At the moment, however, the manufacturing sector is faltering. The Gross Value Added (GVA)-to-Gross Value of Output (GVO) ratio — a key measure of efficiency in value addition — has declined for both manufacturing and the broader Indian economy.

An industry’s GVO equals its GVA plus the cost of intermediate goods. A falling GVA-to-GVO ratio means companies are using more inputs to produce the same output, signalling lower efficiency and weaker value addition.

Manufacturing’s GVA-to-GVO ratio was 21.96 per cent in FY15 and increased to 24.57 per cent in FY18. Thereafter, the ratio started to decline, falling below the FY15 level by FY22. Since FY23, irrespective of the change in the base year, the figures have fallen further below the FY22 numbers. A similar trend is visible in the GVA-to-GVO ratio for the whole economy (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Petroleum products and telecom equipment, including smartphones, were India’s top exports by value in FY26. Notably, the two sectors had one of the lowest GVA-to-GVO ratios among all Indian industries in FY24, the latest year for which data is available. The ratios for petroleum products and communication equipment were 12.33 per cent and 8.86 per cent, respectively.

Other major Indian export products, such as iron and steel, transport goods and electrical equipment, had relatively better ratios. It means that India’s top export products are highly input-intensive, with very low value addition. It also underscores a high dependence on intermediate goods — whether domestically produced or imported (chart 2).

Low value addition and high input intensity are not a problem per se if the industry sources its intermediate goods domestically. A robust manufacturing base for intermediate goods creates jobs, strengthens supply chains and helps improve global competitiveness.

However, India’s exports of petroleum products and communication equipment rely heavily on imported intermediate goods and components. Domestic value addition in gross exports of petroleum products and communication equipment in 2022 was just 10.02 per cent and 20.93 per cent, respectively. Transport goods and readymade garments have low GVA-to-GVO ratios but a relatively high rate of domestic sourcing of intermediate components (chart 3).

A related trend appears in comparing banks by ownership: Public sector banks (PSBs) consistently report higher NPAs than private banks. This pattern holds across loans for agriculture, industry and services. Retail — or personal loans — are the only segment where private banks fare worse.

Gross NPAs (GNPAs) for all scheduled commercial banks fell below 2 per cent in FY26, the first time the overall level has fallen below that mark in at least a decade. GNPAs stood at 8.58 per cent in FY17 and peaked at 11.21 per cent in FY18. Since then, asset quality has improved steadily, with the ratio declining each year.

The bad-loan ratio in the industrial sector fell from a peak of 20.29 per cent in FY18 to just 1.96 per cent in FY26. Agriculture, by contrast, kept increasing from FY17 and overtook industry in FY22, when its ratio touched 9.96 per cent against industry’s 9.45 per cent. It has since eased a little but is above 6 per cent and tops the list of stressed sectors. The ratios for services and retail loans were far lower at 1.84 per cent and 1.12 per cent, respectively, in FY26 (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Ownership adds another layer to this story. Private banks have held more retail loan NPAs than PSBs since FY25. In every other category, PSBs carry more bad debt than private banks, even though their GNPAs have declined sharply over the decade (chart 2).

PSBs, the epicentre of the last decade’s NPA stress, saw their bad-loan ratio touch nearly 15 per cent in FY18, before declining to under 2 per cent by FY26. Private banks’ GNPAs now stands just a shade behind that of PSBs. Over the decade, their bad debt never reached the highs PSBs did (chart 3).

This turnaround was not accidental. The Reserve Bank of India initiated an asset quality review in 2015, after which the government rolled out a “4R” strategy to recognise NPAs transparently, resolve and recover value from stressed accounts through effective laws and processes, recapitalise PSBs, and reform banks and the wider financial ecosystem.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code changed the rules, defaulting promoters lost control of their companies, and wilful defaulters were barred from buying them back. Recovery laws, including the SARFAESI Act and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, were also tightened, and banks began tracking stressed accounts more closely, catching trouble early before it could snowball.

Even so, part of this improvement comes with a caveat. Scheduled commercial banks have written off close to Rs 16.35 trillion in bad loans over the decade to FY24, this clears loans off the books. Recoveries against these written-off loans have stayed in the range of only 13-18 per cent. Thus, the falling NPA number isn’t just banks recovering dues, a lot of it is banks writing the debt off their books.

India is a major exporter of both natural and lab-grown diamonds. Until 2025, the exports of natural diamonds exceeded those of synthetic ones. But from January to May this year, the volume of lab-grown diamond exports exceeded natural diamond shipments.

Indian exports of natural diamonds nearly halved from 26.63 million carats in 2022 to 15.81 million carats in 2025. Exports of synthetic diamonds more than quadrupled from 3.57 million carats in 2022 to 14.95 million carats in 2025.

Further, the average unit export price of both natural and lab-grown diamonds has declined in recent years. The export price of natural diamonds fell from $865.50 per carat in 2022 to $757.91 per carat in 2026 (Jan-May). The price drop was even sharper for lab-grown diamonds: From $388.77 per carat in 2022 to $71.13 per carat in 2026 (Jan-May). (An export price is the price charged by a manufacturer or exporter for goods sold to a buyer in a foreign country.)

As prices fell, the export value of lab-grown diamonds also fell from $1.42 billion in 2023 to $1.19 billion in 2025, despite overseas shipments increasing. Earnings from natural diamond exports exceeded $12 billion — nearly 12 times the earnings from shipments of lab-grown diamonds (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

India’s share in global lab-grown diamond exports has grown from 28.03 per cent in 2022 to 35.73 per cent in 2025. Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the other major exporters of lab-grown diamonds. While India was the primary exporter of polished lab-grown diamonds, Hong Kong and China were the leading exporters of rough and unworked lab-grown diamonds (chart 2).

The United States is India’s largest export market for lab-grown diamonds. However, its share in India’s shipments dropped from 63.49 per cent in 2022 to 16.66 per cent in 2026 (Jan-May). Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s share commensurately increased from 13.51 per cent in 2022 to 45.4 per cent in 2026 (Jan-May). Israel, Belgium and the UAE were the other major markets for India’s lab-grown diamond exports (chart 3).

However, despite steady progress in athletics, India’s footprint at the Olympic Games and World Athletics Championships remains minimal. Javelin thrower Neeraj Chopra remains the only Indian athlete to have won a medal at the Olympics.

At the 2024 Paris Olympics, just two Indians qualified for the finals of their track and field events: Chopra in the men’s javelin throw and Avinash Sable in the men’s 3000 m steeplechase. The rest of the Indian athletics contingent for the 2024 Olympics bowed out in the qualification stage.

While Indian participation in Olympic athletics has grown, a wide gap remains between meeting qualifying standards and contending for a medal. In fact, India’s national records currently meet the 2024 Olympic qualification mark for reaching the final medal-event in only seven of the 28 track events.

Only one of these seven national records (men’s 5000 m) was better than the performance that won bronze at the 2024 Olympics. This means that if Indian athletes race and register a time equal to the existing national records, they would qualify for the final in just seven events and win only one medal (chart 2).

India’s standing in field events is relatively better. Twelve national record performances met the qualification mark to reach the finals across 18 field events at the 2024 Paris Olympics. However, only three of those records would have actually yielded a medal, assuming Indian athletes matched their national bests (chart 3).

While India’s recent rise in athletics is commendable, the country remains miles away from competing at the global level. Sustained, long-term efforts are essential if India is to join the world’s elite on the athletics medal table.

That same volatility carries into where the money goes. Financial, insurance, and business services — the perennial leader holding over a third of all outward commitments in recent years — accounted for two-thirds of the total in April. By June, its share had collapsed to under a fifth, overtaken by construction, a sector that rarely features among the top five and whose share rose nearly fivefold, from 5.17 per cent in May to 25.68 per cent in June (chart 2).

The destination map saw a significant shift in June compared with the previous month. Singapore had been relegated in April and May, when the United States and Mauritius led with 28.29 per cent and 20.38 per cent shares, respectively. It returned to the top in June, holding a 23.79 per cent share, nearly tripling from 8.59 per cent in May. Mauritius, which had led in May with over a fifth of all commitments, fell sharply to 1.08 per cent in June.

Over the decade, Singapore has led from FY16 to FY26, except in FY19 and FY21, when the United States held a marginally higher share (chart 3).

According to RBI data on major overseas investment commitments, ONGC Videsh Rovuma committed $40 million towards its Mozambique-based joint venture. Startup Investments committed nearly $35 million towards its Singapore-based joint venture.

Lenskart committed equity worth $22 million to its Singapore-based wholly owned subsidiary. GFCL EV Products committed $20 million in equity to its Oman-based joint venture and another $0.13 million to its Oman-based wholly owned subsidiary. OneSource Specialty Pharma committed $18 million in equity to its Singapore-based wholly owned subsidiary.

A report by the Centre for WTO Studies shows that large Indian companies have become true global players in outward FDI. Most mid-sized companies, though, are still finding their feet abroad, and smaller companies mostly stick to small, one-time investments.

What this expansion of overseas investment makes clear is that the real story isn’t just about how much money Indian companies are sending abroad, but it’s about how many more of them get the chance to do so. That, in turn, calls for a proper national plan, with easier support for smaller and mid-sized firms.

They earn about Rs 200 daily, according to a report by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. Children are employed because their smaller hands and low wages are useful to someone else, and there are many such Seelampurs across the country.

India amended its Foreign Trade Policy on July 14 to prohibit the import of goods produced, wholly or partly, through forced labour. The amendment comes at a time when the United States is examining forced labour practices in 60 countries, including India.

According to the International Labour Organization’s Forced Labour Convention, 1930, “forced labour” means all work or service exacted from a person under menace of penalty, and for which that person has not offered himself voluntarily.

For years, sexual exploitation was a primary driver of trafficking in India. Data shows that the nature of trafficking has changed. Between 2019 and 2022, the share of trafficking cases driven by labour exploitation nearly tripled, from 17.8 per cent to 49.8 per cent. Over the same period, the share attributed to sexual exploitation barely moved (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

According to the National Crime Records Bureau, the total number of forced labour victims nearly tripled from 1,141 in 2019 to 3,335 in 2022, then fell over the next two years, with 1,493 victims reported in 2024.

Children accounted for more than one in six forced labour victims in 2019. The share rose sharply in the post-pandemic years, reaching over one in four victims in 2021, before easing back to just above one in ten by 2024, still a concerning 12.29 per cent of total victims.

Women comprised 56.35 per cent of forced labour victims in 2022, but the share declined to under 6 per cent later. Men accounted for around 80 per cent of forced labour victims between 2019 and 2024, except for two consecutive post-pandemic years. Women accounted for 5.99 per cent and men 81.72 per cent of forced labour victims in 2024, the latest year for which data is available (chart 2).

Delhi recorded the highest number of forced labour victims in 2019 and 2023. Odisha reported zero victims in 2019 before accounting for the majority of cases over the next three years, followed by a decline in 2023 and 2024 (chart 3).

States may reshuffle year to year, but the goods made by forced labour remain consistent. The US Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ 2024 list of Indian goods bears this out. A few core products — bricks, hybrid cottonseed, embellished textiles, garments, and rice — consistently appear on lists for both forced and child labour. Each sits deep inside informal, subcontracted export supply chains, where cost pressure is passed down to the most vulnerable.

The latest data from the Unified District Information System for Education Plus tells a layered story: Bihar is catching up with Kerala on two fronts — retaining teachers in classrooms and reducing dropout rates, even as the gap between them on enrolment itself is growing wider.

Bihar’s gross enrolment ratio is falling; it has dropped below where it stood eight years ago. From 57.7 per cent in 2018-19 academic year, the ratio slipped to 53.1 per cent in 2025-26, even though the state performed well during the pandemic years, with enrolment rising above 60 per cent. Kerala has never slipped off the high 90s, touching 99.4 per cent in 2025-26. The enrolment ratio gap between the two states has widened, from 40.3 percentage points in 2018-19 to 46.3 points now, even as the national average kept rising (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

The pupil-teacher ratio tells an encouraging story about Bihar. After years of overcrowded classrooms with more than 50 students per teacher from 2018-19 to 2022-23, the ratio began improving after 2023-24 and has held at better levels since. The gap between the two states, which had widened to 40 students per teacher in the post-pandemic years, has since narrowed sharply to just 11 in 2025-26 (chart 2).

Dropout rates follow a similar trend. Bihar’s rate fell below the national average in 2024-25 and stayed there the following year — the first time in at least seven years that this has happened. Its gap with Kerala, which had widened to 22.8 percentage points in 2022-23, narrowed sharply to 2.1 percentage points in 2024-25, before edging up marginally the following year (chart 3).

Bihar allocated 20 per cent of its total expenditure to education in FY26, the highest share among major states. Yet on a per-capita basis, it remains among the lowest spenders in the country. Smaller classrooms and fewer dropouts show the money is reaching schools. But fewer children enrolling means it isn’t yet reaching the families who need convincing to send them to school. The enrolment gap may owe to several reasons: Children being forced out of school to earn extra income for the family, or simply because the nearest high school is too far away. For a state with one of India’s youngest populations, closing that education gap isn’t optional.

Tamil Nadu’s outstanding debt and liabilities reached almost Rs 10 trillion in FY26 — nearly double the FY21 level. The debt-to-gross state domestic product (GSDP) ratio was 28.3 per cent in FY26 — among the highest within large states.

The state has rising contingent liabilities — in the form of government guarantees and financing of loss-making public sector undertakings — worth Rs 1.8 trillion in FY26. That is thrice the amount in FY21, causing the guarantee-to-GSDP ratio to rise from 3.7 per cent in FY21 to 5.1 per cent in FY26. The guarantee-to-debt ratio has also increased from 12.8 per cent to 18 per cent in the same time period.

Power sector entities in Tamil Nadu alone constituted nearly 80 per cent of the state’s guarantees in FY26. Such guarantees accounted for nearly 4 per cent of the GSDP and 14 per cent of the total state debt. Further, the power sector entities’ outstanding debt was 25 per cent of the state’s total debt in FY26.

The power sector was one of the primary reasons behind Tamil Nadu’s deteriorating fiscal position. The state provides free electricity up to 100 units “bimonthly” regardless of total consumption. However, the poor targeting of the free electricity subsidy is taking a toll on finances.

Tamil Nadu provided free electricity to 89.5 per cent of its population, followed by Punjab (82.9 per cent) and Karnataka (81.4 per cent). Furthermore, 85.2 per cent of the richest quintile group and 93.2 per cent of the second-richest quintile group received free electricity in the state, a rate much higher than in other states (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

In FY24, Tamil Nadu’s share in aggregate losses of all state-owned distribution companies (discoms) was the highest at 24 per cent, followed by Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Rajasthan at 13 per cent each. Tamil Nadu’s discom losses accounted for 6.6 per cent of its GSDP — the highest rate among all states in FY24 (chart 2).

Tamil Nadu provided power subsidies worth nearly Rs 32,098 crore in FY24 — the second highest behind UP (Rs 33,384 crore). However, in per capita terms, Tamil Nadu gave a greater subsidy amount than UP due to the southern state’s smaller population (chart 3).

The Average Cost of Supply-Average Revenue Realised (ACS-ARR) gap, after excluding the loss funding provided by the state, remains high for Tamil Nadu, although it has declined from Rs 2.4 per unit in FY22 to Rs 1.6 in FY26. To revive the state’s finances, the government needs a better strategy to target its power subsidies.

Women in India have a life expectancy at birth of 69 years, compared with 65.8 years for men, according to WHO’s 2021 estimates. However, when healthy life expectancy is considered, the gap narrows dramatically. Women are expected to live 58.3 healthy years, a little more than the 58 years for men (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Women spend 10.7 years in poor health, nearly three years more than men, who spend 7.8 years. Put differently, women spend 15.5 per cent of their lives in poor health, compared with 11.9 per cent for men. The data shows that increasing longevity has not been matched by a similar improvement in healthy ageing. As India ages, improving people’s health will be as important as extending life itself (Chart 2).

One reason women live longer but not necessarily healthier lives is anaemia. According to the National Family Health Survey, 57 per cent of Indian women aged 15-49 are anaemic — more than double the 25.1 per cent of men. Anaemia is associated with fatigue, reduced immunity, poorer maternal health and lower productivity, with its effects accumulating over a lifetime. This persistently high prevalence highlights how nutritional disadvantages faced by women early in life translate into poorer health outcomes in later years, even as they outlive men (Chart 3).

Delhi’s fertility rate has fallen to 1.2, while Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal are at 1.3. The levels are similar to those seen in Japan and Finland, which are often cited as examples of advanced population ageing.

Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Punjab now have fertility rates of 1.4, followed by Karnataka and Telangana at 1.5. In effect, a large part of India has already entered demographic territory typically occupied by advanced economies that dropped below replacement levels decades ago.

The contrast is stark because these states have reached ultra-low fertility levels at significantly lower per capita income levels than the developed nations they now resemble demographically. This divergence prompts a question: What happens to economic growth after fertility falls below replacement levels? (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

The experience of both advanced economies and Indian states suggests that declining fertility does not necessarily lead to weaker economic performance. Finland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, for instance, maintained robust annual per capita income growth of 5 per cent to 6 per cent even after dipping below the replacement threshold. While Japan’s growth was more modest at just over 4 per cent, it still transformed itself into one of the world’s richest economies after fertility began declining.

The record of Indian states is stronger. Since crossing the replacement threshold, Karnataka has clocked an average annual per capita income growth of 9.3 per cent, while Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have posted gains of around 9 per cent. Telangana, Kerala, and Odisha have registered similarly robust growth.

However, these growth rates must be viewed in context. When Finland, Denmark and Japan dipped below replacement fertility, they were already substantially richer than Indian states are today.

The data nonetheless suggests that low fertility is not an immediate constraint on growth. Several Indian states are growing rapidly after crossing the demographic milestone, indicating that fertility decline and economic growth can coexist long before the effects of population ageing become more pronounced. (Chart 2).

To understand why, one must look past headline income growth and examine inflation. Among advanced economies, average inflation largely remained below 5 per cent after fertility fell below replacement levels. Japan averaged 2.1 per cent, while France stood at 3.7 per cent. Lower inflation helped preserve purchasing power and ensured that income gains translated more effectively into higher living standards.

Indian states faced a different environment. Average inflation ranged from 4.3 per cent in Punjab to more than 6 per cent in Kerala. Most states recorded inflation rates well above those seen in Japan, France and several other developed economies.

The strong income growth of many states is accompanied by a persistent erosion of purchasing power. While low-fertility states have managed to expand their economies rapidly, the challenge is not only sustaining growth as populations age but also ensuring that incomes continue to outpace inflation (Chart 3).

In demographic terms, India’s low-fertility states mirror ageing, developed economies. Economically, however, they remain at a very different stage of development. While declining birth rate has not constrained growth, it has not guaranteed widespread improvements in living standards either. As more states move deeper into low-fertility territory, the quality of growth may matter as much as the pace of growth itself.

FPIs were exempted from capital gains tax and income tax on interest income on G-secs. The government also removed specific restrictions on short-term investments and security concentration for foreign investors. However, overall investment caps were retained: 6 per cent for central government bonds and 2 per cent for state government securities. General and long-term investment limits were merged into a single cap for both central and state bonds.

The government also expanded the Fully Accessible Route (FAR) to include new 15-, 30- and 40-year bonds, as well as Sovereign Green Bonds.

It announced the measures on June 5, effective from the beginning of FY27. But FPIs were not impressed. They withdrew more than Rs 11,000 crore from central government papers and Rs 1,800 crore from state government bonds between June 5 and June 16 (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

FPI investments under FAR rose by around Rs 27,000 crore between June 5 and June 16. However, their overall share in the FAR universe actually slipped to 6.88 per cent of the outstanding stock as of June 16, down from 6.97 per cent on June 5. Meanwhile, the 40-year government bond failed to attract any FPI investment under FAR (Chart 2).

Net capital inflows into India turned negative in FY26 at 0.24 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), down from a surplus of 1.57 per cent in FY25. This marks the first negative net capital inflows India has seen in several years, highlighting a reversal in foreign capital movements after a prolonged period of positive inflows. While the current account deficit remained relatively stable at around 0.6 per cent of GDP, the shift in capital flows led to the depletion of foreign exchange reserves (Chart 3).

The rupee continues to be under pressure. It depreciated by 4.26 per cent to Rs 88.31 against the dollar in FY26, compared to Rs 84.58 in the previous year. It further depreciated to 93.39 in April, 95.44 in May and 95.46 in the first 17 days of June, FY27.

The Zoological Survey of India has documented the country’s rich cockroach fauna. According to the Survey’s annotated checklist, Tamil Nadu has the highest known diversity with 55 species, followed by West Bengal with 37. Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Sikkim are other major hotspots.

The pattern shows cockroach diversity is concentrated in tropical, forested and high-rainfall regions. India’s eastern and southern states account for a large share of the country’s documented cockroach fauna (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Scientists estimate there are around 4,600 species of cockroaches globally. Yet only about 30 cockroach species are associated with human settlements, and just a handful dominate household infestations. Indian households are most likely to find the German cockroach (Blattella germanica) and the American cockroach (Periplaneta americana) in kitchens, bathrooms and drains.

This means an overwhelming majority of cockroach species live in natural ecosystems and rarely interact with humans. India’s nearly 200 documented species are therefore less a story of pests and more a story of overlooked biodiversity (Chart 2).

Cockroaches are famous for their resilience, and radiation studies explain why. While humans can survive only limited acute radiation, insects tolerate much higher doses thanks to slower cell division. Research shows that while mosquitoes can withstand radiation levels far beyond humans, cockroaches can tolerate doses hundreds of times greater than humans.

The notion that cockroaches will survive a nuclear apocalypse is exaggerated, but they are among the hardiest common insects on Earth (Chart 3).

However, the new government’s announcement was limited, igniting debate about the costs of TVK’s welfare agenda. The controversy has brought attention to a question facing the government: Can it finance the TVK’s welfare promises, which are estimated to cost Rs 1 trillion?

Tamil Nadu has considerable economic strength and revenue-generating capacity. Its per capita income increased from 165 per cent of India’s per capita income in FY21 to 176 per cent in FY25. Prosperity allows Tamil Nadu to fund welfare programmes and absorb additional expenditure commitments (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Tamil Nadu is rich but does it have fiscal room? The state’s finances improved noticeably over five years under the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam government, which lost the assembly elections to TVK. The revenue deficit declined from 3.28 per cent of gross state domestic product (GSDP) in FY21 to 1.47 per cent in FY25, while the fiscal deficit narrowed from 4.6 per cent to 3.24 per cent. Outstanding liabilities fell from 31.8 per cent of GSDP to 26.65 per cent during the period (Chart 2).

Tamil Nadu’s finances are healthier compared to the pandemic years, but the fiscal deficit is slightly above the 3 per cent ceiling prescribed under the state’s fiscal responsibility framework. The room for major spending expansion is not unlimited. While outstanding liabilities remain below the 30-33 per cent range that the 15th Finance Commission considers broadly sustainable for states, implementing large welfare commitments could slow down or even reverse fiscal indicators. Loan waivers, subsidies and transfers will place additional pressure on expenditure and could widen both the revenue and fiscal deficits if not accompanied by higher revenues or spending cuts elsewhere.

Tamil Nadu’s strong social outcomes partly explain why welfare spending has remained a political priority across governments. The share of people facing multidimensional poverty in the state has fallen from 36.5 per cent in 2005-06 to just 2.2 per cent in 2019-21, among the lowest levels in India. The decline reflects substantial improvements in living standards and access to basic services over the past two decades. (Chart 3)

For the Vijay government, the challenge is therefore not one of addressing widespread deprivation, but of determining how much additional welfare spending can be undertaken without compromising fiscal sustainability.

Taken together, the data suggest that Tamil Nadu’s finances are healthier than they were five years ago and its social indicators are among the best in the country. Whether TVK can fully deliver on its ambitious promises may depend less on the strength of the economy it inherited and more on its ability to balance welfare with fiscal discipline.

Murdoch argued that traditional print media had become stagnant and journalism could be disseminated more effectively by leveraging satellite networks and expanding digital media platforms. Murdoch saw a technological revolution, but the public and industry insiders feared that if the Journal became a part of his empire, it would compromise its editorial integrity.

The takeover signalled an accelerating trend. Over the last few decades, corporate mergers and acquisitions have reshaped the media landscape that is increasingly focused on the internet. Data from Tracxn shows that between 2011 and 2025, as many as 1,362 media companies were bought worldwide.

Digital media companies accounted for 75.6 per cent of all purchases, while television (TV) broadcasting companies made up 13.7 per cent. Print media companies, such as newspapers, accounted for just 10.7 per cent.

The United States (US) was the biggest hotspot for deals, hosting 53.2 per cent of all global acquisitions. The United Kingdom followed at 9.3 per cent, while India made up 4.7 per cent of the total.

Globally, data on mergers and acquisitions from 2011 to 2025 shows distinct trends. Out of 1,030 total acquisitions in digital media, 51.8 per cent occurred in the US, 9.8 per cent in the UK and 5.9 per cent in India. There were 186 acquisitions in TV broadcasting: The US led with 53.2 per cent, followed by the UK at 6.5 per cent and India at 1.6 per cent. The print media sector recorded 146 acquisitions. Of these, 62.3 per cent took place in the US and 8.9 per cent in the UK, while no acquisitions were recorded in India (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

The trend of billionaires buying major media outlets continues. On May 20, James Murdoch, the younger son of Rupert Murdoch, bought New York magazine, Vox.com and Vox’s podcast network for more than $300 million. The buyout mirrors what happened more than a decade ago in 2013, when Amazon founder Jeff Bezos purchased The Washington Post.

In India, the Adani Group has over the years acquired major news organisations like NDTV, Quintillion Business Media and news wire Indo-Asian News Service. In 2014, the Reliance network bought Network18 and its massive stable of news channels.

Paritosh Joshi, who runs Provocateur Advisory, an independent media and communications consultancy, explained that in the prevailing economic climate, even if a small media organisation generates enough revenue to defend itself against predatory capital, it remains at the mercy of shareholders.

“When faced with a hostile competitor’s bid, shareholders will inevitably weigh the current promoters’ interests against the higher payout. This dynamic drives global consolidation, forcing smaller companies to merge or buy in. At the end of the day, because advertising is the primary engine that brings in capital, scale becomes a matter of survival,” Joshi said.

India ranks third globally for media acquisitions, but the number of companies bought out is minuscule compared to the US and other rich nations. Furthermore, corporate buyouts in India almost exclusively target digital media platforms.

Global media buyouts steadily increased for a long time before slowing down recently. In 2011, there were 49 media acquisitions worldwide. That number more than doubled to 114 in 2016 and peaked at 143 in 2018. After that, global buyouts began a slow decline, dropping to 133 in 2021 and falling to just 58 in 2025. India recorded just one media acquisition in 2011, which grew to seven in 2017 before crashing to two in 2018. The numbers jumped to eight in 2021, dropped to three in 2024, and then spiked once again to seven in 2025 (Chart 2).

Digital media outpaces traditional media in India. In recent years, newly launched digital media companies have outnumbered similar TV and print ventures. From 2011 to 2025, anywhere between 26 and 471 new digital media companies were founded each year. Traditional media barely grew, with only two to six broadcasting companies and one to five print media companies coming up each year (Chart 3).

Buying digital outlets is much easier and far less expensive than acquiring traditional media empires, says scholar Anya Schiffrin in “Media Capture: How Money, Digital Platforms, and Governments Control the News”, the book she edited.

“Thus, instead of providing a new landscape that makes media capture more difficult, digital media may have had the opposite effect: making capture less expensive and more likely and presenting even greater policy challenges for those hoping to prevent it. The extraction of vast wealth by the tech sector and the control exerted by tech platforms over news mean that concentration of media ownership is now far more likely than it formerly was,” Schiffrin said.

Workers employed under the H-1B visa route are mostly engaged in computer-related jobs. Such work accounted for 62 per cent of all H-1B visa petitions approved by the US government in FY25. H-1B visa holders earn more than American workers in this sector, too.

From FY22 to FY24, the average annual wage of a person undertaking initial employment on an H-1B visa was slightly less than that of a US worker in computer-related occupations. In FY25, the gap closed and the average annual wage for H-1B visa holders exceeded that of a US worker by nearly $16,000. This happened as the average wage of an initial employee rose from $116,000 in FY24 to $136,000 in FY25.

The average annual wage of a continuing employee on an H-1B visa is significantly higher than that of a US worker in computer-related jobs (chart 2).

The US approved over 400,000 H-1B visa petitions in FY25. People born in India received 69.9 per cent of such approvals — the lowest in recent years. That is because the approval rate for petitions by India-born professionals for initial employment fell from 57 per cent in FY24 to 50.3 per cent in FY25.

Petition approvals for India-born professionals for continuing employment declined marginally in FY25 but remain high at 77.6 per cent. This indicates that most India-born professionals in the US maintain their employment by securing H-1B visa extensions (chart 3).

Further, data from FY24 to FY25 showed that GVA per worker declined in manufacturing units employing 8, 14, 15, 18 and more than 20 workers. The worst decline, of nearly 19 per cent, was at manufacturing units employing over 20 workers. Conversely, GVA per worker increased across all other categories of manufacturing enterprises (chart 2).

Fixed assets available per worker in rural manufacturing units fell from Rs 1,14,000 in FY24 to Rs 93,000 in FY25. Fixed assets per worker in urban manufacturing units increased marginally from Rs 1,32,000 in FY24 to Rs. 1,39,000 in FY25. Overall, however, there was a decline in fixed assets available per worker in all manufacturing unincorporated units. This trend highlights a potential decrease in labour productivity in unincorporated manufacturing establishments (chart 3).

The US government issues Green Cards under several categories: Immediate relatives of US citizens, family-sponsored preferences, employment-based preferences, refugees and asylum seekers, and the diversity visa programme. Trump’s ire was apparently directed at the “family” and the “immediate relative” route to a Green Card.

Indians were the third-largest nationality — after Mexicans and Dominicans — in getting a Green Card through the “family” or the “immediate relative” route in FY23. Through just the “immediate relatives” route, Indians accounted for the largest share (5.76 per cent), after Mexicans (22.35 per cent), of all such Green Cards issued worldwide. The Chinese had the fourth-largest share (4.01 per cent). Meanwhile, Indians ranked fifth in the family-sponsored category with a 7.4 per cent share, while Dominicans topped that list at nearly 20 per cent. Notably, Indians ranked first in the employment-preference route with a 14.5 per cent share and the Chinese came next.

In FY23, nearly all Green Cards issued to Dominicans took place through the “family” or the “immediate relative” route. This share was 89.61 per cent for the Vietnamese and 84.83 per cent for Mexicans. Cubans got over half of their Green Cards in FY23 through the “asylum and refugee” route. Meanwhile, 60.1 per cent of Green Cards issued to Indians came via the “family” or the “immediate relative” route, while 36.59 per cent through the employment route — second only to the Chinese (44.34 per cent), among major Green Card beneficiary countries (chart 2).

Indians were the second-largest community to obtain citizenship via naturalisation in FY24, accounting for 6.07 per cent of the total and trailing Mexicans. However, Indians’ share in total naturalisations has dropped to a nine-year low since FY15. Furthermore, Indians spent a median of six years as LPRs before naturalising in FY24 — a significantly shorter duration than that of Cubans and Mexicans (chart 3).

Individuals born in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Mexico showed the highest reliance on the “family” and “immediate relative” routes to obtain Green Cards in FY23. Conversely, Green Cards issued to Indians and Chinese remained relatively balanced between the “employment” and “family/immediate relative” categories.

The gap between what is defined as formal work and what workers get as benefits is wide. Data from the Periodic Labour Force Surveys shows that while workers’ benefits have improved, the pace is slow and uneven.

In rural areas, the share of workers without a written contract reduced from 68.3 per cent in 2020 to 60.7 per cent in 2025. Urban areas have seen a sharper drop — from 66.8 per cent to 56.3 per cent.

The share of workers without paid leave in urban India fell from 51 per cent in 2020 to 44 per cent in 2025 but half of rural workers still lack that benefit. Social security coverage shows broadly the same trend.

As many as 57.3 per cent of rural and 47.7 per cent of urban workers do not get any benefits of formal employment. Gender gaps persist, particularly in urban areas where women are more likely than men to lack social security coverage. What these numbers suggest is that the labour market is making incremental improvements in employment benefits but remains largely informal (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Job precarity is worst in central and northern states. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh top that metric, with nearly half of workers lacking basic protections. Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan rank next.

States regarded as better governed or more socially developed are not stellar either. As many as 43.2 per cent of workers in Kerala and 34.9 per cent in Tamil Nadu do not get basic protection. On the other end, the smaller Northeastern states of Meghalaya and Mizoram have fewer such workers. The divide not only reflects differences in economic structure but also the varying strength of labour institutions across states (chart 2).

Looking at trends over time, there is little churn among the worst performers. Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh consistently have had a huge number of workers lacking social security, making only minor improvements. Rajasthan has seen a gradual decline but remains firmly among the worst affected. Bihar’s count increased sharply in 2024 and then eased slightly. In Tripura, the share of such workers has nearly doubled over the years (chart 3).

These persistent gaps fuel the recurring tensions in industrial hubs like Noida. For many workers, the risk is not unemployment but the inherent lack of protection in their current roles.

Google’s various products have 4.9 billion users worldwide, with India accounting for 8 per cent of that number last year. Around 27 per cent, or over a quarter of the country’s population, uses Google products daily, making the platform critical for politicians seeking to connect with voters.

As internet penetration deepens, political parties have aggressively invested in digital advertising. From FY20 to FY26, 15 political parties and a political consultancy group spent Rs 423 crore on Google-based campaign advertisements. The BJP led the spending at 56 per cent, followed by the Indian National Congress (INC) at 21 per cent, and the consultancy group I-PAC at 7 per cent.

Political spending generally refers to expenditures made by political parties, candidates, consultancy groups, government departments, media organisations, and others for explicitly political purposes. Data on digital spending is publicly available at the Google Ads Transparency Centre.

It shows that such expenditure mirrors election cycles. Spending rose from Rs 20.9 crore in FY20 to Rs 107.4 crore ahead of the Lok Sabha elections in FY24, peaking at Rs 197 crore in FY25. By FY26, it moderated to Rs 42 crore, a figure largely driven by the Bihar elections.

The BJP’s share of Google political ad spending fluctuated from 60.3 per cent in FY20 to a peak of 71 per cent in FY26, following a brief dip to 59 per cent in FY25. The INC’s share showed significant volatility, peaking at 29 per cent in FY24 before a sharp decline in FY25. (chart 1, click image for interactive link).

Between October 1, 2025, and April 21, 2026, the BJP, INC, JD (U), CPI (M) and I-PAC (on behalf of the Trinamool Congress) spent a combined Rs 70 crore. The surge was fuelled by elections in Bihar, Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Puducherry. Data shows that spending booms in the months immediately preceding and during active polling. In Bihar, political parties directed 88 per cent of their monthly digital spending budget to the state in October 2025 and 66 per cent in November 2025. Similarly, Assam saw high engagement in early 2026. West Bengal proved an exception with sustained investment over seven months, commanding 64 per cent of total ad spend in December 2025 and 65 per cent by March 2026 (chart 2).

This trend is part of a global shift towards digital-first campaigning. Comparative data from FY20 to FY26 shows that Google-based political ads account for 93 per cent of total ad share in South Africa and 92 per cent in the US. India was at 53 per cent, ahead of the UK's 34 per cent (chart 3).

Shivam Shankar Singh, who formerly headed the data analytics and campaigns for the BJP, said in his 2019 book that Google, Facebook, Snapchat and WhatsApp have become important in politics as cheap smartphones and low data tariffs “democratise” the internet. He added a caveat:

“The algorithm that Facebook and Google use adds to the problem because both websites will provide results based on a user’s past activities. If a person has engaged with ‘right-wing’ websites and posts more in the past, they are likely to see more of the same in the present and the future. They will simply never get to see the corrections of facts that are circulating in a network dominated by people with an affinity to ‘left-wing’ or ‘liberal’ politics,” Singh said in his book “How to Win an Indian Election: What Political Parties Don’t Want You to Know”.

The US has reduced trade deficits with leading trading partners. Its largest trade deficit was with China, of more than $287 billion, in 2024-25 (April-February). This dropped by 46.12 per cent y-o-y to nearly $155 billion in 2025-26. The deficit with Canada came down by 46.32 per cent. The US enjoyed a trade surplus of $29.67 billion with Switzerland in 2025-26 (April-February), after a deficit of $75.4 billion a year ago.

With India, the US’s trade deficit grew by 7.65 per cent to reach $47.49 billion in 2025-26 (April-February). Further, the US’s trade deficit with Mexico, Vietnam and Taiwan rose by 9.46 per cent, 45.29 per cent, and 110.92 per cent, respectively. Trade surplus with the United Kingdom surged by nearly 260 per cent (chart 2).

The US’s revenues from Customs duties nearly quadrupled from $82.92 billion in 2024-25 (April-March) to $318.17 billion in 2025-26 (April-March). Before Trump increased tariffs in April 2025, the average share of revenue from Customs duties in the US government’s total monthly receipts hovered around 1-3 per cent, with minuscule aberrations. However, since April 2025, the share has been around 5-9 per cent (chart 3).

The Liberation Day tariffs successfully slashed trade deficits in year one, but a February Supreme Court reversal has put future gains in doubt.