I’m happy to announce that the Baltic Flank is back from a few weeks of summer break. But while we have been enjoying the holidays, the world hasn’t stopped—certainly not on the Baltic edges of Europe.

So, what’s the situation on the ground? In just the last week, two Estonian-Russian dual citizens were convicted of espionage. Edgar Mukhanov was sentenced to six years in prison for spying on behalf of Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU).

Mukhanov wasn’t a top-level spy, but he had one significant advantage — an Estonian passport. Living in Russia, the Estonian passport allowed him hassle-free entry into Estonia, and from there, anywhere else in the EU. From what is known publicly, Mukhanov was indeed a frequent traveller, visiting Estonia and Latvia several times a week since at least 2022.

That prompted the GRU to task him with gathering information about the two countries’ defence forces, NATO troops, and military facilities near the town of Võru in south-east Estonia. This is also where the majority of US troops in Estonia are stationed.

The second GRU agent, 28-year-old Nikita Kuzmin, received a four-year sentence. While Mukhanov was operating in southern Estonia and Latvia, Kuzmin was tasked with collecting similar information in Narva. His cooperation with the GRU began while Kuzmin was studying at a university in St. Petersburg.

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The two cases highlight key methods in Russia’s recruitment strategy. They are specifically looking to recruit people who frequently cross the Russian border. And, of course, all of Russia’s main intelligence services have their “representatives” in universities to spot suitable students.

This brings us to the third method: disposable agents recruited on social media to carry out acts of sabotage.

At 1:45 AM on August 15, the alarms went off at a Milrem Robotics warehouse in East Tallinn.

Milrem is one of the success stories of the Estonian military industry, producing unmanned ground vehicles and robotic combat vehicles. Originally founded in Estonia, Milrem had its majority stake bought by the UAE-based EDGE Group a few years ago. But more importantly, its THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles have been deployed in Ukraine, and a Russian think tank previously placed a cash bounty on capturing one intact.

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The fire was put out quickly, but suspicions that the arson was Russian-organized sabotage grew just as fast. Sure enough, three suspects were arrested in Latvia just a day later, and Estonia is waiting for them to be extradited. While all the specifics are not clear yet and sabotage is still only a “working theory,” the incident is exactly what intelligence agencies have been publicly warning about: the continued high risk of sabotage acts directed against critical infrastructure and military facilities, with increasing levels of damage or violence.

Which brings us to the hot topic of the week — CIA chief John Ratcliffe’s quick and unannounced visit to Moscow. Speculation about the message that Ratcliffe travelled to deliver to Moscow in person was quick to arise. Now, the Wall Street Journal and Politico have confirmed that Ratcliffe did warn Moscow “not to attack NATO countries,” specifically mentioning the Baltic states.

Sources that I have engaged with say that the headlines sound more dramatic than the reality. The general consensus in the European intelligence community is that there is no imminent conventional threat of a Russian attack. The threat assessment in Estonia hasn’t changed.

Similarly, the commander of the Latvian National Armed Forces, General Kaspars Pudāns, said yesterday that there are no signs of an imminent military threat. “If we had such signs, I wouldn’t be talking to you in the studio right now, but would be busy mobilizing our troops,” Pudāns told Latvian Delfi in an interview.

This is not a denial of a wider Russian threat against the West. As reported above, Russia’s hybrid operations against the West continue at full steam (think of the drones and explosives found in Leipzig!).

The assessment gaining prominence over this spring and summer has a lot to do with Russia’s dire situation in its “special military operation” and with the war getting more and more visible and tangible inside Russia, especially in the economy. What are the “out-of-box” solutions that Putin might choose to escape from the increasingly difficult situation Russia finds itself in?

***

And then there’s the possibility of a Russian mobilization. Based on my conversations with several European intelligence sources, the possibility of a mobilization after the upcoming “elections” in Russia is more likely than not. If it happens, it will bring tens of thousands of mobilized troops for training to Russian military bases close to the border with the Baltic countries.

These are bases that have been virtually empty since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A mobilization would instantly change the security calculus in the Baltic states.

Still, one source estimated that Russia would need to mobilize at least 500,000 troops in order to boost its efforts against Ukraine AND pose an actual threat to the Baltic countries.

So far, it’s not clear if Putin will announce a mobilization. It’s also unclear, if he does, how many troops will be called up. It is possible that the Kremlin will decide on it only after the Duma elections that take place three weeks from now. The turnout level and the results of the elections — in other words, how much they need to rig them — can be deciding factors, alongside estimating the huge economic consequences for Moscow.

Either way, rest assured that the Baltic Flank will keep monitoring the situation on both sides of the border. We are working to bring you fresh, sober, and well-informed analyses of and investigations into the security developments in the Baltic countries, Europe, and NATO.

Thank you for reading and until next time!

Holger

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In this special podcast episode, I sit down with my Baltic colleagues Indre Makaraityte and The Baltic Flank’s frequent co-author Sanita Jemberga to unpack the story behind the headlines.

In just 20 minutes, we walk you through the most critical aspects of this legal warfare — detailing Russia’s new tactics and how they threaten to turn the world’s highest court into a stage for its hybrid war against Europe.

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When I am invited to seminars or interviews about our Russian investigations, one of the points I like to emphasize is that it doesn’t only matter what Russia is doing now, but what it is working on to do next.

This week, we published a joint investigation with Re:Baltica in Latvia and LRT in Lithuania that reveals one of Moscow’s upcoming operations against the Baltic countries: a plan to sue Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging that the three states have been systematically discriminating their Russian minorities.

Regardless of how unfounded those allegations are, several experts we interviewed warned that the move could keep the three countries on the hook for up to ten years and become the most expensive legal disputes in their history. All the while, Russia would use the proceedings to beat the “Baltics are Nazis” drum.

Behind the scenes, Russia has been laying the groundwork to file these claims since at least early 2022. We identified a chain of diplomatic notes presented to the Baltic countries in which Russia claims the states are violating the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).

The notes began arriving in May 2022, just a few months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In a heavily detailed, 45-page note submitted to Tallinn in March 2024, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) split its allegations into four categories:

• Persecution of Russian-speaking residents through the restriction of political, economic, and social rights;

• The suppression of the Russian language across all spheres of life;

• Stigmatization, framing Russian-speaking residents as enemies of the Estonian state;

• The glorification of Nazism, including the removal of Soviet-era war monuments.

Many of these notes include invitations to bilateral negotiations — a crucial step to demonstrate to the ICJ that Russia attempted to resolve the dispute before turning to litigation. In one instance, Russia suggested holding negotiations with Estonia in either Moscow or Minsk. They gave Estonia just ten days to respond, with the proposed talks scheduled to start within two weeks.

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It was clearly an “invitation” designed to be impossible to accept. Estonia replied by stating that negotiations might be possible, but only in The Hague or Tartu, and only after Russia returns to internationally lawful behavior by ending its war against Ukraine.

For the Baltic countries, Russia’s notes — filled with sometimes openly bizarre arguments, such as citing the constitutions of the Soviet republics — leave few good options. They cannot simply ignore the notes, as silence would be used against them at the ICJ. However, they also want to avoid getting dragged into the weeds by countering each and every specific allegation.

Prominent Law Firm

It is not just diplomats at the Russian MFA working to litigate the Baltic countries. We learned that they have retained a prominent Moscow law firm, Monastyrsky, Zyuba, Stepanov & Partners (MZS), to build the case.

MZS is no ordinary firm. One of its partners, Dmitry Lovyrev, is the son of a longtime FSB deputy director. The firm regularly wins Russian government contracts and represents Moscow in litigation brought by Ukraine over the closure of the Kerch Strait.

Last July, an MZS lawyer, Anastasia Taranova, turned to well-known Russian propagandists Vladimir Simindei and Nikolai Mezhevich to prepare reports on the ethnic composition of each Baltic state, the historical presence of Russians, the development of Russian language and education, and state measures that, in Moscow’s view, demonstrated that the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had long been aware of what it calls the “Russian question.”

Both men are connected to Russia’s intelligence services; Simindei cooperates with the foreign intelligence service (SVR), and Mezhevich works with the FSB. Neither man replied to our requests for comment.

What is Russia’s Aim?

Latvia’s State Security Service (SAB) describes the Kremlin’s strategy as “lawfare”: the use of international law as part of a hybrid war against the West, aimed at entangling adversaries in years of costly litigation while advancing Moscow’s political narrative.

“Russia’s goal is to sow confusion, tie up our resources, and spread doubts that perhaps we really are a small, nasty Nazi state,” said Kerli Veski of Estonia’s MFA.

International law experts told us that while Russia’s prospects of winning the cases are low, the litigation still carries severe risks, such as the ICJ imposing provisional measures at an early stage of the proceedings. “For example, it could order the restoration of Russian language instruction in Russian-speaking schools for the upcoming term,” noted Ieva Miļūna from the Riga Graduate School of Law.

Pretext for Direct Confrontation

No lawsuit has yet been filed. Russian MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova recently stated that the pre-litigation stage will be completed by the end of the year.

Latvia’s SAB has little doubt that a lawsuit will follow; the only question is when. “Russia is confident in its position and believes the ICJ offers a favorable environment,” the agency told us.

In a rare public report published a month ago, SAB went further, warning that Moscow could use the proceedings “as a pretext for direct confrontation with the Baltic states.” The reason could be its stated claim of defending Russian speakers wherever they are.

It’s been an incredibly intense six months. We only launched The Baltic Flank in January, and since then, our community has grown from zero to more than 2,200 subscribers. Thank you to each and every one of you for being here!

While investigating Russian malign influence is our daily job, The Baltic Flank is still a project we do out of our free time — sometimes in early mornings or late evenings, sometimes over the weekend. It’s a space where we bring you not only English-language adaptations of our best reporting, but also exclusive investigations, deep-dive analyses, and podcasts you won’t find anywhere else.

I hope you’ve found our work engaging and relevant. We’d love to hear your thoughts in the comments!

If you find value in what we do, please consider upgrading to a paid subscription. Doing so directly helps us support and compensate our contributors, and allows us to keep growing this platform so we can bring you even more revelations from the frontline between the West and Russia.

Thank you, and see you again soon!

— Holger

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There have been several recent reports in Western media pointing to a new and immediate threat of Russian escalation in the Baltic states or Poland. First, Fox News cited Latvian intelligence warnings of potential Russian provocations, including the use of drones or even missiles.

This was followed by reports in The Guardian and The Telegraph. The former detailed potential military provocations in the region, while the latter outlined the possibility of targeted missile or drone attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as Russian "soldiers potentially crossing the border from Kaliningrad or Belarus” into Poland.

So, what is actually happening?

I reached out to a wide range of sources across governments, intelligence services, and diplomatic circles in the region to learn more. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the topic, all sources spoke strictly on the condition of anonymity. However, the vast majority of the information and assessments presented below was corroborated by at least two independent sources.

“The rumors that Russia is planning a military provocation against the Baltic states began in the spring,” an intelligence source said.

This was confirmed by an Estonian security policy official, who noted that since May, information has circulated within security and intelligence circles regarding an alleged meeting in Russia. At this meeting, the directive was reportedly given to draft plans for potential provocations.

According to the source, the Baltic states, Poland, occasionally Finland, and even Moldova, with which Russia shares no land border, were flagged as potential targets.

“I have not received any information that a political decision has been made to actually carry out a provocation,” the source said. This sentiment was echoed by a Baltic intelligence source: “Today, there is no known date, no concrete plan, and no designated organizer for such a provocation.”

According to three separate sources, any such actions would purposefully fall below the threshold of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense principle.

"There are no indications of a looming military provocation. We see no changes in Russian military presence or preparations [aimed at the Baltics]. If we did, we would instantly engage both nationally and at the NATO level to signal Russia [to stop]," said a Latvian foreign and security policy official who was not authorized to speak on the record.

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"What we are talking about is a hybrid, subconventional escalation," the official added. "Russia is continuously testing and provoking us with sabotage. Migration pressure on the border is growing every day. There are cyberattacks, hostile information campaigns, and lawfare."

All of the sources I spoke to emphasized that there are currently no indications that an actual decision to escalate in the Baltics, Poland, or elsewhere in Europe has been made in Moscow. This makes it difficult to assess exactly what form a provocation might take.

"Russia’s capabilities are limited. But they still need to be monitored carefully," one official noted.

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Nevertheless, the most frequently discussed scenarios include drone incidents —including false-flag drone operations — and increasingly aggressive acts of sabotage. Last fall, a group of unmarked, armed men appeared on a roadside in the so-called Saatse Boot, a wedge of Russian territory that loops across an Estonian road, allowing Estonians to drive through as long as they don't stop. A few months later, three Russian border guards briefly entered an Estonian stretch of land in Vasknarva. These are the types of incidents that could begin to occur more frequently, one source observed.

In essence, there is nothing fundamentally new about Russia planning operations against the Baltic states or the West, or instructing its intelligence services to draft provocation scenarios.

“Russia is constantly planning hostile and subversive activities directed at Estonia,” several sources stated. This includes routine brainstorming at the “grassroots level” by intelligence officers pitching ideas to higher ranks.

If every operation developed against Estonia over the years were published, “it would become your most-read story,” one source remarked. “Yet, for one reason or another, the vast majority of these ideas have never been implemented.”

“It’s not that there is an emergency situation or that we are particularly nervous,” one official said. Another intelligence official echoed the sentiment: “To our knowledge, there is nothing extraordinary.” A third added: “There have been various indicators before and after, but at the moment, there is no information suggesting anything is about to happen immediately.”

One security official assessed that these rumors are part of a deliberate strategic narrative managed by Moscow to generate fear in the West, thereby undermining support for Ukraine. This comes against the backdrop of Russia’s poor military performance, Ukraine’s successful drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, a domestic fuel crisis, and a struggling Russian economy.

“The general assessment of Western intelligence services is that practically everyone in Russia understands that the situation is bad—except for one person,” the official said. “People in the business sector certainly understand this, but increasingly so do the FSB and the military as well.”

The logic of Russia’s narrative is that since their situation is currently difficult, they must somehow escalate the situation. In addition to provocations against the Baltic states and Europe, they are also spreading sentences about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

"I am not convinced that this logic holds up. My experience shows that Russia behaves more aggressively when it feels confident," a security official with long-term experience concluded. "Conversely, when they feel weak, they put their tail between their legs and act more politely. But you can never entirely rule out that this is more than a bluff."

That’s it from me today! Thank you for reading and please feel free to share this post with your friends and colleagues.

If you value our reporting, please consider upgrading to a paid subscription. Your support enables us to dedicate the time and resources needed to bring you the best scoops and deepest insights on the Baltic Flank.

Thank you and until next time!

Holger

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First, let me start with a fresh scoop. This May, an Estonian border guard surveillance plane captured images of Gazprom’s LNG tanker Marshal Vasilevskiy as it was sailing past Estonia’s western islands and northern shore toward Russia’s Bolshoi Bor port in the Gulf of Finland.

The images revealed two sandbagged firing positions equipped with military-grade 12.7mm Kord heavy machine guns placed on either side of the ship’s bridge. After learning about the photos, we asked the Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) to release the images.

This is the first time there is direct evidence of Russia installing military weapons on a civilian ship. It comes as the next step in a larger series of events, which includes Russia manning its shadow-fleet oil tankers with former mercenaries and soldiers to monitor the tankers’ crews, and a Russian warship firing warning shots at a civilian yacht just two weeks ago.

Now, the Marshal Vasilevskiy is not part of the shadow fleet. It’s not carrying oil to boost Russia’s military budget. Instead, its task is to supply natural gas to the heavily armed Kaliningrad exclave, having made the trip between Bolshoi Bor and Kaliningrad four times since August of last year.

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It is owned by the sanctioned Gazprom, and the tanker itself has been sanctioned in several jurisdictions — though not yet by the EU. This means that as long as it doesn’t enter Western territorial waters, it has little reason to worry about encounters with the authorities of “hostile” European countries.

So why the guns?

“My assessment: These weapons were put on board with a 50 percent purpose of repelling a potential Ukrainian sea drone [attack], and 50 percent for signaling to Western countries,” one intelligence officer from the Baltic Sea area told me.

Let’s take this step by step. According to the source, the Kord machine guns are not effective against potential Ukrainian aerial drone attacks — which have frequently targeted Russia’s ports on the Baltic Sea this year.

With an effective range of 2 kilometers, they could provide some cover against naval drones. However, there have been no such attacks in the Baltic Sea, and according to the source, it is hard to imagine Ukraine launching them here.

So what about signalling?

Jens Wenzel Kristoffersen, a Danish naval commander and independent defense analyst, told our partner Danwatch that the weapons are meant to send a powerful message to countries that oppose Russia.

“It’s specifically aimed at authorities who might consider boarding this ship,” Kristoffersen said. “If NATO forces were to approach this ship, I believe they would open fire. If a helicopter approached it, warning shots would be possible,” he added.

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But once again, there doesn’t seem to be any actual reason for Western authorities to plan on boarding or seizing the Marshal Vasilevskiy.

Here is my take. The ship is Russia’s only FSRU — a floating storage and regasification vessel designed to receive super-cooled LNG and convert it back into gas on board to supply pipelines. It’s expensive, but it’s also crucial. With Ukraine intensifying attacks against Russian infrastructure across both land and sea, Russia is acting to try to protect the Vasilevskiy as well.

The Commander of the Estonian Navy, Commodore Ivo Värk, told me that because the tanker supplies natural gas to Kaliningrad — which is vital not only for its residents but also for the Russian armed forces stationed there — it may be regarded as a military target by Ukraine.

So, perhaps this time, Russia’s move shouldn’t necessarily be seen as offensive, but rather defensive. Obviously, having heavy machine guns on a civilian ship cruising past the Baltic coastline several times a year is an inevitable escalation.

But what would happen if the Vasilevskiy were to fire warning shots while sailing past the Estonian coast, as a Russian frigate recently did in the English Channel?

“If fire were opened from aboard this ship at a vessel flying the flag of any country, the [Estonian] Defence Forces would be obliged to protect the ship under attack in Estonian waters,” Värk said, adding that the use of firearms would be permitted.

Kord machine guns are not weapons that anyone working on a gas tanker would know how to operate.

With the help of the Dossier Center, we discovered that the Marshal Vasilevskiy has carried 50 different passengers since last August. Almost half of these “passengers” have backgrounds in the Russian military, the National Guard, and/or the FSB.

One of them, Dmitri Artemenko, has taken every single one of the tanker’s journeys from Bolshoi Bor to Kaliningrad since August. Guess where Artemenko lives? According to his registered residential address, he is stationed at military unit 35690. It’s an FSB special operations center located just outside of Moscow in the town of Balashikha.

He, like many of his fellow passengers, would surely know how to operate these weapons.

That’s it for today! Thank you for reading and we hope to bring you fresh analysis, scoops and investigations from the Baltic Flank already next week, if not earlier.

This is a work we love, but one that often requires my colleagues and me to work through late evenings and weekends.

If you value our reporting, please consider upgrading to a paid subscription. Your support directly enables us to dedicate the time and resources needed to bring you the best scoops and deepest insights on the Baltic Flank.

Thank you and until next time!

Holger

“The last metres of private freedom,’ Andris Kulbergs, Latvia’s new prime minister, wrote on social media on Thursday morning before taking his motorcycle to work. “But what can you do? The state comes first.”

Twelve days ago, the country’s president Edgars Rinkēvičs had asked Kulbergs — a petrolhead and outspoken MP from the opposition’s United List — to form a government after Evika Siliņa (New Unity) blew up hers in a major political miscalculation.

Two days ago, Kulbergs turned 47.

Many observers agree that in these weeks he has shown remarkable political growth.

Kulbergs — advised by veteran ex-PM Māris Kučinskis who became his finance minister, and a deft political intriguer Edvards Smiltēns who is now justice minister — managed to bring four centrist and conservative parties into the coalition. Some of those had split from one another only shortly before the last election in 2022.

Due to an ultimatum from the National Alliance (NA), the Progressives were pushed into the opposition alongside populist and pro-Russian parties. The new government commands a comfortable 66-seat majority in the 100-member Saeima.

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The nationalists are the biggest winners of the reshuffle — apart from the United List, which now has either the perfect launching pad for the October elections if Kulberg’s cabinet performs or to implode spectacularly if it does not. NA is the smallest fraction in the new cabinet (12 MPs vs New Unity’s 25), but has the same number of ministers.

Not only that. The unwritten rule — in place for roughly 15 years — that NA should not control either the interior or education ministries because of fears of their radical approach has now fallen.

The new interior minister, Jānis Dombrava, entered parliament in 2010 at the age of 22 as its youngest member. He has remained there ever since, though never run for a minister.

Dombrava’s favourite subjects are threats from migration, multiculturalism and Russia — and, by extension, Latvia’s Russian-speaking minority. He is not famous for fondness of human rights, meaning Latvian politics in this field is now likely to lurch sharply to the right.

NA is also pushing to end public broadcasting in Russian (radio was closed in 2026, and only online news remains). It wants the decision by the end of term of this parliament and now has a majority for it.

“One can not screw up too much in such a short period, but can lay a very good base for the future,” someone schooled in Latvian politics for years remarked to me this week.

Kulbergs managed to persuade New Unity to join his government, despite the fact that it lost four ministerial portfolios. By giving it the coveted post of foreign minister (kept by Baiba Braže), he prevented Siliņa from joining his government as defence minister which she apparently wanted. Defence will be run by ex-military, another newbie Raivis Melnis (one third of Kulberg’s cabinet has no government experience, including him).

A great deal of soul-searching now awaits New Unity, as Siliņa’s fiasco has left the party without an obvious candidate for PM four months before elections. Its previously prominent figures are now in Brussels, and the party has failed to cultivate convincing new ones.

The fourth partner - ZZS - is crippled by the criminal case against its former agriculture minister, thus it was not asking much. It ended up with one ministry fewer than before, retaining responsibility for the economy, welfare and agriculture. ZZS agreed to count the speaker of parliament as its fourth senior post.

So, where does the 4x4 come from?

The coalition has four parties; each has four ministers; it will work for four months and it has four priorities. Security and defence; spending cuts (Kulbergs has promised to find extra 850 millions in budget not to raise taxes); fight against corruption and cartels; and election integrity.

At the moment, there is a remarkable amount of goodwill towards Kulberg’s government, both in parliament and across society. He is trying to control his famous temper and, in return, the media are treating him rather softly.

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However, eyebrows were raised when he left the Agriculture Ministry to ZZS — despite the shadow of a criminal case looming over it. Some personalities in ministerial offices come from a shady past. Kulbergs wanted to write his government work plan on one page as its time would be short. The wishes of four partners stretched it over four. Difficult decisions are looming in summer: whether to save the national airline and, if yes, where to get money.

And although the debate dragged on for four hours, everyone knew the government would be in place by 9pm. Why? Because Latvia was playing Norway in the Ice Hockey World Championship quarter-finals. The new prime minister is a fan.

If you wondered, Latvia was unfortunately beaten by Norway in the ice hockey world championships on Thursday evening. Let’s see if Kulbergs’ new government will do better.

Meanwhile, we have been busy bringing you fresh, original reporting from the Baltic countries—from tracking drone incidents and Russia’s escalating hybrid threats to breaking down the Latvian governmental crisis. This is a work we love, but one that often requires my colleagues and me to work through late evenings and weekends.

If you value our reporting, please consider upgrading to a paid subscription. Your support directly enables us to dedicate the time and resources needed to bring you the best scoops and deepest insights on the Baltic Flank.

Thank you and until next time!

Holger

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Meanwhile, in Vilnius, trains were halted and residents were directed to shelters, all while Russia sharply stepped up its rhetorical assaults against Latvia.

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First, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, claimed that Ukraine was planning to launch drone attacks directly from Baltic territories, alleging that Ukrainian drone units had already deployed to specific Latvian military bases.

The SVR’s press statement ended with nothing short of a direct threat:

“It’s worth noting, however, that the coordinates of decision-making centers on Latvian territory are well known, and the country’s NATO membership will not protect terrorist accomplices from just retribution.”

Shortly after, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, repeated these exact same claims before the UN Security Council.

Needless to say, there is absolutely no proof behind Russia’s claims. The entirety of Latvia’s political leadership immediately stepped up to debunk the disinformation.

Meanwhile, top NATO and EU leaders, including Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen, expressed support for Latvia and promised unity.

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But threats like these — regardless of how unfounded they are — mark a rhetorical escalation against the Baltic states. This escalation is playing out against a backdrop of continuous air alerts warning of stray, EW-jammed drones crossing into Baltic airspace.

This is why I called up my colleagues Sanita Jemberga (Re:Baltica) and Miglė Krancevičiūtė (Siena.lt) to record an emergency podcast. In this 20-minute episode, the three of us analyze what is driving Russia’s latest threats, how seriously we should take them, and what impact this new propaganda offensive could actually have.

By the way, as we were recording this very afternoon, Latvia witnessed yet another air alert warning residents of a possible drone incursion.

Thank you for listening, and please send us your feedback!

Holger

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Drone explosions, high-level arrests and the government’s collapse rocked Latvia over the last 10 days. Here, my colleague Sanita Jemberga writes what is going on and what to expect next.

***

“What on earth was that?” was the question many Latvians asked last week after witnessing one of the dumbest government collapses I can recall in more than 30 years in journalism.

I am writing this dispatch on Sunday from a café next to the Freedom Monument while waiting for my youngest to finish his 6K run in the Riga Marathon (around 46,000 people registered this year).

Earlier this morning, shortly after 6 a.m., the National Armed Forces sent out an email warning about a possible drone threat in eastern Latvia. Had I been in one of the five regions bordering Russia, I would also have received an SMS alert instructing residents to stay indoors and await further instructions. Shortly before 8 a.m., the threat was called off. One drone had entered Latvian airspace and then left without incident — this time.

It was at least the fifth warning of this kind this month. We are getting used to the fact that when Ukrainian drones attack ports or strategic targets in St Petersburg, Moscow or elsewhere near our border, some may end up crashing here. Ukrainians blame Russian electronic warfare systems for the deviations and have offered expertise in dealing with stray drones. Latvians still strongly support Ukraine and seem to be informed in advance about upcoming attacks — at least enough for NATO jets to be scrambled to protect our airspace — but public opinion could shift quickly if the drones start costing lives.

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It came close more than a week ago, when two drones crashed into an empty oil depot in the border city of Rēzekne. According to some experts, they may have been guided by AI systems that seek visual similarities in targets and therefore fail to distinguish between Russian and Latvian infrastructure. While people here tend to stay calm — drones have also fallen or crossed into Estonia, Lithuania, Finland and elsewhere — this incident created too much uncertainty.

How many drones were there? Initially, authorities thought one had crashed while another was still missing; later, the army commander explained that radar systems had not detected them in flight at all.

Why weren’t they shot down? Allegedly because the military feared that missed shots could hit civilians in the city below.

Why were residents not alerted immediately? What are the protocols for schools? Why were road workers still outside while the alert remained active?

In the end, many concluded that no real lessons had been learned from the first major drone incident in September 2024 — and that spending 5% of GDP on defence was not buying the protection people expected.

And at precisely that moment, Prime Minister Evika Siliņa (New Unity) decided to get rid of Defence Minister Andris Sprūds (The Progressives).

But that was not the reason. It was the pretext.

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The Progressives – currently Latvia’s third most popular party and the only semi-left force in an otherwise conservative and right-wing political landscape – entered government for the first time in 2023. They demanded and received the “heavy” ministries: defence, transport and culture (the latter traditionally useful for boosting ratings).

As it turned out, they were better at PR than governance. With parliamentary elections approaching in October, the coalition increasingly resembled a car without a driver. MPs from the coalition’s third partner, the Greens and Farmers Union, were supporting no-confidence motions against Progressive ministers or voting against other important issues. Urgent decisions were postponed. In a sluggish economy, with a war raging not far from our borders, the paralysis became too much.

That was the moment when Siliņa seemingly convinced herself that sacrificing Sprūds might save her. Opposition parties had already submitted a no-confidence motion against him, and she apparently hoped that by giving them his scalp, they would either support her government or agree to form a new coalition under her leadership.

In secret, she had asked her adviser — Colonel Raivis Melnis, the Defence Ministry’s representative in Ukraine — to become defence minister.

But the plan was disastrously miscalculated.

Sprūds resigned on his own terms, saying he wanted to prevent the armed forces from being dragged into political battles. The Progressives immediately announced they no longer supported the prime minister. Siliņa had failed to secure 51 votes in parliament before asking Melnis to take off his uniform and enter politics. Both opposition parties — the National Alliance and the United List – quickly declared they would not work under Unity or her leadership.

In practical terms, Siliņa no longer had a parliamentary majority.

The coalition had long survived under the slogan that “nothing better can be assembled in this parliament.” We are now about to find out whether that was true.

On Saturday, President Edgars Rinkēvičs invited Andris Kulbergs (United List) to try to form a government, giving him ten days to do so. The president signalled that he would prefer a broad coalition – essentially everyone except the populists and Kremlin sympathisers.

Rinkēvičs justified his choice by arguing that the United List is the largest opposition party and therefore deserves the opportunity. In reality, New Unity could hardly be nominated after blowing up its own government, while the Greens and Farmers Union has been crippled by a fresh criminal case involving its agriculture minister, who is accused of securing state financial support for timber companies that apparently did not need it.

So who is Kulbergs?

One of the country’s most outspoken petrolheads, he survived a serious car crash and later campaigned — while using a wheelchair and crutches — for better infrastructure for people with limited mobility. He joined the United List and entered parliament in 2022. There, he did solid (and loud) work in parliamentary investigative committees into Rail Baltica and inflated utility prices, while simultaneously earning criticism for spreading disinformation on other issues.

He is also a notorious hothead who probably should not be allowed near social media when angry. During protests against Latvia’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, attended by around 10,000 people, he threatened to spit in the face of one of the leaders of Latvia’s independence movement after the veteran politician spoke at the rally.

He also has no government experience.

So what happens next?

If Kulbergs fails to secure 51 votes, Rinkēvičs may invite someone else to try to form a government. Alternatively, Siliņa’s ministers could limp on as a technical minority government until the October elections.

That would be a terrible option. Difficult decisions are looming over the rescue of the struggling national airline and whether Rail Baltica can still be built on time.

Not to mention that someone still has to govern the country — and protect it from drones, and from Russia.

Thank you for reading the latest dispatch of the Baltic Flank! As always, if you liked what you read, please consider subscribing to receive our freshest updates.

We will be back with more updates soon!

Holger and Sanita

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Hi! It’s been a while.

Back in February, after the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service published its public threat assessment, something kept nagging at me. Tucked away within the information were two sentences mentioning a man in Kaliningrad who had set himself on fire in protest against the war in Ukraine.

Surely a case like this couldn’t have gone unnoticed on social media or in the Russian press? I asked several of my Russian friends and colleagues if they knew anything about the case. Could they search through local media sites and Telegram channels for any reference to this tragic event? They came back empty-handed. In fact, my colleague Ilya Ber admitted he didn’t even believe the report at first.

That’s when we set out to learn more about what happened that day in Kaliningrad. Who was the victim? Why hadn’t anyone heard about this clear act of protest against Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

Our first step was to identify every man born in 1988 who had died that day in Kaliningrad. We found two matches. A little more research, including obtaining a confidential Investigative Committee document, allowed us to verify Aleksandr Okunev as the protester.

We spoke to people close to Okunev, who described him as a smart, quick-witted, but quiet and withdrawn man. He worked as a programmer and system administrator for a company selling office and cash register equipment. “He had a very good head on his shoulders. If he had wanted to, he could have had a very successful career, but it seemed that money didn’t matter to him,” said one former colleague.

What happened on February 24 — the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion — came as a shock even to those closest to him. At around 5:00 a.m., he entered Kaliningrad’s Victory Park. The park is a deeply symbolic place, filled with Soviet war memorials.

Near the Memorial to 1,200 Guardsmen, which commemorates the Soviet victory in the capture of what was then Königsberg in 1945, he wrote “No to war” in the snow — likely with spray paint — and set himself on fire.

Someone discovered his body at around 6:40 a.m. and notified the authorities. A European intelligence official familiar with the case told us that what followed was a frantic rush by the authorities to scrub the scene of any traces of fire or protest.

“Their main goal was to quickly remove the body and eliminate the writing in the snow,” the official said. “A separate concern was whether anyone would notice the cleaners and investigators working at the scene.”

By 9:15 a.m., the scene was cleared, and the incident was reported to regional government leaders.

What makes this even more tragic is that Okunev knew exactly how his desperate act would be handled. In fact, he said as much in his farewell note to his family.

“He did it knowing that it probably wouldn’t appear in the news and that everything would be done to keep it out of sight. He took this step fully aware of that,” a person close to him—wishing to remain anonymous—told us.

“In his note, he wrote that he knew how it would go. Everything he wrote turned out exactly that way,” they said. “There were many personal things in the note, but he also wrote that it most likely wouldn’t make the news. He understood that. So, the assumption that this was meant to be something very visible—that’s not really the case.”

Why did the regime go to such lengths to keep Okunev’s self-immolation out of the public eye? Was it for fear of sparking wider protests? Were local officials simply afraid of being held responsible for a scandal on their watch? Or is it because the state demands total conformity in Russian society?

The experts we spoke with don’t believe Okunev’s act would have sparked a larger movement. However, I believe the Russian regime is afraid of any spark, however small, that might grow.

I also believe it was important to bring Aleksandr Okunev’s protest to light, despite those close to him questioning the point.

“At one time, an act may be considered heroic, but at another time, not at all. History is what it is. How something is evaluated changes all the time,” one person told us.

As mentioned above, this investigation was a collaboration between us at Delfi (in Estonian and in Russian), the Lithuanian Public Broadcaster LRT, and the independent Russian investigative outlet iStories. If you are interested in more details and expert views on how the regime covered up Okunev’s act, please read our full reports.

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I hope the change of tone doesn’t feel too abrupt, but on a much lighter note, Delfi’s investigative team visited our colleagues at Helsingin Sanomat yesterday to discuss new opportunities for cooperation.

Our visit was a follow-up to the HS team’s visit to Tallinn last autumn. The results of that first meeting were the shadow fleet investigations we published back in March. Let’s see what grows out of yesterday’s meeting!

Thank you, and greetings from the middle of the Gulf of Finland!

Holger

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Hi everyone, and greetings from Paris! I’ve been here speaking with diplomats, researchers, and reporters about our experiences with Russia’s malign influence and interference tactics.

Fittingly, my colleague Martin Laine published a fantastic investigation today in which he uncovered who is most likely behind the infamous “Narva People’s Republic” campaign that swept through much of European media and social media a few weeks ago.

As I explained yesterday in my presentation, the movement is a non-event that western media, politicians, analysts and social media enthusiasts managed to escalate into something much larger. Sometimes, we really do shoot ourselves in the foot.

But now, let me hand this post over to Martin, who wrote about how and what he discovered. If you like what you read here, please don’t forget to subscribe and share!

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In February 2026, obscure pages for a “Narva People’s Republic” began surfacing on Russian social media. Before long, what started as local rumors reached the Estonian press, eventually ballooning into headlines across major international outlets.

A provocative Telegram group that initially held only a few dozen followers quickly swelled to several thousand. While some international outlets correctly identified it as a Russian information operation, others framed it as genuine separatist sentiment brewing on Estonia’s border.

• Deutsche Welle asked: “Does the Estonian city of Narva really want to join Russia?”

• Euronews reported: “A ‘people’s republic’ on NATO’s edge: The Narva narrative testing Europe’s defences.”

Narva’s mayor, Katri Raik — whose mornings now consist of fielding interview requests from foreign journalists — told us at Eesti Ekspress that these media misconceptions couldn’t be further from the truth. She noted that Narva residents understand perfectly well that life in Russia is significantly worse than in Estonia. In fact they likely see the reality more clearly than those living in the capital, Tallinn.

Got a hint? Find me on Signal at holgerroonemaa.30.

Perhaps the best proof for this is the fact that among the tens of thousands of residents in this border town, not a single person has agreed to put up a separatist poster, despite the group’s administrators actively trying to persuade people to do so. Contrary to the breathless international reporting, there is no separatist “movement” in Narva.

To dispel these misconceptions, we will show who is actually promoting separatism in Narva. Spoiler: these people have nothing to do with Narva.

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Dissecting the Movement

In 2024, Russia’s National Bolshevik movement, Drugaya Rossiya (The Other Russia), posted: “There will be a Narva People’s Republic—there will be!”

I believe this is not a random prediction that just happened to come true (at least in obscure Russian social media channels). Especially since the anonymous admin of the Narva People’s Republic uses the exact same wording in their posts.

The Nazbols, or National Bolsheviks, present themselves as an opposition force in Russia; some of their members have even been arrested.

At the same time, they are hardcore nationalists and imperialists. For example, at a 2023 protest in front of the Estonian embassy, they declared: “Narva, Tartu, and Tallinn are Russian cities!”

In one of the group’s first posts, the administrator shared an edited image of Eduard Limonov—the founder of the original National Bolshevik Party—stylized in the colors of the fictional “Narva People’s Republic.” The choice of such a specific, niche radical figure is likely not a coincidence.

I decided to infiltrate the group. To gain entry, I had to follow a specific “verification” process: writing “Narva People’s Republic” in Russian on a piece of paper and taking a photo of it.

After a lengthy conversation, he admitted: “My views are similar to those of the National Bolshevik Party.”

A few years ago, a nearly identical campaign was launched in Latvia regarding a “Latgale People’s Republic.” The Polish outlet Vot-Tak eventually identified a suspected organizer behind those groups: Svyatoslav Znamensky. Interestingly, Znamensky bears a resemblance to the masked “separatist” currently appearing in Narva-themed propaganda...

Znamensky is a functionary of the St. Petersburg branch of Drugaya Rossiya (coincidence, again). He is a veteran who fought against Ukraine and has been seen speaking at party events—often with Limonov posters in the background—discussing his experience as a drone operator. This could also explain the frontline photos posted in the Narva group.

These are Russian activists with no organic connection to the Russian government or intelligence agencies (at least not yet). Even less do they have any connection to Narva.

The people of Narva have laughed this initiative off, and there is no real separatism there.

There is only the imperial ambition of outsiders from Russia.

Thank you and you will be hearing from us soon again!

Holger

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Szabolcs Panyi is a very good friend of mine. We met nearly 10 years ago while we were both fellows at ASU’s Walter Cronkite School of Journalism in Phoenix, Arizona. Since then, we’ve collaborated on numerous investigations, and he has even babysat my kids.

While it is generally not a good idea to interview your friends, I made an exception this time. Why? Because when Szabolcs published scoops revealing how the Kremlin has put the deputy head of Putin’s administration Sergey Kiriyenko in charge of Russia’s efforts to keep Viktor Orbán's Fidesz party in power in Hungary and how the Kremlin sent a team of GRU operatives to help Orbán out on the ground, the Hungarian state initiated a smear campaign against him and is accusing Szabolcs for espionage.

As journalists, it is our duty to support our colleagues around the world when someone attempts to silence them. Luckily, most of us aren't silenced that easily. As Szabolcs himself put it during the podcast:

“If they made a psychological profile of me, they must know that if I'm pressured, then I'm just getting very mad and multiplying my energy to carry out my investigations.

Of course, my co-interviewer Sanita Jemberga and I we spent a lot of time discussing the upcoming Hungarian elections — probably be the most consequential ones in Europe this year.

Here’s what Szabolcs said of what’s at stake:

• “Either there’s going to be harmony in a way that both our leadership and our institutions will be loyal to the Western alliance [in case the opposition Tisza party wins] or the other way around that Viktor Orbán will finally transform Hungary and its institutions into becoming allies of the Kremlin. I believe that the process of Hungary’s disintegration from both the European Union and NATO would unfortunately start.“

• Even if the opposition TISZA party wins, Panyi warns of Russian retaliation. This could include cutting off oil and gas supplies to create an economic crisis or launching sabotage attacks, arsons, and other hybrid threats. He notes that Russian intelligence has already deeply infiltrated Hungarian cyber defenses, which could be used to disrupt power plants or reactors.

These are just some of the excerpts of our conversation. I really hope you can find some time to listen to the podcast!

As Szabolcs said, when we come under personal attack, we multiply our energy to carry out our investigations. That is exactly what we did. Yesterday, we published a new investigation detailing how Hungary and Russia colluded to stall Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

The calls reveal how eager Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was to please his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov — calling to brief him in between EU meetings and volunteering to send Lavrov EU documents regarding Ukraine’s accession.

In one instance, Szijjártó essentially begged Lavrov to quickly organize a meeting between Putin and Orbán shortly before a NATO summit.

“It makes me want to vomit, how Szijjártó discusses with the aggressor how to put pressure on Ukraine,” a high-ranking EU official told us after reviewing the transcripts.

I find it hard to imagine how Szijjártó will attend future EU-level meetings, or how his European counterparts could ever feel comfortable discussing sensitive topics in his presence again.

Last but not least, our friends from the independent Russian fact-checking outlet Provereno have published a superb report detailing the types of fakes and disinformation about Hungary being presented to Russian society — and potentially within Hungary itself — by Russian actors.

“In recent weeks, Russian-language disinformation outlets have also produced a notable volume of content about the Hungarian elections. At first glance, the subject might seem unlikely to interest an average Russian reader—but the framing shifts once Ukrainians are cast as villains, allegedly scheming to harm Hungary,” Provereno writes.

According to their report, the disinformation cases recently identified by Hungarian fact-checkers revolve around the same themes as earlier Russian-language campaigns — corruption in Ukraine and Europe, wartime recruitment, the “Epstein files,” and so on — albeit reframed through Hungarian realities and domestic concerns.

“On the other hand, these falsehoods are often seeded through purpose-built websites, which are abandoned almost immediately afterward and designed to mimic both real and fictitious media outlets. This tactic is a hallmark of pro-Kremlin disinformation efforts, lending an air of credibility to fabricated claims,” Provereno notes.

I highly value Provereno’s work and encourage you to check out the specific examples on their website.

That’s all for now! Please don’t hesitate to share this post with your friends and colleagues. As always, I welcome your comments, feedback, and suggestions.

Until next time!

Holger

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Inevitably, some of those drones ended up on our side of the border. In one instance, a drone probably redirected by Russian electronic warfare mistook the chimney of an Estonian power plant for its target and slammed straight into it. I’ll provide a more in-depth analysis of the drone situation in the coming days, but for now, I want to highlight two other stories.

Many of you have likely already seen our latest scoop: the revelation of a direct hotline between Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov.

Here’s what we revealed:

• Between 2023 and 2025, Szijjártó and Lavrov held frequent phone calls in which the Hungarian minister shared behind-the-scenes details from confidential EU meetings.

• At Lavrov's request — claiming to act on behalf of sanctioned oligarch Alisher Usmanov — Szijjártó presented a plan for how Hungary and Slovakia intended to get Usmanov’s sister off the EU sanctions list.

• Seven months later, the sister, Gulbahor Ismailova, was indeed delisted after Hungary and Slovakia threatened to block the extension of all EU sanctions against Russian individuals and entities.

• In another call, Szijjártó asked Russia’s Deputy Energy Minister, Pavel Sorokin, to help him craft talking points for EU negotiations. He needed a way to frame the removal of entities from the sanctions list as being in "Hungary’s national interest."

• “I have already removed 72 [entities] from the list, but there were 128,” Szijjártó was recorded saying. “I’m trying to continue, but I have to say that this is in the interest of Hungary.”.

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If you haven’t yet, I highly recommend reading the full investigation (available in English via VSquare and The Insider). I also want to give a massive shoutout to our partners at Delfi (in Estonian and in Russian) — FRONTSTORY (Poland) and the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK, Slovakia)—who were instrumental in this project. It was a truly great team work!

The recordings have already triggered a firestorm across Europe. Polish PM Donald Tusk remarked that “one could hardly imagine anything more repulsive,” while Ukraine’s Andrii Sybiha described the calls not as diplomacy, but as “obsequious reporting to Russian patrons,” calling the situation “a disgrace” that warrants a full investigation.

Szijjártó himself has doubled down. While accusing foreign intelligence services of meddling in the upcoming Hungarian elections—and inadvertently confirming the authenticity of our audio and transcripts—he insisted he was simply “conducting diplomacy.”

Got a hint? Find me on Signal at holgerroonemaa.30.

I usually maintain a strict wall between my reporting and the opinion desk, but I want to share three recommendations recently published by the Delfi Editorial Board in the wake of our story:

1. Hungary must be immediately excluded from all high-level EU decision-making and councils. Sensitive information cannot be allowed to reach the Kremlin via Budapest.

2. Sanctions must be reimposed on every individual and entity exempted at Hungary’s demand. Furthermore, the sanctions Hungary previously blocked should be enacted immediately.

3. Finally, if Viktor Orbán were to win the elections in two weeks, Hungary should be permanently isolated from the European Union — whether through Article 7 (deprivation of voting rights), a theoretical use of Article 50, or an extraordinary rewrite of the EU treaties to protect the Union’s integrity.

And now for something completely different. My colleague Sanita Jemberga (Re:Baltica, Latvia) writes about a controversial court verdict that changes the landscape of Russian language media in the country.

Latvia’s Constitutional Court has just handed down a decision with far-reaching consequences: public broadcasting in Russian, it says, is not compatible with the constitution.

To outsiders, this may sound puzzling. How can a country where roughly every fourth person speaks Russian as their native language decide it has no place for that language in public media? What, exactly, is the state trying to achieve?

If you are local, you saw it coming — but not everyone would agree on where it is going.

Language has been a fault line in Latvian politics since restoration of independence in the 1990s. Soviet-era migration policies deliberately swelled the number of Russian speakers, at one point threatening to turn Latvians into a minority in their own country. The response has been decades of policies aimed at strengthening Latvian as the sole state language - across education, institutions and media. The 2012 referendum, where nearly 75% voted against making Russian a second state language, cemented that consensus.

Back then, however, the media landscape was different. Russian-language newspapers, radio stations and Kremlin TV channels were widely available. Latvia’s public broadcaster also maintained a presence in Russian — radio, online and a TV channel that eventually faded due to low viewership. Many Russian speakers by habit simply chose Moscow’s media over Riga’s.

Russia’s war in Ukraine changed the mood in Latvia to very dark for anything Russian, including the media:

• Books in Russian have higher VAT than in Latvian or other EU languages.

• Newspapers have already almost died (two still exist: weekly “MK-Latvia” for which war in Ukraine does not exist, and pro-Russian “Vesti” which is read by pensioners).

• Kremlin TV channels are banned, and so are many Russian websites.

What remains are few local outlets (notably, Delfi and TVNET, but state support is not available for anything in Russian) and the public broadcaster’s Russian-language content — arguably one of the last attempts to offer an alternative to Moscow’s narrative.

That, too, is now being dismantled. For years, the right-wing nationalist National Alliance has pushed to eliminate public broadcasting in Russian. Before leaving government, it managed quietly to insert this goal from 2026 into the national security concept. New parliament ratified it without even noticing.

Therefore the timid public broadcaster — which is under constant attacks by the same nationalists on Latvian social media which has disproportionate impact on politics — saw no other option than to close the radio channel in Russian as of January this year. Remnants were moved online along with some Ukrainian and Belarusian content which are also Latvian minorities.

But that wasn’t enough. Politicians took the issue to the Constitutional Court. The court has now ruled that the state has no obligation to broadcast in Russian, arguing that it is a large, self-sufficient language with ample private media. Other minority languages, in theory, could be treated differently, if they asked.

At the same time, the chair of court explained that public broadcaster in Russian could broadcast information which confronts Russian propaganda and speaks of Latvia’s values, such as supporting Ukraine or having fair elections.

The implication is hard to miss: Russian speakers may still be addressed in their own language—but only selectively, and on the state’s terms.

Interestingly, the practice of banning public broadcasting in Russian and also not supporting private media directly contradicts the policy of Estonia which has very similar proportion of native Russian speakers, and, presumably, the same Russian threat as Latvia.

What happens next is as much about politics as policy. With parliamentary elections looming in October, competing to be “the most Latvian” remains a reliable campaign strategy (guaranteed at least 10% of vote every time, but with war in Ukraine in the background, all mainstream parties are moving towards more nationalistic positions).

The decision takes full effect in 2027, leaving some room for manoeuvre. In a best-case scenario, parts of the existing infrastructure — like the new public media studio in Latgale, a region seen as particularly vulnerable to Russian influence — might survive in some form. But in an election year, even that may be a stretch.

Where will the Russian speaking audience go? According to most recent research, public broadcaster reached around 52 percent of Latvian minorities. Another 25 percent are reached by commercial media in Russian, and 17 percent by no one.

Now they may well be joined by another 14 percent of people who consumed public broadcaster only in minority languages. In a media environment where VPNs are ubiquitous and Russian state content is just a click away, the likely destination is not hard to guess.

Thank you for reading the latest dispatch of the Baltic Flank! As always, if you liked what you read, please consider subscribing to receive our freshest updates.

We will be back with more updates soon!

Holger

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I was initially planning to publish this post at the end of the month, as the Kremlin was expected to ban the popular Telegram messaging app only in April. However, reports that Telegram is already being blocked in Moscow began surfacing earlier this week. So, here it goes! I’ve asked some of the leading experts to share their insights on the consequences if and when Russia effectively shuts down the platform.

First, you will hear from Ilya Ber, one of the world’s leading experts on Russian disinformation. Although he has lived in Tallinn for years now, he remains exceptionally well-sourced within Moscow. Then, I will hand it over to my colleagues Marta Vunš and Sanita Jemberga, who will provide insight into how a Russian Telegram ban will affect the disinformation and sabotage landscape in Estonia and Latvia.

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Power Struggle Between Two Kremlin Factions

Ilya Ber, fact-checker at Delfi and the founder and publisher of Provereno.media, an independent Russian-language fact-checking site

It remains unclear whether Russia will block Telegram entirely. While April 1 has been leaked to the media as a potential date, it is by no means certain that this reflects reality.

Behind the scenes in the Kremlin, a serious power struggle is underway. One faction of the elite — apparently backed by the FSB — is promoting the “MAX” messenger. They are being opposed by another faction whose businesses, lifestyle, and influence are built around Telegram. This latter group appears to be lobbied by parts of the Presidential Administration and even the Ministry of Defense, primarily because Telegram is where effective communication and coordination on the front line actually take place. Furthermore, it serves as the primary platform for pro-war military bloggers, volunteers, and state propaganda.

Consequently, a ban would be risky and would undoubtedly frustrate millions of people. However, I do not believe the consequences would be catastrophic for the authorities. So far, there are no signs that internal tensions are strong enough to trigger mass peaceful protests, let alone a larger uprising—and a Telegram ban is almost certainly not the catalyst that would change that.

That said, Telegram is a vital, relatively uncensored platform that Russian propaganda has used aggressively since the start of the full-scale war — and indeed long before it. For Russia’s “fake factory,” it is arguably the most important platform.

What would change? On one hand, the “information circuit” would become more insular; the primary propaganda platform for the domestic Russian audience would likely migrate to MAX or be split between MAX and VK. On the other hand, the use of VPN services would become even more widespread. While advertising such services is currently banned and Roskomnadzor is actively blocking them, the use of VPNs by ordinary citizens is not prohibited or criminalized. As a result, the range of options on the market remains vast and continues to grow.

Before we continue with Marta, here is a brief look at Telegram’s relevance as an information source in Estonia:

• While social media ranks only fourth as an information source for the Estonian-speaking population (behind TV, radio, and news sites like Delfi), it is the primary news source for the quarter of Estonia’s population that is Russian-speaking.

• For Russian-speakers, Telegram, YouTube, and Facebook are equally popular, with more than half of that demographic getting their news there. In contrast, only 12% of ethnic Estonians use Telegram for news.

• Because there are few popular local Russian-language channels on Telegram, Russian war bloggers, state propaganda outlets, and influencers have direct, unvetted access to Russian-speakers in the Baltics. This is especially critical given that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have already banned numerous Russian TV channels and websites.

• Lastly, Telegram has become the primary channel for Russian security services to recruit local individuals for sabotage attempts.

Change will arrive slowly; Telegram is too important for sabotage and propaganda

Marta Vunš, fact-checker at our team in Delfi Estonia

Most likely, there will be no significant impact on the local Russian-speaking population in Estonia. First, since Telegram is a very important tool for pro-Kremlin propagandists and war bloggers to broadcast their messages outside of Russia and especially to Russian-speaking people, it would be difficult to give up this opportunity or move the same audiences elsewhere. It is directly in Russia’s interest for their messages to reach Russian-speaking people outside of Russia. It would also be naive to assume that people here will start using their new state “Max” platform. I think that they will rather stay on Telegram and follow [sources and information] what will still be offered there.

Secondly, in mid-February, Russian Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev said that authorities do not currently plan to restrict the use of Telegram at the front, where Russian forces rely on it to coordinate their activities. He did express hope that the military would switch to other platforms over time. Telegram is strategically important to Russia in other areas as well, and the Kremlin will likely maintain (to a limited extent) the possibility of its use for state and regime-friendly propaganda channels.

Telegram has also been a very important tool for recruiting people for Russian special services (you can read our reports about it here and here, including an undercover investigation). If Telegram will indeed be forcefully banned, the change for the Russian-speaking population in Estonia will arrive rather slowly and over a long period of time. I also do not believe that skilled and important pro-Kremlin propagandists will immediately close their channels or stop using Telegram at the first ban. Many also make a living from it and will use a VPN if necessary. There has also been a loud outcry from many bloggers criticizing the plan to ban Telegram.

Kremlin-funded propaganda channels on Telegram aimed at people in Estonia or “Pribaltika” have not been very popular so far. Instead, local Russian-language people follow larger and more influential channels. If these were to stop their work on Telegram, other options such as VK would surely be discovered. Telegram is also used by local Estonian conspiracy theorists and government-skeptical communities that are not Russian-speaking. However, it is used much less than, for example, Facebook. Since Russia cannot ban Telegram outside of Russia, these groups and channels will remain intact. Misinformation still moves primarily through Facebook, TikTok, and X in Estonia.

Z-bloggers, researchers and saboteurs

Sanita Jemberga, editor-in-chief of The Baltic Centre for Investigative Journalism Re:Baltica (Latvia)

Regarding the precise number of users in Latvia, I have yet to see reliable statistics, but Telegram is not currently among the top social media applications in the country. If the restriction is limited solely to Russia, the effect on daily life will likely be negligible, as most people will simply continue using WhatsApp, which is already more popular.

However, I can identify a few specific groups that would be significantly affected. First are the local residents — both Russians and Latvians — who use the platform to follow Russian propaganda channels and “Z-bloggers” to gain Moscow’s perspective on the war in Ukraine. Russia has even financed a specialized propaganda network specifically targeting the Baltics to spread disinformation.

The second group consists of researchers who rely on Telegram content for monitoring and analysis. Finally, the third group is Russia itself, which utilizes the platform to recruit individuals for sabotage. If Telegram is blocked, the Kremlin will be forced to find new channels to replace these functions.

That’s all for this edition! I realize I’ve been hitting your inboxes a bit more frequently over the past few weeks, so I truly appreciate you bearing with me. If you enjoy these insights or find them useful, please consider subscribing and sharing this post with your friends and colleagues. As always, I’m very much open to your feedback and comments!

Greetings from Tallinn and until next time!

Holger

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We spent weeks analyzing the tankers carrying oil out of Russian ports in the Baltic Sea. We knew they were dangerous, but we wanted to understand exactly how dangerous. That is how we discovered the Ailana.

The Ailana is 23 years old. It lacks an ice class rating and has no credible insurance. Its actual owner is hidden behind a Hong Kong-based corporate advisor. Even Russia deemed the vessel “high-risk” as early as 2023. It regularly performs ship-to-ship oil transfers—an maneuver regarded as exceptionally risky—and currently carries 100,000 tons of sanctioned Russian crude oil.

These are just a few of the 15 risk factors we identified. After analyzing more than 700 shadow-fleet tankers that sailed through the Gulf of Finland over the last three months, these markers allowed us to designate the Ailana the most dangerous tanker in the Baltic Sea.

When we identified the Ailana, we didn’t want to describe it solely through compliance reports and public data; we wanted to show it to our readers. We rented a small plane and sent a photographer and reporter into the sky to capture the vessel as it pressed through the frozen Gulf of Finland.

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We were fortunate to catch it passing between Tallinn and Helsinki on a crisp February morning. As the sun rose, our photographer captured really striking images.

However, the Ailana is far from the only threat. We detected approximately one hundred tankers with a similar number of “red flags.” It is a catastrophe waiting to happen. Since roughly 40% of all tankers leaving Russian ports in the Baltic Sea lack credible P&I insurance, the fallout from an oil spill would be financially and ecologically devastating.

We consulted maritime scientists at Tallinn University of Technology to model how a spill of 30,000 tons of crude oil would spread based on the Ailana’s route and specific weather conditions. Although the graph is in Estonian, the takeaway is clear: if an accident had occurred between Tallinn and Helsinki on a specific day last December, most of the oil would have reached the shores and beaches of Estonia’s Lahemaa National Park.

Despite being sanctioned by the EU, UK, Canada, Australia, Ukraine, and Switzerland, nothing stops the Ailana from sailing. Since joining the shadow fleet, it has changed flags five times, operating companies four times, names three times, and owners twice. It currently operates under the flag of Sierra Leone.

“Sierra Leone is a dreadful flag and is being used by floating rust buckets,“ Michelle Wiese Bockmann, one of the world’s leading shipping experts, told us.

We traced the Ailana’s current owner to a Hong Kong-registered company, Delphyx Beacon Ltd. We called the nominal owner, a local corporate service provider with a history appearing in the Panama Papers. His name is Wai Man Chan, though he also goes by Raymond.

When we spoke to Raymond, it was telling how long it took him to even recognize the name of the company he supposedly owns.

The tanker is managed by Azerbaijan-registered Nautilus Fleet Management. Its registered address is a dormitory in the town of Sumqayit that houses refugees. The legal representative for Nautilus Fleet is a Georgian man with high-level political family connections.

We also spoke with two crew members working aboard the Ailana. Surprisingly, they claimed the ship is in “relatively good shape” compared to other shadow-fleet tankers.

One man shared an experience from a previous ship that had a hole in its hull; the crew had to constantly pump out leaking water. “We worked like that for months,” he said.

Working on tankers is considered the pinnacle of a sailor’s career, which is why sanctions are often ignored. The pay is also significant—a second mate can earn as much as $15,000 a month.

The crew members we interviewed seemed unfazed by the threat of sanctions. They told us about the tanker Marinera, which was seized by the U.S. in the Atlantic Ocean. “The men later wrote in crew chat groups that they were briefly reprimanded, then released, and everything was fine. To them, sanctions are primarily a bureaucratic nuisance,” one man explained.

This investigation was a collaboration between the investigative desks of Helsingin Sanomat and Delfi Estonia. A huge shoutout to the entire team: Oliver Kund, Kaur Maran, Greete Palgi, Holger Roonemaa, Nathaniel Peutherer (all Delfi), Sami Sillanpää, Jarno Liski, Juho Salminen, Aleksandr Atasuntsev (all Helsingin Sanomat). Photos by Marko Mumm and visuals by Madli Utt, Linda Vainomäe and Mart Nigola.

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Credit: James O’Brien / OCCRP

I am really happy and proud to share a scoop with you that we broke just this morning! We have spent the last few months investigating the Russian “shadow fleet,” focusing specifically on the tankers carrying oil out of Russia’s Baltic Sea ports.

Today, we released a story detailing how these sanctioned tankers now regularly carry two-person “security teams.” What makes these teams so notable? Well, we identified that most of these men—all of whom are Russian citizens—have histories as Wagner mercenaries; some are former GRU Spetsnaz, others are paratroopers.

We analyzed 20 crew lists detailing journeys that vessels took from the ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk in the eastern Gulf of Finland. In those lists, we identified 17 men serving as these “vessel protectors.” Out of those 17, we were able to confirm a military or paramilitary background in 13 cases.

The man pictured above, for example, is Victor Alexandrov — callsign “Katso” — a former Wagner mercenary. We identified that the photo of him in front of the old truck was taken in Homs, Syria, and uploaded in May 2021. On the right, the same man is pictured on a tanker.

When we reached out to Alexandrov for comment, he told us he “was purely an observer” on the Kira K tanker. Alexandrov did not respond to further questions, but another man we identified as a “guard,” 50-year-old Dmitri Frolov, told us to stop asking.

“Forget it, don’t write. Otherwise, I’ll turn [you] in to the FSB,” he texted us on Telegram.

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Why is Russia using such men on these tankers? We spoke about it with intelligence sources from multiple countries.

“The goal of this activity is to protect the Russian Federation’s revenue base from potential threats, whether it be [Ukraine-organized] sabotage or other interference from the West,” Colonel Ants Kiviselg, head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center, told us.

An analyst with the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (SUPO) said these Russian security teams are likely tasked with preventing the rest of the ship’s crew from complying with foreign authorities. They may also act as “liaisons” for those who hired them, the analyst added. “It can be assumed that if, for example, Russian military forces and naval vessels are operating in the same area and escorting these ships, then the task of these men may be to facilitate communication.”

Another high-ranking European intelligence officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the presence of security officials on the ships raises the stakes for any efforts to intervene in Russia’s oil trade.

“Two potentially armed individuals certainly changes the risk calculus when we must decide whether to stop or seize a tanker. Russia believes this makes NATO member states along the Baltic Sea more cautious,” the official said.

This is just a glimpse into our full reporting on the topic. I would be delighted if you would head over and give it a more nuanced read at OCCRP, Delfi Estonia, or Helsingin Sanomat—depending on your language preference.

***

Stories like this take a lot of resources and effort. Almost always, they are cross-border collaborations. So, here’s a shoutout to all the fantastic journalists from Delfi, Helsingin Sanomat, OCCRP, and iStories whom I was proud to work with on this investigation.

As I don’t want to split your attention between too many topics, I will be back here in the next few days to tell you how we identified the most dangerous tanker on the Baltic Sea.

So long, and thank you for reading!

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Two days ago, on February 24, Estonia celebrated its Independence Day. However, the date also marked the fourth anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Much has changed in these four years. For one, the Baltic states have effectively quadrupled their defense budgets. We know that if we want to protect ourselves, we are racing against time. Estonia’s defense budget alone has reached 2.4 billion euros this year — an increase from the 645 million euros allocated in 2021. We need to buy a lot, we need to spend a lot, and we need to do it fast.

In situations like this, things can go wrong — especially considering the lack of visibility into military procurements and contracts.

That is why my colleagues Sanita Jemberga (Latvia’s Re:Baltica), Indre Makaraitytė (LRT in Lithuania), and I — with help from our friends at Paper Trail Media — decided to investigate how the German arms giant Rheinmetall is making its move into the Baltics. You can watch Sanita and me in a brief behind-the-scenes talk in the video above, but here is the story in a nutshell.

Rheinmetall — whose stock has risen by 1,600% since 2022—is offering to build much-needed 155mm artillery shell factories in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. But there’s a catch: they are only willing to do it if the states become minority partners, investing upwards of 130 million euros. It remains unclear what rights these minority partners would actually hold. Additionally, the countries would have to commit to mandatory “offtake” agreements, buying a set share of the factory’s production. Again, it is unclear how the price or quantity of these shells would be determined.

In Estonia’s case, the combined co-investment and mandatory purchase obligations would have totaled more than 200 million euros. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) replied with a polite “nein” to Rheinmetall’s offer. However, Lithuania and Latvia were happy to accept the deals, seemingly with very few questions asked.

As Raimonds Bergmanis, head of the Latvian Parliament’s Defense Committee, told us: “We have not heard anything from the Ministry of Defense, except for what was publicly announced about the memorandum [with Rheinmetall]. But let them come and build. Rheinmetall is a big player.”

Estonia, which already boasts some of the largest 155mm shell stocks in Europe and was quick to secure new procurements in 2022, opted instead for a public tender for plant construction. Even though the announcement of a winner has been postponed for four months, the MoD remains optimistic. The winning company will not require state co-investment, nor will it impose mandatory purchase obligations on the state.

Which Baltic country made the right call? It’s impossible to say for now. But I suspect we will be reporting on this and similar topics for years to come.

Read the full investigations:

• English version on Re:Baltica

• Estonian-focused version on Delfi

If you like what you read, please let us know — and more importantly — share our stories with your network.

In Other News...

Last week, an Estonian court sentenced yet another Russian spy to six and a half years in prison. Anatoly Privalov, 50, carried an Israeli passport. According to Estonia’s Internal Security Service (KAPO), he was recruited by the FSB back in 2016. What began as “small” tasks — reporting on military exercises or convoys spotted on highways — gradually turned more sinister. Before his arrest, Privalov’s main task was preparing high-impact acts of sabotage in Estonia and elsewhere in Europe. KAPO also published details about Privalov’s FSB handler, Kjamran Alijev.

Got a hint? Find me on Signal at holgerroonemaa.30.

Talking about sabotage, the Finnish Public Broadcaster YLE published an interesting report today on how the Wagner Group continues to recruit saboteurs across Europe. What makes YLE’s story particularly interesting — aside from the fact that they interviewed me — is the discussion on why Russia has avoided high-profile sabotage in Finland while remaining much more aggressive in Central Europe.

Must Read. Finally, I highly recommend a powerful feature by my colleague Ilya Lozovsky at OCCRP. Ilya details the grimmest year of the war yet for Ukraine’s investigative journalists—a year that began with a blow from abroad when the U.S. abruptly extinguished a key source of journalism funding.

“The year ended in cold and darkness, as a relentless Russian bombing campaign has laid waste to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure... Most of these journalists are women, and almost all are young. Despite juggling small children and worrying about husbands at war, they continue to interview sources, pore over leaked documents, and sift through data,” Ilya writes.

He goes on to quote Anna Babinets, editor-in-chief of Slidstvo.info: “No one in Ukraine has a lot of energy. But on the other hand, because we are journalists, we can fight… The energy sometimes comes when you discover something.”

Please read Ilya’s story and, if you can, support these world-class reporters with a donation. I am happy to provide specific suggestions if needed.

Thank you for reading. I feel confident to promise more exciting — if slightly frightening — scoops in the near future!

Holger

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I read them both.

They give a good overview of what to expect from Russia in 2026—not only in the Baltic area, but well beyond.

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The Good News

A Russian military threat against the Baltic countries is not imminent, according to both reports. The Estonian report states that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the coming year and that the VLA is “likely to reach a similar assessment next year.”

The reason? Europe’s growing defense investments that “compel the Kremlin to calculate very carefully what, if anything, it can risk attempting.”

The Long-Term Warning

Latvia’s SAB warns that Russia’s perception of Latvia is becoming increasingly similar to the one it held of Ukraine before the war—depicting us as “Nazis.” While Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Latvia at the moment, a number of signs indicate potential long-term plans.

“Our information indicates that Russian officials believe the propaganda the regime has created and disseminated about Latvia. Although not a priority for Russia, the increasingly negative view of Latvia may result in more aggressive Russian decisions in the long term.”

The Latvians also warn of continued Russian sabotage operations against Western countries, alongside a readiness to carry out cyberattacks on industrial control systems running critical infrastructure.

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The Term of the Year: BSM

The VLA writes of a new concept gaining traction inside the Kremlin: the Baltic–Scandinavian macro-region (BSM) (Балтийско-Скандинавский макрорегион).

The BSM concept is being pushed by a Kafkaesquely named body inside the Presidential Administration: the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC). We have written about the CBC extensively over the last few years—for example, here, here, and here.

Besides Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the macro-region includes Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland. Welcome to the BSM, dear neighbours!

The BSM concept is not a genuine academic or environmental endeavor, but a geopolitical influence operation orchestrated by the Kremlin with heavy involvement from Russian intelligence services. A prime example is the Baltic Platform initiative, which my colleagues and I uncovered a few years ago.

The ultimate goal is to provide the Russian government with actionable plans to interfere in the domestic politics of Baltic Sea countries, undermine national security and energy policies, and use international platforms to accuse Baltic/Scandinavian states of human rights violations or religious persecution.

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Peace Prize for Roger Waters?

One of the more entertaining sections of the VLA report reveals the “behind-the-curtains” drama of the Tolstoy International Peace Prize. This was created by Russian spy chief Sergey Naryshkin and Putin’s advisor (and recent “head negotiator”) Vladimir Medinsky as an alternative to the Nobel Peace Prize. (You can read our profile of Medinsky here).

“When the 2024 prize was being prepared, it became clear that finding a suitable Western nominee would be rather challenging. Several names proposed—such as Roger Waters, film director Oliver Stone, or former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder—were deemed respectable but potentially counterproductive by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Waters’s case, officials were uncertain whether he would agree to accept the award or travel to Moscow. As for Stone and Schröder, the ministry noted the “Russophobic predisposition” of their home countries and concluded that awarding them the prize would not resonate positively there from Moscow’s perspective.”

In the end, the Tolstoy Peace Prize was awarded to the African Union.

A Self-Immolated Protester

While the VLA doesn’t see an abrupt change coming in Russia or an anti-war opposition gaining a public voice, it did reveal a shocking example of protest that Russia has managed to keep “under the lid” until now.

According to the report, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression—at five o’clock in the morning on February 24, 2025—a man born in 1988 wrote “No to war” in the snow near a monument to a Russian soldier in Kaliningrad and set himself on fire in protest. The report did not reveal the man’s identity or his current condition.

GRU Chasing Western Equipment

I’m actually quite surprised by the amount of detailed information the VLA published this year. It isn’t just generalizations; it contains significant detailed data.

For example, they reveal how roughly a hundred GRU officers spend their working days handling product codes, price quotes, and logistics chains to procure technology for Russia’s military industry. The report identifies 10 GRU officers who operate through one specific cover company: Neptun Ko Ltd (ООО Нептун Ко Лтд).

A Huge Push in Drone Warfare

While the EU is pondering how to build its billion-euro “drone wall” and debating if it should be called a wall at all, Russia is pushing hard to implement unmanned systems units across all military branches.

The development of Russia’s unmanned capabilities is of major importance for NATO and Estonia for several reasons:

• Supply: Russia’s defense industry and civilian sector are likely capable of supplying enough unmanned systems to equip new units.

• Capabilities: The extensive adoption of these systems will likely enhance Russia’s intelligence, naval-strike, indirect-fire, and precision-strike capabilities.

• Scale: In the event of conflict, the state must be prepared to fight an adversary using a massive number of unmanned systems at strategic, operational, and tactical levels—on land, in the air, and at sea—simultaneously across Estonia’s entire territory.

Russia is “expected to produce around 190 unmanned systems battalions.” In the Baltic Fleet, a regiment of unmanned naval strike vehicles has already been formed, along with a UAV regiment under the direct command of the Leningrad Military District. These units are currently being staffed and armed in our immediate vicinity.

Russia’s Main Target in 2026: Armenia

Perhaps the most interesting chapters in the VLA report concern Moldova and the South Caucasus. While Russia lost its expensive campaign to steer Moldova back into its sphere of control, the Kremlin “is almost sure to make another attempt to seize control of Moldova’s state institutions,” the report says.

At the same time, the most imminent risk for Russia is losing control over the South Caucasus. Analyzing the U.S.-led peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan—which include a framework for an American-controlled transit corridor—the VLA assesses that this could mark the beginning of Russia’s ejection from the entire region. This “loss” would be a traumatic event of historic proportions for the Kremlin.

Russia is highly likely to do everything in its power to derail the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty and the creation of the transit corridor named after President Donald Trump.

“Moscow’s best option for undermining President Trump’s initiative is to intervene in Armenia’s domestic politics. Russia will therefore almost certainly launch a major influence campaign against Armenia in 2026. This campaign will aim to interfere in Armenia’s parliamentary elections [this summer], remove Prime Minister Pashinyan from power, and install a government that appears nationalist but is, in substance, under Russia’s control.”

These are just some of the excerpts from the Baltic intelligence reports. If you’re interested in reading more, you can find the English versions here and here. Also, the Latvian counterintelligence agency (VDD) published their report just yesterday, but I haven’t had a chance to dive into that one yet.

Thank you, and until next time!

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I am absolutely awed by the warm welcome The Baltic Flank received last week. In just a few days, this community grew from literally zero to more than 900 subscribers, and the interview with Ambassador Vosman has already been read by well over 12,000 people!

Thank you to each and every one of you. Please keep spreading the word!

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The Cable Mystery: A Reality Check

One of the newsworthy quotes from the interview with Andres Vosman was his take on the severed undersea cables in the Baltic Sea. Let’s revisit that for a second:

“My strong assessment is that predominantly the Baltic Sea incidents of recent years have been caused by a coincidence of circumstances - significantly larger shipping traffic in the Russian direction, vessels in poor condition and crews with low professionalism, more underwater infrastructure than before, greater public attention.”

Few Western intelligence agencies or officials have been so direct in their assessments.

But last week, we saw backing for that view from an unexpected quarter. As the cargo ship Fitburg—suspected of cutting data cables between Estonia and Finland on New Year’s Eve—was allowed to leave a Finnish port, our northern neighbor’s internal security service, Supo, issued a rare on-the-record statement that largely echoes Vosman.

While stressing that their comments were general and not a reference to any specific incident, the agency told the Finnish public broadcaster YLE that “there is no indication at the European level that Russia has trained proxy actors for tasks in maritime areas”.

Like Vosman, Supo assessed that damage to underwater infrastructure is not rare—globally or in the Baltic Sea—but that it “just hasn’t been talked about much before.” They pointed to the increasing density of cables, the pattern of incidents occurring during autumn and winter storms, and the fact that the Baltic Sea is critical to Russia’s own economy, giving them an incentive to keep the routes open.

According to Supo, various events that have nothing to do with Russia are being unjustifiably interpreted by the public as Russian sabotage.

“This kind of discussion is beneficial to Russia, as it reinforces the image of Russia’s omnipotence,” the agency told YLE.

The Giant with Clay Feet

This feeds directly into the second part of today’s dispatch: the image of Russia’s omnipotence.

Back in the autumn, my team and I published a series of articles where we dove into the fear of war in Estonian society. As we picked up signals about this spreading anxiety, we wanted to look deeper. How does it affect the everyday lives of families and couples? What about the economy? And is the fear justified, or is it exaggerated?

I don’t think I have ever received more feedback on a series than I did for this one. Readers sent emails and WhatsApp messages explaining, sometimes in intimate detail, exactly how they feel.

Why am I telling you this now? Two reasons.

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First, for those of you interested in “longreads,” I have temporarily removed the paywalls on the most important stories in that series to submit them for a journalism award. It’s a limited-time chance to read them before I have to reinstate the paywall in a few weeks! (Links are at the bottom).

Second, as part of that series, we needed to establish the actual threat level. We spoke with more than 20 top-level defense, security, and intelligence officials, including the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces, Lieutenant General Andrus Merilo.

Even though it feels like a lot has changed in the months since, the strategic reality hasn’t. To be sure, I went back to General Merilo this week to ask him directly: What has changed?

Lieutenant General Andrus Merilo. Photo: Ilmar Saabas / Delfi Meedia

Here are some of his insights on the timeline, the threat, and the myth of the invincible Russian bear.

On Russia’s “Omnipotence” General Merilo notes that in the public imagination, Russia tends to be a “six-meter-tall, immortal, and invincible giant.” Yet quite clearly, this giant has failed to achieve its goals in Ukraine.

“Now he is tied to the Ukraine war, having suffered colossal losses in people, equipment, and the economy. If anyone thinks that he is still invincible and no one else can stand against him, then that is false.”

On the Real Threat to NATO

“If Russia attacks us, it attacks NATO. It will lose. It will lose this war with NATO. Simply, the beginning of this war may be too ugly for us [Estonia], which means we will suffer losses while bringing the adversary to a halt... But if Russia makes this miscalculation against NATO, then it will lose.”

“Today’s picture, at least regarding land forces, is relatively positive. Russian units are not lined up behind the Estonian border in the land, air, or maritime domains. The picture is not such that war will break out tomorrow morning.”

On Putin’s “Immortality” Complex

“We must understand specifically what motivates Putin. If he is motivated only by achieving the status of immortality after his death... then he cannot stop at the point where he is today. This is, unfortunately, a harsh reality... Weakness provokes – this has long been known and Estonians have constantly encountered this over generations.”

How Much Time Do We Have? When I asked about the timeline, Merilo was blunt:

“That is a good question which actually doesn’t need answering. We must look at the situation, not look at where the time is... It is more important for us to notice the signs if the situation gets worse, and make the final preparations in time.”

“I come back to my hypothesis that Putin needs to achieve immortality. Looking at his age, Putin will not live forever. This, too, dictates that he may commit the next stupidity to satisfy his ambitions in the near future... [But] purely technically, for Russia to go into conflict with NATO, it still needs to redeploy forces. Therefore, it cannot happen in just a few days.”

The “Great Patriotic” Reality Check

Finally, a bit of historical perspective to ground us.

Last week marked a grim milestone. Russia has now been waging its full-scale war against Ukraine for exactly as long as the Soviet Union fought in the Great Patriotic War (WWII).

The contrast in results is staggering. Back then, the Red Army was a steamroller, advancing tens of kilometers every single day. Today? It took the modern Russian army over two years just to grind its way from Bakhmut to Chasiv Yar—a distance of only 11 kilometers. Over the last thousand days, Russia didn’t capture more than one percent of Ukraine’s territory. In fact, Russia controls less of Ukraine today than it did in 2022.

The giant is dangerous, yes. But he is not omnipotent.

As recent weeks have demonstrated, Putin isn’t the only one obsessed with his place in history. The deepening rift between the US and Europe is precisely the kind of signal that could lead the Kremlin to a dangerous conclusion: that NATO’s Article 5 is a relic of the past. This is exactly the miscalculation General Merilo today and Andres Vosman last week warned about. We are watching this fracture closely and will hopefully bring you original reporting on it soon.

That’s it for this time!

If you want to read our “Fear of War” series in detail, check the link here. The full interview with General Merilo can be read here and the long-story about the actual threat of war, here. Google Translate usually does a great job with Estonian. I will reinstate the paywalls in early February, so take a look while you can.

Thank you for bearing with me, and please don’t hesitate to send me your feedback! If you appreciate what you read, please share it!

Until next time, Holger

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The interview was first published in Eesti Ekspress. If you fancy practicing some Estonian, please do give it a read! Meanwhile you can find an extended Q&A in English below.

Andres Vosman. Photo: Priit Simson / Delfi Meedia

Q: Let’s start with a trivia question. Faith, hope, love, peace, anxiety, or victory? Which of these words best characterizes the emotional world of Russian society?

Vosman: One can probably find matches for all keywords, but I think the word ‘anxiety’ characterizes it most generally. Russian people are increasingly asking where is this much and long promised victory. They probably see difficulties related to their subsistence and many are worried about the future. But there are many words characterizing Russian society that were not in your list: indifference, switching off, brainwashing.

Q: I am glad that I am interviewing the right person. Readers of the bookstore “Читай-город” (Chitai-gorod) overwhelmingly chose “anxiety” as the Russian word of the year. How can anxiety express itself in such a closed and repressive society?

Vosman: For the majority, it expresses itself in dealing with other things. They don’t think big or socially. It certainly expresses itself in self-censorship. In many ways, Russia has long been back in the Soviet era. The only question is whether it is the year 1937 or 1984, meaning whether it will get even worse or if the bottom has been reached and perestroika will come.

I do not predict perestroika in the near future today. At the same time, all pivotal events in Russia have occurred with a short fuse. Working in intelligence and making forecasts has made me very cautious, and especially regarding Russia, I wouldn’t make long forecasts, but no ray of optimism shines there. Brains have left, people are full of violence. They are willing to turn a blind eye to whatever evil.

The hope is that if at one moment Russian people have to choose between the television and the refrigerator, the refrigerator will win. If there is nothing left in the refrigerator, people might suddenly come to the streets and that is the end of this regime. I certainly hope for Putin’s end. Whoever comes after him, a time of confusion will follow. Russia’s attention will certainly be on internal problems for some time, and this is not pleasant for any dictatorship. There will certainly not be any natural selection where someone simply takes over Putin’s place.

Q: How does the Kremlin itself understand this and how much does Putin’s gang monitor what is happening in society?

Vosman: The Kremlin monitors societal processes and moods very keenly. It micromanages what happens in Russia at the most local level. The Kremlin receives real-time overviews of what is happening in local municipalities, settlements. Every dictatorship is worried about losing control and therefore uses surveillance methods.

We know that the Kremlin is very worried about how to mitigate potential tensions with likely radicalized or disappointed men returning from the war. The Kremlin and FSB monitor these developments very keenly, including all sorts of religious movements, for example neo-paganism. Russia cannot control such things like it controls the Orthodox Church. Russia lacks the capacity to deal with such fundamental problems. Hundreds of thousands of men will come demanding prostheses, demanding hero status, maybe sweet positions. A separate topic is the proliferation of weapons after the war.

Q: With mental disorders...

Vosman: All that alcoholism, PTSD – Russia simply is not ready to deal with this. We see what the level of Russian healthcare is. Thus I forecast that the end of the war will be difficult for Russia.

Q: So the end of the war and the possible gradual lifting of sanctions would not mean a certain liberation for Russia?

Vosman: It might create short-term euphoria for a moment. Maybe the economy even goes up a few percent. But this of course depends on the details, to what extent sanctions go off and on what conditions the war ends. In the long run, Russia faces fundamental problems, primarily related to the economy.

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Q: You mentioned impoverishment. Such a word is not really used about the conditions prevailing in Russia so far. Rather, the conventional wisdom says that sanctions have not had a visible impact on the ordinary person’s life. True, over the last half year there have been more danger signs hanging over the Russian economy, but not impoverishment.
The ordinary person’s income is largely at the same level as it was around the year 2010. This means 15 years of stagnation. But let’s look at the future. What are Russia’s perspectives? Essentially, it is increasingly an economy under China’s control, a raw material warehouse. They have oil, gas, rare earth metals and other metals, but Russia cannot produce anything [meaningful] itself or create new quality. If we leave the war industry aside, then how to cope in the competition of international economy, where keywords are AI, smart technologies, international interaction on scientific level? In this big game, Russia has moved backward a lot in recent years. I don’t see that anything would get better for Russia. Oil price forecasts are rather downward. Their liquid reserves are essentially out.

Q: Which of those same nominees for Russia’s word of the year characterizes Estonian society the most?

Vosman: I think anxiety as well. It is persistent. It is inherent to us, we are a small nation and live next to a serial killer neighbor. Maybe it is also a force motivating us to act. But on the other hand, it is also a factor eating our confidence and exhausting us.

Q: How often do your friends ask you when will the war start?

Vosman: Very often. It happens a lot and I am depressed that there is so much of this anxiety. I am also anxious about Ukraine and at times depressed by the news, but regarding our own security we could be significantly more confident. This doesn’t mean that everything is fine and the end of history has arrived. Putin’s Russia needs constant monitoring, we must constantly validate our assumptions. But the “is Narva next” questions are indeed frustrating.

Q: What do you tell your friends who ask when the war starts?

Vosman: A conventional war against Estonia is not very likely in the near future for various reasons. But we must prepare for it, because we live next to a sick and by nature aggressive state.

Q: What makes you think so?

Vosman: First, everything I know about Russia’s thinking, Russia’s vision of the world, Russia’s intent, and war against the Baltics does not figure there. I do not know that there is currently or has been in recent years an intent to militarily attack the Baltics. We are in NATO. NATO, last I checked, is still operating. Russia takes Article 5 seriously.

We see every day how Russia actually very consciously calibrates how far it goes with certain things. For example, if we take the ongoing sabotage campaign. Certain things are sort of okay for Russia, but certain things are not.

Q: What for example is not okay regarding sabotage?

Vosman: Terror attacks with large civilian casualties. For example against passenger planes, which sort of was on the table. When Western intelligence found out about this and escalated it to the political level, this thing was put on hold [in the Kremlin], because it was understood that this is playing with fire.

Here is also a paradox. General top-down orders are characteristic of the Russian system and then some officials with lower than average IQ carry out these orders and sometimes improvise in hopes of doing favors for the Czar. Due to which mistakes can happen and this is dangerous. With Russia one must always be on guard.

The biggest danger for us is a miscalculation in Moscow. As is known, they also miscalculated in Ukraine, although Putin has wanted Ukraine back from day one. Estonia does not belong to the so-called Russian world (Russki mir). We are not part of this core Russia for Putin or his inner circle like Ukraine or Belarus are. Russia currently lacks the intention to occupy part of the Baltics, but this may change in time. So I always emphasize the temporal definition, because it is also the task of intelligence to check and validate these assumptions every day.

The second reason is our NATO membership and thirdly the Ukraine war, which is a limiting factor for Russia. Russia has completely tied itself militarily to the Ukraine direction. Even when the war ends, a considerable part of the Russian army will likely remain tied to Ukraine. So any military attack involving many risks against NATO, for example in the Baltics, would likely force Russia to free up very large resources from elsewhere. It is not like the Pskov 76th Air Assault division will get an order and it’s done. There are very many things that can go wrong.

Q: At the same time, throughout the last year we have read and heard countless claims to the contrary from Europe, Ukraine, and even the U.S. Chancellor Merz talks about how Putin’s goal is to restore the Soviet Union. Budanov says that Putin will not stop with Ukraine and so on. Again, different experts have started putting a year number on when Russia will attack or be ready to attack the Baltics.

Vosman: Often what Western intelligence says about Russia’s capability relies on the assumption that the war with Ukraine will end and Russia achieves its goals there. Russia has so far not achieved any of its major goals in Ukraine. So these are hypothetical scenarios, but primarily in terms of forecasting capability. Often no distinction is made between intent and capability.

Indeed there have been different statements in the media, but it is not my business to comment on them. I know that Estonian intelligence assessments of the Russian threat do not differ from the assessments of our most capable intelligence partners.

Regarding the statements of Ukrainian intelligence leaders about the Baltics not only this year, but also earlier, these are largely caused by the desire to create an attitude of certain urgency or acuteness in the West, which would make them deal with Russia more forcefully. So we are a bit like collateral damage.

The statements of Western politicians and intelligence services are often related to addressing domestic audiences. For example in the case of Germany, with the desire to create some resonance in society for example to increase defense spending. The Baltics is a convenient example to use. The media is also to blame, which amplifies and sometimes takes things out of context to create a shinier headline.

Q: On the last day of 2025, another ship carrying Russian cargo cut the undersea cables between Estonia and Finland. Estonian security agencies have held the position that all these incidents have not been organized by Russian intelligence. Why do you assess so?

Vosman: One should ask the security agencies, but I will say this much, that it is likely in Russia’s interests to keep the Baltic Sea as problem-free and navigable as possible, since their export, as well as connections with Kaliningrad, depend on the stability of the Baltic Sea.

Every such incident brings new calls for restrictive actions regarding the shadow and other fleets, NATO missions, sanctions. Looking strategically, Moscow doesn’t need this mess. At the same time, bardakk (disorder/mess) also characterizes Russia, due to which one cannot always rule out a situation where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing.

My strong assessment is that predominantly the Baltic Sea incidents of recent years have been caused by a coincidence of circumstances - significantly larger shipping traffic in the Russian direction, vessels in poor condition and crews with low professionalism, more underwater infrastructure than before, greater public attention. Broken anchor devices cut underwater cables in stormy conditions earlier as well, but these incidents weren’t talked about. At the same time, the longer the West collectively allows the shadow fleet to rally on the Baltic Sea, the more likely it is only a question of time when the next thing happens.

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Q: There has recently been a lot of talk about Europe and NATO needing to start paying Russia back regarding sabotage and take counter-activities to Russian territory. Most recently, for example, the head of the NATO Military Committee Giuseppe Dragone presented such a line of thought. Is this a realistic plan?

Vosman: This is talking about something that should be obvious. Why talk about it at all. If Russia is in a so-called hybrid war against us, then it seems reasonable to stand against it. One part of standing against it is also offensive activity.

Q: Maybe these statements are also part of this same search for confidence that the US reproaches us for?

Vosman: Agreed. After all, a large part of Europe continues to live in the hope that these problems will just disappear. I subscribe to America’s reprimanding attitude towards Europe, especially regarding defense spending.

Q: Why don’t we have this confidence in Estonia?

Vosman: This stems from our smallness and history, but is clearly also linked to international developments on the other side of the ocean, which has made people more anxious. Being now in Israel, which is one of the most self-confident societies of all, I think that without it, it is hard to survive. You have to believe in yourself, in your friends, and be ready to act.

Q: But Europe is not small neither geographically nor in terms of population. 450 million people live in the EU. The economy is many times larger than Russia’s. What explains the lack of confidence in Estonian society cannot explain the same in Europe.

Vosman: From our view the situation is not perfect. Europe often does not speak with one voice. This cacophony is written into EU’s architecture. Unfortunately there are also member states who work against it. But let’s rewind ourselves back to February 2022. Would anyone have predicted that now four years later we are working out the 20th sanctions package, tightening the screw all the time? Yes, in our assessment things take too long and are at times full of exceptions and gaps, but in the big picture relative unanimity and readiness to support Ukraine prevail.

Q: In the Russian word of the year competition, договорнячок (dogovornyachok) was also put to a vote. Put into an endearing-sarcastic form, that term roughly translates as a secret agreement, a reference to negotiations going on through US mediation. Why is Russian society so sarcastic regarding these negotiations?

Vosman: Sarcasm is inherent to Russian society in general. It comes from the Soviet time, that one cannot believe everything the mass media says. I think that currently the attitude is simply widespread that one cannot actually negotiate with the West, one cannot trust the West. Therefore they are skeptical regarding all sorts of agreements. The West is conversely just as skeptical [towards Russia].

Q: How would you analyze the current negotiations?

Vosman: It is hard for me to comment because I don’t know the latest status, but it seems a kind of round game is going on. We have already been in this place before, where through the words of the US president it was said that a breakthrough is expected any moment. We have also heard before that Putin wants peace. In actions we do not see this in any way. I am skeptical regarding any significant breakthrough in the coming months. At the same time the situation for Ukraine could also be much worse, so the glass is simultaneously half full and half empty.

Q: The Wall Street Journal published recently how it was Putin who lured Steve Witkoff to be the US chief negotiator and that this chain went through Saudi Arabia. Why did the Kremlin need specifically a man like Witkoff to negotiate and not for example Secretary of State Marco Rubio?

Vosman: Witkoff declares that he is a master of deal making and open to deals. Russia certainly uses different levers very cunningly in negotiations and one of the biggest levers is all sorts of flatteries, promises for deals and other benefits accompanying it. I very much hope that Western negotiators see through this. Russia has certainly consciously looked for such dealmakers.

Q: On the other hand Russia itself has now replaced the pseudo-historian Vladimir Medinsky with Kirill Dmitriev, who similarly lacks any diplomatic background, but in other regards is perhaps more credible.

Vosman: Dmitriev has a US background, he has lived in the US. Dmitriev himself has also been very interested in being in this role. I think Putin uses him as long as needed and at one moment, when his contribution is no longer useful, he will be pushed aside. Dmitriev is another pawn, he is certainly not any decider in the Russian system. His coming into this game has created competition in other Russian players as well. It is inherent to Putin to use different levers and wait who brings a better result, and at the same time keep all options open.

Q: Witkoff is a dealmaker and ready for deals, but it seems to me that the US and Russia are pursuing very different things in negotiations. Trump, Witkoff, Jared Kushner want a deal, be it financial or business, and Putin exploits this. Putin himself, however, proceeds from an ideological strategy and one of establishing “historical truth”.

Vosman: I think you are right. For a large part of today’s US administration, Russia’s war in Ukraine is an unpleasant distraction that should be packed up quickly to deal with main topics, be they South America or China topics.

Q: Does Putin also want to make a deal?

Vosman: Putin wants a deal on his own terms. For him control over Ukraine seems to be an existential question of his legacy in Russian history. Ukraine is a topic that has passionately captivated Putin for over 20 years. Putin is not any historian, but already since the late 1990s he seems to believe that Russia cannot restore its greatness without controlling Ukraine and Belarus. These three countries form the so-called core Russia for him. When Putin talks about Russia’s greatness and growth, about Russia’s borders, then he primarily means these three.

This war is not about Donbas or the Crimea land connection. For Putin this war is still about control over Kyiv. Kyiv does not necessarily have to be conquered for this, but a pro-Russian government must be installed. Currently this does not seem doable from any angle. Ukraine has shed too much blood for this.

Q: Especially if as a result of whatever negotiations Ukraine should give up Donbas or some part of unconquered territory?

Vosman: Maybe it would mean a pause in the war, but not the end of it. It is a separate question on what conditions this pause would arise for Russia, what happens to sanctions, what happens to demobilized soldiers. As much as the Western intelligence community knows, Putin has not given up on his goals. He has likely corrected his timeframes, but there are no references that he has given up on his final goal. The good news is that the final goal does not look significantly closer to Russia than it was four years ago.

Q: How long will Russia last and how long will Ukraine last, assuming a peace treaty will not be agreed on?

Vosman: Very hard to say. If new forceful sanctions were to hit Russia, Russia’s resilience would be more fragile. If some economic cataclysm were to happen in the world that brings oil prices down, Russia’s resilience will be more fragile. Or a natural catastrophe that directs attention and resources elsewhere. There are more and more of these possibilities.

In Ukraine’s case there are fewer of these possibilities, since Ukraine has been in a very difficult state for a sufficiently long time. Ukraine’s problem is primarily a shortage of personnel, but I do not see signs that Ukraine would be ready to give up. Because they know what the alternative is. They have no choice. As long as at least European support remains, and it seems to me that a very large part of Europe is still and strongly behind Ukraine, then I think Ukraine will hold out. This does not mean that it is easy for them or that they will not lose more territory.

Q: Besides the question of conceding territory, the other important chapter of the negotiations is about security guarantees to Ukraine. What basis is there to even believe and assume the validity of such agreements in case the guarantee will need to be activated?

Vosman: Doubt regarding the validity of agreements and promises has likely grown, but whether this mistrust has now taken over completely, I am not sure. Among other things, I think, for example, that Russia continues to consider NATO Article 5 valid and does not wish to test it at the moment. As for Ukraine’s security guarantees, the key question is whether the guarantors are ready to go to war with Russia for Ukraine’s security. This is a black-and-white question. If the answer is yes, then the guarantees are credible.

Q: My question targets Europe at least as much as the US. You said that today there is great support for Ukraine. But if we look a few years ahead, which elections are coming up in various European countries and which parties might come to power, then I do not have confidence that any guarantee or agreement regarding Russia would hold.

Vosman: Regarding Article 5, it does not seem to me that President Trump would want to go down in history as the president during whose time Article 5, and consequently NATO, lost its credibility, its functionality, and is thrown into the trash bin of history. Trump does not seem to me to be a politician who would want to be a loser. He wants to be a winner. I think Russia sees him that way too. Considering also the moods in the Congress, the moods of the American society and its political establishment, which are generally, to put it mildly, critical of Russia, I do not see why an American president would somehow want to go down in history [as the destroyer of NATO]. The situation is of course dynamic and maybe in a year there will be some other winds blowing.

Q: A month ago, the US confirmed a new National Security Strategy. It contains statements about Europe’s civilizational erasure, lack of self-confidence in relations with Russia, and so on. How tragically should we take the NSS?

Vosman: Lack of self-confidence is of course a correct diagnosis. I am not the ambassador to the US and it is not my place to give assessments, but it simply seems to me that during Trump’s time, any strategy document does not possess the value it would have at some other time. It is not characteristic of Trump to act within the framework of strategies written up by officials. This document was likely written in a relatively short time by a handful of people. Also, the entire communication of this document was different than before, which makes one ask how programmatic or strategic it actually is. It is full of slogans characteristic of the MAGA movement. My personal opinion is that we should not pay very much attention to this strategy.

Q: The other document, adopted a bit later, is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which does not come from the White House, but from the Congress. The NDAA seems to me to be much more optimistic, precisely in the part concerning Europe, Estonia and the Baltic states.

Vosman: Yes, the Baltics are the benchmark of good allies from Washington’s view. Estonia generally has a good image in Washington. We say what we do and we do what we say. We don’t go around whining, but also offer solutions ourselves. All this ties in with the new winds in Washington. The fact that American financial aid for Baltic defense investments was cemented is certainly an important milestone.

Q: Compared to before, the funding earmarked for the Baltic Security Initiative is even growing.

Vosman: I would recommend taking note of this fact to many of those who are extremely worried about America’s stance in Europe. I am not one of those who would be declaring the end of NATO. Yes, NATO is probably neither the most urgent nor the most popular topic for Washington policy makers at the moment, but in a few years we may again be in a situation where NATO will again be very topical in Washington as well, for example due to China. It is not known to me that there would be an intention in Moscow to test NATO in connection with America’s new administration or alleged weakness. On the contrary, I think that the unpredictability characteristic of Trump and the readiness to use military force in various places in the world has made Russia somewhat more concerned.

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Welcome to the Baltic Flank

For years, I have covered the shadow war: Russian espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and sanctions evasion. As investigative reporters at Delfi Estonia, my team and I view these threats from the front row.

However, we realized that what is common knowledge in the Baltics is often missed by the rest of the West. That is why we changed our tactics in 2022. Now, whenever we find a lead, we build cross-border teams with partners in Sweden, Germany, the U.S., and beyond.

This strategy led to major investigations like the Kremlin Leaks and the Kremlin Papers. We even went undercover to get recruited for a Russian sabotage operation ourselves.

That is the spirit of The Baltic Flank.

This newsletter is a hub for our most critical reporting, scoops, and investigations—now in English. It will be an irregular publication; I won’t clutter your inbox. You will only hear from me when we have a story that adds true value to the global conversation.

Secure Contact: Got a hint? Find me on Signal at holgerroonemaa.30.