Trump administration decisions likely to weaken US influence in the Pacific

Recently the Trump administration made several decisions that will weaken America’s relationship with its Pacific allies and partners. The first, earlier in August, involved President Trump shortening Exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield. A joint US-South Korea exercise involving approx. 18,000 soldiers. The president ordered the exercise to finish a week earlier than expected.^[i]

Trump stated that he is “not happy” with a costly exercise that is hostile towards Pyongyang because he has a “very good relationship” with the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un. The Guardian reported that “A Pentagon official later confirmed the US ⁠military was “substantially” reducing joint ⁠exercises with South ⁠Korea.” The BBC reported that “Trump said he was unhappy with South Korea’s refusal to join him in his war in Iran but he also has been unhappy with it as a trading partner.”^[ii]

Exercise SSangyong, another large US-Korean exercise was also recently cancelled.^[iii] Aljazeera reported that South Korean officials stated “The US Marine Corps formally notified our forces in June that its ability to deploy forces during this year’s Ssangyong exercise would be constrained due to the situation in the Middle East.”^[iv]

Unfortunately, the cancelation of Exercise SSangyong coincides with the withdrawal of America’s only aircraft carrier in the North West Pacific, USS George Washington. It left to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln near Iran.^[v] The carrier’s withdrawal and the cancellation of Exercise SSangyong are indicators of the impact the Iran War is having on US military capacity.

The inability to defeat Iran, widely reported morale issues on USS Abraham Lincoln, a US destroyer recently breaking down in the South China Sea,^[vi] and the cancellation Exercise SSangyong are all indications that America’s military is stretched thin. A cause for concern in countries like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines that rely on US military power underpinning their collective security arrangements.

However, a bigger issue is the loss of confidence in Trump’s willingness to support legal and moral issues like; freedom of navigation, the sovereignty of smaller states or democratic government. Ideals that the US has traditionally protected and are being challenged in the South China Sea and Taiwan.

History tells us that deterrence; or the resolve and capability to meet force with force stops diplomatic competition escalating into military confrontation. For example, NATO’s military power preserved the integrity of Western Europe’s borders for four decades. The US committed enormous resources to help NATO’s member states secure their boundaries and the social and economic benefits of that investment are huge. The US, Europe and the world have experienced a long period of peace, stability and economic prosperity.

Today’s world is more fractured but in terms of the Pacific, competition is essentially binary. The region’s capitalist liberal democracies compete with a smaller group of authoritarian states. Currently, both blocs are locked in intense non-military competition. For example, China asserts its ownership over islands and parts of the South China Sea. Claims contested by the US and its local allies. The US-led coalition aims to maintain freedom of navigation through the important sea lane and is concerned that if China is successful with its claims that are not supported by international courts other territories might be claimed later.

Traditionally, the US led these nations and provided guaranteed military support but since taking office, Trump has made several policy decisions that undermine confidence in American leadership. This trend started in 2025 when America imposed heavy economic tariffs on friendly countries and continued with the US 2025 National Security Strategy^[vii] and the 2026 National Defence Strategy^[viii] that describe a new approach to alliances and partnerships.

The two strategies outline a new approach to foreign policy based on a set of principles that ‘put America first.’ Its supporters might describe these ideas as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘realistic’ but they could also be summarised as follows:

• Mercantilism. Rejecting the position that global ‘free trade’ is a basis for all nations to prosper and that instead America should focus on how to maximise the economic benefits of security relationships.

• Bilateralism. A rejection of multilateralism and international institutions in favour of bilateral relationships that maximise the bargaining power of the larger partner – the US.

• Might is right. A belief that philosophical concepts like ‘international law’ are unrealistic. Trump’s US is unwilling to accept the cost of enforcing international laws or protecting the sovereignty of smaller nations. Instead these documents abandon universal, international principles of law and justice for an older ideology that could be termed - ‘might is right.’

However, in practice relationships between states are built on trust and confidence. The unsuccessful intervention in Iran weakens the US and forces reductions in its North West Pacific commitments. This situation reduces confidence in the US’s ability to support its allies that are trying to deter China from using military force to achieve its objectives. The impact of America’s military over-extension is exaggerated by the Trump administration’s foreign policy that treats allies and partners poorly, undermining trust.

By ham-fistedly ‘putting America first’ the Trump administration damages long-standing relationships and weakens collective security arrangements. An especially risky policy when the US military is over-extended by its poorly planned intervention in Iran.

Russia flexes its muscles in the Pacific

Putin visits the Kuril Island and Russia conducts missile live-firing exercises

The Kuril Islands are a string of small islands to the north of Japan. The islands were seized by the Soviet Union at the end of World War Two and are now claimed by both Russia and Japan. In early August, the Russian Pacific Fleet conducted a large exercise in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and in the North Pacific. The exercise involved 60 surface ships, submarines, support vessels and about 30 aircraft, helicopters, and drones.^[ix]

Russia’s President Putin visited the Kuril Islands during the exercise. A visit that was protested by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi who said that the visit was “absolutely unacceptable” and that “This visit … by the sitting Russian president goes against Japan’s consistent position on the Northern Territories.” ^[x]

Aside from Putin’s visit the exercise was notable because it involved rare live-firing missile exercises including; land-based anti-ship missiles, submarine and surface launched missiles.^[xi]

Russia’s allies; China and North Korea are increasingly assertive in the region causing tension. Japan’s response includes expanding its already large military, and re-interpreting its constitution to allow for weapons exports and overseas deployments. Notably, Japan is also part of the G7 block of countries that sanction Russia and support Ukraine. Helping Ukraine includes exporting licence-built Patriot missiles to the US so American stocks can be released for use in Ukraine, activity that is very likely to upset Russia.

Therefore the large military exercise and Putin’s visit could be designed to send a message to Japan about supporting Ukraine. Al Jazeera reports that “Analysts said Putin’s visit to the Kurils could be a warning to Japan not to deepen its support for Ukraine by supplying Patriot missiles directly to Kyiv or working closer with NATO.”^[xii] An assessment that I generally agree with but that I think needs to include a greater emphasis on regional political dynamics.

Specifically, Japan’s increasing assertiveness and military power worries China because of the two nations shared history. China’s allies and partners are likely to share similar concerns or at least be willing to support Chinese initiatives to confine Japan. Therefore, it seems plausible that Russia’s activity in the Kuril Islands are probably part of a wider programme loosely organised between these nations.

Putin’s visit and the large Russian exercise are designed to signal a variety of points to Japan. First, that regardless of its issues in Ukraine Russia remains active in the Pacific. This message ‘rattles the Russian sabre’ at Japan serving as a warning that Russia does not appreciate it supporting Ukraine, and is willing and able to defend the Kuril Islands. Finally, this activity demonstrates Russian support for China.

Notably, Russia and China’s exercises perform a similar role to Exercise RIMPAC last month as demonstrations of military capability designed to reinforce diplomatic positions.

Russia issues fake missile test notice near New Zealand

On 18 August, Russia issued a warning that it would be conducting missile testing in the Southern Ocean, approx. 1900km south-west of New Zealand near the Ross Sea. The warning forced a US supply plane flying from New Zealand to Antarctica to cancel its flight.

This incident is notable because no test occurred, and the warning or Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) appears to be a hoax. Dr Anne-Marie Brady wrote in The Diplomat that “… it appears that Russia’s warning is a dummy warning of a dummy missile – an information operation and another example of Russia’s reckless hybrid warfare.”^[xiii]

This activity raises questions about Russia’s motivation. Any action like this is likely to be well considered and designed to send a message. The NOTAM only impacted on US, Australian and US flights supporting the Antarctic programme. So it is clear that the intended recipients of the message are these nations. Dr Brady opined that the warning could be a menacing Russian prank designed to warn New Zealand about its support for Ukraine.

In my opinion this incident is a timely reminder of Russia’s desire to demonstrate that it remains relevant in the Pacific. An important measure for a diminishing power that is trying to maintain its equivalency with its main ally China, while becoming less relevant because of its disastrous adventure in Ukraine. My prediction is that we will see more Russian activity in the wider Pacific as Putin tries demonstrate that Russian is still an international power.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Solomon Islands to review 2022 security deal with China

Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Matthew Wale announced this month that his government intends to review the nation’s 2022 security agreement with China.^[xiv] The agreement was secret and created considerable concern in the region. A review will be welcomed by nations like Australia that are keen to reduce China’s security influence in the region.

Wale stated that his government is committed to greater transparency and has asked Manasseh Sogavare the previous prime minister to participate in the review stating “I call on the Leader of the Opposition to support the review, this House must support the principle that no treaty should stand without the informed consent of Parliament.”^[xv]

Solomon Islands is caught in a difficult balancing act because it is keen to maintain its economic relationship with China but is under pressure from Australia to limit Chinese influence. A situation many Pacific nations find themselves in as larger powers compete for influence in the region. Dr Anna Powles from Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies recently described the Solomon Islands situation as follows “Again, the challenges of balancing the economic and the security relationships is obviously an issue that many Pacific island countries experience.”^[xvi]

Competition between larger powers is not going away, instead it is increasing and this means that more and more small Pacific nations will be facing similar tough decisions as they try to balance their economic and security relationships. Wale’s call for greater transparency should be applauded because open and transparent decision-making is a strong counter to ‘grey zone’ influence operations.

Bougainville independence update

Papua New Guinea’s government is currently debating whether the island of Bougainville should become an independent nation. Radio NZ reports that the “prime minister has urged the nation to appreciate the gravity of the decision on Bougainville that parliament is to debate this week.”^[xvii]

Bougainvillians fought a long civil war against Papua New Guinea, and in a 2019 referendum approx. 98 % supported independence. Now the referendum has been tabled in parliament and will be debated by MPs. The result is uncertain. Bougainville is rich in resources and its independence could encourage other minority groups inside Papua New Guinea to attempt to secede. Factors that mitigate towards Papua New Guinea trying to maintain control of the island.

The stakes are high and the outcome of the vote will have a significant impact on regional politics as Melanesia either welcomes a new state; or Papua New Guinea risks another conflict with the people of Bougainville.

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^[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/17/trump-cuts-south-korea-joint-drills-us-military-good-relationship-kim-jong-un and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/19/us-south-korea-army-drills-cut-trump-push-kim-jong-un-talks

^[ii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gj1vje8dxo

^[iii] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-cancels-joint-marine-drills-with-south-korea-over-iran-war-related-force-2026-08-24/

^[iv] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/24/south-korea-says-us-cancelled-upcoming-joint-marine-exercises-over-iran-war

^[v] https://apnews.com/article/aircraft-carriers-uss-abraham-lincoln-washington-iran-5366eba29f72b6b317416fde81d57a61

^[vi] https://abcnews.com/US/wireStory/us-navy-destroyer-300-sailors-aboard-broke-days-135752031

^[vii] www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

^[viii] https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF

^[ix] https://maritime-executive.com/article/russian-naval-boost-for-president-putin

^[x] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/13/japan-protests-as-russias-putin-visits-disputed-kuril-islands

^[xi] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/08/21/japan/russia-missile-northern-territories/

^[xii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/18/russia-protests-japan-pms-comments-after-putins-kuril-visit

^[xiii] https://thediplomat.com/2026/08/russia-issues-missile-test-warning-to-new-zealand/

^[xiv] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/951604/solomon-islands-pm-urges-no-more-secrecy-over-treaties-with-other-countries

^[xv] Ibid.

^[xvi] https://pmn.co.nz/read/pacific-region/wale-s-china-reset-shows-the-tightrope-facing-pacific-leaders-expert

^[xvii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/1120621/this-is-a-difficult-task-png-parliament-to-finally-address-bougainville-decision

Russia is losing the Ukraine War and a reason why is its failure to respond effectively to Ukrainian strategy. In simple terms, Russia has lost the initiative and acts in accordance with Ukraine’s script rather than shaping the campaign. While this situation continues Russia will become weaker and weaker, until it eventually fails. The failure may take time but without a significant change in Russian strategic thinking it becomes increasingly likely, or perhaps inevitable.

This situation also provides excellent insight into a failure of strategy and leadership that is a lesson for all nations. For instance, Russia’s situation is worryingly similar to the US position in Iran. Both are poorly planned expeditions, hastily organised based on bad intelligence that have ensnared a major military power in a longer than expected conflict. Notably, both Iran and Ukraine have grasped fundamental changes in tactics that their larger opponents do not appear to have considered deeply enough before committing military resources.

Ukraine’s strategy - simple and effective

Ukraine’s strategy is simple, on the ground Ukraine is heavily out-numbered so instead of attacking it fights a defensive campaign designed to attrit Russian forces. Ukraine trades ground for time and inflicts the highest possible casualties on Russia by forcing its enemy to attack. It has used the time Russia invested in capturing towns like Avdiivka, Bakhmut, and Pokrovsk to develop new drone technologies, tactics to use these weapons effectively, and the nation’s defence industry to build enormous numbers of drones.

Concurrently, Ukraine started a strategic air campaign against Russia - using long-range drones and missiles aiming to damage Russia’s economy and create political instability. The logic is simple; without foreign revenue Russia is forced to use cash and gold reserves to buy equipment or pay for contract soldiers. Meanwhile, on the battlefield Ukraine’s defensive tactics attrit Russian resources increasing the cost of the war and accelerating Russia’s financial losses. And, eventually the money will run out forcing the Kremlin to negotiate or take political risks by introducing economic policies that impact ordinary Russians. For example, introducing petrol rationing or ordering a full mobilisation.

Initially, the air campaign attacked Russian oil and gas infrastructure - specifically refineries. The Centre for European Policy Analysis’s Sergiy Makogon recently wrote “Ukraine has turned refinery strikes into a systematic campaign against the core of Russia’s oil-processing network. Meduza reported that by the end of May, citing Reuters, every large refinery by processing volume in the European part of Russia has now been attacked at least once by Ukrainian drones.”^[i] A campaign that’s impact is verified by independent reporting that confirms the widespread disruption of Russian domestic fuel supplies.

However In recent weeks, the air campaign has extended to include Russia’s largest online shopping chain - Wildberries. The company’s logistics infrastructure is slowly being bombed out of existence. PBS reports that “Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said the attacks were designed to disrupt military supplies, breed popular discontent and cause a domino effect in the Russian economy by putting stress on major banks, including VTB and Sberbank, that made massive loans to Wildberries.”^[ii]

Wildberries is one of Russia’s largest businesses worth between US $ 81-87 billion, a figure that various estimates put at approx. 2-3% of Russia’s GDP. ^[iii] The chain also employs large numbers of Russian workers and provides a logistics network for many small and medium-sized Russian businesses. Wildberries and its competitor Ozon are estimated to account for economic activity worth around 8.5% of Russia’s GDP and support approx. 4 million jobs, around 5% of Russia’s workforce. ^[iv]

Finally, the chain relies on loans from Russia’s biggest banks and a default on payments could have larger financial impacts.

Notably, the Russian banking system is also under threat because customers are withdrawing cash worried that the Kremlin will seize their deposits to fund the war. Since the beginning of the year Russians have withdrawn approx. US $ 28 billion from banks^[v] but in recent months the rate of withdrawals has increased; reportedly US $ 4.3 billion in June, US $ 7.2 billion in July, followed by US $ 3.4 billion in the first two weeks of August.^[vi]

The Russian economy is under pressure and Ukraine does not need to destroy it to win. It just needs to make Putin’s political position untenable and there is evidence that the campaign may be having an impact. Putin ally and Moscow Mayor, Sergey Sobyani recently warned about the impact of full economic mobilisation.^[vii] Andrei Klepach, chief economist at state bank VEB was recently fired because of a speech in May to an economic forum. In his speech, Klepach said that Russia “We ​will not win the competition in this war of attrition” and that Ukraine “… has not collapsed and will not collapse.”^[viii] When powerful people like these speak out, and ordinary Russians cannot use Wildberries, or buy petrol it indicates that trust and confidence in Putin’s regime is being undermined.

Ukraine is also winning at the operational and tactical-levels of war

After Elon Musk shut down Russian access to Starlink in February 2026 the Ukrainians immediately attacked Russian forces along the southern frontline. On 12 August, Ukraine commented on the result of their summer ground operation that has been dubbed the Oleksandrivka Counteroffensive. Ukraine claims to have recaptured 745 km² and 26 villages in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.^[ix]

This is a significant amount of territory but my assessment of Ukraine’s objective is that this operation’s goal is to distract Russia from its main effort – capturing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rather than to capture ground. Although the territorial gains are important Ukraine’s offensive contributes to a more important goal; preventing Russia achieving its objectives in Donetsk.

The military reality is that capturing Donetsk requires Russia to build up enough combat power to overwhelm Ukraine’s defences. Ukraine’s successful offensive along the southern frontline forces Russia to displace combat power to the south-west so these resources cannot be used in Donetsk. Ukraine is using its small attacks to weaken Russia’s Donetsk offensive in the same way the Kursk Offensive diverted Russian resources away from Pokrovsk in 2024.

The situation is compounded by two other factors. The first is Ukraine’s ‘deep battle,’ or its drone and missile strike campaign against Russia’s supply lines and the bridges into Crimea. Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s depth disrupt the flow of supplies to frontline troops and to the garrison of Crimea. The strikes also force Russia to spread its air-defence assets wider, reducing their coverage and creating weak spots that can be attacked by Ukraine.

The second factor is Ukraine’s tactical evolution. Since 2024, Ukraine’s drone programme has developed exponentially and new combined arms tactics that integrate drones are evolving. For example, this week the Institute for the Study of War reported that “A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces in the Oleksandrivka direction were advancing both with dismounted infantry and with armored fighting vehicles. These reports suggest that Ukrainian forces managed to employ elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level to retake several settlements.”^[x] Since early this year evidence of Ukraine’s integration of drones into combined arms tactics has started to appear in the public realm ^[xi] and the success of these operations is potentially another indicator of this trend.

If Ukraine’s plan is so simple – Why can’t Russia stop it?

Unfortunately for Russian generals, political interference means their assaults on targets in Donetsk must continue, regardless of the wider operational of tactical-level situation. Therefore, Russian commanders maintain a tempo of smaller than ideal assaults that can be defeated in detail by the defenders. And, each defeated attack in Donetsk carries a ‘bill’ that must be paid in soldier’s lives, lost equipment and supplies.

Any vaguely competent military leader should understand Ukraine’s strategy, its execution, and how to respond and we should not under estimate Russia’s generals. However, since the siege of Pokrovsk started Russia’s operational-level campaign has focussed on capturing Donetsk Oblast. A rigid pattern of behaviour that probably indicates political direction from Putin, and that Russia’s strategic goal is to capture this oblast. Probably to secure (most of) the territory annexed by Russia so that Putin can finish the war with ‘victory’ declared.

This creates an uneasy tension for Russian commanders because their nation’s economy and people are not going to support the war forever and the police and Rosgvardia cannot suppress discontent indefinitely. Therefore, the need to act quickly means that it is likely political pressure and interference in military planning will increase making it ever harder for Russia’s generals to say ‘No’ and reset the campaign. Russia risks falling into a self-perpetuating cycle of defeat as political interference degrades military performance that in turn, encourages politicians to intervene more.

Ukraine is taking advantage of this dynamic. A basic rule of war is that it costs more lives, equipment, and resources to attack than it does to defend. This rule’s impact is compounded if the attacker is predictable and continues to attack on the same axis. While Russia’s military leaders are constrained by political inflexibility and forced to try and take Donetsk they are doomed to fail, throwing away lives and resources trying to breech Ukraine’s ‘Drone Wall.’

We can speculate that a similar dynamic may also be impacting on the US military as it struggles to achieve the poorly thought out (and rapidly changing) objectives of its political leaders regarding Iran. The US’s initial objective, regime change, was poorly conceived and highly unlikely to be achieved without the deployment of ground forces. History tells us that bombs alone do not change regimes.

Like Ukraine, Iran responded with asymmetric means using cheap, plentiful, and hard to counter drones and missiles to choke the Straits of Hormuz. Now US generals face a conundrum trying to craft a campaign constrained by contradictory political direction.

Conclusion

Since 2022, it has become increasingly clear that the Russian Bear’s ‘eyes were too big for its stomach’ and that Ukraine has proven impossible to swallow. Russia stumbled into this war with a vague idea that a sudden attack would create a shock that would force regime change.

Russia’s intelligence proved to be flawed and it is now mired in a war that it will probably lose. Initially, Putin and his generals tried to bluff their way out of the situation believing that Ukraine’s supporters across the world’s liberal democracies would give up – afraid of Russia. When that tactic failed it became necessary to limit their military objectives to only what they need to claim victory, Donetsk.

It is a campaign notable for its lack of planning and integration between the vision of Russia’s political leaders and the practical realities experienced by its military. Ukraine’s campaign planning ‘on the other hand’ is sharpened by fighting an existential war against a powerful and ruthless opponent. Therefore, Ukraine is able to deliver a focussed long-term strategy that integrates all operations from strategic to tactical-level.

The Ukraine War demonstrates that the success of any military of geo-political strategy is based on achieving a balance between political vision and military pragmatism. A powerful lesson for leaders on both sides of the civil – military partnership, especially in our increasingly unstable world.

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^[i] https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-strikes-russias-central-nervous-system/

^[ii] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukraine-takes-aim-at-russias-economy-and-morale-by-attacking-online-retailer-wildberries

^[iii] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/17/ukraine-has-hit-seven-of-russian-online-retailer-wildberries-10-biggest-warehouses-militar and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/12/ukraines-strikes-on-russias-wildberries-arent-about-the-front-line

^[iv] Ibid.

^[v] https://www.euronews.com/2026/08/19/russians-pull-billions-from-banks-fearing-kremlin-will-seize-savings-for-war NB.I converted Euros used in the article into US dollars.

^[vi] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-banks-withdraw-money-putin-war-b3035506.html NB.I converted US dollars used in the article into US dollars.

^[vii] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/81870

^[viii] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russian-state-bank-fires-economist-who-warned-moscow-was-losing-war-attrition-2026-08-17/

^[ix] https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/08/14/745-km%C2%B2-recaptured-in-ukraines-eight-month-oleksandrivka-counteroffensive-kyiv-says/

^[x] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2026/

^[xi] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/a-tactical-revolution-in-ukraine

Security discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting set the scene for the forthcoming Leaders Meeting

The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting is approaching fast. Last week member state’s Foreign Ministers met in Suva. The Pacific Islands Forum is a key element of the Pacific’s security architecture. Its membership includes 18 nations from Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia including Australia and New Zealand. The forum also provides opportunities for diplomatic discussions with approx. 24 ‘dialogue partners,’ a group of nations that include the US, UK, France, Japan, Taiwan and China.

Notably, the forum has a history of successful collaboration around security issues, including 2002’s successful intervention in Solomon Islands. The Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands stopped an ethnic conflict in the nation, and supported the re-establishment of civilian government. The forum has also supported Tonga and New Caledonia to manage security issues.

However, a key feature of recent forums has been diplomatic competition. For example, in 2025, the host Solomon Islands, banned all dialogue partners from the Leaders’ Summit because concerns were raised about Chinese diplomatic pressure to ban Taiwan from attending the conference.^[i] Rather than single out China or Taiwan, the members decided to ban all dialogue partners.

As we build up to this year’s leaders meeting, on 30 August, the forum is again debating issues related to Sino-American or Sino-Australian competition. Like responding to China’s ballistic missile test in the region last month.

A joint statement opposing testing in the Pacific was debated but was not supported by the forum. The members use a consensus decision-making model and therefore the opposition of only two countries - Narau and Kiribati - was enough to prevent a statement being agreed. Radio NZ reported that “Disagreement from some China-aligned Pacific Islands countries has prevented regional countries within the Pacific Islands Forum issuing a joint statement against missile testing in the Pacific.” ^[ii]

Another issue tabled at this week’s Foreign Ministers meeting is a proposal from Solomon Islands for a new regional collective security treaty. New Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale, first proposed the idea soon after his election in May 2026. Wale discussed the idea with Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese in June 2026.

If agreed, the proposed treaty could significantly change how Pacific nations respond to security threats. The forum’s current collegial approach is guided by principles stated in regional declarations like Biketawa, Boe, and the Ocean of Peace. This approach has historically worked well because decisions are carefully considered, collective, and action requires consensus.

An agreement or treaty, on the other hand, may compel participants to undertake specific actions in some situations. Dr Anna Powles, from Massey University summed up the differences for Radio NZ as follows “The proposed treaty would convert political commitments into obligations under international law, which poses a series of questions from what obligations it creates, whether decisions remain consensual, and whether it regulates existing bilateral security partnerships.”^[iii]

At present there is not much information available about the proposal but some impacts of a multinational security agreement could include; changing the focus of security discussions, members having less freedom of action and regional decision-making being less consensus based. For example, a new treaty may require members to notify other members about new security threats or about proposed new security arrangements with other countries.

External powers that wish to retain or grow their influence in the region are all likely to try and shape the discussion. As Powles points out - “There will be concern in parts of the region that the proposed treaty could become another geopolitical instrument through which certain states seek to limit their competitors.”^[iv]

Anyone with an interest in Pacific geo-politics should be carefully studying the forthcoming Leaders Meeting because it is likely to be an interesting meeting. Recently, Australia has signed new security agreements with Papua New Guinea,^[v] Vanuatu,^[vi] and Fiji^[vii] effectively blocking China’s diplomacy in these nations. Immediately after his election in May 2026, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale stated he wanted to ‘reset’ the nation’s relationship with Australia.^[viii] Immediately, Australia provided AUS $ 35 million in emergency aid and the two nations confirmed that they are negotiating a bi-lateral security agreement.^[ix] Recently, Wale also discussed repairing his nation’s relationship with the US.^[x]

My assessment is that Australia’s diplomatic successes will be concerning for China, a nation that has worked hard to build greater influence in the region. Several other nations including India and Taiwan are also keen to maintain, or extend their influence in the Pacific and will be following the situation closely. This means that we should expect plenty of politicking at the Leaders Meeting.

Exercise RIMPAC 2026

The world’s largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), finished on 31 July. The exercise is a bi-annual, US-led event that provides opportunities for the US, its allies and partners to practice their war-fighting skills. RIMPAC 2026 ran from 24 June – 31 July.

Studying military exercises provides insight into participant nation’s security policy and this year’s exercise was large and complex involving approx. 30,000 service personnel from 30 nations, 30 warships, five submarines, and 197 aircraft.^[xii]

The participating land, sea and air components practiced a range of skills that indicate the type of littoral conflict being planned for, the key elements of which can be summarised as follows:

• Inter-operability. RIMPAC 2026 saw a range of activities designed to practice inter-operability or militaries working together. The exercise included training exchanges and joint-operations but another notable factor was the delegation of command roles to non-US exercise participants. For example, a Japanese officer was appointed Vice Commander, RIMPAC 2026 Combined Task Force, a South Korean officer commanded RIMPAC 2026 Combined Force Maritime Component, a Chilean officer commanded the Maritime Logistics Support Element, and an Indian officer served as Deputy Commander of Theatre Anti-Submarine Warfare Combined Task Force 174. The appointment to command roles of partner nations is a method for building better understanding and inter-operability.

• Amphibious operations. The US Navy and Marine Corps led a large-scale amphibious operation involving ships, aircraft, and soldiers from several nations. A key was to integrate partner nations throughout planning and execution of the operations.^[xiii] The exercise also practiced a key skill of amphibious warfare, Naval Gunfire Support, fifteen ships participating in live-firing practice.

• Joint long-range strike. The exercise demonstrated the importance of US and allied forces being inter-operable so they can coordinate long-range missile attacks across military assets from several partner nations. For example, Japan Ground Self-Defence Forces 8th Surface to Ship Missile Regiment and the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 623rd Field Artillery carried out a live firing practice and sank a target warship using their respective Type 12 anti-ship missile and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Notably, the Spanish frigate ESPS Alvaro De Bazan fired an AGM-84 Harpoon and US Army, US Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy helicopters also practiced working together and firing missiles against target hulks.^[xiv]

Studying Exercise RIMPAC 2026 we can see that there is a trend towards bigger and more operationally focussed training. Specifically, the focus on inter-operability and the capabilities required for littoral conflict provide the building blocks of a collective military response to aggression in the region. Further, the exercise involved a wide range of countries from outside the Pacific including; Germany, Greece, India, Spain, Poland and the UK indicating the high level of international interest in the region. Exercises like RIMPAC 2026 are not just training activities but are also capability demonstrations designed to deter assertive diplomacy from escalating into physical conflict.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

US – Solomon Islands security deal creates political tension

A new US – Solomon Islands security deal, called a ‘ship rider’ agreement that allows US Coast Guard vessels into Solomon Islands waters, to conduct joint law enforcement and surveillance operations alongside local police has ignited political tension in the small nation. ^[xv] Essentially, the agreement allows Solomon Islands law enforcement agencies to ride on US Coast Guard ships during transits of the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Solomon Islands benefiting from having access to US Coast Guard ships to help police its EEZ. The US already has a approx. a dozen similar agreements with small nations across the Pacific.

However, the opposition party in the Solomon Islands parliament argues that the agreement will prejudice Solomon Islands sovereignty. The leader of the opposition Manasseh Sogavare, argues that the agreement allows the US to over-ride Solomon Islands interests. Sogavare’s position is indicative of local political tension about relationships with external powers like the US, Australia or China.

Radio NZ quoted esteemed legal scholar and Solomon Islands National University vice-chancellor, Dr Transform Agorae, who cautioned that “One concern I have observed in the current debate is that legal arguments sometimes become proxies for political preferences. Instead of discussing whether an agreement complies with international law, discussions sometimes shift towards whether one supports the government that negotiated it, or whether one supports the foreign country involved.”^[xvi]

In my opinion, Agorae’s statement captures a difficult situation very well. Melanesia is on the front-line of intense geo-political competition and every decision must be carefully weighed and considered. And, like Agorae I believe international and local law should provide the basis for consideration rather than diplomatic or political pressure.

Papua New Guinea requests election support from Timor Leste

In an interesting acknowledgement of the new nation’s development Papua New Guinea has asked Timor Leste to provide security assistance during its upcoming elections. Radio NZ reported that “PNG’s Prime Minister James Marape said the request is part of a broader plan to build a 1000-strong multinational election security and observation team. This would feature soldiers from Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Australia, and New Zealand.” ^[xvii] Timor Leste has been asked to provide 200 personnel.

Participation in a security and observation operation protecting the integrity of Papua New Guinea’s elections is a big step for Timor Leste’s defence force and is an acknowledgement of the new nation joining the Melanesian family of nations. It reflects on the resilience of the Timorese people and the hard work of UN soldiers and civilians that contributed to stabilising the country, and building its state infrastructure over the 25 years since it became independent.

Bougainville independence – An update

Bougainville is a large island located between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. During the 1980s and 90s a bloody civil war was fought for Bougainvillean independence that killed approx.20-30,000 people.

The war finished in 1997, after a peace deal was brokered by New Zealand. Later, a peace accord was signed in 2001 that outlined the steps towards Bougainville becoming independent.

In 2019, a referendum confirmed that 98% of the population want independence. Since then the matter has been debated in Papua New Guinea’s parliament. The referendum is non-binding so a final decision on Bougainville’s status must be made by Papua New Guinea’s parliament, and there has been considerable debate about options and the majority required for a final decision.

Papua New Guinea’s parliament decided in June the ratification vote will require a three-quarters majority of Members of Parliament rather than the normal two-thirds threshold usually required for a constitutional change.

Last week, Radio NZ reported that “After months of uncertainty, both governments have resolved that the Bougainville referendum results will finally be tabled for parliamentary deliberation in three week’s time.”^[xviii]

My assessment is that Papua New Guinea’s parliament will stall, or say ‘No’ offering greater local autonomy rather than giving the island its independence. The reasons why can be summarised as follows:

• Bougainville is rich in natural resources and potentially provides valuable revenue for Papua New Guinea. In 2025, Radio NZ reporter Scott Waide wrote “Economically, Bougainville once underpinned the national budget through the Panguna mine. At its peak, Panguna generated nearly half of Papua New Guinea’s total export earnings and around 17 percent of national government revenue, effectively underwriting the young state’s finances in the years surrounding independence.”^[xix]

• Additionally, Papua New Guinea has other resource rich provinces that may wish to break away; New Ireland or East New Britain. Bougainville’s independence could trigger further independence discussions in these provinces.

However, Bougainvillians may have other plans and last month the Autonomous Bougainville Government announced it plans to declare independence in 2030. Bougainville is also continuing its preparations for self-government until at least 1 September 2027.

Papua New Guinea’s desire to keep Bougainville combined with the strong independence movement make the situation unstable and potentially dangerous. Bougainville is definitely an area in Melanesia that Pacific observers should keep watching.

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^[i] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/570014/manele-wins-door-shut-on-pacific-islands-forum-partners-in-honiara

^[ii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/929410/pacific-islands-forum-fails-to-reach-consensus-on-anti-missile-statement-against-china

^[iii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/918390/pacific-foreign-ministers-to-discuss-solomons-idea-for-regional-security-treaty

^[iv] Ibid.

^[v] https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-australia-mutual-defence-treaty

^[vi] https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/vanuatu/vanuatu-australia-nakamal-agreement

^[vii] https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/fiji/ocean-peace-alliance-veitacini-treaty

^[viii] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-06-03/solomon-islands-china-security-pact-pacific-treaty-australia/106753784

^[ix] https://pmn.co.nz/read/political/solomon-islands-secures-usd35m-australia-funding-and-moves-to-reset-strained-ties-in-regional-power-shift

^[x] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/solomon-islands-looks-bring-traditional-partners-us-australia-cold-2026-08-07/

^[xi] https://www.cpf.navy.mil/newsroom/news/article/3118534/rimpac-2022-concludes/

^[xii] https://www.c3f.navy.mil/News/Article/4563833/rimpac-2026-comes-to-a-successful-conclusion/

^[xiii] https://www.dvidshub.net/news/571054/marines-and-partnering-nations-strengthen-amphibious-assualt-techniques-during-rimpac-2026

^[xiv] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/07/rimpac-2026-sinkex-allied-anti-ship-missile-strikes/

^[xv] https://pmn.co.nz/read/pacific-region/solomon-islands-split-over-us-maritime-deal-as-opposition-warns-of-major-sovereignty-risks

^[xvi] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/892923/solomon-islands-us-shiprider-deal-raises-serious-concerns-over-sovereignty

^[xvii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/894248/png-seeks-election-security-help-from-timor-leste-and-others

^[xviii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/902983/bougainville-and-papua-new-guinea-decide-on-date-for-referendum-result-to-be-tabled

^[xix] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/581919/what-could-follow-bougainville-s-exit-and-why-papua-new-guinea-struggles-to-let-go

Ukraine's strikes on Russian oil refineries and the 'fulfillment centres' of Wildberries and Ozon -bespoke logistics facilities that are critical supply chain nodes for the country's Amazon equivalents - mark an important shift in European warfare. By targeting dual-use infrastructure that underpins both war-fighting capability and the civilian economy, Ukraine has generated effects far beyond the battlefield.

Professional militaries can sometimes forget that throughout history, economic warfare has routinely played a part in large-scale confrontations. This campaign is a warning about the vulnerabilities embedded within their own economies.

Across almost every business sector, decades of pursuing efficiency have steadily eroded resilience. Global supply chains increasingly rely on fewer, larger distribution nodes and bigger, less agile ships. Oil production has consolidated into mega-refineries. Digital infrastructure has followed the same trajectory, with cloud computing replacing distributed on-premises servers, concentrating data in major facilities connected by vulnerable undersea cables.

A relatively small number of successful attacks could cause disruption far beyond their immediate targets, with cascading effects rippling across international physical and virtual networks. COVID-19 demonstrated just how difficult and expensive it is to secure capacity when every country is competing for the same scarce resources simultaneously.

Direct attacks by one state against another's civilian infrastructure remain unlikely because they carry a high risk of attribution and escalation. A more plausible threat is the use of proxies, criminal networks or individuals who can provide varying degrees of deniability while achieving similar disruptive effects.

Adversaries do not need to destroy infrastructure outright; they only need to create enough friction to weaponise the cognitive battlespace. A minor physical disruption to a supply chain can easily be amplified by information operations to trigger contingency plans, incite hoarding, and induce institutional paralysis. In this arena, the psychological impact becomes as strategically significant as the physical attack itself.

The first challenge is ownership. Defence forces traditionally focus on protecting military assets rather than the resilience of privately owned civilian infrastructure. This blind spot likely stems from a strict adherence to the laws of armed conflict, which designate civilian infrastructure as off-limits for attack. However, this creates a false sense of security and assumes that adversaries will play by the same rules-based constraints. In an era of hybrid warfare, the military-civilian distinction is becoming increasingly irrelevant.

The second challenge is funding. Resilience requires redundancy, spare capacity and contingency planning - all of which impose costs that markets naturally seek to eliminate. Few companies will willingly sacrifice profit margins for security, while few governments have shown any appetite to subsidise resilience at the necessary scale.

Modern economies have optimised themselves for efficiency, not survivability. Ukraine has shown how commercial centralisation can be turned into a strategic vulnerability. The question is whether other governments - especially in the liberal democracies - will act to secure their economies, or wait for an adversary to demonstrate the same brutal lesson on their soil.

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Currently, the Ukraine War is at a very interesting point. President Zelensky suddenly replaced the both nation’s defence minister and its military commander-in-chief. Ukraine’s air campaign expanded from prioritising Russian oil and gas infrastructure to include attacking Russia’s version of Amazon. Meanwhile, Ukrainian intelligence sources report that Russia is considering mass mobilisation. It has been a busy couple of weeks in Ukraine!

Leadership changes are an insight into Ukrainian civil-military relationships

On 15 July, President Zelensky dismissed Ukraine’s Defence Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov.^[i] Days later the president dismissed the Chief of the Ukraine’s Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi.^[ii] In less than a week, Ukraine changed its most senior civil and military leaders. A notable turn of events, that demonstrates that potential governance and management tensions are inherent in any conflict.

Fedorov and Syrskyi are very different characters, and conflict was probably inevitable. Fedorov is a tech-savvy reformer credited with being the intellectual horsepower behind Ukraine’s recent advances in drone warfare. Syrskyi is a different beast, trained in the same style of war as his Russian opponents and his nickname ‘The Butcher’ immediately characterised him negatively in many people’s minds.

A recent article with retired Estonian Commander in Chief, General Martin Herem in the Baltic Sentinel quotes Syrskyi’s view of the civil military relationship as follows: “I fight the war and tell you what I need, and you — the Ministry of Defense — deliver it. If you do not, I will find another solution. But you do not come and tell me how I should use these things.”^[iii] Sentiments that would be common to most generals around the world, and that are at the crux of the civil-military relationship.

In most states, military commanders are subordinate to civil power and rely on the wider civilian state to provide them with the resources they need to fight. But military commanders also need a degree of freedom to operate effectively and these boundaries are generally hard to define so there is often tension between elected or politically appointed officials and their generals. An important element of the Art of War at these levels of command is managing civil-military relationships.

Hard to reconcile differences that are summarised with regard to Ukraine in a The Conversation article by Doctors Sarah Whitmore and Bettina Renz who observe that “…. Fedorov came to symbolise a more modern and hi-tech approach to warfare in contrast to Syrskyi’s Soviet style of military leadership.”^[iv]

Regardless of conflict between these leaders, Syrskyi’s strategy is working. Ukraine has stopped Russia’s advance, inflicted massive casualties and is damaging the Russian economy. Fedorov contributed to the strategy’s success over the last six months by streamlining integration between the military and Ukraine’s defence industry. Fedorov’s work meant that new drone and digital communications technology was delivered quickly, and at scale. A joint effort that created Ukraine’s ‘drone wall,’ stopped Russian advances, and provided new long-range strike drones and missiles that Ukraine uses to attack both on the battlefield and deep behind the front-lines.

In Ukraine’s case, Fedorov was dismissed first and then after large civilian protests Syrskyi was dismissed. Obviously, it is unwise to dismiss both of the most important civil and military leaders at the same time and the sequence of events may provide insight into Ukraine’s government and leadership.

My first observation is that this situation indicates Zelensky relies on the military establishment more than individual defence ministers. Initially, he dismissed Fedorov and my speculation is that this action aimed to retain his relationship with Syrskyi, and the wider military establishment. However, Zelensky underestimated the political backlash and when the unpopularity of the decision became apparent, he was forced to dismiss Syrskyi.

Zelensky probably appointed Fedorov to achieve a rapid increase in Ukraine’s drone capability. During his tenure as defence minister, he managed to bridge the gap between industry and the military, introduced new tech, and most notably developed methods to scale implementation of new capabilities. Ukraine’s factories now produce millions of drones; outpacing and out performing Russian production.

Perhaps, like many innovators Fedorov was difficult to work with and robustly challenged Syrskyi and the military establishment. A group that Zelensky values highly and at a pragmatic level needs to retain a good relationship with. So after a significant capability leap was delivered, Fedorov’s position was reviewed and Zelensky decided to dismiss him to ease the concerns of his military.

Based on this assessment I do not believe the dismissals were well-planned or are indicative of a re-structure prior to a change of plan like a Ukrainian offensive. Instead, my assessment is that the changes are a stumble, the Fedorov-Syrskyi relationship simply became toxic and Zelensky took action. An action that had unexpected consequences.

Ukraine’s new military leadership – What changes are likely?

Yevhenii Khmara was appointed Acting-Defence Minister and is an interesting choice because he has a history of special operations commands. He led the operation to re-capture Snake Island and Operation Spiders Web, a series of surprise drone attacks on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet in 2025. He is a seasoned professional military officer whose appointment is probably an attempt to stablise the civil-military relationship.

The new commander of Ukraine’s military is Mykhailo Drapatyi, who at 43 is the youngest Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Drapatyi is a popular commander with a combat history dating back to the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea. Since then Drapatyi’s reputation has continued to grow, and he became a leader tasked with stabilising threatened sectors of the frontline including at Vovchansk in 2024 and later in Luhansk. He then led the important ‘Khortytsia’ later ‘Dnipro’ Operational-Strategic Grouping of Forces.

Throughout his career, Drapatyi is described in positive terms by his subordinates and he is famous for submitting his resignation after a 2025 Russian missile attack killed 12 soldiers under his command on a parade ground. Drapatyi’s acceptance of personal accountability and responsibility for the attack’s success is a trait that people admire.

Based on the available public information it is unlikely that the Khmara will be as innovative as Fedorov but he is likely to get on better with Drapatyi. The two soldiers probably know each other and share a military bond. I believe that these appointments signal a commitment to consolidation and that although Syrskyi may be gone his strategy is working. So, in the foreseeable future I see little change in Ukraine’s war plan that can be summarised as follows:

• Use drones and long-range missiles to put political pressure on Putin by damaging Russia’s economic infra-structure and isolating Crimea.

• Defend the frontline and use defensive battles to attrit Russia and inflict sufficient attrition that Russia’s cannot afford to continue the war.

In my opinion, this means that we should not expect a sudden Ukrainian transition to offensive operations because - If the plan is working - Why would Ukraine risk a ground offensive?

‘Wildberries’ – extending Ukraine’s strategic air campaign

Ukraine’s air campaign targeting the Russian economy expanded this week to include attacks on Russia’s version of Amazon – ‘Wildberries.’^[v] Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed several enormous distribution centres, sounding alarms in the Russian economy. The Ukrainian attacks have already destroyed approx. 10% of Wildberries warehouse capacity.^[vi]

The chain is Russia’s largest online retailer and The Independent reports that “Together, Wildberries and competitor Ozon, account for economic activity worth around 8.5% of Russia’s GDP. They support around 4 million jobs, or more than 5% of Russia’s workforce.” ^[vii]

Ukraine’s official position is that Wildberries logistics infrastructure is being used to support Russian operations making the warehouses a military target. However, it is more likely that the attacks are designed to damage the Russian economy and exacerbate Russia’s air defence problems. The chain’s large warehouses are easy targets that cannot be hidden and are spread across Russia so are probably impossible to effectively defend. Any Russian attempt to do so will further stretch their already thin air defences allowing for Ukrainian attacks on other targets, like oil facilities or defence factories.

The economic impact is difficult to predict and game theorist and analyst William Spaniel provides a good analysis on his You Tube channel titled ‘How the Wildberries Meltdown Could Dismantle the Entire Russian Economy.’^[viii] Although the destruction of Wildberries logistics infra-structure will impact on the local supply chain, especially small and medium-sized businesses, it is also likely that the real economic target is the Russian banking system.

Wildberries is a large business that relies on Russian banks for loans and will struggle to repay debt if Ukraine’s attacks continue. The size of Wildberries means that if it cannot honour its debts there could be significant impacts on the wider Russian financial sector. For example, Reuters recently quoted Denys Shtilierman, Fire Point’s co-founder and chief designer who on 27 July 2026 described “Wildberries as the largest borrower in Russia and said its demise would lead to the collapse ​of a large number of banks, including VTB.”^[ix]

Reuters also reports that “The Russian government is exploring ways to support Wildberries, the country’s biggest online retailer, and related businesses after Ukrainian drone attacks, with state-controlled bank ​VTB expected to play a central role.”^[x] Unfortunately for Russia, the government’s ability to underwrite banks is rapidly reducing as Ukraine’s attacks interdict the flow of oil and gas exports.

This expansion of the air campaign indicates that Ukraine remains focussed on its key strategic goal – Breaking Russia’s economy in order to create political pressure on Putin. It is also a good lesson for other countries about the vulnerability of centralised logistics, and the model’s implications for national resilience.

Mobilisation – Will Putin risk it?

In recent weeks, Ukraine has been warning that Russia is preparing for a full mobilisation. This would involve Russia calling up its reserve of trained conscripts adding approx. another 500,000 soldiers into Russia’s army.^[xi] By Russian law, conscripts can only be used to defend Russian territory so the new soldiers would be used to secure border areas and free up ‘contract’ soldiers for offensive operations in Ukraine.

The prospect of a full mobilisation is concerning for Ukraine because Russia’s most important advantage is the size of its army. The prospect of Russia being able to enhance the weight of its grinding offensives weighs heavily on Ukrainian planner’s minds. And in September, Russia has its elections a key decision point noted last month by the Atlantic Council that stated “Official confirmation of a mass mobilization is unlikely to come before Russia’s September 2026 parliamentary elections. While the outcome of these elections is a foregone conclusion, Putin has a record for using rigged votes to set the stage for unpopular public announcements.”^[xii]

But is Putin likely to mobilise?

The question is impossible to answer at this stage but my assessment is that the political risk is too high. I believe that if mobilisation was a realistic option Putin would have pursued it already. However, there is a chance that he will use the September election cycle to build a mandate for mobilisation. However, a mobilisation is unlikely to change the war’s current trajectory. In an Atlantic Council article, Mykola Bielieskov states “In reality, any Russians mobilized to join Putin’s invasion in the coming months face the prospect of becoming cannon fodder for Ukrainian drones. A mass mobilization will cause more death and devastation, but it is unlikely to decide the outcome of the war.”^[xiii]

Russia’s key tactical issue has remained constant for two years - it has not evolved a tactical system to breach Ukraine’s drone-based defences. Instead, it sacrifices soldiers trying to penetrate the Ukrainian front line, suffering massive attrition. This model is unsustainable, and as Ukraine’s drones get more sophisticated Russia’s losses will increase. The application of more soldiers to an obsolete tactical system will lengthen the war but is unlikely to defeat Ukraine.

Additionally, the Russian economy is already facing labour shortages. A full mobilisation will remove 500,000 working age men from the economy exacerbating this issue and increasing the war’s economic impact. Less workers means higher wages. Higher wages mean higher inflation and that effects Russian consumers. Mobilisation has extreme economic and political risks for Putin. Who probably understands this situation and is so is more likely to continue to focus on outlasting Ukraine’s supporters by sustainably maintaining front line activity with contract soldiers rather than risk a mobilisation.

Conclusion

Strategically Ukraine holds the initiative and on the frontline Russia is fixed and unable to advance. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s successful long-range air campaign has expanded to include Wildberries, a large e-commerce company that supports many small and medium-sized Russian businesses and accounts for a sufficient percentage of Russia’s GDP. Wildberries relies on loans from Russian banks that may need government support if Ukraine’s attacks cause a default.

Currently, Ukraine’s strategy has generated a series of successes and the recent leadership changes are unlikely to affect the campaign. The impact of the air campaign is that Russia’s ability to economically support the war is deteriorating. A situation that may force Putin to take a huge political risk and order a full-scale mobilisation after the elections in September.

^[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/17/dismissal-ukraine-defence-minister-mykhailo-fedorov-volodomyr-zelenskyy

^[ii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/21/zelenskyy-replaces-military-leader-and-brings-back-defence-minister-he-sacked

^[iii] https://balticsentinel.eu/8514437/general-martin-herem-syrskyi-does-not-deserve-the-butcher-label-critics-have-judged-him-too-harshly

^[iv] https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-inside-the-longstanding-conflict-between-politicians-and-military-commanders-288006

^[v] https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/29/ukraine-russia-wildberries-putin-trump.html and https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/23/ukraine-russia-war-wildberries-drones-amazon.html

^[vi] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-drone-strikes-wildberries-warehouses-b3024271.html

^[vii] Ibid.

^[viii]

^[ix] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russia-explores-support-wildberries-after-ukrainian-drone-attacks-sources-say-2026-07-28/

^[x] Ibid and https://www.kyivpost.com/post/81318

^[xi] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-prepares-to-mobilize-500-000-troops-1784374584.html

^[xii] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-may-gamble-on-mobilization-to-rescue-russias-ukraine-invasion/

^[xiii] Ibid.

China’s submarine-launched ballistic missile test

On 6 July 2026, China test fired a ballistic missile from a submerged submarine into international waters in the South West Pacific. It is only the second time China has test fired ballistic missiles into international waters, since the 1980s. ^[i] The missile was launched from a submarine in the South China Sea and it travelled approx. 7,000 km (4,300 miles) transiting over Philippines before it landed in the Pacific Ocean between Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.

The test sparked international protests from the US, NATO, and from several Pacific nations. It is the second time that China has conducted a ballistic missile test in the Pacific in the last two years. China’s response was that the test “complied with international law and practice, was not directed against any specific country or target,” and was “a routine part of China’s annual military training.”^[ii]

China did notify Pacific nations shortly before the test, the Japan Times reported that Japan’s embassy in Beijing got 90 minutes warning and the Guardian noted that “China has followed the letter of the law in informing regional countries, including Australia and New Zealand, that such a test was going to take place, but hardly its spirit.”^[iii]

Notably, China has also called for Pacific nations not to ‘over interpret’ the test that it claims is routine.^[iv] However, this test is subtly different to China’s last ballistic missile test in 2024 and is therefore worth further consideration.

Did Australia’s new alliance with Fiji trigger this test?

A well-canvassed aspect of the test is its relationship to the announcement that Australia and Fiji signed the ‘Ocean of Peace’ alliance. The new alliance is an important piece of Pacific diplomacy and it was signed on the same day as China’s test. Fiji is a key leader amongst the smaller nations of Melanesia and the South West Pacific, an area hotly contested by the US, Australia and China. Australia’s new alliance with Fiji creates a regionally powerful partnership, able to influence other Pacific nations and contest China’s influence.

Some commentary highlights this link, speculating that the missile test is a signal of China’s displeasure with the new treaty. However, this point is debatable because organising missile tests takes lots a planning. The Guardian’s David Vallance summed the situation up nicely when he wrote “It is not likely this was a spur-of-the-moment test. Even for a military whose sophistication has grown immensely over the past decades, and will continue to do so, these things take time. That said, it is possible the signing of the Ocean of Peace Alliance pact caused it to move the test up the timetable.”^[v]

The Japan Times also provided useful context stating that ”More likely it was occasioned by the annual joint naval drills that China and Russia are holding.”^[vi] Notably, the 2026 NATO Summit also took place between 7-10 July, Exercise RIMPAC was about to start, and like the recent Sino-Russian naval exercise is publicly known unlike the sudden elevation of Austro-Fijian security relationships.

In my opinion, it is important to take a wide view of geo-political activity. This test is carefully planned and was designed to send specific messages to the wider international community. It seems unlikely that protesting the Austro-Fijian alliance is the primary objective. Instead China’s test is probably designed to send a message to Washington.

The test must be analysed within wider Sino-American strategic competition

Although there are no indications that war between the US and China is imminent, or even likely. The US remains China’s main competitor, and American foreign policy is currently dangerously difficult to predict because the Trump administration is operating in a manner that creates uncertainty. China’s security policy includes deterring the US from military action, and deterring a nuclear armed power like the US requires China to demonstrate a credible nuclear capability. Therefore as the US becomes less predictable, China is incentivised to ‘flex its nuclear muscles.’

For instance, on Victory Day in September 2025, China paraded its nuclear arsenal including many ballistic and cruise missiles. A powerful force, but one that is over-matched by a key US advantage - America’s nuclear ‘second-strike’ capability.

Second-strike capability, the key to understanding this test

The term ‘second-strike’ refers to a nuclear attack force that cannot be wiped out by a surprise attack. Generally, nuclear-powered and armed submarines are used to provide a ‘second-strike’ capability. The movement and location of nuclear submarines can be concealed so an enemy cannot destroy them in a pre-emptive strike.

On Victory Day 2025 China prominently showcased a variety of nuclear weapons capable of striking the US homeland.^[vii] The recent launch of a submarine launched ballistic missile reinforces this display because it demonstrates China’s ‘second-strike’ capability. China has been able to launch ballistic missile from submarines since 1982 but has not tested (or demonstrated) this capability for decades.

A South China Morning Post analyst - Commodore C. Uday Bhaskar, from the Society for Policy Studies summed up the importance of this test when he opined that “Submarines in this category which have proven second-strike capability are considered the peak of nuclear deterrence.”^[viii]

Australia, Philippines, Japan or any other US-allied power in the Pacific does not have the capability to make a pre-emptive nuclear strike, so there is no need to demonstrate a ‘second-strike’ capability to any country other than the US. However, that does not mean the test doesn’t have secondary objectives like intimidating Philippines or Australia, but the key focus is probably the US.

Implications of China’s actions for the Pacific region

This missile test is part of a larger narrative that includes China’s generally assertive foreign policy in the South and East China Seas, 2024’s missile test, the display of nuclear weapons on Victory Day 2025 and the 2025 circumnavigation of Australia by a Chinese naval task group.

A series of actions that demonstrate that China acknowledges that it is competing with the US, and its allies. Competition that China is clearly worried could lead to military conflict, so it is demonstrating that it has the capability to project power. Whether conventionally in the South China Sea or by sending a task group to circumnavigate Australia, or in a worst-case scenario by having a credible ‘second-strike’ capability to deter US use of nuclear weapons.

Speaking in Ankara before the 2026 NATO Summit, Secretary General Mark Rutte said that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are intertwined and that NATO cannot to be naive about China.^[ix] In the Pacific, naivety also dangerous so it is vital to note China’s actions and ensure that they are closely studied and responded too, in an effective manner that preserves peace and deters escalation.

India’s president visits Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand

In July, India’s President Modi visited Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. An important series of visits because it provides further evidence that India is interested in expanding its influence east into the Pacific, and that Pacific nations are keen to engage with India.

India’s rise as an economic and security partner in the region is not new. In early 2024, I wrote that “Another nation with an interest in South East Asia is India. Since 1991, and the introduction of its ‘Look East’ doctrine India has quietly extended its interests in South East Asia” and that “India is emerging as a security ‘player’ in the Pacific.”

Later in 2025, I observed that “In 2024, Indian diplomats and warships visited the Pacific, and India announced its intention to build an embassy in Timor Leste” and noted that India is taking more of a security interest in the Pacific.”^[xiv]Modi’s visits indicate that this trend continues.

Since the introduction of India’s ‘Look East’ doctrine in 1991 India has quietly extended its interests in South East Asia. Now approx. 45% of India’s foreign trade is with South East Asia, and trade routes through the South and East China Seas are strategically important for the nation.

‘Act East,’ Modi’s policy, includes funding infrastructure projects and increased security cooperation with Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, specifically aimed at securing influence and access to the South China Sea.

India’s economic and security interest in the region is currently synchronised with local concern about China’s assertive foreign policy, and with a diminishing level of trust and confidence in the US. Meanwhile, countries committed to ‘freedom of navigation’ and that oppose China’s assertive territorial claims in the region like; Australia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and New Zealand that are allies or partners of the US are starting to ‘hedge their bets’ by building new economic and military relationships with India. The nation’s large economy, and powerful, nuclear-armed military make it an attractive partner, that may be predictable than the US.

Pacific military exercises – China and Russia’s Ex Joint Sea – US’s RIMPAC

July is summer in the Northern Hemisphere and both China and the US are leading exercises in the Pacific this month. China and Russia conduct annual naval exercises in July that are followed by joint patrols into the North Pacific.^[xv]

This year from 6-13 July, The Russian Pacific Fleet’s flagship the Slava Class cruiser Varyag, a corvette, a submarine rescue ship and a couple of submarines exercised with their Chinese counterparts. The Chinese contingent included the destroyers PLANS Kaifeng and Anshan, the frigate PLANS Wuhu, the supply ship PLANS Kekexilihu, the submarine rescue ship PLANS Yangchenghu and an unnamed submarine.^[xvi]

The exercise is likely have had a focus on submarine warfare, the presence of submarine rescue vessels indicates that this is an area both sides are keen to share knowledge about.

Meanwhile, the US is hosting its largest naval exercise of the year RIMPAC. This exercise started in June and is currently in its at-sea phase, during which the various air and naval task groups exercise together until the end of July.

RIMPAC 2026 involves approx. 30 surface ships, five submarines, 15 country’s land forces, more than 206 aircraft and 30,000 personnel. It is a huge activity that practices many different military skills including the following notable activities:

• Japan Ground Self-Defence Forces 8th Surface to Ship Missile Regiment and the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 623rd Field Artillery carried out a live firing with their respective Type 12 anti-ship missile and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).

• 15 surface warships took part in an exercise practicing naval gunfire support.

Deployment and live-firing anti-ship missiles and naval gunfire support are important war-fighting skills for littoral operations, defending or attacking in a coastal environment. It is another example of how seriously the US, its allies and partners are taking the potential for a littoral campaign in places like Taiwan or the South China Sea.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Australia secures another diplomatic win in Melanesia

On 6 July 2026, Australia and Fiji signed two important agreements. The ‘Oceans of Peace Alliance’ officially the Veitacini Mutual Defence Treaty, and the economic Vuvale Union Treaty.

The ‘Oceans of Peace Alliance’ is security focused and elevates Fiji’s defence relationship with Australia to being an ally, both signatories committing to come to the other’s aid in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific.

This is an important event because Fiji is a key leader and influencer in the South West Pacific, and by securing its support Australia creates a security alliance that can limit further Chinese influence in the region. It also represents a significant change in Fiji’s position. Historically, Fiji has sought to remain un-committed and retain productive relationships with all regional powers including China. By entering this relationship with Australia, Fiji commits itself to the supporting the US-led group of nations opposing the expansion of Chinese interests in the region.

The treaty indicates that Sino-American and Sino-Australian diplomatic competition in the Pacific is escalating, forcing nations like Fiji to pick sides. It is an indication that we are likely to see a more divided region in the future, as countries like the US, Australia and China seek more rigid security commitments from their smaller partners.

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^[i] https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-slbm-test-underscores-importance-ballistic-missile-launch-notification-agreement

^[ii] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2026/07/10/chinas-misdirection/

^[iii] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/07/china-long-range-missile-test-south-pacific-australia

^[iv] https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/07/07/slbm-jl-3-nuclear-triad-japan-australia-new-zealand-pacific-island-nations/9361783475198/

^[v] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jul/07/china-long-range-missile-test-south-pacific-australia

^[vi] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/editorials/2026/07/10/chinas-misdirection/

^[vii] https://www.csis.org/analysis/parading-chinas-nuclear-arsenal-out-shadows

^[viii] https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3360612/chinas-missile-test-submarine-no-guarantee-regional-stability

^[ix] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3359642/nato-cant-be-naive-about-china-it-ramps-military-might-rutte-claims

^[x] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-10/beijing-accelerated-military-movements/106892012

^[xi] ibid

^[xii] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-15/china-japan-defence-spending/106912686

^[xiii] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-10/beijing-accelerated-military-movements/106892012

^[xiv] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-brief-2025-annual-review

^[xv] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/5/china-and-russia-to-hold-annual-joint-naval-drills

^[xvi] https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-07-06/china-russia-joint-sea-taiwan-japan-22187335.html

Recently, reports that US intelligence services warned Poland about Russian plans to attack the country featured prominently in international media.^[i] Reporting that encouraged plenty of speculation, some of it hyperbolic. The threat of a Russian attack on a NATO member is not new and had been well—canvassed; for instance, two weeks ago the Guardian discussed the concerns of Baltic States intelligence agencies.^[ii] The Guardian is not alone and many news outlets, commentators and think tanks have reported similar concerns.

In this case, it is important to note that the range of options canvassed by Russia were below the threshold of overt military action. Instead, the intelligence pointed to small, discrete operations with a high level of ambiguity about their initiation and intent – hybrid or grey zone operations.

Further, in is notable that this intelligence information was released immediately before NATO’s leaders met in Ankara for the alliance’s annual summit. This week’s activities provide insights into the Kremlin’s problems, and about NATO’s hardening position towards Russia. A trend the bodes poorly for Putin, especially as Ukraine’s drones start to slowly strangle Crimea.

Russia’s plans – A ‘real’ war with NATO is not on Putin’s agenda

In June 2026, my post titled ‘Putin has problems, so expect volatility’^[iii] assessed that Putin’s most likely course of action is to use his current recruiting strategies to continue the war in Ukraine and that “… more hybrid operations are conducted in the North Sea, Baltic and in NATO countries that vocally support Ukraine. This increases the cost of security and therefore the likelihood that NATO members that are either; not directly threatened with attack, or are being targeted by hybrid operations may seek to disengage and withdraw support from Ukraine.”

The released intelligence is consistent with this assessment, and indicated that Russian planning considered proposed options like^[iv]:

• Drone strikes on a piece of critical infrastructure for example a power station.

• A Russian helicopter ‘getting lost’ and landing in Poland to provide a pretext for Russian forces to cross the border into Polish territory to rescue the crew.

• Launching a small attack across the border probably near Kalingrad.

A range of small, discrete operations with a level of ambiguity that makes a it difficult for NATO members to agree on a joint response. For example, countries that share a border with Russia like the Baltic States, Poland and Finland are likely to support a powerful collective response. Unfortunately, powerful collective responses are expensive and Putin’s planners are hoping that NATO members, further from the frontline, will argue for a lower grade response creating tensions in the alliance.

The aim is not to invade Poland, capture territory or even inflict a damaging blow. Instead, Putin’s goal is to fracture the NATO alliance. Its members arguing over how to respond to an ambiguous Russian intervention that although violent, is below the conventional threshold for war.

The release of this information reinforces assessments from intelligence agencies like Latvia’s Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) that recently stated the likelihood of a large-scale conventional Russian military attack against the Baltic states is very low but that hybrid operations are highly likely, and that “The aim of such pressure would be to encourage NATO countries to reduce their support for Ukraine or become more willing to make concessions to Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine and any potential diplomatic settlement.” ^[v]

Notably, this information tells us about the Kremlin’s problems and plans. It is an indicator that Putin’s options are limited; he is defeated on the ground and evidence shows that he cannot risk a full mobilisation. It is unlikely he has enough combat power available to fight in Ukraine and threaten a NATO country directly at the same time. So, instead he is looking for smaller interventions to try and influence the situation. Russian strategists have probably convinced themselves that some NATO members are scared of war with Russia and that an aggressive hybrid operation will provide enough escalation, and uncertainty, to stoke that fear and turn it into ‘wedge’ dividing the alliance.

NATO’s response indicates Putin does not scare Europe anymore

Last week, NATO’s annual leaders summit sent a clear message to Putin. The post-summit joint leader’s statement’s first paragraph stating “We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Ankara to reaffirm our ironclad commitment to our collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond. An attack on one is an attack on all.^[vi]

The term “ironclad commitment” is carefully chosen to unequivocally demonstrate that the alliance is committed to collective defence, and will respond to any Russian attack. A point re-iterated in the phrase “an attack on one is an attack on all.” The alliance’s clear, strong language is an important indication of NATO’s position. Europe is not intimidated by Russia and is ready to act if Putin wants to escalate. This situation disincentivises large Russian hybrid operations because instead of creating pressure on the alliance’s internal politics, an attack is more likely to reinforce the alliance by creating a common threat for it to rally against.

Notably, the timing of the release - immediately prior to the conference encourages speculation that it was made public to influence public opinion. NATO leaders would be well-briefed about potential Russian activity, and there is a long history of it being predicted by intelligence services and commentators. But, making this information available to the wider public could reinforce political support in NATO countries for taking a harder line on Russia.

Strategic-level situation – bad news for Putin

Russia has lost this round of the strategic battle. Ankara demonstrated that NATO is committed to Ukraine and is ready to act collectively to counter any Russian escalation. For example:^[vii]

• NATO countries committed another US $ 80 billion of assistance to Ukraine.

• The alliance also committed to increasing its defence spending, including US$ 57 billion in new procurement. A spend that will focus on AI, long-range-precision strike, integrated air and missile defence, uncrewed systems, intelligence capabilities and notably an interoperable transatlantic warfighting cloud.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s strategic air campaign continues to demolish Russian oil and gas infrastructure, reducing Russian government revenue. Ukraine’s campaign also brings the impact of the war home for ordinary Russians as fuel supplies dry up around the country. ^[viii]

Ukraine’s strategy is working and barring a sudden and extreme change in Russian activity either; the money will run out or economic and political pressure will force the Kremlin to negotiate. The question is whether Putin sees the ‘writing on the wall,’ or if he will need to be removed before Russia starts to negotiate.

Operational-level situation – Ukraine’s plan

At operational-level, a new Russian axis of attack has not developed this summer. Instead, Russian main effort continues to be capturing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and the ‘Fortress Belt’ of cities near Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. If Russian captures this area Putin achieves two objectives;

• He can claim victory because he has ‘liberated’ the Donbas.

• Securing the Fortress Belt ensures Russia has a secure base for future operations in Ukraine.

Ukraine ‘on the other hand’ continues to stick to its attritional strategy, trading ground for casualties. This plan is working. A recent Centre for International and Strategic Studies report discussed the situation, and assessed that “The Russian military has suffered 1.4 million battlefield casualties and as many as 450,000 deaths since its February 2022 full-scale invasion, according to new CSIS data. Russia’s territorial control in Ukraine shrank in the spring of 2026, with a net loss of roughly 400 square kilometers in April and May.”^[ix] The report assessed that since the beginning of 2026, Russia has lost eight soldiers for every Ukrainian casualty.

The frozen frontline is evidence that Russian casualties are unsustainable and make it impossible to build up the force ratio required for offensive manoeuvre. Essentially, Ukraine’s ‘Drone Wall’ has defeated Russian plans for a 2026 Summer offensive, and now provides a secure based for the next phase of Ukraine’s plan.

Ukraine’s plan – strangle Crimea

Ukraine is in an enviable position; Russia is busy expending resources trying to advance against its well-tested defences. Meanwhile, Ukraine doesn’t need to use up resources trying to attack because its medium and long-range attack drones can strike with sufficient precision to interdict the R-280 Highway that supplies Crimea, and attack the bridges that are the entry points into Crimea for fuel, ammunition and food. Ukrainian drones are also attacking Russian ferries and supply ships trying to cross the Sea of Azov.

After degrading Russian air defences, and then building a coordinated network of drone and satellite surveillance Ukraine can now strike at will, and very effectively. For instance, Deutsches World recently reported that “The situation in occupied Crimea is particularly tense. Fuel shortages ensued after recent drone strikes disrupted traffic along the so-called “Novorossiya Highway,” which links the peninsula to Russia’s Rostov region and serves as a key supply route for fuel.”^[x]

Commentary that is supported by the Institute for the Study of War’s 7 July 2026 assessment that states “Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against a multitude of diverse targets, including Russian air defenses, petroleum product transport, other logistics, and electrical substations, is collapsing logistics in occupied Crimea.”^[xi] And, more recently on 10 July, Al Jazeera reported that ” In Sevastopol, fuel has stopped being sold to civilians, and more than a dozen Crimean regions are suffering from electricity blackouts.”^[xii]

Ukraine’s attacks stop the flow of supplies into Crimea, causing Putin a big political problem. Crimea is the ‘jewel in the crown’ of his regime, and he is very politically invested in it. If Putin cannot stop Ukraine’s siege of Crimea, he loses face and his weaknesses are exposed to the Russian people. A dangerous situation for an autocrat.

From Ukraine’s perspective, at operational-level it makes sense not to launch ground attacks. It is better to take a cautious approach and rather than wasting young soldier’s lives, use drone supremacy to strangle Crimea from a distance – forcing Putin to respond. His most likely response is to move more air and drone defences to Crimea and onto the bridges, roads and rail lines that carry supplies to the peninsular. An impact of that response is Russian air and drone defences over the frontline becoming weaker, and when they are weak enough Ukraine may choose to attack on the ground.

Conclusion

Strategically, NATO continues to take a more assertive position. A policy demonstrated by the alliance’s statement this week. NATO is no longer intimidated by Putin and is committed to funding Ukraine, and responding to Russian escalation using hybrid tactics. Bad news for Putin.

On the frontline, Ukraine’s Drone Wall has stopped Russia’s Summer 2026 offensive and evidence shows that Ukraine’s drones are stopping supplies from getting to the frontline, and more importantly to Crimea. Last post we said that Ukraine is now in the driver’s seat and will set the tempo of the next phase of the war, and asked whether Ukraine would strike, or slowly strangle Russia’s forces in Crimea from a distance.

Ukraine’s actions indicate it is choosing the latter option - to use its drone supremacy and strangle Crimea from a distance.

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^[i] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/07/03/russia-planning-attack-on-poland-test-nato-resolve-us-warns/ and https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poland-ukraine-war-russia-false-flag-operation-nato-attack-radek-sikorski/ and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj0gp88q4l4o

^[ii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland

^[iii] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/putin-has-big-problems-so-expect

^[iv] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/us-warns-poland-of-possible-russian-attack-1783072209.html

^[v] https://bnn-news.com/latvias-intelligence-service-assesses-russian-security-risks-to-the-baltic-states-281572

^[vi] https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration

^[vii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/8/five-key-takeaways-from-the-nato-summit-in-ankara

^[viii] https://www.dw.com/en/is-russia-heading-for-a-fuel-crisis/a-77579542 and https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russians-are-googling-how-to-make-gasoline-as-fuel-crisis-deepens-20533 and https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/six-russian-regions-left-without-gasoline-1783616978.html

^[ix] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-blood-and-treasure-ballooning-costs-putins-war

^[x] https://www.dw.com/en/is-russia-heading-for-a-fuel-crisis/a-77579542

^[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/

^[xii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/10/ukraine-chokes-fuel-to-crimea-russian-consumers-targeting-military-supply

Sino-Japanese tension and Japan’s rise as a military power

This week, China issued a warning to Japanese Coast Guard vessels operating in the East China Sea.[i] A small incident that highlights ongoing Sino-Japanese diplomatic tension.

Sino-Japanese rivalry is becoming a defining feature of Pacific geo-politics. Japan is worried by China’s assertive territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and about the nation’s increasing military capability. Additionally Japan is likely to be concerned about the future reliability of its most important ally - the US.

In response, Japan is rapidly expanding its military capabilities, causing China great concern. China has not forgotten Japan’s occupation of its territory during World War Two, a history that weighs heavily on contemporary Chinese strategy.

Since November 2025, the two nations have been involved in a heated diplomatic dispute. It started after Japan’s Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi told the Japanese parliament that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is a security issue for Japan.[ii] China responded to Taikaichi’s comments with a range of diplomatic threats and economic sanctions. Takaichi has not backed down and after winning a snap election early this year has a political mandate to continue standing up to Chinese pressure.

Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi’s comments at the recent Shangri La Dialogue about strengthening Japan’s defence capabilities also raised Chinese ire.[iii] Koizumi’s comments are notable because they reinforce that Japan’s pursuit of greater military capability is policy, regardless of China’s concerns or its diplomatic threats.

The change in Japanese defence policy is historic, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution forbids Japan from settling international disputes by, or maintaining the potential to make war, restrictions that remain extant.

So, while Japan’s procurement of air-defence and anti-ship missiles sit squarely within this remit the term ‘self-defence’ is being expanded to include a range of capabilities that are more expeditionary and allow Japan to participate in overseas collective security activities.[iv] This includes participation in joint exercises, deploying staff to work with NATO,[v] and creating military units capable of expeditionary operations like aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships.

Expeditionary capabilities could also allow Japan to deploy military force in support of its allies in the event of conflict. For instance, to support a US-led defence of Taiwan.

Japan’s proposed defence budget is US$ 58 billion this financial year, and it is on track to become the world’s third largest spender of defence over the next five years.[vi] A rate of expenditure that is delivering significant capability increases and that worries China because Japan’s capability improvements include both defensive and expeditionary capabilities.

Japan is investing heavily is air-defence and anti-ship missiles

Japan is building and deploying more air-defence missiles. Japan already has an extensive range of home-grown air-defence missiles like the short-range Type 11 or the medium-range Type 03 but is building more, and is also starting to build combat-proven American Patriot missiles.[vii]

Alongside improvements in air-defence, Japan is also building and deploying larger numbers of shore based anti-ship missiles. Japanese anti-ship missiles range from the short-range Type 88 that has a range of up-to approx. 200km (124 miles) to medium-range Type 12 and Type 25 missiles, some of which can hit targets up-to approx. 1000km (620 miles) away.

Additionally, Japan is also developing the Type 25 Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) that has a planned range of 2,000 km (1240 miles). A weapon system that will provide Japan with a very effective, long-range area-denial capability.

Specifically, Japan is strengthening the defences of its southern Senkaku Islands because they are near Taiwan. One island, Yonaguni is only 110km (70 miles) from the Chinese coast. Notably, Japan is also deploying missiles and surveillance radars to support them to their far eastern islands - Iwo Jima and Minamitorishima.

Japanese planners are clearly aware that allowing these remote islands to be captured would provide a base from which to attack mainland Japan. An acknowledgement that any future military conflict with China will involve vast distances and very long-range strikes.

New expeditionary capabilities are being developed and tested.

A significant change in Japanese defence policy is the development of amphibious and air mobile forces that can be used to project power. For example, Japan’s Izumo and Hyuga Classes ‘helicopter destroyers’ or ‘helicopter carriers’ are practicing operations with F-35 fighter planes, signalling the potential for these vessels to operate as small aircraft carriers. [viii]

Japan is also investing in landing ships and recently sent a carrier JS Ise, a landing ship and 1,400 personnel to Exercise Balikatan in May 2026. Japan also used this exercise to test expeditionary deployment of Type 88 anti-ship missile.[ix] Deployments that indicate an interest in expeditionary power projection using carriers and amphibious warfare ships.

Notably, Japan moved its elite Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade to new southern bases at Sasebo alongside VF-22 Osprey transport aircraft last year. Positioning that allows for rapid reinforcement of garrisons in the Senkaku Island Chain.

China’s position

Japan’s rearmament is of great concern to China, and Chinese diplomats have made a number of statements opposing Japanese defence spending, a programme they refer to as ‘remilitarisation.’ A pointed reference to Japan’s militarist foreign policy before and during World War Two. For example, the BBC recently reported that before the Shangri La Dialogue “China’s national defence ministry spokesman Jiang Bin had warned “the grey rhino of a remilitarised Japan is gathering speed” and called on the international community to “work together to contain Japan’s neo-militarism“.[x]

The current diplomatic battle with Japan is also provides China an opportunity to test the US position. At this point, the US reaction has been minimal and this could contribute to escalation. For example, China may read the lack of US support as an opportunity to push Japan harder. Likewise, it could encourage Japan to look to its own defence, increasing spending, and building wider defence networks. Activities that are likely to concern China.

This week, The Diplomat reported that a Japanese trade delegation visited China, cautiously hinting that this visit could represent an initial thaw in relations.[xi] Regardless of a thaw, the tension between Japan and China is far from over. Japan’s increasing defence spending, the proximity of Taiwan to Japan, and Takaichi’s willingness to stand up to Chinese pressure all contribute to this relationship becoming more tense.

Japan’s rise should be noted by all Pacific nations because as it develops greater military power it will increasingly become a defence leader for democratic nations in the region. Australia, South Korea and Philippines are already working more closely with Japan, and it is only a matter of time before smaller nations enter similar defence relationships.

Japan is also already engaged with NATO so may also develop as the organisation’s lead in the Pacific because it is the largest of the alliance’s four Indo-Pacific Partners (Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand).

Therefore, Japan should be closely studied because its defence decisions are likely to impact across the region and smaller nations will increasingly be influenced by Japanese policy.

Australian defence chiefs highlight security threat

Speaking at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on 25 June 2026, Air Marshall Stephen Chappell, Chief of the Australian air force spoke bluntly about regional security. In his opinion, Australia’s security situation is rapidly deteriorating and he used a metaphor familiar to Game of Thrones fans to describe the situation, stating that “I see the strategic outlook in the region as autumn, and autumn is deepening.”[xii]

Sentiments that were reiterated by the nation’s Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Susan Coyles who said that the Australian army was not yet ready to fight a large, modern war. She stated “If you think that everything you have in your kit bag is going to work at the point and time of need tomorrow – we’re delusional.”[xiii] Coyles was also clear that the army is working hard to build the capabilities it needs for large-scale conflict.

Senior officers do not speak without careful consideration. The fact that both the Chief of Army and Navy are making statements at the same time about the need to deter conflict is noteworthy because it demonstrates how seriously Australia takes the threat of war.

It also indicates that Australia’s military leadership is focused on a peer conflict far to the north; in places like Taiwan, Philippines and the South and East China Seas. Areas of operation that will require a range of new technologies and larger sea, air and land forces than currently exist. Both leaders provided a reminder that Australia’s commitment to increasing defence spending is based on the threat of potential conflict in the region.

Australia and New Zealand test fire Harpoon missiles

Australia and New Zealand are committed allies and last week demonstrated their inter-operability when a RNZAF P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft test fired Australian AGM-84 Harpoon missiles.[xiv] The missiles were fired during a joint exercise near Guam called Exercise Valiant Shield. The exercise involved aircraft, ships and submarines from New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States.

The RNZAF P-8 Poseidon exercised locating, identifying and attacking a target. It also practiced working within a multi-national, inter-operable team, receiving and passing information across multiple assets and working within a joint command structure. For example, the mission included coordination of the New Zealand attack with two missile armed US P-8 Poseidon’s that also attacked the target. A set of important skills for New Zealand forces working within an Australian or US-led task force.

This is the first time that a New Zealand aircraft has fired AGM-84 Harpoon missiles and it demonstrates the increasingly close inter-operability that is developing between the US, Australia and New Zealand.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

American pilot killed in West Papua / Irian Jaya

The western half of the large Melanesian island, Papua, is a province of Indonesia and is officially titled Irian Jaya. However, the territory is contested by an indigenous, separatist movement that calls the area West Papua and wants it to be independence from Indonesia. This conflict means that a little reported but bloody war has raged in the territory for decades and is getting worse. Radio NZ reports that “Indonesia has been increasing its troop deployments to Papua region to the extent that it has at least six times more military per capita in Papua than any other region in Indonesia.” [xv]

Last week, an American pilot working in the region was killed and his plane destroyed by West Papua National Liberation Army fighters in the central highlands. The separatists claim that the pilot and his plane were used by the Indonesian military. [xvi]

Although, violence is common in the highlands of West Papua / Irian Jaya it is unusual for a foreigner to be killed. Historically, foreigners captured by separatists are held for ransom and their release negotiated. This murder may indicate a hardening of attitudes and so could be an indicator of the potential for more violence in West Papua / Irian Jaya.

Further, this killing is likely to lead to Indonesian military operations in the area to capture the perpetrators. Radio NZ reported that locals are already fleeing the area to avoid the Indonesian army. Therefore, it is worth watching the situation in West Papua / Irian Jaya because this incident may trigger more violence.

Australia and Vanuatu sign Nakamal Agreement

It has taken a long time but Australia and Vanuatu signed the Nakamal Agreement.[xvii] The agreement was signed in Canberra on 29 June 2026 and it is an economic and security deal between the two nations. The agreement states that Australia is Vanuatu’s primary policing partner and that the nation will look to Australia, New Zealand and France for emergency relief.

A key element of the agreement is that it stops other countries building military bases in Vanuatu. A provision specifically included by Australia to block China from acquiring a base in Vanuatu. Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanse telling reporters that “What this does do is to provide certainty for Australia that there will be no foreign military base.”

The agreement was supposed to be signed in September 2025 but the Vanuatu government raised concerns about the deal, and since then Australia has been working hard to get a deal signed. The Nakamal Agreement is a victory for Australia in its diplomatic campaign to block Chinese influence in Melanesia. It is notable that it follows the recent change of government in Solomon Islands.

The collapse of Jeremiah Manele’s coalition in the Solomon Islands and appointment of a new Prime Minister, Matthew Wale was good news for Australia. Wale’s new government is more positively inclined towards Australia and is keen to ‘reset’ the relationship including developing a new partnership agreement. Australia’s success in both countries is an indication that their diplomacy is working

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[i] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-02/china-warns-japan-survey-ships-in-east-china-sea-upping-tension

[ii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c86y3ndqlxwo

[iii] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly8qd4595eo

[iv] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/rattled-by-trump-us-allies-eye-japans-biggest-arms-opening-since-ww2-2026-04-15/

[v] https://shape.nato.int/NSATU/newsroom/the-japan-selfdefense-forces-deploys-personnel-to-nsatu

[vi] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/26/japan-govt-greenlights-record-58bn-defence-budget-amid-regional-tension

[vii] https://ua.news/en/world/iaponiia-lokalizuvala-virobnitstvo-raket-do-patriot

[viii] https://news.usni.org/2026/05/20/japans-largest-warship-preparing-for-f-35b-training-with-u-s-marines and https://migflug.com/jetflights/js-kaga-f-35b-marines-japan-carrier-2026/

[ix] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-update-19-april-2026

[x] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8p4ejy8ppo

[xi] https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/china-reopens-a-business-channel-to-japan-while-political-ties-remain-frozen/

[xii] https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/autumn-is-deepening-aussie-expert-issues-chilling-warning-about-china-threat/news-story

[xiii] ibid

[xiv] https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/rnzaf-p-8a-poseidon-successfully-launches-harpoon-missiles/

[xv] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/659917/fears-for-more-conflict-in-west-papua-after-american-pilot-killed

[xvi] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/02/papua-separatists-kill-american-pilot-yahukimo

[xvii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/29/australia-and-vanuatu-sign-deal-to-block-foreign-military-bases

On Ukraine’s frontline, 70-80% of casualties are now caused by drones.[i] Most by simple easily produced First Person View (FPV) drones that any adversary with access to an electronics store and explosives can build. Simple, easily built, FPV drones provide new surveillance and strike capabilities that are re-shaping land tactics.

In Ukraine, vast numbers of FPV drones circle over the frontline so any vehicle or group of soldiers moving in the open is immediately spotted and engaged. This limits the ability to manoeuvre, forcing both sides to look for new tactics, including new force structures and command relationships for FPV drones.

Russia and Ukraine are both centralising command and control (C2) of their FPV drones. In both armies’ FPV drones and their operators are being consolidated into large units like Ukraine’s Magyars Birds or Russia’s Rubicon. A development designed to break the frontline stalemate because FPV drones (and the best operators) can be concentrated at the point of main effort. Concentration that also simplifies support arrangements with other assets like maintainers, suppliers, surveillance drones, electronic warfare units, cyber experts and intelligence analysts.

Russia and Ukraine are creating units and C2 arrangements that can create ‘mass effects.’ An ‘effect’ is the impact (or an ‘effect’) imposed upon the enemy. For example, FPV drones provide a range of ‘effect’s that includes; surveillance, target acquisition or to deliver direct or indirect fire ‘effects’ like ‘neutralising,’ ‘suppressing’ or ‘destroying’ enemy positions.

But what does ‘massed effect’ mean?

In simple terms, using more FPV drones increases the ‘effect’ imposed on the enemy through concentration of force. For example, a platoon in defence is will be impacted more being attacked by 100 FPV drones than by ten. Likewise, allocating 100 FPV drones to a surveillance task provides better coverage than ten.

Before drones, artillery was the arm that provided the best example of ‘mass effect’ because the fire of any gun or rocket that is within range can be rapidly concentrated on a target. Essentially, an artillery unit can transfer an ‘effect’ like ‘suppression,’ ‘neutralisation’ or ‘destruction’ immediately around the battlefield. When artillery multiple units are operating together their ‘effects’ can be massed for great impact on the enemy.

Russia and Ukraine’s drone doctrine emphasises ‘mass effect’

Fighting near Dnipropetrovsk, early in 2026, demonstrated Ukraine using ‘massed effect’ with FPV drones in offensive operations. Ukrainian forces used massed formations (or swarms) of drones to create ‘creeping barrages’ or ‘cascades’ of FPV drones to ‘neutralise’ or ‘suppress’ enemy positions ahead of advancing infantry. Massed FPV drones meant the attacking force advanced behind a supporting barrage of indirect fire, a tactic familiar to generations of gunners^[ii].

Preston Stewart’s, You Tube channel provides good analysis of these tactics -

.

The ‘Two Marines’ Substack’[iii] provides another useful analysis of how Russia is concentrating drone C2 to create ‘massed effect.’ The article discusses Russian experiments with a C2 concept called a ‘Drone Line’ and observes that “The concept was an attempt to more systematically organize strike UAS [Uncrewed Aerial Systems] assets in support of offensive operations instead of having each regiment or brigade’s UAS assets focus on its own area of responsibility.” Like their Ukrainian counterparts, Russian planners acknowledge there is benefit in concentration of drone ‘effects’ through centralised C2 arrangements.

The ‘small helicopter model’ is gone, it evolved into defensive ‘kill webs’

This is a notable change in FPV drone use because early in the war they were deployed in an ad hoc local fashion, essentially operating as ‘small helicopters’ for a unit. Initially, FPV drones provided a view ‘over the hill’ and spotted for mortars and artillery. The next evolution was attack FPV drones that either dropped munitions or crashed kamikaze style into targets.

Next, we saw the development of drone-based defensive ‘kill webs’ over the front Iine. Modern digital communication networks allowed the ‘sensors’ that locate targets like drones and soldiers to instantaneously share information with ‘shooters’ like missiles, artillery, aircraft, drones and tanks which allowed immediate, accurate engagement. The ‘sensor-shooter’ relationship became almost immediate and froze movement on the battlefield because any vehicle or group of soldiers was spotted and engaged.

The next step – C2 arrangements and technology to support massed drone ‘effects’

Now we can observe the next phase of FPV drone evolution. The maturation of C2 systems for FPV drones that allow for massive concentrations of FPV drones. Russia and Ukraine have both consolidated large number of drones and drone operators into large units like Ukraine’s Magyars Birds or Russia’s Rubicon.

An organisational change that allows FPV drones and the best operators to be concentrated at the point of main effort. Alongside logistics and other supporting assets like maintainers, surveillance drones, electronic warfare units, cyber experts and intelligence analysts. A development designed to break the frontline stalemate by creating the ability to mass drone ‘effects’ at a key point on the battlefield.

It also represents a transition in thinking about how FPV drones are used. Ukraine and Russia have transitioned from the ‘small helicopter’ model of drones supporting infantry companies or platoon-sized units towards building the infra-structure for terms of ‘massed effects.’

The next evolution will be using AI for coordination of drones. AI enhancing a side’s ability to pilot large numbers of drones either; within an attack swarm or ‘on post’ maintaining surveillance. Activities that currently require human pilots flying individual drones. Defence One recently discussed Ukrainian drone innovations and the use of AI, stating that “… future drone operations may not require highly trained drone pilots, just regular soldiers who can outline basic mission parameters. The swarm, sharing and analyzing data as a group, would figure out the hard stuff.” ^[iv] Already, there are reports of AI being used this way but they are not corroborated. However, is probably only a matter of time before this is confirmed.

A feature of Ukraine’s tactical success is the Kropyva computerised tactical information and fire control system.[v] The system was developed around 2014-16 and is maturing in service. Essentially, Kropyva is an app running on the Android operating system. Kropyva maps where friendly and enemy forces are and allows units to transfer information about their situation to each other digitally. This means that tactical information can be shared immediately and accurately between vehicles, or between units.

The Kropyva app also integrates drones and ballistic calculations. For instance, drone footage can be shared instantly with a tank, a mortar detachment or an artillery battery that receives not just information about the target, but also the ballistic data to immediately engage the target.

It is easy to see a future in which fire control apps, linked to centralised drone swarms enabled by AI will simplify the used massed drone ‘effects’ on the battlefield. Frontline soldiers using an app to ‘call forward’ the support they need from drone units located behind the frontline.

This reduces the need for frontline units to operate and maintain large numbers of FPV drones because if resources are required apps like Kropyva allow them to be easily drawn forwards. This reduces logistical and management stress on small unit command chains.

Notably, the operational models in already employed by other arms like artillery, logistics or engineers. Likewise, if resources are required elsewhere, they can be quickly moved to other points on the battlefield because like artillery fire, FPV drone effort can easily be switched to another area.

But militaries struggle to adapt

Unfortunately, militaries around the world tend to be conservative and slow to adapt to change. For instance, last year several NATO armies got an important ‘wake up’ call during Estonia’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025.[vi] The exercise was a large wargame pitting approx. 16,000 NATO soldiers against a ‘live’ enemy. RBC-Ukraine reported that Estonia’s head of drone systems, Arbo Probal, said “...the exercise simulated a “contested and congested” battlefield designed to maximize stress and cognitive overload for units, testing their adaptability. Exercise Hedgehog’s aim was to break Estonia and its allies battlegroups and thereby demonstrate areas of weakness.”[vii]

According to media reports, and commentator discussion, the exercise succeeded. NATO’s battle groups were quickly defeated by a relatively small force of Ukrainian drones. RBC-Ukraine reported that the Ukrainian-led opposition force deployed a density of roughly 30 drones per 10 square kilometres, about half the current density on the frontline.^[viii] And, even with this low concentration of drones the effect was lethal. Any unconcealed movement was immediately identified and engaged. The Centre for European Policy Analysis reported that the “The attackers quickly “eliminated” two entire battalions and rendered the NATO force incapable of battle.”^[ix]

This exercise could indicate that NATO forces are still thinking of drones as ‘small helicopters,’ deployed in a de-centralised manner supporting frontline units rather than in terms of ‘massed effect.’ Failing to appreciate their adversary’s ability to saturate an area with surveillance to locate targets and then to swarm attack drones in overwhelming force.

Now Pacific militaries have an opportunity to adapt

Pacific militaries are lucky because they have an opportunity to learn from this experience and build C2 and force structures to manage and maximise the ‘effects’ of FPV drones. In my opinion, the key elements of a successful force structure to manage FPV drones in the land domain are that C2 and logistics need to be centrally managed.

Tactically, centralising C2 allows for FPV drones to be used en masse concentrating their battlefield ‘effects.’ Likewise, centralised procurement, maintenance and replacement of drones produces economies of scale that allow for the deployment of larger numbers of drones.

The next step is to consider whether there is a place in the current force structure that can fulfil this role; or if there is a requirement to create a new force element. My view is that FPV drones are a new and important technology but that the ‘effects’ they deliver already exist slot easily into the artillery’s existing operational model. For example, artillery already manages a surveillance battle, runs the targeting process and provides tactical commanders with support integrating indirect fire into plans.

Notably, artillery’s current operational model – sending liaison forward to support decision-making, then managing the movement of indirect fire ‘effects’ (i.e. artillery fire) forward to support manoeuvre translates easily into managing similar FPV drone ‘effects.’

Likewise, the technical and logistical processes that support artillery equipment and the movement of large amounts of ammunition are transferable into managing large numbers of FPV drones. The roles and disciplines of the gun position translate easily into an operational model for forward drone operations.

In conclusion, rather than trying to ‘re-invent the wheel,’ or viewing FPV drones as ‘small helicopters’ dispersed across the force it makes sense to centralise these resources and take an ‘effects-based’ approach to their management. The battlefield ‘effects’ of FPV drones are essentially surveillance and indirect fire and the existing artillery corps provides a natural home for management of these weapons.

Thanks for reading my work. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here - buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan

This article was first published in the Winter 2026 edition of Lines of Defence magazine. Link - https://defsec.net.nz/2026/06/26/line-of-defence-magazine-winter-2026/

[i] https://www.politico.eu/article/latvian-report-drones-are-mass-killers-on-the-ukraine-front/

[ii] Artillery specialists.

[iii]

Two Marines

Russia’s Drone Line Experiment

During 2025, the Russian military continued to experiment with improving its employment of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in support of its maneuver forces. The Russian military actively records statistics on the effectiveness and success of different types of UAS in its units and develops recommendations for improving their efficiency. One of these init…

Read more

5 months ago · 165 likes · 23 comments · Rob Lee and Dmytro Putiata

[iv] https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/09/ukrainian-startup-has-re-invented-drone-swarming/408099/

[v] https://en.defence-ua.com/news/how_the_kropyva_combat_control_system_helps_in_the_most_difficult_situations_fortified_positions_couldnt_save_russian_army-3646.html and https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraines-secret-weapon-kropyva-software-4026

[vi] https://www.wsj.com/opinion/nato-has-seen-the-future-and-is-unprepared-887eaf0f

[vii] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/nato-not-ready-for-drone-war-estonia-drills-1770974378.html

[viii] https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/nato-not-ready-for-drone-war-estonia-drills-1770974378.html

[ix] https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-busted-myths-after-four-years-of-war/

Western armies have pursued greater protection through larger, more complex armoured vehicles. The result has been solutions that are highly capable on paper but expensive to acquire, difficult to sustain, and increasingly constrained by their size and logistics demands.

Instead, imagine a platoon spread across eight armoured Toyota Land Cruisers armed with a massive volume of drones, Javelin missiles, remote weapon stations (RWS), and networked communications linked to indirect fires. Flexible, agile, lethal, and comparatively low-cost. A force designed to fight dispersed, exploit gaps, hide effectively, and operate with a lighter logistical footprint. Such a platoon could form the basis of a new generation of light motorised forces.

The current generation of heavy vehicles was shaped by the threats in their operating environment. The trend toward larger armoured vehicles was driven by the need to survive improvised explosive devices during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), where blast protection became a dominant design consideration.

In future conflicts, operating under contested airspace against a conventional adversary, different trade-offs will be required, including prioritising agility and flexibility over adding more armour. Rather than continuing to build massive, heavy targets, armies should rethink survivability - pivoting toward lighter, highly networked solutions where speed, dispersion, and tactical concealment become the new definition of force protection.

The Changing Battlespace

The emergence of ubiquitous drones, precision fires, and persistent surveillance should force a reassessment of many long-held assumptions. In this environment, mobility, dispersion, and affordability will matter more than ever.

It is time to revisit the survivability trade-off between large, expensive armoured vehicles and smaller, more agile alternatives. Survivability should be assessed holistically, not solely based on the thickness of a vehicle’s armour.

Rather than pursuing ever-heavier platforms, there is a compelling case for a new generation of light motorised forces built around lightly armoured commercially derived utility vehicles such as the Toyota Land Cruiser, equipped with modern communications, drones, and remote weapon stations.

Such a force would not replace heavy mechanised formations, nor would it seek to defeat heavy armoured units in direct combat. Instead, it would provide a highly deployable, operationally agile capability optimised for dispersed warfare.

Everything is a trade-off. Attempting to solve every battlefield problem with a single platform creates rigid and costly solutions. Heavy vehicles remain essential for many missions, but there is a growing case that future conflicts require lighter and more distributed force structures.

The Modern Battlefield Rewards Mobility

One of the clearest lessons emerging from recent conflicts is that prolonged concentration and navigation across open terrain are increasingly dangerous. Drones have made it possible to locate and track forces at unprecedented scale and at low cost. Precision-guided artillery, loitering munitions, and long-range fires can then rapidly exploit detected targets.

Survival now depends more on the ability to move smoothly through complex terrain, dispersion and concealment.

What was good ground is now bad. Previously, roads and open rolling landscapes were viewed as favourable avenues of movement. Increasingly, they have become predictable killing grounds where low cost drones hunt in numbers.

A lighter motorised force can hide more easily and and disperse across a wider area, reducing vulnerability while increasing operational reach. Rather than concentrating combat power in a handful of expensive vehicles, it makes sense to distribute capability across dozens of mobile platforms.

The Case Against Large Vehicles

When facing an adversary equipped with a near-inexhaustible supply of top-attack weapons - Javelin-equivalent missiles, loitering munitions, and low-cost attack drones - physical size rapidly becomes a liability rather than an asset.

Larger vehicles present larger targets. Advanced anti-armour weapons can threaten almost any vehicle, reducing some of the advantages traditionally associated with heavier protection. Armour alone cannot guarantee survival.

While strategic concealment may no longer be possible, tactical concealment remains vital. The ability to use terrain, vegetation, and cover to delay observation, orientation, and targeting can be the difference between survival and destruction. If a vehicle is too big to hide, and is stuck on limited routes, it becomes easier to find, easier to target, and easier to kill.

The size of vehicles can restrict mobility in many environments. Bridges, narrow roads, urban streets, vegetation, and soft terrain can all limit where larger vehicles can operate and how effectively they can manoeuvre. A smaller vehicle may be able to fit in between trees in a forestry or coconut plantation, drive cross-country across a farm, or navigate informal dirt tracks.

Big heavy vehicles need big supply chains. Heavier platforms consume more fuel and place increased stress on components - particularly moving cross country. Heavy armoured vehicles require heavy support vehicles, dedicated maintenance equipment and specialised parts - sometimes with long vulnerable international supply chains.

Why Smaller Vehicles Make Sense

Smaller platforms are generally less expensive to acquire, consume less fuel, and are simpler to maintain. A lower per-vehicle cost, both in terms of purchase and sustainment, means more resources can be made available for drones and advanced anti-armour systems.

Their lower weight improves strategic deployability by air and sea, while their compact dimensions allow access to terrain that may be difficult for larger vehicles.

Mechanical failures, battle damage, and routine maintenance have less impact when capability is distributed across a larger number of platforms rather than concentrated in a small number of expensive systems. Losing one vehicle out of a four-vehicle platoon means you can’t split into separate patrols and still have mutual support, whereas an eight-vehicle platoon retains far more tactical flexibility, even missing two or three vehicles.

Vehicle size also influences reliability. Larger and heavier vehicles place greater loads on mechanical components, increasing wear and maintenance demands over time. Engineering can mitigate many of these effects, but physics remains impossible to escape - you can’t ignore the square-cube law: bigger vehicles exert exponentially more force on every part.

While lighter vehicles cannot match the protection levels of larger personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, modern lightweight armour incorporating hardened steel, composite materials, and spall liners can still provide effective protection against small-arms fire, fragmentation, and lower-order explosive threats.

The result is a force that is harder to find, harder to target, and highly resilient to individual vehicle losses. Dispersed across the battlespace, these units can act as multiple probing fingers, constantly seeking out and exploiting gaps in the enemy’s lines, going places an armoured fist cannot reach.

Combat Power at the Platoon Level

Being mounted provides more than just mobility and better communications equipment. Motorised platoons have the capacity to organically carry capabilities that dismounted organisations typically hold centrally: advanced anti-armour weapons, sustained-fire machine gun kits (repurposing weapons from their RWS), reconnaissance and strike drones, as well as more of the basics - extra ammunition, fuel, and supplies.

This pushes combat power directly to frontline units, reducing their reliance on centralised logistics and creating a highly flexible force capable of operating across a dispersed battlespace. These small mounted units can observe, communicate, strike, and sustain themselves with a level of independence completely out of reach of a dismounted team.

Modern combat effectiveness increasingly emerges through digital networks. Sensors, drones, observers, and fire support assets combine to create a distributed kill web capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging targets rapidly across a wide area. Smaller vehicles can support all of these functions much more efficiently than either dismounted operations or heavier vehicles.

Drones and Indirect Fire as the Primary Source of Lethality

The most lethal systems on the modern battlefield are indirect fires and drones. Light motorised forces should be designed around supporting the observer-to-shooter kill chain rather than attempting to win through direct combat.

Drones provide persistent surveillance and strike on point targets. Mortars provide a rapid volume of responsive firepower for suppression of harder targets and destruction of softer ones, useful to break contact, screen and bypass.

While drone strikes and indirect fires will be available from higher echelons, motorised forces must hold significant capacity organically to ensure economy, speed of engagement, and resilience. Long-range fires and drone-launched missiles are scarce resources - mortars and shorter-range kamikaze drones should be the first options a motorised force employs.

Forces on the ground need to support the launching, maintaining and recovering drones - all networked back to higher headquarters. The armoured Land Cruisers should be heavily loaded with drones and have tools and spares for first line repairs.

To maximise the utility of a light motorised force an upweighted mortar capacity should be considered - more than the traditional single mortar platoon per battalion.

Semi-automated mortars - such as the Sling or Scorpion - reduce personnel requirements, allowing for an additional platoon without significantly increasing the battalion’s headcount. Having two mortar platoons per battalion compensates for the limited range of these systems and enables dispersed operations.

This style of automation also allows for quicker set-up and redeployment, all while operating from the same common light vehicle platform. No mortar crew wants to be caught by a drone while manually digging out a base plate, and a more capable fully automated system would need a different heavier vehicle that would add to the force’s logistics complexity.

The Remote Weapon Station Revolution

For motorised forces, one of the most significant technological developments of the last two decades has been the maturation of remote weapon stations (RWS). An RWS is a smart trade-off - less capable than a manned turret, but a significantly more capable system than a manual, pintle-mounted weapon.

These systems allow crews to operate weapons from within the vehicle and benefit from day and thermal optics, laser rangefinders, stabilisation systems, and increasingly sophisticated sensor suites. Capabilities once associated with heavier combat vehicles are now available on relatively light platforms.

The combination of stabilised sights and modern sensors also provides a substantial increase in battlefield awareness, often delivering greater operational benefit than the weapon itself. Spotting an enemy via an RWS might trigger a call for fire, or prompt a crew to dismount and deploy a Javelin from a concealed location, while the vehicle remains covered in a defilade position.

Compared with traditional light weapon mounts, RWS-equipped vehicles can engage targets more accurately, at greater distances, and with less risk to their crews. They also provide an important gateway into digital battlefield networks, enabling sensor sharing, target handoff, and improved situational awareness across the force.

RWS Role in Counter Low Cost Drone

A light motorised force must possess the capability to fight the low-cost counter-drone battle. Without it, they are incredibly vulnerable and functionally obsolete.

Advances in computer vision, machine learning, and sensor integration are rapidly improving the ability of weapon stations to detect, classify, track, and engage targets. This allows an RWS to pull dual duty as both a direct-fire weapon and an organic counter-drone system.

While likely effective against low-cost tactical drones, especially where vehicles mutually support each other, defeating strategic, high-altitude drones will still require sophisticated air-defence assets - likely from outside the motorised structure.

Logistics: The Legs of the Beast

Light motorised forces need significantly less logistics support than mechanised formations.

Military organisations often describe logistics as the tail. The metaphor is misleading. Logistics is better understood as the legs of the beast. The jaws of a legless tiger remain dangerous, but they can be easily avoided. Without logistics, combat formations cannot manoeuvre, sustain themselves, or exploit success.

Heavy forces need elephant legs - big, slow, and difficult to hide, leaving a well-trampled logistics path that is easy to interdict. The supply lines of a lighter force are leaner - leaving a smaller footprint that is naturally easier to conceal and more resilient to disruption.

There is a reason Toyota utility vehicles have become ubiquitous across many conflicts. They benefit from global supply chains, readily available spare parts, widespread maintenance expertise, and decades of operational experience in some of the world’s harshest environments. During prolonged operations, simplicity, reliability, and ease of repair can become as important as armour protection.

A Force Designed for Modern Warfare

Survivability no longer comes solely from armour thickness. It also comes from mobility, dispersion, concealment and affordability.

The US is trialing a Mobile Brigade Combat Team structure where squads operate from unarmed and unarmoured nine-person off-road buggies, providing them with mobility and the capacity to carry more weapon systems. While these buggies realise the benefits of being lighter and more nimble, abandoning all armour and lacking an RWS represents an over-correction. A mounted weapon system is critical for tactical overwatch - allowing mutual support with direct fire and counter-drone. Concentrating a nine-man squad on a single unarmoured vehicle creates a highly attractive, vulnerable target.

You can still be light and have some degree of protection and firepower. Protection is not a binary choice. Combat operations in Ukraine have consistently shown that legacy light armour - M113s, MT-LBs, and FV103 Spartans - provide critical survivability options. Even though these older platforms cannot defeat a modern anti-tank weapon, their modest armour routinely saves lives by protecting soldiers from artillery fragments, small-arms fire and less effective drones.

A light motorised force built around armoured commercial vehicles equipped with remote weapon stations offers a compelling combination of light protection, mobility, the capacity to carry and employ a wider array of tactical tools and effects, operational reach, and tactical flexibility.

For many nations, the most useful future force may not be a heavier vehicle, but a smarter one.

Thanks for reading our work. If you like this content and want to support it you can ‘Buy me a Coffee’ here - buymeacoffee.com/benmorgan

Graeme is a retired armoured corps officer and veteran. After leaving the military he has had a very successful career in civilian logistics.

When he took command of Ukraine’s military in early 2024, General Oleksandr Syrski stated his plan to defeat Russia. It was simple, fight a defensive battle to attrit Russia and create the conditions for victory; either on the battlefield or in negotiations. In other words, Syrskyi’s aim was to trade ground for time and turn defensive battles into ‘meatgrinders’ that inflicted such high casualties on Russian forces that Putin was forced to negotiate. And if he did not; the plan would eventually attrit his forces enough that Ukraine could return to offensive operations.

Since then, Ukraine’s strategy has focussed on attrition at strategic, operational and tactical-level. But is recent month Ukrainian tactical innovations may be starting to create conditions for a transition to offensive operations.

Strategic-level summary

Ukraine’s strategic air campaign uses long-range drones and missiles to demolish Russian oil and gas infrastructure, reducing Russian government revenue and forcing the Kremlin to use cash[i] and gold reserves[ii] to fund the war. The logic is simple because without cash Russia cannot buy material or pay for contract soldiers. Eventually the money will run out and force the Kremlin to either negotiate, or to institute a full mobilisation. The second option is clearly politically dangerous for Putin otherwise he would have used it already.

Operational-level summary

At operational-level Ukraine has systematically instituted its plan. Initially, the main effort was defence - holding positions like Pokrovsk for as long as possible to inflict casualties on Russia. Do not listen to Russian apologists that claim Russia deliberately uses battles like Pokrovsk to attrit Ukraine. History demonstrates that a defensive battle inflicts more casualties on the attacker. In fact, good tacticians use these battles to attrit their opponents before transitioning to offensive operations.

A tactic that was well-demonstrated by the Soviet Union in World War Two, most notably at Stalingrad and Kursk. Huge German armies were ground down and weakened in carefully contrived defensive battles designed specifically to weaken them before Soviet counter-attacks. The argument that it is good tactics to attack a defended position to attrit the defending force is illogical. Good tacticians only attack a prepared defensive position when they absolutely need too.

This phase also included the maturation of Ukraine’s defensive drone tactics. First Person View (FPV) drones evolved from operating in an ad hoc local fashion, operating as ‘small helicopters’ for units and providing a view ‘over the hill’ or attacking point targets into the essential components of large defensive ‘kill webs.’ Ukraine has now ‘joined up’ its ‘kill webs’ to create a ‘Drone Wall’ that has defeated Russian plans for a 2026 Spring-Summer offensive.

A large Russian offensive has not developed that confirms their main effort but it is likely to be capturing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[iii] This would bring the wider Donbas region under Russian control and secure the ‘Fortress Belt’ of cities near Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Capturing this area achieves two objectives; it allows Putin to claim victory because he has ‘liberated’ the Donbas, and control of the Fortress Belt provides a secure base for future operations in Ukraine.

Although Russian forces continue to attack along the whole frontline the heaviest fighting is reported in Donetsk, especially near Kostyantynivka, the southernmost town of the Fortress Belt. Notably, the Institute for the Study of War reports that this operation is supported by extensive information operations that it summarised as follows “Russia appears to be perpetuating sophisticated information operations that use artificial intelligence (AI)-generated footage of flag raisings to fabricate claims of Russian tactical successes in Kostyantynivka.”[iv] Reports supporting the assessment that this area remains Russia’s main effort.

But there are important changes in the operational-level campaign

In recent weeks there are several important changes in the operational-level situation. The first is the maturation of Ukraine’s medium-range drone strike capability. Ukraine is now able to consistently strike targets 100-150 kms (60-90 miles) behind the frontline.

This results from a combination of Russian air defences being systematically degraded by Ukrainian operations targeting these assets. A campaign with a long history, that continues today with the Kyiv Post recently reporting that “Drawing on a database of more than 1,530 verified attacks across Russia and occupied Ukraine, the analysis identifies over 492 strikes on air-defense infrastructure between June 2025 and early March 2026, alongside hundreds more targeting A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) assets – the wider systems that support air defense, such as electronic warfare, command systems and missile units.[v]

The second factor is the increasing size and sophistication of Ukraine’s medium-range drones. Longer range, bigger payloads and more sophisticated guidance systems all contribute to Ukraine’s ability to hit Russian targets far behind the front-line. Notably, Ukraine is making extensive use of satellite communications in the ‘sensor-to-shooter’ link. Defence Blog observing that Ukrainian units use Starlink to “operate reconnaissance drones, share targeting data, coordinate fires, and maintain command-and-control links across a front stretching hundreds of kilometers.”[vi]

A digital communications method that produces a new and notable battle in the electro-magnetic spectrum as Russia tries to jam Ukraine’s satellite service. Russia has experimented with jamming systems since 2024, forcing Ukraine to counter by attacking their jammers. Defence Blog reports that a Russian electronic warfare system called ‘Volna Kupol Garant’ designed to jam Starlink by overwhelming transmissions from its satellites is currently being hunted by Ukrainian forces, and that these systems are a priority target.

Ukraine’s ability to strike in-depth means that Russia’s supply lines can be aggressively targeted, and there is even discussion that Ukrainian drones will be able to blockade Crimea. In recent weeks, Ukraine has managed to achieve the following operational-level impacts:

• Ukraine is interdicting Russian logistics, stopping supplies reaching frontline units.[vii] A programme of attacks that Ukraine’s Defence Minister described as a ‘Logistics Lockdown.’[viii] By attacking their logistics Ukraine starves Russia’s frontline units of food, fuel and ammunition. This makes it harder for them to generate the combat power they need to launch attacks.

• Ukraine is threatening Crimea. The peninsular relies on only a few bridges for its supplies of food, fuel and ammunition. The Kerch Bridge provides access from the south. In the north, access is via the Chonhar, Armyansk, Perekop, Arabat Spit and Henichesk Bridges. All of these bridges are being systematically attacked and suffering regular closures. [ix] The impact is to limit military supplies reaching Crimea, isolating and weakening Russian forces stationed there.

It is impossible to know exactly how effective Ukraine’s depth attacks are on Russian logistics but there is a mounting body of reports that indicate they are having an impact. It is also notable that Russia’s forces are currently unable to generate the combat power for large offensive operations, and are being forced to withdraw in some places. An indication that Ukraine’s Logistic Lockdown is working.

My assessment is that Ukraine’s operational-level tactics are impacting on Russian forces by interdicting their main supply route, the R-280, (shown in yellow on the map) from Russia’s main supply hub at Rostov-on-Don to troops in occupied Zaporizhia, Kherson and Crimea. The Guardian reports that “The road, which has been almost completely closed to civilian traffic since late May, is particularly important to Moscow because it constitutes the main land corridor for supplying Russian forces in the south that avoid the exposed Kerch Bridge to Crimea.”[x] Interdiction of this route reduces Russian combat power in the occupied territory, including Crimea. In summary it could create the conditions for a transition to a new phase of operations, and the question is what will Ukraine do?

Ukraine’s next move?

In the last post[xi] we discussed how Putin’s most likely option is to maintain pressure by continuing to recruit contract soldiers, accepting limited operational-level progress in exchange for knowing that Ukraine is being economically depleted. A strategy that will probably be supported by an increase in hybrid operations in the North Sea, Baltic and in NATO countries that supporting Ukraine. The aim us to create a strategic pause that weakens Ukraine by draining its economic resources and that provides time for its international supporters to lose interest. Putin stalling, driving up the expense of the war and waiting for new opportunities to present themselves. So far, this prediction appears to be accurate.

But Putin may find himself needing to respond to Ukraine’s actions rather than Russia being able to set the tempo. Ukraine’s attacks that interdict the flow of supplies to Crimea directly threaten Putin because Crimea is the ‘jewel in the crown’ of his regime. Putin won the strategically important territory back for Russia in 2014. He then built the Kerch Bridge to maintain access, and has now fought a large war to create a land bridge to the territory. Crimea is a place of enormous personal and political importance to him.

Therefore, Ukraine’s plan is probably to use this history against Putin and threaten Crimea with a blockade. This forces Russia to move resources back from the frontline to protect the R 280, the Kerch Bridge, and Melitopol - the key mainland logistic hub for Crimea. A situation that would see Russian air defence and anti-drone assets consolidated further south, reducing coverage of the frontline.

It is unlikely, the Ukraine will risk a large offensive and try to capture Melitopol or other large areas of territory but the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant could provide an interesting option that is worth considering. It is at the edge of Russian territory as well as being a relatively small, discrete and high value target. If Ukraine can get Russia to re-prioritise its counter drone assets to the south, it may be able to achieve local drone supremacy and conduct an operation to recapture the power plant. A small but significant victory.

At operational-level an offensive to recapture the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, or any other attack in the Kherson region serves as a ‘turning manoeuvre’- an attack on a flank that forces the enemy to redeploy their forces away from their main effort. In simple terms, if Ukraine can credibly threaten the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, Melitopol or even Crimea, Russia is forced to divert scarce resources away from Donetsk. A situation that protects Donetsk but that could also translate into Ukraine holding the initiative; able to weaken the Russian line and select the next point of engagement.

However, any offensive operation involves risk so we can be sure that Ukrainian strategists are carefully considering their options. Further, history tells us that if there is a Ukrainian offensive, we may be surprised by its target.

Conclusion

In summary, pressure is mounting on Putin, Russia is starting to suffer economically and the war is not going well. On the frontline, Ukraine’s Drone Wall has stopped Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and their longer-range drones are interdicting the flow of logistics.

Ukraine is now in the driver’s seat and will set the tempo of the next phase of the war. How they do that is still uncertain but their air campaign appears to be impacting on Russian logistics and is likely to create opportunities for offensive operations.

The question now is whether Ukraine will strike, or if it will slowly strangle Russia’s forces from a distance. Based on Ukraine’s history, we should be prepared for something unexpected.

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[i] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/russia-s-international-reserves-fall-to-749b-in-march/3896377

[ii] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/11/20/russias-central-bank-starts-selling-physical-gold-from-reserves-a91192 and https://en.thebell.io/russia-starts-selling-gold-reserves/

[iii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2026/

[iv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/

[v] https://kyivindependent.com/how-ukraine-is-systematically-destroying-russias-air-defenses/

[vi] https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-hunts-down-russian-jammers-targeting-starlink-satellites/

[vii] https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russian-troops-abandon-positions-on-kinburn-spit-following-ukrainian-supply-line-cuts-19592 and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdjp0n7rn41o and https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/

[viii] https://www.kyivpost.com/post/76986

[ix] https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/15/ukrainian-drones-hit-two-northeastern-bridges-to-occupied-crimea-overnight-again-to-cut-a-main-supply-road/ and https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-confirms-strike-on-crimeas-armiansk-bridge-that-hit-50-russian-military-vehicles/ and https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-mid-range-drone-crimea-bridge-slam-asphalt-strike-2026-6

[x] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/11/highway-of-death-the-ukrainian-drone-campaign-menacing-russian-logistics

[xi] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/putin-has-big-problems-so-expect

Shangri La Dialogue 2026 – Notable Trends

The Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri La Dialogue is the Indo-Pacific region’s most important annual defence conference. It attracts defence leaders, officials, policy makers, and academics from Asia, the US, the Pacific and Europe to the Shangri La Hotel in Singapore to discuss international security issues. This year’s conference highlighted several important trends in Pacific security.

The region is concerned about security and is investing heavily in defence

Security and the threat of conflict remain key topics at the conference. Deutches World reported that IISS Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence - Evan A. Laksman reported to the conference that “Regional states — whether major, middle or small ones — cannot escape this worsening security environment” and that Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said before the conference that “The reality in this changed world is that there will be more volatility — we will be facing storm after storm.” “[i]

Statements that capture the region’s current arms race and build up of military alliances. Although Sino-American competition and the potential for conflict in Taiwan or the South China Sea are often discussed it is important to remember other conflicts in the wider Indo-Pacific region. For example, last year India and Pakistan briefly exchanged blows. Pakistan is currently fighting with Afghanistan and the civil war in Myanmar continues.

Therefore, it is no surprise that delegates spent a great deal of time discussing defence funding and collective security. A trend verified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports military spending in the Asia-Pacific rose by 8.1% in 2025 to $681 billion[ii] over the last year. Another indication of current security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region.

US reiterates its foreign policy position

An important focus of the Shangri La Dialogue is America’s relationship with the region. Therefore, the attendance of senior US officials and their statements are very important, and carefully studied. Last year, US Secretary of Defence, Peter Hegseth made an assertive speech clearly identifying China as the US’s Pacific rival.

This year, although his speech was less aggressive, Hegseth reiterated the current ‘transactional’ philosophy of US foreign policy. He described the US position stating it is a “…return to realism…” and reinforcing that as “…the 2026 US National Defense Strategy makes clear, we are charting a new course for our alliances and partnerships, one that is grounded in the realities of power and interests.”[iii]

Current US foreign policy seems to be a retreat from leadership of the democratic world, towards working transactionally with partners that share common interests. A sudden and significant change in US foreign policy, that is accompanied by pressure to contribute financially to defence or risk losing US support. A position that Hegseth articulated very clearly, stating “This is a mindset we fully embrace, the era of the United States subsidizing the defense of wealthy nations is over.[iv]”

Hegseth’s comments indicate the isolationist thinking that underpins this change. The Secretary stating that “This shift is not a matter of choice, it is a matter of strategic prudence. The National Defense Strategy makes clear that the old toothless, utopian, and globalist course of foreign policy was headed for a disaster that all changes under President Trump.”[v] An insight into the frustration some Americans feel with the existing rules-based order, that is heavily subsidised by the US.

It is a fact that the US subsidises the United Nations, including its international judicial system and a network of organistions that support commerce, and international financial institutions. Likewise, US defence spending and military power also polices the world’s oceans, and underpins key alliances like NATO and the US alliances in Asia that have deterred large wars for 80 years. This costs the US a great deal, but America has also benefited enormously from global free trade and the US dollar being the world’s reserve currency.

Benefits and influence that the current administration ignores as it focuses on transitioning the US from being the leader of the democratic world, to a partner of convenience. A policy that’s main impact is to reduce US influence in the Pacific as middle-weight powers like Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia feel increasingly uncertain about US security guarantees and smaller nations actively look for a more stable alternative.

Hegseth’s speech this year indicates that the US is ‘tone deaf’ to the diplomatic politics of the region. Mistaking silence for tacit approval and continuing to pursue a foreign policy that seems to be designed to alienate allies and empower its rivals. A policy that redcues American influence. For instance, Australian ‘think tank’ the Lowry Institute’s blog - The Interpreter - recently reported that “According to the Lowy Asia Power Index, US power in Asia continues to fall. In a recent study by two dons at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Southeast Asian countries -- as measured by indicators such as high-level visits and common membership in multilateral groupings – have begun to lean closer to China. The 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey notes that US standing across various dimensions – perceptions of US economic and political-strategic influence, US leadership in free trade and the rules-based order – have each fallen.”[vi]

Data that indicates waning US influence, and supports a recent observation by the South China Morning Post on 15 April 2026 about the paucity of South-East Asian nations participating in the large, US-led Exercise Balikatan. The newspaper noted the hesitation of several South-East Asian nations to participate and stated “Analysts say that hesitation helps explain Balikatan’s place in the region: for some Asean members, it is a reassuring sign of US commitment, but joining it risks looking like a strategic choice in the sharpening rivalry between Washington and Beijing.”[vii]

Both observations indicate a trend, and US foreign policy and military leaders need to understand and work to rectify or risk losing the ‘soft power’ competition in the Pacific.

China’s absence – two years running

The 2026 conference was also notable for the absence of senior Chinese officials.[viii] The nation’s Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun did not attend this year. Instead, China sent a group of retired officers, and academics. China’s low profile at the meeting is notable because it is the second year in a row that the country has limited its participation in the conference.

The absence of a senior Chinese delegation at this important conference is noteworthy, because it corresponds with President Trump’s term in office. Chinese diplomacy is carefully considered and it is unlikely that the absence is unplanned. Instead the decision is probably a response to the Trump administration.

My assessment is that China understands that it is winning the diplomatic battle in the region and does not need a confrontation with Hegseth. Its strategy is to present itself as a stable, sensible alternative to the US and any public diplomatic confrontation or argument with Hegseth at the Dialogue risks pulling China ‘down’ to the US’s unpopular level of discourse. China appears to believe that it is better to keep a low-profile and quietly let US foreign policy alienate Asian and Pacific nations.

India strengthening defence relationships in the region

At any conference most of the work is done over dinner or on the sidelines, and the Shangri La Dialogue is no exception. Indian diplomats were working hard in sideline discussions with several nations including Singapore and New Zealand.

We have highlighted India’s increasing interest in the Pacific since 2024 (See-Annual Review 2025[ix]) noting that since the introduction of its ‘Look East’ doctrine in 1991 India has quietly extended its interests in South East Asia and that approximately 45% of India’s foreign trade is now with South East Asia. The Modi government continued this engagement with its ‘Act East’ policy that includes security cooperation with Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.

So it is not a surprise that India was meeting with Singapore, a nation that controls access to the Malacca Straits, an important trade route from the Indian Ocean into Southern Asia. Or with New Zealand, a country that has recently signed a trade deal with India and is a close partner of Singapore. Both nations are part of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements that support security of the Malacca Straits.[x]

This trend is likely to continue for two reasons. The first is that India wants to expand its influence in Asia and the Pacific to secure its trade routes. The second is that smaller nations in the region are looking for alternative security partners as uncertainty about US foreign policy and fear of China’s assertive territorial claims combine to make the region less stable.

‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence Community Issues Threat Warning

The ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence partners (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) recently issued a warning[xi] about China’s spy agencies using Linked In and other social media platforms to gather information. Intelligence agents posing as job recruiters, then harvesting information from applicants.

Reuters reported that “Five Eyes agencies said Chinese spies were particularly targeting those who specialised in defence, foreign affairs and intelligence, and military personnel, including those stationed in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Joint warnings from ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence agencies are rare and are indicative of the changing nature of the Pacific region. The area is no longer an international backwater but is now at the centre of Sino-American competition, and contains within it a range of potential conflicts. Notably, other large powers like NATO and India are also taking a greater interest in the region because aiming to deter assertive Chinese foreign policy, safeguarding their interests in the region.

Therefore, the Pacific is now an area of global competition and discussions about its benign strategic environment and distance from competing power blocks are dated. Instead, we must accept that the world’s intelligence agencies are interested in the region and encourage higher-levels of cyber security.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Vanuatu and France contest ownership of islands

Matthew and Hunter Islands are small islands approx. 300 km (186 miles) south-east of New Caledonia, and about the same distance from Vanuatu. Ownership is being diplomatically contested between France and Vanuatu.[xii] The islands are under French authority and considered part of the New Caledonia colony. A position recognised by international law.

However, France’s ownership is at odds with traditional ownership as recognised by the indigenous people of New Caledonia and Vanuatu. The people of Vanuatu believe that the islands are spiritually important and are the home of the god Matjajiki, and contain important burial grounds. In fact, Vanuatu and Kanak leaders both recognise this tradition and signed the Keamu Accord in 2009, stating that Matthew and Hunter Islands belong to Vanuatu.

This situation is an echo of the Pacific’s colonial past. France continues to maintain colonies in the Pacific, and these small islands are important to the French because they extend New Caledonia’s Exclusive Economic Zone into profitable fishing grounds. The Sydney Morning Herald also opines that “France derives much prestige, wealth and a permanent UN Security Council seat thanks to its overseas territories and vast maritime domain, spread across multiple oceans. Now, some politicians and security analysts in France are worried that these two islands, taken from Vanuatu before its independence in 1980, could prompt sovereignty claims in other jurisdictions, from Mexico to Madagascar, if Matthew and Hunter are returned to Vanuatu.”[xiii]

This situation is notable and worth monitoring because it highlights how throughout the South West Pacific tensions between indigenous people and colonial, or post-colonial regimes need to be managed. Failure to sensitively manage these issues and reconcile historical conflicts may create potential security issues.

Solomon Islands to reset its relationship with Australia

The recent election of a new government in Solomon Islands has led to a thaw in the country’s relationship with Australia. This week Solomon Islands new Prime Minister, Matthew Wale met with his Australian counterpart Anthony Albanese and said he was keen to ‘reset’ the relationship including developing a new partnership agreement. Radio New Zealand reported that “The two prime ministers said officials from both countries would now begin negotiations on a “comprehensive” new strategic treaty between the countries, which would bring “transformational change in the relationship” and see a “significant enhancement of the bilateral development assistance partnership between the two countries.”[xiv]

A first step in the relationship reset is a review of the contentious secret security agreement that Solomon Islands signed with China in 2022. When the secret security agreement was announced it caused a diplomatic uproar as Australia and its allies responded to China’s sudden increase in influence in the small nation. Since then, Australia and its allies have been on a diplomatic offensive in Melanesia trying to reset the relationship and limit China’s security relationships in the region.

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[i] https://www.dw.com/en/shangri-la-conference-asia-pacific-on-path-to-rearmament/a-77366299

[ii] https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-military-spending-rise-continues-european-and-asian-expenditures

[iii] https://www.war.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4504755/remarks-by-secretary-of-war-pete-hegseth-at-the-2026-shangri-la-dialogue-in-sin/

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Ibid.

[vi] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-shouldn-t-squander-its-chance-at-shangri-la

[vii] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3350190/why-southeast-asian-nations-are-hesitant-join-major-us-philippine-balikatan-drills

[viii] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/where-is-china-ask-delegates-asian-defence-forum-2026-05-30/

[ix] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/pacific-brief-2025-annual-review

[x] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Power_Defence_Arrangements and

https://www.fivepowerdefencearrangements.org/

[xi] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/five-eyes-security-alliance-warns-chinese-espionage-threat-2026-06-03/

[xii] https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/the-david-v-goliath-battle-playing-out-in-australia-s-backyard-20260604-p603to.html

[xiii] ibid

[xiv] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/597161/solomon-islands-agrees-to-treaty-negotiation-with-australia

After four years of intense fighting, the Ukraine War appears to be no closer to resolution. Russian offensive operations are currently stalled and Ukraine has reversed recent trends capturing more ground than its opponent this April and May.

The Russian economy is starting to show signs of strain and is close to its productive capacity.[i] Russia’s central bank recently sold 27.9 tonnes of its gold reserves, worth more than US $4 billion[ii]. Interest rates are high, labour is scarce and any expansion of defence production will require mobilisation for war. A situation Putin has steadfastly avoided to date.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s air campaign continues to impact on Russia’s primary source of external revenue – the oil industry. For example, Russian diesel production fell by 10% in May 2026[iii] and oil exports are banned until 31 July 2026.[iv] Putin making sure domestic fuel requirements are met. Although, the US war with Iran has resulted in sanctions on Russian oil reduced as several nations waive sanctions to secure supply.[v] However, Ukraine’s air campaign remains a physical sanction by damaging the infrastructure Russia needs to export its oil.

Essentially, Ukraine has ‘brought the war home’ to ordinary Russians who see fuel prices rising, shortages of consumer goods and drone attacks far from the frontline that raise questions about security. Since last month, access to the internet, mobile network[vi] and to Telegram and Whats App have been curtailed for ‘security reasons’.[vii] Restrictions that impact on ordinary Russians and raise further questions about security and stability.

Historically, in Putin’s Russia ordinary people have sacrificed freedom and turned a blind eye to endemic corruption in exchange for stability, security and prosperity. If Putin cannot demonstrate strength and competence, he loses confidence and political capital.

Already, there are subtle hints of insecurity with more reports of political tension and protests. Putin’s personal security measures are increasing and he is appearing less often in public.[viii] Also there are reports of minor conflicts between military and security agencies that may indicate underlying tensions.[ix]

Although he is facing a range of domestic challenges, Putin’s biggest strategic problem is that European nations continue to fund Ukraine. Europe’s support has increased as US aid has reduced, so Ukraine’s defence can be sustained.

A combination of domestic and strategic factors that put Putin ‘on the back foot’ and in an insecure position. If he cannot demonstrate success soon, he is liable to lose domestic support among the elites that keep him in power. Therefore, Putin needs to reassess his strategy and take action to stabilise the situation.

Considering the current situation

Russia is defeated at sea, the Black Sea Fleet either sunk or in hiding. On land the conflict revolves around capturing ground, Russia pushing to conquer territory and Ukraine defending or counter-attacking.

The war will be won on land, but Russia is stuck, its military leadership is not adept enough, its equipment is outdated and its soldiers are poorly trained. So, even after throwing millions of soldiers at Ukraine’s defences and suffering approx. 1.2 million casualties Russia is not making progress. In fact, during April Ukraine ‘turned the tables’ on Russia inflicting a net loss of 116 square kilometres (45 square miles) on Russia’s forces.[x]

In May, the US Defence Intelligence Agency reported that this quarter Ukraine has re-captured 400 square kilometres (154 square miles).[xi] A feature of recent Ukrainian success is the increasing sophistication of its drone use. Ukraine successfully integrating air and ground drones into combined arms tactics.[xii]

While Ukraine innovates and improves, Russia performs poorly against both key metrics of the land campaign. Losing more ground than it captures and suffering enormous casualties. Some commentators report that Russian casualties are now higher than its rate of recruitment.[xiii] A situation that if true bodes very poorly for Russia’s ability to sustain the war.

It is clear that Putin’s current plan is not working and that he needs to take action to reset the campaign. But what can he do?

Putin’s options – What could he do, to get the reset he needs?

It is unlikely, that Putin will seek a ceasefire anytime soon. This option is philosophically unpalatable, and politically unsustainable because a ceasefire without complete control of the four oblasts annexed in 2022 would be interpreted as a defeat.

An assessment backed up by Estonia’s International Centre for Defence and Security that recently reviewed annual intelligence summaries from Baltic and Scandinavian nations, and concluded that “Perhaps the most consistent conclusion across the Nordic and Baltic assessments is that Russia has entered a period of sustained confrontation with the west. The services describe a Russian state that has adapted its political, military, and economic systems to support prolonged conflict.”[xiv] Good evidence that Russia and its leader are locked in a campaign with the ‘West’ that they see as existential.

If ceasefire is out of consideration, then we are a left with the following potential options:

• Option 1: Endure. Russia maintains pressure on Ukraine in the land campaign, continuing to recruit contract soldiers as required. But its aim is now to consolidate and hold the current frontline, rather than advance. The long-term objective is to wait out European support and minimise resources committed to the war. The end state is a frozen conflict that inflicts a long strategic campaign of economic warfare on Ukraine, that constantly needs to fund its defence and work to maintain European support. Ukraine’s political and business leaders knowing that any military defeat or loss of European support will be quickly taken advantage of by Russia.

• Option 2: Wider Mobilisation. Putin ‘bites the bullet’ and fully mobilises Russian society and the military. This option would raise approx. 500,000 more soldiers that could be deployed into Ukraine. A realistic objective is to secure the four annexed oblasts, and the Donetsk Fortress Belt. If this objective is achieved it would be a victory for Putin allowing him to progress into realistic ceasefire negotiations.

• Option 3: Direct action against NATO like attacking a Baltic state. Russia launches a direct attack against a NATO state, probably one of the small Baltic republics. The strategic objective is to scare European nations and split the alliance, Russia escalating to try and scare NATO In de-escalating. An attack that may test the NATO treaty because although most members would be prepared to defend NATO there is a chance that some may step back from the conflict, especially if the US showed a lack of commitment to the alliance. Any split in the alliance enables Putin push harder.

• Option 4: Increase intensity of hybrid operations against NATO. Russia is already engaged in a range of hybrid operations against European countries. Increasing the intensity is a relatively inexpensive form of economic warfare against the NATO alliance. Like a direct attack, this campaign forces members to increase defence and security spending. A challenge that Russia could use to increase divisions in the alliance. Putin playing off the potential for countries that are not directly threatened or impacted by hybrid operations, to object to increases in spending and withdraw support.

But what is the most likely option?

My assessment is that Putin’s most likely option is a combination of Options 1 and 4. In Ukraine Russia can maintain pressure by continuing to recruit contract soldiers from around the world. Putin accepts limited operational-level progress in exchange for knowing that Ukraine is being economically depleted. This option creates a strategic pause that weakens Ukraine by draining its economic resources and provides time for its supporters to lose interest.

Meanwhile, more hybrid operations are conducted in the North Sea, Baltic and in NATO countries that vocally support Ukraine. This increases the cost of security and therefore the likelihood that NATO members that are either; not directly threatened with attack, or are being targeted by hybrid operations may seek to disengage and withdraw support from Ukraine.

This option is the safest because although Russia’s economy and Putin are under pressure, a coup it still remains unlikely based on the information at hand. Therefore, Putin probably has time to take a cautious approach to resetting the situation rather than taking a political risk by introducing full mobilisation, or a military risk by directly attacking NATO.

What is the most dangerous option for Ukraine?

The most dangerous option for Ukraine is Option 2, wider mobilisation. Ukraine is currently managing to hold Russia’s advances and may even be starting to develop a tactical advantage that could lead to successful future offensive operations. However, the sudden deployment of another 500,000 soldiers will tip that balance, maybe even enough to defeat Ukraine.

However, this option is unlikely because history tells us that Putin is keen to avoid full mobilisation. This reticence indicates that full mobilisation has a very high political risk. So, this option is less likely than the proposed combination of Options 1 and 4.

What is the most dangerous option for Putin?

Option 3, a direct attack on NATO, is certainly the riskiest option for Putin. The alliance may have its weak links but over the last four years it has become increasingly focussed on deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine. So, my assessment is that an attack on Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia would be met with very strong resistance and would unite NATO members rather than scare them into de-escalating. Russia is already struggling to defeat Ukraine and Putin probably understands that a war with even just the Nordic NATO members, and their committed partners (the UK, Canada and France) would invite defeat.

Conclusion

The Ukraine War is at an important stage as pressure mounts on Putin. He certainly faces economic issues, is probably under political scrutiny and is not making progress militarily so needs to take action to reset his war. A range of options exist and over the next few weeks and months his thinking will become apparent.

It is a time to carefully watch what a cornered man is capable of doing, will Russia escalate? Or will Putin try to endure the current situation, betting on Ukraine or Europe weakening?

We do not know but we should be prepared for volatility.

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[i] https://fortune.com/2026/05/24/russian-economy-gdp-contraction-inflation-oil-prices-ukraine-war-elites- financial-crisis/ and https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2026/05/the-coming-crisis-in-russias-political-economy/

[ii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/29/russian-rate-of-losses-in-ukraine-almost-triples-in-one-year

[iii] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-diesel-output-falls-further-10-may-after-drone-attacks-data-analysis-2026-05-29/

[iv] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-refining-standstill-central-russia-after-ukrainian-drone-strikes-sources-say-2026-05-20/

[v] https://www.intellinews.com/eu-mulls-freezing-russian-oil-sanctions-as-fuel-shortage-looms-445736/ and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy42x3g7r89o and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/19/us-extends-sanctions-waiver-on-russian-oil-why-it-matters

[vi] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-moscow-internet-outages-putin-ukraine-drones-crackdown-fears-rcna263634

[vii] https://www.nbcnews.com/world/russia/russia-killing-telegram-popular-messaging-app-fears-pushback-rcna263904 and https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clygd10pg5lo

[viii] https://www.dw.com/en/how-real-is-a-coup-threat-against-russias-president/a-77098085

[ix] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/04/europe/putin-russia-security-intelligence-intl and https://www.kyivpost.com/post/75390

[x] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/05/14/europe/russia-winning-streak-ukraine-over-intl-cmd

[xi] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/29/russian-rate-of-losses-in-ukraine-almost-triples-in-one-year

[xii] https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/a-tactical-revolution-in-ukraine and https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/russia-needs-a-victory-this-spring and https://benmorganmil.substack.com/p/are-we-observing-a-tactical-revolution

[xiii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/29/russian-rate-of-losses-in-ukraine-almost-triples-in-one-year and https://www.kyivpost.com/post/75456

[xiv] https://icds.ee/en/signals-from-the-north-what-nordic-and-baltic-intelligence-assessments-reveal-about-russia/

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When it entered service the US HMMWV or Humvee - was criticised for being too wide to navigate narrow village roads or turn in tight urban spaces. Its size was seen as a tactical problem - forcing commanders to use specific, limited, and predictable avenues of approach. Today, the Humvee is dwarfed by the massive wheeled platforms various militaries are starting to field.

Recent Australian Defence Force (ADF) procurements provide a case study, and comparing Australia’s most recent purchases against the Humvee we can see a striking expansion in vehicle size:

The weight comparisons are based on the Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) or maximum combat weight for each platform, compared against the standard 3.49-ton GVM of the baseline unarmoured M998 HMMWV.

Role of Mechanised vs Motorised Forces

While there is a case for mechanised forces - working with main battle tanks - to be better protected, motorised vehicles have a different role to play and the focus on protection seems to have created vehicles at odds with their intended purpose.

Mechanised forces are built for high intensity, combined arms combat alongside main battle tanks. Their primary role is to breach fortified defensive lines, repel heavy attacks and conduct deep offensive manoeuvres. Troops fight in close coordination with their vehicles to project continuous combat power.

Motorised forces focus on rapid strategic movement and then holding key terrain in complex environments. They use speed to rush into defensive positions or urban settings, where they dismount to fight. Fast wheeled vehicles also allow them to act as flank or rear area security and to rapidly withdraw and redeploy but their lower level of protection dictates they operate away from direct, high intensity operations.

Navigating the Modern Battlespace

Large vehicles may be able to navigate the wide-open spaces of the Australian Outback, the rolling plains of Europe, or barren deserts expanses in the Middle East. But modern combat is increasingly urbanised and, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, defined by complex, restrictive terrain.

A Hawkei, Bushmaster or Boxer - may be able to fit down broad main roads or open terrain - but will be difficult to manoeuvre in the built-up areas and dense jungle where future regional conflicts are likely to unfold.

Viewed through a Pacific lens - Australia’s forward-defence environment - the argument for downsizing becomes compelling. Local infrastructure, light bridges, and tight, narrow jungle tracks simply cannot support 30- to 40-tonne vehicles. Even their smallest armoured vehicle - the Hawkei at over 10 tons and 2.4m wide - is too heavy and too broad to be widely deployable in Melanesia or South East Asia.

The Survivability Paradox: Fighting the Last War

The push for massive vehicles was largely driven by the need to survive IEDs - a crucial capability during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and this trend is global.

However, we must ask if armies are making the predictable error of fighting the last war by procuring these large vehicles?

In a future war against an adversary with large quantities of modern advanced anti-armour weapons and massed, cheap drones equipped with shaped charges, large size translates into a bigger target.

The massive silhouette of a vehicle approaching three and a half metres in height is nearly impossible to conceal. While strategic concealment is likely impossible in an era where the battlefield is constantly monitored by satellite and drone surveillance, being too big to hide means being instantly targetable when encountering enemy forces. Time taken to orientate on a target and fire is crucial in any engagement.

The tactical employment of armoured vehicles - taking cover in the folds of the earth or concealment in vegetation - remains an essential capability. If they can’t see you they can’t kill you - but it’s hard to hide if you are as big as a house.

The Logistic Burden

Big vehicles need a big supply chain. Sustaining a heavy motorised force requires a massive logistics tail that is expensive to build, difficult to maintain, and highly vulnerable to interdiction. You need a lot more diesel for one 38 ton vehicle than two much smaller vehicles.

Beyond supply lines, big vehicles are inherently more prone to mechanical breakdowns. The sheer mass of these platforms puts immense strain on every component, a vulnerability that is only exacerbated when they are deployed cross-country rather than on main highways.

Tactical Resilience and Fleet Size

The current procurement trajectory sacrifices operational utility for platform survivability. As vehicles get larger and more complex, they become significantly more expensive to buy and maintain, forcing militaries to field them in smaller numbers. Cost is a factor for all modern armies, even the US with their vast resources.

From a tactical perspective, a counter-argument to huge, highly protected vehicles is shifting toward a greater number of more lightly protected platforms. Rather than a full infantry section (squad) in a 40-ton vehicle, militaries could deploy a fire team in a five-ton vehicle. This would see a mounted infantry platoon based on eight vehicles rather than the traditional four. While each vehicle is arguably more vulnerable - whether or not heavier armour at a larger size will actually be more survivable in a future battlespace is debatable - the entire structure is more resilient.

Losing one vehicle from a 4 vehicle platoon - whether from enemy action or a blown transmission - degrades the unit’s combat power by 25%. Whereas a lighter 8 vehicle platoon the same loss is absorbed with far less disruption to the mission. Eight vehicles carrying up to five soldiers each present a more complex targeting problem than four vehicles carrying ten soldiers each.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Trade-Offs

The tank is not dead - there will always be a need for a super heavy ‘line breaking’ armoured fist to smash prepared enemy defensive positions - however the future of motorised infantry needs further consideration.

The critical question is no longer how much armour can be added to a vehicle. It is whether that armour delivers greater combat effectiveness than the mobility, dispersion, deployability, and resilience sacrificed to obtain it. In an era of ubiquitous surveillance, drones, and precision strike, bigger may no longer mean more survivable.

To be deployable in complex and challenging urban and jungle terrain forces require smaller, lighter vehicles. While sacrificing some protection, their smaller size provides for other forms of survivability - being more mobile, dispersed, and easier to hide. Smaller platforms are also cheaper to procure, easier to sustain, and fundamentally matched to the realities of lighter infrastructure.

Ultimately, militaries must weigh the balance between a heavily protected vehicle that cannot reach the fight, and a lighter, more numerous force that can actually operate where it is needed. In complex terrain, and context of the modern battlespace, it is time to review the survivability trade-off between big, inflexible, expensive vehicles, versus their small, flexible, cheaper solutions - from a holistic approach - not just by the thickness of their armour.

Graeme is a retired armoured corps officer and veteran. After leaving the military he has had a very successful career in civilian logistics.

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US general proposes an integrated ‘kill web’ between US-led coalitions in Japan, South Korea and possibly Philippines

The US general in charge of US and United Nations forces supporting the defence of South Korea, General Xavier Brunson, recently proposed development of a fully integrated ‘kill web’ across Japan, South Korea and possibly Philippines.[i] A tool allowing US-led coalitions to work together more effectively in the event of conflict.

In simple terms, a ‘kill web’ describes the use of digital communications to allow ‘sensors’ that locate targets (drones, soldiers, satellites, aircraft and ships) to instantaneously share information with ‘shooters’ that can attack the target (for instance missiles, bomber aircraft, drones, ships, and submarines). The ‘sensor-shooter’ relationship is called a ‘kill chain,’ and multiple ‘kill chains’ combine to form a ‘kill web.’ The faster information travels through the ‘kill chain’ the more likely a strike is to be successful. If multiple ‘chains’ are available they provide a ‘web’ of potential options that increases flexibility and resilience.

A notable feature of a ’kill web’ is that it integrates battlefield ‘effects’ (for example, surveillance, target acquisition and strike) across several ‘domains’ (space, cyber, air, land and maritime). See the diagram below.

Essentially, a ‘kill web’ allows all the different components of a force whether they are on land, in the air, on the sea or in space to communicate quickly to identify enemy targets. Commanders therefore have information to provide good situational awareness when they plan an attack, or a manoeuvre.

Brunson’s thinking is notable because it reflects an expansion of this concept into a very large-scale integration of precision-strike and long-range surveillance. His proposed ‘kill web’ stretching approx. 5,000 km or 3,000 miles from the north of Japan to the south of Philippines.

Brunson’s proposal is an extension of ideas he published in a November 2025 article, titled ‘The East-Up Map: Revealing Hidden Strategic Advantages in the Indo-Pacific,’[ii] in which he argues US planners should re-orientate their geographic understanding of future conflict in the region by turning the map clockwise 90 degrees. An evolution that places South Korea at the centre of US force projection in the 1^st Island Chain, a forward base inside China’s planned zone of maritime area-denial.

In the article, Brunson argues that “When the same region is viewed with east orientation toward the top, the strategic picture transforms dramatically. The first island chain, a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific strategy, takes on new meaning. Forces already positioned on the Korean Peninsula are revealed not as distant assets requiring reinforcement, but as troops already positioned inside the bubble perimeter that the U.S. would need to penetrate in the event of crisis or contingency.”

Brunson argues that US and allied fire control should be integrated across South Korea and the 1^st Island Chain. US and allied forces on the South Korean Peninsular then become a ‘break in’ point for operations inside potential Chinese ‘area-denial’ plans. The Japan Times states that “Brunson’s remarks underscore a broader shift in how the Pentagon views the region. Rather than treating the Korean Peninsula as a stand-alone arena focused on deterring North Korea, it is now seen as a critical hub in a wider defense network across the “first island chain,” which stretches from Japan to Borneo.” [iii]

This proposal is noteworthy and raises the following questions:

• Is the plan realistic? The idea of developing a ‘kill web’ across the 1^st Island Chain obviously makes sense from a military perspective but at this stage is a proposal, not a policy or a plan. The ability to manage surveillance, target acquisition and strike capabilities across this area in a fully integrated way is attractive and would give a US-led alliance a significant advantage. However, putting this idea into practice may be harder than it looks because it involves the integration of a wide-range of US partners and allies including Australia, Canada, the UK, New Zealand and other NATO countries. Each with different ‘rules of engagement,’ technology and training levels. Further, the cyber and space capabilities of potential adversaries are currently unknown and the digital networks that support the proposed ‘kill web’ are certainly going to be targeted in a future conflict.

• What new infra-structure is required? A ‘kill web’ requires a digital communications network. And, digital communication requires physical infrastructure like; servers, satellites, transmitters and cables. Therefore, implementing this proposal is likely to see a range of new physical infrastructure being built across Japan, South Korea and Philippines and in the surrounding oceans. A programme that is likely to be challenged by potential adversaries.

• What are the inter-operability requirements? US allies and partners will need the physical infrastructure to securely join the ‘kill web.’ This means that countries like Japan, Australia, Philippines, Canada and New Zealand will need to procure digital communications equipment that are secured too, and compatible with US standards, expensive but essential purchases. Further, building digital infrastructure or installing new undersea cables in the South and East China Seas is liable to be contested by China, increasing regional tension.

• What next? This proposal inevitably leads to speculation about the next step, and my assessment is that Australia is likely to be watching carefully and thinking about how a similar web could be developed over its northern approaches and Melanesia. Therefore, we could see an Australian led ‘kill web’ advancing northwards to meet the US led web in the 1^st Island Chain. Inevitably, this would lead to the nations of the Malacca Strait and southern South China Sea; Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia being asked to integrate their defence forces into the widening US-led networks. A diplomatic advance that potential US adversaries would seek to counter, with implications for regional security.

An update on the South China Sea

The South China Sea remains tense, Exercise Balikatan a large US-led exercise finished on 8 May 2026. The exercise focused on littoral conflict – the US and its partners using the exercise to demonstrate their capabilities; aiming to deter China from using force to assert its territorial claims in the region. The exercise included;

• Live-firing defensive battles to practice defence against amphibious attack.

• Practising integrating drones, aircraft, ships and other assets in a coordinated surveillance and target acquisition plan.

• Anti-ship strikes by aircraft and by missiles.

• Movement of troops and providing logistics to dispersed forces.

Notably, Japan deployed and tested its new Type 88 surface-to-ship missile system in a live-firing exercise. Japanese missiles successfully sinking a retired World War II-era corvette formerly used by the Philippine Navy. The target vessel was located around approx. 75km or 46 miles off Northern Luzon. [iv]

Using Type 88 missiles was a notable demonstration of inter-operability. The task involved Japan’s 1^st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, the US Marine Corps 3^rd Marine Littoral Regiment, Canadian and Philippines ships, and was coordinated by the US Army’s Multi-Domain Command Pacific.

The attack is an example of a US-led task force working together to practice a ‘kill chain’ that started with US and Japanese drones locating the target. A range of US and Japanese long-range missiles were available carried on ships at sea or spread out on land. When the attack was authorised, Japan’s 1^st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment was allocated the target and attacked the ship. The Japanese attack was followed by US missile attacks from another launch site separated by approx. 50km or 30 miles.

An operation that demonstrated coordination of multiple observation and attack assets across a range of nations, an important skill for any alliance and a key outcome of Exercise Balikatan. By demonstrating these skills the US and its allies aim to deter China from using military power to enforce claims to territory anywhere in the 1^st Island Chain.

However, China continues to assert its claims in the South China Sea in other ways and is currently locked in a diplomatic dispute over Sandy Cay Reef with Philippines. Recently, Philippines civilians landed on the reef and raised their national flag, since then Chinese scientific research ships have visited the area. Both claimants Coast Guards are now playing a game of ‘cat and mouse’ around the reef.[v]

China and the Philippines are also fortifying territories they claim. For example, in recent months China has expanded Antelope Reef into a large, new artificial island. Forbes reporting on 11 April that “While the world watches islands in the Persian Gulf, China has seized an island in the South China Sea without firing a shot. Beijing’s dredgers have been hard at work developing an artificial island 400 kilometers off Vietnam’s coast with astonishing speed.”[vi] In approx. four months Chinese engineers have expanded the usable land area from nothing to an island almost twice the size of Central Park in New York. A new base in the South China Sea that the New York Times reports is likely to be large and useful, stating that “Analysts say that given its size and the ongoing expansion, Antelope Reef is likely to become one of China’s largest military outposts in the region.”[vii]

Meanwhile, Philippines is upgrading and reinforcing islands that it claims and the South China Morning Post reports that “On Monday, China’s defence ministry criticised Manila over upgrades it was making to other disputed features in the South China Sea, including Nanshan and Thitu Islands. Both form part of the contested Spratly Island chain, and Thitu is close to Sandy Cay.”[viii]

In summary, Exercise Balikatan may be over but tension remains high in the South China Sea, and is likely to increase. President Trump’s comments after his visit to Beijing indicate that the US president views his Chinese counterpart favourably. Historically, Trump seems to make policy decisions based on how he feels about other leaders. For example, his personal feelings for Russia’s president Putin appear to influence US policy towards Ukraine. Therefore, it is likely that Chinese analysts will have interpreted Trump’s recent visit as a ‘win,’ and an opportunity to push more assertively for greater control over the South China Sea.

Chile drifting closer to the US and UK?

On the other side of the Pacific, US F-35 fighters conducted their first in-flight re-fuelling with Chilean Airforce tankers, a small but interesting activity.[ix] Air-to-air re-fuelling is a technically difficult capability and the US decision to practice it with the Chilean Airforce demonstrates a high level of trust. This activity is a signal that the US sees the Chilean Airforce as a partner it can work closely with. An interesting development in Pacific security discussions because of Chile’s location.

Chile’s provides access to the Antarctic, the Eastern Pacific and to South America making it a useful security partner for many nations, including the UK that also appears to be developing its relationship with Chile. For instance, in January 2026 Indian Defence Review discussed UK air movement via Chile to either the Falkland Islands or Antarctica and opined that “These movements demonstrate an enduring strategy of distributed logistical access. By relying on regional facilities, the UK reduces dependence on maritime supply routes and bolsters its ability to project presence over long distances in both the South Atlantic and Antarctic sectors.”[x]

Interesting observations that remind us about the role of South America in Pacific geo-politics. A role that is only likely to increase as interest in, and competition for influence in Antarctica becomes a higher priority.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Solomon Islands political troubles an update

Recently, the Solomon Islands parliament was rocked when a large group of MPs resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition, called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele, and initiated a ‘No Confidence’ motion. Manele’s coalition tried to continue governing with a minority government.

This decision was referred to the Solomon Islands High Court, that decided parliament should be called and that the ‘No Confidence’ motion needed to be addressed[xi] and the parliament met on 7 May 2026 to elect a new government.[xii]

Matthew Wale won the election and is the nation’s new Prime Minister. Wale’s win is notable because he is a critic of Chinese influence in Solomon Islands. A position opposite to both Manele and his predecessor Manasseh Sogavare who both supported a closer relationship with China.

The Guardian reported that international relations expert Alexander L Vuving from the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies said that “Wale has long advocated a more cautious approach toward China and as prime minister is likely to move the country further from aspects of its close security relationship with Beijing while strengthening ties with Australia and the United States.”[xiii]

Across Melanesia, politics are volatile and already Agence France Presse - Fact Check has reported false claims of post-election violence in the capital, Honiara, being circulated on the internet.[xiv] The historic volatility of Melanesian politic is currently compounded by intense Sino-Australian competition. Therefore, it is will be worth watching Solomon Islands closely in the next few months to see how this significant change in government policy impacts on foreign policy.

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[i] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/28/asia-pacific/us-forces-korea-kill-web/ and https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2026-05-07/kill-web-xavier-brunson-us-forces-korea-japan-times-21599739.html

[ii] https://www.usfk.mil/Media/Press-Products/Press-Releases/Article/4332674/commanders-article-the-east-up-map-revealing-hidden-strategic-advantages-in-the/

[iii] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/04/28/asia-pacific/us-forces-korea-kill-web/

[iv] https://news.usni.org/2026/05/12/sinking-ships-in-the-south-china-sea

[v] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3353947/chinese-scientists-land-sandy-cay-reef-tensions-philippines-escalate-once-again

[vi] https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2026/04/11/china-seized-an-island-while-the-world-is-watching-iran/ and https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/04/22/world/asia/south-china-sea-island.html

[vii] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/04/22/world/asia/south-china-sea-island.htm

[viii] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3353947/chinese-scientists-land-sandy-cay-reef-tensions-philippines-escalate-once-again

[ix] https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/us-chile-f35-refuel/

[x] https://indiandefencereview.com/british-raf-a400m-lands-chile-military-base-falklands-mission/

[xi] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific_solomon-islands/592553/solomons-governor-general-refuses-to-call-parliament-amid-court-of-appeal-hearing and https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/solomon-islands-edge-again

[xii] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/594356/manele-calls-parliament-for-thursday-to-face-no-confidence-motion and

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-05-15/solomon-islands-new-prime-minister-matthew-wale/106683120

[xiii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/15/matthew-wale-elected-solomon-islands-prime-minister

[xiv] https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.B3AB6WF

In recent months, we can see more evidence of the tactical revolution Ukraine’s drones are delivering. Ukraine’s bombing campaign against Russia’s oil and defence industries continues, providing no respite for the Russian economy. And, on 25 April, Ukrainian drones destroyed Russian fighter jets at Shagol airfield in the Chelyabinsk region – 1700 km from the border. A new record for a long-range drone attack.[i]

Meanwhile, on the ground, Ukraine’s drone-based ‘kill web’ has stopped Russia’s summer offensive. In fact, the Institute for the Study of War reports that “Russian forces in April 2026 suffered a net loss of territory controlled in the Ukrainian theater for the first time since Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.”[ii] Since November 2025, Russia’s monthly rate of advance has slowed down - a trend reinforced by this report. Wet spring weather contributes to slower Russian progress but there is evidence that the slow rate of advance is influenced more by tactical changes on the battlefield.

Specifically, Ukraine making greater use of ground and air drones in combined arms operations, including President Zelensky’s announcement that “for the first time in the history of this war, an enemy position was taken exclusively by unmanned platforms — ground systems and drones.“[iii] Zelensky’s announcement is further evidence that Ukraine continues to expand its use of ground drones in both offensive and defensive operations over the last twelve months.[iv]

This trend is not new; for example, in July 2025 Ukraine’s 3^rd Assault Brigade, fighting near Kharkiv, reported that “Positions that had previously withstood two assaults by adjacent units were retaken by the 3rd Assault Brigade’s robots thanks to well-planned offensive actions. The cleared fortifications and a forest belt have been secured by our forces.”[v] A small but important incident indicating how robotic capabilities are evolving as ground drones closed with, and captured an enemy position. Two operations that provide insight into the future and raise questions about – What comes next in the automation of war?

The current battlefield - drone swarms, logistics and robots capturing ground

Already, we can see glimpses of the future as drones move from surveillance, target acquisition and individual attack roles into more coordinated offensive roles. Ukraine and Russia are both using swarms of piloted First Person View (FPV) attack drones to produce battlefield ‘effects’ similar to traditional artillery. For instance, ‘immediate neutralisation’ missions that replace artillery or mortars with drone strikes to support infantry to win the firefight and establish fire supremacy in contact. Drones are also used to stop offensive operations, swarms of FPVs descending on assaulting enemy forces providing ‘defensive fire’ to stop an attack. And, even drone ‘creeping barrages,’ FPV drones engaging enemy positions ahead of an advancing force in the same way that artillery has since the First World War.[vi]

Notably, the use of ground drones to provide logistics support for operations is also evolving rapidly but is under-reported. Ukraine claims that a large percentage of frontline logistic support is now provided by uncrewed vehicles that bring ammunition, food and medical supplies to frontline troops, and bring casualties from the frontline back for medical treatment.[vii] Dev.UA news service reports that “In the Azov brigade, most of the transportation to the front line has also been given to robotic complexes: they deliver 20-25 tons of property every month. A similar practice exists in the Airborne Assault Forces: one of the brigades transports 10-12 tons per month, which is approximately 80% of all supplies to the front line.”

Now though drones are evolving from being a support element within a human-centric combined arms team towards conducting independent fire and movement. Zelensky’s announcement is another indication of Ukraine’s experimentation with teams of drones working together to engage an enemy position. Ground drones performing ‘fire and movement’ to manoeuvre forward and capture a position. A recent Lowry Institute article describes how “Ukraine is also experimenting with combining robotic systems rather than using them separately. Kyiv recently showed a UGV designed to carry FPV drones to a concealed launch point and release them from the vehicle itself, which would allow ambushes from unexpected positions while keeping human operators farther from the front.” [viii]

However, it is important not to over-hype these capabilities at this stage because unlike air or sea drones, ground drones must contend with the complexity of traversing terrain. This requires skilled operators, or very capable AI. Recently, Jacob Parakilis writing for the Rand Corporation, opined that “When it comes to ground robots taking on infantry combat, there are a set of serious obstacles. The first is, quite literally, obstacles.”[ix] Parakilis also points out that even with rapid developments in AI capabilities - “Autonomous driving is a massive challenge. Residents of London may have seen Waymo autonomous cabs in recent weeks, moving through the city’s streets ahead of their public rollout. But following traffic laws and (more-or-less) consistent road markings is still a huge and complex task. Navigating a battlefield in a complex 3D environment is at least as complex, requiring a huge amount of processing power.”

Echoing Rand Corporation’s assessment, Defence One reported that John Hardie, from the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies discussed the difficulties ground drones face navigating across country with reporters in February. Hardie stated that “My understanding is that they’ve experimented with autonomous navigation, but it’s especially difficult with [unmanned ground vehicles] for that to be reliable. So I don’t think they’re there yet.”[x]

Additionally, maintenance and sustainment are still considerations for drones. Drones require technical support, weapons must be reloaded, batteries replaced or recharged, and regular maintenance undertaken.

Therefore, the emerging picture of the current state of drone integration into Russian and Ukrainian forces can be can be summarised, as follows:

• FPV drones are supplementing and sometimes replacing artillery as a tool to impose indirect fire ‘effects’ on the enemy. ‘Neutralising, suppressing and destroying’ enemy forces. By clustering drones and operators in larger centralised units both sides achieve economies of scale for maintenance, and guarantee ‘mass’ when FPVs are deployed to deliver these ‘effects’ on the enemy.

• Increasingly, ground drones are being used to provide logistics support and bridge the 5-20km deep ‘kill web’ that arcs across the frontline. Many, small drones, moving quietly backwards and forwards through this zone attracting less attention than trucks. CNN reports that “Land drones are much harder to spot and intercept than larger military vehicles. Compared with their aerial counterparts, they can operate in all weather conditions and carry much larger payloads.”[xi]

• Ground combat drones are proving themselves in defensive operations with examples of weapon carrying drones defending positions for many days with minimal maintenance.[xii]

• And, recent reporting indicates that air and ground combat drones are starting to be used together in tactical teams to assault enemy positions.

It is clear that drone use is constantly evolving, and that we are now on the verge of AI playing a more important role in how drones are controlled so it is important to pause and consider how AI will change the use of drones in land combat.

AI drones are coming but won’t look like the Terminator!

When discussing the impact of AI on the deployment of drones in battle a key consideration is the difficulty of navigating ground drones across country. Unlike in the air, or at sea, the complexity of the landscape means that it will be some time before ground drones can move autonomously - let alone make tactical decisions like; taking cover, outflanking a position or choosing the most concealed route to an objective.

Instead, AI’s short-term impact on battlefield drone technology is more likely to be in the air where navigation is simpler. AI is very good at simplifying interactions between humans and machines, it can receive an instruction then fly a drone to perform that task. For instance, circling an area and monitoring activity or terminal guidance of a munition to a target. The machine taking over managing the inflight course corrections required to achieve the desired result, simplifying the operator’s task.

Already, AI is employed for terminal guidance; or flying a drone to its target. This idea is not new and existing missiles like Javelin already simplify the human-machine interface in a similar manner. Javelin’s technology removes the complexity of guiding the missile to its target. The soldier firing it can simply ‘fire and forget’ knowing that the missile will fly to the target without further input, even if the target is moving. The notable difference between legacy systems and new drones is cost; each Javelin missile costs hundreds of thousands of dollars while the cost of an FPV drone is measured in thousands of dollars.

Another example of AI simplifying the human-machine interface relates to AI technology enabling drones to ‘swarm’ together to deliver synchronised surveillance or attacks. Recently CBS interviewed an American army officer studying the impact of drones and AI, Captain Ronan Sefton who works on the ‘Ukraine Lessons Learned Task Force.’ Sefton described the use of AI to assist swarming drones, stating “It’s debated often as to what [swarm technology] actually means. But it’s really just a lot of drones working together at one time. And you’re taking away a cognitive load from, say, a pilot. And one person might be able to control many drones.”[xiii] Essentially, AI could enable the effort of one human operator to be multiplied so that instead of requiring 100 human operators to pilot a swarm, only one operator is required. AI ensuring the swarm stays in formation and that individual drones perform tasks allocated to them.

AI can also be trained to operate drones with weapon systems that monitor engagement areas and respond autonomously to threats. For example, using a ground drone to monitor an area that automatically engages enemy forces that enter the specified engagement area. This is a simple application of existing AI, the legal or ethical risks of which can be mitigated by training (the AI) and by having robust rules of engagement.

Conclusion – An ethical discussion about drones is fast approaching

In conclusion, this tactical revolution is not without risk because as AI becomes more capable the potential for fully autonomous ground drones becomes a reality. Machines making decisions about inflicting violence on human beings is an uncomfortable situation that requires ethical consideration because autonomous robotic soldiers, able to kill without emotion are the stuff of science fiction nightmares.

However, any discussion about the use of drones in ground combat is an emotive topic because of humanity’s relationship with war, ground and violence. In war, possession of ground is the key metric of tactical success and the side that occupies, and dominates the landscape wins the battle. The industrialisation of war has produced artillery and aircraft that can bombard enemy positions but bombs and shells do not win land battles. Instead, the occupation of ground by human soldiers remains the fundamental condition of victory. Therefore, the ethical considerations surrounding combat remain very human-centric and there is considerable concern about machines making decisions that result in violence.

Currently, the historic paradigm is being challenged because ground drones start to become a substitute for human soldiers. But, in the foreseeable future the application of AI at the frontline is unlikely to produce completely autonomous drones. Instead, it’s impact is more likely to be reducing the cognitive load on operators; allowing them to do more by leading swarms of drones, or by assigning tasks to drones. Battlefield decisions about violence still governed by the drone’s operator. However, the battlefield is constantly evolving and the requirement to closely examine the ethical deployment of AI on the battlefield in drones may be closer than we think.

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[i] https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/new-satellite-proof-shows-four-russian-jets-damaged-in-chelyabinsk-airbase-strike-including-su-57-18407

[ii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2026/

[iii] https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-russia-position-taken-without-using-troops-just-robots-drones-2026-4 and https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/04/robots-just-captured-a-russian-position-in-ukraine.html and https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-robotic-systems-russia-army-positions-ukraine/

[iv] https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-military-intelligence-releases-footage-of-robotic-ground-vehicle-attacking-russian-positions/ and https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-gun-wielding-robot-holds-frontline-solo-for-over-a-month-13466 and https://www.businessinsider.com/ukrainians-devdroid-tw-50-cal-gun-russians-days-2025-12 and https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-assault-brigade-captures-russian-troops-using-only-drones-and-robots-in-historic-operation-military-says-06-2025/

[v] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/07/09/7520954/

[vi]

Trench Art

Ukrainian Troops Marched Into Russia Behind a Creeping Barrage of Drones and Drone-Jammers

On Aug. 6, a Ukrainian corps including at least five combat brigades plus supporting air-defenses, drones and artillery—10,000 or more troops—attacked across the Ukraine-Russia border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast…

Read more

2 years ago · 15 likes · David Axe

and

[vii] https://dev.ua/en/news/nrk-zabezpechuiut-maizhe-vsiu-pryfrontovu-lohistyku-do-80-pidvezennia-vantazhiv-robliat-nazemni-drony-1765958220

[viii] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-ground-robots-are-increasingly-going-offensive

[ix] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/04/robots-just-captured-a-russian-position-in-ukraine.html

[x] https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2026/04/russians-will-surrender-robots-russian-robots-wont/412889/

[xi] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/20/europe/robots-ukraine-battlefield-drones-intl-cmd

[xii] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/20/europe/robots-ukraine-battlefield-drones-intl-cmd and https://defenceleaders.com/news/ukrainian-combat-robot-holds-frontline-position-for-six-weeks-in-sign-of-growing-ugv-maturity

[xiii] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drone-swarms-the-potential-ai-future-of-drone-warfare-60-minutes/

Lots of activity in the South China Sea

Exercise Balikatan is a large US-led exercise is scheduled to run in the South China Sea from 20 April to 8 May 2026. The exercise focuses on littoral conflict and involves practicing amphibious operations, both offensive and defensive. It is also large involving approx. 17,000 personnel from the US, Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, France and New Zealand. The exercise participants will practice inter-operability on land, sea and in the air; or managing different nations military resources together under a joint command structure. The exercise demonstrates the capability and resolve of the Philippines, and its allies and partners to deter conflict.

This year’s exercise is noteworthy for several reasons. The first is that it includes a large contingent of Japanese personnel, 1,400 soldiers, sailors and aircrew. Japan’s commitment includes several large warships:

• JS Ise a large helicopter carrier that can also be used by F-35 fighter planes.

• The landing ship JS Shimokita.

• The destroyer JS Ikazuchi.

Notably, Japan will also deploy and test its Type 88 surface-to-ship missile system. A powerful weapon that is easily deployed with a published range of approx. 100 km.[i] It is the first time Japanese military personnel have deployed to Philippines since World War Two, and is another indication of how Japan’s position regarding sending troops overseas is evolving to meet Japan’s security concerns.

The South China Morning Post quoted John Bradford, from the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies who said the deployment indicates Japan’s defence priorities because “Japan is increasingly concerned by the likelihood of a Taiwan military crisis” and that “counter-landing and missile defence are exactly the capabilities they would need to exercise to defend their [Japan’s} southwestern islands.” [ii] Japan’s increasing willingness to deploy military personnel overseas, even on exercise, worries China because of the nation’s history of Japanese military occupation during the 20^th century.

The second notable consideration is that earlier this month China blocked Philippines access to the Scarborough Shoal by sinking barges in an entrance channel.[iii] Scarborough Shoal is a small group of reefs and tiny islands claimed by both countries. Philippines has complained about this action, and tensions are high around the shoal. This means that the South China Sea is likely to be subject to more surveillance and military activity, and the large US-Philippines exercise adds another layer of risk.

Thirdly, this year’s exercise may indicate issues with US relationships in the region. The South China Morning Post noted on 15 April 2026, the paucity of South East Asian nations participating, and stated “Analysts say that hesitation helps explain Balikatan’s place in the region: for some Asean members, it is a reassuring sign of US commitment, but joining it risks looking like a strategic choice in the sharpening rivalry between Washington and Beijing.”[iv] An interesting observation that could indicate strained relationships with the US, or a perception that it is better to retain China’s favour within this group of nations.

In summary, several factors are impacting simultaneously in the South China Sea. A large exercise, combined with China’s activity around the Scarborough Shoal makes the situation in the area complex. Therefore, the next couple of weeks are be more tense than normal in the South China Sea.

The rise of ‘intermediate’ powers in the Pacific - Canada

Current US foreign policy is unpredictable, and an impact of this trend is that ‘intermediate’ powers like Australia and Japan are emerging as security leaders in the Pacific. Canada is another example of an emerging ‘intermediate’ power that may develop more influence in the Pacific. Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney is a well-regarded economist whose career includes a praise-worthy performance as Governor of Canada’s central bank during the 2008 financial crisis, and who later led the UK’s central bank.

Carney’s foreign policy emphasises free-trade and a cosmopolitan approach to international affairs. At the Davos World Economic Forum conference in January 2026, Carney made a powerful address highlighting the “rupture” of the global rules-based order caused by large powers being “submitted to no limits, no constraints.” Carney made a call for ‘intermediate powers’ “… to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.” [v]

And like Japan and Australia, Carney’s Canada is working hard to mitigate the economic and military risk of current US foreign policy. For example, Carney is the first Canadian prime minister to visit China in more than a decade and during that visit, in January 2026, he negotiated a trade deal between the two countries. Then in March 2026, Carney visited India and agreed trade deals between the two nations’ nuclear and tech industries. Two deals with rising ‘heavy-weight’ powers that opened new markets and help to mitigate the impact of US tariffs on the Canadian economy.

Carney is also working closely with European leaders and met Finland’s President Alexander Stubb in mid-April 2026. A discussion that included Canada’s potential to join the European Union.[vi] A trade block membership that also reduces the economic risk of US actions.

But from a security perspective the evidence suggests that Carney is committed to improving his nation’s security relationship with NATO, and Canada’s historic partners. Security is now a Canadian concern; whether it is China’s increasing assertiveness in Asian waters, Sino-Russian pressure in the Artic or even a threat from the US. This month Canada announced that for the first time since the 1980’s its defence budget would be the 2% of GDP demanded by NATO, and the government has announced approx. $42 billion in new defence spending.[vii] A significant portion of this expenditure will be on infrastructure in the Arctic where approx. $35 billion is allocated for new bases, roads and airports.[viii]

Canada is also investing in other areas like new rifles for the army, and the expansion of its regular and reserve forces. Canada’s Chief of Defence Force, General Jennie Carignan stating recently that “We have to get ready for large-scale conflicts, more conventional, so we need a different military to do that and different capability.”[ix] A commitment echoed by investment in the nation’s defence industrial base. In early 2026, Canada announced the Defence Industry Strategy and the establishment of a new Defence Investment Agency.[x]

Canada already has an interest in Pacific security and a naval presence, the Canadian ‘Maritime Forces Pacific’ includes approx. five Hallifax Class frigates, three Victoria Class submarines and a large Artic Offshore Patrol Vessel. Canada already contributes warships and aircraft to monitoring UN sanctions on North Korea, and to ‘freedom of navigation’ patrols in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas. It also participates in the largest regular Pacific military exercises the bi-annual RIMPAC and Talisman Sabre, the first led by the US and the second by Australia.

So, while the Artic is likely to remain Canada’s primary security focus, we should expect to see an increasing relationship with Australia, New Zealand and Japan. For instance, in March Carney addressed the Australian parliament and spoke about the risk both countries face because of changes in the global order. He also acknowledged that both countries are “strategic cousins” with a shared history and values that provides the basis for working together to mitigate that risk.[xi]

In the two prime ministers’ joint statement at the end of Carney’s visit we can see how Canada and Australia plan to work together. For instance, both countries committed to improving inter-operability and training together more in the Indo-Pacific region. Notably, they also committed to more defence industry collaboration including sharing tech to support building a new Artic Over-the-Horizon Radar to monitor Canada’s northern airspace. [xii]

Therefore, in the Pacific we should closely watch the rise of ‘intermediate’ powers like Canada, Australia and Japan. We should expect to see more defence industry collaboration, intelligence sharing, military exercises and these nations working together to develop collective security arrangements that do not rely on the US.

Australia and New Zealand strengthen cyber-resilience

Australia and New Zealand are long-term allies and are currently committed to strengthening this relationship. A great deal of work is being done by both nations defence forces to increase both parties’ capabilities and joint inter-operability.

New Zealand and Australia have both increased defence spending and are delivering a programme of work to achieve these goals. A plan referenced in a 17 March 2026 joint-statement by the two nations defence ministers that stated a shared commitment to “…being able to operate seamlessly as an increasingly integrated, combat capable Anzac force by 2035.” [xiii]

A key element of modern military capability is cyber-infrastructure. A nation’s digital networks are now the primary form of communication across almost all military activities. Militaries share information about everything including intelligence, targeting information, campaign plans, operational orders, training exercises, logistics and personnel records, across a range of digital platforms. The security of these platforms is vital to success, and is a pre-requisite for inter-operability because allies need to be sure that any data they share will be secure.

On 20 March, the New Zealand Defence Force announced that Australia “…will provide New Zealand with enhanced technical support and access to the Persistent Cyber Training Environment – Unclassified (PCTE-U), a US Department of Defense-developed platform that delivers cutting-edge, realistic cyber training and exercise design.”[xiv] By sharing this tool Australia helps to ensure that New Zealand remains digitally inter-operable.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

New Zealand Defence Force supports Papua New Guinea

This month New Zealand sent Hercules aircraft, helicopters and the landing ship HMNZS Canterbury to Papua New Guinea.[xv] The mission is partly to provide aid after Cyclone Maila’s impact on the small nation, but is also an opportunity for the New Zealand Defence Force’s ‘Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force’ to build relationships and exercise with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.

The Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force’s role is to work with other nation’s defence, humanitarian and law enforcement agencies to respond to events like natural disasters. The idea is to be able to rapidly deploy a headquarters that can support coordination of the military contribution to relief efforts.

This activity is a good example of a smaller regional power, New Zealand, working with an even smaller partner, Papua New Guinea, to respond to a natural disaster and to plan for future events. Activities by which the New Zealand Defence Force will build strong local relationships within Papua New Guinea.

Solomon Islands political troubles continue

The Solomon Islands parliament is not functioning after a large group of MPs resigned from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition, called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele, and initiated a ‘No Confidence’ motion. Manele’s coalition tried to continue governing with a minority government.

A decision that was referred to the Solomon Islands High Court, that decided parliament should be called and that the ‘No Confidence’ motion needed to be addressed. However, the person with the power to call parliament, the Governor General, Sir David Tiva Kapu is refusing too until an appeal against the decision is heard by the nation’s High Court. [xvi]

It is a difficult situation that demonstrates the instability of Melanesian governments. Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands all suffering multiple ‘No Confidence’ motions in recent years that have disrupted their ability to govern. The lack of strong, stable state institutions is a security issue because it creates opportunities for external political influence or internal corruption. Supporting good governance in Melanesia is a sound investment in regional security.

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[i] https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/04/japan-to-join-largest-balikatan-war-games-with-1400-troops-type-88-missiles/

[ii] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3350344/what-does-japans-role-us-philippine-military-drill-mean-taiwan

[iii]https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-moves-block-entrance-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal-images-show-2026-04-15/

[iv] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3350190/why-southeast-asian-nations-are-hesitant-join-major-us-philippine-balikatan-drills

[v] https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

[vi] https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/alexander-stubb-finland-carney-meeting-9.7164014

[vii] https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-nato-defence-spending-9.7142615

[viii] https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/carney-defence-north-announcement-9.7126640

[ix] https://news.sky.com/story/we-have-to-get-ready-for-large-scale-conflicts-says-canadas-military-chief-13530556

[x] https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/02/17/prime-minister-carney-launches-canadas-first-defence-industrial

[xi] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpqwwy8xvy3o

[xii] https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australia-canada-joint-statement

[xiii] https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/operationalising-australia-new-zealand-alliance-anzac-2035-closer-defence-relations

[xiv] https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/media-centre/news/nzdf-adf-shake-hands-on-trans-tasman-cyber-agreement/

[xv] https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/army/army-news/pacific-co-operation-new-zealand-defence-force-and-papua-new-guinea/

[xvi] https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific_solomon-islands/592553/solomons-governor-general-refuses-to-call-parliament-amid-court-of-appeal-hearing and https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/solomon-islands-edge-again

US strikes may have landed real blows against the Iranian regime, but Iran should not be mistaken for a defenceless or cowed state. Its most dangerous leverage is not conventional military power; it is the ability to disrupt fuel supply, push prices higher, and create panic well beyond the region.

Many expect Iran’s path forward will be to absorb the attacks, negotiate, and eventually find a way to restore oil exports in some form. That remains the most likely outcome. But it is worth considering what could follow if Tehran instead decides to widen the war by further impacting oil supply through offensive action.

Iran has three broad options to do this: continued pressure in the Strait of Hormuz; striking oil production in neighbouring states; or pursuing a less obvious approach - attacking the downstream facilities in fuel-consuming countries outside the immediate region. All three could disrupt supply - but only one does so without inviting immediate retaliation.

The first two options carry severe risks for Iran, and for China, its most important economic backer. China’s importance should not be ignored - it relies heavily on imported fuel and is currently drawing on oil reserves, a temporary measure that is not sustainable.

Disrupting Hormuz would harm Iran as much as its adversaries, and attacks on regional production would almost certainly invite immediate retaliation against Iranian production facilities. These scenarios have been widely explored and, beyond noting their cost to Iran (and China), need little further examination here.

The third option has been less discussed - and is less likely - but potentially more dangerous: striking downstream refining, storage, import terminals and distribution nodes outside the region, especially in fuel-distributing nations like South Korea or Singapore, or other allies of the US.

The vulnerability lies in how modern fuel systems have evolved: they are lean, efficient - and dangerously concentrated. Over the past four decades, refining capacity has consolidated into fewer, larger facilities.

The United States now operates roughly 130 refineries, down from more than 300 in the 1980s. Europe followed the same trajectory, with major economies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany relying on a relatively small number of refineries concentrated in limited industrial hubs, while increasing volumes of refined product move through complex, interdependent networks of ports, pipelines, and storage terminals. Smaller developed economies have gone further, in some cases eliminating domestic refining altogether and relying entirely on imports.

The result is a system optimised for cost and efficiency. It depends on a narrow set of critical nodes - refineries, import terminals, and distribution chokepoints - that are difficult to defend, slow to replace, and highly vulnerable to disruption. Efficiency, as is often the case, is the opposite of resilience.

Ukraine has already demonstrated how effective long-range drone strikes can be against oil infrastructure. Repeated attacks on Russian refineries, ports, terminals, and pipelines have disrupted fuel production and exports. Relatively cheap, long-range strikes can create strategic shock without needing to defeat a military force in the field. Like Ukraine, Iran is a leader in drone warfare and could strike oil infrastructure from thousands of kilometres away.

Iran’s most dangerous course of action is attack on downstream oil infrastructure that could cripple domestic economies and have far-reaching effects. Even limited strikes could trigger panic well beyond the immediate damage, potentially setting off a protectionist cascade. In response to any attack, oil-consuming nations are likely to move to increase stockholdings to reassure their domestic audiences. This would drive spiralling prices and scarcity as every nation tries to secure their own supplies.

Iran may not choose this path. But if it did, the effect would be immediate, asymmetric, and politically powerful. Disruption to fuel distribution in other nations would amplify pressure to reopen the Strait of Hormuz - shifting leverage back toward Iran.

Despite the lower likelihood of this scenario, Western aligned nations should be actively preparing for it: understanding vulnerabilities in refineries, terminals, and depots and - more importantly - accelerating the development and deployment of counter-drone systems to protect critical infrastructure.

Low cost, long range drone warfare has the potential to be a lethal weapon in economic warfare. The broader implications here should not be ignored.

Graeme is a retired armoured corps officer and a veteran. After leaving the military he has had a very successful career in civilian logistics.

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In Ukraine, a brief ceasefire for the Orthodox Church’s Easter celebrations finished on Sunday. A brief pause in the conflict that provided an opportunity to reflect and consider several trends that indicate Ukraine’s strategy is working and inflicting a slow, but steady reduction in Russian combat power. A situation that puts pressure on Russia to win a large victory this spring because its economic and military resources are reducing quickly. In fact, 2026 may be Putin’s last chance to win on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s strategy is working – But what about US oil sanctions being lifted?

Ukraine’s strategy for winning the war aims to create either; economic hardship that constrains Putin’s political ability to maintain the war, or that forces him into the politically unsustainable position of needing to use conscripted soldiers in Ukraine.

Broadly speaking the strategy uses two military ‘effects’ to attrit the Russian economy, and achieve these objectives:

• A strategic air campaign that targets Russia’s primary source of export revenue, the oil industry. The campaign’s aim is to reduce Russia’s revenue and therefore its ability to pay for military equipment and fund contract soldiers.

• Meanwhile at tactical-level Ukraine aims to destroy as much Russian manpower and material as possible. Resources that need to be replaced and must be paid for from the reducing pool of revenue Russia receives from oil exports.

In March, Ukraine’s campaign recorded two significant milestones. The first was in the air battle where Ukrainian long-range drone strikes outnumbered Russian attacks.[i] An important metric for success because it indicates the industrial power that Ukraine is mobilising to produce long-range drones and missiles. A notable feature of drone and missile combat is that ‘the gods of war favour bigger swarms’ and overwhelming an adversary’s air defences requires massive numbers so mass producing these weapons is a key component of Ukraine’s strategy. This March, Ukraine demonstrated that it could produce more drones and missiles than Russia.

The second trend relates to battlefield casualties because in March Ukraine set a record for Russian casualties, killing or seriously wounding approx. 35,351 soldiers.[ii] Russia enlisted approx. 450,000 new soldiers in 2025, or approx. 35,000 soldiers per month.[iii] If Ukraine can maintain this rate of attrition Russia will find it impossible to build up the reserves of manpower required for offensive manoeuvre. However, Ukraine has a bigger goal - to attrit Russia at a rate of 50,000 soldiers killed or seriously wounded per month.[iv] By maintaining or increasing its ability to attrit Russian frontline forces Ukraine ensures Putin is forced to continuously find money to pay for contract soldiers - accelerating Russia’s arrival at the point when the politically unpalatable use of conscript soldiers must be considered.

Generally, Ukraine’s strategy is working - Russia continues to fight but the economic cracks are starting to show. In February, the Jamestown Foundation recently summarising the situation

as follows “An economic inversion is taking place in Russia. Independent experts have calculated that the Russian economy has suffered a record-breaking collapse over the past year. Almost 30 percent of companies in Russia were unprofitable in 2025, and they have lost approximately 7.5 trillion rubles (approximately $100 billion)”.[v] At the same time, Al Jazeera news network drew similar conclusions reporting that “The Kremlin may appear willing to wage the war no matter the cost to its coffers and people, but that does not mean that doing so is not devastating its economy.”[vi] Evidence that the war is slowly eating away at Russia’s economy.

However, President Trump’s war with Iran has thrown Putin a ‘life line.’ Trump’s response to the blockade of the Straits of Hormuz includes lifting US sanctions on Russian oil. The impact of this change is difficult to predict but my assessment is that the impact is unlikely to be immediate because Russian exports are being slowed down by damaged infrastructure, that takes time to repair. Notably, Ukraine’s ability to damage larger targets with bigger drones and ‘home grown’ cruise missiles like Flamingo has also increased. New capabilities that Ukraine is now using to target hard to repair facilities at ports like Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk.

Europe’s attitude hardens - Another win for Ukraine

A predictable impact of the Trump Whitehouse’s foreign policy is the military mobilisation of Europe. The administration’s attacks on Europe, tariffs and threats to annex Greenland has strained relationships. The Iran War further widened the rift between NATO and the US. Trump is more critical of the alliance and threatening to withdraw the US - upset by European unwillingness s to support the war.

This behaviour means European countries are keen to mitigate the risk of a US withdrawal by developing their local defence industrial base, developing independent intelligence networks and encouraging greater inter-operability. For example, in February McKinsey reported that “European defence spending is surging. Core defence spending has doubled since 2019 and, under NATO’s new 3.5 percent benchmark for 2035, could reach about €800 billion by 2030—roughly 2.9 percent of GDP.”[vii]

NATO’s largest nations are leading this movement. For example, German defence spending could soon be larger than the UK and France’s combined expenditure. Additionally, since January Germany has started to register men of military age as a prelude to a potential re-introduction of conscription.[viii] Poland’s defence expenditure is 4.1% of GDP and in the UK, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer is committed to increasing defence spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035.[ix]

NATO’s Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are also spending more and working together closely to confront the threat posed by Russia.[x] A collaboration that also includes Canada, the UK and France. The northern and Atlantic members of the alliances securing their borders and area of interest in an increasingly assertive manner.

Trump’s foreign policy incentivises Europe to become more independent of the US. Already, we can see NATO’s assertiveness when Trump threatened to annex Greenland, and this week’s election result in Hungary demonstrates the widespread disdain for the current US administration. Pro-Trump candidate Victor Orban losing in a landslide. Events that indicate European concerns and signal that European powers are starting to develop a more independent foreign policy that is likely to include supporting Ukraine to defeat Europe’s closest threat,

But Europe’s re-armament will take time, and Russian strategists will have appreciated that there is a limited window of opportunity before NATO aid starts to deliver war-winning results. This means we should expect intensive Russian offensive activity this spring and summer.

At operational-level Ukraine’s drones stop Russia’s annual offensive

Ukraine continues to ‘fix’ a large part of Russia’s combat forces at Pokrovsk, committed to that battle but unable to breakthrough Ukraine’s lines. Meanwhile, further south in Dnipropetrovsk Ukrainian forces remain on the offensive. Ukraine has switched main effort from attriting Russian forces in Donetsk, to an offensive operation near Dnipropetrovsk.

Ukraine’s aim is to disrupt Russian plans to generate a summer offensive in that area. A goal Ukraine appears to be achieving, the Institute for the Study of War reporting on 10 April[xi] that Russian strategic reserves are being sent to reinforce this area. Specifically, the 5^th Combined Arms Army (CAA) that is engaged near Huliapole and the 58^th CAA that is engaged near Orikhiv. This is a noteworthy deployment of force away from Russia’s previous main effort at Pokrovsk demonstrating the impact of Ukraine’s operation in Dnipropetrovsk.

Last week, the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Colonel Pavlo Palisa provided useful insights into the drone war. Palisa discussed Ukraine’s current drone superiority stating that Ukraine currently deploys approx. 30% more drones than Russia leading to higher Russian casualties. However, he also pointed out that drone superiority can rapidly change citing Russia’s use of fibre optic, un-jammable drones during their reduction of the Kursk salient. Russian superiority in fibre optic drones providing a decisive advantage.[xii]

Palisa also discussed Russia’s future intentions, stating that capturing the Donbas remains their priority, but that advances in the south near Zaporizhia are planned. Palisa also discussed the potential for Russia to stage operations from bases in Transnistria trying to create ‘buffer zones.’[xiii]

At operational-level, the situation remains stable because of Ukraine’s current tactical superiority. Ukraine’s drones dominate and have stopped Russia’s advances along the Donbas frontline. Further south, drone superiority also means that Ukraine can launch spoiling offensives to stop potential Russian attacks on Zaporizhia City. The deployment of Russian reserves away from Donbas is a good indication of Ukraine’s tactical success in the south. A situation that must be causing Russian planners a great deal of concern as scarce reserves are re-deployed because of Ukrainian activity rather than according to Russian plans for a summer offensive.

Conclusion

In conclusion the key question is how long Russia can continue the war, and the answer is uncertain. For example, in January the European Council for Foreign Relations argued in the article ‘Putin’s longest war: Calling time on Russia’s endurance myth’ that “The West should stop buying into Moscow’s bluff that Russia is invincible; instead, it should use the Kremlin’s weaknesses and double down on its support for Ukraine to bring about real negotiations to end the war.” [xiv] Meanwhile, in February the Guardian reported that the International Institute for Strategic Studies assesses that Russia can maintain combat operations throughout 2026 and into 2027.[xv]

But my assessment is that a combination of huge Russian losses on the battlefield and reductions in foreign revenue are starting to compound into a loss of military capacity, a trend indicated by the Russian army’s in ability conduct large-scale manoeuvre. Ukraine is producing more drones, striking more targets in depth and appears to have defeated Russia’s 2026 offensive. Good indications that Ukraine’s strategy is taking effect and Russia’s military power is declining, and that Putin’s time is running out.

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[i] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/10/ukraine-gains-upper-hand-in-aerial-war-against-russia_6752288_4.html and https://abcnews.com/International/ukraine-outshoots-russia-cross-border-drone-war-1st/story?id=131645399

[ii] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/10/ukraine-says-russia-suffers-record-losses-of-soldiers

[iii] https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/02/23/russia-s-military-recruitment-numbers-remain-steady-but-how-long-can-the-regions-foot-the-bill-meduza-asks-researcher-janis-kluge

[iv] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/02/03/europe/ukraine-strategy-kill-50000-russian-soldiers-intl

[v] https://jamestown.org/russian-economy-collapsing-while-officials-enrich-themselves/

[vi] https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/24/three-myths-about-the-russia-economic-war

[vii] https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/aerospace-and-defense/our-insights/european-defense-by-the-numbers

[viii] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/03/world/europe/germany-military-defense-spending-europe-nato.html and https://euobserver.com/210380/germany-army-draft-battle-ready-men-travel-abroad/

[ix] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-11/starmer-plots-higher-uk-defense-spending-in-bid-to-save-his-job

[x] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-the-nordic-baltic-states-became-europes-reliable-security-engine/

[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/

[xii] https://oboronka.mezha.ua/en/ukrajina-zastosovuye-na-30-bilshe-udarnih-droniv-310126/ and https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/04/08/8029239/ and https://razomua.media/en/news/politika/bilshe-droniv-bilshe-vtrat-palisa-poyasnyv-mekhaniku-zrostannya-rosiyskykh-vtrat

[xiii] https://united24media.com/latest-news/russia-eyes-new-buffer-zone-in-vinnytsia-region-via-transnistria-ukraine-warns-17714

[xiv] https://ecfr.eu/article/putins-longest-war-calling-time-on-russias-endurance-myth/

[xv] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/24/russia-fighting-ukraine-war-throughout-2026-military-thinktank

Japan strengthens its security position

Japan is clearly concerned about security, specifically the threat it believes China poses to its southern islands and to freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas. Recently, Japan’s interest has focussed on the Senkaku islands in Okinawa prefecture.

In any future conflict it is essential for Japan’s security to retain the Senkaku Islands because they are positioned to control access between the East China Sea and Pacific Ocean. The islands could also be used to blockade Taiwan, or to challenge a Chinese blockade. The area’s air defences are being strengthened, and last year Japan’s elite Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was moved closer to the islands.

However, China’s recent projection of carrier task groups into the Pacific appears to be causing changes in Japanese defence policy. Asia Times reported in early-March that “Japan is considering a significant expansion of its military presence on remote Iwo Jima as growing Chinese naval activity beyond the First Island Chain raises concerns about the vulnerability of Pacific bases such as Okinawa.”[i] Japan’s plan includes upgrading the runway and dock facilities on the remote island. Reporting also indicates that permanently basing military aircraft on the island is also being considered.

In March, media reported that the Japanese Self Defence Force plans to base advanced anti-ship missiles on Minamitorishima, another tiny island even further east of Japan, approx. 2000km from the mainland.

Iwo Jima and Minamitorishima are a long way from Taiwan or China but reinforcing these islands contributes to deterrence because they provide bases for surveillance or for ‘area denial’ operations; either with anti-ship missiles or aircraft. Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and Minamitorishima can work together to deny vast areas of ocean to an adversary’s naval forces.

Another reason to base military forces on these remote islands is to mitigate risk. Chinese, North Korean or Russian aggression is likely to start with pre-emptive strikes on Japanese bases. Japan’s mainland bases are close to the Asian mainland so would receive very little warning of an attack. The 2-3000km these islands are from China, North Korea or Russian ensures plenty of warning time before any attack. Bases on the mainland are also more difficult to protect or reinforce because of the proximity of civilian activity.

Japan’s push east is happening in conjunction with a wider diplomatic strategy. Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi recently announcing the creation of a new ‘office’ to support the development of relationships with Pacific nations. Koizumi stating that “Strengthening the defence system on the Pacific side is an urgent task.”[ii] The new office’s job will be to develop new ways to reinforce the Japanese Self Defence Force’s capabilities in the Pacific.

Previously, speaking at a meeting of Pacific foreign ministers in Tokyo, Koizumi called for stronger defence ties with small Pacific nations.[iii] Japan is clearly seeking to deter China, both militarily and diplomatically. In a direct military sense, the expansion of these eastern military bases is likely to be a response to Chinese carrier task groups starting to operate in the Pacific. Now the US security position is less predictable, Japan must consider options to defend its possessions. Basing forces on them is a logical way to deter aggression. Notably, US unpredictability probably also contributes to Japan’s decision to compete for influence in the wider Pacific. Current US foreign policy is not popular amongst small Pacific nations, so countries with a vested interest in securing the region like Japan and Australia are ‘stepping up’ diplomatic activities trying to fill the void left by the US.

Australian Littoral Manoeuvre Group is now operational

Australia is focussed on developing the ability to fight effectively in the South West Pacific’s littoral environment. Its 2023 Defence Strategic Review outlined the requirement for a new force structure that includes “A fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system.”[iv]

In late-March, the Australian Defence Force conducted a parade to recognise the establishment of the new Littoral Manoeuvre Group, a combined arms force that contributes to meeting the objectives of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review.[v] The Littoral Manoeuvre Group is run by the Australian Army but focuses on maritime skills like moving personnel, vehicles and supplies from the sea onto the shore.

The Littoral Manoeuvre Group is headquartered in Brisbane, where 35th Water Transport Squadron and the Littoral Riverine Survey Squadron will be based. Another two landing craft battalions will be based in the Northern Territory and Queensland, supporting the Australian Army’s manoeuvre brigades located in Darwin and Townsville.

The emphasis on littoral manoeuvre demonstrates how concerned Australia is about conflict close to home. Any force hoping to manoeuvre in the archipelagos of Melanesia and the Pacific requires the specialised equipment and skills found in the new Littoral Manoeuvre Group. By developing a large centralised ‘hub’ for littoral operations Australia ensures that specialist equipment and skills; like landing craft and the crews to drive and manage them are available for use by its own forces and their allied contingents.

Exercise Kakadu 2026

Throughout March, Australia hosted Exercise Kakadu 2026 a large naval exercise involving ships and aircraft from 18 other nations. [vi] The exercise involved 20 ships and supporting and supporting aircraft. It covered a large geographic area from Darwin and Cairns in the north of Australia, to Jervis Bay in New South Wales. During the exercise the multi-national fleet practiced manoeuvring together, re-supply at sea and a range of other operational skills.

Exercise Kakadu is a bi-annual exercise that started in 1993, but the increasing size of the activity and the diversity of participation are both noteworthy. For example, this year’s exercise included increased use of drones, Defence Connect reported that the “RAN’s recent Exercise Kakadu included multiple unmanned aerial systems alongside manned maritime patrol aircraft. And multilateral efforts – like planned trilateral drills with the US and UK – will trial AI-driven maritime drone swarms in 2024.”[vii]

A key focus of this activity is likely to be investigating integrating smaller sea and air drones into Australia’s maritime surveillance network. The country already operates two very advanced and capable surveillance platforms, the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and the large, long-range MQ-4C Triton drone.

However, even these sophisticated platforms struggle to monitor littoral environments - full of islands and civilian vessels. Therefore, there is a requirement for smaller more versatile drones that can fly low amongst islands or investigate civilian craft. The aim being to integrate smaller drones with satellite surveillance and long-range assets like Poseidon or Triton to monitor Australia’s long coastline, and its wider area of interest. And, although there is little in the media about this work it is likely that Exercise Kakadu provided a good opportunity to test new ideas and equipment.

Another notable point is the diversity of exercise participants, and how they are indicative of the current tensions in the region. Some notable insights are that:

• The US sent two Arleigh Burke Class, AEGIS equipped air defence destroyers, powerful warships that are a unique American contribution to any potential future multi-national task group. This exercise is an opportunity for these warships to practice working in an Australian led task group with partners like New Zealand, Canada and Philippines.

• India sent the stealth frigate INS Nilgiri to participate in exercise, a deployment that demonstrates the nation’s desire to form a closer military relationship with Australia and its Pacific partners.

• A French offshore patrol vessel FS Auguste Benebig also participated, a reminder that France retains a strong interest in the Pacific region.

Exercise Kakadu was an opportunity for Australia to work with existing and potential partners and practice operating together, whether it is for low-level law enforcement or to prepare for high-end conflict. However, the increasing size, scale and complexity of regional exercises demonstrates local tensions as countries like Australia rehearse with their allies and partners, practising military skills and aiming to deter potential adversaries.

Melanesian Update

A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia.

Australian military support for Papua New Guinea - unexpected hitch

Australia is keen to build a closer security relationship with Papua New Guinea. The two nations signed the Papua New Guinea – Australia Mutual Defence Treaty often called the Pukpuk Treaty in October 2025.[ix]

Currently, Australia is planning to re-equip the Papua New Guinea Defence Force with new rifles, replacing a hodgepodge of different weapons procured over many years. The Papua New Guinea Defence Force’s current arsenal includes several different rifles some of which are old, or are low-quality copies of US weapons. This makes supporting the Papua New Guinea Defence Force harder because armourers maintaining the rifles need to be familiar with different weapons and getting replacement parts for a wide range of rifles is difficult.

A long-term Australian objective is to integrate the Papua New Guinea Defence Force into its network of partnerships and alliances, and supplying new rifles that meet Australian Defence Force standards is a sensible step towards that goal. If the Papua New Guinea Defence Force is using rifles supplied by Australia it is easier to support it using the existing Australian Defence Force logistics chain.

However, Radio New Zealand reported last month that Papua New Guinea’s Chief of Defence Force, Rear Admiral Philip Polewara has warned about the security issues associated with Australia supplying 3,500 new rifles to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force.[x] Papua New Guinea is a small nation with limited state infra-structure that suffers from frequent tribal conflicts. Polewara is concerned because the nation lacks secure armouries and already has a history of firearms from both the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and police finding their way into the hands of tribal militias. For example, a 2005 Australian report found that of 7,000 SLR automatic rifles provided to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force by Australia in the 1970-80s only a minority were accounted for.

This situation demonstrates the issues that need to be considered before providing military support to smaller nations. Successful aid requires a range of support. In this case, upgrading or building new armouries and helping the Papua New Guinea Defence Force establish robust audit processes and checks to prevent these weapons falling into wrong hands.

Polewara is demonstrating his professionalism by highlighting this issue. Historically, in many countries aid has been accepted without considering these issues and Polewara’s honesty and commitment to working effectively with Australia is notable.

Solomon Islands experiences more political tension

Since mid-March, the Solomon Islands parliament has been rocked by MPs resigning from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s coalition called the Government of National Unity and Transformation. On 16 March, ten MP’s resigned including several ministers.[xi] The resignations cited a lack of trust in Manele and leave him governing with a minority government. Manele’s coalition holds 22 seats while the new opposition block holds 28.

This situation highlights the potential for political instability in Melanesia. For example, Manele’s tenure as Prime Minister includes surviving two previous ‘No Confidence’ motions. It is also noteworthy that Manele has appointed former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare as his Deputy Prime Minister. A surprising decision considering that last April Sogavare had resigned from Manele’s coalition, and supported a ‘No Confidence’ motion.

Politics in Melanesia is often unstable; Vanuatu, Papuan New Guinea and Solomon Islands all suffering multiple ‘No Confidence’ motions in recent years. A situation that does not make for stable governance and creates opportunities for external political influence or internal corruption. Supporting good governance in Melanesia is a sound investment in regional security.

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[i] https://asiatimes.com/2026/03/chinas-missile-reach-forces-japan-back-to-iwo-jima/

[ii] https://asianews.network/japans-defence-minister-keen-to-bolster-pacific-defences-with-eye-on-china/

[iii] https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/pac-japan/106431452

[iv] https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review pg 19

[v] https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2026-03-30/new-littoral-manoeuvre-group-established-brisbane

[vi] https://www.navy.gov.au/navy-activities/exercises/exercise-kakadu

[vii] https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/digital-magazine/2026/air-2026/ed2

[viii] https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2026-03-30/exercises-deepen-australia-japan-ties

[ix] https://www.dfat.gov.au/countries/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-australia-mutual-defence-treaty

[x] https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/589050/png-cannot-safely-store-australian-supplied-rifles-military-boss-warns

[xi] https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/programs/pacificbeat/sols-resignation/106458752 and https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/590366/prime-minister-manele-holds-firm-as-opposition-claims-majority-in-solomon-islands