Friday
August 28, 2026
9AM-12PM

Join Zoom Meeting – 82211651228
https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82211651228

With Special Guest:
Dr. Enrico V. Gloria, U.P. Dept. of Political Science;
BA/BS Economic, Pol-Sci.
M.A.; Chinese Foreign Policy Phd., Tsinghua U.,

Herman Laurel
President, Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute

Ado Paglinawan
Vice President for Internal Affairs, Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute

By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 15: Forever peace or forever wars?

“Gringo” has been a word used to refer to people from the United States by the Mexicans.

On August 19, 2026, American soldiers, accompanied by PHIVIDEC personnel entered the San Jia Company compound in Zone 1, Nabulod Baluarte, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

The incident was reported in a police blotter at the municipal police station as a Sanjia security guard, Jermie Espartero, 43, went there at about 11:05 a.m. to have the incident recorded.

According to the guard’s account, at about 10:12 a.m., several American soldiers accompanied by PHIVIDEC personnel intended to conduct a site inspection.

The security guard said their presence and the proposed inspection caused concern among company personnel.

Philippine Army personnel were reportedly already stationed inside the premises.

The group was allegedly denied entry because it could not show the required permit or authorization for the inspection.

The guard subsequently requested that the incident be entered into the police blotter for record and future reference.

What gave the American soldiers the idea that they can inspect a controversial facility that is now in the jurisdiction of government regulatory agencies and the judiciary – is the 17^th question, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, and for that matter his superior, President Bongbong Marcos must answer to the Filipino people.

16 Questions

Earlier Secretary Teodoro was asked by the Chinese Embassy sixteen questions pertaining to the raid he and military personnel conducted on the Sanjia Steel Factory last May.

These were substantial questions asked by the Philippine Star and other media, that he earlier merely dismissed as “evasive and deceptive”.

Filipinos as well as the Chinese people deserve truthful answers to these questions I am reproducing in the public interest:

1. Is Teodoro the Philippine Defense Secretary or a police chief? Why did he participate in a law-enforcement operation against Sanjia Steel?

2. Why was the AFP involved in an operation that should have been handled by civilian law-enforcement agencies?

3. If Sanjia Steel violated environmental or other Philippine laws, why were the workers arrested rather than the people responsible for operating the plant?

4. Why were only Chinese workers arrested, while Filipino workers were released at the scene?

5. Why were the Chinese workers transported to Manila for detention using a military aircraft?

6. Were the Chinese workers actually engaged in illegal activities, as Teodoro claimed?

7. Were the workers properly treated during detention, including the allegation that approximately 70 people were held in cramped cells of about five square meters?

8. Why were Chinese consular authorities allegedly not notified and why were consular visits not arranged as required under the bilateral consular framework?

9. Why did Philippine authorities allegedly refuse to act after the Chinese Embassy supplied copies of the workers’ passports and valid work visas/permits?

10. Why were the workers detained for as long as 32 days despite the documents supplied by the embassy?

11. Teodoro described the absence of documents concerning the workers’ status as a “tell-tale sign of human trafficking.” Does that actually satisfy the legal definition of human trafficking under Philippine law?

12. Are foreign workers legally needed to carry their passports at all times while working in Philippine factories?

13. Who has the legal authority to determine whether Philippine laws have been violated—the Defense Secretary or the judicial authorities?

14. After Philippine prosecutors reportedly ordered the complaints against the 70 Chinese nationals referred for further investigation and ordered their release, why did Teodoro continue accusing them of illegal activity?

15. Does Teodoro respect the rule of law and the decisions of Philippine judicial authorities?

16. What is the basis of Teodoro’s accusation that Chinese Embassy officials were “intervening” in Philippine law enforcement when it was performing internationally-accepted consular functions to protect its nationals?

Implications

The central question is essentially: Why was the Philippine military involved in arresting foreign workers at a private steel factory?

That is a legitimate question to investigate independently, regardless of any one’s position on China.

This is pivotal because the defense secretary has always maintained that his office uses principles as basis for its actions and employed professionalism in all its actions.

But what is apparent is that Teodoro’s public actions have been wildly based on personal and political perceptions that clash with China’s position, which has become improper because they have evolved eventually as the stand of the Department of National Defense.

Teodoro says evidence established violations, but his raid has appeared to be a fishing expedition involving the Armed Forces of the Philippines even if it were dressed as involving the NBI and the PAOCC.

China says workers were improperly targeted instead of arresting the owners and management. Philippine authorities say they acted under legal process but the workers were mistreated and detained excessively.

It is incompetent for Teodoro to assert China “intervention interfering with local law enforcement” when what the China Embassy was doing was within normal consular protection for its nationals.

When the Department of Justice prosecutors ordered release of the Chinese workers, Teodoro retorted this doesn’t establish that the original allegations were false. Duh?

The May 28 resolution by the National Prosecutorial Service is particularly important because it reportedly ordered the arrested Chinese nationals released for lack of evidence. That it referred the complaints for further investigation doesn’t necessarily mean a court found that the workers were innocent or guilty; that is a different procedural question.

And this is probably why the dispute has escalated so dramatically with the Philippine side framing the incident as a test of sovereignty and law enforcement, while the Chinese are asserting diplomatic privilege and human rights.

Wise governance could have just treated this simply an as regulatory issue and not with knee-jerk criminal complications, especially as this could weigh on foreign direct investments in the Philippines.

Anti-China syndrome

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has been labeled by Beijing as one of the most hostile figures against China due to what he claims as vocal defense of Philippine sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea, his outright rejection of China’s expansive maritime claims, and his active strengthening of U.S. alliance ties.

While the Philippine government frames his actions as a constitutional mandate to protect national security rather than animosity toward a specific nation, many key instances of his rhetoric and conduct have created adversarial bilateral relations between the Philippines and China, causing a predicament the Philippines could ill-compete with other ASEAN countries for China opportunities.

Hardline Rhetoric, Labeling

• Calling China “Wicked” and a “Predator”: Teodoro explicitly dismissed Chinese criticisms and military warnings by stating he would continue defending the Philippines “in the face of the wickedness they are committing here and even in our seas”. He also warned that “nothing could come from opening the door to a predator” regarding military cooperation with external partners.

• Malicious Attribution of Bad Faith: Teodoro openly stated that discussions and consultations with China are useless when dealing with maritime dispute settlements, pointing out a severe “trust deficit”. Repeatedly making irresponsible remarks that undermine Filipino-Chinese bilateral relations.

• Calling out Propaganda: At regional forums like the Shangri-La Dialogue, Teodoro admitted to deliberately avoiding his Chinese counterpart and on live television dismissed questions from Chinese delegates as “propaganda spiels disguised as questions,”

• Accusing China of Squid Tactics, Extortion and Blackmail: He has framed Chinese consular representation for its nationals as intervening in law enforcement and blasted statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “classic squid tactics” and labeled Chinese immigration actions against Filipino nationals as “plain and simple extortion and blackmail”.

Confrontational Conduct and Policy Improvisation

• Denying Military Engagement Without Acceptable Justification: Teodoro maintained that the Philippine and Chinese militaries have not engaged in substantive de-escalation talks under his tenure because Beijing lacks “good faith” and tends to use diplomatic dialogue as a weapon against Manila. These are diatribes that are without truthful basis.

• Challenging Chinese Influence: He actively moved to monitor potential Chinese espionage and influence operations within local institutions, labeling events like alleged Chinese academic symposiums questioning Philippine territory as “ludicrous” even if sustained by historical facts.

• Lame Security Enforcement: Teodoro stonewalled that Chinese nationals arrested at Sanjia were involved in allegedly illegal activities even after inquest where the prosecution founded no evidence on charges and ordered them released.

• Flaunting Partnerships with US and its allies: This prejudice is nothing new or limited to Sanjia. Teodoro has maintained a strongly adversarial position on the South China Sea. His public position as Defense Secretary has consistently built up a case alleged Chinese coercion with twisted escalatory assertions feigned to support the Philippines’ need to strengthen its defense posture, consistently spearheading deeper defense cooperation, joint patrols, and military modernization with the United States and other allied nations, which Beijing repeatedly decries as provocation and regional destabilization.

• Discrimination and selectivity: Teodoro has developed an unusually confrontational, explicitly anti-Beijing posture, and the Sanjia operation raises legitimate questions he has crossed from opposition to Chinese state conduct into “discriminatory or selective law enforcement campaigns targeting Chinese nationals” for political purposes and personal aggrandizement.

His continuing corrosive behavior has proven that China was correct in barring Teodoro in June, together with his spouse and child from mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao and prohibited Chinese entities from conducting transactions or cooperation with his family.

US Embassy explanation

According to PhilStar Global, the site visit conducted by the United States and Philippine military personnel at Sanjia was part of routine planning efforts:

“As part of the joint US-Philippines planning for Balikatan 2027, a team of US military and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) personnel “arrived at the Sanjia facility in coordination with the Phividec (Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corp.) Industrial Authority to assess its potential for use as part of bilateral military exercises.

“When notified of facility access requirements, the team moved on to other site visits as planned. At no point was entry insisted upon.”

Shame that these Gringos think we are a bunch of monkeys. Why can’t they simply say, it was a fuck up?

But the larger onus here lies on Phividec Industrial Authority and Teodoro.

Public office is a public trust.

Teodoro’s possible violation of Section 3 of Republic Act 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is being mulled by some civil society groups, and already a 18^th question arises enthused by the earlier raid on the Sanjia factory.

Has Teodoro painted Chinese nationals not only as fair game to Philippine civilian law enforcement authorities, but also to his American friends, so that he can use the issue to further escalate conflict in the South China Sea issues?

The defense secretary must be reminded that Tagoloan is not an EDCA site.

Second, whatever the Philippine Navy is planning in its port has been preceded by the existence of the steel factory in the PHIVIDEC premises by years.

Teodoro announced that the Department of National Defense and the Philippine Navy publicly laid out plans to establish a major naval operating base and logistics hub in the same location only in late November 2024 with defense officials outlining broader operational details and site surveys progressing through September and November 2025.

My earlier information gathered in 2019 was they were planning this for the Ragay Gulf in Bicol, but it seems the department has decided to locate this naval hub for Visayas and Mindanao in Misamis Oriental instead.

Sanjia began its initial setup and operations around that same period, with ground breaking for the Tagoloan plant following on March 15, 2019, before becoming fully operational by 2021. Its existence clearly antedated Teodoro’s incomplete research by four years.

Republic Act 3019 aims to repress unlawful acts for public officials together with private individuals, causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits to any person through manifest partiality, bad faith, or gross negligence.

Targeting Chinese establishments?

That said, arrest of more Chinese nationals manifests its ugly head, this time in Davao City, obviously caused by a momentum of anti-China targeting by Teodoro but without his and the military participation.

Nevertheless, this posed the 19^th question that the Marcos administration must address.

On August 14, personnel from the National Bureau of Investigation and the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission raided the manufacturing facility of Mighty Steel Plant in Barangay Ilang, Bunawan, arresting 10 Chinese nationals and 4 Filipinos.

Consequently, the Philippine News Agency reported that about 200 workers of the plant, trooped to the City Hall to seek assistance three days after their workplace was shut down after the raid, leaving them unemployed.

Davao City First District Councilor Pamela Librado, the current chairperson of the City Council Committee on Labor and Employment Opportunities said, the displaced laborers are asking if the City Government could provide assistance to the workers who failed to receive their salaries following the raid.

The workers denied NBI and PAOCC statements they “rescued” them, asserting instead they were harassed and mistreated during the operation and dislocated from work thereafter.

In an interview, a female employee alleged that NBI and PAOCC personnel entered the facility without presenting a search warrant.

“I thought they were terrorists. It was a surprise when they came. We were just working in our offices, then they [NBI] came with their long guns pointing at us,” the employee said. “They also checked our personal belongings, which I think is not proper. They also asked us to stay quiet on their surprise investigation before leading us out of our offices. They also asked our personnel to shut down the CCTV”.

The employee added that workers were screened for toxic substances, with the tests yielding negative results.

Government personnel check workers of Davao Mighty Steel Corp. during a raid on its facility at Davao City. Photo courtesy of Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission

Teodoro’s citizenship status

The 20^th question is my favorite.

Defense Secretary Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro Jr. faced scrutiny over a past Maltese citizenship and passport obtained in December 2016.

Background and Timeline

• Acquisition: Teodoro reportedly acquired a 10-year Maltese passport (valid from December 2016 to December 2026) through Malta’s investor program while operating as a private citizen and corporate executive.

• Renunciation: He executed a sworn statement to renounce his Maltese citizenship in October 2021 ahead of filing his certificate of candidacy for the 2022 senatorial elections.

• Disclosure: The DND stated that Teodoro declared his former foreign citizenship status to the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and the Commission on Appointments (CA) prior to his confirmation as Defense Secretary.

Legal Challenges

• Complaints Filed: Petitioners led by lawyer Russel Miraflor filed a complaint-affidavit before the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office in June 2026, questioning the legal clarity of his citizenship transitions and pointing out that his Maltese passport lacked physical annotation reflecting the renunciation.

• Defense and Dismissal: Teodoro ignored the allegations as an unverified smear campaign, noting that the matter had already been thoroughly addressed and cleared by relevant oversight bodies.

• Palace Stance: Malacañang maintained that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was fully cognizant of Teodoro’s past citizenship papers implying condonation of an irregularity by a higher official.

Dual citizenship is not automatic- you must complete a process at a Philippine Embassy, Consulate, or the Bureau of Immigration.

Thus, while a natural-born Filipino who becomes a Maltese citizen or an immigrant to Malta, does not permanently lose their Filipino citizenship, they formally reacquire it through steps stipulated under Republic Act 9225 (The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003).

Without completing this process, foreign naturalization technically causes the loss of Philippine citizenship.

Dual citizens may also run for or be appointed to public office in the Philippines, but they must personally and swear to renounce their foreign citizenship before assuming office

Teodoro claims he swore to renounce his acquired Maltese citizenship and has returned his Maltese passport.

But he refuses to show publicly documentation of those transactions. Worse, he has not also shown public documentation that he applied for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, proof of his taking his oath of allegiance, and the proper certificates accompanying such recourse.

Worst in question #39 of his notarized Personal Data Sheet (PDS), standardized as Civil Service Commission (CSC) Form No. 212 that asked “Have you acquired the status of an immigrant or permanent resident of another country?” Teodoro checked the “No” box.

Conclusion

The problem with our Philippine government today is that instead of addressing issues with answers based on facts and matters on the table, it employs mudslingers like Press Officer Claire Castro to deflect issues.

Another attack dog is PCG Commodore Jay Tarriela who as early as 2003 as a student has already lost character and credibility after he was caught cheating in an exam at the Philippine Military Academy as early as 2003.

Obviously tapped to cloud discussion rather than arrived at an enlightenment, when Tarriela cannot answer the arguments, he changes the subject. When he cannot win the arguments and answer questions, he stirs up resentment and resort to hysteria. and when confronted with facts that expose his lameness, he turns the issue into an attack on the Filipino people.

Who gave this Faustian character a card blanche at boorish vulgarity?

Sino-Diplomat and Deputy Spokesman Guo Wei, puts him in his proper place:

“Let me ask you, what is respect? You slander and smear China but expect China to remain silent. Chinese citizens now face discriminatory and targeted enforcement in the Philippines, and you hope the Chinese Embassy does not correct the wrong doings. Are these acts respect? Certainly not.

“Let me be clear. The Chinese Embassy has the responsibility to uphold the interests and dignity of China and provide consular protection and safeguard the safety and legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens.

“It is time to stop pointing fingers and take a hard look at yourself in the mirror. Stop dragging the Filipino people into your publicity stunts.

“Filipinos are warm, kind, and hospitable people, and we have tremendous respect for them.

“You deliberately stoke hostility between our two countries and try to push China and the Philippines toward confrontation, even conflict.

“The Chinese Embassy’s responsibility is to bring our two countries closer, not further apart; to bring our peoples together, not drive them away.”

Marcos, Teodoro and Tarriela, answer the questions foursquare, as once again, public office is public trust.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for internal affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 14: Forever peace or forever wars?

This was my answer to a Facebook follower’s question as she commented on my previous column that exposed the dustbin where President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro have driven our country in terms of foreign relations and economics:

“Will the Philippines most likely end up as another Ukraine?”

Ukraine’s shift from a country balancing between Russia and the West into a society closely aligned with the United States and Europe was driven primarily by internal democratic revolutions and a reaction against Russian military aggression, amplified by U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military backing.

1) But Ukraine did not begin as uniformly pro-Russian

Ukraine’s independence was not simply something America manufactured. Ukraine’s December 1, 1991 referendum overwhelmingly endorsed independence, with more than 90% voting in favor, and Leonid Kravchuk winning the presidential election held the same day.

This was despite it inheriting enormous connections with Russia: Russian was widely spoken, the economies were integrated, families were spread across the border, and much of the population had Soviet identities and cultural ties, especially on its eastern oblasts.

According to data from the Razumkov Centre, about 64% of people in western regions and roughly 63.5% in southern and eastern regions expressed leaning to a distinct political European identity.

So, the starting point wasn’t really “pro-Russian Ukraine or pro-American Ukraine.” It was closer to “independent Ukraine balancing between Russia and the West.”

2) The United States invested heavily in institutions rather than simply changing public opinion

On May 6, 1992, U.S. President George H. W. Bush met Ukrainian President Kravchuk in Washington. Their governments issued a “Declaration on U.S.-Ukrainian Relations and the Building of a Democratic Partnership”.

Declassified notes from their conversation show Kravchuk expressing concern about Russian territorial claims and activity in Crimea. Bush responded that the United States saw strengthening Ukraine’s relationship with the West as an important way of balancing its security concerns.

Bush did not yet promise Ukraine a NATO security guarantee but was trying to encourage democratic reform in Russia and avoid a new confrontation with Moscow, explicitly saying that isolating Russia could make it “more imperialistic,” which would be bad for neighboring countries.

But thereafter, American and European governments began shaping Ukraine’s political environment. Capitol Hill legislation explicitly authorized assistance to improve democratic governance, strengthen civil society NGOs, fund political parties, diversify the Ukrainian economy and energy supplies, and expand independent media.

3) The Orange Revolution was first major turning point

In 2004, Viktor Yanukovych was the Moscow-friendly candidate, while Viktor Yushchenko was more Western-oriented. The disputed presidential election produced enormous demonstrations.

Following the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian Supreme Court called for a new election, which Yushchenko won. This was significant because it demonstrated that a large portion of Ukrainian society wanted a political alternative to the Russian-oriented model.

But the country remained deeply divided geographically and politically. Local governments continued alternating between Western-oriented and Russia-oriented forces.

4) Europe was actually more important to the ideological transformation than America

One of the biggest misconceptions is to equate Western orientation with just American orientation.

For many Ukrainians, the attraction wasn’t primarily Washington. It was Europe.

The European Union represented higher living standards, rule of law, freedom of movement, democratic institutions and integration with prosperous Western economies.

After Yushchenko’s term ended, Yanukovych was elected president in 2010 over Yulia Tymoshenko, but as his government became increasingly authoritarian, EU’s attraction further accelerated.

Yanukovych’s ran on the platform of economic modernization, greater economic ties with the EU, and military non-alignment but his years in power saw what analysts described as backsliding which included the jailing of Tymoshenko, a decline in press freedom and a rise in cronyism and corruption

5) Euromaidan changed the trajectory

In November 2013, Yanukovych’s government abandoned plans to sign the EU Association Agreement, a major trade and political deal with the European Union, and instead moved toward closer economic relations with Moscow.

Protests began in Kyiv. These protests were called “Euromaidan”, the word combines “Euro” (for Europe) and “Maidan” (the Ukrainian word for square), referring to Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv where the crowds gathered

Initially, this wasn’t simply an anti-Russian movement.

Academic research emphasizes domestic political factors—including corruption, government policy and institutional failures—as important causes of the protests.

But American officials openly supported the protesters and the opposition, and U.S. assistance to Ukrainian civil society and political institutions was substantial.

That provides the strongest argument for the claim that the U.S. helped facilitate Ukraine’s Western political transformation.

But saying “the U.S. created Euromaidan” goes substantially beyond what the evidence establishes. The demonstrations involved hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and reflected genuine domestic grievances.

6) February 2014 was the decisive rupture

The political crisis escalated dramatically as around 100 demonstrators were allegedly shot by government snipers.

Yanukovych fled Kyiv and eventually went to Russia. Ukraine’s parliament removed him and installed an interim government.

Russia rejected the legitimacy of the new authorities and subsequently annexed Crimea while supporting separatist forces in Donbas.

This is where the transformation of Ukrainian public opinion progressively became more dramatic.

Before the crisis, Ukraine remained highly ambivalent.

In February 2014, for example, 78% of Ukrainians surveyed still expressed a positive attitude toward Russia, while 66% wanted Ukraine and Russia to remain friendly neighbors with open borders.

So, the idea that Ukraine was already overwhelmingly anti-Russian before 2014 doesn’t fit the polling.

7) Russia itself became the biggest force pushing Ukraine West

Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014 to secure its vital military naval base in Sevastopol, block Ukraine from aligning with NATO. Owning the peninsula gives Moscow strategic control over maritime trade routes, military projection in the Black Sea, and a staging ground for broader regional operations.

Despite Valdimir Putin’s framing the annexation as a correction of historical injustices, citing Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1954 transfer of Crimea from the Russia to Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas Region changed Ukrainian perceptions of Russia far more profoundly than American aid programs had.

In 2013, Ukrainian society was still debating: Russia or Europe? But one 2014 survey found that support for EU membership had risen to 59%, compared with 42% a year earlier, while support for joining the Russia-led Customs Union had fallen from 37% to 17%. with NATO support also increasing substantially.

8) The United States then reinforced the new orientation

After 2014, Washington’s funding became much more geometric and consequential, as this Ukraine increasingly adopted Western institutional models and started orienting its security policy toward NATO.

But again, Ukraine became primarily Euro-Atlantic, rather than simply American.

9) The 2022 invasion completed the psychological transformation

The full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 produced another enormous shift.

Again. Russian had to move decisively as Gallup reported that large majorities expected Ukraine eventually to join both NATO and the EU.

Credits: Aljazeera

However, the war produced an enormous consolidation of Ukrainian national identity around independence and the West

The interesting historical irony is that American and European assistance created institutions, networks and incentives that made Western integration attractive. But Russian military intervention pushed that preference into something much closer to a national-security imperative.

While the US and European allies support Ukraine, they do not engage in direct combat against Russia, who has nuclear bombs in its arsenal, in order to avoid starting a wider global conflagration.

Thus, what exists is a war, proxied by Ukraine.

Contrasting scenario

The Philippine model that the United States has been building since the presidency of Noynoy Aquino is based more on restoring military alliance and seeding propaganda to shame China but sorely lacking in political and economic gravitas.

Aquino’s dalliance with the Americans was, as a matter of fact, strategically interrupted with President Rodrigo Duterte’s balancing impoverishing bilateral relations with the US with pragmatic economic ties with China.

The shift, however, did not settle well with Barack Obama who reacted more like a spurned lover than a faithful ally, misunderstanding Duterte’s move towards a national interest that placed the protection of the masses against narcopolitics ahead of any highfalutin security alignments.

Obama criticized Duterte’s war on drugs, sparking a diplomatic clash that went as far as displaying of historical photographs of the 1906 American massacre of Filipino Muslims at Bud Dajo, during the Philippine president’s international and local speeches.

What started with animosity with the US provided an opening towards a genuine friendship with Xi Jin ping, that later left Donald Trump to do the balancing.

As to what Faustian pact Bongbong Marcos sold the Philippines out to Americans remains unknown when he authorized additional US bases in country, turning his back on Xi Jinping’s pledge of $23 billion in packaged assistance and investments in addition to $17 billion projects in the pipeline, made only a month before in January 2023.

Today, as the Philippines face only 2.3% gross domestic product this year, lower than the Covid pandemic year and lowest since 2009, Marcos turns a blind eye to his defense secretary’s rudderless and often uncouth anti-China narratives.

White Paper

Quite timely, a friend gave me the following analysis which I am quoting verbatim below for documentation purposes and for the attention of our ambassador in Beijing who seems to be sitting on his ass, isolated from Secretary Teresa Lazaro’s career policy making circle:

START OF PAPER

China’s patience with the Philippines appears to be diminishing. What was previously manageable strategic friction is increasingly being perceived in Chinese political and business circles as a broader confrontation encompassing military, political, economic, and information domains.

The central concern is not simply individual incidents in the South China Sea. Rather, Beijing appears increasingly convinced that Manila is becoming an operational component of a broader U.S.-Japan strategy intended to constrain China’s regional rise.

This perception creates a dangerous loop:

• Philippine cooperation with the United States and Japan is viewed by Beijing as evidence of containment;

• Chinese diplomatic and economic pressure is then interpreted in Manila as Chinese coercion;

• and both sides subsequently harden their security positions.

The most consequential risk is therefore not an immediate military confrontation, but the progressive destruction of strategic trust.

1. Chinese Perception of the Philippines

Chinese interlocutors increasingly characterize the Philippines not as a difficult neighboring state with competing maritime claims, but as a country being strategically aligned against China.

Three developments appear particularly significant:

1. Expanded U.S.-Philippine defense cooperation

2. Growing Philippine-Japanese security cooperation

3. Increasingly confrontational public rhetoric surrounding the South China Sea

From Beijing’s perspective, these developments are interconnected rather than independent.

China’s strategic concern is that Philippine territory, infrastructure, military facilities, and political institutions could increasingly support U.S. and Japanese efforts to monitor, deter, and constrain Chinese military activity.

This does not necessarily mean Beijing has decided that confrontation is inevitable. It does, however, suggest that the Philippines is increasingly being viewed through the lens of great-power competition rather than solely through bilateral relations.

Containment of China by UK Council for Geostrategy

2. The Teodoro/Tarriela Factor

Philippine officials, particularly Secretary of National Defense Gilbert Teodoro and PCG Commodore Jay Tarriela, have become prominent figures in Beijing’s negative assessment of Manila.

Chinese observers interpret their public statements and operational policies as evidence of a deliberate effort to internationalize and confront China over maritime disputes.

Beijing also thinks that some Philippine officials are receiving dictations from foreign actors, including US Naval Institute’s agent Raymond Powell and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Washington DC through its local adjunct Stratbase Albert delRosario Institute.

Nevertheless, the perception itself is politically significant. For Beijing, the distinction between direct U.S. intervention and strong policy alignment may matter less than the resulting behavior.

If Philippine actions consistently advance U.S. strategic objectives, Chinese officials may conclude that Manila has effectively surrendered strategic autonomy regardless of the actual decision-making process inside the Philippine government.

Read more at: https://tribune.net.ph/2026/01/16/china-lodges-protest-vs-tarriela-over-smear-campaign-against-xi-jinping

3. Symbolism and the Escalation of Public Provocation

Recent political caricatures depicting Chinese President Xi Jinping, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and China’s ambassador, including imagery involving a casket and other insulting representations, have generated concern among Chinese observers.

The importance of these images should not be underestimated.

Chinese political culture places the highest importance on national dignity, political authority, and respect for senior state leadership.

Public ridicule of China’s top leadership can therefore be interpreted not merely as criticism of a government policy, but as an affront to the Chinese state and national identity.

4. Information Environment and the Chinese-Philippine Media Space

An additional concern involves the behavior of Chinese-language media operating in the Philippines.

These outlets appear cautious about aggressively reporting politically sensitive material because they could subsequently be accused of acting as agents or intelligence assets of Beijing.

This creates an unusual information environment.

The resulting dynamic deserves monitoring because it could further erode confidence between Philippine institutions and the country’s Chinese-Filipino community.

5. Economic Retaliation Risk

The most consequential potential Chinese response may not initially be military.

Beijing possesses substantial economic leverage over Philippine commercial interests, supply chains, tourism, investment, agriculture, infrastructure, and trade.

Chinese authorities and businesses could respond through a gradual reduction of economic engagement rather than through a dramatic formal sanction.

Such measures could include:

1. Reduced Chinese tourism;

2. Delayed or cancelled investments;

3. Restrictions affecting selected imports;

4. Reduced participation in infrastructure projects;

5. Increased regulatory scrutiny;

6. Reduced commercial engagement (including trade) with Philippine companies;

7. Informal discouragement of Chinese business activity in the Philippines.

Most of these have already been subtly happening since 2003, and whose cumulative effect have already been significant even without an official economic embargo.

6. The Overseas Filipino Worker Question

A particularly sensitive issue is the approximately 300,000 Filipino overseas work force in China and Chinese-linked economic environments.

There is speculation that Beijing could seek to impose pressure on Philippine interests through measures affecting overseas Filipino workers.

A few days before the Chinese government implemented arrest of Filipinos who are supposedly working and living in China illegally, some Chinese commentators suggested about hitting the Philippines where it hurts the most, and that is the overseas Filipino workers who are a main contributor to the Philippine economy.

For this reason, Philippine officials should avoid assuming that economic retaliation would remain confined to corporations or government to government relations and trade.

7. Perception of a “Point of No Return”

A growing concern among Chinese observers is that bilateral relations may be approaching a strategic point of no return.

The argument is that Beijing can tolerate temporary disputes, but may respond more permanently if it concludes that Manila has made a long-term strategic choice to align itself with Washington and Tokyo against China.

Under this scenario, China could reassess the Philippines not simply as a neighboring claimant but a strategic adversary. Such a shift would have consequences extending beyond the Marcos administration. Even if a future leadership replacement attempts to restore relations, Beijing could remain distrustful for years.

This is particularly important because Chinese strategic planning tends to operate on a much longer time horizon that electoral cycles.

8. Political Implications for the Philippines

The political danger is that Philippine policymakers may underestimate the cumulative effect of their actions.

From Manila’s perspective, individual decisions may appear reasonable:

1. Strengthening the alliance with the US

2. Expanding defense cooperation with Japan

3. Publicizing maritime incidents

4. Challenging Chinese claims

5. Seeking international support

From Beijing’s perspective, however, these actions can be interpreted as components of a single strategic campaign.

The resulting problem is one of strategic signaling. What Manila considers deterrence may be interpreted by Beijing as provocation.

The result is a classic security dilemma.

9. Implications for US Policy

For Washington, the central policy question is not whether the Philippines should maintain its alliance with the United States as that could a major component of regional security architecture.

The more difficult question is how Washington can strengthen Philippine deterrence without unintentionally accelerating a permanent rupture between Manila and Beijing.

A prolonged China-Philippine confrontation could ultimately impose costs on US interests by:

1. Increasing the probability of a military incident

2. Creating pressure for direct US intervention

3. Increasing economic instability in the Philippines

4. Complicating ASEAN diplomacy

5. Increase pressure on Filipino migrant workers

6. Encouraging Chinese economic disengagement from the Philippines

7. Making diplomatic de-escalation increasingly difficult

Washington, therefore, also has a stake in preserving Philippine strategic autonomy while simultaneously strengthening its deterrence objectives.

END OF PAPER

Conclusion

The nightmare scenario is that the Philippines becomes so militarily and politically entangled in the U.S.-China confrontation that Manila loses control over the escalation and the Philippines become disposable.

But I do not think the Philippines could become another Ukraine. What I anticipate in case of a shooting war involving China, is the Philippines ending up just as countries hosting US bases in the Middle East were targeted by Iran.

First, there is no appetite among Filipinos to war with China.

The Filipino people know Bongbong Marcos’ narcissism and vested interests have only less than two years to go with no possible successor that match up with either Sara Duterte or Robinhood Padilla, who shares President Rodrigo Duterte’s commitment to the Constitutionally-mandated independent foreign policy which Secretary of Defense Teodoro has been toying for two years now.

In fact, the tarpaulin of Teodoro and Tarriela (TNT) “protecting our sovereignty against foreigners” has been torn down to an all-time low of only 3% in the latest Pulse Asia July survey. These latter-day saints of American propaganda turning every disagreement into a test of patriotism and mouthing inflammatory mantras against China, are not gathering traction.

The people’s misfortune is that they elected a weak and greedy leader who has not only hurt the Philippine economy and driven away foreign investments and tourism but looks the other way.

The TNT tandem’s lie that the China is targeting Filipino workers also won’t wash because legal OFWs themselves know that Chinese laws protect them. In fact, what has backfired on Teodoro’s face is that he destroys Pinoy jobs here and abroad.

Second, Filipinos may have colonial mentality viewing living in Los Angeles, Chicago or New York as the greener pasture but the US image has also been failing even among Filipino-Americans, especially on how inflation has been eating up their hard-earned incomes and a home country that is facing another economic recession as early as late this year.

The America for the baby boomers is no longer the haven for the Generation Alpha (2013–2024) who are mostly the children of Millennials, growing up with advanced smart devices and streaming technology, and definitely not of Generation Beta (2025–2039) consisting of children born from 2025 onward where artificial intelligence and daily digital integration would be standard.

Already, I am asking my children to school theirs in Mandarin as early as possible. China is the future.

Lastly, the military alliance between the Philippines and the US is only on a piece of paper the lifeline of which may vary after each election season whereas the shared heritage between China and the Philippines is in the DNA of every Filipino.

What most Filipinos now know is that Gibo Teodoro has not only turned traitor to the Cojuangco family and to his ancestral roots, but the Filipino people.

Filipinos and Chinese shared heritage spans over 1,000 years of early trade and cultural contact, with permanent community roots and intermarriage dating back more than 400 years.

As my grandmother used to say, there will always be an “intsik” (Hokkien: uncle) in every community street corner.

Just as there will always be a Russophone, east of Ukraine.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for internal affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 13: Forever peace or forever wars

When Barack Obama told his audience in the 2008 presidential campaign trail., “You can put lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig,” he was merely echoing an old concept, with a new phrasing. The famous maxim dates back to the 16^th century as many porcine proverbs describe vain attempts at converting something from ugly to pretty, or from useless to useful.

The “lipstick” variation is relatively novel since the word lipstick itself dates only to 1880. Before Obama, however, the most famous usage was Anne Richards disparaging line against George W. Bush’s negative ads in the 1994 race for Texas governor when she said |“You can put lipstick on a hog and call it Monique, but it is still a pig.”

Foreign policy application

The Interpreter, a digital magazine published by the Lowy Institute, a think tank based in Sydney, Australia, recently observed that when China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Philippine counterpart Teresa Lazaro on the sidelines of an ASEAN gathering in Manila on 22 July that bilateral relations “now stands at the crossroads”, it read that the phrasing was deliberate.

A crossroads is both warning and invitation: a prompt to make what Wang called the “correct, rational decisions about the path ahead”.

Two days before, after 15 successful, safe and incident-free routine resupply mission by the Philippine military for the humanitarian needs and rotation of our personnel stationed at BRP Sierra Madre at Ayungin Shoal, Philippine Marines (military) provoked a violent confrontation against Chinese Coast Guards (civilian law enforcers) who took photographs and challenged repairs that were being done at the derelict wreck in violation of a provisional agreement between China and Philippines made in July 21, 2024.

Coming on the eve of the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meetings in Manila, Beijing did not read the timing as coincidence, which it portrayed as an attempt to force the dispute onto a multilateral agenda and cast China as the aggressor.

The publication comments “For Beijing, this was never a quarrel over rocks and reefs alone. Marcos abandoned what it preferred as the quiet bilateralism of the Duterte years, publicised nearly every coast-guard encounter, and rebuilt his case on the 2016 arbitral award that Beijing dismisses as ‘illegal and void’ – mobilising law, media and outside powers to constrain China in what Beijing regards as its maritime backyard.

“Both capitals are now invested in narratives – Beijing’s of external subversion, Manila’s of principled resistance – that leave little room for the quiet compromises that once managed the dispute.”

Not an isolated case

This Ayungin incident is not happening in a vacuum. Today, the Interpreter’s analysis explains why in February 2023, Marcos Jr started embargoing a rosy cooperation with China, only a month after Xi Jinping pledged another $23 billion in packaged donations and economic assistance, in addition to $17 billion in the donated, joint, financed or assisted infrastructure projects left by the Duterte administration in the pipeline.

His foreign policy can now be defined as internationalizing of the Philippine-China in the South China Sea from a bilateral irritant to one of the more vexing problems in China’s peripheral diplomacy, as Manila foolishly thinks it is succeeding drawing external powers into the dispute, carelessly oblivious that the shift has moved Manila closer to the vortex of a possible hot war involving the South China Seas or Taiwan.

According to the Interpreter, his first lever is Washington. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, long treated as a background guarantee, has been reinvigorated: expanded American access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the Typhon (Weapons) System retained beyond its initial deployment, and the NMESIS anti-ship system rotated during 2025 war exercises.

The more striking development is political. Days later, Marcos secured a call, in which US President Donald Trump pledged to raise Manila’s concern with China President Xi Jinping (during the latter’s state visit to Washington DC next month.) That a single Philippine incident can now enter the agenda of a US–China summit is, to Chinese eyes, precisely the form of escalation Beijing believes Manila seeks – a superpower’s prestige tethered to a reef,” the digital magazine added.

His second lever that could worry Beijing more is Japan. The Reciprocal Access Agreement and the January 2026 military logistics accord, have given Tokyo a foothold in maritime Southeast Asia that China regards as historically loaded. I wish to add here a more recent move by Marcos and Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi to join perceived EEZs between the Philippines and Japan, disregarding China in the middle.

The Lowly Institute publication exposed, “Where Washington’s involvement is expected, Japan’s return – a former occupying power reentering the region along the first island chain China is trying to break out of – touches a more sensitive nerve. Chinese commentary now casts Japan, not the US, as the power fueling South China Sea tensions.

“Behind this inner pair lies a widening circle. Australia, Canada and European states have joined the Philippines in maritime cooperative activities and joint patrols, alongside continuing US freedom-of-navigation operations that draw ever-closer Chinese intercepts.”

The pattern was clearest this July, when Washington and its partners marked the (arbitral) ruling’s tenth anniversary with a joint statement – what Beijing portrays as encirclement dressed in legal language. Conspicuously absent from it was ASEAN. Manila’s own neighbors have neither endorsed or opposed it, leaving most of Manila’s explicit backing to partners outside Southeast Asia.

Crossroads defined

From this perspective, Wang’s “crossroads” is an attempt to reassert Beijing’s preferred framing that by blaming “external forces” and unnamed Philippine “military and law enforcement factions”, and warning that Manila risks becoming a pawn manipulated by others, China casts itself as the patient neighbor and Manila as a state led astray.

Its deeper wager is that Manila has misjudged the moment.

The magazine said that “As Wang and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that the space for the Philippines to fish in troubled waters is shrinking as the two powers stabilise their rivalry; an opportunistic Manila will be ‘pushed to the front line’, while Washington ‘will never foot the bill for Philippines ‘losses’. “

A 2006-declassified clarification by former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger in 1975 excludes South China issues as outside the first two categories defining the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty. He however qualified that its third category could cover it under “armed attack” but the convention does not allow an automatic retaliation seeking instead US Congress authorization.

The paper pointed out that Marcos’s maneuver is “no whim but an institutionalised reorientation”– a Maritime Zones Act armed forces retooled for “archipelagic defence” – that a successor would struggle to dismantle quickly. The more accommodating bilateral approach of the Duterte era is unlikely to return, and Beijing’s hope that turmoil in Manila reopens that door may prove a costly miscalculation. That is the hazard the metaphor obscures. Both capitals are now invested in narratives that leave little room for the quiet compromises that once managed the dispute.

Each new clash hardens views further.

Avoiding a slide into conflict will require a crisis-management channel insulated from public messaging and alliance politics – one able to handle resupply missions and incidents before either side turns them into tests of national resolve.

What Beijing may not have reckoned with is that Manila has found internationalizing the dispute can generate leverage with Washington, Tokyo and other Western partners – and may see little value in returning to quiet bilateralism, given a Philippine president who may not be any more capable of equilibrium.

Lame duck spokesman

The clear and present danger to our Constitutionally-mandated independent foreign policy is that the Marcos presidency is seemed locked in tolerating his verbally abusive and unprofessional Secretary of National Defense.

Gilberto “Gibo” Teodoro’s credibility is seriously being questioned in and out of government as politically self-serving, unconstructive and consistent, colored with “irresponsible remarks” and “ad hominem attacks”, and overly aligned with U.S. and Japanese security interests, rather than presenting neutral, legal arguments and impartial defense of Philippine sovereignty and preempting DFA Secretary Teresa Lazaro from engaging in diplomatic dialogue.

When his incendiary statements are challenged by the working press, or Chinese counterparts at foreign meetings, such as the ShariLa Forum in Singapore or the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, he deliberately avoids addressing the core issue and instead use the old and tired excuse that China has a “trust deficit”, exposing his own lack of confidence despite being a former bar topnotcher.

One narrative that sounded ridiculous was typecasting Chinese students schooling in the Philippines as potentially engaging in espionage. As result, the influx of Chinese students and so-called “student tourism” in Cagayan province and other parts of the Philippines dropped sharply following intense national security investigations, congressional inquiries, and strict regulatory oversight initiated in April 2024.

A Mongolian tourist who enrolled in a flying school on Iba, Zambales was also arrested for taking pictures of the municipal airport and at its Palauig River resort, for violating security measures prohibiting picture and video taking of military facilities. Curiously, the nearest military installation is 75 kilometers or two hours away located at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

Beyond rhetorics

The rhetorics were mostly feverish until the straw that hit the camel’s back, when Teodoro used his office to arrest more than 60 Chinese workers in a raid conducted the Sanjia Steel Factory in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental last May 2026, inside the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) Industrial Estate, a semi-autonomous government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) supervised by the Department of National Defense (DND).

Political harassment and personal motives were evident in the ensuing ANS-CBN interview of Teodoro himself:

“Ito ay pag-aari ni Tony Yang na kapatid ng notorious drug lord na si Michael Yang, kung saan dapat nakakulong ‘yan. Nakakulong naman talaga, pero tuluy-tuloy pa rin ito na nag-ooperate,” he added. “So, hindi ko alam kung paano pa nakakuha ng business permit ito. Hindi na dapat eh.”

(This is owned by Tony Yang, brother of Michael Yang, the notorious drug lord who despite being jail is still operating. I don’t even know how he gets his business permits when he is not supposed to.)

Michael Yang has earlier been linked to Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) operations but has long divested himself of interests in the steel mill. (Re: Full Sanjia position at end of this article.)

“What we have here is a case of prima facie undocumented illegal aliens na nagtatrabaho dito,” Teodoro told reporters in Tagoloan town.

The defense chief said the PAOCC sought assistance from the DND after receiving reports (?) that operations at the facility continued despite previous controversies involving Yang. The raid was conducted through a search warrant, with prosecutors and agents from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) processing evidence onsite.

But o complicate issues, the authorities started investigating for possible violations involving labor and employment, environmental and workplace safety regulations, as well as allegations of smuggling and the production of substandard steel products. That in itself was highly suspicious of a fishing expedition because the raiding party did not have representatives from labor, environmental, safety, customs and trade agencies of the government.

Teodoro even dished out a threat against any attempts to interfere in the investigation, calling the issue a “matter of national security”, justifying that that the facility which is industrial estate for Philippine veterans is being designed to become the Philippine Navy’s largest naval base for Northern Mindanao and the Visayas, a logistics hub, and a dockyard for maintaining Navy warships and frigates.

If that was so, why did he not simply tell the Chinese factory to schedule a transfer?

Saniia Steel management and lawyers denied all criminal accusations. They stated that the raid was unfair harassment and argued that the minor problems were just administrative issues that should have been handled through the regulatory powers of the respective government agencies with regular warnings instead of a sudden police shutdown.

What was damning was the Chinese workers who were flown all the way to Manila on board military planes and hauled into immigration detention centers were all later released after having found to be properly-documented, and as a result of the closure of the factory more than 300 Filipino factory workers have so far lost their livelihood.

Teodoro was caught flatfooted firing a blank bullet.

Read: https://asiancenturyph.com/2026/04/29/gibo-teodoro-the-most-promising-failure-in-philippine-politics/

New soapbox after sanctions

Just like Senator Francis Tolentino, who was indiscreet with his political dalliance with former US Ambassador Mary Kay Carlson, authoring a mindless National Maritime Zones Act that has created a law complicating the various issues in the South China Sea discussion, by creating mythical codes that cannot be enforced outside of the country as most of them conflicted with the very UN Convention of the Laws of the Sea and the 2016 Arbitral Award that it codified, Teodoro is the second government official, and the fourth Filipino citizen, who has been sanctioned from entering China.

The other private citizens who have been banned from entering China were the late former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario and former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.

(The ban prohibited del Rosario from attending a board meeting of First Pacific Company Limited, which finally broke into the open his direct connections and vested interest accepting an independent non-executive directorship of the holding company in June 2003 even when he was ambassador of the Philippines to the United States. He only stepped down from the board when was appointed secretary of foreign affairs of the Philippines under President Benigno Aquino III on February 201, a month before two Chinese surveillance and seven fishing vessels shadowed and confronted MV Veritas Voyager, chartered by the UK-based company Forum Energy, a subsidiary of First Pacific. He returned to the First Pacific board after finishing his government service on June 30, 2016 until his retirement on July 1, 2019 for health reasons.

(Secretary Teodoro also has impediments to his appointment to the President’s Cabinet. To date he has not made public documents regarding approval of his renunciation of his citizenship with Malta and his reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship, in face of confirmed facsimiles that he and wife have been using Maltese passports for their foreign travel.)

The Chinese sanctions on Teodoro issued on June 11, 2026, is however unique, as it includes all his family members in the ban from entering Chinese territories and blocking all their business dealings.

Despite this, Teodoro hid his hurt but defiant, he increased the decibels of his attacks on China mustering mainstream media and social media trolls.

The recent arrest of 100 Filipino workers in China has given him another soapbox, as he rejected any comparison between Filipinos nabbed in China and Chinese nationals arrested locally, especially the embarrassing consequences of the raid he led in Misamis Oriental, where he hypocritically targeted Chinese nationals lawfully working in the Philippines.

The defense chief said that “the action against 100 Filipinos is plain and simple extortion and blackmail,” even before the Department of Foreign Affairs could verify the details of the Chinese action on alleged Filipino illegal workers.

“We strongly condemn both the attempt by China to interfere in our law enforcement processes and the blatant blackmail against Filipinos,” he added without first establishing the context of China amended immigration policy.

Without directly referring to the detention of Chinese nationals by the Philippine government, China embassy spokesman Guo Wei said the operations were part of China’s efforts to strengthen supervision of foreigners illegally entering, living or working in the country and were carried out in accordance with Chinese law. He also said Chinese immigration personnel acted in a “standard and civil manner” during the operations and ensured the protection of the rights and interests of the foreign nationals concerned.

This contrasted with Teodoro’s treatment of Chinese nationals arrested in Misamis Oriental.

Obviously, the Defense Secretary is ignorant of the principle of “reciprocity” in international relations.

“The Philippines respects China’s sovereign right to enforce its immigration laws, as it does the right of every state to enforce its own laws on foreign nationals within its jurisdiction,” the DFA said.

OFWs in harm’s way

Unless Manila, however, has evidence supporting Teodoro’s wild allegations, they can be more described as the defense secretary’s kneejerk reaction rather than an established fact.

My concern is Teodoro’s rhetoric could create risks for legitimate Overseas Filipino Workers who are much more exposed to the consequences of deteriorating bilateral relations than Teodoro is.

Our Overseas Filipino Workers spend their weekly day off every Sunday by turning public spaces in districts like Central, Causeway Bay, and Kowloon into vibrant community hubs for resting, eating, and socializing.

Teodoro can make a statement from Manila and move on. Almost 300,000 OFWs in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Macau, still has to deal with Chinese authorities, employers, immigration officials and local communities the next morning.

If his statements contribute to a perception in China’s communities that the Philippine government is hostile toward China, ordinary Chinese nationals could potentially become more suspicious of Filipinos, and they might become “fair game” to street violence.

After travelling twice to China as a tourist and a journalist, what I found out that Sinophobes do not understand is that what Chinese government officials are most scared about is not the United States, or any country in the world, but being driven by homegrown public opinion to a policy they cannot turn their backs on.

The across-the board net posed on illegals in China is in anticipation of stricter controls on people entering and leaving the country from September 15, 2026 that was published last July 31. Under the rules, the stated purpose of an application to enter or leave China, or to stay or reside in the country, must be truthful and lawful.

The new regulations are even stricter for Chinese citizens planning to visit countries or areas facing serious risks from armed conflict, crime, natural disasters, major accidents or infectious-disease outbreaks and who have received administrative detention for fraudulently obtaining entry or exit documents, or for entering or leaving a country illegally, may be barred from leaving China for between six months and three years after completing their punishment. Chinese citizens may also be prevented from leaving for violating export-control or technology import-export rules in ways that could endanger national industrial or technological security.

Conclusion

There is no found evidence, whatsoever, showing that Teodoro’s recent remarks have caused a systematic crackdown against Filipino workers.

Besides, this is no longer part of Teodoro’s mandate of defending Philippine sovereignty, something least accepted by most Filipinos garnering only 3% in the July 2026 Pulse Asia survey.

Teodoro’s obnoxious behavior making sweeping accusations without first publicly establishing the factual basis, especially when ordinary Filipinos overseas may bear the consequences as collateral damage, must be gagged by Marcos, lest the latter suffer further reduction in his numbers that have already breached the cellars in trust and approval.

If Marcos is of any consequence, he must ask Teodoro to resign for sending this country to the brink of war and our OFWs to unnecessary risk; he can very well run his presidential ambitions outside of Camp Aguinaldo. #

Credits: Top artwork by Steven Pabalinas

Read: https://www.facebook.com/TrimediaBroadcastingOzamiz/posts/philippine-sanjia-steel-corporationofficial-statement-on-may-15-and-16-2026-auth/1459050052901174/

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for internal affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

Facebook

Youtube

By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 12: Forever peace or forever wars?

President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. called for a “reset” in Philippine-China relations following a recent violent confrontation at Ayungin Shoal that injured two Filipino sailors, suggesting another midstream shift in a foreign policy that looks more of a maze since he started his administration.

During his state visit to China in January 2023, the Philippines received a pledge of $23 billion from Xi Jinping in addition to about $17 billion in Chinese donated or joint-or official development or loan-assisted projects in the pipeline. A nation celebrated as what appeared as a continuation of the economic programs of President Rodrigo Duterte, fulfilling election promises under a “UniTeam” with the daughter of his predecessor as vice president.

After just a month, he signed a pact with the United States increasing from five to nine the sites of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, therefrom shifting from an independent foreign policy to the American rules-based order, starting an embargo on almost anything Chinese except on trade.

What has been embarrassing following his call for a “reset” is that comparison of videos coming from China and the Philippines proved that the Filipino marines provoked the violence at Ayungin or Second Thomas Shoal. Mere observation showed that the Chinese Coast Guard merely sent personnel aboard two rubber boats, to verify if repairs, in violation of a standing provisional agreement between the two countries, were being made on board BRP Sierra Madre,

The president did not stop at his knee jerk reaction. He made the situation worse.

During his subsequent State of the Nation Address, he waxed jingoistic defending the country’s maritime frontliners and echoed a defiant message on national sovereignty, declaring that the Philippines will not cower or surrender to external pressures.

This explains why Marcos Jr has breached the cellars in his trust and approval ratings.

In the recent Pulse Asia survey, the matter of “defending the integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners” only got 3%.

This is after ten years of hawks in Philippine government and politics selling to the Filipino public a so-called “arbitral victory.”

Car-pyrotechnics

The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has confirmed that since July 2024, there has been a “Provisional Understanding” with China on the conduct of rotation and resupply operations involving the BRP Sierra Madre, which is grounded in Ayungin Shoal.

But in a yet becoming more serious outburst of senior tantrums, expired justice Antonio Carpio, who professes himself the unofficial “Rasputin” of former President BS Aquino and now Marcos Jr, wants the alleged “provisional agreement” between the Philippines and China on Ayungin Shoal revoked, warning the administration that failing so, he might bring it up to the Supreme Court or Congress.

DFA maritime affairs spokesperson Rogelio Villanueva Jr. emphasized that the military does not need to ask China for permission for rotation and resupply operations and invited Carpio to give the Armed Forces of the Philippines a better, safe plan to supply troops without stoking tensions with Beijing in the contested waters, instead of only criticizing.

In an interview with his echo-mechanic Christian Esguerra, however, Carpio insulted the agreement as “dumber than dumb” and called it “an oxymoron.

Let us sort out Carpio’s brain fog:

Claim #1: “The Arbitral Award has already declared that Ayungin Shoal is located within the Philippines’ EEZ.” As always, Carpio loves to pull a rabbit from his top hat. In international law, however, there is a whale of difference between entitlement and delimitation, just as in general law there a distinction between having a right and being able to exercise that right.

• Maritime Entitlement

Stemming from the principle that “land dominates the sea,” entitlements are generated automatically by a state’s land territory. A country establishes its zones (such as territorial seas or exclusive economic zones) independently by measuring distance from its coast. Conceding to Carpio’s assertions, I agree that these rights are automatic and can be unilaterally claimed because under UNCLOS, they exist ipso facto (by the fact itself) without requiring formal proclamations, occupation, or special permissions.

• Maritime Delimitation

Delimitation only becomes necessary when two or more countries have maritime entitlements that overlap in the same body of water. It is the active process of negotiating or adjudicating a single, equitable boundary line to separate the overlapping areas. Unlike unilateral entitlement, setting a boundary requires mutual bilateral agreement between states or a binding decision from an international tribunal or court.

Sadly for the Philippines, the 2013 Arbitration was not a compulsory process under UNCLOS but a voluntary arbitration under the UN Charter where China did not participate, citing an opt-out option under Article 298 of UNCLOS.

The Award affirmed the location of Ayungin Shoal, but did not award any maritime delimitation in favor of the Philippines.

The Tribunal could not delimit with a dispute existing, without violating Article 59 of UNCLOS:

• Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone

In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.

The same rule is reiterated in Article 74 and other portions of the Convention.

Claim#2: “Carpio warned he might seek help from the SC to have the agreement invalidated because “it violates the Constitution. It violates the Arbitral Award.” Frankly I do not see how providing peaceful routine humanitarian assistance to and rotating our stationed troops violates the Constitution. I also deny it violated the Award because the Tribunal did not take this issue at all. It was estopped from even discussing it.

The reason given is found in its Paragraphs 1161and 1162:

“In the Tribunal’s view, this represents a quintessentially military situation”. The Tribunal (therefore) finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ Submissions No.14 a-c (re China’s military activities in Second Thomas or Ayungin shoal).

Carpio was deliberately obscuring facts from the public view.

My verdict on Claims 1 and 2: While the Ayungin vicinity may be within 200 nautical miles from our Palawan baselines, no EEZ can be enforced there not only because it is disputed, but moreso because it is militarized.

Claim#3: “We already have a final decision, the Arbitral Award, but we opened it again. It’s like we slammed ourselves into a big wall.” FACT: The former magistrate presumes finality. Carpio also hides a fallacy here – no human law is cast in stone or iron or permanent. All man-made laws can be changed, amended, or repealed over time. I have a better idiom- it’s like a fly smashing into your windshield.

Claim#4: “Why would you have a provisional agreement which tantamount to “giving up our sovereign right” over Ayungin Shoal.” This time it is Carpio who twists logic and uses an oxymoron, because the reverse is true. Entering into an agreement is precisely an exercise of our sovereign right. How can you enter into an agreement without both parties first being entitled to it and second joining freely their consent?

Claim#5: “The Department of Foreign Affairs has no authority to enter into such a provisional agreement.” Of course, it has because obviously the President approved it.

Claim#6: “The provisional agreement might fulfill the doctrine of acquiescence in international law that ‘admits superiority’ over Ayungin Shoal in favor of China.” Wrong application of international law. Wrong attitude regarding diplomacy. Carpio assumes that the Philippine government entered into an onerous agreement that runs counter to its interest. Engaging China is not capitulation. Negotiation is not abandonment. The result has proved to be an equitable solution.

Under this practical conflict-prevention mechanism to deliver daily necessities and rotate Navy personnel, DFA has recorded a total of 15 incident-free rotation and resupply (RoRe) missions to the BRP Sierra Madre. The July 20 incident was an exception and was in fact caused by a Philippine violation of the agreement.

Facts governing Ayungin

The measures proposed by Carpio are impractical such as using airdrops, drones, and fast boats to deliver goods to the outpost.

These have already been tried after August 2023, when the question of pulling out the BRP Sierra Madre from the shoal, was used by the Office of the National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano, to smear former President Duterte, as having a “secret deal” with the Chinese. Former Ambassador Rigoberto Tiglao clarified this with an exhaustive column on the subject matter.

Read: https://rigobertotiglao.com/2023/08/14/ph-did-promise-to-remove-brp-sierra-madre-from-ayungin/

As a result of the controversy, the Presidential Communications Office revealed a video of Marcos Jr saying, ”I’m not aware of any such arrangement or agreement that the Philippines will remove from its own territory its own ship, in this case, the BRP Sierra Madre from the Ayungin Shoal. And let me go further, if there does exist such an agreement, I rescind that agreement as of now.”

Unfortunately, the concomitant protocol affecting routine resupply mission for the humanitarian needs of our commissioned personnel aboard the derelict Navy ship, was also subsumed by the presidential rescission.

Without any alternatives, the situation went from bad to worst, with the Philippine side insisting on using gray (military) ships to attempt at routine resupply missions. On June 17, 2024, Philippine Navy Seaman First Class Jeffrey Facundo lost his right thumb during a violent confrontation with the Chinese Coast Guard.

The following month the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism at the foreign ministry levels met, and forged a “provisional understanding” under Marcos.

Carpio now wants this disclosed to the public. But he is overruled by Annex C of the standard Philippine Freedom of Information (FOI) Manual under Executive Order No. 2 (s. 2016) which contains the official List of Exceptions where the government can deny public access to certain records.

Besides prohibited by UNCLOS, the Philippines cannot practically undertake a unilateral enforcement on the waters.

The shoal is 105 nautical miles (194 kilometers) west of the Palawan coastline. Given the distance, I hope Carpio can devise a resupply plan that will not be detected by any foreign traffic before any mission can reach it. Besides, wouldn’t that be putting the mission in clear and present danger?

Where I agree with him, however, is when the retired magistrate admitted that “this provisional agreement is weakening our Arbitral Award.”

Arbitral myth

If Carpio and his ilk claim the Arbitral Award is a victory, why is it creating more problems than solutions?

Maybe the only context I can defer to it being a legal victory, was because when it declared that the nine-dash line has no legal basis under UNCLOS. This was reflected in Paragraph 278 of the award.

But that also means no other coastal state can just make drawings in the South China Sea. So why are we peddling to the world our own phantom “West Philippine Sea” drawn from mere sovereign rights entitlements (not sovereignty), in disputed waters at that and with EEZ jurisdictions excluding the surface waters and the aerospace above it?

Let us be consistent with history. Who drew the nine, in fact, eleven-dash line?

Imperial Japan had occupied Taiwan in 1895 and consolidated administration over the South China Sea (and the Batanes Islands) in 1941 and throughout the Second World War. Following the surrender of Japan in 1945, General Douglas Mac Arthur commissioned Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to receive the physical turnover and reclaim the features for the Republic of China, leading directly to the publication of the cartographic lines asserting ownership first published in 1947.

Even if the Peoples Republic of China has been the successor-in-interest to all these territories, including Taiwan, under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, adopted on October 25, 1971, it has never based its official claims on the nine-dash line but on historic titles and rights.

The Arbitral Award did not rule on this matter.

Its Paragraph 272 says

“Finally, because the Tribunal considers the question of historic rights with respect to maritime areas to be entirely distinct from that of historic rights to land, the Tribunal considers it opportune to note that certain claims remain unaffected by this decision. In particular, the Tribunal emphasises that nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea.”

But claiming a victory that the Arbitral Award affirmed our 200 nautical miles entitlements to sovereign rights to an exclusive economic zone is hardly a victory. It is already written in the letter of the Convention – Part V, Articles 55 to 75, and can easily be understood by any senior high school.

The underlying reasons why the most Filipinos do not regard the Award as serious and meaningful recalls the commonsensical analysis of Senior Ambassador Rosario Manalo when it was announced in July 2016:

Her main point was the process was not properly set up. It was disguised as a compulsory procedure under UNCLOS when it was in fact a voluntary arbitration under the UN Charter. Subsequently. It continued without the consent and participation of the respondent party. Lawyering for the Philippines were foreigners, in fact Americans. The magistrates were handpicked by the petitioners.

Actually, she made it sound like a “kangaroo court”.

But really, I am convinced that the Philippine side suffered from optics of not being in good faith. The international reputation of Secretary Albert del Rosario, as a business mogul, is well-established. He is not only a stakeholder in the issue at hand, but a stockholder of the First Pacific, the Hongkong-based multinational holdings corporation that owns Forum Energy, the oil and gas exploration arm of Philex Mining and PXP Energy.

On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats aggressively approached and forced the seismic survey ship MV Veritas Voyager, which was commissioned by Forum Energy, to stop its work and withdraw from Reed Bank (also known as Recto Bank).

This colored the purpose of seeking third party arbitration as not being genuine. The dominance of foreign actors diluted the Philippines quest for legal remedies and suggested a frame up by big powers who wanted to engage China in lawfare.

That sounded plausible especially because Barack Obama had announced a “pivot to Asia” by the United States who needed a proxy in East Asia because they are neither a coastal state or a member of UNCLOS. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also made numerous trips to the Asia-Pacific, engaging media in talking points about the Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty with the US despite refusing to comment on hypothetical questions.

A year after the Arbitration was setup in 2013 , President BS Aquino signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2014 that posted five US bases in the Philippines, thus reestablishing in an oblique way American presence in the archipelago.

As earlier said, in 2023 four additional sites were added to EDCA. The American expansion was only rudely interrupted by six years of the Duterte administration that did not rely on US alone for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but diversified sources from South Korea, India, Poland, Israel, Turkey, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, China and Russia among others.

What was the noisy stage that served as the backdrop for this expansion?

Ten years of lawfare on the South China Sea issues, most active under Presidents BS Aquino and Marcos Jr.

But at what cost?

Conclusion

For more than three years, Marcos Jr’s cops-and-robbers policy in the South China Sea has not only brought us closer to a hot war with China, but has condemned our economy to a projected gross national product at the end of the current year to 3%.

As I said in my previous column, this is outstanding evidence that proves that edifying the 2016 Arbitral Award is n’est pas efficace (not achieving any good result) for the people.

Returning to the July Pulse Asia survey, the top two double-digit concerns are controlling inflation (prices of everyday commodities in the marketplace) @57%; Lowering the price of gasoline @13%.

Holding corrupt government officials to accountability @43%

Increasing the pay of workers @36% and creating more jobs @15%

Reducing the poverty among Filipinos @ 26%; Addressing involuntary hunger @11%.

Fighting criminality @22%, Stopping the widespread sale and use of prohibited rugs @ 19%,

Equal protection under the law @ 11%; Promoting peace @11%.

At the risk of redundancy, the survey revealed that Filipinos are least concerned @3% about “defending the integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners”.

They worry about food on the table first, corruption in government second, better livelihood third and law and order fourth.

They know that the Arbitral Award is only a scrap of paper, which they cannot eat!

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for internal affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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by Mr. Fred Gao, CGTN Radio Editor August 8, 2026

Recently, the Philippine Department of National Defense issued a statement targeting specific provisions of China’s newly enacted Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law. Its objection was not about what the law does inside China, but rather that certain clauses supposedly seek to exert influence over individuals beyond China’s legal jurisdiction. The language was precise, technical, and on its surface a legal critique. But its source deserves a closer look.

The charge that a Chinese domestic statute reaches too far, imposing obligations on persons outside the country, is not a novel argument. It is a familiar refrain in certain Western policy circles and congressional hearings, routinely deployed to paint Chinese legislation as inherently overreaching. For a Philippine defense establishment to suddenly echo this highly specific legal grievance — one that has little apparent connection to the South China Sea or to any tangible Philippine national interest — raises an obvious question: is Manila forming its own independent legal assessments, or is it simply adopting, with minimal adaptation, an analytical framework manufactured in distant capitals?

To be clear, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is fundamentally a framework for governing ethnic relations and safeguarding minority rights within China’s territory. Like many national laws dealing with security or national unity, it may contain provisions addressing acts committed abroad that have consequences on domestic soil — a principle not unknown to Philippine statutes or to the legal codes of countless other states. Describing such standard jurisdictional concepts as an illegitimate attempt to project power over foreign nationals requires a degree of selectivity that often signals borrowed reasoning rather than independent scrutiny.

The deeper issue, however, is what the Philippines hopes to achieve. The most plausible explanation is that some in Manila have convinced themselves that by parroting Washington’s language attacking China’s domestic laws, they can lock in American backing for their own assertive moves in the South China Sea. The logic seems to be: adopt the script, demonstrate loyalty, and the superpower will stand behind you when tensions rise. If this is indeed the calculation, it is built on a fundamental misreading of how things actually work.

For one thing, Beijing does not link its approach to maritime disputes with what foreign officials say about its internal ethnic policies. Philippine officials reciting American-style indictments of Chinese legislation will not shift Beijing’s negotiating position on reefs or exclusive economic zones one inch. The anticipated reward simply does not exist on the Chinese side of the equation. What this borrowed posture reliably produces is a steady erosion of the diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries. Every time Manila acts as a transmission belt for narratives crafted in Washington, it signals to Chinese policymakers that the Philippines is less an independent neighbor and more a convenient echo of someone else’s strategic anxieties. Trust, the essential ingredient for any meaningful dialogue, suffers accordingly.

There is a dignity in speaking from one’s own experience, assessing laws and events through a national lens rather than a borrowed one. The Philippine government does not need to import indictments about Chinese legislation to have a voice; it can raise with Beijing directly. Setting aside this habit of echoing external legal critiques would not be a concession. It would be a demonstration of the very independence and strategic sobriety that national interest demands.###

By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 11: Forever peace or forever wars

My five-o’clock morning coffee is usually accompanied by an aimless surfing for light entertainment to remove the mild brain fog that comes after waking up, but this time I chanced upon Chinese Ambassador’s speech at the 99^th anniversary of the founding of the China’s People’s Liberation Army.

Jing Quan said “China and the Philippines are neighbors that cannot be moved apart, facing each other across the sea. The history of friendly exchanges spanning thousands of years has shown that peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation have always served the fundamental interests of our two peoples.

“Ninety-nine years ago, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army was born at a time when the Chinese nation faced grave peril. From the arduous years of revolution, through the great undertaking of socialist construction, to the New Era’s great journey toward building a strong country and a strong military, the people’s army has always remained inseparable from the people, sharing their aspirations, fortunes and destiny”.

Before the Ambassador offered a toast to the occasion, he made an important qualification: “China remains committed to an independent foreign policy of peace, follows the path of peaceful development, and consistently pursues a national defense policy that is defensive in nature. No matter how developed China becomes, it will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces have always been a staunch force for world peace and an important provider of public good for international security. “

Never hegemony or expansion. Hmmm, wouldn’t that be a mouthful?

Sophomoric twang

My next click was definitely not a coincidental topic. A professor of the University of the Philippines was spewing lawfare when on June 30, 2026, academic researchers from Jinan University, Nanjing University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences met in Guangzhou to discuss maritime and territorial issues and asserted that Batanes Islands—located between Luzon and Taiwan—are a “natural geographical extension” of Taiwan and share historical and legal ties with China.

In an interview with Yin Khvat at Taiwan Talks, a certain Ariel Arugay of the UP Department of Political Science, carelessly said:

“If China really claims Batanes Island, then why not file a case before a court instead of relying on the old script of historic claims, when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the arbitral award already provide legitimate legal frameworks recognized by the international community.”

To a layman listening to this person, everything could sound authoritative especially when he dropped the line mentioning the “community of nations”.

Obviously speaking from a pea brain, the “professor” does not realize that the issue at hand is one of sovereignty that UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award have nothing to do with.

UNCLOS does not rule on territorial sovereignty over land or islands because it has no jurisdiction over who owns land territory. (AAward Paragraph 5). The assertions of the Chinese scholars have everything to do with historic titles which again UNCLOS also has nothing to do with (AAward Paragraph 272).

In sum, their claim about Batanes rests on land sovereignty and historic titles, and Arugay wants them to go to court without them and only with UNCLOS and the AAward which are frameworks for maritime (sea) entitlements.

It appears that the professor does not know international law as he is clueless that UNCLOS and the AAward base maritime entitlements on land sovereignty.

What bench was Arugay warming when Taiwan Talks headhunted him? He sounds like a student of Jay Batongbacal, a sad pick who has not read and studied UNCLOS and the AAward thoroughly, a fake “expert” who talks to foreign media at the drop of a coin.

Tremors before a quake?

What I am worried for our country is that the theories posted by Chinese scholars intersect at a dangerous crosshair with the hawkish attitude our defense community has adopted on Taiwan.

I do not think it is even in the table of the Chinese government because China honors our “historic rights” by virtue of treaty limits we inherited from the United States on July 4, 1946 when we received our independence. The Peoples Republic of China has consistently recognized our territorial integrity from the time by Philippine President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed a joint communique establishing diplomatic relations on June 5, 1075, three years before it did with the Americans. As late as July 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated recognition of the three treaties that gave us our boundaries.

But Marcos Jr has been playing with fire over government pronouncements turning ambiguous about Taiwan, engaging China in doublespeak between security and economic lines even allowing commodores and rear admirals to visit Ching Lai-te in Taipei, tolerating continuous provocations in the South China Sea, inviting Western forces in joint patrols and military exercises in the subregion, but the most devastating of which is agreeing to “delimit” the Philippines “EEZ” with Japan’s “EEZ” ignoring China in the middle.

So, what happens now when Chinese scholars have established loopholes in the accuracy of our historic and legal positions?

First, that Batanes Islands have never been covered by the 1898 Treaty of Paris. It is above and outside its 20-degree parallel (latitude) stipulation. Thus, it may be said that technically, it is not part of the treaty China recognizes to constitute our limits.

Second, that historically, at the outbreak of World War II. Japan occupied the Batanes Islands and attached it to Taiwan on December 8, 1941 before Masaharu Homma even landed at Lingayen. They say that when Taiwan was surrendered by Japan to China, the Batanes group should have appropriately gone with it, because it was no longer part of the Philippine Islands surrendered by Japan to the United States.

Third, that the Tao people of Langyu, Taiwan are the same people as the Ivatans of Batanes.

I agree with DFA Secretary Teresa Lazaro that the Philippines government should deal only with official state positions rather than the views of individual scholars. “These are academics. Sometimes the academics really—well, they are academics.”

But that is exactly the comfort zone we backed on when we dealt with China on the Scarborough standoff.

The possibility now has become a probability that in case of a hot war with China over Taiwan, China has a leeway acquiring control over the Bashi Channel by annexing the Batanes Islands below it to end the debate once and for all.

This has tremendous geopolitical implications.

First is the control over the Bashi Channel.

The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) held its first-ever exercise in the Bashi Channel in March 2015, which was followed by a PLA-Navy exercise in waters east of the Bashi Channel in June of the same year. It marked the beginning of PLAAF long-range strategic bomber flights in the Asia-Pacific region. 2015 marked also the time, when the PLA increased its military presence in the Miyako Strait. In 2016, the PLAN’s sole carrier strike group, consisting of the 60,000-ton Liaoning, a retrofitted Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov-class multirole aircraft carrier, and its escort vessels, for the first time entered the Western Pacific through the Miyako Strait before entering the South China Sea through the Bashi Channel.

As recent as July 30, a U.S. autonomous sea drone captured footage of what Reuters identified as a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Type 052D guided-missile destroyer operating about 65 miles off Luzon in the Bashi Channel.

More than 26,000 commercial vessels transit through the Luzon Strait area with ship-borne trade worth about $5 trillion moving through the broader South China Sea and Bashi Channel region annually.

A major international chokepoint, the channel bed holds major submarine communication cables carrying roughly 97% of data and telephone traffic connecting the U.S., Japan, and South Asia.

Second, the Batanes Islands are real islands, thus entitled to 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone eating into the Pacific Ocean way past the Philippine Sea to the east, and connecting to the South China Sea westwards. China can completely control the Taiwan Strait on the north and the Bashi Channel on the south, as internal waters.

However, if this farfetched scenario happens, the Batanes’s new southern waters cannot go 200nm but will be marked by the Balintang Channel under UNCLOS median policy on territorial sea (Article 15), below which will start the truncated Philippine national territory.

Our problem is Marcos Jr cannot gag the charlatans on the Philippine side because he is in bed with the Americans who wants war.

For the past 10 years since July 2016, we had to deal with lies and confrontation, instead of peace bilateral negotiations with China. What kind of victory is that which has given advantage to the US and Japan but crippled our economic growth and impoverished more Filipinos?

Taming my pen

When I shared this with former Ambassador Rigoberto Tiglao, he was quick to the draw to temper my hypertension. I am quoting his inputs verbatim which start here without quotation marks.

The Treaty of Paris of 1898 did indeed contain a geographic defect: its northern boundary was drawn roughly along the 20th parallel north, which left the Batanes group north of the treaty polygon. The 1934 Constitutional Convention itself explicitly recognized this problem, saying that under the Paris delimitation the Batanes Islands were not included.

The Philippines dealt with that problem principally through actual sovereignty and constitutional language, rather than by simply redrawing the Treaty of Paris line.

First, Batanes had already been under Spanish administration as part of the Philippines long before 1898. Spain formally incorporated Batanes into its Philippine administration in 1783, and after the United States took possession of the Philippines, the American colonial government continued to administer Batanes.

The Philippine legislature subsequently established Batanes as a province. Thus, there was continuity of governmental authority rather than Batanes being treated as foreign territory.

The Philippine government today emphasizes this continuous, peaceful exercise of state authority—what customary international law calls effectivités.

Second, there was the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900 between Spain and the United States. It was intended to remove uncertainty created by the Paris Treaty and provided for Spain’s relinquishment to the United States of islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago but lying outside the lines described in Article III of the Treaty of Paris.

There is, however, an important historical/legal wrinkle: the 1934 Constitutional Convention did not regard the Treaty of Washington as having clearly solved the Batanes problem. Its Committee on Territorial Delimitation expressly said Batanes was outside not only the Paris limits but also the Washington treaty and the 1930 US-UK convention. (The Treaty of Washington “particularly” included only “Cagayan, Sum and Sibutu, and the dependencies”. Cagayan Sum here refers to Cagayan de Sulu in the southernmost part of the Philippines. – Ed)

The 1935 Constitution supplied the crucial catch-all.

The framers therefore drafted Article I of the 1935 Constitution to include not only the territories covered by the treaties but also: “all territory over which the present Government of the Philippine Islands exercises jurisdiction.”

The Constitutional Convention records are unusually explicit about why this language was included. When Delegate Buslon (Teofilo G. Buslon representing the third district of Bohol) asked what territory this additional phrase referred to, Committee chairman Nicolas Buendia (one of the founding members of the Philippine Independent Church and representing the first district of Bulacan) replied that it referred to the Batanes Islands. Asked whether it referred to Batanes alone, he answered: “Sí, Señor.”

That is probably the most important piece of evidence for your question. So the sequence is essentially:

• 1898 Treaty of Paris accidentally leaves Batanes outside the coordinate box. 1900 Treaty of Washington addresses outlying Philippine islands but leaves some ambiguity regarding Batanes. Continuous US/Philippine administration of Batanes. 1935 Constitution deliberately adds “all territory over which the present Government… exercises jurisdiction” to encompass Batanes.

• The 1986 Constitutional Commission later discussed precisely this history. Its records state that even though Batanes was excluded from the treaty boundaries, it could fall under the 1935 Constitution’s category of territories over which the Philippine government exercised jurisdiction.

• The 1973 Constitution further used the broader formulation covering territories belonging to the Philippines by “historic right or legal title.”

Critical Date

Of course, I agree with Ambassador Tiglao with all of the foregoing well taken.

But our strongest point is as he said effectivités – the practical acts of effective control, administration, and governance that a country carries out to demonstrate its real authority over a specific piece of land or water.

I submit that in international law, these real-world actions help support a government’s claim to ownership of a territory.

But our strongest can prove to also be our Achilles heel. Effectivités cannot easily overturn a clear, official legal document or treaty. They mostly serve as backup proof when formal ownership is unclear or disputed.

In this case, not only did a convention, the 1898 Treaty of Paris not include the Batanes group, but historic rights, as in the history of Taiwan even favor the Chinese side.

Nonetheless, China can always take Batanes as additional buffer against the Philippines if in the event of a hot war between the US and Japan vs China, especially about Taiwan, the Philippines joins the conflict actively or passively by allowing its EDCA lily pads to be used by either hegemon as forward operating bases or jump-off points.

Effective control can be overtaken because just as in the Scarbough Shoal, the feature was neither secured by historic title or conventional treaty.

Before the Scarborough standoff, there was hardly debate much less lawfare, as to who is sovereign in Scarborough Shoal.

The Philippines acted as the sovereign and exercised effective jurisdiction over Scarborough Shoal— positioning it within the Zambales province administrative area. The Philippine Navy built and maintained markers and structural installations on the shoal during the 1980s and 1990s. Philippine maritime and naval forces regularly patrolled the area and regulated local activities without continuous foreign interference.

But we are no longer in possessions of the feature. This is what Arugay, Carpio, Tarriela and Teodoro-types did not understand when former President Rodrigo Duterte said the only way to recover Scarbough outside of diplomacy and cooperation is through war.

Since 2016, we have been chasing our own tail because our thinking caps are dominated by lawyers and not diplomats.

The unpractical and legalistic minds of these bozos have rested on mythical laurels of an arbitral award, and keeps on loading the arguments, unmindful the dictum as “Critical Date” rule: Actions taken by a state after a legal dispute do not count and are generally disregarded. This stops countries from performing self-serving acts on the ground to attempt to improve a weak legal position once a dispute has already started.

We started on the wrong feet. Instead of using the China-ASEAN 2002 Declaration of Conduct bilateral mechanisms, we insisted on buffering ASEAN to serve as a multilateral front. In the first submission of Secretary Albert del Rosario to the Arbitral Tribunal on July 7, 2015, he rubbed the DOC spirit the wrong way by leaning on its non-binding effect and the absence of a Code in order to justify bringing our case to arbitration instead as an ultimate resort.

After the ruling a year after, we proceeded to further build up our case by locking our options inside UNCLOS and the Arbitral Award by codifying them, creating a West Philippine Sea out of precedent legal and factual novations in the Scarborough Shoal, a Luzon Sea and a Kalayaan Island Group, and creating mythical exclusive economic zones over contested waters and unilaterally delimiting a phantom West Philippine Sea.

Conclusion

This proves that our present strategy on this issue is n’est pas efficace(not achieving any good result). Even among our people, the recent July Pulse Asia’s most urgent national concerns show our sovereignty attracts only 3% of the population.

My prognosis is if we continue poking the dragon or a violent clash occurs between China and our military ally the United States and/or with our “comprehensive and strategic” partner Japan, or any of their cabal, anywhere in the first and second island chain, the Batanes Islands is there for China’s taking.

This neither as a hegemon or expansionist for China to take as an option, but a mere assumption of its “active defense” policy to prevent a greater regional war and promote forever peace.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for internal affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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by Ben Contreras

Sa mga nagdaang walong dekada kung kailan nagtatapos ang pangalawang pangdaigdigang digmaan, ang Estados Unidos ay siyang tinitingala ng buong mundo na siyang pinakamakapangyarihan sa lahat, hindi lang sa aspeto ng ekonomeya kundi pati na ang kanilag armadong lakas. Dahil niyan, walang sinumang bayan saan mang sulok ng mundo ang hindi sumusunod sa kanyang kagustuhan maliban sa iilang tradisyonal na kaaway.

Kasunod niyan ay ang pagbibigay ng araw ng kalayaan noong July 4, 1946, kalayaang mayroon pa ring malalim na impluwensya ng neo-colonialism ng Estados Unidos. Ito ay makikita sa nagbubuklod ng sandatahang kasunduan, hindi patas na pang-ekonomiyang pangkaunawaan at pampulitikang panghihimasok na humuhubog sa soberenya ng republika.

Parang kailan lang, ang Pilipinas ay pangalawa sa Asya, kasunod lang ng bansang Hapon sa ekonomiya. Ngunit ngayon, naging kulilat ang Pilipinas at pumapalo sa pinakabuntot ng mga bansa sa Asya. Saan ba tayo nagkamali?

Nagkamali ba tayo sa pagpili ng bansang kaalyado?

Ang demokrasya na umiiral ba ay nakakatulong sa pangkalahatang sistema ng ating bayan?

Ang demokrasyang halintulad ng Amerika ba ay naaangkop sa ating paninindigan at kultura? O di kaya na ang demokrasya na gaya ng sa Amerika ay naging saklaw sa ating pag-asenso, naging kadena na gumagapos sa ating kalayaan.

Tanungin natin ang ating sarili. Bakit tayo naiiwanan ng ating kapitbayan na kung kailan lang ay dumaan ng matinding digmaan kontra Amerika?

Matapos ang pangalawang pangdaigdigang digmaan, dapat naging isang bayan na tayong puno ng sarisaring industriya katulad ng bansang Hapon.

Malamang ayaw ng Amerika na tayo ay magkaroon ng maraming industriya, ayaw nilang tayo ay maging matatag na bansa na mayrong malakas na ekonomiya upang manatili ang kanilang implwensya sa larangan ng ekonomiya at militar.

Ang pagiging matatag at malayang bansa ay nakasalalay sa ating lahat, ang taong bayan. Mayroon ba tayong pagmamahal sa bayan,

Ang mapait na katotohanan ay nakikita sa ating ugali at pagpapabaya. Hinayaan nating mapapasakamay ng iilang pamilya ang yaman ng bayan, ipinaubaya natin sa ating mga pulitiko and kinabukasan ng ating inang bayan, mga pulitikong nagnakaw sa kaban ng bayan, nagnakaw sa kinabukasan ng ating mga anak at patuloy na namamahala sa ating gobierno.

Ang bulok na sistema ng gobierno hindi lang nangyayari sa itaas kundi pati na sa ibaba, sa mga ahensya kung saan ang kanilang pirma ay may katumbas na bayad.

Ang mga pulitiko natin ngayon ay nagmamay-ari ng libo-libong ektarya na mga lupain na binibili ng nakaw na pera. Sila ang may monopoliya sa mga malalaking negosya na kinakailangan ng mga ordinaryong mamamayan.

Hindi nyo alam? Bakit ayaw nyong imbistigahan. Dahil hindi puede ang mga magnanakaw mag-imbestiga. Kitang kita naman iyan sa impeachment ng bise presidente kung saan ang mga magnanakaw daw ay naging imbestigador na.

Kaya, mga kababayan, saan ba tayo pupunta? Saan ba ang patutungohan natin?

Sa mga hindi magandang pangyayari na umiiral ngayon, sa kamahalan ng bilihin at hirap na kumita at sa walang maayos na pamumuhay ng ating mga kababayan, ibinibenta pa tayo sa Amerikano na gusto guluhin ang buong mundo, na gustong gawing bala ng kanyong ang Pilipino sa kanilang alitan sa China.

Payag ba tayo na ganito na lang? Payag ba ang Pilipino na magpakamatay para sa Estados Unido?

Nasa kamay na natin ang lahat. Simple lang ang tanong. Kailan tayo tatayo sa ating sariling paa?

Mabuhay ang Pilipino.

Mabuhay ang Pilipinas.

Benjamin Tiu Contreras

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/asiancenturyph/

Twitter: https://twitter.com/AsianCenturyPH

Asian Century Journal is reprinting three guest editorials on a single issue for archival purposes. Guo Wei, who graduated with a Masters degree in Law, is the deputy spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Manila. Dai Fan studied in the University of the Philippines and is an academic and director of the Center for Philippine Studies at Jinan University in Guangzhou, where commentary is frequently published regarding regional relations and educational policy. Rommel C. Banlaoi is the director of the Philippines-China Studies Center at Diliman College and president of the Philippine Society for International Security Studies. He also served as president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies.

(1) When All You Have Is a Hammer: Ray Powell’s Second Battlefield

By Guo Wei

I. The Man With a Hammer

There’s an old saying: When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Raymond Powell is that man with the hammer.

He spent much of his career in the U.S. military and intelligence. Years of viewing the world through the lens of rivalry have conditioned him to look for enemies everywhere. Every issue, every institution, every exchange must somehow fit into a geopolitical contest.

So, when he sees Filipino Chinese schools teaching children Mandarin, he doesn’t see educators preserving a community’s language and heritage—he sees instruments of “Chinese influence.” When Chinese and Filipino scholars gather for academic conferences, he doesn’t see the normal exchange of ideas—he sees political propaganda.

This mindset explains why he can produce articles that read less like serious analysis and more like conspiracy the ories. Ordinary Chinese-language education becomes “infiltration.” Routine academic cooperation becomes a “national security threat.”

The real question, then, is this: Is Philippine society truly full of “nails,” or is it simply that the observer is carrying a hammer, and determined to hammer nails into places where none exist?

II. Powell’s Twisted Logic

Chinese-language education in the Philippines has existed for more than 120 years—predating every American military presence ever established in the country.

For generations, the Filipino Chinese community has established schools, published newspapers, and taught its language not to serve some geopolitical agenda in Washington or Beijing, but to preserve its cultural heritage while raising responsible citizens deeply rooted in Philippine society.

Chinese-language education in the Philippines dates back to 1899—more than a century before Powell concocted his SeaLight project.

To portray it as an instrument of Chinese expansion is not only chronologically absurd; it also ignores the historical reality that Chinese schools in the Philippines have long been independently established, funded, and operated by the Filipino Chinese community itself.

Most Chinese schools in the Philippines have relied largely on donations and financial support from the community rather than government funding. Over the decades, they have educated generations of Filipinos who have gone on to contribute to business, medicine, education, public service, and many other fields.

If that is somehow called “infiltration,” then by the same logic every immigrant community around the world that teaches its mother tongue would deserve the same label.

And here’s where Powell’s double standard becomes impossible to ignore.

If Chinese people teaching Chinese constitutes “foreign influence,” then what exactly should we call Americans teaching English in the Philippines?

The United States introduced and mandated English in the Philippines during its colonial rule. For over a century, the United States has expanded its influence in the Philippines through education, language programs, scholarships, and youth leadership initiatives.

The U.S. Peace Corps has worked in Philippine schools and communities for decades, promoting English-language education and community development while also advancing American values and strengthening U.S. influence at the grassroots level.

The Fulbright Program has long cultivated generations of Filipino officials, academics, journalists, and professionals, creating an extensive alumni network with enduring ties to the United States.

The Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) focuses specifically on emerging political, business, and civil society leaders, nurturing future decision-makers through training programs, exchanges, and alumni networks funded by the U.S. government.

Together, these initiatives form a comprehensive influence network spanning grassroots communities, young leaders, and elite decision-makers. This is typically described as “public diplomacy” or “soft power” by Western countries.

By Powell’s own logic, however, they would equally qualify as long-term efforts to shape another country’s perceptions through education and culture in pursuit of national strategic interests and would indeed constitute infiltration.

His inconsistency extends beyond the fields of language teaching and education. Powell frequently claims to defend “academic freedom,” yet his definition of freedom appears remarkably selective.

When Filipino or Western scholars publish views on the South China Sea that align with his preferred narrative, he celebrates them as expressions of free speech. But when Chinese scholars present arguments grounded in historical records or international law, he dismisses them outright as propaganda.

That is not an objective standard. It is politics masquerading as scholarship.

III. Why a “Second Battlefield”? From Maritime Disputes to Civil Society

For years, Ray Powell’s primary battlefield has been the South China Sea.

Since 2023, he has posted more than 6,000 social media updates related to the South China Sea, relentlessly attacking and smearing China in every way. On several occasions, he has even commented on maritime incidents before Philippine authorities had issued their own official statements, prompting questions about the extraordinary speed and possible sources of his information.

But circumstances have changed. The room for endlessly amplifying maritime confrontations is narrowing. China and the Philippines have recently resumed diplomatic and political dialogue, strengthened communication between law enforcement agencies, and restored direct flights. Despite persistent differences, bilateral relations have begun showing signs of stabilization and renewed engagement.

That is precisely the development Powell appears least willing to accept.

As opportunities to inflame tensions at sea diminish, his attention has increasingly shifted ashore. Instead of focusing solely on maritime disputes, he has expanded his attacks to encompass almost every aspect of China–Philippines engagement—from academic exchanges and cultural cooperation to people-to-people ties.

Chinese-language education, one of the oldest institutions within the Filipino Chinese community and an enduring bridge between the two peoples, has now become his latest target.

A closer look at Powell’s record suggests that his role extends well beyond that of a so-called “independent maritime analyst”. He is in essence a former U.S. military officer who actively engages on the front lines of the South China Sea and continues to shape narratives on issues central to China–Philippines relations.

His broader objective appears clear: to encourage the Philippines to view nearly every interaction with China through the lens of strategic confrontation, gradually transforming the country into a frontline state in Washington’s competition with Beijing. The ultimate goal is to systematically turn the Philippines into a “proxy battlefield” for containing China.

His methods have been remarkably consistent.

First, in politics, he seeks to deepen divisions.

Powell has repeatedly used social media to cast routine diplomatic engagement in sinister terms. He has even portrayed normal interactions by Chinese diplomats as a calculated “good cop, bad cop” strategy.

Such rhetoric does little to promote understanding. Instead, it encourages suspicion and confrontation between the two governments, widens mistrust between civilian and military institutions between the two countries, and fuels hostility toward the Filipino Chinese community. The result is an atmosphere reminiscent of a new McCarthyism—where ordinary exchanges become grounds for political suspicion.

Second, in the media, he attempts to silence alternative voices.

Powell has repeatedly accused Chinese-language media in the Philippines of acting under the direction of the Chinese Embassy, offering sweeping allegations while casting doubt on their editorial independence.

Whether one agrees with those media outlets or not, branding dissenting perspectives as foreign manipulation risks creating a chilling effect, discouraging journalists and commentators from expressing views that depart from prevailing political narratives.

That is not the defense of free expression. It is an attempt to narrow the space for it.

Third, in culture and education, he seeks to recast history itself.

By depicting Chinese-language education as an instrument of infiltration, Powell dismisses more than a century of history and community development.

More troubling still, Powell has gone so far as to criticize activities commemorating the victory over fascism during the Second World War and openly downplay the history of Japanese militarist aggression, turning a blind eye to well-documented atrocities such as the Bataan Death March and the Manila Massacre. Such conduct is not only an affront to the memory of the Chinese and Filipino victims of World War II; it is also a betrayal of the thousands of American prisoners of war who died at the hands of the Japanese military.

Viewed together, Powell’s actions reveal a clear and troubling pattern. Whether in education, academia, the media, or cultural exchanges, the underlying message remains the same: trust less, fear more, and confront sooner.

His focus is not the well-being of the Filipino people, nor the stability of China–Philippines relations. Rather, his priority appears to be the advancement of U.S. strategic interests.

By fueling hostility and amplifying tensions, Powell’s efforts risk undermining any opportunity for further improvement in China–Philippines relations, pushing the two countries toward deeper confrontation and serving a broader agenda of maintaining U.S. influence, or dominance in the Asia-Pacific.

IV. The Philippines Doesn’t Need an American Hammer

Ray Powell would have us believe that everything around us is a nail.

It isn’t.

The Philippines does not need someone thousands of miles away to decide who its friends are and who its enemies should be. Nor does the Asia-Pacific need an American hammer striking every point of contact between China and the Philippines until ordinary cooperation is reduced to another geopolitical battleground.

As a prominent actor on the front lines of the U.S. strategic competition in the South China Sea, Ray Powell’s approach runs counter to the broader trend toward peace and stability, dialogue and cooperation, and development and progress. His actions ultimately risk undermining Philippine sovereignty, harming the interests of the Filipino people, and narrowing the space for independent decision-making. Efforts carried out in the name of “academic analysis” and “transparency” while serving to fuel suspicion and confrontation cannot withstand public scrutiny. Attempts to drive a wedge between the Chinese and Philippine peoples are unlikely to succeed.

The future of China–Philippines relations should be determined by the peoples and governments of the two countries, not by outside actors whose strategic interests depend on keeping the relationship perpetually adversarial.

The Chinese Embassy will continue to present facts, clarify misunderstandings, and ensure that the public is not misled by distorted narratives. Chinese-language education is a cultural tradition that has been passed down within the Filipino Chinese community for more than a century, while China–Philippines educational exchanges are normal, open, and transparent forms of cooperation.

Ironically, the more urgently Powell tries to label Chinese-language education as “infiltration,” the more he reveals his own anxiety over the continued expansion of people-to-people ties between China and the Philippines.

History offers a simple lesson. Attempts to drive a wedge between the Chinese and Philippine peoples have never endured. The foundation of China–Philippines relations has always rested not only on diplomacy, but on the countless personal, cultural, educational, and commercial ties built over generations. Those connections cannot be erased by a handful of opinion pieces, however forcefully argued.

People like Powell may succeed in generating headlines. They may even create temporary political noise.

But they cannot reverse the broader trajectory of China–Philippines engagement, nor can they extinguish the shared aspirations of both peoples for peace, development, and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Because in the end, those who see only nails inevitably spend their lives swinging a hammer.

The rest of us are busy building bridges.

A sample of Sealight’s disinformation campaign.

(2)Beyond Geopolitics: Why Chinese Language Education Should Not Become a Casualty of Strategic Competition

By Dai Fan

In today’s polarized world, almost every interaction with China is read through geopolitics. Universities, research institutes, cultural exchanges—even language classrooms—are too often cast as arenas of strategic rivalry rather than spaces of learning.

As Director of the Center for Philippine Studies at Jinan University, I have spent my career studying Philippine history, society, and China–Philippines relations. One lesson is clear: sustainable relations cannot rest on diplomacy alone. They require mutual understanding, educational exchange, and people-to-people ties.

Thus, it is troubling to see a recent commentary by the U.S.-based think tank SeaLight frame Jinan University’s Chinese-language education in the Philippines as part of China’s United Front strategy. Such reductionism ignores more than a century of educational engagement and the lived experience of Chinese Filipinos.

Founded in 1906, Jinan University is China’s oldest institution created for overseas Chinese. Its first students came from Java. The name “Jinan” means “facing Nanyang,” symbolizing its mission to serve overseas Chinese communities. In 1927, it established the Nanyang Cultural and Educational Division; in 1929, Chinese Filipino students published The Philippines, China’s first journal on the country. These milestones predate the People’s Republic, the Cold War, and today’s strategic competition.

For 120 years, Jinan’s mission has been consistent: educate overseas Chinese, advance scholarship, and preserve language and culture. This continuity deserves recognition before political labels are imposed.

Chinese-language education is only part of Jinan’s broader academic ecosystem. The university is a leader in social sciences, conducting research on overseas Chinese history, migration, diaspora, literature, economics, international relations, media, and Southeast Asian studies. It hosts China’s only Ministry of Education Key Research Base for Overseas Chinese Studies. This reflects a genuine academic commitment, not simply language training.

Ironically, global academia increasingly values migration and diaspora studies. To dismiss them when they involve China undermines intellectual fairness.

Listen to how Secretary Teodoro apes the views of Raymond Powell.

Missing from SeaLight’s analysis is the perspective of Chinese Filipinos. Chinese communities have lived in the Philippines for centuries. Binondo, established in the late sixteenth century, is the world’s oldest Chinatown—a reminder that Chinese–Filipino interaction predates the modern nation-state.

Over generations, Chinese Filipinos have become integral to Philippine society. They built schools, hospitals, charities, and businesses. They contributed to commerce, manufacturing, education, science, healthcare, journalism, and public service. Their philanthropy and disaster relief have aided countless families.

These contributions never required abandoning cultural heritage. Maintaining Chinese language and traditions has not made them less Filipino. My Chinese Filipino friends are proud citizens, secure in their national identity, while also preserving their ethnic culture. This reality deserves respect, not suspicion.

The Philippines itself illustrates why multilingual education matters. As one of Asia’s most linguistically diverse societies, it has long valued cultural and linguistic diversity.

Chinese-language education exists alongside Filipino, English, and numerous regional and indigenous languages. Research emphasizes cultivating local teachers and integrating Chinese-language education into Philippine development, not treating it as a political tool.

Learning ancestral languages is neither unusual nor uniquely Chinese. Heritage-language education worldwide allows communities to preserve culture while participating fully in national life. This principle aligns with internationally recognized cultural and educational rights.

Chinese-language education should be judged by the same standard.

China and the Philippines have differences. Maritime disputes require dialogue. But it would be a mistake to let disagreements define every aspect of relations. Universities do not negotiate territorial claims. Teachers do not set foreign policy but they teach, research, and foster understanding.

Rigorous scholarship demands more than skepticism. It requires historical perspective, methodological balance, and fairness. Criticism is strongest when evidence leads, not when suspicion dictates.

For more than a century, Jinan University has connected overseas Chinese communities with language, culture, and knowledge. That mission has remained consistent across political eras. Hence, universities bear a responsibility not to deepen divisions but to preserve human connections that politics alone cannot sustain.

READ: https://philippinesgraphic.com.ph/2021/03/21/chinese-filipinos-transecting-1521/

(3)Chinese universities and united front operations in the Philippines

By Rommel Banlaoi

A recent article raises alarm over a Chinese university that once claimed Batanes as part of China and is now training Manila’s Chinese-language teachers. It highlights the role of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), framing these activities as instruments of Beijing’s influence operations.

Such concerns really merit serious attention. Yet they must be examined with intellectual humility and objective analysis promoting understanding rather than suspicion that risks fueling hostility and disinformation.

Chinese universities are not monolithic. Like institutions elsewhere, they can serve state policy, but they are also centers of scholarship, cultural exchange and professional development.

To portray every academic tie with Chinese universities as a covert plot undermines opportunities for dialogue and mutual learning. Blanket demonization forecloses avenues that could help Filipinos better understand China, its diverse people and its complex society.

Risks, however, cannot be dismissed. The UFWD does have a mandate to extend China’s influence, and programs linked to it may carry political undertones. Transparency must therefore be demanded, with safeguards to protect academic freedom and national interest. Filipino institutions must remain alert to the possibility of soft power deployed through education, while upholding the highest standards of scholarship and independence.

At the same time, the benefits of engagement are compelling. Training teachers in Mandarin equips Filipinos with skills vital for diplomacy, business and regional integration. Academic exchanges expose participants to diverse perspectives within China, countering stereotypes and reducing misperceptions. People-to-people contacts provide informal channels of communication that can ease tensions in official relations — strategic assets in managing a relationship often marked by geopolitical friction.

The Philippines should adopt a strategy of constructive engagement with vigilance. This means continuing academic exchanges but with safeguards against political manipulation. It requires reciprocity, ensuring Filipino scholars also have opportunities to study in China under mutually beneficial terms. It entails strengthening national independence, framing cooperation with China not as passive acceptance of influence but as active management of ties to advance Philippine interests.

Linking Chinese universities to the UFWD is not entirely wrong, but such connections must be viewed with benign rather than malign intent. Overgeneralization risks fueling paranoia, while balanced and nuanced analysis clarifies contexts, safeguards interests and keeps doors open for genuine scholarly dialogue. Academic freedom and excellence demand that we resist simplistic narratives and instead pursue rigorous, diligent, objective and evidence-based assessments.

In the long run, people-to-people contacts can serve as stabilizing forces in Philippines-China relations, complementing official diplomacy with human connections less prone to weaponization.

The challenge is not whether to engage, but how to engage lawfully, fairly and with a scientific mind committed to high standards of scholarship. By stressing transparency, reciprocity and vigilance, the Philippines can preserve the constructive role of education and exchange while defending national sovereignty.

This nuanced path is neither naïve nor hostile. It is reasonable, nonjudgmental and ultimately aligned with Filipino national interests and not the interest of any foreign power.

The Authors:

Supplement: Following Sealight’s definition of terms, here are clippings of Philippine “united front operations” in Guangzhou, China, caught in camera.

For complete (2^nd Quarter 2026) report of the Philippine Consulate-General, watch more “united front operations” by the Philippines in China.

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

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Twitter: https://twitter.com/AsianCenturyPH

By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 10: Forever Peace or Forever Wars?

Filipino comédienne Tuesday Vargas serves as our ice-breaker who says that we can live without Artificial Intelligence, but if we do not have water, if our environment is polluted, and our minerals from nature are wasted, everybody suffers.

I do not think this is a joke, but a socio-political commentary.

Jesters and journalists

Patton Oswalt, an American stand-up comedian, actor, and writer. He is best known for playing Spence Olchin on the sitcom The King of Queens which ran for nine seasons on CBS from 1998 to 2007 with over 200 episodes and voicing Remy the rat in the Pixar film Ratatouille, said in an interview with South Beach Sessions:

“I hate the phrase that comedians are the truth-tellers and the philosophers. It’s like, shouldn’t we be comedians and our politicians and philosophers and journalists should be the truth-tellers standing up for people?

“The government and people in power are just openly bragging about, oh, we’re absolutely breaking the laws. Do a funny joke about it to make these people feel better while we do it to them. I feel like I’m abetting them screwing people over by giving people a temporary laugh, but it’s like I’m not equipped to affect policy and make change.

“I know how to tell really good jokes, and that should be where my responsibility begins and ends. It’s still a responsibility, but we’ve become so skewed. I don’t know. It seems kind of perfect in the apocalyptic times that we would put the court jesters in charge…”

For my part, I have already exhaustively analyzed the proposed Pax Silica project from the historiographic, educational and geopolitical perspectives in three articles two months ago.

May 8 - Pax Silica, another Gringo Failure in the Making

https://asiancenturyph.com/2026/05/08/pax-silica-another-gringo-failure-in-the-making/

May 10 - Pax Silica leads to Bigger War without Cooperation

https://asiancenturyph.com/2026/05/10/pax-silica-leads-to-bigger-war-without-cooperation/

May 13 - Pax Silica: Preserving US Hegemony by Japanese Surrogation

https://asiancenturyph.com/2026/05/13/pax-silica-preserving-us-hegemony-by-japanese-surrogation/

The intention of this article now, is to deal with the socio-economic aspect of the issue tested by Tuesday Vargas opinion on the matter and from the viewpoint of Philippine sovereignty. While the Philippine government highlights its potential to create jobs and attract tech investments, the Filipino comédienne says Pax Silica poses major risks and potential downsides for everyday Filipino.

Overtaking 30 years lead in a decade?

Pax Silica is a US-led global coalition designed to secure supply chains for artificial intelligence (AI), microchips (semiconductors), and critical minerals. The goal is to build these high-tech components among “trusted allies” to reduce dependence on China.

China is widely estimated to be more than 30 years ahead of the United States in the refinement and processing of rare earth elements, as it spent over three decades consistently developing large-scale, low-cost chemical separation techniques, while Western nations outsourced the messy, toxic work.

As a result, Beijing controls roughly 85% to 90% of global rare earth refining capacity and holds a near-monopoly on specialized equipment like solvent extraction trains and reduction furnaces.

Through Pax Silica, US experts project it will take the U.S. at least another 10 years, and billions in ongoing public-private funding to build a counterpart capability, even as industry analysts note that it takes at least a decade just to train a qualified rare-earth separation engineer and educational infrastructure in the U.S. produces a fraction of the specialized mining and metallurgical engineering graduates that Chinese universities yield annually at a respective ratio of hundreds vs. thousands.

This echoes precisely why local communities across the United States are increasingly pushing back against artificial intelligence, driven primarily by opposition to physical AI data centers, high energy and water consumption, and noise pollution. Recent data shows that roughly 7 in 10 Americans oppose building local AI data centers in their areas, sparking a rapid political backlash that is even costing politicians their seats.

Pushback in the US

While critics and community groups demand restrictions or halts to unbridled expansion, some industry proponents and local officials argue that these data centers bring necessary tax revenue and job growth, revealing a sharp divide over infrastructure needs.

But residents also feel large, wealthy tech corporations force infrastructure into towns without meaningful local input. Subsequently, local and state politicians face fierce voter anger over data center deals, leading to disrupted political careers and candidates campaigning specifically on anti-data center platforms.

New York did not completely ban artificial intelligence, but instead became the first U.S. state to place a one-year moratorium on new large-scale AI data centers, targeting facilities using 50 megawatts or more of power. Signed by Governor Kathy Hochul last July 14, 2026, Executive Order 62 halts discretionary state environmental permits for hyperscale data centers.

The moratorium applies strictly to massive data centers drawing 50+ megawatts—energy levels equivalent to powering 50,000 homes. Smaller data centers, hospital facilities, traditional bank back-offices, educational setups, and the state-backed Empire AI consortium are exempt. The one-year pause allows the Department of Environmental Conservation to draft a Generic Environmental Impact Statement assessing power grid strains, water usage, and air quality impacts.

At least 69 local US jurisdictions have also blocked, restricted, or placed temporary moratoriums on massive AI data centers.

Pushback in the Philippines

Let’s start with the labor sector. Resistance against artificial intelligence in the Philippines center on job displacement fears, rampant deepfake disinformation, and cognitive atrophy concerns.

Key concerns include the threat to the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) workforce, surging AI-generated scams, and a public desire for tighter ethical and security guardrails.

“A World Bank lead economist warns that 26% of the Philippine workforce could be replaced by AI,” as noted by Bilyonaryo News Channel. While many workers utilize generative tools, pushback stems from real anxieties over automation in the country’s massive Information Technology and Business Process Management sector:

Millions of Filipino livelihoods face shifting requirements, with routine tasks most exposed to displacement. Recent studies show that while a high percentage of local employees use AI, many worry it leads to weaker independent critical thinking.

Public and institutional friction caused by disinformation has intensified over safety issues and malicious AI deployment: Cybercriminals increasingly use synthetic media and voice clones to impersonate public figures and private citizens, prompting calls from officials for a temporary industry slowdown or stricter vetting.

Over 72% of adult Filipinos view the spread of false and misleading online material as a major societal problem, leading the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) to pressure tech platforms for verified IDs and mandatory AI content labels.

Sovereignty and leaked paper

But what gave a heart attack to most Filipinos, is that a government who placed high stakes on sovereignty issues has signed a position paper where one of the qualifications of a participating site is that applicable common law in the 4,000 acres Pax Silica will occupy in the New Clark City, would be that of the United States.

The Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) explicitly denied that diplomatic immunity or US common law will apply to the proposed project, clarifying that the facility is strictly subject to Philippine laws.

BCDA President and CEO Joshua Bingcang confirmed that local statutes—specifically the BCDA Law and the Investors’ Lease Act—will govern the zone as a regular commercial contract. The Philippine government rejected the initial US proposal for special legal protections or extraterritorial status, emphasizing that no criminal or civil immunity applies to foreign personnel.

As noted by Manila Bulletin, a US State Department official later insisted the request was about “legal predictability for investors rather than immunity.”

But an alleged document leak from the US Embassy in Manila, suggests otherwise.

A Memorandum of Conversation in the US Embassy in Manila taken by political counsellor Michael Kelleher between Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael DeSombre, Chief of Staff La June Barnes and Charge d’Affaires Rober Ewing last February 15, 2026 at from 8:40 to 10:10pm, the tone was very different, as quoted verbatim, a portion to wit:

“On the matter of strategic realignment of the US-Philippine alliance and in lieu of additional EDCA sites, Barnes explained that State is pursuing the acquisition of land for long-term “Special Economic Security Zones.” These zones are intended to address the Philippines’ request for expanded economic cooperation while concurrently facilitating U.S. force deployment objectives.

“When Ewing inquired about the proposed operational model, Barnes suggested adopting a framework by established precedents in Israel, utilizing 99-year leasehold interests under restrictive U.S. administration, analogous to the legal status of consular districts.

“Ewing noted that a 99-year lease would likely encounter significant domestic resistance in the Philippines due to constitutional constraints and prevailing public sentiment. Therefore, while the written agreement sets a 2-year term, U.S. substantive jurisdiction extends to 99 years.

“Regarding industrial focus, DeSombre stated that these zones would prioritize defense industries centering on ammunition and materiel production to integrate the Philippines into the U.S.”

So, draw your own conclusions regarding American real intentions in the proposed 1,620-hectare Pax Silica hub contrasted with BCDA officials’ positioning it as purely non-binding commercial and business partnership focused on artificial intelligence and semiconductors.

Since our 1946 independence, the Philippines has gotten rid of heavy US impositions tied to post-war reconstruction. The Bell Trade Act of 1946 forced the Philippines to amend its 1935 Constitution to grant U.S. citizens and corporations equal rights with Filipinos in exploiting natural resources and operating public utilities. The Treaty of Manila and subsequent agreements forced the cash-strapped republic to lease major strategic military and naval lands to the United States for 99 years, where diplomatic immunity to Americans as US common law applied.

But as Ibon Foundation observes, the recent Independence Day commemorations were only theatrics to cover how the Philippines remains an instrument of the US to secure and advance its interests in the region.

The Marcos Jr administration perpetuates this one-sided situation by aligning with the US and condoning its self-serving interventions whether military or economic, drastically limiting the Philippines’ policy space and severely constraining the country‘s ability to pursue the national agricultural and industrial development so necessary to achieve genuine sovereignty and independence.

The Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) says the Pax Silica development is designed to comply fully with domestic regulations regarding public land use, resource management, and environmental standards.

This is where things become even more tenuous. Let me give you a concrete example how our corrupt system handles its regulatory function.

An Environmental Clearance Certificate was issued by Lormelyn Claudio, DENR director in Central Luzon on June 14, 2019 in favor of Silvertides Holdings, a contractor of San Miguel Corp. (SMC), to develop 2,070 hectares in the coastal villages of Bambang and Taliptip in Bulakan town for the construction of a P734-billion international airport in Bulacan. When I filed formal complaint and opposition against the Silvertides reclamation project with the DENR Main Office, calling the attention of Secretary Roy Cimatu, Undersecretary Atty. Analiza Rebuelta-Teh. replied to me that the San Miguel project was not a reclamation but a “horizontal development”, and the ECC was not for an airport.

Today the total scope of the project has grown to 3,000 hectares of landfill, over a deltaic flood plain that used to absorb the waters. As we speak, the rainwaters coming from the northern mountain ranges is instead now being displaced by this “horizontal development” onto the streets and homes of hundreds of thousands of nearby residents, because it blocks the natural pathway outflowing onto Manila Bay.

Bending the law in exchange for a “consideration”, has been part and parcel of Philippine governance.

A longer discussion is how the Energy Regulatory Commission, mired in corruption, has miserably failed for decades to implement the Supreme Court ruling on providing consumers electricity at the lowest cost, instead fattening the pockets of the oligarchs that control the industry.

Rainwater mismanagement

Rodrigo Bonifacio, a former police colonel blows the whistle in a Facebook post saying that to arrive at an honest and accurate narrative regarding the Philippines’ water security in the face of the ambitious Pax Silica project, we must look at the hard data, and not rely on uneducated talking points.

1) The Inventory: Do we have enough water aside from rain?

The short answer is no. In a tropical archipelago like ours, rain is the ultimate and only primary source. Every other source we use is merely a “storage container” for rain.

Surface Water like rivers, lakes, and reservoirs are the “checking accounts” of our water system. We have 421 principal river basins and 18 major ones. This water is entirely dependent on recent rainfall and forest cover to prevent it from washing out to sea immediately.

Groundwater such as aquifers) are the “savings accounts.” This water is stored in the soil and rock layers. However, groundwater is also recharged by rain. In many areas (Bulacan, Pampanga Metro Manila, Cavite, Cebu), we are withdrawing groundwater faster than the rain can refill it, leading to land subsidence (sinking) and saltwater intrusion.

The Philippines receives about 2,400mm of rain annually, which is one of the highest in the world. On paper, we have a theoretical surplus. However, due to a lack of impounding infrastructure, we capture only about 6% to 10% of that rainfall. The rest is lost to the sea or causes destructive flooding.

2) The Reality Paradox: Is it enough for basic needs?

Despite the heavy rain, we experience spatial and seasonal water stress.

There is seasonal shortage because during the dry season or El Niño, reservoirs like Angat often drop below critical levels.

There is infrastructure shortage. We don’t have a “water supply” problem; we have a “water management” problem. Our pipes leak (Non-Revenue Water), and our treatment plants are maxed out.

Millions of Filipinos, especially in urban centers and agricultural provinces like Tarlac, already face water rationing or lack of access to clean potable water.

3) The Pax Silica Factor: Analyzing the BCDA Claim

BCDA President Joshua Bingcang stated that Pax Silica will require 65 to 90 Million Liters per Day (MLD) and will not use groundwater. They plan to use surface water and a dedicated 120-MLD treatment plant.

The scientific concern is while BCDA claims they will get water from “the rain” (surface water), this water is currently used for irrigation. Capas, Tarlac is a primary agricultural zone.

There will be competition for resources. If Pax Silica draws 90 MLD from surface sources like the O’Donnell River or the Bulsa River, that is water diverted from rice and sugarcane fields.

There will be high-tech demand. Semiconductor “fabs” don’t just need water; they need Ultra-Pure Water (UPW). Producing 1 liter of UPW often requires 1.5 to 2 liters of raw water. Data centers also need massive volumes for evaporative cooling to keep servers from melting. This water is literally turned into steam and lost to the local community’s immediate reach.

Analysis: Reality vs promises

The ambitious Pax Silica project stands at a crossroads between industrial progress and the basic survival of the local population. To understand the true impact, we must look past the official promises and examine the real-world risks facing the community.

· The Conflict Over Water Sources: The project proponents promise to rely solely on surface water and rainfall to feed the hub’s massive appetite. However, the reality on the ground is that this same water is the lifeblood of downstream farmers and the indigenous Aeta communities. By diverting these rivers to power high-tech factories, the project risks leaving the ancestral lands and the nation’s food-growers with empty irrigation canals.

· The Reality of Sustainability: While there are plans for a massive treatment plant to recycle water, the narrative of “perfect recycling” is often a myth. In high-tech hubs, data centers use water for cooling by turning it into vapor. This means that a significant portion of the water taken from the environment is literally evaporated into the sky, permanently removing it from the local community’s immediate reach.

· The Hidden Threat to Groundwater: BCDA has pledged not to extract water from the ground. Yet, during a severe drought or an El Niño cycle, the project will face a desperate choice: let billions of dollars’ worth of sensitive equipment overheat or tap into the underground aquifers. If the project is forced to prioritize its machines during a water crisis, the surrounding community may find their own local wells running dry.

· The Risk of Chemical Waste Pollution: The project promises modern, clean waste management. However, the manufacturing of semiconductors inherently involves the use of toxic acids and heavy metals. Should any failure occur in the hub’s waste systems, these toxins could leak into the Tarlac watershed. This is not just a local problem; because Tarlac is a heartland for agriculture, a single leak could poison the crops and the food supply that the entire island of Luzon relies on.

Conclusion

Bonifacio’s conclusion is brief: We do not have a surplus of available water. We have a surplus of unmanaged rain. Unless Pax Silica builds its own separate water storage from scratch, it will inevitably compete with the Filipino farmer and the local household for every drop of water.

Frankly, source of rainwater would not have been a problem if President Bongbong Marcos already started his planned impounding system for the Candaba Swamp made in 2023. Hearings and orders for definitive planning were issued.

What followed was atrophy. This is a classic example of why his trust are approval ratings are scrubbing the cellar.

If he started it then, that would have been finished already after three years, alleviating massive flooding created by the Bulacan airport reclamation and gave Pax Silica one problem less.

Originally pitched in 2013 by former Public Works Secretary Rogelio Singson, the project aims to curb massive flooding in Central Luzon.

The project involves securing about 200 hectares—10% of the 2,000-hectare swampland in Candaba—to build a massive water collection and storage pool. Its collected water would have exceeded the impounding capacity of La Mesa Dam reservoir controlling seasonal floodwaters, harvesting rain for irrigation or energy, and easing overflow in low-lying towns.

But like the Candaba project, Pax Silica might just end up a lot of hot fart in a suitcase (maleta).

What has become the new normal is wanton and unmitigated plunder of the national budget.

The President blames his cousin for that, but he is still untouchable after one year of celebrated investigation.

by Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

This is a reflection on Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan’s call for a new course in the South China Sea.

His recent article, “Time to Remove Philippine Derelict Junk from Ayungin Shoal,” is deliberately provocative in both title and argument. It challenges deeply entrenched assumptions surrounding the BRP Sierra Madre, the nature of Philippine rights at Ayungin Shoal, and the wisdom of maintaining a deteriorating military outpost that has repeatedly become the center of dangerous confrontations between Filipino and Chinese personnel.

One may disagree with some of Paglinawan’s language or with particular aspects of his legal analysis. But the essential question he raises deserves serious national reflection: Has the continued presence of the BRP Sierra Madre advanced a peaceful and durable settlement, or has it become an increasingly dangerous symbol around which confrontation, propaganda and great-power rivalry are allowed to accumulate?

Paglinawan argues that the grounded vessel has ceased to function as an ordinary navigable warship and has instead become a fixed military outpost whose continued deterioration has produced recurring disputes over repairs, reinforcement and resupply. He further contends that Philippine policy should move away from cyclical confrontation and toward negotiations, confidence-building and eventual political accommodation.

On this central point, his article is consistent with the position I have advanced in my previous writings on the so-called West Philippine Sea and the broader South China Sea dispute: the Philippines must recover an authentically independent foreign policy anchored in diplomacy, international law and the Filipino national interest.

The dispute should not be reduced to a simplistic choice between China and the United States. Such a framework is itself a diminishment of Philippine sovereignty. The Philippines is not a strategic pawn, a military platform or a subordinate outpost of any foreign power. We are a sovereign republic with our own Constitution, national interests, historic relationships and responsibility to preserve peace for future generations.

Article II, Section 7 of the Philippine Constitution requires the State to pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount considerations must be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination.

That constitutional command does not require isolation from the United States. Neither does it demand hostility toward China. It requires something more difficult and more mature: the capacity to cooperate with both powers without allowing either to dictate Philippine policy.

Engaging China Is Not Surrender

The Philippines must engage China as one of the principal architects of the emerging Asian and global order—a major economic, technological and military power whose influence will continue to shape the region for generations.

That reality cannot responsibly be ignored.

China is our permanent geographic neighbor. It is deeply connected to the Philippine economy and to the wider economic life of Asia. Geography does not disappear with changes in presidential administrations, military alliances or political slogans. Neither can a country relocate itself simply because relations with a neighboring power have become difficult.

The Philippines must therefore deal with China directly, confidently and constructively, on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual respect. We should cooperate where our interests converge, negotiate where our claims overlap and firmly protect our lawful rights where disagreement remains.

Engagement is not capitulation.

Negotiation is not abandonment.

Diplomacy is not treason.

Indeed, diplomacy is how sovereign nations build relations and manage disputes without sacrificing either their rights or the lives of their people.

China must likewise respect the Philippines as an independent sovereign state—not as a minor country to be intimidated, instructed or coerced. Mutual respect cannot operate in only one direction. It requires restraint, reciprocity and recognition that the dignity and security of Filipino personnel must never be treated as expendable.

But respect must also be communicated through serious statecraft rather than through endless theatrical confrontation. National honor is not measured by the frequency of collisions at sea, the volume of official condemnations or the number of viral videos produced after each incident. It is measured by whether our policies make Filipinos safer, strengthen our lawful position and bring the region closer to peace.

The United States Is Ally, Not Master

The Philippines must also preserve and intelligently manage its treaty alliance with the United States.

The United States remains a major economic and military power, a longstanding ally and an important source of defense cooperation, investment, education and people-to-people ties. Millions of Filipinos and Filipino Americans have formed enduring bonds between the two societies.

But an alliance among sovereign states must be founded on consultation and mutual benefit—not automatic obedience.

Philippine foreign policy should not be designed in Washington. Nor should it be designed in Beijing. It must be formulated in Manila, according to the interests of the Filipino people.

To say this is not anti-American. It is simply constitutional.

An independent Philippines may cooperate closely with the United States while refusing to become the front line of an American conflict with China. It may accept legitimate defense assistance while rejecting any strategy that unnecessarily transforms Philippine territory into an instrument of great-power escalation.

The United States and China are both economically and militarily consequential powers. The Philippines must engage each with respect, prudence and strategic clarity. Our relationships with them should be defined not by ideological loyalty, dependency or fear, but by our own national interest.

That is the difference between alliance and subordination.

That is also the meaning of sovereignty.

What the Arbitral Award Did—and Did Not—Decide

Public debate must also be disciplined by legal accuracy.

The 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award was a significant legal ruling. It rejected the legal foundation of China’s expansive historic-rights claim within the so-called nine-dash line insofar as that claim exceeded the maritime entitlements permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The tribunal also ruled on the legal classification of several maritime features and on certain sovereign rights arising under UNCLOS.

But the tribunal did not decide sovereignty over disputed islands, rocks or other land territory. It expressly lacked jurisdiction to determine territorial ownership. It also did not undertake a comprehensive delimitation of maritime boundaries among all claimant states.

This distinction is essential.

UNCLOS allocates maritime entitlements. It does not, by itself, resolve every dispute over territorial sovereignty. The arbitral award strengthened important Philippine legal claims, but it did not make diplomacy unnecessary. Nor could it impose a complete political settlement upon all the states contesting parts of the South China Sea.

The dispute involves not only the Philippines and China, but also overlapping claims and interests involving Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, with Indonesia maintaining significant interests concerning its exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands.

There is therefore no realistic substitute for sustained diplomatic engagement.

The law provides the framework. Negotiation must provide the settlement.

Questions Paglinawan Forces Us to Face

Paglinawan’s article asks whether the continued grounding and reinforcement of the BRP Sierra Madre has become inconsistent with the larger objective of de-escalation and negotiated settlement.

He maintains that the vessel’s loss of seaworthiness, fixed location and use as an outpost complicate its characterization as an ordinary warship. He also invokes the obligation of states to exchange views, pursue provisional arrangements and avoid actions that aggravate unresolved maritime disputes.

These arguments should not simply be dismissed through name-calling.

The legal status of the vessel, the rights of the Philippines at Ayungin Shoal and the operational consequences of any proposed removal are not questions that should be resolved through political slogans. They require careful study by international-law scholars, naval experts, diplomats, environmental specialists and national-security officials.

Any decision concerning the BRP Sierra Madre must be made exclusively by the Philippines, consistent with our national interest and without coercion from China, the United States or any other state.

Removal should not be undertaken as an act of surrender or unilateral abandonment. Nor should the vessel be maintained indefinitely merely because policymakers fear being accused of weakness.

If the Philippines eventually determines that the vessel has become strategically dangerous, environmentally unsustainable and diplomatically counterproductive, its removal should occur only as part of a carefully negotiated, verifiable and reciprocal arrangement.

Such an arrangement should protect Philippine sovereign rights, ensure the safety of Filipino personnel, prevent unilateral occupation or militarization by another claimant and establish a durable mechanism for access, resource management and crisis prevention.

The essential principle must be reciprocity.

The Philippines should not make irreversible concessions in exchange for vague assurances.

Any major change at Ayungin must be accompanied by concrete guarantees, transparent procedures and enforceable confidence-building measures.

From Symbolism to Statesmanship

The BRP Sierra Madre has acquired enormous symbolic significance. It represents sacrifice, endurance and the commitment of Filipino Marines stationed under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

Their service must be honored.

But national policy cannot be based solely on symbolism. A rusting vessel should not become more important than the lives of the soldiers assigned to it, the security of Filipino fishermen or the peace of the entire region.

The highest form of patriotism is not the preservation of a symbol at all costs. It is the protection of the Republic through wise and forward-looking judgment.

There is courage in defending one’s rights. But there is also courage in negotiating a responsible settlement when the existing arrangement produces only recurring danger.

It requires far less imagination to preserve confrontation than to design peace.

A Code of Conduct Must Have Substance

Paglinawan also emphasizes the importance of completing negotiations for a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. His article reports that Chinese officials have continued to express support for completing those negotiations, notwithstanding recent bilateral tensions.

A meaningful Code of Conduct should not be merely ceremonial. It should contain practical rules governing coast guard encounters, military proximity, resupply operations, fishing access, environmental protection and emergency communications.

It should prohibit the use of force and dangerous maneuvers. It should create reliable hotlines and investigation mechanisms. It should encourage joint scientific work, marine conservation and carefully structured resource cooperation without prejudice to the legal claims of any party.

Above all, it should transform the South China Sea from a theater of strategic competition into a region governed by restraint and predictable conduct.

Such an agreement will not resolve every sovereignty question. But it can prevent disputes from becoming wars.

Neither Pro-China or Pro-America

The predictable response to any call for negotiation is to label its author pro-China. The predictable response to any defense of the alliance with the United States is to label the speaker pro-America.

Both accusations are intellectually lazy.

A pro-Philippines foreign policy may oppose Chinese coercion while supporting economic cooperation with China. It may value the American alliance while rejecting the transformation of the Philippines into a military proxy.

It may invoke the 2016 arbitral award while acknowledging the award’s jurisdictional limitations. It may defend sovereign rights while recognizing that final and lasting peace requires negotiation with the other claimants.

There is no contradiction in these positions.

They are the components of strategic independence.

The Philippines should engage China as a major economic and military power whose cooperation is indispensable to regional prosperity and stability. We should engage the United States as a treaty ally whose partnership can contribute to Philippine defense and development. We should also deepen our relations, constructively, with ASEAN, Japan, India, Australia, Europe and the wider international community.

But every engagement must be measured against one standard:

Does it advance the sovereignty, security, prosperity and dignity of the Filipino people?

Choosing Peace Without Abandoning Rights

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan’s article is valuable because it disrupts the comfortable assumption that the existing policy at Ayungin must continue indefinitely merely because no government wishes to accept the political consequences of reconsidering it.

His proposal should be debated seriously, not accepted uncritically and not dismissed reflexively.

The ultimate question is not simply whether to remove or preserve the BRP Sierra Madre.

The deeper question is whether Philippine policy will remain trapped in an endless cycle of resupply confrontation, diplomatic protest and heightened dependence on external powers—or whether the country will recover the confidence to pursue a negotiated and genuinely independent course.

The Philippines must claim lawful rights in good faith.

And neither should it abandon diplomacy.

The spirit of international law is cooperation and peace. Its rules guides countries to work together fairly, protect rights of all peoples, and resolving problems without conflict, especially war.

We can protect our interests without manufacturing permanent hostility. We can preserve alliances without surrendering independence. We can engage China without becoming subservient to China. We can work with the United States without becoming a proxy of the United States.

This is not a pro-China position.

It is not a pro-American position.

It is a sovereign, constitutional and unmistakably pro-Philippines position.

At a moment when the South China Sea is becoming increasingly militarized, the most patriotic policy is not the one that creates the loudest confrontation. It is the one that protects Filipino lives, preserves Philippine rights and opens a credible path toward peace.

Paglinawan is therefore correct to insist that diplomacy must replace cyclical provocation as the organizing principle of our foreign policy.

The Philippines must speak with all powers, submit to none and negotiate from the strength of its own sovereign dignity.

In the end, the nation’s choice should not be Beijing or Washington.

It must always be the Philippines. #

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University. He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

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If Vice President Inday Sara Duterte is impeached, I will boycott the 2028 elections. Period. For me, there is simply no alternative who can replace her. I believe Sara Duterte has already demonstrated that she is a capable executive leader. She is a lawyer by profession, having graduated from San Sebastian College of Law in 2005 and passing the Bar Examination in the same year.

As Mayor of Davao City, she helped transform the city into a debt-free local government and one free from NPA insurgency. During her leadership, Davao became the country’s eighth richest city, the fourth most competitive highly urbanized city, and remained consistently recognized as one of the safest and cleanest cities in the Philippines. To me, this reflects her ability to manage a large local government while maintaining public order, fiscal discipline, and economic growth.

In the 2022 national elections, she received more than 32 million votes, or about 61 percent of the total, making it the highest number of votes ever received by any candidate in Philippine election history.

Her public support has remained strong in subsequent surveys. Among Filipinos aged 18–24, her satisfaction rating reached 61 percent in June 2026, with a net satisfaction rating of +41. A Social Weather Stations survey conducted from June 20–29, 2026 recorded a 58 percent satisfaction rating, 26 percent dissatisfaction, and a net satisfaction score of +31. She also emerged as the leading presidential preference in a nationwide Pulse Asia survey conducted from June 28 to July 3, 2026, receiving the support of 49 percent of respondents. For the past three years, the Office of the Vice President under her leadership has consistently received among the highest trust, approval, and satisfaction ratings in various national surveys.

The Office of the Vice President also implemented several large-scale social service programs that benefited millions of Filipinos, particularly those in underserved communities. Nearly three million commuters benefited from the Libreng Sakay program, while more than 1.08 million trees were planted through the Pagbabago: A Million Trees Campaign. Over 603,000 students received school and dental kits, more than 535,000 families received disaster relief assistance, over 271,000 individuals received medical assistance, and the R.I.I.C.E. Program served more than 231,000 beneficiaries. In addition, over 64,000 families received medical and burial assistance, while more than 4,400 entrepreneurs were supported through the Mag Negosyo Ta ’Day program.

The Commission on Audit also issued an unmodified opinion to the Office of the Vice President for four consecutive years from 2022 to 2025. An unmodified opinion is widely regarded as the highest audit opinion a government agency can receive, indicating that its financial statements were fairly presented in accordance with applicable accounting standards.

As Secretary of Education, she introduced several reforms aimed at improving the country’s education system. She launched the MATATAG Curriculum, which reduced the K–10 curriculum by approximately 70 percent to focus on essential competencies. She also approved a 30-day uninterrupted vacation for teachers, removed unnecessary administrative tasks to allow teachers to focus on classroom instruction, implemented a classroom decoration policy that eliminated non-essential requirements, launched the Telesafe Hotline for the anonymous reporting of abuse, and introduced Catch-Up Fridays to strengthen students’ reading and writing skills following the learning losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Commission on Audit likewise issued an unmodified opinion to the Department of Education in both 2022 and 2023, with the 2022 audit marking the first time in the department’s history that DepEd received this rating. DepEd received the highest approval ratings out of all government agencies when she was at the helm.

For these reasons, I believe Sara Duterte has demonstrated the executive experience, leadership, and public service record needed to lead the country. Based on my assessment, there is no one else who matches her qualifications and track record. For me, there is no Plan B.

SARA DUTERTE FOR PRESIDENT IN 2028!

Daniel Long

Daniel Long is a college student of entrepreneurship at Thames International and a Filipino-Chinese writer who contributes to the Asian Century Journal, The Manila Times, Mindanao Times, and SunStar Davao. He currently serves as ISDA Youth’s National Director for Publications and Journalism. He is also a guest host of the “PH-China Talks” radio program on DWAD 1098 and a member of the Youth Committee of the Association for Philippines–China Understanding (APCU).

Previously, he served as a speechwriter for Senator Imee Marcos and as a guest host of “Opinion Ngayon” on Golden Nation Network. He was also part of the official Philippine press delegation to China in 2023, an ASEAN-China social media influencer delegate to China in 2024, and an APCU delegate to Fujian, China, in 2025.

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 9: Forever peace or forever wars

On July 20, 2026, a violent clash occurred again near the BRP Sierra Madre at Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal when China Coast Guard (CCG) personnel went close to the Philippine ship to call attention to repairs going on inside the ship.

Beijing accused Philippine personnel of provocation, claiming that two Philippine rubber boats ignored warnings, rammed a CCG patrol boat, and attacked Chinese personnel with sticks and oars. In the process, the Chinese Coast Guards blared sirens, fired tear gas, and bludgeoned a Filipino Navy officer with a wooden baton, causing a head injury.

China released video footage of the standoff.

As usual, The Department of National Defense (DND) and the Philippine News Agency and their echo mechanics in the mainstream press and social media, termed the incident as aggression, rejecting China’s attempts to shift the blame onto the Philippines for the incident. The incident also drew heavy condemnation from the United States and Australia, both of whom denounced the “dangerous and escalatory actions” of the Chinese forces.

But the video cannot lie, as to who cast the first stone.

The next day, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. met Ambassador Jing Quan at Malacañang.

The oligarchic press and their paid social media trolls were quick to claim that the ambassador was “summoned” as reported by the oligarchic press, only to commit an erratum as the meeting was preset by the President in anticipation with a following ASEAN foreign ministers meeting on July 22.

Clarifying in an interview, Jing said that his meeting with Marcos was constructive. “It’s not a kind of diplomatic protest (or) demarche, (not) an exchange of very strong words, no. It’s kind of, I think it’s very useful, constructive, kind of in-depth exchange of views.

He said the Ayungin incident was not even discussed: “Especially not on the incident yesterday.”

“But a kind of a whole range of (recent) issues, which create difficulties (and) challenges for our bilateral relations. It’s kind of, you know, focused on the solution, not (on pointing) a finger (at) each other.”

Both sides agreed not to release any content to the media, “It’s really a private discussion. Few people attended and no press.

Jing clarified that it was our ambassador to Beijing, Jaime Flor Cruz. that was summoned by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Yes, yes. Beijing already released the news. As a form of protest.”

Asked as to how this would affect the ongoing negotiations with the Philippines, the Chinese ambassador said “I think Philippines-China, we share the same goal. That is, we hope that we can finish the negotiations by the end of this year. That’s kind of a regional, multilateral issue, also involve other relevant parties. It’s not bilateral issues. So, no matter what happens bilaterally, I think our willingness to finish the talk on the Code of Conduct by the end of this year has not changed.”

Malicious ambiguities

In one press interview with PCG Spokesman Jay Tarriela, he framed the BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) as an active, commissioned warship of the Philippine Navy.

The PCG spokesperson is definitely wrong, but he is only aping a prevarication that Teresita Daza, a spokesperson of the Department of Foreign Affairs made on August 2023. The complete quotation reads “The BRP Sierra Madre is a commissioned vessel of the Philippine Navy that serves as a permanent station for Philippine military personnel deployed to protect and secure Philippine rights and interests in the West Philippine Sea, particularly in the Ayungin Shoal and its vicinity.”

Now that a new controversy has again erupted concerning this derelict Philippine Navy junk., it is time to challenge this DFA statement and the very existence and purpose of BRP Sierra Madre and the foreign policy revolving around its grounding in the South China Sea.

Daza’s summary stands on the following points:

1. Status: Commissioned active-duty vessel of the Philippine Navy.

2. Location: Intentionally grounded in 1999 at Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) in the West Philippine Sea.

3. Function: Serves as a permanent station and home for a contingent of Filipino Marines and sailors.

4. Sovereignty: Ayungin Shoal lies less than 200 nautical miles from the coast of Palawan, falling squarely within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Let’s check if this fits into the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Article 29 Definition of warships.

For the purposes of this Convention, “warship” means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State (✓) bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality (✓), under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State (✓) and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent (✓) , and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline (✓).

At first glance, it passed Article 29 in flying colors for a war ship.

But central and basic to this definition is the assumption that a warship is that it must first be a ship or a vessel.

UNCLOS uses the terms “ship” and “vessel” interchangeably but does not explicitly define them. Generally, international maritime law interprets these terms as any waterborne craft used or capable of being used in marine navigation, regardless of its size, propulsion, or whether it has a crew.

Under modern international law interpretation by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), however, what falls within the general definition of a “ship” , must be intended for and capable of navigation.

In parallel, according to the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the word “vessel” includes every description of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.”

An essential context for falling under the Law of the Sea, necessarily includes navigation.

Defining “commissioned” and “permanent”

Daza continues “The BRP Sierra Madre is a commissioned vessel of the Philippine Navy that serves as a permanent station for Philippine military personnel deployed to protect and secure Philippine rights and interests in the West Philippine Sea, particularly in the Ayungin Shoal and its vicinity,”

A former US and South Vietnamese vessel, it was deliberately grounded at Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal in 1999 and serves as a permanent Philippine military outpost.

1. A ‘commissioned Philippine naval vessel’, and at other times, the term ‘active’ is added when ‘commissioned’ is deemed insufficient, cannot be a ‘permanent station‘ on Second Thomas Shoal.

2. A warship should not be considered a ‘permanent station’, and a ‘permanent station’ cannot be a warship.

A vessel is defined in UNCLOS as a warship strictly by its active status, crew, and command, not merely its physical hull. A warship that cannot navigate usually loses this legal classification, and cannot legally transform into a permanent station or artificial island.

Besides, UNCLOS does not automatically recognize non-navigable military vessels as permanent stations.

Article 29 also requires that a warship be manned by a crew subject to military discipline. While those currently serving on the BRP Sierra Madre are Philippine Marines who are members of the regular Armed Forces of the Philippines and are subject to its discipline, the Philippines has not provided the BRP Sierra Madre with a crew would be responsible for ensuring the safe navigation of the ship.

That would be counterproductive as the BRP Sierra Madre has been moored for an extended period with no navigational capability.

It should also be noted that the mere inclusion of the BRP Sierra Madre in the Philippine Navy’s active roster does not automatically confer upon it the status of a warship. As it stands, the BRP Sierra Madre’s loss of seaworthiness, fixed position and repurposing as a military outpost render it incompatible with the traditional concept of a warship.

This makes the Philippines’ unilateral insistence on its warship status, even as it doubles as a permanent station, is a clear improvisation away from international norms.

Neither does it fit to be a permanent station. A military outpost is typically a small, remote military installation located at the edge of a country’s territory. Its purpose is to monitor and protect national borders from potential threats or incursions.

Topping it all, a ‘permanent outpost’ cannot be constructed on an area where a claimant feigns legitimate territory, EEZ or ECS where there is none.

Distinguishing sovereignty from sovereign rights

In UNCLOS, constructing permanent stations falls under the regime of the coastal state’s exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf rights.

Daza’s glib tongue suffixes this dubious caveat “The deployment of a Philippine military station in its own areas of jurisdiction is an inherent right of the Philippines and does not violate any laws.”

In this respect, the Philippines has discombobulated the conversation. The use of the word “jurisdiction” is misleading and loads onto another question: jurisdiction in a sovereign territory is not the same as jurisdiction in an EEZ or ECS.

Let us first define terms.

• Asymmetry. There is a whale of difference between sovereignty and territory, and sovereign rights and EEZs and ECS. Sovereignty is a state’s absolute, supreme authority to govern its land, internal waters, and airspace, as in ownership. Sovereign rights, conversely, are limited, functional entitlements granted by UNCLOS to explore, exploit, and manage resources in specific maritime zones like EEZs and ECS.

Let me illustrate this in the case of the Benham Rise.

On 8 April 2009, the Republic of the Philippines submitted its claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in accordance with UNCLOS Article 76, paragraph 8, and pertinent information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines east of the Luzon Island.

The United Nations (UN) approved the Philippines’ claim to Benham Rise in April 2012. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) validated the country’s submission, officially recognizing the underwater plateau as part of the Philippines’ extended continental shelf.

This approval grants the Philippines exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources—such as minerals, oil, gas, and sedentary marine species—found on or beneath the seabed in the area. It did not only give us sovereign rights to 150 nautical miles of ECS but validated our sovereign rights to the 200 nautical miles of EEZ before it.

But this is only part of the story.

On April 28, 2012, the Philippine Daily Inquirer headlined a big fraud: “UN approves PH territorial claim to Benham Rise.”

The tall story quotes Environment Secretary Ramon Paje saying “Benham Rise belongs to the Philippines. The United Nations has approved the Philippines’ territorial claim to Benham Rise, an undersea landmass in the Pacific Ocean potentially rich in mineral and natural gas deposits”.

The cabinet member continues: “We own Benham Rise now.” He added that the UNCLOS (?) sent DENR a letter “that the landmass is part of the country’s continental shelf and territory.” UNCLOS is an inanimate treaty, not an agency or organization. UNCLOS cannot and did not extend to full territorial ownership to superjacent (overlying) waters of an ECS (or EEZ for that matter) as they remain open for international navigation.

Even highest officials in our government are ignorant of the asymmetry and has been scamming our people for the past 12 years.

Differentiating inherence from automaticity

The Philippines easily gained enforceable sovereign rights, east of the Philippines. Why? Because no other coastal state is in a position to oppose any of our claims east of our map. The situation west of our archipelago is totally different. Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei disputes Manila’s expansive claims, and so yes, Madam Teresita Daza, we are violating laws because we cannot unilaterally delimit the seas.

• No automaticity. Sovereign rights may be inherent, but its enforcement is not automatic.

This is why UNCLOS provides for key resolution and non-aggravation rules:

1. Obligation to Exchange Views. Article 283 mandates that if a dispute arises, parties must expeditiously proceed to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.

   1. Provisional Measures: Pending the resolution of a dispute, international courts or tribunals (such as the ITLOS or arbitral tribunals) often prescribe provisional measures. These legally bind parties must refrain from aggravating the dispute or taking unilateral enforcement actions that could prejudice the final outcome.

   1. Undelimited Maritime Areas: Articles 74 and 83 outline that pending the delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf, States are to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements. During this period, they must not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement.

The primary dispute resolution mechanisms available to claimant States are outlined in Part XV of UNCLOS, which include negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, and submissions to the ICJ. For overlapping and unsettled maritime boundaries, the default fallback procedure is compulsory arbitration under Annex VII.

In case any or both of the parties have chosen to opt out, Article 298 allowing states to exclude specific, highly sensitive disputes—such as maritime boundary delimitations, military activities, and historic titles—from compulsory third-party binding arbitration. In such a case, the process reverts to Article 283 for bilateral negotiation.

A warship protected by MDT?

As we have established. the Philippines’ dual characterization of the BRP Sierra Madre as an active warship and a permanent station are fundamentally incompatible. The BRP Sierra Madre is a World War II-era vessel, is no longer seaworthy and has been grounded for over two decades. It has clearly lost its ability to function as a naval vessel. The BRP Sierra Madre’s physical condition is severely compromised.

The vessel’s hull is riddled with damage, including large holes and water ingress. This extensive deterioration has resulted in a complete loss of buoyancy and seaworthiness, making it impossible for the BRP Sierra Madre to function as a floating device, gross incapable of navigation.

The question of the South China Sea Probing Initiative, would the United States be obligated to defend the Philippines under the terms of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty? – is again superfluous. In the first place, the BRP Sierra Madre is located where the Convention excludes by virtue of a 1975 State Department secret document declassified in 2006:

Neither does it fit into the second Category:

Neither could it be accommodated into the Third Category:

Besides, US reaction to any attack on Philippine military assets is not automatic, but is yet to be decided by the US Congress. In the words of Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Sate under US President Barack Obama, “I don’t answer hypotheticals.”

DOC infringement

While there have been claims that the Philippines subsequently cited mechanical issues when pressed by China to tow the ship away, this was utilized as a diplomatic delaying tactic. Former defense officials have clarified that the vessel was beached on purpose and that no promise to remove it was ever officially made.

Following the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, the Philippines made a commitment not to construct fixed installations on Second Thomas Shoal.

Article 5 of the DOC states:

“5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”

Spokesperson Daza’s statement that “the Philippine station on Ayungin Shoal was deployed in 1999, years ahead of the conclusion in 2002 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and is therefore not a violation of the DOC,” is a technicality that countermands the spirit of the agreement at a time when President Marcos is working as rotational chairman of ASEAN to complete a Code of Conduct, codifying the DOC.

Furthermore, the country has provided repeated assurances that it will not replenish construction materials.

In September 2003, Acting Foreign Secretary Franklin Ebdalin stated that the Philippines had no intention of building facilities on Second Thomas Shoal and that the Philippines, as a signatory to the Declaration, would not be the first to violate it.

Since 2010, the Philippines has persistently sought to reinforce and refurbish the BRP Sierra Madre, thereby creating complications and contempt“

This constitutes a breach of the DOC’s Article V commitment to exercise restraint and refrain from the occupation of uninhabited reefs.

On the other hand, as recently as 2015, the United States did not recognize the BRP Sierra Madre to be an official Philippine military installation. It was only in the last two years, as U.S.-China tensions escalated, that the U.S. began describing the BRP Sierra Madre as a ‘longstanding outpost’ of the Philippines because of its appetite to build forward operating bases involving the Philippines.

On top of BRP Sierra Madre’s dilapidated condition and its age, Manila cannot realistically justify its occupation of Ayungin (Second Thomas) as occupied territory as the shoal is a low-tide elevation that cannot be appropriated for land sovereignty.

The prolonged beaching of the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal is essentially a disguised act of territorial expansion by exploiting legal ambiguity simply to conceal already obvious true motives.

Conclusion

What multilateral negotiations were the press asking Ambassador Jin Quan about?

On July 22, 2026, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Philippine Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila. He expounded China’s solemn position to the Philippine side and lodged a strong protest against the reckless act of Philippine personnel ramming into the China Coast Guard vessel at Ren’ai Jiao (Ayungin Shoal).

Wang Yi stated that attempts to provoke trouble with the help of external forces will only make the Philippines reap what it sows.

Regrettably, every time China and the Philippines are poised to hold dialogue, some people within the Philippines, particularly some forces in the military and coast guard, would deliberately create incidents to derail the dialogue process. These people harbor ill intentions. What they seek is not the well-being of the Filipino people; instead, they act on the bidding of external forces and pursue personal gains.

China-Philippines relations now stand at a crossroads, and it falls on the Philippines to make a right and rational choice about the way forward.

The Philippine side should immediately stop provocative actions on maritime-related issues, honor its commitments made to China, and take concrete efforts to stabilize bilateral relations.

Unless substantial developments occur within the remaining months of the Marcos administration, rabble-rousers, demagogues, dilletantes and sycophants will rule his day in attempting to infuse bad blood into Philippine-China mutual understanding.

We celebrate the Arbitral ruling that according to UNCLOS, China nine-dash line has lo legal basis, but hasten to sketch our own mythical “West Philippine Sea”. Isn’t that the logic of a retard?

The feeble fact is the BRP Sierra Madre is grounded on a location where the Philippines may have inherent sovereign rights for an exclusive economic zone 200 miles from its coastal baselines, but since they are all contested west of the Philippines, under UNCLOS itself they cannot be enforced unless earlier resolved, between and/or among the parties. This is a classic example of distinction between having rights, and exercising those rights and I have earlier provided the exact international law citations applying these principles.

For the past 27 years, the Philippine position on this issue is anchored on fraudulence. Since 1999, its existence there has brought nothing but conflict and violent confrontation, rather than peaceful resolution. We cannot build peace if our entire legal framework is intended only to support cyclical propaganda and not built to advance diplomacy.

Moving forward, the Philippines must show good faith and remove, or cause to remove our derelict junk the BRP Sierra Madre from Ayungin Shoal and brought to some boneyard.

This way, to satisfy Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, we can recover from some deficit of trust in the international community.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for international affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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By Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

The image circulating on social media depicting the Monkey King confronting the Jade Emperor, accompanied by the slogan “Sa Amin ang West Philippine Sea!“, reflects understandable patriotic sentiment. Every Filipino has the right to love and defend the country’s sovereign rights.

However, patriotism must always be anchored on legal accuracy rather than political mythology.

The greatest danger in any territorial dispute is not merely foreign aggression. It is the spread of legal misconceptions that could encourage confrontation while overinterpreting Conventions to oversimplify one of the most complex maritime disputes in modern international law.

What the Arbitral Award Actually Decided

On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rendered its Award in the arbitration initiated by the Philippines against China.

Contrary to countless political speeches and social media posts, the Tribunal never ruled that the Philippines owns any West Philippine Sea.

It simply had no jurisdiction to do so.

That distinction is one of the most misunderstood aspects of international law.

The Tribunal Could Not Decide Sovereignty

The arbitration was intentionally crafted by the Philippines as a case involving interpretation and application of UNCLOS, not territorial ownership.

Article 288 of UNCLOS limits an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.

Territorial sovereignty over islands, reefs, rocks, or maritime features falls outside that jurisdiction.

The Tribunal itself expressly acknowledged that it was not determining which State possesses sovereignty over disputed land features.

Likewise, it did not delimit maritime boundaries between competing States.

Those questions remain unresolved under international law. UNCLOS itself and the UN Charter provide avenues for conflict resolution.

Maritime Boundary Delimitation Is Different

There is an equally important legal distinction between:

territorial sovereignty;

maritime entitlement;

maritime boundary delimitation; and

sovereign rights within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

These are entirely different legal concepts.

The 2016 Award examined whether certain maritime features generated Exclusive Economic Zones under UNCLOS and whether China’s “Nine-Dash Line” claim was legally consistent with the Convention.

It did not award ownership of the disputed islands to the Philippines.

Nor did it legally redraw international maritime boundaries.

Who Can Decide Territorial Ownership?

Under international law, disputes involving sovereignty over territory are ordinarily resolved through:

mutual agreement between States;

treaty settlements;

adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) where States consent to its jurisdiction; or

other accepted international dispute settlement mechanisms based on State consent.

Neither the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal nor UNCLOS itself possesses general authority to declare which nation owns disputed islands or territories.

That legal reality should not diminish the significance of the 2016 Award.

Rather, it places the Award in its proper legal context.

This Is Not a Bilateral Dispute

Another misconception is that the dispute involves only China and the Philippines.

It does not.

The South China Sea includes overlapping claims involving multiple governments, including:

China (People’s Republic of China);

Taiwan (Republic of China), which maintains claims similar in many respects to those of the PRC;

the Philippines;

Vietnam;

Malaysia; and

Brunei Darussalam.

In addition, Indonesia is not generally regarded as a claimant to the Spratly or Paracel Islands but has maritime interests and disputes concerning areas near the Natuna Islands where China’s claims have overlapped with Indonesia’s EEZ.

This complex web of overlapping claims explains why no single arbitral award could resolve every issue.

The Spirit of the Award Was Peaceful Resolution

Perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the 2016 Award is its broader context.

UNCLOS was never designed to encourage military confrontation.

Its fundamental objective is the peaceful governance of the oceans.

The United Nations Charter likewise obligates States to settle international disputes through peaceful means.

The arbitration was intended to clarify legal rights—not to become a justification for military escalation or brinkmanship.

Law should reduce the risk of conflict. It should never become an instrument for provoking one.

Diplomacy Remains the Only Durable Solution

History teaches that virtually every enduring territorial dispute has ultimately been resolved not by litigation alone but through diplomacy, negotiation, confidence-building measures, and political compromise.

International adjudication may clarify legal principles.

But it cannot manufacture political peace.

Even the strongest legal positions ultimately require diplomatic implementation.

As I have consistently argued in my previous writings on international law and regional security, sustainable peace in the South China Sea requires:

continued diplomatic engagement;

adherence to international law;

respect for freedom of navigation;

avoidance of military escalation;

confidence-building among claimant States; and

practical arrangements that preserve regional stability while protecting each nation’s lawful rights and interests.

Patriotism Requires Intellectual Honesty

Supporting Philippine sovereign rights does not require exaggerating what the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea has actually provided.

One may firmly defend the Philippines’ lawful maritime entitlements while acknowledging the legal limits of the 2016 Arbitration Award.

Doing so is neither “pro-China” nor anti-Filipino.

It is simply being faithful to international law.

The Philippines should continue asserting its lawful rights under UNCLOS, safeguard its maritime interests, strengthen alliances that promote regional stability, and vigorously pursue diplomacy consistent with the treaty’s commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts and our Constitution’s renunciation of war and the rule of law.

True statesmanship rejects both surrender and reckless confrontation.

The challenge before Asia is not merely determining who possesses the stronger legal arguments.

It is ensuring that competing claims are managed through law, dialogue, and diplomacy rather than through coercion or armed conflict.

The South China Sea should become a sea of negotiated coexistence—not a battlefield created by legal misconceptions or nationalist rhetoric.

That is not weakness.

It is the highest expression of constitutional responsibility, international legality, and prudent statesmanship.

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University. He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances

Email: contact@asiancenturyph.com

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 8: Forever Peace or Forever Wars

If Ferdinand Marcos would ask Fabian Ver to jump off the building, he would ask, “from what floor sir?” If Bongbong Marcos would ask Romeo Brawner to jump, he would snap, “I am already on the seventh floor, sir.”

It may be said that most human rights violations, especially the tortures perpetrated by the military under Marcos Sr could be traced to the ruthlessness of General Ver. The same accountability may be thrown in the case of General Brawner but with a twist. In the face of all the unprecedented corruption, human rights violations, warmongering and consequent economic disaster perpetrated by Bongbong, Brawner just sat on his armchair, looked the other way and did nothing.

Ver was guilty of commission, Brawner cowered behind omission.

Retirement of a coward

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner Jr. retires on July 21, 2026, culminating over 41 years of military service. He is the first AFP chief to complete a fixed three-year term under Republic Act No. 11939.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has not yet named his successor, though expectedly, the beleaguered Commander-in-Chief is evaluating candidates based on least political liability and maximum canine loyalty to the presidency.

During his testimonial parade and retirement ceremonies, Brawner received a specific PMA Alumni Homecoming award that was officially designated as “Outstanding,” rather than “Most Outstanding”.

Certainly not ‘most’ outstanding

Following his departure from the military, he has stated he intends to transition into civilian life rather than immediately pursuing another government post. That’s good, he is a deadwood anyway.

Retired Brigadier General Orlando de Leon taunts him in his Facebook post: “I am officially calling General Romeo Brawner a ‘coward’, who throws his soldiers and subordinates under the bus just to save his neck.

“Mr. Brawner, you don’t deserve your designation as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In fact, you don’t deserve the respect of the whole soldiery. No wonder that you avoided hazardous duty all your life because you lack the wherewithal to lead, much less to uphold the morale of your troops.”

“You are nothing but a bootlicking four-star disgrace.”

Brawner’s loyalty to Marcos is unquestionable. Under his term, AFP or the Armed Forces of the Philippines was prominently renamed by netizens as the “Armed Forces of the President”.

National plunder

The retiring general was appointed 60th AFP Chief of Staff on July 21, 2023. It was under his watch that the anomalous budget insertions were exposed by VP Sara Duterte, who was then resigning her concurrent appointment as Secretary of Education as year later on June 19, 2024, alleging that House leaders manipulated the DepEd’s budget by inflating allocations for classroom construction in favor of the Department of Public Works, which allowed them to control billions in public funds, adding she could not defend a budget manipulated by others.

Specifically, the vice president accused House Speaker Martin Romualdez and House Appropriations Committee Chair Elizaldy Co of orchestrating the anomaly.

Nobody, not even her replacement Sonny Angara, picked up the otherwise controversial exposition.

But God was not sleeping.

On July 22, 2024, President Marcos highlighted on his third State of the Nation Address that the government had finalized these 5,521 flood control initiatives between July 2022 and May 2024 to mitigate the impacts of the La Niña phenomenon.

However, just days after his speech, Mother Nature took over to intensify the decibels reverberating the expose of the Vice President and bloating it to unprecedented proportions.

Typhoon Carina and the intensified southwest monsoon caused severe, widespread flooding across Metro Manila and neighboring provinces. This timing could not be otherwise than providential, leading to intense public uproar, scrutiny and questions. about the effectiveness of the completed 5,500 projects. Ghost, unfinished and substandard projects started coming out with millions of views in social media platforms.

In response to the backlash and subsequent flooding, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) lamely justified that the 5,500 projects were stand-alone “immediate relief” interventions designed to protect low-lying areas, mindlessly confessing they were not part of a fully integrated master plan.

Still, massive public uproar attacked flood-control projects exposing widespread failures. Social media posts accused politicians and contractors of pocketing public funds, labeling them as guilty of “economic sabotage” and targeting:

• “Ghost” and Substandard Projects: Netizens highlighted infrastructure that was incomplete, poorly built, or never built at all. Investigations later revealed hundreds of unverified “ghost projects” nationwide.

• Ostentatious Congressmen: Watchdogs shared photos of legislators wearing ultra-expensive designer accessories. For example, sharp-eyed netizens spotted Manila representative Benny Abante wearing luxury timepieces—including pieces from Patek Philippe, Rolex, and Richard Mille priced in the millions of pesos and owning bulletproof Cadillac Escalade SUV and a Jaguar. Abante was targeted because he is a religious pastor, leading many critics to argue that flashing extreme wealth heavily contradicts the biblical teachings of humility.

• “Nepo Baby” Shaming: Public anger targeted the children of top public works contractors and politicians. Social media users scoured TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook to expose the lavish lifestyles of the officials’ children who flaunted designer clothes and European vacations, coining a moniker expressing they are “babies benefitting from nepotism”.

• Unexplained Lifestyle: Online communities circulated information showing the drastic jump in the wealth of certain lawmakers alongside the billions spent on the national flood-control program. Critics flagged down Marikina Representative Stella Quimbo, questioning her transition from a modest teacher’s lifestyle to owning designer goods after becoming a lawmaker.

• Memes and AI: Netizens created and shared AI videos and graphics depicting corrupt politicians as crocodiles—a widespread symbol of greed.

The massive digital outcry spilled into the streets with mass protests in Manila.

Malacañang was so overwhelmed that in his fourth State of the Nation Address in order to shield the Presidency from the combination of his incompetence and complicity, Bongbong Marcos feigned himself as the “whistleblower” of a national plunder that blasted the ceiling to near two trillion peso-mark.

To divert attention and cover-up the historic mess, Marcos weaponized the government to bend the law, quell dissent and opposition, violate citizens’ rights, sink the economy and push the country close to war.

Bending the Law

Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has abused the powers of the Philippine government to shield his family and allies from corruption charges. Critics point to his control over key agencies, dismissals of cases, and his handling of legislative and executive powers:

• Executive Restructuring: On his very first day in office, Marcos Jr. issued Executive Order No. 1abolishing the Presidential Anti-Corruption Commission. On the same day, he appointed two key officials fired by President Rodrigo Duterte from his cabinet, whom Congressman Rolando “Nonoy” Andaya, as chair of the House Committee on Appropriations exposed to have masterminded the 2019 budget insertions for flood control projects: Ben Diokno as finance secretary and Amenah Pangandaman as budget secretary.

• Judicial and Forfeiture Dismissals: Over the course of his presidency, courts dropped several long-standing asset claims and forfeiture cases against the Marcos family. The administration maintained that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) simply lacked the fresh evidence needed to continue the decades-old trials.

• Targeting of Top Opposition Leaders: The classic example of this is the Siege of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ in Davao City, mobilizing five thousand members of the Philippine National Police just to serve a warrant of arrest to one person, Pastor Apollo Quiboloy. This was outdone in spectacle in the joint operations of the DILG, the PNP Chief, the DOJ, the DND Secretary and the National Security Adviser, among others, to kidnap former President Duterte and surrender him to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, Netherlands.

• Impeachment Issues: Controlled by his cousin Martin Romualdez, the House of Representatives dismissed multiple impeachment complaints brought against Marcos Jr. The House Committee voted to block them from moving forward, impeaching instead Vice President Sara Duterte for much lesser offenses.

• Creation of a Palliative: In response to public outcry over massive flood control expenditures, Marcos Jr. formed the Independent Commission for Infrastructure (ICI) which was used to selectively prosecute lower-level contractors and rival politicians while shielding top presidential allies.

• Trump-up Cases against Dissenters and Whistleblowers: Netizens and social advocates have publicly accused the Marcos Jr. administration of using the justice system, specifically the Office of the Ombudsman and the National Bureau of Investigation to silence and arrest those who speak out against administration abuses.

Economic on verge of collapse

Despite the report of the Philippines entering the upper-middle income category, with its gross national income (GNI) per capita reaching $4,850, exceeding the $4,636 threshold in the World Bank’s latest classification, this macro-economic figure does not reflect the actual state of the living conditions in the country. GNI reflects a figure divisible by the total population, it does not give a picture of the grim distribution of wealth based on socio-economic status.

The truth is In the Philippines, less than one percent of the population holds or enjoys the vast majority or roughly 90% of the nation’s total wealth. While the country’s average economy is growing, this extreme gap means a few elite-families control most of the money, leaving the working class with very little. To illustrate, Meralco made about P50 billion in net profits last year, while most consumers could hardly pay their electric bill.

Truth to tell, Capital Economics, a British think tank warns that the Philippine gross domestic product is only projected to make the 3% mark at the end of 2026.

What does 3% mean? This figure is below the year of the Covid pandemic and the lowest since 2009.

Developing economies like the Philippines generally require higher growth (typically 5–6%+) to continuously reduce poverty and elevate living standards across the archipelago. For the average Filipino, 3% growth against the backdrop of elevated inflation that translates to a higher cost of living without a proportional increase in real wages.

With a lower economic expansion rate, fewer jobs are generated. This can lead to higher underemployment, especially as the young and growing workforce enters the labor market. Economists attribute this downgrade to external pressures like global oil shocks and geopolitical conflicts, alongside domestic issues like supply chain disruptions, severe weather events (typhoons), and sluggish government spending.

The Philippines lags behind its Southeast Asian peers in capturing the economic benefits of regional trade integration and supply chain shifts. While neighbors like Vietnam and Indonesia secure booming manufacturing investments, the Philippines struggles to integrate into regional export ecosystems due to high logistics costs, limited energy options, and regulatory hurdles.

Brink of Regional War

Last May. Brawner warned that Filipinos should adopt a wartime mindset amid what he described as ongoing political, economic and information warfare linked to tensions in the so-called West Philippine Sea and broader security threats facing the country. But he has defined “security” only as it relates to the military and “overstretched sovereignty” and defending a mythical expansion at sea, but forgetting the welfare of the people.

In a speech delivered by Lt. Gen. Arvin Lagamon, commander of the Civil-Military Operations Command, before a CSIS-Stratbase forum, Brawner expressed the Philippines was already confronting “political war,” “economic war,” and “informational war”.

But, “not yet a kinetic war!”

The AFP chief said modern threats now cut across maritime, air, land, cyber and information domains, allowing adversaries to challenge countries without openly declaring conflict. Did he even copyread this trash?

On April last year, Brawner Jr. on Tuesday told Filipino troops in the Northern Luzon Command, to start planning for actions in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

His slip of the tongue was based on a wrong presumption that Nolcom’s task to be in the frontline of rescuing our 250,000 overseas Filipino workers in that island. This is erroneous because that mandate belongs to the civilian offices of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei and the Department of Migrant Workers.

This statement is a political statement, in fact bordering on foreign policy linking geopolitics with local governance preparedness.

Combined U.S. and Philippine forces also built a forward operating base in Mahatao on Batan Island highlighted by a “civilian sea port”, and built an airfield in Basco, Batan allegedly to secure these strategic islands just south of Taiwan.

According to Brawner, these structures serve as pivotal outposts for patrolling the Luzon Strait. Is he kidding us? I would put monitoring devices and surveillance equipment and personnel there to watch the Bashi Channel but I will not invest a taxpayer’s centavo building structures there that I cannot defend and costs an arm and a leg to maintain.

In one major drill off the coast of Itbayat, American forces used a Ukrainian-made Magura unmanned surface vessel (sea drone) to sink a decommissioned target ship. The location of the exercise raised many eyebrows.

Batanes sits south of the Bashi Channel in the Luzon Strait, closer to Taiwan than the Philippines. It proves that Philippine defense planning is no longer focused on the South China Sea but Manila is being drawn by the United States strategy for wider regional scenarios that may affect the country’s northern waters.

The US military forces’ launching of war games there is a clear provocation and challenge to China, and is part of the US’s push for Taiwan to break away from China. This is contrary to the “one China policy” that both the US and the Philippines recognize.

Weigh this going forward into a shooting war, sparked no longer by China reunification issues with Taiwan, but by escalations following the surrogation by the United States of an East Asian war to Japan, the Philippines and Korea.

In the Marcos pact with Japan prime minister Sanae Takaichi, the delimitation merger of the “northern EEZ” of the Philippines with the southern EEZ of Japan, disregards China that is spot-on the middle of the proposal. Article 74 of UNCLOS makes it impossible because there can be no overlap between Japan and the Philippines, without them first overlapping with China.

Commanding General Xavier Brunson of US Forces in Korea is also trigger-happy about a “kill-web” among the three countries aimed at China. Brawner is ecstatic over this interoperability gambit, as it includes space technology, but I doubt his pea brain understands its implications.

I would like to ask Brawner: Who first militarized the Batanes Islands? Manila (for the Americans) or Beijing?

My question is what happens after the first shot in an actual combat? Militarizing Batanes is a death wish. If and when China takes over the Batanes Islands because of our provocations that could end up in standoff, just as it happened in Scarborough Shoal, how does he propose to take it back?

Does he know that Sabtang, the southernmost island of Batanes, is well within the EEZ of Taiwan but is beyond 200 nautical miles off Cagayan? Does he know that the Batanes group is not within but over the top of the 20^th degree parallel limits of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, serving as the boundary of our national territory?

Besides, aside from press releases, where are the deliveries of military assets for AFP modernization under his command that cannot be traced to earlier presidencies? Shift from internal counter-insurgency to external defense, what is that but verbiage? All he did was watch the Americans sell him a lot of their phallocentric missiles which we can ill afford to replace after a single launch.

Harpoons, Maguras, Himars, NMesis, and Typhon are lots of hot fart!

Conclusion

To sum it up, the economy is on the brink of collapse, the people extremely polarized as selective justice supplants law enforcement, and society is like a volcano on the eve of an eruption, maybe even of a regional war not of our making, while the Marcos government is in shambles whose first priority is to cover-up for the trillions in plundered public funds mired in the flood-control scandal and wasted in syndicated corruption, by forcibly convicting an impeached vice president on trumped-up charges albeit being the only one still capable of undoing the ruin he has brought to this country.

This is why I was surprised when Brawner admitted that restiveness has begun to ripple through the military ranks, and yet he could not even withdraw support from Ferdinand Marcos Jr., when his predecessor General Angelo Reyes, abandoned Joseph Estrada on January 19, 2001 for much less betrayal of the people?

His great grandfather, an imported Buffalo Soldier deserted the US Army by eloping with a lady from Asingan, Pangasinan. That is more incongruent, but Private Lisbon Brawner showed he had balls.

By his own words, the following video evidences how gutless and hollow his grandson who made it to chief of staff is, saying “Of course, we see what is happening to our country. We are not blind or dumb. We know what is happening. But we are not mandated to know about politics. That is not our mandate.”

This government itself has destroyed the rule of law and social order in the country and he calls it politics?

The national plunder is not politics, the weaponization of the power of the government is not politics, violation of citizens’ Constitutional and human rights is not politics, oligarchs in cahoots with politicians ushering an economic collapse is not politics.

But engaging in geopolitical debate is politics that unfortunately takes us to the brink of a hot war.

So, you call that professionalism? You plan to defend the country for only the first 30 days? Your knowledge of war history sucks. The Japanese Imperial Army invaded Batanes on Day One of World War II, the day they started bombing Pearl Harbor and American bases in the Philippines. It took General Masaharu Homma only 25 days to capture Manila using a century-old technology, some Japanese just riding bicycles after landing at Lingayen Gulf on December 24, 1941. China can demolish all your American EDCA sites in less than 30 minutes!

Paradoxically, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is the protector of the people and the state. This is declared in Article II, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution but your nitwit interpretation allows only protection from outside aggression.

What is your mandate? Taking orders from an incapacitated president and his bozo Maltese defense secretary? The inter-operability this country needs, far exceeds the smell of gunpowder, but coherent and constructive structural, economic, social and security programs that uplift the nation. Not virtual warfare against an enemy not of our own making!

The indictment nags – you were absent in the real battle front – you have failed the State when the people needed you most!

You were blind and dumb.

Indeed, you are a four-star disgrace to your uniform.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for international affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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by Ben Contreras

The cordial bilateral relation between China and our country, the Philippines, had been such because of the pragmatic view of then Pres. Rodrigo “Digong” Roa Duterte that we can not fight a nation like China, that a far better choice was to adopt a foreign policy of “Friend to all, enemy to no one”. Thus, during his term, PH enjoyed a peaceful co-existence with our Asian neighbors, particularly China.

Pres. Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. took a totally opposite path. After a red carpet reception in China, his statement in the United State shocked many. “I can’t imagine the Philippines without America.” It says a lot of what the Philippines has become.

What did the US of A promise Marcos? What did PBBM offer America in return? We can only speculate. But major events that followed point to a few vital issues that are reasons enough for great worries.

The first salvo was probably the South China Sea issue. The issue of who owns the small islands had not been as hot as it is today. Lateral and multilateral talks and negotiations among Asian neighbors was working and is working, I suppose. But US manipulations change everything. We are now a country under the thumb of the United States of America.

Granting more EDCA sites has not been enough. The old airport of Lumbia has been converted into something nobody, not even our government is aware of. Why, because the area is restricted to anyone but exclusive only to US personnel.

True or not, the story of US personnel leaving Lumbia worries me. It’s more scary than knowing there are Americans inside. It gives me the creeps that something has been installed that are remote controlled, like missiles. I bet we all understand the implication.

Now, they are planning to put up a naval base within the Phividec area. They already have chosen an area. I hope that steel plant the DND closed won’t be part of the whole facility.

The 4000 acres in Luzon dubbed as an Economic Security Zone is another agreement without congressional imprimatur. Though it is cloaked in various economic benefits, we may never know the real intents.

In a controlled media, with the cooperation of the mainstream media much like in the US, the Filipino people are made blind to the realities that are happening outside and inside of the country.

What is it like to be a US puppet if not a new colony? Our country is being shaped into a launch pad for US missiles in a possible confrontation with China, a war that we’re not supposed to be part of but a product of US manipulation against China.

We have seen it in Ukraine war with Russia, the Middle East and now Iran.

NATO and US have been warned by Russia regarding the inclusion of Ukraine as member of their alliance. With Ukraine as NATO member, the West can easily install missiles aimed at Russia. That is not acceptable to Russia. It is going to be a constant threat to Russian security. Thus, the war that lasts until today.

Many Middle East nations are host to US military bases and facilities. The number is, alas, quite big. With Iran’s war with US, these nations are fair game. They are now being bombed by Iran for reasons everybody understand.

The old Lumbia airport, the proposed naval base in Tagoloan/Villanueva, the so-called 4000 acres Economic Security Zone, are they not targets for retaliation in case war breaks out?

People of Cagayan de Oro, Tagoloan, Villanueva, in Luzon and all those that host EDCA sites, your silence is deafening. Is it because you are not properly informed or is it because our mainstream media are complicit to the whole agenda.

Ang katahimikan ba ay nangangahulugang handa tayong mamatay para sa America?

Cagayan de Oro would be in danger in the future.

Tagoloan and Villanuea would also be targets. Phividec will slowly lost their locators one by one. And this is just Misamis Oriental. How about the rest of the country with EDCA sites?

If you haven’t thought of that, then sleep well tonight! Tomorrow may never come!

Benjamin Tiu Contreras

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series Seven: Forever Peace or Forever Wars

The best proof that SeaLight is having a “brownout” of narratives is Raymond Powell’s shallow excursion to a glimpse of Prehistoric Philippines by Chinese scholars, exposing the deep cultural heritage of Batanes, a group of 10 islands north of Luzon and south of Taiwan – divided by the Bashi channel, with only three of which inhabited: Batan, Itbayat and Sabtang.

SeaLight is a maritime surveillance tool of Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. The platform uses commercially available technology to peddle transparency and reporting on activities at sea. It is funded by the United States Naval Institute. So, in short, it acts as satellite-powered spy group tracking Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

Ju Hailong, dean of Jinan University’s School of International Studies, argued that Batanes was administered as part of Taiwan Prefecture during the Ming and Qing dynasties. He noted that the northernmost island of the Batanes chain lies about a mere 54 nautical miles from Taiwan’s southernmost Lanyu Island, claiming they are not only geographically closer to Taiwan than Luzon, but are also a natural extension of the island, only 105 miles from Basco, the capital of Batanes

Wang Yuanyuan, a researcher at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, cited Ming Dynasty navigation records documenting the islands along the Xiamen-Luzon sea route. She also claimed that the more than 10,000 Ivatan residents of Batanes share linguistic and cultural links with the Tao people of Lanyu and that their cultural heritage originated from China.

Filipino anthropologists in 2023 confirmed that the elderly inhabitants of Batanes still speak the Tao language—proof that their ancestors migrated from the Taiwan region some 3,000 to 4,000 years ago.

We are actually talking about two very close relatives! The Ivatan of Batanes, Philippines, and the Tao, the indigenous people of Lanyu, Taiwan (also known as Orchid Island) are essentially siblings of the same womb.

They speak closely related Austronesian languages, share similar traditional seafaring canoes (tatala), and trace their origins to the same ancient maritime ancestry. Both are renowned as fierce and resilient survivors of harsh, typhoon-prone environments.

Map speaks

The Chinese academics argued that the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1946 Treaty of Manila that relinquished U.S. sovereignty over to and recognized the independence of the Republic of the Philippines. established the Philippines’ northern territorial boundary at 20 degrees north latitude, placing Batanes outside the territory transferred to the Americans by Spain.

“A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich…”

Philippine weakness, exposed. Our official treaty limits do not include the Batanes Islands.

The claim that Batanes was officially incorporated into the Spanish East Indies on June 26, 1783, making it an established part of the Philippines, does not come from an expert source but from a Philippine copyright as recent as year 2000 by Rex Bookstore, which is more than two centuries after.

The Chinese scholars further contended that post-World War II treaties requiring Japan to return territories seized from China should have included Batanes because they considered the islands appurtenant to Taiwan.

The 1943 Cairo Declaration stated

“It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”

The statutory construction flows through the 1945 Potsdam Conference, the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the 1952 Treaty of Taipei and the 1972 Joint Communique between Japan and the Peoples Republic of China.

The symposium, however, concluded that the Philippines’ present administration of Batanes is merely a postwar fait accompli that lacks legal basis.

For its part, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) soberly declared that the Philippines’ sovereignty over Batanes is “settled and not up for debate” and dismissed these assertions as “flights of fancy” and “revisionist claims”. Furthermore, the DFA highlighted that even China’s own consular framework recognizes Batanes as Philippine territory, as the province falls under the consular district of the Chinese Consulate General in Laoag.

With no appetite for lawfare, China reiterated as recent as 2012, through Wang Yi, its China’s foreign minister, their recognition of the 1898 Treaty of Paris limits.

(This of course does not include expired Justice Antonio Carpio’s hyper-interpretation flexing the 1900 Treaty of Washington. In addition, our problem in geography is self-inflicted. In addition, it was a Supreme Court decision GR 187167 with Carpio as ponente that supplanted our treaty limits and endangering losing 803,104 square kilometers of territorial sea by upholding the constitutionality of our latest baselines law RA 9522 in exchange for inferior sovereign rights in order to gain over a million in exclusive economic zone in mostly disputed areas. Carpio’s GR187167 in effect illegally amended our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions through judicial fiat. Rodante Marcoleta was trying to cure this in aid of legislation, but the stupid Senate leadership gagged him.)

American-led defense

Powell’s paranoia and intrigue, however, has sent Philippine defense officials and self-proclaimed maritime experts to panic and are now raising concerns over what they described as the possible start of a new Chinese “lawfare” campaign.

In a post on X, SeaLight confirmed that scholars at a June 30 symposium hosted by Jinan University in Guangzhou concluded that the Philippines’ control over Batanes “lacks historical and legal basis” and that the islands belong to China.

SeaLight said participants at the symposium “unanimously concluded that the Batanes Islands constitute a natural geographical extension of Taiwan, with sovereignty belonging to China, and that the so-called Japan-Philippines maritime delimitation negotiations in the area with the intention of joining their respective “exclusive economic zones”, hold no legal validity.”

“China saw an opportunity,” Powell said. “Japan and the Philippines announced negotiations. Japan used that pretext to do something that they wanted to do anyway, which is begin running these patrols east of Taiwan into the Philippine Sea. So, this is outside the 10-dash-line.”

“If the pretext was the talks, the escalation now is underway.”

While stressing that no Chinese government official has publicly asserted a claim over Batanes, the retired US airman now a US navy operative said the symposium could be a “trial balloon”, once again exhibiting a usual flaw in reasoning arguing from possibility to reality.

Immediately his echo mechanism gets triggered. Philippine Coast Guard Commodore Jay Tarriela said he had only learned of the symposium and was discussing it with former Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio:

“This is my first time to hear about it. We’re trying to figure out anong naging basehan na naman ng Chinese government or just the students, to claim na merong kaugnayan ang Batanes sa Taiwan.” (…what is the basis of China’s government or the student to claim any basis on Batanes having relations with Taiwan.)

Tarriela dismissed the reported conclusions as another attempt to justify China’s expanding claims, which is also a habit of the commodore making conclusions out of conjectures, and said the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continue to patrol the Luzon Strait and waters surrounding Batanes while conducting maritime domain awareness (MDA) flights to monitor for any Chinese incursions.

For his part, CSIS-ADRi Stratbase fellow Renato de Castro said the Philippine government should not dismiss the symposium simply because it involved academics because he thinks the scholars cannot conduct the symposium under a theme that doses not have the approval of the Communist Party of China.

He also believes the move is linked not only to the planned Philippines-Japan maritime delimitation talks but also to Beijing’s long-term plans about the invasion of Taiwan by 2027. Speaking in the vernacular, he said the Chinese is also planning to occupy the so-called West Philippine Sea including the Luzon Strait.

Navy Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, the military’s spokesman for the South China Sea, labeled the symposium’s conclusions a form of “salami slicing,” a term used to refer to China’s alleged attempts to enlarge its territory through small, calculated steps.

Latest Austronesian insights

I am not certain what sent the usual American geopolitical watchdogs Powell, Tarriela, Carpio, De Castro and Trinidad to start climbing walls, because what I gathered most from the symposium, you can find in Wikipedia on its pages at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivatan_people and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austronesian_people

Panic attacks in dogs can be triggered by a variety of factors, including separation anxiety, noise phobias like thunderstorms or fireworks, past traumatic experiences, environmental changes, or medical conditions such as pain, arthritis, or sensory decline. Some dogs may have a genetic predisposition to anxiety, while others develop panic attacks due to learned behaviors or stressful life events, such as moving to a new home or the introduction of new family members or pets.

But those who show canine devotion to the United States among Filipinos (AsoAms) seem to chase American funding more than any psychological syndrome.

What shocks me is their exposed lack of anthropological appreciation of the Austronesian people and their historical shared heritage.

Among Asian Century Journal resource persons, it is Tanggulang Demokrasya expert Jing Mable who has done extensive studies in their migration. Commenting on a Facebook post by Pepe Alas on Pre-Hispanic Philippines, Mable wrote:

“Alas! There goes the ignorant ranting about our ninunos.(ancestors) Has he not heard of Ninunong Tabon and his control over his environment? Has he not read about the Austronesians whose civilization was fathered in the islands of Luzviminda (Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao)? Has he not read records of ancient Chinese scholars of 8 to12 AD extolling the honesty and orderly conduct of the Sandao (taong pulo- island dwellers) the peoples of the Sansui (3 islands)? Perhaps Pigafetta Chirino or Loarca would be more credible sources for Alas being Europeans? Saan ka nagaral Alas? (Where did you study?) Ateneo o UP? Read more about something before you form an opinion.”

That should give you a sense that Mable is nowhere the cellar league of Powell, Tarriela, Carpio, De Castro and Trinidad when it comes to history.

While having discussions with Rizalistas under Max Villoronte in Nueva Ecija, she gave me a passing lectura narrating that since H. Otley Beyer first proposed his wave migration theory, numerous scholars have approached the question of how, when and why humans first came to the Philippines. As that was more than 12 years ago, let me refresh her thoughts with inputs from Wikipedia.

Two schools of thought. The various “Out of Sundaland” hypotheses, assume that instead of the Philippines the origin of the Austronesian peoples as being the now sunken landmass of what is now modern Sumatra, Java, Borneo and the Malay peninsula.

The most widely accepted hypothesis, today, is the “Out-of-Taiwan” model, first proposed by Peter Bellewood, which largely corresponds to linguistic, genetic, archaeological, and cultural evidence. The Austronesians originated from prehistoric seaborne migration, known as the Austronesian expansion, from Taiwan circa 3000 to 1500 BCE. Austronesians reached the Batanes Islands in the northernmost Philippines by around 2200 BCE.

They used sails some time before 2000 BCE, in conjuction with other maritime technology, notably catamarans, outriggers, lashed lug boats and crab-saw sail enabling phases of rapid dispersal into the islands of the Indo-Pacific reaching as far as Easter Island to the east, Madagascar to the west, and culminating in the settlement of New Zealand to the south in 1250 CE.

However, Roger Blench has challenged the conventional singular “Out of Taiwan” Austronesian expansion model, proposing instead multiple migration waves from the Chinese mainland, supported by substrate evidence in Formosan languages indicating that Austronesians assimilated earlier hunter-gatherer populations who had inhabited Taiwan for over 25,000 years.

Political implications from history

My analysis is that Powell and his echo-mechanics’ consider historic meanderings are anathema because their basal fear is that going back to the past would inevitably spark a deeper public appreciation of China historic rights in the South China Sea and now onto Taiwan. These warmongers turning Sinophobes have only constructed their narratives moving forward from just UNCLOS and the Arbitral Award and integrating them to the US rules-based order.

In addition, their sleepless nights are of their own making:

First, it was the Philippines who escalated South China Sea conflicts involving American-military presence onto Batanes.

The Batanes Islands are located fewer than 200 kilometers from Taiwan — which China is part of its territory — and have hosted joint Philippine-U.S. military exercises including ship interdiction drills as recently as April.

Specific American engagements in Batanes include:

• Naval & Military Cooperation: In joint exercises like Balikatan, U.S. and Philippine forces have conducted drills, including maritime strike training and the deployment of anti-ship missile systems (such as NMESIS) in towns like Itbayat and the provincial capital of Basco.

• Infrastructure & Logistics: The U.S. and Philippine militaries have collaborated to build warehouses in Batanes. Additionally, the U.S. has been planning to build port infrastructure to assist with logistics and cargo during military mobilization.

• Historical Communications: Dating back to 1953, the U.S. Coast Guard built a Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) station in the municipality of Uyugan.

• Communications Support: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has partnered with local officials to improve digital connectivity, including the deployment of premium satellite internet services in the province.

This has drawn scrutiny amid geopolitical tensions between the U.S., China, and Taiwan.

Second, in continuous violation of UNCLOS based on their over-interpretation of the 2016 Arbitral Award, Philippine government ships continue to poke the dragon, so to speak, by asserting 200 nautical miles of EEZ in the western part of the country. Two things – no automatic enforcement of sovereign rights is possible where there exists an overlap or an asymmetrical counter-claim. This must first be resolved using Article 74 of UNCLOS or any of its compulsory mechanisms under Article XV or Part VII of the Convention or under its Article 298 when a party has opted-out of compulsory procedures in favor of bilateral negotiations.

This is also in the letter and spirit of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct, where China has already extended an arm and a leg to disputants within ASEAN. But the Philippine remain recalcitrant invoking US rules-based order misleading the public away from what is permissible under conventional and customary international law.

The Marcos government position – our way or the highway.

The Philippine mule behavior has never stopped sending patrols to trespass Scarborough Shoal’s territorial sea which is under Chinese sovereignty.

PCG BRP Suluan entered 1.5 nautical miles within Scarborough’s 12 nautical-mile territorial sea in August 2025 and instead of just making a safe exit, made a dangerous “kill maneuver” making U-turn towards its starboard narrowly escaping being rammed by a Chinese Coast Guard.

During a maritime patrol on June 19, the guided-missile frigate PN BRP Diego Silang (FFG-07) forayed inside the 23 nm radius of Scarborough Shoal’s contingent zone, and was shadowed by four Chinese military ship and chased up close by a Chinese coastguard vessel. After the Philippine gray ship crossed 24 nautical mile out of the contingent zone, the Chinese ships stopped the chase, but the Filipino mariners issued warnings and launched an AW109 helicopter in an act of braggadocio show of useless force.

The Philippine government is adamant in enforcing a mythical 200 nautical mile EEZ from the Zambales coastline 120 nautical miles away, in violation of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and a February 14, 2012 ITLOS decision whose Paragraph 169 says that the territorial sea over which sovereignty is exercised prevails over an EEZ claim over which only sovereign rights are exercised, a precedent-setting judgment made on the maritime delimitation between Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Third, the Philippines has no EEZ west of its archipelago. The BRP Diego Silang was patrolling a phantom sea.

Besides those EEZ claims are ridiculous. UNCLOS requires coastal states to indicate the outer limit lines of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on publicly available charts or provide a list of geographical coordinates, and deposit copies with the UN Secretary-General. Article 75 states: Charts and lists of geographical coordinates “1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position.”

The Philippines has not complied.

Washington-based international lawyer Arnedo Valera explains “Without defined coordinates, a claim cannot be objectively tested, peacefully contested, or credibly defended.”

So, without compliance, our government ships are generally lost at (the South China) sea.

This is where Marcos and his warmongers “my way or the highway” push comes to shove:

Sabtang, which is the southernmost island of the Batanes Group straight-line distance from the southern tip of Hengchun Township (Pingtung County, Taiwan) 105 nautical miles, technically within China’s 200 nautical mile EEZ.

It is 223 nautical miles from Aparri, Cagayan, more than the 200 threshold.

The Balintang Channels separates the Batanes Islands to the Babuyan Islands administered by the province of Cagayan.

What if China enforces, as the Philippines recklessly and unilaterally enforces a mythical EEZ, protruding southwards from Taiwan, to include Batanes?

Not China but our kneejerk reaction to this Batanes lore is the one giving China this crazy idea of invading the 10 islands north of the 20^th parallel in order to assume complete control of the Bashi channel, as Taiwan reunites with China.

Mabuhay ang mga Tao at Ivatan!

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for international affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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By Herman Tiu Laurel

There is an on-going massive hyping of the so-called “sweeping victory” of the Philippines in the 2016 Arbitral Award’s 10th anniversary this 12th of July. It is to be expected. It is part of the US and its Filipino proxies’ effort to sustain the informational warfare in support of the U.S. policy of “containment of China” that was reactivated in 2011 when then U.S. president Barack Obama announced the “Pivot to Asia.”

The exaggerated claims of a “sweeping victory” is to be expected even though after a decade of hyping that so-called victory the Philippines still has nothing to show for it, not an inch of extra territory nor control of any part of the disputed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or any global recognition of its mythical “West Philippine Sea” it claims to have put on the international map but totally absent from the UN or International Hydrographic Organization map.

What the propagandists of the arbitral award yarn was to build several impressive folklores around the arbitral body that handled the Philippine case against China. The first was to create a false image of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) that handled the proceedings and project it as a court of justice of the United Nations – but nothing can be farther from the truth as the facts shall show.

Just do a short search of the question “… is the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague a court of justice” and the AIs will answer invariably:

“The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental organization headquartered at the Peace Palace, in The Hague, The Netherlands which was built to house the PCA. Unlike a judicial court in the traditional sense, the PCA provides administrative support in international arbitrations involving various combinations of states, state entities, international organizations and private parties.

The cases span a wide range of legal issues involving territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international investment, and international and regional trade. The PCA is constituted through two separate multilateral conventions with a combined membership of 128 Contracting Parties. The PCA is not a United Nations agency, but has been a United Nations observer since 1993.”

The other tall tale the arbitration award celebrators hype is the so-called “UN Backed” decision sustaining the Philippine position in its case against China. Here’s one recent example of the erroneous or deliberately deceitful claim that the arbitration process and decision is “UN backed,” from Rappler:

“’The landmark ruling also declared China’s sweeping ‘nine-dash line’ claim over the South China Sea invalid, with the United Nations-backed tribunal concluding that there was ‘no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’. Philippine Coast Guard spokes-person Rear Admiral Jay Tarriela reiterated this international law basis in February 2026, during an interview with DYSS Super Radyo Cebu.” – FACT CHECK: International law backs PH claim to the West Philippine Sea, Jun 30, 2026 4:00 PM, Rappler.com

The truth and the fact are, which was stated by the Spokesman of the U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon the, Stéphane Dujarric on July 12, 2016 at a U.N. Press Conference that, “The UN doesn’t have a position on the legal and procedural merits of the case or on the disputed claims.” That position has not changed through the past ten years and yet as recently as June 30, 2026 many news platforms still claim that the arbitration award is “UN backed”.

There are many such deceptions the propagandists of the arbitration award “victory” dispenses and we have space just to expose one more, that the PCA rejected all claims of China to relative to its historic rights. Paragraph 272 of the arbitration decision disposes of that as it states, “… The Tribunal emphasizes that nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea.”

No amount of photo-op of flag waving by a hundred “bancas” posing as fishermen’s boats at sea led by the Akbayan party list NGO of anti-China and ex-US Air Force Col. Raymond Powell chum Senator Riza Hontiveros, no amount of Stratbase symposiums and press releases, will change the fact that the arbitration award has no international legal basis for enforcement nor any geopolitical reality for the Philippine to achieve any tangible gain.

Since the meeting of Premier Deng Xiao Ping and President Corazon Aquino ins 1988 China in the words of its premier had proposed to “shelves differences and pursue joint development” in the relevant disputed areas of the South China Sea. That proposal is more urgent than ever in light of the looming economic catastrophe facing the Philippines in the years ahead. Then the Philippines can have energy independence and dispose of the vassalage to the U.S. warmongers. ###

Herman “Ka Mentong” Tiu Laurel

Herman “Ka Mentong” Tiu Laurel is a broadcast journalist and the President of Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute.

He is hosting the live stream program Opinyon Online every Wednesday 6PM-8PM and Unfinished Revolution every Sunday 8AM to 10AM on his personal Facebook page Herman Laurel (fb.com/hermantiulaurel) and the Global Talk News Radio Facebook page (fb.com/globaltalknewsradio).

He was the host of the radio and live stream program Sulo ng Pilipino on DZRJ 810AM. He is a former columnist of Daily Tribune (INFOWARS and DIE HARD III; Mondays and Wednesday) and OpinYon (Consumers’ Demand!, Critic’s Critic, and People’s Struggle; weekly). He hosted Talk News TV and Journeys: Chronicles of our Asian Century, both on Global News Network.

He was also the former Administrator of the Philippine Refugee Processing Center (PRPC; now called the Bataan Technology Park, Inc.) during the administration of Corazon C. Aquino.

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 5: Forever peace or forever wars?

President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has returned from Canada, dealt with untold humiliation by overseas Filipino groups and protesters in Vancouver who came in considerable numbers condemning his administration over alleged government corruption, unaddressed flood control issues, and what they described as subservience to foreign interests.

The trip, which aimed to secure bilateral trade and investment commitments, also encountered controversy when Philippine Palace officials, foremost of which involved Press Officer Claire Castro was stalked and intimidated by protesters, and the President himself swarmed by demonstrators shouting “magnanakaw” or plunderer.

As if that was not bad enough sight, Marcos was also shown in a video, holding an umbrella sheltering Prime Minister Mark Carney while the two walked on a side street of the city. In Filipino optics, the person holding the umbrella inherently takes a subservient or servant-like posture. This highlights an imbalance of power, deliberately elevating the sheltered figure as the higher authority.

Worse, Marcos offered a handshake to a bystander, but the greeter shook the hand of Carney instead.

The bothersome sights and viral altercations were nothing compared to critics dismissing the tour as primarily performative while noting the delegation’s failure not only to resolve restrictive changes to Canada’s migration laws for Filipino professionals but also to secure a loan for Marcos crumbling economic numbers.

As we have explained in a previous article, Marcos returns to home at a time when the Philippine government itself just lowered its Gross Domestic Product target for this year to 3.5% to 4.5%. Looking further back, before the Middle East conflict, Manila originally hoped to reach 5% to 6% this year. Dropping from 5%-6% to 3% isn’t just a “downgrade,” it’s a “halving.”

What does 3% mean? This figure is below the year of the pandemic and the lowest since 2009.

• Slower Job Creation: With a lower economic expansion rate, fewer jobs are generated. This can lead to higher underemployment, especially as the young and growing workforce enters the labor market.

• Missed Poverty Reduction Targets: Developing economies like the Philippines generally require higher growth (typically 5–6%+) to continuously reduce poverty and elevate living standards across the archipelago.

• Impact of External & Local Headwinds: Economists attribute this downgrade to external pressures like global oil shocks and geopolitical conflicts, alongside domestic issues like supply chain disruptions, severe weather events (typhoons), and sluggish government spending.

• Constrained Purchasing Power: For the average Filipino, 3% growth against the backdrop of elevated inflation often translates to a higher cost of living without a proportional increase in real wages.

In short, an economy on the brink of collapse.

Sans Remorse

Do we even see an ounce of guilt from our President?

Instead of admitting even an ounce of accountability for the unprecedented anomaly involving flood-control projects, Marcos insisted that had he not exposed the issue, this will not be part of history:

“If I didn’t say anything in the State of the National Address, we wouldn’t be talking about this. I’m the one who exposed all of this. And I’m the only one who has started to do anything about this.

“Did the previous presidents help you? Did you see them doing anything? Did they freeze any accounts? Did they conduct investigations?”

Bongbong Marcos’ memory is short, delusional and evasive.

1. As president, he signs the General Appropriations Act into law, and his Department of Budget Management releases all government funding. In short, no money gets in and no money gets out without his signature.

2. It was during his three-year term from 2023 to 2025, when the flood-control appropriation went haywire.

3. It was not he who blew the whistle on the budget insertions. Vice President Sara Duterte exposed and criticized irregular insertions in the Department of Education (DepEd) budget during her time as agency secretary. She accused House leadership—specifically mentioning Speaker Martin Romualdez and Appropriations Chair Zaldy Co—of manipulating the DepEd budget for school buildings.

To refresh the memory of President, Ms. Duterte alleged that the House inflated the DepEd’s classroom construction budget beyond the agency’s actual requests. She stated that lawmakers then manipulated and divided these extra funds among favored congressmen, effectively treating it like a “pork barrel”. The Vice President distanced herself entirely from these insertions, arguing that she was powerless to stop them as the ultimate power over the budget rested with a select few in Congress.

In fact, she cited these budget meddling practices as the primary reason for her resignation as DepEd Secretary. She stated that she stepped down to avoid being held accountable for financial maneuvering that she neither initiated nor condoned.

4. The budget issue severely strained VP Duterte’s relationship with the Marcos administration because instead of supporting her clean up the mess, Bongbong took the side of Romualdez and Co, and started vilifying and isolating her.

PRRD reforms

Marcos’ prevarication indicting of former presidents, further demolished whatever remains of his credibility.

Contradicting his allegations, President Rodrigo Duterte’s specific anti-corruption strategies included:

• Mass Firings and Reshuffle: He frequently used his televised addresses to publicly announce the firing or relief of regional directors and district engineers allegedly involved in corruption and kickback schemes. He also ordered a nationwide reshuffle of district engineers to prevent them from developing entrenched corrupt ties in their localities. He warned corrupt officials that tendering their resignations would not protect them from criminal prosecution.

• Tech and Task Force: He expanded the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice-led mega task force—originally formed for PhilHealth—to conduct sweeping investigations and lifestyle checks across the entire DPWH under Secretary Mark Villar, who launched “Infratrack” application, alongside drone surveillance and geotagging, to virtually monitor civil works and verify contractors’ actual accomplishments.

• Ghost Project Audits: After discovering a perk in anomalies in the budget year 2018 where construction projects were funded but never built, Duterte mandated strict physical audits of DPWH projects to eliminate “ghost projects”. PRRD collaborated with the House Committee on Appropriations in investigating “budget insertions”.

It wasthrough the hearings conducted by the late Congressman Rolando Andaya Jr. that a staggering P75 billion was added to public works budget supposedly “parked” in various legislative districts without the knowledge of President Rodrigo Duterte or DPWH Secretary Mark Villar.

• DBM Involvement and Bribery Allegations: Andaya pointed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and its then-Secretary Benjamin Diokno as the authority behind the fund placements. Close coordination with public works officials was effected by his undersecretary Amenah Pangandaman. At the height of the probe, Andaya accused Diokno of offering House of Representatives PHP40 billion in savings from the 2018 budget in exchange for halting the investigation into the insertions.

• Contractor Accusations: Andaya also alleged irregularities in the awarding of 39 infrastructure contracts to a favored Bulacan-based firm, CT Leoncio Construction and Trading, which had ties to Aremar Construction Corp owned by Diokno’s in-laws.

Read: https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1082550/dbm-exec-tagged-in-p75b-insertions-in-dpwh-budget

• Reenacted Budget. The budget stand-off was so intense that resulted in the government operating under a reenacted 2018 budget during the first quarter of 2019. Both the Senate and House subsequently realigned the contested funds before the 2019 General Appropriations Act was passed.

As a result of the investigations, President Duterte relieved Diokno and Pangandaman from the budget department, and floated them in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas while further probe was going on, but the Covid pandemic saved their skin.

It was BBM, on his first day of office, who re-appointed Diokno as secretary of finance and Pangandaman, budget secretary to be part of a Mafiosi style of governance to loot the national treasury in broad daylight and violate the human rights of any and all that will stand in his way.

The Malaysian lesson

If Marcos, and any of the public officials and private contractors involved in this flood-control monumental scam, think they get away with the consequences of this crime of the century, they had better be reminded of the obnoxious Razak legacy.

Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has been sentenced to prison on four 15-year sentences on abuse of power charges, as well as five years each on 21 money laundering charges.

(The jail terms, however, do not add up but run concurrently under Malaysian law.)

Najib, 72, was accused of misappropriating nearly 2.3 billion Malaysian ringgit ($569m; £422m) from the nation’s sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) and a judge found him guilty in four charges of abuse of power and 21 charges of money laundering a larger sum of money, received by his personal bank account in 2013. Najib said he had believed the money was a donation from the late Saudi King Abdullah – a claim rejected by the judge.

The verdict, delivered in Malaysia’s administrative capital Putrajaya, is the second blow in the same week to the embattled former leader, who has been imprisoned since 2022. The former PM is already in jail after he was convicted two years ago in another case related to 1MDB.

Najib’s lawyers claim that he had been misled by his advisers – in particular the financier Jho Low, whohas maintained his innocence but remains at large. But the argument has not convinced Malaysia’s courts, which previously found Najib guilty of embezzlement in 2020.

That year, Najib was convicted of abuse of power, money laundering and breach of trust over 42 million ringgits ($10m; £7.7m) transferred from SRC International – a former unit of 1MDB – into his private accounts, for which he was sentenced to 12 years in prison. But his jail term was reduced to half last year.

The 1MDB scandal made headlines across the world when it came to light a decade ago, embroiling prominent figures from Malaysia to Goldman Sachs and Hollywood.

Investigators estimated that $4.5bn was siphoned from the state-owned wealth fund into private pockets, including Najib’s.

(What about Liza Araneta Marcos?) Separately Najib’s wife, Rosmah Mansor was sentenced to ten years in jail in 2022 for bribery, but she is free on bail pending an appeal against her conviction.

The scandal has had profound repercussions on Malaysian politics.

In 2018 it led to a historic election loss for Najib’s Barisan Nasional coalition, which had governed the country since its independence in 1957, and the rise of Anwar Ibrahim’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat and its broader coalition, the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) coalition, which has formed the present federal unity government, with Anwar as prime minister.

Mene, Tekel, Uphasin

The country is sinking while incompetence and corruption rules.

The handwriting is on the wall.

A disembodied hand miraculously appeared during a sacrilegious feast, writing cryptic words on the wall of the Babylonian King Belshazzar’s palace The prophet Daniel interpreted the writing to mean the king’s reign had been weighed by God and found lacking , resulting in his overthrow .

The Philippine Constitution makes it difficult to remove a president even when incapacitated. The President seems pre-occupied saving his own skin and covering up for his conspirators rather than leading the government. Desperate, it is almost feeding a tiger with meat using your bare hands.

This should serve as a heads up to the members of the president’s official family, the Cabinet, who seem to be either frozen in atrophy or scattered in disarray. But you are not order takers. You were hired by the people because he found some expertise in your in your respective discipline. Do not be disposed to preserving your pay check rather than serving the people. The Constitution allows you to initiate moves for a temporary replacement, writing the Senate about his condition of being no longer able to coherently perform his daily functions.

Congress can also play a role, but almost all of them has conspired with Marcos’ corruption. It is improbable to assemble the numbers.

The military is mandated by Constitution to protect the people and the State, but the major service commanders seem to have also been co-opted by the President and his cousin, the former Speaker.

Wasn’t it Franklin Delano Roosevelt who said, “the only thing to fear is fear itself!”

Ang takot ay nasa isip lamang.

Romualdez with the presidential son Sandro Marcos, congressman in Ilocos Norte, reassuring the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) represented by 17 AFP generals and senior flag officers, an additional ₱350 daily subsistence allowance for soldiers.

This is a call for you to withdraw support from a fallen traitor to the country, a plunderer who knows no limits.

Please do not wait for the people to take the job into their own hands, street justice will mean blood and if not tamed, the obliteration of the State.

We came close to this political and economic disaster once.

Conclusion

On February 25, 1986, news reached us who were encamped at EDSA, that Ferdinand Edralin Marcos and his family were preparing to leave Malacanang Palace. The thermostat hit the ceiling, and masses started marching towards Aurora/Sta Mesa boulevard enroute to Jose P. Laurel/Calle Aviles.

My wife wanted to come, so I drove my white Toyota Tamaraw instead taking some friends from Ligaya ng Panginoon too.

When we got to the corner of Legarda and Mendiola, we saw throngs tearing the barricades apart, many already had pliers and cutters to take home a piece of the barb wire for souvenir. The police gave way.

But arriving at the Gate 4, I saw Marcos Loyalists guarding the fences .In a flash, the mob forced themselves through their ranks, battering them with whatever. Blood spewed all around me as protesters around me took to the fences scaling the fences to inside the yard.

Lynch mobs scaling Palace fences before they were able to break Gate 4 open, as Philippine Marines abandon the yard.

In another minute, a loud command echoed throughout the lawn telling the Marines to regroup. The gates opened and soldiers started marching out to leave the premises in a single file. The crowd wouldn’t wait and ignored them as thousands squeezed against each other, running to the Palace buildings.

I have never seen an angry mob destroy everything with any name and any picture of the Marcos they could lay their hands on.

I was relieved to hear that Malacanang was vacated only a few minutes ahead as there was doubt in my mind that if Ferdinand Edralin Marcos, his family and even his staff chose to stay, the lynch mob would have killed or maimed them.

Utterly defeated today, his son Bongbong insists on clinging to his position like a monitor lizard (tuko).

There is no doubt in my mind that if the people can get to them now, history will repeat itself but the turnout could be very much different.

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for international affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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By Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

Series 4: Forever peace or forever wars?

Before you read this article, let me warn you up-front that it features an opinion written by Bao Ming, a retired senior colonel of the People’s Liberation Army, who is the first military expert co-created by the Haokan Excellent Creation Alliance. A former professor at a service command academy, he presently serves as a military commentator and content creator on Haokan Video.

So, if you are Sinophobic or McCarthyist, stop here. Or deal with nausea, after.

Previously, I wrote two articles citing three foundational lies spawned by a 2016 arbitral ruling, the canine devotion to which has become key to the collapse of the Marcos governance, and if unremedied, the failure of the Philippine state.

My prognosis, however, centered mainly on exposing manipulation of the mainstream media, resorting to lawfare and infowars, building up to a non-existent arbitral victory as the basis for the erection of ghost sea west of the Philippines. Pretty much, geopolitics.

I made few peripheral references on how the present administration is painting, through World Bank mumbo-jumbo, an illusory macro-economics to hide how such geopolitical hoaxes have cost our daily lives on a micro level.

Mr. Bao did a magnum opus, however, on unraveling true state in terms of geo-economics, in gruesome details, and further how despite it, Marcos’ incompetence is worsening our geopolitical woes.

I don’t usually borrow someone’s work, but since the subject here is another person’s analysis, how can I analyze further? Thus. I decided to present it raw, transcending who he is but affirming the substantives that he brought forward.

On July 1, 2026, Bao wrote a rejoinder to Capital Economics, a British think tank. I am reprinting it in verbatim.

Tiger Turns into Sick Cat! The Philippine Economy is Collapsed; the More It Opposes China, the Poorer It Gets—Is There No One Who Can Save It?

This report has left the Philippine government feeling ashamed. It predicts GDP growth of only 3% this year. If this comes true, it will be the lowest point in the post-pandemic economy.

What does 3% mean? The Philippine government itself just lowered its target to 3.5% to 4.5%. Looking further back, before the Middle East conflict, Manila originally hoped to reach 5% to 6% this year. Dropping from 5%-6% to 3% isn’t just a “downgrade,” it’s a “halving.”

How did a country repeatedly touted by Western media as the “new Asian tiger” suddenly become a “sick cat”? Capital Economics has identified three causes.

The first blow is to infrastructure. The corruption scandal surrounding the 118.5-billion-peso (sic) flood control project is considered the most serious corruption case in the Philippines in years. Since the investigation began last July, government infrastructure spending has declined for nine consecutive months.

From January to April this year, infrastructure and other capital expenditures plummeted 45.6% year-on-year to 189.3 billion pesos; April alone saw a sharp 52% year-on-year decrease, leaving only 41.5 billion pesos.

Infrastructure investment in developing countries has nearly halved, effectively shutting down the engine of economic growth. It’s not that governments don’t want to spend money, but rather that they can’t; stricter review processes have slowed down the disbursement of every fund.

Anti-corruption is certainly a good thing, but when it leads to infrastructure stagnation and economic slowdown, it indicates that the country’s governance system is critically ill.

The second blow comes from the Middle East. The US-Iran conflict has driven up global energy prices, and the Philippines happens to be one of Asia’s most energy-dependent countries. Soaring import costs have directly pushed up inflation, making the Philippines one of Asia’s most inflated economies.

United Overseas Bank has raised its full-year inflation forecast for 2026 to 7.5%, which, if realized, would be the highest price increase since the 2008 global financial crisis. From soaring energy prices to surging inflation to shrinking consumption to a slowing economy, this chain is intricately linked, each link tightening the noose around the necks of the Filipino people.

The third blow is to confidence. Corruption scandals have damaged investor confidence, and inflation has eroded consumer confidence. Capital Economics warns that the economic downturn will worsen further in the second quarter.

First-quarter GDP grew by only 2.8% year-on-year, the lowest growth rate since 2009 (excluding the pandemic period). Once confidence collapses, rebuilding it is incredibly difficult.

With these three blows falling simultaneously, the rate of economic bleeding far exceeds Manila’s expectations.

Logically, the focus should be on development and stable growth.

But what is Manila doing? Constantly provoking China on the South China Sea issue, publicly accusing China of being “cunning” at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and continuing to hurl insults by Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro even after being sanctioned by China.

While requesting imports of urgently needed supplies such as fertilizer from China, it also verbally attacks China on the South China Sea issue. This attempt to “want benefits from China while simultaneously opposing it” exposes a chaotic strategic mindset.

Malaysian scholar Zhang Tiancai pointed out a fatal contradiction in the South China Morning Post. The Philippine economy remains dependent on trade, investment, and supplies from China, but security agencies, influenced by increasingly close military ties with Washington and Tokyo, are taking an increasingly hardline stance towards Beijing.

Security considerations have repeatedly superseded economic pragmatism.

In other words, the Philippines is committing economic suicide to obtain a dubious security guarantee.

China has surpassed the United States and Japan’s the Philippines’ largest trading partner, accounting for more than one-fifth of total trade. Bilateral trade has grown from less than $1 billion in the mid-1990s to approximately $42 billion in 2024.

In this context, confronting China is not “defending sovereignty“, but rather severing its own economic lifeline.

ASEAN paradox?

The Philippines has assumed the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026. This should have been a shining moment for Manila, a time to stand at the center of the regional stage, promote economic integration, and showcase its great power status.

However, the reality is that the Philippines is turning this “shining moment” into a “moment of embarrassment.” The theme, “Sailing Towards a Shared Future,” reflects little of the spirit of “cooperation” in its unilateral alliance with extra-regional powers, (which) is a confrontational stance.

Malaysian scholars warn that the Philippines’ increasing reliance on extra-regional powers to contain China could turn the South China Sea into an arena for great power rivalry, weakening ASEAN’s neutrality and status.

President Marcos previously stated that a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” was expected to be reached during the Philippines’ chairmanship. However, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defense Secretary Teodoro expressed doubt about the necessity of a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.”

The president says talks are needed, the defense secretary says no talks are needed; even the basic stance is inconsistent internally.

So how can the Philippines lead ASEAN?

Other ASEAN countries are not blind. The Philippines’ position runs counter to the pragmatism of other Southeast Asian countries in deepening economic and trade ties with China. While other countries are focused on doing business and building infrastructure with China, the Philippines is playing with fire in the South China Sea, provoking in its air defense identification zone, and engaging in public spats at the Shangri-La Dialogue. It’s clear who the real disruptor of regional stability is.

Triple whammy

Corruption, inflation, and confrontation—linking these three keywords together paints a complete picture of the predicament.

Corruption halts infrastructure construction, which in turn slows growth; inflation shrinks consumption, which in turn slows the economy; and confrontation with China damages trade, which makes recovery hopeless.

These three lines intertwine, creating a vicious cycle: the more confrontation there is, the poorer the country becomes; and the poorer the country becomes, the more confrontation is needed to divert attention from domestic problems.

Capital Economics predicts that GDP growth may rebound to 4.5% next year, but this will still be below the government’s target of 5% to 6%. The report states bluntly: “The Philippines’ economic recovery may be slow and difficult.”

The government recently announced that it will accelerate the disbursement of funds for infrastructure projects in the second half of this year. Capital Economics poured cold water on the situation: even if large-scale infrastructure projects that have been shelved are restarted, fiscal policy will remain tight to curb rising debt ratios.

Wanting to spend money but fearing excessive debt; wanting to stimulate the economy but fearing runaway inflation; wanting to cooperate with China but fearing offending the United States, the Philippine government is trapped in a dead end, each step fraught with difficulty.

While the Defense Minister was proclaiming “archipelagic sentinels” at the Shangri-La Dialogue, infrastructure spending was being halved. While verbally abusing China on the South China Sea issue, inflation was hitting a decade-high.

While busy demanding weapons from the US and Japan, economic growth was plummeting to its lowest point since the pandemic. How can a country that can’t even manage its own economy act as a “sentinel”? How can a government that can embezzle 118.5-billion-pesos (sic) from infrastructure funds “protect freedom”?

This report from the British think tank is not pessimism, but a warning. The 3% GDP growth forecast isn’t a fabricated curse; it’s a mirror reflecting the cost of corruption, the cost of confrontation, and the failure of governance.

The government can continue to act tough on the South China Sea issue, continue to make harsh statements against China at the Shangri-La Dialogue, and continue to pledge loyalty to the United States.

Economic data doesn’t lie, inflation doesn’t lie, and the precipitous drop in infrastructure spending doesn’t lie. When ordinary people can barely afford to eat, who cares what slogans you shout in the South China Sea?

The dream of becoming the “new Asian tiger” should end. If it doesn’t do something meaningful, it won’t even be able to remain a “sick cat.”

END OF QUOTE.

Discordant governance

The state of dissonance among high and significant portfolios of the government only shows that nobody, including the President is in control of the affairs of the nation. The disagreements are not accidental nor sporadic.

Even in the other Cabinet clusters, cacophony rules, especially in the prosecutorial system. But that would be for another day.

Our focus here is how the security sector has mutilated our foreign policy.

When it comes to the China-Asean Code of Conduct, for instance, a north and south variance is an embarrassment to the President. He says it is necessary, our defense minister says it is not.

The inconsistencies of the public statements of Teodoro are not isolated. They form a Sinophobic pattern – seething with prejudice, hatred, hostility, and discrimination directed towards the Chinese government.

It is an awkward but deliberate counterpoise to our Department of Foreign Affairs, that is the primus-inter pares, among Cabinet members:

Diplomacy over Confrontation: DFA Secretary Maria Teresa Lazaro champions preserving “diplomatic space for dialogue” through the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM), emphasizing that diplomacy is a form of deterrence. Her negotiations were instrumental in achieving a provisional understanding that allowed incident-free rotation and resupply (RORE) missions at Ayungin Shoal.

“How can we negotiate with the Chinese” slams Teodoro, “when they have ‘deficit of trust’.”

ASEAN-China Code of Conduct (COC): United with all ASEAN countries, Lazaro pushes for an expedited, legally binding Code of Conduct . Under her tenure, she has coordinated monthly meetings among ASEAN member states and China to resolve key milestone issues and prevent maritime disputes from escalating into armed conflict.

In the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, Teodoro expressed deep skepticism regarding the need for an COC, stressing that explicitly blamed China as the primary obstacle to the pact.

Pragmatic Relations: She adheres to the “One-China policy” while seeking future-oriented economic and cooperative ties with Beijing, such as updating non-sensitive coast guard communication agreements without compromising sovereign rights.

Teodoro actively advocates integrating Taiwan into broader regional deterrence against China and broader cross-strait relations to evolve non-taboo economic and security ties with the separatist province of China.

Retaliatory Sanctions: Following Chinese sanctions on Secretary Teodoro and his family, Lazaro maintained that Manila would not impose counter-sanctions and would continue relying on diplomacy rather than public exchanges that could narrow diplomatic space.

According to the Philippine News Agency, Teodoro regards China’s sanctions on him and his family, as a “usual punishment” for those who speak the truth about Beijing’s deception and aggressive actions in the West Philippine Sea.

Integrity in question

Gilbert Teodoro’s behavior exposes his spousing a back-seat driver, powerful enough to countermand the direction of his commander-in-chief. If he overrides openly our expressed foreign policy, who is he and what is he representing?

Several lawyers recently filed criminal and administrative complaints against Teodoro at the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office. The lawyers alleged that he violated the Philippine Passport Act and falsified documents by supposedly maintaining a valid Maltese passport and citizenship.

Teodoro has claimed earlier that when filed to run for Senator in 2022, and accepted appointment to public office in 2023, he had already renounced his Maltese citizenship and returned his passport to Malta, and “reacquired” Filipino citizenship.

Philippine jurisprudence emphasizes that Republic Act 9225 or the Dual Citizenship Act, applies solely to dual citizens by choice (eq. natural born Filipino who are naturalized as a foreign citizen) who seek to retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship and/or hold public office.

In Compliance with the requirements of RA 9225, especially under Section 5, is mandatory, and the citizen in question has the burden of proving compliance by competent evidence. David v. SET, 795 Phil. 529 –(2016)

Mere allegation without documentary support is not enough; moreover, documentation in the form other than as prescribed by Section 5 is not sufficient. Reyes v. Comelec, 712 Phil. 192 (2013). The Supreme Court held that oath of allegiance made by Reyes as provincial administrator is not a substitute for the oath of allegiance required under RA 9225 even if they are similarly worded.

An oath of allegiance to the Philippines is enough for mere reacquisition or retention of citizenship but it not enough for holding public office, as RA 9225 additionally requires proof of renunciation of foreign citizenship. Chua v. Comelec, 783 Phil. 876 (2016)

Section 5 prescribes that renunciation of foreign citizenship must be personal and under oath Condon v. Comelec, 692 Phil. 407 (2012) and not a mere statement, even if made before a public officer. Lopez v. Comelec, 581 Phil. 657 (2008).

Moreover, the oath of allegiance required under Section 5 is in addition to the oath of allegiance found in a certificate of candidacy, even if they are similarly worded. Jacot v. Dal, 592 Phil. 661 (2008)

Any lack of or defect in these documentary requirements is cause for reversion to dual citizenship by choice and disqualification from holding public office. Tan v. Crisologo, 820 Phil. 611 (2018

Finally, compliance must be continuous if after renouncing foreign citizenship a person resumes using the passport of said foreign country, they are deemed to have reverted to dual citizenship by choice and therefore disqualified from holding public office. Agustin v. Comelec, 772 Phil 593 (2015); Arnado v. Comelec, 767 Phil. 51 (2015); Maquiling v. Comelec, 709 Phil. 408 (2013).

For the past two years, we have been requesting Teodoro to come clean and present, not in executive sessions and in private conferences, but for public scrutiny, genuine and proper documents required by Section 5 of RA 9225.

The public official, high in the ladder of government service and holding a very sensitive job dealing with national security, who has the gall to demand others to hurdle any “deficit of trust” just ignored our pleas.

What right, over and above the National Security Council, does Teodoro has going to town accusing others of being spies to foreign interests, when he cannot even present guarantees that he is a Filipino citizen?

What power foreign to the national interests of the Philippine Republics does Teodoro possess, that can even override the President of the Philippines?

What impunity does Teodoro enjoy, that he can freely demonize other countries contributing to the collapse of the Philippine economy?

Shouldn’t we have listened to his aunt, Gretchen Cojuangco, when she said, “Anybody but Gibo?”

Adolfo Quizon Paglinawan

is former diplomat who served as press attaché and spokesman of the Philippine Embassy in Washington DC and the Philippines’ Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York from April 1986 to 1993. Presently, he is vice-president for international affairs of the Asian Century Philippines Institute, a geopolitical analyst, author of books, columnist, a print and broadcast journalist, and a hobby-organic-farmer.

His best sellers, A Problem for Every Solution (2015), a characterization of factors affecting Philippine-China relations, and No Vaccine for a Virus called Racism (2020) a survey of international news attempting to tracing its origins, earned for him an international laureate in the Awards for the Promotion of Philippine-China Understanding in 2021. His third book, The Poverty of Power is now available – a historiography of controversial issues of spanning 36 years leading to the Demise of the Edsa Revolution and the Forthcoming Rise of a Philippine Phoenix.

Today he is anchor for many YouTube Channels, namely Ang Maestro Lectures @Katipunan Channel (Saturdays), Unfinished Revolution (Sundays) and Opinyon Online (Wednesdays) with Ka Mentong Laurel, and Ipa-Rush Kay Paras with former Secretary Jacinto Paras (Tuesdays and Thursdays). His personal vlog is @AdoPaglinawan.

(adolfopaglinawan@yahoo.com)

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