Your Party has faded into political irrelevance, exposing its internal divisions, questionable purpose and failure to build momentum while becoming a huge distraction for Muslims seeking genuine independent political representation, writes Riaz Sobrany.

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This time last year, Your Party presented itself as the next big thing in politics, with reportedly more than 800,000 people signing up as supporters of the project. One year later, it has faded almost into oblivion, currently registering at around 0–1% in national voting intention surveys.

For the best part of a year many Muslims enthusiastically engaged with Your Party as a potential new political home, but now this seems like so much wasted time and effort.

Your Party seemed to die shortly after Jeremy Corbyn’s faction took control of the party’s Central Executive Committee in February, effectively making him its de facto leader. The Corbyn-controlled CEC subsequently restricted the dual-membership arrangements backed at the founding conference, excluding members of several other far-left organisations.

It is noteworthy that in the autumn of last year it was almost impossible to keep up with the number of articles and videos being produced about Your Party. That coverage almost completely dried up after Corbyn’s faction took control of the CEC in February.

This raises big questions about how much public support there really is for Jeremy Corbyn.

He undeniably has a huge personal vote in Islington North, and he will almost certainly win if he contests the seat again in 2029. But the impression I get is that outside his constituency he probably has more than a million admirers, but very few non-Muslims see him as a political leader any more.

A high proportion of the youth vote and non-Muslim progressives who chanted “Oh, Jeremy Corbyn” back in 2019 have now migrated to the Green Party and made it their new political home. That arguably renders a party led by Jeremy Corbyn redundant and superfluous.

However, he still seems to have a sizeable support base among Muslims, despite his shortcomings.

Zarah Sultana

I have believed from the outset that Your Party is really the Zarah Sultana party. After all, she launched the project with a tweet. Jeremy Corbyn initially opposed its creation but later caved in and went along with it, taking the four independent Muslim MPs with him.

Zarah Sultana’s model of Your Party is an ultra-left cocoon for all sorts of Marxist and Trotskyist groups, many of which are not political parties themselves, with Your Party effectively functioning as a front through which they can contest elections.

The defeat of Zarah Sultana’s faction in the elections to Your Party’s Central Executive Committee, combined with the subsequent decision by the Corbyn-dominated CEC to prohibit members of several other far-left organisations from holding dual membership, appears to have resulted in support for Your Party from sections of the far left rapidly melting away.

This may also help explain the dramatic decline in articles and videos about Your Party since February.

If Zarah Sultana’s faction had won control of the CEC, then Your Party would almost certainly be a more active and lively organisation today.

However, an overwhelming majority of her supporters are poor-quality political activists who are already members of other far-left organisations. They are people who, in my view, are incapable of building support in local communities and winning votes in elections, no matter which organisation they join. Relatively few members of the Zarah Sultana faction appear to have significant experience or expertise in electoral politics.

Support for Your Party among Muslims would probably be lower with Sultana in control than it is with Jeremy Corbyn as its de facto leader, although some Muslims will undoubtedly be attracted by her outspoken anti-Zionist stance, despite there being little apparent place within her politics for socially conservative people.

It is unclear what Zarah Sultana’s endgame is. Her pattern of public support appears almost the inverse of Jeremy Corbyn’s: a large number of supporters scattered across the country but relatively few in her own constituency. If she decides to contest Coventry South as a Your Party candidate in 2029, I believe she will be lucky to save her deposit.

In conclusion, Your Party has been a complete circus act since its inception, and a huge distraction from building a genuine independent Muslim political movement.

As Sacha Baron Cohen faces growing outrage over his new Ali G film, it is worth asking whether this under-fire pro-Israel British comedian has built his career over Islamophobic mockery of Muslims. Robert Carter takes a detailed look at some examples of his “Islamophobic caricatures” and whether they paint a picture of a more insidious agenda.

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Sacha Baron Cohen is returning as Ali G, the character that helped make him one of Britain’s big comic exports. However, his new film, Ali G: Who Iz I?, has not been as well received as he would have hoped. Online negativity against the satirical figure and film has steadily grown. Many have taken to social media to accuse Ali G, who in the trailer is seen wearing fake dreadlocks and a Rastafarian hat and discussing his desire to be an “absent” father, of being an “outdated” and “racist” caricature.

Anti-racism activists have reportedly sent 37,000 emails to theatres urging them not to show the controversial film

Much of the outrage so far has been focused on concern over a white comedian engaging in “blackface” and whether the Ali G has crossed that threshold (wouldn’t be the first of its kind in recent pro-Israel British comedic history *cough cough David Baddiel*) but there is an equally strong case to make about Baron Cohen’s obsession with depicting insulting caricatures about Muslims and Arabs.

So, let’s examine what exactly has Sacha Baron Cohen’s comedy done to Muslims, Arabs and other ethnic minorities over the years?

Ali G

Following his first appearance in 1998, Ali G quickly became one of Sacha Baron’s most famous characters. In 2000, prominent Black comedians accused the character of offensive behaviour and argued that a white, Cambridge-educated comedian was effectively performing a caricature of Black street culture for a mainstream audience.

However, for years, it wasn’t clear exactly who Ali was ethnically or religiously speaking? The name Ali suggested it could be a Muslim, his uncle Jamaal certainly reinforced the belief that essentially the character was essentially a weird generic British Muslim trying really hard to be black. It wasn’t until it wasn’t until the movie Ali G Indahouse in 2000 that Sacha finally revealed that Ali’s full name was actually Alistair Leslie Graham. For years, many assumed he was a generic Muslim, and frankly, many still do.

Borat

Then along came the Borat movie.

A 2006 mockumentary comedy starring Sacha Baron Cohen as Borat Sagdiyev, a fictional and grotesquely exaggerated television reporter from Muslim-majority Kazakhstan. Borat travels to the United States to supposedly make a documentary about American life, but the film largely follows his encounters with real people, whom he provokes into revealing their prejudices, ignorance or bizarre behaviour.

The film became a huge international success but also caused controversy, particularly in Kazakhstan, where officials condemned its portrayal of the country as insulting and inaccurate. Critics also argued that the comedy relied on stereotypes about a real, predominantly Muslim nation, despite Baron Cohen’s insistence that the fictional Kazakhstan depicted in the film was deliberately absurd and that the real target was Westerners willing to believe the caricature.

Borat provides another example. The character was presented as a grotesquely ignorant, racist and misogynistic journalist from Kazakhstan, a predominantly Muslim country whose government strongly condemned the portrayal as insulting and inaccurate.

Borat was portrayed as backwards, weird, stupid and, frankly, just dirty and his home village was also portrayed as a dirty uneducated backwater which was teeming with antisemitism and a hatred for women.

Of course, actual Kazakh culture is nothing like that and, of course, it is a Muslim majority country.

There was also further controversy over the supposed “Kazakh village” used as Borat’s hometown. The scenes were actually filmed in Glod, an impoverished Roma village in Romania, where some residents later claimed they had been misled about the nature of the production and felt humiliated by how they were portrayed. Several villagers launched legal action against the filmmakers, although the case did not ultimately succeed.

Baron Cohen argued that the joke was aimed at Westerners willing to believe his absurd portrayal of Kazakhstan. But critics could reasonably ask why a real country and real impoverished people had to provide the backdrop for the caricature in the first place. I guess any old impoverish region would do when depicting an awful character from a generic Muslim country.

The Dictator

Then there was The Dictator.

Released in 2012, The Dictator stars Sacha Baron Cohen as Admiral General Aladeen, the absurdly brutal ruler of the fictional North African state of Wadiya. After travelling to New York to address the UN, Aladeen is betrayed by his uncle, stripped of his beard and replaced by a lookalike. He then finds himself living anonymously in the United States while trying to regain control of his country.

The film portrays Aladeen as an exaggerated despot surrounded by many familiar Western stereotypes associated with Arab and Middle Eastern rulers: an oil-rich desert state, camels, a harem, nuclear weapons, terrorism jokes, a mock-Arabic language that sounds like gibberish and an obsession with violence, terrorism and, once again, generic Arabs/Muslims being antisemitic.

The film generated a significant backlash from Arab-American groups. Nadia Tonova of the National Network for Arab American Communities said the portrayal appeared to perpetuate negative stereotypes about Arabs at a time when Arab-Americans were already facing profiling and prejudice. Arab-American comedian Dean Obeidallah went further, describing the film as a “modern-day minstrel show”

Baron Cohen has insisted that General Aladeen was not an Arab or a Muslim character and that religion was deliberately avoided in the film. Frankly, anyone who watched even 10mins of this film would find that claim laughable – unlike much of the film’s actual content.

In an interview, he said the fictional country and dictator were intended to draw from multiple influences rather than represent a specific Arab or Muslim society. However, it has widely been taken that the character, country and culture being targeted in the film was Libya and its former leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Academic research examining audience reactions to The Dictator found that some Muslim participants interpreted Baron Cohen’s work as containing anti-Muslim racism and reinforcing negative stereotypes, particularly in an already Islamophobic climate. That does not prove that Baron Cohen intended to spread Islamophobia. But it does demonstrate that the argument over his comedy is not some imaginary grievance invented by people who simply “cannot take a joke.”

When Muslims and other minorities object to being repeatedly presented through familiar stereotypes – the backward foreigner, the sexually depraved Arab, the violent despot, the ignorant immigrant or the threatening Muslim-looking man – it is not enough for a wealthy comedian to reply that his intentions were more sophisticated than the audience’s understanding.

A Zionist elephant in the room?

And Baron Cohen’s work has always occupied a strange territory. He relentlessly claims to expose racism but has also made vast amounts of money by giving mainstream audiences permission to laugh at characters constructed from the very stereotypes he supposedly opposes.

That contradiction becomes particularly striking when compared with his own public activism against antisemitism.

Baron Cohen has been outspoken on the subject. In 2019, he delivered a major speech at the pro-Israel Anti-Defamation League (ADL) event attacking social media companies for allowing hate and antisemitism to spread. He described them as an unprecedented propaganda machine and argued forcefully that hatred should not be amplified for profit.

The ADL is a well established Zionist organisation which considers anti-Zionism as a form of antisemitism.

Sacha Baron has close personal, familial, and cultural ties to Israel through his mother’s birth in the country, his Jewish heritage, and satirical elements in his comedy. He grew up in London within an Orthodox Jewish household and maintains a strong connection to Jewish tradition.

At the age of 18, Cohen joined the HaBonim Dror Olami Zionist youth movement and he soon began pursuing his passion for acting in several HaBonim theatrical productions. According to the website, after joining HaBonim Dror Olami, he went to Israel in 1989 and spent a year volunteering with his friends from the Zionist youth movement in Kibbutz Rosh HaNikra.

Now, obviously, being Jewish doesn’t automatically make you Islamophobic or racist but Zionism is a political ideology – a racist colonial politically ideology which promotes and engages in the ethnic cleansing of Arabs and Muslims from the Holy Land.

So, if Sacha Baron is a Zionist, which it appears he very certainly is, it would explain why he constantly and obsessively depicts Muslims in a way which would make a Zionist racist like Ben Gvir chuckle in amusement and agreement.

Baron Cohen’s Jewish identity is well known, and his public record shows strong engagement with combating antisemitism and working with Jewish organisations. He has also played Israeli characters, most notably the Mossad agent Eli Cohen in The Spy, and an Israeli military character, Erran Morad, in Who Is America?

It is worth stating that publicly available evidence does not show Sacha Baron Cohen declaring himself a staunch Zionist outright, but reading between the lines it would be hard to assume that he is anything other than one given his career choices and family ties.

So, with pressure mounting over his film and claims of outdated and offensive stereotypes, I think now is the ideal time to add some additional, and long overdue scrutiny over Sacha Baron’s bizarre obsession with weirdo Muslim characters and whether his agenda is to simply “make people laugh” or if there is a more insidious agenda at play here….

The Butcher of Bosnia Ratko Mladić may be dead, but the hatred that fuelled the Bosnian genocide is thriving in a Europe increasingly comfortable with demonising Muslims, writes Roshan Muhammed Salih.

The death of Ratko Mladić yesterday should bring back powerful memories for any Muslim old enough to remember the Bosnian War in the 1990s.

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For Muslims in Europe, Bosnia was a seminal moment. It was when many of us realised that it did not really matter what colour our skin was. There were still people on this continent prepared to hate, persecute and even slaughter us simply because we were Muslim.

After all, Bosnian Muslims were white Europeans, physically virtually indistinguishable from their Serb and Croat neighbours. And many were not particularly religious or practising Muslims at all.

Decades of socialist rule in Yugoslavia had produced a largely secular society, and for many Bosniaks their Muslim identity was as much cultural and ancestral as it was religious. Some barely practised Islam at all.

Yet that did not save them. They could still be identified as Muslims by their names, their families and their identity, and that was enough for them to be targeted.

And there was a profound irony in this. As Bosnian Muslims realised that they were being persecuted and killed because they were Muslims, the war itself contributed to an Islamic revival among sections of the Bosniak population. A people whose Muslim identity their enemies wanted to eradicate began rediscovering and asserting that very identity.

British Muslim awakening

For many British Muslims, Bosnia produced a similar awakening. It was a moment when a generation began to identify themselves more consciously as Muslims rather than primarily through their racial or ethnic identities as Asians, Arabs or something else.

I distinctly remember British Muslims travelling to Bosnia to deliver desperately needed aid to a population being slaughtered. Among them was Moazzam Begg, who would later become one of Britain’s best-known Muslim campaigners.

We remember, too, the international arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia, which left the poorly-armed Bosnian government at an enormous disadvantage against Bosnian Serb forces that had inherited access to much of the weaponry and military infrastructure of the Yugoslav People’s Army.

And we remember how the Bosnians fought back despite those odds. It was only much later in the war, after years of killing and ethnic cleansing and the Srebrenica genocide, that decisive Western military intervention finally came.

Bill Clinton himself would later acknowledge in his autobiography My Life that religion had played a part in Europe’s disastrous response to the war. Reflecting on why Bosnia had been neglected for so long, the former US President wrote that “some European leaders were not eager to have a Muslim state in the heart of the Balkans,” fearing that it might become a base for exporting extremism.

My own visits to Bosnia

I never went to Bosnia during the war itself. But I remember holding university debates where we showed horrifying footage of the slaughter of Bosnian Muslims and heard testimony about the systematic rape of Muslim women by Bosnian Serb forces.

Those images and testimonies had a profound impact on my generation.

Years later, I finally travelled to Bosnia myself. I visited Sarajevo, Mostar, Srebrenica and other parts of what is an extraordinarily beautiful country. But Srebrenica was the most poignant.

To stand in the place where more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were massacred was to confront physically what we had watched from afar during the 1990s. And it was impossible to forget that these people had supposedly been under the protection of the international community. Srebrenica had been declared a United Nations “safe area”, yet the international system catastrophically failed the people it was supposed to protect.

But we should also be careful not to allow the enormity of Srebrenica to obscure what happened elsewhere.

The killing and ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims took place across vast areas of eastern and northern Bosnia. Places such as Prijedor, Zvornik and Višegrad became synonymous with massacres, detention camps, expulsions, rape and the destruction of Muslim communities that had existed there for generations.

Thousands of Bosniaks were killed in these areas. In Višegrad alone, estimates cited by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia put the number of murdered Bosniaks at around 3,000. The atrocities were not confined to one terrible week in Srebrenica in July 1995. They formed part of a much wider campaign to permanently remove Muslims from territory claimed by Serb nationalists.

My wider travels through Bosnia also left me with an uncomfortable impression: that the peace agreement which ended the war had stopped the killing, but had not necessarily resolved the hatreds which produced it.

In some respects, a sticking plaster had been placed over a much deeper wound.

The political project pursued by Mladić and Radovan Karadžić helped create Republika Srpska, the Serb entity that still constitutes almost half of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian nationalism did not disappear with the end of the war, and Mladić and Karadžić have continued to be glorified as heroes by sections of the Serb population despite their convictions for genocide and other war crimes.

The precursor to genocide

And that brings us to the most disturbing lesson of all: the Bosnian genocide did not emerge from nowhere, and nor did the ideology behind it suddenly appear in the 1990s.

The Greater Serbian nationalist tradition which demonised Slavic Muslims had roots stretching back into the nineteenth century. Anti-Muslim ideas and violence had existed in the Balkans through successive periods of upheaval, conflict and population displacement long before Mladić and Karadžić appeared on the scene.

Under socialist Yugoslavia, these nationalist divisions were officially suppressed in favour of a common Yugoslav identity and the ideal of unity among the South Slavic peoples. But they were never completely extinguished.

As Yugoslavia began to unravel, particularly during the 1980s, Serbian nationalism re-emerged with enormous force. Old historical grievances and myths were revived and Muslims were increasingly portrayed as an alien and threatening presence on land claimed by Serbian nationalists.

By the time war came to Bosnia, therefore, the propagandists did not have to invent anti-Muslim hatred from scratch. They were drawing upon an existing historical reservoir of nationalism, grievance and prejudice and adapting it to the politics of the late twentieth century.

That propaganda was then reinforced by political incitement, media demonisation and ultimately street-level and military violence. Muslims were portrayed as a threat, as an alien presence and eventually as people against whom extraordinary measures could be justified.

The legacy of Mladić and Karadžić lives on

Look around Europe in 2026 and some of those warning signs are disturbingly familiar.

Ratko Mladić may be dead, but the ideology he represented has not disappeared. His legacy continues to be celebrated and defended by sections of society in Republika Srpska and Serbia.

Nor is that phenomenon confined to those places. Mladić and the wider ultranationalist ideology with which he is associated have also been glorified among sections of the Serb population in Montenegro and in Serb-majority areas of Kosovo.

Murals, graffiti, commemorations and public displays honouring convicted war criminals demonstrate that this ideology did not die at Dayton, nor with the convictions of Mladić and Karadžić at The Hague.

And beyond the Balkans, the wider ideology of hatred towards Muslims simply because they are Muslims has become deeply embedded in European political discourse.

Anti-Muslim rhetoric that would once have been confined to the political fringes is increasingly mainstream. Muslims are routinely portrayed as a demographic, cultural and security threat. Politicians build careers around hostility towards Islam. And inflammatory rhetoric is amplified through sections of the media and across social media.

That is why Muslims who remember Bosnia should pay particular attention to what is happening in Europe today.

We have seen this process before. We know that genocides do not begin with massacres. They begin with words, with dehumanisation, with political movements convincing populations that a minority among them represents an existential threat.

Bosnia should have taught Europe where the systematic demonisation of an entire religious community can ultimately lead.

Thirty years later, as Ratko Mladić passes into history, the uncomfortable question is whether Europe learned that lesson at all.

Alparslan Kuytul, the outspoken Muslim leader who has challenged President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for years, now finds himself behind bars alongside dozens of his Furkan Movement followers. But who exactly is Kuytul and what does his Furkan Movement stand for?

On August 19, 32 suspects tied to the now-closed Furkan Education and Service Foundation were arrested by Turkish authorities. The arrests included its founder, Alparslan Kuytul, 60, and his wife Semra Kuytul.

A further 24 suspects were also taken into custody, bringing the total to 56 individuals tied to the organisation.

Kuytul is the founding chairman and leader of the Furkan Movement, a grassroots Islamic movement which opposes the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkish authorities arrested the suspects on charges of “establishing and managing a criminal organisation,” “laundering assets derived from crime,” “aggravated fraud,” “forgery of official documents,” and “violation of the Tax Procedure Law.”

The now-criminalised Furkan Movement

The movement was founded in 1981 by Kuytul under the slogan “In God’s world, what God says must happen!”

Other slogans include: “From tawheed to civilisation!” including quotes to a verse from the 54th verse of Surah A’raf: “Both creation and judgement belong to Allah.”

The official website of the Furkan Movement states that it is an Islamic movement, founded in Adana, Türkiye, “with the aim of preaching tawheed to all of humanity in line with the Qur’an and Sunnah and building an Islamic civilisation.”

Speaking on the mission of the movement, Furkan says they “aim to raise our generation as a generation that has true faith and morality, is in love with worship, has a high scientific and intellectual level, struggles by legitimate means for Allah’s domination on earth, and will lead the society in good deeds.”

The movement can also be described as being driven by pan-Islamic sentiments, or an “Ummatic vision” built on uniting Muslims around the implementation of Islam and Shari’ah.

In addition to its Islamic motives, Furkan is also a fierce opponent of the current Turkish government and ruling AKP party, having had numerous run-ins with the authorities and the law over the years.

The movement does not command mass support in Türkiye, but has built a committed nationwide following, particularly among religious conservatives disillusioned with Erdoğan and the AKP.

Alparslan Kuytul: Leader of Furkan

Alparslan Kuytul, born in 1965 in Adana, Türkiye, is a graduate of the Faculty of Engineering and Architecture and a former student of Al-Azhar University from 1993 to 1997, where he studied Islamic Law at the Faculty of Shari’ah.

Kuytul is a follower of the Hanafi school of thought and rejects Salafi interpretations of Islam, adding that he is against the so-called “Takfiri” ideology of the “Wahhabis”.

The genesis of the Furkan Movement and Kuytul’s Islamic activism can be traced back to 1981, when during his high school years he began engaging in politics and Islamic lectures.

He founded Kardeşler Bookstore in 1988, where he led classes and lectures, and then formally founded the Furkan Education and Service Foundation in 1994, where he continued to give lectures every Friday about Hadith, Sirah, Fiqh, Usul, Arabic, politics, and wider socio-political topics on the state of Islam and the Middle East.

His wife, Semra Kuytul, leads the women’s branch of the Furkan Movement.

A leading aspect of Kuytul’s Islamic political activism is built around pursuing an Islamic vision for Türkiye and advocating for the implementation of Shari’ah law.

Pro-Furkan sources state that the Furkan Movement’s mission is “to bring about an Islamic socio-political and economic change in Türkiye.”

Kuytul believes that Erdoğan is a pseudo-Islamic politician who uses Islam to rally support without implementing it according to its principles, often challenging the Islamic slogans of the AKP as disingenuous.

Kuytul’s views

The Furkan Movement and its founder are known for holding views beyond the situation in Türkiye, calling for change or expressing support for certain governments within the Middle East.

Kuytul viewed the civil war in Syria as a trap for the Middle East, claiming it was an imperial project aimed at sowing Sunni-Shia divisions.

Kuytul is often cited as a supporter of the Iranian regime, frequently defending it against U.S. and Israeli actions and speaking out against Sunni-Shia sectarianism.

With regard to the recent Mecca Defence Agreement, Kuytul strongly criticised Erdoğan for excluding Iran and Palestine, arguing that such pacts without Iran risk turning into a “Western-backed coalition” against fellow Muslims.

Domestic views

Erdoğan supporters tend to make several accusations against Alparslan Kuytul and the Furkan Movement: that he presents himself as an Islamic scholar while relentlessly attacking an elected Islamist-rooted government; that his rhetoric undermines Türkiye during sensitive security operations; and that his opposition sometimes overlaps with narratives promoted by the AKP’s enemies.

More seriously, pro-government voices have accused Furkan of having sympathies toward or links with groups such as FETÖ, ISIS and the PKK. Kuytul and Furkan have repeatedly rejected such allegations.

Ideologically, Erdoğan supporters also object to Kuytul portraying the AKP as Islamic in rhetoric but un-Islamic in practice. His mocking description of the AKP as the “ZKP” (Zulüm Kalkınma Partisi — “Oppression Development Party”), his criticism of Turkish nationalism, support for Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, opposition to the Afrin operation, and criticism of Ankara’s foreign policy have all made him particularly controversial among Erdoğan’s conservative base.

Criticism towards Erdoğan from Kuytul intensified following the 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye, which Kuytul claims was dealt with insufficiently.

As a result, Erdoğan loyalists labelled Kuytul and the Furkan Movement as a terrorist-sympathising organisation.

Kuytul once said that if the AKP ever “declares war” on him, his supporters would not back down, and he frequently refers to the AKP as ZKP (Zülüm Kalkınma Partisi), meaning “Oppressive Development Party.”

The pan-Islamic nature of Kuytul’s activism has also led him to criticise the Turkish government’s treatment of Kurds, saying: “The infidel has already divided us into 50–60 pieces. We shouldn’t want to be divided again. If the Turks want a Turkish state, the Kurds will want a Kurdish state as a result. Arabs will also want an Arab state. But if they all want the Islamic state, then they can unite.

“Every race must abandon the understanding of the nation-state. We are already very divided, will we be divided again? Therefore, everyone should understand the Qur’an in order not to be divided again. We must return to Islamic civilisation. Whatever rights the Qur’an gives to every race, everyone will consent to those rights, with its Turks, Kurds, Arabs.”

“We will all lose when we are divided,” Kuytul continued.

Kuytul supports Kurdish rights and Kurdish language recognition and education in schools, criticising Türkiye for being a nation-state based on Turkish identity and therefore going against Islam.

History of government pressure

The arrests of Kuytul, his wife and supporters of his organisation came shortly after he criticised a similar police operation targeting another Islamic community known as Süleymanlılar.

Kuytul was jailed in 2018 after criticising Turkey’s military intervention in northern Syria and opposing its offensive in Afrin, but was later acquitted of terrorism-related charges in 2020.

He was also arrested in 2022 in connection with the abduction of a businessman in Adana on charges of instigating the deprivation of liberty, extortion, bodily harm and torture, which he denied.

He was released pending trial in June 2023.

The Ankara-based Human Rights Association (İHD) criticised the arrests and other measures taken during the investigation, warning against turning pretrial detention as a form of punishment, saying: “The appointment of trustees to companies, the seizure of assets, the blocking of hundreds of social media accounts and the detention of lawyers following the case raise serious concerns about rights violations.”

The Turkish government has repeatedly denied using criminal investigations to silence its critics.

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A century after Atatürk’s Hat Law helped consign the fez to history, Muhammad Siddeeq went searching for one in Istanbul — and found himself confronting Türkiye’s unresolved struggle over its Islamic and secular identity.

During a recent visit to Istanbul, I went in search of its Ottoman past. It is difficult not to; the city wears its history almost everywhere: in its skyline, its mosques, its bazaars and in the names of sultans whose empire once stretched across three continents.

I attended Friday prayers at the magnificent Sultan Ahmed Mosque, better known as the Blue Mosque, and later prayed Asr at Hagia Sophia, the great Byzantine basilica that became an Ottoman mosque after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, a museum under the secular republic, and once again a functioning mosque in 2020.

To pray beneath its vast dome, and afterwards listen to the customary Turkish style recitation of the Qur’an, was a deeply moving experience. I also visited the Süleymaniye Mosque, commissioned by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent at the height of Ottoman power.

But among the usual pleasures of Istanbul — its kebabs, coffee, ice cream and crowded streets — there was one particular souvenir I wanted to take home: a red Ottoman fez. That proved surprisingly difficult.

The fez is instantly recognisable: a cylindrical red felt hat, usually topped by a black tassel. Introduced as part of Sultan Mahmud II’s programme of military and administrative reform in the 1820s, it eventually became ubiquitous among Ottoman men.

Far from being an ancient Islamic garment, it was itself once a modernising innovation. Yet over the following century it became one of the most powerful visual symbols of Ottoman identity.

Disappearance of the fez

I assumed that in a city which enthusiastically markets its imperial heritage, fezzes would be everywhere. They were not.

Street after street and bazaar after bazaar, I saw virtually nobody wearing one. There were occasional exceptions: ice-cream sellers performing for tourists and employees at establishments such as the famous Hafiz Mustafa confectionery shops.

Otherwise, the hat that once appeared on the heads of Ottoman officials, soldiers, merchants and ordinary citizens had almost disappeared from public life.

Eventually I found one in Istanbul’s historic Egyptian, or Spice Bazaar. Even there, the fezzes were tucked away among other tourist souvenirs towards the back of the shop.

I picked out a bright red one with a black tassel. Unlike almost everything else one buys in a bazaar, I did not even bargain.

The shopkeeper placed it quickly into a plastic bag. Half joking, I asked: “Am I allowed to wear it?”

His answer stopped me. “No. Not here in Türkiye.”

Whether the legal position today is quite as straightforward as that answer suggested is another matter, but his instinctive reaction was revealing.

Mustafa Kemal’s secular reforms

In 1925, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s newly established republic introduced the Hat Law as part of a sweeping programme intended to westernise Turkish society and break symbolically with the Ottoman order. The legislation promoted Western-style brimmed hats for public officials and helped drive the fez — regarded by the new republican elite as a symbol of the old Ottoman world — out of public life.

The significance went far beyond clothing.

Atatürk abolished the Ottoman sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924. Religious institutions were brought firmly under secular state control. The Arabic script was replaced by a modified Latin alphabet. Dress, education and public administration became battlegrounds in the construction of a new, secular and self-consciously European-oriented Turkish nation.

The fez consequently acquired a meaning greater than the object itself.

To many secular Turks, particularly those strongly attached to the Kemalist foundations of the republic, it can evoke an era from which Atatürk deliberately attempted to make a decisive break: monarchy, caliphate, religious authority and an imperial identity that transcended Turkish nationalism.

For others, however, the Ottoman inheritance is not something embarrassing to be discarded but an essential part of Turkish history.

That tension has become increasingly visible during the long political dominance of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party, the AK Party.

A new era under Erdoğan

Erdoğan has repeatedly embraced Ottoman history and symbolism in public discourse. Ottoman rulers are frequently referred to as “our ancestors”, while imperial architecture, military achievements and Islamic heritage have assumed a much more prominent place in Türkiye’s presentation of its national story.

His governments have also dismantled some of the restrictions associated with the older, more rigid interpretation of Turkish secularism. Most notably, prohibitions preventing women wearing the Islamic headscarf in many universities and state institutions were progressively removed.

Yet the fez remains conspicuously absent.

Perhaps that is because restoring it would strike a particularly sensitive symbolic nerve. The headscarf can be defended as an issue of individual religious freedom. The fez, by contrast, is inseparable in the Turkish imagination from the political struggle between Ottoman continuity and Kemalist revolution.

That is precisely why it matters.

A mature republic should surely be confident enough to allow its citizens to engage freely with every part of their history. Wearing a fez need not mean demanding the restoration of the Ottoman Empire, any more than admiring an Ottoman mosque constitutes a rejection of republican Turkey.

A century after the Hat Law, Türkiye is no longer the fragile new state Atatürk was attempting to forge from the ruins of an empire. It is a major regional power with a strong national identity of its own.

Perhaps the greatest sign of confidence would therefore be neither to erase the Ottoman past nor to romanticise it, but simply to allow Turks to decide for themselves what parts of that inheritance they wish to embrace.

The little red hat I carried through Istanbul in a plastic bag ultimately represented something much larger: a country still negotiating the relationship between the secular republic it became and the Islamic empire it once was.

If President Erdogan truly sees the Ottomans as his “ancestors” as he often so proudly proclaims, then it is high time that he repeals Law No. 671 and allows Turks to wear the Fez with pride once again.

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It’s now 57 years since an arson attack devastated Al-Aqsa Mosque. On this date, 5Pillars’ Robert Carter expresses fresh fears for Islam’s third holiest site as genocidal Zionist extremists have grown more emboldened than ever before amid Western complicity in the Gaza genocide and Muslim world leadership shying away from direct action.

On August 21, 1969, the Muslim world awoke to horrifying news: Al-Aqsa Mosque was on fire.

An Australian national, Denis Michael Rohan, had set fire to one of Islam’s holiest sites just two years after Israel’s invasion and occupation of East Jerusalem. The blaze caused extensive damage and destroyed the historic Minbar of Salahuddin, a priceless symbol of Islamic history that had stood in the mosque for centuries.

The attack provoked outrage across the Muslim world and helped lead to the creation of what is now the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The UN Security Council condemned the “extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem” and described the incident as an act of desecration and profanation at one of mankind’s most venerated shrines.

Today, 57 years later, the anniversary should not simply be an occasion to remember a crime from history. It should act as a stark warning.

Because Al-Aqsa remains under threat. The situation has become so dire that some observers consider its destruction imminent, with growing evidence that extremist Zionist and settler movements want to fundamentally transform the site – and some explicitly advocate replacing its Islamic structures with a Jewish temple.

For many Muslims, the danger is not some abstract fear based solely on the memory of 1969. It is rooted in what they can see happening in occupied Palestine today.

A plot backed by Israel’s leaders

The first point to understand is that Al-Aqsa is not simply another religious building.

Under the longstanding arrangements governing the site, the Islamic Waqf administers the compound, while Israel controls access and security. Non-Muslims may visit, but the established status quo prohibits non-Muslim prayer there. That arrangement has come under increasingly direct challenge.

For years, far-right Israeli politicians and sectarian religious nationalist activists have pushed for expanded Jewish access and prayer at the compound. Groups advocating the construction of a so-called Third Temple regard the site as the location of the ancient Jewish temples and seek a fundamental change to its present character.

The most alarming aspect is that these ideas are no longer confined to obscure fringe activists standing outside the gates of power.

Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s National Security Minister, an anti-Arab racist who has invaded the site alongside other extremist settlers, has repeatedly used his political position to challenge the status quo. In August 2024, he openly argued that Jews should be allowed to pray at the compound and said that, if it were up to him, he would build a synagogue there.

Asked directly whether he would build one on the site, his answer was: “Yes.” He also said: “If I could do anything I wanted, I would put an Israeli flag on the site.”

The question Muslims must ask is obvious: how can Al-Aqsa be considered safe when a senior minister openly talks about establishing a synagogue within the very compound that Muslims regard as sacred?

Ben-Gvir and other Israeli politicians have repeatedly invaded the compound, while growing numbers of religious nationalist visitors have prayed and performed rituals there despite the laws protecting the Islamic site from Zionist Jewish conquest.

On July 23 this year, Ben-Gvir again desecrated the compound during Tisha B’Av. He praised what he described as “huge progress” and celebrated the sight of Jews praying there and “feeling like they’re the owners of the place.” “This has never happened before,” he reportedly said. The message couldn’t be any clearer. The Zionist pig wants Al Aqsa.

The Israeli government may officially insist that the status quo remains unchanged, but actions on the ground tell the exact opposite. Even when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office has publicly reaffirmed the existing arrangements, Ben-Gvir and other religious nationalist figures have continued to challenge them without consequence.

Jordan, which has a recognised custodial role at the holy site, recently warned of an “imminent” threat of an Israeli takeover following escalating incursions.

In 2025, the Hashamite King of Jordan, King Abdallah II, warned the United Nations: “Israel’s hostile rhetoric calling for the targeting of Al Aqsa will incite a religious war which will reach far beyond the region and lead to an all out clash which no nation will be able to escape.”

Earlier this month, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi warned that continued tampering with the status quo could trigger a religious conflict that would reverberate far beyond Palestine.

Jordan has repeatedly warned that Israeli actions at Al-Aqsa could trigger wider conflict or war, but always shies away from pledging that Jordan itself would go to war specifically to defend its custodianship of Al-Aqsa. Alas, this fact is likely one of the key factors behind why Israel feels so confident to further its plots against the site. After all if they can commit a genocide against Arab Muslims in Gaza and the Muslim world stands by, what would happen if they seized Al Aqsa?

During Ramadan 2025, Israeli authorities severely restricted Palestinian access to the mosque for weeks, imposing age limits and permit requirements on West Bank worshippers. For four consecutive Fridays, Palestinians faced heavy restrictions at checkpoints, with some reportedly turned away despite possessing the permits required to enter Jerusalem. Jordanian and other Arab world leaders again did nothing to help.

To erase Palestine, they must first erase Al Aqsa

Zionist terrorist plots to destroy Al Aqsa are being worked on as we speak.

In April 2025, the Palestinian Foreign Ministry warned about threats circulating among Israeli settler organisations calling for Al-Aqsa Mosque to be attacked and demolished and for a temple to be constructed in its place.

Other Temple movements have openly campaigned for greater control of the site, while settler activists have organised increasingly large incursions and religious rituals inside the compound.

The destruction of Al-Aqsa is not merely something imagined by its defenders. There are activists who advocate replacing the Islamic holy site, politicians who want to establish Jewish religious institutions within the compound and a steady erosion of restrictions that were supposedly designed to preserve its delicate status quo.

But someone ignorant of the conflict for Jerusalem might ask, why are some Jewish settlers so obsessed with replacing Al Aqsa? It’s just a compound. They have already essentially hijacked the city, right?

The fact is, Zionism – the politically ideology behind Israel – wants a total takeover of all Palestine. The land, the sea, the air and even the culture. It wants to completely remove even any reference of Palestine from history. The whole “it was a land without an people for a people without a land” lie which even the PM Netanyahu pushes himself.

The battle for Al-Aqsa cannot be separated from the wider struggle over Jerusalem or the battle to stop an entire cultural genocide from happening. For decades, since the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Europe, Palestinian neighbourhoods have been demolished, residents displaced, settlement projects expanded and Israeli sovereignty increasingly imposed over more Arab land.

International bodies have repeatedly warned about violence, provocation and incitement by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their historic and religious sites.

Jerusalem Al Quds is not merely a collection of buildings. Its mosques, churches, streets, cemeteries, markets and neighbourhoods carry the history of the people who have lived there for centuries.

To remove Palestinian history from Jerusalem would require more than changing a map. It would require changing the physical and religious landscape of the city itself.

That is why Al-Aqsa matters so profoundly.

An attack on the mosque would not simply be an attack on a building. It would strike at Muslim religious identity, Palestinian heritage and the historical character of Jerusalem.

The 57th anniversary of the Al-Aqsa arson attack should therefore be more than a historical commemoration. It should be a moment of vigilance.

Muslims should remember what happened in 1969, remember how quickly the flames consumed one of the most precious treasures inside the mosque and remember that the political and religious forces seeking to alter the status of the compound have not disappeared.

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Roshan Muhammed Salih argues that five years after the Taliban returned to power, Afghanistan is more Islamic, largely at peace and free from foreign occupation — achievements routinely overshadowed by relentless Western criticism of its government.

Five years after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, the country continues to be portrayed in overwhelmingly negative terms by the Western media.

Much of that coverage focuses, sometimes almost exclusively, on the treatment of women and girls. And while the restrictions on female education and employment are serious issues which Muslims themselves should not shy away from criticising, they cannot constitute the entirety of our assessment of Afghanistan today.

There is another story which deserves to be told.

My overwhelming feeling, five years after the Taliban took Kabul, is one of pride and admiration for a movement which defeated the United States and NATO and brought 20 years of foreign occupation to an end.

For two decades, the world’s most powerful military alliance occupied one of the poorest Muslim countries on earth. Tens of thousands of Afghans were killed, families were displaced, homes were destroyed and a political system heavily dependent on Western military and financial support was imposed upon the country.

But ultimately, despite all their military power and trillions of dollars spent, the Americans and their allies were forced to leave.

For me, therefore, the most fundamental achievement of the past five years is sovereignty.

Afghanistan is once again governed by Afghans. It is no longer occupied by racist and Islamophobic Americans, British or other Western powers who presumed that they knew what was best for Afghanistan and attempted to reshape an overwhelmingly Muslim society according to their own political and cultural priorities.

The achievement of peace

Perhaps the Taliban’s greatest achievement in government has been the restoration of security and stability.

Afghanistan experienced approximately four decades of almost continuous warfare — from the Soviet invasion and occupation, through civil war, the first Taliban government and finally the American-led invasion and occupation which began in 2001.

There were periods when horrific numbers of Afghans were being killed every single day. Today, that level of bloodshed has dramatically declined.

Of course, Afghanistan is not completely free of violence. Security incidents and attacks still occur. But compared with the relentless warfare of previous decades, they are relatively rare.

This transformation should not be underestimated.

For those of us sitting safely in Britain, peace can easily be taken for granted. For Afghans who have spent much of their lives surrounded by bombs, airstrikes, checkpoints, insurgency and warfare, the ability simply to live without the constant prospect of violent death is an enormous achievement.

And that security has transformed everyday life in other ways.

People can travel around the country and conduct their daily lives much more easily, during the day and at night. Businesses can operate and people can travel between different parts of Afghanistan without navigating the insecurity associated with the war years.

Women, too, benefit from the dramatic improvement in general security and can move around without facing the same dangers associated with decades of conflict and instability.

An Islamic government that believes in Islam

But there is another aspect of Afghanistan which particularly strikes me as a Muslim.

Of all the Muslim countries I have visited, I feel strongly that Afghanistan has a leadership which genuinely loves Islam and genuinely wants to construct an Islamic society.

That may sound obvious. The Taliban call their state the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, after all.

But across the Muslim world, we know how meaningless Islamic terminology can become in the hands of governments.

Many Muslim countries are ruled by corrupt elites who enrich themselves, serve foreign interests or treat Islam as little more than a tool of political legitimacy. Even among governments which are considerably better than this, corruption, political expediency and a willingness to compromise Islamic principles remain commonplace.

Whatever else one thinks about the Taliban, I do not get the impression that Islam is merely a branding exercise for them. They take their religion seriously.

Their leadership genuinely appears to believe that Islam should shape society and government, and they are attempting — successfully in some areas and unsuccessfully in others — to put that belief into practice.

For Muslims living in an age when so many of our governments seem embarrassed by Islam, subordinate themselves to foreign powers or readily compromise Islamic principles for political convenience, that sincerity should count for something.

Rebuilding Afghanistan

Another striking development is the amount of construction taking place.

This is particularly visible in Kabul, where new roads are being built, existing roads improved, and bridges and other infrastructure projects constructed.

After decades in which Afghanistan became synonymous with destruction, it is significant to see Afghans building rather than watching their country being bombed.

There has also been the Taliban’s campaign against Afghanistan’s drugs industry.

The dramatic reduction in opium cultivation represents a significant development for a country which for decades was the world’s dominant producer of illicit opium. Alongside this, programmes have been established attempting to rehabilitate drug addicts and return them to ordinary life.

These achievements receive nothing like the international attention afforded to Afghanistan’s failures.

Female education

But admiration should never mean blind loyalty. And there is one issue on which I believe the Taliban have got things seriously wrong: female education.

Five years after taking power, restrictions on the education of Afghan women and girls remain a major failure.

There is not a blanket prohibition on every form of female education or employment. Afghan women continue to study and work in certain sectors and circumstances. Nevertheless, severe restrictions remain, particularly when it comes to secondary and higher education.

This has understandably damaged perceptions of the Taliban not only in the West but among Muslims around the world.

And this is important because criticism of these policies cannot simply be dismissed as Western liberalism or hostility towards Islam. Muslims themselves have legitimate concerns.

We do not need Afghanistan to reproduce the Western model of education. An Islamic society has every right to construct an education system consistent with its religion, morality and social values. But Muslim women must be educated.

No Muslim society can reach its potential while half its population is denied adequate educational opportunities.

Women are half of the Ummah. They are also the mothers and educators of future generations. An Islamic society needs knowledgeable Muslim women just as surely as it needs knowledgeable Muslim men.

Importantly, this is not simply an argument between the Taliban and the West. There are differences within the Taliban itself over female education, with the more restrictive position associated with the leadership in Kandahar prevailing for the moment.

I sincerely hope that, with time, this changes.

The economic challenge

The second major problem is economic.

Ordinary Afghans, particularly young people, still struggle to find employment.

The situation has improved in some respects, but unemployment and poverty remain serious problems. Afghanistan also remains relatively isolated internationally and faces sanctions and other restrictions which inevitably constrain its economic development.

A lack of opportunities is one reason many young Afghans continue to leave the country. They want what young people everywhere want: jobs, financial security and the ability to provide for their families.

If the Islamic Emirate is to consolidate its achievements, creating a functioning economy capable of providing opportunities for its young population must therefore be a priority.

Final thoughts

So where does Afghanistan stand five years after the Taliban returned to power?

The answer is considerably more complicated than the caricature presented to us by much of the Western media.

The Taliban have their faults, and Muslims should have the confidence to acknowledge them. The restrictions on female education are particularly difficult to justify and should change. Poverty, unemployment and international isolation remain enormous challenges.

But these failures should not erase what has been achieved.

A foreign occupation has been expelled. Afghanistan has regained its sovereignty. A devastating war has largely ended. Security has dramatically improved. Afghans can travel around their country again. Infrastructure is being constructed. Opium cultivation has been dramatically reduced. And a leadership which genuinely appears to believe in Islam is attempting to build a society around it.

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A Muslim association in Norwich is calling on the community to support its bid to transform a historic former pub into a new mosque and Islamic community centre after its plans attracted dozens of objections.

The Norwich Muslim Community Association (NMCA) is seeking planning permission from Norwich City Council to convert the Grade II-listed Gatehouse pub on Dereham Road into a masjid and community hub.

The association hopes the centre will provide desperately needed additional space for Norwich’s growing Muslim population and is urging Muslims and supporters to get behind the project as it moves through the planning process.

NMCA says Muslims make up around 3% of Norwich’s population — just over 4,000 people — and that the city’s existing mosques are struggling with space limitations, particularly as the younger Muslim population grows.

“Our dream is to create a centre that not only provides a space for worship but also empowers the next generation with a strong Islamic identity, promotes interfaith engagement, and tackles misconceptions about Islam and Muslims,” the association says.

The project has already required a major community fundraising effort. NMCA says it secured the Gatehouse with a 10% deposit before launching an appeal for £800,000 to complete the purchase, renovate the building and deliver its proposed services.

The plans have generated considerable debate during the planning process, attracting significant numbers of both objections and messages of support.

Most opponents have raised conventional concerns about traffic, parking, the scale of a proposed two-storey extension and the future of the historic pub.

However, a minority of objections have contained incendiary rhetoric directed specifically at the prospect of a Muslim place of worship, including claims that Britain is being “taken over by mosques” and that an influx of “Arabic people” would “rip the community to shreds.”

New home for Norwich Muslims

The Gatehouse was built for Morgans Brewery in 1934 and was granted Grade II-listed status in 2015 because of its distinctive inter-war architecture and unusually well-preserved original interior.

The proposed Islamic centre would provide prayer facilities for men, women and young people alongside weekend and evening madrasahs, Hifz classes and Islamic classes for adults.

Plans also include a homework club, recreational facilities for young people, support for new Muslims, funeral facilities, Islamic marriage and advice services, family counselling and a foodbank for poor and vulnerable people.

The association also intends to host mainstream school visits and establish an Islamic exhibition designed to educate non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims.

Historic pub features to be preserved

Despite concerns about the conversion of the Grade II-listed pub, planning documents indicate that significant elements of the historic Gatehouse would be retained.

The original bar, fireplaces, timber panelling, distinctive windows and historic entrance would remain.

Even the building’s old beer-keg pulley equipment would be preserved and relocated elsewhere inside the building as a reminder of its history.

The major architectural intervention would be the demolition of an existing 1970s rear extension and its replacement with a substantially larger two-storey extension containing two main halls and supporting facilities.

The halls would be available for wider community functions and events but would also serve as prayer spaces on Fridays, with the ground-floor hall used by men and the lower-ground-floor hall by women.

The proposals also include landscaped community gardens, pedestrian routes and improvements around the River Wensum.

Traffic and heritage concerns

The planning application has attracted considerable opposition from residents and heritage campaigners.

A review by 5Pillars of more than 100 public representations found that the overwhelming majority of objections concerned conventional planning and heritage issues rather than hostility towards Muslims.

Parking and congestion were among the most frequently raised concerns.

Objectors have questioned whether around two dozen proposed parking spaces would be sufficient for a venue potentially accommodating around 200 people. Residents fear worshippers could instead park along surrounding residential streets.

Several objectors pointed to congestion around an existing mosque further along Dereham Road during Friday prayers as evidence of what they believe could happen at the Gatehouse.

One resident said: “Dereham Road is unacceptable for more traffic, it is often gridlocked, more so on a Friday when the mosque on Dereham Road is open for worship.”

Another warned that people would be “parking all over Tollhouse Road” and said elderly residents needed to be able to park close to their homes.

Other opponents are primarily concerned about the loss of one of Norwich’s historic pubs.

Incendiary objections

However, mixed among the predominantly planning-related opposition are a small number of much more incendiary comments directed at the prospect of the building becoming a mosque.

One objector wrote: “The Gatehouse has been British for many years, we would like it to stay that way.”

“We are being taken over by mosque’s – we don’t want them or need them, this is our country, we have worked very hard for it,” the commenter added. Describing the proposed conversion as “an insult to us,” the objector concluded: “we want it to stay british.”

Another objector said the site should be “a community space for the local community not for the Arabic community.”

The commenter went on to warn that establishing the centre would lead to “an influx of Arabic people moving in” and claimed that it would “rip the community to shreds.”

Another opponent wrote: “No way should this pub be turn into yet another mosque there is one just up the road! Its use should be for local people!”

Another said they were “horrified” at the prospect of the listed pub becoming a mosque and argued there was “no need or justification for another mosque in Norwich.”

Significant support

The application has also attracted substantial support, including from residents who argue that transforming the vacant Gatehouse is preferable to allowing an important historic building to deteriorate.

One supporter wrote: “The Muslim community in my experience is a thoughtful and generous one, and I feel confident that they will make good use of it, given half a chance.”

The same supporter said the proposed centre could encourage greater interaction between different communities and emphasised that the building should remain available for wider community activities.

Another supporter argued that mosques and community facilities provide educational opportunities, youth activities, charitable initiatives and social support.

Others challenged objections about traffic, arguing that another mosque could relieve pressure on existing Islamic facilities by distributing worshippers across different sites.

Supporters have also pointed to the fact that the Gatehouse is currently unused.

One wrote: “The building has been empty and derelict for quite a while now and not serving anyone.”

Applicant rejects pub claims

NMCA also challenged claims that the Gatehouse could simply have continued operating as a pub.

In a submission supporting the application, it said the property had been openly marketed for sale as a public house before being purchased.

“Despite this marketing exercise, no purchaser came forward who was able to secure the future of the premises as a viable public house,” it said.

NMCA also argues that having a financially sustainable organisation occupying the property provides greater protection for the listed building than leaving it vacant.

“The application does not seek to diminish the importance of the Gatehouse Public House or its place within Norwich’s history,” it said.

“Rather, it seeks to ensure that this important listed building remains occupied, maintained and available for community use instead of facing an uncertain future.”

If you want to assist NMCA in their fundraising efforts, you can do so here.

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Roshan Muhammed Salih argues that the famous comedian John Cleese should be de-platformed by respectable institutions because he has crossed the line from criticising Islam to using his enormous public platform to spread misinformation, caricature Muslims as violent and backward, and legitimise some of Britain’s most prominent anti-Muslim political figures.

If John Cleese, 86, had died a year ago, he would have been remembered as a national treasure.

He was a star of Britain’s most influential comedy group, Monty Python, and the creator of arguably its greatest-ever sitcom, Fawlty Towers.

But instead of basking in the glory of his stellar career, Cleese has chosen to spend the twilight of his life hate-mongering against Muslims.

And if he were to die tomorrow, that hate-mongering would form a significant part of his legacy.

The receipts

The evidence is all there on his own X account, followed by over five million people.

In one of his most inflammatory posts, he claimed that the Qur’an is “ALL about acquiring power, killing ‘infidels’ and imposing Islam on everyone.”

That is not serious criticism of Islamic theology. It is crude misinformation about a religion followed by nearly two billion people.

Cleese has also repeatedly associated Islam with beheading, suggesting that life would be easier for Muslims if they stopped talking about beheading people who refused to convert to Islam. He has also referred to an “infidel’s fear of being beheaded” while discussing Islam.

The veteran actor has described Islam as a “mediaeval woman-hating religion”, claimed that it has a “superiority complex”, argued that Islam does not want multiculturalism but “uniculturalism”, and said that traditional British values are under attack from Muslim belief systems.

He has also raised the construction of mosques in the context of what he calls the “Islamification” of Britain.

Any one of these comments might be dismissed by his defenders as an ill-informed joke, provocation or clumsy criticism. But taken together, over a sustained period, they form a very clear picture.

Muslims are repeatedly presented to Cleese’s enormous audience as followers of a violent, intolerant, misogynistic and expansionist ideology which supposedly threatens British society.

This cannot simply be brushed aside as legitimate criticism of religion.

Endorsement of the far-right

There is also an increasingly obvious political context to Cleese’s rhetoric.

He has publicly endorsed Rupert Lowe, the anti-Islam leader of Restore Britain, saying: “I trust this man more than any of the other leaders.”

And then there is Tommy Robinson, arguably the most prominent anti-Muslim activist in Britain. For years, his political identity has been built around portraying Islam and Muslims as a threat, yet Cleese has amplified material associated with Robinson.

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Of course, Cleese is legally entitled to support Rupert Lowe and to amplify Tommy Robinson. And he is legally entitled to say offensive things about Islam.

But the cumulative picture matters, and at this point it becomes very difficult to maintain the fiction that we are simply dealing with a harmless old comedian making philosophical observations about religion.

No threats have been made against Cleese

There have been suggestions online that 5Pillars’ criticism of Cleese, and my personal criticism of him, somehow amount to a threat, with some even insinuating the possibility of violence. That is complete nonsense.

So let me state this unequivocally: we are not threatening John Cleese, nor do we want any physical harm to come to him.

But we are advocating peaceful, lawful and democratic opposition to his rhetoric. Cleese speaks, we answer. Cleese campaigns against our religion, we expose what he says. Cleese appears at venues, and we are entitled to contact those venues, complain, protest peacefully and ask them why they are providing him with a platform.

That is not intimidation; that is free speech. And free speech works in both directions.

John Cleese does not possess some special right to speak without being criticised because he created brilliant comedy 50 years ago. Nor does he have a right to appear in every theatre that will have him.

Cleese’s UK tour

What we are saying is that respectable institutions should decide if sustained anti-Muslim hate-mongering is compatible with their values. That is particularly relevant as Cleese tours cities and towns with significant Muslim communities.

His September tour includes Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Bradford and Bedford, among other places. Muslims live, work, pay taxes and contribute to the cultural and economic life of those communities.

So those venues should ask themselves a simple question: what message are they sending to their Muslim neighbours when they provide a prestigious stage to somebody who routinely portrays their religion as violent, backward and threatening?

Many of these same institutions will have diversity policies; they will issue statements against racism; they will celebrate inclusion; they will talk endlessly about making minority communities feel welcome.

But principles only mean something when they are applied consistently.

Would the reaction really be so relaxed if an internationally famous comedian spent months making similarly sweeping and hostile generalisations about Jews?

Would prestigious theatres simply say that this was all part of free debate? Would public broadcasters continue treating him as an untouchable national treasure if he repeatedly characterised Judaism through crude stereotypes about violence, conspiracy or disloyalty?

I doubt very much that institutions would be so sanguine.

Yet Muslims are apparently expected to tolerate almost anything. That double standard is impossible to ignore.

A safe target

Ultimately, Cleese has picked a relatively safe target.

Anti-Muslim sentiment is so normalised in parts of British media and politics that statements which would cause outrage if aimed at other minorities are routinely repackaged as “courageous commentary” when aimed at Muslims.

And people with enormous platforms are allowed to contribute to an atmosphere of hate while facing remarkably few professional consequences.

Cleese himself has chosen what he wants to say, and he has chosen who he wants to support. He has chosen to endorse Rupert Lowe; he has chosen to amplify Tommy Robinson; he has chosen to portray Islam again and again as violent, barbaric and hostile to Britain.

Those are his choices. And Muslims, venues, broadcasters and audiences are entitled to make choices of their own.

So yes John Cleese is free to despise Islam in modern, secular Britain. But he is not entitled to our silence.

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Roshan Muhammad Salih reviews the recent Oxford Union debate on Islam featuring Tommy Robinson and argues that, despite some strong contributions from the Muslim speakers, the debate should never have taken place.

Six weeks after it took place amid heated protests, the Oxford Union has finally released the “Is the West Right to be Suspicious of Islam?” debate on its YouTube channel.

But after spending two and a half hours watching the debate, I came away with exactly the same view I had before it started: it should never have taken place.

In fact, I am now convinced that it only happened because the Oxford Union student leadership wanted to platform themselves through a high-profile debate, regardless of the damage it could cause to community relations.

It was a profoundly selfish and immature decision. Not because Islam shouldn’t be debated, but because there is a difference between debating Islam in an academic setting with experts and giving a bunch of dangerous Islamophobic clowns a prestigious platform to spout their bile.

Unsurprisingly, the debate itself produced nothing intellectually new. Tommy Robinson and the other anti-Islam speakers repeated the same arguments they have been making for years, focusing on ISIS, homosexuality, Aisha, selective quotations from the Qur’an and isolated examples of Muslim extremism.

The Muslim speakers largely answered those arguments well, although I thought some of them were unnecessarily apologetic in places. Arwa Elrayess was probably the strongest speaker, while Abdullah Al Andalusi and Brother Dowie made important points about the double standard of blaming Islam for every crime committed by a Muslim while never attributing Muslims’ positive contributions to their faith.

So in the end, nobody learned anything new about Islam, but Tommy Robinson gained something valuable: greater legitimacy and the ability to clip his contributions at the Oxford Union for years to come.

The usual anti-Islam tropes

One thing became abundantly clear as the debate progressed: the anti-Islam speakers relied on a familiar collection of arguments that anyone who has followed discussions about Islam over the past decade has heard countless times before.

Tommy Robinson, Jonathan Sacerdoti and, to a lesser extent, Lawrence Fox focused on ISIS, homosexuality, the age of Aisha, selective quotations from the Qur’an and examples of Islamist terrorism.

More importantly, they all employed essentially the same tactic. Rather than engaging with Islam as a religion or with the lived reality of Britain’s Muslim population, they repeatedly highlighted the actions of a small number of extremists and extrapolated from those examples to Islam itself.

ISIS became representative of Islam. Terrorist attacks committed by individuals became evidence against nearly two billion Muslims. Criminal acts carried out by people who happened to identify as Muslims were presented as though they reflected the essence of the religion.

This is a profoundly flawed way of analysing any faith. No one would judge Christianity solely by the actions of Anders Breivik or the Lord’s Resistance Army. Judaism is not assessed exclusively through the actions of Israel, nor Hinduism through the crimes of Hindu nationalists.

Every other major religion is understood to contain a distinction between its teachings, its mainstream followers and its extremists. Yet Islam is routinely denied that distinction.

I also found that much of the criticism ignored an important practical reality. Tommy Robinson spent considerable time discussing traditional Islamic teachings on issues such as homosexuality, sexual morality and criminal punishments.

People are, of course, free to disagree with those teachings. But the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Britain are not attempting to impose them on wider society. Robinson blurred the distinction between theological belief and political programme, creating the impression that ordinary British Muslims are seeking to transform Britain into an Islamic state. That simply does not reflect reality.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the evening was the contrast between how Tommy Robinson and Lawrence Fox behaved inside the Oxford Union and how they conduct themselves online. In the debating chamber they appeared measured and courteous. Both repeatedly thanked Arwa Elrayess for giving them a platform.

Yet anyone familiar with their online presence knows that this civility is not how they normally engage with Muslims. On social media they routinely use inflammatory rhetoric that encourages hostility towards Islam and Muslims.

Seeing them adopt the language and mannerisms of respectable public intellectuals inside the Oxford Union was, if anything, more troubling than their speeches themselves. It demonstrated how a prestigious institution can sanitise figures whose public careers have otherwise been built on division.

However, one moment that particularly disturbed me was when Lawrence Fox insinuated that he was about to display an insulting cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. In the end, he did not show it, claiming it was merely a joke. But that was almost beside the point.

What concerned me far more was that the Oxford Union had ruled that he would have been permitted to display it. That revealed a serious failure of judgement. An institution committed to serious intellectual debate should recognise the difference between robust criticism and gratuitous provocation.

Allowing a deliberately offensive image would have contributed nothing to the discussion about Islam; it would simply have inflamed tensions and distracted from the issues under debate. More than anything else, the incident reinforced my impression that the organisers were too willing to prioritise controversy and spectacle over thoughtful discussion.

The pro-Islam speakers

The Muslim speakers generally acquitted themselves well. They successfully exposed the central weakness in the anti-Islam case: the repeated attempt to judge Islam through the actions of a tiny minority of extremists while ignoring the beliefs and conduct of the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

Time and again, they demonstrated how Qur’anic verses had been quoted selectively and how isolated examples of criminality were being unfairly extrapolated to an entire faith.

For me, Arwa Elrayess delivered the strongest speech of the evening. She systematically dismantled many of the opposition’s arguments, particularly their selective use of scripture and their attempts to conflate extremist groups with Islam itself.

However, I remain uncomfortable with the fact that she was instrumental in facilitating the debate in the first place. I also felt that her comments on the age of Aisha drifted into apologetics, attempting to make Islamic history more acceptable to modern Western sensibilities rather than defending the tradition honestly.

Brother Dowie was perhaps the most unfortunate speaker because he was interrupted so frequently that he never managed to establish a proper rhythm. Despite that, he finished strongly by highlighting the positive contribution Islam makes to society and pointing out the glaring double standard whereby every crime committed by a Muslim is blamed on Islam, while the countless good deeds performed by Muslims are never attributed to their faith.

Abdullah al-Andalusi also identified the recurring tactic employed by Islam’s critics: taking the behaviour of individual Muslims and generalising it to Islam as a whole. That observation went to the heart of the debate.

By the end of the evening, I was left with the impression that they had answered the substance of the anti-Islam case far more effectively than the opposition had engaged with the reality of Islam or the lives of ordinary Muslims.

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The publicity-hungry students

One of the more surprising aspects of the evening was the prominence given to the Oxford Union students themselves. Rather than simply facilitating the debate, introducing the speakers and managing the proceedings, they were afforded considerable time to express their own opinions.

I found myself wondering why their views should carry such weight. They are entitled to their opinions, of course, but they possess no particular expertise on Islam or community relations. At times, it felt as though the organisers were as interested in showcasing themselves as they were in hosting a serious debate.

That impression only grew stronger as the evening went on. I came away with the feeling that the student leadership had organised this debate because they wanted to be associated with one of the year’s biggest controversies.

They seemed to relish the publicity and prominence that came with hosting such a high-profile event, without fully appreciating the wider consequences of their decision. Even those Muslim students who defended Islam during the debate shared responsibility for creating the platform in the first place.

The decision to invite Tommy Robinson was not simply an internal matter for a debating society. It had implications for millions of British Muslims and for the wider public discourse about Islam. I simply do not believe that a small group of undergraduate students, however intelligent or well-intentioned, should have been making a decision of that magnitude.

It was a judgement that required maturity, experience and a deeper appreciation of the responsibilities that come with conferring legitimacy on controversial public figures. In my view, the Oxford Union student leadership mistook publicity for principle, and in doing so handed Tommy Robinson exactly the mainstream platform he had been seeking.

Who really won?

Was the debate entirely without value? Some of the Muslim speakers made thoughtful and persuasive contributions, and it is also possible that some viewers unfamiliar with Islam may have been encouraged to look beyond the headlines and research the religion for themselves. If so, that would be a positive outcome.

But any such benefit has to be weighed against the cost of granting mainstream legitimacy to figures whose public careers have been built on portraying Muslims as a problem to be solved rather than fellow citizens to be understood.

In the end, I do not believe the Oxford Union advanced public understanding of Islam. I believe it gave Tommy Robinson exactly what he wanted: another opportunity to present himself as a legitimate participant in mainstream public life. For me, that is the lasting legacy of this debate.

And although supporters of the motion may ultimately have lost the debate inside the chamber, they arguably won the battle that mattered most. If the measure of success is influence and exposure rather than the result of a vote, then Tommy Robinson emerged as the evening’s biggest beneficiary.

In the days following the debate, his speech attracted by far the largest audience on the Oxford Union’s YouTube channel, far exceeding the attention given to the other speakers. That was entirely predictable.

Whatever happened inside the debating chamber, the debate handed him a prestigious platform and vastly amplified his message. I have little doubt that he and his supporters will regard that as a victory. In that sense, the Oxford Union gave him exactly what he wanted: not necessarily a debating triumph, but greater legitimacy and a wider audience.

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The meeting took place in London on July 16 under the banner “Together We Rebuild,” bringing together representatives from the UK Muslim Network, the Zionist Board of Deputies of British Jews, government ministers and a number of interfaith organisations.

The summit took place at Adam Hub, a civic and dialogue venue in Millbank Tower, Westminster, operated by the Adam Foundation – a charitable organisation established by businessman Safwan Adam.

According to the organisers, the event aimed to rebuild Muslim-Jewish relations in Britain following “heightened tensions” arising from Israel’s war on Gaza and wider community divisions.

The event was jointly convened by Imam Dr Qari Asim of Leeds Makkah Mosque, Co-Chair of the UK Muslim Network, and Phil Rosenberg, President of the pro-Israel Board of Deputies of British Jews.

Imam Dr Qari Asim

Qari Asim presented the summit as an attempt to prevent the Israel–Palestine conflict from permanently damaging Muslim-Jewish relations in Britain. He said: “We do not want our shared future to be predetermined by conflict.”

He argued that rebuilding relations would require: “Courage to reach beyond our comfort zones, compassion to recognise the humanity of others, and sustained cooperation between our communities.”

He added: “We are not here because we agree about everything. We are here to learn how to disagree honestly and amicably, without allowing disagreement to become hatred… Our security and dignity are intertwined: whenever a Muslim or a Jew is targeted, our communities – and Britain itself – are diminished.”

Phil Rosenberg framed the summit as a response to the impact of the October 7 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza on relations between British Muslims and Jews.

He said: “The events of 7 October and the wars that followed have left scars on all our hearts – and, in many cases, broken them entirely.”

He continued: “Polarised narratives and a relentless stream of horrific images have eroded empathy, deepened divisions and contributed to obscene levels of antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred…

“We must not import conflict into Britain; we must work together to export peace instead… Today is about recognising how difficult this period has been, thanking those who have persevered dialogue and cooperation, and taking the next bold steps together. Together, we rebuild.”

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Who attended?

The summit received senior government participation. According to the organisers, Steve Reed MP, Secretary of State for Communities, delivered the keynote address, while James Purnell, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Andy Burnham, also addressed attendees. Lord Lemos, the government’s Faith Minister, was also present.

No official delegate list has been published. However, individuals whose attendance can be verified through organisers’ statements or their own public posts include:

• Dr Hina Shahid, Director of the UK Muslim Network

• Ibrahim Syed, UK Muslim Network / Liverpool Mosque Network

• Mustafa Field, UK Muslim Network / Faith Forums London

• Imam Asim Hafiz, Ex British Army Muslim chaplain

• Mohammed Ali Amla, Solutions Not Sides

• Avicenna Foundation

• Ashfaque Chowdhury, Association of Muslim Schools

• Zahed Amanullah, Institute for Strategic Dialogue

• Imam Monawar Hussain, Eton College

Israeli genocide

The summit comes against the backdrop of Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza which has caused a devastating human toll on the Palestinian population.

Since October 2023, over 75,000 Palestinians have been killed (almost certainly an underestimate), with women and children making up most of the deaths.

The genocide has also displaced most of Gaza’s population and left much of the territory’s homes, hospitals, schools and essential infrastructure in ruins.

The humanitarian situation remains dire. The UN has warned of severe shortages of food, clean water and medical supplies, with widespread hunger and disease affecting the civilian population.

Commenting on the Muslim-Zionist summit, 5Pillars editor Roshan Muhammed Salih said: “For so-called British Muslim leaders to break bread with hardcore supporters of genocidal Israel is absolutely grotesque. Did they seek the approval and consent of their constituencies before attending such a controversial event? They must know that British Muslims overwhelmingly oppose any kind of normalisation with supporters of a state that is massacring our brothers and sisters, and our children, on an industrial scale.

“There can be no rebuilding of trust between British Muslims and those who support Israel now or in the future. This is a red line for us. British Muslims overwhelmingly reject antisemitism — the hatred of Jews simply because they are Jews — but they also overwhelmingly oppose the political ideology of Zionism and the state of Israel. Any Muslim leader worth his salt knows this. Shame on any Muslim who had anything to do with this summit. Shame.”

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In 2020, Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) was reconverted into a mosque with much fanfare and celebration by Muslims. Originally a Byzantine church for nearly a thousand years, this magnificent building was turned into a mosque by Mehmet the Conqueror in 1453 before being transformed into a museum by the secular fundamentalist founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.

I recall being among the minority of Muslims who believed its reconversion into a mosque was unnecessary, and thinking it was more about President Erdogan grandstanding and brandishing his Islamic credentials than anything else.

But over the years, I softened my opposition given the widespread joy among Muslims that one of the world’s greatest buildings would now be used to worship Allah.

So I was looking forward to praying my salah in Aya Sofya during a recent trip to Istanbul, but ultimately my experience left me questioning whether it has just been reduced to a chaotic tourist attraction masquerading as a place of worship.

Scantily-clad women

I walked into Aya Sofya’s main prayer hall around one hour before dhuhr to the sight of men (many of them non-Muslims) and women mixing freely, talking loudly and taking selfies.

Most women were appropriately covered, but some were clearly showing their hair, arms, and legs. Some of these women were non-Muslims (I’m not sure how they managed to get past security), but most seemed to have been Turks, judging by their speech.

Many of these women seemed oblivious to mosque etiquette, and were probably more familiar with nightclubs. And the masjid security did not remind them of it either.

Hardly anyone was praying. Instead, the hall echoed with the chatter of tourists, and I spent most of my time avoiding getting in the way of group photos. Selfies dominated the scene, with visitors posing against the intricate mosaics and Quranic calligraphy, treating the space as an Instagram backdrop rather than a house of worship.

Photography, while understandable given Aya Sofya’s breathtaking beauty, seemed to take precedence over reverence.

In short, it felt more like a social gathering than a place of prayer. The only exception to this was a small area in front of the mihrab where men were praying unhindered, as well as the women’s section, which foreign Muslim women were obliged to stay in (having been barred from the main prayer hall, which seemed discriminatory).

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To be fair, there were moments when Aya Sofya’s spiritual potential shone through after female tourists and scantily-clad Turkish women were cleared out as dhuhr began.

Standing in the prayer hall, I imagined Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, who first converted the former cathedral into a mosque in 1453, standing in this very space. The pride of praying in a place so steeped in Islamic history is undeniable. Muslims from across the world flock here, their faces alight with awe as they perform salah beneath the soaring arches. The recitation of the adhaan and Quran is also exquisite, a reminder of the divine beauty this space can embody.

A missed opportunity

The Turkish government’s decision to reconvert Aya Sofya into a mosque was a bold, widely celebrated statement, but its execution feels half-hearted.

If Aya Sofya is to be a mosque, it should be treated as one unequivocally – complete with enforced dress codes, restricted photography and entry times for non-Muslims, and a clear prioritisation of worship over tourism.

As it stands, the current setup feels like an attempt to appease religious Turks, secular nationalists and the tourism industry – satisfying none.

The Christian iconography, still visible in patches of uncovered mosaics, adds another layer of complexity. For Muslims, these remnants of Aya Sofya’s Byzantine past are a distraction, even off-putting, in a space meant for Islamic worship.

Perhaps most troubling is the broader cultural context. Many Turks live in a state of jahiliyya – a disconnect from the spiritual and cultural roots of their faith. Aya Sofya, rather than serving as a beacon of renewal, mirrors this ambivalence. The pride of Muslims worldwide who come to pray here is palpable, but it is diluted by the lack of discipline and reverence in the space.

If Aya Sofya is to be a mosque, it must be more than a symbolic gesture. It demands a commitment to fostering an environment of true worship, not a photo-op for tourists or a political statement.

So in the end, my visit left me conflicted. I felt a swell of pride praying in Aya Sofya, connecting with centuries of Muslim history. Yet, I couldn’t shake the sense that its current state dishonours its sacred purpose.

Aya Sofya exists in a liminal space, a compromise that serves neither faith nor heritage well. If Turkey is serious about its role as a mosque, it must prioritise sanctity over selfies, worship over tourism. Otherwise, Aya Sofya risks becoming a hollow symbol, beautiful but bereft of the divine reverence it deserves.

You can follow Roshan on X/Twitter here.

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As Labour seeks to win back Muslim voters, Andy Burnham has struck a softer tone on Gaza. But warm words cannot erase years of complicity, and Muslims should be wary of confusing rhetoric with repentance, writes Maria Akbar.

Andy Burnham is set to take over as British Prime Minister from Keir Starmer on Monday, and in an effort to orchestrate support he has wasted no time in speaking on key issues that have caused public outrage towards the Labour Party.

He recently posted a video reply to a question posed to him: “Please address the Gaza question. Really important to hear what you plan to do.”

He described the current situation in Gaza as a “scar on our conscience” and said it was “unacceptable” that people continue to be killed. He touched on the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded, apologised for the Labour Party “not getting it right” at the start of Israel’s “military action in Gaza,” and said the response was “not good enough.”

He also vehemently spoke about October 7, describing it as a “monstrous attack”, and about the rise of antisemitism. However, his plans for addressing the Gaza question were unclear and vague, though he said he was “passionate” about the issue.

The reality

In my opinion, Burnham’s response was hollow and devoid of any emotion on a topic that incites passion and fury internationally. The language he used was notably euphemistic, understating the seriousness of what has and continues to take place in Gaza.

He did not mention the history or context of the Palestinian struggle, that a genocide has unfolded in Gaza, or that it has been reduced to rubble and Palestinians have been treated worse than animals, with water, electricity and medical aid being deliberately withheld from them.

He did not place any responsibility directly on Israel. By simply describing the situation there as a “humanitarian crisis,” he removed accountability from the perpetrators.

The role of the Labour government on Gaza

Let me be clear, the Labour Party did not just “not get it right”; it had a hand in the genocide that has unfolded.

The Labour government supported Israel’s actions by describing them as the “right to self-defence”, delayed calls for a ceasefire, continued arms exports to Israel, and maintained intelligence and defence ties with them. Sickeningly, Keir Starmer endorsed a siege on Gaza – a war crime.

The sustained military and diplomatic ties with Israel til today mean the Labour government was complicit with Israel in its genocide in Gaza.

Consequently, Labour lost a lot of support. For the first time, the entire world was able to watch a genocide unfold on their devices. We all saw families collecting the remains of their loved ones, hospitals being targeted, bodies trapped underneath the rubble, Palestinians being starved to death and children being murdered in cold blood.

People became vocal against this and more interested in the history and context of the conflict. This meant that the Labour government faced scrutiny over the position it held. Therefore, it had no choice but to call out what was happening, as public opinion was changing. Israel’s actions could no longer be justified as a right to self-defence.

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But despite Labour’s attempts to show some sympathy towards Gaza, it was not enough and it lost public trust. Opinion polling suggests that more than half of former Labour voters who switched to another progressive party or an independent candidate said Labour’s position on Gaza was a factor in their decision.

Who really is Burnham?

Whilst acknowledging that Burnham was one of those who called for a ceasefire early in the conflict back in 2023, his motivations for this are questionable.

His strategy has always been to stand at a distance from the Labour Party’s position on certain issues. This allows others to view him as someone who can revive the party once those positions do not achieve the necessary results in the eyes of the public.

Burnham has taken part in leadership contests before and knows what he is doing.

His response in the Gaza video was a calculated endeavour to win back ex-Labour supporters who left the party due to its position on Gaza as it is an issue that unites many people from different walks of life. Therefore, to speak on Gaza is strategic from a political perspective.

Ultimately, Burnham hasn’t suddenly come with a conscience that Starmer did not have. They are both cut from the same cloth.

Burnham is a member of Labour Friends of Israel, has opposed the BDS movement, and stated in an earlier leadership challenge that Israel would be the first country he would visit if he won.

He also voted in favour of the Iraq War in 2003 and twice against an inquiry – a war that killed around 600,000 people. That is a reflection of his conscience.

He did say, with hindsight, that he regretted those actions in 2023; however, this may just have been a tactic to gain popularity. His regret needs to be proven through actions not words.

So overall, we should not suddenly be swayed by Andy Burnham because of a few words of regret he expressed over Gaza and go back to supporting Labour. He barely said the minimum of what should be said by anyone who speaks on what has unfolded in Gaza. Some would even describe his response as too little and too late.

The Muslim community, especially, should continue to see Labour for what it really is – the party of genocide – and should also recognise manipulation tactics disguised as morality.

After all, the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “The believer is not stung twice from the same hole.”

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Muslims should stop minimising the obligation of hijab or deflecting to other issues and instead accept sincere advice with humility, recognising that every command of Allah deserves obedience, writes Maria Akbar.

Discussions on hijab are often met with defence and deflection. Some feel that it isn’t a topic that should be up for discussion as it’s deeply personal; others feel that there are “bigger” issues taking place in the community that go unaddressed whilst hijab is discussed.

Undoubtedly, hijab is a command from Allah, evidenced in the Quran and Sunnah. The decision to practice hijab is an individual one, like all other acts of worship in Islam. However, it is one that is apparent externally, similar to whether a man has his awrah covered or not.

When an individual omits this practice, not fulfilling the command of Allah, then it is a sin that is taking place in public and can be considered as openly sinning. Hence, it is open to judgement by others.

However, whether one practices the obligation of hijab or not does not necessarily reflect their level of faith. There are situations where individuals who do not wear a headscarf may be more God-fearing and well-versed in the deen than those who do. Despite this, they should be encouraged to do the right thing in accordance with what Allah has legislated. As Muslims, it is incumbent upon us to encourage one another to do good.

Enjoining the good

The purpose of our life on Earth is to worship Allah alone, and to live a life that is in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah as much as possible. In exchange for this, Allah will reward us with Jannah.

Allah tells us in the Quran to remind one another, as reminders benefit the believers (51:55). Therefore, we should not be offended when we are advised on the need to practice or perfect our hijab, as it is for the sake of our hereafter, even if it can be difficult to hear.

Furthermore, the concept of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is an important and fundamental practice within Islam. By our very nature, we are forgetful and can make mistakes. So having other Muslims around who are reminding us of Allah’s command of practising the hijab is a blessing.

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Importance of the delivery

However, when advice is given to sisters in an aggressive manner, it may be considered degrading or shaming.

So in order for the adviser to be able to penetrate the heart of the advised, the way in which the advice is given should be aligned with Islamic teachings.

In the Quran, Allah instructed Musa and Harun to speak to Firaun in a gentle manner so that he may be mindful (20:44). As well as this, the Quran tells us to advise in the best manner with wisdom (16:125).

When advising sisters on the practice of hijab, it should be done by individuals who themselves are of good character, and who present the advice sincerely, with wisdom.

Regardless, there may still be times when the advice will not be accepted by some.

Dangers of minimising the obligation of hijab

An argument that is given is that there are bigger issues for the Ummah to worry about than whether a woman is observing the hijab or not. This may be true when ranking issues in the community against crimes such as domestic violence or abuse.

However, we should not consider sins according to how we interpret their gravity in our own minds. One of the pious predecessors would say: “Do not look at the smallness of the sin, but look at the greatness of the One you have disobeyed.”

In a hadith recorded by Al-Bukhari, Abdullah bin Masud (may Allah be pleased with him) said: “The believer regards his sins as if he were sitting beneath a mountain, fearing it may fall upon him. The wicked person regards his sins as if they were a fly passing over his nose, which he can simply brush away.”

There is a danger associated with minimising the need to wear hijab, and persisting in this without repentance can cause hardening of the heart, making obedience increasingly difficult over time.

At the same time, communities must not neglect other serious issues such as child abuse and domestic violence. Addressing one issue should not come at the expense of ignoring another.

Some of these other issues within our communities impact the lives of many, and in some instances can push individuals away from Islam. Therefore, they should also be addressed, giving them their due weight.

Whispers of Shaytan

We should also be aware that it may be the whisperings of Shaytan that lead us to rejecting or rebuking sincere advice. Shaytan wants us to incline towards wrongdoing (12:53).

Therefore, minimising the obligation of hijab, or deflecting to other issues, may be Shaytan trying to misguide us from the path of Allah. We should ask ourselves if our reactions are due to sincerity or from our nafs.

Allah SWT tells us in the Quran that the rightly guided ones are those who listen to what is said and follow the best of it (39:18). In order to do that, we must possess a certain level of humility and sincerity to keep our hearts open to the truth and a desire to attain the good of this world and the hereafter.

Diseases of the heart

Arrogance and pride are diseases of the heart that can prevent us from fully accepting advice when it is presented to us. If sincere advice regarding hijab causes us to become defensive, then we must ask why. And if it is due to our own internal struggles, then we must look at spiritually curing that.

The increasingly degenerate society we live in makes it difficult to practice hijab, especially when vanity is championed and outer beauty is focused on. But as Muslims, we submit to the command and legislation of Allah.

Know that the greater the struggle against one’s own nafs (ego), the greater the reward. Minimising and continuously engaging in a sin whilst we know better can be a reason that it turns into a bigger sin on our scales on the Day of Judgement.

Islam does not demand perfection, but we should continually strive to obey Allah and repent when we fall short. Certainly, we will be recompensed for all that we do.

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Over the past decade, the Muslim influencer scene has exploded across social media, with many now boasting millions of followers and reaching hundreds of millions of people.

Alhamdulillah, many of these influencers are sincere individuals who share genuinely beneficial Islamic knowledge and make a positive contribution to the Ummah. However, there is also a minority of charlatans, bad-faith actors and outright scammers who exploit Islam for personal vanity, financial gain or influence.

My advice is this: when consuming the content of any Muslim influencer, don’t just listen to what they say. Take the time to find out who these people are.

Anyone can say things that are appealing to the ear or tell people what they want to hear. But someone is only worth following if you are convinced they possess sincere intentions, sound Islamic knowledge and good judgement.

In light of a recent controversy over a prominent Muslim influencer, we’ve decided to issue the following advice to Muslims:

•⁠ ⁠Research their background. Do they have a long track record of serving the Muslim community, or have they simply appeared out of nowhere and built a following overnight?

•⁠ ⁠Assess their Islamic knowledge. Do they have the requisite grounding in the deen, or are they speaking despite being genuinely ignorant of Islamic teachings?

•⁠ ⁠Look at their conduct. Do they publicly observe the red lines set by Islam, or do they routinely flout them with little regard for what Allah has ordained?

•⁠ ⁠Ask whether they are known within the Muslim community. Are they recognised and respected by scholars, community leaders and activists, or do they exist only as an online personality?

•⁠ ⁠Examine your own intention. Why are you following them? Is it because you are drawn to their appearance or personality, or because you are sincerely seeking beneficial knowledge that you can put into practice?

There is no doubt that social media has become an important platform for the dissemination of beneficial Islamic knowledge. But it is also a space where charlatans, bad-faith actors and scammers can operate with remarkable freedom.

By taking the time to ask these questions, you will be in a much better position to distinguish sincere Muslim influencers from those who are simply exploiting our faith for their own ends.

Roshan M Salih, 5Pillars.

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Amplified by Elon Musk, Citizen Vigilante is less an action thriller than a cinematic manifesto and call for violence against Muslims and migrants, writes Roshan Muhammed Salih.

If you live on social media, you can’t fail to have noticed the chat about Citizen Vigilante, the movie which has been banned in Germany and denied streaming platforms elsewhere. But no matter, the world’s richest man and several other far-right influencers have been streaming it for free for the viewing pleasure of the world’s racists and Islamophobes.

Citizen Vigilante is a clumsy, blood-soaked political manifesto masquerading as an action thriller, whose sole purpose is to persuade viewers that Western civilisation is under siege from migrants, Muslims and a weak liberal establishment, and that only strong government or violence can restore order.

Its central message is unmistakable: the state has failed, democracy has become impotent, and if the state doesn’t deliver justice then ordinary citizens will eventually take justice into their own hands.

Migration itself becomes synonymous with violent crime and rape, while Muslims are presented as uniquely incompatible with Western civilisation.

What makes it particularly disturbing is that the film does not merely explain why its protagonist becomes a vigilante; it repeatedly invites the audience to admire him. His actions are framed not as the tragic descent of a broken man but as the inevitable response of someone forced to do what politicians, judges and police refuse to do.

Even when he crosses obvious moral lines, the narrative repeatedly returns to the same justification: the system left him no choice or drove him to it.

That is what elevates Citizen Vigilante from an exploitative action movie into political propaganda. It asks viewers not merely to sympathise with its central character but to adopt his worldview: that liberal democracy has failed, immigration represents an existential threat and violence is becoming the only remaining language of justice.

The racist, Islamophobic plot

The film opens with an idyllic scene of a white mother shopping with her young child before she is brutally murdered by a black man presented as a migrant. Television news bulletins (GB News style) immediately follow, warning of rising migrant crime, creating the impression that society itself is collapsing under the weight of immigration.

Into this chaos steps Sanders, played by the American actor Armie Hammer, a former soldier and landlord who becomes a masked executioner. One by one he hunts down rapists, gangsters, extortionists and others whom he believes have escaped justice. He rapidly becomes an online folk hero, with supporters across Europe and North America celebrating his actions and demanding their own version of the “Citizen Vigilante.”

The film occasionally attempts moral complexity. Sanders also targets white criminals, stops men from drugging women and is portrayed as emotionally damaged rather than conventionally heroic. There are awkward attempts to humanise him through scenes that reveal loneliness, anger and personal flaws (like consorting with prostitutes in a building he owns).

The police detective pursuing Sanders functions as the film’s voice for the rule of law, insisting that institutions must be defended despite their imperfections. But this argument is repeatedly undermined by the narrative itself. Judges release rapists; police fail to protect victims; politicians appear weak or indifferent. Every institutional failure pushes the audience back towards Sanders’ conclusion that violence works where democracy does not.

The film’s final act removes any remaining ambiguity. Sanders confronts a Muslim family whose son has committed rape, delivers a lengthy speech attacking Islam, quotes the Qur’an as evidence of cultural incompatibility, and murders the entire family. He later delivers a final address warning of an “unfriendly takeover” by “Islamist extremists and the blindsided woke left,” urging ordinary people to take matters into their own hands if governments fail to act.

A poor film with a dangerous message

Cinematically, Citizen Vigilante is not a good film. The acting is uneven, the dialogue is frequently wooden, the production values are mediocre and many scenes drag unnecessarily. There are moments that appear inserted simply to pad the running time.

Yet dismissing the film as merely bad cinema would miss the point. Its significance lies in what it is trying to achieve.

Viewed generously, one could argue that the German director, Uwe Boll, is warning governments that when justice systems lose public confidence, vigilantism becomes an inevitable temptation.

But the film repeatedly goes further. It glorifies its vigilante, caricatures Muslims and migrants, and encourages viewers to see political violence as an understandable — even admirable — response to social change. By the closing scenes, the distinction between explaining vigilantism and advocating it has almost entirely disappeared.

If this film tells us anything, it is that the line between political fantasy and political violence is thinner than many would like to believe. The bullets fired in Citizen Vigilante are fictional; the ideas they seek to legitimise are anything but.

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Islamic scholar Islam Uddin argues that the growing trend among Muslim modernists to reject the divinely ordained names “Muslim” and “Islam” is weakening Islamic identity, fostering theological confusion and advancing secular ideological agendas.

Words and language are never neutral. They shape identity, establish boundaries, and signal allegiance. In Islam, language carries even greater weight because revelation itself is conveyed through words chosen by Allah.

The Qur’an does not merely describe belief in abstract terms; it names it. Likewise, the Prophet ﷺ defined faith (iman), submission, and belonging through precise language. For this reason, how one speaks about Islam – and how one identifies in relation to it – is not a peripheral concern. It is a theological one.

In recent discourse, a troubling trend has emerged: individuals who claim belief in Islam yet proactively refuse to identify as “Muslim” or to use the term “Islam” as a self-description. They often insist that this does not amount to a denial of Islam or a rejection of Allah or His Messenger ﷺ. Instead, they explain their position through cultural, anthropological, or sociological language. Islam becomes a culture, a moral tradition, or an object of academic study – but not an identity they wish to carry.

At first glance, this may appear intellectually nuanced. In reality, it represents a serious problem from an Islamic perspective.

Allah explicitly names this (din) religion and its adherents. “He has named you Muslims before and in this revelation” (22:78). This is not a label that emerged through history or culture; it is divine designation. The Prophet ﷺ likewise defined Islam in clear and concrete terms, and the companions understood themselves as Muslims without embarrassment, hesitation, or reinterpretation. The language of Islam was not optional to them – it was constitutive of belief itself.

To deliberately distance oneself from the name “Muslim,” while still claiming belief, is therefore not a neutral linguistic preference. It is a refusal to adopt the very terms through which Allah defines faith.

It is important to be precise. Many who adopt this language do not intend disbelief (kufr). Islamic theology gives great weight to intention (niyyah), and intent protects a person from takfir. However, Islam does not evaluate speech only through intention. Meaning, implication, and consequence all matter. A statement may be sincere in intent and yet still be spiritually and religiously harmful.

This is where the category of fisq (deviancy) becomes relevant. Openly and deliberately refusing the name “Muslim” while affirming Islam constitutes fisq because it involves rejecting divinely chosen terminology, adopting non-Islamic frameworks to define Islam, and introducing confusion into how the din is understood and lived.

Islam is not merely an inward belief; it is submission that manifests in identity, language, and allegiance. Stepping away from the name “Muslim” is therefore not simply stepping away from a word (and bad practices of some people) – it is stepping away from the framework Allah Himself established.

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There is also a psychological dimension that makes this trend particularly dangerous. Identity is formed and reinforced through language. When a person repeatedly refuses a core religious label, their relationship to that religion subtly shifts. Islam becomes something they analyse rather than something they inhabit. Over time, this can produce emotional and cognitive distance from obligation, even if belief is verbally maintained. Language does not merely express belief; it shapes it.

Public language has consequences beyond the individual. When figures reject the term “Muslim” while claiming Islam, it signals to others that Islamic identity is optional, unstable, or outdated. What begins as “personal framing” becomes communal ambiguity. The clarity that preserves iman (belief) is gradually replaced by confusion disguised as sophistication – which then may lead to denial of Islam.

‘Abrahamic faith’

This phenomenon cannot be separated from a broader ideological context. The increasing reluctance to name Islam clearly aligns with the rise of the “Abrahamic faith” framework, which groups Judaism, Christianity, and Islam into a single moral and spiritual family. While the term may appear benign or academic, its modern prominence is deeply rooted in historical and political developments.

After the Second World War, Jewish–Christian dialogue was actively promoted to overcome centuries of antisemitism in Europe. This laid the groundwork for interfaith language that emphasised commonality over doctrinal distinction. This trajectory expanded significantly during the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), particularly through Nostra Aetate, which encouraged improved relations between the Catholic Church, Jews, and later Muslims. From that point onward, interfaith engagement increasingly relied on shared categories rather than theological clarity.

From the 1970s, universities, governments, and NGOs adopted “Abrahamic faiths” as a standard framework for dialogue. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, this language became ubiquitous. Governments, media institutions, and interfaith organisations promoted the Abrahamic narrative as a way to reduce perceived religious tension and reframe Islam in the Western imagination. The goal was not merely understanding, but containment – redefining Islam in ways that would neutralise perceived threat.

This trend reached a new level with the Abraham Accords in 2020, where political normalisation between Israel and several Arab states was framed through religious symbolism. Projects such as the Abrahamic Family House institutionalised this narrative. The message was clear: religious identity must be softened, harmonised, and reinterpreted to serve political ends – of the secular West.

In this context, refusing the name “Muslim” is not an isolated intellectual choice. It aligns – whether intentionally or not – with a broader effort to dissolve Islamic distinctiveness into a shared “religious” or “spiritual” identity. Clear theological boundaries become obstacles. Those who insist on Islam as a divinely defined, exclusive way of life are increasingly framed as extremists threatening a manufactured unity.

Deviation

History shows this is not new. Muslim intellectual tradition has repeatedly encountered people and groups that repackaged deviation in sophisticated language – philosophical sects, esoteric interpretations, and political theologies that diluted revelation while claiming depth. Their rhetoric was often polished. Their outcome was always confusion.

Islam does not preserve itself through ambiguity. It is preserved through clarity, submission, and naming. The companions of the Prophet ﷺ did not search for alternative frameworks to describe their faith. They embraced the name Allah gave them because they understood that identity in Islam is not a burden – it is an obligation.

In conclusion, refusing to identify as Muslim, in the manner some present, while affirming Islam does not automatically remove a person from the fold of Islam. But it is not neutral, and it is not harmless. When done deliberately and publicly, it constitutes fisq. It undermines divinely established language, weakens religious identity, and contributes to a broader ideological project that seeks to redefine Islam on non-Islamic terms.

In Islam, words matter because Allah chose them. And when Allah names something, believers do not have the right to rename it – or to step away from it while still claiming it as their own.From the 1970s, universities, governments, and NGOs adopted “Abrahamic faiths” as a standard framework for dialogue. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, this language became ubiquitous. Governments, media institutions, and interfaith organisations promoted the Abrahamic narrative as a way to reduce perceived religious tension and reframe Islam in the Western imagination. The goal was not merely understanding, but containment – redefining Islam in ways that would neutralise perceived threat.

This trend reached a new level with the Abraham Accords in 2020, where political normalisation between Israel and several Arab states was framed through religious symbolism. Projects such as the Abrahamic Family House institutionalised this narrative. The message was clear: religious identity must be softened, harmonised, and reinterpreted to serve political ends – of the secular West.

In this context, refusing the name “Muslim” is not an isolated intellectual choice. It aligns – whether intentionally or not – with a broader effort to dissolve Islamic distinctiveness into a shared “religious” or “spiritual” identity. Clear theological boundaries become obstacles. Those who insist on Islam as a divinely defined, exclusive way of life are increasingly framed as extremists threatening a manufactured unity.

Deviation

History shows this is not new. Muslim intellectual tradition has repeatedly encountered people and groups that repackaged deviation in sophisticated language – philosophical sects, esoteric interpretations, and political theologies that diluted revelation while claiming depth. Their rhetoric was often polished. Their outcome was always confusion.

Islam does not preserve itself through ambiguity. It is preserved through clarity, submission, and naming. The companions of the Prophet ﷺ did not search for alternative frameworks to describe their faith. They embraced the name Allah gave them because they understood that identity in Islam is not a burden – it is an obligation.

In conclusion, refusing to identify as Muslim, in the manner some present, while affirming Islam does not automatically remove a person from the fold of Islam. But it is not neutral, and it is not harmless. When done deliberately and publicly, it constitutes fisq. It undermines divinely established language, weakens religious identity, and contributes to a broader ideological project that seeks to redefine Islam on non-Islamic terms.

In Islam, words matter because Allah chose them. And when Allah names something, believers do not have the right to rename it – or to step away from it while still claiming it as their own.

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The UK Parliament recently debated the extent of Israel’s influence in UK politics following a public petition backed by 118,000 people. However, the debate was a one-sided stitch-up where pro-Israel speakers got 82% of the speaking time and the result was never in doubt, writes Roshan Muhammed Salih.

There was a debate in Parliament on Monday about Israeli influence on UK politics. The debate followed a public petition signed by 118,000 people. Well, I watched the whole debate and it was a disgrace from start to finish.

Firstly, 80 percent of the speakers were from the pro Israel side. Predictably, they called the whole debate antisemitic and kept trying to deflect attention onto other countries like Iran, Russia and China (typical Israeli hasbara tactics). But the Israeli side did turn up and did their best to bat for their favourite genocidal state.

On the other hand, the pro Palestine side largely failed to turn up apart from the Muslim independents and Tahir Ali of Labour. Where was Jeremy Corbyn? Where was Zarah Sultana? And many others of course. This was their chance to slam Israel on the back of a massive public petition, but they weren’t even there.

With around 20% max of the speaking time, the Muslim speakers did their best but were largely buried amid an avalanche of love for a state that is mass slaughtering Palestinians. And the result was that the petition motion was rejected.

A clear bias

I have since gone back and totalled up the actual speaking time allocated to each side, and the numbers confirm exactly what it felt like watching it live. The pro-Israel side had one hour and nine minutes to put forward their case. The anti-Israel side had just 15 minutes. That works out at 82% of speaking time for the pro-Israel benches against 18% for everyone else. This was not a debate. It was a forum for Israeli hasbara and propaganda, dressed up as parliamentary scrutiny.

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Independent MP Iqbal Mohamed laid out the financial reality behind it all, citing Declassified UK reporting that 13 of the then-25 members of Starmer’s Labour Cabinet had received hundreds of thousands of pounds in donations from pro-Israel donors, and that around 180 MPs in total had accepted such funding.

“What are they for?” he asked, pointing out that Britain investigates alleged interference from Russia, China and Iran without hesitation, yet “when substantial evidence of foreign influence concerns Israel, our principles of transparency, scrutiny and accountability appear to vanish.”

Independent MP Shockat Adam raised serious questions about Elbit Systems, Israel’s largest arms manufacturer, which supplies roughly 85% of Israel’s military drones and land-based equipment. He revealed that freedom of information disclosures show repeated meetings between Elbit executives and the Home Office, asking: “If there is nothing to conceal, why are the details of previous lobbying being withheld from Parliament and the public?”

And what did these serious, evidenced interventions get in response?

Conservative MP John Lamont compared the petition to “historic antisemitic conspiracy theories.” Reform UK’s Richard Tice declared the motion “antisemitic in its very motivation and at its core.”

Labour’s Peter Prinsley described it as repeating “an ancient conspiracy theory repeatedly used to isolate Jews, undermine social cohesion and stoke hatred.” Cabinet Office Minister James Frith closed it out, rejecting the call for a public inquiry and insisting the debate’s premise unfairly singled out Israel.

A failed opportunity

Everyone knows that Israel exerts an overweening influence on UK politics. Everyone knows that the mainstream media, government and a huge number of MPs dance to the Israeli tune. But according to the MPs at yesterday’s debate there is absolutely nothing to see. We are all just antisemites and we should be focusing on Iran, China and Russia and not Israel.

What makes this even harder to swallow is that public opinion is not on their side. A YouGov survey from July 2025 found that just 15% of people in this country sympathise most with Israel, while 37% sympathise most with Palestine. Parliament’s overwhelming defence of Israel bears almost no resemblance to where the British public actually stands.

To conclude, the 118,000 people who signed that petition have been treated with contempt, especially by the pro Palestinians who couldn’t be bothered to even turn up to defend a people suffering genocide.

They were handed a rare opportunity to put Israel’s influence over this country on the parliamentary record. Instead, the chamber handed 82% of the floor to the lobby groups and their sympathisers, and the result reflected exactly that.

Long before he entered Downing Street in 2024, Starmer (who resigned as Prime Minister today) had already transformed Labour’s relationship with Britain’s Muslim communities.

After succeeding Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in 2020, he oversaw a purge of the party’s left-wing and pro-Palestinian elements under the false banner of tackling antisemitism.

Many Muslims who had enthusiastically supported Corbyn viewed this process as the party becoming increasingly hostile to pro-Palestinian voices and increasingly accommodating to pro-Israel interests.

Under Corbyn, Labour had appeared to be moving in a direction that many British Muslims found hopeful. Under Starmer, they watched that trajectory reversed.

Then came October 2023. As Israel unleashed its genocidal assault on Gaza, Starmer gave what would become one of the defining interviews of his political career.

Speaking to LBC radio, he endorsed Israel’s “right” to cut off power and water to Gaza as part of its siege. At a time when Palestinians were facing collective punishment on an unimaginable scale, Britain’s Muslims heard the leader of the Labour Party justify war crimes.

Any trust that remained evaporated.

Weeks later, Starmer instructed Labour MPs to oppose calls for an immediate ceasefire. As Palestinians were being massacred and public anger surged across Britain, Labour MPs were whipped into voting against a ceasefire.

Muslim communities watched in disgust. For them, this was not merely a policy disagreement; it was a moral failure.

Throughout the years that followed, Starmer never fundamentally altered Britain’s relationship with Israel. There were occasional expressions of concern; mild criticisms were voiced when Israeli excesses became impossible to ignore.

But criticism was never accompanied by meaningful action – there were no sanctions worthy of the name, no expulsion of the Israeli ambassador, no decisive break with a state facing accusations of genocide before international courts.

Arms sales continued in various forms; diplomatic relations remained intact; Britain’s political establishment carried on largely as normal while Gaza burned.

For millions of British Muslims and non-Muslims alike, Keir Starmer had become synonymous with Britain’s complicity in Israel’s war of extermination.

The consequences were profound. For decades, Labour had depended on overwhelming Muslim support. In some constituencies, Muslim voters formed the backbone of Labour’s electoral coalition and the party often enjoyed support levels approaching 80 percent.

Gaza shattered that relationship. Ahead of the 2024 general election, campaigns urging Muslims to abandon Labour gained momentum across the country. Independent candidates emerged as credible alternatives and the Greens attracted disillusioned voters. In short, Muslim support for Labour collapsed.

Yet Starmer still won because timing was on his side. The Conservatives had exhausted the patience of the British public through years of scandal, incompetence and economic decline. Reform UK had not yet become the force it would later become. Labour’s victory owed everything to Conservative collapse and nothing to public enthusiasm for Starmer.

But electoral success could not conceal a deeper truth – the bond between Labour and British Muslims had been broken.

And that rupture continued to shape British politics. Anti-Labour sentiment persisted in local elections and communities once taken for granted demonstrated that their votes had to be earned rather than assumed. Support levels that once topped 80% had fallen to around 30%

Keir Starmer’s supporters may argue that history will remember him for returning Labour to government, but British Muslims and pro-Palestinians are likely to remember something else.

They will remember a Prime Minister who stood with Israel while Gaza was destroyed.

They will remember a Labour leader who marginalised pro-Palestinian voices within his own party.

They will remember the crackdown on Palestine solidarity activism that unfolded under his watch.

And they will remember acting on that anger at the ballot box.

As Labour enters its post-Starmer era, his successor (almost certainly Andy Burnham) would do well to understand the lesson: British Muslims will use their voice at the ballot box to hurt those who support Israel and Zionism.

So if Labour wishes to rebuild trust, it cannot simply offer carefully-crafted words while maintaining the same policies. It will require radical action because a few crumbs thrown the way at Muslim voters will not cut it.

Only a complete halt to arms sales, sanctions on Israel, the cutting of ties, and action against the Zionist lobby will do. Otherwise, the exodus of Muslim voters from Labour will continue. And Labour needs those votes to stand a chance at the next election.

For Keir Starmer, however, the verdict has already been delivered by Muslim communities. He may have reached Number 10, but his legacy will always be the blood-soaked streets of Gaza.

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The Oxford Union debate featuring Tommy Robinson affirmed that while Islam embraces genuine scrutiny, the real concern is why provocateurs — without expertise — are repeatedly platformed to define a faith of two billion people, writes Dilly Hussain.

Let me state my position clearly from the outset: I do not believe Wednesday night’s debate, which I personally attended, should have been cancelled.

Islam should always be open to scrutiny, questioning and debate. Our tradition is rich with discourse and dialogue, even with the most hostile of interlocutors. Throughout Islamic history, scholars have engaged philosophers, atheists, heretics and political opponents with confidence and intellectual rigour.

We have never needed to shield our faith from examination because we believe Islam possesses the depth and robustness to withstand — and ultimately rebut — baseless claims made against it.

What I do object to, however, is the platforming of Tommy Robinson and Laurence Fox as some kind of authorities on Islam.

Tommy is a charlatan, a convicted fraudster and, by his own track record, little more than an agent provocateur serving interests far removed from any sincere pursuit of truth. He possesses no formal qualifications on the subject matter whatsoever. Having hundreds of thousands of followers does not transform someone into an expert.

I could just as easily claim expertise in rocket science because I have a large online following and decide to give lectures on aerospace engineering. We would never accept that logic in medicine, law or academia. Why, then, should we accept it when discussing a faith followed by two billion people?

Tommy Robinson, Laurence Fox and similar Islamophobes are not scholars, historians or serious commentators. They are professional provocateurs whose notoriety should not be mistaken for expertise.

An engaging debate

That said, the debate itself proved thoroughly engaging. No doubt it was a long evening – the debate began around 10pm and did not conclude until 1am.

Those who argued against the motion acquitted themselves admirably. They defended Islam with confidence, intelligence and composure, and the final result reflected that.

Attendance was significantly affected by anti-fascist protests taking place outside the venue, with many ticket holders unable to gain entry. The chamber appeared to be only a quarter to a fifth full. Despite the reduced numbers, however, the motion was decisively defeated.

The standout performance on the Muslim side came from the Union’s president, sister Arwa Elrayess.

She delivered a confident and compelling case, particularly when addressing Qur’anic interpretation and the recurring claims made against Islam. While she occasionally leaned on more liberal framings to make her arguments accessible, she effectively demonstrated why Western societies have no rational grounds to view Islam with suspicion.

Crucially, she came armed with data, statistics and research that directly challenged many of the familiar allegations surrounding grooming gangs and other accusations frequently levelled at Muslim communities.

Brother Dowie was another excellent speaker.

As a white convert to Islam, he was uniquely placed to dismantle Tommy Robinson’s rhetoric and expose its contradictions. More importantly, he used the platform to deliver meaningful da’wah at the heart of one of the world’s most prestigious debating institutions. That should not be understated.

One of the evening’s more intriguing contributions came from Jacob Rees-Mogg, who found himself speaking on the side opposing the motion.

She delivered a confident and compelling case, particularly when addressing Qur’anic interpretation and the recurring claims made against Islam. While she occasionally leaned on more liberal framings to make her arguments accessible, she effectively demonstrated why Western societies have no rational grounds to view Islam with suspicion.

Crucially, she came armed with data, statistics and research that directly challenged many of the familiar allegations surrounding grooming gangs and other accusations frequently levelled at Muslim communities.

Brother Dowie was another excellent speaker.

As a white convert to Islam, he was uniquely placed to dismantle Tommy Robinson’s rhetoric and expose its contradictions. More importantly, he used the platform to deliver meaningful da’wah at the heart of one of the world’s most prestigious debating institutions. That should not be understated.

One of the evening’s more intriguing contributions came from Jacob Rees-Mogg, who found himself speaking on the side opposing the motion.

He opened with an impressive acknowledgement of the profound contributions of Islamic civilisation to the advancement of human knowledge and, specifically, to the intellectual developments that later shaped the European Enlightenment and industrial progress.

Yet he concluded by firmly rejecting Islam as a path to truth, invoking the cross and the resurrection of Jesus Christ as reasons why the West ultimately need not concern itself with alternative worldviews.

It was, in many ways, a contradictory position. But credit should be given where it is due: he engaged honestly with history before retreating into theological exceptionalism.

As for the Islamophobes’ arguments, they amounted largely to the usual playbook.

The Prophet Muhammad’s ﷺ marriage to Aisha, his military campaigns, accusations that he was a “warlord,” selectively quoted Qur’anic verses, and — inevitably — references to grooming gangs. These are familiar tropes that have circulated in anti-Muslim discourse for years. In my view, they were more than adequately rebuked and refuted by those arguing against the motion.

Muslims should not fear scrutiny

The broader lesson from the evening is this: Muslims should never fear genuine scrutiny of our faith.

The Qur’an itself instructs believers to engage others with wisdom and “the best of speech.” Debate, dialogue and intellectual exchange are part of our heritage. We should welcome sincere questions and serious criticism, confident in Islam’s ability to provide answers.

What should concern us, however, is the growing tendency to legitimise bad-faith actors by treating them as worthy participants in serious discourse. There is a difference between disagreement and demagoguery.

Some people have no interest in substantive discussion. They exist to provoke, agitate, insult and denigrate. Their business model depends upon outrage rather than understanding.

Whether Muslim or non-Muslim, regardless of the size of their following, charlatans who approach these conversations without sincerity should not be afforded the status of credible authorities.