July and August together present a few things to discuss. This won’t be too in-depth because the quarterly review is the place for that and it’s just five weeks down the road. Maps are a serious time-sink, so there are fewer this time. I will save most of those for the end of the quarter. If you want to see map conventions and data sources, read this. Since my bookkeeping is in week-long chunks, this ends at the close of Sunday, August 30.

Overall, there is stagnation.

Territory and Casualties:

There was lots of attacking and brutal fighting, but, for the most part, no one is going anywhere faster than a baby can crawl. Russia suffered roughly 10-12% per week higher casualties than they did last quarter, but they really didn’t go anywhere other than a couple of short advances. One or two of these are noted below because they indicate probable future priorities.

While Ukraine is losing manpower at a lower rate than Russia, it is a rate that is not sustainable in the long-term. We will see if the change in leadership (Syrskyi’s gone) alters the picture at all. It’s a battle of who can last the longest before national problems take over the battlefield (economic, political, manpower, industrial, logistical, etc.).

Armor:

The behemoth of the battlefield for the past 80-90 years is dead (in peer-to-peer fighting, at least). Modern large Western tanks are pretty much parked. This trend started several decades ago with modern guided missiles and other precision munitions, but the tankers (not tankies) managed to hang on until now because there hadn’t been a peer war for several decades.

In addition, drones were the final dagger to the heart of the beast. It’s likely that some countermeasures (technical, tactical, training, etc.) will be developed that will provide some measure of protection from drones, but top-attack missiles and laser arty shells and mines AND drones and all the other stuff aimed at tanks? They be dead for anything other than long-range direct fire support. IFVs won’t survive in close combat, either, for other than medium-range direct fire support and fast displacement of a fighting force with some protection from shrapnel and small arms.

Skynet Arrives:

Okay, it’s not really Skynet with a chrome and titanium Arnold Schwarzenegger clumping across the battlefield, but “robots” completely controlled by artificial “intelligence” are here. And they are here to stay.

The AI advance means communication with an operator is no longer necessary, making jamming and other Electronic Warfare (EW) countermeasures obsolete. No little glass threads to follow back to an operator. Soon, there will be automated ground and water transport vehicles carrying attack drones just shy of the LOC (Line of Contact - another dead concept) and releasing them to fly unaided and under their own control to attack their target areas. Not long after, the first autonomous robot-vs-robot battle will be recorded in history books. After that, it becomes a battle of engineers, industrial might, and finance.

Sector Breakdown

Getting into specific areas, I usually discuss the Ukr-Rus border region, Kupyansk, Lyman, Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, Hulyaipole, and (recently added) Kamyanske. We’ll just mention a couple of these, and we are shifting from Kamyanske and Hulyaipole to the important town between, Orikhiv.

• The Border: More minor attacks by Russia. They may be trying to lop off a bit of unimportant ground 50 km NNE of Kupyansk, but since that won’t happen in the next five weeks, we’ll wait for end of quarter to show a map.

• Lyman: Both Quaoar (DKos) and I have covered the Ukrainian attacks to pinch off a loaf of Russians NE of town. The Russians exposed to possible encirclement have apparently gotten the message and are pulling back some from Novoselivka. This helps Lyman. Some say it takes pressure off Sloviansk as well, but I don’t see that. The current threat to Sloviansk is from the E, not so much the N because of the Siverskyi Donets River. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to approach Lyman itself with attacks from the SE and E, as usual. And having not a whole lot of success, also as usual.

• Sloviansk-Kramatorsk: This is EVERYONE’S main concern including mine. Even people in Ukraine’s national press are a bit gloom-and-doom. Russia is inching forward from the E and now controls territory a mere 15 kms from each town with no major natural obstacles between them and the outskirts.

  

  At current rates of advance, that still means several months of fighting. Some are saying there will be fighting in the towns themselves in December. I think it will be spring for anything more than minor infiltrators, assuming no major changes at the national level before then.

• Kostyantynivka: Russia continued its movements outside town up the NE and SW flanks to isolate the town center.

  

  On a side note, as part of this, they are FINALLY attacking the tiny town of Stinky, a place I mentioned over a year ago. I thought they would move downhill from the NE (Chasiv Yar) to get Stinky, but they couldn’t. They instead are approaching from the SE. Kostyantynivka itself is a dead wasteland that no one effectively controls. It is serving its purpose, though, stopping Russia’s movement toward Kramatorsk-Sloviansk.

• Druzhkivka: Just as a breakthrough between Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk led to the eventual fall of Pokrovsk, Russia is again pushing in that same spot.

  

  • Scenario I - If successful, they threaten to move BEHIND Kostyantynivka to attack further N up the road at Druzhkivka. Yes, it’s time to learn a new name. Like Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Kostyantynivka, the much smaller town of Druzhkivka is part of the Fortress Belt. These towns are mainly planned to stand against attacks from the E. This possible threat is from the W. How prepared are the defenses in that direction? I have no idea. This possible threat has been developing for a couple of months and will continue for several more. That is a decent amount of time to improve the situation in the unlikely event this is a major problem.

  • Scenario II - There is also some chance Russia will attempt to bypass Druzhkivka entirely and head straight toward Kramatorsk taking the small town of Serhiivka along the way. This would be a gutsy move on their part, but it would open them to great risk of attack on long, exposed right AND left flanks. However, this would allow them to attack Kramatorsk from the E and W at the same time while cutting off both Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka and most of Kramatorsk’s logistical and artillery support. It would be a bold but likely unsupportable move - and I haven’t see “bold” used for a Russian attack in over a year.

• Pokrovsk: Nothing really interesting here except Russia moved Pokrovsk further into its backfield by advancing 4-5 km N.

• Ivanivka??: Not sure what to call this one since it’s between towns of note or importance and is 50 km wide.

  

  I would love to start calling it Velyka Novosilka, but that place taken two winters ago by the Russians is still about 15 km up ahead. Ukraine continued its pressure along this LONG line freeing some more farming villages. However, it still doesn’t really threaten anything. Forward is good and anything that embarrasses the Russian military like “UKRAINE TAKE TERRITORY!!” in the press is good. But from a strictly military maneuver standpoint, there is not much to say.

• Orikhiv: I bring this one up not because there was lots of movement but because it appears Russia is starting finally to get serious about this town that has stood near the front lines for years. It acted as the base for the 2023 offensive attacks toward Robotyne and has stood long before that, all the way back to the start of the full invasion

  

  Learn the name of this one, also. Russia attacked from the SE and approached town, though they fail to control the ground they covered. However, now, Ukraine doesn’t control it either. There are further threats from the NE as well. Keep an eye on this one.

  ---

Territory:

Overall, in the first 8 weeks (July and August), Russia occupied about 230-235 sq km of ground (see note below) and Ukraine took about 150 for a net Russian gain of 80-85 sq km. In doing so, they suffered 76,970 casualties by Ukraine’s count. That’s about 935 casualties/sq km.

To put that in perspective, that means just over 4 guys lying on the ground just to capture my yard. That’s just mind-boggling. So, things are getting worse for them, not better.

• NOTE: According to my main mapper (Project Owl), a significant chunk (over 120 sq kms) of the so-called “capture” or “securing” of territory by Russia in the past two months happened on ONE DAY in July. Instead of a sudden Russian success, it was likely this was an adjustment by Project Owl to correct for previous progress that was not recorded at the time it happened. Russia gets credit for the advance overall, but much of it likely happened last quarter. Therefore, it is quite possible, perhaps LIKELY, that Russia’s actually at a net negative for these two months.

Here are some comments made yesterday on Quaoar’s daily DKos “Russian Stuff Blowing Up” article (Great work as usual, Quaoar):

What military objective Is accomplished by destroying a retail distributor?

Yes - I was referring to Wildberries. I’m not buying the explanation. Punishing people who have nothing to do with the war is wrong - even if it’s retaliation in kind.

Calling them part of the “military logistics chain” is a stretch. Beyond things like clothing, body armor, and dual-use goods, I am not aware of them providing anything such as weapons.

These comments are spoken by someone who knows nothing of what being a soldier is like.

I will ignore the dozen or so other reasons why Wildberries is a valid military target and concentrate on the one that is easiest to understand.

Most soldiers never fire their weapons at all. They may carry one, but they seldom if ever use ammunition in combat for the weapon they may or may not carry. Most of those who do fire their weapons in combat only do so a very limited amount of the time. The rest of the time, ALL of these soldiers are consuming … “stuff.” And that “stuff” comes from … somewhere. And all of that “stuff” that comes from somewhere supports that army’s ability to kill enemy soldiers and civilians.

In most countries, the national government tries to send almost all of this “stuff” to their soldiers. In Russia, a lot of that “stuff” is coming from Wildberries because the Russian logistics systems is, to use the technical term, FUCKED. For comparison, let’s take a look at the US system as a baseline and look at buying stuff from Amazon, since Wildberries seems to be a similar retailer.

The US military breaks its supplies into 10 categories or “Classes.” What can’t you get from Amazon?

• Class V is ammunition, explosives, bombs, missiles, fuses, pyrotechnics, artillery/ tank shells, mines, etc. You can’t buy Class V from Amazon. I’ll mention drones later, since some might count as ammunition.

• Class VII is major end items. This would include tanks and rifles and trucks and boats and planes. You can’t get most of this “stuff” from Amazon, but some things you can, e.g. two-way radios and metal detectors. Again, I’ll mention drones later.

The other 8 classes of supply or “stuff” are things that are at least somewhat (actually mostly) available at Amazon.

• Class I: Subsistence items, including food, utensils, paper products, bottled water, etc. An army marches (survives) on its stomach. This is almost all available from Amazon.

• Class II: Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool kits, and administrative or housekeeping supplies, etc. Almost all available from Amazon.

• Class III: Petroleum, oils, and lubricants, such as fuels, hydraulic fluids, and greases. You can’t get bulk petroleum (diesel and gasoline) from Amazon, but the rest is mostly there.

• Class IV: Construction and barrier materials, including lumber, cement, sandbags, and fortification components, used for base building and defense. No bulk concrete or wood or rebar, but much of the rest is available from Amazon.

• Class VI: Personal demand items, such as hygiene products and morale items. Everything from soap to a deck of cards. Stop supplying soap and your army’s gonna die. Almost all available from Amazon.

• Class VIII: Medical supplies and materiel, including pharmaceuticals, bandages, medical repair parts. The serious pharmaceuticals aren’t available from Amazon, but the OTC stuff is.

• Class IX: Repair parts and components for maintenance of equipment (excluding medical and major end items). Some will be missing, but a bunch of very useful stuff is available from Amazon. This is absolutely true for the Russian’s since they are using civilian vehicles a WHOLE LOT!

• Class X: Non-military program materiel, such as items for civil affairs, agriculture, or economic development in contingency operations. Much is available from Amazon, but probably not much in demand for Russia right now.

So, that means that much of 8 out of the 10 classes of supply that support an army in the field could be destroyed by bombing an Amazon warehouse. If the US Army’s logistical system was a fucked as the Russian one is. Here are some specific examples listed in approximately the order of their class of supply:

Camping Cookware: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=camping+cookware&i=samedaystore&crid=T0BNRD84UPWA&sprefix=camping+cookware%2Csamedaystore%2C273&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Dried and Emergency Foods: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=emergency+food&i=samedaystore&crid=15934OH32SQ8N&sprefix=emergency+food%2Csamedaystore%2C251&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Combat Boots: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=combat+boots&crid=1QMO9X63K9VW5&sprefix=combat+boots%2Caps%2C270&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Bullet Proof Vests: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=bullet+proof+vests&crid=ZDYPT3DHTNEV&sprefix=bullet+proof+vests%2Caps%2C329&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Military Uniforms: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=military+Uniforms&crid=78C7NUTB7XLA&sprefix=military+uniforms%2Caps%2C238&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Helmets: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=ballistic+helmet&crid=1RO1SQDP6I7M0&sprefix=ballistic+%2Caps%2C287&ref=nb_sb_ss_p13n-expert-pd-ops-ranker_ci_hl-bn-left_1_10

Tactical Backpacks: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=tactical+backpack&crid=2TXMWMCCED9PY&sprefix=tactical+backpack%2Caps%2C199&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Barbed Wire: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=barbed+wire&crid=2KABV1RF665QI&sprefix=barbed+%2Caps%2C240&ref=nb_sb_ss_p13n-expert-pd-ops-ranker_ci_hl-bn-left_1_7

Concertina: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=concertina+wire&crid=MAC9FD6S6J8M&sprefix=concertina+wire%2Caps%2C234&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Plastic Sheeting (It’s nice and healthy to keep yourself and your stuff dry): https://www.amazon.com/s?k=plastic+sheeting&i=samedaystore&crid=QRVASASOC7O5&sprefix=plastic+sheeting%2Csamedaystore%2C231&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

This covers only a few things in Classes I – IV, but it gives you a picture. Socks, underpants, T-shirts, gloves, knit caps, bedding, cooking fuels (e.g. Sterno), knives, axes, shovels, picks, bandages, water filtration, camp showers, toilet paper, fuel/water containers, razors, toothpaste/toothbrushes, maps, books, lighters, wet wipes, camp stoves, chainsaws, flashlights/lanterns/candles, light bulbs, waterproof storage bags, mousetraps/ poison, bug repellent, sewing kits, battery chargers, cell phones, generators/inverters, canteens/water bottles, COFFFFFEEEEE (and the pot to make it and the cup to drink it), tobacco, salt/pepper/spices, aspirin, jock-itch spray, tools, weapons cleaning supplies, foot powder, reading glasses, stationary, pens and pencils, disinfectants, …

Most of the “stuff” that a soldier uses all frickin’ day long every frickin’ day is likely to be found on on Amazon.

And at Wildberries.

Let’s dig a bit deeper into a specific category of what has become the preeminent weapon on the Ukraine battlefield:

DRONES.

Heavy Lift Drone: https://www.amazon.com/Heavy-Lift-Waterproof-Take-Off-Delivery-Quadcopter/dp/B0GV7KGYGG/ref=sr_1_5?dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.lPDaWWyrBJeZdFyfCbIWrSTaQSvb9afzbzZmIk_doWIvkToLNOH0Aq_aiIL56mvdAqyNPX-eEv96I0D_AEtdHNyAyvvq0N6kLJ9uWZTLr9ePwfBpdI8RPF6D_tZY8PowI1931QjQNtigXTFlaJowQSZGbwFKl9xf_k6Q1FzhyC8vUUZKpD8iKtcA-bkvEmPsBlceScjt0xKrbdMicNs96kBE7ecXAzZ9mYZWE_gN6c1dG-ZG4dF0YousRkRZ4BLAu7LZAcl7sSprxVZ7rTu2CLccCCCNrFPb2RKCL-PYgbs.eXOgBAa2WGNhtNpw-L_Q3Rn9M3iZmeDHMUfWaFvfoFk&dib_tag=se&keywords=professional+drone&qid=1784945746&refinements=p_36%3A52000-&rnid=386491011&sr=8-5

Lithium Batteries: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=lithium+batteries&crid=311RATN5VG4ND&sprefix=lithium+batteries%2Caps%2C236&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Thermal Drone IR Gimbel Camera: https://www.amazon.com/ERDIEOCON-Dual-Axis-Triple-Sensor-Electro-Optical-Designator/dp/B0FM2NGZ2Y/ref=sr_1_1?dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.lPDaWWyrBJeZdFyfCbIWrSTaQSvb9afzbzZmIk_doWIvkToLNOH0Aq_aiIL56mvdAqyNPX-eEv96I0D_AEtdHNyAyvvq0N6kLJ9uWZTLr9ePwfBpdI8RPF6D_tZY8PowI1931QjQNtigXTFlaJowQSZGbwFKl9xf_k6Q1FzhyC8vUUZKpD8iKtcA-bkvEmPsBlceScjt0xKrbdMicNs96kBE7ecXAzZ9mYZWE_gN6c1dG-ZG4dF0YousRkRZ4BLAu7LZAcl7sSprxVZ7rTu2CLccCCCNrFPb2RKCL-PYgbs.eXOgBAa2WGNhtNpw-L_Q3Rn9M3iZmeDHMUfWaFvfoFk&dib_tag=se&keywords=professional+drone&qid=1784945746&refinements=p_36%3A52000-&rnid=386491011&sr=8-1

10Km FPV Optical Fiber Cable with Build-In Sky End Optic Fiber Cable Image Data Module Kit, Wired Signal Transmission Optical Receiver Link Ground End Station for FPV Drone Accessories: https://www.amazon.com/Optical-Transmission-Receiver-Station-Accessories/dp/B0FRSFKS7R/ref=sr_1_2?crid=10OLTC0HOLOM&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.nopbM9lWLgeJ_YxwVAnoNUaVvfPw-7y6T6bcSi3UUcCozQxIgoxgx5tpah7uNksJ_eQmVmkmGt1Yg4H1ugCGF59aOiVODOlyck8tgw-P7a48_-VwNYURndsY0IrfiCrMov57fuLUoOAvaw662OFqhH2XQzrjqY7VZ9o8kRi-03Wr4s7KqA7JnimiD9R-xq1YIEjlgszAnJCKHj1Kaelnw3S-lww3MV2PRw7reLW9gPs.gEQsoXPQWRkz10H3ipjRPL9ggHTZwLsjYa3tPpDtZrQ&dib_tag=se&keywords=bare%2Bfiber%2Boptic%2Bcable%2Bdrone&qid=1784948736&sprefix=bare%2Bfiber%2Boptic%2Bcable%2Bconnectors%2Caps%2C245&sr=8-2&th=1

Optical Fiber Connectors: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=bare+fiber+optic+cable+connectors&crid=4YUIL653LIEJ&sprefix=bare+fiber+optic+cable+connector%2Caps%2C237&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

GPS Module - HGLRC M100 Pro GPS QMC5883L Compass, Upgraded 10th Generation Chip Compatible with FPV Fixed-Wing UAV: https://www.amazon.com/HGLRC-M100-Pro-GPS-Generation/dp/B0DPH8FV7K/ref=sr_1_17?crid=11IL75GCBZ0MN&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.YU7N1t1cLq_LgPJQZUQ9bWY-IiOEdzsfVvNirgztkxFwzDAc5sk3oMqURe8oiUVJp8-LqQOcjt6JXYbPeRImljEAFP8BDY1ihJoAPSRUxu0ocCwhZ8a-5YCy8tG0FJ1OVEjwgQ31dyRkZrFU10D7rk8dyAssXiUSSNAatmUQ5u8grOQsD0RXamHzCb5o0Lbh__YossXRTbt5v9rhsopC0dbqdQqu4GJYkVmGfFYyI4E.hGnj4a5PGu4AeI1Fa4lMDLzevypAJjtzdxcP2zbes80&dib_tag=se&keywords=gps+module&qid=1784948965&sprefix=gps+module%2Caps%2C276&sr=8-17

So, you can see with these examples that Wildberries could help supply not only the soldier in the field directly, but also the manufacturer that is making drones that will eventually kill soldiers and civilians.

Here are a few other specific items of interest as well.

Thermal & Digital Day/Night Vision Binoculars with Built-in Laser Range Finder: https://www.amazon.com/AGM-Global-Vision-25-256-Binocular/dp/B0DNT9FCX5/ref=dp_fod_d_sccl_3/134-3812406-2502910?pd_rd_w=aAAqj&content-id=amzn1.sym.7f84da73-eb85-4a58-91da-5292f6af7ef2&pf_rd_p=7f84da73-eb85-4a58-91da-5292f6af7ef2&pf_rd_r=NCGR4E14B70R49HQF80A&pd_rd_wg=DCEEb&pd_rd_r=8e06e73d-b7a2-41f7-aa89-061e124fa3a3&pd_rd_i=B0DNT9FCX5&th=1

Thermal Imaging Rifle Scope: https://www.amazon.com/RIX-RifleScope-1024x768-Detection-Magnification/dp/B0CXT2K434/ref=dp_fod_d_sccl_1/134-3812406-2502910?pd_rd_w=aAAqj&content-id=amzn1.sym.7f84da73-eb85-4a58-91da-5292f6af7ef2&pf_rd_p=7f84da73-eb85-4a58-91da-5292f6af7ef2&pf_rd_r=NCGR4E14B70R49HQF80A&pd_rd_wg=DCEEb&pd_rd_r=8e06e73d-b7a2-41f7-aa89-061e124fa3a3&pd_rd_i=B0CXT2K434&th=1

Metal Detectors: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=metal+detector&crid=2QQFF0TUH77IO&sprefix=metal+detector%2Caps%2C312&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Camo Netting: https://www.amazon.com/s?k=camouflage+netting&crid=NY8BPK422P6O&sprefix=camouflage+netting%2Caps%2C258&ref=nb_sb_noss_1

Since the Russian logistics system is failing badly and the army, its units, and its individual soldiers and their relatives and supporters are helping to prop it up by buying “stuff” and sending it to those units and soldiers so they can continue killing Ukrainians, the channel that is helping those civilian supporters prop up the army system that is failing to supply the soldiers that are killing Ukrainians becomes a de facto military system and is a valid military target.

Finally, it would also help if these commentors bothered to read what the various Conventions on warfare (Geneva, Hague, etc.) have to say about what is an is not a valid target in wartime. It is quite apparent the folks who write these BS comments have not.

Update:

I read CharlesII’s thoughtful response in the DKos comments section of “Russian Stuff Blowing Up” from yesterday and I appreciate the effort he put into it. He and I often agree on issues, but we’re gonna disagree on this one. Addressing some of the specifics of his response:

1. Civilian casualties in these attacks have been amazingly low. So far, Russia lists 9-10 civilian deaths and fewer tham 100 injuries (80ish). So the argument of “500 civilians vs 2 soldiers on a bridge” does not apply. Heck far, that’s less than one night of dropping missiles on Kyiv! No, I’m not making light of civilian deaths. I’m bringing some proportionality and scale to the discussion.

2. Looking at “what proportion of Wildberries business is military vs civilian” makes no sense. You’re looking at it backwards. The way to look at it is its effect on the military, not how many rubles is made from war vs not-war. If Wildberries is supplying, say, 10% of the everyday “stuff” the soldiers need (a number picked out of thin air, so don’t analyze it) and “stuff” to war material manufacturers, I don’t care if that 10% is only 2% (more thin air pulling) of Wildberries’ business. I care that it’s 10% of what the army needs. Furthermore, that 10% represents a greater effect than 10% because in a situation that Russia faces (f’ed logistics), that 10% could take the Russian units from 70% supplied to 63% supplied and that could be the amount that results in going from not very effective to totally non-functional. ARMIES ARE NOT STRAIGHT LINES ON A GRAPH. In many respects, they have “tipping points.” That 10% could be what keeps them going.

Again, all the numbers above (and below, for that matter) in this update are completely for illustration and should not be taken literally.

3. Logistics is cumulative. Before you can reach, say, a 50% degradation, you must pass through 45% degradation. And then, you’re on to 55% as a goal. Wildberries represents a chunk. I have no idea how big a chunk it represents, but it’s bigger than 1% and it seems to be a relatively easy chunk to degrade. Furthermore, as the article says, supplies come in classes. In one class, Wildberries may do almost nothing. In another, they may be, let’s say, a quarter. So that “chunk” may actually represent a HUGE effect. And that effect may not be felt for weeks as amounts on-hand in the chain dwindle.

4. I thank him for actually looking at the law, which few bother to do. From his comment:

International humanitarian rules say “ Rule 8. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an EFFECTIVE contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a DEFINITE military advantage.” [2]. Article 52(2) is part of the Geneva Conventions [3] [emphasis added]

Ukraine judged this to be an EFFECTIVE contribution to military action and I am not willing, at this point, to gainsay that judgement. We have seen a fair amount of evidence that agrees with their choice. I have yet to see any evidence that contradicts it. No one (to my knowledge) has published anything that says “The Wildberries attacks didn’t hurt the Russian military’s logistics tail at all.” If anyone is aware of such evidence or articles, please, by all means, post it in the comments below so I (we) can learn. To me, this seems like a textbook EFFECTIVE contribution to military action.

5. I said in the article that I would ignore the dozen or so other reasons why Wildberries is a valid military target so I could concentrate on the one that is easiest to understand. I did that. That doesn’t mean the other dozen or so reasons don’t exist. They are out there: 1) Increased pressure on the Russia’s economic system, 2) bringing the effects of the war home to the Russian people who seem largely oblivious of the war’s effects, 3) punishing some of Putin’s allies, 4) increased political pressure, 5) disruption of Russian internal supply chains, 6) high international visibility of Russian weakness, 7) sewing internal discontent, 8) increasing civilian chatter against the war, 9) decreased availability of the basics of everyday life, 10) financial knock-on effects (bankruptcies of small businesses, loan defaults, etc.), 11) lots of flaming smoking pictures on the intertubes... There’s a bit of overlap in there, but that’s only what I dreamed up in the three minutes it took to type it. There’s more.

Again, CharlesII is one of the absolute best commenters on Ukraine on DKos. He researches. He provides real, useful information (Thank you for the drone maps). But we’re simply on different sides on this one.

Let’s take a closer look at the Ukraine cheerleading squad on DKos. It’s only a certain minority of posters, not the whole crew. Most of the folks there keep one or both feet firmly on the ground. Quaoar’s work is particularly appreciated.

Why do I call the others the cheerleading squad?

A few days ago, an article was written and posted stating that Ukraine “Clears Kostiantynivka of Russian forces.” It stated that the Skelya Regiment (various spellings) had cleared the town using lessons learned in Pokrovsk. As evidence of this, the article cited essentially two things:

First was the fact that Syrskyi had shown up in town to visit the Regiment and had his picture taken in the obligatory “bending over staring at a map table” pose that appears in all of these articles. The fact that he showed up and waved his magic wand over things PROVES that something was about to happen, right? Right?

Second was that, a few days later, the Regiment claimed to have cleared the town.

At the time, I greeted the news with a combination of happiness (if true) and skepticism (since I felt it likely wasn’t). Here were some of the problems I saw with the “news”:

1. Geolocations (confirmed sightings) of Russian troops inside Kostyantynivka continued with about a dozen in the three days preceding the article.

2. No mapper (NONE!) supported the claim. Indeed, the latest change by one of the most conservative mappers showed a minor Russian advance in the area.

3. Russia has something like 7 Regiments and 2 brigades in the immediate area (mostly Infantry) and that’s just to the south. There are more on the east and west sides of town. The Skelya Regiment is quite large (closer to Division strength), but 13K troops (if completely full strength) realistically can’t clear several thousand individual enemy soldiers and small groups from a town of ballpark 30-35 sq km that was previously home to 60K people.

4. No reputable independent agency was publishing the same glorious news. Were it true, it would be all over the place.

So, what’s going on?

The cheerleading squad like to point to every Russian sighting that they don’t like and call it a “Flag Run” meaning it’s just a couple of poor Russian cannon fodder soldiers ordered to sneak forward and wave a flag somewhere so a drone can film it and the commander can claim FALSELY that this particular spot has been taken. Yes, the Russian do a fair amount of this BS. However, many of the Russian sightings are real.

Seems Ukrainians can do (and have done) this, too:

The Kyiv Independent: 2 Ukrainian soldiers captured by Russian forces after flag-raising operation in Kostiantynivka, Skelia confirms.

Well, to support their clearing claim, Skelya had published video of the flag planting. They have since removed it.

Before anyone starts pointing at the Kyiv Independent as some “Russian source,” know, please, that it is, indeed, an independent news source. It is regarded as being pretty even-handed. Its founding by people who split from the Kyiv Post was supported financially by the Canadian government (not exactly a Russian puppet) and it also received financial assistance from USAID before Elon and crew trashed that organization.

Will we see the cheerleading squad publish a retraction? I don’t think so.

Ukraine is best supported by people relating the bold, honest, as-accurate-as-possible facts about this war. Painting everything rosy red and fluffing their Commander in Chief for his every little move does the country no favors.

Presenting real news in a generally favorable light is one thing. Making shit up is another. For instance, this quarter (so far), Ukraine has liberated more territory than it has lost. The amount and locations of these gains are relatively trivial, but plus 37 sq km is a darn sight better than -300 sq km, which is where Ukraine was at this point in the 3^rd Qtr of last year.

That’s real and that’s good news.

At one point a couple of weeks ago, I ask that one of the cheerleading squad desist from quoting me or using my name in his articles when I could not respond directly on DKos. The difference here with this article is that, whereas I cannot comment on DKos, he is quite free to come here and comment any time he wishes.

UPDATE:

Re: Fluffing the Commander in Chief:

“Our sources report that tomorrow there may be good news, and it’s worth paying special attention to this particular photo,” he wrote.

The photo shows Zelenskyy shaking hands with Drapatyi.

In other words, he (MP Zheleznyak) is hinting that Syrskyi will be replaced by Drapatyi tomorrow.

UPDATE 2:

Sryskyi’s gone and Drapatyi is in. Zelenskiy just announced it on his official Telegram account.

Thank you CharlesII.

But Russia is Russia: they believe “The King offensive is dead! Long live the King offensive!” In other words, they’re on to their next meat wave.

Those who are curious can go back and look at last quarter’s report. I also did short monthly updates for April and May this time around. If you’re new to this, have a look at the Purpose and Method paragraphs in last quarter’s effort. Since neither has really changed and most who are reading this are familiar with them, I shan’t repeat them here except in the following short version.

Purpose:

The ground war took a backseat to other forms of conflict a long time ago. What is happening on the ground used to be well reported on DKos, but no more. Yet some folks are still interested in a more detailed look. That’s what this is. It’s a presentation of who has attacked where and who has captured what. It is not an attempt to pass any sort of judgment. It is simply a listing of efforts and results with some opinionated conclusions at the end. This is the ground war only. It is mostly backward-looking and fact-based. Until the end.

Method:

For this report, I regularly follow two mappers (and check others regularly) and I use one as the baseline for the territorial changes (shaded areas) and the other to illustrate the attacks (arrows). The baseline territorial map is the Ukraine Control Map by Project Owl OSINT (UCM). The attacks map is Russia-Ukraine War by Modern Great Game Watch (R-U War). For complete explanation of the maps (colors, symbols, etc.) and sources, see this previous article.

Short Version: In the maps below, the GREEN line is the extent of Russian control from 29 Dec and the RED line is from 28 Jun. If there is only one color, they overlap and it did not move. The difference is recorded as RED (Russian advance) or BLUE (Ukrainian advance). The BLUish area with the BLUE line is Ukrainian current control. The area between the two lines (Russian RED/GREEN and Ukrainian BLUE) is “grey area” controlled by neither.

I will show much of the front line in segments and discuss from N to S. Areas where nothing important happened I don’t bother showing, but may mention briefly.

Executive Summary:

Russia continued its relentless attacks and continued to fail to make any real, meaningful headway, overall. They have had some local “success,” though I put the word in quotation marks because it is relative only to their lack of progress elsewhere. Is what they are doing going to win them the war? No. When you spend over five months trying to advance toward and take a town that used to be home to only 60K people and you STILL probably have several months to go even though it a) is your main effort, b) involved 10s of thousands of soldiers, and c) has cost you many thousands of lives and probably billions of dollars/ euros, that’s not success. Kostyantynivka will not be held up as an example of excellence in military history books.

Coroner’s Verdict: Hold a mirror under the Russian army’s nose and it will still fog up, but only just a tiny bit.

Alrighty, then. Let’s run through the battlefield from N to S:

Russian Border Including Sumy and Vovchansk:

Well, some Russian commander pushed into Ukraine in one spot to the tune of about 25 sq km. If you see the town names Hrabovske or Riasne mentioned anywhere, that’s what this is about. It’s many kilometers from anywhere important, so it means nothing other than some Russian Colonel (34^th Motor Rifle Bde) will get to pin a medal on his chest.

Ukraine got about the same amount of ground back between two locations, a small amount at Vovchansk and the rest further E on the border due N of Kupyansk. None of this trading of ground in different places means anything, so we’ll leave it at that.

Kupyansk:

Russia still has a few surrounded hold-outs within the center of town and is trying to reproduce the temporary success they had approaching the town before from the N. After punching forward about 4 km on a very narrow front, that try died out.

To the E of town and E of the Oskil River (light BLUE squiggly line), continuing where they left off last quarter, Russia has persisted in its efforts to approach Kupyansk from that side while first taking Kupyansk-Vuslovyi. In that effort, they have moved forward to occupy a 70–75 sq km chunk of real estate, which is pretty sizeable—for a week, but not for three months. They will probably succeed in this effort, eventually (6 months?), but it is taking FOREVER and when they are done … looks to me like they’ll still be on the wrong side of the ri-ver!

Ukraine, for its part, seems to have moved most of its large units to the W side of the river into Kupyansk proper which means hopefully no units get trapped. I believe what is left on the E bank is elements of the 33rd and 43rd Mech Brigades.

A bit further S (not really in the Kupyansk area of operations, but I gotta put it somewhere), Russia managed to punch forward maybe 4 km toward the small town of Boronova on the E bank of the Oskil, but they do not seriously threaten the town, yet, and have not moved further in a few weeks. There used to be a bridge over the Oskil there, but it’s gotta be gone by now.

Lyman:

Mostly good news here, though lately Russia seems to have remembered that Lyman exists after months of relative quiet.

Ukraine pushed Russia away from the edges of the town early and threatens a Russian salient to the N of town. I daydreamed a bit about the possibilities of that salient in this article.

Those two BLUE chunks are about 100 sq km. In the past couple of weeks, though, Russia is again pushing inward with long attacks all the way into town (RED arrows). They appear not to be able to hold those temporary gains.

Sloviansk/Kramatorsk:

The main effort here appears to be the N city of the pair, Sloviansk. Russia moved closer to the city by a few kilometers taking something like 125 sq km. Most of this was in the first half of the quarter in small chunks.

Then not much happened until last week when they moved toward Rai-Oleksandrivka (center). It’s a pretty good-sized forward move. They have a long way to go, though. OPINION: I don’t see this thing (the whole frickin’ war) lasting long enough for them to take these two cities. Their army (and perhaps the Russian state) seems to be falling apart too fast.

Kostyantynivka:

This is perhaps where the Russians have come closest to seeing what might possibly be called “success.” This quarter, they moved to envelop Kostyantynivka on its left and right flanks and to approach in the center by FINALLY breaking the southern central defense based on the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (S edge of map) and the small town of Ivanopillya that had held for many months. The reservoir fell because it was enveloped on its W flank last quarter. That then led to the need for Ukraine to leave Ivanopillya as well.

The RED chunk below is about 80-85 sq km.

The Russians are now attempting to take the town using the same basic infiltration tactics they used in Pokrovsk, sending small groups forward to secure points and following up with more, and more, and more (RED arrows). And in doing so, they are losing more and more. I’ve included four weeks’ worth of Russian geolocates (RED dots) to illustrate what is happening and to contradict the cheerleader crew on DKos who say “It’s just a coupla Russian vatniks with flags, just like what happened in Pokrovsk!”

Umm… Who has Pokrovsk right now? This is significantly more than a few unfortunates waving flags.

Basically, the whole town is one great big grey area with men and drones fighting house-to-house and a small river and large empty flat area where old glass factories were torn down two decades ago splitting it up the middle. The Russians are concentrating first on the SW half of the town.

For more detailed information on Kostyantynivka, please see this article. It may help some folks understand the maps here as well as it addresses the big differences between the ‘attack’ map and the ‘territory’ map.

OPINION: I think it likely that Kostyantynivka will eventually fall, but this will be Russia’s high-water mark. To give you some scale on this from a strategic standpoint, the attack on Bakhmut started about 4 YEARS ago.

Bakhmut is just 24 km away (E).

Pokrovsk:

Russia consolidated its capture of Pokrovsk a bit and attempted to continue the attack up the M04 Highway (NW) by attacking and taking Hryshyne (40-45 sq km). However, that’s as far as they got. Nothing much else has happened in weeks there.

As an interesting tidbit, the little 1 km advance in the SW corner of the map is Russia’s attempt to take the all-important coal coking operation of Sviato-Varvarynska. This is the location that used to produce the high-quality specialized coke used in a lot of Ukraine’s quality steel-making operations. Its loss many months ago when it ceased operation was a big blow. Russia seems to want it, though it is destroyed possibly beyond repair.

Ivanivka:

This is Ukraine’s largest physical success, forcing Russia out of approx. 175 sq km of Donetsk Oblast.

It is a continuation of the effort of last quarter where Ukraine pushed Russia out of other big chunks (about 350 sq km, then) of the same area to the E and W of this newer chunk. It helps secure the largish town of Ivanivka, but is otherwise its mostly farms and farming towns. But that’s about 500 sq km in 5 months. Nice!

It is slightly interesting, though, that they are again within 15 km of Velyka Novasilka, a fortress town I wrote about several times 18-20 months ago during the battle for its control (here, here, and here, plus other mentions in other articles). I wonder….

Nah. Never happen.

Hulyiapole/Orikhiv and Vicinity:

I had a few days of worry on this one since Ukraine lost a big important chunk of land to the W and SW of Hulyaipole right at the beginning of the quarter and it seemed like Ukraine was still reeling a bit from the relatively fast march to and through the town. However, this worry was unfounded as Ukraine dug its heels (and troops) in and stopped the advance dead in its tracks.

The RED chunks total about 130 sq km and some of this has gone back and forth once or twice, but it’s been pretty stable of late. Orikhiv seems to be pretty safe from the E for the time being. Let’s hope it stays that way.

Kamyanske:

A Ukrainian success story here as they forced the Russians S out of Stepnohirsk and back toward Kamyanske and the Konka River.

That river and its low area form an excellent defensive position and anchor for the W end of the line. It would be good if they could regain it. The BLUE is only about 20 sq km, but it’s an important 20 sq km.

Totals:

So where does that leave us overall? Well, looking at total acreage taken in a relatively static situation like this isn’t super-meaningful, but it does allow us to look at the overall trend. In this past quarter, Russia took about 660 sq km and Ukraine took about 515 for a net Russian gain of only about 145 sq km. Those totals (660 and 515) are much higher than the individual numbers listed before in the blurbs about each location because of the back-and-forth action in each area.

Since trends are what we’re interested in, let’s look at the same quarter last year. 2^nd Quarter 2025, Russia’s net gain was about 1,240 sq km or about 8.5 times as much as what they did this year. Doesn’t sound like a very healthy trend for Russia, does it?

To reinforce that message, here’s a chart of the last 10 quarters:

Not great, huh?

So maybe they’re taking a lot fewer casualties to make up for the lower territorial gains. That might be a plausible strategic choice.

Okay, so that ain’t it, either. It’s been holding pretty steady at around or just below the 100K per quarter mark for over a year with even a 14% uptick this past quarter on the average of the previous three quarters.

Now, here’s the two charts combined: casualties per net sq km by quarter.

Now THIS one shows it nicely, don’t it? I think someone’s losing their ass.

And THAT’S the point here! That is the importance of the ground war.

Everything From Here on is OPINION:

If Ukraine can chew up enough Russian men and material and officers and CASH that it forces Putin to make politically unpopular decisions (like a wider mobilization after their coming “election”) while at the same time denying Putin the ability to give the Russian populace and political structure any good military news, that may force a change within the Russian government. Crimea’s growing isolation, Moscow’s gas shortages, and black clouds of burnt oil over the Moscow and St Petersburg skylines are all part of that equation.

I’m not talking about something as simple and basic as “It’s the attrition” in the traditional interpretation of that concept. This is one of a number of military and economic steps that combined may bring about political change.

• The military leaders don’t like being made to look like fools on the battlefield or having their navy sunk and/or pushed around by a country that has no navy or having its planes blown up while sitting still on the flight line.

• The public doesn’t like no gasoline and no internet access and skyrocketing prices and (soon) shortages of basic necessities and lines to withdraw money from the bank.

• The oligarchs don’t like giving money to the government for the war or the threat of a free-fall economy or not being able to sail their yachts.

• The extreme right wingers don’t like losing.

• The mothers (some of them) don’t like losing their sons.

• The other government agencies (federal and local) don’t like having no money in their budgets they can then skim into their pockets.

In short, if you don’t REALLY like bags of onions, you’re starting to get pissed. Why should Ukraine push for a ground offensive in which many soldiers will die when Russia is starting to eat its own?

Crimea isn’t going to “fall.” There is no one there to push it over. Ukraine is still 200 dry km or 80 km and a big river away. The noise they are making around the Kinburn Peninsula isn’t a prelude to an offensive toward Crimea or an attempt to retake S Kherson Oblast. Almost everything a soldier uses every single day will need to arrive … BY BOAT!

Now multiply that by several thousand men.

Is an attack going to come across what used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir? I don’t know, but what I have read about it (can’t get no good satellite photos) indicates it really can’t support a large, sustained military operation so I kind of doubt it. However, I suppose it’s possible particularly at the Kamyanske (eastern) end where there is no river to cross (though I believe there are large lakes still there in the ex-reservoir).

Crimea won’t “fall,” but it can turn into great big Russian clusterfuck of a breakdown in civil and military control. And that ain’t a good look for an infallible dictator, is it? Ultimately, the Kerch Bridge doesn’t seem to matter a whole lot anymore from a strictly military standpoint, but it matters as a symbol of Putin and his “invincibility” and it would be a huge embarrassment to him personally and politically should it happen to fall into the sea. Better that this happen before the civilians leave so they continue to be a drain on the resources there and continue to bitch and moan about it on the internet. Politics works best if it’s advertised.

I believe that bridge’s days are numbered and I think that number probably only has two digits in it.

Map Production Software:

I produce maps using Google Earth Pro (GE) by importing data or manually adding/drawing elements into that GE mapping foundation.

Info Source - Mappers:

Mappers are the folks around the internet that track what’s happening in Ukraine. These map sources range from one person to organizations of hundreds spread across the globe. They each have their own methodologies and philosophies and sometimes arrive at different conclusions. These differences are usually minor, but occasionally, they are not. None is ever 100% correct. Watching multiple sources is therefore advisable.

I have a main mapper, a secondary one, and five others that I look at regularly to double check things especially if there are material differences in my main two.

Main Mapper:

I follow the Ukraine Control Map by “Project Owl” (here referred to as “PO”) daily as my primary source. I do this for a number of reasons. First, I can directly import their work onto my GE allowing me to show whatever I want for any particular article. They show approx. lines for each side which leaves the “grey area” (term for “contested land,” not an actual color on the map) in between. They show approx. unit locations for each side. They track what progress each side is making. If you want to learn more about them, follow the link.

Basically, they have a worldwide network of people, many of whom are very familiar with specific areas of Ukraine and/or Russia, who geolocate photos and videos of events. Those locations (RED and BLUE dots) are shown in their work as well links to the source material (original photos and video). It’s a lot of data and provides a lot of clues as to what is happening if you are used to watching those data.

However, perhaps more importantly (to me, at least), I find that PO is usually one of the most conservative mappers out there. In addition to watching the reports from the field, they rely a lot on their geolocated Russian and Ukrainian sightings plus confirmed reports on the situation. As a result, things usually aren’t jumping back and forth based on inflated, biased reporting and rumors. If they say something has moved, I will usually watch it for a day or two to make sure it stays put in its new location. Then I can count on that being pretty accurate. This method has led me wrong only once that I can recall (Robotyne) and I paid for that with an apology and retraction. As it turned out, what they reported had happened there actually DID happen, but it happened a couple of weeks later.

PO usually updates several times a day. There’s an example of their work below after the color key.

Secondary Mapper:

The second source I count on is “Russo-Ukrainian War” (hereafter referred to as “R-U War”) by Modern Great Game Watch. This map, too, can be imported directly into Google Earth. I watch this one because it tends to be a bit more aggressive in its willingness to move lines around. I use them to see what may have jumped in the past day, what to keep an eye on, and what may be a developing story.

They also provide the little arrows that show what attacks are happening where and by whom. They have these arrows displayed all the way back to the start of the full invasion four years ago. This can give a “flow” to the war over time. To judge the current situation, turning off the old arrows is easily done showing what is happening now. This makes things simpler, more illustrative, and easier to understand.

R-U War usually updates about once a day, though they sometime do more or less based on how active things are. There’s also an example of their work below after the color key.

Back-Up Mappers:

When these two sources with their greatly differing philosophies agree on what is happening, I’m pretty confident in the result. When they disagree, I dig deeper by checking one or more of the following sources:

• Institute for the Study of War (ISW): Not downloadable. A respected, well-written, and widely followed source for maps, reports, and analysis of the war.

• Deep State Map: Not downloadable, but also a widely followed and respected source.

• Ukraine 8: Downloadable to Google Earth, but I rarely do that. Lots of individual events are reported regularly.

• Live UA Map: Not downloadable, but they also have lots of individual events reported regularly.

• The War In Ukraine: Not downloadable, but a nice additional check of all the rest.

In addition to using them to settle differences of opinion, I check each about once a week to see if they have anything different to report.

The Weakness of ALL Mappers:

It is important to remember that NO mappers are reporting in real-time. When we see on a map that Ukraine surges forward to take 30 sq kms, did that happen yesterday? Is it the combined effort of seven days of fightng? Did a Russian unit surge forward a few days ago to take that territory and simply fail to hold it? A big square turning BLUE or RED does not necessarily mean some huge overnight movement.

I occasionally see a dozen or more small adjustments in both directions a mapper has made along an entire line of, say, 200 kms. Does that mean that yesterday Ukraine and Russia conducted dozens of attacks in this one sector? NO. It means the mapper has gone along that line and closely examined the evidence and made a dozen small adjustments to its analysis of who is where and how much control each side has. Project Owl and others reexamine areas periodically to try to keep things as accurate as possible over time.

Map Key:

Enough about the mappers. Here is a key to the map colors and symbols. I cannot guarantee that I will stick to this key 100% for every situation for the indefinite future. There are a lot of colors on a map and having ones that are vibrant enough to stand out, yet different enough to show different things can be a problem. I cannot foresee right now everything I will ever want to show. This is, therefore, my color convention. If I make a change for a specific map, I will point out that difference in the accompanying write-up.

Note on Military Units (Square Symbols): As mentioned above, the RED and BLUE square locations are approx. Russian and Ukrainian unit locations. All squares are not equal. One may be a brigade (Bde), the next may be a battalion (Bn) and the next may be a detachment of some sort. A Chemical Defense Detachment does not equal a Tank Brigade. They are intended to show overall concentrations which is an indicator of priorities. 40 squares means the relevant side probably gives that area a higher priority than one with only 5 squares. Also, if doing a more in-depth investigation of a situation or area, it is possible to dig-in to individual units to see who they are and where they have been.

Examples:

This example map shows what Project Owl information looks like. The key above explains each item.

This example map shows what Russo-Ukrainian War information looks like for the same area. The smooth, curvy (not angular) WHITE line is their estimate of where the two forces face each other. They do no show Ukrainian and Russian forces with grey area between. Just a single line of contact. This provides less information, but is, as I said, a more aggressive picture of the action.

And combined, you see how the two views fit together.

Other Information Sources:

Russian Casualties: The best source I have found for casualties (and LOTS of other stuff) is Dashboard on Russia’s war against Ukraine. That link is specifically to their Russian Casualties page, but there is just SO MUCH OTHER STUFF there to look at you could go blind with all the war-porn. Charts and graphs and pie charts and … It’s enough to since a data-guy into orbit. I won’t bother linking to all the other stuff. The curious will poke around for themselves.

Ukrainian Casualties: There are few sources of information about Ukrainian casualties (wich is a good thing). Mostly it’s individual articles about specific events. Example: Zelenskyy recently gave an interview where he said Ukraine had suffered 55K military deaths since the invasion. That’s REALLY low. Was this real or did this not include those likely to be dead among the “missing?” At the time, a source for that number is lists it at 75K. That’s 130K possible dead, if we are to believe those numbers. I’m not intending to dive into this at this time (likely later article, though). This is just to illustrate that data sources for Ukrainian casualties are unreliable and open to wide interpretation.

Equipment Losses: The Dashboard listed above for casualties has a dozen or more pages examining equipment losses from a variety of sources including Oryx and Ukrainian staff reports. It’s easy also to dive directly into those sources, though most won’t want to bother.

Territorial Gains and Losses: These data are a combination of Project Owl and my own internal recordkeeping. Each week (running Sunday to Sunday), I draw each side’s gains and losses from PO in RED and BLUE and store those shapes in Goggle Earth. I also enter their size in sq kms into an Excel spreadsheet which then gets totalled by week and by quarter. It’s easy then to produce the charts that show trends. I have these data running back to the beginning of 2024 and a lesser amount for three months before that. It is also posssible to produce maps going back that far and animations of territorial advances over time. Lotta work to do one of those, though.

Weapons Capabilities, Descriptions, Strengths/Weaknesses, Specifications, etc.: This is a combination of personal experience and knowledge, online resources (confirmed through research), and a dash of Wiki and Google (also independently confirmed), etc. It’s about doing the research and knowing how various systems basically work (or don’t) combined with some experience and some engineering background.

Military History: Just reread the above about weapons specs because it’s similar.

Other Google Earth KML Importable Map Information: There are sources for almost anything you might want to show on a map. All Ukrainian and Russian rail lines? There are maps for that. Ukrainian and Russian airstrips? There’s a map for that. Fortifications? Nuclear weapons storage sites? Yup. It’s out there. Some of these maps are easy to work with. Some are not. For example, the rail line maps are so large, they will kill your work if you try to keep them current in Google Earth. You have to import them, do your analysis, print you results, then erase them before closing down.

There are also sources that are not GE KML importable. Airplane and ship movement? Fires?

If anyone needs a source for something, contact me through BlueSky and I will gladly share anything I have.

Use of AI:

Only one of the words in the phrase “Artificial Intelligence” is accurate. I may rely on “AI” to point me in a direction or find me sources when doing research, but I never rely on it to perform analysis or draw conclusions. BECAUSE IT’S NOT INTELLIGENT. It’s just an algorithm. It’s okay for starting research, but ignore it for everything else.

And nothing you ever read here will have been written using AI.

Quarterly Update Introduction, Purpose, and Method:

To shorten those reports and to keep from boring regular readers who have seen this stuff before, this more thoroughly explains the Purpose and Methodology of those reports.

Purpose:

With the to-and-fro of the war, it is easy to lose sight of the overall progress of battle on the ground itself and to lose a sense of scale. This field changes hands and that patch of woods gets taken and, … what does it mean? How good or bad is it?

There are many ways to measure what is happening: equipment losses, casualties, major events, economic indicators, this airplane arrives, that radar gets hit, counting artillery pieces (is it a mortar or artillery?), drone hits, … All of these are discussed in detail elsewhere. The data on these are often unreliable and the analyses are often shaded by opinion and bias, so who you wish to believe is your choice.

Common “wisdom” is that Russia has been on the verge of collapse (any week, now!!!) for several years. I remember reading about their imminent demise in Nov and Dec 2022. Meanwhile, reporting of the back-and-forth ACTUALLY ON THE GROUND ITSELF is uneven and incomplete possibly because the ground war is, with some notable exceptions, so slow it’s pretty boring. And most people don’t understand it.

This is a presentation of who has attacked where and who has captured what. It is not an attempt to pass any sort of judgement. It is simply a listing of efforts and results. Anything that is OPINION or THEORY here is pretty obvious and often presented with a heavy dose of snark. (Who, me???) I try to separate OPINION and THEORY from fact if there is any doubt. Occasionally, I might fail at that.

Before someone says, “What about xxxxxxxx that is happening?” This intentionally ignores the fairly successful Ukrainian long-range attacks going on and many one-off factors that are amply covered elsewhere, e.g. Black Sea, Crimea, oil facilities, glide bombs, dirigibles, amphibious assaults, Putin’s “cancer,” the continuously “about to implode” Russian army morale, the “they’re almost out of men!” chants, game changing magical weapons systems that will arrive next week, etc.

This is the ground war only. It is mostly backward looking and fact based.

Discussions of casualty rates and a 2+ year “trends” (casualties and territory) will follow in other articles (I promise!).

Method:

As with equipment and casualties, there are various sources for what happens on the ground, e.g. the mappers. I have listed and discussed several in an earlier article. For this effort (Quarterly Report), I regularly follow two mappers (and check a few more regularly) and I use one as the baseline for the territorial changes (shaded areas) and the other to illustrate the attacks (arrows). That baseline territorial map is the Ukraine Control Map by Project Owl OSINT (UCM). The attacks map is Russia-Ukraine War by Modern Great Game Watch (R-U War).

Daily, I download these maps and other updates to GoogleEarth. My process aggregates weekly (Mon-Sun), so midnight (ish) on 28 Dec is the start of the quarter and 29 Mar is the end. Over the course of the last three months (actually, more like 30 frickin’ months), each day, I compared that day’s front line with the previous day’s noting and shading in any movements. For complete explanation of the maps (colors, symbols, etc.), see that previous article I mentioned. Short version: In the map photos below, the GREEN front line is 28 Dec and the RED front line is 29 Mar. If there is only one color, they overlap and it did not move. The difference is recorded as RED (Russian advance) or BLUE (Ukrainian advance). I will show the front line in segments and discuss from N to S.

Areas where nothing really happened I don’t bother showing, but mention briefly, e.g. Sumy and Vovchansk, which are both are merely distractions. There are also minor isolated movements that I won’t show or mention since they amount to almost nothing and may even represent adjustments by the mappers rather than actual movement. They are included in the totals presented, though.

22 Trucks

Munition Plant in Volgograd Hit by Flamingos:

While it is excellent news that this facility has been hit, there is a bit of a grain of salt to keep in mind and also some good news that is slightly ignored:

1. This strike apparently had three successful hits. However, this facility is about 1-1/3 sq kms (half sq mile) (…-ish). While taking out at least one key building and, better yet, key MACHINERY!! (hopefully that is what was hit, but … ???) would have an effect here, it’s still a very a big place. I have the impression from the comments that lots of folks are thinking DESTROYED!!! DONE AND DUSTED!!! NEXT!!! We won’t know for probably weeks (if ever) the true effect this strike has had.

2. The good news that seems to be flying under the radar slightly is that it seems that 5 missiles were fired and 3 hit the target. Given that Flamingo’s successful hit rate has been on the order of 10-20% thus far, this may represent a vast improvement. If an upgrade to the guidance/ avoidance systems signals continued future higher hit rates, we may start to see Flamingo’s involvement more in the future. Kyiv Post’s own headline about the attack is “Ukraine’s Flagship Flamingo Missiles Perform Solidly in Combat for First Time Ever,” so good news.

When Flamingo first was announced, I expressed some unease with the stated specs on the bird (3K km range, fairly small CEP, ability to manufacture at high rates like 3/day, etc.). I caught all sorts of shit for this on DKos including having had my statement’s lied about repeatedly by one individual as well. I did not even hint that I thought the missile was “vaporware.” It’s real. It’s simply a work-in-progress.

Since it’s now apparently being announced that a company is looking at “extending the range to 3K kms,” and that the longest strike to this point I can find is in the neighborhood of 1,600 kms (I’ll be generous and say 1,800), I think maybe this unease was justified since 1,800 is somewhat less than 3,000 and extending the range to 3,000 means it is somewhat less than that now.

Since we’ve only seen a few dozen of these used since the announcement about 10 months ago that these would be manufactured quickly at relatively high quantities (3/day), perhaps that number was a bit over-the-top as well. The most optimistic number I can find for the number of times this tool has been used is 23. Assuming, say, 3-5 missiles per use, that’s ballpark 100. Probably closer to 70-80, though. If they are working out some bugs, holding back on production rates makes perfect sense. If they can make these at 1K per year (3/day), that’s a BIG number particularly if these starting hitting things 60% of the time.

I congratulate and celebrate Ukraine’s apparent success in developing this tool, but suggest that news that seems too good to be true when first announced is often too good to be true. As with other complex systems, this one is taking time to finish development.

Strike on the Rail Bridge at Sabivka:

This is a double span bridge, so there are, of course, two separate bridges. One is completely down. The second is not. HOWEVER!!! Looking at this photo of the remaining span, that spot (red circle) is a dinged compression member.

Since it is a supporting main member designed to be under compression rather than tension, any weight put on this span will cause this particular member to buckle and the whole span would then come down. Conversely, a tension member put under a load that is dinged in this fashion would have a tendency to straighten out rather than buckle when put under a load. This member will absolutely need to be replaced before they can even think about using this span, but this can often be done.

Please note that I know this ignores the apparent damage to the concrete decking of the bridge that is visible. Since I don’t know the structure of the underside of the bridge and do not know the extent of the damage (it may be cosmetic or “weather/ corrosion protection,”) I cannot comment on this additional damage that may also prove fatal to this span. The weird angle may be optical due to the photo’s angle/lens.

S Koreans Vulcan Drone Defense Demo:

A few notes. Not useless AT ALL. While this display is less impressive than it was likely intended to be, it still represents a useful test with results that can be acted upon.

1. As was pointed out in comments, this trailer mounted thingie is 1960-70 technology. I fired one. Greatest single second of my life. This gun is still being installed on US Navy ships as missile protection, so I’m sure there are better versions available.

2. This is firing a 20mm projectile, which is big-time overkill. A 7.62mm mini-gun round would accomplish the same result at a lower cost and with greater barrel aiming response time (though shorter range) than the big 20mm version. Easier to transport, lower recoil (easier to mount on things), less ammo to supply, faster set-up, etc.

3. This was 8 guns firing what looked like a 1 second burst (you can set it for that). That’s 800 rounds of ammunition. It’s probably 1 in 5 tracer ammo meaning for every round you could see, there were 4 more flying through the air you can’t see.

4. If they stick with larger rounds, I’m sure they can develop (are developing or have developed) rounds that go up a certain distance and fragment creating a cloud the drones must fly through. A fire control system tracking the inbound drone speed and direction knows the time of flight and fragment range of the outbound round and should be able to place that cloud approximately where the drones will be. Let’s assume an average 10 fragments of that round. That 800 projectiles becomes about 8,000. Or maybe you use 4 guns instead of 8 layered (3 and 1) so the last gun engages drones the first layer of guns missed. Then you put a more expensive system behind that to chase single drones that slip through. This becomes doable.

5. There are many thousands of these guns and they are still manufactured 70 years after they first appeared. Supply is not a problem.

As cminus says, it’s a test and a useful one at that. You don’t build a finished system and then test it. You check along the way to see what’s working and what isn’t.

Omsk Refinery:

Not sure where people are getting their distance numbers. This refinery is about 2,500 kms from the Ukraine border. If the numbers on Flamingo’s specs are correct as published, back off 100 kms from the border for launch safety and, theoretically, you have 400 kms for in-flight maneuver. Knock 100 off ‘cause you have to go around Kazakhstan near the end. 300 ain’t much, but if you wanna make a statement hit, you take a chance. Throw 10 out there and hope that 2 make it through. If the missile has the range advertised. And it has an improved hit-rate.

Wear of Military Field Uniforms in Public:

“Military uniforms override most dress codes.” I agree with the sentiment that this should be the case. However, in the ‘80s in Columbus, GA (Ft Benning), we were not allowed to stop when driving home when we hit civiliansville. We couldn’t even go through a Burger King drive-through in the field uniforms we wore for IOBC/IOAC classes. In Alaska, I had to have and carry a letter signed by the Division Commander (2 star) to wear my BDUs to the international airport to fly out to train with the AK national guard units, which I did almost every week during winter.

Shorties:

1. Is Russian Z-Blogger Golman related to DKos’s own Slideman???

2. George Clooney can frickin’ well bite me.

3. I would be interested to hear where Mabon heard that 70% of Russian casualties are KIAs. Serious question. I don’t believe it. Also, if it is true even now, this likely applies only to the last few months, so not the full 1.4M.

4. “Our neighbor says that only mothers should be allowed to declare war...” Gender is not the problem. Power is. Throughout history, women national leaders have declared many wars, e.g. Catherine the Great, Margaret Thatcher, Empress Dowager Cixi of China, Indira Gandhi, …

That was fun. I think I’ll try to do more for yesterday’s and today’s posts. Also, I’m working on the 2nd Quarterly Ground War Summary, but have been delayed.

1. You may recall that I reported last month that it seemed at the beginning of Apr that Russia was relearning how to conduct operations without Starlink and that they once more started to make some headway. Then, toward the very end of Apr, those effort faltered. Well, the good news is that this trend continued. Russia still is not succeeding in its attacks. They really does seem to be in a world o’ hurt with only one location perhaps moving forward (or perhaps not, depending who you believe).

2. In our list of six places Russia was pushing for many months (Kupyansk, Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (S-K), Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole), Russia is stalled pretty much everywhere except POSSIBLY Kostyantynivka. This month, again, Ukrainian gave minor ground, but nothing very important except maybe in that area. More on Kostyantynivka below.

3. Again, like last month, Russia is pushing in seemingly unimportant locations along the Ukraine-Russian border, but in fewer places and with less success than before. It’s still just a distraction.

4. Ukraine’s main effort is still on wrecking Russia’s economy and military capability through long range drone attacks while conserving the ground force.

5. In a non-ground war related item, there is an apparent increase in rumblings of dissatisfaction within Russia with the government (Putin), the military, and the war. However, contrary to many, I’m not ready to “stick a fork in” Putin just yet. I’ll believe it when I see it. It is quite possible that this is the ACTUAL objective of Ukraine’s long-range attack strategy. Great big billowing black clouds of burning oil, no internet, and long petrol lines don’t make people happy. In this way, the long-range attacks and lack of reports of success on the battlefield work together to accomplish a political effect.

Main Areas:

For maps and background on these short notes below, see the end of quarter report:

Kupyansk: Unlike last month, Russia had no success moving toward Kupyansk on the E side of the Oskil River. However, in late news (just last week) they did manage once more to strike toward the center of town from the N in a repeat of what they tried to do several months ago before being thrown back by the Ukrainians. There seem to be some Russian “hangers-on” still holding out in a few buildings in the center of town even after months of near isolation. That attack from the N is still 1-2 kms away from linking up with these hold-outs. As before, much of the town is not under the effective control of anyone.

Lyman: Not much to report except the remote possibility of what I reported before in this article/daydream. I won’t repeat the article here except to say that there is maybe just possibly an opportunity for Ukraine effectively to cut off a few Russian units.

S-K: Russia’s efforts to push here amounted to pretty much nothing. In Apr, they took 90-100 sq kms. In May, they netted, what, 6 sq kms??? Really?

Kostyantynivka: I put out an article on this one a few days ago. Since then, Russia has continued the types of attacks I spoke of in that article. As an update to that article, the conservative Project Owl Ukraine Control Map now shows Russia right up to the edge of the urban area in both the SW and NE sections of town capturing something like 55-60 sq kms of ground mainly S and E of town during May.

For map conventions and explanations, see this article.

If they continue with this, they will have the town surrounded on three sides. It isn’t going very quickly, though, and they still have to slog it out house-to-house in the middle of town. Expect this to go on for a while with multiple claims of victory and flag plantings along the way.

Pokrovsk: Early in the month, Russia did manage to secure its position in Hryshyne NW of Pokrovsk, but the attack hasn’t moved in a couple of weeks since then. This attack may be done since they accomplished what they wanted with the capture of Pokrovsk and consolidation of that area. There really ain’t much else out there to go after. It wouldn’t surprise me if some of those Russian forces have been moved over towards Kostyantynivka a mere 40 kms E explaining why that operation (see above) seems to continue with some minor success. This is a guess on my part without any evidence to back it up.

Hulyaipole: As with Kostyanynivka, there is disagreement on the positions of the opposing forces here. Russia had some very minor success, but the more aggressive mappers have much deeper attacks westward toward Orikhiv. Undoubtedly, it has to do with the phenomenon I discuss in the Kostyantynivka article linked above. The Russian attacks probably took place in small numbers, but failed to “control” the territory around and behind the attacking forces. Now, forces are intermingled and neither side is in control of the ground. Russia is trying to be aggressive here driving toward Orikhiv, but, for the most part, they are failing.

Ukrainian Attacks and Regains Territory:

In addition to the Lyman attacks already mentioned, Ukraine has pushed forward in two spots.

1. The first is in the W right next to the Kakhovka ex-Reservoir in the area of Stepnohirsk/Kamyanske. While this only freed up something like 8-10 sq kms, it is much more important ground than your average farmland. If they can clear Kamyansk (still a ways to go on that goal), the town/river is an important anchor to the W end of the line. It is also important politically as this would reverse one of Russia’s only recent successes. It would not be a good look for the Russian commanders at all.

2. About halfway between Hulyiapole and Pokrovsk, Ukraine attacked and pushed Russia out of about 100 sq kms of mostly farmland and a few small villages. This is not operationally important land, but, again, to have it reported that Ukraine advanced about 10 kms ANYWHERE is not good for Putin.

Russian Casualties:

Although Russia has once more slowed to a crawl forward everywhere but Kostyantynivka, their casualty figures continue to be high. However, unlike some of the comments on DKos, they still have a LONG way to go before they hit anything close to the 50K mark that has been set as a goal.

This is 14 months (2^nd Qtr 2025-2^nd Qtr 2026 (so far)) of casualties data as reported by Ukrainian General Staff. The chart takes each week’s number and converts it to what that would be if it continued for a month. Early this year, they were averaging the rate of about 32,000/month. Then Starlink turned off and they slowed their serious attack rate while they tried to sort out their commo problems. You can see that casualties dipped for 6-7 weeks to somewhere around 27,500-28,000. Then they started to pick up their attack rate again and casualties increased back up to that previous rate plus a smidgen more (32,500).

While they are not suffering the wished for 50K/month rate, the GOOD NEWS is that they are expending all of these people resources and not getting much return for that investment. Before, they were killing their own people and taking some ground. Now, they are killing their own people and taking very little ground.

In the 1^st Qtr prior to Starlink shutdown, they averaged about 13 sq kms per day. In May, they average 1/10^th that amount. And it’s headed in the wrong direction. In the last two weeks of the month, they LOST ground.

I’m not quite ready to say the Russian army is done, yet.

But I’m real close.

Let’s see what happens at Kostyantynivka, first.

Before we get too far into the tactical situation, however, let’s have a look at the structure of the town itself. This is immediate pre-full invasion and (obviously) a lot has changed since then.

BACKGROUND and TERRAIN:

Kostyantynivka is was an industrialized town. It was a center of the glass industry with several large factories producing various glass products. This industry was concentrated in the center of town along both sides of the Kryvyi Torets River which bisects the town from NW to SE. This river varies from quite small (large stream) to a notable obstacle in different parts of town.

Several decades ago, the glass industry started to shrink and the factories started to close as the population of the town dropped. Population fell 43% from 1975 to 2015 or from about 120K to 65K over that time. I sizable chunk of what remained was a large excess of women over 50.

With 25-30 people leaving town every week for 40 years, there were already a lot of empty houses and apartment buildings at the beginning of this war. Several very large empty factories in the central industrial area were razed in the early 2000s leaving a river with large flat empty space on both sides for much of the very center of town. Thus, there are two very distinct parts of town: the NE (larger central business and residential) and the SW (smaller and mostly residential).

Each YELLOW diamond is a flattened ex-factory/brownfield. For other map conventions, please have a look at this article.

Russia is concentrating its efforts on the mostly residential SW part of town first.

So, what’s the situation. Then? That’s where it gets difficult.

The mappers and open-source folks vary pretty widely on who is where and who controls what. This is partly to do with each source having different definitions of “control” and “attack” and “contested” and such. It also has to do with each mapper using different sources themselves and weighing each source differently.

Probably the main thing, though, is that the nature of the modern battlefield in Ukraine has changed and, often, the two forces no longer face each other with manned units fighting for bits of ground a la Cemetery Ridge or Passchendaele. Instead, as has been pointed out elsewhere, the “grey area” between forces has expanded with little flying thingies flitting about scoping out what is on the ground and, sometime, crashing into whatever they find and killing it. Some folks would use the incorrect term “fog of war” (See note below) to describe this and say that drones have increased this phenomenon. They’re right about the second part of that sentence.

Since we don’t know with any certainty where the forces are, I will present, instead, several versions of what seems to be the situation since this “amalgam” of sources itself paints a picture.

THE CONSERVATIVE VIEW:

Project Owl has the following as its latest map update.

As you can see in this version, Russia (RED south) is approaching the SW section, but has yet to make any real headway there. You can also see, however, that Ukraine (BLUE north) no longer controls most of this section either. Most of the section is shown as “grey area” contested by both sides. You can also see from all the RED and BLUE dots (geolocations of Rus and Ukr forces for the past 10 days) that this area is, indeed, contested with forces intermingled. What you don’t see with this version is deep, forceful penetrations by Russian troops. Are these geolocated Russians infiltrators or whole units? Hard to say.

AGGRESSIVE VERSION:

For this, we are looking at “Russo-Ukraine War” and “Ukraine 8,” two different mappers who largely agree with each other and both shown on this map.

The RED line is Russo-Ukraine War’s “front line.” The YELLOW and pale RED is Ukraine 8. Are they copying each other’s maps? Couldn’t tell ya. At least Ukr 8 has much of it as contested (YELLOW).

One thing of note is that these both show to some extent Ukraine still in control of a section of the lake S of town (the Kleban-Byk Reservoir) that formed a big part of the town’s defense for months. That big RED loop at the bottom of the page is R-U War saying Ukraine is still there. The YELLOW there is Ukr 8 saying it’s contested. Project Owl has this area under Russian control. If there are Ukrainian forces still along that lake’s bank, they need to get the hell outta there as they are in a world of hurt. I sincerely doubt that area is occupied by the Ukrainians, still. If it is, it is yet another example of “stayed too long.”

The RED arrows you see above in town are what “Ukraine 8” represents as recent attacks by the Russians. “Russo-Ukraine War” has RED arrows showing attacks, too, but I didn’t show them since they agree so closely they would almost be on top of the other ones.

This version of “reality” shows deep penetrations of the SW section of Kostyantynivka by Russian forces with Ukrainian forces moving NW to the edges of town.

There are four other mappers I checked in preparation for this story and they, too, show general disagreement. I can’t download these others to Google Earth to show here, so you’ll have to take my word for it.

I believe the truth lies somewhere in between. Russia is attacking into this section of town with some infiltrators (a couple o’ guys) and some concerted unit attacks (more guys). These forces probably have some success initially as Ukraine conserves its manpower by not facing these attacks head-on with live personnel. The Russians penetrate a certain distant and set up shop wherever they run out of steam or meet significant resistance. These forward points become “anchors” that they then try to fill in behind.

Ukraine responds with a combination of drone clouds and limited live counterattacks sometimes clearing the enemy out and sometime moving behind them to cut them off. As a result, there is likely a mix of troops throughout this quite large area with individual structures “controlled” by different forces and “control” of those structures shifting back-and-forth over the course of hours and days. There are, apparently, cases of one force holding a top floor and the other force holding the basement of a single building.

In other words, both sets of maps may be generally correct and also generally incorrect. The attacks happened. The penetrations happened. However, the ground around each force became contested and, thus, it is accurate also to say that the whole thing is a jumbled, contested grey area with no one truly “in control.” The conservative map does not illustrate the importance of the penetration attacks and the aggressive version gives those attacks too much weight.

And “control” has become, to some extent, illusory.

If this is so, it becomes a “center of mass” exercise. Which force can slowly increase the amount of control it has in the contested area? Can Russia inch (centimeter?) its way forward house-by-house behind that forward edge penetrating force/”anchor”? Can Ukraine continue to choke off that penetrating force? That is the important battle and it is a battle that we likely will not be able to follow in any detail.

As this is going on in the SW part of town, Russia is making moves in the NE to isolate that larger more central business and residential area moving up the higher ground along its NE edge in preparation for what will likely be similar tactics up there.

I see this whole thing lasting at least a couple more months. Kostyantynivka is serving its purpose.

Note:

The concept of “Fog of War” was originally intended (by Carl von Clausewitz in his 1832 treatise “On War”) not to describe our inability as OUTSIDERS to know the situation on the ground while watching from our sofas. It describes the participants’ inability as INSIDERS to know the situation, how that lack of knowledge affects decisions made by participants, and the effects those decisions (good or bad) have on the course of the battle.

Modern war creates a paradox of us BELIEVING we know what is happening because we see a video of it. Yet, in reality, we know LESS than we used to.

The only one with possibilities, I thought, was this one. Very limited possibilities, I said at the time.

Mapper - Russo-Ukrainian War (Modern Great Game) – Aggressive: This mapper shows a different layout of the lines and has the Russians MUCH more exposed.

A 10 km attack heading SE towards the lakes (light BLUE squiggly line) accompanied by a 2 kms advance W out of Lyman and covering a couple of gaps in the Terny area with a cloud of drones that kill anything that moves could theoretically put several Russian regiments in a world o’ hurt. However, this would be next to impossible to pull off since the attacking force would need to move into position undetected up a long narrow gap and attack with its back to the Oskil River.

Finally, I have no way of knowing if those artificially created lakes are still there. The earthen dams and berms could be (and probably are) damaged. However, the ground is likely difficult to cross regardless, even if most of the standing water is gone.

This one has SOME possibilities, but there is no concealing the Ukrainian force as it moves N along the E side of the Oskil River in preparation for the attack and it would be ripe for bombardment, so probably not a good idea.

And this is what has shown up on the maps in the past couple of days. In this updated version of the map, the LIGHT BLUE irregular shapped blocks show Ukrainian advances since mid-April. The LIGHT BLUE arrows were what I put in that previous article in mid-April.

They appear to be attacking from Lyman in the S toward the water obstacle (LIGHT BLUE squiggly line) and from the N toward the northern end of that same obstacle.

Could this be Ukraine trying to “encircle” about 4-5 Russian Motorized Rifle Regiments (or whatever is left of them)? They won’t actually be encircled, but, if so, this could make life quite difficult for them.

As a side note, I will mention that I saw somewhere (that I can no longer find) these Regiments referred to as ones that are no longer following orders or no longer fighting or something like that. Don’t quote me on this last bit because it was just a passing note.

I’ll do a quick look at May at the end of next week. Short version, Russia seems to have crapped out. Completely. Totally.

1. Russian forces had some minor success early, but that seems to have petered out in the last week or two.

2. Ukrainian forces have given some ground, but nothing very important, which matches the preserve the force/trade minor territory for Russian casualties strategy.

3. In a continuation of a move that started last quarter, Russian forces along “quiet” parts of the Russia-Ukraine border continued to make noise and minor advances towards, … nothing much.

4. The areas Russia is concentrating on match what I listed at the end of last quarter: Kupyansk, Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (S-K), Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole. The Lyman effort has apparently become a bit of an afterthought, which is not unexpected.

5. Russia has reoccupied a small portion of the territory Ukraine forced it out of NE of Hulyaipole after Russia lost most of its access to Starlink, but its not tactically, operationally, or strategically important.

6. Russia is recovering SOME from its lost Starlink access, but still has lost some C3 (command, control, communications) capability.

7. The emphasis is still on wrecking Russia’s economy and military capability through long range drone attacks while conserving the ground force.

   ---

Main Areas:

For maps and explanations of these short notes, see the end of quarter report:

Kupyansk: Russia continued its efforts to reduce the Ukrainian held position E of the Oskil River and, according to the more aggressive mappers, is slowly approaching the outskirts of the railroad town there: Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. Ukrainian has pulled back towards the town some, but overall the defense holds. Ukraine continues to try to clear the center of Kupyansk itself, but some Russian infiltrators hold out there, still. I have nothing concrete to back this up, but they seem to be able to get some Russian replacement troops probably from directly across the Oskil rather than from the N. Most of Kupyansk is a pile of rubble controlled completely by neither side.

Lyman: Not much to report. Ukraine seems to have backed Russian forces away from town and Russia does not seem to be in much of a hurry here.

S-K: Russia made some advances from the E side of these two cities early, taking 90-100 sq kms, but it was slow and expensive. And it will get harder and more expensive as they get closer. They are still 15-25 kms from the cities depending on which mapper you believe (there is some disagreement) and how you measure.

Kostyantyvnivka: Russia continued its slow advance and fighting has reached the edge of the town itself in a couple of places. However, they are moving at a crawl. This is a complex situation that deserves a closer look as Kostyantynivka is a town that is split in half with a small river (stream?) and a razed old industrial area running down the center from N to S. I’m trying to develop an article about the town, now.

Pokrovsk: Russia continued its attempts to advance N and NW out of town with very little success taking some chicken farms and most of Hryshyne, but failing to go further.

Hulyaipole: As I mentioned in an earlier quickie article, Russia continued its attacks W out of town toward Orikhiv, but that early success ground to an apparent halt pretty quickly.

Russian Border:

In a half dozen places, Russian forces have crossed the border usually advancing anywhere from a few hundred meters to 5 kms. They often take some tiny farming village and then stop for a while. Most of these minor incursions are isolated. Only one is really worth mentioning. It is on the E side of Sumy.

Yellow line is the Ukr-Rus border. For other map conventions, see this article.

It is a 45 km wide forward creep that, at its current rate, could reach Sumy in … 2-3 years??? It could, theoretically, connect up with the Russian incursion N of Sumy that followed Ukraine’s withdrawal from Kursk a year ago, but at current rates, that connection would still be months away. Also, that incursion really isn’t going anywhere, either. Two unimpressive incursions connect together to make … one unimpressive incursion??? This appears to still be just an attempt to distract and bleed Ukrainian resources away from more important areas, but it should be watched.

A Final Word: Overall, Russia is once more figuring out how to conduct offensive operations after getting punched in the nose with the loss of Starlink. One reason is that they are figuring out how to get around the controls Ukraine/Starlink have put on the acquisition of “approved” (White Listed) Starlink terminals. While it has once more turned toward offense (surprise!!!) after a 6-8 week break, its still not very good at it.

I know you’re averse to Ukraine risking large-scale offensive operations … (I am)

The quality of RU soldiers and equipment seems to be on the decline, and recent reports also indicate they’re now on the wrong side of the force-regeneration/ recruiting curve… (The current, though possibly biased, snippets we see seem to point in that direction.)

At some point isn’t it worth gathering a force strong enough to push somewhere hard enough to test for that brittleness? … Whether you agree that now is the time or not (and I know you think “not!”), I was still curious to hear where you think such a push would be most effective.

With any war situation, there are military implications and political implications. We will look first at this militarily. To do that, let’s back off and examine this with the assumption that we have a half dozen brigades squirrelled away somewhere that are manned, equipped, and available.

The first question is “Why?”. There are, as I see it, two answers. The first is to further Ukraine’s current strategy. The second is to change Ukraine’s strategy. Let’s take a look at the first.

What is Ukraine’s strategy to prevail in this thing overall? How would such an attack fit with and further that strategy? Based on current and past actions and statements, Ukraine’s strategy appears to be:

1. Attack the economic/monetary basis for Russia’s existence. Fancy words for hit the petroleum industry.

2. Bleed Russia of manpower quickly enough that the Russians cannot resupply at a sufficient rate without making politically dangerous moves (more aggressive “recruitment” or even mobilization).

3. Cause so much trouble in the above (economic and manpower) that the Putin regime fails politically.

4. Attack weapons making capabilities. I believe this is more a defensive move to try to reduce Russia’s ability to continue aerial attacks (drones, missiles, and glide bombs) against Ukraine’s populace instead of primarily an attempt to “win.”

So, that basically means 1) adversely affect the economic base and/or 2) cause many more Russian casualties (people and/or equipment) without taking higher damage to the Ukrainian force. How would a big attack further these goals?

Attacking the Economy:

I can find no GROUND attack that accomplishes this. Going after Belgorod might do some damage, but that’s a suicide mission 50 kms into a real city of several hundred thousand with an ample military foundation. It’s not realistic.

Having to fend off a major ground attack would chew into Russia’s supply of some resources (petrol, ammo, etc.), but Russia is doing that already with its attacks into Ukrainians dug in to defenses. In other words, defending accomplishes the same thing. So, we dispense with this one quickly.

Causing Mass Casualties:

As we have discussed many times, the attacker tends to take higher casualties in a toe-to-toe fight than the defender. An exception to this is if an attack “bags” a bunch of the enemy by cutting them off and capturing (or otherwise eliminating) them. I went along the forward trace and found two possible locations where a Ukrainian attack could encircle some Russians, but they are relatively small. They could be a tactical victory (a few hundred), but not a strategic one. A couple hundred scraggly old guys in captivity is not our goal here.

The two spots where Russian forces are slightly at risk of encirclement are:

• Ivanivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (48° 4’32N 36°38’38E): It sticks out enough to be a tempting target.

  

  However, the Russians have the tiny Vovcha River helping guard the two exposed flanks, so probably forget that one.

• Novoselivka, Donetsk Oblast (49° 4’48N 37°42’49E): There are two possible versions of this depending on which of the mappers you believe is right and based on how cheerleader confident you are about Ukraine’s ability to pull it off.

Mapper - Project Owl - Conservative: This mapper has a relatively small Russian force sticking out far enough to be a target, but not so large and isolated that they are “ripe for picking.”

Lopping off the force threatening this town would have the added advantage of taking pressure off Lyman, but it’s not a very “Grand Gesture” that is going to make international press. You would likely only get a couple hundred soldiers for a 12 km attack (or two 6’s), so it’s hardly worth the effort of a “big attack.”

Mapper - Russo-Ukrainian War (Modern Great Game) – Aggressive: This mapper shows a different layout of the lines and has the Russians MUCH more exposed.

A 10 km attack heading SE towards the lakes (light BLUE squiggly line) accompanied by a 2 kms advance W out of Lyman and covering a couple of gaps in the Terny area with a cloud of drones that kill anything that moves could theoretically put several Russian regiments in a world o’ hurt. However, this would be next to impossible to pull off since the attacking force would need to move into position undetected up a long narrow gap and attack with its back to the Oskil River.

Finally, I have no way of knowing if those artificially created lakes are still there. The earthen dams and berms could be (and probably are) damaged. However, the ground is likely difficult to cross regardless, even if most of the standing water is gone.

This one has SOME possibilities, but there is no concealing the Ukrainian force as it moves N along the E side of the Oskil River in preparation for the attack and it would be ripe for bombardment, so probably not a good idea.

Thus, I see no big encirclements where Ukraine’s battling Brigades could bag a big batch o’ Boris’s. To do that, the enemy must be concentrated somewhere. The Russians are concentrated near Kupyansk, Lyman/Sloviansk/Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole. None of these places is configured in such a way that they present an opportunity for such a move. Most are shaped exactly the opposite, threatening Ukrainian forces with encirclement. AND THAT IS DONE ON PURPOSE by the Russians as we have seen many times now.

Overall, an attack would kill Russians, but a defense would likely kill more and, in doing so, kill fewer Ukrainians. So with the economy and casualties not affected in the right way by an attack, such an attack does not really fit with existing strategy.

What about a change in strategy, then?

If you’re gonna try something like that, it can’t be just “another attack.” It can’t be just a pushback of a Russian gain that will be retaken by the typical Russian slow ooze over the next 6-12 months. If you’re going to do this, it needs to at least have the chance of being a killing blow. What change in strategy are we talking about, then?

Can Ukraine cut the Russians in half? No. They have insufficient resources to do something like this. Remember all of those defenses the Russians built a couple of years ago that most folks incorrectly credited with stopping the Ukrainian offensive (Note 2)? They are still there! They’re a bit worn down, but a couple of days (or perhaps even hours) can turn them back into positions that would be a challenge to overtake.

Change in Military Strategy:

What killing blow is there along the front that destabilizes the Russian army in a big way? A crossing of the Dnipro River in a big way might have that effect, but it is not logistically and technically feasible, as I have been saying for a couple of years and for years it has proven to be so.

DOWNSTREAM of the ex-dam, that is.

The only question mark I have, the only slight doubt, is the area that used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir. What is the ground like now that it has been exposed? We’re coming up on three years, now. I know the reservoir basin is VASTLY different with some areas turning into a woodland. How wide and deep is the remaining riverbed? I know there are lakes and ponds through much of the area, but there are likely some traversable pathways across. Could they support an army crossing in force? Hundreds of vehicles? My impression based on limited available evidence (even Google Earth is intentionally fuzzed out) is that this is unlikely. Additionally, one must ask the obvious question: What would the goal of such an attack be?

• Nova Kakhovka: A nice piece of real estate, but hardly a “killing blow.” It accomplishes little militarily. Let’s say you capture the town. Now what? “ONWARD TO CRIMEA!” Nuh uh. 70 kms across enemy territory just to reach the first of three fortified lines 30 kms deep on the narrow Perekop Isthmus while protecting flanks and providing logistics on one road… Ain’t gonna happen.

• The Nuke Plant: This would be a HUGE political statement, but a risky proposition that could backfire in several ways both politically and physically (as in “physics”). It really gains you nothing militarily. And once you own it it’s a target and you own it.

• Kamyanske: The far E tip of the reservoir. This was once one of my daydreams, so I’ve studied it as a “Big Deal.” Being able to attack around the thick, heavy defensive lines at Kamyanske, to move around those lines to its W (through the ex-reservoir) could, theoretically, be a pretty Big Deal as it could open the door to an attack on Tokmak. You don’t even have to cross the river itself because you’re already on the correct side!

  However, there are MORE defensive line to overcome to get to Tokmak even in this direction. Also, I’m pretty sure there are largish lakes still in the old reservoir area here that make this not a feasible idea militarily and logistically. That’s why I discarded it before. Also, what does Tokmak really matter now at this late stage? The accurate range of Ukrainian drone and missile resources has expanded so that “getting within artillery range of their railroads” really isn’t a thing anymore. Tokmak would be nice to have, but it is not a “killing blow,” militarily.

Let’s skip to the other end of the line, now.

Attacking into Russia:

There really isn’t anything along the Russian border that is a “Big Deal” other than one spot: N of Vovchansk. If Ukraine could attack behind Vovchansk and isolate the Russian force there, that would be a pretty big deal. Having said that, it’s a much smaller deal than it used to be. There used to be bunches of Russkies up there. Now, there appears to be a Brigade and two Regiments still hanging around that rubble pile. It would be nice to bag them, though.

However, the town behind Vovchansk on the Russian side is Shebekino. It and the very spread out smaller towns and villages connected to it are almost the size of Pokrovsk, in total. A high casualty urban slugfest is not the “lightning strike” we had in mind. Additionally, there are several Russian units within 30 kms of the town that could be on-site within a day or two, so this is not a realistic option.

Attacking in Luhansk or Donetsk:

In other words, somewhere along the current main front line. There are plenty of places where an attack would do worlds of good, pushing the Russians back and keeping them from accomplishing their objectives. However, these are reactive, not proactive. These are not “killer blows” that shatter some place in the Russian line. Remembering that this is, at first, a military examination and that we will look at the politics later, I see nothing that isn’t simply “pushing back.” If we are trying to kill Russians while protecting our own, attacking straight into Russia’s forces doesn’t seem to do this.

Will the whole Russian army pick up and run home as a result of one of these attacks? Without a collapse at home (a political discussion), no, they won’t. Will you crack the line somewhere? Quite possibly. But what then? Are you going to attack 50 kms into their rear while protecting your flanks and supporting the force logistically while you run out from underneath your air defense umbrella and into the prepared defenses from 2-3 years ago inflicting more casualties than you take? No. That isn’t realistic.

So, the question remains: Militarily, what are you trying to accomplish with an attack?

Now, let’s have a look at the politics.

I claim zero expertise in Russian politics. I see articles that say the Putin may be running out of slack in his rope, that perhaps that slack will tighten and snap that pasty white neck of his. Is this so? I have no idea. If one of our strategic objectives is to stir that pot some, then attacks may serve a purpose.

What I originally saw as the purpose of the Kursk adventure and wholly supported at the time was that it exposed Putin to ridicule and derision both internally and internationally since it showed he could not even protect his own country. Running in there and mucking around for a few weeks then withdrawing in good order to go ahead and do it again somewhere else was, I thought, a brilliant move. Then it stretched on for 7 months and ended in a shambles with Russia following the Ukrainian force into Ukraine itself.

Politically Bash Putin:

Take a couple of fast brigades with lots of engineering support and attack into Russia. Stay within artillery support and small drone range of Ukrainian territory. Blow some shit up. Make headlines. Draw Russian forces towards you. Then get the hell out. Six weeks max. Move somewhere else. Rinse and repeat.

The goal isn’t to hold territory for negotiations (a ludicrous suggestion). The goal is to weaken political support for the Russian government. You do this by spreading the pain around, by causing as much embarrassment in as many places as possible. Combine it with very visible drone attacks on military and economic targets elsewhere and oil depots and shipping terminals burning for days on end.

Is this a worthy political goal? Possibly. Can this be done somewhere in Ukraine as well? Maybe threaten a big unit so-as to cause some panic, then pull back? Possibly. Blow in 8-10 kms, threaten the 29^th CAA (Combined Arms Army) HQ near Novodarivka, maybe blow up a General just for the hell of it, pull back before their reserves arrive or before you run out of ammo, whichever happens first.

It’s about the APPEARANCE of Russian weakness, not the actual territory crossed or held. While I do not know Russian internal politics, I do know that weakness does not go over well in Russia or with any authoritarian government. Do this a couple of times with panache and lots of pictures on the internets and maybe, just maybe, the Russian army will get as sick of it as the Russian rich-folk and Russian war-mongers bloggers seem to be.

Do I see an opportunity to attack Russia if I had an attack force to spare? Yes, I do. But it is not a military attack. It is a politic attack accomplished with a military resource. Unfortunately, that handfull of Brigades is not sitting around ready to go.

Notes:

1. We used to cover our maps carefully with one-sided sticky acetate so we could draw on them with thin alcohol-based colored markers to plan operations and mark check points, LD/LC (Line of Departure/Line of Contact), adjacent units, and such. In classes and training, for this reason, drawing all our “grand plans” on the map was referred to as “Daydreaming on Acetate.”

2. The Surovikin Line’s “huge success.” As I recall, Ukraine only reached those lines in one place (Robotyne) and they breached them in that one place. In Robotyne, the town itself was a huge problem. Elsewhere, how could the defenses prevent advance if they didn’t reach them? It was the minefields and the dispersed nature of the attack. And, for the most part, those minefields are still there, though somewhat degraded.

Well, the conservative one (Project Owl) finally showed a Russian advance worth noting in the area. Here is the result:

For detailed map conventions and methodology, see this article. Short-hand version: GREEN is old Russian forward edge. Bright RED is Russian advance. The BLUE line is the Ukrainian forward edge. The area between is “grey/no man’s land.” RED arrows and GREY line are more aggressive reporting by another mapper.

The old line that ran along Hulyaipole held there for several weeks, but it seems the pressure has had an effect to the tune of about 60 sq kms across a broad front. This probably wasn’t sudden, but rather the mapper simply recognizing the results of a slow creep over the last two weeks or so.

Zaliznychne at the new forward edge was a town of about 1,050 in 2022. In Apr 2023, it’s listed population was 38. That’s where the fight is right now. Tiny Myrne has changed hands several times in the past two months.

The unfortunate town names to start learning now are Huliapilsk and Novoselivka and Hirke and Verkhnya Tersa. Still a L-O-N-G way to Orikhiv, though do not forget that town has Russians to its south as well.

PS: For some reason, I get the impression that there are fewer Ukrainian units to the W of the Russians in this sector than there were 2-3 weeks ago, but that’s just an impression with no data to back it up. If true (probably not), where’d they go? Maybe someone’s collecting a force…????? Let the pure speculations and opinions and conspiracy theories commence!

PPS: After comparing the map from four weeks ago with the current one and checking unit-by-unit, I find I have my head up my ass. No Ukrainian units have left the area and a new one has arrived, the 5th Assault Brigade probably from Kostyantynivka! So ignore that bit of speculation.

For the record, this is the first time anyone has ever admitted to being wrong on SUBSTACK, the place where you never have to say you’re sorry! Where’s dumbass Mattakar when you really need him?

As I said before, Russia has land borders with 13 states in addition to Ukraine. The vast bulk of the borders are with China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan with Finland and the Baltic states coming in at a much smaller, but important fourth. Let’s dispense with some of the others quickly.

• Norway technically shares a short border in the extreme north, but it is wilderness with no roads and, at one point, requires passing through a bit of land that is 13 kms wide to get to the border.

• North Korea’s border with Russia is a short stretch of river with swamps along most of both sides with one road and one rail bridge.

• Poland’s and Lithuania’s Russian borders are with the completely surrounded cesspool of Kaliningrad.

• Belarus is ruled by Putin’s pet.

So, let’s just forget about those five for the time being. That leaves China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan (Eastern/Central), Finland, Latvia, Estonia (Baltic/Western), Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Southern).

Eastern/Central:

If you look back to the beginning of the full invasion (and a bit before), the Russian Eastern and Central Military Districts were virtually stripped of their ground forces to make the initial attack and to follow up when things didn’t go according to plan. Many of the units of those two districts were shipped off to Belarus for “Joint Exercises” right before the invasion. This then became the initial attack into Kyiv. Some of the Eastern Military District’s units were even involved in the Donbas warfare that filled the 8 years before the full invasion.

Here are just a few examples of when Russia weakened its borders with China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan:

• 36th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade has been in Ukraine since mid-late 2022 and perhaps earlier.

• 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade part of the initial assault on Kyiv. Got their asses handed to them.

• 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade arrived in Ukraine before Jan 2023.

• 36th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade arrived before Nov 2022.

• 127th Motor Rifle Division arrived some time in 2022, like right near the beginning.

I looked up a couple of dozen major ground units from those border regions and found NONE of them still stationed outside Ukraine and that almost without exception, these units have not been near their original eastern border locations for more than three years. Part of the reason ethnic Buryats and other minority groups suffered such high casualties at the beginning of the war is the units that formed the bulk of the invasion force were pulled from those eastern border regions that draw a higher portion of their recruits from those ethnic groups due to lack of job opportunities and the existance of many military units and bases in those border areas.

The types of forces left in place in the Eastern and Central Military Districts include air defense, some rocket and missile artillery, aviation, naval (not including most marine Infantry), support (railway, transportation, maintenance, some engineers, etc.), and training units.

So, as President Zelenskyy points out, ain’t nobody home. However, this has been the case for a couple of years, now. It ain’t anything new.

Baltic/Western:

I am grouping Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (close by) into this border group. There are multiple articles and stories indicating that Russia is not weakening its presence up north at all, but rather is STRENGTHENING its presence. Old deserted bases at Petrozavodsk and Kandalaksha are being reoccupied and upgraded and two other current bases also up next to Finland are getting face lifts as well. Military units are being formed or upgraded in the area as well. The area may have had military forces and resources stolen from it earlier in the fight with Ukraine, but that trend has been reversed for several months at least. So “weakening the border” does not apply up yonder.

Southern:

Georgia: Russia apparently has about four Infantry battalions and one tank battalion in a small base in Abkhazia (occupied Georgia SE of Sochi) that they may be trying to turn into a Division. There are also a few thousand soldiers elsewhere in the occupied portions of Georgia (S Ossetia) perhaps including subordinate units of the 76^th Guards Air Assault and 7^th Guards Airborne Divisions, but other subordinate elements of these two Divisions have also been fighting in Ukraine for years as well.

There are conflicting reports about exactly who is where in Georgia (as one would expect), but Russia seems to be doing there what it has been doing: being a pain in the ass for the Georgians and perhaps even slowly pushing outward. The FSB Border Guards seem to be a big part of this outward pressure.

Azerbbaijan: Russia seems not to fear invasion from Azerbaijan at present, though things have been a bit frosty there of late since Russia shot down that airliner. Azerbaijan’s military seems more interested in fighting Armenians every coupla years and in torturing their own solders en masse than they are in invading Russia. Not much is on that border other than a fair number of aviation units. Plus the FSB, of course.

So, how could this weakening be happening, then?

• The main force overseeing the border now is the FSB Border Guards which numbers approximately 170K. Russia could be diverting resources and men from that mission.

• They could be doing the same with other strategic forces like their navy in the Pacific and/or Atlantic.

• The same applies to their air force. With many of their planes grounded (either “suddenly” or through lack of maintenance), they might have a few thousand support personnel without toys to play with. At least one “aviation” ground unit was formed to fight in Kursk.

• They could be weakening some of their foreign “adventures” like Africa and S America, though those seem usually to fall to their mercenaries.

• They could likewise be weakening some of their far-flung outposts like the Kuril Islands, S Ossetia, Belarus support, or Syria.

All of these things could be weakened. However, what I mainly see is that Russia made the strategic decision to denude its long eastern borders (China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan) years ago and has simply been continuing in that same vein.

Here is what President Zelenskyy said:

In a month, we eliminate the same number of occupiers as the Russians mobilize, yet the size of their military contingent on the territory of Ukraine continues to grow. That is, we believe they are increasing their grouping by bringing in personnel from their strategic reserves. We discussed this with the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff – how we are countering it. We believe this is a risky step for the Russians, because by doing so they are weakening their borders with other states, where the situation for them is not simple. Nevertheless, they have taken this step.

Recently, together with Syrskyi and Hnatov, we also reviewed new Russian military maps. They want to capture Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, and Pokrovsk by the end of April. This is impossible, but it is not the first time they have set themselves some kind of deadline, and now they have set this as a target. I have already spoken about the meeting with British intelligence – we have a relationship of trust with them. They also do not see any capability for the Russians to achieve this.

The DKos comments then lit up with celebration of “new opportunities” for Ukraine due to weak Russian border forces and things like “let the Freedom for Russia Legion cross the border and head to Moscow.”

Let’s ignore the fact that the furthest the Freedom for Russia Legion has marched into Russia is about 5-6 kms and Moscow is 500 kms road distance away at its closest point for a moment. Let’s look instead at what President Zelenskyy ACTUALLY SAID. The key words people are missing are “strategic reserves” and “borders with other states.”

Russia is weakening forces in areas other than Ukraine to strengthen the force that faces Ukraine. Russia has 13 other land borders: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, China, Mongolia, and North Korea. Most of these do not pose a threat and none is an immediate threat. However, there are many thousands of military and guard soldiers facing these borders or in cantonment areas dozens or hundreds of kms from these borders whose purposes are to a) train and b) be there if something happens. These are the soldiers to whom President Zelenskyy refers.

If we look at Ukraine’s actual border with Russia and what is happening there, what we actually see is increased Russian activity, not a decrease. Within the past few weeks, Russia has done attacks of varying size (usually tiny) into or towards Sopych, Myropillya, Pokrovka, Novodmytrivka, Ryasne, Veterynarne, Nesterne, and Dihtiarne. These are intended to divert Ukraine’s attention/resources and to get brownie points for the local Russian commanders. This is in addition to their normal larger activities in the big areas of Hlyboke, Vovchansk, and the Sumy incursion.

President Zelenskyy in this article does not speak of Russia weakening its border with Ukraine as an opportunity to attack. He is speaking of how Russia is accomplishing its increase in manpower inside Ukraine and the challenges that poses for the Ukrainians.

He goes on to say that Russia will not accomplish its stated goals for April even with this increased manpower, a statement that is without any doubt true. Russia is pretty much dead in the water right now, though it continues to push in several area we have previously discussed.

Hulyaipole/Orikhiv is the only one I worry about in the mid-term future.

UPDATE (3:12PM Eastern):

Wow! That was quick. Project Owl just 20 minutes ago published an update that shows a very wide advance out of the Hulyaipole direction that is ballpark 60 sq kms of territory in the direction of Orikhiv. I’ll see what I can find out tonight.

This quarter somewhat more closely matches what went before: relatively little change in overall conditions, but enough movement that it’s worth a periodic look. Also, there is, as you may have noticed, a bit of a lull right now. That is interesting since Russia started its spring offensive a couple of weeks ago! It’s embarrassing to have your “offensive” described as a “lull.” I guess that means things aren’t going too well for them, which is a good thing.

Those who are curious can go back and look at previous quarterly reports (4^th 2023, 1^st 2024, and 2nd 2024) if they wish as they have been republished here on SubStack for reference. It’s been a long time and there are some new folks around, so I will repeat the Purpose and Method sections below so everyone knows what’s going on. In the future, I will do a short blurb and link to this long version.

Purpose:

With the to-and-fro of the war, it is easy to lose sight of the overall progress of battle on the ground itself and to lose a sense of scale. This field changes hands and that patch of woods gets taken and, … what does it mean? How good or bad is it?

There are many ways to measure what is happening: equipment losses, casualties, major events, economic indicators, this airplane arrives, that radar gets hit, counting artillery pieces (is it a mortar or artillery?), drone hits, … All of these are discussed in detail elsewhere. The data on these are often unreliable and the analyses are often shaded by opinion and bias, so who you wish to believe is your choice.

Common “wisdom” is that Russia has been on the verge of collapse (any week, now!!!) for several years. I remember reading about their imminent demise in Nov and Dec 2022. Meanwhile, reporting of the back-and-forth ACTUALLY ON THE GROUND ITSELF is uneven and incomplete possibly because the ground war is, with some notable exceptions, so slow it’s pretty boring. And most people don’t understand it.

This is a presentation of who has attacked where and who has captured what. It is not an attempt to pass any sort of judgement. It is simply a listing of efforts and results. Anything that is OPINION or THEORY here is pretty obvious and often presented with a heavy dose of snark. (Who, me???) I try to separate OPINION and THEORY from fact if there is any doubt. Occasionally, I might fail at that.

Before someone says, “What about xxxxxxxx that is happening?” This intentionally ignores the fairly successful Ukrainian long-range attacks going on and many one-off factors that are amply covered elsewhere, e.g. Black Sea, Crimea, oil facilities, glide bombs, dirigibles, amphibious assaults, Putin’s “cancer,” the continuously “about to implode” Russian army morale, the “they’re almost out of men!” chants, game changing magical weapons systems that will arrive next week, etc.

This is the ground war only. It is mostly backward looking and fact based.

Discussions of casualty rates and a 2+ year “trends” (casualties and territory) will follow in other articles (I promise!).

Method:

As with equipment and casualties, there are various sources for what happens on the ground, e.g. the mappers. I have listed and discussed several in an earlier article. For this effort (Quarterly Report), I regularly follow two mappers (and check a few more regularly) and I use one as the baseline for the territorial changes (shaded areas) and the other to illustrate the attacks (arrows). That baseline territorial map is the Ukraine Control Map by Project Owl OSINT (UCM). The attacks map is Russia-Ukraine War by Modern Great Game Watch (R-U War).

Daily, I download these maps and other updates to GoogleEarth. My process aggregates weekly (Mon-Sun), so midnight (ish) on 28 Dec is the start of the quarter and 29 Mar is the end. Over the course of the last three months (actually, more like 30 frickin’ months), each day, I compared that day’s front line with the previous day’s noting and shading in any movements. For complete explanation of the maps (colors, symbols, etc.), see that previous article I mentioned. Short version: In the map photos below, the GREEN front line is 28 Dec and the RED front line is 29 Mar. If there is only one color, they overlap and it did not move. The difference is recorded as RED (Russian advance) or BLUE (Ukrainian advance). I will show the front line in segments and discuss from N to S.

Areas where nothing really happened I don’t bother showing, but mention briefly, e.g. Sumy and Vovchansk, which are both are merely distractions. There are also minor isolated movements that I won’t show or mention since they amount to almost nothing and may even represent adjustments by the mappers rather than actual movement. They are included in the totals presented, though.

Totals:

I usually do totals at the end, but I have a reason to put them up front this time because they tell a story.

Net for the entire quarter across the entire front from Sumy to the Kinburn Spit, Russia gained a measly 90 sq kms in 90 days. That ties with 4th Qtr 2023 for their lowest net gain since I started tracking this stuff 2-1/2 years ago. Just for comparison, 4th Qtr 2024 totalled net almost 1,700 sq kms.

Sounds like nothing much happened, right? Wrong. Russia gained early and lost late and Russia gained in the N and lost in the S. This resulted in a NET across the whole line and quarter of almost nuthin’, but thing did move around, some.

This quarter has an obvious tale to tell. There’s the first 5 weeks and then the last 7 weeks with 1 week of transition in between. The event that divided the quarter so effectively temporally was the elimination (or at least great degradation) of Russia’s ability to use Starlink for command, control, and communication (C3).

However, the story also is of a geographical split between the northern 2/3rds of the line and the southern 1/3rd. In the north, Russia seized territory during that first 5 weeks and managed to hang on to most of it during the remainder of the quarter when their C3 was shot to hell. Meanwhile in the south, early, they were attempting to consolidate the gains in the Hulyaipole area and into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the end of last year. Then late, they were getting their asses handed to them as Ukraine pushed back starting right before the Starlink interruption and continuing over the next couple of weeks with most of that successful Ukrainian counterattacking taking place in the middle of the quarter and slowing noticeably in the last month.

First 5 Weeks (North):

1. Russia continued to make minor gains in the Sumy area S of the ex-Kursk Ukrainian incursion (20 sq km).

2. They crossed the border about 55 kms S of there to capture the completely unimportant town of Hrabovs’ke in an effort to distract and to redirect Ukrainian resources (10 sq kms). That effort has failed as Ukraine sent essentially nothing there in reaction.

3. Russia succeeded in pushing Ukraine out of pretty much all of Vovchansk (35 sq kms) way up on the Russian border, but this too matters not as this is a strategic and operational dead end.

4. In an attempt to recover from getting thoroughly embarrassed in Kupyansk (Putin “WE’VE CAPTURED IT!!!” Zelenskyy “No you haven’t.”), Russia started attacking Ukrainian forces on the left (East) bank of the Oskil River with some success (55-60 sq kms) finally securing the tiny village of Synkivka, which has changed hands a half dozen times (or more) in the past couple of years. There’s nothing left but piles of rubble and empty, unroofed walls. The Russians’ immediate goal is Kupyansk Vuzioli. A bit more info on Kupyansk is in this earlier article, though it was published early in the quarter.

   

5. Throughout the rest of Luhansk Oblast (including Lyman), Russia had other minor, yet ultimately fairly unimportant gains (45-50 sq kms). The immediate goal is the isolation and taking of Lyman as described in an earlier article.

   

6. They had their greatest success to the NE and E of the key cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk (Slov/Kram) with a general wide advance (150-160 sq kms). More info on the background and importance of these two cities is in this earlier article.

   

7. They had their 2^nd greatest success approaching Kostyantynivka from the south and west (85-90 sq kms).

   

8. They moved into Pokrovsk some more and also 15 kms N of there (35-40 sq kms).

   

First 5 Weeks (South):

1. They continued their approach toward Novopavlivka that they have been trying to take for months, now (about 35 sq kms).

2. They initially lost, then regained Hulyaipole. This went back and forth a few confusing times. The map below is a bit of a confusing mess as a result. The net gain is pretty close to nothing, since they lost it to start.

3. They advanced westward in an area that is 18 kms to the N of Hulyaipole, though not strongly.

4. Ukraine started to push on Russia’s weak right flank (northern edge Russia’s westward push toward Hulyaipole). This is hard to picture, so see the light BLUE patch below (Ukrainian gain of about 40 sq kms).

   

So, you see that they had a fairly successful 5 weeks, though nothing really important other than losing, then retaking Hulyaipole and advancing a bit toward Slov/Kram from the E. A net total gain of about 450 sq kms for Russia. 90 sq kms per week isn’t too bad compared to what they usually do.

Transition and Loss of Control:

Then in Week 6, Starlink and Ukraine started turning off the intertube terminals (a process that took a couple of days) and, after a day or two of advances mainly around Hulyaipole (60 sq kms), they hit a brick wall.

For a look at the whole “Starlink” thing and why it took so long into the war to make that happen, check out this article.

Last 7 Weeks (North):

1. Sumy – Nothing important.

2. Border region – Ditto.

3. Vovchansk – Ukraine took back some of what they had just lost, though not in the town itself (10 sq kms).

4. Kupyansk – No advances, though Ukraine continued to clear the city itself claiming probably accurately to have cleaned up what was left of the ragtag Russian infiltrators.

   

   UPDATE (31 Mar):

   Contrary to what I wrote above, according to new geolocates of Russian soldiers posted today and video of Ukrainian shelling inside Kupyansk, there are still Russian infiltrators holding out in the center of the town.

5. Luhansk – Nuthin’ until you get to Lyman where Ukraine pushed the Russians back S of town (about 40 sq kms).

   

6. Slov/Kram was Russia’s only “bright” spot, but with only minor success (35 sq kms), but at least they didn’t go backwards.

   

7. In Kostyantynivka and near Chasiv Yar (E of Kost), Russia had no success and Ukraine retook some (about 10 sq kms).

   

8. In the Pokrovsk area, Ukraine initially retook about 15 sq kms N of town, but Russia took it back later and successfully moved toward and into Hryshyne NW of town (net of about 35 sq kms).

   

So, the big gains stopped almost completely, but there really weren’t any huge failures, either. Mostly, things just ground to a halt.

Last 7 Weeks (South):

1. Remember that 35 sq km advance toward Novopavlivka Russia made in the first part of the quarter? They lost that again and then some more (45-50 sq kms).

2. Around Hulyaipole (though not the town itself) and mainly on its right (northern) flank, Ukraine pushed Russia out of about 355-360 sq kms of territory. It’s all rural farmland, though, with a couple of farming towns population about 500 and a few more in the 2-300 range. Clearing Russia out of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast was an important political accomplishment, but on a purely military level, it didn’t do much. It cut one road from Velyka Novosilka to Hulyaipole, but there’s another that is only 10 kms longer that accomplishes the same thing.

   

There were other bits and pieces of territory scattered around that brought the total for that 7 weeks to almost 400 sq kms in Ukraine’s favor.

Note, however, that in the first 3 weeks of those 7, Ukraine advanced at an average rate of almost 100 sq kms per week. In the last 4, that had slowed to just over 25 sq kms per week (thus explaining the dearth of articles here about the Ground War!) And during the last week, Russia had a small net gain, their first since Star-Unlink. Is this a sign that they are starting to recover from that event? As a data guy, I’ll say that infiltrators.using one single event to illustrate the possible change in a “trend” is HORRIBLE, statistically, but it’s something to keep an eye on.

So there you have it. Russia was continuing its plodding march forward from the previous period, got seriously punched in the nose, the north stopped, the south fell back. Then they pretty much dug in their toes and started trying to go forward again with little or no success.

Now and Future:

Well, now, Russian has apparently started its Spring-Summer Offensive. Not that you can really tell. I would THEORIZE that their objectives for this summer are fivefold (from N to S) (with an OPINION on how well they’ll do this quarter):

1. Advance on and threaten Kupyansk from the E. The first part of this is doable, though the second part is much more difficult because there’s a frickin’ RIVER there. Overall, they won’t succeed.

2. Tighten the perimeter around the N and E sides of Slov/Kram by capturing Lyman to the NE and by advancing from the E on the cities themselves. If they seriously put their mind (and resources) to it, they could probably get this done. However, Lyman seems to be a low priority for them. They will get a bit closer on the eastern side of the cities, though.

3. Tighten the perimeter on those cities from the S by taking (FINALLY!) Kostyantynivka. They won’t succeed.

4. Consolidate Pokrovsk and advance NW up the E50 HWY. They’ll go a little way up that highway, probably, but not far.

5. Consolidate Hulyaipole and advance W along the T0814 Hwy toward the N side of Orikhiv. Here, too, they’ll go a little way, but not far.

More OPINION: The above list of likely objectives illustrates one of the main flaws in Russia’s strategic thinking that has existed for many decades: ATTACK EVERYWHERE! They probably have these five objects and it is likely that lower level commanders not included in this list will try to be superstars, too and will also attack in other places. The list above is already too long by two or three. The Russians never seem to concentrate resources on one or two achievable things. The only time they did (late summer through early winter 2024), they had some notable success. They didn’t learn from that. That’s a good thing!

In other words, I don’t think this isn’t going to be a bang-up couple of months for the Russians.

Why has Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s “Spring Offensive” been so successful so far? There are a couple of likely reasons.

1. Russia’s C3 is still screwed up, though some recovery has probably taken place in the past almost two months. Trying to attack when your units start shooting at each other by mistake (as has been reported to have happened more than once) is hard.

2. Since the lines have been roughly stationary in most places, Ukraine has had the opportunity to improve its defenses along much of the line. In other words, they’ve “dug in.”

3. Again with stationary lines, they have been able to stablize their logistics.

4. With stable lines, they have been able to possibly rotate units and soldiers and balance forces across the line.

Philosophical Question of the Day (repeat of last spring): Can something really be called a “Spring Offensive” if no one is really sure if it’s started? Just sayin’.

First, a bit of housekeeping:

• I reformatted a bunch of my OLD articles from DKos and reposted them here. They are available to the bored/curious and as reference in future work. I did not correct all the links in the articles, so some of them take you back to DKos. Over time, maybe I’ll try to fix that. Probably not. Finally, my map conventions have developed over time, so most of those earlier maps do not stick to the conventions for color and symbology. You guys are smart and will figure them out.

• Next, I tested the “Chat” feature here on SubStack with, at best, mixed results. I sent a single chat out into the ether that would have gone to about 130 recipients and got 7 replies. I therefore assume the chat function will be of limited value and will use it only sparingly.

• Finally, I’m still learning the capabilities of this forum. Thus, I only recently found I could change the size of photos. The maps are photos (screen shots) and are hard to see if small. Well, I can make them bigger!! So I went back through the stuff I put out already and resized the maps.

On with the show.

On the ground, “The Big Stall” continues. For the most part no one’s going nowhere, which is good for the Ukrainians. One of the cheerleader blogs put out an article about two weeks ago about how the Ukrainians were streaking across Zaporizhzhia and about to encircle 30,000 Russians. I’m not exaggerating even slightly. That was their claim. Ain’t happenin’.

Over the past three weeks, things have slowed to almost nothing. The Ukrainians have minor continued advances on the N flank of the Russian force in Hulyaipole, but that FAST advance from earlier has slowed almost to a standstill. The Russians have minor advances to the W out of Hulyaipole, but that is a crawl at best and may have stalled completely, now.

Further E and N, they are confident enough in their hold on Pokrovsk to attack out of the town to the NW into Hryshyne, but that, too, is a crawl. Aggressive mappers have the Russians almost through the town. More conservative ones have them approaching the S edge of town. The truth is probably somewhere in between with much of the town an uncontrolled grey area.

On a side note, it’s sad that I don’t have to check the spelling of “Zaporizhzhia” anymore (and I wrote this paragraph before reading friend Quaoar’s article on DKos with a similar comment, so great minds think alike). In a perfect world, there are hundreds of cities, towns, villages, provinces, rivers, etc. that I never would have known existed (or wanted to know existed) because people there would simply be going about their lives. Thank you Russia </s>.

I promised an article on casualties. Personal events have delayed that, but it will happen.

22 Trucks

Geosynchronous vs Geostationary:

Most people think that a geosynchronous satellite stays continuously over a single spot and is able to take pictures of that spot whenever it wants. That USUALLY is not true. A geosynchronous satellite that is anywhere other than directly over the equator will move from the northern to the southern hemisphere cutting a figure-8 pattern as it orbits the earth in synchronization with the earth’s rotation. It is doing this because the center of gravity of the earth is the center of the earth (duh) so if you travel off the center of the earth’s rotation, you must expend energy to push yourself away from the equator and stay N or S of that center of gravity to stay over a single point (conservation of angular momentum).

A geostationary orbit is a geosynchronous orbit over the equator. Since no energy is required to keep the satellite off the equator, it can take pics of the exact same spot all day long.

HOWEVER, you are limited by the curvature of the earth as to what angle those pictures will be taken. If the item you wish to watch is at or near the equator, hunky dory. No problem. You’re looking straight down on it. If you’re trying to watch the NORTH or SOUTH poles, you’re completely screwed because you can’t even see them at all (see note below). And different points in between will see varying results based on how far NORTH or SOUTH they are.

The other factor that affects this picture angle is orbit altitude. At a lower altitude, you can get nicer pics, but you are more limited by angle and curvature of the earth. At a higher altitude, you can cover more area further off the equator, but you will need better and better optics and electronics to maintain resolution. Thus you have more cost and fewer satellites as a result. And you’ll still have some angle that varies based on how far N/S you want to see.

Increased angle also increases how much atmoshere you’re looking through which degrades resolution.

With a non-geostationary, geosynchronous orbit satellite, you can pass directly over the same spot on the earth twice per day if you position the satellite such that the cross in the figure-8 is on top of the item you want to take selfies of. However, again, the X marks the spot of that figure-8 would be … ON THE EQUATOR! So you might as well just put the orbit there unless there are things that figure-8 can take pics of when it’s not over the equator.

SO:

• Diego Garcia US NSF (7 degrees off equator) is easy to keep track of.

• Severomorsk Russian AFB near Murmansk (69 degrees off), not so much.

Note: Before anyone asks, yes, a satellite that is stationary above the N/S pole could theoretically take pictures of that pole on a continuous basis and not violate conservation of angular momentum …. until it fell to earth because it is not orbiting in such a way as to maintain altitude with centrifugal force. And that would start to happen immediately since there is no “orbit” to decay.

PS Mattakar

Get over it. As you may not have not have noticed, those grand weapons systems haven’t made a huge difference. It is still a slow Russian decay as it has been for a couple of years. Yes, eventually, that decay should be complete. At that point, you will crow about how right you were because you haven’t understood what I said.

And Project Owl has been my go-to mapper since I first started this a couple years ago as I said on numerous occasions on DKos in diaries and comments. Any change is merely your fertile oft demonstrated imagination.

Overall, it’s been pretty quiet since my last update two weeks ago on 18 Feb. Only one place has shown any real movement.

The Starlink changes took place over the period 2-9 Feb. Overall, Russian advances have pretty much ground to a halt in most areas, though there are exceptions. In the three weeks prior to 2 Feb, Russia net gained almost 400 sq kms of territory. In the three weeks since 9 Feb, they have net loss (Ukrainian gain) of about 290 sq kms. Virtually all of this has been in the Oleksandrivskyi front area. Let’s quickly dispatch with the rest of the front before looking at that one.

Working from N to S, as usual:

1. There have been a few minor Russian attacks along the Russian border, but those are just attempts to distract/divert Ukrainian resources and not worth talking about.

2. Ukraine retook about 10 sq kms of mostly wooded land near Vovchansk (up N in Kharkiv Oblast), but it is strategically and operationally unimportant territory, so while advancing is good, but this isn’t worth discussion.

3. Russian continued its attacks from the E of Kupyansk (E/left side of the Oskil River), but do not appear to have made noteworthy progress.

4. Minor attacks towards Lyman, but, again, no real progress.

5. The area E of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk (we used to call this the Siversk area) was quite active. With the Starlink interuption, activity has slowed a little, but this command may not have depended on Starlink as much for command and control since they continue with a reasonably high optempo. However, with the exception of one 4 km advance W up a road toward the tiny village of Nykyforivka, they didn’t really seem to accomplish much. This may be worth a map in a few weeks, but not now.

6. S and E of Kostyantynivka, the Russian have slowed a great deal with a few haphazard attacks and no real success. Ukraine, on the other hand, took two small chunks near Chasiv Yar E of Kostyantynivka totaling just under 10 sq kms.

7. Pokrovsk: I think it’s fair to say that the whole town now falls under the Russians. They are currently attempting to attack out of the town and out of Rodynske to its immediate N trying to head N and W. If they start having some success, I’ll report on it in more detail.

8. Skipping over Oleksandrivskyi/Hulyaipole momentarily going instead to the Kamyanske area on the shores of what used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir, Ukraine has been attacking here and with minor successes.

As you can see, not a whole lot to write about, so I’m not doing a whole lot of writing. On to the main subject.

Oleksandrivskyi/Hulyaipole:

With a picture being worth a thousand words, this map of activity since 9 Feb shows most of what needs to be said.

There been a lot of activity by the Ukrainians from the N and NW. All those BLUE arrows are attacks and all of those light BLUE blocks are the result. The total BLUE area (recaptured) is about 300 sq kms, though no towns of note. There are three main supply highways into Hulyaipole from the E/SE. The N one from Velyka Novosilka is not physically cut, but it might as well be as the Ukrainians are within heavy machinegun range of it.

These advances moved fairly quickly during the first two weeks after Starlink disruption, but have slowed noticeably since then. Also, it is worth noting that Russia has recently once more started to attempt attacks W out of Hulyaipole itself (with no real success), so maybe they are starting to adjust to the changes. We will see soon.

So overall, like I said, the effect on Russia of loss of command, control, and communications plus some drone capability has been pretty drastic on offensive operations, though not a collapse. The next three weeks will show us whether they are able to MacGyver their way out of this situation.

Or, better yet, if Ukraine can spread its successes near Hulyaipole to other areas.

OPINION: On a side note, have another quick look at that map up there. Look at the dozens and dozens and dozens of BLUE squares (Ukrainian units) that are there, now. Those weren’t there on the maps before when we talked about the fall of Hulyaipole, were they? If only Syrskyi had moved JUST A FEW of those squares there a month sooner. We probably wouldn’t be having this conversation about whether or not Ukraine can retake Hulyaipole.

22 Trucks

• Map explanations and info sources used

• Flamingos

• Casualties and Trends over 26 months

• Territorial Gains and Trends Over 26 months

• Perhaps a ground update every two weeks or so (more often if things happen).

Beyond that, I haven’t the time to write more.

On an earlier article, I posted a comment suggesting perhaps a group of us working together could keep this thing more engaged and I received some likes and replies. To explore this possibility a bit more, I’m posting this on SubStack and BlueSky to see if any readers/writers out there are interested in participating in a group effort.

If anyone is interested, I would ask that ARTICLES be fact-based, researched, and at least somewhat balanced. Being in favor of Ukrainian victory and presenting good news is one thing. Naked ridiculous cheerleading is something else entirely. I believe we should present the facts, warts and all.

In the articles, OPINIONS need to be presented as opinions. And GUESSES and SPECULATION need to be presented as guesses and specualtion. The reader needs to be able to tell what is FACT, what is OPINION, and what is SPECULATION. And the place for naked cheerleading is in the comments section.

How exactly this would work I have not quite figured out since it would likely require me to give full access to this SubStack to those who are participating and that, understandably, makes me VERY nervous. Therefore, there would need to be some discussion about rules and some mutual vetting.

We would also ask each participant to agree to average a certain amount of material, like maybe 3-4 articles per month with more being welcome (to a point). There would need to be a minimum standard on what can be included. The intent of this is to be something more than a place to repost others’ work. An aggregation of tidbits from around the war with some analysis thrown in (think Quaoar and Annieli) would be an option as well. Just no single links/embeds to someone else’s long article with a three-word intro. You know what I mean.

The advantage to those who are interested is a SubStack channel with over 100 followers (and growing) and a BlueSky with over 150 (ditto). Additionally, those who are interested in joining this would be expected to promote this SubStack on their own BlueSky accounts, which should drive the readership up. Anyone still on DKos could, by their own choice (carefully and at their own risk), mention this effort on that forum as well.

Any takers?

If so, you can reply publicly on SubStack in the comments or on BlueSky. If you want replies to be private, use the email address tools@earthlink.net. That address will exist for at least another month, probably two. Detailed discussions would take place privately through that email address anyway.

Everyone is invited to comment here or suggest how it could run or whatever.

Regards

22 Trucks

PS If you have ideas for articles I should write, feel free to suggest away.

Kupyansk:

As predicted, Russia is now concentrating on driving towards Kupyansk from the E. Ukraine has the Russian infiltration in the center of town (little RED circle below) completely under control and mostly down to a single block of buildings with a few dozen Ruskies hiding out, shivering, and wishing they weren’t surrounded and hungry. And now they have probably lost much of their commo, too.

On the E side of the river (light BLUE squiggly line), Russia has had some success driving toward town particularly from the NE.

The map shows two mappers results. The DARK RED block up by Synkivka represents territory Russia has taken since last we looked at Kupyansk (30 Jan). Synkivka itself has passed back and forth a couple of time in the past two years, so Russia being shown as controlling it is not necessarily a done deal.

The actual interim goal of this move from the E is the smaller rail town of Kupyansk Vuzlovi on the E side of the river. There are fewer Ukrainian units on the E side of the river than there used to be a month or two ago (probably a good thing). The two main forces remaining (14^th Mech Bde and 43^rd Mech Bde) have backed up toward the river with one defending Kupyansk Vuzlovi and the other defending access to Kupyansk itself slightly further N. There are a couple of independent battalions with them as well. They face at least three tank regiments and perhaps as many as about a dozen Motorized Rifle Regiments (MMRs).

It’s a tough match to fight.

The Starlink situation seems to have caused a pause in Russian operations, but no real change in Russian positions.

Lyman:

No apparent big changes from the 3 Feb update. An attack here, a counter there... Same type thing as was happening before. No new map is really needed. The one in the last article hasn’t changed much. Lyman holds with perhaps a pause caused by Starlink, but no Russian fall-back.

Siversk:

From here on this will be called eastern Sloviansk/Kramatorsk or E Slov/Kram for short.

Since the update article (4 Feb), Russia has been actively and aggressively pushing forward (westward) here to approach and engage the two cities as the RED chunks and arrows above illustrate. It will probably be a while until they get there, though. Again, maybe a Starlink pause, but no fall-back.

Kostyantynivka:

Since this update was only a few days ago on 5 Feb, there’s only been some minor moves in Ukraine’s favor (BLUE chunk), but Russia is once more attacking, so likely has recovered somewhat from the Starlink thing.

Pokrovsk:

Now we’re covering a town where the update was published only about a week ago (13 Feb). Multiple mappers have Russia now holding (though likely not “controlling”) pretty much the whole town whereas before, they didn’t have the N edge, yet.

A of these mappers couple show three aggressive attacks toward Hryshyne, out of Rodynske, and toward Dobropillya (RED arrows and “bulges” on map). I don’t know how successful any of these attacks have been, yet. Russia’s attacking, so likely has reestablished control after Starlink.

Hulyaipole:

Now to be called Hulyaipole/Orikhiv or Huly/Orik for short.

Even though this was updated only a couple of days ago, this has been the most active area with Ukraine conducing multiple attacks mostly N of town over about a 40 kms wide swath. Most of this action had commenced when I wrote that last update on 14 Feb, but it had not settled into a result. There was also a cheerleading diary on this area on DKos a couple of days ago that made absolutely no sense.

Almost the entire Ukrainian net gain in territory last week was in this 40 kms wide swath.

Things are still sorting themselves out to some extent. Example: one mapper showed the tiny town of Myrne in the extreme S of the map going from Russian to Ukrainian to Russian control in the space of about 2-3 days. We’ll see where things are at the end of the week. If it’s appreciably different fromm this, I’ll let you know.

Some are calling this a Ukrainian “offensive.” I don’t really see that as the case. I suppose it depends how you define “offensive.” To me, an offensive is a a pre-planned relatively major action that is sustained over a period of more than just a couple of days that has a long-term defined goal to achieve at its end. I don’t see this rising to that level.

It is more likely the Ukrainians taking advantage of the Russian confusion and lack of communications and control as a result of losing Starlink. There are multiple indications that this area was the most effected by the loss of Starlink. Perhaps the local commander depended on it more. Perhaps the fact that the Russians moved forward relatively quickly in the past several weeks made them more dependent with no fixed communications assets in place. There are a couple of other possible explanations. However, we will see in the next few days whether they have recovered enough to stop their territorial losses. It’s early, but it appears they have. That may be temporary, though.

With everything up-to-date, I will start referring to these areas only when there is action or movement that materially alters the situation in one of more of them and I will similarly refer to other areas not covered, yet, by exception as the situation warrants.

I will likely examine and present an overview of trends in territory and casualties over the past two years next. If there are specific requests, let me know either here or on BlueSky.

I’ve just decided I should probably write a map explanation (colors, symbols, conventions, mapper identification, etc.) as well that will move to stay right below the top of the article list as well.

22 Trucks