Dominika Wilczok is a researcher and writer working at the intersection of AI, longevity science, neuroscience and cryobiology. Her publications examine generative AI in healthy longevity medicine, the integration of AI with biomarkers and geroscience, and AI-enabled cryopreservation. She also co-developed the Peakspan concept, which asks how long people retain near-peak functional capacity rather than merely remain free from diagnosed disease. Her research experience spans China and the United States.

Longevity is sometimes presented as a speculative search for radical life extension. In China, the immediate case is more practical. By the end of 2025, 323.38 million people - 23% of the population - were aged 60 or over. The World Health Organization projects approximately 402 million by 2040. The challenge is not simply helping people live longer, but extending the years they remain healthy, functional and independent.

This tests China’s healthcare system, workforce and wider economy, but also creates a powerful incentive to improve prevention, earlier diagnosis and treatment of age-related disease. AI could contribute at almost every point: identifying targets, designing molecules, combining biomarkers, interpreting imaging and wearable data, and making personalised guidance more accessible. China’s scale, hospital networks and ability to coordinate national priorities could make it one of the most consequential markets for this work.

Interview with Dominika Wilczok

BridgeCross Bio: China has made AI and biotechnology strategic priorities. How could its particular strengths shape AI-driven longevity research compared with the US and Europe?

Dominika Wilczok: I only fully understood China’s efficiency after recognising how much emphasis it places on strategic planning and execution, particularly through the Five-Year Plans. Brain-computer interfaces provide a useful example. China first supported the underlying science, then built shared infrastructure and, increasingly, developed the field as an industry. When China identifies a strategic area, it can connect research, infrastructure and commercialisation with remarkable speed.

The same mechanism could give China a major advantage in AI-driven longevity. The country can connect high-volume hospitals, research institutes, AI engineers, biotechnology companies, manufacturers and regulators around a defined objective. It also already has impressive drug-discovery capabilities and much of the infrastructure needed to develop longevity therapeutics.

However, longer life expectancy and healthy ageing currently tend to be framed around preventing age-related disease and frailty, rather than stopping or reversing ageing itself. The regulatory pathway is less obvious than it is for a clearly defined disease or disability. That may change as stronger clinical evidence emerges. Insilico Medicine’s rentosertib, which entered Phase III development for idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis in July 2026, is an important example of an AI-discovered and AI-designed candidate progressing into late-stage trials for an age-related disease.

Beyond accelerating drug discovery, where could AI have the greatest impact on healthy lifespan over the next decade?

Some of the biggest contributions may come from relatively low-hanging fruit. Large language models can improve health literacy and widen access to understandable, personalised guidance. Wearables can track sleep, activity and cardiovascular signals and warn users when data depart from an established pattern. These tools must be designed carefully so that health optimisation does not become anxiety or obsessive self-monitoring.

AI-assisted radiology is another obvious opportunity, particularly for detecting cancers and other diseases earlier. But technology alone does not improve healthspan. People must be screened, physicians must understand the results, and appropriate follow-up must be accessible. This is why education in longevity medicine matters alongside the technology.

I am also interested in inexpensive biomarkers that can be measured frequently. Computer vision can quantify changes in visible skin characteristics from standardised images, creating the basis for decentralised longitudinal studies. Combined with imaging, blood biomarkers and wearables, AI could help estimate an individual’s rate of functional decline.

This relates to Peakspan, a concept I co-developed with Dr Alex Zhavoronkov. Peakspan is the period during which a person maintains at least 90% of their own peak capacity in a particular physiological or cognitive system. Healthspan may say that someone is free from diagnosed disease even when they have already lost substantial cardiovascular, muscular or cognitive function. AI could help quantify proximity to peak function and support carefully designed N-of-1 studies in which individuals, under appropriate supervision, test whether an intervention changes their personal trajectory.

Cryobiology is another underinvested field. Preservation involves interacting variables including cryoprotectant composition, toxicity, cooling, storage and rewarming. AI could design better molecules and protocols and eventually enable closed-loop systems that adapt in real time, with implications from stem-cell and CAR-T storage to organ banking and regenerative medicine.

What distinguishes the most promising AI-driven longevity companies from the many startups now entering the field?

Longevity is still too young for a reliable checklist. Funding, famous backers and even clinical-stage assets are not enough; biotechnology repeatedly shows how quickly a compelling story can be undone by disappointing data. Capital can attract exceptional scientists and fund difficult experiments, but attention does not translate directly into effective therapeutics.

I look for honesty about what longevity means. A programme targeting a single age-related disease is not automatically a rejuvenation company, and an ageing-clock score moving backwards may show only that one biomarker has changed. I want to see evidence that an intervention affects causal ageing biology and preserves or restores function across more than one relevant endpoint.

A simple test is: if we remove the word ‘longevity’ from the pitch deck, is there still an exceptional company underneath it - one with replicable validation, competitive therapeutic assets and a business model capable of surviving clinical development? A category-defining company will turn ageing biology from an inspiring narrative into a reproducible development engine. Insilico Medicine is one of the strongest AI-driven examples, although even a Phase III programme remains investigational until clinical benefit is demonstrated.

If we revisit this conversation in five years, what would convince you that AI had genuinely transformed longevity rather than simply making existing research more efficient?

I would want to see AI discover a rejuvenation strategy that we had not already anticipated - something beyond the familiar areas of reprogramming, senolytics or stem-cell therapies - and carry it at least through a successful Phase II trial. AI has already shown that it can help identify new targets and generate new molecules. The real transformation will come when it produces a genuinely new therapeutic idea and delivers credible clinical evidence that it preserves or restores human function.

A Chinese longevity opportunity - but not an automatic one

China’s demographic need, data scale and translational infrastructure make it a natural proving ground for AI-enabled longevity. Yet faster discovery is not the same as longer, healthier lives. Progress will depend on meaningful functional endpoints, useful biomarkers, educated practitioners, accessible care and regulatory frameworks able to evaluate interventions between disease treatment and rejuvenation.

China has many of the ingredients required to lead. The decisive question is whether healthy longevity becomes a sufficiently clear strategic and scientific objective to activate the country’s distinctive ability to connect research, infrastructure and industry.

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Sources and further reading

National Bureau of Statistics of China: 2025 population and age structure | World Health Organization: Ageing and health in China | Dominika Wilczok: Deep learning and generative AI in ageing research and healthy longevity medicine | Peakspan: Defining, Quantifying and Extending the Boundaries of Peak Productive Lifespan | Insilico Medicine: initiation of the Phase III rentosertib trial | Dominika Wilczok on LinkedIn

WuXi AppTec has won an important first round in its legal battle with the US Department of Defense.

On 7 August, US District Judge James Boasberg granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Department from enforcing WuXi’s designation as a “Chinese military company” while litigation continues. The court also rejected the Department’s request to pause the injunction pending an appeal and required WuXi to post a nominal bond of just $1.

The ruling is not a final victory. The Department remains free to appeal or designate WuXi again using evidence and reasoning that satisfy the relevant legal requirements.

Nevertheless, the court’s opinion was unusually critical of the evidence used.

The Department had treated a figure showing that WuXi represented 5.32% of an investment fund’s portfolio as evidence that the fund owned 5.32% of WuXi. These are very different things.

It also described WuXi as conducting studies in partnership with military-linked institutions when the underlying records listed WuXi only as a third-party laboratory. In one example, Novo Nordisk was the applicant, the PLA General Hospital was the research institution and a WuXi subsidiary was one of several laboratories providing testing services.

Boasberg concluded that all three stated grounds for the designation rested on misread evidence, making WuXi likely to succeed in arguing that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious.”

Importantly, the judge did not conclude that WuXi could never present a national-security concern. The ruling was narrower: even in national-security matters, a government agency must accurately describe its evidence and explain how it supports its decision.

This matters because a Section 1260H designation is far more than an administrative label. It restricts Department contracts and is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for designation as a “biotechnology company of concern” under the BIOSECURE Act.

More importantly, it sends a signal to the entire market. As Boasberg wrote: “A scarlet letter sends a clear message: keep away.”

Evidence submitted by WuXi described customers pausing projects, cancelling collaborations, redirecting programmes and adopting policies against working with the company. Suppliers also suspended shipments, while advisers reportedly encouraged customers to select alternative providers.

That is why WuXi had little choice but to fight back. What else was it supposed to do?

Nor is WuXi the first Chinese company to seek protection through the US courts. The opinion itself references Xiaomi’s successful challenge to an earlier military-company designation.

There is also the example of BGI-owned Complete Genomics and its patent litigation with Illumina. Although very different from WuXi’s national-security case, it demonstrated that a Chinese-owned company could use the US legal system effectively. In 2022, a Delaware jury awarded Complete Genomics approximately $334 million after finding that Illumina had infringed two patents. A subsequent settlement resolved the companies’ US disputes and included a $325 million payment from Illumina.

Legal victories matter. They can protect intellectual property, suspend restrictions and require government agencies to justify their decisions properly. But the court’s opinion also supports what I have observed directly in my work: the larger commercial threat is often the chilling effect created while a dispute is being fought.

Drug developers cannot simply pause their programmes while a CRDMO’s status is clarified. These are long-term partnerships built on confidence and, in my experience, uncertainty about (any) supplier’s future legal or regulatory position can be fatal to a partnering decision. Moving work may require new process validation, method transfers and additional FDA submissions. But once a customer has invested the time and money required to qualify another CRDMO, it may be unable to return, even if WuXi is ultimately cleared.

The injunction matters. But WuXi can litigate against a designation; it cannot litigate customers back into confidence.

China’s Ministry of Commerce has added six US organisations to a new countermeasures list, prohibiting Chinese individuals and organisations from conducting transactions or cooperating with them.

The list is unusually diverse. It includes reservoir-services company Stratum Reservoir, supply-chain intelligence platform Altana Technologies, labour and human-rights organisations Verité, the Responsible Business Alliance and Human Rights in China, and, most notably for biotech, Applied DNA Sciences.

Beijing says the six entities assisted or supported what it calls illegal US sanctions against Chinese companies over alleged forced labour in Xinjiang. The measures took effect on 5 August. China’s Ministry of Commerce

Why Applied DNA Sciences?

Applied DNA Sciences may appear an unexpected target. The Stony Brook company is best known for its synthetic DNA manufacturing technology and DNA-based product authentication, rather than for any major commercial presence in China.

However, its CertainT platform uses molecular tagging and testing to establish the provenance of materials, particularly cotton. This places the company directly within the infrastructure supporting enforcement of the US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. Applied DNA’s own regulatory filings note that US authorities recognise DNA tagging and isotopic analysis as potential evidence that imported goods did not originate in Xinjiang. Applied DNA Sciences 2024 annual report

This likely explains its inclusion. Applied DNA is not simply another biotechnology company caught in a broad retaliation. Its technology can help generate evidence used to exclude Chinese goods from the US market.

Its direct exposure to China nevertheless appears limited. The company does not disclose a Chinese office, and its latest filing states that all long-lived assets are in the US. It generated around $1.02 million from “Asia and other” markets in 2025, but does not separate China from this figure. The former Applied DNA Sciences parent has also been renamed BNB Plus and shifted much of its focus towards a digital-asset treasury strategy, while retaining a narrower biotechnology business through LineaRx. BNB Plus 2025 annual report

If inflicting maximum commercial damage on the US life-science sector had been Beijing’s objective, there were much larger targets available, companies with substantial Chinese sales, employees, customers and infrastructure. Applied DNA’s selection therefore looks more symbolic and functional than economic.

DNA enters the political bloodstream

The wider significance is the continued politicisation of DNA.

Genomics once sat remarkably far from the centre of Chinese political attention. One story I repeatedly heard during my time working for BGI, was that Beijing was caught almost completely off guard when Bill Clinton publicly acknowledged the contribution of Chinese scientists to the Human Genome Project in June 2000. China’s participation had largely been driven from below by a collection of research institutions, and the newly established Beijing Genomics Institute and its founding scientific team, including Yang Huanming, Wang Jian, Yu Jun and Liu Siqi, which committed to sequencing 1% of the human genome.

Whether every detail of that anecdote is exact, the contrast with today is striking. Clinton did explicitly recognise the contribution of scientists from China to the international consortium. At the time, genomics was still framed primarily as a shared scientific endeavour rather than a strategic national asset.

Twenty-six years later, DNA sits within debates over national security, data sovereignty, surveillance, export controls, supply-chain integrity and industrial power.

Applied DNA’s blacklisting extends this politicisation beyond human genomic data. Here, DNA is being used as a tool of trade enforcement: a molecular marker capable of determining where a product came from and, potentially, whether it can enter the US market.

The target may be small. The signal is not.

Q2 brought a modest sequential improvement for Illumina in Greater China, but revenue remains well below previous levels. The results highlight an increasingly difficult question: where do regulatory barriers end and changing customer demand begin?

Illumina delivered a strong second quarter globally, with revenue rising 9.5% year on year to $1.16 billion. Clinical sequencing demand remained the principal growth driver, supported by continued adoption of NovaSeq X and more than 95 new placements during the quarter.

Greater China was the clear exception.

Revenue from the region, which includes mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, fell 12% year on year to $56 million. After removing acquisition and currency effects, the organic decline was steeper at 19%.

There was nevertheless some sequential improvement. Greater China revenue increased from $52 million in Q1 to $56 million in Q2, an increase of approximately 8%. The year-on-year decline also moderated significantly from the 27% reported and 29% organic contraction recorded in Q1.

The direction of travel improved. But Illumina’s China business remains a long way from recovery.

Stabilisation at a lower base

The latest results need to be viewed against a progressively weaker comparison base.

Greater China generated $75 million in Q2 2024, falling to $63 million in Q2 2025 and $56 million in the latest quarter. Q2 revenue is therefore approximately 25% below the level recorded two years ago.

Across the first half of 2026, Greater China revenue declined from $135 million to $108 million. That represents a 20% reported reduction and a 24% organic decline.

China’s contribution to the wider company has also diminished. Greater China accounted for approximately 4.8% of Illumina’s revenue in both Q1 and Q2 2026, compared with 5.9% in Q2 2025 and almost 7% in Q1 2025.

The regional contrast is increasingly pronounced. In Q2, reported revenue grew 15% in the US and Canada, 14% across Asia-Pacific excluding Greater China and 4% in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Greater China was the only region to contract.

China reduced Illumina’s organic growth rate by 1.6 percentage points in Q2, compared with a 2.3-point drag in Q1. Its declining share of group revenue means the company can now deliver strong global growth despite continued weakness in what was once a much more important market.

Illumina points to an unresolved geopolitical headwind

Illumina’s Q2 filing attributes the $7 million quarterly decline, and the $27 million reduction across the first half, primarily to the company’s continued inclusion on China’s Unreliable Entity List.

The filing repeatedly identifies the designation, wider US–China trade tensions, tariff dynamics and competitive pressures in China as continuing headwinds. Management expects these factors “to continue to impact our sales and results of operations in 2026, and beyond, the magnitude and duration of which remains uncertain.”

Illumina was added to the Unreliable Entity List in February 2025 and was subsequently prohibited from exporting sequencing instruments into China. The instrument restriction was relaxed in November 2025, but exports to Chinese companies remain subject to approval on a case-by-case basis. Illumina also remains on the list, leaving open the possibility of further restrictions.

From Illumina’s perspective, therefore, the weakness is primarily regulatory and geopolitical rather than evidence of a fundamental decline in the need for sequencing.

But the distinction may no longer be so straightforward.

When geopolitical risk becomes a demand problem

As I’ve highlighted previously, regulatory barriers and customer demand are not independent variables in China’s sequencing market.

Blacklisting and import restrictions create direct barriers to purchasing, but they also affect how laboratories assess longer-term platform risk. Buying a sequencer is not simply a one-off capital purchase. It commits a laboratory to a continuing supply of reagents, maintenance, software, technical support and future upgrades.

Even when an Illumina instrument can legally be purchased, uncertainty over future approvals or renewed restrictions may make customers more reluctant to commit to the platform. A laboratory may still value Illumina’s technology but decide that a domestic alternative offers greater certainty of supply and support.

This creates something of a chicken-and-egg dynamic. Political restrictions reduce the practical ability to buy Illumina products. The resulting uncertainty then weakens customer demand, which further reduces sales and creates more opportunities for domestic platforms to establish themselves.

In other words, geopolitics does not simply sit above the market as an external constraint. Over time, it can reshape the market itself.

That makes it difficult to separate “regulatory weakness” from “underlying demand weakness”. If customers are reducing purchases because they cannot be confident that an international platform will remain accessible, this is still a change in demand, even if the original cause is political.

Would demand rebound if the restrictions disappeared?

This is now the central question for Illumina’s position in China.

A full resolution of its political and regulatory difficulties would almost certainly improve the commercial environment. Illumina retains a significant installed base, familiar workflows and longstanding customer relationships. Some laboratories may have delayed rather than cancelled purchases, creating the potential for at least some deferred demand to return.

However, removing the restrictions would not necessarily restore the market to its previous position.

The longer uncertainty persists, the more time Chinese customers have to validate competing systems, redesign workflows and build relationships with domestic suppliers. Once laboratories have made those investments, purchasing patterns may prove difficult to reverse. Political risk may also remain part of procurement decisions even after a specific restriction is removed.

The Q2 numbers cannot yet resolve this question. The increase from $52 million to $56 million could represent an early stabilisation following the relaxation of the instrument ban. But revenue remains below last year, the organic contraction remains substantial and Greater China’s share of Illumina’s business has not recovered.

For now, the most accurate conclusion is that Illumina’s China business is stabilising at a structurally lower level. Resolving the company’s political headaches would be necessary for a meaningful rebound, but it may no longer be sufficient on its own.

As Tom Hancock kindly pointed out to me, this distinction is also reflected in a Seeking Alpha interview with Oxford Nanopore CFO, Nicholas Keher, at the Citi Annual Global Healthcare Conference in December 2025.

Keher described how the company lost a significant order, more than 20 devices, after the prospective customer was added to a US restricted entity list:

“...we had a customer that had multiple, like we’re talking 20-plus device order for us... and essentially, that customer went on to the Americas restricted list and essentially, that killed the entire deal... these things are just completely out of our control.”

It’s worth reiterating that the impact appears to stem from enhanced compliance requirements surrounding specific customers and transactions, rather than a blanket inability to sell into China.

That said, conversations with laboratories and industry contacts in China also suggest that broader market dynamics may be at play. Several noted that procurement and localisation policies, often implemented through informal purchasing preferences rather than explicit regulations, can favour domestic sequencing platforms. Others suggested that concerns around technologies incorporating US-origin components may also influence purchasing decisions in some settings. These observations are anecdotal, but they highlight the complex mix of geopolitical, regulatory and commercial factors shaping China’s sequencing market today.

Oxford Nanopore’s recent preliminary H1 2026 revenue trading update contained one figure that stood out (at least for me). Revenue in China declined by around 16%, with the company attributing the slowdown to export controls and changes to its commercial operations in the region. Outside China and the Middle East, however, the business continued to perform strongly, particularly in clinical and biopharma markets.

Export controls undoubtedly explain much of the decline. But they do not explain all of it.

As we’ve covered, over the past half decade, China has systematically reduced its dependence on imported sequencing technologies. What began with short-read sequencing is increasingly extending into long-read sequencing, a market that has until recently been dominated by Oxford Nanopore and Pacific Biosciences.

The question is no longer whether China will develop domestic long-read sequencing platforms, but how quickly they will become commercially competitive.

Following a familiar pattern

China has followed a consistent pattern across several strategically important technologies. Foreign companies initially establish the market before domestic players emerge, supported by strong investment, a large home market, and national industrial priorities. Over time, those companies become credible alternatives at home before expanding internationally.

Sequencing has followed exactly this trajectory.

Illumina once dominated China’s sequencing market, but today MGI has established itself as the dominant local competitor with its DNBSEQ platforms (plus strong international ambitions). Long-read sequencing now appears to be entering a similar phase.

Several Chinese companies, including GeneMind and QitanTech, are developing nanopore and other single-molecule sequencing technologies. While most remain earlier in their commercial journey than Oxford Nanopore, the pace of progress has accelerated significantly over the past few years.

Perhaps the most notable development is that MGI itself has now entered the long-read sequencing market. Best known for its short-read DNBSEQ platforms, the company unveiled its CycloneSEQ nanopore platform in 2024, signalling that long-read sequencing has become a strategic priority alongside short-read sequencing and spatial omics. If successful, MGI’s established manufacturing capabilities, commercial infrastructure, and installed customer base could significantly accelerate domestic adoption.

Why long-read sequencing matters

The growing interest is being driven by the applications themselves.

Long-read sequencing enables researchers to resolve structural variants, repetitive genomic regions, transcript isoforms, epigenetic modifications, and other features that are difficult or impossible to characterise using short-read technologies alone. As clinical genomics continues to mature, many researchers increasingly view long-read sequencing as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, short-read platforms.

At the same time, China continues to invest heavily in precision medicine, rare disease diagnostics, oncology, and population-scale genomics. Together, these trends are creating a sizeable domestic market for long-read technologies.

Competition is becoming more complex

Oxford Nanopore remains the commercial leader in nanopore sequencing globally (especially for small genome and targeted application sequencing, on a recent trip across Latin America, I spied MinIONs in many labs there!), supported by an extensive installed base, mature software ecosystem, and strong scientific validation.

However, competition today extends beyond instrument performance. Procurement policies, supply chain resilience, regulatory considerations, and geopolitical factors increasingly influence purchasing decisions, particularly within China. Domestic manufacturers also benefit from closer customer relationships and an ecosystem that spans instruments, consumables, software, and increasingly AI-enabled analysis.

The strategic importance of this market is also reflected in the legal arena. Oxford Nanopore has initiated patent proceedings against MGI relating to its CycloneSEQ platform in Australia, while separate proceedings in the UK concern alleged trade secret infringement and breach of confidence. Those cases remain ongoing and highlight the increasingly competitive nature of the long-read sequencing market.

Looking ahead

Oxford Nanopore’s recent trading update should not be interpreted as evidence that domestic Chiense competitors have totally displaced international platforms. The company’s explanation of export controls and commercial restructuring seems credible to me.

Nevertheless, I think the broader direction of travel is becoming increasingly clear. Chinese companies are no longer investing only in short-read sequencing but building capabilities across the full sequencing technology stack, including long-read sequencing, spatial biology and single-cell analysis.

Long-read sequencing will no longer be the preserve of a handful of Western innovators. It has become the latest frontier in China’s drive to build a comprehensive and globally competitive sequencing ecosystem.

Having watched the interview, here are a few of my own pontifications.

1. A surprisingly understated CEO

One of the most striking things isn’t what Jacob says, it’s how he says it.

The loud, enthusiastic San Diego interviewer contrasted dramatically, at least to me, with Jacob’s quiet, analytical style. At times I genuinely wasn’t sure who was interviewing whom.

As someone who lives in Copenhagen and interacts with lots of Danes, that’s definitely the Dane in him.

He talks about studying physics, founding a semiconductor start-up, liking Pink Floyd and even references David Cronenberg’s The Fly (he’s got great artistic taste, in my opinion!). Jacob comes across less as a polished corporate executive and more as someone who still enjoys solving technical problems.

Frankly, I found him refreshingly likeable.

2. China is still clearly part of Illumina’s future

Given recent headlines, I expected a carefully rehearsed answer about China and Illumina’s approach to the market.

I wouldn’t call Jacob’s response a dodge, but it was fairly high-level and somewhat generic: boiling down to science is global.

He talks about working with the world’s best scientists regardless of geography. He describes his inclusion in the US delegation as an honour before quickly shifting the focus to visiting Illumina’s Beijing employees and supporting Chinese customers.

None of that changes the commercial reality. China remains a difficult market for Illumina, and geopolitical tensions are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. In fact, the mood coming out of Washington right now towards China’s biotech sector appears to be moving firmly in the opposite direction.

But if anyone expected Illumina to quietly retreat from China, this interview suggests otherwise.

3. The biggest message wasn’t about sequencing

One sentence stood out above everything else.

“It’s not sequencing, it’s the end-to-end workflow.”

Illumina knows sequencing hardware alone is no longer enough. Increasingly, value sits in the workflow surrounding it: sample preparation, automation, software, AI, interpretation and, ultimately, making laboratories more productive.

As sequencing becomes increasingly commoditised, competitive advantage shifts towards integrated ecosystems that simplify laboratory workflows and deliver actionable clinical insights.

Unfortunately for Illumina, I also think that’s exactly why making renewed progress in China will be especially difficult. As I discussed in a recent BridgeCross Bio article, many Chinese laboratories have already built integrated workflows around domestic technology providers. Re-entering those established ecosystems will be considerably harder than simply selling another sequencing instrument.

4. Competition really does matter

Another interesting moment comes when Jacob says competition ultimately makes Illumina better. The obvious subtext here is Roche’s launch of the AXELIOS platform.

I completely agree.

Where I might differ slightly is in his reflection on sequencing costs.

His comments perhaps overlook an important chapter in the industry’s history. Illumina undoubtedly transformed sequencing economics, but much of the relentless downward pressure on pricing over the past decade also came from emerging competitors, particularly China’s BGI.

5. AI is important, but biology comes first

Almost every genomics company is currently trying to position itself as an AI company to some degree.

Jacob takes a much more measured view.

His argument is that biology is simply too complex, and we still lack the datasets needed to unlock AI’s full potential. His description of building an “Internet of Biology” before expecting truly transformative AI feels very grounded.

Final thoughts

The interview is clearly aimed at investors as much as customers, but it also offers a useful glimpse into how Illumina now sees itself.

This is no longer simply a sequencing company. It wants to become the platform underpinning modern genomics, from sequencing and multiomics through to software, AI and clinical workflows.

Whether that strategy succeeds will ultimately depend on execution, and there are still plenty of questions surrounding the China angle.

Is there any hope of re-establishing itself in China?

If not (and I think not as I’ve made clear), can Illumina maintain its position as the world’s genomics leader without China?

And, as Chinese companies continue to strengthen their own capabilities while expanding internationally, could Illumina begin losing market share in other, more price-sensitive regions as well?

Many of you may have already seen the launch, but in case not…

I’ve built and launched the BridgeCross Bio China Biotech Intelligence Map, a curated view of key companies shaping China’s biotech ecosystem.

New companies are being added every week, and you can now create a free account to access full company profiles.

We’re also working to verify real, usable contact information for every company, something that’s surprisingly hard to find (and definitely not something ChatGPT can reliably do!).

More broadly, with the rise of AI and the sheer volume of content being generated, I’ve increasingly come to believe that data curation and presentation are becoming as important as the data itself. This map is my attempt to put that into practice.

👉 Visit the map and create your free account here: https://map.bridgecross.bio/

If you find it useful, I’d really appreciate you liking and sharing it on social, it genuinely helps support what I’m building. Thank you!

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Introduction

China’s latest five-year plan leaves little ambiguity about the country’s ambitions in biotechnology. Biomanufacturing, including synthetic biology and genetic engineering, has been identified as a strategic sector within China’s emerging bioeconomy. Across government planning documents and provincial industrial policies, biology is increasingly framed not simply as a scientific field, but as a future industrial platform capable of reshaping pharmaceuticals, materials, agriculture, and energy.

At the heart of this shift lies DNA synthesis: the technological “write layer” of biology that allows scientists to design and manufacture genetic sequences.

As China rapidly expands its synthetic biology infrastructure, questions are emerging across the global biotech community. Is China becoming a genuine innovation ecosystem in synthetic biology? How competitive are Chinese companies in DNA synthesis and related technologies? And how will geopolitics shape collaboration and supply chains in the decade ahead?

To explore these questions, BridgeCross Bio spoke with three industry leaders working across the synthetic biology and gene synthesis ecosystem:

Jodi Barrientos, CEO of Ribbon Bio

Marc Montserrat, CEO of DNA Script

Jun Sun, Founder and Chairwoman of Zhonghe Gene Technology

Their perspectives reveal a nuanced picture of rapid industrial scaling, growing technical capability, and increasing geopolitical complexity.

Industrialization, Scale, and Coordination

One of the most striking themes emerging from industry observers is that China’s strength in synthetic biology may lie less in pioneering entirely new scientific frameworks and more in its ability to rapidly industrialize technologies at scale.

“China’s synbio ecosystem is really differentiated by speed, scale, and coordination,” says Jodi Barrientos, CEO of Ribbon Bio. “It can mobilize capital, infrastructure, and manufacturing capacity faster than Europe and certainly quicker than the U.S.”

This industrial approach aligns closely with China’s national strategy for biomanufacturing, which aims to develop large-scale production systems spanning pharmaceuticals, industrial biotechnology, and advanced materials. For Western companies, Barrientos argues, this creates both competitive pressure and potential openings, but navigating it requires strategic caution alongside genuine curiosity about the market.

The Rise of China’s Bio-Industrial Ecosystem

Beyond manufacturing scale, China is also building out the broader ecosystem required to support advanced biotechnology. According to Marc Montserrat, CEO of DNA Script, the country’s rapid development of clinical infrastructure and pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities is particularly significant.

“A number of personalized therapies are being studied in China, and the country is building clinical infrastructure, manufacturing capability, and regulatory pathways in advanced therapies,” Montserrat notes. “For many people the narrative has been that Chinese manufacturers scale commodity synthesis while Western companies lead high-value applications. But that distinction may not hold indefinitely.”

This suggests China’s synthetic biology sector may not remain confined to commodity manufacturing. The country appears to be positioning itself across multiple layers of the biotechnology stack, from upstream research tools to advanced therapeutics.

A Domestic Technology Shift in DNA Synthesis

Within China, a growing number of companies are working to develop domestic technology platforms that reduce reliance on imported equipment and Western-controlled supply chains.

Tianjin-based Zhonghe Gene Technology, founded in 2022 and backed by investors including Lenovo Capital and Guoke Venture Capital in a seed round last year, is among those pursuing enzymatic DNA synthesis, an approach also being developed by companies such as DNA Script in Europe. The technology aims to address well-documented limitations of conventional chemical synthesis: sequence length constraints, error rates, and the use of toxic solvents.

Jun Sun, the company’s founder and chairwoman, frames the opportunity in terms of China’s broader industrial strategy rather than purely technical ambition.

“The Chinese DNA synthesis market is currently at a pivotal moment,” Sun says. “The opportunity is driven by the explosive growth of synthetic biology and China’s national strategy for biomanufacturing.”

Whether domestic enzymatic platforms can close the gap with more established competitors remains to be seen. But the fact that multiple companies, on both sides of the Pacific, are now pursuing similar technological directions suggests the competitive landscape in DNA synthesis is evolving faster than the traditional commodity-versus-innovation narrative implies.

Collaboration, Competition, and Geopolitical Risk

While China’s synthetic biology expansion is attracting global attention, collaboration between Chinese and Western companies is becoming increasingly complicated. Export controls, the US’s Biosecure Act, and broader decoupling trends are hardening the environment, and most observers expect barriers to increase rather than ease.

For Barrientos, the question is less whether to engage and more how to structure it. “Intellectual property protection, data governance, geopolitics, and biosecurity all need to be considered,” she says. “In today’s environment the key question is not whether to engage, but how and on what terms.”

Those purchasing decisions are already shifting. Chinese DNA synthesis providers remain highly competitive on price, but concerns around data security and regulatory risk are prompting some Western buyers to favour European or U.S.-based suppliers. Regional attitudes vary considerably, the issue is most pronounced in the United States, somewhat less so in Europe, and considerably less prominent across Latin America and other markets.

The Future of Global Synthetic Biology Competition

Looking ahead, lower costs, faster scaling, and coordinated industrial policy could intensify competition across large segments of the biotechnology value chain. Western companies are likely to respond by doubling down on intellectual-property-rich platforms, quality, and regulatory trust, while supply chains become increasingly regionalized across China, Europe, and the United States.

For Montserrat, the longer-term question is clinical: “Ultimately the world will be watching whether therapies approved by China’s regulator demonstrate efficacy in large patient populations.”

Biology as Strategic Infrastructure

What is becoming clear is that synthetic biology and DNA synthesis are no longer simply scientific tools. They are increasingly viewed as strategic infrastructure for the future bioeconomy, comparable in significance to artificial intelligence or advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

The result is a global landscape where competition, collaboration, and geopolitical tension coexist, and where understanding China’s rapidly evolving ecosystem is becoming essential for any company operating in the life sciences.

As Barrientos puts it: “China’s strength lies in its ability to industrialize and scale technologies quickly. That makes it a serious competitive force.”

In the emerging global bioeconomy, the race to scale biology may ultimately prove just as important as the race to discover it.

For years, GLP-1 drugs like Ozempic and Wegovy have been defined by scarcity and cost. In China, that dynamic is about to change.

Novo Nordisk’s core semaglutide compound patent expired in China on March 20, 2026, and the race that has been building behind that date is already well underway. More than a dozen domestic pharmaceutical companies have candidates in late-stage development or under active regulatory review at the NMPA. The infrastructure is in place. The starting gun has now fired.

Prices are expected to fall sharply. The standard hypoglycemic dose of semaglutide has already dropped by more than 50% since launch under competitive pressure. Industry observers expect domestic generics to push prices lower still, potentially bringing monthly treatment costs within reach of the mainstream Chinese consumer for the first time.

China’s metabolic health challenge is enormous and still under-appreciated globally.

Over 530 million people in China are currently overweight or obese, the highest absolute number of any country in the world. Obesity rates have risen steadily over two decades alongside urbanisation and dietary shifts, with associated increases in type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease. By 2030, projections suggest the obesity rate among Chinese adults could reach 70%. The scale is not comparable to any other market.

A uniquely Chinese opportunity and a complex competitive landscape.

Unlike in Western markets, where GLP-1 demand is constrained by reimbursement battles and supply shortages, China is positioning itself to combine domestic manufacturing scale with vast unmet clinical need. Hundreds of tertiary hospitals have already established dedicated weight management clinics, normalising injection-based treatment in ways that would have seemed unlikely a decade ago.

The companies currently closest to market represent a cross-section of China’s pharmaceutical establishment. Among those with registration applications at the NMPA or Phase III trials nearing completion:

• Qilu Pharmaceutical - submitted its semaglutide registration for type 2 diabetes as early as September 2024; widely expected to be among the first to receive approval

• Jiuyuan Gene - among the earliest applicants, with a weight-loss indication submission filed in February 2026

• Zhongmei Huadong Medicine - initially challenged Novo Nordisk’s patent directly before pivoting to a biosimilar pathway; considered a strong commercial contender given its distribution reach

• Changchun Bcht Biotechnology - filed for both diabetes and weight management indications; one of two companies most likely to secure the first Class 2.2 generic approval alongside Qilu

• CR Double-Crane and Hanyu Pharmaceutical - Phase III trials for both indications nearing completion, with potential approvals anticipated in late 2026 or early 2027

• CSPC Pharmaceutical - a major domestic player with manufacturing scale and commercial infrastructure already in place
  

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But semaglutide itself may not define the endgame.

Behind the first wave of generics, competition is intensifying across the broader GLP-1 class. Tirzepatide, a dual GIP/GLP-1 agonist, has already surpassed semaglutide globally in sales growth. A pipeline of next-generation molecules is advancing through Chinese clinical trials, including oral formulations, longer-acting variants, and multi-pathway agents that directly address semaglutide’s known limitations.

The caveats remain real.

These are not simple generics. Semaglutide is a complex synthetic peptide, and manufacturing consistency, delivery formats, and post-market surveillance will all shape clinical outcomes and physician trust. Regulatory classification has itself become a competitive variable. For example, companies filing as Class 2.2 chemical drugs in the Chine system face lower evidentiary hurdles than those pursuing the biologics pathway, a distinction that reflects both scientific nuance and commercial strategy. The direction of travel, however, is clear.

Conclusion

China has followed this playbook before: enter at scale, drive down cost, expand access. From DNA sequencing to oncology biosimilars, the pattern holds. GLP-1s appear to be next, and China will not be the last market where this plays out. Patent expiries for semaglutide are staggered across territories, and Novo Nordisk has already had a difficult experience in the United States, where FDA-authorised compounded versions proved harder to contain than expected. In China, the scale, speed, and depth of domestic manufacturing capability behind the generic push makes that challenge considerably larger.

In Western biotech circles, venture capital voices from inside China are rarely heard directly. Yet understanding how China’s investment ecosystem works has become increasingly important as the country emerges not only as a vast healthcare market, but also as a major source of scientific innovation and biotechnology assets.

China’s venture landscape operates under a unique set of dynamics, blending private capital, government-backed funds, and industrial policy in ways that can be difficult for outsiders to interpret.

To help shed light on this system, BridgeCross spoke with Jing (Gabriel) Zhong, Ph.D., MBA, VC Director at one of China’s largest top-tier venture capital firms. In this conversation, he shares his perspective on how Chinese biotech investment works today, how policy and market forces interact, and where cross-border collaboration between Chinese and Western investors may still create opportunities.

Whether you are looking to invest into Chinese biotech, partner with Chinese companies, or simply understand where investment attention in China is moving, this Q&A offers a valuable insider perspective.

Q&A with Jing (Gabriel) Zhong

From your vantage point inside a large state-backed VC, how has the investment narrative evolved over the last 5–7 years — from growth-at-all-costs to today’s more policy-aligned environment?

Given my position, I cannot comment extensively on internal investment narratives. However, it is fair to say that investment decisions today are increasingly shaped by broader strategic considerations, including technological capability and long-term sustainability.

Many Western observers still see Chinese VC as purely state-driven. What do they misunderstand about how investment decisions are actually made today?

This is a common misconception. At least half of Chinese venture capital firms are private companies.

However, it has become more difficult for VCs to raise capital from traditional limited partners in recent years. As a result, many funds now rely on government or state-owned financial institutions as LP investors.

These LPs tend to be more conservative and place greater emphasis on investment security and capital preservation, which naturally influences the overall investment environment.

How does investment decision-making differ inside a state-owned or state-backed VC compared to a purely commercial fund?

In practice, the differences are smaller than many people expect.

Investment committees still include industry experts and experienced investors, and deals must pass rigorous evaluation processes.

Where differences do exist, they tend to involve investment scope and governance. State-backed funds often focus more on high-technology sectors aligned with national priorities, and their auditing and compliance processes are typically more stringent than those of purely commercial funds.

It is also worth noting that purely commercial venture funds are becoming increasingly rare in China today.

How do you personally balance policy alignment with market discipline when evaluating a biotech investment?

My own approach is technology-driven and commercially focused. In many cases, policy priorities actually align with this perspective.

That said, working within a state-owned VC does shape the areas we prioritize. For example, we tend to invest less in areas such as consumer-oriented healthcare products.

On the regulatory side, China’s NMPA was historically more conservative than agencies like the FDA, but the regulatory environment is evolving rapidly.

If a European or US VC approached you today, what would be the most realistic collaboration models?

Today, most state-backed Chinese venture funds do not invest directly in overseas companies.

However, we are very interested in collaboration models that help our portfolio companies expand internationally or license their technologies to global pharmaceutical partners.

In this context, NewCo structures can be an ideal model, as they allow global development of assets while navigating cross-border investment constraints.

Where do Western funds usually get it wrong when trying to engage China?

In the past, many investors approached China primarily as a large commercial market.

Today, that perspective is incomplete. China has become a global leader in biotechnology and many advanced technologies.

Investors are now attracted not only by the market size but also by the scientific capabilities and technological innovation emerging from China.

Are minority stakes, joint ventures, or program-level partnerships more realistic than fully integrated cross-border funds?

Yes, I believe these models are more realistic today.

Geopolitical tensions have made fully integrated cross-border investments more difficult, particularly for state-backed funds.

However, NewCo structures, joint ventures, and program-level partnerships remain very attractive and widely welcomed.

What does a “successful exit” look like internally — and is that changing?

A successful exit is not defined solely by IPO or acquisition.

Ultimately, success is determined by whether the investment generates strong returns for limited partners.

Timing is critical. Investors must exit at favorable market conditions, find acquirers willing to support appropriate valuations, and balance the interests of investors and founders.

Compared with Western funds, Chinese venture funds often operate with shorter time horizons, which adds additional pressure to deliver returns efficiently.

Do you see Chinese funds becoming more open to cross-border NewCo or asset spin-out strategies?

Yes, absolutely.

While geopolitical factors have reduced direct overseas investment activity, Chinese funds increasingly support strategies that allow portfolio companies to establish a global presence, and NewCo models are an effective way to achieve this.

What is one practical step Western VCs could take tomorrow to engage China more intelligently?

The most practical step is to operate in a more China-adapted way.

China has its own technological priorities, investment culture, and disease epidemiology.

Western investors should take the time to understand the local environment, partner with local syndicates, and build relationships within the domestic ecosystem.

What types of Western technologies or therapeutic areas are most compelling to Chinese state-backed capital today?

China’s biotech ecosystem is progressing very quickly, so Western technologies must still maintain a clear technical edge.

Areas that remain particularly attractive include:

• LNP delivery technologies

• AI-driven drug discovery

• advanced antibody engineering

Western companies also continue to lead in novel target discovery, and China can help accelerate development through investigator-initiated trials and cost-efficient clinical infrastructure.

China offers advantages including lower CDMO and CRO costs, large patient populations, and fast clinical execution, which can significantly accelerate the development of promising technologies.

Where do you see genuine win-win collaboration opportunities?

China’s strengths in manufacturing, early development, and clinical execution create strong opportunities for collaboration.

These capabilities can complement Western strengths in target discovery and early scientific innovation, creating a mutually beneficial model.

Recent examples such as Esobiotec demonstrate how this type of cross-border collaboration can succeed.

What in your view are the best channels for Western investors to connect with Chinese biotech and venture capital?

Historically, many Western investors established local teams in China, which can be effective. However, these teams must become deeply integrated into the local ecosystem and learn to operate in a more China-adapted way.

Investors should also participate in major Chinese biotech conferences and investor forums.

Some of the most important events include:

• EBD (易贸) conferences

• Tongxieyi (同写意) biotech forums

• CPHI China

There are also smaller, influential networks connected to leading universities and institutions, such as KaiSi (Chinese Academy of Sciences) and Sinan (Nanjing University).

These communities can be valuable entry points into China’s biotech ecosystem.

Final thoughts

As China’s biotech sector matures and geopolitical tensions reshape global investment flows, cross-border collaboration is becoming more complex but also more strategic.

Understanding how Chinese venture capital operates — including its institutional structures, policy context, and evolving investment priorities — is increasingly essential for anyone seeking to navigate the global life sciences landscape.

Voices from inside the ecosystem remain rare. But as this conversation illustrates, they offer crucial insight into where China’s biotech investment landscape may be heading next.

Deep localisation. Regional partnerships. Expansion beyond tier-one cities.
At its peak in 2020, China accounted for 18% of AstraZeneca’s total revenue.

Now, the recent indictment of former China head Leon Wang, alongside charges against AstraZeneca’s China investment entity, offers a sobering reminder: success in China often requires deep local integration, from partnerships and investment structures to operating models. But the more embedded a company becomes in the domestic ecosystem, the more complex the governance, regulatory exposure, and political risk can become.

This tension is emerging just as many global pharmaceutical companies are scrambling to sign more direct licensing and partnership deals with Chinese biotech firms, reflecting the growing recognition that China has become a major source of innovative assets. Balancing access to that innovation with the realities of operating across two very different regulatory and political environments may define the next decade of Western biotech strategy in China.

The rise of China’s most localised multinational

Leon Wang’s career is well known in Chinese biotech circles. Chinese media often recount his unconventional path, reportedly starting as a foreign-language tour guide before entering pharma through Roche, then rising rapidly at AstraZeneca to become one of the highest-ranking Chinese nationals inside a global pharmaceutical company.

His playbook was simple, but radical for a Western firm at the time:
make AstraZeneca the “most un-foreign” foreign pharma company in China.

That meant:

• embedding deeply into provincial healthcare ecosystems

• partnering with domestic diagnostics firms

• expanding access into county-level markets

• aligning commercial models with China’s reimbursement system

The strategy worked. China grew into one of AstraZeneca’s largest global markets, contributing a significant share of revenue and becoming central to its growth narrative.

But localisation at that scale also creates dense networks of data flows, regional partners, and operational complexity, that sit directly inside China’s regulatory orbit.

AstraZeneca Revenue by Region 2015–2024

Annual Total Revenue (USD Billions)

• China grew from $2.5B → $6.3B (2015–2024), nearly 2.5x growth

• China’s share has stayed roughly 10–14% of total revenue throughout, but at its peak accounted for 18% of revenue in 2020.

• 2022 dip in China revenue was caused by the government’s Volume-Based Procurement (VBP) programme forcing steep price cuts on key drugs like Farxiga

• Total revenue nearly doubled from 2020–2024 largely driven by Alexion acquisition (rare disease) and oncology growth, which is why China’s share as a % stayed relatively flat despite strong absolute growth

• 2025 headwinds are expected from further VBP inclusions and the ongoing Chinese government investigations into AZ personnel
  

  Sources: AstraZeneca Annual Reports & Full Year Results Announcements 2015–2024

  * ROW includes Emerging Markets ex-China, Japan, Canada & Established RoW | 2022 China dip due to Volume-Based Procurement (VBP) | 2021 spike in US/total driven by $39B Alexion acquisition

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Enforcement, not geopolitics, but geopolitics anyway

Chinese reporting frames the prosecution largely as regulatory enforcement tied to long-running investigations around healthcare insurance fraud, data governance, and alleged illegal drug imports.

There is little overt political rhetoric in domestic coverage.
And notably, AstraZeneca continues to invest heavily in China even as the case unfolds, underscoring that the relationship is far from broken.

Yet for Western observers, the geopolitical context is impossible to ignore.

China’s healthcare system is undergoing a structural shift:

• tighter oversight of data and patient information

• stronger enforcement of domestic compliance standards

• increasing prioritisation of local ecosystems

Foreign pharmaceutical companies operating in China are legally treated as domestic entities under Chinese law. As regulatory scrutiny increases, particularly around healthcare data, reimbursement practices, and drug imports, deeper localisation means deeper exposure to enforcement mechanisms.

This is not paradoxical. It is structural.

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Localisation as both growth engine and risk surface

For years, Western pharma executives have looked to AstraZeneca’s China strategy as a blueprint:

Go local. Build partnerships. Integrate deeply.

But the Wang case highlights a harder reality: localisation doesn’t eliminate risk, it redistributes it.

Western governance frameworks are designed for global oversight. China’s healthcare system operates on a dense web of regional relationships, evolving regulations, and local execution models.

When those two systems collide, accountability becomes blurred.

And as China’s biotech ecosystem matures, regulatory scrutiny is becoming less about headline crackdowns and more about sustained, systemic enforcement.

Investment continues even as scrutiny rises

Perhaps the clearest signal that this is not a retreat story is AstraZeneca’s continued commitment to China.

During the recent diplomatic engagement surrounding UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit, AstraZeneca announced plans to invest $15 billion in China through 2030, targeting areas such as cell therapy and radioconjugate innovation.

CEO Pascal Soriot framed the move bluntly: Western pharma must collaborate with Chinese companies not only to compete commercially but to remain relevant in global R&D.

The message is clear, China remains too strategically important to step away from, even as regulatory risks intensify.

Can Western pharma fully localise without losing structural control?

For companies entering China today, the challenge is no longer just market access. It is architectural:

• how to integrate into domestic ecosystems while maintaining global compliance

• how to build local partnerships without creating opaque risk chains

• how to scale in a system where regulatory expectations evolve faster than corporate governance models

China’s life-science sector is entering a phase defined less by rapid expansion and more by regulatory maturity.

And for Western biotech, the next chapter is not be about whether to go local, but about how to localise without losing structural clarity.

When I wrote “Illumina and China: Why Re-Entering the World’s Largest Sequencing Market Is Going to Be Tough” a few weeks ago, we still didn’t fully know how Illumina’s China business had developed since it was removed from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) export ban. Now that Illumina has published its full fiscal year 2025 results, we have data to assess how geopolitical constraints have impacted the company’s performance in China, and what it means for future China revenue. Spoiler alert - it doesn’t look good!

1) China Remains a Weak Spot in the Financials

Illumina’s FY2025 results came in with flat total revenue ($4.34B) versus the prior year, but ex-China revenue was up ~2% on a constant currency basis. 

• The ex-China number growing while total revenue is flat implies that China is a major drag on growth.

• External reporting from Q3 2025 showed Greater China revenue down ~31% YoY to ~$52M and that China had historically been ≈7% of total revenue (~$300M in 2024). 

Put simply: Illumina’s China business not only failed to rebound, it materially shrank during the period it faced export restrictions and ongoing regulatory barriers.

2) The Export Ban Lifted, But It’s Not a Reset Button

In November 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) lifted the export ban that had blocked Illumina sequencers from entering China. Illumina mentions this in its Q4 report as a point of note. However, Illumina remains on China’s Unreliable Entities List (UEL), meaning any instrument purchase still requires government approval. 

That’s a significant point:

• ✅ Export ban lifted → instruments can flow into China again.

• ⚠️ UEL status remains → commercial friction persists.

I’ve covered the significance of this frequently in LinkedIn posts. While Illumina remains on the “Unreliable Entities List” (UEL), approvals will depend on factors such as an institution’s political relationships and how assertively they pursue an exemption. In reality, it’s probably going to be very difficult to get approvals through.

3) Illumina’s Guidance Supports the Narrative: China Growth Is Not Yet in the Cards

Illumina’s FY2026 forecast projects overall revenue growth (~4-6%) driven by ex-China organic growth (2-4%), and only modest upside from the SomaLogic acquisition, but no explicit driver tied to China. 

In investor calls and industry analysis, management has likewise acknowledged that while regulatory engagement with Chinese authorities continues, the academic and research environment remains “muted” and unpredictable. 

4) Competitive Headwinds in China Compound the Problem

China’s domestic sequencing companies, especially BGI Genomics and MGI Tech, have been gaining share over the last several years. Even before the export ban, Illumina’s China revenue was under pressure as local alternatives achieved deeper penetration in both research and clinical markets. 

Combined with regulatory hurdles, this means:

• Illumina must compete on technology and pricing against rapidly maturing domestic rivals.

• Merely lifting the ban does not guarantee restoration of market share or demand.

5) Conclusions

So what can we conclude?

China isn’t a growth driver for Illumina right now.

Instead, it’s a stagnant or shrinking segment marked by:

✔ Export relief (ban lifted)

✘ Continued regulatory conditionality (UEL)

✘ Competitive pressure from domestic players

✘ Evidence of flat or declining revenue contribution

Illumina’s broader strategy, including multiomics expansion, software and services, and diversification beyond core sequencing, makes sense in part because China can no longer be counted on as a dependable revenue springboard. 

6) What This Means for Investors & Markets

From an investor standpoint:

• The fact that Illumina’s ex-China revenue is growing while total revenue is flat tells a clear story, China is one of the biggest weak links.

• China’s regulatory progress is necessary but not sufficient to spur recovery.

• Illumina’s geostrategic positioning and margin outlook rely far more on non-China markets in 2026.

For Western scientists, investors, and industry leaders, a recurring question comes up when trying to understand China’s innovation engine:

Where is the best Chinese science research actually published, and how do you find it?

The answer is more nuanced than simply “look at Chinese journals” or “everything important is already in English.” China has since 2016 overtaken the US to become the world’s largest producer of scientific publications, and its research ecosystem is large, fast-evolving, and increasingly strategic. It is also fragmented, uneven in quality, and shaped by incentives that don’t always align with Western expectations around peer review, transparency, and impact.

Here’s how to navigate what matters, what’s improving, and where caution is still warranted.

The truth: the strongest work is still published in English

Despite the rapid improvement of domestic journals, most of China’s highest‑impact, globally relevant research is still published in English‑language international journals and preprint servers.

This is not accidental. For Chinese researchers operating at the cutting edge, particularly in AI, genomics, synthetic biology, and advanced engineering, international journals remain the primary route to:

• global visibility

• citations and collaboration

• credibility with international peers

As Lyndsey Dixon, CEO and Co‑Founder of Dixon & Straub, notes, much of China’s highest‑impact work is already visible:

“Since China now contributes roughly 30% of global STM publications, much of its highest‑impact research already appears in the international indexes and databases with which we’re all familiar, Clarivate’s Web of Science, Scopus, Dimensions, or OpenAlex.”

That said, this balance is beginning to shift, slowly and unevenly.

ChinaXiv and the rise of domestic open science

China has made a clear policy push to strengthen domestic research infrastructure, including open access. While there is a small but growing open science community pushing these efforts from the bottom-up such as the Chinese Open Science Network, the CAS National Science Library has played a central role here, most notably through ChinaXiv, China’s national preprint server.

After a slow start, ChinaXiv is beginning to see traction, with tens of thousands of preprints now available. However, Dixon offers a pragmatic framing for how Western audiences should treat such platforms:

“To find early‑stage research, ChinaXiv is the national preprint database, but it’s best seen as a way to understand what is happening domestically, rather than a guaranteed filter for the highest‑impact work.”

A reality check is still needed:

• the strongest work often appears first in international journals or global preprint servers

• much content published only in Chinese, particularly in areas like Traditional Chinese Medicine, would struggle to pass scrutiny in top international venues

• English‑language interfaces are often machine‑translated metadata, while PDFs remain in Chinese

ChinaXiv is important infrastructure, but today it is better viewed as a contextual signal rather than quality control.

The domestic journal landscape: improving fast, but uneven

Chinese‑language journals are improving rapidly, driven in part by policy changes that now reward publication in CN‑registered journals more heavily in research assessment.

Dixon emphasizes that concerns around quality are not a specific China problem::

“I think this is really a global issue, not one unique to Chinese journals. Research integrity and reputation are increasingly important priorities in China, and we’re seeing institutions like ISTIC and the Chinese Academy of Sciences taking active steps to implement tighter standards and improve transparency.”

Still, quality varies dramatically. Metric gaming has historically been a serious issue, amplified by monetary and career incentives tied to publication.

China has responded with reforms, including punishment of misconduct and initiatives such as the China Science and Technology Journals Excellence Action Plan (EAP). It has also strengthened domestic evaluation frameworks, including Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) journal rankings and the GoOA platform, which aim to surface credible open-access research. But discernment remains essential.

As Lyndsey Dixon notes, the challenge is not simply access, but distinguishing improving journals from those gaming metrics. As Dixon puts it, the strongest signals of quality remain familiar ones:

“Clear peer‑review processes, respected editorial boards with international participation, adherence to COPE or similar ethical guidelines, and consistency over time.”

One standout to know: The Innovation

If you want a clear example of a Chinese‑founded journal that genuinely bridges domestic research and global relevance, in our view The Innovation stands out.

Backed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and supported by Cell Press, it has achieved:

• an international scope with a multi-national author base

• strong editorial standards

• multidisciplinary coverage across AI, engineering, omics, and applied science

• impact growth that appears driven by quality, not metric manipulation

Its success reflects both editorial discipline and the ability of CAS to channel high‑quality, application‑oriented research into a global‑facing outlet.

Data‑first research: China Scientific Data

Another underappreciated resource is China Scientific Data, a data journal and associated database (Science Data Bank) focused on publishing datasets alongside peer‑reviewed descriptions.

Modeled on Springer-Nature’s Scientific Data and earlier efforts like GigaScience, it has achieved higher submission volumes than many international equivalents and, crucially, provides open, downloadable datasets.

Dixon highlights the opportunity, and the gap, for Western reuse:

“Chinese datasets are significantly underutilised by Western researchers. Awareness, accessibility, and interoperability remain real barriers, but that is starting to change.”

She points to growing investments in national infrastructure such as NSTL and resource‑sharing platforms, while noting that alignment with international standards and English‑language interfaces will be key to unlocking broader impact.

Indexing reality: why you’re missing so much

One of the main reasons Western audiences struggle to find Chinese research is not quality, but indexing.

As we’ve stated, much of China’s highest-impact work does appear in familiar international databases such as Web of Science, Scopus, Dimensions, and PubMed.

However, a very large volume of research published in domestic Chinese journals never makes it into these international indexes.

Instead, it lives primarily inside China-specific discovery systems, most notably:

• CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) - by far the largest and most comprehensive database of Chinese academic literature

• Baidu Scholar - a surprisingly effective search tool for discovering Chinese-language papers, theses, and conference outputs

• Wanfang Data - similar to CNKI, but with additional coverage of technical standards, patents, and proceedings
  

• ChinaXiv - China’s national preprint server, increasingly relevant for early-stage research signals

If you are not using CNKI, you are missing a vast amount of Chinese research, even if much of it requires careful filtering.

Another under-used signal for Western readers is the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). DOAJ currently lists 500+ China-based journals, all of which have undergone editorial and transparency checks and effectively act as a “white list” of non-predatory titles. While inclusion is not a guarantee of quality, it provides a useful first-pass filter for legitimacy.

The net effect of this fragmented indexing landscape is structural invisibility rather than scientific inferiority. Chinese research that is not indexed internationally often remains unseen, uncited, and unintegrated into global discourse, even when the underlying data and methods are sound.

The practical takeaway for Western audiences

If you want to track the best Chinese research today:

• start with international English‑language journals and preprint servers

• supplement with selective, high‑signal domestic sources

• Identify and follow credible Chinese journals (The Innovation being the clearest example)

• use CNKI and Wanfang Data strategically, not indiscriminately

• treat platforms like ChinaXiv as contextual insight, not quality filters

As Dixon concludes, the challenge is not trusting Chinese research less, but assessing it properly:

“The same standards used to assess research elsewhere should be applied to Chinese research, no more, no less.”

China’s research ecosystem is evolving fast. The signal is getting stronger, but so is the noise. Knowing where to look, and where not to, is becoming a competitive advantage.

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Well, since everyone else is talking about Keir Starmer’s visit to China, I suppose I should too!

A lot of the commentary from the UK side, unsurprisingly, has focused on the wins and the deals signed, not least UK drugmaker AstraZeneca’s commitment to invest $15 billion in China through 2030 to expand medicines manufacturing and R&D.

There’s also been a strong undercurrent of commentary focused on the awkwardness of the visit: protocol slights, embassy choreography, linguistic nuances from the Chinese side, inadvertent or intentional (您 vs 你), and endless parsing of who stood where, and why.

What really strikes me is how much mental gymnastics the West still goes through when confronted with China’s rise. There’s a growing acceptance that China is not inferior, that scale and population matter, and that a highly directive state can move very fast when it wants to. But there remains a deep reluctance to accept a harder idea: that a non-Western, state-led system can generate real, durable innovation — not just imitation, not just efficiency gains, but genuine breakthroughs.

Instead, we reach for coping narratives: this isn’t sustainable; it’s all explained by human-rights shortcuts or privacy trade-offs. China’s success becomes something to explain away, rather than something to understand on its own terms.

Starmer’s visit felt less like a reset and more like an implicit admission that not engaging carries real costs. And that, of course, is very much the core message of what we explore at BridgeCross, particularly in the life sciences.

If I’m going to get philosophical about it (which I will!), the reckoning here isn’t really about China. It’s about whether the West can finally let go of the idea that modernity only comes in one political form, and what happens to our thinking once we do.

Matt Marlowe

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Can China ever return as a meaningful growth engine?

On paper, the case looks compelling. China remains the world’s largest and fastest-growing sequencing market, with sustained demand across clinical diagnostics, early cancer screening, population genomics, and an expanding focus on longevity and healthy aging. Illumina’s technology continues to set global performance benchmarks. And since November 2025, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has lifted the export ban on Illumina, formally reopening the door for Chinese customers to purchase its instruments.

But in our conversations with several Chinese biotechnology and sequencing service companies a very different reality emerges, one where Illumina’s challenge is no longer purely technical or even regulatory, but structural and trust-based.

From Preferred Platform to Operational Risk

Several years ago, Illumina would have been the default platform for high-end clinical and research sequencing in China. Today, that assumption no longer holds.

One China-based clinical sequencing provider we spoke with now runs its methylation-based cancer screening services entirely on a domestic SBS platform. Illumina, while still respected technically, was excluded early in the procurement process.

As one interviewee put it:

“Even if Illumina performs well, it’s no longer worth the operational uncertainty.”

Illumina’s placement on China’s Unreliable Entities List in early 2025 fundamentally changed the calculus. Platform choice shifted from a performance discussion to a risk-management decision.

Another interviewee was blunt:

“In clinical operations, stability matters more than marginal accuracy gains.”

For providers responsible for high-throughput clinical services, uncertainty around reagents, service access, or software updates is simply not acceptable.

Buying Illumina in China Today: Possible, but Painful

While import restrictions have partially eased, Illumina remains on the MOFCOM Unreliable Entities List (UEL), requiring government approval for instrument purchases. Purchasing Illumina systems in China remains slow and unpredictable.

Providers described approval pathways involving MOFCOM filings, NMPA certifications, customs inspections, and hospital-level compliance reviews, often stretching procurement timelines by months.

One respondent summarised the situation succinctly:

“You can buy it, but you don’t know when you’ll get it, or what conditions will change next.”

By contrast, domestic platforms move through procurement channels with far greater speed, regulatory clarity, and guaranteed reagent supply.

Platform Choice Has Moved Up the Organisation

One of the most under-appreciated shifts in China’s sequencing market is who makes the buying decision.

Historically, platform selection was often driven by individual labs or principal investigators. Today, decisions are increasingly made at the institutional or governmental level, shaped by national policy alignment, centralised procurement, and geopolitical risk management.

As one interviewee explained:

“Sequencing platforms are no longer just lab tools. They’re infrastructure.”

In this environment, vendor alignment with policy and supply-chain resilience now matters as much as read length or accuracy.

Domestic Platforms Have Closed the Gap-Enough

Another uncomfortable truth for Illumina watchers: Chinese platforms are no longer “catching up”, they are already competitive where it counts.

Fengxiang Bi, the Product Marketing Manager at HaploX, a provider of genetic testing solutions and big data analytics, noted:

“We have validated all our clinical testing products across multiple platforms (including Illumina and MGI, but not limited to these two). Currently, the actual differences in data quality are becoming increasingly smaller, and customer needs are becoming more diversified.”

Across uptime, reagent availability, service responsiveness, and total cost of ownership, domestic SBS platforms and MGI systems are now broadly comparable for most clinical workflows.

In some applications, particularly cfDNA and methylation sequencing, users reported domestic platforms performing better operationally due to tighter local optimisation.

Trust, Not Technology, Is the Real Barrier

Perhaps the most durable challenge for Illumina is not reopening sales channels, but rebuilding trust.

Even if regulatory conditions improve, Chinese institutions remain wary of future disruptions. Platform decisions are now framed around what could break under stress, not what performs best in ideal conditions.

One interviewee captured this mindset clearly:

“We already learned what happens when a supplier becomes politically sensitive. We won’t repeat that mistake.”

This helps explain why many expect China’s sequencing ecosystem to become more domestically anchored over the next 3-5 years, with selective diversification among Chinese vendors, not a return to a single dominant international supplier.

What This Means for Illumina’s China Narrative

China is unlikely to disappear entirely from Illumina’s footprint. Legacy installations and niche research use cases will remain. But the idea of a broad-based rebound driving material earnings growth looks increasingly fragile.

The market has structurally re-oriented around:

• Domestic supply-chain resilience

• Regulatory certainty

• Institutional procurement logic

• Trust built under pressure

These dynamics do not reverse quickly, even if political conditions soften.

For investors, partners, and competitors, the implication is clear:

China’s sequencing market hasn’t paused during Illumina’s absence. It has evolved. And re-entering a market that has learned to operate without you is far harder than regaining access on paper.

*Thank you to HaploX, and the many other companies that spoke with us, but who preferred to remain anonymous.

To explore this, BridgeCross Bio spoke with European and China-based venture investors, including Karl Naegler (Partner, Sofinnova Partners), Claus Andersson (General Partner, Sunstone Life Science Ventures), Yichun Cheng (VP of Investment, Apricot Capital), as well as one anonymous partner at one of China’s largest VC funds.

What emerges is not a story of convergence, but of parallel systems, shaped by distinct incentives, constraints, and expectations around what success ultimately looks like.

For anyone investing in, partnering with, or competing against Chinese biotech, misunderstanding these dynamics comes at a real cost.

China: on the radar, but rarely in the portfolio

For most European funds, China today sits firmly on the strategic watch list, not the active deployment list.

Karl Naegler describes the posture succinctly: China offers “structural opportunity and execution risk” in equal measure. The scale of domestic demand and government support for innovation is compelling, but for European VCs, regulatory complexity and geopolitical uncertainty remain significant barriers.

That does not mean China is irrelevant. Quite the opposite.

European investors are increasingly engaging around China, rather than in China - through licensing deals, NewCo structures, and operational partnerships.

“We are actively considering partnerships with Chinese biotech and pharma companies to license programs for development in the US and Europe through a NewCo model,” Naegler explains, “as well as collaborations between our existing portfolio companies and Chinese CDMOs to accelerate discovery and early development.”

Claus Andersson echoes this external vantage point. With a strictly Europe-only mandate, China is not investable for Sunstone but it is closely watched as a global benchmark.

“China’s pace of innovation and cost structure provide useful reference points when assessing the competitiveness of European companies,” Andersson notes, pointing to strengths in biomanufacturing, small molecules, AI-enabled drug discovery, and medtech engineering.

Where China is strongest: cost, speed, and scale

Across all respondents, there is broad alignment on where China exerts the most competitive pressure.

Chinese companies move faster, in manufacturing scale-up, in clinical trial enrollment, and often in early development iteration. Cost advantages remain real, particularly in CDMO platforms, biologics manufacturing, and small-molecule discovery.

Naegler highlights biologics such as bispecifics and ADCs, small molecules, and CDMOs as areas where China has built durable advantages. Andersson similarly points to manufacturing capacity and execution speed.

The strategic response from Western VCs is not to compete head-on.

Instead, it is to double down on differentiated science, platform IP, and global development and commercialization, while selectively leveraging China’s efficiency where appropriate.

The critical difference: exit pathways and founder intent

If there is one point where China’s VC ecosystem most clearly diverges from the US and Europe, it is how founders think about exits.

A partner at one of China’s largest VC funds put it bluntly:

“Most Chinese founders don’t want to be acquired. In many senses, that would seem like a defeat. They want to list and build an empire.”

This is not a nuance, it is foundational.

In the US and Europe, M&A is a core exit pathway. Acquisitions are culturally accepted, financially attractive, and structurally supported by large pharma balance sheets.

In China, the dynamics are different:

• Late-stage private valuations often make M&A unattractive

• Buyers are reluctant to pay strategic premiums, preferring “asset value” pricing

• Public listings, while regulated, remain the preferred route to liquidity

• Companies are often viewed as founders’ “personal babies,” making loss of control difficult

Only once a company lists, and its share price appreciates significantly, do founders become more open to partial exits.

For Western investors used to acquisition-led return models, this mismatch can be profound.

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RMB funds, USD funds, and the post-COVID reset

Another sharp contrast lies in who supplies capital.

Post-COVID, China’s VC environment has changed dramatically. USD-denominated funds have struggled to raise capital, while RMB funds now dominate.

International LPs have grown cautious about China exposure. As a result, domestic LPs, especially government-backed funds, now provide the bulk of venture capital. This has materially reshaped incentives.

Yichun explains that for many RMB funds, capital comes with additional constraints beyond financial return, including regional development goals and industrial policy alignment.

“Many factors influence investment decisions, rather than simply focusing on investment returns,” Yichun notes. “This is a significant difference compared with Europe and the US.”

Fund structure also matters. RMB funds typically operate on shorter cycles, which can bias investors toward nearer-term outcomes, although longer-duration, state-backed vehicles are beginning to emerge in hubs like Beijing and Shanghai.

Chinese VCs investing Westward: capital is available, conviction is harder

While much attention focuses on Western capital hesitating to enter China, the reverse flow,  Chinese VCs investing into Western biotech companies, comes with its own set of frictions.

On paper, Chinese capital should be attractive. China-based funds bring scale, manufacturing know-how, and potential access to a vast domestic market. In practice, outbound investment is complex.

One challenge sits inside China itself.

Several China-based investors note that their own LPs are often skeptical of overseas investments, particularly in early-stage Western startups. A recurring internal question is simple: if the company is genuinely strong, why does it need Chinese money at all?

For Chinese LPs, Western companies seeking Chinese capital can trigger concerns around:

• weak local investor interest

• unclear relevance to China’s domestic market

• misalignment with national or regional policy priorities

As a result, Chinese VCs frequently need to justify outbound investments internally, especially within RMB-denominated funds.

At the same time, regulatory approvals for outbound capital can be slow, and political considerations increasingly shape what is feasible.

Western caution: trust, IP, and political exposure

If Chinese VCs face skepticism at home, they encounter a different, but equally real, set of concerns in Europe and the US.

Across Western biotech, persistent caution remains around:

• intellectual property leakage, particularly for platform technologies

• governance and control, especially beyond minority stakes

• political exposure, including potential future restrictions on Chinese-linked assets

• regulatory scrutiny, both actual and anticipated

Yichun describes this as a trust gap rather than an information gap. Western teams often understand Chinese investors well enough, but still hesitate. If local capital is readily available, many founders see little incentive to introduce geopolitical complexity unless China market access is explicitly strategic.

As a result, Chinese capital is most welcomed under narrow conditions: minority investments, clear IP boundaries, and a well-defined strategic rationale.

China going global - selectively, but intentionally

Despite the size of the domestic market, leading Chinese investors increasingly believe that China-only strategies cap returns.

Yichun is explicit: Apricot Capital meaningfully upgrades its return expectations only when a portfolio company has a credible global expansion plan, targeting high-value markets like the US and Europe, alongside mid-range markets such as Southeast Asia and Brazil.

Chinese companies are increasingly encouraged to compete globally, but doing so requires navigating regulatory complexity, trust barriers, and very different capital market expectations.

Two systems, one global industry

China’s life science funding ecosystem is not converging on the Western model. It is evolving in parallel, shaped by industrial policy, domestic capital, founder culture, and a strong preference for public listings over trade sales.

For Western investors, the implication is clear:

China is less about direct portfolio construction, and more about partnerships, licensing, benchmarking, and selective collaboration.

Understanding that most Chinese founders are not building to be acquired, but to list, is essential. Without that lens, Western expectations around valuation, control, and exit will continue to misalign.

In a global life science industry, capital may be increasingly mobile, but incentives remain local.

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China's Health System and the Role of AI

China’s hospitals are in the midst of one of the most ambitious digital shifts in global healthcare. Walk into major healthcare centres in Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen and you’ll see glimpses of what the future might look like: radiologists reviewing AI-annotated scans, oncologists working with machine-structured real-world data, and nurses guided by clinical copilots trained on vast national datasets. Together, these efforts form the early architecture of an AI-enabled healthcare system taking shape in real time.

It's important to acknowledge that this transformation isn’t smooth or uniform. Just like many countries across the world, China’s health system still wrestles with inconsistent data quality, uneven digital infrastructure, regional capability gaps, and clinician scepticism - especially outside top-tier hospitals. Policy ambition often moves faster than the realities on the ground. But even with these headwinds, a handful of companies are breaking through: securing approvals, deploying at scale, and solving immediate workflow challenges rather than simply riding the AI hype cycle.

For Western readers, this moment is worth watching. Not because China is racing ahead unchecked, but because it shows how AI in healthcare evolves when a system pushes aggressively toward digitisation, even amid structural friction. The progress - and the limitations - offer lessons for anyone thinking about where clinical AI may realistically deliver impact next.

The Chinese AI Healthcare Companies to Watch

Below, we highlight eight Chinese AI-healthcare companies with verifiable traction across imaging, data infrastructure, and clinical workflow support. AI-drug-discovery firms will be covered separately in a future article.

Infervision

Founded: 2016
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: Radiomics and AI-powered medical imaging for lung, chest, and cardiovascular disease.
Flagship platforms:
- InferRead series of image analysis solutions primarily focussed on lung morbidities
- InferOperate series of 3D reconstruction solutions focussed on thoracic, liver and urology surgeries
Why it matters:
Infervision has translated AI-imaging into routine hospital workflows at meaningful scale. With integrations across major PACS systems, multi-modality support (CT, DR, MRI), and regulatory clearances spanning NMPA, CE, FDA, PMDA, and UKCA, the company demonstrates strong commercial maturity. It reports operations in 30 countries with five global offices, positioning it as one of the most internationally visible players in China’s medical-AI landscape.

Shukun Technology (CareVerse in Global markets)

Founded: 2017
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: AI-powered “Digital Body” imaging platform, with a particular strength in cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease.
Flagship platforms:
- The DigitalDoc and Digital Doctor platforms, covering heart, brain, chest, abdomen and musculoskeletal imaging across CT, MRI, DR, ultrasound and more. 
Why it matters:
Shukun has gained wide deployment across China, claiming adoption in 4,000 public hospitals and 1,000 medical-examination institutions. Its positioning as a workflow-focused platform, supporting quality control, structure recognition, and standardised diagnosis across sites, gives it relevance in large care systems where demand for cardiovascular imaging expertise outpaces supply.

Yidu Tech

Founded: 2014
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: Healthcare data infrastructure and AI platforms for hospitals, public health systems, and biopharma.
Flagship platform:
- YiduCore, a platform that powers a suite of applications across clinical care, staff education, hospital management and research.
Why it matters:
Where Infervision and Shukun work on pixels, Yidu Tech works on data exhaust. Yidu Tech claims coverage of over one billion patient records across thousands of institutions, giving it a rare footprint in healthcare data infrastructure. By supporting operational tasks such as triage, scheduling, documentation and clinical interpretation, it plays an important role in digitisation efforts within large public-hospital networks. Its platforms were reported to have helped cities manage pandemic tracing and treatment logistics, documented in a sponsored Nature article as emblematic of China’s data-driven Covid response.

Deepwise

Founded: 2017
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: Radiomics and AI imaging solutions across multiple organs, with particular focus on breast cancer screening.
Flagship platform:
- Dr. Wise platform for assisted clinical diagnosis and research
Why it matters:
Deepwise has achieved regulatory traction in important disease areas, including what it claims were China’s first NMPA Class III AI certificates for pneumonia (2021) and breast-cancer mammography screening (2023). That regulatory progress, paired with focus on a clearly defined set of clinical use cases, suggests a pragmatic commercial strategy with measurable clinical impact.

LinkingMed

Founded: 2014
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: AI-powered auto-contouring, treatment-planning, and cloud-based collaboration tools to streamline and scale radiotherapy workflows in hospitals and imaging centers.
Flagship platform:
- RT-Viewer-contour, an AI software tool that helps clinicians identify, outline, and label tumors and critical organs on medical scans so radiation can be precisely targeted to cancer while avoiding healthy tissue.
Why it matters:
As demand for radiotherapy grows faster than specialist capacity, LinkingMed’s automation of contouring, planning, and QA supports hospitals under operational strain. By embedding into radiotherapy workflows, the company occupies a strategic position in one of the fastest-expanding areas of oncology care.

Airdoc

Founded: 2015
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: AI-powered retinal imaging to assess eye disease and systemic risk via a single fundus photograph.
Flagship platform:
- Airdoc-AIFUNDUS, a platform for the rapid diagnosis and assessment for diabetic retinopathy.
Why it matters:
Airdoc claims to have screened more than 30 million patients and to have been the first medical-AI company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (2021). With Class III NMPA approval for diabetic-retinopathy screening, it addresses a major national health priority: early management of rising diabetes and cardiovascular-risk burden through scalable, non-invasive screening.

SenseTime

Founded: 2014
Headquarters: Hong Kong
Core focus: Multi-modality imaging platform, smart-hospital solutions, and AI-assisted clinical workflows.
Flagship platforms:
- SenseCare, a suite of AI toolkits covering segmentation, registration, lesion detection and 3D visualisation across multiple imaging modalities and body regions.
Why it matters:
SenseTime is one of the most established companies in China’s AI sector, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and operating across multiple technology verticals. Its SenseCare medical platform positions the company as a general-purpose layer for AI-assisted hospitals. Clinical reports and media coverage suggest it can significantly enhance imaging-department efficiency, strengthening its role in large hospital networks.

Xunfei Healthcare

Founded: 2016
Headquarters: Beijing
Core focus: Comprehensive AI healthcare stack across clinical decision support, disease and patient management, imaging and even insurance.
Flagship products:
- AI-assisted history taking, triage and diagnosis support
- Voice-driven EMR and clinical documentation tools
- Remote imaging cloud & telemedicine service platform
- Chronic-disease management devices and digital-health apps
Why it matters:
Backed by parent group iFLYTEK, Xunfei benefits from deep capabilities in speech recognition and large-language models. With deployment across 60,000+ primary-care sites and 500+ major hospitals, it is one of the largest-scale medical-AI rollouts in China. Its broad footprint in clinical documentation, decision-support, and telemedicine positions it as key digital infrastructure within primary and community care.

What These Companies Tell Us About China’s AI-Health Trajectory

Across these eight companies, a few patterns stand out:

1.     Imaging is the gateway application
Medical imaging remains the fastest path to product-market fit. It’s where data is rich, labels are clear, and clinical value is easy to measure in minutes saved and errors avoided.

2.     Data platforms are the new power centres.
Yidu Tech and LinkingMed illustrate that whoever controls the structured, longitudinal, multi-institutional health data can power not just one AI model, but dozens. Perhaps this is where real defensibility lies?

3.     Regulatory maturity is catching up.
Approvals such as Deepwise’s breast-cancer device and Infervision’s multi-jurisdictional certifications signal that Chinese AI-health firms are learning to navigate high-bar regulatory regimes, at home and abroad.

4.     The frontier is moving from “point tools” to “copilots”.
Several of these companies are already trying to execute system wide models embedded across hospital departments and job functions. The direction of travel is clear: away from single-use tools, toward integrated assistants that sit alongside clinicians and management staff at every step.

Why This Matters Outside China

China is testing AI in healthcare at a scale few other countries can match. The companies above are not redefining medicine everywhere yet, but they are revealing what becomes possible when policymakers, hospital groups, and tech firms are aligned around AI adoption at scale and standardisation into daily clinical workflows.

Whether one sees China as a collaborator, a competitor, or simply a bellwether, its AI-health trajectory offers an early preview of the operational, regulatory, and workforce challenges Western systems will soon face. Understanding this shift now is the first step toward shaping how, and by whom, the next generation of clinical infrastructure is built.

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While the world gawks at AI demos and frets about critical minerals, China has been quietly loading the cannon in an entirely different direction. At its latest plenary meeting (Beijing’s equivalent of a high-stakes strategic retreat without the name badges, trust falls and someone earnestly suggesting a mindfulness breakout session… although who knows!), the leadership unveiled early contours of the 15th Five-Year Plan. The message between the lines is unmistakable: biomanufacturing is the pillar of its next industrial era.

Five-Year Plans are always tea-leaf reading exercises, but this one feels different. The phrasing, the sequencing, the sudden elevation of new industries all point to a country recalibrating for a far more unpredictable world than the one mapped five years ago. Beijing has already christened this plan a “crucial link” in China’s march toward full modernization by 2035. And in that hierarchy of priorities, technology is no longer a supporting actor, it’s the arena in which global power will be contested.

Biomanufacturing Muscles To The Front

Here’s the headline few people seem to have noticed: biomanufacturing now sits beside quantum tech, hydrogen energy, and nuclear fusion at the top tier of China’s future-industries agenda. “Biotechnology” was yesterday’s vocabulary, broad, aspirational, research-centric. “Biomanufacturing” is today’s language: industrial, scaled, and unapologetically commercial.

This isn’t a vision. It’s a build-out.

And Beijing just tipped its hand.

The Big Reveal: 43 New Scale-Up Facilities

In a joint announcement, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published a list of 43 companies chosen to construct new biomanufacturing pilot and scale-up facilities. The sheer number dwarfs anything being attempted elsewhere, and may even overshadow other Chinese industrial initiatives in emerging tech.

It’s an industrial moonshot hiding in plain sight.

Reading the Roster

A few patterns jump off the page:

• Industrial biology dominates. Food additives, materials, enzymes, these companies make things. This is biology as manufacturing.

• Food-and-additives firms lead the pack. It’s the largest group by far, perhaps signaling where near-term commercial wins lie.

• Biopharma plays a supporting role. Once the crown jewel of biological innovation, it now sits mid-table. The message? China sees biology not as a healthcare specialty, but as a general-purpose platform technology.

And yet, almost unbelievably, there’s been no real English-language coverage. The world is too busy watching humanoid robots do backflips.

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43 Pilot Companies (Chinese)

43 Pilot Companies (Chinese).pdf

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43 Pilot Companies English

1. JOINN Bio (Beijing JOINN Biologics Co., Ltd.) – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

2. Tianjin University – Frontier Institute of Synthetic Biology – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

3. CAS Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology – Food & Additives, Biopharma, Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

4. Bloomage Biotech (Tianjin) – Cosmetics, Food & Additives, Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

5. Beijing University of Chemical Technology – Qinhuangdao Bioindustrial Research Institute – Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

6. Inner Mongolia University of Technology – Food & Additives, Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

7. Dalian Practical Biotech Co., Ltd. – Plant Cell Platforms (Plant chassis development)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

8. Changchun Institute of Biological Products Co., Ltd. – Biopharma (Vaccines)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

9. NHU Biotech (Heilongjiang Xinhua Cheng Biotechnology) – Food & Additives拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

10. SDIC Advanced Biofuel (Hailun) Co., Ltd. – Bioenergy, Lignocellulose Utilization拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

11. Shenghejianwu (Shanghai) Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

12. Shanghai SynBio Oasis Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

13. Eicolai Biotech (AibioChem) – Food & Additives拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

14. Vazyme Biotech (Nanjing Vazyme Biotech Co., Ltd.) – Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

15. Nanjing Normal University – Changzhou Synthetic Biology Industry Research Institute – Food & Additives, Cosmetics拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

16. Suzhou Womei Biotech Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

17. WeCare Probiotics (Suzhou) – Food & Additives (Probiotics)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

18. Wenzhou Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

19. Zhejiang Marine Development Research Institute – Food & Additives (Marine)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

20. Transfar YiXun New Materials Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

21. Anhui Huaheng Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

22. Hefei National Laboratory for Health Research – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

23. Xiang’an Innovation Laboratory (Xiamen University) – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

24. Jiangxi Microalgae Resource & Environmental Tech Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Plant Cell Platforms (Microalgae)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

25. Qilu Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

26. Shandong Longtec Enzyme Co., Ltd. – Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

27. Shandong University – National Key Lab of Microbial Technology – Food & Additives, Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

28. Henan Scientific Achievement Transfer Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

29. Hubei University – Enzymes, Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

30. Huazhong Agricultural University – Biopharma, Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

31. CABIO Biotech (Wuhan) – Food & Additives拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

32. Angel Yeast Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Enzymes (Yeast fermentation)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

33. Truking Technology Co., Ltd. – Biopharma (Biomanufacturing equipment)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

34. Hunan Biomanufacturing Pilot Base Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Enzymes, Biopharma (Mixed biomanufacturing)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

35. MoonBio (Guangzhou) – Food & Additives拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

36. Nanning Hanhe Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

37. Sanya BGI Life Science Research Institute – Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

38. Chongqing Ansaibo New Materials Technology Co., Ltd. – Plant Cell Platforms (Plant chassis)拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

39. Chengdu Yatu Biotech Co., Ltd. – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

40. Chengdu Jinkai Bioengineering Co., Ltd. – Food & Additives, Cosmetics, Enzymes拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

41. Institute of Medical Biology, Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) – Biopharma拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

42. Ningxia CAS New Biomaterials Co., Ltd. – Biochemical Engineering拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

43. Yili Chuan Ning Biotechnology Co., Ltd. – Biopharma, Cosmetics拟发布的生物制造中试能力建设平台名单（第一批）

The Quiet Race Has Already Started

The 43 facilities are not the story, they’re just the beginning.

While everyone else is distracted, China is laying the foundations of a biological manufacturing superpower. And it’s doing it with a discipline and scale the rest of the world hasn’t begun to reckon with.

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China’s lab automation sector hasn’t grabbed attention, walking humanoid robots make for better headlines than automated liquid handlers, but its impact may prove just as transformative. In the world’s largest and fastest-moving scientific market, hospitals and research centres handle sample volumes unmatched anywhere else, giving Chinese lab automation firms a testing ground no other country can offer. That scale has allowed them to optimise faster, cheaper, and more aggressively than Western competitors. And with biomanufacturing now elevated to an explicit national priority at the highest levels of government, these companies are shifting from domestic momentum to global ambition. What they’re exporting isn’t just machinery, it’s an entirely new operating model for modern biology.

Introduction

Across China’s research parks and biotech corridors, the whirr of automated workflows has become the new soundtrack of progress, signalling a transformation as profound as any in the nation’s industrial past. Once known as the world’s workshop, China is fast becoming its labshop: the place where the tools of biological research are designed and built.

The country’s forthcoming Five-Year Plan puts biomanufacturing at the centre of its innovation agenda, elevating it from a niche pursuit to a national growth engine. Across Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Suzhou, a new generation of lab automation firms is building the hardware and intelligence that power modern biology, from robotic cell-culture systems to AI-directed bioprocessing.

These companies aren’t content to serve the domestic market. Stress-tested in one of the world’s largest, fastest-moving scientific environments and fuelled by massive sample volumes that have allowed relentless optimisation, they’re now scaling aggressively into Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. Their pitch: a new standard of precision, reproducibility, and speed in biological R&D.

This isn’t just “Made in China”. It’s Invented, Automated, and Globalized in China. For global biotech leaders and investors, the question is no longer if China’s laboratory automation revolution will reach Western lab benches, but how quickly it will arrive, even as the traditional lab bench itself becomes optional!

The Companies Driving China’s Lab Automation Revolution

This selection focuses on robotics and automation companies with direct applications in life sciences and biomanufacturing. Companies primarily engaged in humanoid robotics are excluded, and we also exclude operations outside the life sciences, where applicable. Included are firms that demonstrate clear relevance, meaningful breadth, and strong technological innovation in laboratory and production automation.

MGI Tech (华大智造 / MGI)

Website: https://en.mgi-tech.com
Founded: 2016 | Headquarters: Shenzhen

Focus Area: Genetic sequencing, sample processing, multi-omics, clinical diagnostics
Summary: MGI provides end-to-end “sample-to-report” sequencing platforms that integrate high-throughput genetic sequencing with automated sample preparation, enabling scalable, domestically manufactured solutions for research and clinical applications. One of the most globally established companies profiled, MGI reports business operations across six continents and in over 100 countries and regions worldwide. They have established a new European headquarters in Berlin, Germany, while the company also operates a manufacturing facility in Riga, Latvia.

MegaRobo Technologies (镁伽科技 / MegaRobo)

Website: https://www.megarobo.com
Founded: 2016 | Headquarters: Beijing

Focus Area: Laboratory automation, AI-driven robotics, drug discovery, high-throughput screening
Summary: MegaRobo delivers integrated robotics, AI, and data-driven automation platforms that streamline R&D and drug discovery workflows, from cell-line development and assay screening to imaging, with the goal of enhancing reproducibility and efficiency in biopharma labs.

BIOYOND (奔曜科技)

Website: https://www.bioyond.com/en/
Founded: 2018 | Headquarters: Shanghai

Focus Area: Laboratory automation, clinical diagnostics, analytical workflows
Summary: Bioyond develops intelligent robotic and vision-based automation systems for research, diagnostics, and analytical labs. Its modular platforms support applications in small-molecule drug discovery, biologics, cell and gene therapy, and synthetic biology.

IMADEK (迈迪克)

Website: https://www.csmadik.com/
Founded: 2015 | Headquarters: Shenzhen

Focus Area: Automated laboratory systems, clinical diagnostics, biobanking
Summary: IMADEK designs and manufactures automated diagnostic and sample-processing systems, including nucleic-acid extractors, liquid-handling modules, and blood-bank automation, serving molecular diagnostics, immunoassay, and IVD applications.

Haier Biomedical (海尔生物)

Website: https://www.haierbiomedical.co.uk/
Founded: 2014 | Headquarters: Qingdao

Focus Area: IoT-enabled cold-chain systems, smart labs, biobanking, biomedical storage
Summary: A division of Haier, the Chinese multinational home appliances and consumer electronics behemoth, Haier Biomedical provides digitally managed cold-chain and smart-lab infrastructure, including ultra-low-temperature storage, biosafety cabinets, and vaccine and biobank management solutions. It supports hospitals, research institutes, and biopharma facilities worldwide.

RayKol Group (睿科 / RayKol)

Website: https://www.raykol.com
Founded: 2007 | Headquarters: Xiamen, Fujian

Focus Area: Analytical chemistry, food and environmental testing, clinical diagnostics
Summary: RayKol develops modular, high-throughput sample-preparation and automation systems for analytical, environmental, and clinical laboratories, with the ambition to offer standardized platforms for routine testing and quality control.

XtalPi (晶泰科技 / XtalPi)

Website: https://www.xtalpi.com
Founded: 2015 | Headquarters: Shenzhen

Focus Area: AI-driven drug discovery, crystallography, molecular R&D
Summary: XtalPi combines computational chemistry, AI-based molecular modeling, and automated lab execution to accelerate the discovery and optimization of drug candidates from molecular design through synthesis and testing. Of note, XtalPi has partnered with Microsoft China on an “AI for Science” initiative, combining XtalPi’s drug-discovery automation with Microsoft’s cloud and AI infrastructure.

Insilico Medicine (英矽智能 / Insilico Medicine)

Website: https://insilico.com
Founded: 2014 | Headquarters: Hong Kong / Suzhou R&D Center

Focus Area: AI-driven drug discovery, precision medicine, life-science automation
Summary: Insilico Medicine integrates AI algorithms for target and molecule discovery with robotic laboratory platforms, supporting end-to-end automated drug design, synthesis, and validation in precision medicine.

FAIR Innovation (Suzhou)

Website: https://www.fair-innovation.com
Founded: 2015 | Headquarters: Suzhou

Focus Area: Biomanufacturing automation, diagnostic production, laboratory robotics
Summary: FAIR Innovation develops collaborative robot systems for biomanufacturing and diagnostic automation, emphasizing flexible, localized production capabilities and supply-chain independence for life-science manufacturing environments.

Policy Landscape: Biomanufacturing as China’s Next Frontier in Life Sciences

As China seeks to transition from being the “workshop of the world” to the “laboratory of the world,” biomanufacturing has become central to its next phase of industrial policy. The forthcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) identifies biomanufacturing as one of the nation’s core “future industries.” This positioning places life-science instrumentation, high-throughput robotics, and autonomous laboratory systems squarely within the country’s innovation and industrial agenda.

Analysts note that biomanufacturing has been explicitly cited as a key economic growth engine in China’s push for what policymakers call “new quality productive forces.” In practical terms, this means expanded public investment, regional subsidies, and procurement mandates across genomics, biologics, cell and gene therapy, and diagnostic manufacturing.

What This Means for Lab Automation and Sequencing Hubs

The policy emphasis on biomanufacturing directly benefits the companies featured earlier in this article. Hospitals, clinical centers, and R&D institutes are now under growing pressure to adopt domestically produced automation systems. As China scales biologics and microbial production, demand will increase for sample-preparation robotics, high-density liquid-handling systems, and automated bioreactor monitoring, precisely the technologies these emerging robotics firms provide.

Meanwhile, designated biomanufacturing demonstration zones in Jiangsu, Guangdong, and the Beijing region are offering preferential tax terms, subsidies, and talent incentives to automation and robotics providers. For international firms, this means a transition from acting as external suppliers to becoming co-development partners within China’s ecosystem. Market entry and competitiveness will increasingly depend on localization, manufacturing, R&D, or service footprints inside China’s priority zones.

Conclusion

China’s lab automation and biomanufacturing sectors are converging into a single innovation engine. What began as a push for self-reliance has evolved into a globally competitive ecosystem where AI, robotics, and biology intersect. For international life-science companies, the question is no longer whether to engage, but how early, and on what terms. Those who understand this system now will be best positioned to help shape the next phase of global biotech manufacturing.

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