By: Anna Malindog-Uy

The LOBBYiST

3 SEPTEMBER 2026

The Philippine seabed submission has exposed something important about the SCS dispute: There is not one dispute—there are several disputes layered on top of one another.

To continue reading, click the link below:

Part 5: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-among-the-scs-claimants-which-objections-are-strongest-part-5?fbclid=IwY2xjawUGMepwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMWN5clpFNm9BUVBjREIxOHpzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEe5C05lOytU6-y7ANWR57jeZqwHKHqu0B9ULG_luEEjEe-KbO6OeIFtgincXU_aem_gUn9KrUojtX3KXboyGxNzQ

Here are the links to Parts 1 to 4:

Part 1: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-claim-why-china-malaysia-vietnam-and-taiwan-are-objecting-part1

Part 2: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-why-malaysia-is-objecting-part-2

Part 3: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-china-and-vietnam-two-objections-two-very-different-legal-battles-part-3

Part 4 Link: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-objection-from-vietnam-part-4?fbclid=IwY2xjawT_pntwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMTRidHBRQVpIZDFYRmRVTjlzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeewt02HJyL6yCyJ_JB5YrNHvXeOzriCRTJg6GMXDCnl5l-yohcwI3HoUTrdk_aem_5QrbSp0cWSrXL6BkHC5GwA

Sharing my latest interview with RT on a question that deserves much closer attention in Manila: Are we becoming more secure—or simply more strategically exposed?

We discussed Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s concerns over the expanding military infrastructure on Balabac Island in southern Palawan, where Philippine defense facilities are being developed with substantial U.S. support. Given Balabac’s proximity to Sabah, this is no longer an issue viewed only through the prism of the Philippines–China dispute over the South China Sea (SCS). It is also beginning to affect the security perceptions of one of our closest ASEAN neighbors, - Malaysia.

As the Philippines becomes increasingly embedded in the emerging U.S.-led regional military architecture and expansion, we should ask not only how much deterrence it provides, but also how all these are creating a regional security dilemma, and what new vulnerabilities, threat perceptions, and dependencies it may be creating. Because in geopolitics, more military presence does not automatically mean more security. Sometimes, it can also mean more strategic exposure.

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

The LOBBYiST

28 AUGUST 2026

PRIME INSIGHT: Vietnam perhaps has the most conventional maritime-overlap dispute with the Philippines over the contested waters of the South China Sea (SCS). Its objection to the Philippines’ UN seabed submission is far more conventional under the law of the sea. It argues that portions of Manila’s claimed extended continental shelf overlap with maritime entitlements that Vietnam itself asserts under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), and that Spratly sovereignty challenges the very legal architecture Manila relies on.

To continue reading, click the link below:

Part 4 Link: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-objection-from-vietnam-part-4?fbclid=IwY2xjawT_pntwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMTRidHBRQVpIZDFYRmRVTjlzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeewt02HJyL6yCyJ_JB5YrNHvXeOzriCRTJg6GMXDCnl5l-yohcwI3HoUTrdk_aem_5QrbSp0cWSrXL6BkHC5GwA

Here are the links to Parts 1 to 3:

Part 1: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-claim-why-china-malaysia-vietnam-and-taiwan-are-objecting-part1

Part 2: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-why-malaysia-is-objecting-part-2

Part 3: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-china-and-vietnam-two-objections-two-very-different-legal-battles-part-3

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

HEADSIGHT, The Manila Times

August 29, 2026

APPARENTLY, in today’s Philippines, a steel bar no longer needs to only pass tensile strength, elongation and quality tests. It may also need geopolitical clearance.

That is increasingly the impression created by the widening Marcos government campaign against supposedly “Chinese-linked” steel plants. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission (Paocc) chief Benjamin Acorda Jr. now describes the growing number of such facilities as “alarming,” while Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) RAdm. Roy Vincent Trinidad warns of security implications and even raises the possibility of “economic sabotage” if allegedly substandard steel can be connected to collapsed structures.

If steel produced by both Philippine and foreign companies is unsafe, investigate it. If environmental laws were violated, enforce them. If foreign workers violated immigration law, prosecute them. Nationality does not provide immunity from Philippine laws. But neither does Chinese ownership and being Chinese workers of a steel company constitute probable guilt.

Moreover, rather than making sensational claims, Acorda should also substantiate his claim concerning more than 40 “Chinese-linked” steel plants with actual data and details. Publish the list. Identify ownership structures. Show operating permits, production capacity, specific violations and failed laboratory results rather than nationality-based geopolitical tagging and insinuation.

The same applies to Trinidad’s “substandard steel” argument. Philippine standards recognize multiple steel-bar grades and specifications, with requirements covering matters such as elongation, bend tests, dimensions and markings. Calling steel “substandard” therefore requires identification of the product, grade, applicable standard, batch and laboratory test results, not simply dramatic television interviews.

To continue reading, click the link below:

TMT Link: https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/08/29/opinion/columns/security-politics-balikatan-2027-connection-and-the-expanding-us-military-footprint-in-ph/2414196

So Malacañang now says there is “enough evidence” to convict Vice President Sara Duterte of allegedly misusing confidential funds. Is that so?? Really?? Interesting!!

Did we miss a constitutional amendment somewhere? Has the Palace suddenly become part of the Senate impeachment court? Or has Malacañang simply decided that, since the senators have not yet voted, it might as well announce the desired verdict in advance? Is that it??

Palace Press Officer Claire Castro was asked whether the prosecution had already presented sufficient evidence to warrant conviction. Her answer, speaking for the Palace, was essentially “in a way, yes,” while adding that the ultimate decision remains with the senator-judges.

The trial is still ongoing. The prosecution is still presenting evidence. The defense has not even completed its case. The senator-judges have not deliberated, much less voted. Yet the Executive Branch is already publicly assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and talking about conviction. How politically very convenient!!

WHO EXACTLY IS ON TRIAL — AND WHO IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE JUDGE?

The Constitution could hardly be clearer: “The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” NOT Malacañang. NOT the Presidential Communications Office. MOST SURELY NOT the President's spokesperson. THE SENATE!

Of course, Palace officials are citizens too and may have opinions. A public statement by Malacañang does not automatically amount to a formal constitutional violation. But there is a world of difference between a private citizen expressing an opinion and the institution of the Presidency publicly declaring that sufficient evidence already exists to convict an incumbent Vice President while her impeachment trial is still underway. That is precisely where institutional restraint, political ethics, and separation of powers should matter.

The senators are not merely legislators in this proceeding. They are sitting under oath as senator-judges. Their constitutional responsibility is to evaluate the evidence presented before the impeachment court, NOT to take cues from the Palace about whether the prosecution has already done enough.

So one must reasonably ask: Is Malacañang merely commenting, or is it SIGNALING?

And if the Palace already believes that the evidence is sufficient for conviction, what message does that send to senators belonging to the administration coalition, senators dependent upon presidential political support, and senators who will eventually cast the votes determining Sara Duterte's political fate?

Pressure does not always come in the form of an explicit order. Sometimes, the signal is pressure that starts rooting for and perhaps politically signaling the desired outcome. This is dangerous!

And we are supposed to believe this demonstrates impartiality?

Yes, serious questions surround Sara Duterte's confidential funds, such as perhaps audit deficiencies, disallowances, and transactions that deserve explanation. But those are precisely the matters the Senate impeachment court is supposed to determine through evidence, examination, cross-examination, and deliberation.

Audit deficiencies are not automatically proof of personal misappropriation. Liquidation documents in question DO NOT automatically establish that the Vice President personally stole public funds. And suspicion, however politically compelling, is not a substitute for establishing responsibility.

The burden remains on those seeking conviction to prove their accusations, then let the evidence convince the senator-judges.

Why does Malacañang need to help announce the conclusion?

No doubt, accountability must be pursued. But so must constitutional fairness.

The House prosecutes. The defense defends. The Senate tries and decides, and the Executive should SHUT UP! DUH!🙄🙄

Unless, of course, the Palace has already counted the votes. Has it? Hmmmm…. 🤔🤔🤔

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

August 26, 2026

The U.S. Embassy statement is more consequential than it appears. Its purpose is plainly defensive: it rejects the suggestion that American soldiers tried to force their way into Sanjia Steel or were conducting a law-enforcement “inspection.” But in making that denial, the Embassy confirms an important fact that had previously been uncertain: U.S. and Philippine military planners went to the Sanjia Steel facility specifically to assess its “potential for use” in Balikatan Military Exercises of U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces in 2027. And I think this is the part that deserves serious scrutiny.

Three principles are at issue here, and they raise legitimate sovereignty and governance questions: Philippine sovereignty, due process, and transparency regarding the expanding military use of civilian infrastructure.

Sanjia Steel is located inside the 3,000-hectare PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate in Misamis Oriental, a major government-managed industrial zone that also hosts the strategically important Mindanao Container Terminal.

On May 15, 2026, authorities, including the NBI, PAOCC, and AFP, raided Sanjia over allegations involving substandard steel, hazardous materials, labor and immigration violations, and environmental concerns. 69 Chinese nationals and one Filipino were detained.

However, on June 2, the National Prosecution Service ordered their release after finding the evidence the NBI submitted insufficient to establish the alleged offenses. Eleven other individuals remained subject to preliminary investigation.

The key point is one of due process: the dismissal and release do not prove that Sanjia committed no regulatory violations, but neither should the original allegations be repeated as though they were established facts. Allegations, investigation, and proven wrongdoing are three different things. Then, only a few months later, U.S. military planners arrive

The sequence surrounding Sanjia creates a legitimate appearance problem, even if it does not prove causation. After the highly publicized May raid, AFP involvement, national-security rhetoric, the arrest of Chinese workers, and their subsequent release for insufficient evidence, it emerged that U.S. and Philippine military personnel were assessing the same facility for possible Balikatan 2027 use. The Marcos administration should therefore clarify whether the law-enforcement action and later military interest were unrelated or connected.

The broader issue goes beyond Sanjia. During Balikatan 2026, U.S. forces used the Port of Cagayan de Oro for their first Maritime Prepositioning Force offload in Mindanao, moving military equipment through the archipelago as part of an expanding logistics network for exercises and contingencies.

The emerging picture is that Mindanao is becoming a strategic rear and logistics hub for the U.S.-Philippine military architecture, providing geographic depth away from more vulnerable northern and western locations. Militarily, that may be logical. Geopolitically, however, it raises important questions about sovereignty, transparency, civilian infrastructure, and how deeply the Philippines is being integrated into U.S. regional contingency military planning.

Note that there are currently nine publicly identified EDCA Agreed Locations. PHIVIDEC/Sanjia is not one of them. Lumbia Airport in nearby Cagayan de Oro is an EDCA location, but Sanjia Steel is not. Also, nothing in the VFA (Visiting Forces Agreement between the Philippines and the U.S.) gives American military personnel a general law-enforcement authority to inspect Philippine private companies. The VFA establishes the legal status and conditions governing visiting U.S. personnel; it does not transform American troops into Philippine regulators.

Now, the deeper geopolitical implication is that civilian infrastructure is entering military planning. That means military planning is reaching into a commercial industrial estate.

That carries several consequences. First: the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure becomes less clear. Second, it changes Mindanao’s strategic exposure. Third: commercial facilities can acquire strategic-targeting significance.

So there is a genuine national-policy question: How far should civilian Philippine economic infrastructure be integrated into U.S.-Philippine military planning, and who decides?

Furthermore, the economic consequences are serious. PHIVIDEC was established fundamentally as an industrial and investment zone, not principally as a military zone. Its statutory mandate is to attract domestic and foreign investment and promote regional economic development.

If foreign investors begin believing that commercial properties can be enveloped in geopolitical disputes or considered for military use without transparent processes, several consequences become possible: higher political-risk perceptions; higher insurance and financing costs; reluctance to invest; and increasing segregation of investment according to geopolitical alignment.

This would represent troubling economic securitization and could eventually lead to economic bloc formation. For the Philippines, a country that needs and benefits substantially from Asian trade and investment, that is not necessarily an advantageous destination.

Another important caveat is the risks of turning every Chinese investment into a security question.

The Philippines has legitimate reasons to scrutinize foreign investments around critical infrastructure. That should apply to Chinese, American, Japanese, Korean, or any other foreign investor. But nationality by itself cannot substitute for evidence.

This is particularly important in the Sanjia case because the 69 arrested Chinese respondents were subsequently released after prosecutors found the evidence before them insufficient.

The Philippine standard should therefore be: Investigate suspicious activity aggressively, but prosecute evidence, NOT nationality.

Thus, the Sanjia controversy, therefore, should not be another “Philippines versus China” debate/argument. It should be a debate about Philippine sovereignty and strategic autonomy. Philippine national interest must be the controlling test in this regard.

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

HeadSight, The Manila Times

August 22, 2026

AS the Global Development Initiative (GDI) approaches its fifth anniversary on Sept. 21, 2026, China is taking stock of its efforts to transform an initiative first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the United Nations General Assembly in 2021 from a broad development vision into an increasingly institutionalized platform for international cooperation, particularly with countries of the Global South. What began as a call to put development back at the center of the global agenda is now being presented by Beijing not merely as a foreign-policy slogan, but as a practical framework for addressing some of the most persistent development challenges confronting emerging and developing economies.

For what it’s worth, the GDI was conceived against the backdrop of an uneven global economic recovery and sluggish growth across much of the developing world. Five years later, its underlying premise has arguably become even more relevant. The international environment is increasingly marked by economic uncertainty, geopolitical rivalry, protectionism, supply chain fragmentation, climate pressures, widening development gaps and competing strategic blocs.

In such circumstances, development risks being overshadowed by geopolitics precisely when it needs greater attention. The central proposition of the GDI is therefore both simple and consequential: Even in a fractured and turbulent world, development must remain a priority and cooperation on poverty reduction, food security, infrastructure, green growth, technology, connectivity and human development should not become collateral damage in great-power competition.

To read more, click the link below:

TMT Link: https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/08/22/opinion/columns/between-dispute-and-development-rebuilding-philippines-china-relations-and-the-promise-of-gdi/2410079

The Philippines’ UN Seabed Submission: China and Vietnam - Two Objections, Two Very Different Legal Battles (Part 3)

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

The LOBBYiST

21 AUGUST 2026

At first glance, China’s and Vietnam’s objections to the Philippines’ extended continental shelf submission may seem to put both countries on the same side against Manila. But that would be a serious misreading of the legal and geopolitical terrain.

China and Vietnam may be objecting to the same Philippine submission, but they are not making the same case, not even close. This distinction is crucial. China and Vietnam are not standing on the same legal ground; they simply arrive at the same contested seabed from very different directions. And understanding that difference is essential to understanding not only the Philippine claim, but the deeper contradictions, competing legal narratives, and strategic realities that continue to define the disputed waters of the SCS.

To continue reading, click the link below:

Link: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-china-and-vietnam-two-objections-two-very-different-legal-battles-part-3?fbclid=IwY2xjawT01VpwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMVZiN2tTYXZCQjgwNExBNVBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeystCij56jt41_z-3Fdyb82iRCtkGI7VGVft99RqaNMsif8IxrUcAQIx1bRo_aem_aWHz58uTKF-2B1AShQofCQ

Here’s the links to Part 1 and 2, refer below:

Part 1: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-claim-why-china-malaysia-vietnam-and-taiwan-are-objecting-part1

Part 2: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-why-malaysia-is-objecting-part-2

By: Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy

Augustu 20, 2026

This afternoon, I had the privilege of sharing and delivering my perspectives during Plenary Session/Seminar #1: “Energy Security and Regional Resilience” at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2026 Energy Think Tank Forum, held under the timely overarching theme: “Balancing Security and Transition: Building a Stable and Prosperous Energy Future for the Asia-Pacific.”

In this regard, I would like to share with my readers and social media followers the perspectives I presented in this forum. Here’s My Talk ⬇️

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For many years, we tended to think of energy security primarily in terms of one question: Do we have enough energy to keep the lights on, factories running, and transportation moving?

Today, that definition is no longer sufficient. In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment, energy security has become economic security.

When oil or LNG (liquefied natural gas) supplies are disrupted, the consequences do not stop at the energy sector. Transportation costs rise. Electricity becomes more expensive. Manufacturing costs increase. Food prices can follow. Inflationary pressures intensify. Governments face greater fiscal burdens, while central banks confront more difficult monetary-policy choices.

And when energy costs become unpredictable, industrial competitiveness, investment decisions, supply chains, and ultimately economic growth are affected.

So the central question before us is no longer simply: Where will our energy come from?

The more important question is: How do we build economies that can absorb energy shocks without letting those shocks become economic crises?

This is particularly important for the Asia-Pacific—a region deeply integrated through trade, manufacturing, shipping, energy flows, technology, and investment.

Our greatest strength has been connectivity. But that connectivity also creates vulnerability when too much dependence is concentrated in a single supplier, route, technology, resource, or geopolitical relationship.

Therefore, I would argue that our objective should not be energy independence in the absolute sense.

For most economies, complete energy self-sufficiency is neither realistic nor economically efficient.

Instead, what we need is diversified interdependence. That means having multiple energy sources, suppliers, transport routes, technologies, financing mechanisms, and regional arrangements that can support one another when disruption occurs.

In other words, resilience does not mean eliminating interdependence. It means preventing interdependence from becoming strategic dependence. And there is an important difference.

Interdependence creates mutual benefit. Strategic dependence arises when the failure—or political withdrawal—of one critical component can destabilize an entire economy. And this brings us to another important dilemma: the energy transition itself.

Across the Asia-Pacific, economies are accelerating renewable energy, electrification, battery storage, cleaner transportation, and advanced energy technologies. This transition is necessary.

But we must ask a difficult question: Are we eliminating old energy vulnerabilities—or simply replacing them with new ones?

Reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels may decrease exposure to oil and gas disruptions. But renewable and electrified energy systems require critical minerals, batteries, semiconductors, processing capacity, advanced grids, and sophisticated technologies.

If these supply chains become excessively concentrated, then an economy may simply exchange dependence on imported petroleum for dependence on imported lithium, nickel processing, battery technologies, semiconductors, or grid equipment.

The form of vulnerability changes. But the vulnerability itself remains. That is why energy-transition policy must be evaluated not only by how much carbon it removes, but also by how much resilience, affordability, technological capability, and strategic flexibility it creates. This is where the current debate over de-risking matters most.

De-risking is understandable. Strategic reserves, supply-chain diversification, investment screening, domestic capacity-building, and domestic-security safeguards can all strengthen resilience.

But de-risking becomes dangerous when it turns into decoupling. If every economy responds to insecurity by imposing export restrictions, protectionist barriers, exclusive supply chains, or competing geopolitical blocs, we may paradoxically make the entire regional energy system less secure.

Why? Because no economy possesses every resource, every technology, every financing capability, and every industrial input required for the energy transition.

Energy security in the twenty-first century therefore cannot be built through fragmentation. It must be built through resilient connectivity.

For APEC, I believe this suggests the need to think seriously about an Asia-Pacific Energy Resilience Architecture built around several mutually reinforcing pillars.

First, Diversification—of suppliers, fuels, technologies, routes, markets, and financing.

Second, Connectivity—including stronger cross-border electricity grids, interconnected infrastructure, LNG networks, and efficient regional energy markets.

Third, Strategic Buffers—adequate petroleum and LNG reserves, storage systems, redundancy in critical infrastructure, and emergency supply mechanisms.

Fourth, Regional Coordination. Energy shocks rarely respect domestic borders. A disruption in one shipping route, pipeline, producing economy, or technological supply chain can quickly affect multiple APEC economies.

We therefore need stronger mechanisms for information sharing, emergency coordination, mutual assistance, and crisis response.

Fifth, we need critical-mineral resilience. The energy transition cannot be sustainable if its mineral and processing supply chains are dangerously concentrated. But diversification should not mean simply moving dependence from one economy to another.

It should mean developing multiple production centers, processing capabilities, recycling systems, technological partnerships, and transparent markets across the region.

And finally, we must preserve openness. This may be the most difficult challenge in an age of geopolitical rivalry.

The Asia-Pacific cannot build genuine energy security if energy cooperation itself becomes divided into competing political camps.

APEC’s great advantage has always been its ability to bring together very different economies across political and strategic divides.

We should protect that space. Because energy security is ultimately not about choosing one supplier over another, one bloc over another, or one technology ecosystem over another.

It is about ensuring that no single supplier, route, resource, technology, or political relationship becomes a strategic point of failure.

So perhaps the principle we need is simple: De-risk without decoupling. Diversify without fragmenting. Transition without creating new dependencies.

The successful energy transition of the Asia-Pacific will therefore not be measured by sustainability alone. It must simultaneously deliver security, affordability, economic resilience, technological flexibility, and sustainability.

Because if energy becomes cleaner but unaffordable, the transition will lose public support.

If it becomes greener but strategically fragile, our economies remain vulnerable.

And if we pursue energy security through economic fragmentation, we may solve one problem while creating several others.

The real objective should therefore be neither complete self-sufficiency nor unrestricted dependence.

It should be resilient interdependence—a regional energy system sufficiently connected to generate prosperity, sufficiently diversified to absorb shocks, and sufficiently flexible to survive geopolitical uncertainty.

That, I believe, should be at the heart of an Asia-Pacific energy-security strategy for the years ahead.

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

August 20, 2026

This should make us think very carefully about where the accelerating militarization of Southeast Asia is taking us.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has now publicly raised concerns about the expanding military infrastructure on Balabac Island in Southern Palawan, where Philippine facilities are being developed with substantial U.S. support. Malaysia, in turn, says it needs to strengthen its defense capabilities in Sabah amid an increasingly uncertain regional security environment. (The Straits Times)

And here lies the uncomfortable question: Are we beginning to see the early dynamics of an arms race, or, more precisely, a regional security dilemma in Southeast Asia?

The distinction matters. An arms race means states are deliberately competing to accumulate military capabilities against each other. We are not necessarily there yet. But a security dilemma can be just as dangerous: Country A strengthens its military because it feels insecure; Country B sees that buildup and becomes nervous, so it strengthens its own forces; Country A then sees B’s response as justification for further militarization. And around we go.

That appears to be the warning emerging from Malaysia.

Malaysian Defense Minister Mohamed Khaled Nordin has been careful to say that Kuala Lumpur does not regard the Philippines, the United States or China individually as a specific threat. His concern is broader: as more military assets operate within a relatively confined geographical space, the risks of misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation increase. (South China Morning Post)

And then there is Sabah. This makes Balabac particularly sensitive.

Balabac is not some distant military location buried deep inside the Philippine archipelago. It sits roughly 50 kilometers from Sabah, across a narrow and strategically important maritime corridor.

So when increasingly sophisticated military infrastructure, exercises and potentially deployable weapons systems appear immediately north of Sabah, Malaysia naturally asks what these developments mean for its own security.

There is also an unavoidable historical complication: Sabah remains a politically and historically sensitive issue in Philippines–Malaysia relations.

Malaysia exercises sovereignty and effective administration over Sabah, while the Philippines has historically maintained a claim arising from the Sultanate of Sulu. The issue is largely dormant at the state-to-state level today, but it has never completely disappeared from the historical and political consciousness of either country.

That does not mean the Philippine military buildup in Balabac is directed at Malaysia or connected to Manila’s historical Sabah claim. There is no evidence establishing that.

But geography has a stubborn way of reminding governments of unresolved history.

From Kuala Lumpur’s perspective, military infrastructure immediately across the Balabac Strait cannot be viewed solely through the Philippines-China dispute. Malaysia must assess it through the lens of its own security interests.

This is precisely the danger of importing great-power rivalry into Southeast Asia.

The Philippines says its military modernization and deeper defense cooperation with the United States are intended to strengthen deterrence and defend Philippine sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

That is a legitimate security argument. But security policies do not exist in a vacuum. What Manila considers deterrence, Beijing may interpret as containment.

What Washington considers forward deterrence, another regional state may see as an expanding American military footprint.

And what the Philippines considers defensive military infrastructure, Malaysia may still have to factor into its own defense planning because Balabac sits on Sabah’s doorstep.

This is how a security dilemma develops.

And we should remember that Southeast Asia is already becoming increasingly militarized amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition. American forces are expanding exercises and operational cooperation with the Philippines, including activities involving advanced weapons systems, while Washington continues strengthening its wider Indo-Pacific military posture. (The Wall Street Journal)

Meanwhile, regional states are modernizing their armed forces because they increasingly fear being caught in somebody else’s confrontation.

The danger therefore is not simply an arms race between ASEAN countries. The greater danger is an action–reaction cycle in which great-power competition gradually pushes Southeast Asian countries to spend more on weapons, host more military assets, strengthen forward positions and prepare for contingencies that none of them actually wants.

And eventually we must ask: At what point does deterrence begin producing the very insecurity it was supposed to prevent?

Malaysia’s reaction to Balabac should therefore be taken seriously in Manila—not as hostility from Kuala Lumpur, but as an important strategic warning.

Because ASEAN has spent decades insisting that Southeast Asia should remain a region of peace, neutrality, dialogue and ASEAN centrality.

If every new military deployment requires another military response from the country next door, Southeast Asia could slowly find itself moving in exactly the opposite direction.

Today it is Balabac and Sabah. Tomorrow it could be somewhere else.

The Philippines certainly has every right—and responsibility—to defend itself. But genuine national security must also ask a larger question:

Are our defense choices making the Philippines and Southeast Asia safer, or are we becoming another frontline in a great-power military competition that ASEAN has spent decades trying to avoid?

This is the conversation Filipinos and ASEAN citizens should be having.

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

HEADSIGHT, The Manila Times

August 15, 2026

LONG before China was ruled by emperors, governed from imperial capitals, or recorded in written chronicles, communities in what is now northeastern China were already shaping jade, constructing ceremonial spaces, honoring ancestors, and developing sophisticated ideas about society, spirituality, and the natural world.

This was the world of the Hongshan culture, one of the most remarkable Neolithic civilizations in Chinese history and an important window into humanity’s early journey from small agricultural communities toward more complex social and cultural organization.

My encounter with Hongshan culture deepened and became especially meaningful during a visit to Chaoyang City in Liaoning province, from Aug. 3 to 6, 2026, alongside other foreign media correspondents and practitioners from around the world to participate in the 2026 Conference on Hongshan Culture with the theme: “Hongshan Culture: A Dialogue Between Eras and Civilization.”

Our journey took us through archaeological sites, museums, geological landscapes and fossil exhibitions that revealed not only the depth of China’s ancient civilization, but also the vastly longer history of human life and nature that preceded it.

To read more, click the link below:

TMT Link: https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/08/15/opinion/columns/hongshan-culture-the-jade-heart-of-chinese-civilization-with-a-message-for-southeast-asia/2405857

The Philippines’ UN Seabed Submission: Why Malaysia is Objecting? (Part 2)

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

PRIME INSIGHT, The LOBBYiST

13 AUGUST 2026

The Philippines’ submission of its extended continental shelf claim to the United Nations (UN) has drawn objections from several other South China Sea (SCS) claimants. Each claimant is coming from different legal, geographical, sovereignty claims, maritime rights and entitlements, continental shelf projections, historical assertions, conflicting interpretations of UNCLOS, and strategic interests/standpoint.

It is therefore important to dissect their respective contentions one by one, for only by understanding the distinct premises behind each objection can we appreciate the real complexity of the SCS dispute, and this allows us to move beyond simplistic narratives of “claimant versus claimant” and examine where the respective positions converge, contradict, overlap, or even expose inconsistencies in one another.

To read more, click the link below:

https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-submission-why-malaysia-is-objecting-part-2?fbclid=IwY2xjawTrULpwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMTdzcmJiVW1WSk9VVGhNNDhzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeYGI9gA0QNZJNCystwCNrSUFrH7_sGdZuIWRadIEFGCF1MPSQyWtjCOTweUw_aem_FQgKUAca7DhJK0z7OkYxFw

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

Prime Insight: The LOBBYiST

11 AUGUST 2026

The Philippines’ extended continental shelf claim in the West Palawan Region is becoming one of the more consequential, yet often misunderstood, legal contests in the disputed South China Sea (SCS). What makes it especially interesting is that the objections from China, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan are not based on the same legal argument. They overlap geographically, but each claimant is defending a different bundle of sovereignty, maritime rights and entitlements, and strategic interests.

To read more, click the link below:

https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/the-philippines-un-seabed-claim-why-china-malaysia-vietnam-and-taiwan-are-objecting-part1?fbclid=IwY2xjawTnuvNwZG9mAWV4dG4DYWVtAjEwAGJyaWQRMVA0ZEtwbG1YakJDTUJ5dVRzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzkxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeP5bQ_ntFfiabYR6tpiJNyRwHdIBGDzMbxszhrLeUSb2nFDbXlbPC9Gs_ht8_aem_7gifGaFqAZRGOxzEqEqCkQ

The P612.5M Question: Accountability or Selective Prosecution of Sara Duterte?

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

HEADSIGHT, The Manila Times

August 8, 2026

FOR several days, the impeachment proceedings, more specifically the prosecution, have been trying to turn P612.5 million in confidential funds against Vice President Sara Duterte into one of the most politically explosive figures in Philippine politics.

Indeed, there are certainly questions that deserve answers. Allegedly, there are suspicious acknowledgment receipts, unusual aliases, lack of documentation, Commission on Audit (COA) findings, and disallowances.

But an equally important question has emerged from the Senate impeachment trial: Has the prosecution actually proved that Sara Duterte personally misappropriated P612.5 million? So far, the answer is far less straightforward than the political rhetoric suggests.

To continue reading, click the link below:

TMT Link: https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/08/08/opinion/columns/the-p6125m-question-accountability-or-selective-prosecution-of-sara-duterte/2401081

Has the Philippines quietly applied for U.S. statehood? Because judging from the House of Representatives’ (HOR) approval of a bill declaring the Fourth Thursday of November as National Thanksgiving Day, one might check whether our flag, the Philippine Flag, has suddenly acquired stars and stripes.

For the record, the United States has 50 states. Hawaii is the 50th. Guam is a U.S. territory. So are we now the magical 53rd state of the U.S. with this act by the Philippine Congress???

Folks, there is nothing wrong with Thanksgiving. Filipinos hardly need Americans or Congress to teach us gratitude. “Pasasalamat” (Thanksgiving) is deeply rooted in Filipino culture, family life, faith, fiestas, harvest traditions, and community celebrations.

The question is: Why copy the exact fourth Thursday of November, the unmistakable American Thanksgiving calendar?

If Congress genuinely wants a National Day of Gratitude, why not create something authentically Filipino, grounded in our own history, indigenous traditions, and cultural identity?

Imagine such magnificent unanimity being applied to political dynasties, corruption, food security, education, poverty, agricultural reform or government accountability.

But NO! On those matters, Philippine politics suddenly becomes complicated.

On American Thanksgiving Day? 206-0. Pass the turkey!

What the F**K is wrong with the Philippines these days??? Is this a way of saying to the Americans, hey Uncle Sam, we are ready to be once again under your “TUTAlage,” este “tutelage with open arms? For F**K sake! This is CRAZY!!!

Are we still the Republic of the Philippines, or are we auditioning to become Uncle Sam’s imaginary 53rd state?
At this rate, Congress might as well pass the turkey and start practicing: “Happy Thanksgiving, Pilipinas. Welcome back to TUTAlage.”

The bill is not simply an invitation for Filipinos to practice gratitude. By establishing a nationally recognized Thanksgiving Day and encouraging its observance across government agencies, LGUs, schools and workplaces, Congress is giving the occasion an official place in the country’s civic calendar. That makes the issue more consequential than a harmless cultural celebration.

National observances are never entirely neutral. They reflect what a country chooses to remember, honor and institutionalize as part of its collective identity. This is why the choice of the fourth Thursday of November, the exact timing associated with American Thanksgiving, deserves scrutiny!

The deeper question, therefore, is not whether gratitude is good. Of course it is. The question is why an independent Philippines needs to formalize gratitude through a calendar pattern so distinctly associated with another country, rather than developing an observance more clearly rooted in Filipino history, traditions, and concepts of "pasasalamat."

Congress is not merely choosing a date. It is making a symbolic statement about national identity and symbols matter, especially in a country still negotiating the boundaries between cultural influence, historical inheritance, and genuine independence.
And this becomes especially ironic at a time when questions are already being raised about the Philippines’ growing strategic dependence on Washington.

We already have deeper military cooperation, expanded access arrangements, and an increasingly Americanized security discourse. Must cultural symbolism follow as well?

To be clear: friendship with the United States is not the problem. Subservience is!

Alliance does not require cultural transplantation. Sovereignty is not merely possessing an independent flag and Constitution; it also means having enough national confidence to define our own traditions, priorities, and identity.

If Congress wants Filipinos to give thanks, perhaps it should first give them more reasons to be thankful: competent governance, affordable food, decent jobs, quality education, functioning institutions and genuine accountability.

Until then, Filipinos might reasonably ask: Thanksgiving? Fine. But why exactly are we celebrating it on America’s schedule?

Perhaps the next House bill can clarify whether the Philippines remains an independent republic or whether someone has already submitted our application to become Washington’s mythical 53rd state. And while they are at it, Congress might start debating whether lechon should officially be replaced with turkey.

Goodness! Only in the Philippines! WTF!!!

By: Anna Malindog-UY

August 4, 2026

The uploaded map implies that the Philippines is being steadily converted from an independent state into a strategic platform for U.S. military, industrial, and geopolitical operations. EDCA sites (US bases inside Philippine military bases across the country), military access points, and Pax Silia appear NOT as isolated projects but as parts of a single, expanding defense and military architecture of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), with the primary geopolitical objective of containing China and securing American supply chains, most especially in semiconductors, strategic minerals, artificial intelligence (AI), and more.

Note that semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, data centers, telecommunications and advanced manufacturing are dual-use sectors. They support commercial activity, but they are equally central to intelligence systems, military weapons production, military communications, autonomous platforms and wartime logistics.

An industrial facility can become strategically military without ever erecting a sign saying “military base.”

Modern power is NOT projected only through troops, warships and runways. In this day and age of the information technology revolution and AI advancement, it is projected through ports, data networks, energy systems, mineral-processing capacity, semiconductor plants, and control over supply chains.

Pax Silica is therefore best understood as an economic project constructed within a geopolitical and conflict-contingency framework. It may not be a base, but it forms part of an American strategy to secure critical technologies among trusted allies and reduce dependence on rival countries, particularly China.

Note that under Marcos Jr.’s presidency, the number of EDCA-U.S. base locations/sites was expanded to nine (9); these are declared ones. Some of the additional sites face the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea (SCS), making their geopolitical purpose impossible to disguise as purely humanitarian storage and disaster preparedness.

Now comes Pax Silica, linking the country’s so-called industrial future to a U.S.-led “trusted” supply-chain network. One arrangement grants strategic access to Philippine military facilities; the other organizes critical industries around allied manufacturing.

Separately, each can be defended. Together, they form a pattern.

Obviously, the Philippines is being woven into an American strategic ecosystem—military, technological, industrial, logistical, political, and diplomatic. The danger is not necessarily that Washington will formally own Philippine territory. The greater danger is that Manila will gradually lose the practical ability to make decisions Washington dislikes.

A country can retain its flag, anthem and legal title to its land while surrendering its strategic room for maneuver.

That is the subtle genius of modern dependency: sovereignty remains ceremonially intact while policy independence quietly disappears.

The United States is not acting irrationally. It is pursuing American interests. It wants secure access to minerals, industrial capacity, transportation corridors and technology infrastructure. It wants allies capable of supporting its supply chains during confrontation.

The scandal is not that Washington has a strategy. The scandal and what’s dangerous and embarrassing is that the Marcos administration appears satisfied with becoming a component of it.

The broader consequence is regional polarization. China may interpret the project not merely as economic diversification but as another element of American containment, especially when combined with EDCA expansion, military exercises, and alliance-based maritime policies.

That perception could produce diplomatic retaliation, tighter Chinese export controls, reduced investment or intensified strategic pressure. The Philippines’ substantial dependence on Chinese industrial inputs means that an abrupt technological or economic decoupling could impose immediate costs on Philippine producers and consumers.

Pax Silica also raises difficult questions for the Philippines’ regional position. The conflict arises when an American-led framework requires the exclusion of specific countries, technologies, or suppliers. At that point, the Philippines could be forced to choose between ASEAN’s inclusive, multi-partner economic orientation and Washington’s division of supply chains into “trusted” and “untrusted” blocs.

ASEAN centrality cannot mean assembling leaders for annual family photographs while member states place their most strategic industries inside competing great-power camps.

As ASEAN chair in 2026, the Philippines should be strengthening the region’s collective technological capabilities. Instead, Manila risks becoming the most enthusiastic local franchise of Washington’s external geopolitical-economic strategy.

The best position for the Philippines is to diversify without weaponizing diversification. It should welcome American, Japanese, European, Korean, Chinese, and ASEAN investments under transparent Philippine rules, laws, and regulations.

Conclusion: The danger is clear: Manila bears the risks of retaliation, regional tension, and possible conflict, while Washington gains access, positioning, and leverage. Sovereignty may remain on paper, but strategic autonomy is quietly being surrendered, one “partnership” with Uncle Sam at a time.

Hence, Filipinos should ask critical questions: How much Philippine land, policy space, and strategic independence must be committed before President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. admits that his foreign policy is NO longer merely “pro-American,” but structurally dependent or has been commandeered or hijacked by Washington?

Folks, sovereignty is not defended only at sea. It is defended whenever the government decides who controls Philippine land, minerals, technology, data and infrastructure.

It is easy to stand before a map of the so-called “West Philippine Sea” and declare that every inch belongs to the Filipino people when the WPS is actually disputed by several claimant states, such as China, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

The harder question is the one posed by the graphic map: After surrounding the country with foreign military access, strategic corridors, and allied industrial platforms, can Marcos Jr. still honestly say that the Philippines itself belongs fully to Filipinos?

Pax Silica perhaps could become a Golden Node. But unless Filipinos write the rules, own part of the technology, and retain the freedom to decide their own future, it will be nothing more than a SILICON COLOAR, bright, expensive, and carefully polished so its wearer can PRETEND it is jewelry.

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

August 2, 2026

To Secretary Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro Jr., or to the administrator of his verified page: With due respect, where exactly in my article did I say anything derogatory about you or any member of your family? Where did I insult your wife? Where did I personally attack your family? Where did I say anything “below the belt” or “too low”?

Asking legitimate questions about citizenship, public office, public appointment, public trust, loyalty, accountability, transparency, and documentary proof is not “low” or “too low.” It is called PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY. And in a democracy, public accountability and transparency are NOT suspended simply because the question is uncomfortable.

Let us be clear: I did not drag a private family into a private inquiry. With all due respect to your wife, Gibo, Madam Monica “Nikki” Prieto-Teodoro is not merely a government official and political spouse. She has held elective office and presidential appointments of her own. She served as a public official. She has been appointed to public-facing roles, including as Special Envoy of the President to UNICEF. That makes questions involving public appointments, public trust, and possible matters of citizenship or allegiance legitimate subjects of public discussion, accountability, and transparency, provided they are raised fairly and responsibly.

That is exactly what I did. There is a VERY BIG DIFFERENCE between attacking a family and asking whether public officials and public appointees have fully disclosed matters that may be relevant to their qualifications, loyalty to the flag and country, and public trust. If that is now considered “below the belt,” or “too low,” then perhaps transparency itself has become offensive or problematic.

You said: “Do not involve the family.” With all due respect, the issue is NOT family in the private sense. THE ISSUE IS PUBLIC OFFICE! The issue is PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY. The issue is whether those who hold or have held public positions, especially those connected to the State or the Philippine government, have answered legitimate questions with documents rather than with political insinuations or persuasions.

And since your page or you also mentioned that I lived in Beijing, note that it is in the past tense; allow me to answer that directly.

Yes, I lived in Beijing. The whole world knows that I did my Ph.D. in Economics at Peking University, Beijing, China, a top-1 university in China and among the top 15 in the World rankings, if I am not mistaken. I NEVER DENIED IT! I NEVER HID IT! I even posted it on my social media as part of my profile. I openly and repeatedly posted about my travels, studies, and experiences in China. It is NOT A SECRET. It is NOT A SCANDAL. It is NOT A CITIZENSHIP CONTROVERSY OR ISSUE for Christ’s sake!

Living in Beijing DID NOT make me less Filipino. Studying in China DID NOT TRANSFER MY ALLEGIANCE. Engaging with Chinese people, scholars, institutions, and society DID NOT ERASE MY LOYALTY to the Philippine FLAG. In fact, those who know me, Filipinos and Chinese alike, know very well that I have always stood my ground for my country when necessary, including while I was in China and whenever I am in China.

So let us NOT confuse geography with loyalty to the flag and to the country, Mr. Defense Secretary. I don’t have a citizenship issue. My citizenship remains Filipino, and it will NOT change.

You know what, Gibo, loyalty to country and to the flag is NOT proven by shouting labels at other Filipinos. Loyalty is NOT proven by attacking those who studied abroad, specifically in China. Loyalty is NOT proven by weaponizing the word “China” against anyone who believes diplomacy is wiser than reckless confrontation.

But loyalty is proven by transparency, consistency, and unquestionable allegiance to your Filipino citizenship, especially if one holds a high-level government position, elected or appointed.

So NO, Secretary Teodoro, what I wrote in my article was not “low or too low.”

What is low is turning legitimate public-interest questions into a labeling-and-geography game. What is “too low” is actually implying or insinuating that a Filipino like myself who studied in China is somehow less Filipino or “pro-China.”

And what is lowest of all is demanding loyalty tests from others while refusing to fully settle the questions that remain around one’s own house.

Respectfully, the mirror is NOT an insult. Sometimes, it is simply necessary.

Here’s the link to my FB post for context, folks:

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1E3ictfaQh/

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

August 2, 2026

So Defense Secretary Gilbert “Gibo” Teodoro Jr. now reportedly wants government officials he considers “pro-China” to resign? Wahhh…. How IRONIC, folks, right?

The irony is obvious: the unresolved public controversy over his alleged Maltese citizenship remains a live issue, and there’s even a group of lawyers who filed a complaint against him and have sought subpoenas for records to determine whether he indeed renounced his Maltese citizenship. Note that it’s not just him who allegedly acquired Maltese citizenship. Allegedly, his wife, Nikki Prieto-Teodoro, who was, if I am not mistaken, appointed by Marcos in 2024 as special envoy to UNICEF, is holding a Maltese passport and citizenship and has used it for travel abroad.

Thus, perhaps before Gibo distributes resignation templates to everyone who wants diplomacy with China, he may want to save one copy of resignation templates for himself and his wife, precisely because his own public controversy over his alleged Maltese citizenship and that of his wife remains unanswered in the only language that truly ends suspicion: complete, official, documentary proof and records of renunciation.

Folks, you know what, the issue is not whether Teodoro can deliver a fiery media soundbite. Clearly, he can. The issue is whether a defense chief whose own citizenship history and that of his immediate family, specifically his wife, has become a matter of public controversy should be casually lecturing others about loyalty to the flag as if patriotism were his private franchise.

Let us be clear: NO Filipino public official should serve the interest of any foreign power, whether the United States, Japan, Australia, China, or even Mars or Pluto. Loyalty to the Philippine flag, especially if one is holding a high-level and important government position, must be non-negotiable. Hence, dual citizenship is a BIG NO!

Furthermore, such a principle cuts both ways. It cannot be used as a political whip or propaganda against those who favor peaceful, constructive, and pragmatic relations with China, while those who appear interns and lapdogs of Washington are conveniently off the hook. Right, folks?

If Teodoro’s standard is that public officials with perceived foreign leanings must resign, then perhaps the country should prepare a very long queue because there are so many who are “Pro-Americans,” who treat U.S. talking points like morning prayers, obviously and allegedly including himself.

You know what folks, the real danger here is not simply Teodoro’s statement. It is the lazy labeling behind it. Supporting better Philippines-China relations is not automatically being “Pro-China.” To advocate diplomacy is NOT surrender. To oppose war hysteria is NOT treason. To criticize a blindly pro-US posture is NOT disloyalty. It may, in fact, be the more patriotic position if the goal is to keep the Philippines from becoming a disposable frontline state in someone else’s strategic game and interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

This is where Teodoro’s statement becomes politically theatrical. Here is a defense secretary calling for loyalty tests while questions about his own alleged Maltese citizenship and that of his immediate family, specifically his wife, continue to circulate and are in question.

The Department of National Defense says he renounced and surrendered it. Fine! Then show the complete paper trail. Show the formal renunciation. Show the surrender or cancellation records. Show the disclosures allegedly made to the Bureau of Immigration, Comelec, and the Commission on Appointments. If everything is clean, then transparency should be easy. Right, folks?

A passport controversy CANNOT be cured by shouting “Pro-China” at other people. A citizenship question is NOT answered by waving the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between the Philippines and China like a moral shield. And a public official who invokes loyalty must understand that loyalty is NOT a slogan. IT IS A STANDARD! The same standard must apply to him, to his family where relevant public appointments are concerned, and to every official who holds public trust.

This becomes even more controversial because his wife has also held public-facing appointments, including, accordingly, as special envoy to UNICEF. That does not make her guilty of anything. But it does mean that questions involving citizenship, allegiance, and public appointment should be addressed with clarity. If there are questions about the citizenship status of any family member of a top defense official or public envoy, the proper response is DISCLOSURE!

And yes, the irony is hard to miss. The man warning against “Pro-China” officials is himself widely perceived as one of the allegedly most pro-US voices in the current security establishment of Marcos Jr.’s administration.

So perhaps, the more honest rule should be this: all public officials who serve foreign interests over Philippine interests must resign, whether their compass points to Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Canberra, Brussels, or anywhere else.

That would be a real test of patriotism! But if the test is only applied to Filipinos who want dialogue and good bilateral relations with China, then it is NOT patriotism. It is propaganda with a flag pin.

When a man like Gibo, standing under a cloud of citizenship questions, starts lecturing others about allegiance to the flag and country, the public may not hear the sermon; they may only see the mirror.

Perhaps Gibo should first prove, fully and publicly, that his own house is in unquestionable order. Because in national defense and as far as patriotism is concerned, loyalty to the flag and country is NOT a theatrical performance. IT IS PROVEN BY DEEDS!

By Anna Malindog-Uy

HEADSIGHT, The Manila Times

August 1, 2026

As a Filipino, I stand with the rest of the Filipino nation in asserting and defending the established fact that Batanes is an integral part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of the Philippines. Its people are Filipinos, its elected institutions are Philippine institutions, and its territorial status is neither provisional nor negotiable. Insofar as the international community of nations is concerned, including the governments of China and the Philippines, Batanes is not an existing territorial dispute between the Philippines and China. That distinction matters.

One thing that needs to be cleared and emphasized is that the Chinese government has issued no formal or informal declaration asserting territorial sovereignty over Batanes. The controversial proposition emerged from an academic conference, not from the Chinese government.

Of course, the most defensible Philippine position is to firmly reject this theoretical proposition by these Chinese academics while refusing to misrepresent it as an established Chinese government policy.

To continue reading the article, click the link below:

TMT Link: https://www.manilatimes.net/2026/08/01/opinion/columns/batanes-is-filipino-defending-ph-sovereignty-without-hysteria/2395993

By: Anna Malindog-Uy

The LOBBYiST

30 JULY 2026

Prime Insight | Foreign policy protects national interests. Energy dependence, deepening strategic alignment, and maritime confrontations remain unresolved, and tactical activity without sufficient strategic clarity is futile.

Read more: https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/marcos-jrs-sona-on-foreign-policy-no-clear-strategic-doctrine