This is a bit different than my usual note on a specific company or a portfolio update but after seeing yet another analyst move their PT on a stock by a very insignificant amount, I found myself thinking about the topic I and wanted to get other peoples opinions. I am generally curious how you view and use price targets both from analysts at the big firms and your own valuation work.

I used to be very specific with valuation and found comfort in my spreadsheet but over the years I found that I do better without getting so granular…. Yes, it’s possible I just wasn’t very good at it :p. Either way, I have almost all but stopped doing complex DCF analyses with 100’s of assumptions.

I believe a large part of this is due to human psychology. While not universal, generally we are sensitive to anchoring bias. For me personally, fixating on a specific valuation creates unnecessary thought processes or even worse, unnecessary actions.

For example, if my valuation model comes up with a fair value of $10/share for XYZ stock, what happens when the stock reaches my calculated fair value? Do I sell? Do I tinker with my spreadsheet? At what point below fair value should I buy? What happens if it quickly surpasses my fair value? Were my assumptions wrong? What if it trades to double my fair value?

I understand the most common answer would be, “well you adjust the model based on all the data available today”. Certainly a fair point but I don’t believe markets are efficient or always rational. Constantly tweaking the model each quarter based on a point of growth here or slight miss there doesn’t seem to be well aligned with long term investing.

I find myself resonating much more with a Joel Greenblatt type of view. Looking down not up. I find his style makes much more sense for personally. They way I view it is if the downside risk is minimal but the upside potential is substantial, it may be worth a closer look. Both the terms “minimal” and “significant” are subjective but again who cares if the potential upside is 100% or 110% on paper.

My more simplistic approach now focuses on ROIC, Growth (and growth drivers), Relative Valuation (to peers and its own history), Potential Catalysts, Ownership and Management (plus their incentives). If I look at these items and determine that there isn’t too much downside but can see likely scenarios where the value can roughly double, I am generally interested.

This allows me to be flexible down the road, for example if a position does double, rather than seeing that number on a spreadsheet and choosing to sell, I can ask myself simpler questions. Has anything changed about the story for better or worse? If so, is it material enough to change my thoughts on the outlook? If not, let it run. Same can be said for a decline in stock price which is often a far more uncomfortable position.

In my eyes there are too many variables on the spreadsheet that can cause a wide dispersion of values. When I focus on those small assumptions in the model rather than the big picture I tend to make worse decisions.

I believe in the professional world it feels embarrassing or looks unprofessional to say “I don’t know” when asked what the intrinsic value of company is. We like to have cold hard data to back up our thinking and I agree we shouldn’t just buy or sell based on gut feelings, but we aren’t operating in a principally scientific field. There is a false comfort in having a spreadsheet full of assumptions you can point back to. In fact, it still makes me feel a little foolish at times when I don’t but I at least have a thesis on why I own the shares.

The reality is you can never know precisely what a company is worth until they fold or are sold.

There is maybe something to be said about looking across the spectrum of price targets set by analysts for a specific stock, but I often think this is just a check on calibration of the analyst’s models.

I do find it very interesting to look at the outliers. Occasionally I have come across analysts who clearly do their own thinking and don’t hold a consensus view. I have even found some new names after looking at other companies they cover. So maybe they aren’t totally worthless.

Also, to be clear, I am looking at this through the lens of long term investing, not trading or special situations with clear catalysts. Those strategies may find price targets more useful for a rules based system.

I would love to know if anyone has a differing opinion or utilize them in a way I don’t. Please comment and let me know how you view/use them, or to let me know I am way off base!

Thanks!

At any rate, as I have been trying to be more transparent I am writing about a move I made today. I decided to take a relatively small position in Lending Tree, Inc. This is a new purchase but I am a familiar with the company and have owned shares before.

I previously held for a short time in 2023, in reality I was in and out too quickly, buying around $16-$17 and selling for $21-$24. Not bad for a short holding period but the shares traded up to $77+ in the subsequent years before re-rating back to the $30-$40 range seen most recently.

The company reported yesterday and the market did not like the reduction in full year guidance or the commentary around a weaker SMB market than management initially anticipated. Additionally, the mortgage business remains under pressure due to rates but this has been widely known.

To be clear, the quarter was indeed not great and there are some real concerns in the SMB space. Add to that the intense competition in the space and the call seemed fairly bleak.

So why the heck did I buy?

A great question, which really boils down to two things. 1) Leverage and 2) Capital Allocation.

Leverage:

Ok I lied a little because I actually mean both operating leverage and financial leverage, so 3 three things…. From an operating leverage standpoint, the company should be close to a trough given the slow mortgage business seen over the past couple years and the weak quarter for SMB. Now, things can always get worse but from the signs given it seems we are at least close. The asset light model means when volumes pick up much of that turns into free cash flow. The financial leverage has been on a steady decline over the past few years and is now at a very comfortable level (expecting to end 2026 at 1.6x) and maturities are pushed out to 2030.

Capital Allocation:

Given the factors above, TREE should have free cash flow available to increase shareholder value. Now, they still need to make the right choices but they have optionality. Personally, I would love to see the company embark on a large buyback at these levels. Realistically, they will probably invest in some key initiatives and conduct some level of repurchasing. I also would not be opposed to some M&A (on either the buy or sell side).

Lesser Reasons:

Management also noted that they exited the quarter on a strong note with SMB activity. I don’t place a lot of weight on this given turbulent environment we are in but it was nice to hear. Additionally, the insurance business remains strong and was a bright spot in the quarter.

All that to say, I think there are several ways the company can unlock value given the depressed valuation and poor quarter. Over the past few years the company has shown improvements in its operations even with the pressure in mortgage. It may be an uncomfortable hold in the near term but I am okay with that. I like these setups where a number of different factors could lead to an increase in share price.

As I was scrolling and thinking this, I had to look in the mirror and realize I also wasn’t doing what I am hoping to see, so I figured I would share my current portfolio in a more transparent way. I have shared the results in a few other posts but this time I will show the composition. I am not sharing this to boast as I know much of the return comes from luck and the general market moves.

In the interest of transparency, I have three portfolios. Two retirement accounts and one taxable account which is the subject portfolio I write about.

The Portfolio:

My portfolio is very concentrated as you can see. This is by design but also the result of letting winners run.

I currently view my portfolio in two chunks, the seasoned investments and the “seasoning” investments. Over the years I have sold some of the seasoned positions when I feel the story is no longer as attractive and some have also been acquired.

Typically I like to buy a starter position after I have decided I like a company and their story. I will then continue to get familiar with the company and the ongoing narrative. If the story gets better I buy more if it gets worse I’ll either sell or wait to see how things play out if I believe they will overcome the issue.

Seasoned:

AXSM - I have owned this since 2021 and was my highest conviction play for a long time. My simple thesis was, I really liked the founders background, his ownership interest, the diversified pipeline (that at the time looked like at least one candidate would be successful), and the other partnerships/owners the company had. The CEO, Harriet Tabuteau, was well incentivized to make the company a success and he didn’t sell a single share through some turbulent times.

ENVA - This one has been a bit of a surprise. I originally stumbled across the bonds while at my last firm and pitched them to our investment committee. We ended up buying a good slug of them for clients so I began following the company. As I continued hearing the story quarter after quarter it was very obvious that management knew the company was severely undervalued. They continued to perform well, bought back stock at attractive prices, called some of their bonds and reissued at better rates (sad for our fixed income group). I bought a relatively small position in October of 2023 and its proved to be a great investment. I did sell a few covered calls recently as the current market has me a little spooked.

Seasoning:

MUEL - I wrote about this one not too long ago HERE so I won’t beat a dead horse. Its a small company that is managed very well and making a transition to higher growth industries. Vey low float. Management initiates tender offers fairly regularly at a premium, the last one barely had any interested sellers. I wouldn’t be surprised to see the company go private or be sold in the near future.

PLMR - I haven’t written on this one but some others on Substack have. If I can remember who they are I will give them credit in the comments. PLMR management have done a great job diversifying the business and maintaining strong underwriting standards. Management has a solid growth plan in place and so far I tend to believe they will continue delivering.

SMID - I recently published a very short note on this one HERE. In short, I like the industry, geography, tailwinds, insider ownership, and licensing model. I think its possible the company is rolled up in the future (if the family is open to it) and if not I believe there is runway to continue growth through the demographic shifts in its geography and continuing to scale its licensing model outside its geography.

MCCK - This is a small holding for me mostly because its kind of a weird one. There are really two businesses here; a very solid HVAC business and a precious metals trading business the CEO likes to dabble in, and to be fair he has done a fantastic job. I am a bit unsure how the value is unlocked for shareholders. The CEO is the majority owner and he is an old school kind of guy that hates PE firms, dividends and buybacks. In the past he has spun out divisions that unlocked value but I am unaware of anything pending. He is getting older so maybe with some succession there will be a value unlock. has a great write up HERE.

ACAAU - This one is a flyer and usually I don’t participate in SPAC’s but the set up on this one interests me. It has some overlap with MGTX which I own in one of my retirement accounts and have written about more in depth HERE . The short version is this; Averin is back by Dr. David Barry who has been involved in many successful biotech endeavors. He is tied to HologenAI along with a phenomenal group of people which also has a partnership with MGTX. I have no idea what company they will merge with and it could be a total bust but I acknowledge that risk.

PDEX - I recently pulled the trigger for a starter position in Pro-Dex. This one is a little more expensive than I’d like as well but I believe there could be some interesting growth opportunities ahead both from M&A and internal development. There is substantial insider ownership and support. I also like the history of share repurchases. has a great write up HERE.

Options

I currently have two option positions although I normally stay away from options as well.

LMAT Cash Secured Put (Sold) - I really like this company and wrote a short note HERE. I think its too expensive to take a meaningful position at the moment so I decided to sell some cash secured puts. I will either generate a little revenue or buy at a price I feel at least a little more comfortable with.

ENVA Covered Call (Sold) - I mentioned this briefly above but I also recently sold some call options on ENVA shares. These offered a significant premium given the run up in ENVA price. I will likely buy these back on a dip if given the opportunity, if not some shares will be called away and I’ll owe the taxman :(.

Other Notes:

Frankly, I made a few bad calls recently, as I wrote about and purchased the positions HERE and HERE. They were SaaS and SaaS adjacent companies and I bought shortly before the meltdown. I ended up selling both positions at a loss which I talk more about HERE. I still like both of them but I didn’t feel I knew enough about what was happening in broader SaaS environment. I could see myself buying back one of both of these in the future.

Returns

The portfolio returns are far better than I could hope for and there is unquestionably a large degree of luck involved. In addition to the luck I believe the results are attributable to being patient and holding on to the conviction during the hard times. The graphic below looks great but clearly there is a volatility as well. I’ve seen some massive swings in net worth, both ways, and at times been well behind the market for months at a time.

Total Return*

*November 7, 2023 is not the actual start, its just when my account was transferred from TD Ameritrade to Schwab due to their merger.

YTD Return

I plan to try and keep the transparency going forward and updated on any portfolio changes.

Thanks for reading!

SMID

EV: $151.7M

P/E: 15.3x

5-year CAGR’s

Revenue: 16.3%

EPS: 35.6%

Smith-Midland manufactures a broad array of precast concrete products and systems mostly used in construction, highway, and utility industries. It has several patented products including SlenderWall construction panels, Sierra Wall, J-J Hooks safety barriers, and more. The business is largely tied to infrastructure construction projects and even more skewed toward highway projects. For more on products view their website at: https://smithmidland.com/

Things I like.

Largely insider owned

Insiders are shown to own 13.9% of the company but I believe this is actually more like 48.6%. The reason I believe this to be the case is that the largest owner is Thompson Davis & Co., an investment management firm based in Richmond Virginia. This is about an hour south of Midland, Virginia where SMID is headquartered. When looking into the firm you’ll see that SMID is a huge outlier in their holdings which leads me to believe they are somehow linked to family members/founders of the company. The proxy however does not mention these shares are beneficially owned, this is my own speculation.

Licensing

One of the things I think is underrated about SMID is its licensing program. In this industry its very hard to compete across a broad region as delivery is a real cost and in many cases being close to the end user is key. SMID has several patented products they license to others and earn a 6% royalty on. Currently there are 75 licenses, mostly concentrated on the Midwest and east coast, however some as far as California and Australia. Notably, it’s J-J hooks product received approval in California, which has the 2nd most highway miles in the US.

Rental Program / Precast Modular

The company has been moving from barrier sales to a rental model which has higher margins (25-35%) and is more recurring in nature. They have expanded from 250k linear feet to 575k linear feet available in their rental fleet. I also like the trends in precast modular construction, I still don’t think its taken off across the country like many assumed but it is getting more popular and for certain projects it can make a lot of sense. More info on types of projects here: https://smithmidland.com/products-services/products-by-type/easi-set-buildings/.

Well Positioned (literally)

The company owns three manufacturing plants. One in Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. From these facilities the company serves a geographic area from New York to Florida. While not necessarily a huge hidden gem, there is a disconnect between reported book value and the cost or replicating these assets. Land and Buildings are on the books for ~$23 million. Machinery & Equipment are listed at $23 million as well.

Things I don’t love.

Uncertain Growth

The company operates in a competitive industry where many products are viewed as a commodity and is also tied to the general activity of infrastructure spending in its geography. Additionally, revenue can be lumpy given timing and size of certain projects. Backlog has been on a decline since the peak in 2023.

*Note the small typo on their presentation showing 2006, should be 2026.

As I mentioned at the beginning, this is an area I am slightly uncomfortable with. Below you will see that revenue ramped significantly in 2024, after the record backlog in 2023. Its hard to know the expected timeline and size for the various projects in the backlog. I am not sure where the backlog will level out but if it drops to 2020 levels, SMID could see a meaningful decline in revenue in subsequent years.

Additionally, sales of certain barrier products are also decreasing as SMID moves to a rental model. This is actually better for the company long term (as mentioned above) but can put pressure on near term results.

This would generally be a big red flag and keep me from taking a position but not in this case. So I think its worth highlighting why.

For starters, SMID has the most widely used highway safety barrier in the US, approved in 42 states and there is some legislative tailwind for new barriers needing to be MASH TL3 compliant. Combined with this, I like the licensing approach which in my mind spreads out the project risk and allows them to play in a much larger geography. I also believe their current physical geography is an area that will continue to see more and more investment given the demographics. I would like to see a further push into Florida.

Competition

The company faces competitive pressure which actually ramped up even further in recent years, specifically on the precast side of the business. CMC closed a $675 million acquisition of Concrete Pipe & Precast (HQ in Ashland, Virginia) at the end of 2025. The deal included 17 plants across seven states. CMC also acquired Foley Products, a Georgia based pipe and precast producer with an overlapping geography to SMID. Metromont, a large structural precast company acquired Shockey Precast Group of Winchester, Virginia. Metromont is being acquired by Markel Corporation.

Given the rollups in the space, SMID faces competitors with deeper pockets and larger offerings however it also could be viewed as an attractive bolt on given some of its differentiated assets including J-J Hooks and its licensing network.

Conclusion

I decided to take a stater position because I like some of the industry trends and SMID’s positioning. I like the M&A happening in the space, I believe SMID could be a target although I don’t know if the insiders are open to selling the company. I think the near term (1-3 years) could be bumpy but I largely see the company benefitting from infrastructure spending and favorable demographics. I will be keeping an eye on the company and will adjust my position up or down depending on how things play out and the more I learn about the company.

As always, I would love to hear your take on the stock!

LMAT Overview

Like I said, I won’t get into the weeds here but from a high level LMAT sells medical devices primarily used in Open Vascular surgeries. The company is not creating new products in house, instead they acquire assets from larger companies or standalone, generally single product, firms. LMAT then adds these assets to their large portfolio of products for their expansive sales team to offer to hospitals.

Many larger companies sold off their Open Vascular portfolios in late 90’s and early 00’s in favor of Endovascular (minimally invasive) opportunities. Again, without getting into the weeds, there is still a need for Open Vascular procedures.

The playbook is fairly simple in theory, create a portfolio of niche assets that are #1 or #2 in their small categories. Most of these areas are too small for their big players to focus on and most small competitors don’t have the same scale.

LMAT often acquires assets that are only approved in one region (typically the US first), then moves to get it approved in other markets (Europe & Asia) and also consolidates the manufacturing of the product.

The Good

The company was founded in 1984 by George LeMaitre, who is still the CEO and owns 6.4% of outstanding shares. It should be noted this is down from 7.56% at the start of the year. As mentioned above, most of the assets are #1 or #2 in their space so the portfolio is consists of high quality assets even if some are small.

LMAT has historically been a very solid compounder. This has come from both organic growth and M&A.

5 year CAGR’s below:

• Sales: 14.0%

• EPS: 19.4%

• FCF: 18.5%

  

The margins have also been great. To be fair the company has been able to achieve price increases much higher than industry averages over the past few years. While LMAT should be able to continue increasing price, the the rate may slow in coming years. They have been able to do this primarily because on they are a relatively small line item/supplier to most hospitals and so the increase doesn’t really move the needle and is taken without much question. Additionally, many cases are reimbursed by insurance.

5 Year Averages below:

• Gross Margin 64.1%

• EDITDA: 27.5%

• Net Margin: 17.8%

Integrity

While its a little hard to quantify this, I believe there is a high degree of integrity at LMAT. One example being the following slide, which has to be a favorite at least in recent memory.

While I wish they went deeper into what constitutes winners and losers, the fact that they are publishing losers is very rare in the public markets. The other thing to note from this is that most of the losers have been on the smaller side. Roughly 13% of M&A dollars were losers, or stated differently 87% were value additive (at least I hope that’s the baseline for a win).

Additionally, listening to a few of the calls you can tell that other executives feel very comfortable speaking their mind and occasionally telling analysts they don’t know. To me there are many earnings calls where the executive team sounds more like politicians trying to dance around questions than just speaking the truth, I didn’t get that impression from the LMAT team.

The not so good

Mostly, its expensive.

• P/E (LTM): 37.4x

• P/CF: 26.8x

• EV/EBITDA: 25.9x

• ROIC: 10.5% - While this is not “bad”, its not great and has drifted lower since 2020 and its certainly not stellar.

The valuation is the biggest thing holding me back from taking a position. I am not strictly a deep value or a net-net guy but I do like to feel like I am not over paying.

My Questions

There are several items I would love to have more color on order to help me determine if the premium is fully warranted (I do think a slight premium is justified given the results).

Open Vascular M&A Environment

On a recent call the company stated there were 22 acquisitions that met their criteria of $15 million to $150 million in annual revenue. They did not say what percentage of those were currently only selling products in the US, how many were standalone vs. carve outs of larger companies, or if this number was the worldwide market. The stated criteria was also a little confusing to me as well because while they stated $15 to $150 million, in the same call they mentioned they get just as excited about small deals as large ones. Based on the acquisition slide above its clear they will go less than $15 million. So is the criteria actually different and if so does that change the picture drastically or are their not enough of those deals to move the needle?

Current Portfolio Availability

I haven’t been able to easily tell what percentage of the portfolio is approved in all its markets and what the upside looks like. I believe there is still plenty of organic runway but I have a hard time assessing just how much that is. I don’t believe the portfolio is fully mature or saturated today but I don’t know how long it would take.

LMAT does discuss Artegraft frequently which has been LMATs biggest acquisition and had its international launch starting in 2025. Management noted it grew 36% worldwide in Q1 26. They also mentioned overall in 2025 Artegraft did $40 million in sales but did not discuss how big they think the international market could be but noted they expect $10 million in international sales in 2026 compared to $4 million in 2025. They also said additional approvals are expected in 2027 for Korea, Brazil, Vietnam and India.

Open Cardiac

The biggest question I have is around Open Cardiac. On a recent call management mentioned the same playbook they have been running in Open Vascular is also available in Open Cardiac, which sounds great, however, we haven’t seen any real movement on this. Today it makes up up 12% of revenue but no foundational deals haven taken place.

To be fair, the team acknowledged they have been slower to sharpen the focus here and openly stating they have done enough bad M&A to know he needs to wait for the right pitch. I can respect that and again highlighting the integrity and honesty.

What I don’t know is what kind of assets are available in this space or how much of the market they would play in (CEO noted its 4x the size of Vascular). Management noted there are some products that overlap Cardiac and Vascular which would be a fairly easy learning curve. If they were to purchase an asset outside of the overlap, it may take more time and resources to integrate. Not knowing where they would focus, its hard to know it the margin profiles would be similar to Vascular.

Capital Allocation

I have mixed feelings about the dividend, on the one hand yes, if the company doesn’t have good prospects the dividend could be a smart use of cash. However I have also seen some companies with a large family ownership be reliant on those dividends (cough Ford cough cough) which can cause friction on best use of capital. To be clear I'm not saying that is happening here its just something I consider. The counter would be, the dividend could keep discipline on the M&A front as the founder doesn’t want to jeopardize the cash flows through bad deal making.

LMAT has a relatively large cash balance ($367 million) and they have stated that they are trying to make deals happen. There was also some hinting at a larger deal that they were working on. I’m not sure if its still in play. Either way, M&A is high on the capital allocation list, which I like.

The big question here is longer term, what is the focus dividend growth, M&A, organic growth? Would they take on substantial debt or conduct an offering to purchase a more sizable asset?

All that to say, so far, I think LMAT is a great company. I have more areas I want to spend some time on including management incentives, how those have changed over time, the competition and assets available in both Cardiac and Open Vascular.

I probably won’t take a position any time soon unless I get more comfortable with the opportunity set or if there is a significant re-rating. For now I will keep it on the watchlist and keep digging.

I would love to hear your opinion on the company!

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Thanks!

Let’s start with the mistakes.

I wrote two articles and purchased positions in two companies that were crushed with the SaaS trade. I ended up exiting both at a loss. I am usually not one to sell quickly but with the SaaS space coming unglued, I realized I didn’t have enough information to be comfortable in my thesis. In retrospect, I should have took more time to consider the AI implications, but to be fair at that time of research I probably would not have changed my course of action. The “SaaS Apocalypse” didn’t really start until February.

To be clear, I still believe both companies have merit and may repurchase if I get a better handle on their outlook. My conviction was simply not as strong as other names.

The numbers:

NABL - I took a 33% loss on this position after making my first purchase in December of 2025 and selling my last shares in April of 2026.

CLMB - Here I took a 22% loss. Average cost (after stock split) was $25.77. I first purchased in January of 2026 and sold this around the same time and NABL.

Luckily both of these were starter positions and pale in comparison to my seasoned positions which make up the bulk of my portfolio.

Portfolio Year to Date Performance (as of 06.17.2026)

Despite the lumps I took above, the overall portfolio was up 36% YTD. As you can see I lagged big time starting in February but have steadily climbed since April. This is most notably due to my larger positions in AXSM (+64% YTD) and ENVA (+22% YTD).

Other new(er) and still relatively smaller positions are only up modestly YTD. These positions include MUEL, PLMR, SMID, and MCCK.

Since Inception Performance (sort of)

The portfolio is still doing very well since inception as seen below. Inception isn’t exactly accurate as the date below represents when my TD Ameritrade account was transferred to Schwab after their merger. Either way letting winners run has proved to work well. I don’t expect to continue this same type of outperformance over an extended period but hoping to I can continue finding companies I am comfortable holding over the long term or have a catalyst I can get behind.

Thanks for reading!

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Mkt Cap: $613.7M

EV: $577.4M

P/E: 11.8x

EV/EBITDA: 12.2x

30D average Daily volume: 239 (not in thousands)

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Bottom Line Up Front:

MUEL designs and manufactures high-quality stainless steel equipment and systems used in industry and has done so since 1946. The product mix has been increasingly shifting toward higher growth industries including pharmaceutical and data centers. Management is leaning into these opportunities and continuing to invest in their operations and workforce.

I believe the company is making good investments and will continue to benefit from the capex being spent domestically and “reshoring”. The company routinely conducts tender offers to provide liquidity for shareholders and they are usually favorable terms. The company is largely owned by insiders and due to the tender offers, the number of shares outstanding continues to decrease.

Disclosure, I am long MUEL at ~$379 and will continue to buy more around that level or lower if I am able to. As noted above, not many shares are actively traded each day.

The Business

MUEL operates under 4 business segments; Refrigeration and Heat Transfer, Industrial Equipment, Transportation, and European Operations. Industries served include; animal health, brewing, calibration, consumer beverage, chemical, dairy farm, dairy processing, data centers, food, heat transfer, HVAC, marine, oil & gas, over-the-road shipping, personal care, pharmaceutical, spirits, tank components, and wine. WEBSITE

Refrigeration & Heat Transfer

This segment consists of milk cooling and storage, refrigeration products, heat recovery equipment, and heat transfer products including Accu-Therm® and Temp-Plate®. The majority of sales from this segment are derived from independent dairy farm dealers however the mix continues to shift as newer products are being sold outside the dairy farm industry. In light of this, the company changed the segment name from Dairy Farm Equipment to Refrigeration & Heat Transfer in 2023.

Industrial Equipment

This segment builds stainless steel and alloy processing and storage tanks and pure water equipment. Industrial Equipment made the largest contribution to the increase in performance over the last two years. Within the segment, performance was driven by large projects in the pharmaceutical, food, and beverage industries. Given these large projects, there has been some customer concentration over the past two years. During 2024, sales to any single customer were in excess of 10% with net sales from two domestic customers representing $54M. During 2023, sales to any single customer were in excess of 10% with net sales from one domestic customer representing $40M. During 2022, there were no single customers that exceeded 10% of consolidated sales.

This video does a decent job showing some of the scale and services offered. VIDEO

Transportation

You guessed it, this segment is responsible for transportation. Most of the transport is for delivery of MUEL products but it also back hauls material and has contracted carriage agreements. This is the smallest segment but it is a positive contributor.

European Operations

You nailed this one too, this segment house the operations conducted in Europe. Roughly 80% of this segment services European dairy farms. The remaining 20% of segment revenue comes from process tanks and a small fraction from heat transfer products. As seen below, this segment has been a very consistent top line performer and the bottom line has continued to improve.

Segment Data:

As you can see from the data below, Industrial Equipment has been growing rapidly from $88.8M in 2022 to $135M in 2024.

Financial Results

MUEL has been growing at nice clip over the past few years as noted above. Your eyes will likely be immediately drawn to the net loss in 2023. This was the result of a pension settlement charge. Without this, net income would have been reported at $22M, a record at that time. The pension plan has now been fully terminated and there should be no more liabilities going forward.

Over the last two years, MUEL has increased investment in production equipment at all three of its manufacturing locations. The company has also been investing in its workforce through training programs including a skills lab for manufacturing training. A warehouse was converted into production space for new models of chillers, a calibration lab to support the calibration of customer equipment, and a panel shop to produce control panels for equipment produced by MUEL.

In addition to the warehouse conversion, the company is also constructing a new building on the Springfield campus, which is designed to assemble large modules. This modular assembly or processing equipment allows MUEL to set vessels, heat exchanges, piping, and controls into structural frames that can be shipped to the customer and installed in one module, reducing time and risk required to assemble at the customers location. This method is popular in the pharmaceutical industry, which as mentioned earlier, is one of the largest drivers of recent performance. Its good to see management leaning into this trend.

The company is in strong financial position as you can see by the balance sheet above. Current assets exceed total liabilities by a fair margin and it should be noted that the properties listed are at cost and likely undervalued given their long ownership history. See the table below for location and size of facilities.

Backlog

MUEL’s backlog at the end of Q3 2025 was $250.4M, compared to $171.5M the year prior. However, this was reduced by $50.2M after the company received notice that a large pharmaceutical project was being cancelled. Subsequent to that news, MUEL received an order for a different $20M project which will help fill the production schedule in 2026.

Ownership

The company is largely owned by insiders as outlined in the table below:

Tender Offers

The company has historically announced tender offers for its shares and generally at attractive prices. This is intended to return excess cash to shareholders and provide liquidity for. The most recent offer, announced in October 2025, saw the company repurchase 31,000 shares at $485 per share. Outstanding shares continue to decrease as shown below:

1,085,711 as of December 31, 2023

936,837 as of December 31, 2024

929,883 as of September 30, 2025

Conclusion

Overall I don’t view the company as being “cheap” but I don’t view it as “expensive” either. The shares can trade in a large range given the limited number of daily volume and I feel there are opportunities to buy at attractive levels.

Shares have jumped significantly over the past year (+131%) due to the shares being repurchased and I think there are some who see the company transforming. Historically, the company was very focused on dairy farmers and over the past few years management has pursued more business in faster growing industries. I believe they will continue to have success in these adjacent industries.

Certainly with a company this size, there are plenty of risks; illiquid shares, customer concentration, lack of coverage, etc… That being said the company has a long history of successful operations. I do wonder if management will take the company private over the next few years as there is not a very compelling reason for them to remain publicly traded.

I plan to provide an update on MUEL once the 2025 annual report is available.

This is a very interesting story and interplay of companies and technologies. I hope you find it informative.

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Hologen AI

Hologen AI is a frontier medical AI company founded in 2023 with roots spun out from University College London and Kings College London. In their own words from their website:

Our approach is powered by multi-modal generative AI models that capture the complexity of biological systems—especially the brain—with precision that other methods cannot match.

Learning from large-scale, real-world, clinical and investigational data, we create precise models of disease biology (Large Medicine Models) that help us understand individual differences at an unprecedented level of detail.

Our technology enhances drug development, particularly in the critical late stages, by uncovering hidden treatment effects that are often missed owing to biological complexity. Without models sophisticated enough to capture this detail, even highly effective treatments risk failing in trials.

Combined with a flexible, anatomically targeted, multi-agent therapeutic platform, our approach allows us to craft intelligent, personalized interventions for both common and rare neurological disorders.

We deploy this technology within novel commercial structures that accelerate its real-world translation and maximize its value to patients and creators.

Drawing on a unique cross-disciplinary team and a decade of cutting-edge research, HOLOGEN is a radically new kind of business for the emerging age of AI-enabled healthcare.

Co-founders

Roland W. Tegeder, PhD (CEO) - Former Partner, Goldman Sachs

(in alphabetical order)

Vasudev Bailey, PhD - AI Biotech investor

Jorge Cardoso, PhD - Reader in Artificial Medical Intelligence, KCL

Pierre-François Filet, MEng, MScFin - Former CEO and Co-founder, Quanthouse

Chris Goddard - Former CTO & Partner, G Research

Todd Meister - Co-founder, First Spark Ventures

Parashkev Nachev, PhD, FRCP -Professor of Neurology, UCL

Sebastien Ourselin, PhD, FREng, FMedSci - Head of School of Biomedical Engineering & Imaging Sciences, KCL

Geraint Rees, PhD, FMedSci - UCL Vice-Provost of Research, Innovation & Global Engagement, UCL

Eric Schmidt, PhD - Former CEO, Google

Caroline Sharp, MSc - Head of Life Science Business Ventures, SW7

Richard Sharp - Former Partner, Goldman Sachs

Co-founding Institutions

University College London

King’s College London

Guy’s & St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust

King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust

Recent Hologen AI News

The company recently announced that it is seeking to raise $150M in a Series A fundraising round. According to the article, Hologen plans to build “large medicine models” and “de-risk billion-dollar clinical trials”. Hologen will be investing in and co-developing late stage clinical assets with “fast distribution channels”. The article also made some bold claims about their goals for investors to make a 100% return on their cash within 12 months. The material indicates that the firm is being valued ~$850M before the funding round with aims to becoming a $150B company. Source HERE

Obviously a great cohort with very ambitious goals but I want to focus in on Eric Schmidt.

Eric Schmidt

His list of accomplishments and involvements are far too long for this article but a few relevant items are worth noting.

Former CEO of Google

Google has become one of the greatest companies in the world and Eric Schmidt played a large role in that. He was the CEO of Google from 2001-2011 and the Executive Chairman from 2011-2015 then the Executive Chairmen of Alphabet from 2017-2020. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from Princeton and a PhD in computer science from Berkeley.

National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB)

Mr. Schmidt is currently a Commissioner on the NSCEB. This appointment was surrounded with some controversy as appointees were not required to sell their interests in biotechnology holdings (see First Spark Ventures below).

What is the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology?

Congress charged the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology with conducting a thorough review of how advancements in emerging biotechnology and related technologies will shape current and future activities of the Department of Defense.

The Commission is a legislative branch advisory entity and provided an interim report to the President and the Armed Services Committees in December 2023 and submitted a final, unclassified report on April 8, 2025. The report delivers 49 actional recommendations to Congress and the federal government , focusing on strengthening U.S. competitiveness, securing supply chains, and integrating AI with biotechnology. Although the commission released its “Final Report” their work is ongoing, issuing reports on U.S. - China competition and educating on its recommendations in the Final Report. You can find the report HERE.

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) / Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP)

Mr. Schmidt was also the Chairperson for the NSCAI. This organization assessed AI advancements for U.S. national security and defense. The commission finished its work in 2021 which included 45 recommendations. Following the conclusion of this work Mr. Schmidt launched the SCSP non-profit initiative to continue to the work of the original commission. Many of the same members transitioned over to serve on the SCSP. The final report of the NSCAI can be found HERE.

First Spark Ventures

First Spark Ventures is a venture capital firm in which Mr. Schmidt is a strategic advisor and Founding Non-Managing Partner. First Spark is described as “a Deep Tech venture capital fund investing in breakthrough technologies that make the world healthier, safer, and more productive.” The group emphasizes technologies with a high potential impact. Areas of interest include Advanced Compute, Digital Biology & Biotech, and CyberPhysical Systems. More on the firm can be found HERE.

Mr. Schmidt has a vantage point that I believe no other person can reasonably have.

Not only does he understand the implications at the crossroads of Biotechnology and AI, he is actively involved in shaping (and knowing) what the government is doing to advance these areas via his appointments and connections. He sees what’s happening in the private space through his investments in First Spark Ventures and others.

So What?

Many of us, including myself, wont be able to participate in Hologen AI directly. There is however a bit of a backdoor opportunity through MGTX. I have been an investor in MGTX for a number of years now and Hologen AI was never part of my original thesis or even on my radar. I just believe(d) that there was a margin of safety in the number of different opportunities the company has with its pipeline and partnerships.

MeriaGTx (MGTX)

Overview

MGTX is a vertically integrated clinical-stage genetics medicines company focusing on gene therapies for serious unmet needs. Specifically, ocular diseases, neurodegenerative conditions and salivary gland disorders using targets local deliver of small doses. One of its key differentiating factors is its Riboswitch gene regulation platform. This enables precise, dose-responsive control and unlike traditional gene therapies that are “always on”, riboswitch allows for an on/off control post delivery. The other major differentiator is MGTX’s end-to-end in house manufacturing capabilities. This is huge asset for the company as it reduces regulatory risk, removes third party CMO delays and accelerates timelines.

Stats:

Mkt Cap: $659M

EV: $712M

Current Price: $7.61

Avg. Price Target: $26.75

Ownership

Notable items regarding ownership.

Perceptive Advisors (12.97%)

Perceptive Advisors is a well known healthcare and biotechnology investor with ~$8.5B AUM. MGTX has a long history with Perceptive. In 2022, MGTX received a $100M secured loan from Perceptive secured by MGTX’s manufacturing facilities. In late 2025, MGTX agreed to repurchase 2.3 million shares from Perceptive for $18.2M as a “tax optimization” strategy for Perceptive. Additionally, Ellen Hukkelhoven, Ph.D. (Head of Biotechnology Investments) serves on MGTX’s board of directors.

Sanofi (15.15%)

Sanofi has had a relationship with MGTX since 2023 when Sanofi made a $30M strategic investment in MGTX by purchasing 4 million shares at $7.50 each. This came with a right of first negotiation on certain application of MGTX’s riboswitch technology. This includes specific CNS and I&I targets, GLP-1 peptides and MGTX’s xerostomia program. In 2024, Sanofi let another financing round investing another $30M as part of a $50M offering to extend MGTX’s cash runway. and accelerated the Riboswitch platform.

Johnson & Johnson Innovation (8.25%)

Johnson and Johnson, through its subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceuticals, has also had a long history with MGTX since 2019. Janssen entered a worldwide collaboration and license agreement with MGTX to develop, manufacture, and commercialize gene therapies for inherited retinal diseases (bota-vec specifically). Under the deal MGTX received upfront payments, milestones and royalties. In 2023, J&J acquired MGTX’s remaining interest in the program for $130M upfront plus up to $285M in contingent payments upon first commercial sales in the U.S. and key European markets. MGTX also holds a commercial supply agreement for JNJ. To be fair, the bota-vec program looks to be most at risk as JNJ appears not to be pushing it or has bad data.

Others

There are a few other firms who hold MGTX as a relatively large weight in their portfolio including Prosight Management LP, Knoll Capital Management LP and 22NW LP. Prosight shows a recent reduction in ownership but still own a significant number of shares.

Pipeline

Manufacturing Capabilities

MGTX has a proprietary platform process refined over 9+ years across more than 20 different viral vectors (primarily AAV). These facilities are scalable and MGTX has been strategic in gaining manufacturing agreements for its programs with current partners. The company has 5 facilities in 2 locations, including two GMP-licensed viral vector production facilities.

Shannon, Ireland

Shannon is HPRA-authorized with a 150,000sqft facility operational since 2022 and was the first commercial-scale gene therapy facility in Ireland. It’s also home to GMP plasmid production facility and the GMP quality control hub.

London, United Kingdom

London is MHRA-authorized for GMP viral vector manufacturing and has a dedicated Manufacturing Science and Technology facility for proprietary process development, optimization and quality control.

Partnerships

As you can see from the above pipeline, MGTX has several partnerships with larger pharma players. JNJ was covered in the ownership section but others include;

Eli Lilly (LLY)

LLY has exclusive worldwide rights to MGTX’s AAV-AIPL1 program. MGTX received $75M cash upfront up to $400M in potential milestone payments and tiered royalties. LLY also has exclusive access to two other preclinical ocular programs for inherited retinal dystrophies.

Hologen AI

This is a newer partnership with Holgen AI, a private company mentioned earlier. Hologen is entering into specific agreements with MGTX to fund and accelerate AAV-GAD for Parkinson’s disease. Importantly, MGTX will retain a 30% ownership stake in the joint venture being established. Below are a few snapshots from the release:

Full release can be found HERE

On a call at the time of the deal, MGTX CEO Alexandria Forbes said that Hologen’s technology was able to de-noise brain scans in the Phase 2 data to make it easier to tell what was natural Parkinson’s progression, what was person-to-person variation, and what was the effect of the drug. She went on to say “This may be one of the first times, in a Phase 3 study with a positive, primary, clinically meaningful endpoint, we can start having physiological changes in front of the FDA, which allow them to consider something as disease-modifying.”

Stock Performance

You’d think after reading all of that, the stock would be absolutely crushing it. Spoiler alert, its not. Owning these shares have been a test of patience as its traded in a fairly narrow band for the past 2 years (see chart below). I do believe the patience will pay off as the pipeline progresses and milestones in certain partnerships are reached but today it appears investors are taking a wait and see stance on the shares or maybe there is something I am missing.

Investing in biotech’s is not my usual area, however, AXSM has been one of my largest winners in recent years. The set ups are a little different but what is the same is that there is no single binary event the thesis rests on. MGTX doesn’t need to hit each one of its clinical endpoints or milestone targets to see its valuation increase significantly

Final Thoughts

I believe shares of MGTX are worth consideration given the optionality. The current programs and partnerships offer several near term potential catalysts, the manufacturing capabilities are likely worth the current market cap on their own (the CEO recently cited an unnamed manufacturer with less capabilities that sold for $600M), plus the Hologen JV which is a big unknown in regards to future valuation.

It seems to me that if any one of these is successful, it will justify the current market cap and the rest are options, the wholly owned programs. Certainly there are risks with an early stage biotech company, cash burn is real and without these partnerships and investments MGTX has little runway. Dilution is always a possibility. I believe they are in a decent position currently given the Halogen agreement but we won’t know exactly what has come in and gone out until the year end report.

For me the Hologen AI agreement adds some credibility and reassurance to my thesis. Which is great because I am by no means and expert in the biotech space. I have to imagine MGTX will also gain insights from Hologen’s data and use of AI. I can’t say if Mr. Schmidt was the architect behind the partnership but again, I believe he has an incredible track record and vantage point in this space.

https://www.wearelegence.com/

Hey everyone! I am continuing with the shorter format for this post. My hope is twofold, to create more dialogue with you and give you a quick summary so you can choose to dig in further or cross the name off your list.

What Do They Do?

Legence Corp. engages in engineering, consultation, installation, and maintenance services for mission-critical systems in buildings. The company has a market cap of $5.2B. It operates through two segments; Engineering & Consulting and Installation & Maintenance.

Engineering and Consulting

The Engineering & Consulting segment designs HVAC and other Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing (MEP) systems for buildings, develops strategies to reduce energy usage and make buildings more sustainable, and provides program and project management services for customers’ installation and retrofit projects. Engineering and consulting segment grew at a CAGR 15% from 2021 to 2024. It makes up 28.7% of revenue and 47.6% gross profit. Most jobs are completed in 6 months and have contract values less than $10M (70%).

Installation and Maintenance

The Installation & Maintenance segment fabricates and installs HVAC systems, process piping, and other MEP systems in new and existing industrial, commercial, and institutional buildings and provides ongoing preventative and corrective maintenance services for those systems. Installation and Maintenance grew at a CAGR of 16%. from 2021 to 2024. It makes up 71.3% of revenue and 52.4% of gross profit.

Combined Info

6 of LGN’s top 10 customers engage LGN for both services. Management noted that 80% of jobs meet or exceed initial margin estimates. The largest loss incurred to date was $1.3 million. The average length of relationship with top its top 10 clients is 26 years with many over 40. LGN is even co-located with some of its larger customers. Net revenue retention from 2021 to 2024 was 121%.

What Do I Like?

Ownership -

Blackstone took LGN public in September of 2025 and they still own 45% of the company. If you aren’t familiar, Blackstone is one of the largest alternative asset manger overseeing $1T in total assets. The next largest shareholder is Fidelity Management Research (FMR) at 10.5%. While not infallible, I think FMR usually does a nice just with security selection and I like to see them as major owner.

Picks & Shovels Type Exposure -

At the time of IPO, the company had a backlog to $2.8B, representing a 29% increase over the prior year. Approximately, 40% of backlog in new building were data centers. LGN is focused on high-growth sectors including technology, life sciences, healthcare advanced manufacturing and education. 60% of the companies in the NASDAQ-100 index are clients of the company.

LGN has been hiring additional sales reps to target these high-growth sectors. Additional focus has been placed on growing maintenance and service lines which generate higher margins and create recurring revenue. The table below shows the growth in each of these sectors.

Strategy Implementation -

LGN is executing a roll up strategy very similar to Comfort Systems USA (FIX), which has been one of the best performing equities over the last few years. FIX is much larger than LGN at a market cap of $38B. LGN has a bit broader consulting & engineering focus and FIX has a longer proven track record of results.

From 2021 to 2024, LGN revenue grew at a CAGR of 16%. During 2024, more than 50% of revenue came from high-growth industries (Defined as data center and technology, life sciences, and healthcare end markets). LGN’s largest client was ~4% of revenue in 2024.

I believe management has a solid plan in place to continue their strategy and already has many key players as customers. I don’t know how integrated BX is with their investments but with BX being the largest owner of commercial real estate, one would hope they could steer more business toward LGN.

What Could Go Wrong?

Structure -

As mentioned, LGN is majority owned by Blackstone. The ownership is structured as an Umbrella Partnership Corporation (UP-C) which creates Class A and Class B shares. I won’t go too far into the nuances here but essentially, legacy shareholders (Blackstone) will receive 85% of the tax benefit this structure creates. The good news is that the class structure doesn’t create super-voting shares, so both A and B classes have 1 vote (54% Class A and 46% Class B at IPO).

M&A -

Legence plans to grow through acquisition which is always a risk. They have conducted 20 acquisitions since 2020. Goodwill and intangibles represent the majority of assets. Most acquisitions are less than $50M and LGN appoints a dedicated integration project manager to each acquisition. The company has an “integration playbook” to mitigate. Two recent acquisition examples include CMTA and Bel-Aire which experienced CAGRs of 17% and 43%, respectively from 2021 to 2024.

LGN has not taken the approach of a common branding across all companies it acquires but rather has many brands with separate and distinct legal entities. They also leave a significant amount of decision making with local management which can be great as they are close to the customer but also poses a risk or inconsistencies in performance across the organization.

The table below shows adjusted EBITDA, which I would always take with a grain of salt. In almost every case, management adds back way too much. I would argue footnotes 3,4, and 5 as being a bit egregious but the main reason for showing is that there has been some meaningful goodwill impairment in each of the reported years. All cited as a result of a “decline in projected cash flows due to lower revenue projections”. This leads me to believe at times they are over paying for some acquisitions.

Construction Spending -

LGN is playing into many big construction themes that currently have a ton of capex dollars flowing into large projects. This has boosted LGN’s backlog. If this spending slows materially, LGN’s revenue could be not far behind. Most projects are short lived in nature. Management is trying to reduce this risk by pursuing more maintenance contracts but there would still be an impact.

Additionally, the market has moved largely to fixed price contracts which makes it imperative LGN is pricing jobs correctly from the outset. LGN also relies heavily on subcontractors which pose a risk to cost and on time completions. More than half (56.8%) of LGN employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements. LGN contributed $67.2M to multiemployer pension plans in 2024.

Material Weakness

In the S-1, LGN’s public accounting firm identified certain controls deficiencies in design and implementation of internal control and financial reporting that constituted a material weakness. This centered on general information and technology controls for multiple business units information systems. Essentially, at certain business units there weren’t proper controls on rolling up all financial information. Management is currently working on remediation plan. I don’t see this as being a large risk but it should be noted.

What I Am Doing?

I really like the positioning of LGN and I believe management is focusing on the right initiatives but for now I will keep it on the watchlist. I think it’s too soon to say if they will be able to follow the FIX footsteps. They haven’t even posted their first quarter as a public company. I think the valuation is a little rich at the moment at ~25x 2024 Adjusted EBITDA. I do believe it warrants a premium but I think seeing a few quarters as a public company and listening to management on the earnings calls will help develop or diminish confidence in an investment.

I will provide updated thoughts after their first call but in the meantime I would love to hear what you think!

IPO Capitalization Table:

Hey everyone! I am trying a new shorter format with this post. My hope is twofold, to create more dialogue with you and give you a quick summary so you can choose to dig in further or cross the name off your list.

Here is what I will cover:

1. Who Are They?

2. What Do they Do?

3. What Do I Like?

4. What Could Go Wrong?

5. What Action Am I Taking?

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Who Are They?

• Market Cap: $500.8 Million

• Enterprise Value: $451.3 Million

• P/E: 23.3x

• 5-yr Revenue CAGR: 17.4%

• 5-year EPS CAGR: 21.9%

• 5-year Average ROIC: 17.3%

  ---

What Do They Do?

CLMB is a specialty software distributor connecting technology vendors with a global network of value-added resellers. CLMB aims to be the premier distributor for emerging security, data-center, and cloud-based technologies.

Revenue is derived from two segments:

Distribution - Provides 95% of revenue and 86% of gross profit. As the name suggests, this segment distributes technology products from software developers, vendors and OEM’s.

Solutions - Provides 5% of revenue and 14% of gross profit. Here CLMB acquireds the products directly from OEM’s, developers or distributors and sells them to end users. CLMB provides customer service, billing, sales and marketing support and provides extended payment terms to facilitate sales.

70% of total revenue comes from the US, followed by Europe/UK at 20%, Canada at 7%, and 3% ROW.

Below is a sample of emerging vendors in the US that CLMB works represents.

(note N-ABLE - another name I recently wrote about)

What Do I Like?

Management has a great track record of profitably growing the company. They focus on a very niche market and are very conscious of the vendor partners they bring on. As an example, in the third quarter of 2025, CLMB evaluated more than 70 potential vendor partners and entered into agreements with only four. Below is a graphic from a recent investor presentation that does a nice job of showing where CLMB operates compared to a few competitors (TD Synnex, Ingram, Arrow). They actively seek disruptive up and coming vendors.

The main avenue for growth is through M&A and at their scale there is plenty of room for growth. Management noted a shift in strategy to pursue (relatively) larger, accretive, deals going forward. Specifically mentioning deals up to $40-$50 million and that they would likely be in Europe as that’s where they are seeing more favorable deals. I expected at least one deal announcement in 2026.

Directors and Officers own a decent amount of the company at 6%. While Management does have a metric driven bonus structure, it is based only on EBITDA.

CLMB is substantially smaller than many of it competitors which are more broad based and represent upwards of 4,000 vendor partners. CLMB has taken the approach of building stronger relationships with a smaller number (~100) of niche disruptive technology vendors. This allows their salesforce to truly be experts and partners to the vendors rather than selling everything under the sun.

What Could Go Wrong?

The biggest risks I see with CLMB is the customer concentration. This risk is real and should not be overlooked. Its top 5 customers accounted for 54% and 51% of consolidated net sales in 2024 and 2023, respectively. These customers are not named in its filings anymore but likely include CDW, NSIT and SHI International. If they were to lose one of these relationships the business would be greatly impacted.

A growth strategy dependent on M&A carries risk from poor integration or over paying for assets. This risk is elevated given managements desire to pursue larger deals.

Valuation - While off its peak, CLMB still trades at a decent premium, at least compared to most companies I look at. The shares could re-rate if growth slows meaningfully or we experience a broader market drawdown.

What Action Am I Taking?

I have started a position in CLMB in 2026. I plan to add on weakness so long as the thesis hasn’t changed. I would like to scale into a meaningful position in over the next year. For me this would be between 10-15% of the portfolio. I believe the company will be a long term compounder or acquired.

I would love to hear your thoughts!

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CLMB - Climb Global Solutions, Inc. is a small cap software distributor. They specialize in emerging and niche technologies (e.g., cybersecurity, cloud, data management) with a more specialized, high-touch approach. The company has had impressive growth over the last 5 years and the recent pull back has me interested in taking a closer look. My initial reaction is this could be a long term compounder if it doesn’t get taken out.

PLMR - Palomar Holdings, Inc. is a specialty insurance company. Similar to CLMB, they have done an outstanding job growing and diversifying the company over the past several years. Trades at a premium compared to most insurance comps but given their niche focus, strong execution and smaller size (small acquisitions can be meanignful), I think they can grow in to the valuation.

SPOK - Spok Holdings, Inc. provides communication solutions to the healthcare industry. This is a completely different look than the first two companies mentioned as growth is basically non-existent. It has a wild dividend yield of 9.48% and no debt. I imagine the company will eventually be purchased or they will try to grow through M&A.

EEFT - Euronet Worldwide, Inc. is in the electronic payment industry and has seemed cheap for quite some time now. I don’t yet know enough to have an opinion on whether this is for good reason or if the market is missing something. Voss Capital has been invested in the company for a while and I have always thought highly of their process.

LGN - Legence Corp. provides engineering, installation and maintenance services for mechanical, electrical and plumbing (MEP) system. LGN is new to the public markets after Blackstone led the IPO in September of 2025. I really like this space and reminds me of FIX a few years ago, definitely differences in the business model and I don’t know a lot about the management team yet but I think it has potential.

ISSC - Innovative Solutions and Support Inc. is a small cap manufacturer of flight navigation systems. I really don’t know a ton about this one yet other than they have had impressive growth as of late and are in an interesting industry to me. The shares are up over 120% in 2025, which usually gives me pause (mostly due to human psychology) but I think its worth a look.

GCT - GigaCloud Technologies, Inc. is in the B2B electronic commercial market with “….an end-to-end platform that integrates product discovery, transactions, and fulfillment, backed by a global logistics network across the U.S., U.K., Germany, Canada, and Japan.” Admittedly, I know very little about this company and may easy get tossed in the “no” pile but given its impressive growth I though it would be worth a deeper dive as well.

If you own any of these or have any institutional knowledge I’d love to discuss!

Thanks!

Overview

For those new to my profile, I run a very concentrated, high conviction portfolio. I generally gravitate toward small caps and buyout targets. In my previous roles I was involved in both the debt and equity markets and many of my ideas originated on the debt side.

I’m posting a review of my performance here as that was one of my stated goals with my writing, to be transparent and document my progress so I can reflect on it later. My intent is not to come across as boastful especially since I didn’t do anything spectacular in either of the two prior years. This performance was more the result of making investments in what I thought were undervalued companies and waiting for the market to agree.

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2025

This turned out to be a great year for my portfolio but most would be absolutely bored by the level of activity. I made very few buys or sells during the year.

As I mentioned in a previous post the two largest drivers of performance for the year were AXSM (+115.8%) and ENVA (+63.95%). I didn’t buy or sell any shares of either company during 2025, these were positions built up from 2022/2023.

It should also be noted that performance was meaningfully boosted on the last trading day of the year as my largest position, AXSM was up 22.75% on the day, following two positive FDA announcements.

Trades

I did make a few small purchases during the year which included MRC in March, SLVM in August and NABL in December. MRC announced merger with DNOW a few months after I purchased and I did exit the position. I purchased a small number of SLVM shares and have written on this company recently, same with NABL. Both are still smaller positions that I will likely add to if the respective theses stay intact.

I also sold covered calls on ENVA early in the year and all those gains were wiped out by buying ASPN calls which were later sold at a loss. I will no longer be using options in my portfolio as frankly I’m just not good at it. This is a lesson I have struggled to learn because in the past I have had successes but almost always failures just as big if not bigger. In a future post I will talk about one of my biggest mistakes ever which involves options.

2024

My portfolio was roughly in line with the market in 2024 and had much larger drawdowns, which I am ok with. I know my portfolio is riskier than an index so this should be expected.

This year was even more boring than 2025 as the only thing I did was sell a portion of my AXSM position (ouch). The only reason I sold was to fund my equity contribution into the operating business I purchased with a partner in 2024. As I run the business we acquired, much of my time in 2024 was spent focused on that and not the public markets.

Since “Inception”

My total annualized rate of return is 102.4%, since November 2023. I wish I had more data to provide but when TD merged with Schwab I lost my performance history. If it were available, it would show a much bumpier ride as I used to trade more frequently and used more options. I sold many winners too early and held on to laggards too long. I’m sure it wont be the last time I do so, but I am constantly working on improving this aspect of my investing.

I plan on creating a post soon to talk more about some of the lessons learned prior to 2024.

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Thanks for reading!

Mkt Cap - $1.36B

EV - $1.64B

ARR - $528M

Net Retention Rate - 102%

EV/EBITDA - 16.8x

Overview & History

N-able, Inc. (NABL) is a provider of cloud-based of software solutions designed to solve complex operational tasks for Managed Service Providers (MSP’s), primarily those that serve small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). NABL’s technology serves as a central operating system for its MSP partners allowing for a unified view of their customers IT environments.

NABL has over 25,000 MSP customers ranging in size from 2-3 employees up to large publicly traded firms. These MSP’s represent over 500,000 SME’s around the world.

Values based on public information and FactSet proprietary research

History with SolarWinds

SolarWinds purchased NABL in early 2013 for $120M. In October of 2018, the combined entity IPO’d as SolarWinds (SWI) a price of $15/share. Silver Lake and Thoma Bravo owned ~88.8% of the company at the time of the IPO.

On December 14, 2020, SolarWinds was the victim of a cyberattack on its Orion Software Platform and internal systems. Malicious code, or Sunburst, was injected into builds of SolarWinds’ Orion Software Platform. If present and activated in a customer’s IT environment, Sunburst could potentially allow an attacker to compromise the server on which the Orion Software Platform was installed. The Cyber Incident has been widely reported by SolarWinds and other third parties and appears to be one of the most complex and sophisticated cyberattacks in history. SWI’s stock fell roughly by roughly 1/3 in the month following the announcement and the brand’s reputation was severely damaged.

On July 19th, 2021 SolarWinds completed the spinoff of NABL as a standalone public entity.

In early 2025, SWI was acquired by Turn/River Management for a total enterprise value of $4.4B or $18.50/share representing a 35% premium to the preceding 90-day VWAP. The premium is nothing to write home but this follows a ~24% return in 2024 and a ~35% return in 2023 as SWI was still working its way out of the dog house after the cyber incident.

SWI’s most recent annual revenue at the time of the transaction was $796.9M, and ARR was $311.7M. The valuation was ~13.8x EV/EBITDA. It’s worth noting that NABL is currently 16x EV/EBITDA.

NABL Business

MSP customers typically come to NABL through a specific need, one of the 3 “doors” the CEO refers to, those being Monitoring & Management, Security, and Protection. NABL aims to be best in class in each of these on their own while also offering a comprehensive end to end solution when bundled. I will spend a little time on each below but I should first highlight these “doors” as being a key aspect of the company’s land and expand model and growth plan.

It may be obvious if you follow this space, but its worth noting the avenues for growth. As NABL is generally paid by device or per user of the end product which is ultimately at the SME level, there are numerous levers for growth along this chain. These include:

• New MSP customers

• MSP expansion to other NABL offerings

• MSP customer grows by adding SME customers

• SME customers grow and add users

• New tangential customers in the Value-Added Reseller space (discussed further in later segment)

Monitoring & Management

Monitoring & Management, or Unified Endpoint Management (UEM), serves as the foundation for the managed services model. It gives customers remote access, visibility and insights into the availability and performance of their customers’ networks, infrastructure, devices and applications, all through a centralized dashboard to help maintain uptime and peak performance.

NABL provides role-based access and support so technicians can easily troubleshoot specific IT systems, devices and applications of all sizes across cloud, on-premises and hybrid cloud environments. It is able to support thousands of device types across major device categories, including Windows, macOS and Linux endpoints as well as network infrastructure components such as switches, routers, firewalls and wireless access points.

Through the NABL UEM tools, MSPs can (among other things);

• automate policies and tasks

• power active device discovery and utilize automated alerts and customizable performance checks

• enable technical support personnel to perform maintenance and troubleshoot a wide array of issues, whether attended or unattended by end users

• manage their business through dashboards and reports that track the activities of their technical support personnel, demonstrate value to their customers and identify opportunities for operational improvement

• monitor, manage, secure, standardize and automate Microsoft 365 users, Azure resources, and Intune devices

This is the second largest area of the business today but also the slowest growing. The slower growth is not unique to NABL, these trends in UEM are being seen across the industry.

Sample dashboard products from the company’s website:

Security Operations

Security operations are the second largest part of the business and have been dramatically enhanced with the recent Adlumin acquisition in November 2024 (discussed further in the M&A section).

NABL’s security solutions are designed to help its customers secure their own IT environments and data and those of their SME customers. NABL provides a layered protection approach that spans network and systems infrastructure, applications, and end user devices through patch management, endpoint security, managed detection and response, extended detection and response, web protection, e-mail security and archiving and vulnerability assessment solutions.

We could easily get lost in the weeds with the nuances in the world of security but to keep it brief, NABL offers two overarching types of security; Extended Detection and Response (XDR) and Managed Detection and Response (MDR). XDR utilizes a powerful cloud-native platform that leverages machine learning to identify cyber-threats, automate remediation rules and system updates, and provide continuous compliance reporting. MDR offers around-the-clock, 24/7 threat hunting and remediation of clients’ systems for cyber-threats, abnormal activities, and dark web monitoring.

XDR capabilities were greatly enhanced with the Adlumin acquisition as they have developed proven technology in AI automation. Some 70% of incident investigation and remediation can be automated with Aldumin. NABL previously partnered with Aldumin and was able to see firsthand how the technology worked and customer adoption before making the acquisition.

Adlumin dashboard

Data Protection

This is currently the largest of the three “doors” at ~$200M in revenue. The primary offering is NABL’s Cove Data Protection which is a cloud-first, backup-as-a-service platform. Cove offers customers the ability to back up data more frequently than most competitors and is argued to be more efficient for the MSP’s.

NABL’s backup, recovery and disaster recovery solutions are designed to help MSPs:

• provide their customers with efficient granular data protection and recovery across multiple types of data and systems, including servers, virtual machines, workstations, critical databases and business documents;

• protect and restore critical SaaS application, such as M365;

• understand the integrity of their protection copies based on automated recovery testing;

• optimize data transfers to and from the cloud with the option to designate a preferred storage location in one of NABL’s available data centers in 18 countries

• allow for protection of data across workstations, servers and networks from a single platform; and

• deliver these services to their customers without the need for them to purchase, maintain, and patch hardware

The product has earned plenty of recognition in the market as noted shown below.

Partnerships

While not one of the “doors” mentioned above, NABL has a opportunities to partner with over vendors to offer a more comprehensive package to its customers and potentially get in front of new customers. This can be a key advantage in identifying strong up and coming companies with valuable technology as we saw with Adlumin.

Sales Strategy

Historically, NABL has served SME’s through MSP’s and this remains the largest part of the business today. However, the company is starting to move up into the mid market segment. Additionally, with the Adlumin acquisition the company has inherited a new channel in Value-Added Resellers that they are testing out in other segments and geographies of the business. While this is nascent at this time, it does offer another avenue of growth.

NABL has also been moving customers to more long term committed contracts vs the historic month to month and pay as you go models of years past. Historically, over 90% or revenue were not committed, this number is now around 60%.

This intention here is twofold; creating more opportunities to gain wallet share from stickier relationships and to give customers more visibility on their IT spend. NABL started this process ahead of the Adlumin acquisition as they knew they would want to a longer cross sell runway.

It should be noted that NABL is offering incentives to move into these committed contracts and around 15% of one UEM solution had an on-prem version so going from a non-committed relationship to a contractual commitment can cause what appears to be a revenue slowdown.

The opportunity in front of NABL is large, with management believing there is ~$2.5B in “white space”. The thought here being if all customers and devices were using all of the NABL solutions, that would result in $2.5B in revenue. It’s obvious getting all customers to use all solutions is unrealistic but even if they can hit a fraction of that, the opportunity is substantial, and that’s just among their current customers which should present warm leads.

NABL also assists its MSP customers with growing their business through various programs and partner success teams. These teams help with onboarding, post-sales engineering and partner management.

Financial Info

Since the spinoff, NABL has grown top line revenue at a 10.4% CAGR. Additionally, average revenue per customer experienced a 12% CAGR going from $13.6K in 2021 to $18.9K 2024. Some of the recent slowdown is attributable to the aforementioned change to the committed contracts structure.

The percentage of MSP partners with annual spend over $50,000 has grown from 47% of ARR to 57% (up from 30% in 2018). While the rate of growth year over year appears to be slowing, from 2018 to 2024 this metric experienced a CAGR of roughly 19%.

TTM ARR was $528M as of 9-30-2025, up 14% YoY. Management has stated their goal is to scale to $1B in ARR, which I believe is achievable based on the various levers available to the company. Net retention rate currently stands at 102%. Given some of the moves to mid-market and Adlumin customers consuming more and having better gross and net retention, management believes there’s 100 to 200 bps of improvement available in gross retention.

Historically, EBITDA (Adj) margins have been in the 30% range but have dipped into the high 20’s recently as management has been investing into the growth opportunities mentioned earlier. Management expects this to trend back up and normalize into the 30’s as they grow into the investments being made.

Management

CEO - John Pagliuca

Mr. Pagliuca has been a part of NABL (SolarWinds) since 2013 and has been NABL’s CEO since the spin out from SolarWinds. He was an EVP at SolarWinds and acted as NABL’s CFO prior to that. Mr. Pagliuca also serves on the Board of 8x8, Inc., as Independent Director since 2024.

CFO - Tim O’Brien

Mr. O’Brien has been with NABL (SolarWinds) since 2013. He spent time as both the CFO and COO of NABL in 2013 before becoming the VP of Finance & Operations at SolarWinds. In 2020, he again moved into the CFO position as NABL was gearing up for its spinoff.

Further information on the Management Team can be seen here: Executive Management Team

Board of Directors

NABL’s board is made up of nine individuals (up recently from eight) including the CEO, Mr. Pagliuca as well as two directors from Silver Lake Partners, Mike Bingle and Michael Widmann. The Chairman of the Board is William Bock who has an extensive career in the technology industry. Notable positions include President of Silicon Labs (SLAB) and Partner with CenterPoint Ventures, a venture capital group. Mr. Bock currently serves on the boards of Silicon Labs (SLAB), SailPoint Technologies (SAIL), and SolarWinds (unclear if he still serves on the board as its now a private company).

Further information on board members can be seen here: Board of Directors

Ownership

NABL is still largely owned (~60%) by private equity firms Silver Lake and Thoma Bravo. These two firms were majority owners in SolarWinds as well and were responsible for taking the company public. Silver Lake has two members on the board as noted above. Other notable owners include; Sunriver Management, Crescent Park, Applied Fundamental Research and Macquarie Investment Management. These are notable as NABL either represents a meaningful position in their portfolios, or in the case of Macquarie Investment Management, a recent meaningful purchase.

M&A Activity

Recent Acquisition

As noted above, in November, 2024 NABL purchased one of it partners, Adlumin, Inc. for $265.9M in cash, stock and contingent payout. Adlumin operates as a cloud native security operations platform that provides security services. Under the terms of transaction, NABL paid $220M in cash, issued 1,570,762 shares and $30M in contingent payout payable in 2025 and 2026 based upon the achievement of certain performance metrics against defined targets. Adlumin was immediately accretive to ARR growth at the time of acquisition, and management expected it to be accretive to cash flow by the fourth quarter of 2025 (not known at time of writing). It should also be noted that $160M of the purchase was recorded as goodwill.

Rumors

In May of 2024, it was rumored that Thoma Bravo and Silver Lake were running a sale process for NABL and Barracuda Networks (owned by KKR) was rumored to be among those interested in acquiring NABL. It was reported the market value at that time was $2.5B. Obviously, nothing came to fruition, but I believe these discussions will again be on the table in the coming months/years, especially as NABL integrates Adlumin and creates a stronger growth story.

Risks

One of the biggest risks in technology is the ever changing development landscape that can render todays technology obsolete. The topic of on everyone’s mind is of course artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on workflow and productivity. While I believe the NABL management team is focused on using AI to enhance its products and offerings, there is a chance better tools are developed outside of NABL or tools that make current offerings less attractive. Adlumin has a strong AI component which will assumingly be leveraged across the NABL platform.

Competition in this space is incredibly tough and changes are rapid. There is always the possibility that one of NABL’s competitors develops a superior product or product set that entices MSP’s to move away from NABL. Switching costs are generally low across the industry and especially for those MSP’s who are not deeply ingrained into one ecosystem. This is part of the reason NABL has moved to more contracted revenue as mentioned earlier. To make ensure NABL is keeping up with the rapid technological changes, it is currently spending, on average over the last 3 years, 19.2% of its revenue on R&D. This is up from an average of 15.1% 2018 to 2023.

Many of NABL’s competitors are privately held so there is little available information available to compare. Notable competitors include; Kaseya, ConnectWise and NinjaOne, Acronis, ArcticWolf, eSentire, ManageEngine, Proofpoint, Sophos and Veeam.

Cyber security is another big risk for a company charged with providing protection to thousands of customers across millions of endpoints. The SolarWinds cyber incident mentioned earlier is case and point. SolarWinds reputation and brand image was greatly damaged as a result of this breach and customer trust was lost. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet to avoid cyber threats (if there were NABL wouldn’t have as much business!) and this will always present significant unknowable risks.

Conclusion

I believe the current valuation of NABL represents a good buying opportunity. While I don’t think the shares are screaming cheap at face value, I do believe the market is overlooking the structural changes and overall story of the company. The most likely scenario seems to be a buyout but even if this is years away, I believe management is making the right moves to create shareholder value over the long term.

The company has numerous ways to win including the integration and cross selling from the Adlumin acquisition, committed contract progression, VAR channel expansion, growing the mid-market customer base, further M&A of up and coming technology as well as continuing to invest in their own technology.

Furthering this point is the margin expansion expected, management noted it has purposefully driven margin down but only for a brief period and expects several hundred basis point improvements. The transition to contracted revenue should continue to yield cross selling benefits and increase average revenue per customer.

I believe if management can continue delivering on their stated goals, NABL should be worth $13-$15/share in the next 2-3 years.

Disclaimer - The author plans to open a long position in NABL over the next 30 days.

I run a very concentrated portfolio of high conviction names. I don’t expect this level of out performance to continue and there will be years it doesn’t outperform the market and that’s ok with me.

The largest contributors to performance over this period have been AXSM ($55.91 avg cost) and ENVA ($35.80 avg cost).

*I didn’t cherry pick the start date, that’s when my portfolio was mandatorily moved from TD Ameritrade to Schwab following their merger. If anyone knows how to get that history to I’d be happy to share it all.

I look forward to sharing my writing journey and the results, good or bad.

Thanks!

EV - $2.8B

Market Cap - $2.0B

Div. Yield - 5.0%

P/E (LTM) - 11.8x

EV/EBITDA (LTM) - 6.3x

ROIC (Five year avg.) - ~14%

Thesis

I believe SLVM shares represent an interesting opportunity as there has been quite a bit of noise in the years following the spin off in 2021. Shares are down roughly 35% YTD even after a 13% rebound in the last month but management has delivered on its stated goals. While largely overlooked, there are industry players who have taken notice.

The company has sizable assets from its paper mills to forestland in Brazil. The 250,000 acres of forest land owned in Brazil were recently appraised for BRL 5 billion, or over $900 million, and listed on the balance sheet for $378 million. PPE is listed on the balance sheet at $1.045 billion, net of accumulated depreciation. Keep in mind the market cap is currently $2.0 billion and EV is $2.8 billion.

SLVM has been active in purchasing shares at these levels and have capacity for more with the recent authorization. Management has been able to invest in the business, pay down debt, and return cash to shareholders even in a soft market environment.

Given the substantial asset base relative to EV, cash generation, and shareholder friendly allocation I believe the shares are worth consideration on a standalone basis. I am further inclined to recommend as I also believe the company is a prime target for an outright sale in the near to mid-term.

Overview

Sylvamo Corporation (SLVM) is a paper producing company that was spun out of International Paper (IP) in 2021. SLVM manufactures uncoated freesheet paper products in three segments; Europe, Latin America and North America. It has six vertically integrated mills and one non-integrated mill with an aggregate annual paper and pulp production capacity of 3.3 million short tons. Two mills in North America, three in Brazil and two in Europe.

The company maintains strong positions in each geographic region thanks to operating some of the lowest-cost mills. In the North America it holds the #2 supply position behind Domtar. The company manufactures familiar names such as Hammermill and HP. In Latin America SLVM holds the #1 supply position. Europe is more competitive with the #2-#4 positions being close while Navigator holds the #1 position.

The paper manufacturing operations were further supported by an offtake agreement with IP (subject to their earlier termination) for paper production at the North American Riverdale, Alabama, mill for 350,000 short tons of uncoated freesheet. IP recently announced it will be converting the No. 16 paper machine at its Riverdale mill to produce containerboard by Q3 2026. This mill supplies SLVM with about 260,000 short tons annually. SLVM management noted that relying on Riverdale was never part of their long term strategy and will largely offset the change with capacity expansions currently underway in their own South Carolina mill. These are expected to be completed in the back half of 2026.

History

As mentioned above, SLVM was spun out of IP in August of 2021. Early 2022 was a tumultuous time for SLVM as it closed its Russian operations given the conflict with Ukraine. Prior to this, the company held the #1 supply position in Russia and had operated in the country for over 23 years. In January of 2023, SLVM purchased a paper production site in Sweden for EUR 150 million from Stora Enso to offset the Russian closure. The site has capacity of 485,000 metric tons.

In April of ‘22, private equity firm Atlas Holdings (https://www.atlasholdingsllc.com/) entered into a block trade that gave the firm nearly 14% ownership of SLVM’s outstanding shares. Atlas has deep industry experience and several investments in the space.

Following this investment stake, management at SLVM quickly adopted a Shareholder Rights Plan as they believed the shares were undervalued and wanted to protect shareholders (shares were trading around $38 at this time). After a brief period SLVM and Atlas came to a cooperation agreement that saw Atlas place two members on SLVM’s Board of Directors.

Management

CEO Jean-Michel Ribieras announced his retirement this April, effective 12-31-2025. He is being replaced by John Sims who has been with the company since the spinoff and with IP since 2008 prior to that.

Management has been focused on reinvesting in the business for the long term and returning cash to shareholders through its dividend and share repurchases. Currently, the dividend yield is 3.5% and the board recently authorized a $150 million repurchase program after the most recent program was exhausted. Total shares outstanding have decreased from 43.9M 2021 to 39.4M in the most recent LTM period.

Ownership

Atlas Holdings is the largest shareholder at ~16% (as noted above). Other notable investors include Millennium Management at 5.45% after a recent doubling of their position in November. Fourth Sail Capital LP, only owning 1.3% but the position represents 3% of their portfolio (many holdings outside of the US). D.E. Shaw & Co. have also been building a larger position since mid-2025 buying at $70, $60, and $50 (although a very small position for their portfolio).

Debt

The company had a significant amount of debt after it was spun out of IP at $1.5 billion but has been making steady progress on de-levering. Currently, SLVM is down to roughly $800 million outstanding at a 1.7x gross debt-to-adjusted EBTIDA (stated target at time of spinoff was to get below 2.5x). SLVM previously had issued 8-year unsecured 7.0% bonds which were tendered and refinanced with term notes at a lower rates, even as the Fed Funds rate was increasing. Additionally, the debt maturities on current the three term loans are spread from 2027-2031.

Recent News

The two members Atlas Holdings placed on the Board of Directors have recently resigned, which triggered a termination of the previously established cooperation agreement. In response to this SLVM initiated another shareholders right plan. Management did not discuss these actions any further on the quarterly call. The timing is interesting given the recent decline in share price off its peak around $90. The company has been operating in a soft market but noted it sees some improvement coming as customers unwind built up inventories following tariff uncertainties.

Conclusion

As stated in my thesis, I believe the shares are undervalued given the substantial assets, cash generation and shareholder friendly nature of management, SLVM shares represent a relatively safe investment opportunity. Please note this is not financial advice and everyone is encouraged to perform their own due diligence. I would love to hear any feedback on my thesis. Thanks!