No. Right-wing and religious parties will still dominate, but they won’t all agree to work under Netanyahu.

In perspective, key leaders of other right-wing parties have, on the basis of personal distrust based on past experience, refused to join a Netanyahu-led government. This has meant that Bibi has had to rely on the haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) and far-right parties for a majority – as in his current government (68 seats of the 120 in the Knesset).

Recent polls clearly indicate that the parties in this government will lose their collective majority, falling ten or more seats short of a majority.

A poll released just two days ago has this majority shrinking by almost one-third, down to 48 seats. Netanyahu’s Likud alone would fall from 32 seats won in 2022 to 19. The poll is credible, having a sample size double that of most Israeli polls and with a margin of error of 3.4 percent.

But while Netanyahu would lose, it is not clear who would win. The largest single party, with 24 seats, would be the centrist Yashar (Upright), a party led by former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. Then would come B’yachad (Together), a center-right combo of other anti-Bibi figures, with 13 seats.

The remaining seats would go to the party of recent Soviet immigrants (9), the remaining party of the left (11), and two Arab parties (15).

Thus, even with the decline of Likud, opposition parties would not have a majority without the Arab parties. Confirming previous polls, they would fall a few seats short of a majority of 61, in this case by 4 seats.

And the leaders of the opposition Jewish parties, with the exception of the leftist Democrats, have publicly opposed the prospect of a government dependent on the Arab parties.

So, when the dust settles, maybe Bibi will still be there?

No. Attacks by West Bank Jewish settlers on their Palestinian Arab neighbors could trigger the next big explosion of violence.

In perspective, the West Bank (about 21 percent of the original Palestine mandate) has a current population of about 3 million Arabs and over half a million Jews who have established settlements there since its occupation by Israel in the 1967 war. These settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (to which Israel is a party), but are defended by their supporters in Israel as rightful restoration of the Jewish people to their historic homeland.

Extremists among the settlers have consistently engaged in a pattern of violence against neighboring Arab towns and villages, sometimes as responses to Arab violence and sometimes as part of an openly-declared strategy of forcing Arabs to leave in order to redeem Jewish land.

These attacks involve intimidation, arson, vandalism, physical assaults, and shootings, with resulting deaths. According to a UN report, the number of attacks hit a new high in the first half of 2026, with over 1000 incidents, about six each day -- 63 percent higher than the same period the preceding year.

Statistics from the UN are often dismissed on grounds of that organization’s built-in bias against Israel, with over 50 Muslim nations arrayed against the lone Jewish state. But similar figures are verified by well-regarded human rights groups within Israel, such as B’Tselem and Yesh Din.

The Israeli army, keepers of order in occupied territories, has done little if anything to stop the marauders. It sometimes even enables them. This complicity is also at a new high: the current Israeli government of Prime Minister Netanyahu concedes to parties of the far right, tied to the settlers, control of the police and of civil administration of the West Bank.

Punishment of violent settlers is practically non-existent. One report, covering 1500 killings of Palestinians from 2017-2025, concludes that only 112 cases were investigated and there was only one conviction of a violent settler.

Does Netanyahu actually want the West Bank to explode, providing a convenient national emergency to avoid losing power in the upcoming October election? That would be a very uncharitable interpretation. But charity is running low.

Very possibly. Netanyahu can read the polls, which consistently predict that his current coalition will drop to about 50 seats (from its current majority of 68), ending his reign as Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. The far-right parties that keep him in office, and are tied to the settlers, would also be cast into the political wilderness.

In perspective, earlier intifadas (uprisings) in the West Bank (and Gaza) were sparked under similar circumstances, in 1987 and 2000. And a number of recent confrontations have been deliberately provoked by far-right activists engaged in physical attacks, arson, and other acts of intimidation. According to UN data, the number of Palestinians injured in these clashes came to 832 in 2025 but is already up to 689 as of mid-July this year.

Since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, an additional 80 “outposts” and 126 “farms” have been established by settlers in the West Bank, and some 104 larger settlements have been approved.

In an ominous incident from the past week, a large group of Israeli “hikers” – clearly provocateurs – entered a West Bank town and confronted Palestinian residents outside a mosque. The army was called in, and subsequently four Palestinians and two Israeli army officers were killed.

Seizing the moment, Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Israel Katz directed the army to take “powerful action in villages that serve as terror hubs.” Israel has now deployed 24 battalions (15,000 – 20,000 soldiers) in the West Bank. There is talk of dismantling the Palestinian Authority (PA), which officially rules most of the cities and towns of the West Bank.

In response, some 70 Palestinian towns have organized local defense organizations, and there are fears that Tanzim, the armed wing of Fatah (the dominant force in the PA), will become active and involved.

Some observers believe an explosion is imminent. Does the Prime Minister of Israel oppose such an eventuality, or does he welcome it?

If it serves to take the public mind off his blunders that led to October 7 . . . .

No. The MOU is almost as inadequate on this issue as on nuclear weapons. In fact Iran can claim that it legitimizes their future control of the strait.

The MOU says that Iran “will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only.” This recognizes a continuing role for Iran, including possible future tolls.

Further: Iran “will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman [the other bordering state] to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz.” Iranians see this as ceding to them the right to define a new regime for the strait, rather than returning to the status quo ante.

It comes therefore as no surprise that Iran has established a “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” that claims “Iranian armed forces oversight” over the entire strait, right up to the Omani coast. Accordingly, they claim the right to oppose the passage of ships hugging the Omani rather than the Iranian coast. And, occasionally, to shoot at them.

Previously, ships had used a UN-approved route, dating from a 1968 agreement that Iran had respected. In Iran’s reading of the MOU, this is now dead.

What the Trump administration failed to achieve from Iran was the clear and simple restoration of the status quo ante.

The Strait of Hormuz is, by international law, an international waterway. If Iran can change this, what lies ahead? Will Yemen and Djibouti claim control of Bab el Mandeb (16 miles wide vs. 21 for Hormuz), blocking access to the Suez Canal?

Will Spain and Morocco charge tolls to pass the Strait of Gibraltar (9 miles wide)?

Indonesia and Malaysia might want to profit from passage through the Strait of Malacca (24-40 miles wide), which has more traffic than Hormuz.

And best of all, the United Kingdom and France will announce a new regime, with suitable tolls, for passage through the Strait of Dover (21 miles wide).

Yes. The restrictions apply almost exclusively to majority non-white nations. The United States arguably has the most racist entry policies of any “advanced” country.

In 2025 the U.S. government closed off all entry from 20 nations, Muslim or African plus Haiti, Laos, and Myanmar. Partial exclusion, closing most visa categories, was applied to another 20 Arican or majority black Caribbean states.

In January of this year the U.S. announced an indefinite suspension of immigration applications from 75 nations, including most of the 40 above and another 51 African and Asian lands. These nations – almost half the world -- in 2024 accounted for 46% of immigrant visas issued that year.

These policies take us back almost exactly a century, to the 1924 Immigration Act that set national quotas for immigration expressly designed to “Keep American White.” That also describes current policy; our president says these people have “bad genes.”

In addition, current policy tries to block the path to citizenship for newcomers already here legally. The strategy is to make them leave and apply for naturalization from outside the U.S. – if they are then allowed to apply.

Even those already naturalized are not safe. Some 80 officials have been assigned to investigations aimed at stripping them of their citizenship.

In the meantime, some 1.3 million refugees here under Temporary Protected Status are – with the connivance of the Supreme Court – now subject to forced return to countries from which they legitimately needed protection.

At least the Supreme Court did invalidate the administration’s effort to cancel birthright citizenship despite the plain wording (“all persons born or naturalized in the United States”) of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution?

But wait: four justices agreed to ignore the Constitution’s clear words -- so with one more vote racism could rule supreme.

Not really. There is too much theory, and too little reality, in this projection.

In perspective, the ruling government coalition (all parties opposed to two states) would lose its majority, falling from its current 68 seats to 51 in the latest poll. The other 69 seats in the Knesset would go to parties that, with one partial exception, are open to the idea of two states in one way or another.

The two Arab parties (11seats) and the left-wing Democrats (11 seats) support two states, Israel and a Palestinian state based on the West Bank and Gaza.

The new centrist Yashar [“Straight”] party, under former Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot, polls just one seat less than Netanyahu’s Likud (20 vs. 21).

Eisenkot is open to two states -- BUT not in the immediate future and only if it includes the Jordan Valley and other strategic areas.

Yisrael Beitenu, a rightist party led by Avigdor Lieberman and supported by immigrants from the former Soviet Union, is polling at about 10 seats. BUT Lieberman’s version of the two-state solution would involve drastic separation of the two peoples: annexation of West Bank Jewish settlements by Israel and transfer of Israeli Arab areas to the Palestinian state.

The other 17 seats would go to Beyachad [Together], a merger of the right-wing party of Naftali Bennett with the centrist Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid. BUT Bennett has consistently opposed a Palestinian state, and Lapid accepts it only with extensive conditions. How the new party would come down in the end is not clear.

A majority (61) for two states would require all opposition parties except Beyachad and at least 9 from that party. BUT Eisenkot, Lieberman, Bennett, and Lapid have all opposed a government dependent on Arab parties for its majority.

This not only casts doubt on a government that would support two states, but on forming any government at all without the Likud or one of its two partners: the haredim (ultra-orthodox; 17 seats) or the far right (13 seats).

And support for two states among Israelis generally is only 27% to 39% in recent polls. This could change dramatically, as did support for returning Sinai to Egypt when Anwar Sadat flew to Israel. But there are no such miracles on the horizon.

Yes, by and large. Major surveys that assess democracy over time, for all nations, using the most objective measures available, note a decline in American democracy in recent years – though it should be noted that democracy has been in decline generally in recent decades.

In perspective, the most comprehensive research is the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) survey, which gathers data from 4200 experts around the world, covering more than 600 attributes of democracy. In its 2026 ranking of nations for quality of democracy, V-Dem dropped the United States to 51st of 179 nations surveyed, down from 20th the year before. It also reclassified our nation as an “electoral democracy” rather than as a “liberal democracy.”

The recent decline was attributed to concentration of presidential power, the weakening of legislative constraints, the undermining of civil rights and equality before the law, and challenges to freedom of expression. Legislative constraints were judged to be the lowest in the last 100 years, while civil rights and equality declined to the lowest level in 60 years – going back to the period before the modern civil rights movement.

This comes on top of factors that have usually explained the weakness of U.S. democracy compared to others: a (relatively) low level of participation, the power of money, and structural issues such as gerrymandering and our electoral college.

Another research group, the Economist Intelligence Unit, has since 2006 evaluated democracy in 167 nations on a ten-point scale. In 2016 the U.S. fell below the 8 points that mark the (admittedly arbitrary) line between “full democracies” and “flawed democracies”. From 2024 to 2025 the U.S. score fell from 7.85 to 7.65, cementing our standing as a flawed democracy and ranking us 28th in the world.

We are not alone. According to these and other surveys and to current developments around the planet, democracy is on the retreat. Nearly a quarter of the nations, according to V-Dem, are undergoing a process of “autocratization.” If misery loves company, we should be feeling quite comforted.

No. Not by the terms of the deal itself. It just kicks the can down the road.

In perspective, the major issue was and is Iran’s obvious long-term plan of building an infrastructure for nuclear weapons production, even while a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), so that it will have the shortest possible “break-out time”: the time from when it leaves the NPT on 90-day notice (as it can legally do) until it has a usable weapon. Accordingly Iran enriched uranium up to the 60 percent level, for which there is no credible non-military justification.

The break-out time was then estimated to be a matter of weeks. But The 12-day U.S.-Israel attack on Iran’s nuclear sites in June of last year (by most accounts) buried this stockpile under deep rubble and extended the break-out time to two years (according to the Pentagon; Trump said several years, then one month).

The deal includes an Iranian pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. This is of course perfectly meaningless; Iran has been so pledged since 1968.

The deal changes nothing. The two sides agree “to resolve the disposition” of the enriched stockpile. Resolve the disposition? What the hell does that mean?

The only hint is a reference to “minimum methodology” for “downblending” on site, under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. The chances for negotiating such complicated arrangements in the next 60 days are nil.

The only guarantee that Iran will not retrieve the stockpile, and rebuild its enrichment program, is constant surveillance of the key sites at Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, and a vigorous response to renewed activity there.

Other than that, the deal simply reflects Trump’s own priorities in getting the Strait of Hormuz open and the price of oil down. But it is now clear that Iran can again close the Strait at any time merely by threatening commercial traffic, giving the Iranians great leverage in the negotiations on other issues.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action followed years of hard negotiation with Iran and near-universal sanctions that cut its oil revenues in half. It left Iran with only a tiny amount of 3.67% enriched uranium. The Strait of Hormuz remained open to safe passage before, during, and after.

The claim that this is a better deal is, well, simply comical.

No. The White House Press Secretary admits that many of the inscriptions on the recently-installed presidential portraits were written by the current president himself. This obviously includes the Biden inscription – and others (Carter, Clinton, Obama) that are equally savage acts of retribution.

In perspective, the title of “worst president in U.S. history” is being decisively settled among professional historians. The honor is increasingly going by acclamation to Donald J. Trump himself.

For example, he ranks worst is a 2024 survey by the American Political Science Association, based just on his first term in office. Imagine how he can extend his lead the second time around, with its even more ruthless assault on decency.

Andrew Johnson, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan? All fall short of the destructive standards set by the current occupant of the office. None of them, for example, unilaterally demolished a wing of the White House.

As one ranking organization summarized his accomplishments:

“Donald Trump — Failed to effectively respond to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, ran a massively corrupt regime that flouted ethics laws and violated political norms, and irresponsibly cut taxes for the wealthy (2017−2021). Trump’s second regime (2025-) is assaulting American democracy in horrific ways, which could lead to immense economic devastation, even more corruption, and an end to the rule of law, majority rule with minority rights, and free and fair elections.”

And with two and one-half years yet to go, there’s a decent chance that DJT can make even more headway in wrecking the rule of law, diminishing democracy, and corrupting government institutions at all levels.

Trump might do better in a ranking of presidents by their impact on the nation. His impact promises to be greater than many. But it is rotten to the core.

No. As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is committed to not producing a nuclear weapon, and to having its nuclear facilities monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA). But any member of the NPT can withdraw on 90-day notice, as North Korea did in 2003.

In perspective, this would mean a “break-out time” (the interval between renunciation of the NPT and actual production of a weapon) of at least 90 days -- if the withdrawing party observes the rules.

Before the attacks of June 2025, the estimated break-out time for an Iranian bomb was as low as a few weeks, given their accumulation of near-weapon-grade 60% enriched uranium in retaliation for the Trump administration’s withdrawal from

a 2015 agreement that limited Iranian enrichment to 3.67%.

And where is this 970 pounds of heavily-enriched uranium (HEU)? The IAEA believes most is deeply buried in the rubble of the Isfahan nuclear complex. Before the current war, the Iranians covered entrances to the site even more deeply, presumably as defense against ground operations to seize the HEU.

The IAEA believes there may be smaller amounts of the stockpile in the destroyed enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordo. Entrances to these underground sites have also been reinforced against ground attack.

Add to this: since 2020 the Iranians have been building another nuclear site under Pickaxe Mountain, about a mile from the Natanz complex. If this site is a third enrichment plant, it would provide a means of quickly bringing the 970 pounds of HEU to complete weapons-grade. The same is true for yet another new construction site near Isfahan. The IAEA currently has access to neither.

Given the dispersion of nuclear sites and materials, their underground locations and defenses, and the inherent problems of handling HEU, a commando raid to seize the existing stockpile is not feasible. Even the Trump administration, despite its bravado, seems to have come to terms with this reality – as expressed in Trump’s belittling of the stockpile as “nuclear dust” (actually it’s gas).

The only way forward is through negotiation and (forced) Iranian cooperation. In other words, coercive diplomacy enforced by universal sanctions. This worked in 2015 – but we threw it away.

No. In fact we will be damned lucky if any current agreement comes close to restoring what was achieved in the JCPOA.

In perspective, the JCPOA limited Iran to a maximum level of 3.67% enrichment, and removed 97% of that stockpile. This limit was to hold for 15 years, but when Trump reneged the Iranians proceeded to violate the JCPOA as well, eventually building up a stockpile of 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60% (90% is considered bomb-grade, but experts say 60% can make a respectable weapon).

Trump and his acolytes denounced the time limits in the JCPOA, as well as the fact that it didn’t cover Iran’s ballistic missile program or its support of proxy militias elsewhere in the Middle East.

But without the JCPOA, the time limit for an Iranian weapons program was de facto 90 days. Any member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has the right to withdraw on 90-day notice, as North Korea did. The 15-year prohibition was clearly better than a 90-day waiting period (which Iran might ignore anyway).

As for ballistic missiles and proxy forces, it doesn’t appear that any new deal will cover these issues either. They were not on the agenda in either set of talks. The focus in both was, as it should be, on Iran’s furtive quest for the bomb.

So what will Trump achieve? Presumably the Strait of Hormuz will be open once again to free navigation – as it was before he launched the current war. So the achievement is: back to status quo ante.

And maybe that highly-enriched uranium (HEU) will be removed from Iran, though reportedly the Iranians would like to push those negotiations into a murky future. And the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may be back on the job verifying Iranian compliance, as they were before the war of June last year.

But that HEU wouldn’t exist had we stayed in the JCPOA. The status quo ante – ante U.S. withdrawal – was better than what anything Trump is likely to get now.

For now, yes. The Trump administration has scuttled all refugee admissions and services to refugees already here – save for the curious and racist exception of white Afrikaners from South Africa.

In perspective, U.S. policy is set by a 1980 law that recognizes a refugee as “someone forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence.” This definition reflects, and goes a little beyond, the 1951 International Refugee Convention that focuses on “a well-founded fear of persecution.” The United States is also a party to this convention, which forbids returning refugees to countries where they face persecution.

Refugees undergo a vigorous vetting process before admission, but in the 1975-2024 period the United States admitted 3,696,788 refugees, an average of almost 74,000 per year. In the last year of the Biden administration, about 100,000 were approved for admission.

On his first day in office, Trump stopped the entry of refugees, including some 10,000 already approved. This was followed a few days later by ending services to refugees already arrived. The “big beautiful bill” of last July expanded this to exclude newly-arrived refugees – and other recent immigrants -- from Medicare, Medicaid, the Affordable Care Act, SNAP, and other federal programs.

For 2026 a cap of 7500 refugees, by far the lowest ever, was set. In practice, the only refugees admitted as of April 30 have been 6,066 white South Africans and another 3 (?) from the Middle East.

Trump claims that the Afrikaners wee “victims of unjust racial discrimination.” Their complaints center around land redistribution programs enacted by the South African government to remedy vast inequalities left by apartheid.

The United States has also banned the entry of citizens from some 19 nations, with partial bans for another 20 – lest, God forbid, they could claim refuge.

Among those cut off are Afghans who aided U.S. forces and face retribution, as well as embattled religious minorities in Iran and elsewhere. But their sufferings do not register. For Trump only those of the right race deserve mercy.

Not really. An election was due by October 27 in any event, and will not take place much before then. In fact, Prime Minister Netanyahu may well push it back to the original October date or something close to it.

In perspective, Israeli elections are conducted at least 90 days after the motion for an election passes. Interestingly, this long mind-sapping campaign interlude is not specified in law but is simply customary (I have confirmed this directly with a former President of the Israel Supreme Court).

So the earliest possible date for the election would be late August, but September – or October if Bibi chooses – is more likely. No big deal.

More interesting is the issue on which Netanyahu lost his majority. Not the war with Iran, not the debacle of October 7, 2023, not Bibi’s ongoing onslaught on the judiciary, and not his ongoing trial for bribery, fraud and breach of trust (now concluding its sixth year). Instead, it was his failure to secure a permanent exemption from military service for haredi (ultra-orthodox) religious students.

As noted here before (Perspective 184), this is in some ways the most explosive issue in Israeli politics. Some 15% of young men have avoided the draft by registering in yeshivot (seminaries) until past draft age. Thie is of course anathema to the other 85% of Israel’s public, including non-haredi religious.

Israel’s courts have ruled that exempting religious students from military service has no legal basis and must be ended. Accordingly draft notices were sent out – and ignored. Netanyahu, dependent on haredi parties for his slim majority, has not rushed to pursue the draft evaders.

In fact, he had promised the haredi parties to pass legislation that would secure some kind of permanent exemption for young haredim. But he ran into resistance from others in his coalition, including within his own party. In addition, military chiefs were pushing hard for additional manpower.

So it was handy to use this issue to go to elections that were due anyway.

And the first poll after the event registers little change from the previous poll. Netanyahu’s Likud would win 26 seats (of 120) instead of 25, and the new center-right Beyachad would drop from 25 to 24. Once again, opposition parties would not be able to form a government without the Arab parties.

The two major Israeli centrist parties opposing Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s government just formed a joint list (Yachad, meaning Together) for elections due by November. In an April 23 poll these two parties (centrist-right Bennett 2026 and centrist Yesh Atid) were projected to win a combined 35 seats, with Netanyahu’s Likud winning only 25 (against its current 32). So is Bibi headed for the sidelines?

Not necessarily. A poll from two days ago, by the same polling firm (Midgam), gives Yachad only 25 seats, the same as Likud. Little has changed overall; the chances of displacing Netanyahu remain uncertain, as reported previously in Perspective 199 (April 25).

In perspective, the current government – Likud plus the haredi (ultra-orthodox) parties plus the far right parties – would still be reduced from their current majority of 68 seats to 50-51 seats. The ten seats lost by the two parties in Yachad would go to other opposition parties, without changing the problematic calculus of a government without Likud.

Two Arab lists are together polling, in both polls, about 10 seats. This would leave the opposition one or two seats short of a majority of 61 without some Arab participation. And prominent right-wing leaders have opposed a coalition with Arab parties.

In any event, a government of Jewish opposition parties only, without Likud or its partners, would still need to span the political spectrum from the dovish Democrats (heirs of Labor Zionism) to Avigdor Lieberman’s hawkish Yisrael Beitenu. Not impossible, but certainly tricky.

Meanwhile, the four Arab parties have agreed in principle on a Joint List that would prevent votes being wasted on a party that didn’t pass the 3.25% threshold for representation in the last election. The Joint List, according to some surveys, would win 12-15 seats versus 10 for parties running separately. This would make Arab inclusion in a non-Netanyahu government even more critical.

Apparently the implementation of the Arab Joint List is being delayed by the insistence of one party (the Islamists, as it happens) on the right to leave the Joint List after the election so it could be a candidate for inclusion in a government coalition.

Stay tuned.

The U.S. Supreme Court has just removed the last obstacle to extreme partisan gerrymandering in federal elections. Could this transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a non-democratic institution?

Yes. If current trends in redistricting continue, it is possible to imagine a House in which minorities (partisan or racial) in all 50 states would have little or no representation, and in which a national minority could dominate.

In perspective, shameless gerrymandering has already brought us part of the way. New congressional maps in Texas, Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, and Missouri could flip an estimated 13 seats to the Republicans. Retaliation by the Democrats in California and Virginia could gain them an estimated 9 seats.

This slight advantage for the Republicans may not matter much in the upcoming 2026 mid-term elections. The Supreme Court decision does open the door to southern states, previously prevented from disenfranchising their black minorities, now doing so wholesale. But in many cases it is too late for such changes before the fall election.

And if as expected Trump’s sub-forty percent approval translates into a blue wave, this Republican advantage would be washed away. In Trump’s last mid-term elections, 2018, the Republicans lost 41 seats.

But down the pike, with all legal limitations removed, the picture is more dismal. Already there is an electoral map of California that would give Democrats all 52 seats there, not the mere 48 in the current gerrymander. Texas could likewise make all 37 seats Republican-leaning as opposed to the current 30, and Florida could seize the remaining 4 seats of 28 that have been left to the Democrats.

Such maps boggle the mind. Heavily Democratic cities are sliced into slivers extending far into Republican boonies, like gigantic pinwheels. The term “gerrymander”, based on districts shaped like a salamander, will no longer be adequate to explain the perversity of the American political system.

But our Supreme Court proclaims that in drawing maps for partisan advantage, the sky is the limit. Or more precisely, there is no limit.

Is there a hope for preserving democratic representation? Something like plain, simple, stubborn common sense?

But everyone who has been receiving Perspective will continue to receive it, free or paid. My thanks to all of you for your interest over the last five years. I will continue to write on a weekly basis.

No. The latest poll has Likud, his party, still hovering around 25 seats (of 120), if the election were held now. Likud currently holds 32 seats, plus 4 seats from a smaller right-wing party with which it has formed a joint list.

But despite this drop, apparent since the debacle of October 7, 2023, it is not evident that a new government after elections could exclude Netanyahu. How is this so? We need to look at the structure of Israeli politics.

In perspective, right-wing and religious parties have dominated in Israel since the “upheaval” of 1977, almost half a century ago. Only in one election since then did the two blocs together fail to win at least half of the seats. In the last election they won 74, enabling Bibi to stitch together a government based on Likud plus the haredi (ultra-orthodox) parties (18 seats) and the far right (14 seats), for a majority of 68.

Why can’t Netanyahu count on the inbuilt right and religious majority to keep him in power? The poll predicts that the two blocs would win a high of 79 seats.

But key leaders on the right are reluctant to work with Bibi, following bitter experience. These splits explain why Israel had to hold four elections in two years (2019-2021), with Bibi scrambling to put together rickety coalitions.

The recent poll has the current coalition winning just 50 seats (Likud’s 25 plus 16 for the haredi parties plus 9 on the far right). Two other right-wing parties would hold 29 seats, enough to put Bibi back in power – if they could overcome their aversion to working with him.

Would a coalition without Netanyahu be possible? Without the Arab parties (10 seats) the opposition parties all together would have 60 seats – one short of a majority. Tantalizing, but problematic. Leaders on the non-Bibi right have opposed a coalition with the Arab parties, even if they could work with Jewish parties in the center and left – not a given, despite shared distrust of Netanyahu.

And Netanyahu will be doing his best to pull enough of the right back into his fold. This could end up as a mess matching or even overshadowing the quagmire of 2019-2021.

And a government without Bibi? Don’t count on it.

Is this dramatic trend also reflected in American Jewish support for Israel?

Yes. In a recent Washington Post survey, 76% of American Jews considered the existence of Israel to be vital, but only 64% held a favorable view of Israel – down from 73% only a year earlier.

Support for the war in Gaza was split: 46% were still in support, while 48% opposed its continuation. Fully 61% believed that Israel had committed war crimes – and 39% said that Israel had committed genocide!

In perspective, many American Jews clearly make a distinction between Israel as a Jewish state and the government currently in power. Some 68% registered a negative view of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. (It should be noted that negative views of Netanyahu in Israel are also in the majority.)

Netanyahu’s closeness to Trump clearly does not help him win American Jewish support. Only 35% of U.S. Jews, a historically liberal bunch, voted for Trump in 2024, and a recent poll showed 74% disapproved of his performance.

But the disaffection goes deeper than that. In the past American Jews were also divided on attitudes toward Israel, but these splits mostly reflected the different strands of Zionism battling within Israel itself. Now observers note that a growing part of this community take an openly anti-Zionist position, rejecting the basic assumptions of Jewish statehood.

This is not simply a generational decline over time. The anti-Zionists are reacting to recent developments that they hold to be violations of basic Jewish values. They were horrified by Israel’s restriction of food and medical supply to Gaza as a weapon of war. They are outraged that the Israeli police and army allow West Bank settlers to terrify their Palestinian neighbors.

So long as Netanyahu is the face of Israel, with Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir allowing the settlers to run riot, the deterioration of U.S. Jewish support for Israel will also continue.

Yes. Trump’s relationship with the Almighty may be opportunistic, but when he escaped assassination he proclaimed that “I was saved by God to make America great again.” More to the point, however, is the mindset of his principal military confidant, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.

In perspective, Hegseth is no less a theocrat than Ayatollah Khamenei (father or son). He has called on Americans to pray for victory “every day, on bended knee, with your family, in your schools, in your churches, in the name of Jesus Christ.” He is opposed to the separation of church and state and wants Christianity to be instilled in America’s schools.

Hegseth calls for prayers in his press room and conducts a monthly Christian worship service in the Pentagon. His personal pastor delivered a sermon there telling the assembled brass not to concern themselves overall with the accidental killing of enemy civilians: “Jesus has the final say over all of it.”

Hegseth belongs to a denomination, the Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches, that (as reported in the Guardian) does not embrace democracy but preaches that “legitimate authority comes directly from God” and that Christianity will eventually rule the world.

The movement’s founder, currently working to build a theocracy in Moscow, Idaho, is opposed to women’s right to vote and has characterized slavery as

“a relationship based on mutual affection and confidence.” He has praised the Confederate States of America for its explicitly Christian identity.

Hegseth’s views may not be as extreme, but he has worked to restore Confederate names and emblems in military installations. He is also an admirer of the medieval Crusades, bearing on his arm a tattoo of the Crusader phrase “Deus Vult” (God Wills It) -- a slogan also associated with white supremacism. He has written a book entitled American Crusade, and credits the original Crusades with saving Europe from the onslaught of Islam.

The Crusades do not, however, hold the same charm for the current holder of the Chair of St. Peter. Pope Leo XIV, without being specific, has denounced supposedly Christian wars “distorted by a desire for domination, entirely foreign to the way of Jesus Christ.” In the Pope’s words, Jesus “does not listen to the prayers of those who wage war, but rejects them.”

No. The war has in fact scarcely touched the key element of a potential Iranian nuke: the 60% enriched uranium stockpile at Isfahan and possibly Natanz. It is as intact as it was on the first day of the attacks.

In perspective, Trump as usual contradicts himself. On day one of the war, he bleated that Iran was “within one month” of having a bomb. Now, with no relevant change, he says it is years. “I don’t even think about it,” he says of the stockpile. “It’s so deeply buried it’s going to be very hard for anybody” to reach.

Isfahan and Natanz are of course under tight satellite observation. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was on-site before the 12-day war of last June, says there is no evidence that nuclear material has been removed before or since that war. (But the Iranians may have limited access!)

Remember that under the 2015 JCPOA agreement forced on Iran, 97 percent of its enriched uranium was shipped out, leaving it with a token amount at 3.67% enrichment, all under tight IAEA supervision. It was Trump’s brainless 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA that led Iran, in response, to develop its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium – enough for an estimated 8 to 12 weapons.

Now the existence of that stockpile was the only semi-plausible excuse for unleashing an air campaign on Iran for which the United States, and the broader world, will pay the price in months and years to come. But this goal was then, and still is, more achievable by negotiation than by war.

As recounted in this space previously, experts in extracting nuclear materials believe that it is nearly impossible to do this by military force alone. Even with the cooperation of the host nation, it is a complicated and tricky process.

So has Trump been convinced by the experts that a military solution is too risky? And this despite reports that the United States and Israel have been rehearsing commando raids on the two key sites?

Or maybe Trump’s sudden professed disinterest in the issue is just pretense, part of an attempt to catch the Iranians by surprise? Is an attack yet to come?

Or is it just another symptom of a disordered mind?