Over the last week, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s wing for East Africa, has claimed a series of small-scale attacks across northeastern Kenya. The claims are part of an increased focus on Kenya by the jihadist group over the last few months.

Earlier today, al-Shabaab, through its Shahada News Agency, took credit for three attacks in Garissa and Mandera Counties. None of the purported attacks have been independently confirmed as of the time of publishing.

In the first claim, in Garissa, it said its men attacked a KDF base in Yunbis. In the second claim, in Mandera, it said its forces assaulted two KDF bases in Sheikh Barrow and Fino. Al-Shabaab didn’t claim killing any KDF troops in any of the alleged attacks, just causing material damages to the KDF bases.

Yesterday, Aug. 24, the group also claimed responsibility for an assault on a Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) base in Konton, in the northeastern Wajir County. The jihadist group did not specify any results in the attack, though the KDF itself said that its forces repelled al-Shabaab’s gunmen.

A couple of days prior, on Aug. 22, al-Shabaab said it was behind a pair of attacks in Lamu and Garissa Counties.

First, al-Shabaab claimed targeting another KDF outpost near Mangai, Lamu, again with no reported casualties. This skirmish has not been publicly reported by the KDF, but others on social media have reported the incident. And second, in Garissa County, the al-Qaeda branch said it was responsible for attacking another KDF base in Budai, though this alleged incident has not been independently reported.

A day before, on Aug. 21, the group also said it was behind an attack on KDF in Ceel Qalow near Ramo in Mandera County. This purported incident has again not been independently verified - though some social media posts do mention an alleged al-Shabaab attack on KDF in the area earlier in August. It is possible that al-Shabaab took responsibility for that incident retroactively.

And on Aug. 17, al-Shabaab took credit for an assault on a KDF base in Sarira, Lamu County. This alleged incident again has not been independently reported or confirmed by KDF itself, though some social media posts do refer to it.

These purported incidents come after a series of al-Shabaab attacks in northeastern Kenya in June and July, as I’ve previously written about.

The claims - representing real attacks or simply imagined by al-Shabaab propagandists - show a clear shift of attention paid to Kenya by the jihadist group. Al-Shabaab has steadily released attack claims in Kenya over the past several months, all occurring as the group also consolidates gains elsewhere in Somalia.

At the same time, Jubaland, just across the border from northeastern Kenya, has also conducted a series of operations, sometimes backed by federal forces, against al-Shabaab since April. The United States has also signaled increased support for Jubaland for such operations, as it expands its partnerships beyond Mogadishu in the face of severe political turmoil in the capital.

Given the cross-border nature of al-Shabaab’s movements and activities, the operations against it in Jubaland, and its own attacks in Kenya, are intrinsically linked as the militants shift to avoid or redirect military pressure.

The small-scale nature of most of the group’s attacks in northeastern Kenya also suggests these are probing operations meant to test KDF responses and movements, which enables plotting for larger attacks and ambushes. For instance, this includes the July 28 ambush on the Kenyan police’s Special Operations Group (SOG), which killed 4 SOG members and left one civilian also dead.

Kenya’s importance to the group is more than evident on the ground as al-Shabaab continues to increase its operations, activities, and propaganda claims inside northeastern Kenya, thereby greatly expanding the conflict outside of southern Somalia and ultimately making it one contiguous theater.

Over the last several weeks, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch for East Africa, has significantly stepped up its militant activities in northeastern Kenya. The attacks demonstrate al-Shabaab’s lingering threat inside the East African country.

The recent spate of al-Shabaab attacks have largely focused on Mandera and Garissa Countries, both of which border Somalia. The two counties, along with neighboring Wajir and Lamu Counties, have long been flashpoints of al-Shabaab’s low-level insurgency inside Kenya.

Al-Shabaab’s recent attacks include an ambush on Kenyan Special Operations Group (SOG) troops yesterday, July 28, near El-Raamo, Mandera, which left at least 4 SOG members and one civilian dead. SOG is a heavily specialized counter-terrorism unit under the Kenyan police service.

A SOG armored vehicle, which was sent to reinforce the unit caught in the ambush, was also hit by an improvised explosive device (IED), though no casualties were reported from that blast.

For al-Shabaab’s part, it quickly claimed credit for the assault, claiming that its forces killed and wounded at least 25 Kenyan troops. The high number of killed and wounded Kenyan forces alleged by the al-Qaeda branch has not been reported elsewhere. Al-Shabaab often inflates enemy casualty numbers in its propaganda.

Just a few days ago, on July 26, al-Shabaab’s men destroyed a Safaricom communications mast in Dadaab in Garissa County. The jihadist group periodically targets communication towers in northeastern Kenya, which serves as a means to cut cell phone service and make it difficult for civilians to report on militant movements and to hinder coordination among security services.

Two days before that, on July 24, suspected al-Shabaab gunmen attacked two separate villages in Mandera County. First, al-Shabaab militants targeted a Kenyan security camp in Fino. Kenya reported this assault was thwarted and the militants were pushed back. Al-Shabaab, as usual, claimed its men killed at least five Kenyan soldiers in the assault.

A short time later, however, militants also attacked Arabia village, though no casualty estimates have been publicly reported. Gunfire from suspected militants was also reported in Asharaf, though this also remains unconfirmed.

A few days earlier, on July 20, Kenyan authorities announced that 4 IEDs planted by al-Shabaab were discovered and dismantled in Lamu County, effectively thwarting several future attacks in the area.

Meanwhile, a week earlier, on July 13, SOG forces raided a reported al-Shabaab camp near the Somalia border in Mandera County. SOG said its men killed at least 11 al-Shabab militants and captured several weapons abandoned by killed and fleeing al-Shabaab members.

That raid followed clashes between al-Shabaab and Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) near Dhaashow in Garissa County in late June. As usual, al-Shabaab claimed its men killed several KDF troops in the assault. And two weeks before that, on June 11, KDF troops repelled another alleged al-Shabaab attack in the Lafey District area of Mandera.

Other attacks in northern Kenya were also claimed by al-Shabaab in June, such as in Bura, Garissa, on June 24 and El-Qalow, Mandera, on June 23, though these incidents were not reported on in local media. And even further attacks and Kenyan operations were also reported in May across Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir, as noted by my colleague Jim Loucks.

The last few months have thus seen a significant uptick in al-Shabaab activity inside Kenya, presenting a worrying development for security in the country. This also comes as al-Shabaab is largely consolidating ground in southern and central Somalia, while Somali forces continue to try to expel the group elsewhere.

Al-Shabaab in Kenya

Al-Shabaab has long operated in Kenya, but these recent operations come during a period of increased activity in the country’s northeast. The group’s activities in the area often ebb and flow depending on security conditions in both Kenya and southern Somalia. Kenya has been a target of the jihadist group ever since Kenya launched its Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011.

Most operations conducted by al-Shabaab in Kenya are located in the northern and eastern counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, and Tana River. Several high-profile terrorist attacks were reported in these counties, such as the Mpeketoni attacks in 2014 in Lamu, and on a university in Garissa in 2015. The attacks left over 200 people dead.

In 2019, The Standard reported that at least 100 Kenyan security personnel had been killed by Shabaab’s IEDs in those counties since 2016. In the years since, dozens of other Kenyan security personnel have also been killed by al-Shabaab.

However, the insurgency remains relatively low-level as opposed to al-Shabaab’s overall activity in Somalia. And as I covered earlier this month, al-Shabaab maintains recruitment activities across Kenya more broadly, causing problems far outside of just northeastern Kenya.

Al-Shabaab maintains a unit specifically for high-profile attacks in northeastern Kenya (and southern Somalia), dubbed Jaysh Ayman, eponymously named after its commander, Maalim Ayman. Maalim Ayman was reported killed by Somalia in late 2023, though the United Nations stated he was still alive a few months later.

It also maintains a hierarchy for its Kenyan wing, with Ahmed Iman Ali acting as the group’s shadow emir for Kenya. Iman Ali has a long history within the Kenyan jihadist milieu, dating back to the late 2000s and early 2010s, as a student of infamous Kenyan al-Qaeda ideologue, Aboud Rogo. Iman Ali features prominently in al-Shabaab’s Swahili-language propaganda.

The jihadist group also retains the ability and desire to strike inside the Kenyan capital since al-Shabaab’s 2013 assault on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, as seen in 2019’s attack on the DusitD2 hotel. And in late 2020, Kenyan officials revealed that other attack plots in Nairobi were disrupted. Earlier this year, Kenyan authorities reported another al-Shabaab plot in Nairobi was also thwarted.

The al-Qaeda branch has also been able to strike within the main US-Kenyan base in the northeast at the Manda Bay airfield inside Lamu County. That attack left one U.S. soldier and two U.S. contractors dead and many aircraft destroyed. Lamu County, specifically its Boni Forest, has long been a refuge for al-Shabaab.

The DusitD2 raid, as well as the aforementioned Manda Bay assault, have been routinely shown in Shabaab’s propaganda and are often highlighted by al-Shabaab as evidence of the group’s prowess inside Kenya.

The group continues to routinely lambaste Kenya in its media more broadly, periodically making Kenya-specific propaganda videos, while political events in Kenya are routinely reported and commentated on by its vast array of social media sites.

Kenya’s importance to the group is more than evident on the ground as al-Shabaab continues to increase its operations and activities inside northeastern Kenya, thereby greatly expanding the conflict outside of southern Somalia.

Earlier this month, Al-Monitor reported that Somalia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) confirmed Turkish F-16’s carried out airstrikes in southern Somalia before quickly editing Turkey’s role in the operations out of the press statement.

Though both Somalia and Turkey routinely downplay the latter’s role in military operations within Somalia, Turkey has likely carried out dozens, if not more, strikes in Somalia since at least 2022 according to data I have compiled on such alleged strikes.

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The battle for control over Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Muhammad Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo has now raged for over three years. Both sides, backed by various foreign powers, have committed numerous atrocities, war crimes, and other acts of depravity.

For example, the United Arab Emirates-backed RSF, specifically, was recently confirmed to have committed genocide in Darfur. In some ways, this development is unsurprising. The RSF is essentially the modern incarnation of the former Janjaweed, which itself carried out a vicious genocide in Darfur in the early 2000s. And in both cases, much of the world has spoken out against and have long tried to bring attention to both instances of genocide in Sudan.

But governments and ordinary citizens are not the only ones trying to highlight these injustices. Al-Qaeda has also been involved in trying to mobilize the Sudanese masses for jihad, utilizing these crimes and killings in an attempt to incite people to its cause. Though al-Qaeda has a history in Sudan and many Sudanese nationals have joined various al-Qaeda groups around the world, an active homegrown jihad in Sudan has so far yet to materialize.

This article thus looks at al-Qaeda’s mobilization attempts, starting during the current civil (or rather, proxy) war in Sudan before looking at more historical calls and mobilization attempts over the years. In some ways, these attempts could be called a failure, much like al-Qaeda’s failed attempts at mobilizing jihad in Central African Republic.

But given the murkiness of elements within SAF, which does indeed include Islamists within its ranks, it cannot be said for certain that al-Qaeda’s more recent calls haven’t inspired people to join said Islamist factions within SAF. What can be stated, however, is that no faction inside Sudan has so far publicly taken up al-Qaeda’s cause.

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Earlier this year in February, Saudi Arabia and Somalia signed a military agreement that was meant to “strengthen defense and military cooperation between the two countries, and includes multiple areas of common interest.” Based on recent reports, this agreement is already in full-swing, including the training of thousands of Somali troops by hired mercenaries.

According to these reports, around 5,000 Somali troops (2,000 of which are reportedly from Somalia’s newly established Northeastern State, comprised of parts of the Sool, Sanaag, and Toghdeer Regions) are being trained in two separate Somali bases in the northern Galmudug Region in a Saudi-financed program for nine months. The Somalis are reportedly being trained by Saudi-bankrolled instructors from Romania, Ukraine, South Africa, and Colombia.

Saudi military officials also recently visited the two bases to inspect the progress of the training. Additional details regarding the exact nature of Saudi Arabia’s military agreement with Somalia are unclear.

These reports seem to confirm that Saudi Arabia is thus the latest Arab Gulf state to provide military support to Somalia in an effort to compete for influence in the wider Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar (and technically Bahrain, though through the Emiratis) have long been active inside Somalia.

For instance, the UAE has a significant and relatively long history in Puntland and an evolving relationship with the government in Mogadishu. It has been militarily involved in Puntland since the early 2010s when it helped create the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), a major security organ in the region.

The UAE has been the PMPF’s primary funder, supplier, and trainer since its creation. It is also understood that almost 200 Emirati troops are hosted at a PMPF base in Puntland’s Bosaso.

During Puntland’s offensive against the Islamic State’s Somali Province in the Cal Miskaad Mountains southeast of Bosaso, the Emiratis also launched at least 19 airstrikes against the jihadist group according to my own numbers.

Elsewhere in Somalia, the UAE has historically supported several military units and provided training and funding for others in Mogadishu, especially as its rival Qatar supports other units. Until early this year, the UAE offered both direct training inside Mogadishu and paid for training Somali forces in Eritrea, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

The UAE’s base in Mogadishu - which also hosted a Bahraini training contingent - was targeted in February 2024 in an attack conducted by a Shabaab member who infiltrated the training program.

However, in January 2026, Mogadishu canceled all port deals and security arrangements with the Emiratis, citing the UAE allegedly “undermined national sovereignty,” likely referring to its relationship with Somaliland.

The UAE also reportedly provides military support to the regional forces of Jubaland, a southern state of Somalia on the border with Kenya that currently treats itself as independent of Mogadishu. Jubaland, as well as Puntland, rejected Mogadishu’s banishing of the Emiratis.

Qatar is also involved in supporting Mogadishu, albeit to a lesser extent than the Emiratis. For example, in 2019 it donated 68 armored vehicles to the Somali military. Qatar was also instrumental in supporting and financially backing Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) during the administration of Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo.” During this time, for instance, Qatar backed the formation of NISA’s Duufan paramilitary forces.

Since at least 2025, hundreds of Somali troops have also been trained by the Qatari military in Doha. And just like Saudi Arabia, Somalia’s Ministry of Defence and Qatar also signed a new military agreement earlier this year though exact details remain murky.

As Somalia (and Somaliland) sits at the crossroads of the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea, and just across from Yemen where the Gulf states all also have competing interests, it is no surprise that Somalia is the next extension in this competition.

And to be clear, the geopolitical importance of Somalia is not unnoticed by other Middle Eastern states, also vying for power and influence over the Gulf states. Namely: Turkey and Israel. Both states are also heavily involved in the Horn, with Turkey being one of the largest foreign backers of Mogadishu. Israel is more involved in the breakaway Somaliland in order to also confront what it deems as threats from Yemen and the Red Sea.

These bilateral arrangements come as Somalia is still reliant on both the United States and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) in its fight against al-Shabaab. With the US saying it will cut funding to the United Nations mission in Somalia - the logistical backbone of AUSSOM - the future of the African Union mission is in question.

If the African Union troops were to depart, it remains to be seen if the Gulf (and Turkish) support to the Somali National Army will be enough to help it fight a resurgent Shabaab. And with Mogadishu currently also heavily distracted by clan bickering and legitimacy crises over the administration of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud - which has already devolved into open warfare in Southwest State - the Federal Government of Somalia is already at a crossroads.

But in the meantime, Saudi Arabia is also tossing its hat into the Somali ring, hoping to wrest some influence away from the Emiratis, Turkish, and to a lesser extent Qataris in the Horn of Africa. All the while, al-Shabaab continues its rampage.

Article updated as I incorrectly stated that 2000 of the 5000+ Somali troops being trained by Saudi bankrolled mercenaries were from Puntland. They are instead from Somalia’s Northeastern State (aka SSC-Khatuumo). Apologies for the mistake.

While most focus on jihadist activity in Kenya is centered on Al-Shabaab’s operations in the country’s northeastern counties of Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, and Lamu, a court case earlier this year that went under the radar shed some light on jihadist efforts elsewhere in the country.

In March of this year, Kenya’s Kahawa Law Courts, which exclusively deals with counter-terrorism cases, convicted Somali-national Abdikarim Hassanow Hassan of terrorism offenses as a member of Al-Shabaab. According to the prosecution, Hassan, in 2024, acted as a recruiter, attempting to lure at least one minor to the jihadist organizations ranks in Somalia. However, it was also noted that Hassan “organized meetings in support of the group,” possibly spreading the group’s narratives to other potential recruits.

Hassan was later sentenced to 60 years in prison for these offenses.

These recruitment and radicalization efforts did not happen in Al-Shabaab’s usual Kenyan haunts as mentioned above, though, nor did they occur in other regular jihadism hotspots, such as Nairobi or Mombasa.

Instead, they took place in Kenya’s Migori County, which is located in the country’s southwest bordering Lake Victoria. Based on publicly available information, Hassan trial appears to be the first Al-Shabaab-related case in Migori County, in fact.

But while this might be the first case in Migori County, it is not the first time Al-Shabaab has been reported operating in western Kenya. For instance, in December 2021, a suspected Al-Shabaab member detonated himself in Kisumu County, killing two. Though Al-Shabaab did not formally claim the bombing, the attack marked a rare instance of jihadist violence in western Kenya. Thankfully, it remains the only case of such violence in the area since.

And that same year, 2021, Al-Shabaab recruitment activities were also reported in the counties of Busia, Bungoma, and Kakamega, in addition to Kisumu.

To be clear, these are sporadic incidents. Al-Shabaab’s activities, to include recruitment and operational ambitions, are still minimal at best in western Kenya. Most of its efforts in Kenya are focused on the aforementioned areas, due to both geographical proximity to Somalia, shared communal, clan, and ethnic ties, and prominence of Muslim communities. This not only makes it easier for Al-Shabaab to ingrain itself, but the heavily militarized area also presents ample targets for the jihadist group.

Though Muslims do exist in western Kenya, the area is predominately Christian, which dampens any attempts by Al-Shabaab to make the same kind of inroads that it can elsewhere in northeastern Kenya. But as highlighted in 2021, recruitment can, and does, occur in the area - albeit in a limited manner.

Poverty, lack of education, lack of opportunities, and other structural vulnerabilities can all present opportunities for jihadist recruiters to latch onto to radicalize and lure individuals.

To note, Kenyan officials and media sometimes describe Al-Shabaab and Islamic State networks and individuals as simply all “Al-Shabaab” - not too dissimilar to Nigeria wherein “Boko Haram” is often the catch-all term - it is currently unclear if Islamic State has the same networks throughout Kenya. Clearly Islamic State recruitment does happen, as Kenyans are indeed present in both the Islamic State’s Central Africa and Somali Provinces (ISCAP and ISS, respectively).

And though Islamic State, via ISCAP, does recruit in eastern Uganda, including in Busia, it’s not yet known if they enjoy the same level of activity just across the border in western Kenya. As such, it is likely that whatever efforts are ongoing in the area, it is presumably actually Al-Shabaab.

Regardless of which jihadist group, though, it is still important to note that jihadist recruitment - and other operations - are not just limited to one specific area or areas in Kenya. It also happens in overlooked areas, just on a much more limited scale. But this does not mean Kenyan officials should ignore this phenomenon.

Indeed, ignoring the structural problems that could produce more recruitment opportunities for Al-Shabaab (or potentially the Islamic State) would be a dangerous miscalculation.