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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuela – On 2 September Venezuela’s military high command publicly endorsed the accord, while analysts warn the deal’s reliance on an unelected government and a sanctions-investigated tycoon deepens counterparty and reputational risk.

• Colombia – US Southern Command formalized a new military alliance under President de la Espriella focused on Pacific narco-boats and the Ecuador border, even as a Cúcuta-area car bomb (31 August) killed one and injured 15.

• Malvinas/Falklands – A Trump remark that Washington is ‘reviewing’ its stance on the sovereignty of the Malvinas/Falklands triggered a national address by Milei.

• Brazil – The Senate approved a data-center tax-incentive regime (Redata) on 1 September, signaling ~R$5.2 billion in near-term fiscal exemptions to court AI infrastructure investment.

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VENEZUELA

Venezuelan Military High Command Publicly Backs U.S. Oil Deal, Denies ‘Subordination’ [High]

On 2 September, Defense Minister Gustavo González López affirmed the armed forces’ support for the U.S.–Venezuela accord, framing it as a driver of employment and production and rejecting claims of subordination.

This follows the 1 September White House confirmation that the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital will take a 35% stake in NABEP, which received 100-year rights to 17 fields with ~65 billion barrels of proven reserves.

Significance: Military endorsement reduces near-term political-execution risk for the estimated $100bn infrastructure buildout, but ties the deal to an unelected government and heightens sanctions-transition and expropriation risk for equity partners.

Sources: El Nacional · NPR

White House Details 35% Pentagon Stake in Betancourt’s NABEP; 20% Offtake at Cost [High]

The White House on 1 September confirmed the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital will hold a 35% ownership stake and the State Department a guaranteed right to buy 20% of output at cost.

NABEP, controlled by sanctions-investigated tycoon Alejandro Betancourt, targets scaling production above 1 million barrels per day and pledged up to $100bn in new infrastructure. The agreement was signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Significance: The structure gives Washington a direct financial stake in Venezuelan crude while sidestepping being a direct counterparty to Caracas; Betancourt’s outstanding money-laundering investigations in Switzerland and Spain create material sanctions and reputational exposure for co-investors and financiers.

Sources: Al Jazeera · NBC News · Fox Business

Maduro’s Son Clarifies Origin of Prison Photos Amid Authenticity Doubts [Medium]

On 2 September, Maduro’s son addressed doubts over the authenticity of two images of his father in a U.S. Brooklyn detention facility, which showed him in a gray tracksuit and visibly thinner.

The photos, posted 30 August to Maduro’s accounts and timestamped 25 June, surfaced just days after the U.S.–Venezuela oil deal was announced.

A U.S. federal court has set the drug-trafficking trial of Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores for 1 June 2027.

Significance: The imagery is a political-signaling sideshow to the oil deal but underscores the durability of the new Rodríguez-led government the U.S. is partnering with, supporting deal-continuity assumptions for now.

Sources: El Nacional · Al Jazeera

COLOMBIA

U.S. Inaugurates New Military Alliance With Colombia Focused on Pacific Narco-Boats, Ecuador Border [High]

On 2 September, El País reported the U.S. formalized the first actions of renewed cooperation with the de la Espriella government following the SOUTHCOM commander’s visit, targeting Pacific narco-trafficking vessels and the Ecuador frontier.

Colombia recently joined the U.S.-promoted Coalition of the Americas Against Cartels (A3C) after de la Espriella took office on 7 August.

Significance: Deeper U.S.–Colombia security alignment stabilizes bilateral trade and aid ties after the Petro-era friction, lowering political risk for investors but raising cross-border operational risk near Ecuador.

Sources: El País América · LatinAmerican Post

Army Frustrates ELN Attack in Cúcuta After Car Bomb Kills One, Injures 15 in Los Patios [High]

On 2 September, President de la Espriella said the Army neutralized an explosives-laden vehicle abandoned in Agua Clara, frustrating a possible ELN attack in Cúcuta. This followed a Monday-evening (31 August) car bomb outside a police station in Los Patios, Norte de Santander, that killed at least one person and injured 15.

Significance: Escalating violence in the Norte de Santander border corridor raises security and continuity risk for cross-border trade and energy infrastructure near the Venezuela frontier.

Sources: El Tiempo · Colombia Reports

Army Captures ‘Alias 80,’ Dismantles Clan del Golfo Communications Hub in Antioquia [Medium]

On 2 September, the Army captured alias 80 in a Zaragoza (Antioquia) operation, seizing weapons, explosives, drone grenades and roughly 70 alleged police uniforms and dismantling a communications center. The blow targets the Clan del Golfo, one of Colombia’s most powerful trafficking organizations.

Significance: Sustained pressure on the Clan del Golfo supports the government’s security narrative but may prompt retaliatory disruption along northern trafficking and export corridors.

Sources: El Tiempo

ARGENTINA

Milei Seizes on Trump ‘Review’ of Falklands Stance; UK Firmly Rebuts [High]

After Trump said on 31 August he was ‘reviewing’ the U.S. position on Falklands sovereignty, Milei announced a national address on the Malvinas, scheduled for Thursday evening, calling the cause ‘sacred.’

On 2 September the UK government dismissed Trump’s remarks and reaffirmed sovereignty, with a Downing Street spokesperson stressing the islanders’ right to self-determination.

The U.S. has historically avoided taking sides on the dispute since 1982.

Significance: Any perceived shift in U.S. neutrality injects sovereign-risk and diplomatic uncertainty into UK–Argentina relations and could unsettle South Atlantic energy and fisheries investment; near-term it is rhetoric rather than a policy change.

Sources: Mercopress · El País América · Reuters/US News

BRAZIL

Senate Approves Data-Center Tax-Incentive Regime (Redata), Sent for Presidential Sanction [High]

On 1 September, Brazil’s Senate approved PL 278/2026 creating a tax regime to incentivize data-center installation, zeroing federal import taxes on electronics and IT components.

Beneficiary firms must use clean or renewable energy, meet water-efficiency thresholds, invest 2% of purchased goods’ value domestically, and reserve 10% of services for the internal market. The government estimates exemptions of around R$5.2 billion this year, and the text now goes to presidential sanction.

Significance: The regime is a targeted incentive to attract AI and cloud infrastructure capital, potentially channeling major foreign-direct investment into Brazilian data centers while imposing local-content and sustainability conditions.

Sources: Agência Brasil BWA—Neutralidad Tecnológica: South Ameяica’s Data Center Strategy, BWA—Ordem de Compra: Brazil Sets the Terms

Senate Confirms Rodrigo Pacheco for Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) [Medium]

On 1 September, the Senate approved Senator Rodrigo Pacheco’s nomination as a minister of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) by 63 votes to four, with the indication now going to the Chamber of Deputies. Pacheco, a former two-term Senate president, was tapped to replace Bruno Dantas, who resigned this week.

Significance: The appointment to Brazil’s top audit body shapes oversight of public spending and contracts, a factor for firms bidding on government procurement and concessions.

Sources: Agência Brasil

CUBA

Pentagon OSC Floated as U.S. ‘Partner of Last Resort’ for Sherritt, Antilles Cuba Mining Assets [Low]

In a 30 August analysis, Cuba Trade reported the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital could become a U.S. taxpayer partner for Canada’s Sherritt International (cobalt, nickel, energy) and Australia’s Antilles Gold (copper, gold, silver) operations in Cuba, mirroring the OSC structure used in the Venezuela oil deal. The reporting follows the State Department’s 20 August sanctioning of ICAP and nine Cuban entities and the addition of Cuba’s Ministry of Construction to the SDN list. Sherritt faces a 12 October 2026 deadline and Antilles a 25 January 2027 deadline.

Significance: A U.S. government equity role in Cuba-linked critical-minerals assets would upend sanctions-compliance calculus and counterparty risk for Sherritt and Antilles investors, tightening China-supply-chain competition dynamics.

Sources: Cuba Trade

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

OFAC’s live SDN/recent-actions feed could not be retrieved for this cycle, so no new designations are confirmed for the past 24–48 hours.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) WEEK 36 - 02.09.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly important to the global economy. ¡Viva Las Améяicas!

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Basel’s Ruble: Petrovich’s Cash

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In last week’s BWA, I follow a single drone into two very different economies. The same cheap, commercially available drone that is quietly lifting a smallholder’s cacao harvest in Ecuador is, in other hands, lowering the cost of coercion across Mexico’s cartel country. The cordillera — the great mountain spine that runs the length of Latin America, through its coffee and cacao highlands — will hold both faces.

In this week's BWA, I follow a Chinese purchase order to the Ceará coast, where ByteDance is building its largest data center outside China. Brazil supplied the wind, the land, and the customs regime. What it keeps after the servers are replaced is written into the approval, not the announcement.

Ordem de Compra: Brazil Sets the Terms

Scope of Supply | Fine Print | Landed Cost | Counterparty Risk | Demurrage | Uptime

Takeaways

Brazil’s Offer — The Brazilian state of Ceará combines abundant wind power, industrial land, international connectivity, and an export regime capable of supporting one of the world’s largest data centers.

Terms of Trade — ByteDance supplies the order. Brazil’s return will depend on the assets, skills, and choices that remain after each generation of servers is replaced.

Hundreds of workers are raising concrete columns in a cleared field near the Pecém Industrial and Port Complex, on the coast of Ceará. The columns stand eighteen feet high. Cranes and cement mixers move among square foundations that will eventually support the largest data center complex outside China belonging to ByteDance, the Chinese company that owns TikTok.

The construction site is the visible part of a larger transaction. In May, Omnia, the data-center platform backed by the Brazilian group Pátria Investimentos, signed a $2 billion agreement covering twenty years of electricity from Casa dos Ventos. It is the largest contract the Brazilian renewable-energy developer has signed with a single customer. The agreement is structured as self-production, giving Omnia a stake in Casa dos Ventos’ wind assets rather than a simple purchase of power.

The power will come from the 630-megawatt Ibiapaba wind complex in Ceará and the Dom Inocêncio wind farm in neighboring Piauí. It will supply a facility with approximately 200 megawatts of initial computing capacity and total electricity demand near 300 megawatts. Construction began in January, and the first servers are expected to enter operation during the third quarter of 2027.

That electricity will be consumed at Pecém. The resulting computing service will move across borders through international fiber-optic networks. Brazil will therefore export the work performed by 300 megawatts without sending a single electron abroad. The customer comes to the power source; the computing service crosses the border.

Pecém is frequently presented as a Chinese investment in Brazil. The construction site also reveals a Brazilian value proposition to the global technology industry. Brazil has assembled the resources, infrastructure, and institutions needed to attract a customer operating at ByteDance’s scale.

Scope of Supply

My earlier piece, “Neutralidad Tecnológica,” examined how South American governments manage the geopolitical and geoeconomic tension surrounding American and Chinese hardware, cloud systems, cables, and communications infrastructure.

Pecém raises another question: what is South America’s value proposition? Brazil, the continent’s largest economy, is answering first.

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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuelan Oil – The White House released detailed terms confirming the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital will take a 35% stake in Alejandro Betancourt’s North American Blue Energy Partners.

• Colombia – President Abelardo de La Espriella confirmed a third Guaviare bombing (Operation Azarías) that killed a key Iván Mordisco lieutenant, alias ‘El Tigre’.

• Southern Cone – Uruguay and Argentina moved to defuse a cross-border dispute over HIF Global’s green hydrogen plant.

• Uruguay – The Central Bank marked five years without FX intervention under a free-floating peso.

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VENEZUELA

White House Details Century-Long Oil Concession; Pentagon Takes 35% of NABEP [High]

On 31 August 2026 the White House released a fact sheet confirming its partnership with North American Blue Energy Partners, granting the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital a 35% stake and the State Department the right to buy 20% of output at cost plus a right of first refusal.

The Venezuelan government granted NABEP — run by Alejandro Betancourt and described as Venezuela’s second-largest private producer at over 200,000 barrels per day — 100-year concessions over 17 oil fields containing about 65 billion barrels, roughly one-fifth of proven reserves.

Many of the fields were previously held by Russian or Chinese firms, and Betancourt’s company pledged $100 billion in new infrastructure investment.

The deal was signed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

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Takeaways of the Week

• Economics & Privatization: Colombia unveiled a COP634.9 trillion (~$203bn) 2027 budget in which debt service jumped 55% to COP155.4 trillion, nearly a quarter of total spending.

• Energy & Minerals: Venezuela granted a U.S.-led joint venture 55% effective control of ~65 billion barrels of proven reserves across 17 fields under a century-scale concession.

• Foreign Investments: Canada’s Sherritt International faces a 12 October exclusivity deadline that could force CCAA bankruptcy protection amid competing U.S.-backed bids for its Cuban nickel-cobalt assets.

• Domestic Politics: Venezuela’s National Assembly unanimously passed a first-round Supreme Court overhaul giving civil-society representatives 12 of 23 vetting-committee seats, the transition dialogue’s first concrete deliverable.

• External Powers & Geopolitics: The U.S. resumed lethal Caribbean ‘narco-boat’ strikes on 25 August, pushing the year-long toll past 227 killed across roughly 68 strikes.

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This Week’s Five

Economics & Privatization

Colombia Tables COP634.9 Trillion ($203B) 2027 Budget With Debt Service Up 55% (EC) [High]

Finance Minister Miguel Gomez presented a COP634.9 trillion (~$203bn) 2027 budget on 27 August, a 14% year-on-year increase, after disclosing a COP2.1 trillion shortfall inherited from the Petro administration’s draft.

Debt obligations rose 55% to COP155.4 trillion (~$49.8bn), nearly a quarter of total spending, a burden the government attributed to earthquake reconstruction needs (a ~$6.4bn estimate) and prior miscalculations. The ceiling expands even as the De la Espriella government professes intent to cut spending amid the fiscal deficit, with the reformulation and congressional approval fight adding execution risk.

Banrep has held at 12.0% since 31 July, its easing room capped by fiscal credibility concerns. The debt-service load is the operative signal for Ecopetrol (EC) sovereign-linked paper and COLTES holders: rising crowding-out pressures the peso and widens sovereign spreads into an election-adjacent budget cycle.

Key Takeaways

• Debt service reached COP155.4 trillion (~$49.8bn), a 55% jump and nearly 25% of the entire COP634.9 trillion 2027 budget.

• COLTES and peso holders face widening spreads as Banrep’s 12.0% policy rate has little room to ease against a deteriorating fiscal path.

Sources: Colombia Reports · El Tiempo

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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuelan Energy – Washington and Caracas are discussing US long-term access to Venezuelan oil fields, including a possible 100-year lease.

• Venezuela Politics – The National Assembly gave a first-round unanimous vote to a Supreme Court overhaul, the first concrete deliverable of the transition dialogue.

• Cuba – Sanctions-driven M&A is intensifying as Antilles Gold signed a binding MOU, while Sherritt International faces a 12 October exclusivity deadline.

• Colombian Budget – De la Espriella government unveiled a COP634.9 trillion (~$203bn) budget after disclosing a 2.1 trillion COP shortfall, with debt service up 55%.

• Brazil – Regulator ANPD fined ByteDance about $29.8m for mishandling minors’ data.

• Mexico – Sinaloa governor Rocha Moya, a US fugitive, stepped down indefinitely after briefly returning to office.

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VENEZUELA

US Nears Deal for Long-Term Access to Venezuelan Oil Fields; Caracas Weighs OPEC Exit [High]

On 27 August 2026, sources told Reuters and Bloomberg that Trump administration officials are working on an agreement to secure long-term US access to a portion of Venezuela’s crude reserves, potentially structured as a lease with fields allocated to US producers via auction or tender.

A 100-year lease on several fields is among arrangements under discussion, with a list of 17 fields spanning the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo — some currently operated by a Chinese firm under a Maduro-era contract. Separately, Venezuela is reported to be seriously considering leaving OPEC as it strengthens ties with Washington.

Significance: A US lease over Venezuelan crude, including those fields in which established Chinese interests exist, brings the US and China into conflict. The move to control these assets is in keeping with the revival of the Monroe Doctrine.

Sources: El Pais America · Reuters via BNN Bloomberg · World Oil · Al Jazeera

National Assembly Advances US-Backed Supreme Court Overhaul in First Vote [High]

On 27 August 2026, Venezuela’s National Assembly unanimously approved in a first vote a bill to restart the selection of Supreme Court (TSJ) justices, described as one of the first concrete results of the US-backed transition dialogue.

The legislation would give civil-society representatives a majority (12 of 23 seats) on the committee vetting court candidates, a body traditionally dominated by Chavismo loyalists. The measure stems from the 12 August joint statement between the interim government delegation and the opposition to reform the justice system.

Significance: Judicial reform is a key confidence signal for investors weighing re-entry, as an independent judiciary underpins property-rights restitution and contract enforceability.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles · Bloomberg via Political Wire

CUBA

Antilles Gold Signs 25 August MoU Bringing US-Owned GEM Into Sanctioned Cuban JV [Medium]

Antilles Gold signed a binding MoU on 25 August 2026 to bring US ownership into its sanctioned Cuban gold project — the very mechanism by which it hopes to get the sanction lifted.

The Luxembourg-registered GEM Global Yield, which is 100% owned by US citizens, will take an initial 25% stake in Antilles Gold Inc (AGI), the Australian miner’s Cayman Islands subsidiary, which in turn holds 50% of the Cuban joint venture Minera La Victoria (MLV).

The rationale is regulatory: MLV was hit with a US sanction on 4 June 2026, halting its Nueva Sabana gold-copper mine, and as a US-owned party GEM can petition the US Department of State to have that sanction lifted so construction can resume.

The structure is built to deepen US control over time, targeting a minimum 51% US ownership of AGI by 30 June 2028. GEM has 60 days for due diligence, and the MoU runs for six months.

Significance: The deal is a template for how OFAC/State-sanctioned Cuban assets may be de-risked by inserting controlling US ownership, signaling the Trump-Vance administration’s strategy of steering Cuban critical-minerals supply chains toward US buyers; execution risk remains high pending State/OFAC approval.

Sources: Cuba Trade

Sherritt International Faces 12 October Exclusivity Deadline Amid Two Competing Bids [Medium]

As of the 27 August 2026 analysis, Sherritt International — with cobalt, nickel and energy operations in Cuba — faces a 12 October 2026 deadline when exclusivity expires for one suitor, Dallas-based Gillon Capital, potentially forcing it to seek CCAA (Canadian bankruptcy) protection.

A rival consortium involves Kyma Capital (holding ~13.43% of Sherritt shares), a Brevan Howard partner, and previously Glencore and a US-based party. Absent US-based connectivity, the administration is unlikely to approve any acquisition or lift related sanctions.

Significance: Sherritt’s fate is a bellwether for Cuban nickel/cobalt counterparty risk; a distressed restructuring or forced US-controlled takeover would redirect critical-minerals output toward US and military-linked markets and reprice the JV’s ~US$389m revenue base.

Sources: Cuba Trade

COLOMBIA

De la Espriella Government Unveils Reformulated COP634.9 Trillion Budget [High]

On 27 August 2026, Finance Minister Miguel Gomez presented a COP634.9 trillion (~$203bn) budget for the coming year, a 14% increase, after disclosing a 2.1 trillion peso shortfall in public payroll and other spending in the prior administration’s project.

Debt obligations rose 55% to COP155.4 trillion (~$49.8bn), nearly a quarter of the entire budget. The government cited earthquake-related needs and prior miscalculations for raising the ceiling despite intending to cut spending amid the fiscal deficit.

Significance: A debt-service burden at nearly 25% of the budget heightens sovereign fiscal-sustainability concerns and pressures COP and Colombian bond spreads; the reformulation and approval fight introduce execution risk for investors tracking Colombian rates.

Sources: Colombia Reports · El Tiempo · El Tiempo

Military Kills Eight Suspected EMBF Guerrillas in Joint Operation [Medium]

On 27 August 2026, President Abelardo de la Espriella said Colombia’s armed forces killed eight guerrillas of the FARC-dissident EMBF group in a joint operation. He said the offensive targeted camps used by the Jorge Suarez Briceño Block, a unit of the EMBF.

Significance: The harder-line security posture under De la Espriella affects rural risk premia in mining, energy and agribusiness corridors, though sustained flows will depend on whether operations degrade armed-group extortion of investors.

Sources: Colombia Reports

BRAZIL

ANPD Fines ByteDance ~$29.8M for Mishandling Minors’ Data [High]

Brazil’s data protection authority ANPD, in a decision published 25 August 2026, fined TikTok owner ByteDance 153.8 million reais (~$29.81m) for processing the data of teenagers aged 13-18 without a valid legal basis, one of the country’s most significant data-protection enforcement actions.

The regulator estimated data of at least 8 million minors may have been processed and ordered deletion plus stricter safeguards, with a 25% reduction available if ByteDance waives appeal. TikTok said the fine relates to conduct dating to 2021 and does not reflect a 2025 compliance plan.

Significance: The action signals escalating Brazilian regulatory and compliance risk for Chinese and global platforms, with ANPD probing 22 further platforms — raising the cost of doing digital business and adding a non-trivial headwind for tech counterparties operating in Brazil.

Sources: Latin America Daily Briefing · Reuters via Yahoo Finance · TelecomLead

MEXICO

Sinaloa Governor Rocha Moya Steps Down Indefinitely a Day After Returning [High]

Sinaloa governor Ruben Rocha Moya, a US fugitive under an April 2026 DOJ drug-trafficking indictment, announced indefinite leave on the night of 23 August 2026, roughly a day after resuming office following three months of leave.

His return triggered intense infighting within the ruling MORENA party, with President Sheinbaum and governors distancing themselves.

Interim governor Yeraldine Bonilla Valverde had been appointed after his original May leave.

Significance: Political instability in Sinaloa keeps US–Mexico security tensions and tariff-leverage risk elevated, a persistent overhang for MXN and for cross-border trade and investment exposed to the bilateral relationship.

Sources: El Pais America · CBS News

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

No new Cuba, Venezuela or Colombia-related OFAC designations were recorded in the past seven days.

The dominant OFAC development is licensing rather than listing: on 24 August 2026 OFAC issued Venezuela telecom General Licenses 61 and 62, authorizing US persons to supply telecom infrastructure goods/services and negotiate contingent investment contracts with CANTV, Movilnet and Conatel while explicitly excluding China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Cuba.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) WEEK 35 - 28.08.26

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Takeaways of the Day

• Venezuela – OFAC issued, on 24 August, two general licenses (GL 61 and GL 62) authorizing US firms to supply and negotiate telecom deals with state operators CANTV, Movilnet and regulator Conatel while explicitly excluding China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Cuba.

• Cuba – The battle for control of Canada’s Sherritt International, the top Western investor in Cuban nickel-cobalt, is actively unfolding with threats that add a US-Canada trade dimension.

• Colombia –President Abelardo de la Espriella escalated a hardline security posture, alleging roughly 123,700 barrels of refined product are stolen monthly from Ecopetrol.

• Brazil – Caixa Econômica Federal posted Q2 profit of R$3.9bn but flagged a sharp agribusiness NPL spike to 20.74%.

• Mercosur – Argentine opposition lawmakers travel to Brasília next week to repair Mercosur ties strained by Milei’s insults toward Lula.

  ---

VENEZUELA

OFAC Issues Telecom Licenses to Pull Venezuela Toward US Vendors, Freeze Out China [High]

On 24 August 2026 the US Treasury’s OFAC issued two general licenses (GL 61 and GL 62) permitting US firms to supply telecom goods, technology and services and to negotiate contingent investment contracts with Venezuelan state operators CANTV, Movilnet and regulator Conatel.

The licenses explicitly exclude entities from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, extending to telecom the same China-carve-out Washington previously applied to Venezuela’s oil sector.

GL 61 covers installation, maintenance, upgrades, fiber-optic and satellite bandwidth, cloud, servers and network support.

Significance: This is the implementation of the revived Monroe Doctrine and 2025 National Security Strategy that holds Latin America as a priority. It is a targeted market-access opening that favors US equipment vendors over Huawei and ZTE, reshaping counterparty options for Venezuelan telecom procurement while keeping sanctions exposure high for any China-linked participant.

Sources: Caracas Chronicles · Venezuelanalysis · South China Morning Post

CUBA

Sherritt Control Battle Intensifies as Ontario Threatens US Critical-Mineral Cutoff [High]

On 24 August 2026, Ontario Premier Doug Ford threatened to cut off critical minerals and electricity to the US amid the Canada-US trade dispute, specifically citing high-grade nickel shipped south.

The threat lands amid an active contest for Toronto-listed Sherritt International — the top Western investor in Cuban nickel-cobalt — between a Glencore-led consortium anchored by Texas billionaire Albert Huddleston and a competing Trump-linked Gillon bid.

Sherritt suspended direct Cuban joint-venture activity and saw three directors resign after Washington’s May 2026 sanctions targeted its Moa Nickel venture; the company has warned its going-concern status is in doubt.

Significance: The outcome determines whether a strategic nickel-cobalt refining chain shifts to US control amid supply-chain de-risking from China, while Ford’s threats add cross-border trade and electricity-price risk for US buyers.

Sources: Cuba Trade · MINING.COM · Havana Times

General Cigar Reactivates US Lobbying on Cuba Trade Policy [Medium]

On 26 August 2026, Cuba Trade reported General Cigar Co. has returned to active lobbying after a gap, registering with Continental Strategy LLC to push back on US trade and foreign-relations policy toward Cuba.

The company’s registered lobbyist, Alberto Martinez, previously advised then-Senator Marco Rubio for over a decade. The move follows a May 2025 court ruling confirming cancelation of General Cigar’s Cohiba trademark in favor of Cuba’s Cubatabaco.

Significance: Signals renewed private-sector effort to shape US-Cuba trade rules, relevant to tobacco importers and anyone tracking the direction of Cuba sanctions policy under the current administration.

Sources: Cuba Trade

COLOMBIA

De la Espriella Alleges 123,700 Barrels Stolen Monthly From Ecopetrol [Medium]

On 24 August 2026, President Abelardo de la Espriella claimed thieves in northern Colombia are stealing at least 123,700 barrels of gasoline, diesel and naphtha per month — refined products imported or produced by state oil company Ecopetrol.

He called the theft alarming and demanded immediate action, part of a broader ‘iron fist’ security push announced the same day. Predecessor Gustavo Petro, now the leading opposition figure, criticizes the government daily.

Significance: Large-scale fuel theft directly erodes Ecopetrol’s downstream margins and revenue, a counterparty and creditworthiness signal for holders of Ecopetrol paper and a downside risk to state fiscal accounts.

Sources: Colombia Reports · Colombia Reports

BRAZIL

Caixa Q2 Profit Rises 5.9% to R$3.9bn but Agribusiness NPLs Spike to 20.74% [Medium]

On 26 August 2026, Caixa Econômica Federal reported Q2 2026 recurring net profit of R$3.9bn, up 5.9% year-on-year, driven by strong mortgage-led credit expansion; its total loan book reached R$1.448 trillion. However, 90-day-plus delinquency rose to 3.64% from 2.66% a year earlier, with agribusiness NPLs surging to 20.74% from 7.02%, prompting a 97.6% jump in loan-loss provisions to R$6.97bn.

Return on equity fell 2.7 points to 9.16%, and first-half recurring profit was down 17.6% year-on-year.

Significance: The agribusiness delinquency spike and provisioning surge signal rising credit risk in Brazil’s farm sector — a counterparty warning for agri-lenders and a data point for BRL and rate-sensitive positioning.

Sources: Agencia Brasil

TSE and Google Launch Deepfake Detection Tool Ahead of 2026 Elections [Medium]

On 26 August 2026, Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and Google launched a campaign encouraging 2026 candidates to use YouTube’s ‘Likeness ID’ tool to identify AI-generated content misusing their image.

Users register via ID and selfie verification, after which the platform scans for and flags synthetic content. TSE President Kassio Nunes Marques framed it as a public-private effort to protect electoral integrity.

Significance: Election-integrity infrastructure ahead of the October vote reduces disinformation-driven volatility risk for BRL and Brazilian assets during the campaign window.

Sources: Agencia Brasil

MERCOSUR/REGIONAL

Argentine Lawmakers to Travel to Brasília to Repair Milei-Strained Ties [Medium]

Per Mercopress on 27 August 2026, a delegation of Argentine opposition deputies and senators will travel to Brasília next Wednesday to repair bilateral relations strained after President Javier Milei referred to Lula in offensive terms.

The group is due to meet the Brazilian Senate’s foreign relations committee, the foreign ministry and presidency representatives. Interests cited include the functioning of Mercosur and Brazil’s backing for Argentina’s Falklands sovereignty claim.

Significance: Friction between Mercosur’s two largest economies raises bloc-cohesion and trade-facilitation risk; a thaw would support intra-bloc trade flows and cross-border deal confidence.

Sources: Mercopress

Brazil Fines TikTok Owner Over Data Protection Violations [Low]

The Latin America Daily Briefing reported on 26 August 2026 that Brazil fined TikTok’s owner over data-protection violations. The action reflects continued regulatory scrutiny of major platforms operating in Brazil.

Significance: Signals ongoing regulatory and compliance cost risk for global tech platforms operating in Brazil — relevant to sector investors weighing data-governance exposure.

Sources: Latin America Daily Briefing

US Consulates Suspend Work-Visa Appointments Amid Tighter Immigration Screening [Low]

El País reported on 27 August 2026 that US consulates abroad have temporarily suspended work-visa appointments due to a ‘training initiative’ to screen out foreigners who could be a burden. The measure reflects a hardening US immigration posture.

Significance: Work-visa disruptions raise labor-mobility and staffing risk for LatAm firms with US operations and for cross-border service and investment flows.

Sources: El Pais America

OFAC Sanctions Monitor

No new Cuba, Venezuela or Colombia-related OFAC designations were recorded in the past seven days.

The dominant OFAC development is licensing rather than listing: on 24 August 2026 OFAC issued Venezuela telecom General Licenses 61 and 62, authorizing US persons to supply telecom infrastructure goods/services and negotiate contingent investment contracts with CANTV, Movilnet and Conatel while explicitly excluding China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Cuba.

Confidence Levels (based on open-source corroboración)

High — confirmed by multiple independent open sources, or by an authoritative primary source (official government release, OFAC designation, central-bank data).

Medium — reported by a single credible source, or multiple outlets tracing to one origin; plausible but not independently corroborated.

Low / single-source — a single source, unverified, or a state-media claim without independent confirmation; treat with caution.

Confidence reflects the degree of open-source (OSINT) corroboration at the time of writing and has not been human-source (HUMINT) verified. This brief is for information only and is not investment advice.

BWA (Daily Brief) WEEK 35 - 27.08.26

Welcome to Barbershop Whispers…Las Améяicas (BWA), a weekly publication about all things Améяicas. A big and diverse continent that is becoming increasingly important to the global economy. ¡Viva Las Améяicas!

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Close Shave: How Baku Expands Without Drawing Blood

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed Venezuela’s mountainous debt and the restructuring process. Successful debt restructuring will depend on Rubio and Rodríguez's ability to control the money and the guns, respectively.

In this week’s BWA, I follow a single drone into two very different economies. The same cheap, commercially available drone that is quietly lifting a smallholder’s cacao harvest in Ecuador is, in other hands, lowering the cost of coercion across Mexico’s cartel country. The cordillera — the great mountain spine that runs the length of Latin America, through its coffee and cacao highlands — will hold both faces. The question is which one the region lets prevail.

Janus Over Las Cordilleras: Where Harvest Meets Security

Bloodlands | The Sky Farmer | The Tax Before the Drone | Drone Value | Slow Learner | The Face That Prevails

Takeaways

• Productivity — The same drone democratization that puts precision spraying within reach of a smallholder cooperative also puts precision violence within reach of an armed group. One machine, two ledgers.

• Proliferation — Like the Spanish Civil War before it, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a live weapons petri dish — and the drones and tactics proven there are now spreading into Latin America.

• Asymmetry — A spray drone lifts a farm’s margin by a few points; an attack drone can empty a village, close a port, and reprice a country’s risk. The gains and losses do not cancel on the same balance sheet.

  ---

Juan Pérez and Pancho de la Cruz are representative characters constructed from documented conditions facing small farmers in Ecuador and Mexico.

Just after dawn on the lowlands of Ecuador’s Los Ríos, before the heat settles over the cacao trees, a drone lifts from the edge of Juan Pérez’s grove. It belongs to a service crew hired through his cooperative. In twenty minutes it performs work that once demanded days of hired labor and a man walking row after row beneath a tank sprayer. The machine reaches the trees while the treatment window is still open, before another tropical downpour turns access difficult and disease pressure rises.

Pérez farms fewer than five hectares of Nacional cacao. His scale is typical of an industry in which roughly 70% of producers are smallholders. His crop sits inside a global luxury market, yet much of that value disappears before it reaches the farm gate. Ecuador is the world’s largest exporter of fine-flavor cacao, while field research has found that the premium attached to Nacional beans in international marketing barely reaches the farmers who grow them. For Pérez, the drone’s value is pragmatic: it preserves his existing crop, reduces the labor needed to protect it, and makes his harvest a little more predictable.

More than two thousand kilometers to the northwest, another drone lifts over the Mexican Chiapas hills. In July 2024, a drone dropped an explosive on the community sports court at Nueva Reforma, in the municipality of Chicomuselo. Nearly the entire community, roughly 400 people, fled. Three weeks later, an organized-crime group used explosive-laden drones against the Mexican army’s 101st Infantry Battalion barracks in the same municipality.

The drones over Los Ríos and Chiapas differ in size, payload, and purpose. They share a more important economic characteristic: each puts an aerial capability once reserved for large organizations and governments within reach of a cooperative, a contractor, or an armed narco group. One lowers the marginal cost of protecting a crop while the other lowers the marginal cost of coercion.

This is the Janus story of drones in Latin America, one technology entering two ledgers. The commercial application drove the agricultural use case. The Russo-Ukrainian War accelerated the development of the tactics, training, and countermeasures that have made weaponized drones far more effective.

Latin America now lives beneath both faces, and they are moving at different speeds.

Bloodlands

Every generation of weapons finds its laboratory in someone’s war. In the late 1930s it was Spain, where foreign powers tested aircraft, armor, and the doctrines that would define the conflict to come.

Today the laboratory is the Ukrainian bloodlands, where the military use case and economics for drones are being tested and refined in real time. First-person-view (FPV) aircraft costing roughly $300 to $1,000 can disable vehicles and positions worth many times more. Inexpensive decentralized workshops are being set up to assemble drones at scale. Drones are being equipped with autonomous navigation systems, making them immune to electronic warfare, and fiber-optic control systems carry a live video signal for kilometers while remaining immune to conventional radio jamming. A platform built from globally available components now delivers a form of precision strike that once required the budget and infrastructure of a state.

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Venezuela’s Debt Restructuring on Delicate Rails: Will It Work?

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Takeaways of the Day

• Economics & Privatization: Colombia’s De la Espriella expanded a 30-day economic emergency decree in 15 of 32 departmentos/provinces, unlocking decree-with-force-of-law spending powers for earthquake reconstruction subject to Constitutional Court review.

• Energy & Minerals: US oil companies signed the first post-Maduro contracts with PDVSA on 20 August 2026 under OFAC general licenses covering Chevron, Shell, BP, Eni and Repsol.

• Foreign Investments: The three-way control fight over Canada’s Sherritt International escalated in Ontario Superior Court as Glencore-backed Kyma Capital challenged Sherritt’s rejection of a September shareholder meeting.

• Domestic Politics: Brazil’s presidential campaign formally opened with Lula holding a tight lead ahead of the 4 October first round at a 14% Selic.

• External Powers & Geopolitics: The US State Department designated nine Cuban entities and three ICAP officials under E.O. 14404 on 20 August 2026, targeting the nickel/cobalt, metals and construction sectors.

  ---

This Week’s Five

Economics & Privatization

Colombia Expands Post-Quake Economic Emergency to 15 Departments as Reconstruction Bill Mounts [High]

President Abelardo de la Espriella signed a second decree on 19-20 August 2026 expanding the state of economic, social and ecological emergency to 15 of Colombia’s 32 departmentos. The August magnitude-7.4 earthquake has affected 314,751 people across 481 municipalities, and destroyed 31,183 homes concentrated in Cali and Pereira.

The decree grants the executive decree-with-force-of-law powers to mobilize off-budget reconstruction funds, fast-track infrastructure tenders and expedite insurance-claim processing, with the earlier reconstruction estimate near $6.4 billion. De la Espriella insisted the powers are temporary and ‘not a blank check,’ and the cabinet session that preceded signing was attended by executives from the country’s main insurance companies.

The measures remain subject to Constitutional Court review, adding legal-execution risk on top of fiscal-slippage concerns for the COP and local bonds.

Key Takeaways

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Relaxing 2026 Books: More Russia, Asimov and Brothers Strugatsky

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed whether Cuba’s humanitarian crisis can trigger another mass maritime exodus on the scale of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. The conditions are largely present. At what point does Fulano de Tal decide that the risk of crossing the Florida Straits is better than simply surviving on the island?

In this week’s BWA, I discuss Venezuela’s mountainous debt and the restructuring process. Successful debt restructuring will depend on Rubio and Rodríguez's ability to control the money and the guns, respectively.

Venezuela’s Debt Restructuring on Delicate Rails: Will It Work?

Three Months Out | Three Phases, Two Rails | Stability: The Barrels & Cash | Recovery: Progress & Unfinished Business | Transition: Who Can Bind the Republic | What is to be Done? | Abuelo’s Regime Change

Takeaways

Progress Without a Deal — Venezuela has appointed advisers, reopened contact with the IMF and begun organising creditors. It still lacks a verified debt total, a published sustainability analysis and an OFAC licence permitting direct negotiations. The machinery is moving; the transaction has not begun.

Money and Guns— Venezuela’s debt workout sits inside Rubio’s framework of Stability, Recovery and Transition. Washington controls the money; Miraflores holds together the fragile Chavista coalition and security apparatus. This is not your abuelo’s regime change playbook.

Three Months Out

On 13 May, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela announced the initiation of a comprehensive restructuring of its external public debt, covering the obligations of the Republic and PDVSA. The announcement rested on four principles — sustainability, comprehensiveness, good faith and transparency, and celerity — and offered one date: Venezuela said it expected to present its macroeconomic framework and public debt sustainability analysis (DSA) to the international financial community in June 2026.

That was the Republic’s own expectation rather than an enforceable commitment. Venezuela has appointed advisers and resumed contact with the IMF, but three months on the framework and the DSA remain in process; officials said in July that both were still being refined to absorb the earthquakes’ economic impact. What was announced in May was a process and a perimeter. What is being delivered is momentum.

Three Phases, Two Rails

Miraflores is working inside a framework Washington wrote. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 January, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio set out three American objectives for Venezuela — stability, recovery and transition — without details on sequence or how it would be executed. Seven months on, the phases are running in parallel: stability is being maintained, recovery has been re-scoped by the earthquakes, and transition talks have begun.

For bondholders, Rubio’s three phases will not unfold neatly in sequence. Venezuela can negotiate a debt deal before completing its political transition, but two conditions must be met. Washington must permit the oil revenues needed to support the agreement. Rodríguez must also keep the Chavista coalition, particularly the security establishment, united enough to approve and implement it. Creditors will also need confidence that the next government will honor whatever agreement she signs.

Stability: The Barrels and Cash

Stability has been delivered largely from outside the country. Washington controls the flow of oil and its proceeds, routing payments into US Treasury-designated accounts, an arrangement that has kept the economy from collapsing while making the United States the effective treasurer. It also decides who gets paid, in what order and when, which is the first fact any recovery analysis has to price. China ran a comparable arrangement with PDVSA on a smaller scale, built to recover its own oil-backed loans; US control has disrupted that repayment mechanism by taking hold of barrels earmarked for Beijing, setting a creditor-priority conflict before debt negotiations have begun.

The fiscal arithmetic has since been rewritten by the earthquakes. The World Bank estimates direct physical damage from the 24 June earthquakes at $19.6 billion, with around half concentrated in La Guaira and the Capital District, and warns that at current investment levels reconstruction would remain incomplete over a ten-year horizon; more than 6,300 people are reported dead. Reconstruction on that scale competes for the same cash that would service and settle debt, which is why Venezuelan economists argue that rebuilding has the better claim on the state’s money.

Market pricing has moved on the story rather than on any terms. The license issued on 5 May lifted the Venezuelan sovereign 2027s by 5.4% to 55.53¢ on the dollar, a nine-year high, with the PDVSA 2037s at 40.1¢. Those are clean prices: they exclude the past-due interest any settlement will have to address.

Recovery: Progress and Unfinished Business

Recovery begins with a number yet to be produced. There is still no official register of what Venezuela owes, and press estimates run from $150 billion to $200 billion, alongside a Financial Times-reported figure of about $240 billion — a spread that exists because no aggregate has been published. The economist José Guerra puts the problem plainly: the government does not know how much it owes, the DSA is missing, and no Venezuelan-led negotiating team exists. The DSA is being prepared by the Republic’s advisors, rather than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who typically generates these reports in such circumstances, so there is no agreed set of numbers from which to negotiate. Others have proposed validating and reconciling claims first, then exchanging verified claims into standardized instruments, but this would compete for the same money and attention as the earthquake recovery demands.

The gate is OFAC General License 58 (GL 58), issued on 5 May, which authorizes legal, financial-advisory and consulting work, including the assessment, development and preparation of restructuring options and supporting materials. It expressly withholds authorization for the restructuring, transfer or settlement of debt and for direct negotiations between the government and its creditors. I have experienced OFAC-driven asset sales, and every step – negotiations with the SDN, signature on the sale & purchase agreement, funds transfer – is scrutinized and approved separately. The last item, an OFAC-licensed funds transfer, is the most difficult: finding a bank willing to wire the funds.

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Cuba’s Humanitarian Crisis: Another Mariel?

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The Week’s Key Takeaways

• Economics & Privatization: Colombia declared a constitutional economic emergency after the 7.4 quake, granting De la Espriella decree powers to modify taxes and spending against a nearly exhausted debt ceiling and up to $10bn in damage.

• Energy & Minerals: Petrobras confirmed its first oil discovery on Brazil’s Equatorial Margin at the Morpho well in the Foz do Amazonas basin, extending the Guyana–Suriname trend into Brazilian waters.

• Foreign Investments: Argentina’s YPF filed the $51bn Argentina LNG project with Eni and XRG under the RIGI regime, the largest submission to date.

• Domestic Politics: Venezuela’s interim government released 131 more political prisoners, bringing the total freed to 1,046 since Maduro’s January capture as US-brokered transition talks advanced.

• External Powers & Geopolitics: Colombia authorized joint US military operations and joined the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition as its 19th member, marking a decisive pro-Washington security realignment.

This Week’s Five

Economics & Privatization

◆ LEAD STORY OF THE WEEK

Colombia Declares Economic Emergency After 7.4 Quake, Pressuring COP and COLTES [High]

Following the 10 August magnitude-7.4 earthquake that killed roughly 281–285 people, injured about 3,700, left ~379 missing and destroyed more than 12,000 homes, President Abelardo de la Espriella invoked a constitutional economic emergency on 12 August, granting temporary authority to issue tax and spending decrees, modify taxes and create institutions—including a ‘Miracle Fund’—without congressional approval.

The USGS estimates losses could reach $10 billion against a debt ceiling De la Espriella himself described as nearly exhausted amid ‘the most complex fiscal situation in the country’s republican history.’ The quake struck the coffee-growing axis (Pereira, Armenia, Manizales) and Cali, damaging roads, seven suspended airports and aqueducts, threatening near-term export logistics and insurance exposure.

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Marching toward the Abyss II: Mobilization

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed Cuban certified claims and debts. A follow up to Cuba Bankability and the Last Call on Cuban Sovereign Debt.

In this week’s BWA, I discuss whether Cuba’s humanitarian crisis can trigger another mass maritime exodus on the scale of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. The conditions are largely present. At what point does Fulano de Tal decide that the risk of crossing the Florida Straits is better than simply surviving on the island?

Cuba’s Humanitarian Crisis: Another Mariel?

Cascading Humanitarian Crisis | Exits Are Closing | Two Precedents, One Decision-Maker | Havana’s On/Off Switch | Tripwires | Drift, Surge, or Engineered Exodus | Fulano Sails to Miami?

Takeaways

Pressure: Cuba has nearly every ingredient for another mass exodus on the scale of Mariel 1980: infrastructure collapse, food shortages, closing exits, and a population increasingly desperate to leave.

Permission: Desperation is not enough; mass maritime flight begins only if Havana issues the permission slip and stops policing departures.

Cascading Humanitarian Crisis

On 7 August, Cubans were reported sleeping on mattresses on the ground outside the University of Havana, one of the most symbolically loaded pieces of real estate in the country. One man, let’s call him Fulano de Tal (the American equivalent to John Doe), told a journalist filming the scene that he had gotten used to living without electricity and that what he needed now was to leave:

“What I need is to leave the country. I don’t need anything else”

Five days earlier, the national grid had gone down again, and it went down a second time the following afternoon while crews were still trying to restore it.

Last week Unión Eléctrica, the state utility, forecasted a peak shortfall of 2,347 MW against 3,250 MW of demand, with only 933 MW available — roughly 70% of peak demand unserved. The Cuban Energy Minister Vicente de la O’Levy told the National Assembly that some communities have gone as long as 105 days without electricity, and some Havana circuits are running 20 to 24 hours a day without power.

According to the Universidad de Navarra, the grid’s structural rot can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union and a failed 2006 “energy revolution” built on Venezuelan crude (Universidad de Navarra), while others point to the 50 year-old combustion technology. Then, of course, there is the loss of Venezuelan and then Mexican oil shipments.

A power failure is an abstraction until you trace what the electricity powered. About 87% of Cuban water distribution is dependent on electric pumps, and only 135 of 480 critical pump stations are on protected circuits. That ratio converts every blackout into a water crisis. Roughly 2.7 million Cubans face daily water shortages, and the national hydraulic system is running on ~37% of available fuel needs.

Fuel and pump-station shortages also affect sanitation. Only 44 of 106 garbage trucks were operational in Havana, against 24,000 to 30,000 cubic meters of solid waste generated daily, in a city whose sewer network dates from 1908–14 and was designed for 600,000 people rather than today’s two million.

Poor sanitation has triggered outbreaks of Hepatitis A across the country; the ministry’s own advice to boil or treat water is difficult to follow under twenty-hour blackouts. A deputy health minister warned on state television that with all four dengue serotypes circulating, the country could face an epidemic, naming accumulated solid waste and household water storage as drivers.

Food insecurity completes the humanitarian cascade and makes widening inequality politically combustible. The Food Industry Minister acknowledged that the rationed basket had delivered no cooking oil, chicken or yogurt this year, and the Food Monitor Program — an advocacy-adjacent NGO, not an official statistical body — reports that roughly a third of households experienced recent hunger and that about eight in ten had cooking capacity disrupted by blackouts.

The informal dollar moved from 435 CUP in December 2025 to about 670 CUP by early July, and independent economists put basic monthly needs for one person at roughly fourteen times the average official wage. Households with remittances, generators or solar panels have partly exited the crisis; a single panel costs close to a thousand dollars against an average state salary near seventeen dollars a month, the most visible form of inequality.

Exits are Closing

Cubans have already responded to these conditions, and have been doing so for the past four years. Official statistics record net emigration of 245,264 people in 2025 alone, about 2.5% of the population, with a resident population reported at 9.43 million against 11.24 million in 2017. Independent demographers contest those numbers and place the population closer to 8 million, calling what has happened since 2020 a displacement crisis without a war and a country emptying and ageing.

The analytically important point is how they left. Most emigrants left via airports, through Nicaragua and Central America, humanitarian parole and family reunification, and through asylum claims filed across the hemisphere. However, these routes are closing quickly. Nicaragua ended visa-free entry in February 2026, and roughly 600,000 Cubans already in the United States sit in legal limbo. Some have found new routes. For example, Cuban asylum claims in Brazil nearly doubled to 41,919 in 2025 and arrivals in Uruguay rose from 5,870 to 14,959 last year.

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The Week’s Key Takeaways

• Economics & Privatization: Brazil’s Copom cut the Selic 25bp to 14% on 5 August, its fourth consecutive reduction, keeping real rates near 10% and carry attractive despite industry complaints of restrictive policy.

• Energy & Minerals: Petrobras (PBR) posted a near-record Q2 net profit of R$52.4 billion on record output of 2.7 million bpd, underpinning dividend capacity amid U.S.-Brazil trade friction.

• Foreign Investments: The U.S. Department of War committed $85.5 million to acquire a Guyanese bauxite mine to secure supply away from Chinese reliance.

• Domestic Politics: Colombia’s Abelardo de la Espriella was sworn in 7 August in Cali—the first inauguration outside Bogotá since 1898—launching a hard-security, pro-Washington agenda.

• External Powers & Geopolitics: The U.S. State Department designated five Cuban entities and eight MINFAR-linked officials on 6 August under E.O. 14404, extending secondary-sanctions exposure to GAESA-linked counterparties.

This Week’s Five

Economics & Privatization

Brazil’s Copom Cuts Selic to 14% in Fourth Straight Move as Industry Calls Pace Insufficient [High]

Brazil’s Copom cut the benchmark Selic rate by 25bp to 14% on 5 August 2026, its fourth consecutive reduction and 100bp of cumulative easing since March, with the Galípolo-led board leaving its next move data-dependent.

The National Confederation of Industry (CNI) and Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Firjan)welcomed the direction but called the pace insufficient, noting real rates near 10% remain roughly double the central bank’s estimated 5% neutral rate and have kept credit expensive for 55 months.

Key Takeaways

The watch is changes between now and the upcoming presidential election in October, and any fiscal slippage that reverses the disinflation narrative and hits local-currency bonds first.

Sources: Agência Brasil · Latin America Daily Briefing · Barbershop Whispers…Las Américas Daily

Energy & Minerals

Petrobras (PBR) Posts Near-Record R$52.4 Billion Q2 Profit on Record 2.7 Million Bpd Output [High]

Petrobras reported Q2 2026 net profit of R$52.4 billion (US$10.4 billion) on 6 August, up 97% year-on-year and among its largest quarterly results ever, as oil output hit a record 2.7 million barrels per day and refinery utilization reached 101%.

Exports climbed to nearly one million barrels per day, aided by a rising Brent price, while capex ran at R$26.7 billion with 82% directed to exploration and production.

Robust cash generation supports dividend capacity and BRL inflows, a positive for oil-linked credit and equity (PBR) exposure.

Key Takeaways

Petrobras appears insulated from US – Brazil trade and diplomatic friction. PBR equity and credit holders win on sustained dividend capacity; the swing variables are Brent and BRL rather than the U.S.-Brazil tariff friction.

Sources: Agência Brasil · Barbershop Whispers…Las Américas Daily

Foreign Investments

U.S. Department of War Commits $85.5M for Guyanese Bauxite Mine to Cut China Reliance [Medium]

Three months after publicly flagging interest in Guyana’s bauxite reserves, the U.S. Department of War said on 8 August 2026 it is investing US$85.5 million to help acquire a mine in the South American country to guarantee supplies rather than turning to Chinese sources. The move extends Washington’s critical-minerals securitization drive in the Western Hemisphere, paralleling the contested U.S.-backed bid for Sherritt’s Cuban nickel/cobalt platform and ExxonMobil’s Stabroek offshore boom.

For dealmakers, the transaction signals that U.S. strategic-minerals capital is now flowing directly into upstream acquisition rather than offtake alone underwritten by the US government.

Key Takeaways

Guyana wins as a dual-commodity U.S. strategic partner (offshore oil plus bauxite); Chinese bauxite suppliers lose hemispheric ground as Washington underwrites Western supply security.

Sources: Demerara Waves

Domestic Politics

◆ LEAD STORY OF THE WEEK

De la Espriella Sworn In as Colombia’s President in Cali, Launching Hard-Security, Pro-Washington Pivot [High]

Abelardo de la Espriella was sworn in 7 August 2026 in Cali—the first Colombian inauguration outside Bogotá since 1898—delivering his first address at an Army battalion and pledging up to 40% state-spending cuts, an oil-and-gas revival, an Israel rapprochement including an embassy move to Jerusalem, and ruptures with Cuba and Nicaragua.

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Chingiz Khan Heir Whispers into the Tsar’s Ear

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In last week’s BWA, I discussed why Brazil and Argentina, the two anchor economies of Mercosur, want the same from the institution, and what the bloc's rotating chair says about its resilience.

In this week’s BWA, I discuss what has happened over the past few months since I published Cuba Bankability and the Last Call on Cuban Sovereign Debt in May. In this spirit, I lead my fellow Barbers to the opportunity.

The Cuba Money Opportunity

The Paper: Winnable, Not Collectible | The Destination: Trust Units | The Waterfall That Doesn't Exist Yet | The Trades, Ranked by Risk and Enforceability | The Clocks: Four Dates and a Black Swan

Takeaways

Convergence — The courts opened every door to sue Cuba just as sanctions emptied the Cuban treasury. Judgments now pile up uncollectible at industrial scale, leaving one clearing mechanism standing.

Mispricing — A claims stack potentially worth billions on paper has yet to be priced. The first bid sets the price discovery process in motion, and the unwritten seniority waterfall will govern who gets paid first. Being the first mover on both writes the rules.

Between 1959 and 1968, the Cuban government confiscated American-owned property across the island — refineries, utilities, sugar mills, and docks. Since then, the US government adjudicated the losses and certified 5,913 claims worth $1.9 billion (roughly $8–9 billion with interest) through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC).

In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act’s Title III gave those claimants the right to sue anyone “trafficking” in — commercially using — their confiscated property; every president suspended that right until 2019. Those certified claims, along with Cuba’s defaulted sovereign debt, are the stack my previous piece — “Cuba’s Rocky Road to Bankable.” and “Last Call on Cuban Sovereign Debt” — mapped out.

This piece proposes where they may end up: a claims trust, in which Cuban state assets are transferred to a neutral vehicle and tradeable units are issued to claimants against their paper.

The Paper: Winnable, Uncollectible

Three months since those BWA publications, the US courts, US Treasury, and the corporate exodus have eliminated every avenue for collecting on certified claims — leaving only two endgames: a negotiated structure along the lines proposed here, or the stalemate Cuba has endured for sixty-six years.

For the first time, the stalemate has a countdown clock. The clock is Beijing’s collateral math, Havana’s succession calendar, Washington’s own electoral arithmetic, and the physics of a grid that fails a little more each night.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of claimants twice.

In Havana Docks (8–1, May 21), it held that a claimant whose underlying rights had long since lapsed — Havana Docks' pier concession would have expired on its own in 2004 — can still sue, because what was confiscated was the docks themselves, not the paper interest in them. Claims the market had written off as expired came back to life, reviving roughly $440 million in judgments against four cruise lines.

In Exxon v. CIMEX(6–3, June 23), it held that Title III itself strips Cuban state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of sovereign immunity.

Together, the two rulings did the work of a decade: they revived a lapsed claim and stripped a Cuban SOE of its immunity — multiplying, in a single term, both the number of live claims and the universe of defendants answerable in US courts. What the rulings could not do is make it collectible. That is the hinge of this piece.

Why can't the winners collect? Four walls. The Cuban state companies being sued own nothing in the United States worth seizing. The Cuban money Washington has frozen is locked, not forfeited — no trafficking judgment can unlock it. The courts of Europe are legally barred from helping. And the Cuban government itself is cash broke: the only assets Cuba has are fixed, illiquid assets - hotels, seaports, airports, and mines - some of which are rotting under sanctions.

Thirty-six days after Exxon, the ruling became a docket number: on 29 July, the Cuban Electric Company — holder of FCSC Claim No. CU-2578, the largest certified claim against Cuba at $267.6 million — sued UNE and Energas (both SOEs) in the DC district court, citing Exxon directly. Sherritt, a Canadian mining company with mining interests in Cuba, a one-third owner of Energas, is identified in the complaint but not joined as a defendant. This is a message that every SOE JV partner, past or present, has liability exposure, whether or not they have exited the island.

Meanwhile, the foreign investment exodus from the island is gaining momentum and critical mass.

Ceiba Investments itself — the last market-priced Cuba vehicle, listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) — has been designated as a Special Designated National by OFAC (SDN) and its shares suspended, with OFAC’s General Licenses 2 and 3 giving holders until 22 August to divest or risk holding illiquid paper for an undetermined period.

Sherritt exited after 32 years as a creditor owed $277 million; Meliá terminated all Cuban hotel contracts effective 24 July, booking €79.4 million in provisions on its exit — and with Iberostar and Barceló also gone, all three Spanish hotel majors have now written off their island.

The lesson is brutal and clarifying: owning Cuban operating assets results in a US Treasury designation, while owning claims against Cuba is merely holding uncollectible debt.

And no, the claims cannot simply be paid out of — or attached to — Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) fabled offshore billions. The State Department alleges up to $20 billion in hidden overseas accounts; the Miami Herald’s leaked accounting showed $14.5 billion in unidentified banks; skeptics argue that much of it consists of internal peso entries, not hard currency abroad.

It really does not matter which is true. Blocking reaches only what falls under US jurisdiction — and Havana now routes payments through China’s CIPS cross-border system: non-dollar transactions that are invisible to Western authorities, and outside US jurisdiction.

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