In his book entitled “China’s Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia,” Daniel S. Markey highlights that Beijing’s ingress in the Eurasian region is a function of both push and pull factors, as evidenced by these states’ efforts to harness China’s economic juggernaut. Based on these sets of entanglements, Markey recommends U.S. policymakers to tailor their country’s policy to achieve specific goals in Eurasia. Markey and others who have focused on Eurasia point to the growing significance of the region. However, it is worth recalling that this is not the first time Eurasia has become an epicenter of scholarly attention. If anything, Sir Halford Mackinder’s rich body of work is centered on this region. Therefore, as Eurasia becomes one of the centers of global attention, it is important to look back at what Mackinder argued and advocated for.

Concerned about maintaining British primacy at a time when the command of the seas no longer translated into decisive advantages, Mackinder laid emphasis on the centrality of location( position) and the movement of people and ideas. To him, the inner area of Eurasia was the “pivot area”, whose control would not only eschew the salience of sea power but also ensure global dominance. He went on to refine his ideas, enlarging the inner Eurasian area and calling it the “heartland.” Mackinder considered Eurasia as the World Island, and therefore stressed the need for gaining its control. Mackinder, one could reasonably argue, espoused and encouraged both imperialism and containment. Certainly, if Mackinder’s work is anything to go by, states would look to take control of vital axes while trying their best to stop others from doing the same. The Cold War, to a degree, exemplified this. Interestingly, Mackinder saw the world as a closed system which could not be altered without changing the balance. Logically, Mackinder also spoke to the importance of force in world politics. Force and balance remained two of the most constant themes in his treatises.

Although many assert that Mackinder’s theories have become outdated, examples from today’s world can help explain what he wrote back in the day. The Eurasian landmass, for example, is eyed by key powers, not least China, as evidenced by the Belt and Road Initiative. That being said, for countries to control the heartland today, they need to be able to demonstrate their preponderance over digital, economic, and other arenas. Therefore, scholars are advised to reimagine Mackinder and his ideas in an environment characterized by emerging technologies, non-state actors, and multiple centers of power.

States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are attending the 11th Review Conference (RevCon). This nonproliferation moot is happening at a time when a non-NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS), Iran, is engaged in an existential war with an NPT Nuclear-Weapon-State (NWS) and a non-NPT nuclear-armed state, the U.S. and Israel, respectively. This, coupled with the fact that the last two RevCons failed to adopt an outcome document, does not augur well for the ongoing RevCon.

Some of the most important things that are likely to exacerbate tensions between the NWS and NNWS are the provision of universal, unconditional negative security assurances, non-discriminatory access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the lack of progress on both nuclear disarmament and the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. Moreover, as Iran’s statement and Working Papers show, attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities will cast a dark shadow over the RevCon, given that they deal a severe blow to one of the central articles of the Treaty: Article III.

All these issues align with the principles, aims, and pillars of the Treaty. Therefore, if substantive progress is made in the areas identified above, the NPT-led regime will not only be strengthened but also become credible and a beacon of hope. However, if efforts to address these are scuttled or sabotaged, the consequences will be deleterious. For example, if the United States continues to shield Israel and, in the process, attenuates the prospect of establishing a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, other Parties will raise many a question about the future and efficacy of the NPT. This will engender more misgivings about the commitment of NWS to nuclear risk-reduction, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

Moreover, schisms between NNWS and NWS will also increase because of the latter group’s ongoing nuclear modernizations and strategic partnerships with nuclear possessors outside of the NPT, not to mention the evisceration of the Cold War-era arms control architecture. Also, the intra-NPT groupings and coalitions will become fragmented, not least because of their failure to achieve tangible outcomes.

A third successive failure, among other things, will have two negative ramifications. First, at the global level, the confidence in the Review Process to deliver on key elements of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy will decrease. Second, apropos of Iran, yet another failure would erode the utility of the NPT in the eyes of its leadership. Detractors at home will speak to the ‘dishonesty’ and ‘perfidy’ of the U.S. and its Western allies and call for leaving the Treaty.

Also, disarmament advocates will find the already popular Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons a much better forum to stigmatize nuclear weapons.

Hence, it is reasonable to argue that, in today’s fraught environment, the inability of States Parties to agree on the Treaty’s major planks will not inspire confidence across regions.

On April 8, 2026, Pakistan won plaudits from Iran and the U.S. for brokering an unlikely ceasefire in the U.S.-Israeli war against the former. While everyone is on tenterhooks given the fragility of the ceasefire, Islamabad is ready to host direct negotiations between the two warring parties.

The U.S. delegation is led by Vice President JD Vance, who is en route to Pakistan. However, details of the Iranian contingent remain unknown. Although it is being reported that Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf will represent Tehran, both the country’s participation and the names of the interlocutors remain unconfirmed.

Iran has made it clear that it will partake in negotiations only if a ceasefire takes effect in Lebanon. A few hours back, Ghalibaf also added another condition: the release of Iran’s blocked assets.

The Trump administration has made an effort to convince Israel to stop kinetic actions against Lebanon. While Israel has decided to negotiate with the Lebanese government, it hasn’t halted military operations. Even if negotiations between Tel Aviv and Beirut take place, the Hezbollah conundrum will not go away. Questions will be asked of Iran over its ability and willingness to stand by its key ally. As for the release of Iran’s blocked assets, it is unlikely to happen, not least when the Strait of Hormuz remains closed.

Yet, deep distrust and the absence of any confidence-building measure militate against a positive outcome. Moreover, the threat of spoilers upending talks cannot be ruled out. However, if the Iranian delegation decides to travel to Islamabad, discussions around the extension of the ceasefire might become possible. Pakistan may again use its connections with both parties to good effect with a view to suggesting a step-by-step approach, one that could give both sides more time to iron out their differences. In other words, there is no reason not to expect more rounds of negotiations.

All in all, nobody should expect that an agreement will be hammered out over the weekend. What is more likely is that both delegations will agree to meet again. That, for all intents and purposes, would be a good sign.

The Iran war, which started as a result of U.S. and Israeli aggression against Iran, has entered its fourth week. The prospects of de-escalation and war termination are rapidly attenuating. This is evidenced by brazen attacks on leaders and critical infrastructure, not to mention the absence of any communication channels between the warring parties.

Military operations during the past three weeks have ostensibly not delivered the expected results for Israel and the U.S., as the Islamic Republic remains cohesive enough to continue its retaliatory effort. Therefore, Benjamin Netanyahu is not too confident about the likelihood of regime change and thinks that boots on ground might be necessary. The hawks in Washington, including President Donald Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, are also building a case for more congressional funding, arguing that there is no timeframe for ending the war.

Gulf countries have tried to create a regional consensus against Iran’s attacks, indicating that they are not ready to address the elephant in the room: the presence of U.S. military bases and assets on their territories. This essentially means that Iran is unlikely to rethink its targeting strategy, increasing the prospect of horizontal escalation.

Centered on showing defiance, Iran’s approach to fighting an asymmetric war of attrition will remain unchanged. This is primarily because it can ill-afford to show any signs of weakness. In other words, it cannot offer an olive branch to those that are martyring its leaders and people, including innocent children. For Iran, any let off will be akin to a grand treachery. Instead, it wants to bring the U.S., Israel, and Gulf countries to a point from where they can’t bounce back to wage another war, which seeks to uproot the regime.

That a June-like ceasefire is rightly unacceptable to Tehran is reason enough to conclude there is no end in sight to this war of choice.

The coming weeks are likely to be more bloody. Attacks on energy installations may increase; the Strait of Hormuz will remain selectively closed; and there will be no takers of Trump’s ideas for making the Strait fully open. As a result, the pressure on Washington will only increase.

The year 2026 has been unkind to “unacceptable” leaders. In a span of less than 90 days, top leaders have been abducted, tried in courts, and killed/martyred. Unfortunately, many have narrowly escaped death, and several are in hiding. As the Iran war escalates, efforts to eliminate Iran’s top leadership have accelerated. This is not only evidenced by repeated enunciations by Washington and Tel Aviv to hunt down Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor and son, Mojtaba Khamenei, but also by the reported assassination of Tehran’s security Czar Ali Larijani.

These developments are disturbing. They will set a dangerous precedent for prospective aggressors the world over. Targeting leaders would become enticing, leading, in the absence of any guardrails, to the creation of a debilitating norm: leadership decapitation. If countries get away with taking out foreign leaders who don’t pander to their strategic interests, decision-making elites’ survival instincts will come to the fore. Resultantly, they would be less amenable to sitting at the table with their opponents. Instead, they would become more reclusive and accumulate enough power to secure themselves.

In peacetime, this would result in the further erosion of diplomacy, making risk reduction all the more difficult and misinterpretation likelier. Misgivings and distrust would make the environment more fraught and the window of peace, however ugly, narrower. The repercussions could be deleterious. With a view to surviving, leaders might invest much more in defense, resort to repression at home, and embark on a path to nuclearization. Remember, leaders who did not bare their countries’ teeth are all dead or incarcerated.

As Prof. Elizabeth Saunders rightly argues in her book entitled “The Insiders’ Game: How Elites Make War and Peace,” the elites have the resources to both escalate and limit wars. So, if members of a ruling elite are incapacitated or killed during a high-stakes crisis, what will become of decision-making? In the interim, who will direct both kinetic operations and diplomatic efforts? Most importantly, how will the successors of slain leaders take decisions if they are groping for cover and secrecy because of veritable threats? With emerging and disruptive technologies thickening the fog of war, the leadership vacuum will become a strategic vulnerability. As a result, escalation might become uncontrollable, and off-ramps will be harder to find and take.

All in all, while targeting and neutralizing the bad guys might be appealing and operationally tenable, it would enhance the risk landscape precipitously while doing little to coerce adversaries.

The Iran war has lasted many more days than what Washington and Tel Aviv had hoped for. Twelve days after the outbreak of this round of violence, Tehran launched the 37th wave of True Promise 4, announcing it would up the ante against Israeli and U.S. targets across the region.

While Israel and the U.S. are brazenly attacking Iranian cities, killing civilians and targeting critical infrastructure and historical sites, Iran is retaliating along multiple axes employing an assortment of drones, ballistic missiles, and, tellingly, naval interdictions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Concomitantly, U.S. President Donald Trump is giving mixed signals about the future of the war. He has given a series of statements, which allude to ending the war as a victor. That being said, these elusive remarks do not inspire any confidence or indicate that the war will terminate anytime soon. However, they are certainly reflective of a desire to create a face-saving narrative and theory of victory sooner rather than later. His saying there is nothing left to target in Iran despite the fact that the regime, under its new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is well-entrenched, is quite instructive. It shows that he is unsure that Operation Epic Fury will be able to topple the regime. Further, he is not particularly gung-ho about letting the war drag on, as it is taking its toll on the global economy and trade, not to mention the damage it has caused U.S. military assets in the Persian Gulf.

Although Trump, ever the erratic, is expected to say and do something completely different in the days to come, it is abundantly clear that he wants to extricate himself from this self-created quagmire. However, if the tone and tenor of Iranian officials is anything to go by, Trump is unlikely to get a gateway for withdrawal. This is primarily because Tehran does not want to give breathing space and time to both Washington and Tel Aviv. Doing so would only lay the groundwork for another round of escalation a few months down the line. To an enraged, bruised, and spirited Islamic Republic, a perfunctory ceasefire will be akin to letting the killers of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei go scot-free.

Source: BBC

Less than a year after attacking Iran in the middle of nuclear-related negotiations, the U.S. and Israel did the same on Saturday. They launched strikes inside of Iran, killing innocent civilians, not least girls in a school. These brazen attacks also killed Iran's longtime Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who had spearheaded the Islamic Republic since 1989.

Revered by Shiite Muslims across the globe, Khamenei became an instant martyr, giving the regime more impetus to confront the U.S., its allies in the Gulf, and Israel. This is evidenced by the fact that, rather than succumb, the regime has chosen to resist and retaliate. Apart from targeting Israel, Iran has relentlessly struck U.S. military assets in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. These Gulf countries have, thus far, done little to deter Iran. Moreover, the U.S. has lost men and materiel, ensuring the elongation of the war, much to the chagrin of the Trump administration.

With Iran planning more attacks and rightly refusing to negotiate, the war is far from over. Oil and gas supplies are likely to be hampered, not least because of reported disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Add to the mix the volatility of the situation, and the region will well and truly enter a new, more dangerous phase, which will feature an angry Trump, an enraged Netanyahu, and a defiant Iranian leadership.

If the first 72 hours of the war are anything to go by, Washington and Tel Aviv have made a big miscalculation. The regime ,including its linchpin, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has not hunkered down. Also, there have been no protests inside Iran despite encouragement from Israel, the U.S., and Reza Pahlavi.

In the days to come, Iran might continue to show higher resolve, primarily because it feels rejuvenated after the martyrdom of Ali Khamenei. Furthermore, it is unlikely to choose a different approach because it feels that it was tricked into joining the negotiation process while the groundwork for the attack was being laid.

Although Iran will sustain losses, it will fight with a view to showing its defiance to both internal and external actors. The rally-around-the-flag effect will give breathing space to the interim leadership, allowing the security forces to focus on inflicting pain on the U.S. and its allies.

On the other hand, neither will Trump be able to avoid being ensnared in a long war nor will Israel be able to stop its cities from being bombed every day.

As of this writing, Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the midst of an intense military crisis, which has, thus far, featured the use of aircraft and drones. Pakistan’s decision to take the battle inside of Afghanistan emanates from the country’s frustration over the Afghan Taliban’s unwillingness to pull the plug on the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) —a proscribed terrorist outfit that has wreaked havoc in Pakistan, not least from its safe havens in Afghanistan. The group has long received operational and logistical support from the Afghan Taliban, contributing to precipitously increasing the level of violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

So, Pakistan has to achieve compellence vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. In other words, Pakistan has to convince the Afghan Taliban to reverse this ongoing action: the provision of sanctuaries and operational support to the TTP.

Compellence involves both the threat of use of force and the actual use of limited force to convince the adversary to comply. As opposed to deterrence, compellence demands actions or their reversals. Therefore, in this case, if the Afghan Taliban end their espousal of the TTP, Pakistan can claim that its compellence strategy was successful.

As reams of scholarly writings argue, compellence is harder to achieve than deterrence. This is primarily because compellence success cannot be claimed without substantive evidence on ground. Pakistan’s compellence success would be a big reputational loss for the Afghan Taliban, forcing them to show greater resistance.

For Pakistan, the TTP problem is non-negotiable, and so is compelling the Afghan Taliban. Hence, Pakistan should clearly communicate the objective behind its kinetic actions: convincing the TTP and the Afghan Taliban that the status quo will not continue. To achieve this, Pakistan’s military operations must be calibrated, target the TTP’s and Afghan Taliban’s infrastructures only, and be time-bound.

Framing the Afghan Taliban conundrum as a compellence problem rather than a deterrence one is but correct, not least because Pakistan wants to see something concrete from the TTP’s hosts and backers: a complete reversal of their approach toward the group.

All of this has to be accompanied by reassurances and promises of Pakistan’s non-action in case of the Afghan Taliban’s compliance. The Doha talks will provide a conduit to both issue threats and give reassurances.

India’s old terrorism mantra against Pakistan is fast losing its sheen. While an inability to produce evidence, not least during and after the recent crisis, has contributed to it, using terrorism as a catch-all phrase is a problem that must be recognition. Therefore, it is important to shed light on that.

A major challenge in defining terrorism comes from the mischaracterization of its major sub-element: non-combatants. Schmid’s chapter in “The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research” does a good job of highlighting these analytical problems. While critiquing the U.S. Department of State’s definition, Schmid draws attention to the changing meanings of non-combatant. Certainly, if one were to accept the State Department’s labeling, a number of issues could arise. Is a trained serving infantry officer on leave a combatant or a non-combatant? To an extent, one could also ask the following questions: Does the target always have to be a civilian? Is the emphasis on non-combatants still valid, especially when they provide critical help to combatants? These questions gain more currency when the targeted force is, acts like, and is seen as an instrument of occupation.

One of the principal problems apropos of defining terrorism is that of politicization. Actors and their actions can be included or excluded from a definition at the whim of the entity tasked with defining terrorism. This opens the door to both witch-hunting and espousal. It is closely tied to the stigmatization of opponents through the use of terrorism-related nomenclature. All of this impedes the fight against terrorism, creating a plethora of policy inertias.

Further, some scholars have taken exception to deeming terrorism a preserve of non-state actors, arguing that this gives a free pass to states that sponsor terrorism to achieve their foreign policy objectives. This is a solid criticism as many a state, including India, has both sponsored and perpetrated acts of terrorism.

While there are a number of other criticisms of defining terrorism, two are worth mentioning here. First, using the term in every other domain, not least cyber and economic, does not help explain actual issues that must be addressed. Second, some definitions do not account for ideology and political objectives, something which limits our ability to deconstruct various incidents of terrorism.

Therefore, when the term is beset with definitional problems, India’s announcement of considering every act of “terrorism” as an act of war becomes all the more dangerous and reckless!

Thinking about this academic problem is particularly important in the context of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, where violence is a response to both occupation and annexation. Let’s broaden our intellectual horizons.

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Ali

I recently read Dr. James Acton's excellent, timely report for the Council on Foreign Relations, in which he makes a compelling case against U.S. focus on counterforce targeting.

I would urge you all to read it here:

https://www.cfr.org/report/optimal-deterrence

He questions the strategic logic behind sticking to counterforce with reference to escalation, arms racing, damage limitation, and costs. The report made me write this short piece with a view to explaining why counterforce targeting, in general, is risky and puts crisis and strategic stability under stress.

An attack that targets an adversary's military assets and nuclear forces is dubbed a counterforce strike. It could be carried out primarily to completely destroy or significantly degrade an enemy's capability to launch its forces, not least its nuclear ones. The objective is to eliminate its weapons and delivery vehicles before they can be launched.

A key problem with having this targeting strategy as part of one's doctrine is this: regardless of the advent of what Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press call the accuracy revolution, a counterforce strike cannot fully destroy the other side's nuclear forces. This means that the enemy will be left with enough in the arsenal to retaliate with nuclear strikes.

So, when an adversary knows its nuclear forces cannot be fully obliterated, it will not be particularly deterred by a country's counterforce targeting strategy, especially during peacetime. However, during a high-stakes crisis, not least one involving emerging and disruptive technologies, a counterforce targeting strategy will create survivability-related concerns.

Fearing that B might take out its nuclear forces, including command, control, and communications, A might launch preemptive strikes, which would lead to uncontrollable escalation. A, as they say, will use it rather than lose it!

A counterforce targeting strategy could, thus, lead to exactly what it is hoping to deter: nuclear use.

On the other hand, Kim Jong Un, for example, is deterred from nuking San Francisco because he knows Pyongyang will be nuked to smithereens. That Pyongyang and San Francisco are vulnerable to nuclear strikes is the reason why neither has attempted to draw first blood. Holding cities hostage by threatening countervalue strikes creates stronger deterrent effects. This is primarily because even a handful of nuclear weapons can carry out those strikes, they cannot be defended against, and they will cause colossal damage. (Yes, even ballistic missile defenses cannot intercept all incoming projectiles!) The unacceptability of damage, which generates deterrent effects, can only be guaranteed by credible threats of countervalue strikes.

The situation becomes all the more complicated in regions like South Asia, where there is hardly any distinction between counterforce and countervalue targets. Therefore, India's counterforce temptation is particularly dangerous, and I will dedicate a Substack to it.

Stay tuned!

Over the past decade, the Narendra Modi-led Indian government has, both in peacetime and crises, tried to deny Pakistan's agency. Its use of force and the narrative around it have centered on erroneously circumventing and wishing away Pakistan. While such attempts have failed, they make for a provocative, incendiary policy thought process. All Indian statements post-May have focused on one: showing that Pakistan was just a silent spectator during the crisis.

If a state doesn't recognize the capabilities and resolve of its adversary, crisis and strategic stability become a casualty. The Cuban Missile Crisis tells us that, while luck was very much a phenomenon that saved the day, prudent leadership and sane advice were instrumental too. President John F. Kennedy was made to acknowledge the agency of the Soviet Union by his sage Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.

It is useful to look back at the Cuban Missile Crisis, not least to highlight McNamara's strategic empathy refrain.

Not a 13-Day-Long Crisis

Nuclear historian and founder of “Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog,” Alex Wellerstein, informed by various experts and new documents, contends that claiming that “the Crisis was “over” on October 28 was a publicity move (one well-timed for the 1962 midterm elections as much as anything else).” Wellerstein is right as evidence points to the fact that Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons did not leave the region until December 1962.

Regardless of the longevity of the Crisis, everyone was on the edge of their seats from the time Soviet missiles were found to be stationed in Cuba. The Crisis started when President Kennedy was shown images of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba.

According to some of the declassified audio clips of briefings in the White House during the Crisis, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) comprehensively analyzed the satellite imagery. Shocked and concerned by the presence of Soviet missiles within striking distance of the U.S. East Coast, Kennedy was convinced that the Soviets must be forced to remove them. Cognizant of the enormity of the challenge, Kennedy immediately took three executive decisions. First, as per McNamara, the President stated that “only a limited number of senior officials would be informed of the missile deployment in Cuba—in the State and Defense Departments, the White House and the Office of the National Security Adviser.” Second, the ExComm was asked to restrict sharing information with others until the President was ready to give a response to the situation. Third, the ExComm was asked to convene immediately, with a view to presenting a unanimous course of action to the President.

The ExComm deliberated long and hard for days before giving Kennedy two options. The first was a naval quarantine of Cuba, an option that was aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from supplying military equipment to that country. The second recommendation was to launch an air attack on Cuba. While many members of the ExComm advocated for launching an airstrike, McNamara espoused the first recommendation.

Persuaded by McNamara and others, President Kennedy decided upon implementing a naval blockade of Cuba. He announced that in a televised address to the nation on October 22. This was supplemented by putting the U.S. military on DEFCON 3. The situation deteriorated as Soviet ships were told to hold their positions after reaching the quarantine line.

The threat of a nuclear exchange only dissipated when a combination of warnings of further action from the U.S. and Soviet Union’s Premier, Nikita Khrushchev’s fear of uncontrollable nuclear catastrophe forced de-escalation. Khrushchev announced the dismantling of Soviet missiles from Cuba and did not repeat his demand of the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The Crisis subsided without the use of force. President Kennedy’s decision to constitute the ExComm proved to be beneficial. McNamara was one of the key members of the ExComm, and therefore his role was crucial.

A Forward-Looking Defense Czar

When the satellite imagery was shown to the President, McNamara was cautious in giving a definitive call on the readiness levels of Soviet missiles. He also came across as less of an alarmist when he said Soviet deployment in Cuba did not change the strategic balance one bit. These two statements gave a clear indication that McNamara would not be hawkish or give recommendations that would increase the prospect of unremitting escalation. McNamara also advised establishing careful contact with Khrushchev.

This remark should be seen in conjunction with McNamara raising the specter of a Soviet invasion of Berlin, a concern that the President and other members of the ExComm shared. Here, it is worth mentioning that McNamara’s policy proposals were centered on minimizing the likelihood of escalation. Therefore, on October 20, 1962, he lent support to the naval quarantine option.

In an oral history interview, McNamara recalled how he outlined some of the most conspicuous advantages of foisting a quarantine. He said imposing a quarantine will be critical to avoiding “the Pearl Harbor approach of a sneak attack and a war without warning on a small nation. It was really the only course of military action compatible with our principles and our standing as a free world leader.”

Further, McNamara argued that the application of a blockade avoided taking a military action which could lead to reprisals from the Soviets. To McNamara, exercising this option was Washington’s best bet as far as controlling the consequences of its actions was concerned. McNamara, it must be stressed, was trying to empathize with the adversary, something that he discussed in the years following the Crisis. McNamara bolstered his cogent defense of imposing a blockade by highlighting how massive an undertaking launching airstrikes would be.

McNamara’s support for the blockade led to confrontation with the U.S. Navy. McNamara, as per the-then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson, tried to be intrusive and dominant, as evidenced by his asking all sorts of questions related to operations and tactics. McNamara was searching for a basket of viable options for the President to choose from. And he was not only able to give Kennedy a menu of options but also was able to prevail upon him.

Unfortunately, India has the Dovals, Shahs, and Singhs advising an already reckless Modi!

U.S. attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities were preceded by several threats of punitive action. The message was simple: make a deal or face the music. In international relations parlance, threats to use force and /or a very, very limited use of force(as a show of resolve and to warn), with a view to compelling an adversary, is known as coercive diplomacy. It would not be wrong to say coercive diplomacy centers on giving your adversary an opportunity to avoid bearing the brunt of a brutal war.

Given the lopsided distribution of powers, coercive diplomacy has often been used by the United States. This is primarily because Washington has the requisite heft across all domains to browbeat its enemies into changing their behaviors. Robert J. Art finds that “Washington’s coercive diplomatic gambits have failed more often than they have succeeded.”

If colossal amounts of power are inadequate in making coercive diplomatic efforts work, it essentially means that the said strategy is much harder than it appears to be.

In a chapter entitled “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” Art and Kelly M. Greenhill discuss six factors that make coercive diplomacy hard.To them and rightly so, it is difficult because compellence is much harder to exact. Indeed, as an actor requires to carry out an action, it may refuse to budge an inch so as to avoid public humiliation and a loss of reputation.

Next, they believe that defenders of status quos are more resilient and resolute than the coercers. Certainly, status quo powers try tooth and nail to keep revanchists at bay. Additionally, according to Art and Greenhill, the target of coercive diplomacy feels that its capitulation will open the floodgates to more onslaughts. This is a tenable refrain, as it is likely that coercers may get more emboldened after their initial gains, deciding to go for the kill. Related to this is the problem of the coercer’s credibility. The mighty coercer will remain gingerly committed to not demanding more concessions.

States like the U.S. demand more than what the other side can give. U.S. zero-enrichment ask from Iran is yet another example of this approach.

Given that a failure of coercive diplomacy leads to war, it is important for states to delink coercion and diplomacy, while focusing on the latter!

Weaker states show more defiance against coercive actions. They even adapt and find a way to bleed the enemy during wars. Neither coercive diplomacy nor war works!

Recently, I hosted Dr. Ludovica Castelli for a conversation on her excellent co-authored book, The Global Third Nuclear Age. This seminal work is the culmination of a sustained inquiry into the shifts in the global nuclear order.

At the heart of this Age are emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). Their propensity to thicken the fog of war, compress decision-making, and create perceptions of increasing what Fiona Cunningham calls coercive leverage makes them appear lucrative. This is indeed upsetting the hierarchies of both escalation and de-escalation. But the users of technology — not technology itself — determine employment patterns. Therefore, I see merit in the book’s conscious methodological choice to move away from discussing nuclear rivalries among Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. So, to gauge the impact of EDTs on strategic stability, it is useful to evaluate how various groups of actors see them, power diffusion, and norms.

To me, actors’ engagements with norms and technological advancements will be determined by how comfortable they are with their existing positions. In other words, their views on regional security, assessments of the balance of power, and the objectives they seek to achieve will shape both the deployment of technology and their adherence or lack thereof to norms. Variables like leadership and strategic culture will gain more primacy.

If a country thinks its growth and stability are contingent upon the absence of futile wars, it will explore pathways to reaching arms control and risk reduction agreements related to EDTs. If it doesn't, better situational awareness, for example, could incentivize first strikes. Thus, when China links arms control to political ties, it makes an argument rooted in plain logic. Similarly, the Pakistan-proposed Strategic Restraint Regime is driven by a desire to reduce the prospect of war.

When the wrongs of geopolitics are righted, we might start giving due attention to what the Nobel Laureate Assembly called global public goods: strategic stability and risk reduction.

Ali

Last month, Iran was brazenly attacked by two nuclear-armed countries in Israel and the U.S. Bruised, battered, and disintegrated, Iran struck back at Israel with the only available weapons in its strategic toolkit: missiles. The damage that Iranian strikes caused to Israeli cities and strategic targets was unprecedented, pushing the Israelis to requisition direct military help from the U.S. After all, Israel's Rising Lion didn't obliterate Iran's nuclear infrastructure, especially the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near the sacred city of Qom. Therefore, U.S. President Donald Trump gave in and authorized launching the targeting of Iran's nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Thus, the U.S. ended up bombing a country with which it was negotiating a new nuclear deal.

Washington's indirect and direct involvement in the 12-day war, even though it led to a ceasefire, has made Tehran more skeptical and wary. The trust deficit has only increased, compelling key Iranian officials to say this: there is no reason to trust the U.S. Given its past dealings with Iran, including the unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the U.S. needs to go the extra mile in winning Iran's trust. Absent that effort, Iran will question the value of diplomacy, norms, and treaties. Remember, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as being a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), did not stop the U.S. and —particularly, Israel, a non-NPT nuclear-armed —from targeting safeguarded nuclear facilities. All of this, it must be stressed, started days before the 6th round of nuclear talks was due to take place.

The good thing is that Iran is willing to resume diplomacy. However, it is finding it difficult to trust the U.S. again. Therefore, the ball is now in Washington's court. If it clings to its zero-enrichment demand, it will face a much more defiant Iran. However, if this unnecessary and unfair demand is dropped, Iran's sovereignty-related concerns will be somewhat alleviated.

Regime change is Tehran’s Achilles’ heel. During the 12-day war, both Israel and the U.S. talked about it in no uncertain terms. Yet, to his credit, Trump said he doesn't want to topple the regime, for that would be chaotic. A much more serious and firm renunciation of regime change is needed to convince Iran that the U.S. is not looking to do an Operation Ajax redux. If such reassurance is not given, Iran will take steps—including in the nuclear realm—that will be repugnant to U.S. strategic interests.

An unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to win Iran's trust will be bad news. It will further subvert diplomacy, leaving Iran on its own and unaccountable. This, in and of itself, will increase proliferation and geopolitical risks. A complete breakdown of diplomacy is the last thing the region and the world need.

In his 2018 book, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia, Dr. Moeed Yusuf introduces a new framework to analyze post-1998 crisis behavior and diplomacy in South Asia: brokered bargaining. This is a three-way bargaining mechanism in which a third party—the U.S., in the case of South Asian crises—plays an active role in crisis de-escalation and termination. The two warring parties—India and Pakistan—seek to elicit third-party mediation. Committed to preventing the outbreak of nuclear war in South Asia, Washington led mediatory efforts during the Kargil War, the Twin Peaks Crisis, and the Mumbai Crisis. The U.S. had both the tools and the clout to shape the behavior of both India and Pakistan. However, a risk-acceptant India and Washington’s inability to come across as a balanced mediator reduced U.S. involvement in subsequent crises. The 2019 Pulwama-Balakot Crisis, it must be stressed, was terminated without substantive U.S. mediatory effort. New evidence, however, might force scholars to reassess the role of third parties during that episode.

The high-stakes, technology-driven crisis between India and Pakistan, however, once again saw the U.S. play a pronounced, decisive role. While we need more evidence to draw the full picture, one thing is clear: U.S. President Donald Trump, Vice-President JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio worked the phones to craft a ceasefire, however fragile it may be.

In his customary style, Trump has talked about his leveraging trade to stop a situation that could have spiralled into something big. His repeated mentions of his timely intervention have been lauded by Pakistan but censured by India. While Islamabad has praised Trump’s sagacious leadership, New Delhi is bent on showing its strategic braggadocio. This attitude is not a simple denial of agency to both Islamabad and Washington. If anything, it is a nefarious attempt at proving to the world this: India can initiate and terminate a nuclear-tinged crisis with Pakistan on its own terms. More menacingly, it shows that India will unlikely listen to voices of restraint, especially if they counsel something against the country’s politico-strategic objectives. Moreover, when India tells the world that it doesn’t need U.S. mediation, it essentially signals a disinterest in crisis management, let alone conflict resolution. In the absence of bilateral crisis communications and management frameworks, what this recalcitrance suggests is very disturbing: a desire to exact Pakistan’s submission, not controlling escalation.

When a nuclear-armed state is driven by a faux penchant for humiliating its nuclear-laden adversary, stability goes out the window. Pakistan cannot be coerced into capitulation; it cannot be wished away or considered a cakewalk. Nonetheless, make no mistake, India is committed to inflicting greater pain to Pakistan—and therefore, it will discredit actors that call for prudence, be it the U.S.

Dear Readers,

We are living in testing times, where rationality, prudence, and empathy have little influence on strategic decision-making. The global order is in disarray; we have well and truly entered what scholars refer to as the Third Nuclear Age; and the use of force is being increasingly seen as effective instruments to achieve revanchist objectives. Leaders see deterrence, risk reduction, and arms control as barriers to realizing their broader strategic goals. Therefore, rather than strengthen them, efforts are geared toward eroding them.

Advancements in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) show what man is endowed with. However, their applications for subversive purposes are weakening norms and making the global security landscape more fragmented. Drone technology, for example, is being used to breach sovereignty rather than to reduce smog. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is exciting warmongers because of its destructive, wide-ranging military uses.

Diplomacy, multilateralism, and regional connectivity—practices and outcomes necessary to combat some of the gravest threats to humanity— are either dead or being politicized. Diplomatic engagements are punished, while kinetic operations are feted. All of this has led to high-stakes crises in South Asia and the Middle East—ones that have set dangerous precedents.

My homeland, Pakistan, is navigating the deleterious effects of all this with resolve, restraint, and responsibility. However, lying at the crossroad of South, Central, and West Asia, its balancing act will come under strain.

This worsening security milieu needs to be analyzed dispassionately, ingenuously, and honestly. Reason, not hyperbole, should inform our debates and discourses. Elusive Stability is an attempt to create the space to do precisely that.

I welcome you all to join my Substack. Let’s connect and engage. Be proactive but reverent.