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In 2009, Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein published a book titled The State in the Third Millennium. What he envisioned was a metanoia, a complete change of perspective on the state and its functions. Rather than treating citizens as subjects, he proposed that in the state of the future there be greater self-determination, decentralisation and a more limited understanding of the state in general. Citizens are thus put first - their will cannot be simply overridden by a governing oligarchy. His ideal understood the state essentially as a service company, with stronger competition among jurisdictions and possibilities for citizens and municipalities to opt out, through a consistent application of the right to self-determination at the local level.

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Compliance for Subjects, Self-Determination for Citizens

A consistent application of such a principle would have far-reaching consequences. Attempts at linguistic and cultural assimilation become outdated. Rather offering board autonomy becomes the preferred alternative. The preservation of territorial integrity of a state of the future would not be possible without the consent of the governed. However, proposals to solve tensions in the Balkans by moving certain borders according to ethnolinguistic borders and preferences of the peoples involved have repeatedly been blocked by the EU. Had this understanding of self-determination prevailed, Moscow would have been forced to accept Chechen independence, just as the same principle would legitimize a Russian Crimea. Hard truths cut both ways, Ser Davos1. Putting the citizens first means borders would not be frozen in time, they become negotiable. The Armenians of Artsakh, like other cross border ethnic communities, would cease to be hostages of a border drawn decades or centuries ago that did not put citizens first.

At present the European Union seems to be moving in the opposite direction, rejecting the concept of public power in the third Millennium as proposed by Hans Adam II. What we observe instead is a return of continental-wide dirigisme echoing the 20th century regimes with dissenting voices on migration in 2015 and Covid in 2020 largely silenced. While the citizenry of the 21st century has reached unprecedented levels of literacy and education, they are still considered to be a vulnerable target of disinformation and manipulation campaigns, in need of guidance and tutelage, rather than independent protagonists capable of genuine political choice and statesman-like maturity.

What we witness is the original promise of progress and liberal democracy turned on its head. The expansion of education, economic prosperity and information access ought to have made the citizen less dependent on political tutelage. On the contrary, precisely these conditions appear to have made him more vulnerable. For Brussels, greater access to information, far from fostering democratic resilience, becomes a threat to it.

Where Hans Adam II proposes less centralised oversight, the European Union moves towards more and more regulation and harmonisation. Where Hans Adam II sees citizens mature enough to determine their political allegiance, the Brussels establishment is worried by potential targets of foreign interference. Where one sees the Brexit vote as a legitimate exercise of self-determination, be he excited by its outcome or not, the other analyses the vote through the lens of disinformation, malign influence and manipulation. In the latter case, there appears to be some question on which it is not in the interest of the public to decide on. It becomes a system tailored to protect the electorate for its own mistakes - only to transform into a system that protects an establishment from being rejected by the citizenry. It becomes a system that allows the perpetuation of a president of the European Commission who was not directly elected by a single European voter.

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The Return of the Political

Hans Adam II’s conception of the state of the future sees a government losing much of the political aspect and ultimately becoming more a question of libertarian technocratic efficiency. Governments would compete for citizens by providing better services, more freedom and fewer taxes. The competition that already exists for foreign direct investment and tax residency of multinational corporations would open up for local communities as well.

But contemporary Europe is bringing back the political. For some time, it seemed that the old left-right cleavage had been bridged as broad coalitions appeared in many countries and a uniparty consensus emerged. Far from it, the political has returned in its purest Schmittian form - in the friend-enemy distinction, that has become apparent in the allocation of European funds using the rule-of-law conditionality clause. The strictness in its application against a Fidesz-governed Hungary and PiS-governed Poland contrasts heavily with the tacit leeway given to the Tusk and Magyar governments enacting a policy of revenge against their predecessors2. Should the rule-of-law conditionality mean anything at all, it should follow objective criteria rather than political sympathies or antipathies.

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Incapability of Project Power

Yet perhaps the greatest weakness of the European project lies in its incapability of shaping its direct neighbourhood.Prince Hans Adam II considered the role of the European Union working in tandem with the United States in projecting power outside, with the United States providing the hard power and the European Union providing the soft power. While American marines were capable of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, and are able to accomplish many tasks, a foreign military cannot really accomplish task such as nation-building and rebuilding civic trust. Hans Adam II suggested that this ought to have been the place where the European Union could have stepped in, providing the experience to rebuild a democratic state of law. The task of Europe would have been to provide an expeditionary police force and train local law enforcement, oversee the rebuilding of representative institutions - first by overseeing local elections, followed by overseeing a gradual political transition, while eventually allowing a debate on secession of separatist regions. Whether Europe could have been successful in Iraq of course is another question, but the scenario shows where European experience could have been deployed. Not in the capacity to conquer, but the capacity to reconstruct.

While Hans Adam II rightfully pointed out the military unreadiness of European military in foreign interventions (see Libya and the Sahel), his proposal of how the European Union could use this comparative advantage to its benefit has proven unsuccessful. In the book he describes an alternative scenario of what the European Union could have done following the American occupation of Iraq. The failure of the European Union to shape its surroundings can be traced already when the American ambassador Warren Zimmerman sabotaged3 the agreement between the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats negotiated back then by Lord Carrington and Cutileiro from Portugal, persuading Alija Izetbegović to withdraw from the agreement and proclaim unilateral independence.

The same problem reappeared in Ukraine. The Agreement on settlement of the political crisis in Ukraine4, promising early presidential elections, was mediated by the foreign ministers of Germany, Poland and France, as well as Russia and signed in February of 2014 by both Viktor Yanukovich and the Ukrainian parliamentary opposition failed to be implemented. While Europe sought to shape developments in its immediate neighbourhood, implementation failed as rapid escalation on the ground took a development of its own, reducing European diplomats to becoming passive observers.

Again European diplomacy was present. Again, it failed to implement the agreement it drafted. It has become a regulatory superpower with little geopolitical enforcement

Similarly, following the overthrow of Muammar Kaddafi in Libya and the outbreak of the war in Syria, the European Union, despite becoming the immediate target of the consequences - an unprecedented migration wave - it seems the European Union did not lead a political settlement in those countries.

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Control Without Authority

But the more interesting question is what Europe could have done with the comparative advantage it actually possessed.

Europe has neither become the decentralised, citizen-centred and politically restrained system envisaged by Hans-Adam II, nor has it become the coherent geopolitical actor that its expanding political ambitions would seem to require. It has acquired more regulatory power without acquiring a corresponding capacity for strategic action. More control inward doesn´t translate into more authority outward.

In fact the European Union used to resemble the state of the future a decade and a half more than it does today. Its global competitiveness has fallen, its energy prices have risen, while trade in climate indulgences is rampant. This is not a continent prepared for the next millenium. Where others innovate, Europe regulates.

In the third millenium citizens should be treated as adults, not as kids whose algorithms need parental control. What we got are officials with the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank-clerk5, writing regulations that control more and more aspects of everyday life. This is not a state of the future imagined by Hans Adam II. Nor is it effective.

To get out of this bleak situation, what Europe needs is trust. Not trust in the Brussels establishment. But in the citizen. Trust in the nation. Trust in political responsibility. And, perhaps most importantly, trust that freedom can survive the possibility of making the wrong choice.

The third millennium was supposed to make the citizen sovereign over the state.

Instead, we are witnessing the Brussels becoming sovereign over an increasingly managed citizen.

Hans-Adam II’s book is valuable because it reminds us that this was not inevitable.

The question Europe has yet to answer is whether it is prepared to become the kind of political civilisation in which the citizen is once again treated as an adult.

Having previously simulated the potential stability of superimposing the modern borders onto the demographic and logistical realities of Europe, North Africa and Western Asia, Central, Eastern and Northern Asia and most recently Southern and Southeastern Asia, let us examine how the continent of Africa would behave in this simulation.

There are two general observations to make: the various African countries, whose borders were often determined by projecting control from a coastal foothold inland until encountering either a major physical obstacle or the power projection from a rival power would not necessarily operate under this logic. Development, particularly in Western Africa is concentrated across the Sahel-Sudan belt in 1337, thus giving the interior dominance over the coast.

The second observation to note is the non-availability of European languages, namely English and French to serve as lingua francas across the continent. This implies that the countries would need to choose a local African language as their official one. Furthermore, the spread of Islam at this time is limited to the Sahel Belt, while Christianity outside of the Miaphysite regions of East Africa has not arrived to Africa yet.

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Central Africa

Angola

Angola would see many parts break away, but unlike many other countries of Central Africa, a rump coastal region in the northwest populated chiefly by the Ambundu and Ovimbundu people will perpetuate the notion of Angolan statehood, while an interior Chokwe polity would form a relatively larger country in the Angolan hinterlands

Cameroon

Cameroon is one of the countries that would fracture un this scenario almost instantly. Lacking any coherent core to hold the country together, the majority of the country falls apart, with almost every region becoming independent - the only exception being the coastal Bassa region that would maintain hold of a much smaller Cameroon but in a similar geographic shape. The remaining polities - except the northernmost part merging with neighuring Bornu polities - would remain independent but still heavily decentralised muli-lingual cheifdoms.

Central African Republic

The entire area of the country finds itself in 1337 in a region with no institutional tradition of statehood. What exists is a handful of tribal cheifdoms, into which the coutry would dissolve almost immediately.

Congo

The country of Congo-Brazzaville will also be among those countries lacking stronger traditions of statehood and collapsing into a dozen of local chiefdoms.

DRC

The vast Democratic Republic of the Congo at this time lacks the infrastructure and traditions of statecraft to be able to hold onto such vast regions from the delta of the Congo River all the way to Lake Tanganyika. With dozens of languages, and problems of transportation, it would fail to establish its control outside of the area between Kinshasa and the coast, with the remaining provinces slipping away fast.

Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea would not be able to hold together the mainland area and the island of Bioko at the same time: the two would split into separate countries.

Gabon

In 1337 Gabon lacks any tradition of statehood. As such, it would fail to coalesce and it would soon disintegrate into a handful of local chiefdoms.

Sao Tome e Principe

The island is uninhabited in 1337.

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Eastern Africa

Burundi

Burundi in this scenario emerges as a local ethnically homogenous country.

Comoros

The geographically defined Comoros, populated by a homogenous Swahili population would make the archipelago a rather stable entity.

Djibouti

While Djibouti as a country would initially be a viable cit-ystate, it would eventually extend to include the Muslim Afar-speaking regions of neighbouring Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Eritrea

Eritrea could remain mostly recognisable as a Miaphysite Christian kingdom populated by the Tigray and Tigrinya peoples. The southeastern coast extension would be difficult to control and would most likely be ceded to Djibouti.

Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Highlands are marked by a striking ethnic diversity. Given this occurs prior to the Oromo migrations, Ethiopia´s system of ethnic federalism would need to have been reworked, as the majority of the Oromia province at this time was not inhabitted by ethnic Oromos. Nevertheless, Ethiopia would manage to hold the majority of the country together by granting autonomy to various tribal and ethnic peoples: the exception being the Muslim regions in the Afar depression gravitating towards Djibouti and the regions in the environs of the city of Harar populated by Harla and Somalis, forming the Emirate of Harar.

Ethiopia as such would retain a Christian majority with substantial Muslim, Jewish and folk religion minorities, while Amhara remains the official and Geez the liturgical language. Interestingly, the capital is relocated not far from Addis Abeba - to the city of Ankober.

Kenya

Kenya as a country would hardly be able to hold together. Covering various climate zones and population centres, there is little that would hold together the Swahili people of Lamu and Mombasa along the coast, the Cushitic goat-herders of the semidesert, the Luhya along the shores of Lake Ukerewe as well as other tribal peoples in the Rift Valley and the savanna.

Madagascar

The island of Madagascar in 1337 is difficult to predict. The islanders are broadly ethnically related as Malagasys, however they are already subdivided into over a dozen of local identities. More structured social organisation exists along the coasts, where substantial Muslim populations are located

Mauritius

The island appears to have been uninhabited by 1337.

Rwanda

Rwanda appears to be a stable local ethnically homogenous country.

Seychelles

The Seychelles were uninhabited in 1337.

Somalia

Somalia, excluding the secessionist Somaliland, would be well-placed to be a stable country in 1337, united by common language (Somali), religion (Islam), and sitting along the Indian Ocean seaboard. Possessing already the a tradition of statehood, Somalia is well-placed to survive in the simulation

Somaliland (Disputed)

The disputed country of Somaliland would count among the few countries of Subsaharan Africa to remain stable, without any border changes, as a Somali-speaking Sunni country facing the Gulf of Aden.

Sudan

Sudan, given the 1337 demographic realities is rapidly to break apart. Among the first to secede are the Daju in the area we refer to as Darfur (it would be called Dardaju after them) and the Nuba peoples of Kordofan, as well as the Muslim Beja people along the Red Sea coast.

What would remain would be a thin strip of the Nile Valley, the area historically known as Nubia. While Nubian Miaphysite Christians would be the majority, the area would have a substantial minority of Arab Muslims. Given the functional unity of the area, a territorial secession would be unthinkable: rather, a constitutional recognition of the Muslim Arabs would need to take place. Further arrangements would ensure the autonomy of the region of Fazughli, of Christian religion but ethnically distinct (home to Berta and Dinka people)

South Sudan

South Sudan, perhaps renamed Equatoria, at this time lacks any experience with institutional statehood.It would rapidly dissolve into tribal units,

Tanzania

Tanzania would see its statehood continue along the Swahili coast and as far inland as institutional capacity would allow, with the capital moving to the city of Kilwa. The remaining inland regions are likely to collapse into tribal chiefdoms

Uganda

Uganda belongs to the more densely populated regions of East Africa, and was so also in 1337. The country is divided roughly in half between Bantu-speaking and Nilotic peoples. Without a unifying statehood and institutions, the country is likely to fragment among ethnolinguistic lines. An Acholi and Luo- speaking secedes to form a chiefdom, while Kampala remains the capital of a Bantu-speaking (with Luganda as its official language) south called Buganda. The western parts of the coutrny along the lakes are given large-scale autonomy.

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Southern Africa

Botswana

Botswana as a country would extend only into the eastern section of the country. The arid Kalahari and Okavango basin remain home to various Khoisan hunter-gatherers, outside any level of state organisation. The capital would shift from Gabarone to Masunga (known today as Francistown) near the border with Zimbabwe.

Eswatini

Eswatini as an ethnically compact tribal kingdom not only survives intact but expands to merge with neighbouring Mpumalanga province

Lesotho

Lesotho as an ethnically compact tribal chiefdom not only survives intact but merges with neighbouring Free State provinces.

Malawi

Malawi would be able to survive as a Chewa-speaking chiefdom, granting the Tumbuka people in its north a degree of autonomy

Mozambique

Mozambique as a country would be overextended. While the capital, Maputo, could extend its control across the Tsonga-speaking south, its power projection would fail to secure hold over the lower Zambezi. The northern regions would form the country of Makua, with a notable Muslim minority along the coasts.

Namibia

Namibia would be another country to quickly collapse into a dozen of local chiefdoms, with the largest being the Damara in the northwest and the Nama in the south. At this time, the Ovambo had not entered northern Namibia, so the entire country would be Khoisan-speaking.

South Africa

South Africa belongs to one of those countries, which without an established tradition of statehood at this time would rapidly disintegrate. The Western Cape forms a geographically and culturally distinct entity populated by the Khoemana, a Khoisan-speaking people; the Northern Cape largely populated by the Khoisan speaking Cxam would also break free. The Eastern Cape province would fracture in two, with the western and southern regions populated by the Khoisan Gonaqua separating from the northern and eastern Xhosa country.

The remaining parts of South Africa would see centrifugal forces motivated more by geography than ethnic divisions. KwaZulu-Natal in the Indian Ocean basin would claim independence, as would the Venda people in northern Limpopo, while neighbouring Tsonga would merge their kinsmen in Mozambique.

Mpumalanga would join their compatriots in Eswatini, while the Free state would merge with Lesotho. The remaining parts of South Africa thus consists of Gauteng, the North West province and the major part of Limpopo.

Zambia

The country of Zambia in this simulation is likely to split into three based on ethnic lines: the Lozi in the west establishing an independent Barotseland; the Bembe in the northeast and the relatively less numerous Chewa join their compatriots in neighbouring Malawi.

Zimbabwe

The country of Zimbabwe would be a rare exception, to be held together as a nation-state of the Shone people with borders unaltered (as this would be prior to the migration of the Matabele).

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Western Africa

Benin

Benin would be split roughly in half between a Bariba-speaking inland north (Borgu) and a Fon-speaking coastal south (Dahomey).

Burkina Faso

The country of Burkina Faso, perhaps named Mossiland, could remain largely stable, perhaps extending southwards. The country in 1337 is home to peoples speaking Mossi and other related languages (such as Gurunsi) belonging to the Gur family. A common religious tradition would also reinforce the sense of national unity.

Cape Verde

The archipelago is uninhabited in 1337.

Chad

The country of Chad, soon to be renamed as Kanem- interestingly persists largely as a relatively stable country- uniting on the basis of Sunni Islam as the prevalent religion and Kaembu as the official language, as well as encompassing the northern section of the Lake Tchad Basin - as such it would soon include the eastern parts of a dismantle Niger speaking Kanembu and Toubou languages. The region of Ouaddai, with its distinct language, as well as the Toubou-speaking Tibesti plateau, would given autonomy.

The southern regions of the country, adhering to a pre-Islamic religion and with a variety of languages such as Baguirmi, Sara, and various Eastern Chadic languages. The area - “Confederation of Logone” is more a conferedation of chiefdoms rather than a unified state, establishing a political region in the south in opposition to rule from the northern Kanem .

Gambia

While Gambia as a Manding-speaking country would largely retain is borders, the easternmost Fulani-speaking Muslim regions would likely secede and join their kinsmen in Senegal to form the country of Futa Tooro

Ghana

The country of Ghana would rapidly redefine itself as a largely Akan-speaking and Ashante country. This would alienate the Gur- speaking peoples in the northern region and Dagbon and Ewe regions in the east. Nevertheless a relatively large Ashante country with stable institutions and a degree of ethnic homogeneity could become a major regional power.

Guinea

Guinea as a country would be torn apart between the coastal regions, speaking various Atlantic (non-Mande) languages, with its capital at Boké at the northern section of the coast (the only non-marsh location along the coast), and the interior, which as a Mandinka-speaking region would join Mali, despite the fact that these regions would still stick to African traditional religions rather than Islam.

Guinea-Bissau

The country of Guinea-Bissau, perhaps renamed to just “Bissau”, could continue to function in essentially unchanged borders as an ethnically distinct city-state.

Ivory Coast

The Ivory Coast as a country given the 1337 demographic realities would lack a stable core identity, and would thus fragment along ethnic and linguistic lines , as Senufos and Kulangos establish their own independence in the north, Mandinkas join Mali and the Dan people join their kinsmen across the western border. The southwestern regions of the country establish their own federation of smaller Kru-speaking cheifdoms, while the Akan-speaking southeast sees its statehood crystalise around Baoulé.

Liberia

Liberia, lacking a unified written language and administrative capacity, would likely revert to become a series of tribal chiefdoms, belonging to the tribes of Kpelle and Dan (inland) and Bassa and Grebo in the coastal areas.

Mali

Mali would see a deep division mostly on ecological and ethno-linguistic lines: the southern Bambara, Mandinke and Soninke-speaking core around Bamako in the savanna and a northern Songhaic- and Tuareg- speaking north centrered around Gao and Timbuktu. Two distinct cultures: the former a syncretic Islamic one, the latter a purely Islamic one.

Mauritania

Mauritania at this time would be mostly Berber-speaking, divided among the Lamtuna and the Gudala clans. A common Islamic tradition and nomadic clans structure keep most of the country together- the exception be the Fulani-inhabited south, which would in this case likely secede and join neighbouring Senegal

Niger

Among the countries that would fail to coalesce is Niger, which would fracture into four distinct zones. The area of effective state control would be reduced to the environs of Niamey in the Zarma-speaking southwest of the country, not differing greatly and perhaps merging soon with Azawad detatched from Mali. Large swathes of northern and central Niger would be taken over by the Tuareg to form an emirate centred on the city of Agadez, while the southern Hausa-speaking regions would join their compatriots further south. The eastern parts of the country would join neighbouring Chad.

Nigeria

Similar to its northern neighbour, Nigeria as a country would fail to hold together. Infrastructural development and population density would be higher in the north. There an ethnically defined Hausaland - as a decentralised federation with a Bori, the pre-Islamic religion of the Hausa as prevalent religion, would emerge as the largest successor state in the north.

Similarly, Yorubaland, a federation of city-states in the southwest of Nigeria would emerge a distinct homogenous ethnolinguistically defined country. In the southeast, Igboland emerges to unite various states east of the Niger and south of the Benue, while smaller Ijaw, Urhobo, Edo, Nupe , Tiv and Gbaya polities emerge as buffer states between these three large successor states, while the northeast becomes independent as the kingdom of Bornu.

Senegal

The country of Senegal, already equipped with administrative capacities would in this simulation fracture on ethno-linguistic lines: while a coastal Wolof-speaking state centred on Dakar would remained attached to traditional folk beliefs, the eastern Fulani-speaking Muslim regions would secede forming the country of Futa Tooro, while Casamance, the region found between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau would form its own little state with Jola as its official language

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone, with its competition between the Tembe people in the north and the Bullom in the south is likely to fracture into two countries in this manner: the lack of pre-existent state structures would accelarate the process.

Togo

Togo in this scenario would have trouble achieving stability. While the coastal Ewe people would form a plurality of the population, the country could hardly be defined on ethnolinguistic grounds, while the inland peoples, such as the Tem and Kabiye have by this time not developed institutions of statehood. The country will struggle to project control inland.

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Summary

The map of Africa in this simulation, where modern borders are transposed onto 1337 demographic and logistical realities produces a mpa, where few countries find their place in any recognizable form. Among the handful of those that do, we can count Gambia, Guninean Bissau, Mali, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Togo in western Africa. In central Africa the closest thing would be a rump coastal part of Angola; in eastern Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland would be largely recognizable, as would Rwanda and Burundi without any border alterations. Similarly, as would Madagascar and the Comoros. In southern Africa, only Malawi and Zimbabwe would remain reminiscent of their current borders.

Elsewhere, particularly along the equator, many countries would fracture into dozens of small chiefdoms. This is especially true in Central Africa, while Kenya and Tanzania also see intensive fragmentation.

Among the regional powers, that would emerge from this simulation, there is Mali, Hausaland and Kanem in western Africa, perhpas we can also count Mossiland and Ashante. In eastern Africa, there is Ethiopia and perhpas also Nubia and a rump coastal Tanzania centered on Kilwa, while the three major powers of southern Africa are Zimbabwe, Lozi and Madagascar.

This exercies proves that modern borders differ vastly from demographic realities of the African continent in 1337. Islam at the time has reached the Niger river and as far south as the Comoros. But the continent was also home to three Christian countries: Ethiopia , Eritrea and Nubia.

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While the concept of democracy may mean many different things across many countries, in general it still presumes the belief that ultimately the citizenry is in charge, knows best and, through elections, every few years chooses a path from a variety of options.

Of course, the system is far from perfect and some parties tend to cater to only a subsection of the electorate—such as pensioners, as they bestow them with a generous welfare system to be paid for by other parts of the electorate.

Yet, trust in the system rests on the assumption that the public collectively can ultimately make a generally good decision and correct course should the ones holding power be leading the country in the wrong direction. Trust relies also on the belief that election outcomes do matter and will result in policy changes.

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An Election Between Democrats and Their Enemies

This trust has eroded . Elections are no longer applauded as being festivals of democracy, with various political parties all being legitimate options; they begin to be viewed as potential security threats.

In Slovakia, a section of the media continues to portray only certain parties as democratic, while others are denied that adjective—though the distinction does not lie in their internal structure and decision-making. Citizens are no longer considered as independent and rational decision makers, trustworthy enough to decide the fates of countries: they are conceived more as victims of disinformation and propaganda, to be lectured to on critical thinking, their social media algorithms having to be adjusted.

Elections’ outcomes no longer need to be manipulated at the ballot box: rather they can be influenced by algorithms promoting certain political candidates while shadowbanning others. The most blatant example of this mindset was the reasoning behind the annulment of elections in Romania2. The “wrong” candidate was labelled as being the agent of a rival power.

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The general enthusiasm surrounding democracy and pluralism following the fall of the Iron Curtain has dwindled. You may notice how often the media refer to political pluralism as an intrinsic value, and how often they refer to the system as “liberal democracy”. The adjective itself, even if claimed otherwise3, implies a certain ideological framework at its root. It appears more like a description of a political current—similar to social democracy or Christian democracy, rather than a neutral descriptor. The increasingly frequent use of the expression “liberal democracy” is itself revealing.

From Pluralism to Liberal Democracy

For if democracy alone were considered sufficient, the adjective would be unnecessary. Its constant repetition implies that democracy, rather than a neutral procedural framework, is in fact expected to produce substantively liberal outcomes. Political currents falling foul of its orthodoxies are therefore treated not merely as political opponents, but as threats to democracy itself.

When some in Slovakia, such as Milan Krajniak , raised4 eyebrows5, his concerns were rapidly dismissed6, rather than seriously engaged with. The election of political forces outside this “liberal democratic” bubble is not greeted as a legitimate outcome: when national populist forces in Slovakia scored victory in elections, an intense mobilisation of supporters of the opposition came the following year. Fearing an authoritarian capture of the state, one of the opposition-aligned media organises regular discussions on “How to save democracy”, which a writer from their own bubble denounces as basically a collective therapy session7.

The phrase itself has become almost ritualistic, with live discussions in theaters attracting opposition supporters8. The very recurrence of such debates reveals a chronic anxiety about the potential collapse of democracy; it is viewed as an existential struggle between democracy and its enemies, rather than a political competition of legitimate political alternatives. Unable to win elections, the ‘enlightened’ liberal and progressive democrats are apt to portray the more successful national populists as a threat to Slovakia’s continued EU membership, hijacking Slovakia´s geopolitical position to some vague post-Soviet republics.

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Geopolitical Desorientation

However, a very similar mindset could also be found at the other side of the political divide. During the recent elections in Hungary, the national conservative scene regarded the victory of Tisza with a similar fear as Germany’s centrist establishment is haunted by a potential AfD victory. The election campaign of Fidesz framed the elections as a question of whether Hungary would remain sovereign, or be controlled by a pro-Brussels and pro-Ukrainian satrap. The frequent associating of Magyar Pétér with Ursula von der Leyen and Volodymyr Zelenskiy revealed that mindset. For some, had Calin Georgescu won in Romania or AfD in Germany, their countries would risk becoming pro-Russian authoritarian puppet states in a matter of weeks. For others, the fact that Orbán Viktor lost an election opens the door for the European Union to become as centralised a state as France in a matter of months.

The centrist establishment commentators showed a general ignorance by continuing to portray Orbán Viktor as a pro-Russian politician—yet a few days prior to the election it was the American Vice President JD Vance, rather than Russia’s, who had arrived to declare his support for the Orbán government despite claiming not to tell Hungarians whom to vote for9.

Neither the strong ties between Fidesz and the Republicans, nor Hungary’s co-opting of Trump’s slogan for its EU presidency10 (“ Make Europe Great Again”) appear to have been strong enough evidence for some to be able to distinguish between a pro-American statesman and a pro-Russian one.

But perhaps it was not as much a matter of ignorance as one of expediency. Being labelled as pro-American for leading a country that is a member of NATO can hardly be used as a weapon by an establishment who for decades took pride in their transatlantic diplomatic ties.

During the decades-long hybrid war and anti-disinformation campaigns, terms like “Russian agent”, “Putin asset” came in vogue. Indeed, any declaration of sympathy for the Eurasian power became highly suspect. Yet as use of these terms became more frequent , so did its effectiveness.

Putin Versus Soros

Those who use them have become almost a mirror image of their ideological opponents accusing their rivals of ties to George Soros. Although the liberal establishment used to caricature accusations of someone being a Soros agent as conspiracy theories, their own practice of discovering alleged Russian agents, thereby undermining democracies across Europe, betrays the same penchant for conspiratorial theorising: presuming the existence of a secret coordinated network, subservient to a personality who is the real world equivalent of Sauron.

While self-appointed practitioners of critical thinking may see conspiracy theorists as simple-minded, the latter’s relatively large numbers reveal the lack of trust in democracy (they allege secretive, well-organised groups control a nation’s trajectory, rather than voters) and the lack of trust in human agency (they see men not as individual actors motivated by their own interests and aspirations, but as someone’s pawns).

While both camps may doubt independent human agency and come to understand political processes as the result of well-organised clandestine networks, EU institutions appear to have lost genuine trust in democracy despite claiming otherwise.

Indeed, European citizens are being told to use their vote11, yet no matter how elections turn out, the president of the European Commission, who received exactly zero votes in the election (for she did not stand for election) continues to serve in office.

The alliance between the European Parliament’s groups EPP and S&D, with ALDE/Renew as their habitual auxiliary, endures across electoral cycles, almost irrespective of how Europeans vote.

The result is a European Union that trusts the Humphrey Applebys12 of the world to guide it, more than it does the European public.

When Vested Interests Prevail

Both among the Humphrey Applebys in Brussels and the entrenched Fidesz cadres who have occupied the Hungarian administration for successive electoral cycles, one observes what Carroll Quigley described as institutionalisation13.

No longer responsive to feedback coming from society, such types begin to be concerned more about retaining their privileges and protecting their own interests: their ability to address societal issues effectively declines as a result.

As Quigley writes: “The vested-interest groups are generally tending to defend a relatively ineffective system and the “reformers” are, among many mistakes, generally advocating measures that would increase the organization.”14

While Quigley´s commentary was more concerned about the institutions, such as the Lord Chancellor and the Privy Council, themselves, the same applies to political forces and bureaucracies comfortable enough in their position, immune to the winds of change.

Vested interests of these institutions would then portray a threat to their positions as a threat to the system itself—be it depicting any opposition to the current course of the European Union as coming from the Union´s enemies, or portray the defeat of Orbán Viktor as opening the path toward a centralised European superstate.

Once the vested interests of institutions prevail, the self-perpetuation of entrenched bureaucracies begins to be portrayed not as a political problem open to democratic correction, but as a necessary condition for preserving order itself. In such a climate, elections cease to be understood as moments of real and legitimate change.

Options for change become increasingly cosmetic. As the phrase goes: “Same, same, but different. But still same.” Elections cease to offer substantive alternatives and instead revolve around a cartel of broadly aligned parties, maintaining only the façade of plurality — a democracy with a revolving cast but an untouched script, where elections function primarily to manufacture consent. A recent Irish election is telling: when voters were offered only three shades of the same color, a stunning 13% of ballots were spoiled15—a clear signal that the electorate demands real alternatives, not pre-approved variations.

But whenever genuine change threatens to materialise, it is swiftly cast as a menace to the system itself. Challengers are not engaged with but delegitimised — labelled as agents of malign networks, foreign powers, or threats to democracy itself. Such reactions reveal an inability to accept even the possibility of democratic correction, reform, or authentic political dialogue. In such an environment, trust in democracy may survive rhetorically, but its substance has already began evaporating.

Europe thus faces a profound paradox: the ritual celebration of democracy alongside a deep fear of actual democratic choice. The forms persist while the vital spirit fades. If democracy in Europe is to be restored, the remedy does not lie in more anti-disinformation campaigns or critical thinking workshops, but in recovering trust in the electorate’s political maturity—and, crucially, in cherishing the only diversity that truly matters for democracy: the diversity of political thought. Without it, democracy becomes a performance—stripped of the reality that once made it worthy of celebration.

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Heirs of Elendil

Gondor is a dwindling empire of the long decline, with the metaphysical war against Mordor being deeply ingrained in its very identity. It seems that Saint Michael Archangel , the Prince of the Heavenly Hosts would be the best fit.

Rohan, with its Anglo-Saxon aesthetics, its tradition of cavalry culture and more communal way of life could pick Saint George the Dragonslayer. It suits perfectly - Saint George fought on horseback, he protected ordinary folk and is also the patron saint of England.

The lost realm of Arnor- an empire torn apart and destroyed, dotted with many ruins and apparently high learning reminds one of post-Roman England. Indeed the long wars against Angmar echo in events and geography the wars against Danelaw. So perhaps King Edward the Confessor could be a fitting saint.

The Shire, with its peaceful, agrarian ethos cherishing ordinary life and the joy of little things would be best captured by chosing Saint Francis of Assisi.

The town of Bree, not far from the Shire may choose Saint Cristopher, the patron of travelers and the hospitable welcome of strangers. Bree is a gateway where journeys begin and lives intersect.

The lost realm of Númenor, especially in the struggle connected to its pride, grandeur, and eventual downfall, would need a patron saint embodying both the glory of a great civilisation and the tragic danger of confusing earthly greatness with ultimate destiny. Few saints would fit this role more profoundly than Saint Thomas More. He stands as an opposite to the prideful Ar-Pharazôn, who sought to usurp privileges that belong to no earthly prince. Perhaps Ar-Pharazôn was subconsciously inspired by some aspects of Henry VIII´s reign.

The coastal nation of Umbar - a maritime, coastal, cosmopolitan realm , resembling either Carthage, corsair republics or decadent late imperial ports. There are several saints who could become patron saints of Umbar: among them Zacchaeus, the man who climbed a fig tree to Jesus and then was ready to return fourfold should he have stolen from anyone anything. Other possibilites could be Saint Matthew the Tax Collector, or even Saint Augustine of Hippo - a man who was at once intellectually brilliant yet formed a culture of moral decay but fully converted to Christian It would encapsulate the dilemma of realm caught between worldly splendour and spiritual restlessness.

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The Lands of Elves, Dwarves, and their Neighbours

Lothlórien is a mystically beatiful place, of almost otherwordly essence and outside the ordinary timeflow. It may well do to choose a mystic such as Saint Theresa of Avila as its patron saint

Rivendell is a place of refuge and preservation of memory, where the memory of the lost realm of Arnor, as well as that of the Beleriand beneath the waves is still remembered. It is a place of contemplation and its reclusive location makes it feel almost like a monastery. A monastery, where the future of the continent is decided, and Elrond as its great abbot. Saint Benedict of Nursia would be an almost perfect fit - with monasteries serving as places of learning and restoration of civilisation after it was submerged in the Volkerwanderung.

What about Lindon, the westernmost of the Elvish realms in Middle—Earth? Especially given the presence of Círdan the Shipwright and their calling to build ships that allow the Elves of Middle-earth to sail westwards to Valinor, one patron saint would be most befitting: Saint Brendan the Navigator.

As for the Woodland Realm, or the Elvish parts of Mirkwood, battling various spiders and vile creatures in the forest, no other patron saint would be more befitting than the patron saint of hunters - that is Saint Hubert of Liege.

Not far from there lies the kingdom of Dale and Esgaroth- a mercantile, urban realm focused on practicality and prosperity. A good fit may be Saint Nicholas as a patron merchants, townsfolk and associated with generosity.

Overlooking the Dale and Esgaroth is the dwarven kingdom of Erebor. Saint Eligius, the patron of goldsmiths, metalsmiths and artisans would be an obvious patron saint of Dwarves as master craftsmen.

Khazad-dúm, the Dwarven realm which later became later known as Moria, would be an obvious choice. Santa Barbara as the patronness of miners and those facing death underground is a perfect fit.

Lest we forget, the Fangorn Forest - an ancient, almost timeless forest, a place of seclusion could chose as its patron saint Saint Anthony, the desert father of Egypt, among the founders of the monastric tradition.

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The Lands of Evil

How about the lands that are evil almost by definition? Could these realms have Christian patron saints?

Mordor as the prime example is not a country - it is a place of ultimate spiritual desolation and slavery, a total inversion of divine order. As a possible intercessor Saint Dismas, the Penitent Thief at Golgotha could offer the glimpse of hope, of the possibility of redemption even at the very precipice of damnation. As a patron of prisoners and those facing execution, he may offer hop to a realm defined by captivity.

Dol Guldur could, given Sauron´s identity as the Necromancer choose Saint Lazarus , who was raised from the dead as its patron saint ( by a similar logic, the same could apply to Minas Morgul)

Angmar as a realm of terror and dread built upon the dark magic of the Lord of the Nazgúl could choose Saint Cyprian of Antioch, a powerful magician commanding demons prior to his conversion to Christianity. Cyprian’s past in demonic magic and subsequent conversion demonstrates that even the most thoroughgoing “occultist” can, through grace, become servant of the true King.

Isengard - a tower almost entirely devoted to technology and domination through speech and natural sciences could take as its patron saint Albert the Great , who famously sought to harmonize faith, reason, and the natural sciences. Isengard represents what happens when a mind like Albert’s loses its moral anchor, turning science into industrial exploitation and the pursuit of raw power.

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What emerges from this exercise may not necessarily be a system of one-to-one correspondence. Rather, it shows how different cultures sanctity to interpret themselves and their very own ethos. Middle-Earth may not be an allegory, but the legendarium is a profoundly Christian work. This exercise translated the realms of Tolkien´s legendarium back to a Christian historical imagination, though the modern reader may be more familiar with the former rather than the latter. Yet what matters may perhaps not be precision itself - but rather the shared intuition and how grace may manifest itself for all peoples, all realms and in all situations in life. Leave a comment and share your thoughts on potential patron saints of the realms of Middle-Earth.

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The focus of civilisation shifted upstream, away from the marshy delta, closer to the narrowest point overlooking the middle course of the Tigris and Euphrates. Babil - the gates of God, they called it. Rather than quarrelsome city-states built amidst reed, silt and mud, the Babylonic civilisation articulated itself into a handful of regional states: Assyria, Babylon, Elam. These states no longer quarrelled over the possession of fields and water but over borders and lands. Power moved from temple to palace, from the immediacy of cult to the abstraction of rule. The primary axis of this civilisation shifted, to connect the upper and middle Tigris to the lower Euphrates : from Niniveh and Ashur, to the city of Babylon.

Order Against Chaos

As the Empire of the Four Corners of the World crumbled and the ancient Sumerian tongue gave way to Semitic dialects, a new civilisation was born. The history of Mesopotamia, where the Euphrates and Tigris bring surprising floods, and where its people are left to defend the alluvial plains from both the mountain peoples of the Zagros from one side and from the desert nomadic peoples from Arabia, is a history marked by uncertainty and unpredictability of the forces of nature and of the human environment. As Jaroslav Krejčí writes: In Mesopotamia, on the other hand, the natural environment and the vulnerability to foreign invasions produced a general sense of irregularity and insecurity. Civilization in Mesopotamia, in contrast to that in Egypt, could hardly build on belief in an orderly, predictable universe. Although such a universe might have been felt to be desirable –as is suggested by the Babylonian myth of creation, whose essential plot is the defeat of chaos and the establishment of divine rule – the primary lifeexperience of Mesopotamians clearly contradicted such an ideal.2

Indeed both the Enuma Elish and the Epic of Gilgamesh reveal this this primordial tension between order and chaos, between civilisation and barbarism. The slaying of Tiamat is the mythic image of irrigation itself: the imposition of form upon formlessness. Where the Hebrews mistrust the city and find purity in the wilderness, the Babylonian reverses the polarity. The wild man Enkidu must be drawn into civilisation—tamed, seduced, made part of order. And just as Enkidu, so too were the peoples who arrived - Amorites, Kassites, Gutians, Hurrians,Subarians, Suteans, Arameans and Chaldeans - absorbed into this civilisation.

The entire Babylonic civilisation - from the irrigation canals, through the codex of Hammurabi to the Assyrian military and the calculations of the priests and astrologers is ultimately striving towards a single aim: to keep chaos at bay.

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The Assyrian kings leading their warriors into battle sought to impose this order in the immanent way: by force of arms and shattering of all resistance. A tour de force following their resolute defiance to the waves of barbarians during the Bronze Age Collpase. The Babylonians contemplated this order and made it visible through its splendour—through walls, temples, and the measured magnificence of the city. In popular myth it survived as the story of Semiramis3 and the Hanging Gardens of Babylon.

Heavens as Script

The Babylonic civilisation sought answers in the heavens to foretell the future. The sages- like those mentioned in the Gospel at Epiphany4 were Babylonic astrologers. They did not shape their own destiny, rather, these sages sought to read the future, to interpret events to come, and to translate them into human action.

In this astral philosophy - the firm belief that the movements of heavenly bodies reveal earthly events to come, was the Babylonic civilisation developped a philosophy of determinism - a belief in certainty of fate - one which was to spread to all ends of the world 5 and whose elements remain in popular superstition as horoscopes.

The same spirit appears, transfigured, in the vision of the Book of Daniel, where kingdoms are weighed, numbered, and measured—where history itself is rendered as something already apportioned. What is written in the heavens must unfold upon the earth.

Ethos

When contemplating the ethos of the Babylonic civilisation, what temrs come to mind? For the Caphtorian, we have chosen the descriptors to be: maritime, labyrinthine, distributive, sensual, and atragic.

For the Babylonic civilisation, these descriptors are measured, inscreibed, fated, splendid, vigilant

vigilant, scribal, fatal, inscribed.

Measured, for the Babylonic civilisation understands the world through measure and division. Time is broken into hours, the heavens divided into constellations, from the rivers canals distribute water to the fields. Reality is weighted and apportioned, becoming the very condition of order itself.

Inscribed, for not only is history and law inscribe into clay tablets, but so too is the cosmos , whether in the stars or in the tabulation of omens, understood as something ordered and structured.

Fated, as was the firm astrological belief that the future may be revealed rather than shaped. For a people surrounded by instability, the belief that all things are already written is not a philosophical luxury, but a condition of survival. Fate is not resisted - it is deciphered. To know what is to come means not to resist, but to align oneself with what has already been written.

Splendid for the awe-inspiring grandeur and the orchestration of the magnificent. It does not stand to display opulence: but to display that order has subdued chaos: gates, walls, temples, procession ways, all displaying deliberate grandeur: not ornament, not excess. The Babylonic world makes its strcuture manifest: so that its structure from brick may be legible from afar.

Vigilant, for it was a civilisation exposed to both the disasters of nature and the hostility of their both physical and human environment. The heavens, the rivers, the sky - all are watched for signs and omens of distress.

The Cosmic Table

When we seek to understand the Ursymbol of the Babylonic civilisation, we find the cosmic table - the intuition of a readable cosmos, where every element has its fixed place. Reality is understood not as open or infinite, but as structured and inscribed—whether in the movements of the stars, the codification of law, or the tabulation of omens. The world appears not as a landscape to be explored, but as a table to be read: finite, ordered, and resistant to spontaneity. In this lies the distinctiveness of Babylon. It does not seek to discover new truths, but to locate all things within a pre-existing totality, where meaning arises not from creation, but from placement.

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Where the Hellenic man sees the here and now, the Frankish man seeks to go plus ultra and the Egyptiac man seeks to preserve and maintain, the Babylonic man reads what is to come.

When Alexander the Great arrived, they welcomed him as a liberator. The Greeks were marvelled by what they encountered. Yet the inner life of this civilisation was already extinguished. The soul had withered, though forms and tablets remained. Its last echoes persisted in places such as Harran, where astral cults survived for several centuries. There on the margins, they took the form of a Syriac ummeta: as the Sabians of Harran.

Babylon did not discover the world—it learned to read it. They sought to decipher the signs of events , from the visions of the Daniel through astronomical tablets to the lingering priests of Harran: the conviction that fate is not made, but disclosed.

This exercise projects modern territorial borders onto the demographic, religious, and logistical realities of the year 1337 in order to test whether such borders could plausibly crystallize into durable political entities under late medieval conditions. Political authority is assumed to decay rapidly beyond areas of regular taxation, communication, and troop movement. The main resource used for demographics from that time are maps from Europa Universalis V development diaries¹. Last time, we focused on how the model would apply to Northern, Central and Eastern Asia.

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Southern Asia

For reference, see the Tinto Maps here

Afghanistan

Afghanistan at this time would have lacked the logistical capicity to remain as a stable country. Power from Kabul could have been projected across the Pashtun heartland to the south of Hindukush - across the Sistan and Zabulistan basins, while the Hazara-populated mountainoius center and the Tajik-populated north would establish its own country (Balkh). The city of Herat would become another centre of power, and would join with the realm of Khoarasn in eastern Iran, as well as with neighbouring Merv. While all these realms would be separated mostly due to distance, terrain and logistical issues, alongside minor ethnic division, the northeast of Aghanistan would see secession happenning on a much stronger civilisational boundary.

The northeastern parts of Afghanistan would see Badakshan secede as a Pamir Shia statelet joining their brethren to the north of the Upper Oxus, while mountain peoples speaking the Dardic languages would break off from Kabul to establish their Hindu confederacy in the mountains.

Bangladesh

In 1337, Bangladesh is Hindu-majority country. As such, despite strong regional identity and significant population, it becomes subsumed into Hindustan, being part of a major population axis along the Indo-Gangetic Plain

Bhutan

While Bhutan would have been largely expected to remain stable, actually at the time of the simulation, Bhutan would have had trouble holding onto the eastern parts of its territory. While the core of Bhutan would have remained ethnically Ngalop and religiously Tibetan Buddhist, the eastern valleys, home to the tribal Monpa people would break free.

India

India in 1337 is found inside boundaries that greatly exceed its power-proejcting capabilities at the time. The Subcontinent has never been united in such an extent, and therefore, peripheral regions and population centres far away from the Indo-Gangetic Plain are most likely to break off.

The core of India in the Indo -Gangetic Plain: Haryana, Indian Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal (without the northeasternmost part), Jharkand, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan - would form the core of Hindustan. Hindustan in this scenario would attempt to define itself as an ethnoreligious formation: uniting Hindustani, Punjabi, Bengali, Malvi, Rajasthani, Gujarati and other peoples by a common Hindu identity, with Jains being a notable minority in Gujarat and Rajasthan, a Sunni minority in Punjab and Koyapunem among the tribal peoples in the south.

The states of southern India: Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana with Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Goa are likely to assume independence. Majority of these countries become ethno-linguistically defined.In Kerala, with substantial Sunni and Nestorian populations, a power-sharing agreement between the three religious communities on the national level would need to be reached , allowing for strong local decentralisation.

In the southeast, Orissa and Chhattisgarh would assume independence, while tribal regions: the Munda-speaking south of Jharkand and the Gondi and Halbi-speaking south of Chhattisgarh would break of and form their own local polities.

In the north, the Kangri-dominated Himachal Pradesh assumes independence, while Uttarakhand separates into Garhwal and Kumaon principalities. The northernmost union territories of Jammuand Kashmir and Ladakh become also independent.

The region of northeast India fragments into a handful of local statelets, each with a distinct language and religion. This mosaic of different states, languages and faiths stretches even into the lowland plain of the Brahmaputra, which at this time is populated by a mix of Bod, Karbi and Taic peoples, thus this region also remains fragmented.

Maldives

The Maldives would in this scenario remain a coherent whole, bound largely together as a geographic (archipelagian) formation

Nepal

Nepal, similarly to bBhutan, would have found it difficult to hold onto the whole length of the Himalayan foothills. The country would have largely fractured into two, with Kathmandu holding onto the eastern half of Nepal with the Newar people as the principal ethnic group, while the western valleys populated by the Khas , the Therai and the Magar would form their own mountain federation.

Pakistan

In 1337, the existence of Pakistan would be put to question immediately, given that at the time, the country was far from achieving religious unity. Quite the contrary: Punjab was majority Hindu, Sindh is portrayed as practicing Sammithiya, while Balochistan and Pashtun areas are already Muslim. As such, it may be presumed that Punjab would join Hindustan, while Sindh could assume independence.

The northern parts of Pakistan see the emergence of smaller polities : a Buddhist Baltistan, Hindu polities in Gilgit, Kuhestan and Chitral, ensuring a largely fragmented north, while the border along the Durand line separating Pashtun regions of Afghanistan from Kyber Pakhtunwa would be abolished, establishing a single Pashtun polity, along with the Pashtun-inhabited regions of northern Balochistan.

The rest of Balochistan would join with the former Iranian province of Sistan and Balochistan to create a hifghly decentralised confederacy of Baloch and Brahui emirates.

Sri Lanka

The island of Sri Lanka would see secession of the Hindu Tamil-speaking north to join their ethnic kinsmen across the strait in Tamil Nadu, while the rest of Sri Lanka would remain largely Sinhala and Theravada Buddhist with a substantial Muslim presence along the coast and Vedda presence inland.

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Peninsular Southeast Asia

For reference, see the Tinto Maps here

Burma

Superimposing borders over the situation of Burma in 1337 would make it difficult for the country to hold together. Most importantly, the ethnic Burmese would in no means form the majority of the population, only dominating in the central Irawaddy Plains. The city of Yangon is at this time populated by the Mon, who dominate the coastal regions, while the area inside the borders of the Shan State is populated by a mix of Palaungic, Wa and Karenic peoples, as well as some Thaic peoples in the eastern part. As a result, Burma fractures into 8 states, populated by the Rakhine, Mon, Bamar, Kachin, Karen, Palaung, Wa and Thaic peoples, respectively.

Cambodia

Out of the countries of Peninsular Southeast Asia, Cambodia is most likely to remain stable within its borders, defined as a Theravada Khmer polity. The tribal peoples in its east, labeled on the map as Degar , do not seem to be in a position to question the stability of the country, and may well be offered a degree of autonomy.

Laos

Laos as a country in this scenario sees a dramatic difference between the northern core, predominantly populated by the Lao and other related Thaic peoples (as well as the Austroasiatic Khmu people) and the the southern panhandle, populated chiefly by the Katuic Bru people. As such, the southern panhandle secedes, separated establishing a country for the Bru people between the Mekong and the border with Vietnam.

Thailand

The existence of Thailand as a distinct country in the demographic realities of 1337 is unthinkable namely since the ethnic Thai have superimposed themselves only as small minority over central Thailand. As such, calling it Thailand would be an anachronism. The city of Bangkok being dominated by the Mon, while large parts of central Thailand are populated by Palaugic-related Lawa people, with a Thai minority across the area. While ethnicities and languages may differ, the basin of the Chao Phraya and a common Theravada religion would still bring the peoples of this area together into a common multilingual realm.

Northern Thailand, on the other hand would secede as an independent Thaic polity, while Karen-speaking hillsides in the west and Khmer-populated borderlands in the east in this scenario would join their ethnic kinsmen across the border. Another Thaic polity, called Ligor would be found in southern Thailand, in the area populated by the Southern Thai or Dambro people and include also the island of Phuket.

Northeastern Thailand, located in the Khorat Basin, would be an ethnically mixed area populated by Katuic, Khmer and Kuy peoples. Despite strong gravitational pull towards Cambodia, the existence of some geographic barriers, and the prevalence of indigenous non-Buddhist religions would result in the area becoming another independent multilingual realm.

Vietnam

The territorial integrity of Vietnam would be put to a quick test given the demographic and logistical realities of 1337. Larger parts of the area known to later French colonial authorities as “Annam”, namely from the province of Quang Tri (inclusive) to encompass South Central Coast and Central highlands of Vietnam would be dominated by the Cham people, speaking a Malayo-Polynesian language and being of Hindu religious persuasion. The Cham at this time possessed an urbanised culture, dense populations and the civilisational difference from the Kinh or Vietnamese people, which were part of the Sinosphere would be substantial enough to warrant their secession. The inclusion of the Bahnaric mountain peoples into Champa would be achieved by granting them a degree of autonomy.

The areas of Vietnam further south in the Mekong Delta (known to French colonial authorities as Cochinchina) at this time would be largely Khmer-populated with notable Cham minorities. As such on condition of recognition of the Cham minority it would likely join Cambodia.

While northern Vietnam is still home to various peoples and languages, historically the power centre at Hanoi and the Red River Basin was able to exert some influence over the mountain peoples in the surrounding area, allowing for a somewhat consolidated northern Vietnam.

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Insular South East Asia

For reference, see the Tinto Maps here

Brunei

The existence of Brunei as a city-state would not come with any serious issues. However, the area would not be primarily Muslim. Instead, the capital would be predominantly Hindu, with local beliefs in the countryside. Malay, spoken in the capital remains the dominant language

East Timor

Interestingly, the division of the island of Timor into West Timor and East Timor stays, as it reflects linguistic, ethnic and cultural divisions rooted in deep time.

Indonesia

Indonesia as a country transposed into the demographic and logistical realities of 1337 would rapidly collapse as a country. Holding together a hundreds of islands with different languages and dozens of religions as a centralised state would be outside of logistical capacities in 1337. Indonesia would not be a nation-state. It would be an empire - without the institutional capacities and cohesion present. Rather, looser ways of maritime hegemony - similar to the Athenian League- would be used by stronger islands to enact dominance from smaller neighbours.

On the island of Java, at this time prevalently Hindu, distinct countries for the Javanese and Sundanese people emerge, while the Madurese and Balinese peoples in the neighbouring islands establish their own countries. Further eastwards, the Lesser Sunda Islands would see the states of Bima and Larantuka.

The island of Sumatra is likely to be divided among several countries: Aceh in the north (fracture among coastal Hindu and Muslim Malay polities and Gayo people in the interior), a Batak state just to the south of it, a Minangkabau country in the west and a Lamapung country in the south. Large parts of central and eastern Sumatra, ethnically Malay, would join Malaysia.

On the island of Kalimantan, it would be largely the coastal peoples who would be in a position to establish statehood: the Hindu Malays in the west, the Hindu Banjarese in the south, and the Kayan and Tidung peoples in the east. The inland regions become home to tribal confederacies of the inland Dayak peoples.

The island of Sulawesi/Celebes would fragment, with Gorontalo, Bolaang, Buton and Mamudju becoming independent, while Makassar would dominate southern and central Sulawesi. Further eastwards, the Moluccas would be maintained under the thalassocracy ruled from two capitals: Ternate and Tidore.

Malaysia

While the Malaysia, as a federal monarchy would be institutionally well-equipped to be transposed in its borders to 1337 demographic realities, there are several issues, that would make it difficult to survive with borders intact.

Firstly, bridging together peninsular Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo. This would lead to both areas becoming independent, with northernmost Sarawak sliding under the control of Brunei.

Secondly, Islam present only in the state of Perlis and the southwestern parts of Thailand is located only in this area. Given the civilisational difference between Islam and Buddhism, it is likely that Muslim Malays would be in a different country from Buddhist Malays.

Thirdly, large parts of the interior of the Malay Peninsula at this time would be populated by indigenous Orang Asli. This would however not equate to a rival centre of power, but still less effective Malay control.

Philippines

The Philippines, with their with hundreds of islands separated by straits and mountain belts separating different coasts of the same islands from each other would not be in a position to remain unified. Rather, they would fragment into over a dozen of distinct polities, reachable from a single core. The archipelago is labelled primarily as Anitist - refering to local indigenous beliefs, while Hinduism is present in major coastal cities.

Manila and the surrounding bay remains the largest population centre, and the largest polity encompassing the Central Luzon and Calabarzon, and thus the Tagalog-speaking areas remains the dominant country in Luzon, while the areas further north fragment into smaller chiefdoms, while a separate polity populated by the Bicolano people emerges in southern Luzon, while the Visaya fragment into half a dozen countries.

The island of Mindanao in the south sees Butuan consolidate its relatively flat eastern section, Lanao the northern coast, Kiliman in the western valley and Zamboanga in the peninsula, while the Sulu and Palawan islands emerge as distinct polities.

Singapore

Singapore may opt to preserve its city-state status. While religious distinctiveness - being Hindu rather than Buddhist could justify its independence, its relatively small size, strategic location and ethnically Malay character would ultimately result in its adhesion to Malaysia.

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A Portrait of Southern and Southeast Asia

What emerges is a geography shaped not by colonial borders, but geographies of language and settlement pattern.

In the Indian Subcontinent, Hindustan in this simulation appears unified, stretching from Punjab to Bengal to Gujarat : a space brought together by a strong population core, linguistic proximity and agrarian surpluses, while Islam would yet have to gain foothold in the area. In the Deccan Peninsula, more distant states emerge as ethno-linguistic formation.

By contrast, mountain belts and archipelagos, together with ethnolinguistic fragmentation translated into small-scale polities and chiefdoms, valuing their independence and resisting submission. Island worlds project power not through bureaucracies, armies and direct control, but throught trade routes, navies and influence. The largest power in the insular world would be Malaysia controlling the Straits of Malacca, and eastern Java.

In the Peninsula of Southeast Asia- or Indochina, as it is known to some, would see partial consolidation of the large river plains, allowing namely Cambodia to become a significan regional power. The portrait of Southern and Southeastern Asia offered by this simulation is of stark contrast to the contemporary political map: few polities survive with unaltered borders: Maldives, Singapore and East Timor being the notable exceptions - all three defined by island geography. Brunei, Cambodia and Sri Lanka remain clearly recognizable, with some border alterations.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia are yet to witness the spread of Islam; Philippines is yet to encounter Christianity. The Thai are yet to become a majority in Thailand, and the Cebuano people are yet to settle Mindanao.

The map seen above reflects borders adapted to a different time: before the spread of religions and technologies that would allow contralisation, before the rise of populations and ethnic consolidation. But it underlies a truth: that sometimes, modern borders are impositions bringing together valleys and islands that would have seldom formed a unified whole.

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The cult, religion, is found at the source. Culture is downstream from religion and politics is downstream from culture. Throughout the recent years, it has become evident within our Frankish civilisation, that politics is the implication of culture and society. Thus it is not sufficient to hope that this or that political party stands with the best candidates or programme, without grounding in the cultural and intellectual tendencies, without understanding the fundamental principles, without a solid foundation, such a house will be built on sand. Therefore, a Christian conservative institute between Devín and Vihorlat is needed.

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Character of Conservativism in the Intermarium

The most natural form of conservative thought in Slovakia is that of the Christian flavour. In each country of the Intermarium the conservative tendencies have articulated themselves into different outlooks. It is not for the preference of any great political or philosophical figure to gravitate towards any particular nuance of conservativism. The reason lies in the rhythm of the centuries, the longue durée, the different character of the protagonists, the creative minority, amidst the various peoples of the Intermarium. This has given them a different experience and a particular character.

Our northern brothers, the Polish, have developed an aristocratic republic, the Rzeczpospolita, as their political form. The szlachta has become the protagonists of the nation – whence follow the noblesse, the courage, the heroism, from there stems the motto Bóg-honor-ojczyzna. The experience differed among our western brothers, the Czechs. It was the burghers, who became the national protagonists – the urban culture, the humanism. Therefore a civic conservativism naturally develops in the Czech lands.

Amongst our brothers of Lower Hungary, of Magyar language, it was the aristocracy as well, like among the Polish, who became the national protagonists. Let us remember the Hussar´s cut. Janko Vitéz. Among Magyars, the reverence to the crown of Saint István, as well as a national pride unite themselves in a synthesis, which implies a national conservativism.

But in Slovakia, an authentic and rooted conservativism of the civic or national flavour is hardly possible. We scarcely had a domestic burgher culture, that was not of German language. The aristocratic culture of Slovakia has not survived either, for it accepted Magyar identity and custom.

To be conservative in Slovakia is to be Christian conservative. It was priests who stood as protagonists of Slovakness: Slavomir at the head of the revolt for independence of our forefathers, for the freedom of Moravia, thus defining a particular distinct character of the Intermarium. He was followed much later by Catholic priests: Anton Bernolák, Juraj Fándly and Ján Hollý, as well as Ľudevít Štúr of the Lutheran confession. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the Slovaks were led by priests Andrej Hlinka and the first president of Slovakia was also a priest – Jozef Tiso – with all the tragic implications therein.

If the protagonists of Slovakness were priests, should it surprise us that the Slovak dissent against Communism had a primarily Christian character? Would it be possible to imagine a Slovak dissent without the contributions of Kolakovič, Silvester Krčméry, Vladimir Jukl or Anton Neuwirth? Since the Slovak protagonists had been priests, the opposition against the totalitarian regime was built on Christian principles.

Thus, it is natural that the prevailing nuance of conservative thought in Slovakia is neither conservativism of the civic nor national nuance, but Christian conservativism, and by the prevalent confession of the Christian religion between the Ipeľ and the Dunajec, Catholic.

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The first place belongs to God

If we are conservatives, what do we conserve? Are we to conserve the status quo, be it what it may? Are we to say that the essence of conservativism is a stubborn resistance to change, a passive perpetuation of the present? It cannot be so. Rather it be our task to seek a conscious return to tradition, and a restoration of the true, the good and the beautiful. So what does the Catholic Christian perspective consist of ?

The first place belongs to God. The civic society should recognise and fulfil its obligations to God, those which it has. Should justice be defined as giving to each, what is owed, then to recognise and glorify God is a matter of justice. To do the contrary therefore is an act of injustice. A private prayer is not sufficient, for God wills his disciples not as individuals nor families, but nations. Etymologically, the word “religion” comes from Latin “re ligere”, to bind together the society again.

The society needs a solid point of reference, a principle that is not self-referential, but which transcends the society.Since without the humility and obedience to God, this place will be taken over by the Leviathan, becoming omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent. In its pride, it will demand obedience without question of its subjects, their human sacrifices on the battlefield. The result: an immense human suffering and great many lives extinguished. An impersonal and arbitrary Leviathan, bestowing new and numerous proscriptions, regulating all aspects of existence of their subjects, requiring public manifestations of loyalty from their subjects and laying claim even to their thought.

Never again should the Leviathan be allowed to take the place reserved to God. It should not demand a greater portion from the fruits of its subjects’ labour than God and the Church would ask for. By what right does the Leviathan take more?

There are two ways to know God, faith and reason, fides et ratio. Faith without reason loses itself in superstition and sentimentality, reason without faith loses itself in endless speculations and in cold rationality detached from morality.

Such has been the mission of the Ladislav Hanus: to elevate the life of faith, Christendom, amidst his compatriots. It is here that we are to build on his foundations so that our compatriots are not Christians by folkloric perpetuation, but so that they know what it means to be Catholic , what does the magisterium teach on sin, salvation, redemption and free will.

So that we may say, proclaim and affirm with Diego Laínez at the Council of Trent the good news, as relevant today as the day it has been proclaimed at that famous Council:

That all people may be save or damned. That each man or woman has the capacity to receive and accept salvation, whatever the skin colour, country of birth or social class may be, what ever the native tongue. We proclaim this vis-á-vis the passive fatalistic resignation, a mechanic determinism or a panic anxiety. We proclaim this vis-á-vis those divide mankind into chosen and condemned tribes, those who distinguish innocent victims and vile oppressors. We reject such a division, all and wholesome. This division was the cause of immense human suffering and great many lives extinguished. In a different form, this notion sought once again to captivate our civilisation.

Integral Patriotism

We reject a nationalism of pride and hate that seeks to idolise the blood or tongue – one that forces to choose between the identity of Breton and Grench, between being Basque or Spaniard. We acclaim an integral patriotism where one stands not between the choice of either-or, either the particular or the integral. As said de Maistre, he never encountered the Man in abstract – only Frenchmen, or Polish or Spaniards. Let us go deeper: there are no Germans, who are neither Bavarians, nor Swabians, Saxons, Prussians, etc. There are no Frenchmen, who are neither Normans, Picards, Bretons, Gascons, Provensals etc. One cannot be part of a grander integral identity without belonging to any of its particular identities.

Firstly we are Christians-Catholics.

Secondly, we are the sons of this Frankish civilisation, which began to take form during the reign of Charlemagne, this synthesis of Christian religion, Greek reason and Roman inheritance, and the ci-devant barbaric peoples bearing their own code of honour and concept of freedom. Our civilisation is that which has always sustained social pluralism and this is what enabled it to become great and we will make Europe great again, building on the foundations laid out across the centuries, by Thomas Aquinas, Cervantes, Dante, Laínez, Mozart, De Maistre and Tolkien. The heritage of this civilisation was bestowed upon us and we shall transmit it to our sons and grandsons and so forth ere the worlds ending.

Thirdly, we are Central Europeans, sons and daughters of the Intermarium. Our history has bestowed unto us the mission to be the Antemurale Christianitatis, the bastion of Christendom vis-á-vis the janissary marching under the shadow of the crescent moon, vis-á-vis the barbaric red despotism of the hammer and sickle and vis-á-vis the mechanical conception of Antieurope that seeks to dissolve all that remains organic, homely and personal.

We have prevented the imposition of despotism by the courage of the Hussars, glory eternal to them, who saved the day like the Riders of Theoden at the fields of Pelennor by defeating the invading hordes. The Pope and the Faithful of the Intermarium have broken the despotism of the Iron Curtain. And we shall defend the liberty of the Free World again tomorrow. Being a small people among small peoples, history teaches us that the survival of our people may be never taken for granted, that we need to consciously transmit what our ancestors have built, we have improved unto our descendants, with intention.

Then, we are Slovaks. What is la Slovaquie profonde? To be Slovak implies a certain rootedness, a permanence across the centuries. The picturesque Slovak village at the foot of the mountains. To speak the local vernacular amidst one´s own. The trues anthem of the Slovaks is Na kráľovej holi sung from the full throat, like the true Catholic anthem is the Salve Regina chanted after the Sunday mass.

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The essence of the Slovakness was summarised by Samo Chalúpka in “Mor ho” as the heroes proclaim: “It is injust to have a master, to be such is an injustice far greater”. The Slovaks have never subdued other peoples but have not been reduced to degraded fellahin oppressed by a Mamluk ascendancy either. We have not been subject to a thousand-year yoke: we had been co-protagonists of the history of Pannonia, this Kingdom of Hungary under the protection of Saint Stephen. Like its emblem features the patriarchal cross atop mountains of Upper Hungary and the red-and-silver stripes to feature the rivers of Lower Hungary, so too Ostrihom, the first capital of the Kingdom was chosen at the bridge between Slovaks and Magyars, between civilised and the barbaricum.The history of that Kingdom has been our history, its victories our victories, its tragedies our tragedies, its heroes our heroes. We are the co-protagonists, co-authors of this glorious history. Without the Kingdom of Saint Stephen it be impossible to recognise the Slovaks as they are. Would they not have been reduced to an ethnographic curiosity as in the case of the Moravians or the Cashubians? Would they be truly a distinct people?

In the essence of Slovakia, there is humility. The Slovaks do not beat their chests, they do not boast by their kings, they don´t wave flags. The Slovaquie profonde can be experienced at the celebration of your uncle´s 50th birthday, it is more than halušky, valaška or some folklore.

The Slovak is prudent. He doesn´t pick a forlorn battle for ephemeral glory. He retreats to distant valleys, with his head down, to remote villages too distant for the ideologues to arrive. He is the champion of survival, he shall prevail, he shall maintain.

The true archetype of the Slovak is the legendary Juraj Jánošík – a brigand who combats the enemy with hit-and-run tactics, delivering him a thousand petty inconveniencies. His heroism ends with the arrival of the gendarmerie into the village when he vanished into the mountainside. He would never confront the enemy head-on. Our compatriots need to understand that they are no longer anyone´s subjects – they are their own masters, the authors and protagonists of their own history, their own destiny. Not as an object but a subject of history.

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There are those who conceive of man and society only in two degrees of resolution, as dictated by the cold abstractions of modern philosophy. They recognize only the isolated individual, an isolated atom drifting in the void, stripped of all bonds of fellowship, standing alone to face the indifference of the world. In theory, his decisions are guided by reason; in practice, they are often determined by little more than instinct reacting to external stimuli. And they recognize only the highest scale: the macrocosm, where humanity taken in its totality dissolves into indistinction and confusion, into a grey deracinated and interchangeable mass, where man stands reduced to a faceless cog, with every nuance erased. Such a vision is fundamentally mistaken, for it denies the very nature of man and robs him of the bonds and friendships that make life joyful, and of the responsibilities worthy of sacrifice.

Man is a zoon politikon—a political animal—inscribed in a concrete place, at a concrete moment, bound by concrete relationships and concrete responsibilities. Man is not an atom. Those who posit an abstract man, bearer of abstract rights, uprooted from his historical milieu and measuring all things by the price of coin, are in error: they leave the individual abandoned. They bring about a time when the courage of man fails, when he forsakes his friends and breaks bonds of fellowship. They despoil him of his honour, of his roots and of his identity.

Yet there are others who see in man nothing more than a replaceable cog within the collective, where initiative and responsibility dissolve, and the aspirations of the person are crushed beneath the weight of a depersonalized machine and virtue evaporates amidst the formless mediocrity of the crowd.

These are two equally calamitous errors: the radical individualists, for whom man is but an isolated atom, and the radical collectivists, who reduce him to an anonymous part within an impersonal mechanism.

Our age has produced something more insidious still: the synthesis of radical individualism and amorphous collectivism. In the name of liberalism and globalism, it promises unprecedented liberty, even as it flattens difference, uproots traditions, and effaces every enclave of rootedness. It reacts with hysteria to the mere mention of intermediary bodies, and imposes a subtle yet pervasive Gleichschaltung—a forced alignment that strips identities away until only a grey, indistinct, uprooted crowd remains, all in the name of progress and consumption.

A Man Rooted in Place and Tradition

We insist instead upon the concrete man: man in his concretelocal context, in his concrete time, speaking the local vernacular, within his circle of relations. To consider the concrete man is to affirm the particularity of place—where one feels at home, where the vernacular of the land is spoken, where local cheese takes shape. This local character—this genius loci—develops organically over centuries, taking root in the cadence of the earth, cultivated by ancestors and passed down through memory accumulated by generations. Without the homely fire in the hearth, places are rendered uniform—steel and glass monuments to nothingness.

Man must be considered in the concrete, not in abstraction. Society must cease to be mechanical and become organic once more. A society where one can live, breathe and feel at home.

We call for a society that no longer seeks to standardise man—nor his labor, nor his tongue, nor his thought, nor his cuisine; a society in which the human being is reduced neither to a bureaucratic object of regulation nor to an anonymous number within an impersonal machine, but a place where man is free to rise, to fail, to dream, to act, rather than be processed by the standardised procedure of a bureaucratic apparatus.

We must return to subsidiarity. What has been usurped by higher bodies must be restored to local levels. What belongs to the nation should be decided by the nation; what can rightly be determined by the province must be entrusted to the province; what falls within the competence of the canton must again be decided by the canton. We must fortify intermediary bodies, rehabilitate the primacy of the local, and restore to man genuine agency—the capacity to decide, to act, and to assume real responsibility.

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Leviathan Ascendant: The Peril of Centralisation

Without subsidiarity, bereft of intermediary bodies, nothing remains in this barren and apocalyptic desert to shield the small man from that omnipresent, omnipotent, self-proclaimed omniscient monster—the Leviathan—who in the century past proved the source of immeasurable suffering and countless extinguished lives. Deprived of these intermediary bodies, the small man stands exposed to the tyranny and arbitrariness of Leviathan, facing it alone, naked, stripped of protection.Only the intermediary bodies and their privileges - the family, the association, the guild, the Church, the municipality, the canton, the province, the estates - provide the safe fortification for the helpless individual and shield him from the arbitrariness of power unconstrained by custom, privileges of estates or natural law

This danger is no abstraction. Is not the twentieth century a graveyard of societies that destroyed their organic mediations? The lesson is unmistakable: even today, the technocratic and populist temptations of Leviathan remain undiminished.

We see it in the steady transfer of decision-making from municipalities to distant transnational jurisdictions; in the quiet replacement of custom by regulations; in algorithms that mediate friendship, commerce and rumours; in the global supply chain that renders streets indistinguishable across continents. Local bakers disappear, replaced by standardised franchises, while dialects recede replaced by debased standardised languages filled by anglicisms and slang. Associations wither while platforms expand. Regulations multiply, responsibility evaporates. Decision-making is outsourced to procedures, best-practices, committees or consultants. Such is the zenith of the anthropocentric time, when the individual is said to reign supreme, yet founds himself lost in a labyrinth he neither understands nor has any tool within reach to influence.

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Authority, Power and the Hunger for Leadership

Authority and power are too often conflated. Authority determines what ought to be done; power enforces that determination. Authority is the vision, the decree of what ought to be done; power is the hand that enforces it. Authority precedes power; legitimacy precedes force. Where legitimacy collapses, force expands.

Today, power concentrates as authority dissipates. In the formative periods of our civilization, it was the reverse: principles were discerned by a respected authority and enacted through local power. Now many aspire to power, but few possess legitimate authority.

Power without authority is despotism; authority without power is impotence. Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Absolute power is brute, formless, unrestrained. Many constitutional architectures have sought to contain it. The result has too often been impotent offices occupied by interchangeable stewards driven by ambition rather than vision. Institutions proliferate, but greatness withdraws.

The tragedy of our generation is not merely political dysfunction, but the failure to produce genuine leadership—leadership capable of transcending daily intrigue and embracing a coherent civilizational vision, borne by what Toynbee called a creative minority. A leadership that transcends petty ambition, elevates the spirit, and follows a vision worthy of the ages. One that embodies virtue and obeys the eternal laws of God, homeland and family.

Never has there been such hunger for authentic leadership—leadership that is neither mere management nor fictive authority; where responsibility is not surrendered to committees and procedures, but assumed directly by the concrete man.

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We must rebuild society so that the individual is neither absorbed by the mass nor isolated in sterile individualism; so that the distinctive genius of communities—their customs, dialects, cuisines, and festivals—are not sacrificed upon the altar of universal standardization.

Is this not the central drama of our epoch? Shall we drift into the desert of uniformity, or defend the hope of an organic, differentiated, and flourishing society?

The Eastern regions of the legendarium consist of three regions: the Endless Steppe at the banks of the Deepsea, the Misty Marshes and the Land of Endless Night. In the east lies also the city of Kałwógrod located on the Bagnica River. In case you have missed the previous post on hussars, dwarves, elves and dragons, you may find it here.

Dear traveller, as you wander towards the rising sun, beware, for the expanses are vast. As you to not get lost, beware, for you every step may be watched as if vigilance was spellt into the very rules of these vastly different realms.

Endless Steppe

The Endless Steppe is a surreal landscape. It is a flat, treeless expanse, with vast herds of saigas and wild horses. It is populated by nomadic horsemen, living in yurts, masters of the bow and arrow, and experts in throwing the lasso. Their cuisine relies on dairy products—milk, cheese, yoghurt—and fermented mare’s milk, which serves both as drink and ritual offering. The most common meat is mutton, while breads and cereals are rare and treasured.

The steppe is a land of both freedom and peril. Travelers who stray from the rivers risk being swallowed by the horizon, lost in its unending monotony. Storms sweep with sudden violence and temperatures vary greatly from night to day. Wolves, foxes and eagles patrol the plains and skies. The nomads learn from childhood to read the signs in the grass, the patterns of the grass, to read the shapes of clouds, to recognise slight features in the monotonous landscape.

The nomads of the Endless Steppe are tall, lean, and wiry, shaped by constant riding across the treeless plains. Their hair is dark and braided for practicality, while clothing is functional yet ornate, made from leather, wool, felt, and furs, often embroidered with symbols of lineage, herds, or personal deeds. Every nomad is trained from childhood in horseback riding, archery, and lassoing, while tending vast herds of horses, saigas, and sheep. Life is clan-based: extended families form ulus, led by councils of elders, war leaders, and shamans. Leadership is temporary, earned through skill, courage, and wisdom. Seasonal migrations, raiding, and trade shape their lives, while craftsmanship—leatherwork, bow-making, and saddle-carving—marks each clan with distinct pride. Their exploits are sung in epic tales, to the rhythm of the drum and from the depths of the belly - they celebrate bravery, cunning and endurance.

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Misty Marshes

To the east of Hussaria lie the Misty Marshes. In the shadows of impenetrable forests stretches a land of bogs and swamps, where the river itself loses direction in a maze of slow-flowing branches, ponds, and dead arms of the main current. From morning till midday, the air hangs thick with shimmering mists. The buzzing of mosquitoes and other small insects fills the stillness, while frogs, fish, and waterfowl move silently beneath the surface. Reeds and willows bend over the water, and mud-cracked banks glimmer with the traces of creatures unseen.

The Misty Marshes are home to the Swampborn. Not human, they are vodníki—wotnicks, with muddy-colored skin, slightly elongated, webbed fingers for swimming, and lungs that allow them to breathe both air and water. Their large, prominent front teeth, reminiscent of beavers, and circular ears set them apart further.

Living in stilted huts on the riverbanks or small islands, the Swampborn navigate their watery lands in dugout canoes. Nets and traps are their tools, but the waters also hold ritual and play: children dive through the reeds in sun-dappled pools, elders bless the river at seasonal festivals, and processions of small carved poles mark the high-water celebrations.

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Kałwógrod

To the east of Hussaria stands the city of Kałwógrod, a beacon of order and memory, set at the bridge of the Bagnica, where the river still holds a clear and disciplined course before collapsing into the endless Misty Marshes further south.

Kałwógrod rises like a cathedral of shining bronze upon twin hills overlooking the crossing. On the western hill stands the Cathedral of the Bare Hill, its vertical spire bathed in sunlight, its bells resonating for miles unending. The Bare Hill itself is a hollow mound of pale sandstone, where no grass has ever grown.

Upon the eastern hill stands the High Citadel, a walled castle encircled by three rings of terraced fortifications. At the heart of its courtyard rises the circular Eagle Tower, crowned with a great bronze eagle’s head facing eastward, gazing over the Winged Fields beyond the city. Set into the eyes of the eagle are vast telescopes, said to see farther than should be possible, watching both the plain and the approaching night.

The Winged Field stretch eastwards - a wide plain of golden grasses sweeping in the wind. From a distance, the Winged Field seems serene and endless, yet the more careful observer notices patterns in the grasses, shallow hollows where the ground has settled differently, narrow funnels and patterns of oddly arranged stones, whose meaning has long been forgotten. The plain is overlooked by birds of prey - eagles, falcons, vultures, eyeing corpses below. At the edge of the horizon, the land gradually folds into hills, a natural barrier marked by megalithic pillars run down by countless time from weather, covered by lichen and the smallest of grasses.

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The Land of Endless Night

Beyond the Winged Field and the Misty Marshes, several weeks’ journey to the east begins the Land of Endless Night — a place where sunlight dims, and the land itself remains shrouded in twilight even at the noon hour. Trees grow twisted and dark, their branches heavy with leaves that seem to drink the scant sunlight. Rivers run sluggish, dark with silt and shadow, and the wind carries a perpetual moan, as if the land itself warns any traveler who dares trespass. The terrain is uneven, broken by ridges, crags, and abrupt pits, with black stones etched with mysterious runes scattered seemingly at random.

The Moggurds

This blighted land is home to the Moggurds (English rendering of the original mągurdzi): a humanoid race of stocky, muscular build, with broad shoulders, thick necks, and heavy limbs. Slightly shorter than humans, they move with surprising agility for their bulk. Their skin ranges from brown to ochre, earthy to ashen, often scarred from battles, with red, black, or ochre markings symbolizing clan allegiance or commemorating victories. Their rugged faces bear strong square jaws, flat noses, and thick brows, while their lower canines extend upward like saber-teeth, giving them a predatory grimace. Eyes are typically amber or ochre, glowing faintly in the land’s perpetual darkness. Dark brown or black hair is common, and their slightly pointed ears peek through in some individuals.

Moggurds dress in layers of leather and fur, often reinforced with chainmail or plate armor. Spiked pauldrons and circular wooden shields mark their readiness for combat. They favor brutal, direct weapons — axes, sabres, and spears — wielded with strength and precision, their style honed for the broken, treacherous terrain of their homeland.

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The Land

The land itself mirrors their rule: lawless in appearance, yet ruled by terror and ritual. Elders and warleaders dominate their clans with iron will; superstition and myth are weaponized to keep the masses compliant. Any intruder who dares cross the endless forests and twilight plains risks vanishing, or worse: becoming part of the ritualized horrors that sustain the Moggurds’ dominion. Watchfires flicker across the steppe like scattered warning beacons, and every darkened hill or pit is a testament to the cruelty that governs this nightmare realm — a land where history is rewritten in blood and memory serves only power.

On the highest ridges of the Land of Endless Night, blackened onion domes rise like frozen flames, their frost-crusted surfaces glinting with the faintest light. Beneath them, riders sweep across the plains, clad in dark cloaks that swallow the wind, their mounts equally shadowed and skeletal. No banners flutter from their saddles, no herald proclaims their passage — only the sharp glint of bronze sabres and the low, mournful clatter of hooves on frost-hardened earth.

The Enforcers

These riders are feared even among the Moggurds: silent, relentless, and impossible to reason with. Faces are hidden beneath helms or veils of shadow, revealing only eyes that shine with cold intelligence, like coals smoldering in the endless dusk. Wherever they pass, the land itself seems to recoil: grasses blacken, the wind carries whispers of terror, and even the rivers slow, as if avoiding their path.

Legends say they are neither wholly alive nor dead — watchers of the towers, enforcers of forgotten rites, the emissaries of a power older than the Moggurds themselves. Some claim they can summon storms or frost with a gesture, or bend the minds of men and beasts to obedience. Their presence transforms any plain into a landscape of dread: invisible lines mark territories where even the toughest clans hesitate to roam, and the faintest echo of hooves sends shivers across the land.

The Enforcers- that´s what they are called, serve a power stronger than themselves: the Eternal Regent, whose true name is not even uttered, and as such few actually know it - a lord of dread whose true nature is unknown, even whether he is truly alive or undead, whether he is a man or moggurd corrupted by dark sorcery. His will is absolute, commanding terror, blood rituals and submission: no Moggurd clan dares to oppose it.

The Eternal Regent reigns from the Tower of Endless Night: a colossal blackened onion-shaped spire: its walls are built of dark stone, veined with frost and shadow, as if the land itself had risen and crystallized into a fortress. Beneath it are hidden vaults and dungeons, constantly echoing the torment of tortured prisoners. The tower is ancient, older than the memory of any Moggurd clan, and some say it is alive, feeding on the darkness and the fear of the land. From its ramparts, all the Land of Endless Night can be surveyed — the forests, ridges, and twisted rivers stretch endlessly, yet every approach can be observed.

The Land of Endless Night is a kingdom of shadow under a single, terrifying authority, but it is not a kingdom in the conventional sense: the Regent does not care for the prosperity of the land, only the perpetuation of its own dominion and the constant subjugation of all who dwell within. Tribes of Moggurds may govern themselves in minor matters, but the shadow of the Tower and its riders ensures no clan or faction can grow beyond the shadow.

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We shall pause here in our tour of the Polish legendarium, before we wander into the inhospitable lands up north, dominated by the Tower of the Iron Law.

This exercise projects modern territorial borders onto the demographic, religious, and logistical realities of the year 1337 in order to test whether such borders could plausibly crystallize into durable political entities under late medieval conditions. Political authority is assumed to decay rapidly beyond areas of regular taxation, communication, and troop movement. The main resource used for demographics from that time are maps from Europa Universalis V development diaries¹. In the previous part dedicated on simulating North Africa and Western Asia I went to some lengths explaining the limits of the model.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan

In 1337, the territory of present-day Kazakhstan is populated predominantly by groups identifying themselves as Uzbeks—named after the ulus of Öz Beg Khan—while speaking a Kipchak Turkic language. Although unified by a broadly shared nomadic lifestyle and linguistic continuum, the sheer spatial scale of the steppe undermines durable political cohesion.

Two peripheral regions would almost certainly detach. In the west, along the Caspian Sea, the Nogais form a distinct political and ecological unit. In the southeast, between Lake Balkhash and the Tian Shan, Karluk-speaking populations gravitate away from the steppe core.

A deeper fault line runs along the Syr Darya. The southern riverine belt differs sharply from the rest of Dasht-i Kipchak by its Sunni Islamic persuasion, while the central and northern steppe remains predominantly Tengriist. The Karluk regions of Zhetysu would gravitate toward Kyrgyzstan, while the lower Syr Darya, centred on Kyzylorda, would persist as a small but distinct khanate anchored in irrigated agriculture and trade.

Kyrgyzstan

In 1337, most of present-day Kyrgyzstan is inhabited by Karluk populations. With the partial exception of Batken and Osh—already oriented toward the Ferghana Valley—the mountainous core would form the nucleus of a Karluk polity. This state, here termed Karlukistan, would naturally extend into the wider region of Zhetysu (Semirechye), where ecological continuity and shared pastoral routes favour political integration.

Mongolia

Mongolia’s modern borders appear strikingly resilient when projected onto 1337. Ecologically unified as steppe and semi-steppe, religiously coherent through Tengriism, and linguistically integrated by Mongolic speech, the region forms a stable civilisational zone. The presence of Oirat groups in the west does not meaningfully threaten this integrity.

Mongolia should not be imagined as a centralised state, but rather as a nomadic civilisational field—capable of repeated political recomposition without losing its structural coherence.

Tajikistan

With the exception of Upper Badakhshan, the territory of modern Tajikistan would be absorbed into the Transoxanian successor state centred on Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva. Upper Badakhshan, isolated by altitude and defined by its Pamiri languages and Ismaili Shia religion, would survive as a small but resilient mountain principality, protected by remoteness rather than power.

Turkmenistan

In 1337, Turkmenistan would likely cohere only in its western half, where desert nomadism and strong tribal structures prevail. The Merv oasis would gravitate toward Herat, while the southeastern fringes would orient themselves toward Bukhara. Despite isolation, the western Turkmen lands could maintain political continuity through tribal cohesion and a shared nomadic culture.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan, when projected onto 1337, reveals deep internal fragmentation. The Aral Sea region is largely Turkmen; the Ferghana Valley, Bukhara, and Samarkand are predominantly Tajik; Tashkent is Karluk; and Sogdia as a whole would be not Turkic Karluk-speaking but actually Tajik. While Transoxania retains a strong economic core, the absence of a unifying ethno-political identity makes the survival of Uzbekistan in its modern borders implausible under late medieval conditions.

Summary: Central Asia

Western Central Asia undergoes the most dramatic transformation. Former Kazakhstan fragments into two Tengriist khanates: the Nogai Khanate in the west and Dasht-i Kipchak across the central and northern steppe. To the south, Kyzylorda persists as a small Syr Darya khanate, while Karlukistan emerges from the union of Kyrgyzstan, southeastern Kazakhstan, and Tashkent.

Southwestern Central Asia consolidates around two poles: a western Turkmen state and Mawarannahr as a dominant regional power encompassing much of modern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Upper Badakhshan remains a mountain principality, while Merv aligns with Herat.

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Eastern Asia

China

China in 1337 remains a recognisable civilisation-state. Its bureaucratic tradition allows it to transcend internal linguistic and cultural diversity: Jin in Shanxi, Wu in Zhejiang, Min in Fujian, Gan in Jiangxi, Xiang in Hunan, Yue in Guangdong, and Shu in the Sichuan Basin coexist within a shared administrative and civilisational framework.

Beyond this agrarian core, however, Chinese governance rapidly loses traction. Dongbei (later Manchuria), inhabited by Tungusic-speaking Jurchen populations, lies outside the reach of durable bureaucratic control. Inner Mongolia likewise resists incorporation: nomadic steppe ecology renders sedentary administration ineffective, drawing the region instead into the Mongolian confederacy.

Xinjiang (East Turkestan) is too distant and ecologically distinct to sustain meaningful governance from China. It fragments into three zones: a northern Oirat Tengriist polity, a Buddhist Uyghur state around Qocho, and a Karluk-dominated polity centred on Kashgar.

The Tibetan Plateau quickly slips from Chinese authority. High altitude, remoteness, a written language, Buddhist institutions, and the persistence of Bon traditions allow Tibet to cohere as an independent civilisational entity. Qinghai follows a similar trajectory: dominated by Amdo Tibetans but incorporating Salar, Yugur, and Monguor communities, it forms a distinct highland buffer zone.

Other regions likely to detach include western Sichuan (Kham and Gyalrong areas), Yunnan (dominated by Yi with a significant Bai presence), Guangxi (Zhuang), and Hainan, which emerges as an independent Hlai polity. Guizhou fragments into a Hmong confederation interspersed with autonomous tusi chiefdoms, including Kam polities. The detachment of the these latter areas appears not as necessary, but as a consequence of the general instability of China as it would struggle to maintain control over other peripheral regions.

Taiwan (Formosa) remains a separate island confederation, unified primarily by geography.

Japan

Japan in 1337—excluding Hokkaido and the Ryukyus—forms a stable civilisational unit. Geography, language, and the syncretic Shinto–Buddhist religious complex bind Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku together. Political fragmentation occurs internally through competing daimyo rather than through territorial secession.

Peripheral regions diverge: Ryukyu and Ainu Hokkaido, culturally and ethnically distinct, assume independent trajectories.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula in 1337 constitutes a coherent geographical and cultural whole, legible from a single administrative centre. Absent any structural reason for division, a north–south split would not persist. Only the northeastern fringes of Hamgyong—ethnically Jurchen and culturally distinct—fall outside the Korean civilisational sphere.

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Northern Asia

The modern Russian Federation spans immense ecological and spatial gradients. In 1337, no ruler based in Moscow could meaningfully comprehend—let alone govern—such an expanse. Analysis therefore proceeds by modern federal districts, treated as heuristic rather than anachronistic units1.

Central Federal District: Muscovy

The Muscovite heartland forms a viable medieval polity: linguistically cohesive (Muscovite and Ryazanian dialects), Orthodox, and supported by dense river networks. As a grand principality, it possesses the demographic and logistical depth to endure.

Northwestern Federal District: Novgorod

This region coheres around Novgorod on Lake Ilmen, drawing on strong mercantile and republican traditions. It plausibly retains Pskov, Novgorod, Vologda, Arkhangelsk, Leningrad Oblast, and southern Karelia. More distant territories fragment: Pruthenian chiefdoms slip away along the Baltic; Komi chieftains dominate the eastern forests; Nenets and Sámi societies persist as circumpolar tribal zones.

Volga Federal District: Kazan and its Neighbours

The Volga Federal District (see Paradox´s revised map here) remains ethnically vaired. Nizhny Novgorod aligns with Muscovy, while Mordovia, Mari-El, Udmurtia, and Permia emerge as independent Uralic polities. The dominant power is Tatarstan, centred on Kazan and controlling the Volga–Kama confluence. This Sunni-majority but religiously plural state absorbs Ulyanovsk, Samara, parts of Tambov and Vyatka, and western Orenburg.

Chuvashia survives independently, both through its distinct pagan identity and as a buffer between Muscovy and Kazan. Bashkortostan, incorporating much of Orenburg and southern Perm, forms a mixed Bashkir–Chiyalik polity, preserving traces of early Ugric populations related to the Magyars.

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Southern and Caucasus Federal District

Outside the Caucasus proper, the lower Volga is dominated by Tatar populations—Astrakhani, Mishar, and Crimean—with no Kalmyks present at this time. An Astrakhan Tatar state controls the Volga–Don corridor, projecting power toward the Sea of Azov and upstream to Saratov. Islam predominates in urban riverine centres, while Tengriism persists among nomads.

The republics at the northern foothills of the Caucasus are quick to assume independence: Adygea includes also parts of the Krasnodar Krai south of the Kuban River; slightly further east the Kabards and Balkars establish their mountain federation, followed by Alania(North Ossetia) and Vainakhia. Dagestan is a multilingual and multireligious place ( there are cantons populated by pagans and Orthodoxes,) with Kumyak and Avar being the two widespread languages. Dagestan is structured as a confederacy: authority remains granular and Dagestan as such is a micro-political mosaic.

Crimea divides naturally. The southern coast, Pontic-speaking and Orthodox, orients across the Black Sea toward Pontus, while the steppe interior—Tatar and religiously mixed—aligns with polities along the northern Black Sea coast.

Urals Federal District

The northernmost areas would constitute themselves as distinct chiefdoms: the Nenets in Yamal, the Khanty in Yugra, the Mansi in larger parts of Yekaterinburg oblast (with the exception of the southernmost parts). Tyumen, along with Kurgan, Omsk and Novosibirsk would stand as the core of the Siberian Horde, standing as a major Turkic Tengri country in the forest-steppe belt of Siberia.

Siberian Federal District

Western Siberia integrates into the Siberian Horde. Tomsk emerges as a Selkup (Samoyedic) chiefdom. Altai forms a multi-tribal confederation encompassing Altai Krai, Altai Republic, and Kemerovo. Krasnoyarsk fragments: Enetsia forms on the Taymyr Peninsula; Evenkia detaches; Ket dominate the central Yenisei; the south aligns with Khakassia. Tuva persists as a small mountain polity. Irkutsk coalesces into an independent Buryatia, while present-day Buryatia itself is populated by related Mongolic groups rather than Buryats proper.

Far Eastern Federal District

This vast region lacks the density for unified statehood. Buryatia and Zabaykalsky Krai integrate into the Mongolian confederacy. Amur Oblast is Evenk-dominated; Primorsky Krai is Udege; Khabarovsk Krai forms an Amur Basin polity incorporating Nivkh, Ulch, Oroch, and Evenk populations, extending to northern Sakhalin. Southern Sakhalin remains Ainu.

Chukotka and Kamchatka exist as separate tribal chiefdoms. Magadan fragments three ways: western areas align with Lamut kin; coastal zones join Kamchatka; inland territories gravitate toward Yukaghir lands. Sakha (Yakutia) fragments as well: Evenk regions in the northwest detach, Yukaghir territories beyond the Verkhoyansk Range separate, while the Lena basin remains under Yakut control

Summary

The emerging pattern reveals much about how the ethnic, religious and civilisational patterns have altered significantly since 1337. While Korea, Japan and Korea stood largely within their present-day borders, distance and different ethnic make up would put into question the continued persistence of the borders of Russia, China and the -stan countries of Central Asia. The difficulty of extending political control into harsh and remote climate zones would see the retreat of Russia and China back to their civilisational cores.

Out of the sedentary countries, important regional powers include China, Japan, Korea, Mawarannahr and Muscovy, to some extent also Novgorod. The large nomadic polities - Mongolia, Dasht-i-Kipchak, Siberian Horde, Astrakhan lack a centralised bureaucracy but are perpetuated by shared ecology, culture and mobility.

The simulation reveals dozens of peripheral polities assuming independece, in mountain fastnesses or forbidding climates. Tibet, Circassia, Vainakhia, Tuva, Chukotka - all these take advantage of the fact that projecting power therein is more costly than potential benefits obtained.

Taken together, this exercise reveals, the possibility of power projection relies on technology, that was absent back in 1337, and how some capitals today exert power over valleys and forests that were terra incognita a few centuries ago.

Spain. A country that lost the last remnants of its empire in 1898, when the Americans carved out Cuba and the Philippines. A question hovered in the air: why did Spain decline? Ramiro de Maeztu seeks an answer. He writes Defensa de la Hispanidad.

The Thesis

His thesis: Spain has a historical mission. That mission is to proclaim to all corners of the world the Good News. The historical mission of the Hispanic nations lies in announcing to all people on earth that, if they so will, they may be saved—and that this depends on their faith and their will (p. 73); the unity of the human species and the essential unity of mankind, grounded in the possibility of salvation (p. 195). All people may be saved; all people may be damned (p. 97).

The day Diego Laínez presented this idea at the Council of Trent, on October 26, 1546, is considered by Maeztu the most important day of hispanidad (p. 111). The significance of that day is clear to him: on that day, the moral unity of humanity was preserved (p. 112)—a question that in the first half of the 21st century is perhaps just as important as it was when Maeztu built his thesis upon it, and just as relevant as on the day it was first declared.

Maeztu’s answer to the question of Spain’s decline is as follows: It is evident that all our problems can be reduced to one: the loss of our national ideal. Our ideal lay in faith and in spreading it throughout the world. After the loss of faith came indifference (p. 292).

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Its Implications

From this single thesis, Maeztu unfolds his entire work. For consider this: if man could not convert, if he could not change, what meaning would laws have? (p. 92)

From this thesis he also derives his observations on economics. He praises the model of limited partnerships and the market economy. Freedom of enterprise is tied to a firm belief in the possibility of saving all people on earth. The point is to provide everyone with an opportunity that allows him to improve his position in the world. This does not mean that all will seize it, for many are called, but few are chosen (p. 136). As a remedy for economic difficulties, he prescribes the following: All institutions should be organized in such a way that the highest positions correspond to the greatest perseverance and sacrifice, so that all people may hope that if they strive, they will be rewarded with an honorable and respected old age (p. 140). He recalls times when people of all skin colors were convinced that there existed a Castilian king who would uphold justice if necessary (p. 274).

In diagnosing the crisis Spain faced, Maeztu did not spare the spheres of education and politics. Educational systems—and encyclopedic gymnasiums in particular—do not raise working men, but rather meek souls who will require the protection of some state institution in order to secure their daily bread (p. 171). The result is a constant growth in bureaucratic positions and administrative apparatuses, which expand inexorably over time. He ultimately concludes: The continuous increase of public expenditure has become a historical law for all nations. Thus states are no longer protective shields of nations, but cancers that consume them. The worst thing, however, is not the increase of public spending, but the fact that it is supported by the very representative regime that was established to restrain it (p. 178). As he observes: No one guards the guardians; no one protects us from the state that should protect us. And the very ideal that inspired the creation of modern states is now being questioned (p. 180).

Maeztu explicitly warned against omnipotent statism and prescribed the following medicine: From now on, educated minorities must prepare to seize the first favorable opportunity to tame the monster and reduce the functions of the state to what they ought to be: justice harmonizing the interests of different classes, national defense, peace, good example, and the guardianship of higher culture. For this democratic state—payer of voters and provider of jobs—is nothing but barbarism, and its successor must already be sought (p. 216).

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The Antitheses

In formulating his thesis, Maeztu consciously defined himself against its antitheses.

The first antithesis, against which Spaniards fought for centuries during the Reconquista, was Muslim fatalism. It lies in the denial of the possibility of conversion, of change. It lies in the impossibility of forgiveness and, in its consequences, denies the efficacy of the sacrament of reconciliation.

For the German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler, it is precisely the sacrament of contritionthat is the primary sacrament of our—his words—Faustian civilization. There is no other culture in which the personal life of the living man, the conscientious reflection of each feature, has been so important, for this alone required accounts be rendered in words(… )This peculiar liberation of the will is to us so necessary that the refusal of absolution drives to despair, even to destruction(…) It may be said that no other institution in no other religion has brought so much happiness to the world as this1. That is Spengler on the civilizational importance of confession and forgiveness. But let us return to Maeztu.

The second antithesis lies in the denial that all people may be saved. It manifests itself in various forms: in the postulation of one’s own tribe as the chosen people, a nation destined to rule the world—or conversely in the belief that “savages” are superior to the civilized (p. 126). In our own time, this has translated into the ideology of white guilt, which divides the world into innocent victims of colonialism and reprehensible oppressors. There is no room left for individual free will—only for collective guilt.

A Celebration of Empire?

Defensa de la Hispanidad is exactly what its title claims: a defense of Spanishness. The reader will hardly find criticism of the excesses of the conquistadores, such as Pizarro’s execution of Atahualpa even after the agreed ransom was paid. Against the charge that the book is an uncritical glorification of the Spanish Empire, it is difficult to argue. And yet Maeztu demonstrates that the system had its strengths.

He shows how the Spaniards were able to guarantee stability over vast parts of the American continent from the time of the conquistadors with a relatively small military presence. Evidence that his thesis rests on historical reality is the fact that while the United States celebrated in 1962 the graduation of its first African American student, James Meredith, Spain already knew Juan Latino in 1556—a graduate of the University of Granada and the first professor of African descent in the West. As early as 1511, the voice of Antonio de Montesinos rang out from a Dominican pulpit2 on Hispaniola, accusing the encomenderos of mortal sin for their mistreatment of the Indians—proof that the principle of the equality of souls and the possibility of salvation was not a later rationalization, but the original core of the Hispanic project. Maeztu recalls the Laws of Burgos (1512), by which the Spanish Crown prohibited the enslavement of Indians, guaranteed their personal freedom, restricted abuses of the encomienda system, and required that conversions be voluntary. While Anglo-Americans expelled the Five Civilized Tribes from the American Southeast into ever-shrinking reservations, Indians were subjects of the Spanish king in the same sense as fishermen from Galicia.

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A Catholic Political Vision Critical of Corruption

Ramiro de Maeztu is, like all of us, a son of his time. His work represents a remarkable attempt to construct an autonomous political identity grounded in Catholicism—defined against collectivist models in the Soviet Union and Germany, and against the weaknesses of democracy itself. Precisely because Maeztu understands empire primarily as a moral order, his critique of the modern state is more than merely political.

He does not hesitate to criticize party clientelism, as in the following passage: They did not wish to see what the experience of all nations shows: that democracy is a system that consolidates itself only by distributing fates and advantages among voters, until it leads to the ruin of the state—and that it nowhere establishes itself unless people are first deceived by promises of the impossible or by systematic slander of former rulers (p. 103). This critique resonates with earlier objections raised by Donoso Cortés against corruption in liberal regimes, where all have necessary to become corrupters or corrupted(…) The kings corrupt the ministers by promising them eternity; the ministers the king, by promising them an expansion of their prerogative.The ministers corrupt the representatives of the people by placing all the dignities of the state at their feet; the assemblies corrupt the ministers. The members traffic with their power, the electors with their influence; all corrupt the masses with their promises, and the masses corrupt all with their clamour and threats.3 Returning from the digression of Donoso Cortés, let us return to Ramiro de Maeztu.

Yet Maeztu does not locate the problem of the modern political order solely in the growth of the state, but also in the moral hollowing-out of liberal slogans themselves. Liberty, equality, and fraternity—meant to be universal principles—become in practice instruments of selective power.

What happened to the dream of freedom for all doctrines, for all associations? A privilege for friends, a concession to enemies on the condition that they remain obedient. Equality is openly denied from above: friends cannot be treated the same as enemies. Fraternity has turned into an insatiable and eternal resentment toward all or nearly all ruling classes of the old regime. And this is not it, say those who expected something else. Some blame the malice of the rulers, others the malice of the ruled (p. 103).

Defensa de la Hispanidad may therefore ultimately not be merely a celebration of the Spanish Empire. It is a reminder of the foundational principles of Catholic anthropology. It reminds us that we need not blindly follow foreign models. Its thesis—that every human being may be saved or damned—its emphasis on individual responsibility, shatters the entire progressive division between oppressors and oppressed, and offers hope to anyone who has been mercilessly cancelled. His critique of statism and clientelism, meanwhile, names with surprising precision the afflictions of contemporary politics.

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The Centre

At the centre of this world stands Hussaria, proud and tall, a realm of open plains and broad rivers, famed above all for its winged hussars. It is a land shaped by aristocratic virtue: honour sworn rather than written, courage proven in battle, and chivalry understood as a moral duty rather than a courtly ornament. Its people are capable of immense collective and individual heroism, rising in moments of peril with a unity that astonishes friend and foe alike.

Hussaria stands grandiose, yet its greatness bears the weight of age. Behind the façades of ancient lineages and ancestral banners lies a quiet sense of exhaustion, as if the realm lives more in remembrance than in renewal. Power rests with the nobility, whose freedoms are vast and jealously guarded; kings rule, but only by persuasion and prestige, not command. Councils stretch into endless debate, and every reform fractures into a dozen rival visions, each defended as the true inheritance of the past.

Thus the realm is paralysed by its own virtues. Honour becomes pride, liberty becomes obstruction, tradition becomes immobility. The nobles stand divided by faction, ambition, and personal vanity, each convinced of his unique role as saviour of the realm. And yet, when the banners are raised and the enemy rides into the plains, Hussaria remembers itself. Old rivalries fall silent, wings are fastened once more, and for a fleeting moment the realm becomes what it has always believed itself to be.

The South

Hussaria´s southern border is formed at the start of the coniferous forest at the foot of jagged peaks. This is the Highlander country, where people build wooden chalets and spend their days shepherding on the mountain meadows. Their people are tough and durable, but quick to anger. It is a communal country, where no castles nor nobles are to be found. They are known for their long hair, their hats

Across the Highlander country stands Atulia: the land of the fabled horse archer and falconers, a people whose tongue is foreign though their temperament is one with Hussaria. Atulians are noble and trusted allies, fierce and loyal.

Dwarven Realms

The Dwarves are of stockier build and lower height, their mighty beards and their large noses are well-known. They have a tendency to the study of substances: minerals and metals, and from there, alchemy follows. Dwarven alchemists have discovered the uses of gunpowder and their soldiers use arquebuses. The temperament of the Dwarves of Jan Lechowicz is slightly different than of Tolkien. They are great lovers of culture, writers of chronicles, they are not driven by greed, but by carving for eternity, by preserving memory. They are practical and down-to-earth, pun intended. The Dwarves are of course known for their beards, which are however solely the domain of male Dwarves. Female Dwarves are clean-faced, known instead for exceptionally long hair, often bound or braided in intricate styles denoting clan and craft.

At the southwestern borders of Husssaria lies the Silver Gate - the largest gateway to the underground dwarven city of the Salten Keep : a wondrous city carved into salt and stone, with halls of salt, monumental cathedrals and statues, one of builders, artisans and sculptors. Salten Keep is just the first and largest part of the realm of the Saltkeepers. Few know the true extent of their realm, but their network of tunnels is said to run across the underground of the whole of Hussaria, with archives, libraries and hidden forges. The Saltlands shine even in the darkness as Dwarven alchemists discovered minerals that glow and glitter in the dark. In their vast caverns, they cultivate forests of mushrooms. The cuisine of the saltkeepers consists of salt-cured or smoked meats, like beef and venison, sausages, hard cheeses, rye, several varieties of mushrooms, dried herbs, and various minerals. Foods that endure.

Separated by the Eagle Mountains, one arrives to the Beerhold Halls: a land of brewers, scribes and artisans, of the jovial and down-to-earth Beerbeard Clan. They are jovial, down-to-earth and eternall sceptic. What is the point of all that heroism, they ask? Why not just close the doors to the Beerhold Halls and let them fight it out, while we feast in our underground halls? The Beerbeards are witty. They somehow think that they know better, and everyone else are slight fools. They are masters of compliance by non compliance. Their cuisine is known for beer in every colour, for the abundance of pork and mushrooms, cabbage and bacon. Meats glazed with honey, a feast for laughter.

A third clan of the Dwarves are known as the Exiles. They are scattered for their ancient homeland was conquered and found refuge in Hussaria. They live in walled neighbourhoods and commit themselves to trade and money-dealings. They are a nation of scribes - it is said that their walled neighbourhoods contain vast libraries.

The Exiles prepare inherited recipes of salted fish, flat bread, honey cakes, nuts, seeds and porridge.

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The West

The West in this legendarium consists of three important realms. Two of these are Elvish lands. The Elves of this legendarium are more versatile than humans, with a deep connection with nature, with the song of the forest and sounds of the streams. The Elves are in general slightly higher than humans by a few centimetres, their waists are slimmer. With strong concentration, they can understand the language and the song of the birds. The Elves are masters of endurance. Their appearance differs from humans by the presence of rudimentary antlers on the males. These antlers grow slowly, and are shed at ceremonial rituals. The female Elves do not have antlers, but their hair grows like living vines, with small leaves of the colour of their hair - which subtly responds to the changing colour of the surroundings. Flowers bloom along the vines with seasons: paler ones in spring, deep reds in yellow, muted amber and browns in autumn, while silver ones in winter. Elvish girls and weave these into garlands and braids. Elves- both men and women - are decorated with tattoos, glowing subtly in dew and mist and undermoonlight. The Elves have naturally a lifespan of around 300 years.

The northernmost is the Amber Coast - an Elven land at the sandy coasts, populated by pirates and merchants, armed with circular shields and wielding battle axes. They see themselves as the sons of the raven. Their hair is blonde, with braided beards. The Amberborn hold their biggest feast in the Winter Solstice, and worship in meadows amidst the deep oak forests, where they come in torched processions and drink mead - the drink that remembers both amber and the warmth of the sun in the cold winter day. The Winter Solstice sees the Amberborn shed their antlers. They feast on hunted game: wysents, aurochs, bovines and deer.

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The Forest Elves are master archers and hunters, their eyes attuned to the subtle motions of the forest, their senses so acute they can discern the language of the birds and the song of the streams. Both sexes know every plant, every herb, and every fruit that grows in their lands; their lives are bound to the rhythms of the forest. Their cloaks are greyish-green, allowing them to vanish among the trunks and shadows, and their movements are fluid and silent. Male elves bear rudimentary antlers, subtle nods to the spirits of the forest, while female elves are unadorned in this regard but are often crowned with flowers, feathers, or braided vines. Both are equally adept in archery, hunting, and forest lore, though females specialize in herbalism, healing, and communicating with the natural spirits.

Silverpine Mountains

To the south of Deepwood and the Beerhold Halls, and to the west of Atulia stand the Silverpine Mountains - a series of jagged peaks with snow-capped peaks and glaciers, deep valleys and scattered lakes. Some of the remote valleys of the Silverpine Mountains are home to dragons, while others are under control of the Silverpine Oathbond - a confederation of disparate mountain valleys, whose oath of union is renewed every year at the mountain meadow on Midsummer. Some slopes of the Silverpine Mountains are covered with vineyards, while others are cow-pastures or covered in forests. The Silverpine mountaineers are known for their cheese and wine making, their craftsmen for precision, their warriors as expert pikemen and crossbowmen.

The dragons of this legendarium are tetrapods related to tuatara1: their front legs became wings, while their hind legs retain the function of movement on grounds. The dragons have developped the parietal or so-called third eye on their forehead even further than their tuatara relatives inhabiting the earth. It detects cycles, not only those of the day, but also of the sun and moon. The dragons of Silverpine live in mountain environments, tolerating cold and snow far better than other reptiles. Their length from head to tail is on average 5 meters for the adults, with some 7 meters of wingspan and a lifetime of 300 to 400 years. The largest ones may measure slightly over 6 meters and have a wingspan of slightly more than 8 meters.

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The dragons of the Silverpine Mountains dwell in high alpine environments, tolerating cold and snow far better than their distant relatives. They spend their nights in caves and burrows, emerging during the day to bask on sun-warmed rock faces and mountain slopes.

Though outsiders speak of dragons breathing fire, the truth is more restrained. Their glands produce a volatile, vividly coloured chemical which, under conditions of low humidity and in contact with certain airborne dusts, may ignite. Such events are rare, unpredictable, and dependent on weather and terrain — yet they have sufficed to give rise to fearful legends.

The relationship between men and dragons in the Silverpine Mountains is governed by an ancient rite known as the Full Moon Offering. On the first day after the full moon when neither rain, snow, nor violent winds prevail, men from the surrounding valleys gather at the Dragon Circle — a megalithic structure standing at the threshold of the dragon valley.

There they offer twelve cows, or in winter twenty-four, and summon the dragons by sounding the dragon horn, blown at a low frequency felt more than heard. In times of famine, horses are offered instead; in leaner years, sheep; and in the darkest recollections of the past, even dogs. As the dragons are known to shed their skins, sometimes, as a gesture of goodwill, they would bring the shedded skin to the humans at the Full Moon Offering. Such a gesture is highly prized and celebrated, and aldermen who received such a gift are seen with great respect. It is valued for its use as clothing and armour and saddles, it is displayed in townhalls, its oils are famed for their medicinal properties. Costumes made entirely from dragonskin are worn for the most solemn ocasions - weddings, the Midsummer Oath-Renewal, the installation of new aldormen.

Corylia

Beyond the Silverpine passes lies Corylia, a land that is neither kingdom nor empire, but an order.

Terracotta towns, olive and walnut groves, vineyards, and wheat fields define its gentle hills. Everything is proportioned; nothing excessive. Cities of pale stone and warm brick gather around forums and loggias. Towers rise for bells and clocks, not war.

At each city’s heart stands a Loggia of Judgment, open to light and air. Law here must be visible, or it becomes tyranny.

Libraries and schools are everywhere. Writing is sacred; false record a grave sin. Corylians are human — shaped by memory, discipline, and restraint. Eloquence is prized above strength. Their plates are filled with fine bread and pasta of all shapes and sizes, cheese, vegetables and wild game, all flavoured with olive oil and a rich variety of herbs, its cups overflowing with the best of wine.

They see themselves as the fountain of true faith — not through prophecy, but custody. Revelation is complete; their task is preservation. Theology is architectural, truths laid stone upon stone.

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To Be Continued

Here ends the first part of the gazetteer of the Polish legendarium, exploring Hussaria, and the lands to its west and southwest. Described were the dwarves, elves and dragons. What remains to be explored are the expanses of the east and north, with their two towers.

Drop a comment, if any particular idea resonates strongly, or if you found any reference to some specific historical event.

And then I remembered. I remembered the early game Warcraft III that we used to play as teenagers. A grim game, where I as kid found it hard to combat the Undead Scourge. For the first time, I just stopped.

But now, a decade and a half later, let´s revisit the feel of Warcraft III: Reign of Chaos. In this essay, I am going to discuss only the playable campaign races of this game, and not the Frozen Throne expansion nor later developments of the World of Warcraft within the same universe.

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Before delving into specifics, there are two general remarks to make about the portrayal of the various races in the Warcraft III universe, which needs to be noted.

Firstly, the multiplicity of races across Warcraft III universe. Unlike the Lord of the Rings, Warcraft features a great multiplicity of races, which differ both culturally and physiologically, such as humans, high elves, dwarves, orcs, trolls, goblins, ogres, tauren, centaurs, night elves and so forth. We seldom find different cultures belonging to the same race. From that it follows that divisions among peoples are permanent and untranscendable.

Secondly, in my analysis, I found that the essential category in which the four playable races of the Warcraft III vary is their conception of time and their attitudes to death, as has been explored by Franz Borkenau.1

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The Humans

The campaign begins with Arthas Menethil, heir apparent to the throne of Lordaeron and prince charming. He is an apprentice to Uther Lightbringer, Paladin of the Order of Silverhand. He is impatient, wrathful and prone to vengeance as a major motivation.

In the game, we see three major institutions: the royalty- embodied in king Terenas and Prince Arthas ; the academia/mages- embodied in Antoninus and Jaina Proudmoore and the military order of the Knights of the Silver Hand headed by Uther Lightbringer and also enbodied in his disciple prince Arthas.

The kingdom of Lordaeron is subject to institutionalisation, as Carroll Quigley would put it- its institutions perpetuate an order, but are no longer the instruments of growth and - in Toynbeean terms- cannot respond to the challenge ahead. Its institutions are perfectly able to perpetuate order, should tommorrow be similar to today, but are not able to confront the coming of the Undead Scourge.

Humans live in historic time. They do not know how to react under stress and in exceptional situations. They know how to deal with ravaging orkish clans. They have no ways of confronting the Scourge.

The Humans of Lordaeron live in an anthropocentric paradigm. Their institutions pay lip service to the Light, but they lack revelation. They do what they deem to be just . They may have a moral code, which is however is however not internalised - in other words, there is no magisterium, to tell characters how to interpret that order. The King upholds order, the Knights uphold honour and glory, the Mages seek knowledge.

Lordaeron of the campaign has a fin du siècle attitude to itself, a civilisation that still retains reference to a higher order, but of perpetuation and this reference is not lived. A cultural Christendom without a lived Christianity, if you will.

If we are to frame the Human civilisation in terms of Ursymbols, we find the Crowned City - a human order of medieval institutions , but without transcendence. A city whose spires still point upwards, but expect no answer.

Stratholme Dilemma

One particular question in the Human Campaign arises, which I would frame as the Stratholme Dilemma. In the campaign, Arthas, Uther and Jaina are facing the following situation:

• Stratholme is a large city

• Its inhabitants have been delivered magically infected grain, that turns them into undead once consumed

• The turn is inevitable and irreversible

• No known cure is available and no reliable way of telling the healthy from the infected apart

• Inaction leads to the city turned into a major bastion of the Scourge.

Uther Lightbringer decides for inaction and walks away - to save his conscience, true, but consequences would arise from this nonetheless. Prince Arthas, on the otherhand decides to exterminate the inhabitants of the city - becoming himself at once judge, and executioner. He doesn´t consult - he judges too easily.

Arthas claims: the city must be purged2. He lets determinism and fatalism guide his actions. He does not believe that he has any choice left - he lets impulse without counsel be his reaction. This is the psychology of a civilisation in its late phase: the sense that events unfold not through human freedom, but through necessity. The deterministic reaction to deterministic reactions led Europe to the tragedies of World Wat I.

In that sense, Arthas is already half-Undead before he ever reaches Northrend.

The Undead

The Undead appear as the antagonists of the human campaign. Their advance appears as unstopable and chaotic - but they are actually one of the most ordered factions in the Reign of Chaos.

The Undead Scourge is highly centralised: it is ruled in a totalitarian manner from the Frozen Throne located in the icy continent of Northrend. It is a homogenising centralised force. Its advance is depicted as a caravan - a logistics chain. There is no emotions. No freedom. No passions. There is just obedience. A cold, de-humanising force. Countless ghouls are expendable. There is no meaning. No fear, no compassion.Only processing and efficiency. Once it captures cities, they are blighted. They no longer feel homely. They are sterile.

Time is not historic. It is static. It is frozen. The undead do not die. Corpses become resources. All being is reduced to function and efficiency. They are integrative and egalitarian. They level all previous distinctions. They are Hannah Arendt´s banality of evil3 after evil no longer needs intention. That´s why they are so terrifying.

If the Humans of Lordaeron are are inhabitting a post-Christian culture which gradually forgets its roots, what follows is what Borkenau hints at in his chapter Post-Christian Pospects: “A Death-Embracing” Culture4, which literally manifests itself in the existence of a Cult of the Damned5. A culture of death is of course the terminal point of any development, and therefore nothing can succeed it.

The Undead are, of course thanatocentric. Death is the organising principle. They are post-historical. They have overcome death. No supernatural remains.

The Frozen Throne is a well-chosen Ursymbol of the Undead. It is sterile. Ice preserves, but does not regenerate. There is concentrated absolute power. Distinctions have been erased, hierarchy has been abolished,death has been conquered.This is not apocalypse by fire.It is apocalypse by bureaucracy and ice.

The Orcs

The Orcs under the bold leadership of Warchief Thrall are civilisation in its heroic phase. They are the noble barbarians. Thrall leads the exodus of the Horde across the sea to Kalimdor. The Orcs are portrayed as having a strong warrior ethos and code of honour; they are chthonic and shamanic, with an intuition of the supernatural. Their migration is a true Völkerwanderung.

The Orkish shamanism echoes to some extent the Mongolic peoples, in others the warrior cultures of native North America. They are organised into clans.

Thrall is a cautious leader. He seeks to guide his people to redemption. To break the blood pact with the demons. He is open to outside influences and is willing to work together with Humans, Trolls, Tauren and Night Elves. He doesn´t elevate an racial identity. He seeks common ground. He doesn´t believe in racial exceptionalism.

The Orkish culture may well be psychocentric - focused on communicating with spirits, ancestors and the supernatural world. They are still mythically receptive.

If we are to search for a paradigm of existence, the Orks are psychocentric. They still inhabit a charged cosmos. They are a creative minority, able to respond to the challenge ahead of them. They are able to make common cause to strangers and build bridges where others would continue grudges.

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Their Ursymbol may be the war drum - an echoing rhythm that allows the warrior to give direction to his force.

The Night Elves

The Night Elves are a civilisation that aesthetically resembles druidic pagan Europe, but in their understanding of time is very similar in fact to the Egyptiac civilisation.

The Night Elves succeeded in what the Egyptiac civilisation strove for: to suspend time itself. They achieved immortality. Many of their druids remained asleep, their heroes remembering time thousands of years ago.

The Night Elves live in harmony with nature. Their army is called the Sentinel - they see their role as guardians and custodians, rather than actors. They seek not dominion, but to maintain the order of the universe.

The Night Elf faction is starkingly feminine: its focus on harmony with nature, cult of the moon goddess Elune, and a rather passive custodianship .

The Ursymbol of the Night Elves is, of course the World Tree - their way of cheating mortality. The World Tree appears to be both an echo of the Yggdrassil 6, as referenced by the toponym Nordrassil, but also of the Two Trees of Valinor featured in the Silmarillion, especially given the World Tree´s location in the western continent of Kalimdor.

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Their civilisation is cosmocentric and is centred around its axis mundi- the World Tree itself. They have achievced perfect stability and made themselves vulnerable to those who tresspass it. They have, in Fukuyama´s wording, achieved the End of History.7 They are the prototype of every Appollonian civilisation, that has fulfilled its quest for timelesness, balance and a perfect world order. They represent, as Spengler would put, it the end of becoming. Nothing new is needed, and all novelty brings disturbance and ruins the equilibrium. It is this Apollonian state, that leads the Night Elf campaign to be essentially about gathering more and more troops for the Sentinels and waking the Druids from their various states of meditation.

Frozen Throne and the World Tree

Warcraft III speaks to those who feel that history is nearing its end. The humans and the Orcs have been around for Warcraft I and II, so the original additions of Warcraft III are the two new races: the Undead and the Night Elves. Let us consider their prime symbols closer, becuase they present two opposing visions of civilisation at its culmination.

In Spenglerian terms, they represent two different final victories:

The Undead embody the triumph of the macrocosm. Here, all being is reduced to immanent function. Reality becomes mechanical, centralised, and totalitarian. Time is frozen not in fulfilment, but in sterility. The soul has been abolished, and what remains is a world governed by pure process.

The Night Elves, by contrast, embody the triumph of the microcosm. They have achieved the Apollonian ideal: to suspend time in harmony with the eternal. Reality is not administered, but participated in. Their civilisation does not conquer the world — it belongs to it. The soul here has not been destroyed, but perfected.

Thus their two great symbols stand as opposing metaphysical principles:

The Frozen Throne represents domination without life — death universalised, power concentrated, existence petrified into function.

The World Tree represents life without decay — transcendence rooted in the world, immortality achieved through harmony rather than conquest.

One is the image of the end of civilisation through mechanism.

The other is the image of the end of civilisation through form.

And in that contrast, Warcraft III gives us not merely a fantasy struggle, but a meditation on the final destinies of cultures when they reach the limits of their historical becoming.

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Epilogue

Warcraft III was unsettling because it was honest. It did not offer the comfort of simple evil. It suggested, instead, that the most terrifying fate is not destruction, but preservation without meaning. That the end of history is not fire, but ice. And that the greatest temptation of a wounded civilisation is not sin, but administration.

This is why the image of the Frozen Throne returned to me while contemplating the Tower of Iron Law. They are not the same symbol — but they rhyme. And in that rhyme, one hears a warning not meant for teenagers, but for civilisations approaching winter.

Limits of the Model

This exercise does not operate at the level of event-history, contingency, or political intention. It is situated deliberately within the longue durée: the slow-moving strata of geography, demography, religion, and modes of subsistence that define the outer boundaries of political possibility. What is tested here is not whether a given state might survive, but whether it is structurally legible to a fourteenth-century world in which authority is local, legitimacy is embodied, and power decays rapidly with distance.

Accordingly, the model abstracts from individual rulers, dynastic fortune, and short-term institutional improvisation. Such factors belong to the conjunctural or episodic plane and may accelerate or delay outcomes, but they do not, in themselves, overturn the deeper constraints imposed by terrain, population density, confessional organisation, and communication corridors. Where modern polities rely on administrative penetration, fiscal abstraction, and technological compression of space, late medieval ones must conform to inherited social grammars of rule.

The projection further assumes an abrupt transplantation of modern territorial forms into a pre-modern environment. This is not a flaw but a methodological stress test: by stripping away the gradual accretion of bureaucratic habit and nationalist ideology, it reveals which borders correspond to durable civilisational cores and which exist only by virtue of modern statecraft. The resulting configuration should therefore be read not as a forecast, but as a structural equilibrium—a map of political forms that align, or fail to align, with the deep rhythms of the fourteenth century.

The Countries Examined

Abkhasia (disputed)

Common religion and commercial gravitation towards Georgia eventually convince the Abkhaz elite to join Georgia as an autonomous region.

Algeria

Algeria in 1337 faces several issues: first of all impossibility of exerting control across its vast desert. Secondly, the existence of various smaller coastal core regions: Oran, Algiers, and Ksantina would challenge the unity of coastal Algeria alltogether. Add to its mostly rural Berber population opposed to the urban Arabic core, and particular Berber tribal identities- Zenati, Chaoui, Kabyle, it is unlikely that coastal Algeria could survive as a unified state in 1337.

Amongst the successor states, there remains Zenati core in the northwest, Kabyla and Choaui local chiefdoms. The interior collapses into three further local chiefdoms: a Mozabite Ibadite state, a Zenati desert state in the southwest around Timimoun and a Touareg state in far southeast

Armenia

Armenia is ethnically and religiously stable - it can survive without any major difficulty as a stable country. The small Georgian-speaking parts of the Lori province could be ceded to its larger northern neighbour.

However, Armenia after unifying with large parts of Armenian-inhabitted eastern Turkey transforms into an Armenian Federation

Artsakh (disputed)

Artsakh in 1337 is overwhelmingly Armenian in language and Miaphysite Christian in religion, geographically contiguous with eastern Armenia. It would naturally integrate into the Armenian Federation as an autonomous mountainous region, with no plausible alternative political orientation.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan in 1337 finds itslef as a completely different country. The areas west of the Kura river are populated by a solid Armenian majority and are distinct from the rest of the country. The border is redrawn and recognised. The country is not Azerbaijani Shia; rather its speaks Adhari, a Persian language, and is Sunni Muslim, with Zoroastrian minorites. The lowlands across the Kura- Aras water system create a core region around which this country is connected together also logistically

The exclave of Nakhichevan breaks independent - and keeps Azerbaijani as its official language. Indeed, it was surprising to find that while larger parts of Azerbaijan continued to speak Adhari or Armenian, it was Nakhichevan that had an Azerbaijani Oghuz Turkic majority in 1337.

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Bahrain

Bahrain in 1337 is able to take over large parts of the eastern parts of coastal Saudi Arabia.

Egypt

Egypt (Misr) with 1337 would need to balance well between its various religious minorities3: the Sunni Muslims dominate, while Copts are a significant minority throughout the Nile Valley, Shia are majority in parts of Upper Egypt and Ibadis in the Siwa oasis.

While these particularities will challenge the internal stability of the country to some extent, a stable population core in Lower Egypt and an easy way of projecting authority allows the country to maintain control over all its territory.

Georgia

Georgia, maintaining a common national unity aided by a common written Georgian and an Orthodox religion, and allowing for a decentralised structure is able to attain internal stability and be considered a medium-size power. It will annex Gerogian inhabited regions of neighbouring northeastern Turkey and northern Armenia, while negotiating the inclusion of South Ossetia.

Iran

Iran in 1337 is a country mostly of Sunni persuasion, while major Shia-majority areas could be found between the Caspian and the Elborz in Tabarestan and in the Luri highlands. Sunni Islam would also be the prevailing religion in Rayy, where the capital is located (Tehran is not a major location in 1337). Population centres can be found mainly in the western half of the country. Important linguistic minorities include the Adhari and Azeri in the northwest, Talysh, Gilaki and Mazandarani in the north, Khorasani and Baluchis, in well, Khorasan and Balochistan, Achomis in the Fars province and Lurs and Kurds in the far west in the Zagros. Communication with Khorasan and Baluchistan is difficult, the distances are large.

As a result, it would be difficult to assume that Iran could remain stable in the same borders given 1337 demographic realities. Iran would therefore need to redefine itself on non-religious grounds. Prior to the Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam, this denomination of Islam could not function as a rallying cause of inter-lingustic unity. Therefore, it would need to draw its own identity on something else: namely Persian nationalism.

Persia would cover a significant part of the Iranian Plateau from Qazvin to Hormuz, with several Shia majority cities, such as Qom, Kashan and Semnan. The state religion would thus be Sunni Islam ,but Shia Islam and Zoroastrianism (namely in Yazd and Kerman, but across large parts of Persia) would be recognised. Persia would keep hold over Kermanshah - a major city along the main Silk Road route, though populated by Kurds. While pulling out of other mountainous regions in the Zagros and allowing them to secede away, holding onto the most important road to Mesopotamia would be among strategic priorities.

The border regions of Khorasan and Balochistan, with strong regional identities and far away from the rest of the country, would slip away. In the western mountains, a Shia Lorestan would organize itself as a mountainous confederacy, while a Sunni Kurdistan would do similarly further westwards. The Shia-majority areas of Mazandaran between the Caspian Sea and the Elborz, both distinct religiously and linguistically would secede. The Shia-dominated Khuzestan would be independent as well. While geographically in may be the continuation of the Mesopotamian Plains, it remains distinct because of a Shia majority in 1337, while being a lowland region in contrast to Lorestani mountains means different ways of life and organisation of society would occur in these two regions.

The region of Tabriz and Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan would be also another compact are to secede in 1337. The reasoning behind this would not be that much in logistics, but rather in ethno-linguistic differentiation.

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Iraq

Iraq in 1337 finds itself in a different situation. It has three major population centres - the largest one in the north, around Mosul, a second in the centre, near Baghdad, and a third in the south around Basra. Among these, Mosul is the largest. While the river should allow for simple communication, the distance between the various population centres and their comparability in size does not reveal a hirarchy of them, with a single centre being dominant and others being its satellites.

In terms of language, however, the northern core stands divided among Syriacs, Kurds and Arabs, while the southern two remain unified as Arab Sunni. The country is home to sizeable Nestorian, Shia and Yezidi minorities.

Iraq as a polity in 1337 would fail to coalesce. In the north, the division is ethnic: Nestorian Syriacs around Mosul and Iraqi Kurdistan declares independence, moving its capital to the newly acquired Kerkuk, while Dohuk is ceded to Assyria. As for the rest of Iraq, the division is not ethnic nor cultural, but caused by trouble reaching Basra from Baghdad.

The southern desert is lost to a nomadic Bedouin successor state in former Saudi Arabia

Israel

The country of Israel without the demographic presence of a sizeable Jewish population would have no reason to continue existing separately from Palestine. The confessional equilibrium would lead to what is currently labeled as a one-state solution, while logistical difficulties would lead to Eilat, the country´s port at the Red Sea, to gravitate towards Egypt.

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Jordan

Given 1337 demographic realities, Jordan fails to crystalise as a distinct and durable polity. Rather, it is subsumed into neighbouring dynastic realms.

While its easternmost regions struggle to connect to Amman, the country would lose its southernmost part to Egypt, while the rest would be incorporated into Syria.

Kuwait

Kuwait joins the Basra state, since it has no real distinction from it in 1337.

Lebanon

Lebanon in this scenario would survive - as a remnant of the Outremer, with a solid Syriac Catholic majority, Shia Muslim majority areas in the south and Sunni Muslim regions in the country´s eastern Beqaa valley. The country enforces confessional, but non-territorial autonomy and maintains its distinctiveness as the Catholic country in the region.

Its mountainous terrain, urban mercantile elites, and confessional power-sharing traditions allow it to survive despite internal diversity

Libya

Libya is also one of the rapidly collapsing states. It soon collapses in a Maghreb-facing Tripolitania, a desert-landlocked Fezzan and an Egypt-facing Barqa.

However, Tripolitania soon becomes incorporated into Tunisia; Fezzan remains independent while Barqa would end up in the orbit of Egypt. Tazerbu in the southeast would slip away as its own Tebou country.

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Morrocco

While Morrocco remains linguistically divided between Arabic urban regions and Berber rurality, and Berbers in Morrocco are divided into a number of distinct clans, such as Masmuda and Sanhaja, ultimately, Morrocco has the advantage of having one economical core and being able to be unified as a dynastic monarchy. Given the collapse of neighbouring Algeria, Morrocco would be able to expand into the Saoura basin to its immediate south, giving it more control over the Trans-Saharan trade routes, as it had done multiple times in history

Oman

Oman in 1337 within its borders appears highly plausible: an Ibadi Muslim Omani kingdom, based off mercantile trade along the Indian Ocean coast.

Palestinian Territories

As hinted above, Israel would merge with the Palestinian Territories in a one-state solution. This new Palestinian country with a sizeable religiously Orthodox and linguistically Syriac population would geopolitically come quickly under Egyptian influence. It would rely economically from pilgrimage tourism, sitting upon the holy sites of Islam, Christianity and Judaism.

Neighbouring Egypt would take control over the southernmost Negev region.

Qatar

Qatar exists in 1337 as an ethnically and religiously unified country- Shia Muslim with Khaliji Arabic language. It is able to annex neighoburing parts of al-Hasa province.

Saudi Arabia

With the population and logistics of 1337, Saudi Arabia could not hold. Its population is too small, its distances too vast, its regional identities to distinct. It would likely break up into its different components: the tribal Sunni Najd in the centre; a tribal Sunni Hail Emirate in the northern inland regions, including also the adjacent parts of Jordan and Iraq.

The northernmost parts of Hejaz - the Sunni Tabuk province- would be taken over by Egypt, while the rest of Hejaz, now with a Shia majority, would break independent. The southernmost region - Asir, Jizan and Najran is ethnically , geographically and religiously contiguous in 1337 with northern Yemen and would likely join Sanaa

The eastern coast is divided up between mostly Bahrain and to a smaller extent also Qatar.

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South Ossetia (disputed)

South Ossetia would agree on joining as an autonomous part of the decentralised Georgian state.

Syria

In 1337, Syria struggles to keep itself united. The coastal provinces of Latakia and Tartus with a distinct Nusayri Shia majority are quick to separate from Damascus - and representation of the local Orthodox minority keeps them along with this separatist project.

The remaining parts of Syria - all of them - maintain a solid Syriac speaking minority, some of whome are Orthodox, others being Miaphysite. Damascus serves as the central core and maintains hold over autonomous local emirates, along the Orontes main axis.

However, the areas to the east of the Euphrates are difficult to reach, and gravitate actually more northwards, to the Syriac Piedmont around Urhoy, than to Damascus, and the area under the administration of the North and East Syria slips away to join the Syriac state with its capital in Urhoy.

Tunisia

Tunisia comes out as a stable country. With a strong agricultural basis, a unified language (Arabic) and religion (Sunni Islam), its borders are relatively natural. Its relative stability allows it to also hold together authority over Berber-speaking Chaoia in the west, as well as smaller Mozabite annd Ibadi communities in the south of the county.

Turkey

When modern Turkish territorial and linguistic assumptions are projected back onto 1337 with Ankara as its administrative centre cannot hope to hold the country together. Its Sunni Turkish core is lightly populated and separated from other population centres: namely the Greek speaking coastal area around Constantinople in the west; the Armenian Cilicia separated from the Turkish core by the Taurus mountains.

The result: the secession of the Greek Orthodox Thrace, Marmara and Aegean-facing areas that are in language Greek, in religion largely Orthodox and more urbanised. Vast regions still have a Turkish Sunni minority with the area.

In the coastal northeast, a Pontic Republic would be proclaimed by the Pontic Greek Orthodox population around Trebizond, with a substantial and recognised Laz minority.

The southeast is home to another major concentration of population in the Piedmont of the Armenian Highlands. There Muslim Kurds, Miaphysite Syriacs and Armenians all declared independence in Amed (Diyarbakir), Urhoy (Edessa) and Van, respectively, which would soon merge with Armenia.

Ultimately, Turkey is restricted to the the inland Anatolia Plateau, with substantial Shia and Tengri minorities, as well as Armenians in the east. and a small Cappadocian Greek community in the south.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates survive surprisingly well in 1337: not only is their political model, a federation of emirates- translatable directly to 1337, but also they are religiously distinct- being Sunni Arab in comparison to Shia neighbours further west or Ibadi Oman further south.

Yemen

The distinct zones of control of various factions in the ongoing civil war reveal deep divides in the country. Divides, which are echoes of deeper fault lines shaping distinctions also in 1337. The Shia Yemeni upland regions in Sanaa could function as its own state, while the Southern Movement´s hold over Aden with a Sunni majority, reliant on Indian Ocean trade would be self sufficient. The Sunni state would have a substantial Shia minority and vice versa, while a significant urban Jewish community would have a presence in both countries.

In the areas near Yemen´s border with Oman, an independent Hadhramawt is likely to emerge, while the Nestorian-populated island of Socotra could emerge as its own island state, distinct both geographically, religiously and linguistically (speaking Soqotri) from the mainlands.

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Summary

Structural Winners

The polities that endure in this projection do so not by historical accident, but because their territorial form aligns closely with late medieval constraints of demography, logistics, and authority. Egypt persists as the clearest example of structural resilience: a dense riverine population, long-established administrative traditions, and a transport artery that allows power to be projected cheaply and continuously along the Nile. Oman similarly survives due to the coherence of its Ibadi religious identity and its orientation toward maritime trade, anchoring authority along the coast while avoiding the necessity of dominating vast inland spaces.

Lebanon endures as a compact and defensible mountain polity in which political stability emerges not from uniformity, but from a durable confessional equilibrium. Multiple communities coexist under a shared institutional framework that does not require territorial homogenisation. Elsewhere, a strong and clearly articulated common identity—especially when contrasted sharply with neighbouring populations—also proves decisive. Georgia and Armenia survive through the conjunction of linguistic and religious distinctiveness; Bahrain, Qatar, and the Emirates through religious cohesion; and Tunisia through linguistic continuity rooted in an urbanised core.

In each case, survivability is rooted in the presence of a clear economic or demographic core, a manageable territorial scale, and a form of political legitimacy intelligible to a fourteenth-century order.

Structural Losers

By contrast, the polities that fail to consolidate share identifiable structural weaknesses rather than contingent political misfortune. Some collapse under the burden of overextension: territories such as Arabia, Algeria, and Libya encompass spaces far exceeding their demographic density and infrastructural capacity, rendering sustained governance beyond limited cores impracticable. Authority dissipates rapidly, giving way to local autonomy, tribal confederation, or competing spheres of influence.

Others suffer from false unity, wherein modern borders enclose multiple population cores without a unifying confessional, linguistic, or dynastic principle. Iraq, Syria, and Anatolia thus fragment along older and more intelligible lines of settlement, religion, and communication, each oriented toward different axes of trade and authority rather than a single political centre. This would include countries whose ethno-linguistic make up differs significantly from 2025, such as Turkey, Azerbain and Algeria, as well as Israel, which lacks a major Jewish population.

A third category fails through peripheral abstraction. Territories such as Jordan or Kuwait lack a dominant demographic, economic, or symbolic core altogether, functioning historically as zones of transit, mediation, or negotiated autonomy between stronger neighbours. In a late medieval context, such regions do not collapse so much as dissolve, reverting to looser forms of suzerainty rather than crystallising into durable polities.

Taken together, these patterns indicate that late medieval political geography favours compactness, coherence, and legibility over scale, abstraction, or nominal territorial continuity.

Transplanting modern borders onto 1337 may end up looking something like this. Note the colours of the religions are based upon this site. Important regional powers would likely be Egypt and Persia, to a lesser extent Morrocco and Ifriqiya. A reconstituted East Roman polity centred on Constantinople—alongside Armenia—would act as a northern anchor, while the persistent fragmentation of the Levant, Anatolia, and the Arabian Peninsula would generate a shifting balance of power rather than durable hegemony.

The exercise demonstrates that late medieval political geography favours compact, demographically coherent, and logistically legible polities, while penalising large, abstract territorial constructs lacking a unifying elite, religion, or economic core.

The closest reconstruction of the local name for this civilisation is Caphtor as it appears in the Hebrew Bible, (Amos 9:7; Jeremiah 47:4), where it is referenced as housing the remnants of the Philistines, who were one of the Sea Peoples. Akkadian and Ugaritic texts also mention Kaptara, Kaptaritum and K-p-t-r, located somewhere to the west of the Syro-Palestinian coast.1 Egyptian records refer to the land of Keftiu2, with the cities Kenesch (Knossos), Byschty (Phaistos), Amnesch (Amnissos), Keteny (Kydonia) and Leket (Lyktos).

The Biblical name Caphtor appears to be the name under which this civilisation was known to its contemporaries, whether they live in the valley of the Nile, or the Euphrates, or the shores of the Mediterranean. It is therefore more befitting a name than Minoan, which is the adjective form of a mythical king Minos; Aegean would be far better as a geographic descriptor, were not the Aegean Sea also the birthplace of a successive Hellenic or Classical civilisation, wlourish on both its Peloponesian and Asiatic banks.

Its legacy continues to live on, if only by culinary mean. This diet was based on olive oil, grape wine, fish, and wheat, and proved so successful that it has remained the staple diet of the Mediterranean area to the present time.3

The civilsiation of Caphtor was not limited to the island of Crete. It encompassed Cyprus and the Cyclades, as well as Mycenean Greece as its peripheries.

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Myth

The Caphtorian civilisation is often over-idealised: as an oasis of paradisiac peace, as a culture, where matriarchal structures prevented conflicts and wars. The reason for this statement are unfortified palaces and cities, visual arts that practically neglect, war, battle and government representation and allegedly a priviliged position of women.4

In other words, it is imagined a peaceful, matriarchal idyll in harmony with nature — a first Europe without fortresses or swords, a world of dolphins and lilies, olive oil and frescoes, untouched by tragedy. This image owes much to Hesiod’s nostalgic vision of a Golden Age5, later projected backwards onto the civilisation that preceded the Dorian invasions. Yet this reading mistakes absence of walls for absence of power, and fluidity for innocence.

Caphtor was not weak. It was unfixed.

The almost absent fortifications may be explained by naval protection and the references network of points d´appui in the Aegean - by an outward politico-military power projection. The island itself certainly saw the permanent interest balance among centres of power6. The referenced points d´appui of the Caphtorian civilisation led the English historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee to claim the existence of a thalassocracy of Minos, 7 the collapse of which led to the invasions of the Sea Peoples and the Bronze Age Collapse.

Ethos

Belonging to the garden civilisations of the highland belt stretching from Anatolia through the Zagros to Iran, Caphtorian society was neither Semitic nor Indo-European in speech or spirit. Its linguistic traces — the pre-Greek endings -inth, -issa, -nth — remain embedded like fossils beneath later tongues: labyrinth, Corinth, hyacinth, thalassa.8 It was a civilisation whose memory survived not through texts or monuments, but through substrate.

Quigley is right to emphasise its matriarchal tendencies, its weakly formalised cult, and its redistributive palace economy9. The bureacracy of Caphtor may be inspired by the temple economies of Egypt, but without their metaphysical origins. Yet these traits must not be read through modern sentimentality. Caphtorian power did not manifest itself as command, but as coordination; not as law, but as circulation. Its authority was managerial rather than juridical, symbolic rather than coercive.

If we are to define the Caphtorian ethos in five words, in the manner of Egyptiac order or Gelibic regeneration, it may be rendered thus:

maritime, labyrinthine, distributive, sensual, and atragic.

Maritime, for the sea was not a boundary but an ecumene. Where later civilisations faced outward from the shore, Caphtor lived within the sea. The Aegean was its road, its market, its connective tissue. Islands were not margins but nodes. Expansion occurred not through conquest, but through presence — ports, exchanges, craftsmen, administrators. This was thalassocracy before the concept existed.

Labyrithine, for where others ordered their space axially as Egypt, or hierarchically as Sumer, Caphtor disoriented. It was not a throne hall civilisation.10 but a maze of corridors, storerooms, light wells, and ritual spaces. Power was hidden, indirect, diffused. Authority did not confront; it enveloped. The Labyrinth was not merely a myth — it was a political form.

Distributive, for the palace was not a royal residence but an economic heart: collecting, storing, redistributing. Grain, oil, textiles, and bronze circulated through bureaucratic channels without monumental display. This was a civilisation of accounting rather than proclamation, of seals rather than laws. Wealth moved, but did not accumulate visibly. There were no pyramids, no stelae, no triumphal inscriptions — only flow.

Sensual, for Caphtorian art reveals a civilisation at ease with the visible world. Its figures move, leap, float. Bulls charge, dolphins curve, human bodies bend and dance. There is no heroic stiffness, no obsession with moral tension, no fixation on guilt, sin, or cosmic judgment. This was a culture unburdened by metaphysical anxiety, neither ascetic nor tragic, neither penitential nor martial. It delighted in form, rhythm, and immediacy — not as decadence, but as orientation.

Most decisive is Caphtor’s experience of time. It did not yet know tragedy. Catastrophe existed — earthquakes, fires, invasions — but it was not internalised as destiny. Time was not experienced as a moral trial, nor history as a burden of guilt or fate. There was danger, but not moira; destruction, but not existential judgment. Caphtorian civilisation did not fall because it was weak or decadent, but because it was structurally unarmed for a world reordered by iron, linear violence, and heroic confrontation.

The Caphtorian religion is difficult to reconstruct, but its contours can be traced. It lacks a divine judge and carries no eschatological fear. Instead, the divine manifests immanently—in mountaintops, caves, and the natural world—rather than existing as a transcendent, external authority. There are no vast monumental temples; sacredness resides in everyday spaces and landscapes. Caphtorian belief emphasizes agricultural seasonality and venerates the nourishing feminine. It embodies immanence, cyclical time, and the sacral circulation of life, reflecting a worldview in which the divine flows through the rhythms of nature rather than imposing moral judgment.

In Krejčí’s typology, Caphtorian civilisation resists classification: it precedes the emergence of a dominant civilisational centre, standing neither under law, nor fate, nor cosmic terror, but in a pre-tragic equilibrium of movement, ritual, and coordination.

Labyrinth

The Ursymbol of the Caphtorian civilisation seems to be the maze, or as it was called locally, the labyrinth.

If Egypt’s Ursymbol is the pyramid, and the Gelibic civilisation’s the termite mound, then the Ursymbol of Caphtor is unmistakable: the Labyrinth.

Not a monument, but a system.
Not a hierarchy, but a network.
Not command, but circulation.

The Labyrinth expresses a civilisation that does not impose order from above, but allows meaning to emerge through movement. It has no visible sovereign, no final axis, no terminal centre. This is why Minos was an elected magistrate, not a hereditary dynast. One enters, circulates, and is absorbed. Like the sea itself, it resists fixation.

Yet the Labyrinth has its limit. Against linear violence it offers no wall; against heroic clarity it offers ambiguity. When the sword-bearing peoples of iron entered the Aegean world, the Labyrinth yielded to the Temple, the flowing line hardened into the column, and the atragic world gave way to tragedy.

The Sea Peoples were not the fulfilment of the civilisation. They were the symptom of its disintegration. Movement without coordination, as thalassocracy gives way to piracy, labyrinth gives way to dispersal and atragic time to tragic eruption.

What was the grand paradigm? Was man´s role to uphold the continuation of Cosmos, to obey God, to gain glory? Caphtor stands before a definition of man´s place in the universe, before man focuses upon God, Power, Psyche, Cosmos or Death. Caphtor defies the categories of man´s place in this world by Jaroslav Krejčí.

Caphtorian civilisation did not perish in failure, but in succession. Its memory endured — in myth, in Hesiod’s lament, in Ariadne’s thread — as the submerged childhood of Europe. Not an ideal to be restored, but a form that could not survive once history demanded hardness.

If Egypt built eternity, and Classical civilisation built form,
Caphtor built movement.
And movement, once arrested, leaves only memory.

Position in Genealogy

Carroll Quigley identifies four distinct components that came together to in mixture to form the Caphtorian civilisation:

1. a mixed group from Anatolia who may have been in the mesolithic cultural stage, with a few early domestic animals and pottery made to look like leather bags;

2. a Neolithic Garden culture of the usual type, the major ingredient in the subsequent Cretan culture;

3. a significant Asiatic influence, possibly associated with the megalithic diffusion, bringing knowledge of metals;

4. an Egyptian influence, which is sometimes attributed, with- out evidence, to refugees from the unification of Egypt by Menes, just before 3000 B.C.11

Of which he concludes, that the Neolithic Garden Culture was prevalent.

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Oswald Spengler, however does not consider Minoan Crete to be a separate Hochkultur in its own right. The Minoan art of Crete is pure craft-art, a northern outlier of Egyptian post-Hyksos taste12, is his reference in passing, as he discusses the late stage of culture where ornamentation is lost. From this passage, it may be established that Spengler never consider Caphtor to be a separate civilisation (Hochkultur) in its own right, but a mere imitation of the Egyptiac in its late stage

Perhaps there be some truth to this claim. It seems not to have the importance assigned to it by Toynbee, but neither can it be dismissed as a periphery of the Egyptiac civilisation.

It may be very well argued that Caphtorian be a satellite civilisation of the Egyptiac one, which explains the large redistributive and palatial economy.

The bold Toynbeean claim: that the “Syriac” society, by which he means what has been established on this site as the Canaanite civilisation is one of the children of the parent Caphtorian civisation 13 and sibling to Greek appears overstated. True, the Caphorian civilisation is among the three pillars of the Hellenic civilisation - Knossos, Tyros and Doros14, but hardly can it be claimed that the Phoenicians or the Hebrews are the direct heirs of Caphtor. The Canaanite civilisation was born from the interactions of various preceding civilisations: the Egyptiac, the Sumeric, the Anatolic, and also the Caphtorian.15

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Caphtorian civilisation did not seek eternity in stone, nor salvation in law, nor memory in scripture. It sought intensity — in movement, in ritual, in beauty. It was the civilisation that lived the carpe diem. And when intensity could no longer shield it from judgment, it did not resist; it dissolved.

Egypt built eternity.
Classical civilisation built form.
Caphtor built movement.

And movement, once arrested, does not become ruin —
it becomes myth.A civilisation that refuses judgment will eventually be judged from without.

This is what the Greatest of Battles (Le Plus Grand des Combats) looks like.

Abbé Matthieu Raffray is a phenomenon. He breaks stereotypes about traditional priests. He embodies archeofuturism. A priest from the Institute of the Good Shepherd. He celebrates Tridentine Masses. From a family of nine children. He is also an influencer with 190,000 followers on Instagram, viral on YouTube and X. His mission: to evangelize the digital continent. To evangelise a missionary space that is equivalent to Africa or Asia a hundred years ago. To evangelise young people who spend their time on social networks, who have been left behind. Who do not understand the concept of fasting, but begin to understand it when it is translated to them as Christian Ramadan. Who often hear the Good News of Easter for the first time from the mouth of a priest on Instagram.

The book opens with a powerful testimony. A car breakdown on a road in western France brings him to a young man, a friend of a certain Yann. Yann’s girlfriend, an eighteen-year-old girl, was seriously ill and her liver was failing. She had reached a critical stage where she would not recover on her own. However, what troubled Yann most was that his girlfriend had not been baptized. Yann was desperate. He subconsciously sensed that he needed to find a priest. He didn’t know where. He didn’t know how. Father Matthieu shared his prayer intention, and a prayer chain began. Finally, Yann sent him a text message: She has recovered. I am now reading this passage for the third time, and each time it is just as intense. Yann then converted and began to prepare for baptism. God intervened in his life. And he is not alone.

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This is an entire generation that has not been handed down the faith. How many times have I heard this testimony: “My grandparents were Catholics, my parents were baptized but not practicing, and I myself am not baptized, I don’t know who I am, where I’m going, what’s important...” I am simplifying, but this is a widespread phenomenon today: a lot of young people are looking for answers to fundamental questions that only faith can answer! And they no longer want sweet, sentimental, worldly words—they know the voice of this world better than we do. On the contrary, they are looking for real teaching, doctrine, truth—unchanging and immovable—which was the strength of their ancestors and which they sorely lack today” (pp. 76-77).

He appeals to a generation that has been forgotten because so much attention has been paid to the pastoral care of “Others”—migrants, divorcees, homosexuals—that the real neighbour, the young Frenchman in the countryside, has been forgotten (pp. 171-172). To a generation of young people who are downright repelled by the image amusingly summed up by one Dominican: When we’re having a beer, we immediately recognize a Catholic: he always agrees with everyone, has no opinion on anything, and ends every discussion with a word about tolerance. This is an illustration of how Catholics have allowed themselves to be permeated by this nonsense—because the opposite of reason is nonsense—of modernity (p. 79).

A generation that wants to reject a world full of teddy-bears1 and soy-based cute Christianity and longs to hear about the heroes of tireless missionaries, steadfast martyrs who have as their role models the Mexican Cristeros2, Generals de la Charette and Cathelineau of Vendée3, St. Joan of Arc, St. Louis4, or the Crusaders who went to give their lives for the liberation of God’s tomb (pp. 146-147). Our generation is truly looking for models of masculinity, and we need to offer the right models of masculinity: I would probably be stating the obvious when I suggest that Andrew Tate is not one of them.

Immerse yourselves in deep conversations, where Abbé Raffray recalls his attempt to prove the existence of God with a mathematical proof borrowed from Descartes5, or his recalling of family life. Communal prayer, dad cleaning his shoes after breakfast, communal mass, Sunday lunch: traditions, sacred customs, liturgy, a sequence of well-chosen gestures that made Sunday special, of which we were both the authors and the audience (p. 67). A passage that recalls a return to earlier times when the world was calmer and more beautiful.

In conversation, he quotes Benedict XVI and his thesis on faith and reason as two paths to knowing God. He discusses how modern man is tired of constant consumption and how the sense of the sacred is being lost. He explains the liturgical richness of the Church. He continues with an interesting chapter entitled “Passing on what I have received,” which deals with concepts such as aggiornamento, polemics with the spirit of the Council, the actions of Marcel Lefebvre6, and the rejection of sedevacantism, which he considers absurd in its essence. He talks about restoring human dignity, asking whether it is dignified for a person to spend their days in front of a screen, looking at Excel spreadsheets for a corporation that does not know them and will replace them like a pawn (p. 155).

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In conversation, he talks about how Christians should approach mass migration and its consequences, he talks about his view of Islam, and he reflects on whether women have won by being included in the levée en masse for corporations. Where he states that during Lent it would be futile, even a little ridiculous, to give up Nutella, sweets, and who knows what else, if our main addiction is our phone, tablet, or the hours spent in front of the computer (p. 209). He does not shy away from issues such as euthanasia, IVF, abortion, homosexuality, abuse, pornography, or celibacy.

Before concluding, he formulates 10 rules. Ten habits that can be adopted as a basis for Christian life. Ten resolutions that readers can rely on and through which they can begin to bring their lives closer to Christ and grow in virtue. Start the day with morning prayer. Do not skip Sunday Mass. Find a place to sacrifice yourself. Know where your roots are. Don’t play with love. Don’t put off until tomorrow what you can do today. Be an heir, not a consumer. Defend the truth. And seek the Kingdom of Heaven above all else.

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Abbé Matthieu Raffray. Perhaps the polar opposite of the image of an American televangelist. And yet he appears in the media. When publicist and former presidential candidate Éric Zemmour presented his book La Messe n’est pas dite7, in which he defended the preservation of France’s Christian character from his position as a Jew, Abbé Matthieu Raffray confronted him in a debate, accusing him of wanting to instrumentalise faith8. He refuses to put Christianity at the service of a political project. Where Zemmour wants to build a coalition of Catholics, Jews, agnostics, and all those who prefer to hear church bells rather than the muezzin’s call, Raffray knows that if salt loses its taste, there is nothing left to salt with.

Abbé Matthieu Raffray did not come up with a manifesto of political Catholicism. He does not call for a nostalgic return to the past. He invites people to conversion. To follow Christ. He does not call for a Christian civilisation without Christians. He explains to young people who do not know Christ what it means to follow him. Fully. Without compromise. For whom faith is not sentimental kitsch, but a way of life.

And perhaps that is why Le plus grand des combats appeals to those who are no longer moved by slogans or compromises. It appeals to a generation that senses that something is missing. A faith that was not passed on to them. A baptism that never happened. A generation that does not want to be a universal gray mass, consuming the same hamburgers at the same McDonald’s from Bamako to Saint-Brieuc to Lendak. A generation that wants to know what it means to be Catholic and Breton. Catholic and Basque. Catholic and Slovak.

Not as an identity slogan. As a calling to follow Christ.

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To the Anatolic1 world,
He is the Lord who stands above kings and treaties,
the righteous witness who binds oaths in truth,
and before whom even emperors must bow.

To the Andean world,
He is the Lord of the mountain heights and the valley depths,
who binds together sun and moon, earth and sky,
man and God.

To the Babylonic world,
He is the perfect Lawgiver foretold by those who studied the signs in the heavens,
who inscribes a new law not in clay or papyrus,
but writes righteousness upon the hearts of men.

To the Caphtorian2 world,
He is the Lord of the sea and the hidden center,
who tames chaos without violence
and leads His people through the waters into life.

To the Canaanite world,
He is the shepherd who cares for His flock,
who walks with His people in their suffering
and gives abundance without conquest.

To the Chibchan world,
He is the giver of gold without corruption,
the source of life and fertility,
who orders the world through generosity rather than force.

To the Egyptiac world,
He is the One who overcame death and opened the way to life eternal,
not by spells or secret names,
but by giving His body as the bread of life.

To the Ethiopic world,
He is the Holy One who dwells among His people,
the Word carried by the Ark,
whose presence sanctifies the land and its kings.

To the Frankish world,
He is the anointed King who conquers not by the sword,
but by the sign of the Cross;
the King who came not to be served, but to serve.

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To the Gelibic world3,
He is the Lord of the living waters,
the source from whom all life flows and to whom all paths return,
who sanctifies the river of time
and establishes justice through balance, restraint, and mediation.

To the Hellenic world,
He is the Logos made flesh,
whom philosophers long sought,
uniting wisdom and love
and revealing Himself as a Person.

To the Hinduic world,
He is the true Deliverer,
who enters the cycle of suffering
not to escape it,
but to break its bonds through love and sacrifice.

To the Huaic4 world,
He is the Son of Heaven,
who fulfills the Way without coercion,
restoring harmony between Heaven, Earth, and Man
through virtue made visible.

To the Indic world5,
He is the true Sacrifice,
the offering that ends all offerings,
who gives Himself as living food
not to bind the cosmos,
but to bring it to rest.

To the Japonic world,
He is the pure offering,
who restores harmony between heaven and earth,
revealing that true honor
is perfected in self-giving.

To the Khorasanic6 world,
He is the Word of God who enters history,
the Mercy sent down,
who manifests perfect obedience even unto death.

To the Malayic world,
He is the Lord of the crossings,
who gathers the peoples of many isles
and leads His people
from the storm into rest.

To the Meluhic7 world,
He is the perfect Measure,
who cleanses not by outward rites alone
but restores purity from within
and makes the city whole.

To the Mexic world,
He is the ultimate sacrifice,
the living heart that sustains life,
offered once and for all,
so that blood need no longer be shed.

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To the Mississippian world,
He is the true Priest-King,
who raises the holy mound not of earth,
but of His own body,
gathering the peoples to a feast of peace
where heaven and earth are joined.

To the Monic8 world,
He is the King who renounces violence,
whose power flows from compassion,
and whose reign restores balance to the world.

To the Posogic world9,
He is the Giver of rain and breath,
who teaches His people to walk in harmony,
to receive the gift of life with gratitude,
and to dwell faithfully upon the land.

To the Rhomaic world,
He is the Emperor of all,
who unites authority and humility,
ruling not by domination
but by self-giving love.

To the Russian world,
He is the Suffering King,
who enters the depths of sorrow
and transfigures endurance into glory,
making beauty rise from pain.

To the Sinic world,
He is the perfect Sage-King,
who perfects law through mercy,
leads by example,
and whose mandate shall never end.

To the Sogdic world,
He is the faithful Mediator,
in whom no deceit is found,
who makes strangers into brothers
and to whom all roads lead.

To the Sumeric world,
He is the Lord who descends among men,
not to rule through terror,
but to restore justice
and lift humanity from the dust.

To the Syriac world,
He is the Messiah come to heal the world,
to repair the sin of Adam,
to bind back what has been broken
and restore creation to its former beauty.

To the Tibetic world,
He is the Compassionate One,
who enters suffering freely,
opening the path from death to life
through mercy stronger than illusion.

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Without further ado, let´s jump in:

Albania

The mountainous country of Albania would be less ethnically homogenous , yet more religiously consolidated. Tirana back in 1337 is not a major town, and thus the seat of government is located in Kruje. Albania in this scenario has a stark religious divide: the solidly Catholic north and the Orthodox south. Apart from the Venetians in Durres, many of Albania´s ethnic minorities are concentrated in the south, namely Greeks in Gjirokaster and Vlore, but also Bulgarians located in the country´s east and dispersed throughout the south, and Aromanians in the southeast. In this case, Albanian nationalism would be more closely tied to Catholicism and relations with Italy, wary of Greek irredentism in the south. Of course, the Albanian state may have difficulty getting under control the country´s distant valleys.

Albanian nationalism is defined by the Gheg Albanian Catholics and dependent on Italian patronage- its headache are Greeks

Austria

Austria would be eased with difficulty in ensuring the control of the mountainous country thanks to its federal system. There would be two Bundesländer, whose inclusion into the Austrian state appears to not have been fully justified under the pretexts of Nationalism: Burgenland in the east in 1337 speaks a mix of Hochdeutsch and Magyar. Vorarlberg in the far west is officially billingual, both in Hochdeutsch and Rhätisch, though the latter appears to dominate the countryside. In the south of Austria, there is also a substantial Slovene minority, which led to Slovene being adopted as co-official in Carinthia, though not in Styria, where such demand were seen with suspicion. Lower and Upper Austria have their own religious minority- the Waldensians.

Austria in 1337 survives as dynastic federal Hochdeutsch strate- the Romansh are coopted, Burgenland is lost quickly.

Belarus

The largely forest country of Belarus would find itself dominated by Belarusians of Orthodox religion, who see themselves as belonging to two distinct local identity, Polesians in the southwest and Polatskians in the northeast. The largest distinct minority is in 1337 in the northwest: the Romuva Lithuanians dominating Grodno and Lida, along with a much smaller minority of Romuva Sudovians, both of whom would seek to unify their regions with the neighbouring Lithuania.

Belarus in 1337 survives as a Slavic Orthodox country, albeit without the northwest borderlands.

Belgium

Belgium in 1337 would be, unsurprisingly, divided into two: the Dutch speaking Flanders in the north and the Wallonia in the south. Back in 1337, Brussels is Dutch speaking, and Flanders is economically and demographically dominant, pursuing a policy of close ties with neighbouring Netherlands, worrying the Walloons in the south who advocate for independence (in 1337 it is more likely for the Flemish to seek union with the Netherlands than for Walloons with France). Not well known is also a very small Middle German Rhinelander minority in the east of Wallonia.

Belgium thus evaporates

Bosnia and Hercegovina

Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1337 remains a profoundly multi-religious polity, with no single confession able to claim exclusive dominance over the entire territory. Four religious communities coexist within the country: Catholics, Krstjani, Orthodox Christians, and Bogomil Morlachs, producing one of the most intricate religious mosaics in Europe.

Catholics dominate much of northern and western Bosnia, including large parts of what would later be known as western Republika Srpska. They also form a majority in Posavina, and—alongside a notable Orthodox minority—in Tuzla Canton. Along the western frontier, from Bihać through Livno, Catholic Croats constitute the prevailing population, anchoring Bosnia firmly to the Catholic world along its Croatian borderlands.

The Krstjani form the demographic and symbolic core of the country. Their dominance stretches across central Bosnia, from Jajce through the Bosna valley to Srebrenica, creating a contiguous religious heartland that is neither Catholic nor Orthodox and distinctly Bosnian in character. This central belt functions as the country’s ideological and institutional anchor.

Orthodox Christians are concentrated primarily in the eastern regions, especially across the Drina-facing territories of present-day Republika Srpska. While numerous, these Orthodox communities are largely peripheral, forming a borderland population oriented toward Serbia rather than a competing internal core.

In the rugged highlands separating Bosnia proper from Hercegovina live Bogomil Morlachs, whose mountain pastoralism and heterodox faith place them outside the administrative reach of both church hierarchies and urban institutions. Their presence reinforces the country’s decentralised character and complicates any attempt at confessional uniformity.

Adding further complexity, German Catholic miners, concentrated in central Bosnia and around Srebrenica, introduce an economically vital but culturally distinct element into the Bosnian interior, strengthening urban centres while remaining politically marginal.

Faced with this configuration, Bosnia in 1337 opts for pragmatic territorial adjustment. The Bihać region is ceded to Croatia, recognising its strategic importance for securing Croatia’s land corridor from Zagreb to Dalmatia along the Una River and removing a chronically unstable border zone from Bosnian governance.

Internally, Bosnia seeks survival not through homogenisation but through institutionalised pluralism. The state defines itself explicitly as a territorial, multi-religious polity, maintaining political equilibrium through a formalised parity system: Catholics, Krstjani, Orthodox, and Bogomils represented in a 3 : 3 : 2 : 1 ratio. The country is reorganised into highly autonomous cantons, each reflecting local religious and geographic realities, while loyalty is owed to a shared Bosnian political framework rather than a single confessional identity.

Under 1337 conditions, Bosnia thus functions less as a nation-state than as a confessional federation, a Balkan analogue to Switzerland—stable not despite its diversity, but because its institutions are built explicitly around managing it.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria in 1337 is a relatively homogenous country. Apart from the Bulgarians, there is only one district with a non-Bulgarian majority: Sozopol in the southernmost region of the Pontic coast dominated by ethnic Greeks, who are also present along the entire coastline, and in the city of Plovdiv. Other minorities include Albanians in the Stara Planina Mountains, but also a distinct Armenian Bogomil population in the Rhodopes and Wallachians along the Danube.

As a result: Bulgaria achieves an almost perfect stability.

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Croatia

Croatia in 1337 is facing a logistical challenge due to its shape, as it is difficult to extend control from Zagreb to the Adriatic coast. The country appears to have issues holding the borders together both logistically and politically.

For geopolitical reasons Croatia decides to constitutionally declare the Dalmatian language as co-official basically across the whole of the Adriatic seaboard, as Dalmatians constitute a majority in all of the islands and everywhere to the south of Split, as well as in Zadar, while constituting a substantial minority in Rijeka, the mountainous Lika province. A related dialect dominates the entire peninsula of Istria. This however, is the first of Croatian headaches.

Furthermore, the eastern parts of Slavonia: Osijek, Vukovar and Ilok have a Magyar majority in 1337. The small Serb minority in east Slavonia is in 1337 largely geopolitically ignored.

Cyprus

Cyprus in 1337 appears to be largely stable, being unified as a Cypriot Greek Orthodox country, with minorities - Armenians, Latins and Nestorians all being reserved a few seats in parliament. Northern Cyprus quickly agrees for reunification.

Czech Republic

There are two distinct groups demanding recognition in the Czech Republic: the Moravians who advocate for an autonomous Moravia as an autonomous region, and the Germans, who are a significant minority across large parts of the country, but outside of the the westernmost edge of Bohemia, are nowhere in the majority.

Denmark

Denmark itself is relatively stable in 1337, though it faces a substantial issue: apparently something like one third of the Danes are living in Scania, which belongs to neighbouring Sweden. Denmark would therefore seek to claim Scania.

Its possession of autonomous Faroese remains largely stable, and its grip over Greenland, which speaks a dialect of Icelandic(rather than Inuit) is more stable than in 2025.

Estonia

Estonia in 1337 is a religiously unified Catholic country. The largest minority are not the Russians, but the Baltic Germans and Swedes, thoughout the country, as well as the Livs, a closely related people to the Estonians in the deep southwest of the country.

Finland

Finland in 1337 is hardly consolidated. Very few identify as Finnish - Tavastian in the central and western regions, Savonian in the east and Kven in Ostrobothnia are the primary designations by which the people identify themselves. Add Swedish townsfolk in the coastal areas and Samis populating basically everything north of Oulu, and you see why. Religious, the country is divided as well, between the Catholic southwest, Muinaisusko in the centre inland and Sami Shamanists in the north. The Aland islands are hastily ceded to Sweden, the main warrant of the goverment in Helsinki

Thus, holding the country together appears to be beyond Helsinki´s possibilities. The capital is Catholic and has a Tavastian majority and Swedish minority - both languages are proclaimed official. While this stabilises the southwestern third, the country still faces a revolt of the pagan Savonians and separatism from the Sámi in the north. As a result, Finland in 1337 would hardly hold together and hardly be called Finland.

France

France in 1337 would have trouble remaining centralised and laique, nor retaining its monolingual French as the only language. France would have trouble exerting control beyond the traditional langue d´oïl speaking regions, such as Normandy, Anjou, Berry, Burgundy, Champagne and Picardy. The large French régions are not helpful either, as several such as Pays de la Loire, Nouvelle Aquitaine, Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes and Grand Est barely hold together; this is contrasted by a much more self-aware Britanny, Occitania, Provence, Corsica and Picardy (previously known as Hauts-de-France) that are quick to demand autonomy, to which it is force to give in. France with EU5 demographics is also facing Alsatian and Basque separatism, which it lacks means to suppress.

Germany

Germany in 1337 has a noticeable Slavic minority, particularly concentrated in Lusatia, but also throughout Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, but also present in some localities of Niedersachsen and Schleswig Holstein. The federal system of Germany allows for both easier local control and managing dinguistic diversity given the fact that the German language at this time does not have a unified written standard: Hochdeutsch is the written language in Bavaria (much to the frowning of the Franconians in the north) and Baden-Wurttemberg which quickly renames itself to Swabia; Mitteldeutsch in Rhineland-Pfalz, Saarland, Hesse, Thuringia and Saxony and Plattdutsch in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, Nidersachsen, Bremen, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein; Nordrhein-Westphalen is following some negotiations divided between a Middle German Nordrhein and Low German Westphalia; Frisian is recognised in Low Saxony and Schleswig Holstein, Polabian in Mecklenburg, Brandenburg and parts of Schleswig and Saxony Anhalt, while Sorbian in Saxony and Brandenburg.

The capital of Germany will move to a city located closer to the economic axis along the Rhine, most likely Frankfurt.

Greece

Greece in 1337 faces a logistical challenge: extending control into the Pindos mountains and the Epirus, but also into the inland of Morea; the islands and the Aegean coast are well connected from Athens. What helps Greece in stability is ethnoreligious unity. The major exceptions are the Aromanians in the Pindos mountains and slightly more worryingly Bulgarians, some of whom are Bogomils, in the north, though luckily for Athens there are no contiguous Bulgarian-majority areas in Greece. The Tsakinians in the Peloponese speaking a highly divergent dialect are considered a mere ethnographic curiosity.

As a result, the Greek state faces no major separatist problem. The nature of bringing the area under control leads to association of Aromanian language and banditry, which would lead to the issue of enforcing Hellenisation.

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Hungary

In 1337, Hungary has a large irredentist claim. More Magyars live outside its borders than within them, and the small Cuman and Jasz minorities within its borders are showcased as examples of how well the Hungarian state treats its minorities. Its irredentist claims target almost all neighbouring countries: Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Slovakia, Austria, with slightly lesser intensity to Ukraine and the notable exception of Slovenia. Hungarian administration is helped by the fact that exerting control is quite easy given the flat landscape and use of the Danube and Tisza waterways. In 1337, this advantage plays much stronger than in 2025.

Iceland

Uninterestingly, Iceland remains stable thanks to being geopgraphically, religiously and ethnically unified.

Ireland

Irish nationalists in 1337 have a reason to rejoice: the majority of the country speaks natively the Irish language. There are two questions that dominate Irish politics: reintegration of the Catholic, Irish-speaking Northern Ireland, and the city-countryside divide which manifests linguistically, as English is the prevailing language in the Pale, and is also spoken as a minority in a handful of other towns and throughout Leinster. Local politics have thus become a division between an Anglophone bourgoisie and a communal Irish-speaking rural politics.

Italy

Italy remains more unified by religion and geography than by language and communication. The Appenines, the spine of the continent, block meaningful exertion of control from Rome to the Adriatic coast. Furthermore, the different regions of Italy retain strong local identities and distinct varieties. As a result, Italy also needs to opt for federalism, to hold the country together. In the south, Neapolitan and Sicilian separatists advocate for a Republic of Two Sicilies. Sardinia pushes from autonomy to independence, while South Tyrol, following an agreement between the German and Ladin speakers seeks unification with Austria. In Friuli, the city of Trieste is a target of Slovenian ambitions for a major sea port and local linguistic majorities are in Italy´s favour. While Slovenia may not be able to contend with Italy on its own, an independent Friuli would achieve the objective.

Kosovo (disputed)

Kosovo in 1337 would be quick to seek unification with Serbia, given that Serb Orthodox constitute demographic majority. The preservation of the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija would be a concession to the local Albanian Orthodox and German Catholic minority, as well as local Bogomils.

Latvia

Latvia has an ease of maintaining control over its country thanks to two important geographic features: Riga and the Daugava River. This maintains control of the country, which is demographically diverse: while the inland speaks Latvian, Livonian is spoken thoughout large parts of the coastal region, while Baltic Germans form the upper classes.

For Latvia, to maintain unity of the country, all three languages: Latvian, German and Livonian were declared as official and national and Catholicism was supposed to become the unifying factor. Or was it? Since in the west, Curonians remain Romuva pagans, and are seeking closer ties to neighbouring Lithuania.

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Lithuania

Lithuania in 1337 stands proudly as the beacon of European pagans- it is ethnically and religiously unified as a Baltic pagan country, and fuels irredentist movements in neighbouring countries: Belarus, Latvia, Russia and Poland, all home to a concentrated Baltic pagan minority.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg remains as a city state.

Malta

Malta in 1337 becomes an Arabic-speaking Catholic maritime republic

Moldova

Moldova in 1337 has a somewhat similar dilemma than in the 21st century. The question of its relation to Romania. The country´s identity, the Moldavian regional identity ties it at the same time to West Moldavia within Romania. It is home to East Slavic and Tengri Nogai minorities, which however do not form a contiguous population anywhere. Moldova is likely to accept an agreement with Romania of unification whilst preserving Moldavian autonomy, whilst renouncing all claims to Transnistria

Montenegro

Montenegro remains a Serb Orthodox republic, whilst recognising several minority communities, such as Dalmatian Catholics, German Catholics, Krstjani Bosnians and Albanian Orthodox.

Netherlands

The Netherlands form a functional decentralised monarchy, with a strong burgher middle class. The country remains internally stable. Close ties with neighbouring Flemish-dominated Belgium eventually lead to the Netherlands and Flanders unifiying with the new capital being located at Antwerp, which is closer to the economic hub of the country in the south. To maintain unity, the Netherlands recognise a Frisian language in the north.

North Macedonia

North Macedonia in 1337 is a country which struggles to articulate itslef. The majority of the population is Bulgarian and Orthodox, with sizeable Albanian and Serbian minorities in the west and north, respectively, and with also a sizeable Bogomil minority. Political gridlock connected with balancing these minorities eventually leads to the country accepting adhesion to Bulgaria as an autonomous province.

Norway

The country of Norway in 1337 would be faced with the dilemma of whether to relocate its capital. Moving the capital to Trondheim would allow easier communication with almost all of the Norwegian coast, while the southern city of Oslo remains more populous and outward-facing. The division Trondheim versus Oslo would portray itself also into a political rift - rural coast northers versus urban southerners.

Norway in 1337 would likely align itself with Denmark in a quest to gain the province of Jamtland in neighbouring Sweden.

Norway is also home to a substantial Sámi minority in the north. Cultural and linguistic concessions would be of little cost to Norway, for Sami separatism would not put Norwegian control of the region in question, for the Norwegians keep control of the coastal towns, while the Sámi in the interior remain dependent on trade through said coastal towns.

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Poland

In 1337, Poland faces several issues that give it a headache. First of all, there is East Prussia. For Poland, the northeast is a hotbed for trouble. In the west of its portion of East Prussia is a concentrated German minority with a crusading mentality. In its eastern portion are Pruthenian pagans. The tensions between these two groups, and their mutual clashes keep the Masurian-Warmian voivodeship in constant gridlock.

Germans form a substantial minority in Poland. They are prevalent in the Vistula estuary and around Stettin in Western Pomerania. As a minority they are present also across Pomerania and Silesia. The maintenance of Polish control over these territories is dependent on whether Poland can win the loyalty of the Slavic Kashubians and Silesians. Given so many issues, Poland would be in 1337 happy to solve the issues surrounding its eastern borders with a border adjustment along the ethnic border with Ukraine, in the latter´s favour.

For Poland, control over Gdansk remains imperative. It allows Germans around Stettin to secede and join Germany, as well as eastern Lusatia. Meanwhile, Silesia, rather distant from Warsaw, would secede: a region with a German urban culture and a Slavic countryside would naturally gravitate towards Czechia.

Portugal

Portugal is able to project control thanks to the suitable position of Lisbon, the capital, which allows also connection with Madeira and the Azores. However, its major inner political is the large Muslim Andalusi minority, that is present throughout the southern portion of the country.

Romania

Romania in 1337 has difficulty of holding the country together. While Bucharest allows control across Wallachia, and Moldavia following the unification is provided autonomy, while increasing the population with more Romanians, the real issue is on the Pannonian side of the Carpathians. Transylvania is a mix - Magyars, Magyar-speaking Székelys, Transylvanian Saxons and Romanians- a diverse place, but ultimately its has non-Romanians dominate the whole area. In addition, the Banate is populated largely by Serbs, rather than Romanians.

As a result, in 1337 Romania has cannot hold together. Transylvania is not dominated by Orthodox, but by Catholics. It is going to form itslef into another Switzerland- with cantons for the Székely, the Magyars, the Saxons and the Romanians as well, while the Patrium- the border regions with Hungary will join that country.

What remains of Serbia will still have significant minorities- Bulgarians along the Danube or Greeks along the coast.

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Serbia

Serbia has also a major issue. It is connected with the autonomous province of Vojvodina. While Serbia proper has a larger population than Vojvodina, it has issues actually projecting control into the valleys of Serbia, while Vojvodina has much easier task of projecting control from Novi Sad. In 1337, it has a Magyar majority.

Belgrade rests with two options: allow Vojvodina to slip away or revoke the autonomy. The conflict would resolve itself by ceding Bacska to Hungary. Serbia is ultimately compensated by acquiring Banate from Romania and incorporating Kosovo. Serbia would have also trouble projecting power into its easternmost Romanian and Bulgarian dominated districts.

Slovakia

Slovakia in 1337 would hardly be able to hold the country together. Large parts of the southern part of its country are populated by Magyars. Many regions have a German bourgoisie, The capital - half Slovak, half Austrian, has difficulty projecting control further than the plains of West Slovakia. The breadth of the mixed Slovak-Magyar belt convinces Slovaks to join Hungary.

Slovenia

In 1337 Slovenia is a bilingual Slovenian-Hochdeutsch country. It finds itself surrounded by overextended neighbours- Italy, Croatia, Hungary, while Austria is also slightly struggling to get by. Slovenia declares two languages - Slovenian and Hochdeutsch as official. Most importantly, however, Slovenia lacks a maritime port. Therefore, its foreign policy almost immediately focus on acquairing Terst, which already has a Slovenian majority.

Spain

The Kingdom of Spain could try to achieve stability by making stronger use of the autonomous communities into which it articulates itself, to co-opt local identities. For that reason, Castilla y León is soon divided, unsurprisingly, into León and Old Castille. However, this still may not convince Basque and Catalan separatists.

However, Spain is dealing with a concentrated Andalusi Muslim population in Granada, Almería and Malaga provinces, and Muslim minorites across large parts of Spain such as Valencia, Aragon, Extramadura and elsewhere.

Spain can hardly consider losing grip over the area: after all, these borders mean the fulfilment of the reconquista. However, it assumes a likely Andalusi revolt: and the naval bases in Ceuta and Melilla come in handy. The unruly provinces form over 6% of the country´s population, with the addition of Muslim minorities across Spain it proves a large destabilising factor.

Catalan separatists may seek to reinstate the Crown of Aragon - a country focused more on Mediterranean trade, whose key axis is the Ebro River.

Sweden

Sweden in this scenario, with its capital in Stockholm, is facing logistical difficulties combined with irredentism from its Scandinavian neighbours.

Scania, with a Danish identity, is much closer to Copenhagen to Stockholm. Similarly, the Norwegian-speaking Jamtland may be distant from Stockholm, but is just across the hill from Trondheim. While Norway could have had difficulty enforcing its claim alone, the alliance with Denmark would allow it to enforce its claim. Even further northwards, Sweden is unable to enforce any reasonable claim across the Sámi in the inland Laplands, which drift away out of control into local chiefdoms, while the northernmost coastal areas are given autonomy as Kvenland.

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Switzerland

Switzerland as a decentralised confederation of cantons achieves almost perfect survivalibility in 1337 conditions.

Transnistria (disputed)

For all practical purposes, Transnistria collapse as a

Ukraine

The Ukraine in 1337 is overextended. The areas occupied are Russia hastily agreed upon to be ceded as an independent Crimean Khanate - the area is populated mostly by Tengriist Crimean Tatars. While Ukraine pulls of from all areas south of the Dnieper and Samara Rivers, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, it remains keen on maintaining access to the Black Sea through Mikolayiv and Odessa.

Ukraine would have difficulty establishing control to Uzhhorod and Carpathian Ruthenia, and the area is likely to drift to Hungary. So too would it lose grip over the ethnically Romanian northern Bucovina. Similarly, the Budjac would also slip out of control and become a Tatar state.

The rest, can however remain together as one country. It remains largely ethno-religiously unified (Orthodox East Slavic), and the flat terrain allows communication, though it would need to allow a decentralised model to maintain effective control over the western regions: Galicia and Volhynia.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom would instantly lose all its overseas possessions: most of them are unreachable, while Gibraltar and the bases in Cyprus too expensive to maintain.

Maintaining hold over Northern Ireland without a strong unionist community would also be a strain, and Ulster would likely be ceded to Ireland.

How about Great Britain, then? While England appears to be able to survive: a country unified by language and geography, maintaining hold over Scotland would be more troublesome. Three distinct languages (Scots, Gaelic, Norn), a long distance from London and a local economic base, along with its own orientation towards Scandinavia would actually encourage London to allow a Scottish independence - to avoid being drawn into its constant squabbles.

Wales functions for England similar to the highlands. It would be unlikely for Wales to survive as an independent country - its possible economic base in the southwest is most open to any English invasion. England would, however try to placate the Welsh particularists for granting the various Welsh counties strong autonomy.

Few Decades Later

Given these tensions, what the remodelled map look like? Taken as a whole, this map represents a remarkably coherent and historically plausible outcome of superimposing modern European borders onto the demographic, religious, and logistical realities of 1337. What survives does so not because of nationalism or administrative uniformity, but because geography, river systems, urban networks, and dynastic legitimacy still allow these territories to function as political containers.

Few countries survive entirely unchanged - exceptions include Montengro, Swizerland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal. Elsewhere, constitutional changes , including substantial federalisation and decentralisation, allow countries such as France, Germany and Italy to largely hold together. Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Czechia, Hungary , Austria, Slovenia Bulgaria, Greece and Lithuania were able to actually gain land. Countries such as Belgium, Moldova, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Finland, Transnistria and Slovakia collapse altogether.

Notice the white areas- Maghreb, Turkey, Russia and Crimea. Those have not been considered yet. Lets look at survivavibility of North African and West Asian countries next.

This civilisation was born on a vast grassy belt, nestled between the equatorial rainforest on the southern coast of the Gulf of Guinea and the seemingly endless Sahara Desert on the northern side. Vegetation density increases from north to south, from the semi-desert and steppe Sahel to the grassy savannah of Sudan1, stretching from Cape Verde in Senegal to Lake Chad in the heart of Africa.

The core of this civilisation lies in a triangle, formed by the estuary of the Senegal River to the Atlantic Ocean, the bend of the Niger River and the southern reaches of the Guinean Highlands. The principal axis remains, of the course the Niger River, named Jeliba in Manding and Maayo Jaliba in Fulani. Therefore, it has been chosen to names this civilisation Gelibic. There lie the major cities that stand as testimony to its greatness: Djenne-Djenne, Kawkaw, Kumbi Saleh, Timbuctou. These cities hosted large libraries; they were ruled by kings whose wealth became legendary.2

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The wider borders of this civilisation extended to include many peripheral regions - namely Senegambia in the west, the Mossi Highlands to the southeast3 and the middle course of the Niger River further downstream, from where it would further expand to encompass the Hausa cities and the Kanem Bornu region of lake Tchad. Thus, the Gelibic civilisation would come to encompass the whole ecological region between the baking sands and the lush rainforests. Their kings made great fortune by controling access to two vital resources: salt, found abundantly in the arid north where semi-desert gives to desert, while rich gold deposits were found in the south.

In the Sahel and savannah regions between latitudes 10º and 20º north of the equator (which i will be referring to as the middle latitudes since “Sudanic” and “Sahelian” can be quite confusing), the tsetse free environment, relatively flat terrain and sparse vegetation supported horse rearing which greatly improved the mobility of the army, it is thus unsurprising that this was where the majority of Africa's large empires were found since the improved logistics allowed such states to control vast territories; only one of the about twenty pre-colonial African states that exceeded 300,000 sqkm was located outside these longitudes.4

This region is also one of a striking variety of languages. Consider the number of linguistic families located within the borders of the Gelibic civilisation: Mandé (including Manding, Bambara and Soninke), Senegambian (including Wolof and Fulfulde), Dogon, Ayneha,5 Chadic (including Hausa) and the Saharan (including Kanuri).

The Sahel region is one of the earliest centers of independent agriculture, where sorghum, millet, and African rice were domesticated6. Indeed, if we were to follow Quigleyan structures that classifies civilisations based on their main crop, we would conclude that the Gelibic civilisation belongs neither to the wheat group of civilisations, nor the rice group, nor the maize group. As such, we would need to claim that the Gelibic civilisation belongs to a completely new type of civilisation - the millet branch, as both millet and sorghum form the main staple crop in the region of the Sahel even today.7

The area of the later Gelibic civilisation was also one to independently develop iron metalurgy This hypothesis is enforced by the fact that iron smelting techniques used by smiths in Sub-saharan Africa were so different from the methods used by their colleagues in ťhe Mediterranean, that it points to independent development.8 The blacksmiths developped a unique position in the society of the Gelibic civilisation. Depending on the society and era, they were both respected or feared, powerful or marginalized, because they wielded social power derived from access to knowledge of metallurgy, divination, peacemaking, and other salient social practices.9 They became their own caste, as did the griots, masters of oral history, the troubadours and chroniclers at once. They were the once who composed and performed this civilisation´s epic - the Epic of Sundiata Keita, which equals to the Homeric Epic or the Shahnameh.

The Architecture and the Ursymbol

It found its own architectural style that perfectly matched the rhythm of the land. Characterised by the use of bricks and timber, the Sudano-Sahelian architecture encompasses a wide range of building typologies. It features the use of buttressing, pinnacles and attached pillars, with a distinctive façade that is punctuated by wooden spikes and is often heavily ornamented with intricate carvings.

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Build of adobe and mudbrick supported by wooden beams, the Gelibic architecture appears as termite mounds. Indeed, if one were to search for the Ursymbol of the Gelibic civilisation, it would not be found in the road, the city, or the monument, but in the termite mound. Like the mound, this civilisation is earthen, collective, hierarchical, and endlessly renewable. It does not impose form upon nature; it grows within it. Its architecture rises not as defiance of time, but as accommodation to it — repaired each year, sustained by ritual labour, permanent only through repetition. Power, too, follows this logic: central yet porous, authoritative yet embedded, enduring not by rigidity but by adaptability. Where other civilisations seek eternity in stone or memory in text, the Gelibic world achieves duration through regeneration. It does not conquer decay; it outlives it.

The Gelibic civilisation endured not by freezing itself in stone or scripture, but by allowing power, form, and memory to circulate endlessly — like the Niger itself, or the termite mound it unconsciously imitated.

As we have described the Egyptiac, the Frankish, and the Ethiopic civilisations, so too must we describe the Gelibic. The Gelibic ethos may be defined in five words: earthen, collective, regenerative, hierarchical, and circulatory.

It is a civilisation that found in the rhythm of the savannah and the slow pulse of the great rivers a pattern of social truth, and made of its culture a system of endurance through renewal, as witness in the predictable rhythm of the changing wet and dry seasons. Gelibic civilisation seeks not permanence through fixation, but duration through repetition; not immortality through monument, but continuity through repair. Its architecture does not deny decay—it incorporates it. Its power does not abolish fragility—it manages it.

The five traits of the Gelibic ethos—earthen, collective, regenerative, hierarchical, and circulatory—are not abstractions, but cultural responses to the monsoonal alternation of wet and dry seasons, which forbade permanence, demanded coordination, and made renewal the condition of survival.

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Where Egypt embalmed time, the Gelibic world reworks it. Its buildings rise from earth and return to earth; its authority is central yet porous; its endurance depends not on stone but on ritual labour. Truth here is not preserved by inscription, but by participation. Memory is not frozen; it is reenacted.

If Egypt confronted death with stone and ritual, Gelibic civilisation confronted entropy with regeneration. It did not seek to overcome decay. It sought to outlive it.

Formation, Peak and Components

The formative structure of Gelibic civilisation was the kingdom of Wagadu, known in history as Ghana, which is not the name of the country itself but the title of the ruler10. Interestingly, the time when Wagadu was founded coincides with the crowning of Charlemagne.11 This makes the Frankish and the Gelebic civilisation contemporary. Its collapse allowed a handful of kingdoms to arise: Diafannu, Sosso, Djene, Goa, Manden, Takrur, Wagadugu and Jolof, which would be united under the banners of the Manden Kurufaba, or as is know to us, the Mali Empire

The Gelibic civilisation found its universal empire in the Songhay Empire, which dominated the region in the 15th and 16th centuries.

As we have laid out the genealogy of many previous civilisations, let us attempt to trace a genealogy also of the Gelibic civilisation. At its base stood the indigenous peoples of the West African savannah and Sahel, speakers of Mandé, Senegambian, Dogon, and related language families, whose social forms were shaped by agriculture, seasonal rhythms, and sacred kingship rooted in land and lineage. Upon this substrate arrived pastoral and semi-nomadic peoples from the northern Sahel and Saharan margins, bearers of mobility, cavalry warfare, and long-distance exchange. These may be distinguished further between the elements broughts forth by the individual Mandé, Dogon and Ayneha peoples.

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Another strong influence on Gelibic civilisation came from the Fertile Crescent. The legends of the Hausa and Yoruba peoples and the chronicles of Kanem-Bornu indicate a strong influence from the Sumerian (Sargon of Akkad), Babylonian (Assyrian Empire), and Canaanite civilizations (political form)12. Dierk Lange suggests that the dual system of government at the head of Sahelian civilization has its roots in Canaanite Carthage, which was ruled by two suffetes, from which a system of dual kingship emerged over time, with a significant first king and a subordinate second king13.

From the eighth century onward, Islam entered this world not as a force of rupture, but as an additional layer. First adopted by merchant elites and courts, it coexisted for centuries with indigenous religious forms, producing a distinctive synthesis. Like Ethiopia, the Gelibic civilisation became a satellite of a greater Abrahamic world—here the Islamic umma—yet never dissolved into it. Islamic law, literacy, and scholarship took root in cities such as Timbuktu and Gao, while rural ritual life and sacral kingship endured beneath the surface.

If Ethiopic civilisation made Scripture into liturgy, the Gelibic civilisation made ritual into architecture. Its adobe mosques, rebuilt each year by collective labour, stand as material expressions of a worldview in which permanence is achieved not by fixity, but by renewal. Not speculative nor philosophical, but practical and ritualistic. Its artistic forms—earthen architecture, carved wood, oral epic, and genealogical memory—remain outward-facing and communal. Where Ethiopia turns inward toward the Ark, the Gelibic world turns outward toward the marketplace, the river, and the seasonal cycle.

One of the predecessors of Syriac civilization was the Canaanite civilisation, which formed on the Levantine coast after the invasion of the Sea Peoples, which plunged the eastern Mediterranean into a period of darkness. Among its bearers, the inhabitants of the Phoenician coast in present-day Lebanon and the Israelite tribes left the deepest historical mark – the former by coming up with the groundbreaking idea of a phonetic1 alphabet and the latter by gradually arriving at a monotheistic perception of God2 3, which would later become the basis of the monotheistic religions of Syriac civilisation.

The cradle of this civilisation is an area that was the scene of the fiercest of battles at the dawn of history, and even today, this is no different. In the Battle of Kadesh, the superpowers of the world at that time, Ramesses II of Egypt and Muwattalis II of the Hittites, met on the battlefield. The arrival of the Sea Peoples meant the end of the Hittite Empire and the collapse of the Anatolic civilisation, and Egypt defended the Nile Valley with all its might.

The Canaanite civilisation arose between the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and the basking deserts of Arabia. It formed in the cedar-covered gorges of deep valleys, at the crossroads of continents, where the influences of Egypt, Sumer and Anatolia converge. Their testimony are not vast monuments but ways to remember. While Egypt embalmed eternity in stone and Mesopotamia recorded power in cuneiform ledgers, Canaan reduced speech to its purest form. A letter for every consonant and one needs not to entrust the arcane mysteries of papyrus to servants of the Leviathan - it made them versatile for the merchant, the priest and the prophet.

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And hence, merchants, priests and prophets could write down. They write not of unchanging order, nor of calculations to predict the future and prevent divine wrath. They write of a people found at a crossroad of empires, whose survival is always uncertain and yet persevere.Unlike Egypt, which immobilised time, or Mesopotamia, which sought to master it through calculation and law, Canaan understood time as transmission. What matters is not the present moment, nor the eternal repetition of the past, but the faithful handing-on of meaning across generations. Memory, not monument, becomes the vessel of permanence.

Here lies the deepest contrast with Egypt. Egyptian civilisation seeks to abolish history; Canaanite civilisation invents it. The past is not a model to be repeated, but a narrative to be remembered. Catastrophe is not an interruption of order, but a test of fidelity. The destruction of cities, the loss of kingship, even exile itself become moments of meaning rather than signs of civilisational death.

A People Among Peoples

The Israelite branch of Canaanite civilisation achieved something even more radical. In a world saturated with gods, myths, and cosmic hierarchies, it introduced an idea so explosive that it would fracture history itself: that there is one God, outside nature, superior to kings, and binding even the strong by law. This was not a philosophical abstraction; it was a civilisational revolt. Covenant replaced empire. Memory replaced monument. Law replaced myth. A people without an empire outlasted every empire that ruled over it.

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If they had thought of themselves as a Chosen People, they must have been a people amongst peoples, one who bore similarities with their neighbours. A tablet in Ebla and Mari references people bearing names familiar from the book of Genesis: Abram, Jacob, Lea, Laban, Ishmael4 The Phoenicians had a worldview akin to that of the prophets of Israel5. Judah was one among many: Edom, Moab, Ammon, Tyre, Sidon. At first their devotion to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob was just that - a devotion to a patron deity to a people, similar to Chemosh among the Moabites.

In the days of its youth and maturity, the basic political unit of the Canaanite civilisation was neither empire nor polis, but the sacral city-community: a community bound by law, lineage, and ritual, whose autonomy was local and whose survival depended on adaptability. Phoenician cities like Tyre or Byblos were independent yet networked, Israelite tribes were confederations with covenantal authority6, and Carthage operated as a ritual-commercial republic. The Levantine world was thus decentralised, juridical, and portable, unlike the state-centric Egypt or Mesopotamia.

Pillars of Canaan

The search for the pillars of Canaanite civilisation will inevitably lead us to the predecessors who ruled the area before the collapse of the Bronze Age. These are the Anatolian, Egyptiac, and Sumeric civilizations.

The Anatolian pillar in Canaanite civilisation was perhaps inconspicuous, but it manifested itself in an extremely significant way. Paul Johnson believes that they learned the art of depicting history from the Hittites, who were also a people with their own historical consciousness.7

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The Egyptiac pillar of the Canaanite civilisation is preserved above all in memory and narrative, most powerfully crystallised in the Exodus tradition. Egypt appears not merely as a place of bondage, but as the civilisational Other par excellence: the land of monumental order, sacral kingship, and cosmic stability. From Egypt, the Canaanite world absorbed a heightened sensitivity to death and judgment, as well as the intuition that existence unfolds under a moral horizon that extends beyond earthly life. The Egyptian concern with the afterlife, transposed and stripped of its funerary monumentalism, survives in a transformed key: not as pyramidal eternity, but as ethical reckoning. Likewise, the idea that the world itself is called into being by a divine Word—an act of ordered speech rather than brute force—bears unmistakable Egyptiac resonances, refracted through Semitic language and covenantal thought. What was in Egypt a cosmological given becomes in Canaan a moral command.

The Sumeric pillar of the Canaanite civilisation was remembered in oral tradition by Abraham leaving the city of Ur, abandoning the settled, urban, temple-centred world of southern Mesopotamia. Sumer represents the first great civilisational attempt to master time through calculation, law, and record-keeping; its legacy is the consciousness of history as a sequence of events that can be narrated, dated, and remembered. Yet the Canaanite response to this legacy is telling: instead of perfecting the city, it walks away from it. The Abrahamic memory is not one of foundation but of rupture. From Sumer comes the sense of genealogy, of recorded lineage and remembered origin, but also the decisive intuition that meaning is not exhausted by the city, nor salvation guaranteed by civilisation itself. History is no longer a ledger of kings; it becomes a journey under promise.

Lets us not forget the Semitic pillar: that of the pastoral nomads whom the Egyptiacs called habiru8 - wanderers. From them derives the patriarchal form of life: mobile, kin-based, austere, and intensely personal. Authority here is not bureaucratic but paternal; law is not written in stone but carried in custom, oath, and memory. This nomadic inheritance instilled in Canaanite civilisation a suspicion of absolute settlement and a capacity for survival under displacement. It explains why covenant could replace territory, why law could precede statehood, and why identity could endure without walls. The patriarch is neither king nor priest in the Egyptian sense, but a bearer of promise whose legitimacy rests on fidelity rather than power.

And lets us not forget the Caphtoric pillar, that has been brough here by the invasion of the Sea Peoples. They arrived as masters of iron and war, they settled between Gaza and Ashkelon.They brought with them not memory but rupture: a militarised ethos, new technologies, and a harsher realism born of collapse and migration. In the Philistine presence, the Canaanite world encountered organised violence unanchored from sacral kingship. This forced adaptation sharpened the Levantine genius for survival under pressure and contributed to the persistent tension between force and law that runs through the civilisation. Where Egypt neutralised violence through cosmic order, and Mesopotamia codified it through empire, Canaan learned to live beside it—and to judge it.

The Ethos of Canaan

If we were to render the Canaanite civilisation in Quigleyan terms, we would be struck above all by its inner contradiction. This was not a civilisation of harmony or cosmic balance, but of friction—between spirit and matter, transcendence and appetite, memory and survival. Canaanite society was vigorous and practical, oriented toward immediate action rather than abstract speculation. It was commercial rather than monumental, adaptive rather than static, inventive rather than orderly.

Yet this practicality did not imply superficiality. Beneath what often appeared as crudity or unrefinement lay an acute intelligence and an intense spiritual sensitivity. The Canaanite did not seek proportion, nor harmony, nor eternity carved in stone. He sought meaning that could survive displacement, conquest, and collapse. This produced a civilisation at once sensual and superstitious, yet capable of profound religious innovation.

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In Quigleyan terms, Canaanite civilisation may be described as energetic, pragmatic, pluralistic, memory-centered, and morally charged. Energetic, because it thrived in movement—trade, migration, exile—rather than territorial stability. Pragmatic, because its institutions served survival rather than metaphysical completeness. Pluralistic, because it existed at a crossroads of empires and absorbed multiple traditions without synthesising them into a closed system. Memory-centered, because continuity was preserved not through stone or bureaucracy but through narrative, genealogy, and law. And morally charged, because power itself was placed under judgment—whether by covenant, prophecy, or divine law.

Its universal empire would be found outside of its core and peripheries, in the African outremer, where the city of Carthage presided over an empire across the southwestern shores of the Mediterranean

Its ethos is one which builds a relation between the moral actions of man and his prosperity on this Earth. Good order produces good fruit; corrupt rule corrodes even material life. Prosperity is never redemptive in itself, yet neither is it morally neutral. A just king brings peace to the land; a disciplined community generates trust, credit, and abundance. When, Carroll Quigley drew the conclusion: commercial capitalism had been the instrument of expansion of this civilisation.9

The Canaanite civilisation is not one of monuments or empires, but of fidelity and law. It survives where Egypt and Mesopotamia could be overrun; it endures where empires crumble. Memory, covenant, and adaptability are its instruments. Its children—the Israelites, Phoenicians, and Carthaginians—carry forth the genius of a civilisation that never relied on brute force, yet outlasted the powerful and the mighty.

In Spenglerian terms, the Ursymbol of the Canaanite civilisation cannot be neither monument nor horizon, but the path—narrow, perilous, and exposed to judgment. Canaanite man does not inhabit a finished world; he traverses a historical one. Space is not a possession but a passage, time not a cycle but a trial. Meaning is not secured by stone or empire, but by memory faithfully carried forward under conditions of constant threat. Where Egypt sought eternity, and Mesopotamia sought control, Canaan learned endurance. Its world is not ordered in advance; it is revealed step by step, through covenant, exile, and return.

Canaan is the Narrow Way through History: a civilisation on the path, not the throne, where meaning travels in speech and fidelity is tested by exile.