In an effort to forestall these new tariffs, the Canadian government engaged in what were essentially emergency talks with the United States, with a revised deadline of August 22. Despite Donald Trump’s announcement of a “deal” a few days before the deadline, talks collapsed late on August 21 when, according to Ottawa, the Trump administration made new, sweeping demands as part of the negotiations1.

This is a simple overview of the current situation, and I have no intention of straying out of my lane to discuss the economic aspects.

Carney has now provided some detail out why the government walked away2. He stated that the United States introduced new terms in the final days of the negotiations that were “uneconomic, unfair, and undermined the net benefits to Canada.” More importantly, he confirmed that the Americans had continued to press for concessions affecting Canadian sovereignty, including the protection of the French language and Canadian culture, until the very last minute. Carney also revealed that the American demands would have constrained Canada’s ability to negotiate new trade agreements. In his words, “We cannot accept what they have offered, and we will not give what they have asked.” The important point is that Canadian sovereignty was directly at issue. Indeed, he confirmed my assessment that the intent was to “break us so that they can own us”.

Carney did not identify every American demand, nor did he say whether the last-minute changes extended into the defence and strategic-resource realms. However, last week, The Globe and Mail reported that the United States was preparing to make sweeping demands directly affecting Canadian sovereignty. The report stated that these included demands that Canada3:

• Give the United States a right of first refusal over Canadian critical minerals;

• provide guarantees concerning future Canadian oil and gas supplies;

• complete the full purchase of 88 F-35A fighter aircraft;

• abandon the selection of Saab’s GlobalEye airborne early-warning aircraft in favour of an American system; and

• participate in Trump’s Golden Dome missile-defence project.

The report was based on unnamed Canadian and American sources and has not been publicly confirmed in full. However, it is telling that the U.S. Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, stated:

The U.S. offer was also forward-looking, and included a historic economic and national security partnership to cooperate on export controls, combat transshipment, enhance digital trade, and align certain external tariffs.

The offer would have led to supply chain coordination on aerospace, complementary actions to address unfair trade practices, critical mineral cooperation, increased enforcement against imports produced with forced labor, and the announcement of formal U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) negotiations4. (emphasis added)

The USTR statement confirms that these were never merely tariff negotiations. Washington was attempting to embed trade concessions within a much broader economic and national-security alignment agreement. What remains unknown is whether the defence and resource provisions reported by The Globe and Mail were among the last-minute terms that caused the talks to collapse.

The references to “combat transshipment” and “align certain external tariffs” also suggest that some of the U.S. demands were intended to constrain Canadian economic relations with China.

If even the some these reported demands are accurate, there is no way that any Canadian government could reasonably have agreed to them. Taken together, such concessions would have transferred substantial control over Canadian defence procurement, strategic resources and relations with third countries to Washington. No matter how you feel about Canada’s approach to dealing with an aggressive and autocratic China, this is a matter for Canadians—and Canadians alone—to decide.

This interpretation would be easier to dismiss if it did not fit the Trump administration’s modus operandi. Washington has made no secret of its view that the Western Hemisphere is Washington’s to control and that the United States has the right, by virtue of its power, to dictate the policies of its neighbours. Moreover, Trump himself has repeatedly stated that he would apply economic coercion to attain U.S. policy aims.

The Trump administration is increasingly erratic and continues to demonstrate a disturbing drift towards authoritarianism. Trump’s manifestly unsuccessful war against Iran, and his decision to punish South Korea for refusing to participate by abruptly curtailing a major annual military exercise—even while praising Kim Jong Un—demonstrate that the United States has become an unreliable, if not untrustworthy, actor on the international stage5. Only the Trump administration would treat highly consequential economic talks with a major partner as an opportunity to dictate measures affecting that partner’s national security. Trump’s policy is, essentially, “We’re America, bitch, so do as we say.”

If there is one benefit from this entire fiasco, it is that perhaps the scales will finally fall from the eyes of those people who assume that the United States will always act in the West’s—and Canada’s—best interests. There is still a large constituency in Canada that believes the United States does the right thing and that those Canadians who think otherwise suffer from a case of “Trump Derangement Syndrome.” Recent events should dispel any remaining illusions.

Canada currently enjoys considerable international goodwill and soft power. I have just returned from Europe, where the support for Canada that I encountered was remarkably deep and consistent. Canada is increasingly seen as a country willing to stand up to Trump—and as one of the few with a coherent policy for dealing with him. Unfortunately, this comes with a price, no matter how quickly Canada reorients its international trade and defence posture. We are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, too intertwined with the United States to avoid the consequences of Trump’s wrath. However, millions of Canadians appear willing to suffer those consequences, especially if our sovereignty is directly threatened.

I believe it is.

Okay, fine…

Only two weeks ago, I published a brief piece announcing a sabbatical, in part because things were quiet and I was tired of the same old, same old from Donald Trump.

Unfortunately for me, just after pressing “send”, Canada decided to make some of the most consequential defence-related announcements of my adult lifetime.

The most significant of these was, of course, the selection of Germany’s TKMS as the preferred supplier to provide Canada with “up to” 12 conventionally powered submarines. There were others, though, made on the margins of the Ankara NATO summit, that were almost as consequential. I’ll try to offer some comment on each, bearing in mind that I am often limited in my technical knowledge; most of the major equipment announcements fall well outside my professional experience in land operations.

The Selection of the German-Norwegian Type 212CD Submarine

The selection of the German-Norwegian bid over that of South Korea shouldn’t really have come as a surprise, no matter how attractive the Korean bid appeared to be — and it appeared to be extremely attractive, based upon a very capable platform.

However, the lure of purchasing a similarly capable submarine from two NATO countries, one of which Canada is pursuing extensive cooperation with in the Arctic, was always likely to be too strong. Operating the same platform as Germany and Norway offers obvious advantages in training, maintenance, logistics, spare parts, weapons, technical development and, potentially, personnel exchanges. It also opens the door to much closer cooperation in operations and sustainment over the lifetime of the fleet.

TKMS has been selected as the preferred supplier rather than being awarded a final contract. Negotiations will now take place over price, configuration, industrial benefits and the many other details involved in a programme of this size. If those negotiations fail, the South Korean bid remains available as a fallback.

Where doubt creeps in is Canada’s desire to procure “up to 12” boats. This is a very serious undertaking and would place Canada near the forefront of conventional submarine operators globally. Frankly, the sustainment, infrastructure, personnel and other challenges are likely to mean that the full number may never see the light of day.

Moreover, as usual, the procurement timelines are very long. The first four submarines are expected to begin arriving in 2034, even with Germany and Norway offering to reallocate production slots to accelerate Canadian deliveries.

That being said, this procurement will give Canada a powerful capability, designed for Arctic patrol and possessing exceptionally low acoustic and magnetic signatures. It will also allow close joint operations with two NATO countries — one of them another Nordic nation — that operate the same platform.

It is the clearest sign yet that the pivot to Europe is real.

Joint Strike Missiles

Lost in the submarine noise were a number of other announcements. One of the most important was the decision to procure Joint Strike Missiles from Norway.

The JSM is a long-range precision-strike missile capable of hitting targets more than 150 kilometres away. Canada has never possessed such an air-launched capability, and one can easily see how much of a deterrent it might provide against Arctic incursions or in defence of NATO’s Eastern Flank.

The Royal Canadian Navy’s new River-class destroyers are already intended to carry the related Naval Strike Missile. The NSM and JSM are not identical weapons, but they belong to the same Kongsberg missile family, potentially offering some advantages in training, industrial support and logistics.

Combined with the Army’s planned procurement of HIMARS rocket systems, Canada is suddenly moving towards possessing a credible long-range precision-strike capability of a kind found in relatively few nations.

A submarine-launched derivative of the missile family has also been discussed for the Type 212CD programme, although this remains a prospective rather than confirmed Canadian capability.

Flying under the radar — pun intended — is the fact that the JSM’s current operational integration path runs through the F-35 fighter aircraft. It was designed from the outset to fit inside the F-35’s internal weapons bays. I have found no evidence of an active programme to integrate it with the Swedish Gripen.

An approximately $800-million Canadian purchase of the missile is therefore a very strong signal that Canada will proceed with at least a major portion of the planned F-35 purchase. Of course, this doesn’t rule out the eventual acquisition of a mixed fleet, but we will certainly be flying the F-35.

As an aside, I am beginning to get twitchy about the F-35’s radar.

Canada is currently expected to receive the mature and fully functional APG-81 radar rather than the much newer APG-85. The latter has suffered from production, certification and integration problems, while the additional electrical power and cooling required by the Block 4 upgrade remain significant technical challenges.

Several US Marine Corps F-35Bs have even been accepted without radars installed. These aircraft can be used for basic flying but are unable to conduct combat missions or meaningful combat training.

More troublingly, the APG-85 has not yet been cleared for export, even to F-35 partner nations. Canada is therefore not currently slated to receive it.

This raises an important question: is this merely a temporary result of the APG-85’s troubled development, or is the programme evolving into separate American and export configurations?

Given Canada’s financial and industrial participation in what was presented as a common, continuously evolving fleet, Ottawa should be demanding a clear answer. I think it entirely possible that the Trump administration will permanently restrict export of the APG-85 once its technical problems have been resolved.

We shall see.

Arctic Communications

Another important announcement was the agreement in principle with Telesat to use its Lightspeed satellite constellation for the military Ka-band portion of the Enhanced Satellite Communications Project — Polar.

The critical feature of this procurement is that it will provide a sovereign, Canadian-controlled communications capability throughout the Arctic rather than one dependent upon American infrastructure or permission.

Obviously, this is another capability that will be very useful for NORAD — and, increasingly, NATO — tasks, but it will remain under Canadian control.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important.

NATO Force Posture

Canada has also announced that it will become the third Framework Nation for Multinational Division North, alongside Denmark and Latvia, taking on a larger role on NATO’s Eastern Flank.

This complements Canada’s leadership of the multinational brigade in Latvia and suggests a very concrete commitment to NATO and to a persistent, if not effectively permanent, Canadian presence in the Baltic region.

Canada has also extended Operation REASSURANCE until 2031 and plans to increase the number of persistently deployed personnel to as many as 2,600.

Much of this is, of course, political. It gives Canada a way to demonstrate — in real terms — a commitment to both the Alliance and Europe.

It remains to be seen whether the Canadian Armed Forces, and particularly the Army upon which much of the force-generation burden will fall, can sustain such commitments over the medium to longer term.

The Army is already understrength, overtasked and struggling to generate personnel for its existing commitments. Announcing a persistent presence is one thing. Generating, training, equipping and rotating the forces required to maintain it year after year is quite another.

The Elastic 5%

Much has been made of NATO’s new target of spending 5% of GDP on defence and defence-related requirements, adopted at The Hague last year and reaffirmed at Ankara.

NATO leaders have been careful to “credit” Donald Trump for this Alliance-wide measure, something that can be read in two ways: either Trump was so effective in persuading the Allies to improve their defence postures that they all immediately agreed, or he has made the United States so unreliable and hostile to its traditional allies that dramatic increases became almost mandatory.

I’ll leave it to the reader to decide.

Whatever the truth, Canada was quick to announce that it was “on track” to meet the 5% target.

As with many things, however, all is not quite as it may appear to the uninitiated.

The actual core defence-spending target is 3.5% of GDP. The remaining 1.5% may be made up of investments in strategic infrastructure and broader national resilience, including ports, transportation networks, communications systems and critical-mineral development.

Canada has also shuffled the accounting deck to improve the immediate picture, including the Canadian Coast Guard and spending by other departments in its NATO figures. Veterans Affairs alone accounts for approximately $7.8 billion and is now the second-largest departmental contributor to Canada’s reported defence spending.

Admittedly, many other NATO countries do the same, and none of this necessarily violates NATO’s accounting rules. However, a figure in which Veterans Affairs is the second-largest departmental contributor tells us considerably less about present combat capability than the headline percentage might imply.

The inclusions allowed Canada’s reported defence spending to take a sudden leap. It’s not exactly smoke and mirrors, but it certainly allowed the Government to announce dramatic increases sooner rather than later.

On the positive side, the changes to Canada’s defence posture have been sweeping and real. It appears to me that the Government is genuinely serious about reaching the core 3.5% defence-spending target, although doing so — and turning that spending into usable military capability — will take considerable time.

Trump and the Looming Crisis

Casting a dark shadow over NATO is, of course, Donald Trump.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was conciliatory and genial during private meetings in Ankara. I think one must take this with a grain of salt.

Whatever goodwill Trump may have generated in private was promptly overshadowed in public by his renewed demand for Greenland, his direction to staff to “cut off all trade” with a “wasted cause” Spain, and the resumption of his bizarre and increasingly irrational diatribes towards Iran.

The latter, of course, still occupies much of Trump’s attention as we lurch from “ceasefire” to open warfare and repeated threats from both sides over the Strait of Hormuz.

There is no obvious end in sight. Trump will never willingly back down, while Iran has little incentive to do so. Indeed, it remains difficult to determine what political or military end state the United States is attempting to achieve.

Somewhat troubling is Prime Minister Carney’s occasional rhetorical support for Washington’s stated objectives throughout this fiasco. While it is true that his words mean virtually nothing in practical terms, I’m not sure that encouraging Trump — even while simultaneously calling for a genuine ceasefire — does much good.

Conclusion

Overall, things seem to be moving remarkably quickly on the defence and strategic fronts.

While I applaud these large and potentially game-changing announcements, I remain leery of the pace, the delivery timelines, and our ability to generate and sustain enough personnel for both the new equipment and the new commitments.

Moreover, it seems to me that we still have critical capability gaps across the Canadian Armed Forces that need to be addressed sooner rather than later. Long-range missiles and advanced submarines are extremely welcome, but they do not solve shortages of personnel, ammunition, air defence, vehicles, infrastructure and countless other less glamorous requirements.

I know work is being done on these fronts, so there is reason to be optimistic.

I just wish they’d hurry up.

I will be in Europe and the United Kingdom for the next few weeks, and the atmosphere there should be interesting. I will, of course, report on anything important.

Until then, I hope everyone is having a great summer.

Regular readers will remember that I write here as a cathartic experience and as a way to contribute when I think I have something of value to say. In the less than two years I’ve been publishing on Substack, I’ve managed to put out a few dozen articles, albeit with fairly long gaps between some pieces.

Lately, though, I’ve found myself with little inspiration. The descent of Trump’s America into chaos and stupidity continues unabated, but even the critiques have grown repetitive and stale. One can only write about Trump’s idiotic choices so many times as the United States lurches from self-generated crisis to crisis on the international stage.

Similarly, but more positively, there isn’t a lot I feel that I have to say on the domestic front, especially in my usual area of commentary - defence. Gratifyingly, Ottawa appears to be translating its rhetoric into action; the pivot away from the United States umbrella seems genuine and seems to be moving extremely rapidly. There are major projects in the pipeline, most of which have my wholehearted support. The big one, submarines, is well beyond my area of expertise (I’ve been on them but am not qualified to critique a purchase) and I have repeatedly said my piece on the F-35 procurement and the potential for a shift to the Swedish Gripen jet fighter.

Aside from this malaise, life has also been rather busy on the personal and family front, with a significant amount of travel. There will be much more over the summer and my ability to sit down at the keyboard will be severely limited. Unless something dramatic happens on the international or defence fronts, I cannot imagine putting out a major piece until September, when the dust settles.

I am immensely grateful to have some 3000 people subscribe and read my thoughts here on Substack. The feedback I’ve received over the past 17 months has been almost universally positive.

I’ve never been one to write to a schedule. I’d much rather publish when I have something worthwhile to say than simply fill the page. But rest assured, I’ll get fired up about something sooner rather than later. I’m still here, still thinking, and still planning to write. I may broaden the range a bit rather than forcing another article on the same well-worn topics.

Thanks for sticking around. More soon.

Before we start, I should make something perfectly clear. I have no time or sympathy for Alberta separatists. Indeed, I regard the entire movement as one that is assisted in no small part by Russian and American disinformation campaigns, with the former government-sponsored and the latter nurtured in the MAGA-verse. The separatists are guilty of misleading supporters, spreading disinformation, and indulging in delusional magical thinking to wave away any roadblocks to what I believe is, for at least some of its leading voices, the real objective: eventual absorption into the United States.1

With that out of the way, this article will focus on one of the major roadblocks facing separatists, one barely acknowledged in the midst of a sea of utterly delusional thinking: defence — a major issue that they wave away with the jauntiness that only a true believer can muster. Except that should they get what they want, defence will instantly become a major — if not the major — issue, much more so than equalization, pipelines, pensions, or the economics of separation. Having spent much of my career inside the machinery of defence planning, I find this particular bit of magical thinking almost breathtaking.

The Constitutional Reality

Contrary to popular belief, Ottawa can’t just send the armed forces into whatever province it wishes. Instead, a written request from the provincial Attorney General is needed to launch Canadian Armed Forces in the province. No formal request from Alberta’s Attorney General? No Canadian Armed Forces dispatched into Alberta.2

We can start with this howler from the Alberta Prosperity Project — the leading proponent for separation and purportedly the most organized — because it is dangerous and horrifically wrong. Moreover, it is indicative of the misinformation and wishful thinking being fed to sovereignty supporters. The Canadian Constitution gives exclusive responsibility for defence and all defence-related issues to the federal government. Provinces have no role in military activity whatsoever.

This extends to such mundane matters as health care for military members, taxes, vehicle registration, and driver’s licences for military vehicles. Much more importantly, the Canadian Armed Forces can be deployed anywhere in Canada for any defence or military purpose — full stop. The only time a province gets involved is to request assistance in the event of a situation that is beyond the capabilities of that province. This is almost always a natural disaster or policing matter. This is the only time an Attorney General becomes involved in this specific scenario. Aid to the Civil Power is not the same thing as federal command over CAF assets or its ability to deploy those assets.

In a hypothetical, apocalyptic situation involving the attempted rupture of the country, the federal government would not be helpless. It would retain command over the CAF, control over federal defence assets, and the constitutional authority to act in defence of the Canadian state. And make no mistake: in a domestic setting, the CAF is an incredibly powerful tool, the ultimate one available to Ottawa.

I begin with this point because the assumptions the Alberta Prosperity Project’s misinformation leads to could — in extremis — be incredibly dangerous. They are basically telling Albertans that there can be no “worst case” response from Ottawa, which is patently untrue.

Constitutional issues are the separatists’ weak spot; they completely fail to understand the division of powers within the federal system or they twist the meaning of the Constitution to suit their own purposes. There is no small element of thinking imported from the United States that separatist elements have attempted to apply to Alberta and Canada. This may account for the claim made above: that Alberta is already “sovereign” under a weak federal government and has some sort of jurisdiction when it comes to military affairs.

If this is the case, the APP and the rest of the separatists are in for a rude awakening. Aside from the ability to deploy forces anywhere in the province for any purpose, Canada possesses extensive defence infrastructure supporting a good portion of the Canadian Armed Forces’ combat capability. None of this would — or indeed can — belong to the province in the event of separation. Ottawa is not likely to surrender 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Edmonton, Canada’s major fighter base in Cold Lake, Wainwright, Suffield, or the classified systems and munitions that support them. These are not Alberta assets. They are instruments of Canadian sovereignty.

All of this would be pulled out of Alberta — with a separatist Alberta footing the bill for any residual infrastructure. With it would go all the classified systems, munitions storage facilities, the munitions themselves, and all the training infrastructure, including the computerized systems. After all, these are Canadian assets and a “Republic of Alberta” would be required to recreate any defence capability from scratch. Apparently, there is talk of $1 to 2 billion being allocated for this purpose, a figure that is patently ridiculous.

The Geographical Problem

Much is made of Alberta’s landlocked status, an issue that separatists wave away by stating that Canada would be “required” to give Alberta access to the sea or by saying that the United States would charitably provide Alberta with export routes through its territory. Virtually nothing is said about another issue — one that directly impacts Canada’s defence posture and national security.

British Columbia would not become an exclave in the strict legal sense, but its principal overland connection to the rest of Canada would run through a foreign state. Yukon and the Northwest Territories would also find their southern access and support routes complicated. No sovereign country would willingly accept that kind of strategic vulnerability without ironclad guarantees.

Canada would almost certainly demand military overflight authority, authority to transit armed troops through Alberta, and a guarantee that military installations — including the home of Canada’s Pacific naval fleet — could be supported. There are far too many hypotheticals to go into in a short article such as this one, but imagine a scenario where B.C. requests troops to assist with fighting forest fires. How do they get there? Even with paper guarantees, a Canada playing hardball could easily insist on Canadian forces being located within Alberta proper to ensure transit rights.

The Defence Treaties

An independent Alberta would not be party to the treaties governing the North American Aerospace Defence Command, or NORAD, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Admittance to the former would have to be negotiated with both Canada and the United States, while admittance to the latter would likely be a non-starter.

NORAD, then, becomes a major issue. Neither Canada nor the United States would tolerate a “black hole” in NORAD’s coverage right in the centre of the continent. This would give Alberta two choices: develop an independent air identification and interception capability or give up sovereignty over Alberta’s airspace. The former would be incredibly expensive, even assuming that Alberta could take over existing Canadian defence infrastructure.

F-35 fighter aircraft — and Alberta would almost certainly want F-35s — are not cheap and could well be beyond the capability of a landlocked petrostate to manage. By my rough estimate, even a small squadron of 12 F-35s, with supporting infrastructure and an initial weapons package, could easily run $4.5–6.0 billion. Separatists would need to explain how they would address this air defence gap, who pays, who commands, who has access to classified systems, and what Canada and the United States are expected to trust.

Separatists will likely shrug this off. While one can imagine their having issues with Canadian aircraft intercepting targets over Alberta, one doubts that they would have the same quibbles should it be the United States Air Force. Another issue waved away. Easy, isn’t it?

Given these issues, any defence negotiation would be brutal and unforgiving. Defence is a central pillar of sovereignty and this is one area where Canada would be incentivized to play hardball. To do otherwise would be to compromise the security of the rest of the country, including the security of those finding themselves suddenly cut off from Canada.

Separatists operate under the delusion that a win in a referendum would automatically result in a friendly division of defence assets. It almost certainly would not. To the contrary, Canada would not be constitutionally forced to give anything on the defence issue, and a referendum would certainly not force Canada to surrender bases, divide up assets, ignore treaty obligations, accept de facto isolation of B.C., provide air defence, or tolerate a strategic gap in the middle of the country.

A successful referendum might get Alberta to the table. It would not put Alberta at the head of it.

I will close with this. The post below was reposted by one of the leaders of this independence charade — one of the same people who has been to Washington and claimed American financial backing. It asks “American friends” to donate to Alberta separatism.

You can imagine what I think.

• I shuffled towards the tent lines, sweating in the 45°C heat, my eyes squinting against the glare and blowing sand. In the distance loomed a small building, one that hadn’t been there a few hours earlier. As I grew closer, I realized that it was trimmed in bright red, the colour brilliant amidst the tans of the desert. I circled the building to what was obviously the front. There, above wide, sliding serving windows, was a familiar sign: Pizza Hut. The Americans, seemingly out of nowhere, had dropped a Pizza Hut smack in the middle of camp.

I share this little anecdote because it vividly illustrates the American way of war: unparalleled logistics, virtually limitless resources, cultural isolation, and sometimes odd planning decisions. It’s grounded in history and initially served the United States well. However, as I’ll attempt to show, American strength is not always effective. Indeed, it has become a significant weakness and has led to strategic decisions that have had grave consequences for both the United States and the wider international community. For Canada, the danger is not merely that the American way of war fails; it is that dependence on American capabilities steadily pushes us into adopting it.

Generally speaking, American employment of military power is characterized by a number of traits that can trace themselves back to the Second World War: unparalleled industrial capability, incredible logistics, the use of airpower as a panacea, allies as a tool rather than a partner, cultural isolation, technological solutionism, firepower as the first solution to tactical problems, and not a little amount of hubris and exceptionalism. We see all these being applied now during Trump’s war against Iran, but their threads run through most US military actions since 1945, including during “my” war in Afghanistan. In many ways, the United States is still attempting to apply the lessons learned during World War II to conflicts that are dramatically different in nature or scale.

Before we begin, I would like to stress a couple of points. First, this essay aims to describe systemic attitudes that I have observed, not the attitudes found amongst individual military personnel. The US military is a large and diverse organization, and there are many, many professionals who are well aware of the traits I’m describing and how they affect military policy. Furthermore, I’ve written about my personal experience elsewhere, and attempted to explain the relationship between Canadians serving with the US and the American armed forces.

Secondly, there are minor exceptions to the norms I outline below. Arguably, airpower forced a solution in the Balkans and in Libya, and the first Gulf War vividly illustrated how effective the American way of war can be in a conventional setting. But I think that these are exceptions, and the track record is hardly spotless.

The Historical Background

The United States emerged from the Second World War as the world’s preeminent military power. It leveraged its industrial potential and population to create a military establishment capable of operating at a global scale. American logistics capability was unparalleled and the movement of troops and materiel between continents became a matter of routine. US industrial capacity meant that nothing was ever in short supply and that equipment was normally of the finest quality. The mass use of strategic airpower contributed significantly to the defeat of both Germany and Japan, while carrier aviation became central to victory against the latter. The force was so large that training could be focused on specialists, rather than on teaching personnel to be “jacks of all trades”. Allies became junior partners at best and an annoyance at worst. And all this led to the United States convincing itself that it alone won the war.

The Americans applied these lessons in both Korea and Vietnam. Both conflicts saw the United States employ strategic bombing as a primary means of forcing tactical decisions and the use of mass firepower as a means of keeping American casualties to a minimum. In Vietnam in particular, the US operated with a certain level of cultural insensitivity and became used to conducting operations without the input of allies, most of whom relied on the Americans for support anyway.

This eventually translated into what I believe is the underlying tendency of the American way of war: to find the most technically or operationally convenient solution to problems, no matter how complex. Thus we have a reliance on airpower and firepower, the extensive use of special operations forces, a strategic inability to adapt to local situations, extreme efforts to avoid casualties, leading to a suspicion that American lives are somehow more valuable than others, and a tendency to regard allies as a “bolt-on” or as part of a political kabuki theatre.

Logistics

• The Gulf, 2002. The ramp was littered with aircraft — as many as nine huge C-17s and over 20 C-130s at any given time. C-17s arrived virtually on the hour from the US and Europe, along with enormous C-5 Galaxies direct from the States. Unseen, but supporting it all, was a fleet of air-to-air refuelling tankers, ensuring US aircraft could fly with no interruption. The scale was gigantic. All of Canada’s air force in one place. And it was one of five such installations.

The United States Armed Forces have an unequalled ability to move forces anywhere on the planet. US Air Force aircraft operate daily around the globe and the Americans have a far-flung system of bases and support hubs on virtually every continent. Much of this is a legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War, but it means that the US is capable of doing things that no other country can. Air strikes can be launched within hours of being ordered — anywhere on the planet — and carrier strike groups can be moved between continents within a matter of days. Land forces can be airlifted directly into action. The knock-on effect is that US dominance in logistics means that American leadership always has access to a military option.

This makes the United States virtually unbeatable in a conventional conflict — i.e., state-on-state warfare. The issues arise when situations aren’t so clear-cut, or where nuance and restraint are called for.

Airpower

The US Air Force is, in many ways, the service that most reflects the lessons of the Second World War. The ghosts of Curtis LeMay and memories of the Strategic Air Command stalk the halls of the Pentagon. This is translated into a very large constituency within the American armed forces that believes that airpower is the solution to most military problems and that conflicts can be won using airpower alone. The liberal use of aerial firepower is enormously attractive to the political leadership. It has the benefit of appearing decisive, holds the promise of forcing a solution, and, most importantly, is of very low risk. American technological dominance ensures that US airpower can operate with virtual impunity and, if an aircraft or two are lost, that plays better in the domestic press than thousands of land-based casualties.

The problem with airpower is that all it can do is break stuff. It doesn’t take into account the human factor. This should have been a lesson learned in 1945, when airpower alone wasn’t sufficient to force Germany’s final surrender. Nor did mass raids in North Korea, the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, or “shock and awe” over Baghdad create conditions for an American victory. Even firebombing Japan didn’t force a surrender; it took atomic weapons and a submarine campaign to do that. Yet this lesson doesn’t appear to have been learned, as we see vividly illustrated in Iran today. In Iran, air strikes have destroyed infrastructure and conventional military capability, yet the regime remains intact and Iran’s capacity to wage unconventional war still exists. Bombing has not forced a victory, Donald Trump’s claims to the contrary.

The Special Forces Fetish

• “Proximo” led the Presidential Protective Detail, supported by contractors using, in a surreal yet very American touch, fast-food names as pseudonyms. All claimed service in one special forces unit or another, sometimes without any real proof; wildly inflated resumes were the norm. “Proximo” earned a reputation for driving through the capital, siren blaring, .50 calibre machine gun pointing at all and sundry. The final straw came when the Detail physically assaulted the Minister of Transport at an event.

The American special forces community is larger than most countries’ entire armed forces. There are so many units with so many names that it is difficult for the uninitiated to keep track. The US Air Force has special operations aircraft and helicopters, there are US Marine Corps special operations units, the US Navy famously has the so-called SEAL teams, the US Army has Rangers, the Green Berets (the original “special forces”), “Delta Force”, and everyone has secretive aircraft of their own. This is all supported by a massive intelligence and support infrastructure.

Because all these units operate without public knowledge, the temptation to use them is very great. Moreover, because some operations have been successful — thinking here of the effort to support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and the killing of Osama Bin Laden, to name two — confidence in the special forces community as a whole is very high. On the face of it, SOF is the perfect solution.

Except that it isn’t. SOF is very expensive and is suitable for exquisite, surgical operations. Bin Laden is a good example. However, to conduct a campaign or to achieve strategic effects, conventional forces are virtually mandatory. This hasn’t stopped the United States from trying to leverage SOF capabilities at the strategic level, with little success. The result is a very large force structure that leans into the mythology created by US media. How many “SEAL” television programs are there? Books? Movies? Plenty. None of this is to deny the quality of many SOF personnel; the problem is the strategic mythology built around them. But none of this demonstrates a war-winning capability.

Technological Solutionism

The American way of war leans heavily on technological solutions. This is the belief that sensors, networks, precision weapons, “fusion”, and information dominance can solve problems that, in reality, require political solutions. There is a tendency to disregard the human element in favour of the technological, including in scenarios where technology is limited or ineffective. That belief runs from strategic bombing to “shock and awe”, drones, and AI-enabled targeting. It’s the Pentagon version of “there’s an app for that,” except the app costs $80 billion and requires three congressional districts to maintain.

Allies

American attitudes towards allies are grounded in history, exceptionalism, and not a little hubris. To begin with, we must understand that Americans, generalizing here, of course, believe that allies bring nothing to the table. The United States possesses every capability that any ally could possibly provide. Indeed, most allies — the major ones included — are often reliant on US logistics and intelligence support. They become a burden and a liability. Worse, as we’ve seen in Pete Hegseth’s various rantings, allies bring different rules of engagement and national caveats that can serve to hamstring American operational flexibility. At best, then, allies are a “bolt-on”, a means of increasing US capability under American direction and leadership, and woe betide anyone saying differently. Even with this, allies are part of a hierarchy, with the British at the top, and Canada and Australia just behind. Everyone else is left out of the equation entirely.

The first problem with this is that while the US is strategically unmatched, allied forces at the tactical level can be as good as, or better than, their American counterparts. For example, I was mocked online for suggesting that the Danes could give the US a bloody nose should the United States attempt an occupation of Greenland. American commentators, in a bout of hubris, regarded the idea of Danish military resistance as a joke. This level of exceptionalism could have resulted in disaster. After all, the Danes — at the unit level — are easily a match for the US. They have extensive combat experience, fantastic soldier skills, good, modern equipment, and well-trained leaders operating under a Royal Decree ordering immediate resistance to an invader. Reports soon emerged of Danish plans to crater Greenland’s runways and to cause American casualties. The Trump Administration would surely have shrugged this off, wildly misreading the capabilities of one of America’s oldest NATO allies.

The second issue is that the US tends to use its predominance to impose its way of war on allies — big and small. The “host nation” becomes a very junior partner pushed to the side, and countries with differing rules of engagement find themselves shut out completely. The result is the Americanization of those forces within the “inner circle”, with its reliance on firepower, “kinetic” action, special operations, and airpower. US direction becomes the default setting and allies wishing to have any influence at all are forced to adapt, essentially submerging themselves in the US system. But they’ll always be outsiders and there is never any doubt as to who is running the show. After all, NOFORN classifications apply to virtually everything and allies can’t really be trusted to do things “properly” anyway.

Finally, the United States tends to employ local forces as a combat multiplier rather than as a true partner. We saw this in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Like other allies, local forces — fighting in their own countries — are expected to take US direction and adopt US practices even as they receive inferior training and equipment. In two instances, Vietnam and Afghanistan, local forces were eventually abandoned in cynical displays of US self-interest. Such things do not inspire confidence or loyalty, something that was continually demonstrated with the Afghan National Army.

Exceptionalism

• Afghanistan. Picture military personnel and civilian contractors, all armed to the teeth, lined up at the Burger King or shopping at the North Face store. Want a latte? Green Beans is right there. The AAFES is promoting a contest for a new Chrysler and has stereos on sale. Grab a movie to play in your shack. It’s like you’ve never left home, aside from the dust and occasional scorpion. And the Afghans? Well, I saw a “detail” cleaning the shitters this morning.

Systemic exceptionalism is rife across the entire American way of war. The organization is utterly convinced that it will prevail, that it is right, and that there is little room for learning or change. Thus we saw the United States repeating the same mistakes over and over in Afghanistan for almost two decades; after all, there’s nothing wrong with the way America fights, is there? The issue is that this exceptionalism creates an environment that is entirely counterproductive, an environment that manifests itself as in the anecdote above. Cultural insensitivity is pervasive. What other army would permit — for a while at least — a unit to hand out translations of the Bible in deeply Muslim Afghanistan? Imagine allowing a reprobate like Pete Hegseth, with all his prejudices and hubris, to instruct local forces. Crusaders don’t play well in Kandahar.

The issue with systemic exceptionalism is that it breeds contempt. Contempt for allies, contempt for those you’re purportedly helping and, worst, contempt for your enemy. The enemy, after all, has a vote, and war is a fluid and unpredictable thing. Having contempt for it leads to recklessness, poor planning, and failure.

Trump’s War with Iran

We see all of this in full display right now, with Trump’s war with Iran. The United States launched extensive airstrikes against Iranian infrastructure and decapitation strikes against its leadership. Conventional Iranian military capabilities were wiped out and Trump himself was quick to claim a resounding victory. Yet the enemy has a vote and the American way of war was ill-suited to bring Iran to heel without an extensive, risky, and potentially expensive ground operation. Hubris and exceptionalism, personified by a strutting Pete Hegseth, waded in and failed to account for the Iranian regime’s resilience and ability to conduct unconventional warfare. Consequences and second- and third-order effects were obviously disregarded as Trump watched video of airstrike after airstrike. Today, though, “victory” seems far off.

This is because US strategy cannot work. Bombing alone has rarely, if ever, produced the clean political surrender American planners seem to expect from it, and the United States seems to have developed few other options. Iran has become the master at creating unintended consequences, both with its drone and missile strikes and with small-scale operations in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has alienated its usual allies — allies that possess minesweeping capabilities beyond those possessed by the US Navy — and is left virtually alone confronting Iran. Those minesweepers would have come in pretty handy in clearing the Strait and providing close-in naval support to shipping, capabilities that were discarded due, in my opinion, to sheer arrogance.

As for Canada?

Canada, of course, developed its own way of war, one grounded originally in British tradition and modified by our own lessons from the First and Second World Wars, Korea, service with NATO, and a variety of peacekeeping missions: reliance on small units, a wide scope of training, managed resources, and a more discriminating use of both force and firepower. Over the past couple of decades, these have been subsumed into the American way of thinking because we have played the role of junior partner on several American-led operations. On these, we relied on US logistics, strategic transportation, and combat enablers. We shared camps and conducted joint operations. Canada conformed and we will continue to conform as long as we rely on the United States to provide basic military capabilities. An army without air defence cannot operate independently in the 21st century. We don’t need a deployable Tim Hortons; we need sovereign resources that permit Canada to operate the way it sees fit, and not be beholden to another country’s agenda.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to describe what I see as systemic issues with US military strategy and its “way of war”. Of course, as mentioned at the start, there are many Americans both within and outside the US military establishment who don’t subscribe to the traditional US military view of operations. I have no doubt, for instance, that many officers warned of the repercussions of attacking Iran, of limiting those attacks to airstrikes, of the resilience of the Iranian regime, and of the consequences to global shipping and to the world economy. Yet the Administration’s hubris and confidence in doing things the same old way prevailed. And the Strait remains closed.

Every time I discuss Canada’s military relationship with the United States, it comes up: Canada’s military is too pro-American and too likely to side with the United States as Canada attempts to pivot away. Usually, accusations like these have little evidence to support them and lean heavily on the commentator’s somewhat jaded view of the military in general. That being said, there is some truth here, and it is fair to say that the Armed Forces are generally pro-American. However, there is good reason for this, as this article will attempt to explain.

First, my usual caveats. I was never posted to the United States myself. However, I did conduct an entire operational tour with the Americans, served alongside them with NATO, and participated in extensive planning with USNORTHCOM as part of the Bi-National Planning Group. I wrote about my personal experience with the US military in my article “My Drift into Quiet Anti-Americanism”, which you can find here.

Canada’s military has been pro-American because we wanted it to be. Beginning in the late 1950s, Canada made strategic policy decisions that deliberately placed us firmly in the US orbit and made us militarily dependent on the United States. We stopped producing most items of military equipment and dismantled much of our defence industrial capability. We also decided that the Armed Forces could dispense with many core capabilities because we would “always” operate as part of an American-led coalition. Thus, things like attack helicopters, long- and medium-range air defence, deep-strike weapons (both air- and land-based), and many other weapons are not found in the Canadian arsenal. Our entire defence policy was, for decades, predicated on having an incredibly close relationship with the United States. It allowed us to eliminate “extravagant” defence spending — Canadians were largely uninterested in the military anyway — and focus on other priorities.

There was, of course, a trade-off. Canada became incredibly dependent on and integrated with the US after about 1965. We eliminated huge swaths of our defence industrial capability with the assumption that we could simply purchase what we needed from the United States. The North American Air Defence (later Aerospace) Command (NORAD) came into being in 1958 and completely integrated continental air defence, with operations commanded from Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Thus, Canada deliberately decided to abandon some elements of sovereignty in the defence realm. In return, we received security and the ability to spend the bare minimum on defence. And it worked as long as the relationship was benign. It is this assumption — that our defence relationship with the United States will always be benign — that drives many of the CAF’s attitudes towards the US, and these attitudes reflect the policies set by the political leadership.

The result is that, at any given time, there are some 700 Canadians serving in the United States, most with NORAD. Canada is one of the very few countries that the Americans have permitted to command US forces. For instance, the Deputy Commander of NORAD is a senior Canadian general. Another RCAF general serves as deputy commander of the US NORAD region, based in Florida. Canadian generals serve in senior leadership roles with the US Army; Canada has a slot on the much-vaunted US Army Ranger course. Even when Canadians aren’t permanently assigned to duty in the United States itself, the working relationship is — as I can attest — very close. I know from experience that there are Canadians working in highly sensitive parts of the US military system, including alongside US Special Forces. More are assigned to US CENTCOM HQ in Qatar, flying with US Air Force squadrons, and Canadian ships routinely sail as part of US Navy task forces. They do all of this because that is what the Government of Canada wants them to do.

You can imagine what happens at a personal level. Working with the United States can be very professionally rewarding. For example, Canada doesn’t have an Army Corps HQ or an operational division, yet our commanders can gain experience operating at that level by working with the US. The Americans can be overwhelmingly welcoming and hospitable. Deep and lasting friendships are formed. If Canada decides that its personnel cannot support a US operation — as Ottawa made clear that Canadian personnel were not to be involved in the US attack on Iran, for instance — this is typically tolerated with some grace, even if there is private grumbling. Within NORAD, Canadians are assigned real operational roles critical to the defence of the continent and are found throughout the organization at every level. The Americans have resources that cannot be found anywhere else, and Canada is one of the few countries trusted enough to work directly with them.

It obviously isn’t perfect, and the pressure to “go along” is immense. The odd slight gets ignored, as do the jokes and weird cultural differences. The NOFORN caveats and paranoia become background noise and are sometimes disregarded because “you’re one of us anyway”. But overall, most Canadian personnel working with the US find it a rewarding and positive experience and come away with an affinity for the US military. That permeates the entire Armed Forces; the US has been our closest and most trusted ally for decades, and a large percentage of Canadian military people have trouble viewing the Americans as an adversary or a threat. Again, this reflects decades of deliberate government policy.

None of this is to say that our Armed Forces have been brainwashed; they are composed of individuals, after all, and many share the view that I expressed in the article mentioned abovd. But those views are usually expressed in eye-rolling or sideways-glance terms rather than in anything concrete. If you’ve seen The Office, a good analogy would cast the US as Michael Scott and Canada as Jim Halpert. Jim might have issues with Michael’s antics, but still finds him endearing in the end and finds it difficult to break free.

Canada, for good reason, is attempting to break free from dependence on the United States. As part of that, our entire defence policy is shifting and major adjustments are being made. However, our commitment to NORAD remains the same, and Canada still has exchange personnel in the United States at all levels. This deliberate closeness remains a policy of the Government, despite the re-emergence of Trump and his almost continuous threats to Canada. That translates into activities and attitudes that Canadians, reacting to these threats, find off-putting.

Thus, the RCAF recommends the F-35 because that was (and is) Government policy. An Army unit exercises in Alaska as Trump threatens Greenland because that is Government policy. An RCN ship sails with a US task force because the Government of Canada wants it to. The Armed Forces follows orders and takes its policy direction from our elected officials. There’s no pro-American conspiracy here: the military will shift if and when it is told to, personal attitudes notwithstanding. In fact, we just did exactly this when Ottawa ordered our personnel serving with the Americans to have nothing to do with the US attack on Iran.

If you’re looking for a sea change in the CAF’s stance towards the US, it will not come from the people in uniform. Instead, it has to come from our elected officials, and those officials are attempting to walk a tightrope wherein they maintain a viable continental defence relationship with the US (because we have to) while pivoting our relationship to reduce our dependence and increase sovereignty. These are political decisions, and in a democracy, militaries respond to political direction. My gut feeling is that the CAF writ large gets it, despite memories of good times in Colorado Springs.

I’ve withheld comment as the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran has progressed. Military situations are, by their very nature, fluid and often take on a life of their own. Sometimes, it is best to wait and see.

So I waited. I waited to be proven wrong.

After all, I have been highly critical of U.S. actions against Iran, both those of last summer and the current round of devastating attacks. As I saw it — and as I argued in my March 3 article — the United States pursued a war of choice without coherent objectives and without any serious regard for consequences. Sadly, my assessment has proven accurate. Indeed, I am tempted to conclude that Trump attacked Iran in part to demonstrate American military power to the rest of the world: a warning to friends and adversaries alike, a display of supposed American omnipotence and hegemony. Trump the fearless leader. Trump the strongman.

After more than two weeks, it has become obvious that the United States unleashed a war on Iran without any meaningful strategic thought. To be sure, the U.S. military, once given the order, would have planned its part of the campaign in minute detail. The United States has an unequalled ability to deploy overwhelming air power anywhere on the planet. No nation, least of all a massively degraded Iran, has the capacity to withstand an all-out aerial assault by the U.S. armed forces. Even here, however, there is evidence that the American targeting process may have been flawed, relying on out-of-date information and, unbelievably, AI-driven analysis. Further, we have yet to see the full consequences of Pete Hegseth’s “rules of engagement are for losers” attitude; there has still been remarkably little reporting describing the real effects of the U.S. assault.

What we have seen are dramatic consequences throughout the region, most of which should have been easily anticipated by the Trump administration. After all, this region has been the subject of study, war-gaming, and contingency planning for decades. We can be fairly certain that military planners identified and warned of many of these risks as the attack on Iran was being contemplated. We can also be fairly certain that Donald Trump, a man not known for depth of thought, either ignored or dismissed any discussion of second- and third-order effects.

The Resilience of the Iranian Regime

The United States armed forces are, by a considerable measure, the most powerful on the planet. It should come as no surprise, then, that Iranian conventional military resistance to the American-Israeli onslaught was entirely ineffective — if it was attempted at all. This has created the illusion, enthusiastically embraced by Trump, that victory was almost immediate and total.

The reality, of course, is quite different.

As decades of U.S. intelligence, country studies, and experience should have told any serious policymaker, Iran has prepared for this conflict for years. So while the Americans release dazzling video of airstrikes against forty-year-old fighter aircraft and undefended targets, Iran is displaying dozens of drones in underground facilities and continues to launch attacks with both drones and ballistic missiles across the region. There are signs that the Iranian regime has recovered from the initial shock of the decapitation strikes and that the current government, under the leadership of a younger Ayatollah Khamenei, may prove even more entrenched and radical than the one the United States believed it had shattered.

All of this should have been foreseen. The United States has more than ample intelligence resources and some of the world’s foremost experts on the region. It also has access to Iranian opposition figures and Israeli intelligence sources inside Iran itself. But none of that matters when professional information and analysis are belittled or ignored because they do not match the political leadership’s preconceived notions. Donald Trump is infamous for his inattention to briefings and his contempt for professionals. This war bears all the hallmarks of that contempt.

The Strait of Hormuz

Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the bottleneck between the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf through which a significant share of the world’s oil traffic flows. For many years, Iran’s ability to wreak havoc in the Strait with mines, missiles, small boats, and drones has been obvious to anyone with even a passing knowledge of the region. Indeed, Western navies, including that of the United States, have kept minesweeping and other forces in the region for precisely this eventuality.

So what happened?

The Trump administration obviously ignored this threat as a likely consequence of any attack on Iran. Indeed, the U.S. Navy had pulled its only dedicated minesweeping vessels from the Gulf and, literally a week before Trump began threatening and cajoling over the Strait, withdrew them from service. The last remaining mine-countermeasures capability, in the form of Littoral Combat Ships, was reportedly in Malaysia.

The conclusion is obvious. Trump — and it is all on Trump — either ignored this threat entirely or assumed that American military prowess was so overwhelming that Iran would not dare respond in any meaningful way. But the enemy always gets a vote, and Iran has been preparing for this eventuality for decades. Moreover, it does not take much to close the Strait. A drone attack, a couple of mine strikes, or the mere presence of small fast attack craft can be enough for insurers to pull coverage and owners to deny sailing authorisation. After all, who wants to sail a 100,000-ton bomb into a war zone?

The American response has been bizarre. First, Trump offered to underwrite insurance policies. When that did not work, administration officials accused shipping owners of being “too chicken” to sail through the Strait. Finally, when that bit of diplomacy failed as well, Trump demanded that NATO and other allies — including, by name, the Chinese — help reopen the Strait by providing naval vessels and, by extension, entering the war. Many of those navies, after all, have retained mine-countermeasures capabilities greater than those possessed by the much-vaunted U.S. Navy. When this failed to attract commitments, Trump resorted to bluster and threats in an attempt to bring allies on board. At the time of writing, the answer remains a resounding no, and the Strait remains effectively closed.

Hezbollah and Lebanon

Another reaction that certainly should have been anticipated — and that has made the war significantly more dangerous — was that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah, a staunch Iranian ally and client and a rabid foe of Israel, has launched retaliatory attacks on Israel before. It was entirely foreseeable that it would do so now.

After all, the United States launched its attack openly in conjunction with Israel as an ally and partner. In other words, Israel participated in this war as a full operational partner of the United States, sharing planning and intelligence, airspace deconfliction, mutual support, and targeting. That immediately drew Hezbollah into the conflict, with its usual response of rocket and mortar attacks on Israel proper.

Israel responded with attacks on Hezbollah and, it appears, preparations for a major ground incursion into Lebanon. As recently as two days ago, five full Israeli divisions were reportedly earmarked for an invasion, which would make it the largest Israeli action in the country since 1982. Israel certainly anticipated this, and one is left with the strong suspicion that the Netanyahu government may seek to leverage this moment to “deal with” Hezbollah once and for all. If so, it is an extraordinarily dangerous strategy, one that risks drawing Israel into a protracted quagmire in southern Lebanon, with catastrophic consequences for the civilian population.

The Gulf States

I cannot help but think that Trump is disappointed by the reaction of the Gulf states to his war. None has offered to participate, despite ongoing attacks on oil infrastructure and other civilian targets. Instead, most appear to have adopted a defensive, wait-and-see posture: engaging Iranian missiles and drones when attacked, but undertaking no offensive action.

Unfortunately, several Gulf states — Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar among them — host significant American military facilities, making them targets whether their governments like it or not. Making matters worse is Iran’s announcement today, March 18, that it would target “U.S.-associated” oil infrastructure and warn workers to flee. Most will not, but some will. Again, this is the sort of consequence that could and should have been anticipated, but apparently was not.

Allies — and the Kurds

If the Gulf states are ambivalent about American intentions and wary of participation in the conflict, the same is true of America’s traditional allies. The war began with Pete Hegseth mocking American allies for following rules of engagement, a statement quickly followed by Trump claiming that the UK wanted to participate but that it was “too late”, only to backtrack a few days later as the situation in the Strait became clear.

Trump has burned his bridges with America’s allies. Most, including Canada, regard the U.S.-Israeli attacks as unprovoked and illegal under international law, no matter how odious the Iranian regime may be. As discussed in my last piece, U.S. justifications for the attacks have been all over the map; few are supported by facts or concrete intelligence. Many analysts assess that Iran was nowhere near possessing a nuclear weapon when the United States struck. Indeed, Joe Kent, a rabid MAGA supporter and Trump appointee as head of the National Counterterrorism Center, resigned in a blaze of controversy on March 17, stating bluntly that Iran did not pose an imminent threat to the United States. As a Trump true believer, he went on to suggest that the President had been manipulated by the Israelis and had fallen for a disinformation campaign. I am not certain that this latter claim is true — and it may simply reflect Kent’s far-right worldview — but it is not a point that can be casually dismissed.

As it stands, given the blinding incompetence with which this war has been conducted at the strategic level and the resulting lack of confidence in Washington’s willingness to consider second- and third-order effects, there is virtually no scenario in which America’s allies would agree to full participation in the conflict. In fact, public opinion — already vehemently opposed to Trump and his policies — would not permit participation even if governments wanted it. The United States has completely destroyed its credibility with its core allies, something that will take years, if not decades, to recover.

Another American ally has also recoiled from Trump’s efforts to involve it in the conflict: the Kurds. Somewhere in Washington, someone had the bright idea that the Kurds — a people spread across northern Iraq, Turkey, and the western border regions of Iran, and long committed to the pursuit of their own independence — might wish to invade Iran and help destabilise the regime. What the Kurds would receive in return is, to put it mildly, unclear. While the Kurds proved to be a valuable ally against the Islamic State, they quickly disavowed any intention of engaging Iran militarily. The level of stupidity here is staggering. Kurdish aspirations are viewed with deep suspicion by NATO ally Turkey, and any move to increase Kurdish military capability would be profoundly destabilising in a region already plagued by conflicting and overlapping interests.

The U.S. Armed Forces

The consequences of Trump’s Iran war for the U.S. armed forces are more difficult to quantify. As I have repeatedly stated, the U.S. military is easily the most powerful on the planet. In an air campaign against a country like Iran, it can operate virtually unopposed and with very little risk — something sure to appeal to a risk-averse Trump. But even the United States is not omnipotent.

Trump has insisted on a level of bombing and missile attack that has likely not been seen since the Vietnam War. Virtually all of Iran’s military and civilian infrastructure has been targeted, the latter in violation of international law. This has required an unprecedented operational tempo and expenditure of munitions, with all that implies. For instance, the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group has been on continuous operations since last fall. It moved from NATO operations in the Mediterranean to the Caribbean for operations against Venezuela, and then back across the Atlantic to the Middle East for operations against Iran. Last week, it experienced a major and reportedly very destructive fire. Crews will be exhausted. Machinery will break down.

Beyond that, there have been reports that the United States is expending high-end munitions such as Patriot air-defence missiles and Tomahawk land-attack missiles at a far greater rate than they can be replaced. While the United States can revert to so-called dumb bombs in the relatively permissive skies over Iran, the same does not hold against a near-peer adversary such as China. In addition, the U.S. Army continues to employ high-value munitions against low-value threats. Using a $4 million Patriot missile to shoot down a drone that may cost less than $50,000 is not exactly a model of efficiency. This situation is made even more absurd by reports that the United States turned down offers by Ukraine — a country with extensive recent experience — to assist with anti-drone training and equipment last year. Hubris is not a force multiplier.

Further, reports are now emerging that even the much-vaunted American technological edge may not be as useful as advertised. There is some evidence that targeting, which resulted in the disastrous attack on an Iranian girls’ school, was carried out using old data with AI input. That is sheer laziness compounded by an unprecedented operational tempo. There is also evidence that Patriot is proving only partially effective. Yesterday, March 17, reports out of the UAE suggested that Patriot had missed four out of four incoming threats. That would represent a significant shift for a system advertised as virtually infallible. And this is before we mention the reported loss of four U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles to a single Kuwaiti fighter pilot flying a legacy F-18 Hornet.

Aside from equipment failures and losses, we have little sense of the full human cost. Casualties inside Iran have proven difficult to determine, but given the sheer scale of the U.S.-Israeli attacks and the enormous array of targets, the number is certain to be very high. The United States appears to have reduced its concern for so-called collateral damage, something that can only increase civilian casualties. There are also civilian casualties in Israel from Iranian and Hezbollah retaliation and, almost certainly, dead and injured in Lebanon from Israeli responses.

American casualties are easier to quantify, but even here transparency has been limited. We know that six U.S. service members have been killed in drone and rocket attacks on American installations and that another six were killed in an accident involving aerial refuelling tankers. Reports also suggest that more than 200 military personnel have been injured, a figure not yet confirmed by the Pentagon. American bases throughout the region remain highly vulnerable to drone and missile attack. Al Udeid in Qatar is a good example: a sprawling, high-value installation defended by expensive — and potentially ineffective — missile systems.

Consequences

We have yet to see all of the consequences of Trump’s war against Iran. Despite the destabilising and odious nature of the Iranian regime, there was nothing to suggest that the geopolitical situation had changed enough, or that the threat level had increased sufficiently, to warrant a pre-emptive attack. This was, in every meaningful sense, a war of choice.

It is also a war that, as a military professional, I find jaw-droppingly stupid.

The Trump administration is consumed by hubris and exceptionalism, and this is reflected in the astonishingly poor level of strategic planning behind the war. The conflict has no obvious objectives beyond what Pete Hegseth has effectively described as “punching Iran while it’s down”, and it has no discernible end state. Objectively, while the American attack has succeeded tactically — which it was always likely to do — it has failed strategically. That failure stems from an inability, or unwillingness, to anticipate and plan for obvious consequences. Every single effect described above would have emerged in even the most elementary planning session. Yet either that planning was not done, or it was ignored.

What we are left with is Donald Trump’s intuition, vanity, and prejudice. He is notoriously unable to anticipate the consequences of his actions, and in this case that defect has produced a totally unnecessary war with hundreds, if not thousands, dead and injured. This is a war driven by Trump’s ego and planned and executed — at the strategic level, at least — by some of the worst people the U.S. political system can produce. Trump appears to view it as spectacle, a grotesque display of power. Pete Hegseth, for his part, seems almost gleeful in his embrace of violence and destruction.

And the worst part? The United States is so large and influential that it will not suffer immediate consequences for this gigantic mess. Instead, Trump will be hypnotised by the prowess of his military and may easily turn his attention to another opponent once he grows bored with Iran. He is already talking about how it would be his “honour” to take Cuba. Or will it be Greenland? Or Panama? Or Canada?

But while there may be no immediate consequences, the long-term damage is already done. Allies have been deeply alienated. U.S. policy has been exposed as irrational, incoherent, and cruel; hubris has become its animating principle, and the United States is increasingly being grouped with China and Russia as a destabilising bully. A future Democratic administration, perhaps backed by a Democratic Congress, may attempt to repair some of this damage, but I fear we are already past the point of no return. The United States may retain its power, but its moral authority and its claim to lead the free world are gone.

Thankfully, Canada and other democracies are beginning to realize it.

Western militaries all have a “way of war” and many articulate this in a series of national philosophical points that are unique to each country. Canada has ten of these points, all of which are taught across Canadian professional military education and shape planning, doctrine, and tactics and pervade everything the Armed Forces do.

A list is beyond the scope of this piece, but there is one master concept from which all others was are derived:

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

Every military operation must have a clearly defined and attainable aim. Without a clear aim, military success becomes tactically impressive but strategically meaningless.

Why do I bring this up now? Because as I write, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, is engaged in a massive attack on Iran with tenuous justification and wildly shifting aims. I addressed the background to this conflict in an article last year after the first round of US/Israeli attacks. You can read it here:

Not much has changed since last June. Donald Trump claimed at the time that the Iranian nuclear program had been “obliterated”, a claim that still appears on the White House website. Indeed, both Trump and Hegseth were highly critical of anyone who contradicted this claim, and the operation was described by the Americans as “textbook”, as it was in many ways.

What the first round of attacks demonstrated was that there was - and is - massive technological superiority of the US over Iran. American and Israeli aircraft operated in Iranian airspace with impunity and struck targets with near-impunity. At the time, we were assured that Iran’s capabilities had been so severely degraded that they no longer posed a meaningful regional threat and that any idea of a nuclear weapon was shattered. Never mind that the justification for the first round of attacks was wafer-thin or that they were likely a violation of international law.

So what’s changed since last summer to justify a new, much more extensive attack? The Iranian regime has engaged in severe repression, including mass arrests and reported lethal force against protesters, though exact casualty figures remain contested. But little else has changed. Iran is still a major destabilizing player in the Middle East and a supporter of terrorism, as it has been for 40 years. Iran continues to supply Russia with drones and other weapons with which it presses massive attacks against Ukraine. But all of this has been happening for years. What has changed to justify US attacks now? Very, very little.

By most public intelligence assessments, Iran was not on the verge of an immediate nuclear breakout. Indeed, the US was engaged in talks with Iran to further reduce this threat - despite Trump’s prior insistence that it had been “obliterated”; however, there is growing reporting suggesting that diplomatic channels remained active up to the final days before the strikes, including mediation efforts by Oman. Since then, in various public statements, Trump and senior officials have offered multiple rationales for this latest military action, including:

• To destroy the Iranian nuclear program

• To support the Iranian opposition and force regime change

• To decapitate the Iranian leadership

• To retaliate for the deaths of “thousands” of Americans

• To destroy a (theoretical) Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program

• To stop Iranian sponsorship of terrorism and to reply to Iran’s (completely unproven) attempts to assassinate Trump

• To prevent an Iranian first strike

• To respond to Iran’s using “games, tricks, and stall tactics” in the recent (sham) negotiations

Most of these justifications have come from Trump himself and don’t exactly inspire confidence in American decision-making. In fact, the United States seems to have little idea of what the end-state will be. Trump has said something along the lines that he wants to see a solution somewhat akin to what he “imposed” in Venezuela, where U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, while the broader state apparatus continued under remaining regime figures — a dramatic decapitation-style action that removed the head of state without dismantling the underlying regime.

Complicating this is the apparently broad and aggressive targeting pattern of the US/Israeli attacks. Trump himself stated yesterday (2 March) that they had killed several senior figures who might have played roles in succession to recently dead Ayatollah Khamenei. Regime change, if that was the objective, has been made immensely more complex. Militaries like their direction to be clear and unambiguous, with firm objectives and an obvious, attainable endstate. This operation appears to have neither.

Instead, we appear to have a war of choice being prosecuted for no obvious reason. Trump desperately wants to look strong and decisive and it’s hard not to believe that much of this is driven by his immense ego. Trump has a tendency to listen to the last people who have spoken to him and there is reporting suggesting that Israel and Saudi Arabia strongly encouraged decisive U.S. action. Both of these countries have aims of their own, aims that are not necessarily altruistic or compatible with those of the United States.

Regardless, this operation has obviously violated the core principle of military operations that I mentioned at the outset: there appears to have been no clearly articulated, consistent end-state, nor an obvious means of sustaining one. US policy has been amateurish and incoherent, driven almost entirely by Trump and his personality.

This brings me to a couple of last points.

Trump is notoriously unable to see the consequences of his actions. Planners call these “second and third order effects” and the military planning process has a whole system designed to anticipate these. It is unclear whether the administration fully accounted for the likely Iranian response, one that has destabilized the entire region. The US is expending munitions at a high rate, with some analysts warning that certain interceptor and precision-munition stocks could come under strain if the exchange continues (Trump vehemently denied this today). The entire region is under a State Department evacuation warning, despite airports being closed throughout the Middle East. Iran has launched drone and missile attacks on American facilities and on those countries hosting them. Dubai has been shaken by blasts and regional aviation hubs have faced significant disruption. The U.S. Embassy complex in Riyadh was reportedly struck and caught fire. There have been casualties in Israel and in Lebanon, and Hezbollah has signaled heightened military readiness and support for Iran. There have been American casualties too, including — unbelievably — the loss of three U.S. F-15 fighter jets in a friendly-fire incident.

All of this — every last point — could and should have been anticipated. The US has extensive experience in the region and military planners reportedly warned Trump before the attacks were launched. He went ahead anyway, regardless of consequences. The resulting deaths, destruction, and instability are all on him. The person who should have warned Trump and properly communicated the military’s reservations is the Secretary of Defense (er, “War”), Pete Hegseth.

Regular readers will know that I have nothing but contempt for this walking caricature. Soon after the attacks launched, he gave a news conference minimizing US casualties, crowing about the American “success” and bragging that — unlike America’s “traditional allies” — Israel wasn’t restrained by any pesky rules of engagement and neither would the US armed forces. The whole press conference was an exercise in hubris and idiocy.

But that’s where we’re at, three days into Operation “EPIC FURY”. There are dead and injured both in Iran itself and in other countries across the region, no articulated objectives, wildly shifting justification, massive instability throughout the Middle East, and yet more consequences to come. Is it likely to expand? Possibly, but Trump — in my opinion — is highly unlikely to undertake land operations. He prefers low-risk, high-technology solutions that make the US — and by extension himself — look omnipotent and powerful. However, airpower alone has rarely achieved durable political outcomes without complementary political or ground leverage, and the Iranian regime may prove much more resilient than the Americans anticipate, especially if they obtain the assistance of Russia and China.

This was entirely a war of choice for Trump — an operation that many lawmakers and legal scholars argue violates U.S. war powers statutes and international law. The consequences are his alone to bear.

That being said, there have been some seismic events since my last piece. Internationally, Trump has continued with his threats against Canada, there have been a number of developments on the Canadian military front, and the international situation remains grave. With this in mind, I thought it might be useful to provide a bit of synopsis by way of commenting, with a view to expanding upon some issues in the future.

Trump and Iran

At the time of writing, the Winter Olympics have ended, and Donald Trump is continuing his military build-up in the Middle East, aimed at Iran. Frankly, despite weeks of signaling, Trump’s objectives and strategy remain, as usual, unclear. The build-up is massive, consisting of two carrier strike groups, a large number of Tomahawk missile-equipped vessels, and land-based combat aircraft at a number of locations near Iran, including Al-Udeid in Qatar. Trump promised the Iranian opposition that “help is coming” weeks ago, during the widespread anti-regime protests, but the moment appears to have passed — at least for now.

As we saw in Venezuela, we could be entering a period of prolonged waiting, with forces at very high readiness, while Trump makes up his mind. Based on past behaviour, we can reasonably expect two things: Trump will likely select the lowest-risk option available, and it will consist primarily of airstrikes. What purpose this will serve is, well, beyond me. Airstrikes alone are unlikely to force regime change and, unless targeting is extremely careful, risk alienating those Trump claims to be assisting. If the target is the Iranian nuclear program, was that not “eliminated” by Trump’s attacks last year (it wasn’t)?

Trump supporters are already mystified that Iran hasn’t “capitulated,” reasoning that the mere presence of overwhelming US force should be sufficient to bend Tehran to Washington’s will. As usual, this is wishful thinking. The mullahs’ regime is completely invested in retaining power and would be more likely to burn it all to the ground rather than render tribute to Trump. After all, they have no issues with slaughtering thousands of Iranian citizens; what would make a futile war with the US any different? Moreover, and this is important, Trump hasn’t exactly articulated what the conditions for an Iranian capitulation would look like.

As it is, an American attack on Iran, perhaps in conjunction with Israel, would likely be viewed by many as a violation of international law, no matter how odious the Iranian regime is. Airstrikes would be yet another example of what appears to be the real “Trump doctrine” — that the world is to be run by the most powerful and that the United States gets to dictate policy and act in its own self-interest. Current trends suggest escalation remains likely. There is little evidence of consideration for second- or third-order consequences. So, let the aircraft and TLAMs fly, consequences be damned; Trump will be on to the next thing in a month or so.

Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy

Last week, the Canadian government announced a new defence industrial strategy aimed at increasing sovereign Canadian defence production capacity and the amount of Canadian equipment procured by the Armed Forces. I won’t have too much to say on this for now. It is too early to tell what the strategy will actually translate into and reality has a tendency to intrude. That being said, the objectives are laudable and probably achievable. I would introduce two major notes of caution at this stage.

There is a horrible tendency for governments of all stripes to sacrifice operational capability for regional economic gain. Repeatedly, the Armed Forces have had to settle for sub-par equipment simply because it could be built in this or that MP’s riding. Anyone who has watched Canadian procurement for more than a few years will recognize the pattern. While I agree that economic considerations are important, this type of behaviour cannot continue if we are to rebuild the military.

Secondly, Canada has a horrible track record in attempting to develop and field equipment independently. Examples abound of extended development periods, massive cost overruns, political interference, reliance on mythical “overseas markets” to bankroll projects, and the like. It is much better if we crawl before we try to walk. That means concentrating on proven Canadian-built capabilities and, just as importantly, seeking foreign partners with whom we can either share licence-built equipment or development risks. If we plunge headlong into developing major military equipment independently, the risks to the Armed Forces’ operational readiness and to the taxpayers’ wallets are huge.

Army Restructure

As some readers may know, the Army is at the beginning of a major restructuring plan designed to improve operational readiness and, eventually, to give Canada a fully deployable division capable of major combat operations. This is the initiative of Lieutenant-General Mike Wright, the Army Commander — a pretty smart cookie with a reputation for pragmatic thinking. Moreover, this time the plan is backed by major equipment initiatives that are actually programmed and funded — for the first time since I became affiliated with the Army many years ago.

There are issues, though, and I plan to address these in a forthcoming article. This has proven somewhat difficult to write, especially as I attempt to translate technical jargon into something more relatable. Watch and shoot, as we used to say.

Trump Sails into Greenland

Finally, Trump is up to his usual antics. MAGA has reacted to the US men’s hockey team winning Olympic gold with more distasteful (and incredibly juvenile) attacks on Canada. “Loser Canada Loses” read a Fox News chyron after the women’s hockey final loss, and Trump has posted AI video of himself as a hockey player assaulting a Canadian. The US team itself hasn’t been much better, and I mention this only because it reflects a bigger issue: the rift between Canada and the United States will take a generation to repair, no matter how much Maple MAGA and some business leaders try to wish it away. I may not be a “typical Canadian,” but my respect for and confidence in the US is absolutely gone.

The best illustration of the new American attitude occurred in a farcical episode earlier this week. Trump announced on his pet social media platform that a US Navy hospital ship was to sail to Greenland to administer aid to infirm and ill Greenlanders — as soon as possible. Never mind that Greenland has universal healthcare or that the Americans would arrive entirely uninvited; what Trump says — no matter how bizarre — is expected to be translated into action. Unfortunately for the President, both Navy hospital ships are laid up in extended repairs and cannot deploy.

Taken together, these developments suggest we are entering a period in which Canadian strategic assumptions will be tested more severely than at any point in recent memory. That is where I intend to focus next.

Watch and shoot.

Regular readers will remember that I am a veteran of America’s war in Afghanistan. I deployed twice, once (early in the war) embedded with the Americans themselves. Moreover, I was a senior planner and staff officer throughout Canada’s entire involvement in the war – from beginning to end. I’ve said elsewhere that this involved all aspects of the operational side of our mission: training, manning, deployment, sustainment, and – alas – next-of-kin notifications and initial management of casualties originating from Western Canada.

My staff was heroic. We received casualty calls at all hours. My wife grew to hate my BlackBerry and, at one point, smashed it; I was fielding calls from the delivery room when my daughter was born. At one point, my staff branch was 28% manned. Three senior NCOs left with heart issues. I suffered heart issues myself and was hospitalized, adding to my other injuries. Yet, as I wrote about last year, failure wasn’t something that could be tolerated, and we kept on working sometimes 18–20 hours a day, every day.

Things came close to unravelling, and Afghanistan nearly broke the Canadian Army. This chart may help illustrate why. It’s different from most you may have seen, as it depicts the burden on each nation’s army, not on the general population. The burden was very, very high – almost unmanageable.

Afghanistan became the entire focus for Canada’s little Army, to the exclusion of almost everything else. As an indicator, Ottawa will tell you that some 40,000 soldiers served in Afghanistan throughout the duration of the mission. But this figure is misleading. It doesn’t account for those soldiers, including your humble author, who served multiple tours. Indeed, most Army personnel serving through the duration of our Afghan mission served multiple tours. I know soldiers with five tours. The effect of such a pace on families, mental and physical health, and careers can only be imagined.

All of this was done in support of the United States and in furtherance of its aims. Afghanistan was an American show from beginning to end, with Canada playing a supporting role and bearing the consequences of American decisions, including their disastrous counterinsurgency strategy. We were there from the very beginning and suffered our first casualties at the hands of overeager and overconfident US Air Force pilots. Later, we commanded in Kabul and then, at NATO (i.e., American) request, assumed the lead in Kandahar Province – the hotbed of Taliban resistance. Coincidentally, this coincided with the US surge into Iraq, and Canada was left conducting brigade-level combat operations with a single battlegroup virtually alone. And we carried on in combat and training roles up to the end of the ISAF mission in 2014. Twelve years spent supporting the United States and American objectives in its so-called “Global War on Terror.”

And what did we get? I described the lack of gratitude and the belittling attitude I encountered while deployed in my essay “My Drift Into Quiet Anti-Americanism” (here). But afterwards, Canada – and the rest of the Allies – were forgotten and written out of the American history of the conflict. Two years after the end of our involvement in the Afghan War, Trump was elected and the insults and threats began.

These were tempered during his first term by staff who acted as a restraint on his worst impulses. Now, during his second term, he is totally unencumbered and is actively encouraged by the absolute worst US society has to offer. This has been translated into threats of tariffs and annexation, and into name-calling and childish insults. Trump was unbalanced in 2016; he is almost certainly mentally ill now.

So I take it personally when Trump insults NATO allies or, as he did a few days ago in Davos, openly insults our contributions to their wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. MAGA commentators tee-hee about an invasion of Greenland and openly mock Canada’s military capacity. American legislators threaten us. Members of the US Cabinet openly support Alberta separatists who, in turn, hint at American support. For someone like me, it’s hard not to have an emotional reaction both to the insults and to those Canadians who still cannot bring themselves to think of the US as an adversary or – worse – who want to bring Trumpism to Canada.

We are at an inflection point. The scales need to drop from the eyes of those Canadians who think “Trump Derangement Syndrome” is a real thing or who desperately want business as usual. We need emotional responses right now. Trumpism, in all its odious forms, is a grave national security threat, and we need to treat it as one.

And Trump himself? As I was completing this piece, he called our Prime Minister “Governor” again and threatened us with 100% tariffs because of a trade deal with China. He also, likely in a desperate effort to salvage King Charles’ visit in April and Prince William’s attendance at the football World Cup, lavished praise on the British for their contributions to America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not a word was said about anyone else.

He, and the United States, can go to hell. And yes, that’s my emotions speaking – and I’m through apologizing.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in his threats to annex Greenland and assume sovereignty from Denmark, by force if necessary. Like many other notions or public utterances, the idea of the United States “owning” Greenland has been on Trump’s mind for some time. There is little indication of what put the idea in his head or the original rationale. It may be – or indeed is likely – that the concept is based solely on dominance and ego, with Trump looking at a map, seeing a large sparsely populated island on the North American continent and deciding that it would look better as US property. It shouldn’t be lost on readers that this could easily be the reason behind his desire to annex Canada.

Admittedly, direct evidence for this is sparse. However, we can make some inferences from what Trump has said his reasoning is, and how that reasoning doesn’t stand up to even casual scrutiny. Essentially, Trump has stated that the United States needs Greenland for defence purposes, that Denmark has neglected Greenland’s defences, and that there is an ongoing threat from Chinese and Russian ships and submarines.

None of this is true.

The American presence in Greenland is governed by a 1951 treaty with Denmark. This agreement gives the US almost blanket authority to establish whatever defence installations it sees fit anywhere in the protectorate. At one time, during the Cold War, the US had some 15,000 personnel stationed across Greenland, manning airbases, radar installations, and research facilities. American cuts have reduced this to some 150 US Space Force personnel manning the ballistic missile warning system facility at Pituffik (formerly Thule). There are no longer any flying units at this base and the US maintains no combat units in Greenland.

It’s important to note that the 1951 agreement does not commit Denmark to defending Greenland on its own. Indeed, the essence of the treaty is that defence is largely left to the United States. Surely if there was an immediate threat, the first thing the US would do would be to increase its presence. This would be a routine and uncontroversial thing to do. Yet that has not happened — because there has been no increase in either the Russian or Chinese threat. Their ships are not “circling” Greenland as Trump would have us believe. There is no threat of invasion. There’s been no sudden uptick in overflights or testing of air defence zones.

And we would know. The so-called Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap is intensely monitored by NATO. Canada maintains surveillance of its own over the Western Atlantic. Commercial ship trackers are available to the public, as are flight trackers. None of these have shown an increase in hostile activity. Moreover, Denmark, in response to US threats and accusations, has dramatically increased its spending for Greenland’s defence and has procured new platforms specifically for that mission.

In other words, Trump is lying about his reasons for wanting Greenland under the US thumb. He can have everything he wants simply by asking, yet that doesn’t seem good enough.

Many commentators have attempted to rationalize Trump’s designs on the Danish territory. We’re to believe that it’s about rare minerals or a grand strategy to control the Arctic. Trump hasn’t mentioned these himself and he’s not exactly known for keeping his thoughts close to the vest. He’s also not known for strategic thinking. Greenland’s mineral potential is largely unsurveyed and much of it still lies under the ice shelf, despite the encroachment of global warming. Moreover, Denmark and Greenland have hardly hindered attempts to explore for any potential mineral wealth; yet again, Trump can get what he wants simply by asking.

There are, of course, other strategic reasons that may drive Trump’s desire to own Greenland: domination of the Arctic. Possession of Greenland may go some way towards achieving this goal – if it is a goal at all. So far, there is no real evidence that Trump has thought this deeply. Northern Greenland is dominated by a massive ice shelf and is largely inaccessible. The landmass is too distant from the Northwest Passage to exert much influence, and Greenland does not possess the population or infrastructure to support a large-scale military presence without the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars.

We’re left with an uncomfortable truth. Trump wants Greenland because it is another means of displaying American dominance, because it demonstrates his vision of a world in which the great powers rule over “spheres of influence”, and because his ego and hubris have decided that he – personally – deserves it. This worldview is incompatible with NATO by definition, not just in practice. There is no grand strategy; this is Trump having an idea and now trying to follow through on it. In Trump’s new world, might makes right, allies are expendable, and every move is a transaction. If Greenland can’t be bought, it’ll be taken simply because the United States can.

The danger is very real, perhaps acute. Trump has been emboldened by his “victory” in Venezuela and has demonstrated increasing disdain for multilateralism and for international norms. This especially extends to Europe for some reason and he may view his Greenland gambit as an easy way to discredit both the European Union and NATO. He may be making a grave error. The language coming out of Denmark and the EU (and, somewhat later, Canada) has become increasingly firm and tolerance for American threats is vanishing quickly. There are now reports via the Daily Telegraph that the EU is considering drastic sanctions should the US launch a military incursion into Greenland, including bans on US tech firms and the eviction of US military installations.

Further, Denmark has stated that a military operation against Greenland would destroy NATO, a point which is undoubtedly true. It’s easy to anticipate NATO being reconstituted as an organization without American participation.

This leaves Canada in an incredibly difficult position. Canadians will, by a large majority, expect the country to stand with Denmark. Indeed, Ottawa was uncharacteristically clear in denouncing US threats and reiterating Greenland’s right to self-determination. Should the US persist with the unthinkable, Canada’s situation will become much more complex. It is virtually impossible for Canada to pivot away from the US to the extent required in the time available. Moreover, our defence system is completely intertwined with that of the United States through NORAD. As I’ve maintained for some time, NORAD exists primarily to defend the US and no American government would take a Canadian withdrawal lightly.

It is difficult to predict how this will play out. Canada is likely to try to walk a tightrope, adopting increasingly pro-Denmark and NATO positions publicly and diplomatically while trying to keep economic and defence relations with the US on an even keel. This will not sit well with the still vocal minority that either supports Trump or cannot conceive of a hostile United States. Worse, there is serious potential that the US will attempt to leverage the Alberta separation movement to destabilize Canada in combination with economic coercion. Indeed, we already see reports of separatist leaders visiting Washington, cap in hand. Even attempted US interference would have chilling effects, regardless of success.

There is one saving grace: even the US isn’t omnipotent. Trump is threatening military action across the globe and the US military is seriously stretched. It is maintaining a full Carrier Strike Group in the Caribbean, troops in Europe, threatening Iran with strikes, conducting airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, launching missiles against (somewhat suspect) targets in Nigeria, conducting a shadow campaign in Somalia, and maintaining thousands of troops in East Asia. Combine this with reports that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are uneasy with the legality of unprovoked aggression against Denmark and Greenland, and the picture isn’t as simple as some in the US would have it.

Unfortunately, Trump is a linear, simple thinker who thinks in terms of dominance and ego. If US Generals don’t go along with his plans for Greenland, he’ll undoubtedly find some who will. Forces for a Greenland operation will be dug up, likely from the Special Operations community. And Trump will have his way. But getting his way means he will destroy the international order as we’ve known it since 1945 and he will make the US into a pariah state.

The problem is that he doesn’t care.

I wrote about recent US policy towards Venezuela here (Shooting at Shadows: America’s Manufactured War in the Caribbean). At the time, and I’ve seen nothing that changes my opinion, I believed that Trump’s justifications for aggression against Caracas were invented out of whole cloth and illegal under international (and indeed criminal) law. That the Maduro regime was corrupt and dictatorial is almost beyond debate, as is Venezuela’s relationship with such global luminaries as Russia and Iran. However, I believed then, as I believe now, that there was no evidence that supported a case for regime change. Worse, I maintain that Trump and his enablers operate in a universe where style and a narrative mean more than actual substance.

Nothing in the last 24 hours has proven this view to be incorrect. The US Armed Forces attacked Venezuela and seized its president, ostensively to face criminal charges in the United States. The charges cited — including possession and conspiracy to possess a machine gun — underscore the absurdity of asserting US criminal jurisdiction over a sitting foreign head of state.

So now, the US is the dog who has caught the car. If Trump is to be believed, the United States will assume control of the Venezuelan government and will “run” Venezuela until a suitable transition to a mythical local authority can be maintained. Further, Venezuela’s oil industry is to be run by American oil companies. It’s a page right out of Putin’s playbook and an egregious example of naked aggression and an obvious violation of all international norms.

More ominously, Trump “hasn’t ruled out” placing US troops on the ground. We’ve seen this exact scenario before: the US runs roughshod over a developing country’s decrepit military, topples its authoritarian government in the name of “freedom”, finds it needs to control events on the ground so it moves troops in, and quickly loses that control because the population doesn’t want the Americans there and is very well armed. Thus, while it was easy for the US to operate in Venezuelan airspace with impunity due to the nearly non-existent capability of the Venezuelan armed forces, the situation longer term may not be as easy. In common with other dictatorships, the Maduro regime created a large “popular” militia, one armed with small arms and the like. The conditions are ideal for an insurgency should even small numbers of Venezuelans oppose a US presence.

All of this is before tackling the larger issues. Trump appears to have gone into Venezuela under his (hilariously named) “Donroe Doctrine”, whereby the US claims to have a free hand to defend its interests anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Never mind that the “threat” from Venezuela was virtually non-existent, might makes right as far as Trump is concerned. That Maduro was head of state of a sovereign country was of absolutely no consequence; extraterritoriality of US law was what mattered. The US not only withdrew from the ICC, but has criminalized cooperation with it and sanctioned its officials — making its sudden embrace of universal jurisdiction deeply cynical. By US logic, Canadian helicopters can land on the White House lawn, seize Trump and his wife, fly them to Canada, and haul them in front of a Canadian court to face some invented criminal changes. But of course, this “right” only applies to the United States.

So what next? Well, it is obvious that there was no plan for what was to happen after Maduro was deposed. The shape and form of whatever US control Trump will assert over Venezuela has yet to be seen. Are US oil companies really going to go in, seize production assets and simply take over? What will be the US military’s role? Will Trump and the US face any consequences for this profoundly illegal act? Somehow, I doubt it.

Meanwhile, the rest of the Western Hemisphere looks on nervously, wondering who will be next. Marco Rubio, the US Secretary of State, has made it quite clear that his long-time ambition of toppling the Cuban government means Cuba is next on the list. Or will it be Greenland, to which Trump recently appointed a special representative to manage a US takeover? Or will the US attempt to destabilize Canada by offering support to separatists in Alberta?

Regardless, Trump and his administration have shown that they have literally no regard for international norms or for the international community. Appeals to multilateral organizations like the UN or the Organization of American States will amount to nothing. Sanctions are impossible and the US military remains – by far – the most capable and technologically advanced on the planet. Since I started this page, I’ve been calling for Canada – and the rest of the world – to take the threat from Trump and his cronies seriously. This is why.

Frankly, I’m finding the topic exhausting as everyone and their dog is entering the discussion, usually with one message: buy the SAAB Gripen E and dump the F-35, consequences be damned. The urge to tell the Americans where to go and to tell Trump to suck eggs is almost overwhelming for some, and it’s a sentiment that I understand completely, as regular readers will know.

Regular readers will also know that I believe things are never as simple as they seem and that situations are usually much more complex than made out. This is certainly the case with the fighter replacement project, as I’ve attempted – somewhat unsuccessfully it seems – to articulate in prior articles. So, I’m going to break a rule and indulge in a Bright Idea. Military planners, and I was one for many years, hate Bright Ideas with a passion because they often arrive out of the blue in the planning cycle, disrupting thought processes and being generally annoying. The Bright Idea Fairy is a plague to planners. Nevertheless, I think that, with the repeated delays to the final fighter decision and the copious amount of misinformation and politically inspired manoeuvring, it’s time to cut to the chase and make an actual recommendation. I’ve done this in the past, but perhaps it’s time to take things a step further.

Caveats

First, my usual caveats. I was an Army senior planner, trained in Joint Operations and taught how to fuse political considerations with military necessity. I back this up with civilian post-graduate training in strategic studies and a few years of direct experience. What I am definitely not is a fighter pilot or engineer. While I can research the capabilities of aircraft and have a passing knowledge of systems and weapons, I am not an expert in the technical intricacies of this or that airplane. I cannot and will not get into the various systems unless they directly impact my analysis. I am open to correction by genuine experts anytime and it is more than possible that my arguments have serious flaws. But something has to be said.

In the end, I don’t really care what fighter aircraft Canada buys if it meets the operational requirements of the Air Force and – and this is important – the political requirements of the Government of Canada.

With all that out of the way, here we go.

Assumptions

• Canada has paid for 16 F-35s and will take delivery of those aircraft

• 16 aircraft do not have the critical mass to be an operational fighter capability

• The government will proceed with additional F-35 purchases to create a viable capability, up to the full 88 aircraft

• The United States, for operational and political reasons, will put tremendous pressure on Canada to proceed with the full F-35 purchase

• Trump will punish Canada if we do not proceed with the full purchase

• Canada wishes to pivot away from the United States towards Europe and other nations

• Canada wishes to further develop an independent defence industrial base

• Sweden has made multiple overtures to Canada to form a defence partnership and has offered very attractive packages, including co-production of the Gripen E+ aircraft in Canada and several other incentives to move away from the F-35.

• The Canadian public is placing tremendous pressure on the Government to demonstrate our independence and have seized upon the F-35 purchase as a means to do so.

• Gripen E+ can come close to matching the F-35 in some areas, but the F-35 remains a superior aircraft in most respects.

Discussion

The saga of Canada’s effort to replace the CF-18 is too long and convoluted to bear repeating here. I have covered it in previous pieces on this subject, and it has been the topic of exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that this issue has been ongoing for decades; it is time to put it to bed and get on with it.

Canada has three commitments for which it requires advanced jet fighters: the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and expeditionary and contingency operations. Of these, NORAD is arguably the most important and our commitment to it drives many of the requirements for choosing a fighter aircraft. These requirements certainly drove the selection of the F-35 for the RCAF.

NORAD. As I have argued in the past, NORAD essentially exists to defend the United States – and its nuclear deterrent in particular. Canada’s defence is certainly secondary to this objective and Canada remains a junior partner. NORAD’s role is to detect and warn and the two countries are completely integrated at the operational level. This includes tasking, communications, intelligence, and systems. Indeed, this integration is so thorough that, during the last fighter competition, both the British and French aircraft withdrew because they were unable to meet the integration requirements. The Gripen doesn’t meet some of these requirements, which is why it wasn’t the winner of the competition; this basic fact remains unchanged.

The F-35 was selected in large part because it could be fully integrated with the US Air Force. This requires systems over and above what would typically be needed for NATO operations, including a demand to access US classified data feeds and networks, along with communications systems. The Americans would be unwilling to place these systems in a foreign-built aircraft. This makes the F-35 the only real option should Canada wish to remain a fully functional part of NORAD. The alternative is to see US aircraft conducting interceptions and possible shootdowns in Canadian airspace because Canada will be locked out of the so-called “kill chain”.

Some have argued that Canada is risking being at the mercy of a US “kill switch” or some other means of disabling our aircraft should we select the F-35. I deem this to be highly unlikely. Canada is to receive the Block 4 version of the F-35, the most advanced, and it is likely to be very close – if not identical – to the version flown by the US Air Force. Why? Because, as I noted earlier, NORAD exists to defend the United States and giving Canada an inferior aircraft or one that can be disabled directly affects US defence interests. It would not make sense to shut down RCAF aircraft if those aircraft are defending the United States.

NORAD is not going away, and we are spending billions to upgrade our warning systems specifically because they’re needed for NORAD operations. The United States will look very unkindly on an aircraft that cannot be fully integrated with their operations for continental defence. This remains true whether or not Trump is in office. My conclusion is that we need the F-35 for NORAD purposes. (As an aside, this is why RCAF retired generals are so set on the F-35, not because of some conspiracy with Lockheed Martin, which does plenty of other business with Canada and is making hundreds of aircraft for the US).

NATO. The requirements for NATO are somewhat different. A NATO role requires that the aircraft be interoperable with other NATO allies. This means compatible communications and data systems along with compatible weapons. A Canadian aircraft would need Link 16 data links and a variety of electronic warfare systems to defeat an aggressor (ie: Russian) radars and aircraft. Further, the aircraft would be required to operate in both a strike and close air support role and be capable of working alongside any of our allies. Both the F-35 and Gripen can do this without modification. The idea that we need the F-35 for NATO purposes is somewhat disingenuous as the Gripen is perfectly capable of defeating a Russian adversary. Indeed, the Gripen’s ability to operate from dispersed locations and its simplicity may make it more suitable to NATO operations than the F-35 – at least in a Canadian context. Frankly, despite the fact that the F-35 is flown by many of our European allies, the Gripen may be preferable in this role.

Expeditionary and Contingency Operations. People forget that Canada routinely employs fighter aircraft for contingency purposes. We flew combat operations during Operation DESERT STORM, over Bosnia and Serbia, over Libya, and against ISIS in Iraq using the CF-18. It is prudent to plan for the continuation of such operations, with or without the Americans. In such eventualities, it is useful to have an aircraft that can operate from austere locations with a minimum of support demands. A continency fighter will still need to integrate with allies – in a manner similar to NATO operations. In these types of scenarios, full fusion with the US Air Force becomes somewhat less important, although it is still useful. This leads me to think that the Gripen is preferable in this role as well.

Quantity is a Quality All of its Own. Canada has been shrinking its fighter force for decades. During the 1950s we had an entire fighter wing based in Europe, along with a robust contribution to NORAD at home. Since then, with every purchase, our fighter force has been shrinking. Canada procured 138 CF-18s in the early 1980s and deployed two full squadrons (24 aircraft) to Qatar for Operation DESERT STORM. We cannot do this now, and the RCAF typically plans for the deployment of a “six pack” of fighters – a mere six aircraft – for contingency operations as the CF-18 fleet has continued to shrink over the last three decades. Canada is currently slated to receive 88 F-35 aircraft. Some commentators – and I am one – have argued that this is insufficient to maintain our commitment to NORAD and to NATO concurrently. After all, if a conflict breaks out with Russia in Europe, the North American continent cannot be regarded as immune from Russian attacks. I’m not even sure the RCAF is planning for this worst-case scenario.

So, with the roles out of the way, it’s likely time to address the massive amounts of disinformation, obfuscation, and contractor propaganda that have swamped the discussion of this entire issue. Let’s take them one by one.

The Americans Have a Kill Switch!

No, they don’t and the use of the phrase deliberately inflames the rhetoric surrounding the discussion. Canada is slated to get the most advanced version of the F-35. It is deliberately designed to be integrated into both the US and NATO systems. This means just in time delivery of spare parts and software common across Allied platforms. Much of this is controlled by the United States, although spares can come from any of the nations participating in F-35 production. The issue becomes with the “just in time” delivery and central warehousing of spare parts, which the US by and large controls.

Further, the US will control access to software updates. They can’t “brick” the aircraft, but they can ensure that capabilities are limited or restricted. BMW does this, much to my annoyance, with its cars. The car will still function, but it won’t be the latest version and may not perform as well.

Finally, it defies common sense to suggest that the US would simply “kill” an aircraft that is, in the end, dedicated to its own defence.

Gripen Can Land on Highways!

Yes, it can. So can an F-35 or an CF-18 for that matter. The latter did only last month during Exercise COBRA WARRIOR in Finland.

The Gripen is designed for ease of maintenance and for dispersed operations. This is because Sweden developed it while it was a neutral nation expecting to defend against a Russian attack alone. It has an entire system of road-based runways and dispersed maintenance and arming facilities throughout the country. Canada has no such system.

The argument is that this could be a useful capability in the North, but I fail to see how. Supersonic aircraft are limited to paved surfaces, of which there are few in the far north. Further, there is no cover for concealment in most locations above the treeline. This has limited Canada’s northern fighter presence to Forward Operating Locations with paved runways. This limitation holds true for the CF-18, the F-35, and the Gripen.

The warning time and standoff distance for NORAD tasks means that operation of our fighter fleet from fixed bases in the south is viable; the only way they can be attacked without warning is by missile strike and we would need warning to disperse aircraft to austere locations in any event.

Where this capability is useful is in Europe, in those countries that have developed a dispersal system with the infrastructure and equipment to support it. This is where the Gripen could have an advantage, especially if we consider deploying to defend NATO’s northern flank alongside Sweden and Finland.

Gripen Brings Jobs and We’ll Totally Revitalize our Aerospace Industry!

This is a bit harder to quantify or forecast. Canada largely abrogated its ability to produce high-end fighter aircraft in the 1970s. This was done deliberately as aircraft grew more expensive and complex and as Canada elected to shift procurement to the United States. It has been a matter of policy to select American fighter aircraft since the 1960s.

The F-35 is already in production and hundreds of aircraft have been delivered across most of Canada’s major allies. Construction of these has been spread out between the members of the original fighter development consortium, including Canada. For instance, Magellan Aerospace in Winnipeg is already producing F-35 components and roughly 6000 jobs relate to this effort.

SAAB has been making a lot of promises regarding jobs in Canada and has, more importantly, dangled the prospect of full production or assembly of the Gripen in Canada, possibly for export. At this point, it’s difficult to assess how realistic these prospects are. The Gripen E is just entering production now, with an assembly line in Brazil. Sweden should follow shortly. The relative simplicity of the Gripen lends itself well to dispersed production and Canada would have little difficulty setting up a line here. The number of jobs promised has been touted as somewhere in the neighbourhood of 11000, but this is largely vapourware, as it’s impossible to determine how much of the downstream, systems-based production would be transferred to Canadian companies.

Would Gripen put Canada back in the fighter game? Perhaps. The temptation to give it a shot is very great. We are, after all, more than capable of producing a jet fighter, we have just decided not to. But as sugarplums dance in our heads, we must remember that there are thousands of jobs already connected to the F-35 and that we risk losing those should we be too drastic.

But We Can’t Trust the Americans and Fuck Trump

This is a view that I have some sympathy for. The urge to make a dramatic gesture that vividly demonstrates our shift away from American hegemony is almost overwhelming. Indeed, I have regularly argued for just such a shift, including in defence procurement. However, in this case, the decision should be more measured and deliberate.

First, Canada will never use fighter aircraft to defend against a US invasion. I, and many others, have tried to address this fever dream – to little effect. For Canada to have the critical mass to mount even a token defence against American aggression, we would need a fighter fleet several times the size of what we’re planning. US power is so overwhelming and so out of scale that few countries on the planet can mount an effective defence. I think we need to cease this line of thinking – it gets us nowhere.

Second, Trump will be gone long before the bulk of either the Gripen or the F-35 can be delivered. Cancellation of the F-35 may send a message, but it will soon be lost as the Administration changes.

Third, the blowback from the Trump administration to cancellation of the F-35 could be considerable. Even the most benign of US administrations would be pushing Canada extremely hard to stay the course and proceed with the full contract. The US regards the F-35 as being critical to NORAD and thus to its own defence. Further, we must remember that Canada has bought and paid for 16 F-35s already. These aircraft are under contract and are coming unless Canada completely shuts it down and defaults. We are extremely unlikely to do so, as the rupture with the Americans would be considerable and extend across the US government, no matter who is in power.

The Gripen is a Better Aircraft!

Objectively, it is not. The F-35 won the original fighter competition against the Gripen by a considerable margin. That’s not to say that the Gripen E isn’t a fine aircraft. It is. However, it is a 4 or 4.5 generation fighter without stealth capability, without some of the weapons available to the F-35, and without some of the networked capability and classified datalinks produced by the Americans. Could Canada fly the Gripen in a NORAD role? Possibly – if we’re talking about the Gripen E. What we do know is that both the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale withdrew from the competition because they couldn’t meet NORAD requirements. That says something.

Frankly, there’s a reason that the Gripen E is so cheap and has been exported only to a handful of countries: it is less capable. There’s nothing wrong with that at all; a less complex aircraft has many benefits. But we must be clear-headed about what we’d be getting.

Finally, the Gripen itself isn’t much more “sovereign” than the F-35. Like the F-35, it is integrated into Western production chains; the engine is American, along with avionics and other systems. It is indeed more sovereign than the F-35, but again we have to remember what we’d be getting.

So What?

Canada has dithered and wrung its hands over this purchase for decades and its time to make a decision. It is a huge buy, complicated by the fact that the RCAF has been told to expect the F-35. We have pilots training on it now, infrastructure being planned and built, and aircraft purchased. Turning this boat around is going to be difficult.

Moreover, the RCAF has very significant personnel issues and has had difficulty in producing and retaining pilots. Its system is under severe strain and the Air Force will be extremely reluctant to add to the tension by switching aircraft midstride or adding an additional fighter to the inventory, thus complicating both training and maintenance. These are the concerns that led retired air force general officers to publicly advocate for the F-35, not any self-serving connection to Lockheed Martin.

Having said all this, politics do intervene. I’m a vocal advocate of keeping politics out of defence procurement and am reluctant to insert them here. However, we must. The United States has treated Canada with distain and hostility for years now. We are attempting to pivot our economy and our security arrangements away from the US. A message must be sent and we have new allies to consider. NATO is just as important – perhaps more important – to Canada’s security than NORAD and it is critical that we demonstrate our commitment to Europe and our collective security. Buying Gripen E does just that.

A Bright Idea

I understand Canada’s dithering. There is a very large constituency in this country that believes defence is a waste and that any major purchases are unnecessary. These voices have been fairly quiet as of late, but the sentiment is still alive and well in some quarters. Making matters worse, the geopolitical situation has changed immensely, and public sentiment is hardly pro-American. The Government is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. But a decision must be made and made soon.

Barring a complete break with the US, Canada is getting the F-35, like it or not. 16 aircraft are too few to sustain a viable fleet. We must allow for training, maintenance, and attrition. This means contracting for more to create a combat-effective capability. While I have argued for a reduction in F-35 numbers, we can anticipate that Canada will contract for all 88 aircraft being planned.

So far no change. But I think we need to be bold and look beyond the F-35 to get our fighter numbers up, to address training throughput and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to NATO. With this in mind, we could:

• Contract with SAAB for (say) four squadrons of Gripen Es.

• Insist that the aircraft be built/assembled in Canada with as many Canadian-produced components as possible.

• Include provisions for export Gripens, particularly those destined for Ukraine, to be produced in Canada.

• Explore the possibility of a joint training programme with Sweden, to include ab initio training though to Gripen graduation. Indeed, we could look at splitting all flying training between Canada and Sweden.

• Station two Gripen squadrons in Europe, co-located with Swedish aircraft and under NATO operational control. These would be available for NATO Air Policing tasks and, in wartime, for direct support of the Canadian brigade in Latvia.

• Arrange, as part of the basing agreement, shared use of maintenance and spares support systems in Sweden.

• The two remaining squadrons would be held in Canada for training, for contingency expeditionary operations, for NATO reinforcement, and for surge support to NORAD.

As indicated earlier, the Gripen E is, despite the very significant improvements made over the original Gripen, somewhat inferior to the F-35. However, it is more than capable of acting in a NATO capacity, particularly if it were to serve alongside the Royal Swedish Air Force, where its positive attributes can be exploited to the full.

Maybe I’m an Idiot

Military planners hate all the above. Bright ideas interrupt the planning process, dislocate decisions already made, and are sometimes not grounded in reality. That may well be the case here – I’m just a retired old Army guy – but I honestly don’t know. What I do know is that Canada needs to make a decision and to make one soon - and commit to it. There will be political blowback no matter what that decision is and no one will be happy. The RCAF wants an all-F-35 fleet, for valid reasons. Canadian nationalists want to dump the F-35 and poke Trump in the eye. Canada’s pacifist streak will squirm at any hint of such large defence purchases, money that – in their view – could be better spent elsewhere.

But we need to be strategic and to build the pivot while acknowledging geopolitical realities. We will not fully escape being under the American umbrella but there are things we can do – now. It is time to be bold and imaginative in how Canada defends itself and our allies. Let’s get on with it.

I’m not going to throw cold water on all of this excitement. It is good that defence issues — after decades of wallowing in darkness — are finally receiving attention. Unfortunately, defence literacy in Canada is very low, so I do think it’s time for a reality check. After all, the Carney government is about to spend billions of dollars on defence, and it’s important to approach any plans from a dispassionate and realistic perspective.

Gripen

By far the most excitement surrounds Canada’s purchase of new fighter aircraft. I’ve written on this subject fairly extensively and will post links at the bottom of this piece should anyone be interested. Fundamentally, the issue is that Canada’s current fighter fleet is on its last legs, despite the significant improvements made to a number of aircraft in an effort to keep them operational. I won’t go into the background here, but Canada began the process to replace the CF-18 decades ago and we are a foundational member of the international F-35 programme. After a protracted development period, the issues with the F-35 appear to have been sorted out and it is now in widespread service.

Canada has bought this aircraft. Sixteen are paid for and are on the way in the first tranche of what is ultimately a total of eighty-eight aircraft. This, of course, is before the re-entry of Trump on the world stage and the decimation of Canada–US relations. Now, there is a move to abrogate the contract and go with a different, non-US fighter: the SAAB Gripen from Sweden. Unfortunately, there are issues with this:

• A shift will likely further delay the replacement of the CF-18.

• A fleet of sixteen F-35s is too small to be a viable capability. Sixteen jets is barely enough to keep pilots current, let alone defend anything. They bring with them all the drama caused by the F-35 — centralized spare parts, high operating costs, and a lack of control over software — with none of the benefits. We have to cater for fleet rotation, training requirements, maintenance, and attrition, and need significantly more than sixteen aircraft to do that. Ergo, we are almost certain to contract for more F-35s — if we don’t simply break the contract.

• In the frenzy over the fighters, the limitations of the Gripen are often forgotten. The F-35 is a generation ahead of the Gripen. It has full stealth capability, is fully networked with NATO systems, has superior electronics, and is in service with all of Canada’s major allies. While the Gripen does indeed offer simpler maintenance and lower costs, this — in part — reflects its lower capability. Even the Gripen’s fabled “deployability” is of limited use in the Arctic, where most airfields are gravel-based.

Today (18 Nov 25), the government began signalling that it was open to discussing the Gripen — after a huge push from Sweden, including a visit by the Swedish king. Unfortunately for defence specialists, the messaging from government isn’t based on capability or military considerations but instead is focused on industrial benefits and economic considerations. This is in keeping with PM Carney’s approach to “Canadianize” military procurement.

There will be immense US pressure to proceed with the full F-35 buy, and it is very likely — if not certain — that Trump will take it personally should Canada elect to procure something else. Moreover, for NORAD (which, in my opinion, exists almost entirely to defend the US) the F-35 is the obvious choice — and a major reason it won the competition in the first place.

With all these considerations, it’s understandable that the government has taken its time in tackling this problem. In a way, they’re damned if they do and damned if they don’t. Billions of dollars are at stake, and Canadians are in no mood to kowtow to Washington. The urge to deliver a massive snub to Trump is almost overwhelming. I understand the urge to poke Trump in the eye — believe me. But — and it’s a big but — the F-35 is a more capable aircraft by most measures, and there could be immense pressure to simply proceed with what’s been contracted.

What I hope happens is what I outline in my prior musings: that Canada sucks it up and goes with a mixed fleet, despite the myriad reasons for not doing so. I also believe we need a larger fleet and that we have an opportunity to further demonstrate our resolve to the European members of NATO. In the end, this means the F-35 for NORAD and the Gripen for everything else, including NATO tasks. It also means, in my opinion, returning to a fleet of about 140 aircraft. The cynic in me says it’ll never happen.

Submarines

There seems to be less of a frenzy surrounding the proposed procurement of submarines. I haven’t written about this project a lot because I’m hardly a naval expert. That being said, submarines are a tremendous asset to any navy and would, of course, be immensely useful. Those who follow such things will know that the Carney government has narrowed the selection for a new fleet to a German–Norwegian consortium and a South Korean bid. The South Koreans have been particularly aggressive, pitching not only submarines but a complete defence package including core Army equipment. They’re also making all kinds of deals with support agencies and for infrastructure that have people very excited.

I’m in no position to assess the merits of either bid. I’m immensely relieved at the Commander RCN’s statement that the Navy will not seek to modify or “Canadianize” any new submarines. However, I’m not confident in the RCN’s ability to operate a fleet of twelve boats — the number usually mentioned. The Navy struggles to crew the ships it already has, let alone when it’s operating fifteen new frigates, new corvettes, new replenishment ships, and the like. Moreover, submarines need dedicated support facilities and maintenance, all of which must be catered for. A fleet of six to eight is much more practical and likely, but we shall see.

Defence Increases

Much has been made of the “massive” increase in defence spending in the recent budget, and it is indeed very large. But it must be remembered that Canada has been underspending on defence for many decades. There is genuine rot that must be repaired even as we are distracted by talk of fighter aircraft and submarines. This starts with properly funding spare-parts procurement, ammunition production capacity, and addressing current capability gaps. These gaps include such basics as air defence, modernized artillery, enhanced drone capability, drone defence, sealift, proper staffing, modernized personnel administration, and many others. These don’t trend on social media, but they’re what actually win or prevent wars.

Finally, the desire to speed up procurement and move quickly is encouraging. One of my criticisms for many years has been the tendency of successive governments to “punt” major decisions, to delay procurements, and to stretch them over decades to reduce costs. Further, decisions are usually driven more by political considerations than by operational necessity. Hopefully, the reforms to the procurement process serve to address some of these issues. After all, Canada is — whether we like it or not — a major country with global interests and global obligations. It’s time we acted like it.

If you haven’t seen the movie Sicario and its sequel, they’re worth a watch. In them, the U.S. government pursues a secret campaign using extrajudicial force against the Mexican cartels with the CIA and special operations forces. They’re important if you believe, like I do, that Donald Trump — and by extension his administration — applies “movie logic” to situations, equating leadership and toughness with things he’s seen in a movie or on TV. Trump is always referring to “ratings” or describing people as being “right out of central casting,” and he has been known to use Hollywood to interpret his worldview literally or symbolically. He constantly uses Hollywood language when describing military operations (“taking out the bad guys,” “obliterating,” “fire and fury”) and tends to see the world through a simplistic, movie-oriented lens where adversaries “need to see strength.” There’s no room for nuance in Hollywood or in Trumpworld.

There’s nowhere in the international arena where Trump’s tendency to conflate real-life situations with movies is more apparent than in his dealings with Venezuela. Because, for whatever reason, Venezuela has become the focus of Trump’s wrath and the stage for the execution of a real-life Sicario scheme. Sicario is, of course, set in Mexico, but the Mexican cartel situation is far too entrenched and complex to provide the easy foil that Trump seeks. Moreover, U.S. ties with the Mexican government run deep, and Mexico is much more a victim of cartel violence than an active ally.

Venezuela as the Perfect Foil

Given this, he’s set his sights on Venezuela. Venezuela has had issues for decades, especially since the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez brought a left-wing populist government to power. At first, Chávez was the darling of the political left, promising economic reforms to benefit Venezuela’s poor and pursuing a foreign policy that set it on a course to be free of U.S. influence. Unfortunately, this didn’t last, and the country entered a long deterioration (even after the death of Chávez and his replacement by Nicolás Maduro) that produced an overreliance on oil money to keep the economy afloat, mass emigration, nationalizations of entire industries, highly politicized security services, and — worst of all, from a U.S. perspective — alliances with Russia, Iran, and a variety of non-state actors. The Venezuelan economy has essentially collapsed, and the regime has found itself in near-constant conflict with the United States through sanctions and diplomatic breaks.

This has led to significant regional instability as Venezuela’s economic situation and political repression have produced refugee flows that have affected its neighbours and, indirectly, the U.S. southern border. This has served to create a pressure point that has been a long-standing and demonstrable concern for U.S. policymakers across the political spectrum.

Thus, Venezuela provides the perfect foil if Trump was looking to manufacture a threat. Its links with Russia and Iran alone would earn it Washington’s ire, and to this must be added the disruption to regional oil supplies and Caracas’s nationalisation of a variety of industries. To the American right wing, it spells one thing: Communism. To politicians like Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, who view the world through a Cold War lens and have an incredibly simplistic view of international politics, “Communism” alone makes Venezuela a threat to the United States.

The Manufactured Threat

Unfortunately for Trump, Venezuela isn’t a real threat to the U.S. Its military capabilities have degraded significantly over the last two decades (the Venezuelan Navy has a single frigate, and the serviceability of the entire Air Force is in doubt), and the country doesn’t have an ideology where exporting a “revolution” is an imperative. Yes, Venezuela has border disputes with its neighbours and flirts openly with Cuba (much to the upset of the rabidly anti-Communist Cuban-American community in Florida from whence Rubio came), Russia, and Iran, but there’s little evidence that these ties have generated any real threat to U.S. interests.

So, in the absence of a direct threat, Trump has had to manufacture one — and he’s found his excuse on two fronts: immigration and a real-life “cartel.”

As already noted, the dramatic destruction of the Venezuelan economy has produced mass emigration and a tide of asylum seekers looking to leave the country. Some of these are political refugees seeking to escape the oppressive and authoritarian Maduro regime, while others are simply economic refugees forced out by a lack of opportunity and an economy teetering on the brink of collapse. Many — if not most — of these people gravitate to the traditional destination for refugees from Latin America, the United States. Trump’s position on immigration is far too well known to need repeating here. Suffice it to say that he has accused Venezuela of “emptying its prisons” and of sending criminals to the U.S. in an effort to destabilize the country. More hilariously, Trump has confused “asylum seekers” with people confined to mental health facilities, accusing the Maduro regime of emptying its “asylums” to ship mentally ill people to the U.S. It’s farcical, of course, but panders to Trump’s MAGA base and reflects his own deep prejudices.

Reality Check: Tren de Aragua and the Limits of Power

The “cartel” situation is more complex, for there is indeed a “cartel” operating in Venezuela: the Tren de Aragua and the so-called Cartel de los Soles. Moreover, the U.S. has, for years, accused the Venezuelan security apparatus of supporting the drug trade and has gone so far as to place a $50 million bounty on the head of dictator Nicolás Maduro.

But, as with anything Trump, there are issues with this. First, it’s by no means clear that the Venezuelan government — as a policy — supports the drug trade and meets the definition of a “narco-state,” despite its very serious flaws. Yes, President Maduro has been indicted in the United States, but this relies entirely on U.S.-sourced information, which is certainly subject to bias or fabrication. I’m not saying we shouldn’t believe the U.S. government, but…

Secondly, Tren de Aragua isn’t a typical “cartel.” It generally doesn’t manufacture its own drugs but instead acts as a transporter and facilitator — it’s even in the name, “Aragua Train.” This isn’t to say that it isn’t incredibly violent or that it hasn’t made inroads into the Venezuelan government. It is, and it has. However, it has yet to develop major operations in the United States. Tren de Aragua largely functions as a transporter, human-trafficking and extortion network; it has not been identified in public reporting as a major source of fentanyl destined for the United States. Indeed, the vast majority of fentanyl entering the U.S. comes from Mexico, not Venezuela. Tren de Aragua might be a “threat” in the wider sense but hardly represents a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. A case could be made that the Mexican cartels represent a far more serious threat, yet we don’t see the same amount of sabre-rattling against Mexico.

Regardless of the facts, Venezuela has proven to be the perfect target for Trump’s ire. It’s ruled by a “revolutionary” dictatorship that may or may not have ties to drug cartels. Its collapsing economy has created a wave of refugees, many of whom look to enter the United States. It’s host to a criminal organization that specializes in drug transhipment. All of this equates to the perfect foil for a president looking to demonstrate strength, U.S. hegemony, military power, and Republicans’ anti-Communist credentials. The idea that the threat is either non-existent or overblown hardly matters; Trump will get his win even if it means lying about the fentanyl threat.

Sicario Redux

With this in mind, Sicario Redux took shape shortly after Trump took power earlier this year. Maduro was indicted, and CIA destabilization efforts began anew. U.S. support for Venezuelan opposition figures became much more obvious and more vocal. More worrying, the U.S. military began extrajudicial air strikes against boats ostensibly linked to the drug trade and Tren de Aragua. This was done without disclosing any relevant evidence and without demonstrating any link at all to the drug trade. It’s a page right out of a Sicario script but is almost certainly illegal under international law, no matter how much cheerleading is done by Pete Hegseth and Marco Rubio. Worse, the strikes have been extended to Colombian watercraft, with at least one attack occurring in the Pacific, much to the alarm of the Colombian government.

If this wasn’t enough, this week, U.S. Air Force B-1 bombers were observed cruising just outside Venezuelan airspace, having flown extended missions from the continental United States. These were almost certainly show-of-force flights designed to intimidate the Maduro regime and to escalate tensions. Of note, the White House has denied B-1 flights despite their appearing on publicly available flight tracking programmes. We can certainly anticipate more of the same over the next few weeks, perhaps escalating as the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group (CSG) enters the Caribbean.

The deployment of the latter is, in and of itself, a major escalation. The Ford CSG was pulled from Europe at no notice and dispatched across the Atlantic to be parked off the Venezuelan coast. A carrier strike group has more embarked firepower than all the South American naval and air forces combined; a deployment against Venezuela is a massive overreaction designed to intimidate. There’s next to nothing Venezuela can do to counter it. However, a CSG is of limited utility unless the United States is considering a full range of military strikes against Venezuelan targets. Given the current situation and the state of the Venezuelan armed forces, this appears to be quite unlikely — unless Trump wishes to appear tough to his domestic supporters.

A War for Ratings

What seems far more likely is the Sicario scenario, whereby the CIA and U.S. special operations forces operate within Venezuela to further destabilize the regime and — potentially — conduct direct action against Tren de Aragua. The U.S. would certainly be assisted by elements of the Venezuelan opposition, despite its appearing fractured and without central direction. A message to this effect may have been sent after the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to María Corina Machado, one of the major leaders of the Venezuelan opposition. In her response to the award, Machado was effusive in her praise for Trump, adopting an almost fawning tone — a move that shocked some of the more moderate opposition figures who worry about American intervention and being seen as U.S. puppets.

It is entirely possible that U.S. special forces are already operating in Venezuela, with CIA support. If this is the case, the next step in escalation could well be the use of limited military force, such as air strikes against infrastructure supporting the regime or decapitation strikes against Maduro and other regime leaders. The international backlash will almost certainly be swift and almost universally negative. Aside from Venezuela’s allies like Russia and Iran, the European Union and other like-minded organizations and countries (including Canada) have long pursued diplomatic and economic measures to support democracy in the country, especially in the absence of a full-fledged threat or any real evidence that Venezuela is becoming a “narco-state.”

What we have then is the performative militarization of Trump’s anti-immigration agenda — kabuki theatre shaped by Hollywood imagery rather than strategic necessity. Venezuela is not a direct threat to the United States, and the drug “cartels” that the U.S. claims to be pursuing there are not the same as those operating in Mexico and elsewhere. Moreover, the extent of the Venezuelan government’s participation in drug trafficking is certainly an open question. Finally, Trump has used the minor influx of refugees seeking asylum in the U.S. to use the situation in Venezuela to further his anti-immigrant agenda, providing a litany of accusations without any real evidence.

The International Community’s Dilemma

Operations against Venezuela offer Trump an opportunity to showcase his strength and toughness. Venezuela, with a “revolutionary” government, a collapsing economy, a stream of asylum seekers, and a violent criminal element linked to the regional drug trade, provides a perfect foil for Trump’s “badass” script. The fact that following this script has already resulted in the extrajudicial execution of people and violations of both international and maritime law is of little consequence to Trump and his minions. In Trumpworld, Donald Trump is judge, jury, and executioner — the rest of the world be damned. If the situation escalates further, Canada and other countries will have a decision to make: acquiesce and watch international norms corrode even further than they’ve done thus far, or risk alienating a thin-skinned, egomaniacal Trump — a president who takes every slight personally and translates his pique into retribution. It’s a tough call, but one we may be forced to make.

Memories seem short these days, especially when it comes to Donald Trump. It’s been 10 months since his return to power - a short time by a historical measure. Yet during that time he’s managed to dominate news cycles around the world as he has lurched from one artificial crisis to another. We’ve already forgotten his threats against Panama, his siding with Putin in Ukraine, his demand for Greenland and his threats to Denmark, his equivocation on support to NATO, and his attack on Iran in support of Israel. We’re already starting to ignore his strikes against so-called “drug traffickers” off Venezuela and his incredibly odious domestic policies. And we’ve forgotten what Trump has said about Gaza.

The media is falling all over themselves to praise Trump’s new found statesmanship and his “pivotal” role in securing a ceasefire in Gaza. What has been forgotten in all of the hoopla is Trump’s longer term vision for Gaza and for Middle East peace. It’s a vision that is firmly pro-Israel and, worse, may enable Trump’s personal financial interest. After all, Trump never does anything without personal benefit and, as much as he wants a Nobel Peace Prize, money is the thing that matters most.

Astute readers will harken back to February when Trump announced his brilliant idea for the future of Gaza. In essence, it called for the removal of Palestinians in the territory and its handover to the US, with Trump in charge. Trump and his friends would then turn Gaza into some sort of resort area, filled with hotels and attractions. What was to happen to the Palestinians was conveniently forgotten.

Trump, it must also be remembered is a close friend and ally of Israel’s own version of himself, Benjamin Netanyahu. So, it should come as no surprise that the US remained silent as what was a justified response to a horrific terrorist attack eventually lost all sense of proportionality and became obviously aimed at forcing as many Palestinians to leave Gaza as possible. But in the middle of all the violence and diplomatic manoeuvring, the original Trump scheme for Gaza left the public’s consciousness.

But it’s important to remember that it never left Trump’s consciousness.

The Trump/Kushner Scheme

Earlier, on 15 February 2024, Jared Kushner gave a revealing interview (at Harvard) in which he spoke of the value of Gaza’s waterfront and floated ideas of moving people to make redevelopment possible. (All quotes from here: The Guardian)

Some of Kushner’s more provocative lines:

• “Gaza’s waterfront property … it could be very valuable … if people would focus on building up livelihoods.”

• “From Israel’s perspective, I would do my best to move the people out and then clean it up.”

• He suggested moving civilians from Gaza to the Negev (in southern Israel) or — with diplomacy — into Egypt (e.g., via border crossings into Egypt) as part of cleanup operations.

• On return: “I don’t think that Israel has stated that they don’t want the people to move back there afterwards.” (i.e. allowing return was ambiguous)

• He also explicitly questioned the viability of a Palestinian state, calling it “a super bad idea” that would “reward an act of terror.”

The GREAT Trust Plan

• On 29 August 2025, reporting surfaced on a leaked/insider plan called the Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration and Transformation Trust (GREAT Trust). (A story broken by the Washington Post) That plan included:

  
  • A U.S.-administered trusteeship for about 10 years.
  • “Voluntary relocation” of Gaza’s entire population either abroad (Egypt, Jordan) or into secured zones during reconstruction.
  • Incentives: payments, rent subsidies, cash, digital tokens for property redevelopment rights, etc.
  • Reconstruction centered on tourism, tech, “Gaza Trump Riviera,” smart cities, etc.
  • In the plan, Israel would maintain “overarching rights to meet its security needs” in the first year; internal security would rely on Western/third-country contractors.
  • The plan does not explicitly reference Palestinian statehood; it conceives of a reformed Palestinian polity eventually taking over but under the Abraham Accords framework.

• The Washington Post reported that some of the plan’s authors were Israeli business figures and former Trump aides; the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) had been involved in financial models (though BCG later denied official endorsement).

The current accord is the perfect delivery vehicle for Trump’s larger scheme.

Overview: What is the “Trump” plan?

• On September 29, 2025, Trump and Netanyahu unveiled a 20-point Gaza peace plan meant to end the war and set Gaza’s postwar order. Reuters

• The plan is structured in phases (or “stages”) — starting with ceasefire and hostage exchanges, then moving to security, demilitarization, governance, reconstruction, and long-term arrangements. Council on Foreign Relations

• Trump says this is his signature foreign policy achievement, capable of making him a major Middle East mediator. PBS

But many parts are ambiguous, contested, or aspirational.

What has been implemented (Phase 1 so far)

This is where the plan has made its strongest public steps.

Ceasefire & Hostage / Prisoner Exchange

• Israel and Hamas agreed to Phase 1 of the plan: a formal pause in hostilities, a trooper withdrawal to “agreed lines,” and the exchange of hostages and prisoners. Reuters

• All living Israeli hostages (20 in recent reports) were released. CBS News

• Israel, in return, released about 2,000 Palestinian prisoners / detainees (including some long-term ones). Reuters

• Some (but not all) bodies of deceased hostages have also been turned over; this remains a sticking point. Reuters

• Israel’s troops are pulling back to predetermined lines (with initial withdrawal in Phase 1) and freezing frontlines to stabilize the situation. Council on Foreign Relations

Humanitarian Access & Aid

• The plan calls for a substantial increase in humanitarian deliveries. For example, “600 trucks per day” is cited as a planned target for aid entering Gaza. Reuters

• Reconstruction relief, restoring water, power, sewage, roads, clearing rubble, are part of the early demands. Council on Foreign Relations

Governance & Transitional Oversight

• The plan envisions a postwar governance structure called a “Board of Peace”, to be chaired by Trump, possibly including figures like Tony Blair. Reuters

• Under that body, Gaza would be run by technocratic / transitional arrangements under international oversight. Reuters

Phased Israeli Withdrawal

• The plan map suggests three stages of withdrawal: from ~53% control to 40% then 15%, finally leaving a security perimeter. Council on Foreign Relations

• In other words: Israel keeps control over key buffer zones or security areas even as much of Gaza is handed back. Council on Foreign Relations

What comes next (Phases 2, 3, etc.) — what’s promised, what’s speculative

After Phase 1, the plan envisions further steps that more deeply reshape Gaza’s security, governance, and economic future. Below is the projected outline and the areas of high risk / ambiguity.

Phase 2: Demilitarization & Security Measures

• Hamas is expected to disarm (voluntarily or be disarmed). Trump has warned disarmament “quickly and perhaps violently” if Hamas resists. Reuters

• Deployment of an international stabilization / peacekeeping force, likely involving U.S., Arab, and European partners, to monitor the truce and enforce security. CBS News

• Training of Palestinian police forces (Egypt, Jordan, or Arab states involved) to take over internal security in non-military areas. CBS News

• Israel continuing withdrawals, tied to benchmarks in disarmament and security readiness. CSIS

Phase 3: Governance & Reconstruction

• The “Board of Peace / transitional authority” assumes more administrative control of Gaza: infrastructure, services, rebuilding, land management. Council on Foreign Relations

• Massive reconstruction financed by Gulf states, international donors, private investment. Council on Foreign Relations

• Rebuilding “smart cities,” roads, utilities, hospitals, housing — essentially transforming Gaza’s physical layout. PBS

• Gradual transfer of authority (if conditions met) to a reformed Palestinian governance entity (e.g. the PA) under oversight. Council on Foreign Relations

Phase 4 (Long Term / Final Settlement)

• A long-term security arrangement: Israel retains the right to intervene if renewed threats emerge. Council on Foreign Relations

• Possible normalization steps: border control, trade, connectivity, integration with West Bank or outside markets. CSIS

• Conditional movement toward Palestinian statehood or political recognition (though in the publicly circulated plan, this is vague). Council on Foreign Relations

How this connects with the “resort/relocation/redevelopment” ideas

• The technocratic transitional authority / Board of Peace concept gives a mechanism to bypass traditional Palestinian political actors (Hamas, even the PA). That authority could, behind diplomatic legitimacy, control land, contracts, zoning, redevelopment decisions. Trump himself is “chairman” of this board.

• The staged Israeli withdrawal (leaving buffer zones, security perimeters, Israeli “control” in key regions) echoes the idea of a demographically reworked Gaza where municipal or urban cores become “investment zones” while some populations remain pushed to peripheral or resettled areas.

• The displaced populations from the war may be channeled into “restricted zones” during reconstruction, or offered “voluntary relocation” as part of resettlement programs (as we saw in leaked plans) — the peace plan gives no strong guarantee of full return.

• The reconstruction push gives enormous power over which developers, foreign or domestic, get contracts — opening the door to Gulf or Israeli firms to dominate the rebuilt Gaza.

• The disarmament and security phase gives justification to lean heavily on external security forces and oversight, thereby limiting local armed resistance to redevelopment plans.

• The plan leaves open the Israeli “right to intervene” or retain security control in the final settlement, which can be used to enforce the new order.

The Trump Scheme

It appears that this much-ballyhooed “peace deal” is anything but. Indeed, it appears to be the first phase in the Trump/Kushner/Netenyahu plan to push the Palestinians out of Gaza and transform it into something more akin to Trump’s failed empire in Atlantic City. This should come as absolutely no surprise to anyone who has followed Trump’s public utterances on the Palestinian issue. The United States is rabidly pro-Israel and does not support the increasing international consensus favouring a two-state solution. Indeed, the Israeli government lost no time in proclaiming victory after the ceasefire was announced.

Of course, it is possible that Trump has brought a lasting, equitable peace to Gaza, which may lead to a broader settlement, but I seriously doubt it. Trump doesn’t exactly have a record of a;truism and almost always acts in his own self-interest. The brains behind this scheme is surely Jared Kushner, with his deep ties to Arab Gulf money and his oft-stated antipathy towards the Palestinians in general.

Unfortunately, it appears that the international community, in its haste to grasp at any straw that may lead to peace and in its relief at a ceasefire in Gaza that may hold, has fallen for Trump’s manoeuvring hook, line, and sinker. World leaders were lining up to curry favour and to congratulate Trump on his “statesmanship”, ignoring the fact that the agreement was certainly timed to support Trump’s massive lobbying effort for the Nobel Peace Prize. But we must be reminded that we have only seen Phase One of “Trump’s” plan. The follow-on Phases will be implemented under the threat of American military power and with the support of extensive Israeli military support. The international community’s support may well wane after Trump names himself as “Chairman of the Board”, and as the Palestinians are forced out to make room for development conducted by Trump’s friends and supporters.

There is something rotten here and we would do well to be leery of American motives. They are not an honest broker and we should not be viewing the US as such. That being said, the conflict is so protracted and has occupied so much of the international community’s attention that the world’s political leadership may be willing to grasp at any straw to find a solution - even if that straw is a completely corrupt US administration.

Donald Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22)served to reinforce this view. It was rambling, self-congratulatory, accusatory, and insulting. None of the points he made were valid – if he made any real points at all. What became clear, though, is that the US cannot be trusted to follow international norms and that its policies are being shaped by a single, odious personality – Donald Trump.

Trump’s knowledge of history and of world affairs is virtually non-existent, and this is reflected in the US stance on a wide variety of issues. Under his second regime, US policy has become what one Trump aide described in 2018 as, “We’re America, bitch.”1 It is entirely transactional, nationalistic, and suffers under the tremendous influence of Trump’s massive – and incredibly fragile – ego. Under the Trump regime, the tiniest personal slight is equated to a slight on the US itself and translated immediately into policy. Worse, Trump’s every whim and utterance is translated into action by his cult-like staff.

This does not bode well for the cornerstone of Western unity and collective action: NATO. After all, NATO exists as a collective security organization, one which relies heavily on consensus and on the concept of deterrence. It is the only treaty that automatically commits the US to go to war if a member is attacked. Of course, this means that NATO is anathema to a transactional gangster like Trump – there’s nothing obviously in it for the US or for Trump personally.

Since 1949, the US has exerted an outsized influence on NATO. Militarily and economically, it was – and is – by far the most powerful. This manifested itself in the US always being given supreme command of the Alliance’s forces, in possessing a near-monopoly on nuclear weapons, and in very large US forces being based in Belgium, Germany, the UK, and Italy. That influence remains despite the dramatic effect of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of most US forces from Europe, and a significant reduction in NATO’s nuclear force posture.

It is difficult to understate the effect that the end of the Cold War had on NATO. Most countries rushed to move from military readiness to spending on civilian requirements. Forces were slashed, conscription ended (in many countries with the draft), and entire industries mothballed. Canada and the US withdrew the bulk of their forces from Europe, and entire stockpiles of reserve equipment were trashed. European nations basically dismantled their defence infrastructure. While the effect in the US was less noticeable, they too undertook significant reductions in heavy forces, shifting their focus to worldwide commitments.

This situation grew even worse after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and NATO’s resulting involvement in the Afghan conflict. Virtually every major nation shifted focus to low-intensity and counter-insurgency operations, with the knock-on effect on training programmes and equipment purchases. Tanks were out, and convoy escorts, anti-IED (i.e., improvised explosive devices), training missions, and civilian cooperation were in. Moreover, this focus had the benefit of being cheaper than preparing for major combat operations (MCOs) against a near-peer enemy.

And so it went. NATO became a shadow of what it was during the Cold War and lacked a focus, even as it expanded into Eastern Europe.

This expansion added a significant amount of complexity. Former Warsaw Pact countries, now democratic, were left with militaries equipped entirely with Soviet equipment and following Soviet doctrine. To be effective within the Alliance, these militaries had to be completely retrained and re-equipped with NATO-pattern systems. This took decades, and NATO is still feeling the effects. To some extent, the new members were more of a burden than a benefit.

Enter Trump 1.0

Donald Trump, in his first iteration, was somewhat restrained by the professionals occupying responsible positions in his administration. That being said, he tended to view NATO as a protection racket, with European members “taking advantage” of American largesse and of “owing” NATO (and by extension the US) money. That NATO was still fighting alongside the Americans in Afghanistan was of no consequence to Trump. Purely transactional, he viewed contributions in terms of dollars and cents – and America was owed.

That the Alliance had cashed in on the so-called “peace dividend” made things much worse. Many nations struggled to meet the Alliance’s 2% of GDP goal for defence spending, and readiness was non-existent. Trump was, some grudgingly admitted, right – for the wrong reasons.

Unfortunately, the gangster-like exhortations from Trump had limited effect. There was no obvious threat (even Russia – despite its occupation of Donbas and Crimea – wasn’t viewed as a rival), and the shifting of defence funds to civilian use meant that reversing that shift would affect a host of domestic programmes. There was no incentive to do what Trump demanded.

The Ukraine Factor

To my mind, the first real shock – the one that galvanized NATO out of its complacency – was Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Never mind that Russian aggression had been ongoing for years; this was a blatant attack on the international order against a country – a democracy – with whom NATO was building a relationship. NATO began accelerated programmes to train Ukrainian soldiers and began shipping arms and ammunition into Ukraine in an effort to stave off Ukrainian defeat.

To an extent, this worked – although the vast majority of the credit goes to the Ukrainian people and government themselves. But even this limited effort exposed gaping holes in NATO’s military capacity. Aside from US stocks, there were no pools of reserve equipment. Defence production capability had slowed to a crawl, and defence industries were incapable of delivering equipment in quantity and in a timely fashion. Ammunition production was based on peacetime training requirements or had been discarded entirely. Almost immediately, NATO was scraping the bottom of the barrel in an attempt to give the Ukrainian Armed Forces more capability, often pulling equipment from their own forces – equipment that could not immediately be replaced. Ukraine was a wake-up call in more ways than one.

Trump 2.0

The second election of Donald Trump has further served to galvanize the Alliance. Already, massive deficiencies in capability had been identified and NATO had added two powerful members – Sweden and Finland – who were under no illusion as to the threat posed by Russia. Unfortunately, the people that restrained Trump during his first term were long gone. What remains is a group of sycophants, cultists, and ideologues who take every word uttered by the President as gospel. Trump is free to give rein to his worst impulses – and those impulses are nationalist, authoritarian, and purely transactional.

Now, it wasn’t just a financial shakedown. Trump’s weird affinity for Vladimir Putin has caused him to prevaricate on support for Ukraine. He has publicly refused to rule out using coercion or even military force to pursue geopolitical aims (notably Greenland) and has repeatedly suggested extreme measures toward allies, including rhetorical proposals about Canada — remarks widely reported and criticized by allied governments. He’s imposed sweeping tariffs on nearly everything the Alliance produces and has started multiple trade wars. And, most pertinent to this discussion, he’s equivocated on the American obligation to go to war if a fellow NATO member is attacked. American foreign policy is rudderless, based entirely on Trump’s whims, and reflects an odious, authoritarian ideology.

The current situation – NATO without the US

Officially, nothing has changed. The United States is fully committed to NATO and has publicly stated that it will oppose Russian incursions into Eastern Europe. Our faith in this commitment has been shaken, however, by the mixed messages coming from the Trump administration, its obvious disdain for Europe, and the concept of collective security. Should things heat up in Eastern Europe, there will be tremendous pressure on Trump to remain aloof – pressure that will match his own desires.

Most NATO countries have reacted to this lack of certainty. NATO’s position is significantly stronger in Eastern Europe (we’ll touch on this later), defence spending is finally on the rise, countries are making investments in industrial capacity and strategic depth, and much is happening in the defence realm without the United States. Indeed, there is more than one NATO nation that regards a Trumpist US as a strategic adversary. Leaving aside Trump’s ludicrous demand for defence spending to rise to 5% of GDP (a wartime level of spending that even the US is nowhere near capable of sustaining), the 2% targets are now being met, and are set to increase to 3.5% on core defence activities. While Trump hastens to take credit for these improvements, most have occurred because of a lack of faith in him, not because he’s so convincing. Finally, Trump’s equivocating over support to Ukraine has created a realization that Ukraine needs a reliable partner in the form of European NATO countries and that they must, to a large extent, endeavour to replace US assistance.

As a result, NATO’s force posture has improved dramatically over the past eight months. Most major nations have announced very significant increases to defence spending and to efforts to improve defence production capacity. This is particularly apparent in Germany, France, the UK, and Poland, with Poland in particular viewing itself on the frontlines of any confrontation with Russia.

For the purposes of the remainder of this discussion, it is important to distinguish those forces declared to NATO command from those retained under national authority. For instance, while Poland has declared some forces to NATO, it retains very substantial forces under national command – but available to NATO in a crisis.

I have produced the following chart to indicate those forces that are declared to NATO on the Alliance’s eastern flank. Note that it does not include the very significant forces under national command, including those in Germany, US air assets in the UK, Polish forces, and the F-35-equipped forces of Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands (as well as the Gripens available to Sweden).2

As you can see, Canada is in the midst of transitioning its multinational battle group to a full brigade. This includes the recent deployment of tactical helicopters and other enablers. It is important to note that, while the Canadian Army has serious equipment shortfalls, these were – in part – addressed by Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) buys for our forces in Europe.

The Canadian-led brigade is a powerful force in its own right and is backed up by a British-led mechanized battle group in Estonia and by a very strong German brigade permanently stationed in Lithuania. These are (currently) supported by a US Army armoured brigade combat team (ABCT) based in Poland with VII Corps headquarters.

In my opinion, this is more than sufficient to deal with any Russian ground incursions, including a theoretical full-on Russian attack.

The Russians

When discussing Russian combat capability, one must remember one overarching factor: Russia has been very severely mauled in Ukraine.

• Open-source counts and think-tank estimates show Russia has suffered very heavy losses of tanks and armoured vehicles in Ukraine, leaving its armoured force substantially degraded and forcing Moscow to rely increasingly on external munitions and components.3

• Many of Russia’s most experienced combat formations have been heavily attrited; its ability to mount large-scale, agile manoeuvre operations is significantly reduced in the near to mid term.

• Air defence equipment has suffered significant attrition.

• Ammunition stocks are low and are now partially reliant on North Korean support.

• Russia’s ability to conduct battlefield manoeuvre has all but disappeared.

• Russian drone attacks, while extensive, appear badly targeted and seem aimed at increasing civilian terror rather than striking at defence infrastructure.

• The Russian economy is beginning to crack, with significant fuel shortages, large tax increases, and an inability to support legacy Western-produced equipment.

• Russia has demonstrated itself to be incredibly incompetent on the battlefield and has struggled with innovation, manoeuvre, and with the employment of old Soviet tactics (Ukraine is guilty of the latter as well).

• Given these factors, I do not believe that Russia has the capacity to conduct more than harassing operations against NATO. They certainly do not have the capability to conduct major ground operations.

This holds true, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the air. The past two weeks have seen a dramatic increase in Russian air activity directed against both Poland and the Baltic states. This is likely harassing activity but has resulted in the deployment of more NATO fighter aircraft to the Baltic Air Policing mission and to Poland. NATO now has more than adequate forces to deal with further intrusions. It is highly unlikely that these assets will be used to shoot down Russian intruders unless they display overtly hostile intent. It is also very unlikely that NATO will establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine in reaction to such incursions. In addressing the latter, we must remember that NATO operates only when there is consensus, and the potential for a direct confrontation with Russia will lead some nations to veto such an idea.

Russia has been so weakened that NATO almost certainly has the ability to defeat it on the battlefield even without US participation. NATO doctrine is designed for manoeuvre and was originally designed to defeat the very tactics Russia has been using in Ukraine. Moreover, NATO has depth forces that could be brought to bear in the event of a Russian attack. Frankly, Polish forces on their own would likely be capable of defeating a weakened Russia.

A Caveat

While NATO without the US can almost certainly deal with any immediate contingency, the situation becomes more complex should a conflict become protracted or attritional. As indicated above, Europe and Canada essentially dismantled their defence production and reserve capacity in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. While the US reduced its capacity as well, its worldwide commitments meant that much remained. As a result, the US brings elements to the battlefield that other NATO nations cannot:

• Tactical nuclear capability

• Theatre-wide sustainment

• Access to reserve equipment stocks

• Strategic-level deep strike

• Tactical-level strike

• Long-range suppression of air defence

• An operational corps-level headquarters

• Additional access to intelligence and reconnaissance resources

The absence of these is not critical unless a conflict is protracted and Allied attrition is very severe. NATO nations have independent resources to draw on, some of which mitigate the loss of US assets. Moreover, it is likely that, should the US be reticent in the event of a Russian attack, France and Britain would extend their national nuclear umbrellas over the rest of the Alliance. While these are much smaller than their American counterparts, the deterrence level is considerable.

Conclusion

NATO doesn’t need the United States to beat Russia in a fight today. The Alliance has the troops, the kit, and the doctrine to blunt and roll back any Russian move on its eastern flank. Ukraine has already proven that Russia is a shadow of the threat it once was, and NATO’s forces are better trained, better equipped, and better led.

Where the problem lies is in staying power. Europe and Canada have hollowed out their defence industries for decades, and while the wake-up call is finally being answered, there is still a long way to go. The Americans bring depth — production, logistics, strategic strike, and nuclear deterrence on a scale that Europe and Canada cannot yet match. That doesn’t matter much in a short, sharp fight. It matters enormously if the war drags on.

The reality is that the United States can no longer be counted on as a rational ally. American policy is now hostage to the whims of a single, unstable personality and his band of sycophants. Betting Europe’s security on Trump is not strategy — it’s suicide.

The lesson should be obvious. NATO must be ready to stand on its own, fight on its own, and sustain the fight without assuming the US cavalry will ride over the hill. Old assumptions are dead. NATO’s survival depends on acting like it.

In the meantime, I thought this little piece was timely, although - because I have some pretty strong opinions - it may have suffered from over-editing.

Maybe you know the feeling. You’ve drafted a risky text or email—you know it needs to be sent, but there will be blowback.

This article is one of those, as the Canadian Army is about to restructure, and I’m going to write about the Primary Reserve.

Experience matters. This is a subject that I—for better or worse—have strong opinions on, developed over many years of direct experience. I began my career as a Reservist and worked with and alongside the Reserve Force for all 25 years of my uniformed service. My experience is with the Army Reserve; I know little about the Naval or Air Reserves. Army units form the bulk of Canada’s military reserves.

I entered the CAF with a civilian undergrad degree in military history and international relations. I thought I knew what I was getting into. I was very wrong.

First night, first lesson. My first night with my Reserve unit was a disaster. Drinking culture was rife, and the unit often seemed more focused on social activities than training and readiness. Only about half of the NCOs and junior officers retained qualifications in the unit’s assigned role. Lest I be considered too cynical, the qualified half were often exceptionally dedicated, making extraordinary efforts despite a complete lack of support and resources. The problem was leadership, not troops. Despite heroic efforts by Regular Force staff to change the culture, attitudes remain entrenched to this day—over three decades later.

Virtually nothing in the subsequent 25 years served to change my opinion of the Army Reserves, particularly its leadership. In my view, the Reserves remain the weakest component of the Armed Forces.

Historical Background

A long history. Canada’s Reserve Force—or Militia—predates the Regular full-time military by decades. Some units predate Confederation. This history, stretching through the Victorian era and two world wars, has driven many structural and operational decisions, even when it shouldn’t.

As Canada expanded, so did the Army Reserve. By the First World War, most communities had a Militia unit. Eventually, the Army ended up with roughly 186 units across 86 communities. Many units are very small—less than 100 soldiers—a size hasn’t changed much since the early 20th century. Units encompass all arms and services, totaling about 19,000 Army Reservists, organized into Reserve brigades under the four geographical Army divisions.

Size versus structure. Despite their size, units retain the trappings of full-strength battalions or regiments, with command structures, administrative staff, and messes. A 90-soldier unit may be commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel with a Regimental Sergeant Major and additional staff, whereas a Regular Force battalion using the same structure commands roughly 600 soldiers.

Units have sufficient equipment for local training only; most heavy equipment is stored at training areas or issued only to Regular units that can support it. The Reserves have limited logistics capacity of their own and rely on the Regular Force for any major training activity requiring a field deployment of more than a few days. Support for operations has to come from the Regular Army, (which may be augmented by the Reserves).

Operational Challenges

At one time, I was heavily involved as operational staff in generating forces for training in Canada and overseas missions. I can say without equivocation that the Reserve Force caused roughly 80% of the issues I faced.

Why?

• Unit size: Most are too small to generate significant numbers for tasks. Creating a sub-unit of 120 soldiers for operations or exercises sometimes required a division-wide effort, often involving a dozen units and weeks of training and screening.

• Training dependency: While the Army Reserve is capable of conducting its own basic training and basic trades training, more advanced courses are heavily dependent on Regular support - staff who were increasingly deployed or preparing for deployment, often resulting in course cancellations and recriminations.

• Leadership experience: Reserve senior leaders hold the same rank and authority as their Regular counterparts but generally lack equivalent training or operational experience. Senior Reservists were sometimes deployed without adequate preparation, leading to complaints from UN and US headquarters about unqualified staff in operational roles.

• Lack of Operational Agility. Deploying Reservists on operations requires a complete force generation effort including sourcing of individual soldiers, screening, pre-deployment training, and integration. This requires a major effort for what is often less than 20% of the overall deployed force.

These issues persist. Structural and equipment limitations, distance from training areas, and complexity of modern equipment exacerbate the problem. Western Canada, for instance, has few nearby training areas, requiring long travel or reliance on US facilities.

Domestic Operations / TBGs

Starting around 2005, the Army Reserve was assigned responsibility for domestic operations through Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs) and for the generation of other operational units such as Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and convoy escort troops. These were intended as exclusively Reserve roles but ran into difficulties due to:

• Dependence on volunteers; planners never know who will be available.

• A need for high-readiness and an immediate response.

• Small unit sizes requiring composite sub-units.

• Lack of logistics capability beyond a few days into a deployment.

Despite these systemic issues, some in the Reserve community continued to demand high-readiness assignments. The reality is that only the Regular Force possesses the flexibility, consistency, and logistics to perform agile, high-readiness tasks. The Reserves are limited to well-planned, volunteer-supported roles that can be executed within days, not hours.

Summary / Critique

• Reserve regiments and battalions are not full-strength units despite their trappings.

• Units train roughly three hours a week plus one weekend a month, limiting skill development and supervision.

• Many units parade fewer than 100 soldiers—a number unchanged for a century.

• Skill levels in Reserve leadership vary widely; only a few are equivalent to their Regular Force counterparts.

• Many units are located far from viable training areas.

• Equipment is limited to local training needs, not operations.

• Reserves cannot usually deploy even a company-level sub-unit without resorting to a composite group. Exceptions are extremely rare.

• Units lack logistics to conduct sustained operations without Regular support.

• The Army employs the Reserve mainly as individual augmentation or composite sub-units for low-risk, well-defined missions. The skill-set doesn’t currently exist to conduct tasks at the full unit levels.

• Attempts to reform unit structures have met resistance for decades, allegedly to maintain community footprint and theoretical wartime mobilization readiness. This resistance has often been politically motivated.

Proposed Reforms

• Acknowledge that reform at the unit level is urgently needed.

• All units should reduce to a sub-unit structure, commanded by a Major, retaining customs and traditions.

• Each Reserve brigade should have battalion structures for training and operations, commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, providing the framework for territorial defence and domestic operations.

• Obtain local ranges and training areas—at least one per brigade, urgently in Western Canada.

• Reserve units could be assigned three roles: augmentation to Regular Force, territorial defence, and domestic operations.

• Provide equipment for training and territorial defence operations; Reserve equipment should match Regular Force equipment whenever practical.

• Reserve combat service support units should be structured and equipped to enable local operations for at least a week.

• Review and reform mess and non-public fund structures where necessary.

• Cap Reserve ranks at full Colonel; eliminate Reserve General Officers.

• Remove stovepiped chains of command and staff chains.

The point is: the structure needs reform, the Reserves need a defined role, and we must stop pretending dozens of small units contribute meaningfully to operational readiness. While they will never match the agility of Regular Force Immediate Reaction Units, assigning a territorial defence role is worth exploring.

As is happening across government, it’s time to think outside the box, develop innovative Canadian solutions, and act decisively. Reform of the Army Reserve has been bogged down for decades; now is the time to get it moving.

I chose Europe for a number of reasons. The most important were family-related and aren’t germane to this discussion. Secondly, I’m approaching a milestone birthday, and the trip was a present to myself. Finally, I, like many Canadians, have chosen to avoid all travel to the United States.

I encountered the latter attitude with every Canadian I met in passing. Meeting a mixed group of Americans and Canadians at one destination, I was pulled aside by a Canadian couple who whispered that they were hiding their nationality to avoid provocation, but that their reasons for being in Europe were the same as mine. The numbers are significant, and I encountered the same motivation amongst other Canadians while visiting four different countries.

With this in mind, I have a few observations.

First, I do think Canada has much in common with Europe and that these similarities need to be cultivated to bring us closer to the continent in general. Fundamentally, I think Canadians share a very similar perspective to that of Europeans regarding what government is and what role it should play in society. Our vision is wildly at variance with that of the current US administration. I worry, though, that Canadian society has become far too Americanized to allow Canada to become European in a broader sense. Dreams of Canadian EU membership are, I suspect, just that—dreams.

This isn’t to say that Canada shouldn’t pursue closer economic and security relations with Europe—far from it. Many of the countries in the EU are historical allies with whom Canada shares deep connections. Moreover, I believe that many, especially in the US, seriously underestimate European industrial and defence potential. As this expands, Canada has made the correct decision to become involved at the very beginning. A pivot to Europe could be a real and substantial step.

I spent a considerable amount of time in France and the United Kingdom, reaffirming my belief that both remain significant powers in their own right. Of the two, France appears better positioned to confront the new realities imposed by Donald Trump and his odious administration. France has a completely independent defence industrial base and isn’t beholden to allies for any capability. They are in an enviable position, despite having cashed in the peace dividend in the 1990s. However, this independence means that any adoption by Canada of French defence hardware is much more complex than procuring systems from the US or other NATO countries; French systems use French parts and French technology. Having said this, I hope that the very fact that French defence equipment isn’t dependent on the US makes it more, not less, attractive to Ottawa.

The UK is in a much more difficult position. As predicted in my article Britain’s Faustian Bargain: The Special Relationship Meets Its Reckoning the UK is attempting to walk a tightrope and appease the Trump administration while pivoting to a more sovereign defence posture. Unlike France (or Canada for that matter), the UK hosts important US military bases and has deep integration with the Americans at the strategic level. As pointed out in my prior article, the entire British nuclear deterrent is dependent upon missile sharing with the United States, and the “special relationship” remains central to the British global approach.

However, the UK is making major efforts to develop more sovereign, high-technology systems away from US input. These include fighter aircraft, missiles, and communications systems, all of which Canada could seek to get on board with. Thus, while the British will likely continue to appease the US and stroke Trump’s enormous ego, things are changing almost under the radar. The British certainly retain the potential to pivot. Whether the will is there remains to be seen.

Unfortunately, I didn’t visit Germany, but things seem to be changing rapidly there. Germany was one of the countries that took major advantage of the so-called peace dividend and dramatically reduced its defence potential. They appear to be attempting to rebuild this rapidly to counter the obvious threat posed by Putin’s Russia. There have been major announcements regarding defence budget increases and large procurements of armoured vehicles, naval vessels, and other improvements. Given that Germany, perhaps more than any major Western power, cashed out the peace dividend in a major way, they have a long way to go.

My return to Canada has coincided with Prime Minister Carney’s European tour. I believe Carney is attempting a delicate strategic balance: placating the US while quietly pivoting toward Europe, signalling that Canada intends to maintain strong ties with both without being dictated to by either. I’ll be the first to admit that I was getting concerned with the tone coming out of Ottawa over the summer. Carney appeared to cancel the Digital Services Tax in an effort to appease Donald Trump. We also seem to have given ground during the ongoing trade negotiations, with the PM attempting to remind suspicious Canadians that we already enjoy a “good deal” with the US and that the concessions aren’t all that serious. On top of that, Ottawa has lavished grating praise on Trump personally for his ridiculous efforts to negotiate peace in the Ukraine conflict. I’m not sure Canadians are in any mood to stroke Trump’s ego, no matter how strategic the thinking behind it.

My worries have been mollified to a large extent by Carney’s current visit. He’s saying all the right things on the European stage and has concluded several agreements very quickly. On the defence front, key Cabinet members have visited Sweden, and the Prime Minister announced the two candidates for Canada’s new submarine programme—in record time. The much-ballyhooed “pivot” seems to be real, but it will take months yet to see it translated into concrete action.

In the meantime, we’re still awaiting Cabinet guidance on major issues such as the F-35 procurement. The RCAF is fully committed to the F-35 and has a strong professional affinity for the US Air Force, making a shift challenging. That said, Cabinet must make the final decision, weighing political, strategic, and industrial considerations. I hope they settle on a smaller F-35 purchase, paired with a larger number of European aircraft—but only time will tell.

I’m certainly a fan of Canada becoming more “European” in our approach to defence, security, trade, and industrial policy. There is an enormous amount of potential to be tapped by pursuing closer relationships with the EU and other European countries. However, I fear that Canada remains too intertwined with the US for a pivot to have much effect in the short to medium term. Despite our newfound patriotism, Canadians remain very American culturally and are awash in American influences. Many Canadians love their NFL too much to give it all up, but unless we start making a deliberate mental shift, we’ll never move beyond symbolic gestures. If Canada is serious about shaping its own future, the time to begin is now.

I’ll admit to being completely baffled. Here was someone transparently stupid, spouting utter nonsense in the guise of providing advice to men. I soon found that there was a plethora of these toxic influencers, all saying the same thing: kindness and empathy are weakness, education is worthless, women are to be used, and the rules don’t apply to them. Everything is a transaction and the pursuit of wealth is the entire focus; altruism is pointless.

It should be no surprise, then, that this philosophy is reflected in the modern-day US Republican Party and the Trumpist MAGA movement. Toxic manosphere influencers and MAGA are interconnected at multiple levels: Tate, Joe Rogan, and all the rest are vocal supporters of Trump. There are spillover effects into “manly” sports like MMA fighting. Trump has even announced that, in a stunning display of crassness, an MMA fight will be held on the White House grounds, while major leagues donate lavishly to MAGA causes.

In my opinion, toxic influencers, MMA (and other “masculine” pursuits), MAGA, and the far right are all intertwined. Their audience is characterised by the demeaning of empathy, disdain for education and expertise, a sense of elitism, and a philosophy best described as “fuck you, make me.” This attitude extends from the White House to Canadian “convoy” and Trump supporters. It also extends, in a different form, to the Armed Forces and to debate surrounding defence issues.

Such men—and it is men—consider themselves to be mentally and physically tough and believe that empathy and concern for others is a weakness. In a military context, this is often translated into what many have called a “warrior culture.” This is the idea that mental and physical hardness is the only means to achieve success. It relies fundamentally on mythology about warrior societies and on the idea that warriors are a breed apart from society and that only certain, special men are to be admitted to their ranks. Empathy, education, and thoughtfulness are symptoms of weakness or worse. Never mind that guys like Andrew Tate wouldn’t survive long in many of the Army’s training exercises, let alone on operations. It’s the myth that counts.

So of course MAGA has grabbed on to this concept with both hands, demanding an end to so-called “woke” policies and a “return” to warrior culture as the only way to win wars. This was echoed by the Canadian Conservative Party during the last election, although this more reflected the abysmal state of defence literacy in Canada than anything else.

In the US, Trump put this idea into action by selecting a self-proclaimed “warrior,” the stupendously unqualified Pete Hegseth, as Secretary of Defence. Hegseth has accomplished very little of substance aside from leading physical fitness training to demonstrate his warrior credentials. His entire career has been mediocre and measured by a massively inflated résumé and ego.

The “warrior” concept is almost entirely American and has been one of their more distasteful military exports. Prior to Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, where we worked incredibly closely with the US, warrior culture wasn’t much of a thing. To be certain, elements could be found, especially in infantry units. Indeed, an early form of warrior thinking, with hazing, false elitism, and an ethos that denigrated empathy and critical thinking led directly to the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in the 1990s.

Having said this, there is a tiny grain of truth in what warrior culture espouses. There is a place for fitness, team cohesion, and quick and decisive discipline, something that Ottawa has forgotten amidst a barrage of Human Rights decisions and external reviews. The military, by definition, has a distinct and separate culture, one that must limit the rights enjoyed by the rest of the country to be operationally effective.

This doesn’t mean buying into the warrior propaganda, and the CAF has had major issues absorbing the grains of truth I mention within its wider culture. This has left it open to accusations of softness and operational ineffectiveness, none of which have been proven in practice. Worse, these issues led the Conservatives to parrot MAGA propaganda about warrior culture, despite being totally unable to define what it means.

So, while I wasn’t a warrior, I was a soldier and there is a major difference. Issues like the Airborne aside, Canadians in uniform have long described themselves as soldiers rather than warriors. What’s the difference? Well, I’ve prepared a little chart to illustrate what I mean.

Unfortunately, this entire issue has, as I mention above, become politicized, given fuel by MAGA “warrior” propaganda from the United States, by an obvious emphasis on cultural issues by the Trudeau government, by an opposition looking to score political points, and by a tiny minority of far-right CAF veterans looking to stoke division and controversy. I wrote about the latter describing their views in my very early piece “We’re Better Than You.”

The right-wing critics and trolls pollute social media, criticizing the CAF as being unable to fight, as being hijacked by “wokeness,” and led by incompetent officers chosen for their woke credentials rather than operational competency. Groups like “Veterans For Freedom Canada,” Diagolon, and others deliberately target serving members, using their credentials as veterans to poison the discourse in Canada and to push disinformation. They litter the CAF’s social media with abuse and accusations, usually without foundation.

The result is a perfect storm. The entire US Government is engaged in a war against “wokeness” and the American military is in the process of reversing many social directives in a misguided effort to “restore” a warrior culture—a culture that never really existed except in the minds of right-wing commentators like Hegseth. The spillover effect on Canada is enormous, and the Canadian right has adopted MAGA views on defence almost without question.

Young men—and it is men we’re discussing—still form the bulk of the potential recruiting base for the Canadian Armed Forces. This is precisely the group that is under constant bombardment by people like Andrew Tate, MAGA (and Maple MAGA) politicians, and by far-right groups like Veterans for Freedom Canada. The situation becomes worse when the small positive aspects of warrior culture come under scrutiny from a government that appeared to care little about the basis of military culture in general. This leads to situations where some CAF members may find themselves in sympathy with Trumpism and the anti-wokeness crowd and may become radicalised. Others may have joined the military with preconceived notions, created by American media, of what serving actually looks like.

The result are discipline problems like the ones we saw in Ottawa and, in a more serious situation, in Quebec earlier this month. Unfortunately, addressing these issues is not as simple as some in the media or academia would have us believe.

First, it is almost impossible for the recruiting system to tell who has “anti-woke” or even more radical views during the recruitment process. The entire process depends on the truthfulness of the recruit, and one can easily lie. There would be privacy issues with the examination of a recruit’s social media without cause. Thus, if one keeps quiet, it is possible for virtually anyone to make it through the process—barring any physical or psychological issues.

Once someone has made it through basic training, the issues continue. Part-time soldiers (i.e., Reservists) are not on duty unless actually at work and are not subject to military discipline. Military supervisors see their soldiers perhaps three hours a week and one weekend a month. It is extremely difficult to police a Reserve soldier’s behaviour within these limitations. These issues continue, albeit in a different form, when dealing with full-time (i.e., Regular Force) soldiers.

In the Regular Force (indeed across the CAF in general), Charter issues have repeatedly come into conflict with traditional military discipline. Supervisors are extremely unlikely to examine a soldier’s social media without direct cause and, perhaps, without the assistance of the military police. Fear of a litany of redresses, legal action, and an increasingly civilianized disciplinary system also can lead to inaction. The CAF has accepted, virtually without question, a variety of Human Rights Commission directives in this arena, despite the Supreme Court repeatedly acknowledging the uniqueness of military service.

Thus we have a dichotomy: individual rights versus traditional discipline when the entire system is becoming less, not more disciplined. No amount of awareness training or cultural sensitivity classes will eliminate those who espouse far-right views or who still engage in MAGA-inspired online shenanigans. Without action, these people could be left to rot the entire military from within.

I believe we need to acknowledge the validity of some of what “warrior” culture says and restore a focus on operational readiness, fitness, and discipline. There is something to be said for having a force that is absolutely ready to fight at any time. I believe that Canadians expect this. Moreover, it doesn’t hurt to have a force that presents itself well in public and inspires confidence. Finally, having experienced it, there is some truth to the “warriors’” focus on bonding within small units and on the relationship between soldiers.

But that’s as far as it goes. The rest is mythological tripe that is anathema to operational effectiveness and is based largely on movies and television. It is the type of thing professionals view with suspicion.

So what to do? First, ensure that expectations are set right at the door of the recruiting office. By this, I don’t mean the same old focus on ethos and cultural sensitivity. I mean a focus on the ethics of soldiering as I describe above—right from the beginning. Secondly, supervisors need to be empowered to administer discipline. People join the military expecting that it is a disciplined environment and that some rights enjoyed by other citizens may not be available to them. We need less civilianization of the system in general and fewer lawyers, not more.

I think we also need to acknowledge that no amount of system-imposed cultural sensitivity training or ethics education is going to convince a true racist or extremist to change their views. This solution, beloved by academics, is preaching to the converted and only adds fuel to the accusations of “wokism” and a focus on cultural wars. We need to address attitudes long before a soldier is sitting in a classroom getting their annual cultural awareness lecture. This means having a leadership with the mandate and authority to stomp out extremism as it’s discovered.

But, as with other things, I feel that something is indeed happening. CAF social media has become much more direct in addressing disinformation and accusations online. There seems to be a renewed focus on operations rather than cultural issues. Things like fitness and preparation are being stressed from basic training forward; recruits are being warned that they need to prepare both mentally and physically. This is all to the good.

Soldiering is an honourable and worthy profession, and Canadians are extremely good at it. It reflects the values of the society it serves with the added awesome responsibility of being the only profession that may deliberately employ violence to attain objectives. Warriors, on the other hand, serve a myth. It is critical that Canadians understand the difference, especially as we begin to disentangle from the United States.

We have our own culture and our own way of soldiering, one that is worth preserving. Canada’s military culture must reflect our own values—not imported myths. It’s time to reclaim the profession of arms from the caricatures of warrior fantasy and reassert the ethics of the soldier.

Personal Notes

I rarely (if ever) write on “cultural” issues but this article is an exception. Don’t expect much more of this sort of thing!

Subscriber chat: I’ve noticed (and been told) that spammers have somehow gotten hold of the chat and are bombarding folks with junk. I may need to shut it down until I can figure out what the issue is.

Scheduling: I’m heading off on holiday until mid-August and certainly won’t be writing. With my daughter away from school, I have not had a lot of time to put articles together. My apologies to subscribers and I’ll be back in force after mid-August. In the meantime, I’ll check in every so often.

Have an amazing summer!