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The principal doubt in this article regarding the conclusion is whether, according to natural reason, it must necessarily be affirmed that free will properly and without metaphor exists in God — so that God himself is master of his own actions, and can not have the action he has, and can have the action he does not have.

First argument on the negative side. In God there is properly speaking no counsel — therefore neither is there free will. The consequence is clear, because deliberation, by which one deliberates to determine some means to an end, proceeds from a comparison of the means that can be chosen toward an end. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, I–II, q. 14, art. 2, and from St. Gregory of Nyssa, book 5, chapter 5, who assert that counsel presupposes an inquiry into means and ignorance of the certain means for attaining the end; and St. Thomas says that inquiry of reason in doubtful and uncertain matters is called counsel. But such imperfection cannot exist in God — therefore neither can counsel.

Second argument. Everyone who has free will is by nature indifferent to deliberating or not deliberating about something, to performing some act or not performing it. But this indifference is repugnant to God, to whom it is proper always to be in the same state and unable to be otherwise than he is — therefore free will is repugnant to God.But if someone responds that the indifference of free will in God is not with respect to any divine act but extrinsically through relation to the being or non-being of a creature — a counter-reply is made. If there were indifference in God in this way, according to his relation to creatures, it would be either with respect to those creatures that are not and were not and will not be, or with respect to those that coexist with eternity in some difference of their time. But neither of these can be — therefore that indifference is not possible. I prove the minor. For with respect to creatures that coexist with eternity, the divine will is not indifferent, but willed determinately that they should exist. Similarly, with respect to those that do not coexist with eternity, there is no indifference. For from eternity God willed those things not to exist — therefore there is no relation of the divine will that is indifferent with respect to creatures, and thus free will is repugnant to God.

Third argument. If free will exists in God, it follows that God is not altogether immutable, but can be otherwise than he now is in himself — and the consequent is against James 1: "With whom there is no variation or shadow of turning." To appreciate the force of this argument, note that man and angel are said in their own way to be immutable, or not to change, with respect to free will. A man is not said to be blameably changeable when he changes his plan owing to new circumstances arising — but in fact the will of a man can change and does change when, after having willed something to happen, without any entirely new circumstance arising, he now wills it not to happen, whether that change is blameworthy or praiseworthy. An angel, however, is not mutable in that way owing to the perfection of his nature; rather, once he has chosen something he cannot choose the opposite. Yet in the angel a mutability in free will is considered insofar as the choice he has, he could have not had — and consequently could be otherwise in himself than he now is. But in God (says James) there is no variation or shadow of turning, because the divine will cannot have not had from eternity every action that it has in itself — but just as it now is in itself, so it is necessarily so by necessity of nature. Now the inference is proved. For if there is free will in God, so that he can make things otherwise than he does, it is necessary that in the divine will, which is the cause of things, some difference be possible, and that it could have been otherwise in itself than it now is. The inference is proved because by natural reason it seems manifest that a total cause remaining in entirely the same and invariable state, and incapable of being impeded or modified by anything external, must necessarily always produce the same effect — and what is not produced cannot be produced. Therefore it does not seem intelligible that, with no change made in the divine will, the world comes into being from nothing, and from the same will in the same state the world does not come into being. Therefore this diversity of effects — namely, that the world comes from nothing and that the world does not come from nothing — must necessarily be referred to some possible variety in the cause, which is the divine will; and consequently the divine will would be otherwise if it had not created than it now is in willing to create.

Fourth argument. In demons there is no freedom in the act of will with respect to the object of pride, because angels immutably adhere to the object they once willed — and this because of the perfection of the angelic nature. Therefore neither in God is there freedom with respect to the things he willed from eternity. The consequence is clear, because God is much more immutable than an angel. The antecedent is proved because if the angel were now to act freely, his guilt would always increase — and consequently the punishment due would increase in eternity without any limit.

Fifth and final argument. Aristotle — who is called a prodigy of nature — denied that the first cause operates freely, and asserted that it moves by necessity of nature, just as it moves all things. Therefore, according to natural reason, it is repugnant to, or at least cannot be gathered that, free will is in God. The antecedent is clear from Physics book 8, texts 7 and 8, where he says that if the first mover did not move previously, it was necessary, in order for it to move afterward, that an impediment be removed by which it was hindered. Here he seems to presuppose that God acts by necessity of nature — otherwise his argument would be frivolous. For one could have responded that the first mover is free and therefore could have not moved, not because of an impediment but because it did not will to move. And in the same place, text 15, he says it is absurd for God not to have acted from eternity and then to have acted. Furthermore, in book I of On the Heavens, chapters 10 and following, he says the heavens are ungenerable and incorruptible. But if Aristotle had understood God to be a free efficient cause with respect to the heavens, he would have asserted that the heavens could be corrupted and the world destroyed — therefore, etc. And this is confirmed all the more because Aristotle was ignorant of production from nothing — therefore according to his teaching it was necessary that something besides God be eternal, namely prime matter from which corruptible species would be made, and the intelligences themselves, which are not made from matter. And finally in Metaphysics book 9, text 17, and book 12, text 30, he says that the heavens cannot not be moved, and that God and the intelligences do not have the power not to move, but are always actually moving.

For the decision of this difficulty, we must presuppose from the teaching of St. Thomas, I, q. 14, art. 1, ad 2, that what is said of God is to be accepted without any defect that is found in us. This is to be understood not only of those things said eminently of God, but also of those said formally — for example, knowledge in us is of conclusions through reasoning from causes to effects, but knowledge said of God signifies certainty about all effects in the first cause without any reasoning. There is also the example in angels, in whom knowledge is a quality superadded to the angelic intellect, while in God it is his substance. Note secondly with Cajetan, in that place, that counsel in us signifies complete inquiry — that is, up to and including judgment — since inquiry without judgment is not counsel except in a preliminary sense. Therefore in counsel, as its specific proper nature, what is to be considered is the very terminus of the inquiry. However, the inquiry itself and the practical reasoning require our own proper imperfection. With these presuppositions laid down, the First Conclusion is: counsel formally and properly and without metaphor exists in God. First proof: since knowledge is properly and formally placed in God without metaphor, so too prudence is placed in God properly and formally — therefore so too is counsel. The antecedent is admitted by all metaphysicians and theologians. The consequence is proved because, just as knowledge, although defined by us as a habit acquired through demonstration, is nonetheless understood by us according to its proper and specific nature — insofar as knowledge as knowledge is a certain power of knowing effects in their cause — so too counsel, although in us it presupposes inquiry, is according to its proper nature a practical judgment about some means that in itself does not have necessary connection with an end. And such a judgment is no more repugnant to God than a judgment of knowledge, which is properly and formally found in God — since its specific nature does not necessarily require reasoning, or the nature of a habit, or of a quality that is an accident of a substance. Second proof: according to the widespread teaching of St. Augustine, those things which are said in Scripture and which can be understood without metaphor, ought to be understood according to the propriety of speech. But counsel is frequently found in Scripture said of God — for example, Ephesians 1: "Who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Therefore, just as will is placed in God properly and formally, so too counsel is properly to be affirmed as existing in God, with all imperfections removed that belong to counsel as it exists in rational creatures.
Second Conclusion. Free will truly and properly and formally exists in God, just as do wisdom and knowledge. This conclusion is certain both from Sacred Scripture and from natural reason. First proof from the preceding conclusion: since counsel exists properly in God, so too does free will. The consequence is proved because counsel concerns a means that in itself has no necessary connection with the end, and yet is judged to be orderable and to be ordered toward the end. But free will is nothing other than, as theologians define it, the faculty of reason and will toward either option. Therefore, with respect to the means about which there is counsel, there is freedom of will to choose it or not. For if the means were necessarily willed, there would not be counsel about it either. Second proof from the argument of St. Thomas in this article: God wills things other than himself, and not by necessity of his nature — therefore with respect to those things he has free will. The major is manifest, because since God is the ultimate end and naturally wills the ultimate end, it necessarily follows that whatever else exists in the nature of things besides God, that it exists for the sake of the ultimate end. The minor is proved because the goodness of God, which is the ultimate end, is by itself alone most perfect, since it is existence itself by essence — therefore the divine will wills no other good by necessity of its nature. The consequence is clear, because the necessity of the will with respect to means arises from nowhere else than from the fact that the attainment of the end depends in some genus of cause on those means. Therefore, since the attainment of that divine end in no way depends on any means, it follows manifestly that the divine will does not by necessity will anything other than itself.
Third proof: in us there is free will, as is to be held by faith, as natural reason dictates, and as experience testifies — therefore free will also exists in God. This consequence is proved because when a man is freely moved by his own action, he is moved either by himself as his first mover, or by God. If by himself, then there is some motion in the creature that is not reduced to God as to the first mover and moving cause upon whose motion the creature acting and moving itself depends — and thus God would not be master of the free will of man, which would be blasphemous. But if you say that man is moved by God as the first mover, yet not as one who moves freely but as one who moves by necessity of nature — against this it follows that man is not moved freely. The inference is proved. For this inference is valid: "God moves my will — therefore my will is moved by God." Furthermore: if the antecedent is necessary by necessity of nature, my will is not moved freely — since it is impossible that God should move me and that my will should not be moved. Where then will the freedom of the action be? For the consequence is necessary from the nature of the thing, and the antecedent is also conceded to be absolutely necessary — therefore my freedom is entirely destroyed. But perhaps some superficial thinker will respond that an equally strong argument can be made even if God is a free mover through his free will. For the argument would proceed: "God by his will, though free, yet efficaciously moves me — therefore I am moved." The consequence is indeed necessary, and the antecedent is necessary by supposition — therefore, given the truth of the antecedent, my will cannot not be moved — therefore it is not moved freely, since God moves the will no less efficaciously by his free will than if he were to move it by necessity of nature. To this objection the final consequence must be denied. The reason is: although that antecedent "God moves my will" has the necessity of supposition in the composite sense — that is, on the supposition that he freely wills to move, it is necessarily simultaneously verified that he moves — nonetheless he moves freely, because he can simply not move, since he can will not to move. Yet from this my freedom is not destroyed, but rather perfected. For from the divine free act that efficaciously and gently moves, my will itself participates in freedom and is freely moved. But on these matters enough was said in article 8. Fourth proof of the conclusion: what is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency must, as often as it is in act, be moved by another. But if God were to operate by necessity of nature, our will could not sometimes be in act and sometimes in potency — therefore God operates by free will. The minor is proved because our free will can be efficaciously moved by no other than God; but if God moves by necessity of nature, no reason can be assigned why the will now passes into act and now remains in potency.

The theological proof from St. Paul: But now at last the conclusion is proved by a theological and necessary argument. And I lay down this excellent foundation from the testimony of the Apostle in Romans 1: "His invisible things," he says, "from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made." In this testimony two things are to be weighed by us, from which we shall construct a twofold argument. The first is how the Apostle testifies that from the perfections of creatures the divine perfections can be investigated and demonstrated. The argument therefore is: we ourselves experience free will, which is a supreme perfection — therefore free will is in God. Nor does it avail to respond that free will is not a simple perfection. For as we have already shown, the faculty and power of acting freely includes no formal imperfection according to its proper nature — any more than knowledge or wisdom. But this is further confirmed: for man through the faculty of free will has the power to master other things and to order them as pleases him toward an end intended by himself. Since therefore God is supremely master of those things that exist outside himself, and has disposed and ordered all things for himself as for the ultimate end, as is found in Proverbs 16, it is necessary that God be supremely free. And this is confirmed from what we read in Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." On this testimony all the doctors, especially the scholastics, say that man is made in the image of God chiefly in that, through free will, he acts freely, as if a judge and master of his own actions. Whence he can also govern the rest of things, referring them to himself and himself to God as to the prototype after whose likeness he was formed. For it must be considered that the divine essence itself is the most excellent prototype which all created things imitate according to their measure. For all things have being from the divine essence, which exists through itself; and those that live receive life from that life which is itself through itself. But no creature other than the rational and intellectual one is said to be made in the image and likeness of God — because the best that is honorably understood in God is intellect, will, and the providence and judgment of all things, which is signified to us by the very name of God, which among the Greeks is derived from "providence." But this is much more intimated in the cited passage from Genesis, where in the Hebrew language in which the text was originally written, it says: "And Elohim created" — that is, judge or judges — "Adam in his image. In the image of Elohim he created him." As if to say, "in the image of a judge." For man was created to be as a certain judge, a kind of vicar of God on earth, so that concerning his own actions, according to the natural and divine law inscribed in him, he would dispose by his own judgment and refer himself together with all other things to the supreme judge. We have therefore that from the free will of man, free will in God is gathered — and that the free will of God flows into our will and confers freedom upon it, and efficaciously and gently moves it to free actions. Now the second thing we promised to weigh in the testimony of the Apostle presses more forcefully. For the Apostle says: "Because when they knew God, they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks." From these words it is gathered by necessary inference that the Apostle is speaking of the knowledge that men had of God from the power of natural light. For he says: "Because when they knew God" — that is, as the author and governor of the world — and he reproves them for sinning in that "they did not glorify him as God, or give thanks." But if God does not freely move and govern all things, and does not watch over and provide for human affairs, no thanks would be owed to him. For thanks are given to one who freely and gratuitously confers a benefit. We do not give thanks to the heavenly bodies, even though we receive great benefit from their influences. Nor again do we give thanks to God himself for what he does by necessity of nature — for example, we do not give thanks because he generates a Son equal to himself; but we do give thanks because he freely deigned to reveal to us that eternal generation, and sent his only begotten Son into the world, that everyone who believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. Thus we have concluded efficaciously from Sacred Scripture what can be known by natural reason — that free will is in God — since the Apostle testifies that natural reason dictates that God is to be glorified by us, and that immense thanks are to be given to him for the benefits received.

Banez’s replies to the remaining objections: But now I judge it will be of great benefit to theologians, in the course of my replies to the arguments I raised on the opposite side, to show where the proper nature of a free action consists.

To the arguments of the opposing side: To the first: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I respond that St. Thomas and Gregory [of Nyssa] are speaking of counsel according to the conditions it has in us. Yet the proper nature of counsel consists in the elective judgment of some means in relation to an end — which means, according to its own nature, does not have necessary connection with the end, but rather the attainment of the end could have stood without it. It happens however at times, because of human ignorance, that men inquire into means and compare them to one another, by which they may attain an end absolutely willed — even though it often happens that there is only one means necessary by its own nature for attaining the intended end, which if they had known beforehand, they would not have deliberated at all. But God most perfectly knows that for the attainment of his end — which is the object of divine goodness — no means is necessary, nor does anything contribute to a better attainment of the end. Yet he operates all things according to the counsel of his will — that is, according to a counsel that is voluntary and free. For it is a Hebrew idiom that a genitive supplies the place of a denominative and a superlative — as in "the kingdom of the Son of his love," meaning "the kingdom of his most beloved Son." So "the counsel of his will" means "a counsel most voluntary and free."
To the second argument, in order to respond, it must be noted that "indifferent" or "indifference" can be understood in two ways. In one way, negatively — that is, not differing, not determined, not a difference, not a determination. In another way, privatively — so that something is called indifferent that is apt to be determined but is not yet determined, but still remains in potency toward either option. Like a man who has not yet decided to take a wife, nor decided not to. The answer therefore to the argument is that indifference understood in the first way is not repugnant to God, in this sense: that by his nature and from his proper substance he does not have determination to will anything outside himself. But if indifference is taken in the second way, it is repugnant to God — because God was never suspended with regard to possibles and things producible by him, but whatever he has done in time he willed and deliberated from eternity to exist in time, and whatever he has not done and will not do in time, he decreed from eternity not to do. And thus it is verified that privatively understood indifference is not in God. But now let us begin to gather some necessary property of free will. For what is required is not indifference toward either option in the privative sense — namely, that there be aptitude toward either option and no determination to either. This happens in us because of the imperfection of free will. But the perfection of the operation of free will is when such indifference is in the faculty of free will in the negative sense — in this sense: that on the part of the nature of the one deliberating, no determination to the one or the other is found. Hence it was well responded when the argument was proposed. For indeed all that indifference, if considered privatively, is to be referred to the being or non-being of the creature. And even if indifference is considered negatively, it is not to be placed in God with respect to any divine act as it is in God, but only in relation to the extrinsic relation to the being or non-being of the creature. And to the counter-reply of the argument I respond that that indifference, as placed in God by us, can be compared to all creatures, even possible ones — whether they coexist or do not coexist with eternity. For the divine will is not determined from its nature to producing any creature, since no creature has necessary connection with the ultimate end, which is the proper object of the divine will. However, the divine will never was or can be, as it were, suspended with regard to any creature, but from eternity has immutably willed and wills whatever it wills to happen, and immutably does not will whatever it does not will to happen. Hence it is gathered that mutability does not pertain to the proper nature of free will.
To the third argument: I deny the inference. To the proof I respond that that maxim, celebrated among the philosophers — "a total cause remaining in the same state," etc. — is verified in created causes, which have a limited and finite mode of being and operating; but not in the first cause of all things, which, since it is unlimited and infinite existence itself, contains in itself the power of operating or not operating — without any possibility of being otherwise in itself, but only through the mutability of the effect does it operate otherwise than it previously operated. It must therefore be conceded that the divine will would not be otherwise in itself if it had not willed to create the world than it now is having willed to create. But the world itself is much otherwise when it actually receives being from him and is really referred to him as to its first efficient cause — whereas if it had not been created, it would be referred to God only by a relation of reason. I freely confess that it is difficult for us to understand the free production of things by the divine will, together with such great and ineffable immutability. Yet from what we know naturally, we can be somewhat guided toward some understanding of so great a majesty. For we see that two contraries cannot come together in the same material subject, and yet a single power receives the species of white and black without variation in itself. Furthermore, the distinct objects of the five senses, which are proper to each and mutually incommunicable, a single sense called the common sense knows under a single simple species their differences. And finally the intellect, under a simpler species, perceives the differences of many things in a simpler and more immutable manner. Theologians are accustomed to pursue this reasoning even with respect to angels — therefore, speaking consistently, it is no wonder if the divine purity and majesty, whose intellect and will are a simple substance, and whose substance is simple and infinite existence, could, without any shadow of mutability, have not created the world which it created — remaining in the same state creating the world as it would be in not creating it.
To the fourth argument: I respond from the teaching of St. Thomas in I, q. 64, art. 2, ad 3, that there remains still in the devil the sin by which he first sinned, as regards appetite, even if it does not remain as regards his believing he can obtain what he desires. Just as if someone were to believe he could commit homicide and willed to do it, and then the power were taken from him, the will to commit homicide could nonetheless remain in him — so that he wills he had done it, or wills to do it if he could. So Thomas. And in the reply to the first objection he had said that good and bad angels have free will, but according to the mode and condition of their nature. We have therefore from St. Thomas's teaching that there is no contradiction in an act being free and yet being immutable by reason of the perfection of the angelic nature — immutable, I said, in the sense that the angel cannot choose the opposite; not however in the sense that he cannot suspend the free action. For this is possible for the angel, and to that extent he is mutable and measurable by time. To the argument therefore I respond that the angel still sins the sin of pride which he sinned from the beginning; and whether in the meantime he suspends the act of pride or does not suspend it (which seems more probable to me, and will be explained below in q. 64), yet in that act of sin there is still freedom, even though he immutably adheres and immutably chooses what he once chose. As for what was inferred in argument 4 as an inconvenience — that as the demon's guilt increases, his punishment would also increase in eternity without limit — St. Thomas responds in book 2 of the Sentences, d. 7, q. 1, art. 2, ad 5, that some say the guilt and punishment of demons can increase up to the day of judgment. But this does not seem true, because since they are not in the state of the way, just as they cannot change toward the good, so neither can they change toward the worse. Hence it must be said that their guilt or pride is said to increase not as regards the intensity of malice, but as regards the multiplicity of acts. So too the essential punishment does not increase, but the accidental punishment does — which arises from the multitude of the damned — just as it is also with the reward of the good angels.
To the fifth argument from the opinion of Aristotle: I respond that we need not esteem Aristotle so highly as to assert that he was an infallible rule of natural reason in everything. Indeed he himself in his teaching is quite ambiguous concerning the immortality of souls and then concerning the assertion of free will in God. In other places besides those cited he seems to hold the opposite — for example, in Topics book 4, chapter 5, he says: "God and men can do many things that they do not do." And in Ethics book 1, chapter 8, he asserts that those who are truly wise are most dear to God, and that he confers the greatest benefits upon them. And in Ethics chapter 7, he teaches that God has friendship toward men — not indeed as between equals, but from supereminence. All of which cannot be true unless God has free will.

But now at last I judge it will be greatly worthwhile for the benefit of theologians, as I gather from the aforesaid assertion of divine free will certain teachings by which they may be able to resolve many theological difficulties that are accustomed to greatly torment some in public disputations. First teaching. It is sufficiently received that the freedom of will does not consist in the ability to sin. For although from the fact that someone sins, or can sin, we rightly conclude that he has the faculty of free will, yet conversely it does not follow: "This will is free — therefore it can sin." For behold, God himself is most free, and yet is far from the possibility of sinning. Likewise, Christ the Lord, insofar as he is man, is impeccable — if the particle "insofar as" is not taken reduplicatively, as the dialecticians say; for in that sense the proposition "Christ insofar as he is man is impeccable" would be false, because this proposition included in it would be false: "Every man is impeccable." But if the word "insofar as" is taken specificatively, so that the meaning is that Christ through his humanity, or through his human will, cannot sin, the proposition is true — because such a sin would be attributed to the divine suppositum; and yet through the human will he is free and can merit. The reason for this teaching is most frequent in the doctrine of Augustine. For to be able to sin is not a power, but a weakness of free will. Therefore if through God's grace man is cured of this weakness, his freedom is in no way destroyed but rather perfected. As was done in the Blessed Virgin through the fullness of the grace of sanctification, so that she could not sin even venially; and in all those confirmed in grace, so that they can no longer sin mortally — and nonetheless they remain free and can merit in the observance of the commandments, as we shall explain more fully later.
Second teaching. There is no contradiction to the freedom of will with respect to means — indeed it is a greater perfection of free will — that the will itself should be naturally and necessarily inclined toward the ultimate end, or also through God's grace and through supernatural gifts is determined, as if naturally, toward the ultimate end. Indeed, the freedom with respect to means that have no necessary connection with the end will be all the more perfect, the more the will itself is determined with respect to the end. Behold the example of the divine will, which necessarily and naturally loves the highest good, and is nonetheless most perfectly free with respect to all creatures that are ordered toward the ultimate end, since they have no necessary connection with it. Similarly, the will of man is naturally determined toward good in general as regards the specification of the act, and is nonetheless free even as regards the specification of the act with respect to certain means that have no necessary connection with the good in general, which is the object of the will. Indeed, even if the will were naturally determined as regards the exercise of the act toward willing good in general, it would nonetheless remain free with respect to such means — though not with respect to those things which have necessary and intrinsic connection from their own nature with the object of the will, such as being and living, which have necessary connection with the good that is desired.
The third teaching, to be especially observed, is that the freedom of the act of will — which formally exists in the will itself — arises from the root of the act of the intellect — namely, from such an act and judgment of the intellect. For the intellect proposes to the will an object that is in itself indifferent with respect to the attainment of the object of the will and has no necessary connection with it, and yet judges it to be orderable toward the end of the will, or toward the attainment of that end, or toward participating in some goodness from the end. And then it judges that it is to be ordered toward the end — and then the will chooses, and in such a choice is formally free. This freedom arises as from a root from the aforesaid judgment of the intellect. (And it must be noted incidentally that we place the indifference in the object itself as judged, and it is not necessary to understand indifference to be in the intellect itself or in its act — as we have already said is not found in the divine intellect.) We have therefore that what is necessary for the freedom of the act of the will is that the indifference of the means to be chosen be judged by the intellect, and that such a means be simultaneously judged as to be determined toward the end. This judgment is indeed practical and necessarily conjoined with the choice of the will as its effective root from which the actual freedom of the agent operating through the will originates. Let those who do not wish to err in resolving questions about merit and the nature of meriting observe this teaching carefully — which I demonstrate in no other way than from the foregoing. For God is most free, as has now been settled, and yet in him no other reason for freedom is found with respect to the things he wills outside himself, except that he judges them to have no necessary connection with the end, but to be in themselves indifferent. Yet he judges them to be orderable toward the end, and judges that they are to be ordered. And this is the reason why the willing to order is free. See therefore, theologian, whether we do injury to our free will, when we gather that: the more perfectly the rational and intellectual creature will be free in its operation, the more that operation will be assimilated to the divine free operation — after whose image and likeness it has been made according to intellect and will.

But you say: so it is. Now then attend to the corollaries which we gather by evident consequence from the foregoing. The first is: as often as an act of will arises from the aforesaid root of judgment, it will always be free. Hence I gather further: whatever has preceded, or accompanies, or supervenes upon the act of will — if it does not destroy that judgment concerning the means in relation to the end — will not destroy the freedom of the operation. This consequence is evident, because given the definition of a free act, the act must necessarily be free. Now therefore approach the more difficult matters gradually. The eternal and immutable counsel of the divine will precedes our free operation, and so does the infallible predefinition of divine providence, which has predefined every good free operation — indeed, every operation insofar as it is good and is exercised concerning good. But because God himself, by his providence and immutable counsel, does not bind or destroy our judgment by which we judge the indifference of the means and its orderability and that it is to be ordered toward the end — he does not therefore destroy the freedom of our operation either, but rather efficaciously produces, fosters, and preserves it. Behold how our freedom of operation stands together with infallible and efficacious divine providence — indeed, without it it could not stand at all. Now you will understand more clearly, concerning the grace of God and the efficacious divine aids and precepts, how they are not opposed to the freedom of our will, but rather favor it. The reason is evident, if you are unwilling to deny the aforesaid teaching which you have necessarily conceded. For all of these things are so far from disturbing or binding the judgment of our reason — so that it cannot judge in the aforesaid manner the indifference of the object — that they rather illuminate it, perfect it, and raise it to the likeness of God. Behold, says the Prophet in Psalm 18: "The commandment of the Lord is clear, enlightening the eyes." And when he again asks: "Perfect my steps in your paths, that my footsteps may not be moved" — is he asking that freedom be taken from him by divine aid? Certainly not. Rather, he entreats that he be perfected in the observance of the commandments. Similarly, when the Bride asks: "Draw me, we will run after you" — is she praying for an efficacious aid so that she may not walk by her own steps, that is, by free affections? No — rather she desires that she may run more freely and swiftly. Let it therefore be far from the Catholic and pious theologian to defend freedom of will while diminishing the efficacy of divine providence, divine grace, and the obligation of divine precept, in order to assert the freedom of operation of those confirmed in grace.

Finally, let us gather that among all intellectual creatures the most perfect freedom of operation was in the soul of Christ the Lord, because it was assimilated above all others to divine freedom. First, because through the hypostatic union it was made impeccable. For since it existed in the nature of things under no other personhood than the personhood of the Word, if the soul of Christ were to sin, the sin would be attributed to the Word itself. Furthermore, because Christ the Lord, by the light of glory, clearly beheld the divine predefinition and precept of dying concerning himself and his operations, as an most excellent exemplar — just as was said to Moses: "See, and make according to the pattern shown to you on the mountain" (Exodus 25). All of these things perfected the freedom of his will and illuminated the practical judgment of the intellect, by which Christ more certainly and evidently judged the indifference of means toward the end and their orderability, together with the divine ordering or pre-ordering. Hence Christ the Lord himself, subordinated to the same ordering, ordered those same things toward the ultimate end out of the immense charity with which he was borne toward the ultimate end.

And in this he was also assimilated to God, who necessarily loves himself, while he loves us freely. So too the soul of Christ the Lord necessarily loves God himself and all means that have necessary connection from within with the attainment of that end — namely, with the beatific vision of the soul of Christ — and thus it wills the light of glory as proper to its own intellect and its own being. But the rest of the things that do not from within have necessary connection with the attainment of the end, even though they have it by supposition of a precept — these he willed freely. Consistent with this teaching is what we read in Psalm 39, which is understood literally of Christ as the Apostle testifies in Hebrews 10: "In the head of the book it is written of me, that I should do your will." (Behold, the divine predefinition and immutability of the divine will preceded — by which it was predefined and willed what Christ would do.) Then follows: "My God, I willed it." Behold the free act of the soul of Christ, subordinated to God, by which he willed to obey even unto death, embracing with immense but free affection the law of dying the death of the cross. And this is what he says: "And your law is in the midst of my heart."

From the foregoing it finally follows that one would greatly and dangerously err who were to assert that Christ the Lord neither merited nor could have merited by obeying the precept of dying — unless he willed to obey more intensely than he was held to by the obligation of the precept. This certain persons wished to confirm by the following argument: because it cannot be properly understood how, given the precept of dying, the soul of Christ could freely will to die — since, given the precept, it could not not-will to die; therefore, in order for him to merit through the act of obedience, one must assert in that act an intensity that was not enjoined under the precept. This argument is indeed ridiculous and proceeds quite freely from ignorance of the definition of a free act, and it seems to us unworthy of being refuted at length after the foregoing teachings. Nor is it pertinent here and now to examine and show with precision how much danger lies hidden — or rather (to speak more accurately) lies open — in that assertion. For my part I would not dare without danger to my own position to affirm that such an opinion is in any way probable. But we shall speak more opportunely on this matter, the Lord willing, without whom it is nothing. So much has been said on this most grave doubt, subject to the correction of the Roman Church.

A second question is raised concerning this article: whether at the present moment, in fact, there is in God a real power to will that Antichrist should not be future. Cajetan, above on article 7, ad 4, holds that in God, at the present time, there is no real power for this. He proves it first as follows: power for opposites places mutability in that in which it resides, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics book 9. But God is altogether immutable — therefore he does not have power for opposites. Second argument: if God can now will that Antichrist not exist, then he can change. The consequence is proved, because he has already now willed that Antichrist exist — therefore he would cease to will what he willed, and this is to change. And finally St. Thomas himself in the passage cited and in Contra Gentiles book I, chapter 82, seems to hold this opinion. Nonetheless, Cajetan concedes that the proposition "God can will that Antichrist not exist" is true if the word "can" is taken absolutely. Scotus, however, holds the opposite opinion in book I, distinction 39 — an opinion followed by many among modern theologians, even Thomists. And it is proved first because God can bring it about that Antichrist not exist — therefore he can will it. I prove the antecedent: when God will create the soul of Antichrist, he will create it freely, and not by necessity of nature — therefore he can bring it about that Antichrist not exist. Second argument: God is most perfectly free with respect to all things outside himself — therefore he has true and real power for either option. The consequence is clear from the definition of free will. Finally, before God produced the world, I ask: did he have real power not to produce it, or did he not have such power? If the first — then he simply has now real power not to produce Antichrist. If the second — then he produced the world by necessity and not freely. The consequence is clear, because from eternity he did not have the power not to produce it. For the resolution of this difficulty, which seems to us to be a question of terminology, a distinction must be made when it is asked whether at the present moment in God there is real power not to produce Antichrist and to will the opposite of what he has willed. For if the word "now" makes a composite sense with the two opposites — that is, given the supposition and truth of one opposite, the other opposite is also verified — then the answer must be negative: there is no such power in God, nor can there be. But if the word "now" makes a composition of one opposite with the power to do the other, it would be blasphemous to deny that God now has real power to bring it about that Antichrist not exist, and to will that Antichrist not exist. The earlier opinion of Cajetan therefore proceeds in the composite sense, while the other opinion proceeds in the divided sense and speaking absolutely. But speaking absolutely, the second opinion holds the truth — and with it the immutability of the divine will stands well, which, though it can do the opposite, will never do it nor will it — and in this consists the being of an immutable will. And through this it is clear what must be said in response to the arguments of each opinion.

-Banez commentary on ST. I vol 1

414. Although under this commandment "thou shalt not commit adultery" only adultery is explicitly expressed — which is what the Greek word moicheia properly signifies — nevertheless every venereal act outside of marriage is forbidden by the same commandment. See the Salamancans, on the sixth precept, chapter 1, no. 3, who prove this at length with St. Augustine and St. Ambrose. For although fornication is a lesser evil than adultery, nevertheless, because by the law of nature carnal union is ordained only for marriage, through which offspring may not only be begotten but also well educated, God therefore in this commandment forbade all sexual intercourse outside of marriage and likewise all venereal acts, because they are not ordained toward generation. Furthermore, fornication is found to have been expressly forbidden by God elsewhere, as in Leviticus 19:29, Deuteronomy 23:17, and 1 Corinthians 6:9.

415. i. Kisses, embraces, pressings of hands, and similar acts, if done outside of marriage with the intention of a lustful act or for the sake of venereal pleasure — even if not that perfect pleasure which consists in emission of seed — are nevertheless always mortal sins; because in that spirit they are immodest outside of marriage, and by their nature such pleasure tends toward the perfect act. Filliucius, vol. 50, chapter 9, no. 294; Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, disputation 8; Sanchez, book 9, disputation 46. It is asked whether in the genus of lust there is parvity of matter. It must be noted that theologians distinguish venereal or carnal pleasure — that is, with arousal of the vital spirits serving generation — from sensitive or natural pleasure. Hence two doubts are debated. Doubt I is: whether there is parvity of matter in venereal matters. Sanchez, on marriage, book 9, disputation 46, no. 9, setting aside the danger of pollution or consent to a carnal act, holds that there is parvity of matter — as would be the case with touching a woman's hand or foot, pressing her arm, pinching her, or twisting her fingers. And the same is held by Navarrus, Soto, Salas, and several others cited by the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 79. Tamburini, Decalogus on immodesty, chapter 8, §1, nos. 8 and 9, also appears to hold the same. But Tamburini proceeds by a different route: he distinguishes, together with Palaus (who calls this opinion most common), and says that there is indeed no parvity of matter in venereal matters — in which any small pleasure is gravely evil — but that there is nonetheless parvity of matter in the subject matter of lust as it extends more broadly to the senses of touch. Hence he says that a light touch out of playfulness or with pleasure that is not venereal does not exceed venial sin. Notwithstanding all these opinions, it must be held absolutely, with Viva, in his scrutiny of proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, and with the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 81, and Moya and Corella, that every carnal or lustful pleasure taken with advertence and deliberation is a mortal sin — especially after the aforementioned proposition 40, which stated: It is a probable opinion that a kiss engaged in for the sake of carnal and sensible pleasure arising from the kiss is only a venial sin, setting aside the danger of further consent and pollution. For if in kisses there is no light matter, neither is there to be granted in other touches accompanied by carnal pleasure. The reason is that any carnal pleasure, or any arousal of the vital spirits serving generation, is a kind of inchoate pollution or movement toward pollution. Tournely, Continuation, vol. 3, p. 526, conclusion 2, and the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 65, together with Cajetan, Bonacina, Tamburini, and Lopez, therefore rightly condemn the acts described above — namely, pinching a woman's hand, twisting her fingers, etc. — as mortal sins, on account of the carnal pleasure that is present on such occasions, or at least on account of the proximate danger thereof. And De la Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 911, likewise rightly rejects the opinion of Arriaga, who says that one who voluntarily consents to such slight carnal movements occurring spontaneously does not sin gravely. 416. Doubt II is: whether there is parvity of matter in sensible or natural pleasure — namely, if someone takes pleasure in the touch of a woman's hand, as in the touch of something soft, such as a rose, silk cloth, or the like. The first opinion affirms this, with St. Antoninus, Silvester, Salas, Navarrus, Filliucius, Hurtado, Moya, and many others cited by the Salamancans, chapter 1, no. 36; and Busenbaum below, no. 4, and Tournely, vol. 3, p. 516, conclusion 7, together with Comitolus, Baronius, Silvester, and others adhere to this. The second opinion, however, denies it, with Cajetan, Diana, and others cited by the Salamancans, no. 40, at the end. The reason is that touches, insofar as they are pleasurable according to the sense of touch of a girl or young person, are by their nature ordained toward pollution. And this I consider must be held absolutely — since the Salamancans, no. 48, together with Filliucius, Trullench, Diana, and Roncaglia, on the sixth precept, chapter 1, question 2, rightly say that the first opinion is not practically probable, because on account of corrupt nature it is morally impossible to have that natural pleasure without also feeling carnal and venereal pleasure — especially in persons capable of intercourse, and especially if these acts are engaged in with some affection and lingering, as Elb., on the sixth precept, no. 186, rightly observes. Hence Sporer, on marriage, chapter 3, no. 687, together with Sanchez, book 9, disputation 49, and the common opinion, and De la Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 804, rightly say that as a general rule the first opinion is not practically probable — because it is in itself a mortal sin to expose oneself to the danger of consenting to venereal pleasure. De la Croix, however, makes an exception for someone in whom such proximate danger would be absent. I would admit this only, with Fr. Holzmann, on the sixth precept, chapter 2, no. 706, in the rare case where someone, through long experience, was morally certain that no danger of consent threatened him — but when will such a case occur? It must be noted, however, that there is a difference — as Tournely, vol. 3, p. 570, at the beginning, rightly distinguishes — between acting for the sake of taking pleasure and acting with the pleasure that arises from qualities attached to bodies. In the latter case, parvity of matter can well exist, if the pleasure is merely sensible or natural; provided — it must be added — that you do not rest in it, but in the act itself detest the pleasure; otherwise you would not be acting with pleasure but for the sake of pleasure, which cannot fail to be inseparable from the danger of falling into venereal pleasure. ii. Such acts are of the same nature as perfect or consummated acts; and therefore in confession it must be explained whether they were engaged in with a person of the same or opposite sex, with a free or married person, a relative, a consecrated person, etc. Lessius, disputation 15; Sanchez, book 1, chapter 2.

417. iii. Kisses, embraces, pressings of hands, and similar non-obscene acts, if done only out of duty (as St. Thomas, 2.2, question 15, article 4, states), or out of the custom of one's country, or for the sake of decent courtesy or the increase of goodwill — even if venereal pleasure incidentally arises (provided consent is not given to it) — are not sins. Lessius; Filliucius, loc. cit., no. 171. (So holds the common opinion: St. Antoninus, part 2, title 5, chapter 1, §10, and Tournely, vol. 3, p. 505, with Silvester, response v, to 1.) De la Croix, however, rightly notes, book 3, part 1, no. 900, that kisses engaged in even by the custom of one's country are ordinarily mortal sins if engaged in with lingering or ardor. He says the same, together with Sporer, of kisses on the mouth or of one receiving another's tongue with the mouth. He observes on the other hand, with Sanchez, etc., no. 902, that to kiss children (understood of very young children), even with sensible pleasure, is ordinarily no more than venial, because that pleasure is ordinarily nothing more than natural.

418. iv. But if these acts are done out of some venial vanity, playfulness, curiosity, levity, wantonness, or even out of sensuality or a sensual and natural affection (provided they are not done with venereal pleasure nor for its sake, and if such pleasure should arise unexpectedly and contrary to intention, it is repelled, and the acts are then avoided), they do not exceed venial sin. See Filliucius here; Lessius; Sanchez, loc. cit.; Diana, part 4, tract 3, response 136. The contrary, however, is safer. See Trullench, book 6, chapter 1, disputation 12, no. 8. (But see what was said at no. 416.)

430. xi. An unmarried person who permits herself to be touched by another with a touch that is commonly regarded as decent — such as taking of hands, handling of the hand, embraces, and kisses according to the custom of one's country — does not sin unless it is clear to her that it is being done with a wicked affection; for it is not lawful to cooperate with that. Filliucius teaches, however, that even then it can be admitted so that the one who is touching may not be defamed (or so that suspicion of infamy may not be introduced, or that others may not be scandalized — so Tournely, vol. 3, p. 505, with Silvester, and the Salamancans, chapter 3, no. 62, with Sa, Azor, Cajetan, and Bonacina). She is obliged, however, to resist if the touches are done secretly and it is certain that they are done maliciously. Salamancans, ibid.; Tamburini, §4, no. 25; De la Croix, book 2, no. 249. One who admits immodest touches (such as of the breasts and shameful parts) or furtive kisses (as the Salamancans, ibid., no. 22, also say) — and lingering or indecent ones — sins, because a wicked affection is presumed. See Filliucius, book 30, no. 169, and below, book 5, chapter 1, doubt 2. Whether, moreover, a woman who is overcome by force is obliged to cry out, in order to avoid the immodest touches of another if need be — the Salamancans, ibid., together with Cajetan, from the common opinion as they assert, affirm this, and prove it from Deuteronomy 22:23-24, where a girl is condemned to death because she did not cry out, being within the city. But Navarrus, Summa, chapter 16, no. 1; Soto, on justice, book 5, question 1, article 5; and Bonacina, on the fourth precept, single question, no. 10, together with Reginaldus, very probably say that a woman is not obliged to cry out when there is the danger of notable harm or infamy or excessive shame — because in that case, if she otherwise resists as much as she can, she is not obliged to repel the force at such great cost to herself. Exception must be made if there is a proximate danger of consenting. Nor does the text of Deuteronomy cited above stand in the way; for that precept was a judicial precept pertaining indeed to the external forum, in which a girl who had been violated and had not cried out while in the city was ordered to be condemned — because it was presumed (as commented by a Lapide) that she had consented to the violation and therefore had not cried out. And Menochius and Gordon, with Philo, as cited by Calmet on the cited text, hold the same. Furthermore, no one doubts that all the judicial precepts of the old law have now altogether ceased, superseded by the more perfect judicial precepts of the evangelical law, as the learned Frassen proves, vol. 6, on law, disputation 3, article 2, question 4, conclusion 1, at the end. It must not be denied, however, that if a woman is in proximate danger of consenting to intercourse — on account of past experience or on account of her known weakness — she is indeed obliged to cry out in order to free herself from that encounter. Whether, moreover, a woman who is overcome by force is obliged rather to suffer death, by repelling with force the aggressor against her chastity, than to permit intercourse — there are two opinions on this, as we said at no. 368. But the negative opinion, held by Soto, Navarrus, Toledo, and others, is probable speculatively rather than practically.

Which Contains the Catalogue of All the Remaining Assertions, Which We Call “Appendices”

In the first part of this treatise we have addressed many questions necessary for refuting those eight dogmas of Molina which seemed to us the most grave and which we judge are those most capable of causing problems for Catholic doctrine. Therefore, in this second part it is necessary to abridge the narrative — partly to spare the censors of this cause a prolonged effort, and partly because what has been said in the first part of this treatise will make it easy for any learned theologian acting as censor to ascertain how much falsehood is contained in the following assertions.

Fourteen Diverse Assertions of Molina

I. First assertion of Molina. “It can happen that, by virtue of an unequal effort and influence of free will, and after God has granted two men an equal aid of assisting grace, one of them acts more intensely and disposes himself better to attain justifying grace than the other; and it can also happen that, having conferred unequal aids upon them, they act in the same manner; or, sometimes, it can also happen that one acts better than the other, despite having received a lesser aid.” This Molina teaches in his Concordia, page 225, § Illud praeterea. And the reason he adduces is that, since free will influences freely and efficiently, together with the aid of God, the act by which it disposes itself to attain justification, a man can therefore, by virtue of his freedom, exert greater or lesser effort than another man, whether the aids of God they receive are equal or unequal.

II. Second assertion of Molina. “If one must speak with the utmost rigor… it should not be affirmed in an absolute manner that, having received equal aids, one man is converted and another is not converted, unless one adds and speaks of prevenient grace;… likewise, nor should it be affirmed that one of them, by virtue of his freedom alone, is converted and the other is not, because, although this conversion takes place on account of free will by virtue of its freedom alone, nevertheless it does not take place by virtue of its freedom alone, but through the simultaneous cooperation of the aid of prevenient grace, from whose influence cooperating grace follows.” Thus speaks Molina on page 240, and he teaches the same on page 30.

III. Third assertion. “The interior call of God and the aids of prevenient grace depend exceedingly upon free will.” Thus he speaks on page 41.

IV. Fourth assertion. The first parents in their state of innocence did not need a particular superadded aid in order to avoid mortal sins and persevere in grace, but rather, for a certain time, were able to remain free from all sin, both venial and mortal. “Therefore, since in Adam there was no weakness, nor indigence, nor rebellion, it certainly followed that, with the common aid of God, he could act and merit his salvation and eternal life.” This he teaches on pages 17 and 18; and he cites Domingo de Soto in support of his doctrine and Saint Augustine’s Hypognosticon, Book III.

V. Fifth assertion. The supernatural concurrence of God, as it is in itself, does not differ from the concurrence by which God concurs to purely natural effects; and he does not believe that supernatural acts are such by reason of that concurrence, just as they are not such by reason of the influence of free will, but are supernatural only by reason of the influence of God through prevenient grace. This he teaches on page 226, § Quod si quis dicat. And consequently he says on page 227: “Therefore, with the general concurrence of God alone, I think that, once the infused supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity have been acquired, free will can choose one or another act of faith, of hope, and of charity, because these acts are supernatural by virtue of the concurrence of the supernatural habits. Similarly, I believe that the intellect, once flooded by the light of glory, can produce the beatific vision with the general concurrence of God alone.”

VI. Sixth assertion. In which he teaches that freedom of will is eliminated if it is maintained that everything has already coexisted in eternity before its existence in time, page 302.

VII. Seventh assertion. Christ, through His passion and His obedience unto death, did not merit by the substance of this act, but only by its intensification. This Molina teaches, or it is at times inferred from his doctrine.

VIII. Eighth assertion. The free will of man will not cooperate because God has foreseen that it will cooperate, but rather, because it will cooperate, God has thereby foreseen that it will cooperate. Thus speaks Molina on pages 322–325, and he had already anticipated this on pages 13 and 14. He continues saying: because if the preceding conclusion is not admitted, we cannot reconcile free will with the knowledge of God, nor defend in what manner sin is truly sin and God justly punishes it, nor preserve that our good works are meritorious; and the doctors of Spain who maintain the contrary suppress free will and, like Luther, reduce it to a mere word.

IX. Ninth assertion. “The general concurrence of God is indifferent… and according to the diversity of influence of the second cause, one type of action rather than another follows… or the volition of the honorable object rather than that of the shameful one.” This he teaches on page 194; and on page 200 he says: “With the same concurrence of God… with which an act of a natural genus is produced, an act of morally good virtue or the act of vice — that is, of sin — can be produced; or indeed, sometimes, neither another concurrence of God nor a greater concurrence is required for a morally good act of virtue to be produced or for the act of vice — that is, of sin — to be produced.” He repeats this on page 207.

X. Tenth assertion. “That God will deliver someone to Christ depends upon this, namely, that that man, through his freedom, will cooperate.” This he says on page 57, and on page 58 he invents that the antecedent of this consequence — the eternal Father has delivered someone to Christ: therefore, he comes to Christ — does not suppress the freedom of the adult with respect to the consequent, because just as the consequent depends upon the free influence of the adult in the act of believing, so also the antecedent depends upon that same future free influence, foreseen by God from the height of His intellect.

XI. Eleventh assertion. “The order of causes and of means which divine providence has established brings about absolutely no necessity of consequent or of consequence for free will.” This he teaches on page 371, and on page 372 he infers: “Not every order of divine providence is certain, immovable, and indissoluble with respect to the execution of the effect.”

XII. Twelfth assertion. “It does not seem necessary to admit that divine providence directs all fortuitous effects. For this reason, it is evident that it is not necessary to maintain that the death of someone who, wishing to swim, contrary to his intention, drowned, was directed and willed by God, but only permitted.” This appears on page 375, § Circa effectus. And on page 381 he teaches that the deaths of those who are unexpectedly murdered by bandits and the drownings of others in rivers and effects similar to these… are not directed by divine providence, nor does God prepare the nexus of causes by which all these effects take place.

XIII. Thirteenth assertion. God did not predestine the Most Blessed Virgin, nor the Apostles, nor all the others who were confirmed in grace, without foreknowing the future good use they were going to make of their free will. This he teaches on page 408 of the Concordia and in his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, q. 14, a. 13, d. 16, paragraph 4, and in the solution ad quintum, sextum et septimum, and in q. 23, a. 1, paragraph 3.

XIV. Fourteenth assertion. “Whenever our free will, by virtue of its natural powers, attempts or is prepared to attempt all that it is capable of by itself — both with respect to what must be learned and embraced in relation to faith, and with respect to sorrow for sins and justification — God with certainty confers upon us prevenient grace or the aids so that we may act as is necessary to attain salvation; not, certainly, because by this attempt we have made ourselves worthy of such aids and have in some way merited them, but rather because Christ would have obtained them for us by His merits. And among the laws that both Christ Himself and the eternal Father enacted concerning the aids and gifts that Christ, through His merits, conferred upon us, one of them… was that, as often as we attempt, by virtue of our natural powers, to do what lies within us, the aids of grace will be available to us, by which also, as is necessary for salvation, we shall ensure that, for this reason, while we are on the way, our salvation will always be placed in the hand of our free will.” Thus speaks Molina in his Concordia, d. 10, page 44, q. 14.
We could add many other condemnable assertions of Molina; but this treatise would be infinite if we were to mention and refute everything Molina says that is deserving of censure. For the entire book of the Concordia is filled throughout with the new doctrines that Molina offers in his principal attempt to introduce a new concordia. But if we succeed in our refutation of the cited assertions, the remaining ones will not only appear to have been rejected, but will be of little harm.

Let us now proceed to the refutation of each of the assertions of this first chapter.

Chapter Two

In Which the Aforementioned Assertions Are Refuted

I. Concerning the first assertion, almost nothing new can be said beyond what we said in the first part of this treatise, in which we refuted the first four principal assertions, for Molina expresses himself consistently in this first assertion. For if no aid of God is efficacious in itself, as it comes from Him, but it is free will itself which, by its natural and innate freedom, applies itself to acting with these aids, it ought not to surprise us that Molina maintains that a free will, by virtue of the powers of its nature — even having received a lesser aid than that received by another man — exerts itself more, acts more intensely, disposes itself better for salvation, and receives greater justifying grace than the other, who, despite having received greater aids, has exerted himself less. Indeed, consequently, Molina will be able to adduce in his favor this common philosophical adage: what holds true absolutely also holds true when its degrees are increased.¹ Therefore, if free will, having received the supernatural aid, causes it to become efficacious by its innate freedom and the effort made by virtue of its own powers, it consistently follows that if free will were to exert itself more by virtue of its own powers, it would achieve a more intense act with this aid; in the same way, the greater the effort a soldier made with the same sword, the more violent the blow he would land.
However, the great absurdity that this proposition entails appears more evidently than the difficulties presented by its first principal assertions. For in defending those, our adversaries proceeded with a certain caution, maintaining that the one who is converted possesses a greater aid of cooperating grace, though not of prevenient grace. We have already shown that this response is empty. But now, in the present assertion, they cannot even offer such an excuse. For in this assertion we speak of the better disposition toward justifying grace, and it is evident that this disposition takes place simultaneously with the infusion of grace. Therefore, according to this assertion, at the moment of justification — when God truly acts with free will — without a greater aid of the grace operating with free will, one man becomes more just than another who exerts himself less; and thus Molina attributes greater holiness to the one who exerts himself more with his free will by virtue solely of his natural powers. And the reason he offers demonstrates what we are saying. The humble censors will easily judge whether this doctrine owes more to Christian humility or rather to Luciferian pride.

II. Certainly Saint Bernard, in his Sermones in Cantica, sermon 67, thinks very differently when he says: “I tremble at all that is mine, in order to be mine; unless perhaps what makes me mine is more truly mine, namely, the grace of God that justifies me.” Thus speaks Saint Bernard.² But Molina, in order to be his own, does not tremble at what is his, but embraces it and glories in it and not in the grace of God itself; for he says: I, by a greater effort by virtue of my innate freedom, sanctify myself more with a lesser aid and dispose myself better to become more holy than the divine aid of itself disposes me. But the humble Bernard says: “in order to be mine” — that is, in order to be free from sin through the redemption owed to Christ — I tremble at anything that is properly my own, which holds me captive and does not allow me to escape, nor allows me to become more holy than what is permitted by the grace of God more vigorous than any powers of my own that I may have received. And for this reason he says: “unless perhaps what makes me mine is more truly mine, namely, the grace of God that justifies me.” For Saint Bernard makes use of that figure by which something is qualified from one of the effects it produces; thus, for example, death is called pale and cypresses are called sad. Therefore, he spoke thus: unless perhaps what makes me mine is more truly mine, namely, the grace of God that justifies me.

III. Furthermore, when Saint Paul said: “I have labored more than all of them” (First Epistle to the Corinthians 15:10), he did not add: “because I have exerted myself, by my own powers, more than the other Apostles”; but rather he said: “not by my own powers, but by virtue of the grace of God with me” — which is the same as saying: I, certainly, labored more than all of them, but not, indeed, by my own powers, but by virtue of the grace of God itself, which caused me to labor more than all of them. But Molina with his doctrine makes man so proud that he may think himself permitted to glory thus: I labored more than another, I exerted myself more than another, and I disposed myself better for a greater holiness, not because the grace of God itself had brought about my effort, but because, by my own powers, making use of a lesser grace than that received by another, I by myself attained a greater holiness.
Likewise, in the Epistle to the Ephesians 4:7, Saint Paul says: “To each one of us grace has been given according to the measure of the gift of Christ”; here Saint Paul attributes a greater quantity of grace to a greater gift of God and not to a greater effort of the will by its innate freedom.
Finally, this assertion causes the cross of Christ to disappear — that is, the merits of the crucified Christ. For if the greater holiness that someone attains by having exerted himself more is not attributed to the help of divine grace but to the greater effort of free will, it follows that this greater holiness is not owed to Christ. This consequence is proved in the following manner. A greater disposition toward this holiness, insofar as it is greater, is not owed to Christ, since Molina attributes this greater disposition solely to free will by its innate freedom. It is clear, moreover, that Christ did not grant to men, through His merits, free will, because this is a natural property that man’s constitution possesses by nature.
What we have said thus far is already sufficient as censure of the first assertion; we consider, certainly, that this first assertion is no less erroneous than the four principal assertions of Molina.

IV. We have offered the second assertion of Molina to show that there is no possible excuse — despite what he intends by it — for his error. Certainly, Molina had said in the first four assertions, the most important ones, which we presented in the first part of this treatise in order to refute them — indeed, he had said that by innate freedom alone, with an equal aid or even with a lesser one, it can happen that one man is converted and another is not converted. But subsequently, realizing that this manner of speaking sounded poorly, he wished to avoid censure and said what this second assertion contains, namely: “If one must speak with the utmost rigor…”; thinking he was going to cloud our eyes with darkness so that we would not notice his deception. For now he maintains in his second assertion that the expression “by virtue of his freedom alone,” speaking rigorously, does not exclude the aids of prevenient and cooperating grace. He even maintains that he is speaking with the utmost rigor. But certainly, up to this point there has been no censor so strict with Molina who has understood the word “alone” to exclude the supernatural prevenient aids and the concomitant ones, through which God acts simultaneously with free will. Now, if it were necessary to speak with the utmost rigor, Molina would be clearly convicted of the fact that his doctrine is Pelagian. We, for our part, when we presented the censure of those first four principal assertions of Molina, did not speak with the utmost rigor with which he himself explains in his second assertion, but rather with another utmost rigor — namely, according to the context of his discourse and his intention. For Molina maintains that the entire reason why one man is converted and another is not must be attributed solely to freedom. Indeed, he does not attribute the reason to the aid itself, nor to a greater or lesser aid of prevenient grace, but makes the reason fall solely upon freedom.

V. Again, Molina does not sufficiently excuse himself, by speaking with that utmost rigor, from defending that the one who is converted causes the aid of grace to act simultaneously with free will. For if the aid of concomitant grace is not in itself, as it comes from God, efficacious for conversion, but is indifferent and determinable by free will itself, it will be verified, speaking with the utmost rigor, that the entire reason why a man who is converted is distinguished from another who is not converted, is owed solely to the freedom of his will. This we prove in the following manner. Because, according to Molina, free will in itself can, by its innate freedom, cause the aid of prevenient grace to become concomitant and to accompany free will. And therefore, since Molina eliminates the efficacy of every divine aid as it comes from God and from His will and decree, it is necessary, speaking with the utmost rigor, that by his freedom alone one man be distinguished from another. Since God Himself, by His divine freedom, does not distinguish one from another, nor decides, on His part, to give the concomitant aid to one before another; rather it is man who, through his own use of free will — foreknown by God, but not, however, provided by Him — obtains the concomitant aid, as Molina sets forth in the eighth assertion which we refuted in the first part of this treatise, Chapter 26, conclusion 4. Therefore, Molina is convinced that, speaking with the utmost rigor, it is not necessary to exclude aids of this nature, of which he speaks in this second assertion; for this reason, he does not excuse himself from the error of which we accuse him, because, speaking with the utmost rigor, he entirely excludes the efficacy of every special aid by which God, through His good will, distinguishes one man from another — efficaciously causing one to be converted or to dispose himself better to believe freely, to hope, to love, to suffer, and to purpose to obey God in all things.
But in truth, Molina constantly denies that there is an aid of prevenient grace that is simultaneously concomitant and accompanies the free operation by which man is converted, since he considers that every prevention of grace takes place before the instant of justification; and, moreover, he attributes to divine aids only a concomitance at the moment of justification. But we already showed in the first part of this treatise, in Chapter 8, following the canons of the Council of Orange and the Council of Cologne, that the concomitant aid is also prevenient to the concurrence of free will and efficacious. From this we argue: The actual aid of God by which the sinner rises again and in act recovers his strength, and which is conferred upon him at the instant of justification, is the special aid of prevenient grace, as the Council of Cologne defines. But this aid is had by the one who is converted and not by another. Therefore, the one who is converted always receives a greater aid of prevenient grace so that his free will may cooperate with God, who produces in us the willing and the acting.

Chapter Three

In Which the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Assertion of Molina Are Refuted

I. The third assertion of Molina sounds the same as the preceding ones; and when he says that the interior aids of prevenient grace depend exceedingly upon free will, he intends to deny that any aid is efficacious in itself, although it may bring with it, as it comes from God, a certain indifferent sufficiency, but one determinable only by innate freedom. This assertion does not need, in this sense, any other censure than that which we already offered against his four principal assertions. Now, if Molina wishes to say that the aid of prevenient grace depends upon free will considered as a subject and natural principle of the vitality of the free act, no theologian will doubt that every aid of God depends upon the potency that receives it, which, at the same time, by virtue of this aid, will possess vitality as regards the substance of the vital act — just as the light of glory depends upon the created intellect as regards the substance of vitality. Now, we maintain that the efficacious aid in itself, as it comes from God, does not suppress this dependence. On the contrary, its efficacy is exercised in such a manner, insofar as it proceeds from God, that it efficaciously elevates free will so that it may consent with God; and the opposite does not happen, as Molina pretends — that is, that free will elevates the aid itself and makes it so efficacious that God Himself consents with man and accompanies the free action for as long as man himself, by his innate freedom, wishes. But we piously maintain the contrary, namely, that free will will consent and cooperate with God, who acts through His grace, for as long as God Himself, by His free will, has wished and decided to act with free will itself. And in this way it is verified that God Himself is the one who produces in us the willing and the acting, and that He Himself causes us to fulfill His commandments, as is said in Ezekiel 36:27: “I will cause you to walk in my statutes.” Concerning this, read Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, Chapters 10 and 11.

II. The fourth assertion of Molina purports to respond to a certain canon of the Council of Orange. It is necessary to consider what meaning he wishes to give to his words. For he affirms that Adam, in his state of innocence, received from God an aid so that he could persevere and, moreover, that by this aid alone, without adding any further one, he would have in fact persevered, if he had so wished, since for perseverance the habits of original justice, grace, and the theological virtues sufficed for him.
Therefore, we judge that the fourth assertion is, in the aforementioned sense, above all erroneous and contrary to the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, and moreover contradicts the sacred councils.
And certainly, in De correptione et gratia one can clearly see the great extent to which Saint Augustine differs from the doctrine of Molina, since in Chapter 11 he teaches that there is a grace with which one can persevere and do good, and another grace with which one perseveres and does good. Saint Thomas cites this doctrine in the Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 109. How erroneous the doctrine of Molina is can be appreciated by appealing to what was defined in the Council of Orange, canon 19: “Although human nature had remained in that purity in which it was created, nevertheless it would by no means have preserved itself without the assistance of its Creator. Therefore, if it could not preserve, without the grace of God, the health it received, how could it then, without the grace of God, recover what it lost?” Thus it was spoken in the council.³ And these words appear expressly in Saint Augustine’s Epistola 186, toward the end.⁴ The council esteemed the authority of Saint Augustine in this mystery to such a degree that it deigned to introduce his very words literally into its canons.
Thus, we consider that the council intends to define that, even presupposing the original justice that Adam had received, he also needed the help of the grace of God to persevere in that purity in which he was created. Therefore, against this definition Molina affirms that, by means of the grace he received, Adam would in fact have persevered, without any other help of divine grace, if he had so wished, by virtue of his freedom.
Now, Molina responds in the cited place that the council only intends to define that man does not persevere solely by the powers of his free will, without a new influence of the grace and of the original justice already previously received. For Molina thinks that habits alone are sufficient to influence together with free will, as is clear in the mentioned place, page 19.
But how false this interpretation is becomes evident if one considers the words of the council and the context of the discourse itself. For the council defines that the help of God was necessary for man to be preserved in that purity in which human nature was created. From this the council infers that, without the grace of God, it would be far less able to recover what it lost — that is, without the actual and gratuitous help of God Himself. Therefore, by this help the council does not understand the habits themselves that man already possesses by nature, but defines that the aid of the grace of God is also necessary for preserving the purity that the habits themselves cause formally.
But Molina says that if Adam, by his freedom, had wished to persevere by means of these habits, the aid of the grace of God would have been nothing other than an influence proceeding from these habits.
But certainly, the help for exciting or exercising the habits would proceed more from the nature of free will than from the grace of God. The evident reason for this is that the habits of original justice and grace are not in themselves operative, but that man acts through the habits of the theological virtues. Moreover, the habits of the theological virtues themselves, although they are in themselves operative, nevertheless do not naturally bring about the actual influence directed toward the operation of the potency or toward the potency itself, unless something excites them — for otherwise they would always be acting. Therefore, this excitation of the habits is either owed solely to free will with the general aid of God who preserves man in his being, or it is owed to God Himself, who would specially excite and inspire free will to exercise the habits of the virtues efficaciously. To affirm the former is expressly contrary to what the council defines, because the general aid of God is not an aid of grace but rather of nature, which excites the habits themselves. But to admit the latter is to defend what the council intends to define — that is, the actual aid of God is necessary for man to wish to make use of the habits and thereby to remain in the grace received or to be restored from sin.
This is demonstrated thus: According to the doctrine of Molina, man, by his free will, would have the power to persevere and would in fact persevere if, by his own powers, he wished to make use of the habits received; therefore, he would not receive the gift of perseverance from grace, but from his nature. The consequence is evident, because the gifts received from grace would not in themselves, as they come from God, have efficacy for man to persevere, but rather man himself, through his freedom, would bring about perseverance by making use of the habits received — of which, however, he would not make use by virtue of grace.

III. Furthermore, we demonstrate our censure by means of the argument that Saint Augustine offers in De correptione et gratia, Chapter 12, and in De natura et gratia, Chapter 48: because the gift of God that we have through Christ is greater than that which Adam received. But through Christ not only can we persevere, but indeed some actually do persevere. Therefore, actually persevering is a gift of God distinct from being able to persevere. Therefore, if Adam had persevered, he would have received a greater gift of the grace of God in order to persevere. Otherwise, certainly, those who now persevere would not receive a greater gift than Adam’s, but their perseverance would be owed to the natural powers of their free will.
Finally, Saint Augustine, in his Enchiridion, Chapter 106, speaks thus: “Although sin can only be spoken of where there is free will, nevertheless free will is not sufficient to retain justice, unless, together with participation in the immutable good, divine assistance is offered.”⁵ Behold: according to Saint Augustine, free will cannot in the same manner receive justice as preserve it. For to receive it depends solely on freedom, but, on the other hand, to preserve it, the help of the immutable good is needed; and thus it is said in Hosea 13:9: “Your destruction has taken place, O Israel; for in me alone was your help.”

IV. Molina cites a certain passage from Domingo de Soto, De natura et gratia, Book III, Chapter 4, although Soto does not defend the erroneous doctrine that Molina presents in his Concordia, page 17, § Communis — namely, that man can perform acts of the theological virtues with the common aid of God alone through the supernatural gifts of faith, hope, and charity. Molina cites Soto’s passage falsely and without any foundation, since Soto, in that chapter, as is manifest, does not speak of acts of the theological virtues, but of acts that are only morally good, which a man who is not in grace can perform. And he says that if a man in grace performs them, the probable opinion is that, through these morally good acts, this man becomes deserving of eternal life, since they virtually lead toward it and toward God as a supernatural end, precisely because they proceed from a man in the state of grace. However, Soto never says that for the act of faith, hope, and charity, the supernatural aid of God is not required. Such is the manner in which Molina cites authors.
Likewise, in his Concordia, page 18, he cites without foundation Saint Augustine, De correptione et gratia, Chapter 10, and the Hypognosticon, Book III, attempting to prove that free will, in the state of innocence, has no need of any other supernatural aid. Without doubt, Saint Augustine says nothing of the kind in those passages, but only affirms, as Molina himself notes, that in that state man possessed a most full freedom and that his perseverance depended solely on his free will. Now, this does not confirm the doctrine of Molina, for man can depart from righteousness by himself without the special aid of God; but, on the other hand, in order to persevere, Adam needed the special help of God, and, in order to perform supernatural acts, he needed a supernatural aid superadded to the habits. Saint Augustine does not deny this, precisely because he affirms that Adam received the gift of being able to persevere, since, speaking in absolute terms, the following proposition is true: Adam could persevere, because he could possess the gift of perseverance. This potency was grounded in the gifts received and in the knowledge he had of the path by which he ought to persevere — namely, by humbly subordinating himself to God, who assisted him. But his non-perseverance was due to himself, on account of the defectibility of his will, which did not wish to subordinate itself to God. For this reason he sinned. And therefore his sin was one of pride, because he did not subordinate himself to God. But the present place is not the most suitable for disputing this matter.

V. Concerning the fifth assertion of Molina, we are astonished that a man who is both philosopher and theologian can say such things, unworthy of being uttered by a Christian and prudent man. Indeed, since in the cited passage above, § Quod si quis dicat, he wishes in some manner to draw Domingo de Soto and Andrés Vega — whom he had previously refuted — toward his doctrine, he says: “For Soto and Vega understand nothing other under the name of the particular aid of assisting grace than the immediate influence of God.” And according to Molina, with this influence God concurs with free will and prevenient grace in the act of believing, of hoping, and of repenting, as is necessary for attaining salvation. And Molina adds: “Above all, I think that the supernatural concurrence, as it is in itself, does not differ from the concurrence by which God concurs to purely natural effects; and I do not believe that supernatural acts are such by reason of that concurrence, any more than they are such by reason of the influence of free will, but they are supernatural only by reason of the influence of God through prevenient grace.” Thus speaks Molina.⁶
With these words, Molina says three intolerable things that violently diminish the grace of God and vainly elevate the power of free will to excess. In the first place, he affirms that the aid by which God concurs in the acts of believing, hoping, and repenting, as it is in itself, does not differ from that by which God concurs in purely natural effects. It is true that Molina does not speak of the identity that the aid possesses in God Himself, in whom there is no real or formal distinction; for He is the author of grace and of nature through His single and most simple essence, and for this reason His power to create and to justify is one and the same in itself. Thus Molina speaks of the concurrence of God as an influence received by creatures, indicating that the concurrence by which God concurs to purely natural effects is of the same type as the concurrence by which He concurs to supernatural effects — such as the act of believing, of hoping, and of repenting — as is necessary for attaining salvation. This assertion seems to us not only rash against the common way of thinking of theologians, but also close to error, if it is not erroneous.

VI. In the first place, we demonstrate this thus: Because the inspirations of the Holy Spirit by which God concurs with us in the aforementioned acts are not only supernatural aids when the habits are infused, but are also called and are supernatural aids when, through such an act, faith, hope, and charity are increased. Therefore, they are not of the same type as the aids by which God concurs to purely natural effects. The antecedent we demonstrate thus: Because the aids by which God concurs to purely natural effects are not called “inspirations of the Holy Spirit.” But the consequence is demonstrated thus: Because the concurrence that creatures receive for purely natural effects does not exceed the nature of the order of nature. But, on the other hand, the inspirations of the Holy Spirit proceed from the grace and gift of God above the order of nature. Therefore, it is more than rash to say they are of the same type.
In the second place, it can be demonstrated more efficaciously thus: Because the theological virtue of hope, according to Catholic faith, rests upon divine aids — not only those that have been given, but also those that are yet to be given. Therefore, these aids are not of the same type as the aids by which God concurs to purely natural works, such as the generation of corporeal beings and other natural or moral actions, such as seeing, speaking, and walking. The consequence is proved in the following manner: Because hope does not rest upon aids of this nature, which are generally given to all by virtue of a quasi-natural law established by God, but rests upon the aids that were given to all of us through Christ and His merits — and this is also certain, according to the faith. Therefore, the assertion of Molina is not only rash but also erroneous, because we do not receive, through the merits of Christ, aids of the natural order.
This is confirmed thus: Because the Church frequently asks for supernatural divine aids in order to be able to act — for example, to believe, to hope, and to love, as is necessary for attaining salvation; and thus it is said in those prayers: “Lord, we ask you to increase our faith, hope, and charity”; “let your swift mercy go before us”; and “O God, come to my assistance; O Lord, make haste to help me.” Therefore, the aids that the Church asks for are not of the same type as the aids by which God generally concurs to purely natural effects. For in vain and out of ignorance would someone ask for what he already has and what is given to everyone; indeed, it would be the same as asking for the sun to rise tomorrow. Therefore, we rightly judge the assertion of Molina to be very erroneous. Moreover, nearly all the arguments we presented in the first part of this treatise to demonstrate the efficacy of the aids of grace confirm our censure. Wherefore we do not wish to delay on this point, but only to note how Molina himself contradicts himself. Thus, in his Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, d. 12, toward the end, he teaches that the aid of God is nothing other than the act itself as it proceeds from God. Therefore, the act itself is not something supernatural, since, according to Molina, it is identical with an aid that is of the same type as the aid by which God concurs to purely natural effects. However, no Catholic theologian will dare to deny that the act of faith, hope, and charity is supernatural, intrinsically and formally, by virtue of its object. And therefore the aid by which God concurs to this act cannot be of the same type as the aid by which God concurs to purely natural effects.

VII. From this it follows that what he says second in his fifth assertion is false — namely, that these acts are not supernatural any more by reason of the aid of God than by reason of free will.
No less false is what he says in the third place, namely, that these acts are supernatural solely by reason of the aids of prevenient grace. And it is astonishing how perversely Molina philosophizes on this point; for he calls these aids “preceding” only because they precede in time the very act of faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, if they were supernatural only for this reason, it would follow that they would not be intrinsically and formally supernatural in themselves, according to their species and by virtue of their own object, but would only be called “supernatural” because they would have an extrinsic supernatural beginning.
We do not know what Catholic theologian could fail to see that this doctrine is Pelagian. For Pelagius did not deny that the natural concurrence of the first cause was necessary for all our acts, but denied that intrinsic supernatural aid was necessary for performing the act of faith and charity, because believing, hoping, and loving would depend on the very nature of free will, with the general aid of the first cause. Moreover, Pelagius gladly admitted that a certain divine illumination or a certain intellectual inspiration preceded these acts, as can be deduced from the words of Pelagius that we offered in the first part of this treatise, in Chapter 4, when citing Saint Augustine’s De gratia Christi, Book I.
Finally, how can Molina demonstrate what he says in the second assertion that we presented in Chapter 1 of this second part? Namely: “If one must speak with the utmost rigor, it should not be affirmed in an absolute manner that, having received equal aids, one man is converted and another is not converted, unless one adds and speaks of prevenient grace.” How, we ask, can he put forward such an excuse and at the same time maintain that any other aid, with the exception of the aid of prevenient grace, is of the same type as the general aid by which God concurs to natural acts? For such aids are not owed to grace; and yet, speaking with the utmost rigor, it will be verified that, according to Molina, a man is converted despite having received an aid of grace lesser than that received by another who is not converted. And in this way the aid concomitant to the operation, as Molina says in his fifth assertion, is not supernatural, nor is it an aid of grace, but is of the same type as natural aids. Therefore, Molina contradicts himself in the second assertion and in the fifth.

Chapter Four

In Which the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Assertion of Molina Are Refuted

I. The sixth assertion of Molina displays a supine ignorance concerning the nature of eternity. For Molina thinks that since we maintain, together with Boethius and Saint Thomas, that all things — whether future, present, or past — coexist in eternity, it is therefore necessary that, speaking in absolute terms, they exist in eternity beyond their causes, although neither Boethius nor Saint Thomas understood it in this way. But the true understanding of this point appears in the commentators on the Summa Theologica, I, q. 10, who explain the following concerning eternity — namely, that eternity itself, which is the dimension of divine operation and knowledge, encompasses every other inferior dimension. And for this reason nothing can be known in time that is not known in the most eminent manner in eternity itself by divine knowledge. Therefore, since we maintain that God knows and sees all future contingents in His eternity, and that the future acts themselves, insofar as they are going to come to pass, have already been seen beyond their causes by God Himself, we do not mean that future acts already exist absolutely, but rather as present objects of divine knowledge insofar as divine knowledge itself knows them in eternity — which encompasses with its infinity every other dimension; and this is to coexist in eternity. For this it is not necessary that they exist absolutely, but it is sufficient that they be, in their full extent, objects of knowledge on the part of divine vision, which knows in eternity.
Moreover, for something to be said to exist absolutely, it is necessary that it actually exist beyond its cause and that its own dimension be known. Wherefore, we think it is close to error, if not erroneous, to maintain that freedom is suppressed if one affirms, in the manner explained, that everything coexists in eternity for divine vision. And this we prove in the following manner: Because the Holy Fathers affirm the antecedent, which is grounded in Sacred Scripture and is admitted by the common doctrine of theologians. Therefore, from this antecedent nothing against the faith can follow — such as affirming that this antecedent destroys freedom, as Molina infers, because he says he cannot understand how, with this coexistence of things in eternity, the contingency of things and free will are maintained.
It would now be overly lengthy, although easy for us, to prove that this antecedent is grounded in Sacred Scripture and in the doctrine of the Holy Fathers. Let the testimony of Job 14:5 suffice as an example: “The number of his months is known to you.” And from the Epistle to the Romans 4:17: “I have made you father of many nations… before God, who calls into existence things that do not exist”; that is, Abraham was already before God the father of many peoples, since certainly this was to come to pass in the proper dimension of future time. And in this same sense Saint Ambrose and Saint Thomas speak — the latter clearly in his third reading.
Read Saint Hilary, De Trinitate, Book XII, where he says: “Everything that exists has always existed with God; and although it was created, nevertheless it was never new to the power of God or to His authority. And witness to this is the prophet Isaiah, when he says: O God, you have made all that is to come (Isaiah 45:11). Although, in order for it to take place, what is yet to come must be created, nevertheless in the creation of things nothing is new and recent, for they have already been made; while they await in time until they are created, they have already been created in the power of divine virtue and of His foreknowledge.” Thus speaks Saint Hilary.⁷ The same is said by Saint Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book X, Chapter 12, and his commentary on Psalm 49; Saint Basil, commenting on Isaiah 3; Saint Jerome, commenting on the Epistle to the Ephesians 1; Saint Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, Book IX, Chapter 35; Saint Anselm, De casu diaboli, Chapters 18 and 21; Saint Isidore, De summo bono, Book II, Chapter 6; and Theodoret, question 37 of the commentary on Genesis. Therefore, without doubt, God foresaw the mortal and future Adam, because all that is past and all that is future is present to Him.

II. And certainly, otherwise, divine foreknowledge — which is the vision of future contingent things — could not be infallible and certain. Thus, if they were known only in their proximate causes, God would not see them with His intuitive knowledge and His knowledge would not be certain. Therefore, it is necessary that not only the contingent causes be known, but also the effects that proceed from these causes and that will at some point come to pass beyond them.
But let us set aside this subtle dispute and agree with Molina that either when the actually existing act of free will is present, freedom is destroyed by being actually present to God and coexisting in eternity, or, on the contrary, it is not destroyed — as must in truth be affirmed. From this, therefore, does the consequence that Molina infers follow — namely, that freedom of will is destroyed if it is affirmed that future acts already coexist in eternity? For although the acts may have already been determined also beyond their causes, they do not for this reason lose the property they receive from their own causes; in the same manner, even now the devil sins freely, for he still possesses the capacity of choice which he possessed from the beginning by virtue of his free will. Thus Molina errs both in matter and in form, in wishing to exempt human free will not only from divine predefinition, but also from divine foreknowledge — or at least from the perfection of this foreknowledge — despite the fact that for it, as it knows from eternity, all events that are to come are most present.
But for this reason the contingency and freedom of the creature are not destroyed, as was said in the Council of Cologne, in its Enchiridion christianae institutionis, in the treatise on the sacrament of penance, page 207, where it says thus: “Although God foreknew that man was going to fall, nevertheless it was not on account of this foreknowledge that He took away from natural man the gift He granted him at creation, nor did He force him, nor did He impel him to act thus. For God foresees and determines contingent acts in such a way that He does not suppress the manner in which He decided that man should act by nature, but determines his actions as they come to pass.” Thus far what was said in the council. And a little before it had censured “those who, concerning the infallible foreknowledge of God, draw inextricable absurdities and, not without grave danger for the weakest, curiously and rashly sophize and dispute about how the contingency of things and the freedom of will can be maintained simultaneously with the most certain foreknowledge of God. Those who reason soundly, and not capriciously, think that man, who is so mortal as to be earth and ashes, cannot penetrate the abyss of the incomprehensible judgments of God. For how could he comprehend the most abstruse secrets of the invisible and incomprehensible God, who cannot properly receive sufficient power and nature of the soul by which he lives, by which he feels, and by which he understands, and thus says Jeremiah: The heart of man is depraved and incapable of comprehension? Therefore, the judgments of God are not to be penetrated, but to be adored; they are not to be disputed about, but to be believed as most just. Otherwise, the scrutinizer of His greatness will be the victim of his own fatuity.” Thus far what was said in the council.⁸ Certainly, nothing more fitting could be said against Molina and his followers, who, as they say they cannot understand what is mysterious and incomprehensible, deny that it is most certain.

III. The seventh assertion we have not encountered for the first time in the Concordia of Molina, but the defenders of this doctrine, speaking consistently, maintain it in the same manner — and it was even defended publicly in the schools of the University of Salamanca some fourteen years ago. And certainly its consequence necessarily follows from the doctrine of Molina. For if, in order to exercise freedom of will, it is necessary that, once all the prerequisites for the free act are present and in place, it must simultaneously be verified in the composite sense that free will can refrain from acting, one easily infers that our Lord Jesus Christ did not freely obey the precept of dying and suffering. And this is demonstrated in the following manner: For in order to obey, a precept is necessary; but given the precept, it was incompossible for Christ not to obey; therefore, He did not obey freely. The minor is proved thus: Because if Christ had not obeyed, He would have sinned, which is impossible. Now, it would not be difficult for us to demonstrate with varied arguments how false and erroneous the aforementioned assertion is. However, since we strive not to prolong the present treatise excessively, we refer the censure of this question to what we already said in the first part, Chapter 14, in which we showed to what extent our Lord Jesus Christ freely obeyed unto death, even though, the precept being present, not obeying was incompossible.

IV. The eighth assertion of Molina could be tolerated in another sense; however, it is intolerable and erroneous in the sense in which Molina understands it. Thus, this assertion can have a double meaning. One is the following: Divine foreknowledge, considered by us in an absolute manner — that is, without consideration of the decree of the divine will — is not understood as the cause of future acts. In this way, indeed, it can be verified that something does not occur because God foreknows it is going to occur. Without doubt, God foreknew the sin of our first father, just as His good works and His repentance; and yet Adam did not sin because God foreknew he was going to sin. Thus also, when we consider the knowledge of God regarding future contingents solely in its intuitiveness, we do not say that it is the cause of things, but rather we understand that things are present in eternity, which is the dimension of divine knowledge. For the distinction of divine knowledge, with respect to creatures, into the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision is not taken from God, but from the things themselves, which, as objects of divine knowledge, are either merely possible or else exist in past, present, or future time. And in this way, since eternity encompasses all time and in it God knows eminently in their presence-to-Him everything knowable in time, for this reason things that are future are said to coexist with respect to eternity and appear as present to divine knowledge in the dimension of knowledge itself.
And certainly, on this point there ought to be no disparity of opinion among theologians, above all among those who claim to be Thomists. Thus, we admit with Molina that divine foreknowledge, considered solely according to its nature as foreknowledge, does not entail the causality of future acts, but only the knowledge of what is truly going to happen.
But the second part of this assertion — namely, because free will will cooperate, for this reason God has foreknown that it will cooperate — is intolerable, because it attributes the cause of divine foreknowledge to the creature, although, nevertheless, the cause or reason of this foreknowledge should not be sought externally to God. On this question, what we said in the first part of this treatise, Chapters 15 and 16, will suffice — in which we showed that the infallibility of divine foreknowledge is never owed to something extrinsic, but is owed to the immutability of the divine will that wishes to do something or to permit it.
Finally, it is an error to maintain that free will cannot be reconciled with the foreknowledge of God, nor that sin is truly sin, if we deny the following causal statement: Because free will is going to act in one way or another, for this reason God has foreknown that it is going to act in that or the other way. Because just as, in accordance with the faith, there is no cause of the divine will, so likewise the cause or reason of divine knowledge ought not to be sought externally to God. Otherwise, divine foreknowledge could be fallible, if externally to God it had its foundation — which would be defectible — and the truth of His knowledge depended on our free will. But on this point, what we said in the first part of this treatise will suffice.
Moreover, Molina insults the doctors of Spain who oppose his doctrine, for he says that we suppress free will and, like Luther, empty it of content. But we have compassion for his ignorance, which leads him to approve the same consequence that Luther draws, since he does not understand — despite Saint Thomas, Saint Augustine, and the other Fathers already cited by us — in what other way the concord of free will with predestination and divine foreknowledge can be preserved, except by taking something away from the perfection of the divine attributes in order to exalt free will, so that it may thereby glory in itself by reason of what it would not have received from God, nor from the decree of His will. It does not surprise us that Molina makes the reason for divine foreknowledge fall upon free will, since he already did the same with respect to divine predestination. But this dispute will weary the reader if we delay in it any longer.

V. Concerning the ninth assertion, we refer our censure to what we already said about the efficacious causality of divine influence — both with respect to natural and supernatural acts — in the first part of this treatise, censures 3, 4, and 7 of its principal assertions; and we also refer to what was said in the censure of the fifth assertion presented in this second part of the treatise, Chapter 3. Indeed, Molina shows himself to be consistent in defending the exemption of free will from the influence of the first cause. For he maintains that created free will, in all its actions — whether good or bad — is the sole and primary determinant of such action. And therefore he attributes to the influence of the first cause such indifference that, with the same concurrence of God by which an act of a natural genus is produced, the act of virtue or of vice — that is, of sin — could be produced. Thus, according to Molina, the concurrence of God does not in itself influence the good act more than the bad one, nor the act of virtue more than the act of vice; and this, without doubt, sounds and is blasphemous. But we venerate and honor the true God who works all things — even the most insignificant — according to the design of His will, and disposes all things from one end of the universe to the other vigorously and in an excellent manner, and has done in heaven and on earth all that He willed. His causality does not depend upon a determining human will, but determines all things according to the nature of each second cause. About all this we have already spoken sufficiently in the first part of this treatise, Chapter 19 and following, in which we refuted the erroneous doctrine of Molina concerning the influence of the first cause upon second causes.

VI. Concerning the tenth assertion, see, in this second part, our censure against his third assertion, Chapter 3, because it contains the same error. See also what we said in the first part, Chapter 9, and thus no other censure against this tenth assertion will be necessary.

Chapter Five

Containing the Censure of Molina’s Remaining Assertions

I. Molina makes two claims in his eleventh assertion. The first is that the order of causes and means which divine providence has established does not entail a necessity of consequence for free will itself. This assertion is contrary to the common thinking of theologians, for all of them affirm the correctness of the following inference: when God wills that some effect be produced, He ordains determinate causes and means; therefore, that effect will come about. For otherwise, God would not be omnipotent, and what the Church proclaims would be false: “God, we humbly implore you to drive away all our failings and to grant us all that is of use to us, for in your governance your providence is never lacking.”⁹
Saint Augustine, for his part, defined predestination — which is a part of providence — in the same manner as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 23, when he says: “It is the preparation of God’s benefits by which those who are freed are most surely freed” — that is, all those who are saved.¹⁰ But since Molina denies that divine providence extends to the works of free will in particular, and instead thinks that it belongs to providence only to ordain sufficient causes and means, yet not efficacious ones, he therefore denies that from such an order of causes and means a necessity of consequence can be inferred, since that would destroy freedom. And so Molina’s reasoning is unable to extricate itself from the quagmire in which it sinks, and consequently he defends the errors we have mentioned, by which he denies the efficacy of divine influence upon free and contingent actions.
But in a very different manner did the Fathers of the Council of Cologne reflect, in the place cited earlier, chapter 4, where the council responds to a certain objection based on a passage from Acts of the Apostles 1:16: “It was necessary that the Scripture be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke beforehand by the mouth of David” — from which it seemed to follow that Judas would sin necessarily and without freedom. The council responds as follows: “This distinction is necessary. For necessity is twofold: there is an absolute necessity, which we call the necessity of the consequent, by which, for example, it is necessary that man be a rational animal; and there is a necessity of consequence, by which we say that something follows necessarily — not what is necessary by its own nature, but what necessarily follows by reason of antecedent causes — as, for example, it was necessary that Christ should suffer, because God had so decided and judged it supremely fitting.” Thus spoke the Fathers of the council.¹¹
Moreover, since the objection derived from the sin of Judas, the council did not attribute a necessity of consequence to the divine decree — although with respect to Christ’s suffering it did attribute this necessity — but rather attributed a necessity of consequence to the fact that God had foreknown that the wicked will of Judas would carry out that impious crime. Molina, however, denies that this consequence is necessary — that is, that from the order of causes and means which divine providence establishes, the free operation of a good act follows. We therefore judge that the first part of Molina’s eleventh assertion is erroneous; the grounds of our censure may be seen in the first part of this treatise, in the chapters where we reprobate Molina’s fourth capital assertion and in those where we reprobate his seventh capital assertion, in which he speaks of the manner in which God causes with respect to secondary causes and their effects.

II. The second thing Molina maintains in this eleventh assertion — namely, that not every order of divine providence is certain, immovable, and indissoluble — deserves the same censure, above all because in the same place, page 372, he attacks Saint Thomas and Boethius. He does this unless, falling back on his own imagination, Molina intends to explain what they say in such a way that when they affirm the order of divine providence to be certain, immovable, and indissoluble with respect to the execution of the effect, what is meant is this: God has the intention of executing that order, and yet there is no certainty whatsoever regarding the obtaining of the effects, because these depend on created free choice. Molina does not hesitate to regard the opposite as contrary to the faith. Thus, to affirm that divine providence infallibly and certainly secures the effect of a good choice of free will is, according to Molina, erroneous in a matter of faith.
But we judge that the opposite is, in truth, erroneous in a matter of faith. What is certain, however, is that Molina himself assigns the certainty of the effect — which depends on free will — to the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, which would be incorporated into the order of divine providence. But this is merely an excuse that conceals another error. For according to Molina, as is clearly seen in the eighth assertion which we reprobated in the preceding chapter four, the certainty and infallibility of divine foreknowledge are not the cause of the certainty of the effect of free will; rather, Molina affirms: “Because free will is going to act in this way, therefore God has foreknown that it will act thus.” Here we see how, if one reads carefully what Molina says, he attributes no certainty at all to divine foreknowledge.
He therefore necessarily infers that the effect depends on free will — though in the cited place, at the end of the section § Quando ergo, he speaks of a necessity of consequence with respect to the foreknowledge of the effect of free will. But certainly, thinking in this manner, a necessity of consequence cannot be gathered. Indeed, Molina explains that since the effect is going to take place on account of free will, for this reason God will have foreknown that it is going to occur thus. Therefore, it amounts to arguing from beginning to end as follows: This effect will take place on account of free will, because if it is not going to take place because God has provided for it, nor because He has foreknown that it will come about, then it will take place on account of free will. We know that, faced with such difficulties, Molina takes refuge in the sanctuary he has invented — that of middle knowledge — which is a pure fiction, as we already demonstrated in the first part of this treatise, chapters 16 and 17.
From what has been said it follows that it is far less tolerable to affirm that divine providence errs and acts in vain in any particular case. For this contradicts the passage of Wisdom 14:3: “Your providence, Father, governs all things from the beginning”; from this universality nothing good can be subtracted. Therefore, since this governance implies the execution of providence, it follows easily from this that the good choice of free will is infallibly executed through divine providence. Thus far we have spoken of the eleventh assertion.

III. From one error it is easy to fall into others. We do not hesitate to mark his twelfth assertion with the sign of error — or rather, of heresy contrary to Sacred Scripture. First, we shall demonstrate this by attending to the First Book of Kings 22:34, where it is said: “Then a man drew his bow at random and struck the king of Israel.” And yet it is evident, from the very context, that the chance effect produced by the man who fired his arrow at random was nonetheless ordained by God so that Ahab would be slain precisely on account of the vineyard which, in his wickedness, he had seized from Naboth — and so the word of the Lord spoke through the mouth of Elijah in the cited place.
Likewise, in the Gospel of Saint Matthew 10:29, the Lord says: “Are not two sparrows sold for a penny? And yet not one of them will fall to the ground without your Father’s consent” — that is, without the providence of God, as Saint Jerome and the interlinear gloss expound. And yet it usually happens that a sparrow falls to the ground by chance, just as a swimmer drowns in a river. Similarly, in Proverbs 16:4, it is said: “The Lord made all things for His own sake.” But God also produces effects that, with respect to man, are chance occurrences. Therefore, He produces them for His own sake and, thereby, by virtue of His providence. The inference is evident, for it is proper to providence to ordain means toward an end.
And this is demonstrated as follows: divine providence, providing positively and not merely permissively, extends as far as divine causality extends. But the causality of God extends to chance and fortuitous effects. Therefore, so also does His providence. Saint Thomas, in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 22, a. 2, demonstrates the major premise, because to provide is to order something toward an end. And since God acts for the sake of an end, it is necessary that what He does He orders toward an end; therefore, the providence of what He does belongs to Him. The minor premise, for its part, is certain according to faith, because without God nothing comes to pass — not even deadly disasters. Therefore, the drowning of the man who drowned while swimming was not a chance occurrence with respect to divine providence; rather, just as God provided that this man would swim, so also He provided that he would drown for the sake of some good end — for example, so that, if this man was in God’s grace, he would be saved; or, if he was in sin, he would be punished and in him the order of divine justice would shine forth, just as it shone in those upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, as is narrated in the Gospel of Saint Luke 13:4–5. Concerning these, God insinuates — as is clearly deduced from His words — that they died on account of their sins, when He says: “Do you think that they were more guilty than all the other men who dwelt in Jerusalem? No, I tell you; and unless you repent, you will all perish in the same way.” Therefore, it is necessary to affirm that not even a leaf of a tree falls without divine providence and the causality of God, because He does nothing that He has not decreed from eternity most surely to do, and He thus ordains efficacious means so that everything comes to pass according to the nature of the effect itself.
We are certainly astonished at how it could have occurred to Molina to invent such a concord of free will with divine providence, for it entails so great a detriment to divine power and occasions so great a disturbance among theologians that, were they to decide to embrace this concord, they would have to repudiate or forget all the sacred theology they have hitherto learned. May God grant an impartial judgment, in which the cause of God and of Jesus Christ may prevail over errors of this kind, which some attempt to introduce into the Church under the appearance of piety.

IV. Now we must offer the censure of the thirteenth assertion. We are surprised that Molina did not also include Jesus Christ alongside the Most Blessed Virgin, the apostles, and all others who have been confirmed in grace — although Molina will reply that our Lord Jesus Christ was also predestined on account of the foreknowledge of the good use of His free will, or certainly not before God foreknew the good use of His free will. We are likewise surprised that he did not say that the soul of Christ received habitual grace from divine providence, but not before the foreknowledge of the good use of His free will — which, by virtue of His innate freedom, would have taken place at the very moment He received habitual grace.
Indeed, Saint Thomas, in the Summa Theologiae, III, q. 34, a. 2, affirms that through the disposition of His free will the soul of Christ received habitual grace. Consequently, according to Molina’s doctrine, the habitual grace infused into the soul of Christ and the assistance of God by which free will was disposed to act more fully would have depended on the good use that the soul of Christ — placed within that order of things — was going to make of free will by virtue of its innate freedom; not because such aids of the Holy Spirit, in themselves and as they proceeded from the Holy Spirit, were efficacious for the disposition of free will.
Therefore, either Molina must deny that the soul of Christ received habitual grace on account of the disposition of His free will and according to the degree of that disposition, or he must admit the consequence. But whatever his response to the question of why God decided by His divine decree to confer so great an infused grace upon the soul of Christ — whether because He would have foreknown that Christ was going to make such great and intense effort by virtue of His innate freedom, or because Christ would have obtained habitual grace through the nature of the hypostatic union, without any free disposition of His free will — whatever the response, since Molina will certainly have something to object, it will be fitting to return to the Most Blessed Virgin and to see what good use of free will God would have foreknown in the Holy Virgin so as to have thereby predestined her.
For the Most Blessed Virgin was sanctified in her mother’s womb and received as much grace as was necessary for one who was to be the Mother of God. She did not, however, receive this grace by virtue of the use of her free will. And yet, by means of this grace — which could never thereafter fail her — she was predestined to beatitude, since from that moment she was confirmed in grace. Therefore, it cannot be said in any way that the Most Blessed Virgin was not predestined before the foreknowledge of the future good use of her free will. For it is evident that the grace of sanctification was not owed to the future good use of her free will. Indeed, to this good use there is not owed, nor could there be owed, the disposition for the grace of sanctification with which the Most Blessed Virgin was confirmed from that moment.
But Molina will object that, although the Most Blessed Virgin had been predestined to beatitude in a general sense by means of this grace, nonetheless, before God’s foreknowledge of the future good use of her free will, she would not have been predestined to such a degree of beatitude as would have made her deserving of an increase of grace and glory.

V. But whatever Molina may think of the Most Blessed Virgin, his thirteenth assertion nonetheless contains the same error we already refuted in the first part of this treatise, in chapter 23 and in the two following chapters, where we demonstrated at length that it is an error to explain the reason for the predestination of any particular predestined person as a consequence of the foreknowledge of the good use of his free will — which, according to Molina, would not be an effect of predestination.
Molina so firmly holds that predestination in particular depends on the good use which man, by his innate freedom, makes of his free will, that he also extends this to the Most Blessed Virgin, the apostles, and all who have been confirmed in grace — even though there is a particular reason why Molina’s doctrine should not be extended to them. The reason is that confirmation in grace is an effect of predestination sufficient for attaining eternal life. But in truth, God does not decree to give confirmation in grace to the predestined on account of foreknowing the good use of their free will — which, according to Molina, would not be an effect of predestination. Therefore, at the very least, the Most Blessed Virgin, the apostles, and all who have been confirmed in grace were predestined before the foreknowledge of the good use of their free will. And thus the antecedent is in truth demonstrated. For otherwise, all those who made good use of the divine aids by virtue of their innate freedom would receive confirmation in grace; and to affirm this is heretical.
For this reason, Ambrose Catharinus, in De praedestinatione, noted the difference among the predestined: some, after God had most surely predestined them, were not abandoned to the inconstancy of their free will — and these were the apostles — whereas others were abandoned in their uncertainties to the mutability of their free will. But Molina supposes that all men have been predestined in their totality, given the foreknowledge of that middle knowledge by which God knows what each one would do, by virtue of his innate freedom, placed within a determinate order of things; and those whom He foreknew would make good use of His aids until death, He predestined to glory.
We, on the contrary — together with Saint Thomas, Saint Augustine, and the Holy Fathers — do not admit that the good use of free will is the motive for the predestination of those who were predestined in particular. Rather, we affirm that every good use of free will by which the divine aids are used well is an effect of divine predefinition, and in some men it is an effect of predestination; and we judge this, according to the Catholic faith, to be true. But we already explained this point sufficiently in the place we have cited.

VI. On the fourteenth assertion we must necessarily dwell at some length, because intolerable things are maintained therein. For Molina appears to affirm three things.
The first: it is a law that whoever does what lies within him by the sole forces of his nature, without any prior motion of divine grace, will immediately obtain the prevenient aids so that with them he may come to know, adhere to the faith, and feel sorrow for sins, as is necessary for attaining salvation.
The second: our Lord Jesus Christ obtained through His merits that men should receive such aids whenever, by the forces of their nature, they disposed themselves in this manner.
The third: our eternal Father and Christ established the law of aids and gifts — which Christ offered us freely — so that as often as men attempt, by their natural forces, to do what lies within them, the aids of grace would be at their disposal to strengthen their powers and to act in the manner necessary for attaining salvation.

VII. Concerning the first of these, certainly, if Molina thinks that the following consequence is necessary — namely, if someone does what lies within him by his natural forces, the justification of one who so disposes himself by the sole forces of his nature will infallibly follow — we, for our part, judge, as the common doctrine of theologians teaches, that this is an error contrary to the Catholic faith.
And we prove it as follows: if this were so, it would follow that man, by the forces of his nature, would dispose himself sufficiently for the grace of justification. This is demonstrated thus: since this disposition is considered sufficient, justification would infallibly follow. And this is demonstrated thus: the Pelagian heresy maintains that there is an infallible connection between morally good works and grace. Against this, Saint Prosper, Liber contra Collatorem, ch. 6, and Saint Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia Christi, ch. 18, affirm that grace would no longer be grace if it were received infallibly from something done — which would precede grace — by the forces of nature.¹² Saint Augustine affirms the same in Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifacium, bk. 1, ch. 19, and bk. 2, ch. 8, and in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 25.¹³
Likewise, the Council of Orange, canon 7, defined: “If anyone thinks that by the good vigor of his nature he can choose or embrace anything that is necessary for the salvation of eternal life, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.”¹⁴ Therefore, if anyone maintains that by disposing himself through the forces of his nature he will infallibly obtain the grace of justification, as Molina says, he is deceived by a heretical spirit.
Moreover, if, according to the first thing Molina appears to affirm, it is a law that whoever does what lies within him by the forces of his nature will infallibly obtain the aids of grace by which he will attain eternal salvation, we must ask whether this law is natural or supernatural. If it were natural, two inconveniences would follow. On the one hand, the justification of the sinner could be known by natural reason, because a natural law is knowable by natural reason. On the other hand, the consequent would be erroneous, because, according to the sixth article on divinity, God grants justification — and this, properly speaking, is a matter of faith and exceeds the knowledge of natural reason.
But if it were a supernatural law, it would have to have been revealed supernaturally. Yet this law does not appear in Sacred Scripture, nor in apostolic tradition, nor in the councils, nor is it deduced as a necessary consequence from the revealed word. Therefore, it has in no way been revealed, and consequently it is not a supernatural law. The major premise is evident. The minor can doubtless be demonstrated inductively, unless perhaps Molina maintains that he himself has been the recipient of a new revelation or deduces it from Sacred Scripture as a necessary consequence.
But Saint Paul seems to think otherwise, for in the Epistle to the Romans 3:23–27, he says: “All have sinned and are deprived of the glory of God… Where then is boasting? It is excluded. By what law? By the law of works? No. By the law of faith.” But Molina affirms that man, by the law of works and through the forces of his nature, infallibly obtains the aids of grace by which he is justified. Therefore, man will be able to boast of having attained his justification because, by his natural forces, he did what lay within him.
Likewise, in the Epistle to the Romans 7:24, while describing the weakness of our nature, Saint Paul says: “Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ.” But if Molina’s law were true, this man would not be so wretched, for one could have replied to him: Why do you cry out saying, “Wretched man that I am”? For if you did what already lies within you by your natural forces, you would obtain freedom through Jesus Christ.
Moreover, according to this law, it would follow that supernatural aids would depend on the good disposition previously attained by the forces of nature. This consequent is false, because it is well known that some men, found in the act of open crime, were anticipated by the aids of God’s grace — such as Saint Paul, who while in the very act of open persecution was surrounded by a light from heaven that illumined him inwardly; and similarly many other tyrants, while torturing the martyrs, were anticipated by the Holy Spirit and converted to the faith. Therefore, Molina vainly invents a law that is not common to all those who are justified.

VIII. But, so as not to give the impression that we argue against Molina without reason, it is necessary to examine the words of the first thing he maintains in his fourteenth assertion. For Molina does not say that man — by doing what lies within him through the forces of his nature — infallibly obtains justifying grace, but rather that he obtains the aids of grace so that he may thereby carry out the acts necessary for attaining salvation. However, if we attend only to these words, it is easy to see that by them Molina is consequently referring to justifying grace. For he does not say that man — by doing all that lies within him through the forces of his nature — obtains the aids of grace so that he can believe and act, if he so wishes, but rather: so that he does this, namely, believe and do what is necessary for attaining salvation.
For this reason, everything we have argued in the aforementioned manner militates against Molina, if his words are to be understood literally. Nevertheless, since we are certain — and have so declared — that according to Molina’s doctrine the aids of grace are not efficacious in themselves as they come from God, but are only sufficient — such that if man wills, by his innate freedom, to make good use of them, he believes and converts to God — for this reason we must, on the one hand, persevere in the arguments we have set forth and, on the other, introduce new ones, to remove so pernicious and so pride-filled a doctrine from the hearts of the faithful. The arguments we have presented thus far, based on the testimonies of Saint Paul, possess full validity, as does the argument we developed by asking Molina whether the law of which he speaks is natural or supernatural.

IX. But now we will offer new and varied arguments.
First: who, before receiving the faith, can do all that lies within him by the sole forces of his nature, in such a way that he can do no more? It is certainly very difficult, or rather impossible, to find anyone of this kind. Therefore, Molina vainly invents such a law — namely, if someone were to do all that lies within him — if there is no one who does so.
But Molina says: there will be someone who does, by his natural forces, all that is required to fulfill the natural law; for example, if some unbeliever — whether upon reaching the use of reason, or subsequently, after the resolution he makes by the natural light that illumines his intellect — attempts to resolve, by his natural forces, to fulfill the natural law: certainly, this man, at that very moment, not only does not sin against the natural law but acts well by resolving and firmly deciding in his soul, as it seems to him, to observe everything that natural reason itself dictates must be done at all times. And of such a man, according to Molina, the following will be verified: God will immediately give him the aids of grace.
Against this solution we reply as follows. This man, before receiving the aids of grace — although he is excused from a new sin — does not nonetheless do all that is required to be done according to the natural law, because the natural law cannot be fully observed by means of the will and the resolution that man makes for himself. For it is evident that, according to the faith, in his state of corrupt nature, man cannot, without the grace of God, fully observe the natural law; and to discuss this question now is unnecessary. We therefore merely intend to show that the resolution of man is inefficacious for accomplishing what he resolves. Therefore, by means of this resolution — although at the very moment of making it he does not sin but acts well and is excused from sin — he cannot fully observe the natural law, even though he may be able to avoid each individual mortal sin and therefore does not sin mortally in each of them.
So from where does Molina derive — in order to free God from the charge of cruelty — that law, namely, that such a man, having so disposed himself by the forces of his nature, subsequently and infallibly obtains at his disposal the aids of grace by which, through his innate freedom, together with the general and natural aid of God, he converts? Therefore, if God were not to confer such aids immediately upon this man, He would be unjust, or at any rate, a transgressor, because He would not be observing the law decreed by Himself. And again, He would not be acting equitably but unjustly, if He were to rouse and invite with the aids of His grace a man found in the act of open crime and were to abandon another who was acting well by the sole forces of his nature, having made the resolution of which we speak.
It is certainly a great audacity to inquire into the reason why He draws one and not another; we must not inquire into this reason if we do not wish to err, as Saint Augustine counsels when commenting on the Gospel of Saint John 6:44: “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him.” But Molina, with all the forces of his nature, attempts to reduce the differing designs of God to the good or bad use which man can make of his free will by the forces of his nature — and this will become clearer in the following argument.

X. We present another argument against the first thing Molina maintains in his fourteenth assertion, because from it it follows that man, by means of his natural forces, begins to dispose himself in such a way that by the law of God — whether natural or supernatural — it infallibly follows that he receives the aids of grace, from which in turn, by virtue of his innate freedom, he makes good use, effectively doing all that is necessary for attaining salvation. And therefore, according to Molina, it will be verified that man begins his justification and completes it by means of the forces of his nature; while God, for His part, only grants the prevenient aid, which is in itself indifferent for completing justification, since its efficacy depends solely on the innate freedom of the will.
The Church teaches us the contrary when she prays: “We ask you, Lord, to anticipate our actions with your inspiration and to assist their continuation, for every work of ours is always begun by you and through you what was begun is completed.”

Chapter Six

In Which the Refutation Continues of the First Thing Molina Maintains at the Beginning of His Fourteenth Assertion

I. Molina thinks he escapes error by adding these words at the beginning of his fourteenth assertion: “but not, certainly, because by this attempt we have made ourselves worthy of such aids or have merited them in any way.” So Molina speaks. For this reason he thinks that the arguments we developed in the preceding chapter can do nothing against him. For the testimonies we offered would speak of meritorious works that precede grace, whereas Molina would not base the consequence he deduces on the dignity of the one who acts by the forces of his nature, or on his merits, but on the law decreed by God.
However, our arguments from the preceding chapter are also directed — as will be evident to anyone who reflects on this point — against this law that Molina invents. For we have already demonstrated that such a law is neither natural nor supernatural. And up to this point we have not charged Molina with deducing an infallible consequence from merits, but from the disposition that, according to him, man can attain by his natural forces. And our arguments have been directed against this claim.
Now, however, we wish to show that he not only in word denies the merit antecedent to the aids of grace, but that in fact he attributes this merit to the natural forces of free will. And this is demonstrated as follows: nothing would be lacking to the moral operation of which he speaks for this merit to be owed to it, given the law that Molina affirms has been decreed by God. The reason for this would be that this operation would be good by the sole forces of the natural free will, with no evil act accompanying it; therefore, this operation in itself would merit some reward. Therefore, if God by means of this law decreed that to the man who prepared himself in this way He would confer the supernatural aids so that he could proceed even further, then the obtaining of these aids would be a reward obtained through the decreed law — just as if a king were to promise a valiant soldier who wreaks havoc among the enemy hosts a Turkish city or the hand of his daughter in marriage: although such havoc in itself might not be worthy of such a reward, nevertheless by virtue of the king’s promise the soldier would be deserving of such a reward. Therefore, if God promises by His decree to confer supernatural aids and assistance, then this concession will be a reward owed to the good work, since it will be a good that the ruler of the republic grants on account of the laudable work that man performs by the exclusive forces of his free will.
Or let Molina tell us for what reason this reward is granted. But the objection he raises against us is of no avail — namely, that we too are obliged to admit that when man disposes himself through the prevenient and efficacious aids of grace, it immediately follows — since this consequence is correctly deduced — that he is justified through the infusion of habitual grace, even though this infusion of grace is not a reward; therefore, according to Molina, our argument is weak.
But we deny that the consequence Molina draws follows, because the disposition of man through the act of faith, hope, charity, and penance is not due to the natural forces of his free will, but to the efficacy of the aid of God’s grace; and therefore man, through this disposition, does not make himself deserving of obtaining the efficacious aid or justifying grace, because God alone, as creator of grace, produces the cause of this disposition. For although the acts by which man is disposed — and through his consent with God disposes himself — are vital acts and therefore arise from the powers of man, from his intellect and his will, nonetheless it depends solely on the Holy Spirit that these acts possess the nature of a disposition sufficient and adequate for receiving grace.
For the common doctrine of theologians has never admitted the following proposition: man justifies himself efficiently or produces grace. On the contrary, God infuses this grace in us without our acting, though with our consent; thus Saint Augustine defines infused virtue, saying: “It is the good disposition of spirit that God infuses in us without us.”¹⁵ And theologians explain this by saying that, although we do not act, we do consent. But if man, by his exclusive natural forces, were to efficiently produce the ultimate disposition, it would certainly follow as a necessary consequence that man would also concur efficiently in the production of grace, or at least in uniting it with the soul; and this is how it happens in physical acts, because man can efficiently produce the generation of another man, since he acts by virtue of his exclusive natural vigor; yet man cannot generate the soul, for only the creator can bring it forth from nothing, just as only He efficiently provides for the ultimate disposition so that the soul is united to the body. Therefore, if man were to efficiently produce the ultimate disposition for receiving grace, it would necessarily follow that he would also concur efficiently either in the production of grace itself, or at least in the real union of grace with the subject; and for this reason he would be a sufficient cause of his own justification.

II. This granted — and no one will dare deny it unless he be a pseudo-philosopher — we will continue our dispute with Molina. For Molina does not admit that an aid is efficacious in itself as it comes from God; rather, according to him, free will, by its exclusive forces, disposes itself before receiving the aid — by virtue of that decreed law — to receive the prevenient aid of grace, which would not be efficacious in itself. Likewise, making use of this aid would depend solely on the innate freedom of the will, such that, according to Molina, it would be man who would perform the acts leading to the ultimate disposition for attaining justifying grace. Certainly, from this it follows that man would make himself deserving, first of all by himself, of receiving such prevenient aids; and then, by acting well through making good use of these aids — by virtue of his exclusive natural forces, together with the general aid of God — we repeat, by making good use of these aids that would not be efficacious in themselves — man would make himself deserving of being justified through the infusion of grace. And indeed, whether this be a natural or a supernatural law does not eliminate the merit of free will; rather, on the contrary, such a law is necessary for merit. Therefore, according to Molina, if man freely performs good by his exclusive forces, with what has been promised him by law following from this, that promised reward would not be a reason for eliminating from this work the merit of what has been promised by law — just as, if a king were to give a soldier a horse and weapons so that he could fight, the merit of the soldier before the king would likewise not be eliminated for having fought, by his exclusive forces, with these weapons.
We flatly deny that the justification of the ungodly is owed to the merit of his free will, for it depends solely on God, on His aid, and on operative grace, that this disposition — as a disposition for justification — is efficiently brought about. And Saint Thomas so teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 111, aa. 2 and 3. However, what is certain is that, with respect to eternal life, according to the common opinion, the acts by which man disposes himself for grace are meritorious; but it is considered that it is infused cooperative grace that performs these acts with respect to the ultimate end, according to the proportion of grace itself and not to a greater degree. For man does not make himself deserving by means of these acts of a glory greater than that which corresponds to the quantity of infused grace. Moreover, after man has become a son of God through grace, he can then consequently make himself deserving — through the good works he performs by virtue of the merit of Christ and the grace of God — of an increase of grace and glory, as was defined in the Council of Trent, session six.
We have disputed this point in careful detail so that the censors of this cause may note to what great extent the doctrine of Molina resembles the heresy of the Pelagians, who would have been satisfied if Catholics admitted such a law according to which whoever does what lies within him by the forces of his nature infallibly receives sufficient aids; and so, if man, by the exclusive forces of his nature, wills to exercise these sufficient aids and make them efficacious by himself, he will be justified and will attain salvation. For the Pelagians also explained the nature of merit from the determination that free will itself imposes on itself to embrace the faith and fulfill the rest of what, as is prescriptive, must be done.
Therefore, if, as Molina says, through these inefficacious aids man sufficiently disposes himself so as to be able to perform, without any other aid of a supernatural order, the acts of the theological virtues as is necessary for attaining salvation — and these aids are conferred infallibly on the one who does what lies within him by the forces of his nature — then certainly, in the final analysis, our salvation will lie in the power of our free will. And this is what Pelagius affirmed.
In this point we do not insult Molina, for he himself — as we have already shown earlier — boasts that if Pelagius had heard his doctrine, he would have immediately agreed with it. But we do not doubt, but rather are certain, that Saint Augustine and the Holy Fathers would have rejected Molina’s doctrine, because they would have considered it Pelagian; and we have already proved earlier that they would have rejected it.

III. Now it is time to set forth briefly our view on the second and third points — which we have already identified — of the fourteenth assertion. For Molina maintains that Christ, through His merits, obtained on behalf of man that God would confer on him the prevenient grace or aids so that he might thus do all that is necessary for attaining salvation, whenever, solely by his natural forces, he attempts or is ready to attempt all that he can by himself. Molina thinks that with this addition he avoids error. But certainly he does not avoid recklessness, for in so important a matter he alone invents that Christ through His merits obtained for us the infallibility of the following consequence: if someone does all that lies within him by the forces of his nature, he will obtain the aids of grace so that with them he may do all that is necessary for attaining salvation.
Therefore, it is not owed to the merit of Christ that man should do all that lies within him by the forces of his nature; for if this merit were owed to Christ, then man would be acting by virtue of the grace of Christ and not solely by his natural forces. But according to Molina, it is owed to man’s merit that if he does by himself what he can, he obtains the aids of grace. And Molina adds that Christ and the eternal Father established this law, among others. We judge this to be supremely reckless. For none of the Holy Fathers mentions this law, and no theologian before Molina and his followers has found such a law. Therefore, only to Molina has this law been revealed — namely: “while we are on the way, our salvation will always be placed in the hand of our free will.” And it must be noted that Molina always says “while we are on the way”; with these words he also speaks of the faithful sinner or the just person, giving to understand that the salvation of these will always be placed in the hand of their free will, precisely because by their natural forces they will wish to undertake some of the works required for justification, and for this reason God will always be at the disposal of one who, by his natural forces, wishes to undertake the works required for justification. Let Molina’s Concordia, q. 14, d. 10, p. 44, be read, so that it may be evident that we put no falsehood in his mouth that he has not himself uttered.
Moreover, from Molina’s assertion about the pact of Christ with the eternal Father to establish the law revealed to Molina alone, it follows that the cross of Christ is rendered void. This consequence is demonstrated as follows. Man can attain, by the sole forces of his nature, the disposition required for obtaining justification and salvation — even though this disposition is not owed to the merit of Christ. And similarly, if the justified man begins to undertake some work by the sole forces of his nature, God will immediately be ready to grant him the aid of grace, so that, if this man wishes to make use of this aid by his innate freedom, he may carry out the work as is necessary for attaining salvation — even though neither the beginning nor the completion of the work will be owed to the merit of Christ, but only the sufficiency of the aids, whose efficacy will depend on man.

IV. These are the teachings of Molina — Pelagian dogmas with which he seeks to exalt free will to the detriment of the efficacious grace of God and the cross of Christ. It is manifest how foreign all of these are to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and of the councils, which we already presented in the first part of this treatise in order to refute Molina’s four capital assertions.
Moreover, in the course of our refutation we have not offered the doctrine of Saint Thomas on the virtue of God’s grace that disposes our free will for justification, because Molina deliberately and knowingly departs from it and dares to combat it openly. The learned and prudent censor will find that this is so, if he reads Saint Thomas carefully in the Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 111, aa. 2 and 3, where he expressly determines the following: “No preparation is required of man, since he is incapable of surpassing the divine aid; rather, whatever preparation man attains is due to the aid of God who moves the soul toward the good.” And in the reply to the second argument he teaches: “It does not matter whether man attains perfect preparation suddenly or gradually… for man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God premoves him and moves him toward the good”; from which it follows, as he says in the reply to the third argument: “An agent of infinite power does not require matter or a disposition of matter previously put in place by the action of another cause… and similarly, for God to infuse His grace into the soul, no preparation is required of man that He Himself does not bring about.” So speaks Saint Thomas.
But Molina not only places the preparation by natural forces prior to the aid of grace by law, but once this aid has been received, makes it depend on the good use of free will through its innate freedom — foreknown, certainly, by God, but not produced as an effect of His grace and predestination.
This is Molina’s new concord, which we judge to be blasphemous and full of errors. Let the Summa Theologiae, q. 113, a. 8, and the reply to the second argument also be read, and the censor of this cause will recognize how discordant is the concord that Saint Thomas teaches from the new concord of Molina. Saint Thomas, like the Council of Orange, never admits that we begin the good work and that God later helps us with His grace; rather, according to Saint Thomas, God always begins, continues, and completes the good works necessary for man to attain salvation, and never waits for man by some law to wish to repent by the sole forces of his nature, but rather He Himself anticipates us so that we may will to believe and repent.

V. Finally, Molina makes himself deserving of our greatest censure because, in order to demonstrate his error in the cited tenth disputation, he offers the following verse from the Gospel of Saint John 1:12: “He gave them the power to become children of God.” But contrary to the interpretation of all the Holy Fathers, he twists it, because it contradicts the following decree of the Council of Trent, session 4, § Praeterea ad coercenda petulantia ingenia… And so Molina, notwithstanding the aforementioned decree, explains the testimony of Saint John, saying: “For the power to become children of God has been granted to them insofar as, if they attempt all that lies within them, God will be at their disposal so that they obtain faith and grace and are not frustrated in their desire. Therefore, to become children of God is within their power.”¹⁶
This interpretation is contrary to the thought and unanimous agreement of the Fathers. Certainly, concerning this passage of Saint John, all of them have interpreted that this power is owed to grace or to the aid of grace — and not to free will, as if man were to attempt by his natural forces all that lies within him, whether in being ready to strive, or in disposing himself to will what belongs to faith and what is necessary for attaining eternal salvation. For although the opinions of the Holy Fathers on this passage of Saint John are varied — and we do not offer them in order to avoid this cause becoming excessively prolix, and above all because they can be seen in the Glossa ordinaria and in the Catena aurea of Saint Thomas and in the Commentaria written by the most illustrious Cardinal Francisco de Toledo on this passage — nonetheless, all agree on this: that this power must be attributed to grace or to the aid of grace. Therefore, Molina twists the testimony of Sacred Scripture in favor of his doctrine and against the common thought of the Holy Fathers.
Nor can he defend himself by appealing to John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, because Fisher, in his Assertionis Lutheranae confutatio, a. 36, does not maintain that to those who have not yet become children of God through the grace of justification, such power has been granted before becoming children of God; rather, he only affirms that when the ungodly man becomes just, at the moment of his justification he consents through his free will. He never maintained — nor can such a thing be gathered from his words — that his consent or his effort was owed to free will by its exclusive forces. From this it follows that Molina attributes a false testimony to Fisher, who presented his Catholic doctrine against Luther, maintaining that at the moment of his justification man freely consents to the motion of God’s grace and accepts the gift of justifying grace, of which God alone is the efficient cause.
And the very context in which the verse of Saint John appears confirms his position, for it is also said: “But to all who received him, he gave the power to become children of God.” It is clear that, according to the common interpretation of the Holy Fathers, this speaks of those who received Christ through living faith, just as it is said that through living faith Christ dwells in our hearts. And when they first receive Christ through this living faith, their free will is not destroyed, but becomes more potent and virtuous in consenting to the motion of divine grace, which is the efficient cause — as it comes from God — of justifying grace. And for this reason Saint John did not say that the power to make themselves children of God had been granted to them, but only to become children of God, because the efficient cause of justifying grace belongs solely to God through Jesus Christ, as is manifest in the doctrine of Saint Thomas and Saint Augustine on this point.
And thus what Saint Augustine often says is verified: “He who created you without you will not save you without you”¹⁷ — that is, without your consent; but not, however, in such a way that this consent is the efficient cause of justification through the infused gift of grace. And therefore, consequently, Saint John says, explaining who those are who received him: “Those who believe in his name, who were born not of blood… but of God.” But if Molina’s doctrine were true, they would be born of themselves, because by virtue of the natural power of their free will, they would not only have done what lay within them before receiving the aids of grace, but even after receiving them they would have made them efficacious; and for this reason they would have justified themselves efficiently and received the power to make themselves children of God — but then Saint John would not have said only: to become children of God.

VI. In favor of our Catholic doctrine, see a celebrated passage of Saint Augustine from De spiritu et littera, ch. 26, where — commenting on the Epistle to the Romans 2:13, “Those who keep the law will be justified” — he affirms: “They are not called keepers of the law because they have previously kept the law — as when we say ‘men will be freed,’ we understand that there were men first and that they will be freed afterwards — but rather, just as when we say ‘men will be created,’ we must understand that men come to be through the very act of creation; so also it must be understood that those who keep the law will be justified, because through the grace of justification men are made keepers of the law.” Saint Thomas teaches the same on the same passage from the Epistle to the Romans.
But Molina’s new law makes it so that whoever has been a keeper of the law, insofar as it depends on himself by his natural forces, is justified afterwards, because he will subsequently receive the aids of grace in such a way that he can do with them all that is required for attaining salvation — so that with these aids, we repeat, he attains salvation through his innate freedom and not through the efficacy of the aids of grace, which in themselves and as they come from God would lack efficacy. And so Molina dogmatizes, because he says that otherwise he would not understand how it can be in the power of men to become children of God — nor how this verse can be verified: He wills all men to be saved (First Epistle to Timothy 2:4) — unless to those who strive by their natural forces and who do what lies within them, the prevenient aids of grace are given so that they may perform the acts necessary for attaining salvation.
But whoever reads Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 8, a. 3, and the reply to the first argument, will understand why Christ is said to be the head of all men. For Saint Thomas affirms that of some men He is head only potentially, even though this potency may never become actual, because: “this potency is based on two things: the first and certainly most important is the virtue of Christ, which is sufficient for the entire human race to attain salvation; the second and secondary is freedom of will.” Therefore, in this way it is verified, according to the explanation offered of the passage from the First Epistle to Timothy, that God wills all men to be saved. On this question Saint Thomas expresses himself in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 6, reply to the first argument, where he explains at length how, when one speaks of the salvation of all men, Saint Paul must be understood as referring to the antecedent will of God and not to His absolute will, which is always fulfilled. But Molina almost always departs from the common doctrine of theologians.
We could offer many more objections, but those we have presented will suffice to set the wise censor of this cause upon the path we defend.
All that we have said in the second part of this treatise we wish to place at the feet of the most holy Roman Church; in the meantime we also subordinate it, as impartial judges, to your judgment. And although from what has been said it is sufficiently established that all the arguments our adversaries oppose against our ancient doctrine are manifestly very weak — and are indeed refuted by Saint Thomas and other doctors — we will nonetheless proceed to their refutation in the third part of this treatise.
In the meantime, we will confirm and approve by signing with our own names everything we have said in the first and second parts of this treatise: in the convent of Saint Paul of Valladolid, on the 28th day of August, 1595.

Brother Domingo Báñez, Master and Professor of the First Chair at Salamanca.

Brother Juan de la Fuente, Master.

Diego de Yanguas, Master.

Brother Pedro de Herrera, Master and Professor at Salamanca.

Brother Pedro de Ledesma, Presented and Rector of the College of Saint Thomas of Ávila.

Brother Diego Nuño, Presented.

Brother Diego Álvarez, Presented and Lecturer in Scripture at Valladolid.

1Here we follow the translation proposed by Vidal Peña. In reality, the text reads: Sicut se habet simpliciter ad simpliciter, ita magis ad magis. That is, however great the aid may be, if it is not efficacious for the effect to take place, the effect will not be produced, unless the true efficient cause is present. Therefore, the effect will not depend on whether the aid is greater or lesser — since it is clear that the aid is not efficacious — but on whether free will applies a greater or lesser effort.

2Saint Bernard, Sermones in Cantica, serm. 67, n. 10. Migne, P.L., 183, 1107.

3Mansi 8, 716.

4Saint Augustine, Epistola 186, cap. 11. Migne, P.L., 33, 830.

5Saint Augustine, Enchiridion, cap. 106. Migne, P.L., 40, 282.

6Luis De Molina, ibid., et. Cit., p. 226

7Saint Hilary, De Trinitate, Book XII, n. 39. Migne, P.L., 10, 457.

8Canones concilii provincialis Coloniensis anno 1536 celebrati, ed. Parisiis 1545, fol. 100.

9Missale Romanum, 7th Sunday after Pentecost.

10Saint Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14. Migne, P.L., 45, 1014.

11Canones concilii provincialis Coloniensis anno 1536 celebrati, ed. Paris 1545, fol. 100v.

12Saint Prosper, Liber contra Collatorem, ch. 3, a. 6. Migne, P.L., 51, 222. Saint Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ch. 18, ep. 17. Migne, P.L., 65, 473.

13Saint Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifacium, bk. 1, ch. 19, and bk. 2, ch. 8. Migne, P.L., 44, 507 and 583. Idem, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 2. Migne, P.L., 44, 963.

14Mansi 8, 714.

15Saint Augustine, Retractationes, bk. 1, ch. 9, n. 6. Migne, P.L., 32, 528.

16Molina, Luis de, Concordia…, cited ed., pp. 44–45.

17Saint Augustine, Sermones de verbis Apostoli, s. 169. Migne, P.L., 38, 923.

I. First assertion of Molina. “It can happen that, after God has called two men through an equal interior aid, one is converted by virtue of the freedom of his will and the other remains in unbelief. It often happens that, with the same aid, one is not converted, but another is… In the same way, it can happen that although someone has been called and favored to a greater degree with a greater aid, nevertheless, by virtue of his freedom, he is not converted, and another with a lesser aid is converted… Affected in the same way and called equally by God to the faith, by virtue of their freedom alone it can happen that one embraces the faith and the other disdains it.” This is what Molina says in his Concordia¹, pages 52 and 53.

II. Second assertion of Molina. “With the aids of God by which one person is justified and saved, another is not saved by virtue of his freedom… It should not be doubted that many have strayed into hell, even though God granted them greater aids for salvation than to many who enjoy contemplation in the divine heaven. But while those were neither predestined nor saved with greater aids, these others, on the contrary, with lesser aids, were predestined and saved. And this happened thus because those did not wish, by their innate freedom, to make use of their will to attain salvation, and these others, on the contrary, wished to do so to the highest degree.” Thus speaks Molina on page 447.

III. Third assertion of Molina. “It is an error to hold that efficacious aid possesses efficacy by virtue of the nature of the divine motion and of God himself. And this, with a sound faith, cannot be maintained.” Thus speaks Molina on pages 425 and 426.

IV. Fourth assertion of Molina. “In our doctrine we take as a premise the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious, according to the effect, which at the same time depends on the freedom of the will. And this sufficient aid, whether greater or lesser in itself, is said to be efficacious when through it the will is converted thanks to its freedom, although, nevertheless, this aid not preventing it in any way, it could have not been converted; on the contrary, this aid is said to be inefficacious when through it the will is not converted, by virtue of its own freedom, although, nevertheless, it could have been converted; otherwise, such aid would not be sufficient for conversion.”
“From this we affirm in fifth place that the efficacy or inefficacy of the aids of prevenient and adjuvant grace for conversion or justification, which according to the usual law are delivered as provisions for the journey, depends on the free consent and cooperation of our will with them; and it is in our free power either to make these aids become efficacious, by consenting and cooperating with them to carry out the acts through which we dispose ourselves for justification, or to make them become inefficacious, by withholding our consent and cooperation, or even by provoking the contrary dissent.” Thus speaks Molina on page 232.

V. Fifth assertion of Molina. “A free agent is said to be one who, given all the requisites for acting, can act and not act, or do one thing just as well as its contrary. And by virtue of this freedom, the faculty is said to be free by which such an agent can act in this manner… Wherefore it happens that free will, if it must reside anywhere, resides nowhere other than in the will, in which freedom is formally deployed, following the judgment of reason.” Thus speaks Molina, defining free will in his Concordia, d. 2, page 12. And a little further on, he says: “because if at the same time it can choose indifferently both an act and its contrary, freedom is also distinguished by the type of act which, as they say, possesses the character of full and perfect freedom.”

VI. Sixth assertion of Molina. “It is necessary to distinguish in God a triple knowledge, lest we wish to err with great danger when it comes to reconciling the freedom of our will and the contingency of things with divine foreknowledge: one purely natural… another purely free… and, finally, the third, the middle knowledge, through which God has observed in his essence, by virtue of the most lofty and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, what each one would do by his innate freedom, if placed in this or that or even any of the infinite orders of things, although, nevertheless, he could, if he truly so wished, do the opposite… perhaps someone will ask whether this middle knowledge should be called free or natural. First of all, it must be said in response to this that there is no reason whatsoever to call it free, both because it precedes every free act of the divine will, and because it is not in God’s power to know through this middle knowledge anything different from what he in fact knows. Furthermore, it must be said that, in this sense, it is not natural knowledge either, as if it were innate to God, since through this middle knowledge God cannot know the opposite of what he knows through it. And if the created free will were to do the opposite, as in fact it can, God himself would know this very thing through this middle knowledge, and not, however, what he in fact knows.” Thus speaks Molina in the Concordia, pages 329 and 330.

VII. Seventh assertion of Molina. Molina, in his Concordia, q. 14, a. 3, from d. 26, page 167, to d. 29, expresses clearly two things concerning the general concurrence of God, and even more so concerning his special gratuitous concurrence. On the one hand, the general concurrence of God, in concurring with secondary causes, does not influence them by premoting them, but only influences immediately the operations and effects of the secondary causes themselves. And on the other hand, God himself, with his concurrence, whether special or generally gratuitous, is a partial cause of the effect; and we shall gather Molina’s own words when we refute this doctrine.

VIII. Eighth assertion of Molina. In his Concordia, q. 23, a. 4, d. 1, m. 10, pages 483, 489, and 491, Luis de Molina, despite openly admitting the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas on the mystery of predestination, which is the common doctrine in the schools of theology, nevertheless attempts to demonstrate the opposite doctrine. And since on this mystery he says many things that must be refuted and entirely condemned, we do not cite his words here, since we shall refer to them further on when refuting his doctrine. Now, however, we shall begin to refute the cited assertions by making use of theological arguments and evident testimonies.

Chapter Two Which Contains the Censure of the First Assertion

I. We consider the four parts of the first assertion to be erroneous, contrary to the Catholic faith, and derived from the Pelagian heresy. We shall demonstrate that our censure is entirely justified; first, by grounding it in the celebrated testimony of the Apostle Saint Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 4:7: “Who, then, distinguishes you?” With these words, Saint Paul, according to the common interpretation of the saints whom we shall cite, sets forth the reason why no believer should boast before anyone; and so he adds: “What do you have that you have not received? If you have received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it?” From this we draw the following theological argument: If of two men whom God makes completely equal in the aids and helps they receive, one of them is converted by virtue of his freedom alone, as Molina says, through making good use of these aids, and the other is not converted, then without doubt God does not distinguish with his aids and helps the one who is converted, but rather the man himself, by virtue of his freedom alone, distinguishes himself from the other, converting to the faith while the other remains in unbelief. And therefore, he who is converted will in truth boast before him who is not converted, since he will truly say to him: I received from God no more goods and aids than you, and yet by virtue of my freedom alone, which is naturally my own, I made good use of the aids of God’s grace. Therefore, it is not the grace of God itself that distinguishes me from you, since it has been given equally to both of us.
We do not speak here of habitual justifying grace, but of actual premoting grace, and we affirm that he who is converted, according to Molina’s doctrine, by virtue of his freedom alone performs the act of faith, of hope, of charity, and of contrition, by which he ultimately disposes himself for grace — but not because God prepared this conversion through the bestowal of his gratuitous aids, since these aids did not prepare the one who was not converted. And on this point we insist and shall insist against Molina and against his fallacious answers, since ultimately he always attributes solely to the freedom of the human will the final disposition and preparation for justifying grace, and not to that grace itself which efficaciously prepares and favors the good will.

II. But lest it should seem that the interpretation of Saint Paul’s sacred testimony has its place only in our minds, we shall offer the interpretation of the Holy Fathers. First, Saint Thomas, in his Commentaria in epistolas divi Pauli, 1 ad Cor., 4, lect. 2, on the cited passage of Saint Paul, interprets his words in two ways; but in both he constantly affirms that the distinction between one man and another — by which one ends in the abyss of perdition, or the believer becomes better before God — is due to what is received from God. And Saint Thomas speaks clearly of what man receives from the grace of God. Thus he says: “He therefore boasts as if he had not received it, who prides himself on account of himself and not of God, in the same manner as those spoken of in Psalm 48, who trust in their own virtue.” Thus speaks Saint Thomas. Therefore, if Molina’s assertion is true, he who believes does not differ from the other in any aid of preparatory grace, but by his own virtue, thanks to his natural and innate freedom, makes himself different from the other, embraces the faith, and for this reason will be able to boast of his virtue before the other. Saint Thomas considered this doctrine contrary to Christian humility; and so he says in the cited place: “This belongs to the first kind of pride, when someone who has something says he has it of himself.”

III. But let us give way to the great Father Saint Augustine, who, after the Apostle Saint Paul, was the most eminent doctor and preacher of divine grace and predestination that has ever existed. In De praedestinatione sanctorum, chapters 3, 5, and 6, he cites the already-mentioned testimony of Saint Paul, using it against those who were infected with the remnants of the Pelagian heresy, and, calling upon the words of Saint Cyprian, says: “That pious and humble doctor did not think thus — I speak of the most blessed Cyprian — who maintained that we ought to boast of nothing, since nothing is our own; to show this, he calls upon the apostle as witness, when he says: What do you have that you have not received? If you have received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it? It was especially by this testimony that I myself became convinced that I had erred in a similar way, by having thought that faith, by which we believe in God, is not a gift of God.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine. It must be observed here that he does not speak of faith only insofar as it is an infused habit, but that he speaks of the very act of believing, which he says is a gift of God, retracting what he had previously thought. For he had previously maintained that believing depends on us, while doing good would depend on Him. And he asserts that he would not have said this had he already known that faith itself is among the gifts of God bestowed upon us in the same Spirit. And thus, both believing and acting belong to the free will of our will and are given to us through the spirit of faith and charity. Thus speaks Saint Augustine.² If, therefore, believing is a gift of God, it is necessary to acknowledge that he who believes receives a gift from God that he who does not believe does not receive, since if the latter received it, he would likewise believe.
To this explanation Molina and his defenders respond that the act of believing is said to be a gift of God insofar as God donates the aid by which man is able to believe. But certainly this evasion is very weak, since, according to Molina, the aid that precedes the act of faith does not distinguish him who believes from him who does not believe; rather, it is he who believes who, by virtue of his freedom alone, distinguishes the aid given to him from the aid given to another, because he wishes to make good use of it by virtue of his freedom alone. Indeed, one must ask Molina what he intends to say with this exclusive expression: “by virtue of his freedom alone.” For he does not intend to exclude the prevenient aids, nor the concomitant ones, but only intends to explain the difference by which one man believes and another does not believe, referring ultimately only to freedom and not to some aid that moves the will to believe, even if this aid is concomitant and adjuvant. For Molina, as will become evident further on, does not believe that this aid possesses efficacy of itself, but rather begs it solely from the freedom of the human will.
Those who are censors of this cause must take this into account to the highest degree. Thus, Molina never admits that the Holy Spirit himself, through the motion of his actual grace, produces the difference between him who believes and him who is not converted; on the contrary, he always affirms that man, by virtue of his innate freedom, determines the divine aids — which are of themselves indifferent — by making use of them to arrive at believing. For since Molina and his followers establish no other intrinsic aid distinct from the sufficient, which is prevenient, they cannot offer any other reason why this prevenient aid persists and becomes adjuvant, except by saying that it is the man himself who, by virtue of his freedom alone, makes good use of this prevenient aid. And since God foreknew the good use of the free will, he causes the aid to persist and coadjuvates and cooperates with the free will itself, not by influencing the free will from the beginning, but in the effect and in the action of the free will, as is evident in the seventh assertion of Molina, which we shall refute further on. But now we deliberately wish the reader to notice how cautiously our adversaries attempt to evade the theological demonstration of the cited argument, by inventing a middle knowledge in God, as will become clear further on when we refute Molina’s sixth assertion.

IV. However, for the moment we shall proceed with the interpretation of Saint Augustine, who in chapter 5 of the cited work says the following: “Is it by the gifts that all men have that some men are distinguished from others? Saint Paul first said: Who distinguishes you? And afterward he added: What do you have that you have not received? Without doubt, an infatuated man can say to another: my faith distinguishes me, my justice, or else something else. Forestalling such boasting, the good doctor says: What do you have that you have not received? Who distinguishes you, if not he who gave you what he did not give to another?” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.³
We argue in a completely similar manner against Molina, who, although he does not speak expressly in the same terms as the Pelagians — that is, my faith distinguishes me, my justice distinguishes me — nevertheless says something nearly equivalent, from which it also follows that a man, when he believes, having been helped in the same way as another, is not distinguished by God, but rather, as Molina says: only my freedom distinguishes me, since I received no more aids of God’s grace — and even sometimes fewer — than another man who is not converted. But in truth, Saint Augustine in this place does not combat the Pelagians by appealing to his own authority, but has recourse to the authority of the Apostle Saint Paul and the Sacred Scriptures, which, as Saint Augustine demonstrates by appealing to Saint Paul, cannot be understood in any other way: “Who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received?” Yet here is Molina who says: I have innate freedom and by means of it, given equal divine aids, I myself distinguish myself from another, because God, helping him equally as he does me, or even sometimes more than me, does not wish to believe by virtue solely of his freedom, and disdains the faith.
Without doubt, this seems to us an evident theological demonstration, and when our adversaries are pressed by it, they take refuge in the adjuvant aid, for in this way they think they can give the impression of asserting that he who believes receives from God something more than he who does not believe. But against this solution we immediately reply as follows: If these adjuvant aids are not of themselves more efficacious, as they come from God by his gracious will, how can the difference between him who believes and is converted and him who does not believe and is not converted be attributed to these aids? For this reason, the force of our argument will always remain, because we demonstrate that the distinction between one man and another by virtue of his freedom alone is an affront to the apostolic testimony. In refuting Molina’s second and third assertions we shall mention other testimonies of Saint Augustine.

Chapter Three In Which the First Assertion of Molina Is Refuted by the Testimonies of Saint Ambrose, Saint Jerome, and Other Doctors of the Church

I. Saint Ambrose, in De vocatione gentium, bk. 1, ch. 1, treats clearly the question concerning the harmony between grace and free will; and after a long disputation, he finally concludes, drawing upon various testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures, that the efficacious aids of God are not granted to all, and thus he ends with these words: “When something must be read against the insolence of one who boasts of choosing by virtue of his free will, it will be necessary to have recourse to the sentence of the Apostle Saint Paul, since he opposes such a claim when he says: Who distinguishes you? For the depth of this question which, as Saint Paul declared with admiration, we must proclaim inaccessible, is not resolved by saying that it depends on the free will to will or to reject the good, since, although it is in the power of man to reject the good, nevertheless, unless it is granted to him, he will not will the good.”⁴ This and many other things that condemn the doctrine of Molina says Saint Ambrose in the same book.
We know that Erasmus, although he thought that the book De vocatione gentium was not by Saint Ambrose, maintained that it was by an author of the highest authority and of no common eloquence. But, whatever Erasmus may think, without doubt this book enjoys an ancient authority within the Church, and the schools of theologians always cite it as a confirmation of sound doctrine. All the Holy Fathers confirm the doctrine on this point, just as Saint Paul himself does, when they cry out that the designs of God are inscrutable. Let Saint Augustine be read, for in De praedestinatione et gratia, chapters 15 and 16, he teaches at length that this question must not be investigated by means of human reason, but that what faith teaches must be humbly maintained — that is, that the difference between him who acts well and him who does not is due to the divine will.
But Molina, as a reckless scrutinizer of this difference and distinction, boasts of having found it, when he says that, having received equal aids, by virtue of their freedom alone, one man is converted and the other is not; and he has recourse only to the foreknowledge of God and to the middle knowledge, recognizing them as the manifest reason why God would have decided to coadjuvate with one man and not the other, since he would naturally have foreknown that the former would make good use of the sufficient aid by virtue of his freedom alone. But certainly, if things were to happen in such a way, the designs of God would not be inscrutable, as Saint Paul says.

II. Furthermore, Saint Jerome — commenting on the verses of Jeremiah 26: “you direct yourself to them” — says: “It is in our freedom to do something or not to do it, in such a way that whatever good work we desire, attempt, or manage to do, we must attribute it to the grace of God, who, according to Saint Paul, gave us both the willing and the doing.” Thus speaks Saint Jerome,⁵ whose opening words Molina is accustomed to cite in his own favor, as if we were denying that it is in our freedom to do something or not to do it. We, however, have reproduced the words that Saint Jerome adds as an explanation of the foregoing, for they contradict Molina, since Molina presents Saint Jerome’s testimony in a truncated form. The latter does not maintain that we do good by virtue of our freedom alone, nor does he consider that only the prevenient aid of God is owed to the gift of grace; rather, he even affirms that the good action itself must be attributed to the grace of God; and for this reason he cites the Epistle to the Philippians 2:13: “It is God who, by his good will, makes you desire and act” — that is, by his free will, as Saint Thomas explains in the same way.

III. Furthermore, Saint Anselm, in De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 3, speaks thus: “There were some proud men who thought that the entire efficacy of the virtues resided solely in the freedom of the will.” And a little afterward, referring to those who turn toward God and act well, he says: “Everything depends on grace, because neither does desiring depend on him who desires, nor running on him who runs, but on the compassionate God; for to everyone except God it can be said: What do you have that you have not received?” “In this way, no one receives the gift of acting well, except through prevenient grace; and no one preserves it, except through subsequent grace.” “When it is said that neither he who desires, nor he who runs, is in control of these things, but that both depend on the merciful God, it is not denied in him who desires, or in him who runs, that he makes use of free will, but it is meant that desiring and running must not be attributed to free will, but to grace. For when it is said that it does not depend on him who desires, nor on him who runs, it must be understood that the desiring and the running do nonetheless take place.” Thus speaks Saint Anselm.⁶
We ask the judges of this cause to pay attention to the way in which Molina attempts to reconcile his assertion with the aforementioned doctrine of Saint Anselm; for Molina maintains that the efficacy of conversion resides solely in the freedom of the will. In this way, although man has need of divine prevenient aid, nonetheless Molina denies that this aid, as it comes from God, brings efficacy for the work or the act, but rather begs it from the free will itself; and it is precisely from the free will that the good use of the divine aid depends, in the same way that for a sword to cut, it is necessary that it receive the force for the act of cutting not from itself but from the motive energy of the man.
Saint Paul did not seem to think thus, when he said: “I worked more than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God that is with me” (First Epistle to the Corinthians 15:10). But Molina seems to think the contrary, when he affirms that the man who is converted must say: I believed, I hoped, and I loved — not, however, because the grace of God itself had converted me, but because I, with it, believed and loved by virtue of my freedom alone.
For his part, Saint Anselm sets forth and offers the following example: “It is the same as when someone, even though he owes nothing to a man who is naked and has not a penny to obtain clothing, gives him clothes; for his part, although the naked man has the power, once he has received the clothing, both to put it on and not to put it on, nevertheless, putting it on does not depend on him, although he dresses himself, but on the one who gives him the clothing. Wherefore it can be said: putting on clothes does not depend on him who dresses himself, but on the merciful one, that is, on him who gives him the clothes. But much more would this be said if he who gives the clothes were also to give the power to keep and to put them on; in the same way, God, when he gives grace to man, gives him also the power to keep and to use it.” Thus speaks Saint Anselm,⁷ in whose example we observe that he argues from lesser to greater, when he says: “But much more would this be said, if he who gives the clothes were also to give the power to keep and to put them on.” And in the same way one could say: If among men it is justly said in this case that putting on clothes does not depend on the naked man, although he dresses himself, but on the compassionate one who gives clothes to the naked man without giving him the power to use them, much more truly will this be said of the justified man, because the power is not in him who desires, nor in him who runs, but that the compassionate God, when he grants grace to man, gives him the power to use it. Thus, everything must be attributed to grace, including the very free action of him who desires and of him who runs — unless we wish to pride ourselves in the manner of those whom Saint Anselm censures.
Indeed, Molina thinks that the divine prevenient aid is like a medicinal drink which, although it possesses a certain virtue of altering the sick human body, nevertheless does not of itself bestow the efficacy for healing the human body; rather, it receives the healing efficacy from the nature of the living human body itself; for, as physicians say, it is nature itself that produces healing through the medicine skillfully prepared by the physician. Wherefore it happens that, two sick persons having received the same medicine, one recovers and the other dies or remains sick; the reason for this difference is due to the different constitution and disposition of the one and the other. We, however, through the Holy Fathers, have learned to venerate more piously the celestial physician of our souls. For we maintain steadfastly that the grace of God through Jesus Christ heals us with such power and excellence when we are justified that, through grace itself — that is, the gratuitous aid — our free will receives the efficacious force for making good use of the divine motions and inspirations; and we declare that such an efficacious motion of God bestows along with itself, as it comes from Him through Jesus Christ, the healing virtue; moreover, it in no way begs from our innate freedom. For the very motion of God prepares and illuminates the mind of man in such a way that it not only makes him a voluntary and spontaneous agent, but also grants him the free capacity of choice to consent to God through the act of believing, of hoping, and of loving. And it does not happen that, as Molina thinks, along with the Lutherans, free will is destroyed by this doctrine; on the contrary, it is perfected. This is what we shall show, with God’s help, a little further on in the clearest and most evident manner, when we censure the fifth capital assertion of Molina.

IV. Also the ancient Saint Prosper of Aquitaine, in his Epistola ad Rufinum, when explaining how every good action proceeds from the grace of God, contrary to what Pelagius maintained, speaks thus: “Who doubts that the free will obeys the command of him who exhorts it, when the grace of God in it produces the effect of believing and obeying? Otherwise, it would be sufficient to admonish man, and there would be no need to endow him with a new will… and so Saint Paul speaks in his Epistle to the Philippians 2:13: It is God who, by his good will, works in you both the willing and the doing. By his good will God works in them, and just as he bestows the capacity to will, he also bestows the capacity to act.” Thus, this is what Saint Prosper of Aquitaine says.⁸ Behold how strange is what Molina says — namely, by virtue of their freedom alone, with equal aids, one man believes and is converted and another is not converted. And finally, it is astonishing with what face the defenders of Molina cite Saint Anselm and Saint Prosper in their favor, when, however, these, like many others whom they cite, confirm our doctrine, as will become evident in the third part of this treatise, in which we shall respond to the arguments of our adversaries.

Chapter Four In Which the Second Capital Assertion of Molina Is Refuted

I. The first three assertions of Molina contain the same doctrine, despite their different formulations. But it has seemed fitting to us to proceed to their censure one by one, both to avoid a certain tedium on our part, and because in each one our new reconciler of free will with God’s grace explains something particular.
We consider the second assertion of Molina to be no less erroneous than the preceding one, since it comes quite close to the heresy of the Pelagians; moreover, it better explains the erroneous sense of the preceding one in what it affirms — that is, by virtue of the innate freedom of those who were saved as well as of those who were condemned — namely, that with greater aids, some were neither predestined nor saved, and others, however, with lesser aids, were predestined and saved.
All the arguments and testimonies we have presented against the first assertion refute this second assertion in a clearer and more powerful manner. Furthermore, there is a special reason why this second assertion can be refuted more vigorously, since from it it openly follows that the gift of perseverance is not a special effect of divine predestination, but is obtained by the force of free will, when it makes good use of other aids by virtue of its innate freedom. Or else, certainly, if the gift of perseverance is a special gift of divine grace and an effect of divine predestination, then it is necessary that those who have been saved received this special gift that those who have been condemned did not receive. Therefore, it is a manifest error to maintain that by virtue of their innate freedom alone some are saved, since salvation only takes place through the special gift of perseverance. But Molina insists on attributing the reason why some have not only been saved but also predestined to their innate freedom; since otherwise Molina does not understand how man can have free will, nor how the greatest goodness and justice can exist in God; and when we refute his eighth assertion, we shall show that Molina, thinking thus, errs exceedingly.
Now, however, we shall undertake our attack against Molina by focusing on the gift of perseverance. For in no way can it be said that this gift depends on the foreknowledge of the good use of free will; and much less on the good use of free will by virtue of its innate freedom. We demonstrate this as follows. Indeed, it is clear that, according to the ordinary law of God, it is possible that, two just men being considered, the more just one may sin and suddenly die, so that he would die in a state of sin, while the other, being less just, if he does not sin and also dies suddenly, would do so in a state of grace and without having made any other good use of his free will. No faithful theologian will dare to deny that this is so. Therefore we argue in the following way: Since the less just man dies suddenly in a state of grace, the reason for this effect cannot be explained by the innate freedom of his free will; and much less by his freedom alone, since he has died suddenly. Therefore, the decree of the divine will — or, to speak more properly, this decree of the divine will, namely, that the less just man should die in grace and the just man should not die in grace — depends solely on the freedom and mercy of God, since otherwise the more just man would also have made good use of his free will and would have obtained the gift of perseverance. Therefore, how does Molina dare to say that solely by virtue of their innate freedom some men, with lesser aids, have been predestined and saved, and others, with greater aids, have been neither predestined nor saved, when nonetheless Saint Paul cries out that the reason for this difference — which, as we have promised, we shall expound at length — must not be attributed to any other cause than the unfathomable depth of God’s designs? Whoever publicly preaches that some who enjoy divine contemplation have received lesser aids of grace than others who are tormented in hell will offend the pious ears of the common Christian faithful in an absolute manner.

II. Also the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 22, defined the following: “If anyone shall say that the justified man is able to persevere, without the special gift of God, in the justice received, or that with it he cannot, let him be anathema.” Behold that the Council defines that, without doubt, the just man perseveres with the special gift of God; therefore, it is erroneous and impious to explain the difference between the two men on the basis of the innate freedom of the will; and it is a pious and Catholic dogma to explain it on the basis of the gift of perseverance, which comes from the divine decree of divine predestination. But Molina persists in his fancy, in order to satisfy the minds of proud men who seek the cause or reason of divine predestination beyond the divine will; and so Molina places this cause in the foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of him who makes good use of the aids received, not through the efficacy of those aids, but by virtue of his innate freedom. This is the same as what Pelagius already said in other words, as Saint Augustine testifies in De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, bk. 1, against Pelagius and Celestius, ch. 4: “So that no one may say that we have not understood correctly what Pelagius says, or that with bad intent we present his words, giving them a meaning they do not have, hear what he says. We, says Pelagius, distinguish three categories and distribute them in a certain order. First, power; second, willing; third, being. Power resides in nature, willing in the will, and being in the effect. The first, that is, power, properly belongs to God, and he bestows it on his creature. But the two remaining ones, that is, willing and being, must be placed in man, since they have the will as their origin.”⁹ (A marginal note in manuscript M, but omitted in A, reads: Molina says they have innate freedom of will as their origin.) “Therefore, the merit of man lies in his will and in his good work; but the merit would belong not only to man, but also to God, who always contributes the aid of his grace to the possibility of the will and the work itself.” Thus speaks Pelagius, from whose remaining words, which Saint Augustine reproduces,¹⁰ we refrain, since the ones mentioned are sufficient to establish the argument we are preparing against Molina.

III. And above all, we declare that the doctrine of Molina and his followers does not entirely agree with the principal doctrine of the heresiarch Pelagius. For Pelagius, although he often avails himself of the name of grace, of the aid of grace, and of the varied and ineffable gift of celestial grace, by which God opens the eyes of our heart, as Saint Augustine expounds, nevertheless, as Saint Augustine himself says, Pelagius understands by this grace nothing other than that through which God reveals and shows what we ought to do, since he does not consider that God grants us grace and cooperates so that we act. The authors of the new concordia say that on this point they differ from Pelagius. Indeed, they do not deny the application of supernatural aids added to nature so that man may be able to act, nor do they call only nature and the natural power of the will the grace of God; rather, they add that God himself internally arouses, moves, and invites sufficiently through supernatural actions or motions, so that with these aids the free will is able, by its innate freedom, to will or to act efficiently that which is recommended to man to do. Nevertheless, if we examine attentively this manner of teaching the concordance of God’s grace with the free will of man, we shall clearly find that a doctrine of this nature is nothing other than the Pelagian error, though moderated. And certainly we show this in the following way. For Pelagius was unjust toward the grace of God, by indicating that through it God voluntarily created us, voluntarily preserves us with our powers, and even voluntarily teaches and illuminates us externally, teaching us what we must believe, do, and imitate in order to attain eternal happiness; yet Pelagius affirmed that the rest — namely, believing and acting — depends on our will. Thus, at this point Pelagius was unjust toward the grace of God, because he added that this grace alone is sufficient to grant man the capacity to act, but that, nevertheless, it is not necessary to superadd another grace so that man may act. This acting, indeed, although grace is present, he caused to depend solely on the power of the will. Molina says the same.

IV. Therefore, we now argue against the new reconcilers. For, although they assure us that a certain incitement takes place within the mind of man through God’s supernatural invitation and counsel, nevertheless they add that all these helps only grant the capacity to be able to act, since they have no other efficacy of themselves, as they come from God, except with such a dependence on the natural forces of our will that supposes it is the will itself which, by its innate freedom, causes the divine aids themselves to be efficacious. And it does not avail them to adduce the evasion they resort to when they respond that, while man wills and acts, God himself also cooperates, accompanying the free will with his aids. This response does not avail, because Molina explains such concomitance of God only in the following ways: either because God decides, from the foreknowledge of the good use of the free will, to assist through his aids the good use of the free will that man carries out by his innate freedom — and not because the aid of God, as it comes from Him, is efficacious; or because he preserves the aids themselves, after foreknowing that a man, placed in a determined order of things and circumstances, would make good use of his free will. However, Molina and his defenders never declare — on the contrary, they always deny — that there exist divine aids which proceed from the eternal design of God and through which whoever receives them always does what God wills him to do. But they add that, once God has conferred any special aids whatsoever, it can at the same time happen that, with them, man does not act, because they believe that the freedom of our will cannot be preserved in any other way; and for this reason they entirely deny that divine aids bring with themselves such an efficacy of work as can be exercised freely by man. We, on the contrary, following the ancient and true concordance of Saint Thomas and the Holy Fathers between the grace of God and the free will of man, philosophize in a very different manner. For we think that the new concordance mentioned eliminates a great part of the omnipotence of God, who made in heaven and on earth all that he willed, and in all the abysses, and in all the creatures that are in them, whether men or angels. We think it would be contrary to this omnipotence of the Creator and Savior that man, by virtue of his innate freedom, should determine that these aids, as they come from God, through his compassion for men, should not of themselves bring such efficacy with them. And this is the state of the matter, the reason, and the principal foundation of the discord that has arisen between us and certain theologians of the Society of Jesus — but everything will become much clearer in the following chapter.

Chapter Five In Which the Third Assertion of Molina Is Refuted

I. Luis de Molina speaks quite clearly in the third assertion, offering us much material to dispute against him. We consider this third assertion to be not only erroneous against the Catholic faith, but also very unjust toward the schools of theologians, and above all toward Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, as we shall demonstrate evidently from this point onward. And indeed, Molina himself not only dares to introduce into the schools a new dogma concerning the concordance of free will with the grace of God, but also attempts to condemn the ancient one as contrary to the Catholic faith; in this matter we do not know how he can excuse himself for such great rashness. But let us consider this already set forth and leave to the Holy Tribunal the pertinent judgment and just punishment.

II. We therefore argue in the first place by having recourse to the testimony of Isaiah 46:10: “My counsel shall stand and all my will shall be accomplished.” From this we deduce the following demonstration: The divine counsel and the purpose of acting of God himself possess certainty and firmness by virtue of the divine nature itself, which is entirely immutable. But God has decided from eternity that the sinner shall be converted, here and now. Therefore, everything necessary for this effect depends on the eternal counsel of God, as the first cause that operates in the most certain and infallible manner. But one of the necessary requirements for conversion is making good use of free will. Consequently, this good use depends, in the exercise of its choice, on some aid of God that is infallibly destined and sent by Him so that the free choice of man may take place. This consequence is demonstrated as follows: If such efficacy were not most certain by virtue of God’s counsel, it would follow that God’s own counsel would not be firm. And this is demonstrated because then it would depend solely on the innate freedom of the free will — which is of itself indifferent and defectible — whether the decree of God were carried out. Therefore, it is necessary to affirm that the means which God disposes for the execution of his eternal counsel and his will bring with them the most certain efficacy by virtue of the divine decree, and that this certain efficacy guarantees to the free will that it infallibly chooses the very thing which God from eternity decided that man should choose. Otherwise, how could God’s counsel be firm, if its effect with respect to actual exercise depended solely on the freedom of the will?
This is confirmed because God not only decrees through his counsel to grant, here and now, his aid to man so that he may be able to choose, but also decrees what man chooses. Therefore, God not only efficaciously delivers the sufficient aid, but also, through his assistance, efficaciously moves the free will to the choice which He decrees man shall carry out. This is confirmed by what is said in the Gospel of Saint John 15:16: “You did not choose me; I chose you.” In this passage it is clear that Christ the Lord did not wish to deny that the apostles themselves had followed him by their free will, after having been called; otherwise, they would lack a well-deserved esteem before Christ; for even the Lord himself, when making a promise, says: “You who have followed me, shall sit upon the twelve thrones.” Therefore, what else did Christ wish to say, if not what we teach in the present treatise — namely, that our good choice is an infallible effect proceeding from the choice of God? Otherwise, certainly, the choice of God would have as its object only the provision of sufficient aids so that man might be able to choose God, but the exercise of choosing would not be an infallible effect proceeding infallibly from God’s own choice.

III. And the response of Molina does not suffice — namely, that God infallibly foreknew the good use of free will by virtue of its innate freedom, and that for this reason the very choice of the sinner’s conversion possesses infallibility. First of all, certainly, because the choice of conversion that presupposes foreknowledge of the good use of free will means ratifying rather than choosing to make good use of the free will. Indeed, according to Molina, it will never properly be verified that the divine choice has as its proper object and effect the good use itself; rather, it will only be verified that this good use is the object of divine foreknowledge, but not, however, the effect of the choice or of foreknowledge itself. For this reason we ask Molina concerning the very infallibility of divine foreknowledge: how can it be infallible before the decree of the divine will? Since, certainly, the free will, even though it is infinitely comprehended by God himself, is nevertheless always known such as it really is in itself — namely, indifferent — unless perhaps Molina intends to say that what God knows through his comprehension is different from how it is by its nature. Therefore, if the free will, even when placed in a determined order of things and circumstances, is of itself indifferent, its determination will not be infallibly knowable by God before the decree of the divine will, by which God wills that good be done, or even permits evil; otherwise, divine foreknowledge itself would not surpass the character of mere conjecture and would be fallible, since the free will could act otherwise, always remaining indifferent, even after any divine aids whatsoever have been conferred, as Molina says. We shall expand upon this point further in the refutation of Molina’s sixth assertion.

1Molina, Luis de, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione, Olyssipone 1588.

2Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 3. Migne, P.L., 44, 964–965.

3Ibid., ch. 5. Migne, P.L., 44, 968.

4Ps.-Ambrose, De vocatione omnium gentium, bk. 1, ch. 25. Migne, P.L., 52, 685.

5Saint Jerome, Commentaria in Jerem., bk. 1, ch. 26. Migne, P.L., 24, 877.

6Saint Anselm, De concordia praescientiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, q. 3, cc. 1, 3, 5. Migne, P.L., 158, 522, 524–525.

7Ibid., q. 3, c. 5. Migne, P.L., 158, 526.

8Saint Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistola ad Rufinum [reference in source].

9Saint Augustine, De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, bk. 1, ch. 4. Migne, P.L., 44, 362.

10Ibid.

Chapter Six In Which the Third Assertion of Molina Is Condemned by the Testimony of Saint Augustine

I. No one versed in the doctrine of the Holy Father Augustine will doubt that the third assertion of Molina, like many others, is contrary to his doctrine. Nevertheless, by way of example, we shall cite some testimonies of Saint Augustine for their public acknowledgement — not only on account of the authority of so recognized a doctor, who in matters of grace and predestination ought to be esteemed more highly than Molina and his followers esteem him, but also on account of the theological demonstrations which the most wise doctor of the Church himself clearly carries out from the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures.
Let his first testimony be from the book De praedestinatione sanctorum, chapters 10 and 11, where — commenting on the passage of Genesis 17:5, concerning what God said and promised to Abraham: “I have made you father of many peoples”; and that other passage from the Epistle to the Romans 4:16: “So that through grace his promise might be firm for all the descendants” — he says the following: “He did not make the promise on account of the power of our will, but on account of his predestination. For he promised that it would be He who would act, and not men. For although men do all the good that is required to honor God, it is He himself who makes them do what he prescribes, and it is not they who make Him do what he promised. Otherwise, the fulfillment of God’s promise would depend on the power of men, and not on God, and what the Lord promised would come about through the imitation of Abraham that the peoples themselves would carry out.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.¹ Therefore, if the third assertion of Molina is true — namely, that the aid of God does not possess efficacy by virtue of God himself and of the divine motion — one evidently arrives at the absurdity that Saint Augustine infers: that is, the promise of God made to Abraham would not have been efficaciously fulfilled by God himself, but by the peoples and men, who would have made good use of the aids granted to them, since they would have wished to believe through their innate freedom with such aids — aids which, of themselves, even as coming from God himself, would have been indifferent and would not have carried with them efficacy for achieving conversion. From this it would further follow that the statement of the Apostle Saint Paul in the Epistle to the Romans 4:16 — that is, “so that through grace his promise might be firm for all the descendants” — would be false; that is, it would not be true that the promise made to Abraham that the peoples to come would be his children through faith in Christ, who was the son of Abraham, would have firmness and infallibility by virtue of the grace of God itself.
However, Molina says that the grace of God possesses no efficacy of itself, as it comes from Him, because otherwise, he thinks, free will would be destroyed; and for this reason he maintains that the free will of men makes use of the aids of God’s grace to believe only through their innate freedom. Thus, according to Molina, one must say that the promise of God was firm by virtue of the free will of men, which is of itself weak and indifferent as to believing or not believing, but by itself is determined to believe, since the grace of God itself does not determine it through its gratuitous aids. But what Saint Paul says can only be understood in the name of grace; Molina cannot deny this. Nevertheless, Molina says that since God foreknew that those men, by their innate freedom, would make good use of his aids, the promise of God was therefore firm and infallible thanks to his foreknowledge. We judge this very absurd, not to say blasphemous. First, because, according to Molina, God does not foreknow this good use by virtue of his grace, since, as Molina says, it is not in God’s power to know anything other than what he knows. Therefore, if the promise is firm only by virtue of divine foreknowledge, then it is not firm by virtue of grace. But then, as we shall show in the refutation of his sixth assertion, God’s own foreknowledge is not entirely firm and infallible, since, although it is not in God’s power to foreknow anything other than what he knows, nevertheless Molina admits, as we have already mentioned, that the power of the free will possesses the capacity to act differently, and therefore it is possible that God might not know what he foreknows.

II. Furthermore, what prudent and truthful man promises something that depends only on a foreign power? For a prudent man can promise a friend that with the greatest care and diligence he will concern himself with seeing that another man wishes to do what he himself desires for the benefit of this friend; however, he will not promise what he himself does not have the power to accomplish. For example, if John desires that Peter be granted a benefice by the bishop, being prudent, John will never promise Peter that the bishop will grant him the benefice, but will promise him that he will intercede with the bishop and persuade him to grant it. Even if John knew from the bishop himself his intention to grant the benefice to Peter, he would not promise him that the bishop will grant it, but at most would state and affirm that this will be the case — though under oath, he could not recklessly proclaim it will be so, because the bishop might change his mind.

III. Therefore, for the sake of Jesus Christ, let the censors of this cause pay attention and judge for the honor of God. For it does not accord with the doctrine of Molina that God with his oath promised Abraham that the peoples descended from him would be blessed. Certainly, God could have made his promise in the following manner: “I promise you, Abraham, that I shall send suitable preachers to preach to your people, so that they may be called to the faith; I also promise to send them interior and supernatural aids that sufficiently invite them to the faith, so that if they wish to make use of them, they may believe and be blessed in your people, which is that of Christ.” But the truth is that God did not promise in this way; rather, absolutely and under oath, he promised that in the seed of Abraham his peoples would be blessed. Therefore, He himself would accomplish what He promised so that his peoples might attain the blessing. Otherwise, certainly, the promise of God would not be a promise, but rather a prophecy of what was to come; moreover, this prophecy would be weak, because it was not sustained by the decree of the divine will but only by the future good use, by virtue solely of innate freedom, of the free will, which is mutable. We are greatly surprised that Luis de Molina is unable to admit such an evident theological demonstration; if he admitted it, he would not so rashly state in the third assertion that it is an error to maintain that the efficacious aid possesses efficacy, as it comes from God, by virtue of the nature of the divine motion; saying this cannot be maintained with a sound faith. But we maintain the contrary — namely, that with a sound faith one cannot deny that the efficacious aid possesses efficacy, as it comes from God, by virtue of the nature of the divine motion; and this is what Saint Augustine demonstrates quite clearly.

IV. The second testimony of Saint Augustine appears in Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, bk. 1, ch. 19, where — when explaining the passage from the Gospel of Saint John 6:44: “No one can come to me unless the Father who has sent me draws him” — he notes that the Lord does not say “unless my Father guides him,” for one is guided who is willing, but says “draws him,” since one is drawn even who is unwilling. Thus Saint Augustine shows that our will does not precede the motion of God, but that the reverse is the case. Thus speaks Saint Augustine.² But if the divine motion itself, as it comes from God, does not make man wish to come to Christ, then the motion and the aid of God itself will be determined by the free will, while it makes good use of this aid, and will thus become efficacious; and therefore, the man who comes to Christ will not be efficaciously drawn by the Father himself, but rather, by virtue of his free will, will draw the grace of God toward himself in order to attain to believing in Christ. But Saint Augustine says in the same place: “Therefore, through wondrous means man is drawn to wish to believe by him who has known within the heart itself, and who works not so that those who do not wish to believe may believe, but so that those who formerly did not wish may wish to believe.” Behold how Saint Augustine attributes to the wondrous divine manner of working the fact that the man who formerly did not wish to believe now wishes to believe.

Chapter Seven In Which the Third Assertion of Molina Is Refuted by Other Testimonies

I. The third testimony of Saint Augustine is found in his Enchiridion, ch. 32, in which — explaining the Epistle to the Romans 9:16: “It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy” — he poses the following question: “How does the Apostle Saint Paul say that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, when, without doubt, if a man is of an age to use reason, he will not be able to believe or to act unless he wills it… and he will not have run except by his own will?” And Saint Augustine responds, first refuting a certain false solution — namely, when it is said that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, it is as if it were said that the will of man alone does not suffice unless it also receives the mercy of God, since both are necessary. To this Saint Augustine replies: “Why is it not correctly said the other way round — that is, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of the will of him who wills and of him who runs, since mercy alone does not suffice?” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.³ Certainly, Molina imagines that with these words Saint Augustine wishes to say that God is a partial cause and concurs partially with the free will toward the effect of conversion. But let us hear what Saint Augustine concludes there. Horrified at the assertion that it is not only of God who shows mercy but also of the desire of man, and that thus conversion to God is produced through both of them, Saint Augustine finally concludes by saying: “For this reason, it was correctly said that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy — thus attributing everything to Him, since He prepares the good will of man to cooperate and also assists it after it has been prepared.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine. Behold how Saint Augustine attributes everything to God, including the very good use of the aid, which he calls “good will”; moreover, God prepares it so that it may cooperate, and assists it after it has been prepared. But if the divine aid were not efficacious as it proceeds from the merciful God, Saint Augustine would not attribute the entire conversion of man to God, but in part to God and in part to the free will, which only by its innate freedom would wish to make good use of the aid of God — an aid that would be indifferent, as Molina says, but determinable only by the innate freedom of man.
We, however, subordinate the free will — without detriment to its freedom, but rather with its perfection — to the efficacious grace of God, in such a way that, by necessity of consequence and not by necessity of the consequent, it freely performs and wills what God, through his absolute freedom, decrees that man performs, here and now.

II. Saint Augustine confirms this same point in De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 20, where he says: “The will of any man is so much in the power of God that He, as much as He wills, turns it in whatever direction He wills.”⁴ Likewise, in De correptione et gratia, ch. 14, he says: “The will of man cannot prevent God from doing what He wills, because He does what He wills even with the very wills of men.”⁵ As a confirmation of this, he adduces the First Book of Kings 10:26: “And there went with him the warriors whose hearts God had touched.”
Furthermore, in De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 16, Saint Augustine says: “Indeed, it is certain that, if we will it, we obey the commandments; but since God prepares our will, we must ask him that we will to the extent that it is sufficient to act by willing. It is certain that we will when we will; but He makes us will the good; of this it is said in Proverbs 8:35: ‘God prepares the will.’ It is also said in Psalms 36:23: ‘God will direct the steps of man, and he shall will his way.’ Likewise, it is said in the Epistle to the Philippians 2:13: ‘It is God who makes you will.’ It is certain that we act when we act; but He makes us act, providing most efficacious forces to our will, since in Ezekiel 36:27 he said: ‘I will cause you to walk in my grace and to observe and fulfill my precepts.’” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.⁶ Can one speak more clearly against the third assertion of Molina? We ask that attention be paid to the following words: “He makes us act, providing most efficacious forces to our will.” And Saint Augustine says many other things in the same place, and all of them prove that the aid of God is most efficacious, as it comes from Him, for preparing a good will; and not only does He provide an aid by which man, if he willed, could act, but through this aid man actually does act.
We could present many more testimonies of Saint Augustine as confirmation of our doctrine, but those whom the testimonies we have presented do not satisfy would not be convinced by more testimonies either, as was said at the Council of Orange, can. 20.

III. That which our adversaries allege is without force — namely, that the authority of Saint Augustine does not suffice to condemn his third assertion as erroneous — since, as we have already said, we cite Saint Augustine not only for his authority, but because his statements are theological demonstrations. Indeed, we cite not only Saint Augustine, but also other Fathers, when we refute the first and second assertions. Moreover, we intend to offer further on the testimonies of other Fathers, since in so grave a matter the authority of so many Fathers must count for the highest importance. Nevertheless, if our adversaries do not understand how free will is not destroyed by such great efficacy, let them believe and humble themselves, and let them not attempt to deny, in favor of free will, the perfection of the divine will — by whose decree it is necessary that all good works take place, not only as to the substance of the effect, but also as to the manner in which God wills the effect to come about according to the condition of the secondary cause. Therefore, since man by his free will is the secondary cause of his own deliberation and choice, the divine deliberation confers such gratuitous aid upon the man whom God wills to be converted, so that through it he is converted efficaciously. Concerning grace, Saint Augustine says in De praedestinatione sanctorum: “This grace remains hidden. But who doubts that it exists? Therefore, no hardened heart rejects this grace, which divine generosity secretly assigns to human hearts; indeed, God delivers it to man so that He may first remove the hardness of his heart. Therefore, when the Father speaks internally, teaching the way toward the Son, He removes the heart of stone and replaces it with a heart of flesh, as the prophet promised in preaching, in Ezekiel 11:19. Thus, indeed, He produces the children of the promise and the instruments of mercy which He prepared for glory.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine,⁷ with whose doctrine the third assertion of Molina — who denies that any divine aid is efficacious of itself, as it comes from God — is in no way compatible; on this we shall expand further in the refutation of the fourth assertion and in the responses to the arguments of Molina.
Finally, all the testimonies we offered against the first and second assertions also contradict the third assertion of Molina.

IV. Furthermore, Saint Fulgentius, in De incarnatione et gratia Christi, ch. 17, speaks thus: “God granted the peoples repentance so that they might attain eternal life (Acts of the Apostles 11:18), when our Savior converted the human will through the command of his own voice.” And a little further on he says: “Nevertheless, this is evident, because in order to begin to believe in God, man receives from Him repentance for eternal life… Then, having provided man with repentance, God transforms his will. Therefore, if anyone says that wishing to believe depends on me and that the grace of God only helps, let him change the order of what was said… and let him not maintain that what comes later happens first and what comes first happens afterward. For he errs who places the grace of God behind his will, since there could be no good works if the grace of God were not present. Therefore, it should not be said that wishing to believe depends on me and that the grace of God only helps, but rather that it is proper to the grace of God to help.” Thus speaks Saint Fulgentius.⁸
But since Molina and his followers respond that they do not deny that the help of grace is necessary for man to believe, nor do they deny that, when man believes, such aid is simultaneously present with the very act of believing, Saint Fulgentius also refutes this same evasion: “Then, truly and rightly, it is proper to man to wish to believe at this moment — namely, when God begins to help with prior grace.” Thus speaks Saint Fulgentius. Behold how Saint Fulgentius affirms that the wish to believe is an effect of prior grace, even though this grace is given at the same time as the willing. But Molina postpones the efficacy of the aid to the freedom of the will; for the only efficacy he acknowledges is that which the free will, by virtue solely of its freedom, produces by making the aid become efficacious.
Against this view, at the end of ch. 17, Saint Fulgentius says: “God prepares and directs the will through which we begin to wish to believe, and thus Solomon said: ‘God prepares the will’ (Proverbs 8:35); and David sang: ‘The Lord will direct the steps of man, and he shall will his way.’” Likewise, in ch. 19 — commenting on the Epistle to the Romans 6:22: “But now, having been freed from sin” — Saint Fulgentius speaks thus: “But this freedom, which arises not from human free will but from the gratuitous mercy of God, causes the good will to arise.” And a little afterward he says: “For just as the formation of the divine work precedes in carnal birth every will of the man who is born, so also it happens in spiritual birth.” Thus speaks Saint Fulgentius. Therefore, it is necessary to affirm that, through divine aid, the motion of God possesses efficacy for the free will, when it chooses to believe or to love God.

Chapter Eight In Which the Third Assertion of Molina Is Condemned by Conciliar Canons

I. Up to now we have wielded against Molina the testimonies and theological demonstrations of the Holy Fathers. But now we shall again reprove the three already-mentioned assertions of Molina, and especially the third, by having recourse to the decrees of the sacred councils. And in order to accomplish more efficaciously, with the help of God, what we have promised, we consider that attention must be paid to what occurred in Gaul in the time of Saint Augustine.
Saint Prosper recounts in his Epistola ad Augustinum de reliquiis pelagianae haereseos in Gallia subolescentibus that in Gaul certain men, on account of their good position and their authority, corrupted the people, being infected by the Pelagian heresy, and opposed the doctrine of Saint Augustine — and against them he requests the help of Saint Augustine himself. And among other things Saint Prosper says: “Because the errors derived from the Pelagian doctrine are not nourished by a moderate virulence, if the principle of salvation is erroneously placed in man; if the human will is impiously placed before the divine will, in such a way that he who wishes to believe is helped by God, though not because he is helped will he wish to believe; if some impious person erroneously believes that the reception of the good depends on himself and not on the supreme good; if anyone believes he will please God on account of something that God himself has not donated to him.” And a little afterward he says: “Thus, all of them defend the same doctrine, according to which men receive the design and the predestination of God according to his foreknowledge; and for this reason God makes some to be vessels for honor and others vessels for dishonor, because He foresees the end of each one and foreknows what the will and the action of each one will be under the help of grace.” Thus speaks Saint Prosper.⁹
Who does not already see that Molina falls into the same quagmire in which the Gallic bishops sank — bishops whom Saint Prosper considered corrupted by errors derived from the Pelagian heresy, and against whom he asked Saint Augustine not to delay in destroying their error with new writings?
We also beg, for the sake of Jesus Christ our Savior, that those who are going to judge this writing read attentively the letter of Saint Prosper and that of Bishop Hilary of Arles concerning the errors derived from the Pelagian heresy, by which letters they will ascertain that the doctrine of Molina is indebted to the Pelagian heresy, since it differs little or nothing from the doctrine of those who were corrupted by errors derived from that heresy. Against them, Saint Augustine responded to Hilary and to Saint Prosper with two books, De praedestinatione sanctorum and De dono perseverantiae — certainly brief, but filled with more erudition than all the others that deal with the same subject. The truth is that the adversaries of the grace of God were so strengthened that, after Saint Augustine’s death, they persecuted Saint Prosper and Hilary without rest. They therefore had to flee to the Apostolic See, on whose throne sat Saint Celestine I, who, having been informed of the entire matter by Saint Prosper and Hilary, sent letters to the bishops of Gaul, defending Saint Augustine and proclaiming his doctrine, and severely condemned his detractors, furthermore ordering the bishops to silence them.¹⁰
But not even so did they rest, because, after the death of Saint Celestine I, the adversaries of the grace of God did not acknowledge the books that the pontiff had approved — namely, De correptione et gratia and De praedestinatione sanctorum — since they alleged that the pontiff himself had not expressly referred to these books by their titles, but that his praise of Saint Augustine, according to them, would have been owed to the merit of his earlier writings. This is denounced by Saint Prosper himself in Responsiones contra Collatorem, bk. 4, ch. 21.

II. But subsequently, Saint Leo I — who was the third Pope to succeed Saint Celestine I — in the face of the contumacious perseverance of the adversaries of the grace of God, convoked the Council of Orange, in which the Catholic doctrine of Saint Augustine on grace and free will was renewed and confirmed by means of canons drawn expressly from his books, which not only condemn the ancient Pelagian heresy but also the heresies subsequently influenced by it, in such a way that there is no longer any room for the new concordia of Molina. We shall therefore present the most important canons of this council, so that they may be read attentively.
The sacred council, in its canon [I], defines the following: “If anyone maintains that, in order to be cleansed from sin, our will must await God, and yet maintains that the desire to wish to be cleansed from sin does not depend on the infusion and the operation of the Holy Spirit in us, he denies what the Holy Spirit himself says through Solomon: ‘God prepares the will’; and the Apostle Saint Paul also healthfully preaches: ‘It is God who, by his good will, makes you will and act.’”¹¹ But in truth, if it is not the case that the efficacious aid possesses efficacy, as it comes from God, by virtue of the nature of the divine motion, then it is God who must wait — whatever aid may have been conferred — for the will of man to wish to be cleansed; and thus the divine aid would receive its efficacy from the human will, and not from the Holy Spirit, even though it is the latter who efficaciously prepares the will and causes man to will and to act — and the council expressly condemns the contrary.
And the frequent response of our adversaries is without substance — namely, that the council condemns the Pelagians for asserting that the free will wishes to be cleansed from sin through its own forces before receiving any supernatural aid of grace. We maintain that this response is without substance. First, certainly, because, although the oldest Pelagians thought thus, nevertheless those on whose account Saint Leo I convoked the Council of Orange already admitted that the aid of the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary, as is clear from the cited letters of Saint Prosper and Hilary. But they were wrong, because they maintained that such aid of grace depends on the free consent of the human will, which the Holy Spirit through his motion cannot produce; rather, He must wait for the human will at least to wish to be cleansed. Furthermore, although this definition of the council was directed against the Pelagians, it nevertheless not only destroys the ancient error, but also builds up the doctrine of the faith that must be defended, when it affirms that the efficacy of preparatory grace takes place by virtue of the Holy Spirit, in such a way that it does not depend on the human will, but rather that the Holy Spirit himself, vigorously and in an excellent manner, causes the human will to freely wish to be cleansed. And so it is God who works in us the very willing. Otherwise, certainly, God would begin and man, through his free will, would complete his justification. Therefore, the sacred council not only condemns the ancient error, but also defines what Catholics must think about the grace of God, so that henceforth the errors derived from the heresy of Pelagius may disappear. We have indeed not only offered the refutation of the ancient error, but also the defense of efficacious grace, since he who glories shall glory in the Lord, but not in something whose cause is not the efficacious grace of God.
Furthermore, canon five confirms the aforementioned doctrine, making reference to the following passage from the Epistle to the Philippians 1:29: “It has been granted to you by Christ not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him.” Therefore, God has granted through the merits of Christ the capacity to believe; and He not only provides an aid that enables man, if he wills, to be able to believe, but also confers the very desire to wish to believe. Likewise, it is said in the Epistle to the Ephesians 2:8: “By grace you will be saved through faith — not because of you, but because of God.” But in contrast, the new reconcilers affirm that, even if the sufficient aid be as great or as small as one may wish, nevertheless the execution of the act of believing and of repenting must be attributed to the natural forces of the will, since by virtue of its innate freedom — and not by virtue of the efficacy of an aid that distinguishes one man from another — one is converted and another is not converted, as Molina maintains.
Furthermore, canon six defines the following: “If anyone says that we receive the divine mercy when, without the grace of God, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, watch, study, ask, seek, or pursue, and does not admit that in order to believe or to will or to be able to carry out all the foregoing as is necessary, we must receive the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, or else subordinates the help of grace to human humility and obedience, without admitting that humility and obedience are a gift of grace itself, he thus opposes the Apostle Saint Paul, when he says: ‘What do you have that you have not received?’ And also when he says: ‘By the grace of God I am what I am.’” This is what was maintained at the council.¹²
The doctrine of the first part of this canon does not contradict Molina and his followers, because they do not deny that the aid of prevenient grace is necessary for man to be able to carry out all that is mentioned in the first part of the canon. But we argue against Molina on the basis of the second part of the canon. Indeed, attention must be paid to what the council defines — that is, all these works, if they are to be done as is necessary, are accomplished through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. However, if this inspiration depended on the obedience and consent of the human will, then it would not be efficacious of itself, but would receive its efficacy from the innate freedom of man; for this reason, man would have something that he had not received from the grace of God — namely, the efficacious consent, which would depend on him by his innate freedom, since such aid would not be efficacious as it comes from God. And therefore, Molina, in attempting to make men free, makes them proud and leads them to the abyss, hurling them into hell together with Satan, since he subordinates the help of grace to human obedience.
Furthermore, in canon seven it is said: “The Holy Spirit grants to all excellence in the act of consenting and believing in the truth.” Therefore, the very act of believing is owed, efficaciously and excellently, to the Holy Spirit. And in canon eight the sentence found in the Gospel of Saint John 6:44 is introduced: “No one can come to me unless the Father who has sent me draws him.” And also this passage from the Apostle Saint Paul: “No one can call upon the Lord Jesus unless he does so in the Holy Spirit.”
There are many other canons of the same council that condemn the doctrine of Molina, especially canon twenty, which says: “In man many good things come about that man does not produce; but man does no good thing that God has not disposed.”
The solution of Molina and his defenders must not be accepted — namely, that God produces the good works that man does, because He confers the sufficient aid, in such a way that, if man uses it, He then coadjuvates. We maintain that this solution is contrary to the canons of the council, since, according to this solution, God subordinates himself to the will of man and does not work efficaciously so that we wish to be cleansed. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain that this aid is efficacious of itself, as it comes from God. On the other hand, certainly, although Molina and his defenders do not adhere to the Pelagian error in its strict formulation, nevertheless they defend the same Pelagian error, but formulating it in a more moderate manner, even while they also eliminate the efficacious virtue of divine grace and falsely pretend to exalt free will beyond what is fitting. We, on the contrary, strive to keep the Christian people within the ancient doctrine, since we suppress nothing whatsoever of the virtue and dignity of divine grace, and we defend and affirm the freedom of man — but within its limits, since we subordinate it to divine grace, which operates vigorously and in an excellent manner. For it is not proper to the nature of the human free will to determine first, here and now, the action itself; rather, this is proper to God, since He is the first to decide, for no creature by itself decides anything that God has not decided shall come about in the manner in which it actually comes about. For God works all things according to the design of his will, reaches mightily from one end of the world to the other, and governs the universe in an excellent manner. And as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, the divine will operates efficaciously not only as to the substance of the act, but also as to every specific and singular mode of any effect.

III. Furthermore, in the Council of Cologne, in its Enchiridion christianae institutionis, in the treatise on the sacrament of penance, folio 191, how false the concordia of Molina is, is demonstrated. For here the Fathers of the council expressly distinguish two prior or prevenient graces: “One, through which God prevents the sinner so that he may rise and abandon sin; another, through which the sinner himself rises and recovers his strength, after adhering to the design of God who prevents our will.” These are the words of the council. And it was also said: “Through both graces God prevents our will, but when He provides the first He acts alone, since with respect to the other, our will, following God, cooperates with it through its desire or approval, thus receiving the forgiveness of sins.” And on folio 195 it is said again: “Therefore, although our will has been anticipated and instructed in good desire by the celestial physician — that is, God — it cannot assent without his grace; and yet, who does not see that this assent depends on our will? But moreover, to wish to be cleansed, to wish to repent, to wish to receive the forgiveness of sins, does not depend solely on our will, but God works all of this together with us, transforming our malevolent will into a benevolent one and causing it in this way to adhere to his will. Hence God transforms our will and acts in us in such a way as to cause us to will.” Here end the words of the council.¹³
Who does not see that from the aforementioned doctrine there follows the refutation of what Molina maintains and the confirmation of our doctrine? Certainly, although Molina considers the grace granted before our justification to be prevenient — as in truth it is — nevertheless he denies that the adjuvant grace at the moment of the conversion of our will toward God is prevenient, but calls it only “concomitant”; for he thinks that if this grace were to prevent our will, the freedom of our free will would be destroyed. The Fathers of the council did not think thus, since they ruled that both are prevenient. Thus, the Fathers of the Council of Cologne considered prevenient the grace of the actual aid that man receives while being justified. Indeed, the council stated: “Through both graces God prevents our will, but when He provides the first He acts alone, since with respect to the other, our will, following God, cooperates with it through its desire or approval.” Surely the Fathers of the council were influenced by Epistle 106 of Saint Augustine to Boniface,¹⁴ (in reality it is to Paulinus) in which Saint Augustine affirms that the human will is always a follower of divine grace, and not prior to it, in good works and in actions suited to attaining salvation.¹⁵ But our adversaries vehemently maintain that the aid of actual grace that helps man at the moment of his justification is only coadjuvant and concomitant, but not prevenient, and does not of itself move efficaciously; rather, it receives its efficacy from the free will itself, because, as it comes from God, it is always indifferent — in such a way that they believe it can be verified that a man, having received such aid, is not converted, and also that it is possible that a man — having received a greater aid than the one received by another man who in fact is converted — may not be converted and may be condemned.

IV. Finally, to connect the modern views with the ancient ones, we can note that in the Council of Petrikau celebrated in the kingdom of Poland in the year of the Lord 1551, the presence of actual prevenient grace at the moment of justification is clearly defended with the following words: “Let us take a lukewarm believer; for as soon as the Holy Spirit suddenly visits him, he becomes fervent and begins to burn with devotion to exercise himself in good works. Therefore, in this man something has been modified, since he begins to be what before the Holy Spirit penetrated him he could not be.” And a little afterward it is said that this grace is always prior, since the cause is always prior to the effect, and God is always prior to all effects. Behold how the council declares that the intrinsic aid, through the Holy Spirit, which penetrates the free will of man, is prior, and through it man begins to burn with devotion.
Up to this point we have already spoken sufficiently against the third assertion of Molina, above all because, in the refutation of his fourth assertion, we shall condemn this third assertion with further arguments.

Chapter Nine In Which the Refutation of the Fourth Assertion of Molina Begins

I. Since Molina denies in his third assertion that there is an efficacious aid that, as it comes from God, possesses efficacy by virtue of the nature of the divine motion, and on the other hand knows the common distinction that theologians establish, dividing the aid of actual grace into sufficient and efficacious, he therefore, in order not to appear to depart entirely from the common manner of speaking of theologians, invents a new distinction in his Concordia, on page 232, in which he says the following: “We take the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious from the effect, which, in turn, according to our doctrine, depends on the freedom of the will.” In his book Molina affirms this and many other things that follow.
First of all we note that there is no aid of God that does not result in being efficacious for producing a certain effect, and so God sends his aid so that, by his absolute will and his predefinition, the effect that God decrees shall come about does indeed come about. We ground our doctrine in Psalms 113 and 134: “He did in heaven and on earth all that he willed.” And Saint Augustine confirms this point in his Enchiridion, ch. 95, when he says: “Otherwise, how would God be omnipotent, if something that He wished to do He had not done?… And it would be more unworthy that God, being omnipotent, had not done what He willed because the will of man had prevented Him… And thus the very beginning of the confession of our faith is endangered, by which we confess that we believe in God the Father Almighty.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine¹⁶ in chapters 95 and 96.
Also Saint Thomas, in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 6 — explaining Psalm 113: “He did in heaven and on earth all that he willed” — draws an absolute conclusion when he says: “Because it is necessary that the will of God be always fulfilled.” Furthermore, he thought that this conclusion could also be demonstrated by means of natural reason. Thus, in the cited place, in the solution to the first argument, he explains — by having recourse to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers — the verse from the First Epistle to Timothy 2:4: “He wills all men to be saved”; and he affirms that if all men were saved, this testimony could not be explained by the absolute will of God. However, if an appropriate number of men were saved, then this testimony could well be explained by his absolute will, because what Saint Paul means is that all those who are saved are saved by the will of God, as Saint Augustine explains in De praedestinatione sanctorum, bk. 1, ch. 8, and in other places. Similarly, if the number of those who are saved depended on “each kind and not on each individual of the kinds,” then the testimony of Saint Paul would also be explained by the absolute will of God. But on the other hand, if, as we said, all men were saved, then in that case the will of God could not be taken in an absolute sense; since whatever God simply does not will to happen does not happen. All this is accepted by the common school of theologians. And from this it necessarily follows that every aid of God results in being efficacious for producing a certain effect; and so that this certain effect may be produced, God sends his aid by his absolute will; and thus the passage of Isaiah 46:10 is verified: “My counsel shall stand and I will accomplish all my will.” This passage harmonizes with Isaiah 55:11: “So shall my word that goes forth from my mouth be: it shall not return to me empty, but it shall accomplish all that I willed, and it shall prosper in all those things for which I sent it.”
Therefore, since theologians distinguish a twofold aid of actual grace — namely, sufficient aid and efficacious aid — they admit the aforementioned foundation. Certainly, it is necessary that sufficient aid also be efficacious in relation to some effect, even if it is not so in relation to another effect, with respect to which, by its nature, it is of a lower order than the aid necessary for such an effect to follow. For example, the Apostle Saint Paul says in the Epistle to the Romans 2:4–5: “The goodness of God leads you to repentance; yet by your hardness, your impenitent heart stores up wrath against you.” In the explanation of this testimony no one denies that the goodness of God interiorly urges and invites the sinner to repentance. Behold, therefore, the effect of the prevenient aid — namely, a certain passive inspiration that is produced in the mind of man. For the rest, this aid alone is not of itself sufficient, without another aid of actual grace, for man to dispose himself to repent. But, nevertheless, it is said to be sufficient for man to be able to be converted, and also for him to be obligated, by the invitation of God, to the act of conversion — not because with this aid alone conversion must take place, but because, unless man hinders it, he will receive another efficacious aid for conversion.

II. With respect to this question, Molina and his followers commit a serious paralogism, since they believe it is necessary that man first possess an aid with which, once it has been conferred, he can be actually converted, so that he may be verified to be obligated to be converted. And for this reason Molina, in the third and fourth assertions, does not attribute to any divine aid of itself, as it comes from God, the efficacy of conversion, but only from the effect — insofar as, by making use of this aid, a man is converted thanks to his freedom, although, nevertheless, with the same aid and the same freedom, another man is not converted. And consequently, Molina affirms that the efficacy of the prevenient and adjuvant aids, which are given to man as provisions for the journey according to the ordinary law, depends on the free consent and cooperation of our free will with them. Thus, as is clear from the fourth assertion itself, Molina explains the efficacy of the coadjuvant aid at the moment of the sinner’s conversion by the aid that precedes in time, but attributes the entire cause of this efficacy only to the free will. On this point we shall speak more extensively when we present our solutions against the arguments of Molina, and we shall show how egregiously he errs in his discourse by considering the aid to be sufficient because with this aid alone — once the consent of the free will has taken place by virtue of its innate freedom — the conversion of the sinner and the final disposition for the infusion of grace come about.
Now, however, with respect to his fourth assertion, we shall show that the distinction of the actual aid of grace must be understood differently from the way Molina understands it, and that such a distinction is necessary in the sense in which we, together with the common school of theologians, understand it. Molina, Francisco Suárez, and their followers depart from this distinction to the greatest degree, since they consider that if an aid is efficacious of itself, as it proceeds from God, then free will is destroyed; and concluding, just like the Lutherans, that this consequence is correct, they decide to deny its antecedent, thus aligning themselves with the Pelagians.

III. But we deny such a consequence against the Lutherans and, against the Pelagians, attribute to the grace of God its due efficacy, insofar as it proceeds from the eternal decree of the divine will.
In the first place, we shall demonstrate our assertion following Saint Thomas, for in the Summa Theologiae, I–II, q. 111, a. 3, he says that a single effect of grace takes place so that man may efficaciously perform the good he desires.
In the second place, we can have recourse to the Sacred Scriptures, since there are several testimonies in which both the sufficient aid and the efficacious aid are mentioned — the aid by which God wills that man be efficaciously converted. Concerning the first kind of aids, it is said in Proverbs 1:24–26: “Since I called you and you rejected me, I extended my hand and there was no one who paid attention; I also will laugh when you perish.” But in truth, if such a calling and the stretching out of the divine hand were not sufficient for those men to be able to consent with God, they would not be justly rebuked, nor would God threaten them with punishment on account of their ingratitude for not having been converted after having received such benefits. Likewise, it is said in the Epistle to the Romans 2:4–5: “Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? Yet by your hardness, your heart stores up wrath against you for the day of wrath and of the revelation of the just judgment of God.” Behold that the judgment of God will act justly against him who, despite having been urged by the goodness of God, did not wish to convert to God through repentance. Therefore, this aid is sufficient for someone to be obligated to repent, because through such aid he is invited to that which is possible through the grace of God. And in a similar way it is said in the Gospel of Saint Matthew 23:37: “How many times I wished to gather your children under my protection, and they did not wish it.” The same is said in the Gospel of Saint John 15:22: “If I had not come and had not spoken to them, they would have no sin; now, however, they have no excuse for their sin.” And many other testimonies can be adduced about such aids, which are sufficient to oblige men to believe or to repent. However, once such aids have been conferred, men often do not believe nor do they repent, and for this reason it is said in Acts of the Apostles 7:51: “You always resist the Holy Spirit.”
The difference then between our position and that of Molina and his defenders is that the latter think that sufficient aids do not need, for the conversion of the sinner, another aid — namely, the efficacious aid of itself, as it comes from God; in this way, according to Molina, the sufficient aid would only become efficacious through the innate freedom of the free will that made good use of this aid. But we do not attribute such sufficiency to these aids; rather, on our part, we maintain that another aid is needed that of itself, as it comes from God, is efficacious for conversion, since no hardened heart rejects such an aid, as Saint Augustine says in De praedestinatione sanctorum, bk. 1, ch. 8. Furthermore, the sufficiency of the first mentioned aid consists in the fact that, through this aid, man is sufficiently affected and invited to that which is possible according to the ordinary law of God — namely, to will and to act by virtue of his grace; but man himself can, through his innate freedom, reject that which is offered to him as possible. And in this consists the cause of sin and of resistance to the Holy Spirit. And it is not necessary, as our adversaries think, that man should first have received an aid such that, once conferred, without needing to receive another aid, it can be verified that man believes or is converted through his repentance. For once the efficacious aid is conferred, no hardened heart rejects it, and thus in the Gospel of Saint John 6, the Lord says: “Everyone who hears and learns from the Father, comes to me.” And in the same place: “All that the Father gives me will come to me.” And also: “No one can come to me unless the Father who has sent me draws him.”
Therefore, according to our doctrine, which we consider Catholic, it will never be verified that he who receives the efficacious aid does not come to Christ, nor that anyone comes without having this aid; although it will always be verified that all who are converted are converted freely and through their own choice, and it is also possible that they not be converted, speaking in an absolute manner. However, it is not composible that, once the efficacious aid has been received, one is not converted; otherwise, what the Lord says would not be verified: “All that the Father gives me comes to me”; nor would the other testimonies that we have offered to refute the three first assertions of Molina be verified — he who thinks that it belongs solely to the freedom of man to make divine aids efficacious or inefficacious, because otherwise, as he often says, he would not understand how human freedom is not destroyed. It will not be difficult for us to answer his ignorance — so that he may not appear to be the only wise man — when we refute his fifth assertion. Nevertheless, in the interim we shall continue defending our position, demonstrating the other part of the distinction, as we understand it, by means of various testimonies.

IV. Saint Cyril, in De adoratione et cultu in spiritu et veritate — which is a dialogue with Palladius — toward the middle of the book, narrating the story that appears in Genesis, ch. 19, of how Lot received the angels in a sign of hospitality and how the angels took the hand of Lot and of his wife and daughters, and explaining mystically this taking of hands, says: “For you, Palladius, this must be a very manifest proof that God, the Savior of all men, not only stimulates us with words and exhortations, which He causes to penetrate our minds so that we may turn away from sin, but also shows toward us such great goodness that He supports us with his efficacious help, as it is written: ‘You took my right hand and conducted me in your counsel.’ For since the nature of man is not very noble, nor sufficiently apt to be able to flee from evil, therefore, while in a certain way God fights along with us, He also seems to grant us a double benefit — on the one hand, persuading us with exhortations to discover his help, and on the other hand, causing it to prevail more powerfully than the present and violent evil could prevail.” Here ends the speech of Saint Cyril.
From this testimony we call attention to the following. First, Saint Cyril, in order to explain the efficacious help, cites Psalms 72:24: “You took my right hand and conducted me in your counsel” — where we read: “and conducted me in your will.” For without doubt one can speak equally of the divine will and of the divine counsel with respect to what God does externally, since He works all things according to the design of his will. Indeed, his efficacious help does not beg its efficacy from our will; otherwise, it would not be said: “You conducted me in your will and in your counsel”; but rather, it would be verified that the will and the design of man would conduct and apply the help of God to the action that pleases God; for, according to Molina, all the help of God is indifferent, as it comes from Him, for salvation or condemnation, since it is man who determines it, by virtue solely of his innate freedom, and applies it to the work.
In the second place, we ask that attention be paid to the distinction of the twofold aid that Saint Cyril expressly offers: with the first aid, God stimulates and arouses the minds of men, through interior exhortations, so that they may turn away from sin; with the second aid, God the Savior himself shows toward men such great goodness that He supports them with his efficacious help — a help that is stronger than the first — so that they may effectively overcome sin and it may not prevail, being thereby snatched from its servitude. Certainly, one cannot speak more clearly against Molina. For Saint Cyril does not distinguish the twofold aid in just any manner, but does so in such a way that one of the aids is efficacious — not thanks to us, but thanks to God the Savior, by whose goodness He supports us with his efficacious help. Therefore, we do not produce, by virtue solely of our innate freedom, the efficacy of the divine help — whether prevenient, adjuvant, or coadjuvant — but God himself, in us and with us, works so that we may work, because He works all things according to the design of his will, so that we may be found in the praise of his glory.
But Molina says that God does not work our believing according to the design of his will, but according to the design of our will, since He would only have foreknown our choice, but would not have decided that it should come about. But we, like the Apostle Saint Paul, declare that our design and our choice are effects of the design and decree of the divine will; and by his goodness God efficaciously converts him on whom He has compassion, providing him with the special aid that no heart rejects. Otherwise, certainly, what Saint Paul says would not be verified: “So that we may be found in the praise of his glory”; because, even if God were to grant the aid without which man cannot act, nevertheless, if man determined it by virtue of his innate freedom and did not, through this aid, decide to believe, then without doubt this believing would not attain to the praise of the glory of God, because God would not have granted efficacy to the free will through his gratuitous and divine aid; rather, such an act would attain only to the praise and glory of the free will, because solely by virtue of its innate freedom — by which it would make good use of the aid — it would be converted through faith in Christ. But the Apostle Saint Paul did not think thus, when he said: “I will glory in this, but not of myself.” And also our Lord Jesus Christ teaches us the contrary, when he says in the Gospel of Saint John 15:4: “No more can the branch bear fruit of itself.” But Molina finds a way for the free will to produce the fruit of itself, since according to him the good use of the free will does not depend on the aids that man receives through the merits of Christ; rather, by his innate freedom, man brings about through that aid the consummation of the work. However, it is evident that the merits of Christ do not confer upon man this innate freedom.

V. Furthermore, in the Enchiridion christianae institutionis of the Council of Cologne, in the treatise on the sacrament of penance, folio 105, the Fathers of the council — when explaining the Epistle to the Romans 9:16: “It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs” — reflect in the following manner, saying: “With these words, Saint Paul teaches that our will is completely useless and incapable of willing the good and, as a provision for the journey, is altogether inefficacious without the grace of the merciful God.”¹⁷ With these words those most learned Fathers did not wish to deny that it is our will that wills and runs, but they teach this — namely, that the efficacy does not come from our own will, but from the grace of God. Otherwise, if our will were to make the grace of God efficacious — that is, if the grace of God were inefficacious without our will — they would not say that our will is useless and incapable of willing the good (for they speak of supernatural good), nor would they say that it is inefficacious without the grace of God.
Therefore, since Molina recognizes no efficacy in the very gratuitous aid of God, except from the effect — that is, once the sufficient aid itself has been received, it must be the will that wills, by virtue of its innate freedom, to make good use of this aid, although it could fail to do so despite having received such aid — it clearly follows that he makes the entire efficacy fall upon the nature of the free will.
Against this doctrine we could also argue in the following way, if Molina wished to deny the consequence we have just presented and say that the will itself is also not efficacious without the mentioned aid of grace, and that therefore, speaking with the greatest rigor, it should not be said that man solely by virtue of his innate freedom consents with God, when He calls and arouses him. For this reason we argue against Molina as follows: No aid of God is efficacious of itself, as it comes from Him. Then, if the free will itself is also not efficacious of itself by virtue solely of its innate freedom, we must ask Molina whether the one receives efficacy from the other. If Molina responds that grace receives its efficacy from the free will, the consequence we infer will be appropriate — when we allege that Molina reduces the efficacy of consenting with God, when He calls us, solely to the nature of the free will. However, if Molina responds that the free will receives its efficacy from the aid of God, then he will be arguing in favor of our doctrine — namely, that the aid itself, as it comes from God, is efficacious for moving vigorously and in an excellent manner the free will, not only so that it may consent, but also so that it efficaciously consents and chooses for itself the good that God commands or decides. For it would be astonishing if neither the aid of God nor the free will itself were efficacious of themselves, and neither received efficacy from the other, nor from some third thing that conferred efficacy upon them by its own virtue and motion, and yet the effect of consenting with God were efficaciously attained. Reasonably, Molina turns in every direction to escape this argument, so that he may not appear to attribute to the nature of the free will more than is just; and yet he cannot flee without his deceptions coming to light.

VI. We know that many members of the Society of Jesus, especially learned ones, detest this new concordia invented by Molina. But we shall present only the testimony of one — who, before Molina brought his discordia to public light, wrote some commentaries on the Gospel of Saint John; this is Francisco de Toledo, of the Society of Jesus, Cardinal of the Roman Church, whom we cite with all respect. This most illustrious, most reverend, and most learned man, in his commentaries on Saint John, annotation 20 — interpreting the verse: “No one can come to me unless the Father who has sent me draws him” (Saint John 6:44); and responding to the doubts raised by the question concerning the grace of God and free will — teaches the following, in these words:
“These two propositions differ greatly: ‘All that the Father gives me comes to me’; and ‘All that comes to me, the Father gives me.’ The second means that the Father gives all who come to Christ; the first means that those whom the Father gives will come to Christ. Nevertheless, it is clear that the two are very different. For he who says that the Father gives all who come does not thereby mean that all whom the Father gives come; but he who says that all whom the Father gives come to Christ, means that there is no one of those whom He gives who does not come. For this reason it is evident that what Saint John Chrysostom maintains should not be inferred — that is, that the Lord only wished to give to understand that no one can come to Christ unless helped by the aid of grace. Indeed, this is true; however, the Lord did not only wish to say this. Otherwise, he should have said the following: all who come to me, the Father gives me. And not this, but differently, he said: all that the Father gives me comes to me. Because not only does he come whom the Father gives; but if the Father gives him, he comes with all certainty, because thanks to the Father he is able to come and also actually comes.” Thus speaks Francisco de Toledo. And this is precisely what we argue against Molina — namely, the aid given to man, as it proceeds from the Father, not only confers the possibility of being able to come to Christ, but also causes man actually to come.
The second response of the Cardinal is the following: “This proposition, ‘All that the Father gives me will come to me,’ does not mean that others who have not been given by the Father will not also come, but only that all those whom the Father gives will come to Christ. If indeed others came without the Father having given them, provided all those whom the Father had given came, the following proposition would be true: ‘All that the Father gives me comes to me.’ But since in fact no one comes unless the Father gives him, the Lord therefore says a little further on: ‘No one can come to me unless the Father draws him.’” Thus speaks Francisco de Toledo. And a little further on he says: “The Lord shows perfectly that no one can come unless the Father gives him; and all to whom the Father gives will come efficaciously and infallibly. And the doubt proposed at the beginning is due to the difference between the two propositions we have mentioned.” Thus speaks Francisco de Toledo. It is manifest to what great degree his entire disquisition is opposed to the doctrine of Molina, who denies that the efficacy of the aid comes from God. If this were true, it would be verified that someone to whom the Father gives does not come to Christ.
Likewise, the cited Cardinal, in his annotation 21, maintains against the Manichaeans that the free will of man in conversion to God must not be denied because in the Sacred Scriptures it was said: “No one can come to me unless the Father who sends me draws him.” He therefore says the following: “Nevertheless, the Sacred Scriptures use this expression to explain the efficacy of the divine calling.” And a little further on he says: “This change, which is only efficacious thanks to the divine right hand, is called drawing — not because God drags men by necessity and by force, for in this way his motion would be less efficacious, but because of those things which are the only ones that man, willingly and desiringly, passionately desires, he is suddenly converted by God to their contraries.” Thus speaks Francisco de Toledo. We call attention to what he says: “This change is efficacious only thanks to the divine right hand.” Certainly, this does not accord with the doctrine of Molina, who not only does not attribute the efficacy to the divine right hand, but denies that it comes from the right hand of God, since he attributes it to the free will by virtue solely of its innate freedom; however, Saint Cyril attributes this drawing to the heavenly Father, because he makes it clear that the divine nature is needed in order to believe and to come to Christ — and the Cardinal himself cites him.

VII. Therefore, the distinction of the gratuitous aid of God into efficacious and sufficient is not a new invention; rather, it is a necessary distinction for explaining the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures. And this is proved in the following manner.
The sufficiency of the divine aid is due to the very nature of the aid, as it comes from God, and thus it was said in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians 3:5: “Our sufficiency was given to us by God.” Therefore, the efficacy of the divine aid is due to God. Otherwise, what is less important — that is, the sufficiency — would be attributed to God and to his grace, and what is more important and valuable would be made to fall upon our natural freedom; on our part, we judge this to be impious, blasphemous, and contrary to what we read in Psalms 113:9: “Not to us, Lord, not to us, but to your name give the glory.” But in contrast, those who follow the doctrine of Molina seize the glory owed to the grace of God, by denying that its efficacy comes from Him. For they think that every aid of divine grace is similar to the medicinal potion that a wise physician prepares with all the efficacy one may wish, in order to deliver it to two sick persons; nevertheless, this medicinal potion does not have the same healing effect in the one as in the other; rather, one heals and the other dies, on account of the different natural constitution of the one and the other individual. One, certainly, through the forces of his nature — even though he has also received the virtue of the medicine — overcomes the illness; but the other, on account of the weakness of the natural faculties of his vegetative virtue, dies because he is more weakened, despite having received the same medicine. So also, they consider that such a physician — namely, Christ — delivers the same medicine to two sinners, of whom one is said to heal after the good digestion of his spiritual medicine, thanks to his innate freedom; while the other, on the contrary, almost wishing to vomit the same medicine through his innate freedom, remains in the illness of sin.
We, however, following the Holy Fathers, the sacred councils, and the testimonies of the Sacred Scriptures, consider that the celestial physician must be venerated more scrupulously. For although we declare that sometimes Christ confers on very many sinners certain special medicinal aids that we say are only sufficient and that the sinner himself, by virtue solely of his innate freedom, transforms into wrath — and thus Saint Paul also, in the Epistle to the Romans 2:4–5, says: “Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? You, however, by your hardness store up wrath against yourself for the day of wrath” — nevertheless, any sinner who is converted to Christ does not achieve this by virtue solely of his innate freedom, through making good use of medicinal aids; on the contrary, we affirm that the spiritual salvation of the sinner must be defended by the greater efficacy of the medicine that the celestial physician applies to his mind. For although it must not be denied that the free will and the intellect of man concur effectively in supernatural actions — since they are vital powers and concur vitally in their own actions, even in supernatural ones — nevertheless, we affirm that, through the supernatural virtue of God, these powers are elevated and made of a supernatural order by the divine motion, in such a way that they are able to produce the actions necessary for justification or for the increase of justification. However, this is not applicable to the case of the reception of the natural medicine, since this is of the same order as the healable nature; for this reason, nature itself is the principal cause of its healing, which takes place with the help of the medicine. But in contrast, the physician of our souls applies such a medicine, when He absolutely wills to heal, that whoever receives it heals — as the Church sings: “Heal me, Lord, and I shall be healed; save me and I shall be saved” (Jeremiah 17:14). But it is folly to ask for what reason God confers his efficacious medicine on one man before another. For we consider, together with the Holy Fathers, that the solution to this question can only fall upon the good pleasure of the divine will.
Nevertheless, from this it does not follow either that he who perishes, or who sins, or who remains in sin, does not perish through his own fault — as we shall show in the refutations of the arguments of Molina. For far less is required for sinning than for doing good, since for sinning the free will of man is sufficient by itself, because it is defectible by nature. And for this reason, even being strengthened and invited by supernatural aids and inspirations — through which the possibility of being capable of believing and doing all that is necessary for salvation, aided by the divine virtue, is presented to him — without doubt he could, through the natural forces of his free will, not wish to subordinate himself to God and, consequently, not receive greater aids. Therefore, it is not necessary that man receive the efficacious aid before sinning — for if he received it, he would not sin — but it suffices that, the receiving of such aid being possible for man, he does not wish to receive it and rejects it. Certainly, thus it would be verified that such a man, speaking in an absolute manner, could have believed and was obligated to believe, but by his own forces did not wish to believe.

VIII. Everything we have just said can be confirmed by the conclusions reached by the Council of Mainz celebrated in the year of the Lord 1549; for in chapter 8, on charity and good works, it is said: “The good works of the justified are effects of the grace of God and take place through the Holy Spirit, who moves and helps. Indeed, these works must not be valued according to human forces, but according to the dignity they possess thanks to the Holy Spirit, who is the mover and cause of every good work. For human forces must be weakened so that the grace of God may not also be considered contemptible. Thus, in the performance of the good work, the faculty of man must be diminished, so that we may think that the motion of the Holy Spirit is not only efficacious in us, but also of value before God.” This was said at the council.¹⁸ If all of this is admitted, our censure of the four assertions of Molina will in no way be judged severe and unjust.
Furthermore, we must also add the ancient and common distinction of the Scholastics concerning the merit and satisfaction of Christ with respect to the sufficiency or the efficacy of the aids; in this distinction the Scholastics show more than adequately that, by its own nature, the character of the sufficient aid and the efficacious aid is the same. For Christ died for all with respect to the sufficiency of his redemption; however, his redemption does not have efficacy in all men, but only in some — of whom Christ said: “Father, of those you have given me, I have not lost one” (Saint John 18:9). But in others the redemption of Christ was efficacious for their justification, although it did not cause them to obtain the gift of perseverance — with the exception of the predestined, of whom, as if they were sheep, Christ said: “No one shall snatch them from my hand, just as no one can steal from the hand of my Father” (Saint John 10:28). Therefore, the efficacy of the aids of grace comes from God and not from free will. Thus, the difference among the predestined must not be considered to reside only in the divine foreknowledge of the good use of the free will, but to depend on the divine mercy and the omnipotent hand of God, of whom David says: “He saved me because He loved me” (Psalms 17:20); “Let us humble ourselves, therefore, under the mighty hand of God, so that He may exalt us” (First Epistle of Saint Peter 5:6); and “Let us not wish to know more than it is fitting to know” (Epistle to the Romans 12:3).

Chapter Ten In Which It Is Finally Shown, by the Customary Prayers of the Church, That, According to the Catholic Faith, the Aid of God Must Be Affirmed to Be Efficacious of Itself, as It Comes from Him

I. Saint Augustine, in De dono perseverantiae, from chapter 4 onward — which the judges of this cause should read attentively — argues together with Saint Cyprian in many ways against the Pelagians. But now let us fix our attention on the discourse that Saint Augustine and Saint Cyprian offer when commenting on the petition: “Lead us not into temptation.” Indeed, Saint Augustine says in chapter 6: “Therefore, when we say to God: lead us not into temptation, are we not saying: do not allow us to fall?… And Saint Cyprian said this in the following way: Do not allow us to fall into temptation… Therefore, we live more securely if we attribute everything to God, rather than commending ourselves partly to Him and partly to ourselves. And this was already seen by that venerable martyr Saint Cyprian. For, commenting on the same petition, he says a little further on: When we ask not to fall into temptation, we call to mind our weakness and uselessness, while we pray that no one may insolently boast of himself, that no one may arrogate anything to himself with pride and boasting, and that no one may claim the glory of his confession or his suffering for himself, for the Lord himself, teaching humility, said: Watch and pray, that you may not fall into temptation… So that, while our humble and submissive confession comes first and everything is attributed to God, whatever we beg suppliantly with fear of God, He, by his own piety, may grant. Therefore, if there were no other teachings, this Lord’s Prayer would suffice for the cause of grace that we defend, because we have nothing to glory in as our own.” Here ends Saint Augustine’s words.¹⁹
Let Molina now judge whether in the conversion of the sinner, in the observance of the commandment, and in the victory over temptations, everything must be attributed to God, or rather part to man and part to God. Certainly, Molina and his colleagues do not understand in the same way as Saint Augustine and Saint Cyprian how this petition can be explained: “And lead us not into temptation.” For if the free will determines by virtue of its innate freedom the good use of the prevenient aids, and even the man himself applies the adjuvant aids through his natural freedom, what does he ask of God when he says: “Lead us not into temptation”? For if God were to confer no efficacious aid of itself, with which, once received, no one would sin, but every aid were indifferent of itself, man would be asking in vain for what is given to no one. And in fact, according to Molina, it happens that, having received equal aids, one man fulfills the commandments and another, however, sins.
Certainly, we defend the same thing that Saint Augustine affirms: “If there were no other teachings, this Lord’s Prayer would suffice for the cause of grace that we defend, because we have nothing to glory in as our own.” But Molina attributes much to men, so that they may glory in it as their own — namely, in their sole and innate freedom — since, according to Molina, it is man who, by making good use of the divine aid of God’s grace, whether prevenient or adjuvant, causes this aid to become efficacious, whereas of itself, as it comes from God, it is not efficacious. And Saint Augustine says many other things in chapter 7, but nevertheless, so as not to go on at too great length, we omit them. In any case, we shall mention something he says in chapter 7: “Henceforth, let the Church not await painful disputes about this matter, but rather pay attention to its customary prayers. For the Church prays that unbelievers may believe; and for this reason, God converts them to the faith. It prays that believers may persevere; and for this reason, God grants them perseverance until the end.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine. With these words, Saint Augustine teaches that God himself efficaciously brings about through his grace the conversion of those who are converted, and does not wait upon the natural movement of the free will.

II. But it is consequently worthwhile to add to the doctrine of Saint Augustine some prayers of the Church in which efficacious aid is asked of God himself.
Principally, in the Vigil of Pentecost, in the first prayer of the Mass, the Church prays thus: “God, you who offered to the human race examples of obedience in the hardships of Abraham, your servant, grant us your help, and thus we shall destroy the vices of our will and shall fulfill in all things the righteousness of your precepts.”²⁰ Behold that the Church asks not only for supernatural aid so that men may be able to destroy the vices of their will, but also asks for their actual destruction and the fulfillment of the commandments. Therefore, the efficacious aid that the Church asks for comes from God. Otherwise, indeed, it would not prudently ask for what man would already have by virtue of his innate freedom — namely, to make good use of the divine aids received.
Likewise, on the sixth Sunday after Pentecost, the Church prays thus: “God, since you possess the excellence of virtues in the highest degree, introduce into our hearts the love of your name and increase in us religious fervor, so that we may efficaciously attain what we faithfully beg of you.” Behold that the Church asks efficacy from God. Let Molina now say whether the good use of free will is counted among the excellent goods that we ask of God. For if it were counted, it would be necessary to say that God efficaciously strengthens this good use through his grace; and therefore, we would not make prevenient and concomitant grace efficacious through our innate freedom.
The Church says the same on the eighth Sunday: “We beg you, Lord, always give us a disposition of spirit to know what right and fitting conduct is and to act accordingly, so that we who without you cannot exist may have the strength to live according to your precepts.” Who does not understand that the disposition of spirit which the Church asks for — so that we may know and perform right conduct — is the impulse and efficacious motion coming from the Holy Spirit?
Likewise, on the twelfth Sunday the Church prays: “Almighty and merciful God, by whose work your faithful serve you worthily and honorably, we beg you to help us so that we may run without stumbling toward your promises.” Can one speak more clearly to repress the boldness of Molina, who thinks that we err in matters of faith because we maintain that by virtue of the gratuitous aid itself we can serve God worthily and honorably? How can it be reconciled with ecclesiastical prayer that, by virtue of his innate freedom, a man, with an equal or perhaps lesser aid than that received by another man, should please God, while this other man, even with a greater aid, should displease Him and, after sinning, should fall from the grace of God? But in truth, the Church acknowledges that it is through the gift of God that we run without stumbling.
Furthermore, on the sixteenth Sunday it prays: “We ask you, Lord, may your grace go before us and accompany us, and continually allow us to apply ourselves to good works.” Therefore, the grace of actual aid not only goes before us, but also of itself enables us to apply ourselves to good works.
Likewise, on the twenty-second Sunday the Church prays: “God, our refuge and strength, attend to the pious prayers of your Church, author of piety, and give us strength to obtain efficaciously what we faithfully ask of you.” Behold our demonstrative argument: we ask God to grant us the good work; but the Church, for her part, says and asks that what we faithfully ask, we may obtain efficaciously; therefore, the efficacy of what we ask — that is, of the good work — is owed to the grace of God and comes from Him through the aid of his grace; and it does not happen, as Molina says, that by virtue solely of his innate freedom a man makes good use of the aids of grace that have been granted to him.
Likewise, on the fourth Sunday after Pentecost, the Church prays thus: “Having offered you, Lord, our prayers, we ask you to appease your wrath and propitiously direct our rebellious wills toward you.” And before Communion it prays: “And make me always obey your commandments.” This manner of speaking does not appeal to violence, but to the powerful efficacy of divine grace, which in an excellent manner overcomes the human will, which would otherwise be rebellious, but which chooses to ask God to appease his wrath.

III. Finally, among these prayers it is worth recalling a certain solemn prayer that was pronounced at a provincial council, under the authority of Pope Benedict VII and the Emperor Henry II, in the year of the Lord 1023. The prayer of the pontiff was as follows: “We beg you to assist us, Lord Holy Spirit, us who are hostages of the ferocity of sin, yet gathered especially in your name; come to us and deign to penetrate our hearts. Teach us what to do, show us where to go, accomplish what we do. Be the salvation, the inspirer, and the executor of our judgments, because, together with God the Father and his Son, you possess a glorious name; do not allow us to be disturbers of justice, you who love the evenhandedness of the supreme truth, so that ignorance may not drag us to the left of God; let no flattery bend us, nor acceptance of an office or a benefice corrupt us, but rather unite us to you efficaciously with the gift of your grace alone, so that we may be one in you and in no way deviate from the truth; for being gathered in your name, we thus defend justice in all things, being guided by piety, in such a way that our thought may in nothing disagree with you, and in the future we may obtain eternal rewards for our good works. Through our Lord…”²¹ Here we conclude the citation of the pontiff’s prayer at the council celebrated almost six hundred years ago. We judge it already superfluous to linger longer on these matters.
Certainly, if the doctrine of Molina were true, this prayer seems that it ought not to be imitated, but rather corrected. Indeed, how do the words of the pontiff’s prayer — “unite us to you efficaciously with the gift of your grace alone, so that we may be one in you and in no way deviate from the truth” — accord with the assertions of Molina? For he denies that the aid of grace possesses efficacy of itself, as it comes from God, since the efficacy would be owed only to the innate freedom of man who wishes to make good use of the aid of the grace of God. May the Lord judge his cause and efficaciously illuminate with his gift of grace the sacred judges, so that they may issue their verdict as soon as possible, for the honor of the grace of Christ, and thus remove the new dogmas from the midst and correct and restrain the new reconcilers.
Up to this point enough has been said concerning the four assertions of Molina, which are the most important and which have been shown to be the cause of this entire controversy.

Chapter Eleven In Which It Begins to Be Shown That, on Account of a Bad Definition of Free Will, Molina and Francisco Suárez Were Presented with the Occasion to Deny the Efficacy of Divine Grace and of Predestination

I. If the mentioned theologians paid attention to the counsel of the Apostle Saint Paul — or rather, to the precept contained in the Epistle to the Romans 12:3 — perhaps they would enter the worthy path frequented by Saint Thomas and his disciples. Indeed, Saint Paul says: “For by the grace that has been delivered to me, I say to all of you that you must not try to know more than it is fitting to know, but rather that you know the just measure that must be known.” Saint Paul himself was an eminent example in this, because when he was writing in chapter 9 about the predestination of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau, inspired by the Holy Spirit, after contemplating the profound abyss of God’s designs, finally, almost carried away by a divine ecstasy, he cried out in favor of humility, saying: “Oh, the depth of the riches, the wisdom and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his designs and inscrutable his ways! For who has known the thought of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? Or who has first given to him, that recompense should be made? Because from him, for him, and through him are all things. To him be glory for ever and ever.” Thus spoke Saint Paul.
Now, however, in our times — God forgive us — there have arisen some who wish to know more than it is fitting to know, who are not frightened by the depth and the unsearchability of God’s designs concerning the difference between the predestination of Jacob and the reprobation of Esau, and who wish to reduce this difference solely to the innate freedom of men as a first foundation. In this way, although they do not acknowledge merit in the very nature of the free will, they nevertheless admit — as they persuade themselves — that the reason why God predestines one man before another is owed to the foreknowledge he has of the good use of his free will. And yet, in the Epistle to the Romans 11:25, Saint Paul said: “For I do not want you, brethren, to be ignorant of this mystery, so that you may not be wise in your own conceit, for partial blindness shall endure in Israel until the full number of the Gentiles has entered.” Nevertheless, these new reconcilers wish to be considered wise, and so they openly explain the reason for the difference between the illumination of the Gentiles and the blindness of the Jews solely by the innate freedom of men — naturally, because God foreknew that the Gentiles, placed in a certain order of things, would make good use of the divine inspirations, and that on the contrary some men of the Jewish people, even having received greater aids of divine grace, would be blinded by their own freedom.
Reasonably, if this were the case, Saint Paul would have proclaimed that profound mystery in vain when he said: “Oh, the depth of riches!…” For then, we could say to him: “Why do you cry out, Apostle, teacher of the Gentiles?” Yet behold that certain men openly attribute the reason for the difference between those who have been predestined and those who have not been predestined solely to innate human freedom, the good or bad use of which God would have known only through his foreknowledge; for God would not have predestined them through his absolute decree and the design of his will. Nevertheless, on our part, we maintain that, through his design, God has willed and irrevocably decided from eternity to permit evil acts or to bring about good works. Certainly, the error into which Molina falls is very far from the doctrine we defend. Indeed, we willingly confess our ignorance, since we do not wish to know more than it is fitting to know, but only wish to know the just measure. Certainly, sobriety is contrary to the vice of drunkenness, since drinking wine in excess is harmful to the head. Thus, there are men who, carried away by the sweetness of wine, drink more than is fitting and lose the judgment of reason. And in no different a manner do we think those act, who — not content with a modest knowledge of the mysteries of the faith and divine things, manifesting themselves as reckless scrutinizers of the divine majesty — are choked by their own vanity, as is said in Proverbs 25:27: “Just as if someone eats too much honey, nothing good will follow for him from it, so the scrutinizer of the divine majesty will be choked by his own vanity.” This excessive curiosity is the precipice of the proud. This was the beginning of all heresies, above all the Pelagian and the Lutheran, because in matters of faith they wished to know more than it is fitting to know and established new dogmas, with which Pelagius and Luther satisfied themselves and attracted others toward themselves as disciples of their pride.

II. Not far from that dangerous precipice are our modern theologians, who, boasting of having found a new concordia and seeking to persuade with their dogmas all those who allow themselves to be guided by curiosity, weaken the grace of God in order to exalt the free will of man beyond measure. In our times, Luis de Molina and some others — who would to God they did not belong to the institute of clerics of the Society of Jesus — have dared to maintain such a doctrine and try to persuade others. The principal reason for their boldness is, as they say, that they cannot understand, nor is it intelligible, how the freedom of the human will is preserved, if the aids of divine grace, as the common doctrine of theologians maintains, are of themselves — as they come from God — efficacious for the action of the will. For they say that we, by arguing in this manner, suppress the freedom of man for carrying out the acts of faith, hope, charity, and similar acts, and that we only safeguard their voluntary and spontaneous character. However, they, by affirming that the aids of divine grace are not efficacious of themselves but only by virtue of the free will itself, think they can easily show how human freedom is preserved in the said actions.
On the contrary, we object to them that it is less intelligible in what manner God could be the perfect cause of infinite goodness, if of any good — and especially of the greatest good — that is found in man, God himself with his influence were not the principal efficient cause and did not efficaciously move the secondary cause — which is the free will — to the effect of believing, hoping, and loving. Therefore, we firmly affirm both human freedom and the efficacy of the aids of grace, and we deny the consequence that the Lutherans infer — that is, the nonexistence of free will on account of the perfection of divine providence, predestination, and the aids of efficacious grace. Likewise, against the Pelagians and their followers we deny the consequence they infer, for these, by opposing the consequent, also oppose the antecedent in the following manner: “There is free will; therefore, predestination, divine providence, and the efficacy of grace are not as perfect as Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, the cited Fathers, and we ourselves defend.” Therefore, we judge that this difficulty must be resolved by having recourse to the legitimate definition of free will, which Molina ignores.

Chapter Twelve In Which We Present the Deficient Definition of Free Will That Molina and His Followers Defend

I. From the definitions of free will, Molina and his followers have chosen one that does not appear in Aristotle, nor in Saint Thomas, nor in the Master of the Sentences, but in Almain and in certain nominalists of his same condition. Moreover, even poorly understood, they place it as the permanent foundation upon which to build their new concordia.
It is the definition that Molina presents very briefly in his Concordia, d. 2, §3, page 12: “Free will is that which, given all the requisites for acting, can act and not act; or can act in one way just as well as in the contrary way.” Francisco Suárez, of the Society of Jesus, defends the same definition in a certain manuscript written in the vernacular language, which was circulating in Salamanca from hand to hand and which was denounced to the Fathers of the Holy Office and delivered by some Thomists. The title of this writing was In Defense of the Society Concerning Free Will. In this way, Suárez attributes his doctrine and that of Molina to the Society, when, however, it is well known that in the Society itself there are a great number of men who follow the ancient doctrine and think the same as Saint Thomas and the Thomists.

II. Now, for a better understanding of the definition they have chosen, we must ask them what they mean by these words: “given all the requisites for acting.” For if they refer to all the requisites prior to the free action itself taking place, it is clearly verified that the will up to that moment remains indifferent to act or not to act. However, from this no objection follows against our doctrine, because the aid of God that we defend as being efficacious of itself, as it comes from God, is not included among the requisites prior to the free action taking place, but among the requisites simultaneous with the very free action of the will that chooses what God commands or determines. But if they refer to all the requisites at the very moment in which the choice is made, it is completely false that, once all these requisites have been given, it is composible for man not to choose the good that God commands or determines. Nevertheless, we have said that it is incomposible — and not simply and absolutely that it is not possible for the will not to choose what God commands, or to will the opposite — because we speak of impossibility in the composite sense, and we shall immediately explain in an evident manner what we mean.
Now, for the moment, we shall show in what a deficient and confused manner our adversaries understand the mentioned definition. For there is a constant requisite for the will to choose: that by nature the dictate and command of human reason precede it. And yet, with this command of reason, the choice of the will is so determined that it is impossible for the will not to choose while under such a command of reason. Therefore, it is not verified that free will is that which, given all the requisites concomitant with the free action at the very moment of the action, can act and not act in the composite sense. For it implies a contradiction that, while under such a command, the will does not choose. And this we call the “composite sense,” but our adversaries do not wish to understand it. For the “composite sense” is spoken of in compositions and expressions of this nature, but not to compose the possibility of an act with the possibility of not acting or of carrying out the contrary act. Certainly, two possibilities can be verified simultaneously; for example, these two propositions are true at the same time: “Peter possibly runs” and “Peter possibly does not run” — indeed, the copulative sentence they form is always necessary. Furthermore, we do not compose in the composite sense when we speak of composing the very possibility of a contrary act, or of the non-performance of this act, with the other contrary act; in this way, indeed, a composition is possible; for example, this copulative sentence can be true: “Peter is seated and Peter possibly is not seated.” But finally, when we say that in the composite sense it cannot be verified that, while under some divine aid or divine motion, the will can fail to act, we compose the existence of the aid with the non-operation of the will, and not with the possibility of not acting — which we say is incomposible with such an aid. For this copulative sentence can be verified: “God moves the free will with his efficacious aid and the free will possibly does not choose”; because each of the propositions of this copulative sentence does not destroy the other, since the first proposition is contingent and the second is a necessary modal, and they are therefore simultaneously composible. Therefore, we judge impossible the composition of a single act — namely, the efficacious motion of God — with the contrary act or with the non-performance of this act.
Saint Thomas also uses this manner of speaking in the Summa Theologiae, I–II, q. 10, a. 4, ad tertium, when he says: “If God moves the will toward something, it is impossible that the will not be moved toward it. However, it is not absolutely impossible. From this it does not follow that the will is moved by God out of necessity.” Thus speaks Saint Thomas. Therefore, according to Saint Thomas, the necessity of consequence does not impose in absolute terms a necessity of the consequent — as he also teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 6, where he shows how the divine will is always fulfilled; and in a. 8 he teaches the following: “As the divine will is most efficacious, it not only happens that what God wills to happen does happen, but it happens in the manner that God wills it to happen.” And in the solution to the first argument, he maintains that a conditional necessity is imposed on the things willed by God, and thus says: “It is necessary that this conditional statement be true: If God wills this, it is necessary that this come about.” And in the solution to the second argument he says: “Because from this very thing — that nothing opposes the divine will — it follows that not only does what God wills to happen come about, but what He wills to come about contingently or necessarily does so come about.”

III. From this doctrine — which we adduce not only on account of the authority of Saint Thomas, but because it demonstrates its conclusions according to the logical, metaphysical, and theological manner — it is easy to notice how erroneously our adversaries understand the assertion with which they try to define free will, when they say that, given all the requisites for acting, it is simultaneously composible that with them the free will does not act or acts in the contrary manner. We, however, deny that such a composition is possible — that is, that God moves the will with his efficacious aid to choose and the will does not choose what God wills it to choose. In a similar way, we also judge it impossible that someone who has been predestined should not be saved, even though this copulative sentence may be true: “Peter has been predestined and Peter possibly is not saved.”
We are embarrassed to linger now on such a minor point, but we combat one vice with another vice. For we must call to mind the teachings of the dialecticians, so that the arguments our adversaries wield against us may be revealed as sophistical. Because if their arguments were correct, they could also prove with their manner of arguing that God does not freely conserve the world, for they would say: “A free agent is one who, given all the requisites for acting, can act and not act; but God, given all the requisites for conserving the world, cannot fail to conserve it, if we speak in the composite sense, which our adversaries mock; therefore, He does not freely conserve the world.” The minor is demonstrated thus: the only requisite for the conservation of the world is that God from eternity should have decided through his design to conserve it; but once this has been decided, it implies a contradiction that God should then not conserve the world but annihilate it; therefore, the consequence that God then does not freely conserve the world would be correct. We easily respond to this sophism that it is not necessary, in order to be able to speak of a free action, that it can be verified that the action does not take place given all the requisites; rather, it is sufficient, speaking in absolute terms, that this action possibly might not take place, provided the true form and foundation of free will are not absent. For we do not place the character of freedom in the fact that the agent acts and possibly does not act; for the animal lives and possibly does not live — indeed, this copulative sentence is true. Therefore, our adversaries commit a serious paralogism when they believe that we attribute to our free will only a voluntary and spontaneous character in acting, but not a free one. And so as not to go on at too great length, we shall establish the legitimate definition of free will, which no one can deny.

Chapter Thirteen In Which the Legitimate and Necessary Definition of Free Will Is Established

I. Roberto Bellarmine, of the Society of Jesus, in his Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei, vol. 3, ch. 11, on grace and free will, and bk. 3, ch. 3, distinguishes five definitions of free will, and none of them is the one used by Molina and Suárez — namely, “given all the requisites for acting…” But finally, he chooses the fifth definition, which he thinks can be gathered from the doctrine of Saint Thomas under this form: “Free will is the free power, attributed to intellectual nature, for the great glory of God, of choosing from among those things that lead to some end one thing before another, or of accepting one and the same thing, or, in virtue of its own will, of disdaining it.”²² He explains this definition in his own manner more extensively in that chapter.
But in our judgment, Bellarmine’s definition is not artful, but in part superfluous and confused and in part limited. For since God formally possesses free will, it ought to be defined in a universal — though analogical — manner, so that it could be applied both to God and to creatures, who were created in the image of God thanks to the power of his free will. And the confusion of the mentioned definition is due to the fact that within the definition itself there appear the two words that compose the term to be defined, for the expressions “free power” and “in virtue of its own will” are used; certainly, this is the great error to be noted in the definitions of the dialecticians. Therefore, since all the doubts that arise about each of the expressions of the definition must be resolved, it is necessary to explain the legitimate definition of free will. And certainly, in Aristotle the expression “free will” does not appear, but we only find “choice” and “decision,” which, together with their properties, are defined; from these one can gather the definition of the free will of man.

II. Therefore, we — since we consider according to the Catholic faith that God has free will, just as he has knowledge and wisdom — defend the following definition of free will, so as not to exclude it as a divine attribute. Our definition is this: “FREE WILL IS THE FACULTY OF THE INTELLECT AND OF THE WILL TO ACT OR NOT TO ACT, OR TO PURSUE ONE THING OR ANOTHER.” This definition appears in the book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, d. 24, §[ch.] 3. However, we use the word “intellect” where the Master of the Sentences speaks of “reason.” For he was defining human free will and therefore said that it was: “the faculty of reason and of the will.” And he added: “by which the good is chosen with the help of grace, or evil if grace departs.” And subsequently, in d. 25, he says: “in defining free will, mention is made of the will, because voluntarily… it can be led toward those actions which it can judge good or evil.” Thus speaks the Master of the Sentences.²³ But the truth is that the formal character of the will does not consist in being able to sin — as Saint Thomas demonstrates in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 62, a. 8, ad tertium, in II–II, q. 88, a. 4, ad primum, and in his Commentaries on the Sentences, I, d. 42, q. 2, a. 1, ad tertium, and especially Saint Anselm in his Dialogus de libero arbitrio, ch. 1 — but rather, the ability to sin supposes the greatest imperfection and weakness of free will, because certainly, of itself and as God creates it, the free will has such a condition and inclination toward the good that even when it sins, it does not formally tend toward evil, but always moves under some consideration of the good, as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 63, a. 1, ad quartum. Nevertheless, the truth is that the created free will is defectible by nature and, as the theologians add, can sin insofar as it is created from nothing and is limited.

III. From what has been said it follows that free will is more perfect the further removed it is from sin and from everything that turns it away from its true ultimate end. Certainly, this perfection is found in God to the highest degree — as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 10 — and this does not prevent the will itself from loving the supreme good by necessity. For this is not opposed to freedom with respect to the means orderable to the ultimate end; on the contrary, in this way it can be demonstrated how freely God wills all things distinct from himself, because He knows that no other possible good has a necessary connection with the supreme good itself — even though it is orderable to this good as the ultimate end — and not on account of the perfection of this end, but on account of the perfection of the created good that participates in some manner in the supreme good. And this is the supreme and infinite perfection of free will that is formally found in God.
Furthermore, the free will of the angels is also more perfect than that of man with respect to natural perfection; and for this reason, the angels could not immediately deviate from the natural end and from the means necessary to reach this end, because in no way could something be presented to them as an image of the good that would turn them away from such an end. Likewise, the angel chooses in so constant a manner that by nature it remains immutable with respect to what it once chose — even when it sins, as in fact it sinned against the supernatural precept by which, under the illumination of faith, it was obligated to convert to God as the supernatural end, to hope for beatitude by virtue of his grace and mercy, and to submit itself and all that belongs to it to the divine aid of grace. But since it did not convert to God, but turned toward itself, it abandoned all relationship with God and sinned — freely, indeed — and thus remains obstinately and immutably in its sin, by which it continues even now to sin against God.
We recall all this because these are dogmas very well recognized by the theologians, and from here we shall need to arrive at the definition of free will and of the free act. From what has been said it also follows that, although no creature is by nature completely impeccable — as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 63, a. 1 — nevertheless, if through the virtue of the grace of God it is so consolidated in the good that it cannot sin, for this reason its freedom for the necessary choice of the good is not destroyed; rather, on the contrary, the creature will be free in a more perfect manner, the more it resembles God through grace. Thus the Most Blessed Virgin was confirmed in grace, so that she could not sin even venially. In this same manner the apostles were confirmed in grace, so that they could not commit mortal sins. And yet, both they and the Most Blessed Virgin acted meritoriously, since they obeyed the divine commandments through the act of their free will. Even the saints themselves, who on account of the nature of their state love by necessity God whom they see, nevertheless also exercise their freedom with respect to other objects that by nature lack a necessary connection with the end. For example, the guardian angels freely guard men and, through this guardianship, receive certain accidental rewards up to the day of judgment, as is made manifest in the doctrine that Saint Thomas offers in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 62, a. 9, ad tertium. Above all that has been said, let us recall the free will of the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ, which by the hypostatic union with the Word was made impeccable, and yet acted meritoriously to the highest degree through its obedience unto death on the cross.

IV. From everything said, it is gathered how badly Molina philosophizes — and with what danger for the faith — in his fifth assertion mentioned earlier, since he says at the end: “If at the same time the will can choose indifferently both an act and the contrary, freedom is also distinguished by the type of act that possesses the character of full and perfect freedom.” Thus speaks Molina.²⁴ This doctrine cannot be tolerated in any manner, because it attributes to the free will that can sin a fuller and more perfect freedom than that which a free will that cannot sin would possess. From this it evidently follows that those who have been confirmed in grace would not have as perfect a freedom as those who have not been confirmed; and even God himself would not have as perfect a free will as that of the creature, since God’s free will cannot in any manner will the contrary of the good. And it is not surprising that Molina, author of the new concordia, has fallen into other errors, since his ignorance of the definition of free will and of perfect freedom is enormous.

V. Therefore, we understand and explain in a very different manner the definition we have offered. For its comprehension we must note that the principal root and foundation of freedom are found in the intellect that judges the indifference of some means of itself with respect to an end. For from this formal freedom arises in the will with respect to such a means. Therefore, when we define free will from the faculty of the intellect and of the will to act or not to act, or to pursue one thing or another, we certainly attribute this faculty to the intellect and to the will, although not, however, in the same manner, but differently. To the intellect, without doubt, in a radical and fundamental manner; to the will, on the other hand, in a formal manner, because formal freedom resides in it. And just as — certainly — Saint Thomas demonstrates in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, that if any creature has intellect, it also has will, so also, since the intellect is not determined to judge one thing alone, but has the faculty of knowing the difference between the cognoscible means with respect to an end, in this manner it is shown that the will itself is also free and has the faculty of doing something or not doing it and of willing one thing or another. Nor should it be said “or the contrary,” as Molina says, because such a definition can encompass neither God, nor those confirmed in grace, who nevertheless possess formal and most perfect freedom.

VI. In the second place, we must note — and to this much attention must be paid — that the mentioned indifference need not necessarily fall upon the intellect or will of the free nature itself. And we prove this as follows. If this were intrinsically necessary for formal freedom, God would in no way formally possess free will, since He is pure act and in himself cannot be different from how He is, for in Him there is no change nor shadow of alteration, as is affirmed in the Epistle of James 1:17. Hence, if God had not created the world — which was created freely — God would not be different from how He now is, after having willed to freely create the world. Since Aristotle did not come to understand this, he was shamefully blasphemous toward God, asserting that God had produced the world from eternity by virtue of a natural necessity, since he did not understand how God can be completely immutable in himself and at the same time can create and not create. We, however, illuminated by faith, think that from the beginning of time God has created each creature from nothing, and we respond to Aristotle by denying the consequence he infers — for it is not necessary that a cause which has an unlimited mode of being should undergo a variation in itself on account of the variety of the effects it produces, even if it itself is the entire cause of the variation of these effects; rather, all variation reverts to the effect itself. Therefore, if it is necessary, according to the Catholic faith, to attribute formal freedom to God, it is consequently also fitting to affirm that the sufficient root of freedom is the knowledge of the indifference of means with respect to the end. And this knowledge is found in God in an infinite and most perfect manner, even though He does not possess formal indifference in himself. But in contrast, there is not such uniformity in intellectual and rational creatures — neither in the judgment of the intellect, nor in the inclination of the will — but rather a certain greater or lesser variation, according to the greater or lesser perfection of the creature. These variations are rather imperfections of freedom than formal characteristics. Therefore, it is clear that the indifference that is formally found in the will derives from the faculty of the intellect capable of judging the indifference of means with respect to the end. And although the will chooses something it could have not chosen, or chooses something by leaving aside something else it could have chosen, it is not said to act freely by remaining undetermined and indifferent, but because it determines to choose a means acting under the judgment of the indifference of means with respect to the end. Moreover, with this judgment alone it would not be determined to act, unless at the same time the practical judgment and the command of the intellect intervened with respect to this unique means.
From this it follows that when some act is said to be free in us, its freedom does not consist in its own indifference — because it has already been determined — but it is called free by virtue of the condition of the power, which, speaking in absolute terms, could not perform such an act, insofar as this power acts under the judgment of the indifference of means with respect to the end; from this judgment the will proceeds to the choice, which would be determined by the practical judgment and the command of the intellect.

VII. Now, departing from the mentioned definition, we can construct another for one who acts freely, under this form: “A free agent is one who acts on account of an end with knowledge — that is, by virtue of knowledge — of the indifference of means with respect to this end.” This definition encompasses both God and creatures. And it is here that one can best see that man has been made in the image and likeness of God, because he has been created with free will — as theologians teach, following Saint John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, bk. 2, ch. 12. The sacred text itself of Genesis, ch. 1, insinuates the same, according to the character of the sacred language, when it says: “And God created Adam in his image, in the image of God he created him.” And it is as if it were said: in the image of the one who judges and orders himself and his actions freely toward an end. And theologians call such actions human acts.

VIII. It only remains for us to explain what we understand by the name of “end” in the mentioned definition of free agent; for we have constantly repeated that freedom and the free act originate from the judgment of the indifference of means with respect to the end. But someone, philosophizing ignorantly, will be able to object that no one can judge indifferently the observance of the commandments in relation to the end of eternal life; and yet, man observes these commandments freely: therefore, our definition is deficient, since the observance of the commandments is not considered indifferent but necessary for eternal life, which is the ultimate end.
To this objection, on our part, we respond that when we speak of an end in the mentioned definition of freedom and of free agent, we are not referring in a determined manner to the particular true end — which is God himself and the beatific vision — but that we speak of the end in the same manner that Saint Thomas speaks in the Summa Theologiae, I–II, q. 1, when he says that every act is produced on account of an end, and that everything that man does, he does on account of an ultimate end; here Saint Thomas does not speak of the end or the ultimate end in particular as the end of eternal life or God himself, but speaks of the common good and of the end that man seeks in order to be happy. However, under this common good man often seeks happiness in particular goods in which it is not found, and always, by choosing these goods, moves away from the true ultimate end, which is God.
Up to this point enough has been said about the definition of free will, of free agent, and of the free act.

1Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 10. Migne, P.L., 44, 975.

2Saint Augustine, Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, ch. 19. Migne, P.L., 44, 568.

3Saint Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 32. Migne, P.L., 40, 247–248.

4Saint Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 20. Migne, P.L., 44, 906.

5Id., De correptione et gratia, ch. 14. Migne, P.L., 44, 913.

6Id., De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 16. Migne, P.L., 44, 900–901.

7 Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 8, n. 3. Migne, P.L., 44, 971.

8Saint Fulgentius, Epist. 17 de incarnatione et gratia D. N. Jesu Christi, ch. 17. Migne, P.L., 65, 472–473.

9Saint Prosper, Epistola ad Augustinum. Migne, P.L., 51, 72–73.

10Cf. Mansi, 4, 455 ff.

11Mansi, 8, 713. The Council of Orange II was not held in the time of Leo I, but of Felix III, and was confirmed by Boniface II.

12Mansi, 8, 173.

13 Canones concilii provincialis Coloniensis anno 1536 celebrati, Parisiis 1515, fol. 91v and 95.

14In reality it is to Paulinus.

15Saint Augustine, Epistola 106. Migne, P.L., 33, 831.

16Saint Augustine, Enchiridion, chs. 95 and 96. Migne, P.L., 40, 276.

17Canones concilii Coloniensis, ed. cit., fol. 99.

18Acta conciliorum, vol. 9, Parisiis 1714, col. 2116.

19Saint Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, chs. 6–7. Migne, P.L., 45, 1000–1001. Cf. Saint Cyprian, apud Migne, P.L., 4, 555.

20Missale Romanum.

21Mansi, 19, 401.

22Bellarmine, Roberto, Opera, ed. Vivès, vol. 5, Parisiis 1873, p. 583.

23Peter Lombard, Liber sententiarum, 2, d. 25, n. 1.

24Molina, Luis de, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, ed. cit., p. 12.

Chapter Fourteen

In which it is shown to what extent the aids of divine grace, however great their efficacy may be, do not destroy our freedom but rather perfect it

I. Here we shall recall what we said in the preceding chapter, in order to show how far Molina and Suárez depart from the true and legitimate definition of freedom and of the free agent. For this reason, it is not surprising that, ignorant of this principle, they have fallen into other errors concerning the aids of divine grace — to which we have already referred when speaking of Molina’s first four propositions — and concerning divine providence and predestination, of which we shall speak further on. Now, however, proceeding from the aforementioned and legitimate definition, which can in no way be denied, we shall show in what a far more pious manner we ourselves explain the harmony of free will with the gifts of divine grace.
We therefore set out from the following foundation: the freedom of human action is not destroyed — unless the actual or virtual judgment of the indifference of means with respect to the end be destroyed or eliminated — even if several elements concur in the exercise of the free act, by which, by necessity of consequence, such an act must take place. In this way, for example, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 6:17, the Apostle Saint Paul says: “He who is united to God becomes one spirit with Him”; and in the Epistle to the Romans 8:14, he says: “All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God.” We cannot infer from this that, therefore, the sons of God do not act freely when the impulse of the Holy Spirit leads them to will that toward which the Holy Spirit efficaciously inclines the sons of God; for at that moment they are perfected in their freedom to the highest degree, because they make use, as sons of God, of the grace of adoption, imitating the Father of whom they are said to be sons and truly are. They are not, therefore, dragged toward the good like animals, but, illumined by God, they judge more perfectly the indifference of the means considered in themselves with respect to the common end, which, as we have already said, is the proper object of the human will. And furthermore, they are illumined so as to judge, here and now, that it befits them to follow what God prescribes and decides. And they are even illumined so as to possess the practical judgment and the command concerning each thing they can do; and thus, vigorously and in an excellent manner, they are led to do what is pleasing to God.

II. But Molina and his followers do not think that freedom is present in the action if the divine aids are such as we maintain — that is, if, by necessity of consequence, the good work follows from them — for they immediately revert to offering their definition, indeed misunderstanding it, namely, that free will exists naturally because, given all the requisites for acting, it can be simultaneously verified in the composite sense that the man either does not act or acts to the contrary. But we, having already demonstrated that this definition is most unsatisfactory, easily respond to our adversaries that, once efficacious aids have been received, the man cannot fail to choose what is good. For, according to the legitimate definition we have set forth above, formal freedom continues to remain in the will, which in turn depends upon the true root of freedom, namely, the judgment of indifference of the means with respect to the end, which does not prevent the will, through actual grace, from firmly and infallibly choosing to act rightly. And this is the true freedom of the sons of God; and this is the freedom of the humble who glory entirely in the Lord and not at all in themselves.
Our new conciliators, however, are saddened, as Saint Augustine says in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 12: “because they consider themselves exempt from all pious endeavor, unless they attribute to themselves something which they are the first to offer to God Himself.”¹ And this is what Molina intends, without doubt, when he says that the divine aid does not bring with it, as it comes from God, efficacy for the work, but that it is man himself who, by virtue of his innate freedom, confers efficacy upon the aid itself while making good use of it.

III. Saint Thomas thinks very differently, for in the Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 24, a. 11, he says: “The Holy Spirit works infallibly all that He wills. For this reason it is impossible that both of these situations should simultaneously obtain: that the Holy Spirit wills to move a man to an act of charity and that this man, by sinning, does not attain charity.” Thus speaks Saint Thomas. And yet it is evident that the Holy Spirit does not compel the will to the act of charity, but that the man moves freely toward the love of God. Therefore, the efficacy of the divine aid, as it proceeds from the Holy Spirit, does not destroy freedom but perfects it, inasmuch as the Spirit moves the will vigorously and in an excellent manner, thereby perfecting both its own faculty and that of the intellect. In this way, the Virgin fulfilled the precepts with the most perfect freedom, and it was no obstacle to this that she acted by the work of the Holy Spirit, having been confirmed in grace by Him. But also the Apostles obeyed the Holy Spirit meritoriously to the highest degree, and so much the more as the Holy Spirit guided them with greater and more efficacious aids of the grace of God. Finally, also Christ the Lord obeyed freely even unto death; and it was no impediment that His soul had been confirmed in good, not only through habitual grace and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, but also through the hypostatic union, by virtue of which His soul was rendered impeccable. All these divine aids, therefore, did not withdraw but rather illumined the human judgment that examines the indifference of means with respect to the end; and this indeed is the root of formal freedom, which is in the will, as we have already explained. For the supervening precept does not destroy freedom, as some of our adversaries have philosophized — and would that they had not philosophized thus — attributing all the merit of Christ to His intense obedience, that is, solely to a circumstance that was not under the divine precept, and not to the substance of the act itself. For this reason they maintain that Christ did not act meritoriously by having obeyed, but by having obeyed and having acted more intensely and more willingly than the precept obliged Him, contrary to what is said in Isaiah 53: “He offered Himself because He willed it”; for here Isaiah does not say that He offered Himself more willingly than He was obliged, but says that His offering was voluntary. And on account of this a reward is promised to Christ, as Isaiah says: “If He offers His soul in place of sin, He shall see a great posterity and the will of the Lord shall be fulfilled in His hand.” Likewise, against the opinion of these philosophers, it was said in the Epistle of Saint John 10:17: “I lay down My soul”; that is, I die because I will it, as Saint Augustine explains in his Treatise 47 on the Epistle of Saint John, and also Saint John Chrysostom in his Homily 54 on Saint John.² Likewise Saint Paul speaks against them in the Epistle to the Philippians 2:8–9: “He obeyed unto death, a death on the cross; and therefore God exalted Him.” In all these testimonies the Holy Spirit teaches that the reward of Christ was owed to His obedience, His passion, and His voluntary death. In like manner, in the last chapter of the Gospel of Saint Mark, Christ the Lord exhorts the Apostles to preach the gospel to every creature; and yet who would dare deny that the Apostles merited a crown by their obedience in preaching the gospel, and not by having preached more willingly than they were obliged? Certainly, those who have invented this new theology assert that, since the Apostles were confirmed in grace, they did not obey freely, because, having received such a precept, they could not but obey.
Behold the precipices down which those who do not humbly follow the worthy path plunge headlong. For, since they do not know how to resolve the argument they attempt, they invent a new manner of philosophizing, on account of the bad definition of free will that they put forward. We, for our part, consider that, on account of the arguments set forth, the doctrine in question errs in a matter of faith.

IV. And finally, we shall demonstrate that those who maintain that Christ the Lord did not attain merit by virtue of His act of obedience but through the ardor with which He obeyed, even though this was not under the precept, affirm contradictory things. For indeed the act of obedience, according to its species and its object, is an act of virtue, both morally good and praiseworthy by reason of its object. Therefore it is meritorious. Therefore it implies a contradiction that it should be an act of the virtue of obedience and yet not be meritorious.
This is demonstrated as follows: the ardor or pleasure with which an act is performed is neither good nor bad in itself, but all goodness or badness depends upon the action itself, and the action itself depends in turn upon its object. For, as Aristotle says, one who performs a good deed experiences a good pleasure, and one who performs a bad deed experiences a bad pleasure. Thus in moral philosophy those who invent such dangerous and unheard-of dogmas are in error — precisely because they say they do not understand how freedom is preserved unless it can be verified that, once the precept and all the other aids of divine grace have been received, the man fails to do what is prescribed for him. But we do understand how formal freedom is preserved in the will, once the efficacy of the divine aid has been received as it comes from God, or once divine providence and predestination have operated, for these do not pose an obstacle to the definition of free will that we defend; rather, they actually perfect freedom, assimilating it to the supreme and first free will, which is that of God, who works all things according to the design of His will, from one end of the world to the other, and governs the universe in an excellent manner.
We have by now said enough against Molina’s fifth proposition, in which we find two errors: one, how confusedly he understands his definition of free will; the other, maintaining that the full and perfect reason of freedom consists in the ability of a free agent to do the opposite of what it does. From these errors we have clearly shown that it would follow that there would be no full and perfect freedom in God, nor in our Lord Jesus Christ, nor in those who have been confirmed in grace. And this we must criticize without reservation.

Chapter Fifteen

In which we present the foundations that allow us to demonstrate that the middle knowledge invented by Molina and Suárez, in order to defend their errors, is a mere fiction

I. Luis de Molina, in his Concordia, d. 50, p. 329, pretending to appear as though he does not altogether deny divine predestination and the predefinition of the good acts of our free will, invents a certain divine middle knowledge, hitherto unheard of in the schools of theologians, with which he claims to resolve all the difficulties and objections that we have presented following the doctrine of Sacred Scripture and of the Holy Fathers. Thus he says in the cited place: “It is necessary to distinguish a threefold knowledge in God, unless we wish to err dangerously, in attempting to reconcile the freedom of our will and the contingency of things with divine foreknowledge. One is purely natural knowledge, which therefore cannot in any way be other than it is, and through which God knows all those things that divine power can bring about — whether immediately or through the intervention of secondary causes — not only as regards individual necessary natures and their unions, but also as regards contingent natures, though not, certainly, because they were going to be determined or because they were not going to be so, but because they could indifferently be so or not be so, as necessarily belongs to them, and therefore they fall under the natural knowledge of God. Another is purely free knowledge, through which God, after the free act of His will, without any hypothesis or condition, knows absolutely and determinately which of all contingent unions will actually come about and which will not. Finally, the third is middle knowledge, through which God has seen in His essence, by means of His most sublime and inscrutable comprehension of any free will whatsoever, what that free will would do, by virtue of its innate freedom, if it were placed in this, or in that, or indeed in any of the infinite orders of things, even though in reality it could also, if it so willed, do the opposite, as is affirmed in dd. 47 and 48.” Thus far Molina has spoken.

II. Censure. He calls this knowledge “middle” because it is neither purely natural nor purely free, but occupies a middle position — as we shall make clear at once, following Molina’s own words. Nevertheless, we intend to destroy his new foundation, above all because he says that this middle knowledge must be admitted, unless one wishes to err dangerously in attempting to reconcile freedom with divine foreknowledge. Therefore, for greater clarity, it is worth disputing briefly, as is customary among scholastics, on this small question.

III. First, we shall argue in favor of Molina and shall prove that middle knowledge must necessarily be admitted. There is an intermediate future, which lies between the absolute future and the possible future, namely, the so-called conditional future: therefore there is a divine middle knowledge that is concerned with the conditional future. This consequence is demonstrated as follows: God most certainly knows all species of being in act and in potency. Now, since there is a species of being that is neither an absolute future nor merely possible, but depends upon a condition, it is necessary to maintain that God knows this conditional future with certainty. It must then be affirmed: God does not know this conditional future by simple intelligence, which is concerned only with the necessary or the possible object, nor by the knowledge of vision, which is concerned only with what has being at some point in time. Therefore it is concluded that middle knowledge is necessary, through which God knows the conditional future with certainty.

IV. But the antecedent of the main argument, namely, that there is a conditional future that in reality is neither an absolute future nor merely possible, can be proved in two ways. First, from the common manner of speaking of men, who frequently assert as certain, even under oath, that something would happen if a given condition were met. For example: if Peter comes to my house tomorrow, he will dine with me; and similarly: if Peter had devoted himself to business, he would be rich.
Second, it can be demonstrated from Sacred Scripture, for example, in the Gospel of Saint Matthew 11:21, our Lord Jesus Christ says: “Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida!, for if in Tyre and Sidon the miracles had been done that were done in you, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes.” Behold that the Lord does not say that they possibly would have repented, but affirms that they would have repented, if that condition had been given.
Likewise, in the First Book of Kings 23, after David inquired of the Lord, the Lord answered that if David had remained in Keilah, Saul would have come down, and that the men of Keilah would certainly have delivered David into the hands of Saul. And yet none of these things came to pass, nor did the Lord answer that they could have come to pass, but answered that it would most certainly have come to pass thus, if David had remained in Keilah.
Finally, in the Second Book of Kings 13:19, Elisha says to King Joash: “If you had struck the ground five or six times, you would have struck Syria until you had destroyed it.” There are many other similar examples in Sacred Scripture.

V. Second, Molina argues as follows. Unless it be admitted that God possesses middle knowledge, we shall err in attempting to reconcile the freedom of our will and the contingency of things with divine foreknowledge. If, on the contrary, we suppose this middle knowledge, we shall easily understand how, before the free decree of the divine will, God knows the conditional choice of free will — that is, what a man placed in a determinate order of things and circumstances would do — and once this knowledge is attained, God decides to do something or not, so that freedom may remain in man with respect to his future conditional choice, prior to the decree of the divine will.

VI. These are the principal arguments by which Molina and others who also defend middle knowledge err. We, however, philosophize in a very different manner. For we intend to show that those who wish to demonstrate the new concord of free will by means of this middle knowledge err with great danger, falling ceaselessly into evident errors.
And so that our censure may be well understood, we must note something well known among those versed in the study of dialectic. First, certainly, a conditional proposition can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, by reason of its consequence, in such a way that the particle “if” is understood in an illative sense, for example: If man flew, he would have wings. On the other hand, this particle can also be understood in such a way as to express a concomitance not founded on the correctness of the consequence, but on some promise or some intention of a man, or on some other contingent cause, the correctness of the consequence being excluded; for example: if you intercede for me with the king, I will give you a horse; if you had come yesterday, you would have dined with me; if Peter had made the journey in summer, he would have fallen ill; and so on with similar cases.

VII. Second, we must note that every illative conditional inference is either necessary or impossible. The reason for this is evident, since the truth or falsity of an illative conditional proposition consists solely in the correctness or incorrectness of its consequence. But indeed a consequence that is correct once is always correct, and one that is incorrect once is always incorrect. If, however, the particle “if” is not understood in an illative sense — that is, according to the rigor of the consequence — but is understood in the second manner, then, for such a proposition to be true, it is sufficient that the foundation of that concomitance actually obtain; for example, if such a condition is expressed, that the intention to act in such a way exists on the part of the one who affirms or who promises conditionally. The truth is, however, that if God formulates such a promise or intention, the consequence will be necessary by reason of the veracity of God, who is sincere in all His words. If, on the contrary, man formulates such a promise or intention, the consequence will not be correct, because man’s intention alone is not in itself firm and certain, unless he speaks inspired by God and by divine revelation.

VIII. Some invent a third meaning of the particle “if,” according to a certain non-existent concomitance; for example: If Peter goes to the countryside today, the king of France will die tomorrow. And they say that these too are conditional futures and the object of middle knowledge, through which God knew whether this would come to pass or not, if such a condition were given. But this meaning deserves to be ridiculed; for no prudent person speaks in this manner. Now, perhaps they intend to add the expression “provided that,” in order thus to have a contingent conditional future as the object of that middle knowledge; for example: If and provided that Peter sleeps, the king of Gaul will die. But a conditional future of this nature does not require a special knowledge, but only knowledge of each of its parts, which are simply contingent propositions of which one does not depend on the other.

Chapter Sixteen

In which it is shown that middle knowledge is a purely dangerous fiction

I. Given all of the foregoing, which no trained mind will be able to deny, we establish two conclusions.
First conclusion: God knows every conditional future that implies a consequence corresponding to the illative mode and that is moreover correct, by means of the necessary knowledge that is natural to Him, with which, for example, He knows that man is a rational animal, whether he exists or does not exist.
All theologians agree on this conclusion. The reason is that God necessarily knows every absolutely necessary truth by means of His natural and necessary knowledge, with which He knows His essence, which necessarily contains formally or eminently truths of this nature. Now, since every conditional proposition of a correct consequence is a necessary proposition, God will know it by means of His natural and necessary divine knowledge. If, on the contrary, it were a question of an incorrect consequence, the proposition would be impossible; and God would know its impossibility by means of the same knowledge with which He knows the necessity of its contradictory.

II. Second conclusion: All conditional futures that imply a consequence that does not correspond to the illative mode do not fall under the knowledge of God, insofar as they precede the free and absolute decree of the divine will or the free and conditional decree of God, by which He wills good or permits evil.
This conclusion directly contradicts the new doctrine that Molina presents in the cited place, where, a little further on, explaining the nature of middle knowledge, he says things much worse: “It is probable that someone will ask whether this middle knowledge ought to be called free or natural. To this it must first be said that there is no reason at all to call it free, both because it precedes every free act of the divine will and because it is not in God’s power to know through this middle knowledge anything different from what He actually knows. Furthermore, it must be said that in this sense it is not natural knowledge either, as if it were innate to God, since through this middle knowledge God cannot know the opposite of what He knows through it. And if the created free will were to do the opposite, as indeed it can, God would know this very thing through middle knowledge and not, however, what He actually knows. Wherefore it is no more innate to God to know through middle knowledge this part of the contradiction, which depends on the created will, than the opposite. Therefore it must be maintained that middle knowledge possesses in part the character of natural knowledge, since it is prior to the free act of the divine will and since it is not in God’s power to know by it anything different from what He knows; and in part it possesses the character of free knowledge, for insofar as God — proceeding from the hypothesis of man’s creation in one or another order of things — decides to place man in a state of affairs, He will thereby know that the free will will do one thing rather than another, even though it could indifferently do either. And this is what the freedom of created free will reasonably requires.” Thus far Molina has spoken.
We judge that this doctrine is full of contradictions and erroneous blasphemies. For, first, he affirms that this middle knowledge ought in no way to be called “free.” Yet afterwards he says that this middle knowledge possesses in part the character of free knowledge. Moreover, he errs still more greatly when he attempts to establish this; for he maintains that the free middle knowledge precedes every free act of the divine will and that there is no possibility in God’s power of knowing anything different from what He knows; and yet he affirms that God could have known the opposite of what He knows through it, because the free will could have acted in the opposite manner.
Therefore we shall prove our conclusion in the following way. These conditional futures, which in reality are not futures, possess no certainty and no infallibility — not by the illative force of their consequence, nor by their proximate cause, which is in itself contingent and indifferent, nor by what will actually come to pass, nor by the decree of the divine will, since, as Molina maintains, this knowledge precedes every free act of the divine will. Therefore God cannot know conditional futures of such a nature. This consequence is demonstrated as follows. The knowledge of God must be certain and completely infallible. Therefore, if such an object of knowledge — namely, the contingent conditional future — possesses in no way certainty and infallibility, it cannot be the object of infallible divine knowledge, unless someone dares to blaspheme by affirming that the knowledge of God is fallible.
This reasoning implies, in our judgment, a demonstration such that those who defend the contrary doctrine deny the antecedent we have just presented and therefore try to ascertain how such conditional futures can possess a certainty that precedes the free decree of the divine will, whether absolute or conditional. Thus Molina, as we have already noted, maintains that God, by means of His most eminent comprehension of the free will of any particular man, knows in His own divine essence all that a man would do by virtue of his free will, if placed in a determinate order of things, with determinate circumstances and aids — knows, we repeat, all that he would do before the free decree of His divine will takes place. And since the divine comprehension of created free will is natural and necessary to God, they therefore add that God knows with certainty and infallibly what a man would do if placed in a determinate order of things, even though He simultaneously knows that this man could act in the opposite manner. And for this reason they say that this knowledge is middle. Indeed, it is not free knowledge, because the comprehension of free will precedes every free act of the divine will. Moreover, it is not in God’s power to know by means of this middle knowledge anything different from what He actually knows, since it is not in God’s power to act differently once man has been placed in a determinate order of things; yet in man’s power is the possibility of acting differently; consequently, God could have known something different from what He knows; therefore, this knowledge is not purely natural. Nevertheless, they add that it must be placed alongside the natural, so as to distinguish it from the free, even though it is not purely natural, because God cannot know the opposite of what He knows through it. For if the free will of man were to act in the opposite manner, as it really can, God would have known this very thing through this same middle knowledge.

III. We cannot but be astonished at the audacity of that man and of those who are pleased with this new invention, so contrary to the divine majesty. And we shall show this in the following way.
First, certainly, it is a chimerical and blasphemous fiction to affirm that the certainty of divine knowledge concerning what a man would do, placed in a determinate order of things and abstracted from every free act of the divine will, derives from the most eminent comprehension that God has of His created free will. For this affirmation withdraws from the divine will and providence the good produced by the created cause, since it certainly attributes to this cause an action that is independent of the divine will, even though the divine will is the cause of all good exterior to God, as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19; and on this point theologians affirm that it is most certain according to the faith that God is the free cause of all good and of every good action. Therefore it is impossible to imagine that a good action can come about through the free will of man placed in whatever order of things one may suppose, unless at the same time the free divine will is the cause of that future good action.
And it is not sufficient, as we have previously shown Molina to maintain, that God has freely determined to create free will in one or another order of things. For this solution does not escape the difficulty we have inferred through our argument; for it is not sufficient that the divine will has freely created man with his free will and placed him in a determinate order of things, but it is necessary to acknowledge that, in order for man’s action to be good, the decree of the divine will must precede it. And let Molina not think that by obscure fictions of this nature he blinds us to the point where we are unable to see that he intends to deny the free causality of the divine will, which inwardly effects the good action together with the free will of man. Indeed, for this reason he invents such middle knowledge, to explain how free will in its future exercise does not depend on God’s predefinition or predeliberation, as regards the exercise of the free action, but only on God’s willing to create a man with his free will and to place him in a determinate order of things with determinate circumstances.
Furthermore, God does not decide in advance the future action itself, although Molina concedes that God foreknows this action by means of middle knowledge, which is in part natural, by virtue of the most eminent comprehension of free will, and in part free — but not by the free will of God (for Molina denies that it is in God’s power to know anything different from what He knows) — but rather, in a certain sense, this knowledge is free almost externally, that is, through the created free will, in whose power would be the possibility of acting differently from what God has foreknown. And this is in reality what Molina intends to maintain when, as we have noted above, he affirms that it is not in God’s power to know anything different from what He actually knows; and yet God could have known the opposite of what He knows through this knowledge, since the created free will does in fact have the power to act in the opposite manner.
If his words are read attentively, it will become clear that this is Molina’s intention. For he considers that the freedom of created will cannot be conceived otherwise than as abstracted from the causality of divine predeliberation with respect to the exercise of its free action. We, on the contrary, maintain that Molina’s doctrine weakens the omnipotence of the divine majesty and of His free will, which is the first cause of all good, since God decides all good that is produced, both as regards its substance and its circumstances. And thus in Wisdom 8:1 it is said: “With great energy it reaches from one end of the universe to the other, ordering all things excellently.” And therefore we consider that God not only foreknows whether the free action itself will take place, but also predefines the manner and moment in which it will be produced by virtue of man’s free will. And it does not happen, as our adversaries maintain, that the freedom of the free agent is first. For this excellence belongs only to the divine free will, in whose power all things rest; and there is no one who can resist His will, since He is Lord of all things, as is said in Esther 3. From this passage the Church took the beginning for the Mass of a Sunday in summertime: “In your will, O Lord, all things rest...”³ For this reason it is said in Proverbs 21:1: “As a stream of water is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord; He directs it wherever He wills.”
We know that some of our adversaries dare to maintain that this testimony implies a necessary, not a free, inclination. But this manner of understanding things renders unnecessary the petition that David makes in Psalms 118:36: “Incline, O God, my heart toward Your word and not toward covetousness.” By these words the prophet does not ask for a natural inclination of the heart, like that of animals, but one that is free and meritorious before God. Of it he says a little further on in the same psalm, as though he had almost already obtained what he had asked: “I inclined my heart to attain Your justification...”

IV. Furthermore, we shall demonstrate that the existence of a divine middle knowledge can be maintained only irrationally. For it implies a contradiction that, from the divine comprehension of created free will, God should know with certainty and infallibly how free will would act if placed in a determinate order of things. For even with man placed in a determinate order of things, the essence of his free will, however much we may wish to singularize it, remains indifferent in itself. Therefore, from the comprehension of this singular free will, God cannot know with certainty its future determination to act in a determinate manner, since, as Molina says, such an order of circumstances does not determine free will to act in a determinate manner, but it can act differently. Therefore this free will and this determinate order of things are not in themselves the object of a certain and infallible knowledge; hence we must attribute infallibility to divine knowledge in another way, namely, from the free decree of the divine will, which wills all the good that is produced or permits evil.
This is demonstrated as follows: However eminent the comprehension that God can attain of a created free will may be through His necessary and natural knowledge, God always knows it as it essentially is. Therefore He knows through this comprehension that free will is indifferent. Otherwise, the knowledge that God has of an act would differ from how that act actually occurs, and therefore His knowledge would be false. Consequently, by virtue of the capacity of such comprehension, God knows only each and every act that free will could possibly perform, but not what it will perform when abstracted from the design of the divine will.

V. Furthermore, the angel comprehends the free will of man and yet, as Molina says, does not know what a man would do placed in a determinate order of things; nor does the soul of Christ possess such middle knowledge; nor does even God Himself have it of Himself, as our adversaries declare; nor does He know all conditional futures by consideration of free will itself, since Molina maintains that the most eminent comprehension is necessary above and beyond the known act, as he makes clear in his Concordia, p. 331, when he says: “For we do not understand how freedom would remain intact in God, if before the act of His will He supposed what it was going to do. For given such knowledge, He could in no way choose the opposite.” Thus Molina speaks. But it would certainly be remarkable that God should deprive Himself of His freedom to act by having foreknowledge of His own will, and yet should not suppress the freedom of free will, even while having foreknowledge of its future determination. For if the fact that God could act differently implied that God’s knowledge is fallible, it would equally follow — according to Molina — that it would be fallible if, given such foreknowledge of God, the free will could act differently.

VI. Furthermore, to know something is to know it through its cause. But it cannot without blasphemy be attributed to divine knowledge that, by knowing a created cause, it should also know its effect. For this would be a most great imperfection, just as it would also be to suppose that God, as He wills that one effect come about externally to Him, also wills that another take place — although we admit that God wills one effect to come about on account of another, as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19. The reason for this is that the will of God is directed immediately only to the divine goodness itself, which is the reason for willing all other things externally to Him, as Saint Thomas says in the same place, a. 2, ad secundum. Therefore in a similar manner, the reason for knowing something different from itself cannot be due to some extrinsic knowledge of the divine knowledge, but the entire reason for knowing what it knows must be in God Himself. Therefore that middle knowledge destroys the perfection of divine knowledge, since it would be the created future object, once comprehended by God, that would confer infallibility upon divine knowledge. We, however, do not seek this infallibility of divine foreknowledge outside God, but place it in the free decree of God, who works all things according to the design of His will or, if they are evil, permits them according to the design of His will.
Thus, with respect to divine knowledge, the common distinction established by theologians between knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision is sufficient, in such a way that through the former God naturally knows the essences of all possible things, and through the latter, free knowledge, He knows all that will come to pass insofar as this depends on the free decree of God, who wills that certain good works come about and permits others that are evil as a manifestation of His wisdom and omnipotence.
We consider it unnecessary to explain in this place how the distinction of the twofold knowledge mentioned is not taken from the formal distinction found in God, but only from the different analogies with the known things, by means of which this distinction can be spoken of in God.

VII. Finally, it is surprising that the defenders of middle knowledge, in order to refute the arguments we object against this knowledge, have recourse to a most eminent comprehension in an infinite degree of created free will, and yet claim that it is not lawful for us, in order to refute their sophisms, to have recourse to the infinity of the divine goodness, which is the reason why God wills that something exist externally to Him, according to the design and decree of His will; and on account of this infinity we maintain that God, vigorously, in an excellent manner and most efficaciously, confers strength upon our wills by producing in us the determination of our free will, so that it may be made like His own, in order to incline us toward whatever good He may desire. But certainly, after carefully examining the whole matter, it is necessary to acknowledge that we proceed in a far more pious manner than our adversaries in having recourse to the infinity of the divine goodness, since we intend to defend religiously the greatness of the supreme good, by which all good works come about infallibly and efficaciously without detriment to our free will. But our adversaries take refuge in the infinity of the most eminent comprehension of God, in order to favor the independence of created free will, for they do not wish to subject it to the vigorous and excellent decree of the divine will, because they say they do not understand how the freedom of man is preserved if God decides in advance the future choice of free will. But we, inasmuch as proper modesty and humility satisfy us, affirm that the predetermining predeliberation of God is free in the most eminent degree above our created freedom, in such a way that it does not destroy it but perfects it, when it introduces into our free will the infallibility of acting rightly and produces the right act itself in us and with us, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord. For it is not necessary to maintain that our free will is free in such a way that its work does not depend on the causality of the divine will, for He is the first to decide all good works and produces each one vigorously and in an excellent manner.

Chapter Seventeen

In which we respond to the two arguments proposed by Molina

I. It remains for us to respond to the most important arguments by which our adversaries believe they demonstrate that middle knowledge is necessary.
To Molina’s first argument, which we presented in chapter 15, we deny its antecedent, because the conditional future object is not a middle thing but an object for divine knowledge. For all that God knows externally to Himself, He either knows as necessary or as possible — and of this He gains knowledge through His divine essence — or He knows that it will actually come to pass at some point in time. The first type of divine knowledge we call “knowledge of simple intelligence.” And the second type of divine knowledge we call “knowledge of vision and free,” insofar as it presupposes the free act of the will of God, who wills that an object come to pass, if it is good. If, on the contrary, it is evil, it presupposes the free will of God, who permits the intellectual creature, which is in itself defectible, actually to depart from the order of divine law. And therefore it is in the divine power to know something else, because it is in God’s power not to do good nor to permit evil.
We therefore do not entirely deny every conditional future, but affirm that it does not constitute a new knowable degree for divine knowledge. For if God knows with certainty some conditional future, we affirm that He knows it through the free determination of His will, which can decide and determine an object conditionally, in such a way that this condition is maintained on the part of the decidable and determinable object. Thus we offer the passage from the Gospel of Saint Matthew 26:53, in which our Lord Jesus Christ says to Peter: “Do you think that I cannot pray to My Father, and He would send Me more than twelve legions of angels? But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled?” In this testimony two things must be understood: first, that Christ would suffer by the absolute decree of God; and second, that a certain conditional future would come about if the aforementioned condition were given. Certainly, in this conditional future there are two elements to consider. One is the consequence itself, namely: if Christ were to pray to the Father, God would send Him twelve legions of angels; and this consequence is necessary by reason of what is established by God’s own law, namely, that Christ would obtain whatever He asked absolutely. The second element is the condition itself, which belongs to the genus of the possible; for this reason, the consequent also belongs to the genus of the possible. Therefore all that God knows with certainty regarding this conditional future, He knows, as a genus of the possible, with natural and necessary knowledge. However, as regards the consequence we have presented as necessary — given the law established by God — He knows it freely through free knowledge, because it was in God’s power not to have legislated such a law and, to the same degree, He would not have known the correctness of this consequence, for if such a law did not exist, this consequence would not be correct. Therefore God knows no conditional future before the absolute or conditional decree of His divine will.

II. For this reason we can respond very easily to the demonstration of the antecedent of Molina’s first argument, which we presented in chapter 15, since, as human providence is uncertain, in order for the assertions that Molina offers to be true, it is sufficient that the man have the intention to act in such a way or that a probable conjecture be formed that, given that condition, some other future would follow. Now, a conjecture of this nature is opposed to divine foreknowledge, which is most perfect and not based on conjectures, though God most certainly knows that those conjectures are probable for us.
Saint Prosper, in his Epistola ad Augustinum de reliquiis pelagianae haereseos, censures those who were infected with the remains of the Pelagian heresy, because they invented, to confirm their error, certain futures that are not futures. In like manner, Luis de Molina invents such conditional futures in order, by injuring divine foreknowledge, to make men freer than is fitting.
To the second demonstration of the antecedent, which is the clear argument of our adversaries, we respond mainly, as do Saint Thomas, Saint Jerome, and Saint Gregory, that man cannot know the secrets of God. Saint Augustine also affirms the same in De dono perseverantiae, ch. 10, where, after presenting a certain solution of a Catholic disputant, he notes that it is better to refer the question back to divine predestination.⁴ He therefore says that, since the gift of faith was not given to the Tyrians and Sidonians, therefore they were denied the possibility of believing. And no injustice was done to them, since God justly abandoned them on account of their sins. However, we avoid one vice with another. For, since the new conciliators, being excessively curious, wish to give the precise reason why the Tyrians and Sidonians would have repented had they seen the miracles of Christ, but not so the Jews, they therefore intend to reduce this difference solely to innate freedom and not to some other special aid that God Himself would have offered to the Tyrians and Sidonians if such miracles had been performed among them. For this reason it seems necessary to us to respond to this argument. Indeed, we deny the consequence that our adversaries infer from the testimony of Christ, namely: therefore, with an equal aid on God’s part, the Jews would not have converted, but the Tyrians and Sidonians would have converted. And the reason why we deny this consequence is the following: in order for this conditional to be true, it is not necessary that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have repented in such a way that the act of repenting itself would not have been owed to the special gift of God, which the Jews did not receive on account of their greater sins. For we understand these two statements to be equivalent: the Tyrians and Sidonians would have repented; and God would have granted repentance to the Tyrians and Sidonians. For no one will deny that repentance is a gift of God which he who does not repent certainly does not receive. If someone, however, asks why Christ says that if such miracles had been performed among the Tyrians and Sidonians and they had heard the preaching, God would have granted them the gift of repentance that He was not efficaciously granting to the Jews, it must be answered that, in condemning Chorazin and Bethsaida, our Lord Jesus Christ wished to say that those Jews were worse than the Tyrians and Sidonians and therefore less worthy — or rather, more unworthy — than those to whom God grants efficacious aids. But indeed concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians, Christ, who knew the hidden designs of God, affirms that if such preaching, with such miracles, had taken place among them, God would have efficaciously conferred His aid upon them, so that they might repent.
Very similar to the aforementioned passage is that of the Gospel of Saint Matthew 12:41: “The men of Nineveh will rise at the judgment with this generation and will condemn it, for they repented at the preaching of Jonah, and behold, one greater than Jonah is here.” For Christ does not intend to say that the men of Nineveh repented at the preaching of Jonah with lesser internal aids, mercifully infused by God, but rather that our Lord Jesus Christ teaches that the Jews, despite being present at His preaching and miracles, were more unworthy than those to whom God inwardly provokes more efficacious inspirations so that they may truly repent. Thus the thought and intention of the Lord was to attribute to the Jews greater sins and greater hardness of heart than to the Tyrians, Sidonians, and Ninevites, and even the Sodomites, as is said in that passage of Jeremiah 4:6: “Greater has been the iniquity of my people than the sin of those of Sodom, which was destroyed in a moment.”
Therefore we have demonstrated, following the necessary theological method, that from the testimony of Christ it does not follow that, with an equal aid, one man is converted and another is not; likewise, we have also demonstrated that middle knowledge does not serve to establish the doctrine of Molina. For, even if we admit the aforementioned conditional future, which was undoubtedly known by God and confirmed by our Lord Jesus Christ through the infallible knowledge He possessed by reason of the abundant knowledge that had been granted to Him, nevertheless it does not follow from this that middle knowledge exists. For the conditional future object we have been discussing does not exceed the degree of possible being. Indeed, it was possible for God to have sent Christ at the time of the Tyrians and Sidonians. Furthermore, the aforementioned consequence would only be necessary by virtue of the conditional decree of the divine will, by which God would have decided to grant repentance to the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had performed among them the same miracles He worked in Bethsaida and Chorazin. This response is sufficient to refute the sophistical argument that Molina elaborates against the truth we judge to be Catholic.

III. Now, as for the testimony of the First Book of Kings, we can also respond that God decreed absolutely to remove David from the danger that was indeed hanging threateningly over him; and for this reason the Lord made use of that means to reveal to David — after he had inquired of Him — that such danger threatened him and, in this way, David, by fleeing from Keilah, was delivered from the danger.
As for the testimony of the Second Book of Kings, we can respond that this favors us, because there was no connection between Joash’s striking the ground five times and Syria thereby being destroyed unto annihilation, except solely through the conditional decree of the divine will that was revealed to the prophet himself. Furthermore, as regards other conditional futures that we might invent — for example, if God had not created the angels He created, He would have created or predestined others — we can certainly define nothing, but only know that God could have done many other things He did not do and could have not done others He did. But indeed, if we have a firm basis in Sacred Scripture or in the ordinary divine law, we can well define many conditional futures; for example, if Peter did not repent, he would be condemned; if Judas had repented, he would be saved. But with respect to other conditional futures, it is more pious to acknowledge our ignorance than to affirm something rashly. As to whether such conditional futures are contained formally or eminently in the decree of the divine will, this could be a matter for dispute among theologians; but we do not think that the definition of this question is necessary for elucidating the matter that occupies us at this moment.

IV. To Molina’s second argument, which we presented in chapter 15, we must respond that the greatest inconvenience involved in the affirmation of middle knowledge is that its defenders think it necessary for understanding the mysteries of the faith, especially predestination; and on top of this they add that we err dangerously if we do not admit it. Let the blessed judges consider whether it should be tolerated that, in order to understand the mysteries of the faith, recourse must be had to the new fiction of middle knowledge, when up to this day all Catholics have followed in the explanation of these mysteries the ancient manner of exposition, founded on the doctrine of the Holy Fathers and on the theological demonstrations we have presented; and what has been said concerning Molina’s sixth proposition is already sufficient.

1Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 12. Migne, P.L., 44, 977.

2Saint Augustine, Tract. in Joan., tr. 47, n. 7 ff. Migne, P.L., 35, 1736. Saint John Chrysostom, Homil. in Joan., homil. 60. Migne, P.G., 59, 328.

3Missale Romanum, 21st Sunday after Pentecost.

4Saint Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 10. Migne, P.L., 45, 1006.

Chapter Eighteen

In which the new dogmas that Molina teaches concerning the concurrence of God with secondary causes, in his seventh proposition, are mentioned

I. It is surprising what new inventions Molina and his followers wield in defense of their doctrine concerning the new concord. For in addition to their fictitious middle knowledge, which we have just refuted, they have invented a new philosophy concerning the concurrence of the first cause with secondary causes. Indeed, Molina says in his Concordia, dd. 26, 27, and 28, from p. 167 to p. 183, that God, with His aid and general concurrence, does not influence secondary causes by premoving them, but influences only the operations themselves and the effects of the secondary causes, without carrying out any premotion of the secondary causes themselves; and he thinks that the contrary doctrine destroys freedom of will and provides occasion for many errors. And this is the first thing he says.

II. Second, he says that the aid of prevenient grace for supernatural acts is an influence that God provides directed toward the faculty itself and that, since this aid is not infallibly followed by the effect, for this reason this aid does not eliminate freedom.

III. Third, he says in the same disputation 26, that God, through His general or special gratuitous concurrence, is a partial cause of the effect. Indeed, on p. 169, he says the following: “Wherefore it comes about that the general concurrence of God does not influence the secondary cause in such a way that this cause, having been previously moved by it, causes and produces its effect, but rather influences immediately with the cause upon its action and upon its effect.” And afterwards he explains this in the following way: “Since it cannot be denied that any effect of a secondary cause needs the immediate influence of God upon itself in order to be conserved, and also after the influence of the secondary cause has ceased, and much more in order to be produced anew; therefore we argue thus: certainly, either the general concurrence of God with secondary causes does not influence these causes previously so that their actions and effects may be produced, but influences immediately with the causes upon their actions and effects, as we attempt to demonstrate; or else, God, with a double general concurrence, influences the production of any effect in the following way, namely, with one concurrence He influences immediately upon the cause and through this cause mediately upon the effect, and with the other He influences immediately upon the effect, which until now no one has dared to defend.” With this and with other harmful arguments, Molina strives to demonstrate his false philosophy, to prove that God, with His general and special gratuitous concurrence, is a partial cause of the effect of the secondary cause; likewise also, Molina adds, when two men push a boat, neither owes his strength to the other, nor does one move the other, but from both together there arises a single total causality upon which the whole effect entirely depends in being produced.

IV. Fourth, he says that the general aid and universal concurrence of God are purely natural and serve equally for all natural effects as well as supernatural ones, whether good or bad, in such a way that the act of man, by force of this concurrence, is no more inclined toward faith or the act of charity than toward infidelity and hatred of God or fornication. Molina teaches this in his Concordia, disputations 26, 27, 37, and 39, and also in his Commentaria ad primam divi Thomae partem, disputations 6 and 8; and in this way he partly withdraws the influence of divine causality by making it a partial cause, and partly attributes to it what does not belong to it, because he says that this concurrence is purely natural and serves equally for supernatural effects both good and bad. Concerning this general aid he says many other things that ought to be examined attentively; we shall mention some of them a little further on.

Chapter Nineteen

In which it is shown that the aforementioned doctrine is contrary to natural reason

I. First, we shall present our argument against this philosophical invention. For Molina’s thesis weakens the discourse of natural reason, which shows that there is only one first mover and one first efficient cause. And we shall demonstrate this clearly as follows. If the causality of the secondary cause does not depend on the influence of the first cause upon it, but moves and produces without being moved by the first cause, then the discourse that Aristotle offers in his Physics, bk. 8, is vain — where he maintains that everything that moves is moved by another, in order thereby to arrive at a first unmoved mover.¹ If, therefore, the first cause concurs partially with the effect of the secondary cause by influencing the effect itself but not the secondary cause, then this discourse of Aristotle is vain and we lack natural reason to demonstrate that God is the first cause.
For a better understanding of this we note the following. First, philosophers distinguish two types of action of the secondary cause: for one action can be transient, as when a man generates a man and fire generates fire; or it can be immanent, such as vision, intellection, and volition.
Second, we note that it is evident to anyone that the secondary cause is perfected through immanent action, because it is constituted in second act, by which it becomes more like God, who is pure act. Hence the secondary cause, the less potentiality and the greater actuality it possesses, will be so much the more perfect. But it is not so clear how the secondary cause is perfected when it acts through transient action. However, wise metaphysicians show and demonstrate this, noting that each thing exists for its operation. Therefore, when the secondary cause acts, it is more perfect than when it does not act. This consequence is evident, because operation is the end of being: therefore the perfection of what exists consists in its operation. This is demonstrated as follows: when the secondary cause does not act, it is indifferent; but when it acts, its potency is already determined toward that to which, by its nature, it has been ordered by God. Therefore this complement is the perfection of potency.
If, however, someone asks in what the perfection of the agent that produces transient action consists, he will be answered that it consists in two things. First, certainly, in that, while it acts, it is necessary that the creature receive in itself the divine excitation that comes from the first being upon which it depends in its origination, conservation, and operation. Hence the actual subordination to God produces the perfection of the creature, for by it the creature can actually operate. Second, with respect to this perfection, it is considered that the more beings there are in the nature of things, so much the more perfect will each one of them be, as parts of a more perfect whole. And numbers serve as an example of what we say: for the greater a number is, each of the units of which it is composed becomes more perfect when a final unit is added to this number, because any unit added to it will be the hundredth or the thousandth. Thus, since all things are perfected at the arrival of something new, it follows from this that the secondary cause is perfected all the more which, through its subordination to the first cause, is the cause of something new in the whole. And for this reason metaphysicians consider that the relation of the secondary cause to the effect and of the effect to the cause is real, since by their nature they are mutually ordered as parts of a whole. Certainly, this does not hold in God, because God is in no way perfected through the production of creatures, for one who cannot be part of a whole cannot, by the same token, be a partial cause.

II. But against this doctrine Molina argues as follows. If God is a partial cause simultaneously with the secondary cause, it follows that, while God causes efficaciously, He is a party in the act of causing and, therefore, there would be no reason why the other partial cause could not really be attributed to Him as well. But it would also follow that the act of causing would be more perfect if we attribute its beginning to both causes simultaneously rather than to one separately; and for this reason, from God and the creature there would arise almost a more perfect beginning for causing the effect than from God alone, if He is a partial cause. This is made clear by the example that Molina presents of two men carrying a stone or pushing a boat, by which it seems evident that the causality and causal virtue are more perfect in both together than in one alone, when the entire effect is attributed simultaneously to both and not to each one alone.

III. But against Molina we can offer an evident argument. For from Molina’s doctrine it would follow that God and the secondary cause would be united accidentally to contribute to a single effect. This consequence is demonstrated as follows: the secondary cause was not acting before, but now it acts; similarly, the first cause was not previously producing the effect, but now it cooperates simultaneously. Therefore it is necessary to affirm that, unless some supreme cause is produced that unites the one and the other cause for the operation, they will be united accidentally to produce this effect — unless someone says that the secondary cause moves the first cause to cooperate with it. But then the secondary cause would be prior to the first cause in this particular operation. Therefore, what necessarily remains for us to say is that God Himself is not only first in existence but also in applying and determining the secondary cause to cooperate with Him in the effect that God Himself, here and now, wishes to produce according to the mode of being of the secondary cause — that is, that the effect be produced freely, if the secondary cause is free. And by this the freedom of the creature is not destroyed, but rather actually perfected by the supreme free will of the Lord, without whom nothing comes to pass.

IV. Finally, all that has been said is confirmed by the notable testimony that appears in Acts of the Apostles 17:25–28: “As God gives us all life, breath, and all things, in Him certainly we live, move, and exist.” Therefore God Himself not only gives us the power to live in fact — that is, to exercise the vital action — but also gives us the vital action itself. Certainly, Molina denies that God gives us all things, for if He does not give us the production of the effect nor the actual causality of the effect, it follows that He does not give us all things. Likewise, we must examine the expression “and we exist,” because by it is intimated the reason why we depend on God in all our works and movements — evidently, because God Himself is the cause of the existence and conservation of being itself, so that in this way creatures are not returned to nothingness. From this we take a metaphysical argument: every agent acts insofar as it is in act; therefore it is necessary that every agent depend, in its acting, upon that upon which its being depends. This consequence is evident, because being itself is, according to the wise metaphysicians, the first actuality of all things, as Saint Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4, where he affirms that God influences the secondary cause and not only its effect. And he explains it thus: while fire generates fire, it is necessary that it possess the form of fire; but the form of fire itself is not in act unless it has been actualized through its existence; therefore, upon that upon which the being of the form of fire depends, there also depends the actualization of fire, so that it may be in act and able to act; hence, also in acting it depends on God and on His influence; and indeed it depends on God all the more insofar as being itself is more formal than the specific form of fire. We recall all this so that it may be evident how Molina errs in philosophy when he seeks to introduce new dogmas into theology.

V. We can also easily respond to the objection that Molina mentions in the third proposition we reproduced in the preceding chapter. Let us recall that Molina does not admit that the first cause always produces two effects when concurring with the secondary cause: one in the cause itself and another in the effect. For our part, speaking in absolute terms, we maintain that two effects are not produced, but only one; and so also, when a craftsman — for example, a potter — shapes a jar, speaking in absolute terms, only one effect is produced, although the potter moves his arms, the wheel, and other pottery instruments. And the reason for this is that by the name “effect,” speaking in absolute terms, we understand the principal end toward which the influence of the first and the secondary cause is directed. In this way, therefore, it is said that in moral and natural effects the first cause of all concurs to a single effect — although it influences the secondary cause, causing it to act, and simultaneously also influences the effect of the secondary cause itself — without prejudice to our being able to distinguish two effects, one of which, however, would be subordinate to the principal one. In the same way, we also say that the sun and man generate man, but for this reason it must not be denied that the sun influences the man who generates. Therefore it is all the more necessary that the first cause of all, which is God, currently influence every secondary cause when it acts and as it produces the effect that God wills to be produced. For it is God who acts as a craftsman also according to His purpose, in willing that such an effect, here and now, be produced, by moving the secondary cause, which was previously in potency, to act according to its mode of being and its nature as secondary cause. And in this point Molina greatly deceives himself, because he thinks that God is a universal cause determinable by secondary causes, just as the sun is determined. But we do not believe in such a God, because in this way a great part of the divine greatness is suppressed, if we consider that, with the same influence and general concurrence, God concurs with all secondary causes in such a way as to be determined by all of them with respect to particular and singular effects; and even worse is that the general aid and the universal concurrence of God, as Molina affirms, should be equal for all supernatural effects, whether good or bad, as is clear from Molina’s fourth proposition, which we presented in the preceding chapter. For this reason, Molina also denies the efficacy of divine concurrence with respect to the effect that is a secondary cause, according to the particular mode of this effect.
For this reason, consequently, Molina also stubbornly denies that the special gratuitous aid of God is efficacious as it comes from Him. For he considers it sufficient that the man possess innate freedom with the purely natural general aid, so that, with the aid of prevenient grace, from the very first moment the man can act and does act by his innate freedom, determining these aids and making them efficacious for the effect that the man himself desires.
And therefore, in the second proposition cited in the previous chapter, Molina easily admits that the aid of prevenient grace for supernatural acts is an influence of God directed upon the faculty itself of free will, precisely because he says that from this aid the effect does not infallibly follow and in this way freedom is not destroyed. Thus Molina speaks. He therefore thinks that if from some aid the effect were to infallibly follow, freedom would be destroyed. Indeed, he constantly maintains that the determination of such an effect is not owed to any cause other than free will.
From this it also follows that, in the third proposition of the preceding chapter, he says that God, through His general or special gratuitous concurrence, is a partial cause of the effect. But we have always considered God a total cause — although, certainly, not using the word “totality” exclusively, as if God were the only cause and no other causes existed; but, since there is nothing with respect to Him that does not possess the nature of an effect, so also the secondary causes themselves, not only in existing but equally in causing, here and now, are effects of the first cause, who works all things according to the design of His will. And in this way we affirm that the decision of our free will is, on the one hand, freely owed to us who perform the action, and on the other hand, owed to God Himself, who decides in advance our good decision, insofar as it is good. But this is scandalous to Molina and his followers, since they say they cannot understand how this can come to pass. If, on the contrary, they did not claim to be the first to choose the good and to be free like God, nor to be more masters of their free actions than God Himself, perhaps they would understand how this can come to pass. Certainly, God reveals this to the little ones and conceals it from the wise, who want to know more than it is fitting to know. We are also amazed at how it can come to pass that men who sometimes cultivate piety leave to God only the perfect dominion of natural things or of other effects that only God Himself produces. For if God desired to incline the free will of man wherever He wished and could not do so except by exercising violence, then He would not be Lord of the exercise of freedom, but only man himself would have dominion over such exercise. And just as it is said that the wise man dominates the stars, because with his free will he makes use of their influences as it pleases him, so also these wise men claim to dominate God and to determine for whatever they wish the influence of His aids, which, as they come from Him, they consider indifferent.

Chapter Twenty

In which it is shown by conciliar canons and testimonies of the Holy Fathers that the aforementioned doctrine is false

I. Up to this point we have proceeded against Molina philosophically. Now, however, we intend to demonstrate theologically that his doctrine is contrary to the Catholic faith.
First, certainly, if a philosophical error diminishes the perfection of the author of nature, it must consequently be considered contrary to the faith, for the faith does not tolerate the attribution of something imperfect to the author of nature. But, as we have already said, the aforementioned error implies that God ceases to be the first and interior principle of all the being of the creature according to every mode of perfection. Therefore this is contrary to the Catholic faith.
Furthermore, this error coincides with, or is undoubtedly similar to, the error that Durandus commits in his commentary on the Sentences, II, d. 1, q. 5, when he affirms that God concurs with secondary causes only by conserving their natures and their powers. Molina himself cites Durandus in his Concordia, p. 164, claiming to excuse him from the error that Domingo de Soto points out in his Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis, bk. 2, q. 4. Indeed, Molina says that the doctrine of Durandus is false and unsafe; however, he does not wish to qualify it as erroneous, because he knows that it is very similar to his own doctrine. And we shall demonstrate this in the following way. For although Molina speaks of the general influence and even of certain prevenient aids of grace, he nevertheless maintains that they concur with the actions of the secondary cause only insofar as God proceeds to their conservation, but without influencing the secondary causes through His concurrence so that they may act — rather, the secondary causes themselves would determine the influence of the first cause. Here, therefore, is how Molina is barely distant from the doctrine of Durandus, because he believes that the entire error of Durandus’s doctrine consists in denying that God determines secondary causes in their effect and in affirming that God concurs with the effect only insofar as He conserves the efficient secondary causes. Nevertheless, Molina, although he places the actual influence of God — whether general or special — beyond the entity of substance and of the faculties, also denies that in the actual operation of the secondary cause there intervenes any actual influence of God, except through conservation. Indeed, if we reflect attentively, Molina does not explain differently the manner in which God influences the effect, since, according to him, the secondary cause determines the divine influence — whether general or special — to produce such an effect. Moreover, he thinks that this doctrine deserves the greatest consideration for understanding free actions. For he continually denies that the divine influence of itself, as it comes from God, brings efficacy with it, but only an indifferent sufficiency determinable by free will; indeed, he also denies that the helping and cooperating aid itself, of itself and as it comes from God, possesses a helping and concomitant determination and efficacy; for he thinks that it is always determined and made efficacious through free will, solely by virtue of its innate freedom. And therefore it will be helping and cooperating for as long as it pleases the man to act with it, and not for as long as the divine will has predefined that free will should follow God when He guides it, acting and cooperating.

II. The Holy Father Augustine and the other Holy Fathers, whom we have already cited above, think very differently about this matter, for they firmly maintain that the grace of God always precedes every good action and that our will is always a follower and is guided by the Spirit of God, not by its own spirit. Thus it is said in Psalms 79:2: “Guide us, O Lord” (Heb. גּוּמֵנוּ, אֱלֹהִים — Guide us, O God). And in Psalms 72:24: “You guided me by your will.” And the Roman Church prays: “May your grace, O Lord, always precede us and follow us (that is, accompany us) and immediately make us prepared to perform good works.”² But if the very grace of God, as it comes from Him, did not bring with it what we ask for, to what end would the Church ask for what has already been placed in our free will solely by virtue of its innate freedom? Since, however, she does ask for it, one must understand that the very grace of God enables us to propose to ourselves the performance of good works. And if, once prevenient grace has been received, we could act with it alone by our innate freedom, to what end would the Church ask that your grace, O Lord, always precede us and follow us? For, according to Molina, it lies solely in our freedom that prevenient grace follow us and accompany us by cooperating with us. Consequently, just as the Church asks God for prevenient grace that precedes the good action in time — because this depends on His will — so also the Church asks that God Himself deign to mercifully grant the aid of cooperating grace. And if Molina and his followers do not understand how, with this doctrine which we consider Catholic, the freedom of will in acting is safeguarded, let them believe, and let them understand once and for all. For Saint Augustine says in De praedestinatione sanctorum, bk. I, ch. 14: “For why, if what has been said is not understood, should it be denied, being as it is manifest?”³

III. Furthermore, as a confirmation of our doctrine, we cite the notable testimony of Saint Celestine, who was the first Pope with this name, taken from his Epistola ad episcopos Galliae, § 6, where he says the following: “God works in the hearts of men and in free will itself in such a way that every venerable thought, every pious decision, and every good action are owed to Him.” And in paragraph 9, as if responding to the argument of those who shamelessly maintain that a divine operation of such a nature causes free will to disappear, he adds: “For, without doubt, the aid and assistance of God do not destroy free will, but liberate it so that it may be luminous instead of darkened, just instead of iniquitous, sound instead of languid, prudent instead of imprudent.” Thus speaks Saint Celestine the Pope.⁴ We do not know whether one can speak with greater clarity against Molina and his new conciliators.

IV. Furthermore, in canon 20 of the Council of Orange it is said: “God works in man many good things that man does not do, but man does nothing good without God granting him the doing of it.”⁵ But truly, if God Himself did not confer virtue upon free will to perform the good action, how would it be verified that God grants to man the doing of it? It would only be verified, according to Molina, that God grants through the aid of prevenient grace the ability to act; but the action itself and the use of the aid, as Molina defends, would depend solely on the innate freedom of man. For this is what he defends when he says that God is a partial cause, together with free will, of the production of the good and free action. Now, Molina not only makes God a partial cause, but also a less perfect one, because he attributes to free will the completion of the work and to God Himself only the sufficiency. And in this way the beginning of the good work will depend on God, but its completion on us — contrary to the following passage from the Epistle to the Philippians 2: “For it is God who produces in you both the willing and the doing.” And contrary to canon 9 of the Council of Orange: “It is the function of divine office to make us think rightly and to turn our feet from falsehood and injustice. For as often as we do good things, God works in us and with us, so that we may work.”⁶ Here, moreover, the Council not only defines that God works with us by influencing, together with free will, upon the effect, but also that He works in us by influencing our very free will and moving it toward the good.

V. Furthermore, from what the Council of Cologne defends it is clearly gathered that God influences free will when the man efficaciously wills to repent and to be justified, for in its Enchiridion christianae institutionis, in the treatise on the sacrament of penance, p. 195, the following is said: “In order that we may will to do penance, to repent, and to receive the forgiveness of sins... God works with us by transforming our malevolent will into a benevolent one and causing it to consent with His will. Therefore, certainly, God changes our will and thus works in us the willing. But, nevertheless, since our will cannot change under compulsion, it cooperates with God while it consents with Him.”⁷ Behold that the Council openly proclaims that God with His aid influences not only the operation, but also the free will and the will of man, transforming it and causing it to become benevolent.

VI. And this very thing is confirmed by the Council of Trent, ses. 6, can. 4, when it defines: “If anyone shall say that the free will of man, once moved and excited by God, does not cooperate with Him, even though God excites and calls it to dispose and prepare itself to obtain the grace of justification... let him be anathema.” It must be noted that this definition of the Council refers not only to the moment when the man is justified with certain prior dispositions that precede in time the instant of justification — such as fear of hell, attrition, and other similar dispositions that accompany mortal sin, concerning which the Council of Trent (ses. 14, ch. 4, on penance) affirms the same thing, namely, that they are gifts of God and impulses of the Holy Spirit, who does not yet dwell within but only moves, so that the penitent, having been aided, may prepare the way toward justice — but the Council also speaks of the motion and excitation of God, which can suddenly enrich the poor man lacking any disposition that precedes in time the instant of justification.
Saint Thomas expressly maintains this doctrine in the Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad secundum, where he says the following: “Since man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God strengthens and moves him toward the good, it does not matter whether someone arrives at perfect preparation suddenly or gradually. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus 11: It is easy in the eyes of the Lord to suddenly enrich the poor. And so it happens that sometimes God moves a man toward some good, but not perfectly, so that such preparation precedes grace; or sometimes He moves him immediately and perfectly toward the good, and suddenly the man receives grace, as Christ says in the Gospel of Saint John 6: Everyone who hears the Father and learns comes to me. And so it happened with Paul, because suddenly and perfectly, even while he was increasing his sin, God moved his heart and therefore, hearing, learning, and coming, he suddenly attained grace.” Thus speaks Saint Thomas.
Therefore, since the definition of the Council must be verified in this case — namely, when a man is justified suddenly, as Paul was — we shall argue clearly against Molina from the words of the Council: when a wicked man is suddenly disposed to receive grace, God excites and moves his free will so that it may act and obtain the grace of justification, as is clear from these words of the Council: “once moved and excited by God”; therefore, God does not influence solely through His aid the operation of free will by which the man disposes himself to receive grace, but also influences by exciting and moving the free will of man. Therefore, the aid of God influences not only the effect but also the cause. From this doctrine of Saint Thomas, which is common among theologians, it is fully gathered that to attain justification the efficacious aid of God is necessary, which is distinct from the sufficient aid. For Saint Thomas says that sometimes God moves man toward the good immediately and perfectly and that thus the man receives grace suddenly. With these words, the Holy Doctor explains sufficiently that the perfect efficacy of the divine motion proceeds from God Himself.

VII. Furthermore, Saint Ambrose, in De vocatione gentium, bk. I, ch. 1, openly confirms our doctrine by refuting a certain error that circulated in those times — and that was undoubtedly very similar to the error of Molina — according to which, in the conversion of the sinner, God does not by nature previously move free will, so as not to harm its freedom, but only accompanies it; and this is expressly the explanation of Molina, as is clear from his third proposition which we have mentioned. Thus Saint Ambrose disputes against this error, condemns it, and teaches that, although God premoves the will, He does not suppress man’s free will.⁸ In this way, Saint Ambrose also defends the premotion of the will. However, Saint Ambrose does not refer solely to the precedence of the premotion in time — for this premotion is certainly already present before the operation of free will by which the man converts himself without detriment to his freedom — but also speaks of the premotion that actually concurs with free will in the good work; and Saint Ambrose denies that such premotion destroys free will.

VIII. Furthermore, as we said earlier, it sometimes happens that God, without prior dispositions in time, suddenly illumines and disposes the sinner for grace. We must ask Molina whether in such a case the man is justified without divine premotion. Certainly, he will deny it, on account of the danger that affirming the contrary would entail; for the Lord always prepares the will of man, and free will concurs in its justification only once moved and excited by God, as the Council of Trent defends, whose definition we have just presented. Thus, if this happens in this way, the divine premotion itself does not suppress freedom of will. Otherwise, the man would not be justified freely.
But Molina will consequently say that this divine premotion is not efficacious as it comes from God, but becomes efficacious through the consent of free will, since, even having received the premotion, it could fail to consent in the composite sense, so that the following conjunctive statement would reasonably be verified: the divine premotion is present in free will and free will does not consent. From this it would follow, as a necessary consequence, that the completion of the conversion would depend on free will and not on the premotion of God, which would be indifferent, according to Molina. Certainly, we leave it to the judgment of the blessed judges to determine the degree of discord that such a doctrine entails.

IX. Furthermore, Saint Bernard teaches how God influences the free will of men by premoving it — and not only its operation — in a certain treatise, namely De gratia et libero arbitrio, which he published against those who said that the prior and prevenient grace of God destroys free will. Toward the middle of the book — explaining the passage from Wisdom 8: it reaches mightily from one end of the world to the other — he says that this testimony demonstrates that God moves our wills toward good acts, leaving intact the freedom of man. Indeed, he says thus: “It reaches mightily, but not with inconstant comings and goings, nor with local diffusion, nor only with the strict assistance due to the subordinate creature, but with a certain substantial strength, present everywhere, with which, certainly, it moves most powerfully the totality of all that exists, orders it, assists it...”⁹ And at the end of the treatise he expressly maintains that God applies the will to action.

X. Also Saint Athanasius — explaining the Epistle to the Ephesians 2: for indeed we are His work... — teaches that God transforms our will, because it cannot act without God influencing our free will. Finally, with all the arguments wielded against Molina’s four propositions, we have shown that it is impossible that with an equal aid one man should be converted and another not; we have also proved with them that the efficacious influence of God upon free will is necessary, because free will is of itself indifferent and remains indifferent in choosing a new action even having previously received in time the general or gratuitous aids; therefore it is necessary that something superior predetermine it for the new effect to take place.

Chapter Twenty-One

In which the fourth dogma of Molina is refuted, which appears repeated often in his Concordia, in the places already cited

I. We have already intimated, in chapters 19 and 20, the absurdity of his doctrine — namely, that the general aid and universal concurrence of God should be purely natural and equal with respect to all natural and supernatural effects, whether good or bad, in such a way that the act performed from this concurrence possesses no more force for assenting to faith or to charity than to infidelity and hatred of God or to fornication. Above all, we are surprised at the manner in which Molina becomes enraged against us, or rather against the doctrine of Saint Thomas, because we maintain that God, with His general and natural aid, concurs with the act of sin but not with sin itself; and yet Molina maintains in the aforementioned proposition that the general aid of God concurs indifferently to good or to evil. But Molina will respond that he does not accuse us for what we say, but because we defend that God, with His efficacious aid as it comes from Him, concurs with the material element of sin. We, on the contrary, maintain that God does nothing at a given moment without having predefined from eternity that He will act as He does. He also concurs efficaciously with all good insofar as it is good. Therefore, without any dependence, He accomplishes with His efficacious aid whatever He wills to do.
But let us pass over this point, which would deserve a more subtle observation, and go to the heart of the matter. We judge it to be an error to maintain that the aid of God by which someone actually believes or loves is not by its nature more determined toward good than toward evil, nor more determined toward the natural act than toward the supernatural, but that it is the very will of man that determines the aid to perform one act rather than another. And we demonstrate our censure as follows. It is an error to maintain, as is clear from the aforementioned propositions of Molina, that the will of man determines itself to believe in the articles of faith and not on account of the efficacious aid of God. Therefore, for this very reason the aforementioned proposition is erroneous. Furthermore, this is confirmed by the arguments we set forth to prove that this proposition would imply that, two men having received an equal aid, one embraces the faith and the other rejects it.

II. We can also argue ad hominem. For Molina himself, in his Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, d. 12, toward the end, maintains that the aid of God is nothing other than the act itself as it proceeds from God. Therefore, if the general natural aid of God is sufficient for believing in everything that ought to be believed, then the act of faith itself — which is not distinct from this aid — will also be natural. But what do we object against Molina? Precisely this, which he expressly teaches, namely, that a man can believe, without any kind of doubt, in all the mysteries of the faith, thanks to the forces of his nature, solely with the general aid of the natural order. This he affirms in the cited place and also in his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, d. 4, 8, 13, and 19. Against this proposition even Francisco Suárez, of the Society of Jesus, in his Scholia on the matter of penance, d. 3, q. 7, on contrition, maintains that it is rash. But we are not surprised that he is so indulgent with his brother and colleague in other doctrines.

III. We, however, consider such doctrine erroneous. And we shall demonstrate it in the following way. First, because according to the faith it is beyond doubt that the aid of the grace of God is necessary for performing each one of the acts pertaining to salvation; but to believe without doubting in all the mysteries of the faith is an act pertaining to the attainment of salvation as its beginning and, as Molina maintains in his cited proposition, such an act brings about the fulfillment of the supernatural precept; therefore, Molina’s proposition is erroneous. We prove the major premise, for the minor is evident. We can easily prove the major, because in the Council of Palestine, held against Pelagius, as Saint Augustine recalls in his Epistola 106,¹⁰ and in the African Council, where 214 bishops gathered and which was confirmed by the Pontiff, as Prosper of Aquitaine relates in his Chronicon, it was defined that the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ helps us not only to know but also to do justice through each of our acts, in such a way that without it we would indeed neither possess, nor think, nor say, nor do anything holy or pious.¹¹ Thus far goes what the decree of the Council says. We also affirm that to believe without doubting in the mysteries of the faith is to think with assent about the mysteries of holy piety. Therefore, for believing in them the helping grace of God is necessary, and the virtue of our nature with the general natural aid is not sufficient.

IV. Second, we continue our demonstration by making use of what was defined by the Council of Orange, canons 6 and 7, in which it was decreed as heretical to affirm that anyone can, by the force of his nature and without the illumination of the Holy Spirit, say or affirm anything necessary for the salvation of eternal life, or consent to what is preached in the gospel.¹² Therefore Molina errs when he affirms that, thanks to the forces of his nature, anyone can believe with certainty what is preached in the gospel solely with the general aid of God, which is of the natural order.

V. Third, we continue our demonstration by making use of the Epistola ad concilium Carthaginense of Pope Saint Innocent, which appears in Epistola 91 of Saint Augustine; likewise, of the Epistola ad concilium Milevitanum, which appears in Epistola 93 of Saint Augustine; and of the epistle of Pope Saint Celestine to all the bishops, as he comments in his Epistola ad Gallos. All of them affirm the following, namely, that the daily heavenly aid which the saints implore is indispensable for carrying out all works of a nature necessary for attaining eternal life.
Similarly expressed are Saint Ambrose, in his commentaries on the Gospel of Saint Luke, bk. II, ch. 12; Saint Jerome, Contra Pelagianos, bk. III, from almost the beginning; Saint Augustine, Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, bk. III, ch. 5, also De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 2, De gratia Christi, chs. 26 and 47, Hypognosticon, bk. III, toward the end; and Saint Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia Christi, chs. 13 and 20 — all of them expressly teach that no one can believe, nor perform any act necessary for salvation, except by means of the help of the grace of God through Jesus Christ. Therefore, with the general aid alone and with natural forces — which are not given to us through Jesus Christ — we cannot believe with certainty in all the mysteries of the faith, nor fulfill the supernatural precept of believing. This would contradict what was decreed in canon 4 of the Council of Milevis and what Saint Augustine maintains in De fide ad Petrum, ch. 32, where he says: “Hold firmly the following and do not doubt it for a moment: indeed, a man can... read or hear the words of the gospel; but no one can obey the divine precepts unless God has strengthened him with His grace, so that he may feel with faith what he hears with the body.”¹³ But Molina affirms that, before receiving prevenient grace, the man can believe in all the mysteries of the faith and fulfill the divine precepts solely with his natural forces and with the general aid, which is of the natural order. Certainly, Molina reconciles free will very poorly with the gifts of grace on this point.

VI. Finally, it is frequently affirmed in Sacred Scripture that an act of this nature cannot be accomplished without God and without Christ. For example, in the Gospel of Saint John 15:5 it is said: “Without me you can do nothing.” But a man does a great deal without Christ who, by his natural forces, believes without doubting in the gospel and in all the mysteries of the faith, even if he is not charitable; for even unformed faith is a gift of God. Thus the response does not avail that all the aforementioned testimonies must be understood as referring to the formed act of faith and meritorious by charity. In like manner, Molina’s response lacks force — namely, that everything said is verified with reference to the act of believing related to the supernatural end, insofar as it is necessary for eternal salvation; for such an act would take place, according to Molina, not only with the general aid but also with the aid of prevenient grace, as he teaches in his Concordia, d. 8, q. 14, a. 13. However, such a solution is not correct.
First, certainly, because the act through which, by virtue of his natural forces and solely with the general aid, a man believes without doubt in all the supernatural mysteries of the faith is good and brings about the fulfillment, as Molina admits, of the supernatural precept. Therefore this act maintains a relationship with the supernatural end, since it is not ordered toward a natural end. But in fact, synderesis and natural prudence can in no way impose certainty of believing in the gospel and in the mysteries of the faith, although they can show, under some common reason, that they are credible. Therefore such certainty cannot have a purely natural efficient cause; hence it is not ordered toward a natural end but toward a supernatural one — therefore only by virtue of some cause that operates in a supernatural manner.

VII. Furthermore, the error of Molina is manifest. For in the aforementioned councils, and above all in the Council of Orange, in its canon 25, and in the Council of Trent, ses. 6, canon 3, it is affirmed: “If anyone shall say that, without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and without His help, a man can believe as it is fitting... let him be anathema.” But the expression “as it is fitting” seems to include three conditions, as Roberto Bellarmine notes in his Disputationes de controversiis christianae fidei, III, bk. 6, on grace and free will, ch. 3.¹⁴
The first condition: that the man believe with certainty by reason of the object, which can in no way be false, because it is certain that it has been revealed by God. The second: that he believe by reason of the subject, in such a way that the man does not doubt at any moment. The third: that the man believe by reason of the pious affection of his will, by which he submits to God in order to assent to the mysteries of the faith, which surpass all reason.
Of these three conditions, the first two depend on the intellect, the third on the will. Thus, since Molina maintains that the man can believe with certainty by means of his natural forces in such a way as to fulfill the precept of faith and avoid sin, it follows as a consequence that he can also believe with certainty by reason of the object revealed by God. But in fact, the precept of faith is not fulfilled if one believes in the mysteries of the faith by some human reason; for no human reason is capable of believing with certainty and firmly that God is triune and one.
On the contrary, Molina himself teaches that the pagan can, thanks to his natural forces, believe with as much certainty as his capacity as a subject allows, in such a way that he will sometimes believe more firmly than the Catholic by the habit of faith. Therefore, according to his doctrine, the intellect requires no supernatural aid in order to believe as it is fitting to believe, but only the supernatural aid is required for the pious affection of his will; thus it could happen that the man is saved without any supernatural illumination of his intellect. But this is manifestly erroneous, for without faith it is impossible to please God; hence Saint Paul says, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the Holy Spirit infuses faith into the intellect. Therefore, the solution of Molina is empty. Furthermore, it is erroneous to teach that a heretic or a pagan can assent with greater certainty to their errors than a Catholic to the truths of the faith. For in Sacred Scripture it is said not only that faith itself is in itself certain, but even that the faithful themselves have greater certainty in matters of faith than in matters depending on natural knowledge.
For example, in the Epistle to the Galatians 1:8–9, Saint Paul says: “Even if we ourselves or an angel come from heaven should announce a gospel different from the one you have already received, let him be anathema. Just as we have already said it, now we say it again: if anyone announces a gospel different from the one you have already received, let him be anathema.” And Saint Peter, in his Second Epistle 1:18–19, in order to explain the certainty of faith, says: “We heard this voice come from heaven when we were with him on the holy mountain, and thus the word of the prophets was made more firm for us, to which you do well to pay attention, as a light that illumines in a dark place.” Behold that Saint Peter affirms that faith in the prophetic word made them more certain than what the very sense of hearing made them when receiving the voice from heaven saying: “This is my beloved Son...” For his part, Saint John, in his First Epistle 5:9–10, says: “If we accept the testimony of men, greater is the testimony of God... He who believes in the Son of God possesses within himself the testimony of God.” Therefore, there cannot be greater certainty in the pagan or in the heretic than in any Catholic, however much it may be said that the pagan possesses greater certainty by reason of himself as a subject. For the certainty of the pagan is rather stubbornness and is based on no authority or reason; hence it can by no means be called certainty, but fiction and imagination of certainty.
And Saint John Chrysostom, in his Homilia 21 ad Hebraeos, declares: “It is said that faith can only be had in things that are not seen, for of those that are seen, each one will have had knowledge of them.”¹⁵
And certainly this explanation proves that otherwise the certainty of faith would not surpass natural certainty. For faith is what causes the subject to possess certainty. But, according to Molina, faith does not provide us with a stronger certainty than the certainty of the pagan or the heretic. Therefore, according to Molina, the certainty of faith does not cause the subject to adhere more firmly to the supernatural object. And we have briefly addressed in this chapter the fourth dogma of Molina concerning the concurrence of the general aid of God. We have by now said enough about his seventh proposition.

Chapter Twenty-Two

Which contains the false dogmas of Molina on the mystery of predestination

I. Luis de Molina, erring — as we have already demonstrated — in the definition of free will and wishing to understand how free will is reconciled with divine predestination, falls into several grave errors. For since Sacred Scripture frequently proclaims that predestination takes place according to the design and free choice of God, Molina, so that he may not appear to contradict the apostolic teachings with his new concord, invents a thousand ways of expounding it, thereby attempting to escape censure. In this way he invents that middle knowledge and the foreknowledge of the good use of free will by virtue of its natural and innate freedom alone, in order to explain with these the difference and the reason why God would have chosen some men and not others and would have predestined them to eternal life. And although at the outset he attempts to explain in his own favor and in his own manner the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas on predestination, he nevertheless does so in vain and, finally, openly vilifies them, as though they were ignorant of the true concord. Let his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, q. 23, a. 1, m. 6, from the first to the eighteenth column, and his Concordia, p. 431 and following, be read, and it will be found that he always intends to attribute, as the first foundation, the difference between the predestined and the non-predestined not to the decree of the divine will, but to the good or bad use of free will, which God would have already foreknown would take place by virtue solely of the innate freedom of men.

But it is worthwhile to repeat in this chapter some words of Molina, so that our censure may not strike blindly. Luis de Molina, in his Concordia, q. 23, a. 4 and 5, d. 1, m. 6, p. 431, says thus: “Having completed our refutation, let us return to the matter; without prejudice to the great respect that Saint Thomas deserves from us, we are not surprised that the doctrine most common among the scholastics — especially understood in the manner that follows from the words of Saint Thomas in the cited place — is judged by many to be excessively harsh and unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency.” And he says many other things of the same kind, which we shall refute further on. But now we shall repeat other propositions of Molina.

II. He also says in the same place, m. 10 and 11, that predestination does not depend on us. But he explains his doctrine by maintaining that God, through that middle knowledge which he invents, has known many rational creatures, many orders of things, and many different aids with which He could lead men and angels to beatitude, and that from all of these He has chosen this order of things which He actually decided with respect to nature and grace; and in choosing this order He has predestined men and angels through certain determinate means and aids. And since from all those orders He willed one and predestined men through certain aids rather than through others, for this reason alone he says that predestination depends solely on the will of God and not on us; and he says that it comes about according to the purpose of the grace of God.

III. Third, he says that predestination as it actually takes place presupposes two things, among others: first, middle knowledge by which God, thanks to His most eminent comprehension, knows what any man would do if he were placed in a determinate order of things with determinate circumstances; and second, the design of granting sufficient means of such a nature that the man can with them attain beatitude. And he says that predestination is accomplished through the will of God, by which He decides to confer upon adults and children the means with which He knows they will attain beatitude — whether by their own operation, as happens in adults, or by means of another operation, as occurs with children. This divine will, however, presupposes the middle knowledge through which God knows that these men will actually arrive at eternal life by means of such aids. This Molina affirms in the place cited above, m. 9.

IV. Fourth, he says that upon this predestination — insofar as it concerns the aforementioned act of the divine will and purpose to confer such aids — the reason or condition of the good use of free will does not depend; on the contrary, the reason or condition of predestination itself is to be found in the use of free will and in the cooperation of the predestined person, as regards the act of foreknowledge which such predestination presupposes.

V. Fifth, he says in the same place as before, in the eighth conclusion, that the reason for the predestination of any particular adult must be sought in the use of his free will; such predestination depends on man in such a way that it depends on his will whether in him there is found the reason for his predestination or only the reason for the providence by which God provides man with sufficient means to attain salvation. For insofar as the adult wills to cooperate with these means, it follows that providence attains the character of predestination, since otherwise there would be only providence. From this he infers that the reason for predestination depends on the will of the adult who wills to cooperate with these aids; and Molina affirms that this cannot be denied without failing in the faith; and he extends this to the angels, of whom he says that they were left in a common providence of supernatural means. Wherefore he affirms that it is necessary to presuppose in their predestination the foreknowledge of the means and of the good use of their free will. Molina maintains this in the same place, § Possumus confirmare.

VI. Sixth, he says that the predestination of men is not secure and infallible by force of the means and aids which the will of God confers upon the predestined so that they may attain beatitude; hence he attributes the security of predestination solely to that middle knowledge. For otherwise, on account of the freedom of our will, it could never be assured with certainty that with such means someone would be saved. Indeed, Molina also considers it possible that someone who has been predestined and who has received such aids might not be saved, and he affirms this in the cited place, m. 9, concl. 2 and 8. He even adds that if we maintain that predestination is guaranteed by such aids, we destroy freedom of will and fall into abundant errors. And this he says in the cited place, m. 6, § Certe non dubitarem, and in his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, q. 14, a. 13, d. 18, m. 2 and 3. From this he infers that, without such foreknowledge, despite having received the providence and aids of God, predestination is no more secure than common providence, as this author concludes in m. 9 of the cited place.

VII. Seventh, he says that God does not predestine any man on account of his foreseen merits, nor on account of the foreseen good use of his free will. However, the only thing he does is substitute this formulation, because he says that adults are predestined by means of their own foreseen merits and not without foreknowledge of the good use of their free will. And he says that this must be affirmed in conformity with the faith, as he writes in his Concordia, q. 23, a. 5, d. 1, m. 8, especially in the last paragraph, and in his Commentaria, q. 23, a. 5, m. 9. But in the Concordia, m. 9, explaining this doctrine more deeply, he says that the good use of free will is the cause without which there is no predestination, and that this must be affirmed in conformity with the faith, in such a way that neither the Apostles nor the Most Holy Virgin were predestined otherwise than by virtue of the use, foreknown by God, that they were going to make of their free will, as a causa sine qua non. This he also says in his Concordia, in the place cited above, m. 6 and 7. And he considers the doctrine of Saint Thomas and Saint Augustine — which does not explain predestination and reprobation through the foreknowledge of the use of free will — to be excessively harsh and unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency, because, according to it, Molina says: “God, without taking into account the use of free will, would have chosen and predestined from eternity only certain men for one single or principal end — abandoning the rest, who on the contrary would be almost innumerable, since they would not have been chosen or predestined, and knowing at once that for this very reason they were going to be reprobated — namely, so as to have in this way those whom to punish and upon whom to apply His punitive justice. What justice, goodness, and clemency does he require who, by his will alone, without taking into account the use of each person’s free will, would have decreed that certain particular men be predestined and others reprobated? Certainly, this seems more fitting for someone harsh, fierce, and cruel than for the most clement source and author of all consolation, goodness, and piety. For this reason, divine justice, instead of being made trustworthy, is obscured.” Thus speaks Molina.¹⁶
And again he infers in m. 8, § Quo loco, that it is not because God has foreknown and predestined a particular man that he will be saved, but rather, on the contrary, he will be saved because his will will have made good use to the end of the aids of God; and for this reason God will have foreknown that this man will be saved. Indeed, toward the end he seems expressly to defend that the cause of our predestination is in us and in the good use of our free will. And although from time to time he seems to deny this very thing with other words, he nevertheless maintains it in many places, especially in the cited place, m. 9, concl. 9, and reasons 5 and 6, where he demonstrates it thus: God predestines in order to justify and save adults in the same way that they are in fact justified and saved in due time; but it depends on their free will that they be justified and saved; therefore, it depends on their free cooperation and on the influence of their free will that from eternity they have been predestined through these means. This Molina says.

VIII. Eighth, he says, in the same place, m. 8, that the cause that produces the total effect of predestination is in us, and that the effect of predestination depends on our free will.

IX. Ninth, he says that the magnificence of the justice of God is not the principal cause of the permission of sin. He teaches this in his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, q. 23, a. 3, and in the Concordia, in the same article.

X. Tenth, he says that God is accustomed to permit the sins of children and their eternal condemnation in order to punish the crimes of the parents. Molina maintains this in his Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, d. 33.
These are the principal dogmas that Molina defends on the matter of predestination; and they seem to us deserving of grave censure.

Chapter Twenty-Three

In which the common refutation of the aforementioned doctrine on predestination begins

If we had to refute in its every detail the aforementioned doctrine on the mystery of predestination, we could not compose a book of small extent. But our intention is that the present treatise be as brief as possible, so as not to weary the sacred judges and censors, nor to delay, by prolixity of writing, the verdict on this cause.

I. First, who does not notice how openly Molina departs, in his first proposition, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, which is common among the scholastics — without prejudice, he says, to the great respect that the Angelic Doctor deserves from him? In the prologue of the Concordia he says from the very first moment: “Since we have decided to follow the doctrine of the first part of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas, who is the great sun and source of scholastic theology...” Now, on the contrary, in the most grave mystery of predestination, without the light of this sun, he decides to penetrate by a new path through darkness. He also dares, deliberately and knowingly — as is manifest in his seventh proposition — to judge the path and doctrine not only of Saint Thomas but even of the Holy Father Augustine as excessively severe and unworthy of divine goodness and clemency, even though the common doctrine of theologians has followed Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas for so many centuries. And behold that there arises a new commentator of Saint Thomas, who departs in almost everything from his teaching and yet calls him master and preceptor, though he refuses to be his humble disciple in the most profound mystery of predestination.

II. We, for our part, offer our judgment and our censure of the whole doctrine of Molina on the matter of predestination, maintaining: first, that this author speaks with excessive boldness and presumption; second, that he shows himself unjust not only toward Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, but also toward other Holy Fathers; third, that he approaches the heresy of the Pelagians; fourth, that he repeats all the errors that we already condemned in the censures of his preceding propositions.
And certainly the audacity and temerity of this author are apparent in his own words, for in the Concordia, q. 23, a. 5, d. 1, last m., he expressly boasts of having discovered that middle knowledge and claims that if the Holy Fathers, or even Pelagius and other heretics, had known it, they would without any doubt have followed it, abandoning their own doctrines, and the faithful would have been moved to less sedition than with the doctrine of Saint Augustine, and all the heresies that arose from this cause would have been struck down. It is impossible to exonerate this proposition from the charge of temerity, because Molina, deliberately and knowingly, not only despises the common doctrine of the schools of theologians — which is indebted to the thought of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas — but judges it to be pernicious and should be rejected, and presumptuously substitutes it with his new doctrine, as is the custom among heretics, according to what Saint Vincent of Lérins says. And it is surprising that he arrogates to himself such great merit as to think that before him the Church had no firm and true doctrine on the concord of free will with grace that gave rise to no error and through which it refuted the heresies that arose. And in this way we demonstrate the first two points of our censure.

III. The third point of our censure we demonstrate as follows. Since Molina attributes the reason for the difference in the predestination of each particular person, as a first foundation, to the good use of free will by virtue of its innate freedom, and not to the decree of the divine will except insofar as the foreknowledge of this good use is presupposed, he certainly is not far from the heresy of Pelagius; and for this reason Molina himself acknowledges that Pelagius would easily abandon his own doctrine to embrace his. For although Pelagius did not affirm that gratuitous supernatural aids precede the good use of free will, as Molina does, Pelagius nevertheless affirmed that these aids do not precede, because he thought they would destroy freedom if their efficacy were to come from God. And therefore Pelagius affirmed that if supernatural aids are not efficacious of themselves, but it is free will itself that must, by virtue solely of its innate freedom, embrace the faith, then these supernatural aids are superfluous, excepting those through which the gospel is preached, made known, and men are taught what they must believe and do. Therefore Molina rightly says that Pelagius would easily adopt his doctrine. But to us, on the contrary, it seems that he thanks him as his patron.
Now, we are most certain that Saint Augustine would completely reject and condemn the doctrine of Molina and would consider it infected with Pelagianism and therefore born of human pride, as we already made clear with the testimonies we cited from Saint Augustine to refute Molina’s first four propositions.
Finally, we do not doubt either that Luther would in like manner be grateful to Molina for his doctrine, because in reality Molina exonerates him from all blame by approving the consequence that Luther maintains as necessary from the principles that Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, and the common school of theologians defend as necessary. Therefore Luther, understanding the antecedent of the consequence in the same way as the doctors of the Roman Church in his time, would not sin when he affirms that free will does not exist, because, according to Molina, such a consequence would be necessary.
Thus Molina excuses Luther, pleases Pelagius, and shows himself unjust to Saint Augustine — as if Saint Augustine had been so obtuse as to be ignorant of this consequence, namely: if God, by His will alone, without taking into account the use of free will, loved, chose, and predestined certain men from eternity for eternal life and abandoned others — though nevertheless all men were equal — with such predestination free will would be destroyed and divine goodness would be defamed among men.
But Saint Augustine, on the contrary, denies this consequence and teaches humility to men, following the doctrine of the Apostle Saint Paul, so that they may not attempt to know more than it is fitting to know, nor claim to be scrutinizers of the divine greatness, lest their own vanity overwhelm them. For he always teaches in this mystery of predestination that the ways of the Lord are inscrutable and unfathomable. Let Saint Augustine be read, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14, at the end of the chapter, where he says thus: “Why do some have ears to hear and others do not — that is, why has the Father granted the former to come to the Son and not the latter? Who has known the mind of God, or who has been His counselor? Or you, O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Epistle to the Romans 9:20 and 11:34) Must that which has been revealed to us therefore be denied, because what lies beyond our reason cannot be comprehended?” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.¹⁷

IV. But behold that our Molina thinks that the evident reason why some have ears to hear and others do not is to be found in the good use of free will, which would not be an effect of divine predestination; and therefore Molina decides to deny what Saint Paul says — whose doctrine the Holy Fathers who speak of the mystery of predestination follow — because he says he does not understand how freedom of will can be saved with such predestination. This was the ruin of Luther, who did not dare to deny the antecedent, because he thought that Saint Paul could not be doubted, but who also considered its consequence to be necessary. For this reason he inferred that free will does not exist. But this was also the ruin of Pelagius, who, considering the same consequence correct, denied the grace of divine predestination, because he could not deny free will, the existence of which his own experience made manifest. For indeed, from the denial of the consequent he argued the denial of the antecedent: free will exists; therefore there is no such predestination of grace.
Thus, if we examine this question attentively, we see that the root of both heresies arises from the acceptance of the same consequence. But the difference is that Luther argues as follows: there is predestination; therefore there is no free will. Pelagius follows the same line of consequence but, from the denial of the consequent, argues the denial of the antecedent: free will exists; therefore there is no predestination. Therefore those who give their assent to the establishment of a consequence of such a nature favor both heresies. But Molina takes the Pelagian side, because, in order to defend free will, he decides to abrogate the grace of divine predestination, placing on our side the cause of the total effect of predestination and maintaining that the effect of predestination follows from our free will, as we have shown in the eighth proposition offered in the preceding chapter.

V. We, for our part, unanimously incline neither to one side nor to the other, and deny the consequence that both heretics infer. For from the affirmation of free will it does not follow that there is no such predestination as Saint Augustine and the Holy Fathers understood it and as the Thomist school teaches — nor does it follow, from such predestination, the denial of free will — but rather, on the contrary, we defend that free will, by virtue of such predestination, is perfected to the highest degree and made like unto the divine free will, not only while God excites it firmly and in an excellent manner, but also while He moves it efficaciously and strengthens it in the good, so that it may infallibly and most securely attain eternal life.
And he who cannot understand this ought to believe it humbly; thus the ingenious Cajetan, in his commentary on ch. 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, acknowledges that he does not know how to reconcile the freedom of our free will with divine predestination, but nevertheless maintains with firm faith that there is both predestination and freedom of will. And Molina cites Cajetan in his Concordia, in the place we pointed out when offering his first proposition in the preceding chapter. And certainly it would be better for Molina if, like Cajetan, he were to make his intellect captive to submission to the faith, rather than exalting himself by teaching a new way of understanding a concord that until now no one has been able to understand. And in truth, if the doctrine of Molina were true, those who admitted such a concord would understand it easily. But to us such a concord seems impious and blasphemous, because, in order to defend free will, it suppresses from God what is proper to Him — namely, that He works all things according to the design of His will.
But we, as we already said in the prologue of this treatise, shall not directly produce human demonstrations aimed at allowing the human intellect to understand clearly this incomprehensible concord; we nevertheless declare that, according to the faith, both are certain — namely, such predestination exists and, despite it, the free will of man is preserved. Likewise, we declare ourselves capable of evidently refuting the arguments wielded against this truth. For it is one thing to directly demonstrate a truth and another to evidently respond to the arguments wielded against a believed truth. We believe that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are really three distinct persons in unity of essence; and this is certainly for us a dark and incomprehensible mystery; and yet, to the arguments of the heretics we respond evidently that they do not demonstrate this to be impossible. And this is the duty and the pious office of theologians — and moreover, not to wish to know more than it is fitting to know.
In this way, regarding the aforementioned concord, we affirm that it cannot in truth be directly demonstrated in this life; nevertheless, to the arguments of our adversaries one can respond evidently, and we shall show this in the third part of this treatise. For the rest, the third and fourth points of our censure proposed in this chapter are already sufficiently demonstrated by everything that has been said.

1Aristotle, Physics, 241b33. Saint Thomas, lect. 1–2 and 7–8.

2Missale Romanum, 16th Sunday after Pentecost.

3Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum. In reality, this belongs to De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14. Migne, P.L., 45, 1016. Formerly these two works were often cited as a single work composed of two books.

4De gratia Dei indiculus seu Praeteritorum Sedis Apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates. Mansi 4, 460 and 462.

5Mansi 8, 716.

6Ibid. 8, 714.

7Canones concilii provincialis Coloniensis anno 1536 celebrati, ed. Parisiis 1545, t. 94v.

8Ps-Ambrose, De vocatione omnium gentium, bk. I, ch. 1; bk. II, ch. 26. Migne, P.L., 51, 649 and 711–712.

9Saint Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 10. Migne, P.L., 182, 1029.

10Saint Augustine, Epistola 106. Migne, P.L., 33, 816.

11Mansi 4, 461.

12Mansi 8, 713.

13Saint Augustine, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 32. Migne, P.L., 40, 775.

14Bellarmine, Roberto, Opera, ed. Vivès, Parisiis 1873, t. 6, p. 111.

15Saint John Chrysostom, Homiliae in epistolam ad Hebraeos, hom. 21. Migne, P.G., 63, 151.

16Molina, Luis de, Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, ed. cit., p. 431.

17Saint Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 14. Migne, P.L., 45, 1016.

Chapter Twenty-Four

In which we begin to refute in particular the dogmas of Molina which we have set forth

I. In addition to the arguments we have set forth in common against Molina’s propositions on predestination, it is necessary to demonstrate the falsity of these in particular. And indeed in the preceding chapter we have already sufficiently censured his first dogma. Concerning his second dogma, one must note how cautiously Molina speaks. For he begins very gently, saying that the cause of predestination is not in us; but afterwards, in explaining what predestination he is speaking of, he boldly bites and tears apart the reason of predestination as Saint Augustine defines it and as Saint Thomas and the schools of theologians take it. For he explains predestination only as a choice of God, by virtue of which, from among all possible orders, God chooses one order and decides to give men certain aids that are not efficacious of themselves for men to be saved with certainty, but only decides to give certain aids determinable by man himself, so that he may thereby attain his justification and salvation. And this common providence Molina calls “predestination” in his second dogma. And he thinks that in this way it can be sufficiently demonstrated that the cause of predestination is not in us and that predestination is accomplished according to the purpose of the grace of God. For it can only depend on the divine will that God should have wished to provide a determinate order of things with determinate aids and circumstances.
Furthermore, he denies that that effect — namely, the justification and salvation of certain men — is owed to the predestination of God as an efficacious cause, but maintains that before it must be presupposed the foreknowledge of the good use of free will, which, according to Molina, would not be the secure and infallible effect of predestination, as we shall show quite clearly when we come to his following dogmas. For in the third, in the distinction he presents, Molina shows that his doctrine attributes infallibility to predestination not of itself, but by virtue of that middle knowledge with which God knows what any man placed in a determinate order of things would do. And he says that predestination is accomplished through the will of God, by which He decides to confer these means upon adults and children.
But nevertheless, in his fifth dogma he spits poison when he says that the reason for the predestination of any particular adult must be attributed to his free will, upon which such predestination depends, in such a way that it will depend on his will whether in him there is found the reason for his predestination or only the providence by which God provides man with sufficient means for his salvation. Behold that Molina clearly thinks that it does not depend on God, nor on the divine decree, that the reason for predestination in particular should be in the divine predefinition, but that he reduces the difference between the predestined and the non-predestined solely to the use of free will, whose effect never follows efficaciously from the design of the divine will.
All this and similar things Molina teaches as following consequently from his first four propositions, which we have already refuted above. Thus he also speaks consequently when he says that the predestination of a man is not secure and infallible solely by virtue of the force of the means and aids which the will of God assigns to the predestined. He also speaks consequently in his seventh and eighth propositions, because he thinks that no aid is efficacious as it comes from God. And this is the root of almost all the errors of the new concord by which Molina attempts to persuade, since he does not think that freedom of will can be saved in any other way.

II. Therefore, so as not to be lengthy, we establish the following conclusions against the aforementioned doctrine.
First conclusion: It is an error contrary to the Catholic faith to affirm that the reason for the predestination in particular of any predestined adult is owed to and depends on the foreknowledge of his free will, in such a way that God would not predestine anyone to eternal life with an absolute and efficacious will, except under a certain mutable condition of the good use of free will.
We prove this conclusion as follows. First, with the eloquent testimonies of Sacred Scripture. For example, in the Epistle to the Romans 9:6–8, the Apostle Saint Paul, wishing to show that even though certain Israelites had departed from the faith and from eternal salvation, the promise of God had not thereby departed, says the following: “It is not that the word of God has failed; nor that all who are descended from Israel belong to Israel; nor are all children of Abraham because they are his offspring, but through Isaac shall your offspring be named. This means that it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are counted as offspring.” Thus speaks Saint Paul, and on this passage Saint Thomas and other holy interpreters hold. By this testimony Saint Paul manifestly expresses that the effect concerning the predestined depends absolutely on the word and promise of God and not on the mutable use of the free will of men.
Saint Paul confirms this still more strongly — adding in vv. 11–13 the example of Jacob and Esau — by saying: “For before they had been born or had done anything good or bad, in order that God’s purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” Thus speaks Saint Paul. Let us now see how Molina reconciles his doctrine with the apostolic testimony. For Saint Paul says: in order that God’s purpose of election might continue — that is, it would be firm by virtue of God’s own election and not by the foreknowledge of the use of mutable free will. For if predestination were secure in particular by the foreknowledge of the good use of free will, it would not be secure by virtue of God’s election and of the purpose of conferring sufficient means that men could use well or badly indifferently.
Likewise, Saint Paul — when he says: for before they had been born or had done anything good or bad — does not refer to the good or bad work they could have done in their mother’s womb, but the sense of what he says is, according to the common interpretation, that without taking into account the good or bad works that of themselves and by their innate freedom, by virtue of the nature of their free will, they were going to do, the divine election of Jacob preceded and through it remained firm the purpose of God to save Jacob and not to predestine Esau. But Molina does not admit the firmness and infallibility of predestination by virtue of the firmness and efficacy of the divine design, but only by that middle knowledge with which God knew how Jacob would act if placed in a determinate order of things, with determinate circumstances and sufficient aids, in such a way that with these, if he so willed, solely through his innate freedom, he could act well and persevere. But since we have already shown above that this middle knowledge is a fiction and lacks infallibility by virtue of the comprehension of human free will, it is clearly gathered that Molina destroys the firmness of divine predestination by not making it rest on the absolute will of God as a most efficacious principle, by which He willed to choose a particular man with most efficacious means and aids, in such a way that no one could snatch the predestined sheep from His hand.
Furthermore, Saint Paul, as if foreseeing that proud men would arise who would investigate the reason for the difference between Jacob and Esau, attributing it not only to Him who calls, but also to some other cause, says thus in v. 14: “What then shall we say? Is there injustice on the part of God?” Here, certainly, is the reply to Molina. For Molina says that the predestination taught by Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, and their disciples makes God cruel and unjust. But what does the Apostle Saint Paul answer? Does he have recourse to the middle knowledge of the future good or bad use of free will upon which God’s election would depend? Certainly not; rather he says: “By no means! For he says to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy.” Behold that Saint Paul reduces the response to the proud question solely to divine mercy and not to him who wills or to him who runs. For although men, through their free will, may will and run, nevertheless it is God who by His mercy causes men to will and run efficaciously, as we have already maintained above in the refutation of Molina’s third and fourth propositions.
Finally, the Apostle Saint Paul, in the aforementioned ninth chapter, closes the mouths of the proudly blaspheming. For he says thus: “You will say to me then: why does He still find fault?” That is, why does God complain of us when we sin, if, by not granting us efficacious aids, He hardens us? For who can resist His will? And Saint Paul responds: “O man, who are you to answer back to God? Has the potter no right to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?” Certainly, Saint Paul, as a pious doctor of souls, would not respond so forcefully if the doctrine of Molina were true. For it would be easy to soften the hearts of the ignorant by responding that the entire reason for the difference between the vessel of honor and the vessel of dishonor is reduced to the free will by which each makes the vessel appropriate for honor or for dishonor. But the Apostle Saint Paul thinks nothing of the sort; rather he reduces the difference between the predestined and the non-predestined to the first and ancient root — the divine will — attributing in common the reason for this difference, by which God would have willed to predestine some but not others, to the manifestation of divine justice and mercy.
Moreover, neither Saint Paul, nor Saint Augustine, nor Saint Thomas, offer any explanation of the reason why God predestines one man and not another, for this truly concerns only the divine will, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 23, a. 5, ad tertium, citing Saint Augustine apropos the testimony of Saint John: “If you do not wish to err, do not attempt to investigate the reason why He draws one and not another.”¹ But Molina, to satisfy himself and proud men, claims to investigate the reason. Wherefore it is not surprising that he errs. Let Saint Augustine be read in De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum, bk. I, q. 2, where he triumphs over those who seek to attribute to free will the reason why God predestines one and not another, refuting them with the aforementioned testimony of Saint Paul. And we too do not interpret the apostolic testimony from our own understanding.

III. Furthermore, we shall demonstrate our conclusion with another notable testimony of Saint Paul, from his Epistle to the Ephesians 1:3–6: “Blessed be God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, in Christ, even as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before Him in love, having predestined us to be His adopted children through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace.” Thus speaks Saint Paul, by whose testimony we can observe that he shows himself supremely contrary to the doctrine of Molina. Let Saint Augustine be read, De praedestinatione sanctorum, chs. 17, 18, and 19, and the sixth book of his Hypognosticon. From his doctrine we shall draw attention to the following.
First, without doubt, Saint Paul says: that we should be holy and blameless before Him. But he does not say that we are going to be holy by making good use, through our innate freedom, of the sufficient aids of the grace of God, which would be conferred upon all men; rather he says: that we should be holy according to the purpose of His will. Nor does he say that we are going to be holy according to the foreknowledge of the good use of our free will, but according to the free will of God, as it is said in the Gospel of Saint Matthew 11:26: “Yes, Father, for such was your gracious will.”
Likewise, it must be noted that Saint Paul says: who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, in Christ. From these words we argue theologically as follows: everything that is given to us for attaining eternal life is called a spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, and this is given to us thanks to the merits of Christ. But the good use of free will that belongs to us by our innate freedom is not given to us thanks to the merits of Christ. Therefore it is not useful for attaining the spiritual blessing in the heavenly places. The minor premise is proved as follows: Although Molina admits that men receive sufficient aids thanks to the merits of Christ, we do not receive through the merits of Christ the innate freedom to which he reduces the difference between the good or bad use of free will; for freedom is contained in the definition of man. Therefore, according to Molina, it will not be owed to the merits of Christ that a man, here and now, acts and makes use of the aids of God, but through sufficient aids the man will only be able to believe and act well.
Likewise, careful attention must be paid to what Saint Paul adds: according to the purpose of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace. From these words we argue as follows: if the infallibility and security of our good operation do not arise efficaciously from divine predestination according to the purpose of conferring aids, but only from the middle knowledge by which God foreknows the future use of our free will, then certainly the divine predestination by which God predestines us to be His adopted children will be owed to our free will, and for this reason our will ought to be praised to a greater degree than the glory of His grace, which would have no efficacy according to the purpose of His will, but according to the efficacy of our innate freedom.

IV. Furthermore, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 7:25, Saint Paul says: “I received mercy to be faithful.” On these words the Council of Orange, in its canon 25, observes that Saint Paul did not say “because I was faithful” but “to be faithful.” With him Saint Augustine agrees, for in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 18, he reflects on the passage we cited from the Epistle to the Ephesians and says that Saint Paul wished to convey that predestination does not take place because of our foreseen good works or because we are going to be holy. And in ch. 17 — reflecting on the passage from the Gospel of Saint John 15: You did not choose me, but I chose you — Saint Augustine says: “He does not speak thus for any other reason than because they did not choose Him so that He would choose them... when He was made flesh in the world, but they had already been chosen in Him before the foundation of the world. This is the immovable truth of predestination and grace, for what does the Apostle Saint Paul say? That He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world. Because certainly if it had been said that God foreknew they would believe but not that He Himself was going to make them believe, then the Son would be speaking against this foreknowledge when He says: You did not choose me, but I chose you. Therefore they were chosen before the foundation of the world with that predestination in which God foreknew His own future acts.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.²
But it seems that we interpose the authority of Saint Augustine against Molina in vain, since Molina himself rejects it very boldly. But, as we said above, we interpose the authority of Saint Augustine not only because he is indispensable in the explanation of the mystery of predestination, but also because of the necessary and theological argumentation he develops by having recourse to Sacred Scripture, which, once the preceding chapters have been read attentively, necessarily demonstrates that the doctrine of Molina is erroneous. Above all, let what Saint Augustine maintains in his Glossa ordinaria ad Ephesios, 1, be considered, where he says thus: “How could He choose those who do not yet exist, except through predestination? Therefore He chooses us by predestining us; and just as He does not thereby choose us because we are already holy at that moment, so neither does He choose us because we are going to be holy, but rather He chooses us so that in the moment of grace we may be holy through good works. Therefore He does not choose us because we are going to be holy, but so that we may be holy. Therefore we are going to be holy because God Himself has predestined us to be so through His grace. But the Pelagian” — and the same seems to be what Molina says — “insulting the truth, says: God foreknows who are going to be holy and blameless by the will of their free choice; and therefore He chooses those whom He foreknows by His prescience will be holy; that is, He chooses them before they are holy, predestining the children He foreknows will be holy, but He neither made them holy nor will make them holy, since God only foresees that they will make themselves holy. But Saint Paul refutes this doctrine when he says: that we should be holy.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.³
Molina affirms nothing different from what the Pelagian defends, for he maintains that predestination is not of itself anything other than the providence of placing man in a determinate order of things with determinate aids, in such a way that, if he so desires, by his innate freedom he is capable of acting well and persevering — not because the divine aids themselves, as effects of predestination, bring with them the efficacy of acting well and persevering, but only because the foreknowledge of those who, by virtue solely of their innate freedom, will make good use of such sufficient aids is presupposed. And therefore it is in the power of free will to cause the providence of God to become predestination, since another man, despite having received the same aids, would be condemned. And it is clear that, by everything he says, Molina thinks thus.

Chapter Twenty-Five

In which it is shown that the excuses of Molina are of no importance

I. To the aforementioned testimonies Molina is accustomed to respond that they only serve to prove a predestination which, according to a certain general plan, has been carried out not precisely on account of the foreknowledge of good works, but by the pure will of God, who, from among all those infinite modes of predestining which He necessarily knows as possible, wished to choose this mode of predestining. It is true that in this choice He took no account of the foreknowledge of any work. However, with respect to the predestination of men in particular, these testimonies do not demonstrate that God does not predestine some rather than others on account of the foreknowledge of their works. Molina opts for this solution, as he shows in the cited place, m. 6, concl. 4 and 6, § Illud magnopere.

II. But we can argue effectively against this solution. For Saint Paul, in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, does not speak of predestination by comparing it with other possible modes of predestination, but speaks of predestination with respect to particular predestined individuals and the means that God actually predestines for their salvation. And for this reason he adduced the example of Jacob and Esau, of whom He chose one and hated the other; and he does not reduce this difference to the foreknowledge of good or bad works, but to the will and power of God, and for this reason presents the example of the potter.

III. Wherefore Molina himself, inventing another solution, has recourse to the fourth conclusion cited, in which he says that Saint Paul, in the aforementioned ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, is not speaking of the eternal predestination of each individual — for otherwise all those of whom he speaks there would be predestined — but rather speaks of the love of the people of Israel and the reprobation of the Edomites, that is, of the distinction between the Jewish people and the Gentiles.
But in truth this solution is empty and contrary to the text, just as the preceding one was, as we shall show. For although these testimonies — “Jacob I loved, Esau I hated”; “the elder shall serve the younger” — as they appear in Malachi and in Genesis, have been understood literally in reference to two peoples, it is a well-known matter that Saint Paul presented them in a mystical sense, identifying in that ninth chapter Jacob with the predestined and Esau with the reprobate. And it is also manifest that in Sacred Scripture the promised land must be understood mystically as beatitude and Mount Seir as eternal condemnation. But the mystical sense, when it is drawn from Sacred Scripture itself, is an argument as efficacious as if it were its primary literal sense, as is clear in the Epistle to the Galatians 4, where Saint Paul says that the example of the two sons of Abraham is an allegory — namely, one was born a slave on Mount Sinai and the other in the heavenly Jerusalem, which is free. Therefore, since throughout the entire ninth chapter and the two following chapters Saint Paul speaks expressly of the predestined in particular, both from among the Jews and from among the Gentiles, it is clearly seen that Molina’s way out is useless. To what end, then, would Saint Paul say in the ninth chapter: “Has God rejected His people? By no means, for I myself am an Israelite, a descendant of Abraham” — unless, indifferently, he understood under the name of His people the predestined in particular, both from among the Jews and from among the Gentiles?

IV. Certainly, it would be an arduous task to offer the testimonies of the Holy Fathers and doctors for refuting Molina’s fifth dogma and for demonstrating our conclusion. For apart from Saint Augustine — De praedestinatione sanctorum, De dono perseverantiae, De correptione et gratia, and Epistola 105 — we cite Saint Prosper, De vocatione gentium, ch. 1, Responsiones ad capitula Gallorum; Saint Fulgentius, De incarnatione et gratia Christi, last chapter; and Saint Gregory the Great, Dialogi, bk. I, ch. 8. Likewise, let Bede, Saint Anselm, Sedulius, and many other Catholic doctors who comment on the same ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans be read; and Saint Bernard, Sermo 23 and 78 in Canticis; and Saint Basil, Oratio de humilitate. Let Saint John Chrysostom be read, whom our adversaries usually cite in their favor, because on this matter he sometimes tends, as is customary among the Greeks, to favor free will more than is fitting. Nevertheless, in his homily on the first chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians — commenting on the words: who distinguishes you — he expressly teaches that predestination does not depend on the foreknowledge of works.⁴
Now we judge it superfluous to refer to Saint Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 23, a. 3, to Saint Bonaventure, Commentaria in Sent., I, d. 41, q. 2, and to other ancient and modern scholastics; for Molina himself declares himself to be against the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas. He even dares to say in his fifth dogma that it cannot be denied, without prejudice to the faith, that the reason for predestination depends on the will of the adult; and in his sixth dogma he maintains that the predestination of a man is never infallible and secure by force of the means and aids of God, but only by virtue of the middle knowledge with which God foreknows that the free will of man will make good use of such aids. But let the sacred judges see, or rather let them hear Saint Augustine, who in De dono perseverantiae says thus: “This I know: no one, except by erring, can dispute that predestination which, following Sacred Scripture, we defend.”⁵ Therefore Molina errs, because in his disputes he rejects the predestination which Saint Augustine, following Sacred Scripture, defends.
Similarly, Saint Prosper, in his Epistola ad Rufinum de libero arbitrio and in Responsio ad objectiones Gallorum, I, maintains that no Catholic can deny the doctrine of Saint Augustine on the matter of predestination, since this would be as impious as denying the very grace of God. And Saint Celestine I also approves the same doctrine in his Epistola ad episcopos Galliae, ch. 2, and censures those who condemn Saint Augustine for his doctrine of predestination and grace. Similarly, Saint Leo the Pope also, in his Epistola ad concilium arausicanum, sends certain chapters that contain, word for word, the aforementioned doctrine of Saint Augustine on the matter of predestination — according to which it takes place before the foreknowledge of the use of free will — which the whole Council approved. And Pope Saint Gelasius, in a certain council of seventy bishops, approved all the writings of Saint Augustine and Saint Prosper that contained the aforementioned doctrine on predestination. From all of these it is clearly gathered to what extent Molina favors the Pelagians by weakening the authority of Saint Augustine. We hope, however, in the Lord, that the Supreme Pontiff, who is the Vicar of Christ in the Apostolic See, following the footsteps of his predecessors, will once again confirm the authority of Saint Augustine with regard to the mystery of predestination.

V. Furthermore, the conclusion we presented in the preceding chapter is also demonstrated by the common, almost axiomatic, expression of the theologians, taken from De praedestinatione sanctorum, where Saint Augustine says that Christ is the bright light of predestination.⁶ And just as Jesus Christ was predestined without the foreknowledge of any merit, so also men are predestined without any knowledge of their future merits.
It is not hidden from us that Molina, in the cited place, m. 9, § Ex dictis, wishes to explain the difference between Christ and other predestined persons. For Christ, he says, could not attain through His own means the hypostatic union, because this union only God could bring about; for this reason there was no foreknowledge of works in the predestination of Christ. However, men, by making use of their reason, are justified and saved through the works of their free will; and for this reason, once God has knowledge of this, they are predestined to perform the foreseen works.
But this solution lacks validity. First, certainly, because it destroys the common doctrine of the theologians, who maintain together with Saint Augustine that through grace each Christian is converted from the beginning of his faith and that through grace that man — namely, Christ — was predestined. Furthermore, just as God Himself efficaciously united the humanity of Christ to the divine Word, so also God Himself efficaciously justifies men. And although the justification of men takes place through the actions of free will, it is nevertheless God Himself who causes the man to will and to act, as we have frequently repeated in the refutation of Molina’s first four propositions, adding moreover many other arguments that demonstrate our conclusion and refute Molina’s solutions.

Chapter Twenty-Sixth

In Which the Remaining Dogmas of Molina on Predestination Receive Their Deserved Censure

I. Now, finally, with the foundations set forth, we can briefly reprove his remaining dogmas with deserved censures.
Thus, let this be, in order, our second conclusion: It is erroneous to affirm, as Molina does, that God left the angels under a common providence so that, through the exercise of their free will, such providence might be converted into predestination. This conclusion is proved as follows.
From Molina’s doctrine it evidently follows that the angels who were saved did not receive from God the special gift of perseverance, but rather from the natural forces of their own free will — which, by making good use of certain aids that were equal to those received by the angels who were condemned, allowed them to attain beatitude directly. For this reason, they are no more indebted to the grace of God than those who were condemned, because they did not persevere through the efficacy of grace, but through the good use that their free will made of the aids received. Likewise, from Molina’s doctrine it follows that the lesser angels who were saved are less indebted to God than Lucifer and other greater ones who fell; for Lucifer and others received more gifts of grace — even justifying grace — than the lesser angels. Therefore, if the lesser angels, through the consent of their free will, caused the divine providence — which was common to them and to the others — to be converted into predestination, then they are less indebted to the grace of God than those who fell.
We, on the contrary, think very differently, namely: Not only men, but also the angels who were saved, are more indebted to the grace of God than those who were condemned. For as Saint Augustine says in De civitate Dei, Book XII, Chapter 9: “If the angels could not make themselves better than God had made them, no one could do anything better than He; certainly, they could not have the good will to be better, if the help of the Creator did not operate. And their good will caused them not to turn toward themselves, for they were inferior, but toward Him, who is supremely great, so that, inclining toward Him, they might partake of His greatness and virtue and live wisely and with beatitude. This shows that any good will would not even be capable of maintaining itself in the good desire, unless He who made His good nature capable out of nothing also made it better of Himself, after making it more eager by exciting it.” Thus speaks Saint Augustine.⁷
However, we maintain that Molina’s position is erroneous not only by the authority of Saint Augustine, but also by the absurdity that evidently follows from such an assertion — namely, that God Himself would not have provided in greater measure for those who were saved than for those who were condemned; and therefore, through divine providence, those who attained beatitude would have been saved from the fall on their own. Nor is it sufficient to reply that God foreknew that it would happen thus; for through His divine providence, if Molina’s position is true, God would not have intended that some be saved and others not.
Therefore, we, together with Saint Augustine and the common doctrine of theologians, define that predestination is the preparation of grace and of the benefits of God by which, with the utmost certainty, everyone who is saved is saved. And we affirm that God predestines men and angels in the same manner, for, as is said in the Apocalypse, the measure of man and of angel is the same.

II. Third conclusion: It is an error to affirm that children who are baptized by another’s will and action, and who die suddenly and are saved, are considered predestined only because God foreknew that external action.
We present this conclusion against what Molina says at the end of his third dogma. We prove our conclusion in the following manner. The child is baptized by virtue of the merits of Christ; therefore, his baptism is an effect of predestination, and consequently God does not merely foreknow and foresee that the child will be baptized by virtue of the free will of the one baptizing.
The first consequence is demonstrated as follows: Not only is the salvation of the child — if he is baptized — brought about by the merits of Christ, but it is also an effect of the merit of Christ that he is baptized and that baptism is applied to him, because baptism is a means intrinsically necessary for the salvation of the child, as is stated in the Gospel of Saint John 3:5: “He who is not reborn of water and the Holy Spirit cannot enter the kingdom of God.” But everything that the predestined receive, through the merits of Christ, in order to be saved, is an effect of predestination. Therefore, God does not merely foreknow that the baptism will take place, but also ensures that it takes place, so that the salvation of the child who is saved may come about. It is so clear among theologians that all that we presuppose is a matter of faith that it is unnecessary to demonstrate it with further words.”
We shall offer only one example, which is familiar in the doctrine of Saint Augustine: Two children are on the point of dying; one of them lacked water and someone to baptize him; however, the other was covered with water and a minister of God wished to baptize him by virtue of his free purpose. We ask in this case whether God merely foreknew this difference between the children, or whether, instead, He provided for the second child a minister, water, and that minister’s purpose so that the child might attain salvation; while the first child had no one to baptize him and, the Lord permitting it, was condemned on account of original sin. Certainly, no theologian worthy of the name ought to deny that the fact that the second child was baptized by another’s action was an effect of the predestination of this particular child; otherwise, the one who baptized the child would have caused the divine providence — which provided a baptism in common — to have been converted into the particular predestination of this child. Molina acknowledges this difficulty, for he places the dependence of predestination in the foreknowledge of the foreseen (but not predestined) use of free will.

III. Fourth conclusion: It is an error to affirm that within us lies the cause of the total effect of predestination, and that the effect of predestination depends upon our free will.
This conclusion can undoubtedly be proved entirely by the same arguments and testimonies with which we have refuted Molina’s first four assertions. Throughout them all, he maintains that no aid of God is efficacious as it comes from Him, but that it is free will itself which confers efficacy upon it, by applying itself to action by virtue solely of its innate freedom along with these aids. And he speaks consistently in this manner in his eighth dogma, against which we present our fourth conclusion.
For Molina affirms that the free application of free will is not an effect of divine predestination, but would only have been foreseen; and that the grace of predestination would consist solely in the granting to man of such aids at the moment when God foresaw that free will would apply itself to good action — but not because God had arranged its application here and now. Wherefore, speaking consistently, Molina maintains in his eighth dogma that within us lies the cause of the total effect of predestination, because he does not consider it an effect of predestination that free will should wish to make use of such aids. For if it were an effect of predestination, the cause of the total effect of predestination would no longer lie within us, since the total effect would include also the application of free will and, therefore, it would be a cause of itself, which is impossible. Thus Molina always excludes from the effect of predestination the free application of free will to operating with the aids; for this reason he says that within us lies the cause and the reason of the total effect of predestination.
And at this point the blessed judges and censors must pay close attention. Frequently, indeed, Molina conceals himself in obscure subterfuges and seems equally to be asserting one thing as another, as is evident in the seventh dogma which we reproduced in Chapter 22; for in the cited paragraph 8, he attempts in a thousand ways to escape the error. Indeed, here Molina distinguishes between God predestining a man on account of his foreseen merits or on account of the foreseen good use of his free will, and God predestining an adult by means of his own foreseen merits and not without foreknowledge of the good use of his free will. He denies the former, because the expression “on account of” refers to a meritorious cause; and it would be manifestly Pelagian to say that man merits the effect of predestination — for by the same token he would also merit justification. But he admits the latter.
Now, we must ask Molina what he means when he affirms that an adult is predestined by means of his own merits and not without foreknowledge of the good use of his free will. For if he understands these merits to be the first effect of predestination and the cause of the second effect — that is, beatitude — we confirm this in a Catholic manner. Similarly, if he means that the foreknown good use of free will is an effect of predestination, no Catholic will deny that this is so. And then, even if one were to say that, on account of his own merits as a cause, a man is predestined to the ultimate effect of predestination, it would in truth be said, as Molina himself says, that no adult would be condemned to eternal torments except on account of his own demerits.
Therefore, Molina shows in vain that he does not say that adults are predestined “on account of their own merits,” but “by means of their own merits.” For one and the other are true, if he speaks of the first effect of predestination with respect to the second effect, namely, beatitude. But if Molina refers to the total effect of predestination, then one and the other are false, whether he says “on account of” or “by means of”; for both one’s own merit and one’s own good use of free will are effects of predestination and are included in predestination as parts of the whole effect. Therefore, no adult is predestined on account of his foreseen merits, nor by means of his foreseen merits, nor by means of the foreseen good use of his free will, since both the good use of free will itself and one’s own merits have been predestined by God Himself as something that must come about efficaciously. In this way, we return to the efficacy of God’s aids, which has already been clearly demonstrated at the beginning of this treatise.
But all of Molina’s anguish stems from the fact that he does not understand how freedom of will is preserved if it has been predestined by God and its good use comes about through Him. For this reason, he again takes refuge, in paragraph 8 of his Concordia, pages 447 and 455, in the partial causality of God together with free will, and maintains that God is, together with His creature, a partial cause. How blasphemous this is, we have already shown in Chapters 19 and 20, in refuting Molina’s seventh assertion. Likewise, we have explained at length in the refutation of Molina’s fifth assertion, in Chapter 12, how ignorant he is of the definition of free will. For he insists on freedom being such that nothing free would have previously predestined its good use. Wherefore, we do not wish to prolong our fourth conclusion further.

IV. Fifth conclusion: It is an error to affirm that the magnificence of God’s justice is not the principal cause of the permission of sin, as Molina says in the ninth dogma which we presented in Chapter 22, and which appears in his Concordia, q. 23, a. 3, and in his Commentaria in primam divi Thomae partem, q. 23, a. 3.
We shall demonstrate our conclusion by appealing to the Epistle to the Romans 9:22–23: “For if God, wishing to show His wrath and to make known His power, endured with great patience the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, in order to make known the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy which He prepared for glory…” Regarding this passage, the sacred commentators affirm that the Apostle Saint Paul meant that the motive of predestination and reprobation in common was that in this way God might show with the reprobate His punishing justice — known under the name of “wrath” — and His supreme mercy with the predestined, whom He prepared for His glory; whereas He endured the former in His patience, permitting their sins.
Likewise, in the Epistle to the Romans 9:17–18, Saint Paul presents a certain passage from Exodus, addressed against Pharaoh: “For this very reason I have raised you up, to show my power in you, and so that my name may be proclaimed throughout all the earth. So then He has mercy on whoever He wills, and He hardens whoever He wills.” Saint Paul refers to the permission of Pharaoh’s sin with these words: “I have raised you up” and “He hardens whoever He wills.” Therefore, the manifestation of divine justice is a sufficient cause of the permission of sin.
Wherefore, we argue thus: If the manifestation of divine justice is not a sufficient reason for reprobating some and, thereby, permitting them to fall into sin, it will not be possible to verify what Saint Paul says, namely: “as God wished to show His wrath, He endured with great patience the vessels of wrath”; nor what is stated causally: “I have raised you up precisely to show my power in you.” By the word “raising up” is understood the permission of Pharaoh’s sin, which God willed and ordered to that end.
This is confirmed by the passage from Proverbs 16:4: “All the works of God have their own end; the wicked man also shall be present on the day of evil.” It is as if one were to say, as Lyra, Rudolph, Haymo, and many others explain, that God also created the wicked man and permitted his wickedness, so that on the day of judgment the justice of God might shine in his punishment.
Saint Augustine also thinks this, for in De civitate Dei, Book XI, Chapter 18, he says: “For I do not say that God created even one angel, nor even one man, foreknowing that he would be wicked, without at the same time having known in what way He could make them serve for the benefit of the good; and it is as though the antithesis of each were to enhance the order of the ages as a most beautiful poem.”⁸ Moreover, Saint Augustine frequently teaches that God is so good that He tolerates no evil, unless He causes some good to derive from the evil. But in the reprobate there is no other good that God brings about, except the very manifestation of divine justice in their punishments, so that in this way His mercy may shine all the more brightly in the predestined.
Nevertheless, the truth is that if we wish above all to identify the principal cause by which God permits sin, we must not speak of the punishment of the wicked themselves — so that God may thereby show His divine justice — but rather of the manifestation of His greater mercy in the predestined. And this same point is intimated by Saint Paul, in the place cited above, when he says: “in order to make known the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy which He prepared for glory.” From these words an argument may also be drawn against Molina. For God would not have made known the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy which He prepared for glory, if the vessels of wrath had likewise been equally prepared with divine aids; and the difference, according to Molina, would consist solely in foreknowledge, because God would have foreknown that some would make good use of these aids and that others, on the contrary, would not. Indeed, what riches of God would be shown in the vessels of mercy, if those very vessels, by their own power, prior to divine predestination, could bring about their own predestination from the divine providence by which God provides for and bestows His aids upon them? Certainly, what would be manifested more would be the power and supreme liberty of man, who could glory in making good use of such aids by virtue solely of his innate liberty and not by the predefinition and predestination of God. This theological demonstration seems to us to be grounded in apostolic testimony.

V. Sixth conclusion: It is a blasphemous error to affirm that the divine goodness, clemency, and equanimity prevent God from having chosen and predestined from eternity — without regard to the use of free will — only some men, for a single or principal end (abandoning the rest, who, by contrast, would be almost innumerable, since they would not have been chosen nor predestined, and knowing at once that for this very reason they were to be reprobated), namely, in order to have in this way those whom He might punish and upon whom He might exercise His vindicative justice, and that this would seem more proper to someone harsh, fierce, and cruel than to the most clement Prince.
In this manner Molina rages, led by the spirit of pride, in his Concordia, q. 23, a. 4 and 5, paragraph 6, pages 431 and 432; against him we oppose our aforementioned censure. Certainly, there is no need to demonstrate it with many arguments and testimonies, since it follows clearly from the conclusions mentioned and from what we said in Chapter 23, in the censure we gave in common against the dogmas of Molina.
Nevertheless, it must be made clear that Molina will not be able to escape our censure by saying: “the divine goodness, clemency, and equanimity prevent God from having chosen and predestined…only some men without regard to the use of their free will.” First, certainly, because children who, once baptized, die immediately and are saved, would have been predestined without regard to the use of their free will. Furthermore, according to Molina, it is not an effect of predestination that the baptizing minister of God should have the free intention to baptize, but rather it is a contingent future foreknown by God. Therefore, foreknowing the use of the free will of the one baptizing would not justify God any more than ordering, through His eternal predestination, that such use of the free will of the one baptizing serve for the salvation of the child. Therefore, if God is not cruel, according to Molina, for placing by His free will a child in an order of things in which He foreknows the child will be baptized by a free action of another — and for deciding to create many other children in a certain determined order of things, foreknowing that in this order they will die without the immediate remedy — would He then be cruel for ordering it by His own will, and not merely foreknowing it? That is, would He be cruel for preordaining — and it is precisely for this reason that God has foreknowledge — that His minister should come to baptize the child and that the child should thus be saved, while permitting from eternity that others die in original sin? Clearly, Molina reflects rashly upon the divine judgments and does not fear the harsh rebuke of Saint Paul, who says in the Epistle to the Romans: “O man, who are you to answer back to God?”
Moreover, speaking of adults, we must ask Molina how he can find greater justification in the divine predestination he defends, even were what he maintains to be true — namely, that God, taking into account the use of free will foreknown by middle knowledge, decrees to predestine some and to reprobate others according to the difference between the good or bad use of their free will. We therefore argue against Molina in a manner similar to the way he argues against Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, and the common doctrine of the Scholastics, which we consider Catholic doctrine.
For this reason, our argument will be ad hominem and we shall propose it from his own doctrine: God necessarily knows, as Molina says, through middle knowledge, the infinite possible orders of things that He can bring about; but from all of them He chooses a certain determined order of things, of nature and of grace, knowing that some men, placed in such an order of things, with such circumstances of nature and of grace, will make good use of their free will and will therefore be justified and saved; likewise, He foreknows that other men — almost innumerable — if placed in such an order of things, will make bad use of their free will and will be condemned.
Then, we argue against Molina thus: God could have created men — whom, placed in one order of things, He foreknew would be condemned — in another order of things, knowing by middle knowledge that in this other order of things they would make good use of their free will. Therefore, it is proper to someone harsh and fierce, rather than to the most clement Prince, to have willed and chosen, by His sole will, that order of things and to have created those men in it, foreknowing that in that order they would make bad use of their free will and be condemned forever; and yet to have placed others in another order of things, foreknowing that, with certainty, in this order they would make good use of their free will.
Therefore, we wish to know: why does He decide to establish one order of things rather than another, knowing that in this order some will be saved and others will perish? Their lot could thus have been the opposite. For God knew that if those who are to be saved were placed in another order of things, they would be condemned; and, on the contrary, if those who are to be condemned were placed in some other order of things, they would be saved. Certainly, no first reason can be assigned for this difference of effects, except the divine will, which chooses some in particular and all the others, by contrast, does not choose, but permits them to sin, so as to show in these His justice and His power, and in those, on the other hand, His mercy. But why He would have wished to show His mercy in some in particular and His justice in all the others cannot be attributed to any reason except the divine will, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches in the Summa Theologica, I, q. 23, a. 5, ad tertium, where he says: “Yet there is no injustice in God, even though He does not dispose the unequal with the unequal. For it would be contrary to the nature of justice that the effect of predestination should be given by obligation and not by grace.” Saint Thomas speaks, as is clear in the article itself, of the total effect of predestination. For a particular effect — for example, the obtaining of beatitude — is owed to a meritorious cause, that is, to a good work done in grace; but grace itself and good works are also effects of predestination in those who are saved.
But Molina constantly maintains that to free will, by virtue solely of its innate freedom, must be attributed the reason — foreknown by God — of why this man, rather than that other, comes to be predestined. In reality, however, if one reads him attentively, Molina does not explain why one man predestines himself and another does not, for Molina makes only the providence of giving all men greater or lesser — but in themselves indifferent and determinable by the innate freedom of will — sufficient aids depend on God. And in this manner he reflects throughout his whole Concordia, which is rather a blasphemous discordia against the divine and incomprehensible greatness of God, who works all things according to the design of His will and does not await our will in order for us to wish to be purified, but rather He Himself, vigorously and in an excellent manner, causes us to will freely through His grace, which always anticipates our will in the good work itself, as we have already shown previously.

VI. Seventh conclusion: To affirm that with predestination, as Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, and the common doctrine of theologians explain it, freedom of will disappears, is a Lutheran error.
We defend this conclusion against Molina, who thinks that we favor the Lutherans, when it is he in reality who favors them. For Luther judged correct the consequence that Molina also approves. For regarding the antecedent there was no doubt among the doctors of the Church in the time of Luther, nor did Luther himself dare to doubt the antecedent. But Molina, in pretending to respond to Luther, rather favors him by admitting the consequence that Luther draws; likewise, he favors the Pelagians by denying the antecedent; moreover, he strips from divine predestination what belongs to it and what was formerly defined as belonging to it — against the Pelagians — by the holy pontiffs, by the sacred councils, and by the Fathers; wishing to introduce, in name only, a certain predestination that of itself would not exceed a common providence, as is evident from the seventh dogma of the ten we offered in Chapter 22, where he says that it is not because God foreknows and predestines a particular man that this man will be saved, but that, on the contrary, God foreknows that this man will be saved because his will is going to make good use of God’s aids until the end.
Behold: Molina does not admit on God’s part any other type of particular predestination than the common providence of necessary and sufficient — but not intrinsically efficacious as they come from God — means of salvation. He teaches this same thing quite clearly in his third dogma.
But it is worthwhile to show that Molina himself, when he defends freedom of will, also destroys it. We shall argue ad hominem to show this. For, according to Molina, God knows, through middle knowledge and through the most eminent comprehension by which He knows the free will of man, what a man will do by his will, here and now, if he is placed in a certain determined order of things. Therefore, we shall demonstrate that either this knowledge of God is not infallible, but only conjectural, or that the will of man is not free, but operates by necessity of nature. And if this middle knowledge is certain and entirely infallible, then it is infallible either by virtue of the knowledge of free will according to its species, or according to the individuation of the free will of a particular man.
Regarding the first, Molina does not say that, since the free will of all men is equal according to species, it is necessary that through this middle knowledge God know the same thing about all men in particular, placed in the same order of things. Thus, if the second is admitted, then we already have the argument: therefore, the certainty and infallibility of middle knowledge arise from the particular individuation of a free will. But this particular individuation is natural. Therefore, the certainty of such an action of the will, here and now, is held by virtue of the knowledge of this individuation of free will; and therefore this middle knowledge is purely natural in God, in such a way that through it God cannot know anything different from what He knows. Otherwise, without doubt, middle knowledge would be fallible, if free will, placed in a certain determined order of things, could do something different from what God knows. Nor is it sufficient to reply that the infallibility of this knowledge comes from the comprehension of the divine essence, because the divine essence does not represent objects differently from the way they are on the part of the known object. Therefore, it must necessarily be said that all infallibility of divine knowledge regarding a future contingent object arises from the free but immutable decree of the divine will, by which He wills to do something or to permit it. On this question, see what we said previously, in the refutation of Molina’s sixth assertion, where we showed that this middle knowledge is a fiction.

VII. Eighth conclusion: It is erroneous to affirm that God is accustomed to permit the sins of children and their eternal condemnation in order to punish the crimes of the parents, as Molina says in the tenth dogma of those we offered in Chapter 22.
This conclusion can be demonstrated by appealing to Ezekiel 18:20: “The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father. The soul that sins, it shall die.” From this passage Saint Thomas draws the following consequence in the Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 87, a. 8, namely, that in matters pertaining to spiritual goods no one is punished for the sins of another.
This is confirmed by the verses from Jeremiah 31:29–30: “In those days they shall no longer say: the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge; but each one shall die for his own iniquity.” Making use of this passage, Saint Jerome, in his Epistola ad Atticum, Saint Augustine, Contra Adimantum, Chapter 7, and Saint Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, Book XV, Chapter 22, treat the theme of spiritual punishment and maintain, by appealing to this testimony, that children are not punished with spiritual penalties for the sins of their parents. This same teaching is found in Saint Augustine, in his Epistola 75, Saint Anselm, De conceptione virginali, Chapters 24 and 25, Saint John Chrysostom, Super Psalmum 34, and Saint Cyprian.
Finally, there are theological reasons that support this, since children, although they receive from the father human nature — and therefore could and do contract original sin, insofar as human nature, as faith teaches, was corrupted in the first parents — nevertheless, children do not depend on the father with respect to their soul and spirit; therefore, they are not punished in it directly on account of the sins of their parents. And this the Lord intimates in the cited passage from Ezekiel, when He says: “All souls are mine”; that is, I alone created souls, and therefore it is not fitting that they be punished spiritually for the sin of their parents.
On the other hand, we said that it can sometimes happen that from the sins of children some temporal harm or infamy may follow for the parents themselves; and with respect to this harm it does not seem deserving of censure to maintain that on occasion, on account of the sins of the parents, God permits the sins of the children to take place before everyone’s eyes, in order to punish thereby the sins of the parents. This seems to have a foundation in Sacred Scripture. For David was punished on account of the sin he committed with Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah; and on account of the sin of murder that David committed by killing Uriah, Amnon, his son, was killed by the sword of his other son, Absalom, as Nathan had prophesied; and also on account of his sin, his own son Absalom pursued him and lay with his concubines upon a rooftop before the eyes of everyone. If Molina understands it in this manner, he is not deserving of any censure.

Up to this point we have already refuted at length the ten dogmas of Molina on the mystery of predestination and have already spoken sufficiently in the first part of this treatise, submitting ourselves to the correction of the Roman Church, our most holy mother.

1Saint Augustine, Tractatus CXXIV in Joan. Evang., trac. 26. Migne, P.L., 35, 1607.

2Saint Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 17. Migne, P.L., 44, 985–986.

3Id., Glossa ordinaria ad Ephesios, ch. 1, Antverpiae 1617, t. 6, 527.

4Saint John Chrysostom, In epist. I ad Cor., homil. 12. Migne, P.G., 61, 97–98.

5Saint Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, ch. 19. Migne, P.L., 45, 1023.

6Id., De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 15. Migne, P.L., 44, 981.

7Saint Augustine, De civitate Dei, Book XII, Chapter 19. Migne, P.L., 41, 356.

8Ibid., Book XI, Chapter 18. Migne, P.L., 41, 332.

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First Conclusion: No one properly and absolutely hopes any good for another, but only for himself. This is gathered from St. Thomas here, and can be proved by the authority of Augustine in the Enchiridion, chapter 8, where he teaches that faith is of one’s own things and of others’, but hope is only of things pertaining to the one who is said to bear that hope. It is then proved by reason, because hope is properly a certain movement or reaching of the appetite toward an arduous good as proportionate and accommodating to oneself; therefore, one does not properly and absolutely hope for another.
Second Conclusion: Insofar, however, as another is united to us through love, we can also hope for that person the good and eternal life. This is also from St. Thomas, and it is explained: insofar as love joins that person to us, he is in a certain way the same as ourselves, and in hoping good for him we also hope it for ourselves, because his good is in a certain way ours — for we rejoice with him over the good obtained for him as though it were our own, and we feel it is well for us as a result.
But when we will beatitude for another because this is pleasing to God who wills all to be saved, and so that God may be honored in him, then this act of will is not of hope but of charity.

These four Articles we will explain together, on account of the connection of the subject matter, so that we may not be compelled to say and repeat the same things more often with tedium and confused order.
For the explanation and understanding of the doctrine of these Articles, it is to be noted first that we are said to believe explicitly those things to which we assent as proposed and expressed to us under their own proper and particular terms: for example, one believes the mystery of the Incarnation explicitly who believes that the Son of God hypostatically assumed human nature, and that Christ is God and man. So one believes the mystery of the Trinity explicitly who believes that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God and three persons. But we believe implicitly those things which we hold by faith in another — either as in a more universal principle in which they are contained, or as in the meaning and sense of the teacher of faith to whom we adhere, or as in a figure or shadow which we know does not lack signification, even though we do not know clearly and particularly the thing signified.
It is to be noted secondly that something is said to be necessary for salvation in two ways: namely, as necessary by necessity of means, and as necessary by necessity of precept. In the former way, that is necessary without which salvation simply cannot be obtained, for whatever reason it may be absent — even if it is absent without any new fault or violation of any precept. In the latter way, that is said to be necessary which is indeed commanded to be done, yet in such a way that if it happens to be absent without new fault — for example, through inculpable ignorance — the defect of it does not impede salvation.
It is to be noted thirdly that in adults the necessity of precept for the same object tends to arise from necessity of means, provided the necessity of means is known. But when that necessity is invincibly unknown, then that means would happen to be not employed without new fault, because invincible ignorance would excuse from the obligation of that precept which we say arises from necessity of means — yet, on account of obstacles of sin, whether original or personal, not removed, such a person would be damned, because without that means being employed he cannot be freed from sin and saved.
It is to be noted fourthly that the holy Fathers and Doctors distinguish diverse states of the world, or of the human race. For example, they posit a first state, which was one of innocence before the fall of the first parents; a second, which was after the fall before the law was given through the hand of Moses; a third, which was from the giving of the law up to the coming of Christ; and finally a fourth, which accompanies and follows the coming of Christ.
It is to be noted fifthly that among men in every state there were diverse orders in matters of religion — so that just as some presided over others, so also some were instructed and taught by others in the matters of faith and divine religion. For certain greater ones were always particularly illuminated and taught by God in divine matters, whose duty it was to instruct others. Now the following is established:
First Conclusion: In every state of the human race, man was and is obliged to believe certain things pertaining to faith explicitly — not only by necessity of precept but also by necessity of means in order to attain salvation. This is the position of Saint Thomas here in Article 5, and common to others. We speak, however, of an adult, and this is evident from the doctrine of the Apostle in Hebrews, chapter 11: “He who comes to God must believe that He exists, and that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him.” Hence it would not suffice for salvation if someone were to say that he believes all things which his parents believe, or which the Pastors or Doctors propose to be believed — and meanwhile knew not a single article of faith in particular and under its proper terms, whether about God or about Christ. For all who approach God must explicitly believe that He exists (and consequently that He is our Creator and we are His creatures), and that He is a rewarder of the good — as is established from the words of the Apostle cited — and therefore they must believe God’s providence, and His justice in rewarding good works and punishing evil ones; because without explicit acknowledgment and faith in these things, a man can neither lawfully worship God nor fittingly direct his life and actions toward God as his end.
Second Conclusion: In the state of innocence, if man had persevered in it, all would have had explicit faith — not only in the one God and in His essential attributes or perfections, but also in the mystery of the most holy Trinity. Indeed, and also in the mystery of the Incarnation of the divine Word, if we suppose that mystery to have been certain even if man had not fallen from original justice — the opposite of which, however, we consider far more probable with Saint Thomas and others.
This is proved: because in the first place, there can be no doubt about the mystery of the Trinity, since this very Trinity is the supernatural end in the order of which man was created in such great perfection of justice — and therefore the primary object of beatitude in the homeland. Hence that mystery ought to have been known at least by faith in this life; for that end toward which all ought to tend by divine ordinance could not be unknown before man by his own fault had turned aside into an erroneous path — nor was it fitting that they should be ignorant of the principal good which they intended and hoped for as the reward of their way. Similarly, they ought not to have been ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation: for the Incarnate Son, or Christ, would also have been the secondary object of beatitude, and would have contributed greatly to the perfection and dignity of human nature, even if He had not provided liberation from sins (which we suppose would not have been necessary). Therefore it is not probable that that mystery would have been hidden from man in the state of innocence.
And this is confirmed: because the common opinion of the holy Fathers is that the first man Adam knew this before his fall, because it was going to take place — whether on the occasion of the fall foreseen, or for some other cause, which are disputed in the Third Part. Therefore, without doubt, he would also have come to know it even if he had persevered in justice, supposing that the divine Word was going to assume flesh even if the first parents had not sinned. The consequence is clear: because knowledge of it pertained to the state of innocence no more — indeed, perhaps less — than it would then have pertained.
The Fathers prove the antecedent from that passage in Genesis, chapter 2: “This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh, etc. Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.” They prove it, I say, from these words together with the explanation of them which the Apostle has in Ephesians, chapter 5, where he writes: “This is a great mystery: but I speak in reference to Christ and the Church.” So Saint Jerome on the cited words of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Ephesians; Saint Augustine, Book 9 On Genesis according to the Letter, chapter 19; Tertullian, the book On the Soul, chapters 11 and ii; Prosper, On the Promises and Predictions of God, Part 1, chapter 1. And indeed, that the words of Adam contain a prophecy of the Incarnation of Christ is manifestly established from the cited doctrine of the Apostle. But it is not probable that Adam, in that state of perfection, entirely ignorant of the mystical meaning, prophesied in the manner of Caiaphas saying: “It is expedient that one man die for the people” — as is found in John, chapter 18.
Although this is to be admitted in the meantime (which several Fathers also indicate) — namely, that not all things at least as to the manner and circumstances prefigured by those divine and mystical words were then fully known to Adam. For even in that passage the mystery of the Cross and of the Lord’s death is intimated: for when Eve is formed from the side of the sleeping man, the sleep of Christ through death on the Cross is indicated, and the Church to be formed from that side which was to be opened by the lance is prefigured — which future events Adam did not yet understand at that time. Hence Saint Thomas here, Article 7, in the body of the article, teaches that Adam had explicit faith in the Incarnation of Christ as it was ordered to the consummation of glory — but not as it was ordered to liberation from sin through passion and resurrection.
Third Conclusion: Whatever faith — whether explicit or implicit — was or is in any state sufficient on its part to obtain the grace of justification, that same faith has always been and is now sufficient to attain salvation and eternal life. This is the common position of the Doctors against some more recent ones, such as Melchior Cano, Relectio on the Sacraments in General, Part 2, question 1, Conclusion 3; Castro, Book 2 On Penal Law, chapter 14; and Bannes here, Article 8, at the end.
It is proved first: because the grace of justification and sanctification is the grace of adoption as children of God, which formally constitutes a man as a son of God and confers the spirit in which we cry “Abba, Father” — hence every justified person is a son. But if a son, then also an heir, as the Apostle argues in Romans 8. But if an heir, then he cannot be excluded from the inheritance without injustice. Again, the grace of sanctification is that water springing up unto eternal life, of which Christ speaks in John — therefore, the faith which suffices for righteousness also suffices for salvation and eternal life.
Second, because the Council of Florence, in the letters of union, defines that all those who depart hence fully purged in righteousness enter immediately into life — which would be false if some were just but to whom the entrance into heaven was not open on account of a defect merely of more explicit faith. For these, even if they were fully purged of every debt of guilt and punishment, would not enter immediately into life.
Without foundation, however, it is answered that such justified persons cannot die before they have acquired further explicit faith. For nothing is established about any divine promise to this effect, nor does such a divine providence exist, explained to us and against all occurring occasions of such cases, by which they are to be preserved until they have learned the faith more fully.
Nor do those speak to the point who say that such persons indeed enter immediately into life — because as soon as the soul is separated from the body, it learns explicitly what it previously held implicitly — and in that sense explicit faith is necessary for them unto salvation which was not necessary for righteousness. For speaking thus, since infants departing hence from baptism also learn in act and explicitly what they held only in habit, one would have to say also that their faith with infused justice does not suffice for the heavenly kingdom, but that actual faith and explicit knowledge is also required in them to attain eternal life — which no Catholic Doctor would say.
It is added that the knowledge which the soul acquires at that time, when it has departed hence justified and fully purged, as happens in infants, is not knowledge of faith or of the way, but of vision and the homeland. Third: Saint Augustine reproaches the Pelagians for acknowledging or teaching that infants before Baptism are innocent and just — and yet for denying that they can attain heavenly beatitude and the divine vision if they die without Baptism. Augustine, therefore, presupposed that, besides freedom from sin and obtained righteousness, nothing could or ought to be further required for attaining blessed and heavenly life. Finally, neither the Sacred Scriptures, nor the Councils, nor the more ancient Scholastics, place here any distinction between what is necessary for sanctifying righteousness — provided it is preserved — and what is required for heavenly beatitude, when a man has been fully purged of every debt.
But against this they object, first, from Saint Augustine, who in Book 1 To Simplicianus, question 2, writes thus: “In some there is so great a grace of faith as does not suffice to obtain the kingdom of heaven, as in catechumens, as in Cornelius himself before he was incorporated into the Church by participation in the Sacraments; but in others so great as to be already reckoned to the body of Christ and the holy temple of God.”
It is answered that that doctrine of Augustine favors our Conclusion more than those who oppose it with it. For by the former words he only teaches that there is given a certain inchoate grace of faith and imperfect righteousness — as when from hearing, faith is conceived with a certain fear of the punishments of the life to come, and perhaps also with some displeasure at the evil life previously lived, or even with an imperfect affection of justice — and that a grace of faith of this kind does not yet suffice to obtain the kingdom. But he does not also say that it suffices for sanctification and for obtaining adoption as a son of God. Indeed, by the latter words he signifies the contrary: for in them he equates and acknowledges the same righteousness which suffices that someone be reckoned to the holy temple of God, and be united to the body of Christ, namely as a living member.
They object secondly: Cornelius the Centurion, in Acts 10, is said to have been religious and fearing God; likewise that his prayers and almsgiving had ascended as a memorial before the Lord. Indeed, in the same place he is expressly called just and fearing God — and yet, on account of a defect of explicit faith in Christ, he could not be saved, as is gathered from the following chapter 11, where it is said that he was ordered to summon Peter, who would speak to him words by which he himself and all his house would be saved; therefore, etc.
It is answered that there are here two opinions about the righteousness of Cornelius before he summoned Peter. Some think that he was truly justified when he was arranging for Peter to be summoned; others deny this. Those who wish to follow the former opinion will say that Cornelius was of the number of those who straddled two periods in which two modes of justification concurred; and that he had been justified before the promulgation of the Gospel, and that therefore the mode of justification usual before the coming of Christ had a place in him — but that because the time of the New Testament was arriving, he was also obliged by divine precept to believe in Christ. Which law of faith he could not long remain ignorant of, since the Gospel was already being preached in nearby places. An Angel was moreover sent to him so that he might more quickly learn the faith of Christ, and grow and be confirmed in righteousness through it, and also so that on account of perhaps culpable future ignorance he might not fall from righteousness — hence it was rightly said to him that Peter would teach him the things by which he would be saved.
But the other opinion seems more true, which says that Cornelius was not justified before he heard Peter — as Saint Augustine teaches in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7, and in Book 1 To Simplicianus, question 2, in the words cited above, and Chrysostom in the homily On Faith and the Law of Nature. He is called a religious man and fearing God because he had certain dispositions toward righteousness by which he was being prepared and tending toward more perfect righteousness — just as we are accustomed to say of sinners that they live religiously and with the fear of God when, struck with the fear of God, they are observed to be disposing themselves toward righteousness. Therefore, so that Cornelius might be perfectly justified, Peter was sent to him to explain the faith of Christ — not so that one fully justified might not be admitted to blessed life on account of a defect of not sufficiently explicit faith.
Nor does it matter that he is also said to be just before he heard Peter: because this is only said on the part of those who were sent by Cornelius to Peter, who did not yet understand in what true righteousness consisted — but they spoke in a general and common way about him as a good and just man. Cornelius was, however, justified before the real reception of baptism — namely, when Peter was catechizing and instructing them in the faith, and the Holy Spirit fell upon them, as Augustine teaches, Book 4 Against the Donatists, chapter 24 — but this belongs to another place.
They object thirdly: In the old law, many were justified through implicit faith in the Incarnation — yet none were admitted to the kingdom except after they had learned the mystery more explicitly in purgatory or in limbo; therefore, etc.
It is answered that the faithful and just before Christ were not detained in limbo because they did not have explicit faith about the Incarnation of Christ — for even those who had had explicit faith, such as Abraham, Moses, Isaiah, and other great ones among the people, among whom were also some who had seen Christ present, such as Simeon and John the Baptist, underwent the same fate. But for another reason. And therefore even those who had nothing to be purged were then detained outside the kingdom — because, namely, the way of the Saints had not yet been made public, the former tabernacle still having its standing, until our High Priest Christ had entered once through His own blood into the Holy of Holies, as is said in Hebrews, chapter 9; and when He inaugurated for us a new way, as is said in Hebrews, chapter 10.
Fourth Conclusion: Explicit faith in the mystery of the Incarnation of the Son of God was not necessary before the coming of Christ — neither by necessity of means for obtaining righteousness, nor for salvation; indeed, not even by precept, at least with regard to all men.
It is proved first from the Scriptures: Galatians, chapter 3: “But before faith came, we were kept under guard, imprisoned in reference to the faith that was to be revealed. So then the law was our custodian leading us to Christ, etc.” Therefore, those who were as it were kept in a childlike age under the custodian leading to Christ, holding under figures and under a veil those things that were to be revealed, were not lacking the means and modes of justification and salvation. This is confirmed: for even a minor who is under a custodian and under administrators and guardians is heir of all things, as the same Apostle has in the following chapter.
Likewise, Ephesians, chapter 3, he writes about the mystery of Christ: “Which was not made known to other generations to the sons of men, as it has now been revealed to His holy Apostles and Prophets by the Spirit.” And Colossians, chapter 1, he says of the same: “Which was hidden from ages and generations, but has now been manifested to His saints, etc.” Now, those things that were absolutely necessary for righteousness and salvation were not hidden and unknown from ages and generations to the sons of men — for even in preceding ages and generations there were faithful and just persons, not only those great men such as the Patriarchs and Prophets, but also many of the common people. Therefore, the mystery of the Incarnation explicitly known and believed was not of the number of those things which were then absolutely necessary for righteousness and salvation.
It is proved secondly because the ancient Fathers so held: Eusebius, Book 7 On the Preparation of the Gospel, chapter 3; Saint Augustine, Book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 14; Saint Chrysostom, Homily 37 on Matthew. Hence they also refer to this point the rending of the veil at the death of Christ, which they teach signified that the mysteries concerning Christ, which had been more obscurely prefigured in the law and the Prophets, were now to be revealed more manifestly and clearly. See Saint Augustine, the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 15, and the Enchiridion, chapter 118, and Origen on chapter 27 of Matthew.
Saint Bernard, plainly and expressly, in Letter 77 to Hugh of Saint Victor, refutes the contrary opinion with diverse arguments; among which he strongly urges this one — that one who teaches or holds otherwise makes God, before the coming of Christ, either too sparing regarding the salvation of men, or immoderately lavish in conceding more excellent gifts and prerogatives. For either (he says) he reduces the number of the elect of that time to the scarcity of very rare spiritual persons — whom Scripture records as having stood out as remarkable and distinguished in those times on account of the special excellence of their holiness, and as having been able through a singular gift of the Spirit to foresee with the greatest certainty each thing as it was to come — and so he too greatly shortens the hand of God, by thinking that no one could be saved in that time except those few most perfect ones. Or certainly, if they do not deny that those times also had a multitude of those to be saved, even besides these, they assert that a great — but unheard of — largeness of divine gift was bestowed upon the former people.
For since it is manifest that nothing of those things which we now believe explicitly about the mystery of Christ was then clearly written or publicly preached, it remains (he says) that we confess all things were revealed to all by the Spirit, and that thus all were spiritual, all perfect, all Prophets — and thus in ancient times there was either prepared salvation or too numerous a perfection; both of which Bernard consequently rejects.
And he concludes at length: “How many today in the Christian people are there who, of eternal life and of the coming age, which they undoubtedly hope and believe in and ardently desire, yet do not know even tenuously how to think of its form and state? Thus, therefore, many before the coming of the Savior, holding and loving God Almighty as the gracious promiser of their salvation, believing Him faithful in promise, hoping with full certainty for a Redeemer, were saved in this faith and expectation — even though they were ignorant of when, how, and in what order the promised salvation would come.” He confirms this his doctrine with the authority of the Venerable Bede.
I said in the Conclusion: not only was that explicit faith not necessary by necessity of means, but neither by precept — because since it is clear from what has been said that common people were saved without it explicitly, it consequently becomes manifest that neither were they bound by precept to hold that explicit faith. I added, however, at least not with regard to all; because not improbably some think that the greater ones and those in charge of sacred matters were bound by precept to have explicit faith in the Incarnation. For this they adduce Saint Thomas here, Article 7, where he says that the passion of Christ was prefigured before the law and under the law by certain sacrifices, the signification of which (he says) the greater ones knew explicitly. By these words they want Saint Thomas to teach not merely that they knew this in some way, but as it were by office — and therefore by precept. This can also be confirmed by reason: because it was fitting that those who presided over sacrifices should know their significations and mysteries more explicitly and distinctly — otherwise, if even these were ignorant of them, their signification would seem useless, and all instruction of the people about such mysteries would have been lacking.
Nevertheless, others with no less probability hold that not even all the greater ones who succeeded in ordinary course to the offices of sacred matters were bound by precept to explicit knowledge and faith of these things — for even the rarer among them seem to have attained to that understanding. Hence Saint Thomas, Third Part, question 47, article 5, says that the leaders of the Jews knew that Christ was the Messiah, but yet were ignorant that He was God. Nicodemus also, who was a teacher in Israel, understood little or nothing of the mystery of the Incarnation of the Word, as is evident from the words of Christ in John 3. Indeed, even the Apostles themselves and many disciples, who were just while the Lord was preaching, did not yet then know the mystery of the Incarnation explicitly — so much so that even when the Lord preached openly, they did not sufficiently understand His passion and resurrection.
Fifth Conclusion: It must, however, be said altogether that from the moment of the fall of the first parents, that mystery was revealed to certain persons, and in every age was explicitly known and believed by some of the greater ones. Saint Thomas properly teaches this in the words cited above, and Hugh On the Sacraments, Part 10, chapter 6, where he writes: “We believe that in the Church of God from the beginning there was faith and knowledge of the Incarnation and passion of Christ: because from the beginning there were never lacking those who knew this. Others will be saved because they were joined to the perfect faith of these by simple faith and followed them by living well.” Saint Bernard teaches the same in the letter cited above, where he says that in ancient times very few — and the more perfect — knew the faith which now all the Christian people ought to know and profess; which also other holy Fathers hand on everywhere.
As for the confirmation adduced above, to show that all the greater ones were bound by precept to this explicit faith — it is answered to the former part that the signification was not therefore useless, because although not all the greater ones understood it perfectly, yet in a more imperfect mode they knew that the manner and form of purification from sins and of salvation to be given was being prefigured there. It is added that there were always, as we said, some who understood it perfectly.
To the latter part, however, it is answered from Saint Bernard above — that in those times the mysteries shadowed by sacrifices and legal ceremonies did not need to be explained to the people by clear and manifest exposition. For as Saint Bernard there presupposes, men who had spiritual understanding of these things received it not generally from the preaching or doctrine of others, but immediately from divine instruction and the anointing of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it was not incumbent upon those in charge of sacred matters to hand on, as a matter of office, explicit knowledge of those things prefigured in the sacrifices and ceremonies to the people themselves.
Sixth Conclusion: From the fall of the first parents, faith in the mystery of the Incarnation and redemption to be accomplished through Christ — at least implicit faith — was necessary in every age for all persons unto righteousness. This is common to the Doctors in Book 3, distinction 25, and in Book 4, distinction 11, and is the position of Saint Thomas here, Article 7.
It is proved first: because the Sacred Scriptures in various places generally indicate that no one ever attained righteousness and salvation without this faith — at least implicit. Wisdom, chapter 9: “By wisdom were healed all those who were pleasing to you, O Lord, from the beginning.” Isaiah, chapter 28: “Behold, I will lay in the foundations of Zion a tested stone, a precious cornerstone as a sure foundation, etc.” — where it is signified that the city of Zion, or the city of the people of God, or of the faithful, is founded upon one stone which is none other than Christ the Lord. Moreover, the city of the faithful is one from the beginning up to this time, and no one could ever lay any other foundation — therefore all who are in this mystical building must rest in their own way upon this foundation, namely, Christ the Lord, through faith. With this agrees the testimony of Saint Peter, Acts, chapter 4, when he subjoins to the words of the Prophet: “For there is no other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved.” Romans, chapter 3: “The righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ unto all and upon all who believe in Him” — and afterwards: “Justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.” To this also pertains what is said of Christ under the person of Christ in Hosea 13: “I will be your death, O death, etc.” No one, therefore, escapes death except through Christ and faith in Him — as through the looking at the bronze serpent, erected by the command of God through Moses. Hence also in Apocalypse, chapter 1, it is said of Christ that He had the keys of death and of hell.
It is proved secondly from the holy Fathers: Saint Jerome, on chapter 2 to the Galatians: “We ought to remind the Saints who were in ancient times that they were justified by the faith of Christ: indeed Abraham saw the day of Christ and rejoiced, etc.” Saint Augustine, Book 18 On the City of God, chapter 47, where treating of those who formerly pleased God, he adds: “Which is to be believed to have been granted to no one except him to whom was divinely revealed the one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who as coming in the flesh was thus foretold in ancient times, just as it has been announced to us that He came.”
But lest anyone infer from this that Saint Augustine requires explicit knowledge and faith in the mystery of the Incarnation for righteousness even before the coming of Christ, it is to be observed that he explains himself in other places — as in Letter 47, question 2; and Book 19 Against Faustus, chapter 14; and Enchiridion, chapter 118 — where he also teaches that none of the ancients found salvation apart from faith in Christ, but simultaneously adds: “Which grace was not indeed lacking even before to those to whom it was fitting to be imparted, though according to the dispensation of the time, veiled and hidden” — by which he sufficiently indicates that he does not require explicit and manifest faith for ancient times, but at least implicit and veiled under shadows and figures.
Prosper, on that verse of Psalm 104: “Do not touch my Christs” — “These elect” (he says) “were then called Christs of this very faith, because they themselves also lived in the faith which was to be revealed in the last times: from the beginning and in all the Saints, justification was only in Christ.”
Saint Leo, Sermon 13 On the Passion, teaches at length that by the same faith of all ages the just have been renewed; and in Sermon 14: “This counsel of mercy and justice of God, although in the past ages it was overshadowed by certain veils, etc.”
Saint Gregory, Homily 17 on Ezekiel, mystically applies to this topic what is said in the Gospel: “And those who went before and those who followed cried out, saying: Hosanna, etc.” “All the elect,” he says, “believed and believe in the Mediator of God and men; those who went before and those who follow cry Hosanna, etc.” The same Saint Bernard teaches in the letter and with the words cited above.
But a controversy is raised among the Scholastics as to what kind that implicit faith in Christ ought to have been.
Saint Thomas here, Article 7, reply to objection 3, seems to indicate that faith in divine providence sufficed — by which a man would believe God to be the liberator of men according to the modes pleasing to Him. This opinion is followed by Soto, On Nature and Grace, chapters 11 and 12; Cajetan; and Bannes in this place.
Hugh of Saint Victor also, in the place cited above, teaches that before the Law it was not necessary for the simple to believe, even in general, that God would send some redeemer; but only that God would liberate them from sins in the manner pleasing to Him. But that in the time of the Law it was obligatory for all to believe that God would send them some liberator.
But it is more probable that such faith in some redeemer to be sent was always necessary, even before the law — and that that general faith about divine providence regarding the salvation of men never sufficed. So hold Bonaventure, in Book 3, distinction 25, article 1; Albert the Great, in the same place; Gabriel, in the same place; and toward the same opinion inclines Scotus, question 1, number 9.
It is proved first: because that faith about divine providence regarding the liberation and salvation of men seems more general than can be said to include in it the implicit faith of Christ and a mediator — because even if no mediator or redeemer were to come, faith about divine providence regarding the salvation of men would still stand. Second: because all the testimonies adduced in support of the Conclusion, both from the Scriptures and from the holy Fathers, sufficiently signify that not just any implicit faith in Christ was necessary, but such as would be concerned with some particular mediator and redeemer who was to be sent by God — although it was not necessary to know and believe explicitly and clearly that He was to be the Son of God and God who would assume flesh, and that through passion and death with the strictness of justice He would satisfy for sins and thus redeem man, etc.
Here also observe that the holy Fathers frequently inculcate that we and the ancients are justified by the same faith of the Mediator. But how can it be said to be the same faith of the Mediator, if they were entirely ignorant of whether there was going to be any mediator or not? Certainly in that same way it could also be said to be the same faith of theirs and ours, even if they had been saved without a mediator, through the sole gratuitous remission of sins liberally granted by God, and we through the merits and satisfaction of Christ. See Saint Leo, Sermon 14 On the Passion, and Bernard in the letter cited above, where treating of the implicit faith of the ancients about Christ, he says they were hoping with certainty for a redeemer.
It is proved thirdly: because immediately after the fall of the first parents, the Lord revealed this mystery about a particular liberator to come, when in cursing the serpent He said: “I will put enmity between you and the woman, between your seed and her seed; she shall crush your head, etc.” — which Adam doubtless knew, and handed on and communicated to his children and posterity for their consolation and hope of redemption.
To these can also be added a reason of fittingness: because since Christ is the universal cause of the salvation of men, it was altogether fitting that all should know Him in some way, and be united to Him through faith and hope — believing, namely, that God would send someone who would be acceptable and most pleasing to Him, through whose intercession, merits, and sacrifice God would reconcile man to Himself; and thus simultaneously hoping that through the work and merits of that Mediator to come they might be able to obtain pardon for sins and salvation. See Ruard, On Article 8 of the Louvain against Luther.
But it is objected: the Mediator to come is said to have been promised first of all to Abraham, then to David and Solomon, as Saint Jerome has on chapter 1 of Matthew on those words, “Son of Abraham” — therefore at least before that time it was not necessary to have faith in a liberation to be accomplished through some Mediator. Furthermore, after Abraham, that matter also seems to have become known only to his posterity.
It is answered by denying that the promise of a coming mediator was made first of all to Abraham: because Adam in the state of innocence also knew the mystery of the Incarnation — though not under the aspect of redemption to be accomplished through Christ, as we said before. Then also, immediately after the fall, God foretold and promised to us a liberator in the words already cited from Genesis, chapter 3. Enoch also, who was the seventh from Adam, had knowledge of one Redeemer Christ: because, as Jude writes in his Canonical Epistle, Enoch himself prophesied of the coming of the Lord for judgment. Similarly, Job, who was not a Jew, had faith in one Redeemer of his, as is evident from chapter 19 — which also his friends do not seem to have been ignorant of. Balaam too, though a Gentile, very manifestly prophesied about Christ, in the book of Numbers, chapter 23. Finally, the Sibyls also among the pagans produced many prophecies about Christ. Therefore God from the beginning seems to have made sufficiently known to the world that one was to come who would bring remedy and salvation to the human race — so that to all this knowledge and faith could rightly be said to be necessary, according to the Scriptures cited, in order to recover righteousness and life.
Moreover, Christ is said to have been promised first of all to Abraham, because to him first it was promised that from his posterity He was to be born, and that in his seed all nations would be blessed — not because no promise of Christ, or of the Messiah, or of the Savior to come, had been made to those of earlier times.
It is objected secondly: Eusebius, Book 7 On the Preparation of the Gospel, chapter 3, writes: “Scripture attests with the highest praise to Abraham’s admirable righteousness, which he obtained not from the Mosaic law but by natural reason” — by which he seems to indicate that before the Law, natural knowledge of God and of divine matters sufficed for righteousness; therefore faith in some redeemer was not necessary. And Saint Chrysostom, Homily 37 on Matthew: “Men could be saved even then without confessing Christ” (he says) “— for the worship of Christ, who had not yet come, was not demanded of them, but only that, spurning the worship of idols, they should know the one God the Creator of all; therefore etc.”
It is answered to Eusebius that he only teaches that men could attain righteousness in the state of nature, when they still lived not under some positive divine law but under the guidance of natural reason. Yet in such a way that, although he says Abraham was justified without law — and indeed excellently — he does not exclude faith and grace: for he subjoins from the Scriptures that Abraham attained righteousness through faith; which is also evident from other adjoining matters which he treats concerning Enoch.
To Chrysostom it is answered that he speaks of explicit faith in Christ by which He would be known not merely as some mediator to come, but as the Son of God and as God — namely, that without such confession and worship of Christ, men could be saved at that time. Yet this faith and confession and worship are now necessary for us unto righteousness and salvation — which his own cited words also sufficiently and manifestly import.
Seventh Conclusion: At the very coming of Christ and soon after His passion, the Gospel not yet having been sufficiently promulgated throughout the world, it was not necessary for all by necessity of means to believe explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ.
It is proved: because, as Saint Bernard in the cited letter — against someone who asserted that from the time when it is first read to have been said by the Lord, “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, etc.” — no one could be saved in any way without that same Sacrament actually and visibly received, or martyrdom in its place — rightly argues: it seems too harsh and severe that the hidden Word should now openly harm, and should strike as judge before He threatens, and that meanwhile what the Savior speaks in darkness and in the ear does not yet save, because it does not yet appear — and that it should already fill the world with the condemned. And a little below: “Who thinks thus? It agrees not with the Author of life to use death, which He came to destroy, immediately at the beginning of His ways, to the prejudice of the most recently and still unknown heavenly edict. It is truly wicked to think of the Giver of all good things that He gave such an evil beginning upon His coming.” And again: “What therefore could not be known unless it were heard — very unjustly indeed” (he says) “is obedience demanded where hearing has not preceded. Was God to destroy a nation ignorant and just — to speak with the pagan” (he says a little above) “? Nor is the mystery of Christ, like that of His Baptism, such that even without promulgation, the natural Law would not suffer it to be unknown.” See in the same place many similar things.
Eighth Conclusion: When, however, the Gospel began to be preached — even before it had been sufficiently promulgated throughout the whole world — those to whom it was announced were bound by necessity of precept to believe explicitly in Christ. This is evident from the last chapter of Mark: “But he who does not believe will be condemned” — for accompanying the preaching of the Gospel was the precept by which hearers, already sufficiently instructed, were bound to believe and embrace it, the Lord cooperating and confirming the word with signs that followed.
Ninth Conclusion: When the Gospel of Christ was sufficiently promulgated throughout the world, explicit faith in Christ began to be necessary by necessity of means for righteousness for all adults — namely, to believe that the Son of God assumed human nature, and that He Himself is true God and man, who came into this world to redeem the human race by His death, and to reconcile it to God the Father. This is the more common opinion of theologians. It is gathered from Saint Thomas: for here, Article 7, he has: “After the time of grace revealed, both greater and lesser are bound to have explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, especially regarding those things that are commonly solemnized in the Church and publicly proposed, such as the articles of the Incarnation.” And in Book 3, distinction 25, question 2, article 2, he holds this faith to be so necessary that if someone did not have a preacher, God would reveal it to him, unless through his own fault he placed an obstacle. This is well to be noted in Saint Thomas — in the first place against those who think that explicit faith is not necessary to attain righteousness, though they admit it is required for the attaining of glory, whom we rejected above. Then against the opinion of Andrew Vega and several others, who think it is only necessary by necessity of precept, not of means — for if that were so, there would be no need for God to reveal by Himself to those who, inculpably and on account of a lack of a preacher, were ignorant of these things. Third, against those who admit that extraordinarily at least it can happen that even one who has not believed explicitly in Christ may be saved.
For the same opinion, among the more ancient, are adduced: the Master, Book 3, Sentences, distinction 25; Albert the Great, in the same place, question 1, article 6; Bonaventure, in the same place, article 5, question 5; Scotus, question 1; Gabriel, in the same distinction, sole question; Alexander of Hales, Third Part, question 82, member 3, article 3 — who, though they did not express it in explicit words, yet seem to have altogether presupposed it. More manifestly, however, the same is held by Durandus, in the cited distinction 25, question 1; the Carthusian, in Book 3, question 1; and among the more recent, by Valentia, Volume 3, disputation 1, question 2, point 4; Sanchez, On the Decalogue, Book 2, chapter 2; Lorinus, on chapter 2 of the Acts of the Apostles; Lorca, 2–2, disputation 22; Tanner, Volume 3, disputation 1 On Faith, question 7, doubt 2; Malderus here, question 2, article 2; and the Louvain theologians against Luther, Article 8, which has: “For justification, before all else in adults, necessary is the faith by which we certainly believe that Christ Jesus is the Son of God, proposed by the Father as propitiation for us for our sins in His blood, without which no justification can be obtained by any works of ours or any penitence.”
And Ruard, on the said article, page 10, writes thus: “But this faith was necessary up to the manifestation of the Gospel, distinct or veiled; in the open, or in mystery, as the Master teaches after the Blessed Augustine” — now, however, distinct and express faith of the Mediator is necessary.
And it is proved first from the Scriptures: John, chapter 3: “And just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, so that everyone who believes in Him may not perish, but may have eternal life.” Here Christ signifies that faith in Him is necessary to avoid perdition and to attain eternal life — just as for the children of Israel wounded by serpents, the looking at the bronze serpent erected by Moses in the desert was necessary.
Someone will say: the words of Christ cited — “So must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him, etc.” — do not seem to import more than that faith in Christ crucified avails for escaping death and obtaining life; not, however, that without it there is no other reason or way to escape death.
It is answered by denying the assumption: for the comparison instituted by Christ requires and imports more — because not merely was the looking at the bronze serpent among other means effective for healing the wounded, but it was the necessary means, and there was no other way or means of obtaining healing from the bites of serpents. And so Christ also signifies that faith in the Son of Man exalted on the Cross has a place in the order such that one may not perish.
Which He expresses most clearly in the same chapter with other words, where He says: “He who believes in Him is not judged; but he who does not believe is already judged, because he does not believe in the name of the only-begotten Son of God.” And at the end of the chapter: “He who believes in the Son has eternal life; but he who does not believe the Son will not see life, but the wrath of God remains upon him.” Now that He speaks of explicit faith in the Incarnate and crucified Word is manifest from this — that He adds: “Because he does not believe in the name of the only-begotten Son of God.” Also: “He who does not believe the Son.” And from that which He prefaced: “So must the Son of Man be lifted up, that everyone who believes in Him, etc.”
And that He requires this not only for attaining eternal life, as Melchior Cano, Castro, and Bannes hold, but also for righteousness — this is clear from the fact that He not only says: “He who does not believe the Son will not see life”, but also adds: “but the wrath of God remains upon him” — which is very much to be noted against the aforesaid authors.
Again, that He speaks of the time of the New Testament is similarly established from these circumstances: “This is the judgment, that light came into the world.” John, chapter 17: “Now this is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.” Here the Lord signifies that faith in Himself as sent by God — that He might be our Mediator — is as necessary as faith in the one true God, in order that one may be able to attain eternal life.
Romans, chapter 10: “This is the word of faith which we preach. Because if you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart that God raised Him from the dead, you shall be saved.” Where the Apostle requires explicit faith in the death and resurrection of Christ. See the same in the same Epistle, chapter 3, and Galatians 2.
It is proved secondly from Saint Augustine, who in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7, has that those will not free themselves who can say they have not heard the Gospel of Christ. He therefore thought that faith in the Gospel is a necessary means so that someone may be freed from condemnation and death — hence also below in the same chapter he teaches that, without any doubt, God arranges for the Gospel to be heard and believed by all who by the largeness of divine grace are set apart from original condemnation. Which would not be necessary if through implicit faith, which is concerned with divine providence regarding the liberation and salvation of men, we could attain righteousness.
And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 7: “If he can be saved without faith in Christ” (he says, referring to Cornelius the Centurion) “the architect Peter would not be sent to him to build him up.” To this also pertains what is found in the Extravagante Unam Sanctam, where it is said that those who have heard nothing of Christ cannot be of the Church in which there is one faith, one baptism, and outside of which there is no salvation or remission of sins.
It is proved finally by a reason of fittingness: because it was shown above that before the coming of Christ, faith in some mediator to come between God and men was always necessary for adults — though not according to His determined qualities. Therefore it is fitting that after He has now come, and has presented Himself to the world, and has set forth His qualities and His mission, and has conversed with men, it should be required that He be believed and worshipped by all as He is, and that men acknowledge their liberation through His death — so that thus they may more confess, acknowledge, and venerate God’s kindness, mercy, and clemency toward themselves.
This is confirmed: because the state of the new law is the state of perfection, in which the truth previously veiled and shadowed by various figures was at last manifestly revealed. Rightly, therefore, it is considered that now a more perfect knowledge and more explicit faith in the redemption of men is required than formerly. A sign of this is also the fact that the Apostles and the first proclaimers of the Gospel immediately inculcated this explicit faith everywhere upon all — and indeed in such a form of words as to signify that without it the remission of sins and salvation cannot be had.
But against this, it is objected first: true contrition for sins and perfect love of God above all things are the ultimate dispositions for righteousness — such that with these posited, righteousness is infallibly infused into a man. But these can be had without explicit faith in the mystery of the Incarnation and redemption accomplished through Christ; therefore, etc.
The minor is confirmed: because in many of the simpler just ones of the old Law, those dispositions were present without such explicit faith — because true faith in the one God who gives rewards to the good and punishments to the evil, together with acknowledgment of sin, seems on the part of the intellect to be a sufficient foundation for a man to be able thereby, with divine assistance, to arrive at perfect contrition for sins and true love of God; therefore, etc.
It is answered: granting the major, speaking of contrition and love of the supernatural order, and denying the minor. And to the confirmation it is answered that the dispositions prerequisite for justification are not entirely connected with each other in a natural and necessary order, nor does the prior one naturally and necessarily cause or lead to the posterior; but they cohere with each other and are posited antecedently or subsequently to each other in mutual relation according to the free ordinance of God, supported by fitting reasons.
Therefore, although in former times — when those were the times of infancy, shadows, and images — God promoted some to the remaining dispositions, and thus to righteousness itself, upon that more obscure and less perfect faith previously had, it does not follow that He also does this now. For after the fullness of time came, and God sent His Son the Savior, it was already necessary to put away the things of a child, and to lay aside the veil of figures. Hence He rightly requires the perfection of knowledge and faith in all divine mysteries — and especially in the recognition and faith of our redemption. Which reason also counsels, as is evident from what has been said before. And it is proved from the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 6, where on the manner of preparing and disposing oneself now for righteousness, it writes thus: “They are disposed to that righteousness itself when, excited by divine grace and assisted, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing to be true those things which are divinely revealed and promised, and especially that, by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, the ungodly are justified by God.” Now, therefore, without explicit faith in Christ, no one is promoted to those ultimate supernatural dispositions — and thus neither to righteousness, because that, according to divine ordinance, is now prerequired.
It is objected secondly: If, when the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated through the world, this explicit faith at last becomes necessary by necessity of means — then it will not appear to have been thus necessary except toward the end of the world; for the Gospel has not been preached throughout the whole world except when the consummation of the age is imminent. Which Christ first indicates in Matthew 19: “I say to you, you will not have gone through all the cities of Israel before the Son of Man comes.” And Matthew 24: “And this Gospel of the Kingdom shall be preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then shall the consummation come.” And so Saint Augustine seems to teach in Letters 78 and 80 to Hesychius, and in the book On Nature and Grace, chapter 2, and elsewhere; therefore, etc.
It is answered by denying the Consequence, and for the answer to the Confirmation, it is to be noted that the Gospel can be said to have been preached throughout the whole world in two ways. In one way, so that everywhere to all parts of the world there were proclaimers of the Gospel and they preached the Gospel there — and in this sense are to be taken the words of Christ cited from Matthew, as Augustine seems to have understood them in the places cited. But in another way, the Gospel can also be said to have been announced or proclaimed through the whole world when it has been preached in the more important and more renowned parts or provinces or kingdoms of the world — from which some knowledge of it is also carried to other places, at least by report.
In which sense the Apostle seems to have spoken several times in his Epistles — as 1 Thessalonians, chapter 1: “Not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but in every place your faith which is toward God has gone forth.” Also Romans, chapter 1: “Because your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world.” And chapter 10: “Have they not heard? Yes indeed, their sound has gone out into all the earth, and their words to the ends of the world.” Nor indeed could what was openly and consistently preached at Rome be hidden anywhere — for men of what nation were not in that city at that time? Or what peoples anywhere were ignorant of what Rome had learned? As Saint Leo has in Sermon 1 on the feast of Peter and Paul. And in this sense Chrysostom is also rightly understood to have said in Homily 76 on Matthew, that in twenty or at most thirty years the Gospel ran to all shores of the world.
To those things, therefore, which were adduced for the Confirmation, it must be said that they demonstrate only that the Gospel, in the former mode, was not to be preached through the whole world any sooner. But it is enough that that necessity of explicit faith is considered to have been imposed on all adults when the Gospel, at least in the latter mode, has been promulgated throughout the whole world — which manifestly follows from the doctrine of Saint Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 7.
Tenth Conclusion: Explicit faith in the most Holy Trinity was not necessary by necessity of means — indeed, not even by precept — in the order of all men in the ancient times before the coming of Christ. The Scholastics commonly teach this.
It is proved first: because the mystery of the Trinity was never openly and publicly handed on before the birth of Christ — and therefore it was not commonly known by the faithful of those times. Therefore the faithful could then be saved without explicit faith in it; otherwise, without doubt, divine providence would not have permitted it to be generally unknown to the faithful, but would have revealed it more openly, and caused it to be more manifestly explained and made known to the faithful people.
It is proved secondly: because explicit faith in the mystery of the Incarnation was not necessary in those times, as has now been shown — therefore neither was that of the Trinity, because the reasoning seems equal for both. Indeed, for a stronger reason, knowledge of the Incarnation would have been required — inasmuch as it touches us more closely and served in a special way for the liberation of the human race — therefore, etc.
It is not to be denied, however, that certain greater ones, even in those times, had explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity, to whom it was specially revealed — such as Abraham, David, Isaiah, and others, who, given such a revelation made to them, were also then bound by precept to believe it. And therefore in the Conclusion, when I said that that faith was not necessary even by necessity of precept, I added: at least with regard to all.
Eleventh Conclusion: Explicit faith in the most Holy Trinity is, in this time of the New Testament, necessary by necessity of means. Saint Thomas indicates this here, Article 8, where he says that after the time of grace divulged, all are bound to believe explicitly the mystery of the Trinity. And so teach Malderus, Gregory of Valentia, Tanner above, and most others cited for Conclusion 9.
It is proved first: because explicit faith in the Incarnation is necessary by necessity of means in the time of the New Testament, as was shown — therefore also explicit faith in the Trinity, because the former cannot be had without the latter. For one cannot explicitly believe the Son of God incarnate and conceived of the Holy Spirit, unless one explicitly believes the whole Trinity — because in believing the Son in divinity, one also believes the Father, without whom the Son cannot be understood. Second, because we are not reborn in Christ except through the express invocation of the most Holy Trinity — for Baptism, which is called the Sacrament of faith, must be conferred in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Third, because the Trinity is the principal object of the beatitude we hope for — therefore explicit faith in it, after the Son of God appeared in flesh and conversed with men, and the whole Trinity clearly manifested itself at the Jordan, when Christ was baptized by John while the voice of the Father was heard and the Holy Spirit descended in the form of a dove, is rightly required by necessity for salvation in the children of the New Testament.
But against both this and the ninth conclusion, there is further objected: It appears too rigid and severe to say that explicit faith in the Incarnation of the Son of God and in our redemption through His death on the Cross, and in the mystery of the most Holy Trinity, is necessary by necessity of means for all adults to obtain the remission of sins and salvation. This is so both because almost infinitely many men throughout the world do not have proclaimers of the Gospel or teachers of the Christian faith from whom they can learn and be instructed in these mysteries — which are greatly elevated above all natural reason — and also because very many of the simpler Christians appear so unlearned and dull of intellect that they can in no way understand or grasp what it is to have in God one divine nature and three distinct persons; indeed, they cannot even conceive what nature is, or what person is.
Therefore a vast multitude of Christians, of otherwise sufficiently upright life, will appear to be excluded from the attaining of salvation solely on account of a defect of that explicit faith which they are unable to attain on account of slowness of intellect. For if it is said to be necessary by necessity of means, they will not be excused on account of impossibility — whether that impossibility arises from a lack of teachers of the faith or from the natural incapacity of the hearers — just as they could be excused if it were posited as necessary only by necessity of precept. Hence the way of salvation would now seem more difficult than in ancient times. It therefore does not appear that we should think God requires that explicit faith as an absolutely necessary means.
It is answered: although the Christian law ought not to be called too rigid or harsh, it is nevertheless arduous and perfect. Hence it also contains many precepts very burdensome to a man not yet fully healed through grace — such as that he cannot merely refrain from hating his enemy, but is also bound to love him. But just as difficulties and no small struggles arise against a morbidly affected disposition from the norm and rule of the Christian life, so also from the law of faith of Christ there arise many things that are difficult to an intellect obscured and always intent on earthly things — not only in believing, but also in learning, so as to believe. For the Christian life is sublime and has a sublime end — wherefore it should not seem surprising that the rule proportionate to directing it is greatly elevated and not learned without toil.
As for the difficulties alleged, it is answered to the first: just as almost infinitely many men are said not to have proclaimers of the Gospel of Christ, so also in ancient times there were, and even now there are, almost infinitely many who did not have and do not now have teachers from whom they might be instructed about those objects exceeding natural reason — the explicit faith of which, in every time, in every state, by the common opinion and judgment of all, was necessary by necessity of means for attaining remission of sins and righteousness. Such as: the infection of man through sin in which he is born; divine providence regarding the liberation of man from it and from other sins; the justice of God regarding the actions and works of men, which punishes evils with condign punishments and rewards goods with condign rewards — not always here temporally, but above all in the life to come eternally; and consequently also the immortality of the soul, and similar things. And yet no one, for the reason that so many were and now are without competent teachers from whom they might learn these things, thinks that explicit faith in these was not and is not necessary by necessity of means for salvation — nor does anyone argue that the doctrine which posits this necessity is too rigid or too severe. Unless one opposes Vega, of whom we spoke above, who perhaps for this reason thought natural knowledge could suffice for attaining righteousness with faith in desire, as we explained there — but he is rejected by all.
And indeed, it is as easy for God through His inward anointing, or through an Angel, to instruct men without a teacher about the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption through Christ, and of the most Holy Trinity, as about those other things which, as we said, all acknowledge must be held by explicit faith by all. Or also to send preachers who, just as in these, so also in those, may instruct them. Which I add lest anyone perhaps place the distinction there. For no one can sufficiently know and believe those things by natural investigation alone in the order of salvation. Therefore no one ought or can rightly be moved by such an argument to say that this perfection of explicit faith is not a necessary means for the attaining of righteousness and salvation — but from this it is rather fitting with humility of spirit to venerate the judgments of God, who “is terrible in His counsels over the children of men” (as the Psalmist sings, Psalm 105), and “Who announces His word to Jacob, His justices and His judgments to Israel; He has not done so for every nation, and His judgments He has not made known to them” (as the same Prophet sings, Psalm 147); and thus with thanksgiving to acknowledge and confess the great mercies of the Lord upon us. And with Saint Augustine, Book 9 of the Confessions, chapter 9, sweetly to contemplate the height of the counsels of God over the salvation of the human race. Whether, however, all have the assistance of God and a sufficient light by which even these can arrive at the knowledge necessary for faith, we have disputed in Book 1, Question 2 (1. 2. q. 111), Article 3.
To the latter inconvenience alleged it is answered that it is not required that all understand those mysteries, but that they believe them — because faith consists not so much in the understanding of things as in assent. Hence Saint Augustine rightly said of such persons in the book Against the Epistle of Fundament, chapter 4: “The multitude is made safest not by the liveliness of understanding, but by the simplicity of believing.” And Tractate 4 on John: “What is faith, but to believe what you do not see?” Hence in the Enchiridion, chapter 9, he teaches that knowledge of things and causes is not necessary for us — but, he says, it suffices for a Christian to believe the cause of created things, whether heavenly or earthly, whether visible or invisible, to be nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who alone is the one and true God; and that there is no nature which is not either Himself or from Him; and that He is the Trinity — namely, the Father, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same Father and Son.
It suffices, therefore, according to this doctrine of Saint Augustine, for the simpler ones to believe the mystery of the most Holy Trinity under its own terms, even if they were ignorant of what pertains to its explanation. Which some think Scotus wished in Book 3, distinction 25, when he writes: “If there is some unlearned person who cannot conceive what nature is and what person is, it is not necessary that he have an explicit act about the article pertaining to the unity of essence and the Trinity of persons distinctly, as literate clerics have — but it suffices that he believe” (namely, that mystery proposed under its own proper terms) “as the Church believes” — namely, in that meaning and understanding, as to its fuller explanation.
Which sufficiently accords with what Azorius writes in Volume 1, Book 8, chapter 6, question 6 — namely, that explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity as to substance suffices: namely, to believe that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that these three are by no means three Gods, but are one God. Similarly also, faith in the mystery of the Incarnation: namely, to believe that Christ, the Son of God, was born of the Virgin, and was crucified and died for our salvation.
To these, however, I add that no one in possession of the use of reason is to be considered so dull and obtuse that, with instruction applied, he cannot at some point grasp — at least by a general and confused concept — what nature is and what three persons are, and apply that general concept, according to the sense of the Church, to God, when he believes God to be one in substance and triune in persons: or to be Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and to be one God.
But whatever may be the case, speaking speculatively, about the probability of the opposite opinion — which seems to be inculcated too much in books — this in the meantime must be indubitable to all: that it is dangerous in practice, inasmuch as it can, under the appearance of humanity and compassion toward the wretched and the unlearned, be the cause or occasion of the perdition of many, and can serve almost no good or bring assistance to salvation.
For if in reality, by God’s ordinance and decree, explicit faith in those mysteries is necessary by necessity of means — according to the doctrine we follow — no probability of the other opinion will be able to supply here the defect of that faith. Just as sometimes it supplies the defect of what is necessary only by precept, when it is taught by others that it is probably not necessary. What remains, then, but that it causes or provides occasion for negligence and sloth — both in Bishops, Pastors, Confessors, and Catechists, and in the faithful themselves? In the former, as to the proper diligence of instructing those in their charge; and in the people, as to the proper diligence which must be applied in learning those pious things which are necessary to know for salvation? For all easily indulge themselves, and under the title of the rudeness and incapacity of the people, will think themselves not obliged to spend so much labor in instructing — and the people will think themselves as it were absolved from the necessity of precept on account of the impossibility of learning, as they say.
Whereas, if all from both sides fulfilled their due office, it would come about that the faithful people would be sufficiently instructed in the things that belong to faith and piety — to which all will undoubtedly be more stirred up if they understand that without knowledge of these things, no hope of salvation remains.
With these things thus explained — chiefly regarding those things which must be believed explicitly by necessity of means — it remains to set forth more particularly those things which in the time of the new law must now be necessarily known and believed explicitly by every Christian man by necessity of precept.
Here I first presuppose that all are obliged by precept to know and believe explicitly all those things which must be believed explicitly by necessity of means — for this the Doctors all hold without controversy. The reason is that natural reason dictates that God, who wished man to tend toward such an end through certain means, also wished and bound man to apply those means which on his part, according to divine ordinance, are necessary for the attaining of that end. Similarly, I presuppose that all those things must also necessarily be known and believed by obligation of precept, knowledge of which is necessary for living rightly and uprightly in the order of the supernatural end for which we were created — because one who commands someone to do something is considered also to command him to obtain those things without which it cannot be done, insofar as it is in his power.
Moreover, since we now have occasion to speak of precept, it is to be observed that just as precepts are commonly distinguished into affirmative and negative, so also a twofold precept of faith can be distinguished: one affirmative, which obliges to believe the mysteries of faith; and another negative, which obliges not to dissent from the mysteries of faith, nor to doubt about their truth.
Now there is a great difference between these two: because the affirmative one does not oblige all persons to believe explicitly in particular all and every object revealed by God — nor even to exercise an act of faith about any object whatsoever at all times; but only to believe explicitly certain specific objects, and to exercise acts of faith about them at certain times. The negative, however, regards all objects and all times — because it is always prohibited to dissent, and indeed from any object of faith whatsoever, which is sufficiently proposed as revealed by God. Hence the remaining difficulty concerns those things which by affirmative precept are to be believed explicitly and in particular. For the explanation of which, the following is established:
Twelfth Conclusion: The affirmative precept of faith, although it does not oblige to all objects to be believed explicitly in particular — as was said — nevertheless obliges to believe explicitly all mysteries contained in the Creed, at least as to substance. This is the Conclusion of Saint Thomas here, Article 5, where he says that the first things to be believed — such as the articles of the Creed — must be believed explicitly, which must be understood at least of necessity of precept. Likewise of Cajetan, Bannes, Arragon in the same place; Malderus, Article 7, last Conclusion; Valentia, Volume 3, Disputation 1, question 2, point 3, Conclusion 3, and point 4 in the same place; and commonly of the Scholastics in Book 3, distinction 25. And the Roman Catechism favors this, which has: “What Christian men ought first to believe are those things which the holy Apostles, inspired by the divine Spirit, arranged in twelve articles of the Creed.”
It is proved first: because whatever is contained in the Apostles’ Creed consists of the first rudiments of Christian doctrine. Hence Augustine writes in Sermon 135 On the Season: “The Creed is the brief and grand rule of your faith: brief in number of words, grand in weight of sentences.” And in the same place, Sermon 181: “The Apostles handed on a certain rule of faith which, comprehended in twelve sentences according to the number of the Apostles, they called the Creed — by which believers might hold Catholic unity and convict heretical depravity.” Therefore none of these can be unknown to any Christian — for it is disordered that someone should be ignorant of the first foundations and fundamental rules of the religion he professes.
This is confirmed from the chapter Baptizandos, On Consecration, distinction 4: “Those to be baptized ought to learn the Creed of faith and render it on the last Thursday of the week either to the Bishop or to the Priest.” And from the chapter Non liceat in the same place, which has: “It is proper that in those days, those who are to be baptized should learn the Creed.” The Church therefore considered that Christians ought to believe the Creed explicitly, in the same distinction 4, and the chapter Deus qui, On Penances and Remissions.
It is proved secondly: because from the very beginning, the Apostles and the proclaimers of the Gospel everywhere preached and inculcated upon all the people the mysteries of faith contained in the Creed — as is evident from the Acts of the Apostles and their Epistles: such as chapters 1, 2, 10, 17 of Acts; Romans, chapters 3 and 4; 1 Corinthians 15; 1 Peter, chapter 3; and elsewhere indiscriminately. It is therefore a sign that they considered these things ought to be known and believed by all.
Third: because by the most certain opinion of the Doctors, all are bound to believe explicitly those things that are said about the Trinity and the Incarnation and Redemption. And indeed concerning the Trinity, this is clear — for in this the faith of this state exceeds the faith of the ancients, wherefore also Baptism, which is the gateway to righteousness and salvation, is given under the express invocation of the most Holy Trinity, and the very sign of the Cross, which is the distinctive mark of Christians, is formed by all under the invocation of the Trinity. Similarly concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, Nativity, Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ, this is sufficiently established — because these are celebrated by solemn feasts in the Church.
That all ought also to hold explicitly the coming of Christ for judgment is proved: because the Apostles always most of all proposed this to the faithful. Hence Peter, Acts 10, commanded to preach to the people that He is the one who was appointed by God as judge of the living and the dead. But if the Apostles had a precept to preach this to all the people, it follows that all the people ought to know and believe it. Nor is this surprising — because that matter greatly serves to commend the grace of Christ and the justice of God, and at the same time greatly avails to call men away from sin and deter them.
All also ought to know that there is one holy Church — for that matter is not difficult, and knowledge of it is very necessary so that the rest may be rightly believed, because the faith of the Christian people, as to the reason of credibility, rests greatly upon the authority of the Church proposing.
It is added that they ought to know that instruction in religion is not to be sought from any and all indiscriminately, nor are Sacraments to be sought from any and all, but from the Pastors and ministers of the Church, which is one and holy.
As to what pertains to the remission of sins, that faith was necessary after the fall in every age — as is sufficiently established from what was said above about the necessary faith in the liberator and mediator. They are also bound to believe the resurrection of the dead — because in it consists all our future hope of retribution. For one who does not believe the resurrection consequently does not believe future rewards or punishments — as the Apostle deduces beautifully and at length in 1 Corinthians 15, and Chrysostom on that passage. The same reasoning applies to faith regarding eternal life in the coming age.
I said in the Conclusion that it is obligatory by precept to believe explicitly all the articles of faith contained in the Creed, at least as to substance — because not all the circumstances added there seem similarly to fall under precept. For example, all are obliged under mortal sin to believe explicitly that Christ suffered and died for our salvation — but they are not bound under so grave an obligation to know that He suffered under the judge Pontius Pilate. Again, they are bound to believe explicitly that He rose from the dead — but they are not similarly obliged to know that He rose on the third day. And so of certain others.
So also all are obliged to believe explicitly the holy Catholic Church — and yet Sanchez, Book 2 On the Decalogue, chapter 3, number 7, not improbably teaches that the more unlearned are not obliged to believe explicitly in it the Communion of Saints — because that matter does not seem to contain any principal moment, whether in the order of divine things or in the order of those things which make for living piously and justly; and it has its subtlety, since even the learned dispute about what things this communion consists in.
But someone will ask: are adult faithful therefore not all bound to know the whole Apostles’ Creed, so that they can recite it in order?
I respond and say first that they are not obliged to this by any divine precept — because a precept of this kind is neither obtained from the Scriptures nor from the nature of things, nor can it be efficaciously deduced. For the Scriptures nowhere hand on the articles of the Creed in that order — and for the instruction of a man, whether as to the intellect or as to the moderating of the affections, it seems to suffice that someone hold distinctly the very things contained therein, so as to be able to grasp and reconsider them at time and place.
I say secondly that nevertheless by ecclesiastical law — as Bannes speaks here — or at least by the custom of the Church obtaining the force of law, all ought to know the Apostles’ Creed in order and word for word. This is gathered from the Canons cited above, which are drawn from the Councils of Laodicea and Braga and others. And that these were in use at Rome in the time of Augustine is evident from chapter 1 of Book 8 of the Confessions, where he mentions that those to be baptized were accustomed to render publicly their faith as if comprehended in a summary. This obligation, however, does not seem to be in itself unto mortal sin — but at least under a grave venial sin, as Navarrus teaches, chapter 11, number 2, and with him Malderus — although meanwhile, on account of the danger of being ignorant also of the very things and the substance of the articles, which is usually concurrent when they are neglected to be learned in order, such negligence may sometimes be mortal. For perhaps it not rarely happens that those who cannot recite them by heart and in order — especially those who have never thus learned them — also do not know the mysteries contained therein as to their substance, and cannot distinctly call them to mind.
Which must be done at some time — both for thanksgiving for divine benefits conferred upon us, and for other pious exercises, such as overcoming certain temptations, shaking off sluggishness, recovering lost righteousness through the due dispositions — namely, so that a man who has fallen into sin may be usefully shaken by the fear of divine justice from his faith, and turn to considering the mercy of God, and by turning raise himself to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to him on account of Christ — whence also he begins to love Him as the fountain of justice.
Therefore it will not suffice to know how to recite the Creed without some concept and sense of the very things — as, for example, in a language one does not understand. Hence Pastors rightly ought to be greatly solicitous about their subjects, so that all may diligently seek to learn the Creed by heart, and instruct them according to their capacity about the sense and substance of each article. For Chrysostom, Homily 3 on Acts, and Augustine, in the book On Pastors (where he expounds chapter 34 of Ezekiel), teach that not a few Prelates perish because they did not diligently enough instruct the people in the faith. Let them therefore imitate Saint Paul, who says of himself in Acts, chapter 20, to the elders of the Church: “You know, etc. how I kept back nothing profitable, so as not to announce to you, to teach you publicly and from house to house, testifying both to Jews and to Greeks, etc.”
Someone will again ask: is a formal and explicit act of faith in all those things — at least those said to be necessarily believable by necessity of means — required for the justification of an adult who has lapsed after Baptism?
It is answered that a formal and expressed act of each of them is not always required; but that virtual faith in them can suffice, when they have otherwise formally and expressly been believed by him. For example, one who is sorry for having offended God virtually believes that God exists and is a rewarder of good and evil work; and one who hopes for pardon through the merits and satisfaction of Christ the Lord — which he has professed at other times — and believes by a formal act that the Son of God was sent by the Father and suffered for our sins, also virtually believes the mystery of the Incarnation and of the Trinity.
Moreover, Ruard rightly admonishes, regarding Article 8 of Louvain against Luther, that faith in the Mediator Christ in habit alone does not seem to suffice here, but that faith in Him is required in act — at least in virtual act, as he himself speaks — by which, namely, the penitent is so directed that he does not hope for pardon or righteousness as if from works, or from the mere grace of the Father without the intervention of the redemption accomplished through the Son, but that his penitence proceeds from it — at least according to the hope of pardon. Namely, so that the hope of the penitent may be virtually grounded in faith in the Mediator and Propitiator, Christ the Lord.
Thirteenth and Last Conclusion: Besides those things which we have up to now said must be believed explicitly — both at all times and after the coming of Christ — moreover from precept, the following must now also be known and believed explicitly by all: at least three Sacraments, namely Baptism, Eucharist, and Penance, and the rest whenever and where one ought or wishes to use them. Likewise, the precepts of the Decalogue and the ordinary precepts of the Church — to which the Lord’s Prayer is rightly added, containing those things which man ought to desire and ask of God, as we will explain more at length below in the Treatise on Religion.
It is proved: because everyone is obliged to know and hold those things that are necessary to know and believe in order to be able fittingly to arrange his life toward the end set before him — as we said before — and according to the demands of the body or community of which he is a member or part. But all the things just mentioned are necessary to know for those effects. For Baptism must be known so that one may know by what way one can become or has become a Christian, and be enrolled in the Church or number of the faithful. Eucharist, because its use is necessary for adults by divine precept for the refreshment of souls — and they must be able to discern the Body of the Lord and distinguish between this supernatural food and bodily food, so that they may be able to receive it worthily and give thanks to God for such great benefits. Penance similarly must be acknowledged and believed — because we are frail, and very often most persons lapse from righteousness; therefore one must know and believe the remedy instituted for recovering righteousness and divine grace.
As for the precepts, it is sufficiently self-evident that without knowledge of them a man cannot direct his life and actions as he ought — both in the order of his ultimate end, and according to the demands of the office of a Christian man.
Here, however, some note that the common faithful are not bound by any divine or universal Church precept to be able to recite them word for word and in order — but that it seems sufficient that they know them according to the substance, to the extent that when questioned they can remember what is to be held about such things as are commanded or forbidden; and that they know to ask for, and with a pious wish or affection to desire, those things which are contained in the Lord’s Prayer. This, however, is again to be observed: it is very dangerous for the faithful not to be able to recite them word for word, because with this ignorance there is usually also conjoined ignorance of the very things themselves.
Someone will ask: when does the precept of learning those things — at least as to their substance — oblige a man? It is answered that both the faithful and unbelievers, when they have arrived at the use of reason, must be solicitous to hear teachers of the faith and to believe the things heard and duly proposed. So that those who neglect this are formally guilty of transgression of that precept — even if otherwise they were of a disposition ready to believe, and even if they said that they believe whatever the Church believes — while meanwhile they neglect to learn those things which by necessity of means or of precept they must know and believe explicitly and in particular. But those who invincibly do not know this precept can indeed be excused from a new sin of negligence and omission — yet they meanwhile lack the remedy for attaining remission of their other sins.

A Council, according to the broad meaning of the name, can be defined in general as a certain assembly of prudent men, convoked by public authority, for the purpose of treating and ordering, with common intent, the matters necessary or advantageous to a commonwealth or community. This definition embraces not only Ecclesiastical Councils but also Political Assemblies. Each commonwealth — both the Spiritual and the Civil — holds its own assemblies for treating the more difficult matters of the community, pertaining to each respectively, for the good, peace, and benefit of the commonwealth itself.
In truth, we do not here undertake a discussion of a council in so general a sense, but only of the Ecclesiastical Council, which may in general be defined as an assembly or congregation of Ecclesiastical Rectors and Prelates, convoked by legitimate authority, for the purpose of defining, establishing, and ordering those things which, in more serious matters, are necessary or greatly useful for the peace and good of the Church. Hence a council consists, as it were materially, of Ecclesiastical Rectors and Prelates; its efficient cause is the legitimate power of convocation; to its form belongs the fact that the convocation is made so that ordinances and decrees may be issued therein concerning the more serious affairs of the Church — for example, concerning the dogmas of the faith and the notable rites of the Church, concerning discipline and the standard of Christian life, and sometimes also concerning the settling of disputes and contentions among the Primates of the Church. Its end, finally, is the preservation of sound faith and good morals, and, if these have anywhere been mutilated or corrupted, their restoration and renewal.
The Church derived the form of celebrating councils from the Apostles themselves, who in Acts 15 assembled and held a council to determine the questions that had arisen concerning the observances of the Law. Hence it must not be said that the origin of such an assembly is something devised by merely human and natural reason alone — insofar as reason dictates that such congregations are useful for determining difficulties and questions, as Pighius maintains in book 6 of the Hierarchy, ch. 1 — but rather that it was divinely suggested to the Church. For first, there ought to be no doubt that the Apostles, already filled with the Holy Spirit, celebrated that first council at Jerusalem only at His prompting and suggestion. Then the Council of Chalcedon in its letter to Leo, the Sixth Council in session 17, Pope Celestine in his letter to the Council of Ephesus, and the Third Council of Toledo, all consistently teach that councils were demonstrated by Christ in those words of Matthew 18: “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.”
As for the division of councils, four kinds are commonly established. Some are Ecumenical or General; others are National; others Provincial; and others Diocesan. St. Augustine mentions the first three in book 2 of On Baptism Against the Donatists, ch. 3, where he says that the councils of Provinces, or even the larger ones such as those of Regions, are corrected by Plenary councils.
A General or Plenary Council, as St. Augustine calls it, is an assembly of bishops from the universal Church, convoked by one who has legitimate authority. Hence it is required, first of all, that the convocation be general and made known to all Christian Provinces, at least the major ones. Second, that no Bishop who is in communion with the Church be excluded from it, if he presents himself there. Third, that at least some bishops in fact appear from the greater and more principal Provinces of the Christian world. Hence the Seventh Council, in session 6, judged that pseudo-council held by the Iconoclasts at Constantinople against Images not to have been General, because its sound had not gone forth into the world, and because it had not had — as is stated in the same place — the Roman Pope, nor his priests, either through vicars or through provincial letters, “as,” it says, “ought to be done in Councils.” It is not necessary, however, that all bishops whatsoever appear, although they are bound by oath to do so, as is established from the chapter Ego in the Decretals, On Oath, unless they are excused for reasons; but it suffices that at least some from the greater part of the Christian Provinces assemble.
Hence, when councils were celebrated in the East, the Westerners were not present in equal numbers as the Easterners. For it was always deemed sufficient at that time that the majority be present from the Provinces of the East, while some sent from the West by the Roman Pontiff would supply the place of the rest. This may be gathered from the first four Ecumenical Councils, which by the judgment of all are General and have always been held to be such. For in that great Council of Nicaea, from the West there were only two Presbyters from Italy, one Bishop from Gaul — namely Nicasius — one from Africa, and one from Spain — namely Hosius. At the Second and Third Councils, no bishops from the West are recorded as having been present; but the Roman Pontiffs Damasus and Celestine respectively confirmed those councils in their own name and in that of the Western Bishops whom they had assembled at Rome. At the Fourth Council, namely Chalcedon, the Legates of Leo were present, and he also submitted the consent of the other Bishops of the West from Spain, Gaul, and Italy, who had held councils in their own Provinces and had written to Leo that they would follow his judgment in all things.
On the other hand, at the Western Councils few Easterners were present — as at the great Lateran Council under Innocent III, the Council of Lyons under Gregory X, the Council of Vienne under Clement V, the Council of Trent, and others at which Westerners were present in great numbers. At the Council of Florence, however, the Greeks were present in a fairly substantial number.
I said that a council is an assembly of bishops, and not of other Prelates of inferior rank. For although to some later councils Abbots — especially exempt ones — and Generals of Orders were also summoned and likewise subscribed, this is not required of necessity for the nature of a General Council, nor does it pertain even to the substance of a National or Provincial council. This is gathered above all sufficiently from all the ancient councils, at which bishops alone subscribed. Furthermore, the same is taught sufficiently plainly by Cyprian at the beginning of his letter to Jubaianus; Hilary in the book On Synods; Ambrose in letter 32; Augustine in letter 119; Leo in letter 19 and the following; Athanasius in his letter to those living the solitary life; and others, who everywhere assert that councils are assemblies of bishops. Hence at the Council of Chalcedon, when the Archimandrite Martin was asked to subscribe, he said that it was not his place but only the bishops’ place to subscribe, as is recorded in session 1. And in the same council, when monks and laymen had entered on behalf of Dioscorus, the Fathers repeatedly cried out: “Put out those who are superfluous: the Council belongs to the bishops.” Therefore, that others at some times, and these at other times, are called and admitted to vote and to subscribe, is granted as a certain privilege — just as in certain councils Abbots have also been made participants in the dignity and honor of the episcopate.
Someone might object: it is also established that Emperors and Kings, either personally or through their ambassadors, were accustomed to be present; likewise other learned men — therefore it seems that a general council is an assembly of more than just bishops.
It is replied that indeed such persons were also accustomed to be present, and rightly so — not indeed in order to give their opinion, but Emperors and Kings were present so as to be defenders of the council, and so that they might afterward more readily cooperate in the execution and observance of the Decrees, which naturally comes about when from the beginning they have been made aware of all the things that were ordained and established in the council. Hence they sometimes also subscribed — but in a different form than the bishops: for they do not say they subscribe by judging or defining, but by consenting. Similarly, learned men are called, but only to examine the materials and to give counsel, not to cast a decisive vote; and therefore they do not belong essentially to the general council.
A National Council is one in which the Archbishops and Bishops of one Kingdom or Region, legitimately summoned for this purpose, assemble. Of this kind are many Roman, Toledan, and African councils. Here it is to be observed regarding the National Council that, although it is simply distinguished from the Universal and from the Provincial Council, it is nonetheless sometimes addressed by the name of either. For of the Roman council held under Symmachus, it is said that “Symmachus presided over the General Council,” and yet only the Bishops of Italy were present. And in the Third Council of Toledo, ch. 18, it is said: “This Holy and Universal Synod commands,” and yet only the Bishops of Spain were present. The same is clear from the Fourth Council of Carthage. The reason for such a form of address can be given, because in such a council a certain universality is observed with respect to the whole kingdom or nation, which contains a notable multitude of bishops. They are also called Provincial by Gratian at Dist. 3, can. Porro, because the force and authority of these councils is confined to certain Provinces and does not extend to all Christians, as those do which are simply General.
A Provincial Council in the specific sense is one in which only the Bishops of one Province — that is, those who are under one Archbishop or Metropolitan — assemble. Many councils of this kind are found in the volumes of the councils.
Finally, a Diocesan Council is one in which the Prelates and Priests of only one Diocese assemble — especially those who more closely serve the Bishop in the care of souls and the governance of the Diocese. Such an assembly does not so properly obtain the character of a Council, because according to the manner of speaking of the ancients, a council implies a congregation of Princes or Bishops, to whom their own external jurisdiction is also due — whereas in this assembly there is only one such person, namely the one who presides over it.

DOUBT II.
Whose office is it to convoke Councils, and to preside over them?

It is replied, and let this be the First Conclusion: A Diocesan Council is legitimately convoked and assembled by the Bishop; a Provincial Council, by the Archbishop or Metropolitan; and a National Council, by the Patriarch or Primate. Upon each of these, respectively, likewise falls the duty of presiding over the same. This is the common teaching, and Augustine so teaches in letter 217 to Victorina. Nor do heretics contradict it. The entire difficulty, however, concerns the General Council; hence:
Second Conclusion: It belongs to the Roman Pontiff alone to convoke a General Council and to preside over it, such that every general assembly of the Church held without his command or at least his consent, or which he has not ratified, must be regarded not as a true council of the Church, but as a conventicle and pseudo-council. This is likewise the common and certain teaching of all Catholics, against the heretics — among whom the Protestants wish to assign this function to the Emperor. Beza, however, says it belongs to the Christian Monarch, if there be one; but if there are several supreme Christian Princes who acknowledge no superior — as is now the case — then it belongs to all of them together with the Emperor and the free Cities.
But the Conclusion is proved, because it is evident that in every Kingdom or community, it belongs to the one who holds supreme authority therein — and who can command and indeed compel all and each to appear — to convoke the Princes or nobles to treat of the affairs of the kingdom. But in the kingdom of the Church, the Pontiff alone is the one who holds supreme power, and who can command all the Bishops, Archbishops, and Patriarchs of whatever territories or Sees, and compel them to assemble — not any Emperor or King. Therefore, etc.
The minor proposition, which alone is attacked by the adversaries, is confirmed first: because to command the Prelates of the Church, such as Bishops and others, and to call them to treat of the affairs of the Church, is an Ecclesiastical power — but this is not found in the Emperor or Kings, because it is neither the same as Civil power, nor subject or subordinate to Civil power. For temporal things must not be confused with spiritual things, nor must the latter, as being of an inferior order, be subjected to the former; but on the contrary, as we said above.
Secondly it is confirmed: because no Emperor or King, not even as regards civil actions, has all the Provinces to which the Church extends subject to himself, as the Pontiff has them subject to himself in spiritual matters. For the Emperors had exercised and were exercising the most extensive dominion at the time of Leo and Prosper — and yet then the Christian world subject to the Pope was greater than the Roman world subject to the Emperor, as St. Leo testifies in sermon 1 On the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul: “Through the holy See of blessed Peter, Rome, having been made the head of the world, presides more widely through divine religion than by earthly dominion.” And Prosper, in the book On the Ungrateful: “The See of Rome, which has been made the pastoral head of the world, holds by religion what it does not possess by arms.” But if they say that the convocation ought therefore to be made not by one Emperor, as Beza maintains, but by all the Princes and Republics acknowledging no superior, they then render the celebration of a Universal Council morally impossible. For it is morally impossible that so many Princes and free Republics, disagreeing among themselves with such great difficulties and contentions, should convene to appoint a single Council to a fixed place and time. And yet the heretics wish the necessity of a General Council to be so great that they contend that the right governance of the Church cannot subsist or be preserved without it.
Thirdly it is confirmed: because Provincial Councils are convoked by the Metropolitan, and National Councils by the Patriarch or Primate — which even Calvin admits in book 4 of the Institutes, ch. 7, and Illyricus in Century 4, ch. 7 — not by the temporal lords of the places or the Princes of the region. Therefore General Councils too must be convoked by the universal Pastor of the Church, and not by Emperors or secular monarchs.
Fourthly it is confirmed: because in Acts ch. 1, St. Peter arose in the midst of the brethren and took charge of those things that were fitting to be done in the newly founded Church of Christ — namely, that one should be substituted in the place of the ministry and apostolate from which Judas had fallen by transgression. And although a Council was not there properly convened, it is nonetheless sufficiently clear from this that the first and principal care of the general affairs of the Church pertained to Peter as the universal Pastor of the Church. And in Acts 15, although we do not expressly read that Peter convoked that Council, it is nonetheless sufficiently established that it was assembled with his consent and will, since he himself also, as its principal director, spoke first and pronounced his judgment on the question treated there.
The Conclusion is proved secondly from a most ancient Canon of the Church, which states that Councils cannot be celebrated without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff. Blessed Pope Marcellus writes that this is Apostolic, in his letter to the Bishops of the Province of Antioch. The same was renewed by the first Nicene Council, as the Alexandrian Council testifies in its letter to Felix. Likewise Julius I, in his letter to the Eastern Bishops, of which Socrates makes mention in book 2, ch. 13; Zosimus in book 3, ch. 9; and Nicephorus in book 5, ch. 9. Now if a Council cannot be celebrated without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, it therefore belongs to him to assemble it, or at least to give his consent for it to be assembled.
Calvin replies that that Canon contains nothing other than that the Roman Pontiff also ought to be summoned to the Council. But if it contains nothing else, then a similar Canon ought to have been made or could have been made about the Patriarch of Alexandria and of Antioch — for these too were preeminent Patriarchs, and according to Calvin, equal to or greater than the Roman Pontiff. Noting this, other heretics attempt to divert the meaning of this Canon to something else — but in vain. For its true meaning is most clearly understood from the letter of Julius mentioned above, since in it Julius rebukes the Easterners for having celebrated a council at Antioch without his consent, and he adduces the aforesaid Canon as the foundation for this rebuke. He therefore understood the Canon to mean that no universal council can be celebrated without his judgment — or else he would have cited that canon most impertinently.
Nor does that interpretation have any appearance of validity, which some fabricate from the Greek text — namely that without the judgment of the Roman Pontiff, churches cannot be dedicated. For no ancient author mentions such a decree, nor was there ever, nor is there now, such a practice that temples cannot be dedicated without the authority, permission, or grant of the Roman Pontiff.
The conclusion is proved thirdly from the Council of Chalcedon, session 1, where Dioscorus of Alexandria is ordered not to sit among the bishops, on the grounds that he had dared to hold a synod without the authority of the Roman See — which, as it is said therein, was never permitted and had never been done. So likewise the Seventh Council rejected that council — or rather conventicle — at Constantinople, of which we made mention above, because it had not had the Roman Bishop as a cooperator. And in the last Lateran Council, session ii, it is expressly asserted that it belongs to the Roman Pontiff to convoke General Councils. Again, in the Fourth Roman Council under Symmachus, when King Theodoric had said that he had convoked a synod so that the case of the Pontiff Symmachus might be judged, all the Bishops replied that the synod ought to have been summoned not by the King but by the Pope, even if the case of the Pope were being dealt with. The King finally satisfied them on these grounds, showing that he had convoked the assembly with the assent of the Pontiff Symmachus — which the Pontiff, being present, acknowledged to be so.
The conclusion is proved fourthly from the ancient Pontiffs. Leo, in letter 93, ch. 17, says: “We have sent letters to our brethren and fellow bishops, and have convoked for them the assembly of a general synod.” Pelagius II in letter 1 to the Easterners: “The authority of convoking the council of synods has been handed over to the Apostolic See of blessed Peter by singular privilege.” Sixtus III also writes thus to the Easterners. “Valentinian Augustus convoked a Synod by our authority.” Adrian II in his letter to the Emperor Basil says: “We wish, through the diligence of your piety, that a numerous council be convoked at Constantinople.” Finally, Sozomen reports in book 6, ch. 7, that when the Emperor Valentinian was asked by the Bishops to permit them to hold a council, he replied: “It is not for me, who am in the lot of the laity, to scrutinize such matters too curiously. Let the priests, to whom these matters are of concern, assemble wherever they wish.”
But against this, the heretics object that the first General Councils are found to have been convoked and assembled throughout by Emperors, and not by Pontiffs. For concerning the first Nicene Council, Sozomen writes in book 1, ch. 16: “But when matters turned out contrary to his expectation, and the contention was preventing a reconciliation of concord, and the one sent to make peace was returning without having accomplished anything, Constantine convoked a Council at Nicaea, a city of Bithynia, and wrote to all the Presidents of the Churches to be present on the appointed day.” Ruffinus, cited by Bellarmine in book 1 On Councils and the Church, ch. 13, records the same. Concerning the first Council of Constantinople, Theodoret also testifies in book 5 of the History, ch. 9, that it was convoked by Theodosius the Elder. Similarly Evagrius, in book 1, ch. 2, teaches that the first Council of Ephesus met at the command of Theodosius the Younger. And St. Leo, in letter 43 and elsewhere, writes that the Council of Chalcedon was convened by the Emperor Marcion. Therefore it belongs to the Emperor, not to the Pontiff, to assemble a General Council.
This is confirmed first, because St. Leo, in letter 42 to Theodosius, asks that the Emperor command a Council to be convoked within Italy. Second, because Pope Liberius also, in Theodoret book 2, ch. 16, seems to concede that it belongs to Imperial power to convoke a General Council. Third, because St. Jerome, in book 2 of his Apology Against Ruffinus, speaking of a certain council of which Ruffinus had made mention, writes thus: “Tell me, which Emperor commanded this Synod to be convoked?” — where he plainly supposes that Synods are convoked only by Emperors.
It is replied that the cited Councils were indeed convoked by the effort and work of the Emperors, but not without the consent and authority of the Pontiffs.
For as regards the Nicene Council, the Fathers of the Sixth Council speak of it thus in session 18: “Constantine, ever Augustus, and Sylvester, worthy of praise, assembled the great and illustrious Synod at Nicaea.” And since Ruffinus says above that Constantine convoked the Council on the judgment of the priests, it is altogether probable what Baronius noted at the end of his annotation around the year of the Lord 324, where he writes: “We have followed the acts of Constantine at Rome before his baptism, at the time of his baptism, and afterward — when the same Augustus, departing from the City concerning those matters which pertained to the convoking of an Ecumenical Council, having communicated counsel together with the holy Roman Pontiff Sylvester and having firmly established what was to be done, set out for the East to found a city in his own name, and equally to assist the afflicted Eastern Church, torn by heresies and schisms.”
In order to understand this more fully, it must be known that Sylvester the Pontiff had already previously, at the complaints and petition of the Bishop of Alexandria, sent Hosius of Córdoba to the Eastern regions, to remove if possible the seditions and schisms that had arisen there — both on account of the questions about the day of Easter, and on account of the heresy of Arius. To him Constantine had also given his own letters to the same effect, as Epiphanius testifies in Heresy 68. But when, as Sozomen testifies above, he had returned without accomplishing anything, then the Emperor Constantine together with Sylvester thought of applying a more effective remedy, and it was agreed between them that a general council of bishops should be convoked — which in the following year, namely 325, was carried out. At that council also the aforesaid Hosius and Roman Presbyters sent there by Sylvester presided as Legates of the Apostolic See, and on that account are found to have subscribed in the first place before all the Bishops and Patriarchs of the Nicene Council — as may be seen more fully worked out in Baronius around the years of the Lord 324 and 325.
Concerning the First Council of Constantinople, as Theodoret reports, it is established that Theodosius did not so much convoke that council on his own as he sent the letters of Pope Damasus to the Bishops. For in Theodoret, book 5 of the History, ch. 9, the assembled Bishops are read to have written to Pope Damasus: “At the command,” they say, “of the letters sent by your Reverence in the previous year to the most holy Emperor Theodosius, we have prepared ourselves only to make the journey to Constantinople.” Although therefore Theodosius procured the convocation of the council, it is clear nonetheless that he convoked it on the authority of the Apostolic letters. Hence the Fathers at the Sixth Council say that Theodosius and Damasus withstood Macedonius through the Second Council, just as a little before they said that Constantine and Sylvester assembled the First Council to withstand Arius.
Concerning the First Council of Ephesus, Prosper writes in the Chronicle that it was accomplished by the industry of Cyril and the authority of Celestine. It is also established from Evagrius, book 1, ch. 4, and from the letter of Celestine to Cyril — which is found among the works of Cyril — that the same Cyril was appointed as Legate of the Apostolic See to perform its functions at that council. This is a clear argument that the Synod was not assembled without the authority of the Pontiff. The same is evident concerning the Council of Chalcedon from the letter of the Emperor Marcion himself to Pope Leo, which is found before the Council of Chalcedon — where the Emperor, about to convoke a council, asks the Pontiff to come himself and hold the Council, or, if that were burdensome, to indicate by letter what he wishes to be done; and at the end he concludes that he will write to all the Bishops to assemble at a fixed place. “And what profits the religion of Christians and the Catholic faith,” he says, “let your Holiness declare by his arrangement, as he shall have defined according to Ecclesiastical rules.” Likewise from letter 49 of Leo to the same Marcion, where, after having said that it would have been his wish that the celebration of the Council be deferred to a more opportune time, he adds: “But because you, out of love of the Catholic faith, have wished the assembly of the Council to be held now, lest I should seem to oppose a devout purpose, I have summoned my brother and fellow bishop Paschasinus from that province which seems to be more secure, who can fulfill the function of my presence, and have sent him,” etc. By these words Leo manifestly indicates that the Emperor could not have celebrated the Council without his consenting will, and that he could have prevented it, but preferred to satisfy the Emperor’s pious will — and that therefore he was sending his Legate there to fulfill the functions of his presence.
This same point is confirmed from the letter of Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania, in which the Pontiff says that the Apostolic See alone, by its authority, decreed that the Council of Chalcedon should be held. Note here that the exclusive expression “alone” does not exclude the work of the Emperor, but the other episcopal Sees — signifying that it was not, for example, the See of Alexandria, or of Antioch, or even of Constantinople, but the Roman See alone that by its authority decreed that Synod to be held, although not without the assistance and cooperation of the Emperor Marcion. Because the heretics did not notice this, they unjustly accuse Gelasius of a splendid lie.
Someone will ask: why did the Pontiffs not convoke and assemble the Councils by themselves alone, as they did later and do now? It is replied that this did not happen — as heretics pretend — because a Council assembled without the Emperor’s authority would not have been held as legitimate or ratified among Christians; for Athanasius writes plainly in his letter to those living the solitary life: “When did an Ecclesiastical judgment have its authority from the Emperor?” But it happened for many other reasons that prevailed at that time and afterward ceased.
One of the foremost was that at that time those Imperial Laws were still in force which prohibited associations and more frequent assemblies of men from being held without the Emperor’s authority, out of fear of the danger of sedition or tumult. See Law 1 ff. On Illicit Associations, and Law Conventicula, C. On Bishops and Presbyters.
Another reason was that, even if such a Law had not existed, since the Emperors reigned most extensively at that time, a Council could not be held except in some Imperial city. And reason does not permit that so general an assembly from the whole world should be held in any place without the permission of the lord of that place — just as even now, if a Council had to be assembled not in the territories of the Pontiff but in the dominions of the King of France or Spain, the consent of the one to whom that city or province belonged would without doubt be sought.
A third reason was that in those times Councils were held at public expense as regards the transportation of the Bishops, with their necessaries, to the place of the Council, as is evident from book 3 of the Life of Constantine in Eusebius — where he also adds that throughout the time of the Council all the Bishops lived at Constantine’s expense. This is also gathered from Theodoret, book 1, ch. 16, where he reports that when Liberius requested that a general council be held, it was replied that the public treasury was not sufficient for the conveyance of the Bishops.
A fourth and final reason was that at that time the Pontiff, although in spiritual matters he was the head of all the faithful including the Emperor, nevertheless in temporal matters submitted himself to the Emperor, as Bellarmine teaches in book 1 On Councils and the Church, ch. 13. And therefore he could not conveniently, with any hope of effect, attempt such an assembly against the Emperor’s will. And although it would have sufficed to ask for the Emperor’s cooperation, or merely to ask him to allow a Synod to be convoked, yet because he acknowledged him as lord in temporal matters, or at least treated him as such, he preferred to defer to him more, and to ask that he himself command a council to be convoked — always at the petition and will of the Pontiff himself. For in this way it came about both that the Emperor more prudently and more seriously cooperated with the Pontiff’s intention, and that the Pontiff more certainly achieved the effect of his will — since the commands or earnest wishes of Emperors or Kings are in almost all things obeyed more readily than the letters of Pontiffs or Bishops without their combined effort, against which otherwise exceptions or excuses are more often made.
From these considerations the reply to the first confirmation — from letter 24 of Leo — is clear. To which may also be added what he writes to the same Theodosius in letters 25 and 34: for Leo asks nothing of the Emperor other than to convoke a General Council within Italy — and this not because he himself did not have the authority from himself to convoke a council, but for the other reasons already explained.
It must be observed, however, that Leo expressly asks for a general Synod, not a Provincial one, as certain heretics maliciously allege, in order thereby the more to diminish the authority of the Pontiff and to exalt that of the Emperor. For there was no reason why he should ask for a Provincial Synod: for Primates and Patriarchs are accustomed to celebrate Provincial Councils without the work of the Emperor, nor was that matter considered of such great magnitude. This is evident from the very letter 25, because it is written not by the Pontiff alone, but by him and by a Provincial Council to the Emperor — for its title reads: “Leo the Bishop, and the Holy Synod which has convened in the City of Rome, to Theodosius, ever Augustus.” And from letter 33, where it reads: “But if any dissent from the purity of our faith and the authority of the Fathers, let your Clemency grant, as the Synod which had convened at Rome for this cause, together with me, requests, a universal Council within Italy,” etc.
To the second Confirmation it is replied, by denying that Pope Liberius says or admits that the convocation of a Council belongs per se and directly to Imperial power. Rather, Liberius — as other Pontiffs also did — merely asks that the Emperor be willing to lend his effort to the holding of a General Synod. And this both for the reasons already stated, and because this Emperor was an Arian, and therefore whatever the Pontiff might have done in that matter without consulting him would very likely have been impeded by him.
To the third Confirmation it is replied that St. Jerome there rejects a certain assertion of Ruffinus, by which he affirmed that the writings of Hilary had been so corrupted by heretics during his lifetime that even Hilary himself had been accused and excommunicated on account of them in a certain Council which Ruffinus does not specify — and this in order to accuse the writings of Origen in a similar manner. St. Jerome therefore denies this, and in order to refute it, asks in this manner: The Synod by which Hilary was excommunicated — in which city was it? Tell me the names of the bishops; show in which year those consuls held office; which Emperor commanded this Synod to be assembled? Now for St. Jerome’s question and argument to have their force, it is not necessary to say that he acknowledges it to have belonged to the Emperor per se to convoke a Synod — it is sufficient that he presupposes what was then customary, namely that Synods were assembled by the care and work of the Emperor.
The heretics also raise a difficulty against the many other Councils which they wish to have been convoked by Emperors alone — which we admit to be true of some of them, but those were not true Councils nor were ever received by the Church, being only conventicles of heretics. Concerning the others, however, which the Church received, it must be entirely denied; for the authority of the Pontiff always simultaneously intervened. This is again manifest concerning the Sixth Council, which certain sectarians also claim was convoked I know not by what Pontiff. The contrary is clear from the Emperor’s edict on the convoking of the Synod to the Patriarch of Constantinople, because he narrates that he had written to the holy Pope of ancient Rome concerning the assembled Synod. “And with him,” he says, “departing from this world, the holy Agatho, recently ordained Pope, in the Apostolic See of the aforesaid ancient Rome, receiving these our pious letters, sent in person those clothed with his own authority — Theodore and Gregory, beloved of God, Presbyters,” etc.
From these considerations it is clear, as also from the other things said up to this point, that General Councils have not only always been assembled with the consent and authority of the Roman Pontiff, but that he has also presided over them through his Vicars or Legates. Nor can it be doubted that it belongs first and directly to his authority to convoke such assemblies — to whom it also belongs to preside over them.
Here it is asked: may a Council not be convoked by someone other than the Pope when he ought not or cannot convoke it? For example, if he be supposed to be a heretic, or a schismatic, or if he should have become mentally incapacitated, or should have died? It is replied that a perfect and properly so-called Council — of which we speak here — one that has authority to determine and define doubts and controversies of faith, cannot be convoked by another. For the authority and infallible certainty in those determinations are not had from others, without Peter or his successor, to whom it has been particularly entrusted to confirm his brethren. I add, however, that in those cases some imperfect Council can be held, which will suffice to provide the Church with a head. For the Catholic Church without doubt, when it has no head, has the authority to provide itself with a head, even though in the meantime without a head it cannot establish many things which it can with a head — as Cajetan well teaches in the Opuscule on the Power of the Pope, chs. 15 and 16. And this is gathered from the letter of Cletus of Rome to Cyprian, which is letter 7 of book 2 among the letters of Cyprian, where the Presbyters and Deacons, the See being vacant through the death of Pope Fabian, write thus: “Seeking not to hold here the balance of that moderation” (namely between severity and indulgence concerning the lapsed) “and having deliberated long, and indeed with certain neighboring Bishops and those drawn near, and those whom the ardor of this persecution had driven out from other Provinces far away, we think that nothing should be decided before the appointment of a Bishop” (namely the Roman Bishop), etc. Such an imperfect Council, says Bellarmine in book 1, ch. 14, On Councils and the Church, can be held either if it is convoked by the College of Cardinals, or if the Bishops themselves assemble of their own accord in one place.
It is asked secondly: what if a Council is necessary for the Church and the Pope from malice is unwilling to convoke it? It is replied: divine providence will never permit that in a true and absolute necessity, upon which the salvation of the Church entirely depends, the Pontiff should fail in duties so necessary. For just as in the definitions of faith and the decrees on morals the Lord infallibly always assists, instructs, and directs him, so that nothing contrary to faith or the integrity of morals may be determined or established — so likewise it must be held that He will never fail to rouse him and efficaciously move him to assemble a Council, when this would be necessary for the preservation of the Church. Hence even if perhaps very many were to judge it most useful or even necessary that a General Council be convoked, yet if the Pontiff is averse to it, no one or no group of persons must attempt to convoke it themselves. Rather it must be presupposed that God would by other means succor the necessities of the Church, or that He wishes to permit the Church to be pressed for a time — which He will nonetheless never permit to be altogether overwhelmed. See Torquemada, book 3, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 8.

DOUBT III.
Whether Councils are of infallible authority?

First Conclusion: A General Council together with the Pontiff, or confirmed by the Pontiff, is altogether of infallible authority and truth, both in decrees of faith and of morals. Where what is said concerning decrees of morals is to be understood as we explained above in the treatise on the Pontiff, number 12. This is moreover a certainty of faith, and common to all Catholics.
It is proved first from the Scriptures, Matthew 18: “Again I say to you, that if two of you shall agree on earth concerning any matter whatsoever that they shall ask, it shall be done for them by my Father who is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.” From this the following argument is constructed: Christ here promises even to two persons who with unanimous affection ask for something, that the effect of the petition will be granted by His Father; and accordingly that He will be present, namely by help and direction, to such a gathering made in His name. Therefore, much more to all the Prelates of the Church gathered together in general, and unanimously asking to understand those things which pertain to the preservation of sound faith and the sanctification of the faithful, will the Lord grant the effects asked for, and Christ will be present in their midst for instruction and direction, lest they commit any error against faith or good morals in their decrees. For if Christ is present in the gathering of a few private persons to help them in lesser matters suited to their order and station, it cannot be doubted that He is more certainly and more efficaciously present in the gathering of the whole Church, to enlighten and direct it in these great matters.
This is confirmed: because it seems that Christ said these things for that purpose — for He had stated beforehand that if anyone who is fraternally corrected does not amend himself, such a person should be referred to the Church, at the same time expressing the power of the Church in these words: “Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.” And in order to render more credible and more attested what the Church will be able to do, He seems to add: “Again I say to you, if two of you shall agree,” etc. Matthew 16: “And upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” Likewise Matthew 28: “Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world” — which is understood through the helps, illuminations, and directions to be furnished to the Apostles and their successors, in all things pertaining to the faith of the Church, its preservation and governance. 1 Timothy 3 calls the Church of the living God the pillar and ground of truth. A full or general Council, therefore, cannot err in matters of faith and decrees of morals.
This is confirmed: because otherwise the gates of hell would prevail against the Church, and Christ would also be shown, contrary to His promise, to have abandoned the Church; nor would it itself be, or be able to be called, the pillar and ground of truth, because the General Council represents and sustains the person of the entire Church. For just as every particular Church is and is represented in its Bishop, according to Cyprian, book 4, epistle 9, so also the universal Church is represented in the Bishops universally gathered together. Furthermore, because Bishops are to be held by the rest of the faithful as Pastors, heard as Teachers, and followed as Leaders, according to Luke 10: “He who hears you hears me”; and Hebrews 13: “Obey your prelates and be subject to them.” If therefore the Bishops legitimately gathered together with their head the Roman Pontiff were to err in faith, it would be necessary that the whole Church would consequently err, because the rest are bound to follow the doctrine which is handed down and defined by them.
It is proved secondly from the Holy Fathers, who teach in the first place that the definition of a General Council in causes is the ultimate irreversible and altogether immutable judgment, such that no appeal remains from it, nor is any further examination of the cause left — therefore they judge it to be altogether certain and infallible; otherwise they would unjustly compel all to abide by such a judgment, nor would they admit further inquiry for judging again. The antecedent is clear from:
Athanasius, in his epistle to Epictetus, where he says that the decrees of the Council of Nicaea cannot be changed without erring — whence he marvels that anyone dares to raise a question about matters defined there. From Augustine, epistle 162, where he teaches this in express terms. From Leo, epistle 33 to Theodosius Augustus, epistle 50 to Marcian Augustus, and epistle 61 to those who were gathered in the Council of Chalcedon. Gelasius likewise teaches the same in his epistle to the Bishops of Dardania, and it is established in the Council of Ephesus toward the end, and in Chalcedon, Action 5, final canon. Furthermore, the Holy Fathers teach that those who do not acquiesce in the definitions of a General Council are to be separated from communion and held as heretics. This is clear first because the Fathers of the Council themselves pronounce anathema on those who contradict, as Athanasius testifies regarding the Nicene Fathers in his epistle to the Bishops of Africa; and regarding others, this is clear from the Acts of the Councils themselves.
Saint Gregory, book 1, epistle 24, pronounces anathema upon those who do not receive the five general Councils, which alone had been celebrated up to that time, because, he says, since they were established by universal consent, whoever presumes either to loose those whom they bind or to bind those whom they loose destroys himself and not them; whoever therefore thinks otherwise, let him be anathema. In the same place he says that he venerates the four first General Councils as the four holy Gospels of God, to which he then adds and equates the fifth. See also Saint Leo, epistles 77 and 87. Hence Saint Ambrose, epistle 32, says: “I follow the decree of the Council of Nicaea, from which neither death nor the sword will be able to separate me.”
It is proved finally by reasons: because if a General Council could err, there would be no firm judgment in the Church by which questions and controversies of faith could be settled and the unity of the Church preserved — for nothing in the Church is greater than a legitimate and approved General Council. But it would be said in vain that a greater and ultimate judgment is to be found in the Sacred Scriptures, because all those who contend assert that the sentence of Scripture stands on their side. There must therefore be in the Church another Judge who can without error judge on which side the sentence of Scripture stands.
Secondly, all condemned heresies could justly be recalled again into dispute, if legitimate Councils can err. For Arius would say that the Council of Nicaea erred; Macedonius, that the Council of Constantinople erred; Nestorius, that the Council of Ephesus erred; Eutyches, the Chalcedonians; and so on with the rest.
Thirdly, because Scripture attributes to the Holy Spirit the determinations and decrees of such a Council. Acts 15: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us” — whence also Cyril, book 1 on the Trinity, calls the decree of the Council of Nicaea a divine and most holy oracle — therefore, etc.
Second Conclusion: Particular councils, approved by the Supreme Pontiff, can contain no error in faith or morals. This conclusion is of the same reasoning and certainty as that by which we established above that the Roman Pontiff cannot err in faith or morals even without a General Council, and it is sufficiently proven from that. For if the Supreme Pontiff cannot err, it evidently follows that neither can any Council contain error in those matters in which it has been approved by him. Furthermore, if such councils were not of infallible truth, very many heresies which were condemned only in particular councils could again be called into doubt — such as those of the Pelagians, Priscillianists, and others.
Against the stated conclusions, heretics object:

First, that the Council of the Jews, presided over by the Supreme Pontiff Caiaphas, erred when it pronounced that Christ had blasphemed by calling Himself the Son of God — therefore, etc.
It is replied that the Supreme Pontiffs and legitimate Councils among the Jews could not err as long as Christ, whom the Synagogue awaited as coming, had not yet arrived; but once He was already present and announcing the Gospel, they could err — for this too had been foretold in Isaiah 6, Daniel 9, and elsewhere. For by then the state of the Old Testament, which consisted chiefly in figures and shadows of things to come, was being dissolved and becoming obsolete in the presence of truth; and thus the offices and duties of those who presided in it also had to cease — and so it is no wonder if they were then also deprived of the divine privileges promised to them up to the coming of the Messiah.
They object secondly from the Holy Fathers: Saint Gregory Nazianzen, in his epistle to Procopius, writes thus about Councils: “I, if I must write truly, am so disposed that I flee all assemblies of Bishops, since I have seen the end of no Council to be happy and auspicious, nor such as rather to have a lessening of evils than an increase and growth of them” — therefore Councils are not of that authority and esteem which is here attributed to them.
It is replied, speaking of legitimate councils, by denying the consequence — for Nazianzen does not deny that these produce certain faith; but he complains that in his time no Council could be held legitimate in every respect. And he complained rightly: for his age fell between the two first General Councils, the Nicene and the Constantinopolitan; in which intermediate time many Councils were attempted which had an unfortunate outcome on account of the multitude of Bishops inclining toward heresy and favoring heretics, such as the Councils of Seleucia, Ariminum, Milan, and others. And for this reason Gregory does not approve of again attempting a Council to which he himself was being called in the name of the Emperor by Procopius — hence he also asked to be excused, both because he did not hope for any happy outcome, and also because he was detained by a more severe illness.
These things can be confirmed from Saint Basil, who lived at the same time and writes in epistle 42 to Athanasius that it seemed to him impossible for a legitimate Council to be held at that time, and therefore that letters should be written to the Roman Pontiff, that he might by his authority annul the Acts of the Council of Ariminum — which Damasus also accomplished. Otherwise, that Nazianzen thought it altogether necessary to abide by the judgment of a legitimately celebrated council is clear from his epistle to Cledonius. For when the Apollinarists denied that they were heretics and alleged that they had been received into a certain Catholic Council, he replied: “Let them show this, and we shall acquiesce. For it will be clear,” he says, “that they rightly assent to true doctrine, nor can the matter stand otherwise, if they have obtained this.” Furthermore, he was himself the greatest preacher of the Council of Nicaea, so that by his efforts the Nicene faith, which lay there almost extinguished by the Arians, was revived in Constantinople, as the Tripartite History reports, book 9, chapter 9. Moreover, he afterward attended the second General Council, as is clear from the subscription and from his oration delivered to the Fathers themselves.
From Augustine, they object first that he writes in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 4: “Neither ought I to bring forward the Council of Nicaea, nor you the Council of Ariminum, as if prejudging the matter: I am not bound by the authority of the one, nor you by the authority of the other” — therefore, etc.
It is replied that Augustine writes thus to Maximinus, bishop of the Arians, not because he judged him truly not to be bound by the authority of the Council of Nicaea, but because he knew that he did not receive that council, and therefore could not or would not be constrained by its authority — and for this reason Augustine conceded this in that disputation, namely that he would not urge or press him through the teaching of that council. For he knew that if he had pressed the Council of Nicaea, the other would have opposed in turn the conventicle of Ariminum, which was of the Arians — and so, before coming to the matter itself, it would have been necessary to dispute about the validity of the one and the invalidity of the other, which disputation Augustine avoided because he had sufficient and excellent arguments from the Scriptures for his purpose. The meaning therefore of Augustine’s words is: “Let us now set aside Councils, of which you do not receive one and we reject the other, and let us come to the Scriptures which we receive in common.” This sense is clear from the context; for he adds: “Let the matter contend with the matter, the cause with the cause, the reason with the reason, by the authorities of the Scriptures — not those belonging to any individuals, but those common to both sides as witnesses.”
Secondly from the same Augustine it is objected that he writes in book 2 on Baptism, chapter 3: “And those plenaries themselves are often corrected by later ones, when, by some experience of things, that is opened which was closed, and that is known which lay hidden.” If earlier plenaries are corrected by later ones, therefore plenaries sometimes err.
It is replied first that Augustine can be said to speak of general councils in common, both illegitimate and unapproved as well as legitimate and approved — and thus it can indeed happen that earlier ones, which were not legitimate and contain errors, are corrected by later legitimate ones, just as the second Council of Ephesus was corrected by that of Chalcedon.
It is replied secondly that if anyone contends that he speaks only of legitimate ones, it can happen in three ways that earlier ones are said to be corrected by later ones: First, if an earlier council happened to decide some question of fact — for example, judged a certain Bishop or Patriarch guilty of a definite crime and therefore deposed him from his rank — a later council can correct this if by experience of events it becomes known that he did not do what had been proved against him. Second, in decrees and laws pertaining to the convenient governance or discipline of the Church, insofar as things that had been well established in earlier councils for the reason of that time, but are found to be less suitable or useful in later times, can be abrogated by subsequent councils and others ordained according to the convenience of the time. For laws and precepts are changed according to the conditions of times, places, and persons — which changes are called corrections, not because the thing was bad at the time when it was instituted, but because it began to be bad or useless when circumstances changed.
Third, in doctrinal matters, purely when earlier councils did not absolutely and simply define one part of a question as to be held by faith, but only proposed it as the more probable or the one of more apparent truth to be followed — then it can happen that later councils, after all things have been more carefully examined, might define absolutely and simply the opposite part of the question; and thus in a certain manner earlier ones might be corrected or perfected by later ones.
Therefore, according to one of these three modes must it be understood that earlier ones are corrected by later ones in the mind of Saint Augustine — not that later ones correct determinations in matters of faith absolutely made by earlier ones, for this can never happen. Which Augustine also sufficiently indicates in book 1 on Baptism, chapter 28, where he excuses Cyprian for holding, together with many other Bishops of Africa, that those baptized by heretics ought to be rebaptized, before the sentence of a plenary Council and the consent of the whole Church had confirmed what was to be followed in this matter — he would not have excused him in the same way if he had wished to persist in his own opinion after the sentence of a plenary Council, had a general Council been celebrated before his death.
They object thirdly from Saint Leo, who in epistle 53 to Anatolius, Patriarch of Constantinople, epistle 54 to the Emperor Marcian, and epistle 55 to the Empress Pulcheria, acknowledges the Synod of Chalcedon as legitimate, and yet says it was drawn and impelled into an occasion of ambition and undue connivance, namely that it had favored the ambition of Anatolius the Patriarch, and had assigned him a place above the Alexandrian and Antiochene contrary to the constitutions of the Council of Nicaea.
It is replied that what Saint Leo writes in those letters counts nothing against us — for he indeed acknowledges the Council of Chalcedon as legitimate, and also approves and confirms its Acts concerning matters of faith in which his Legates had participated, and in these no error has hitherto been found; but he disapproves and rejects a certain sentence or constitution of the same Council which concerns a particular question of fact, namely concerning the place and right of the Patriarch of Constantinople. For in the absence of the Legates of the Apostolic See, and after the Acts in questions of faith had been concluded, the remaining Fathers established that the Patriarch of Constantinople should be preferred to the Alexandrian and Antiochene, and even that the authority of these sees should be submitted to his — as is gathered from the cited epistle 53 of Leo. This ordinance of the Council of Chalcedon, therefore, as repugnant to the rules established at Nicaea, he declares he is rendering null and making to cease by a general determination through the authority of Blessed Peter the Apostle. Leo writes this same thing in epistle 55 to the Empress Pulcheria. That these things do not conflict with what we have said is manifest: first, because this constitution was only a particular determination of fact; second, it was not made in the presence of the Pontiff’s Legates; third, it was not approved or confirmed by the Apostolic See. In such facts and proceedings conducted in this way we admit that errors can have intervened.
It is objected fourthly from Isidore, as found in Gratian, distinction 50, canon Domino sancto, where he says that when Councils disagree with one another, one must abide by the more ancient and more approved — therefore Councils sometimes err, because when they disagree and hand down contradictory things, it is necessary that one of them errs.
It is replied: Isidore speaks of councils whose authority is uncertain, of which it is not established that they have been confirmed by the Pontiff — in these we do not deny that conflicting opinions or errors can be found.
The heretics finally allege and raise what are almost innumerable errors of Councils. These are of three kinds: some are true and gross errors, but of councils which were never approved by the Pontiff, or received by the Church — indeed rejected and condemned, such as those of Ariminum and Seleucia, the second Council of Ephesus, and similar ones. These errors they bring up in vain, because they count nothing against this Catholic doctrine. Others are not true errors, but true dogmas of the Catholic faith and holy decrees determined and established in legitimate Councils, which they themselves however reprehend as gross errors because they are adverse to their heresy — thus they allege that the Council of Chalcedon erred when nuns were forbidden therein to violate their vow of continence, and in this way they bring up many examples from other councils. But these too they enumerate in vain, because we deny that they are errors — and the opposite, which they themselves maintain, we say is erroneous and heretical. Others finally they bring forward as errors from true and legitimate councils, that is, certain statements which have the appearance of error, and thus in the sense in which they take them are errors, not only in their judgment but in ours as well. Yet although the words taken apart might to some extent seem to carry such a sense, we deny that such is the sense in the mind of the councils and the Fathers; rather they have another true and sound sense which the councils intend to signify. We pass over proposing these here, however, because in the various materials of theology these more obscure authorities of councils are customarily raised in opposition and explained there.
Third Conclusion: Councils not only particular, but also universal, without the confirmation or approval of the Pontiff, are not of infallible authority, even if in the same councils there are also present Legates of the Roman See. Regarding particular councils, this is a certain and common opinion. And it can be proved from canon 2, distinction 18, where it is said that Episcopal — that is, Provincial — councils convoked by some Bishop or Archbishop are invalid for defining questions of faith, such that their definition is valid for establishing certain faith, without a superior authority being added. Regarding general councils, the opinions of the Doctors are not so concordant: for those who think a general council is above the Pontiff hold, with some others, that a legitimate universal council cannot be subject to error, however much the approval of the Pontiff has not been obtained. Others however more commonly teach the contrary. In order that this matter may be more fully understood:
It must be noted first that Roman Pontiffs sometimes send their Legates to a general council with a definite instruction concerning their opinion about the questions to be disputed and determined in the Council — as is established to have been done in the fourth General Council of Chalcedon by Leo, when he sent his Legates; and likewise in the sixth and seventh councils. Sometimes however without instruction, as was done in the Council of Trent. The reason for this different manner of proceeding can be that in some councils only one or two questions are to be raised and defined, as happened in those first General Councils — and therefore the Apostolic See can easily give its Legates instruction concerning its mind. In others, however, sometimes many materials and various questions are to be examined and determined, as in the Council of Trent — whence such an instruction cannot so easily be given to the Legates. It also happens that sometimes the place of the council is less distant from the Apostolic See, so that on every occasion the Council can more easily be informed of the Roman Pontiff’s opinion, whence it is not so necessary to give prior instruction to the Legates.
It must be noted secondly that there can be four ways in which a question comes to be determined by a General Council: One way, that the Fathers of the Council consent to one part and define it, but with the Legates of the Apostolic See dissenting. Second, that they define with the Legates also assenting, but contrary to the instruction given to them by the Apostolic See. Third, with all including the Legates of the Apostolic See consenting, but who did not have instruction from the Apostolic See. Fourth, with all consenting, and also the Legates, in conformity with the instruction which they had from the Apostolic See.
Regarding the first two ways there appears no difficulty, because it is sufficiently established that in proceeding thus, errors can be committed by a council — for in fact the second Council of Ephesus erred, which, with the Legates of Pope Leo objecting, proceeded to decrees contrary to sound faith, as is clear from epistles 24 and 25 of Leo to Theodosius. Likewise the Council of Constantinople in the time of Nicholas I erred, where the Legates of Nicholas acted contrary to the instruction of the Pope, as is clear from the epistle of the same Pontiff to the Patriarchs and other Bishops of the East, and from Zonaras in the Life of the Emperor Michael.
Nor should this seem remarkable, because those councils cannot be or be said to have been legitimately celebrated, or to have proceeded legitimately, which contend with their own head. But when the other Fathers proceed to a definition while those who hold the place and the role of the head object, they are judged to contend with the head. Likewise also, if these latter indeed consent, but contrary to the express instruction given to them by the Apostolic See — because then they do not act as Legates, since they do not act in the name of the Pontiff. For Leo expressly in epistle 45 and Agatho in his epistle to the Emperor, which was read in the sixth Synod, Action 4, affirm that they do not give authority to Legates except according to the rules handed down to them.
On the other hand, regarding the fourth way, the matter appears altogether certain: that such definitions of a Universal Council cannot be subject to errors — for in the first place a sufficient approbation of the Pontiff is present, because his express consent given to the Legates is found. Since therefore the consent of the remaining Fathers of the Council is added at the same time, it follows that that definition is absolutely and simply that of the whole Church, which without doubt cannot err.
Someone will say: that prior instruction of the Pontiff is not the definitive sentence of the Apostolic See, because the Bishops in the Council are not obliged to follow it — otherwise the votes would not be free, nor would they seem to appear as judges of the cause, because by the prior definition of the Apostolic See all would be prejudged — therefore it seems that there is still no firm and certain determination of the General Council, even though it decrees and defines in conformity with the instruction which the Legates of the Apostolic See received from the Pontiff.
It is replied by denying the consequence. For although that instruction is not by itself the definitive sentence of the Apostolic See, yet when the Council consents with that instruction and a decree is thus formed by the Legates in the name of the Pontiff, then it begins to be the definitive and ultimate sentence, not only of the Council but also of the Pontiff — nor can the Pontiff retract it. For either this is a most certain sign that it was from God, when it is approved by the universal Council which agrees with it.
Saint Leo indicates this in epistle 63 to Theodoric: “What the Lord first defined through our ministry, the irrefragable assent of the universal brotherhood has confirmed, so that He showed it truly to proceed from Himself, when what had been formed first by the First See of all had received the judgment of the whole Christian world, so that in this too the members might agree with the Head.”
Now in order that these things may be more easily grasped, it should be known that when Pontiffs send Legates with instruction, they are accustomed to send them with this condition: that if the Council consents to the judgment or instruction of the Apostolic See, then a decree is to be formed; but if not, then the formation of the decree is to be deferred until the Roman Pontiff, further informed and consulted, responds. These things are established from the Council of Chalcedon — for in Action 3, as soon as the Council had consented to the judgment of the Pontiff concerning the deposition of Dioscorus, the Legates formed a decree in the name of Pope Leo, by which he was stripped of episcopal dignity and made an exile from all priestly office. But in Action 16, when the Council wished to decree something contrary to the information of the Pontiff, the Legates said that this ought first to be signified to the Apostolic See. When therefore the council decrees in conformity with the express sentence of the Pontiff which the Legates bring, it is the same as if the Pontiff had there in person pronounced his sentence — and therefore as if he had approved or confirmed the decree of the council. Hence Saint Leo in epistle 61 to the Bishops who attended the Council of Chalcedon, by which he confirms it as to matters of faith, openly indicates that it was not necessary for him now to give his confirmation — except because some seemed to doubt whether in truth the determinations had been made according to his opinion and with his consent. In order therefore that it might be clear to all that what his Legates had reported and done had been done truly from his express mandate, he was submitting that confirmatory epistle.
It is proved secondly that in councils of this kind, without awaiting further confirmation by the Pontiff, execution is customarily made immediately — that is, those who hold the contrary are condemned as manifest heretics, and the guilty are deposed from the Episcopate or priestly office. Thus in the Council of Nicaea, six Bishops together with Arius were condemned and sent into exile, as Rufinus writes, book 10 of the History, chapter 5. In the Council of Ephesus, Nestorius was condemned and deposed, as Evagrius testifies, book 1, chapter 4. In Chalcedon, Action 5, Dioscorus is deposed, and in Action 4 ten Bishops of Egypt are judged heretics because they were unwilling to acquiesce in the decree issued in Action 3. Likewise with Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, in the sixth Synod, Actions 8 and 12. But if these Councils could have been subject to error before the further confirmation of the Pontiff were obtained, then those who had resisted before that confirmation would not yet have been to be judged manifest heretics — therefore, etc.
Regarding the third way, the matter is in controversy; but it seems altogether to be said that such a council can err, and its judgment is not to be held altogether infallible before the confirmation of the Pontiff is obtained. First, because the acts of such a council are sent to the Pontiff for confirmation, and he can approve or disapprove them, as is gathered from Pope Gelasius to the Bishops of Dardania, and from the epistle of Pope Nicholas to the Emperor Michael, and from the practice of councils seeking confirmation — and in particular from the Bull of Pius IV, in which he confirms the Council of Trent.
But against this argument someone will perhaps say: although Councils are sent to the Pontiff for signing or confirmation, it is not therefore the case that he can disapprove them when all things have been legitimately concluded and determined with his Legates present and consenting, who do not have contrary instruction.
This is confirmed because Bishops at a Council are present not merely as advisors who discuss and examine causes, but as true judges of questions and causes — and therefore also Bishops alone by ordinary right, as absolute Pastors and Princes in the governance of Churches, have a definitive vote. For if they were only advisors, then learned men rather than Bishops ought to be summoned and have a vote — therefore the Pontiff, who in the council is as it were the President, whether in person or through his Legates, is bound in forming decrees to follow the sentence of the council, indeed even of the majority — for this pertains to the office of President. When therefore the Fathers of the council have concluded something in common with the Legates of the Apostolic See, although the Legates did not have particular instruction on the matter from the Pontiff, the Pontiff cannot disapprove it — because if he had been personally present, he ought (as appears) to have concluded according to the same sentence.
It is replied by denying the prior assumption; and to the confirmation, admitting the latter assumption, the consequence must be denied — because although the President of the Council, acting purely and simply in the office of President, ought to follow in forming a decree the greater part of the votes, yet this is not perpetually true if some other quality concurs. For when one who presides is at the same time the supreme Ruler of the commonwealth, he can for reasons, in concluding, not follow the greater part of the judges but the sounder part. So therefore the Roman Pontiff also, because he is not a mere President but also the supreme Prince and Pastor of the Church, can correct or retract what has been judged by the body of the Council — and this is attributed to him with more just reason because it is his office to confirm and direct his brethren, and for this he has the assistance of the Holy Spirit not to err, as is established from what was said above concerning the Pontiff. See Torquemada, book 3, chapters 63 and 64; and Melchior Cano, book 5 on Loci, chapter 5.
I add however that perhaps it has never happened that the greater part has not consented with the Pontiff when Councils were celebrated without fraud and deceit in the presence of his Legates. Otherwise indeed, when frauds intervened — for Damasus annulled the Acts of the Council of Ariminum, to which the greater part of the Bishops had consented, but the Catholic Bishops had been deceived by the obscurity of a Greek word, as Rufinus testifies, book 10, chapter 21. Likewise Leo annulled a certain constitution of the Council of Chalcedon, of which we made mention above, because it had been decreed fraudulently in the absence of the Legates of the Apostolic See.
The same can be proved secondly: because the firmness of a General Council arises from the conjunction and confession of the body with the head; but in such a council the Head has not yet declared its sense and mind. For although the Legates preside in the name of the Pontiff, they are not in truth the Pontiff, nor do they have the privilege of infallible assistance and of not erring in the universal teaching of the Church and in confirming the right faith — which was obtained for Peter by the prayer of Christ.
Thirdly, the Council of Basel, together with the Legate of the Pontiff, established by common consent that the Council is above the Pontiff — which council however is not received, and is only tolerated in certain matters.
But it is objected: such a council is a legitimate General Council representing the whole Church in its head and in its members — therefore it cannot err. It is replied: granted that it is a legitimate General Council, it is nevertheless not in every way complete, because the personal presence of the Head is lacking, both in the matter itself and in its own proper votes and sentence. Although the presence of Legates even without instruction suffices for a council to be held legitimate, yet without the instruction or sentence of the Pontiff being added, it does not suffice for absolute definitions or constitutions to be made, except still depending on the accession of the personal sentence of the Supreme Pontiff. For the Pontiff is not considered to commit to Legates the decision or definition in his own name when he does not instruct or inform them of his mind, but only that they preside and direct the council in his name and inform the Pontiff himself about what is being done there.
They object secondly: Councils add anathema to their definitions against those holding the contrary, even before they are confirmed — therefore the definitions are infallible even before confirmation. It is replied that councils indeed add anathema, but understand that it will have its force when it has been confirmed by the Pontiff, whose confirmation they suppose must be sought and obtained.

DOUBT IV.
Whether a General Council is above the Pontiff?

It must be observed that this question can be understood in two ways: one way, whether a General Council taken apart without the Pontiff — that is, with him absent or not consenting, or contradicting, but otherwise legitimately assembled — is above the Pontiff. Another way, whether a Council together with the Pontiff — that is, with him present and consenting — is of greater power than the Pontiff alone, and can thus exercise some coercive power over him and his successors. Having explained these matters:
First Conclusion: A Universal Council taken apart from the Pontiff in the explained manner is not above the Pontiff, nor of equal power; but the Pontiff is above the Council itself, inasmuch as he is the Head of the Council. This conclusion is not only against all heretics, but also against certain Catholics — against John Gerson, Jacob Almain in his Treatises on the Power of the Church; likewise against Panormitanus on the chapter Significasti, Extra, De Electione; and against his teacher Cardinal of Florence, and Tostatus of Avila on chapter 18 of Matthew, question 108; and certain others.
It must however be noted that there is a difference between these authors and the heretics. For the heretics wish the Pontiff to be in no way the Head or general Pastor of the whole Church, but only the Bishop of his particular Church, or at most, Patriarch of the West. These Catholics, however, admit and teach that the Pope is the head and Pastor of individual faithful and of individual Churches, if they are taken separately — and only deny that he is the head of the whole Church assembled together, as in a general council. Wherefore according to them, the Pope is in the Church what the general Prefect of an Order is in a religious community, who is above individual religious, even Priors and Provincials, but not however above the general congregation itself, since he must obey it, not command it. These authors therefore wish the Church assembled together to be taken as a kind of form of the complete body, and all the power which was scattered in the various members to be united there. And accordingly they compare the Pope with other Christians or particular Churches taken separately — which is, according to them, to compare the most noble and predominant member with the less noble and inferior members; but to compare the Pope with the council is to compare a part with its whole, and therefore to compare the lesser with the greater, to which consequently the Pope ought to yield and submit.
Moreover as the foundation of their doctrine they further establish that the supreme ecclesiastical power has principally and proximately been conferred and attributed by Christ to the Church thus universally assembled — yet because the Church cannot perpetually be assembled and exercise this power, they add that Christ instituted the Supreme Pontiff as a general instrument for all the actions of the Church, and placed this power in him to exercise it in the name of the Church — yet in such a way that they wish the direction in the use of power to pertain to the universally assembled Church, as to which that power first and principally belongs and has been conferred.
Nevertheless the conclusion is certainly to be maintained, being proximate to faith and taught by nearly all in common. It is gathered in the first place from the ancient Scholastics: Albert the Great, Saint Thomas, Bonaventure, Richard, Paludanus, Durandus, and others in book 4, distinction 16, where they treat of the Keys. Although they do not dispute this question explicitly, they nevertheless say that the Pontiff is so supreme in the Church that he cannot even submit himself to another’s sentence according to coercive power — which would be false if he were in fact subject to the power of a General Council. Others explicitly teach this, as Antoninus, part 3, title 22, chapter 10 of the Summa Historialis, and part 2, title 3, chapter 11 of the Summa Theologica; Torquemada, book 2, chapters 93 and 104 of the Summa de Ecclesia; Cajetan in his Treatise on the Comparison of the Pope and Councils, and in his Apology for the same Treatise; Pighius, book 6 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy; Ferrariensis, book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 76; Turrianus in his three books written on this question; Sanders, book 7 of the Visible Hierarchy, where he treats of the Council of Constance; and many others, whom Bellarmine cites, book 2 on Councils, chapter 34.
And it is proved first because the testimonies of Sacred Scripture alleged above in the Treatise on the Pontiff, Doubt First, with the explanations of the Holy Fathers, to prove that Christ instituted one general Prefect and one Head of the Church, namely Saint Peter, show not only that he was constituted the Head of individual faithful, but also of all of them however many may be assembled together. This is confirmed because Matthew 16 says not that individual faithful are to be built upon the Rock which was Peter, but the Church is said to be built upon that Rock. Now the Church does not signify individuals separately, but is a collective noun and signifies a people convoked into one — therefore from Peter as a foundation depend not only individual faithful or particular Churches taken separately, but also all of them however taken or assembled together, because it is in the most proper sense that they are then called the Church; and thus he is also the foundation and head of the entire assembly — and consequently, neither those assembled together will be above Peter, but Peter above them.
It is further said in the same place that the gates of hell shall not prevail not against particular individual Christians or particular Churches (for this would be false), but simply that they shall not prevail against the Church built upon this Rock — therefore it is the whole Church taken collectively which is fortified and sustained by this Rock. The Rock therefore is not itself dependent on the Church universally assembled. Thirdly, in the same place it is not said: “And to the Church I will give the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and you Peter will be its agent,” but it is said: “To you I will give the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven” — indeed for the utility and good of the Church, yet in such a way that to you first and immediately belong the right and power of the keys.
Hence the Council of Chalcedon in its epistle to Saint Leo confesses in express words that he was the Head, not of individuals only, but of the Council itself — for treating of the Fathers assembled in that Council, it writes thus: “Over whom you indeed presided as Head.” And in the Council of Florence it is expressly stated that the Roman Pontiff is the Head of the whole Church and has received from the Lord the fullest power of governing the universal Church. But the whole and universal Church does not signify individual faithful separately, or particular Churches taken separately, but all collected or gathered into one. Likewise, John 21, Peter is constituted Pastor of the lambs and sheep of Christ — now a Pastor is in charge not only of individual sheep, but also of the whole flock and the whole sheepfold. Hence the Fathers thus explain it, saying that Peter was instituted by Christ as the Pastor of Christ’s sheepfold, and the care of the whole world and of all the sheep was committed to him. Hence also the Church prays for the Pontiff in the Collect thus: “O God, Shepherd and Ruler of all the faithful, who hast been pleased to set thy servant, e.g. Urban, over thy Church.” The Council of Lyon, moreover, as found in the chapter Ubi periculum, De electione in the Sixth, calls the Roman Pontiff the Rector of the universal Church — therefore he is not only the Pastor and Rector of individuals, but also of the whole community of the faithful, which the name universal Church most properly signifies. Conformably, Saint Ambrose on those words of the Apostle, “That thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God,” 1 Timothy 3, writes thus: “The house of God is called the Church, whose Rector today is Damasus.”
It is proved secondly from other Councils which expressly confess this truth, so that there is no need to contend against their authority on behalf of true doctrine. The Council of Sinuessa under Marcellinus has at the end: “The First See shall be judged by no one.” The same is found in the Roman Council under Silvester, last canon: “No one shall judge the First See” — where the Councils remove judgment of the first See not only from private persons, but also from the Fathers assembled together. In the Council of Chalcedon, Action 3, many letters written from various places to the Council itself are recited, which all begin thus: “To the most holy and most blessed universal Patriarch Leo of Great Rome, and to the holy universal Council assembled in the city of Chalcedon” — but none of all the Fathers objected or contended that the Pontiff ought not to be placed before the whole council, which they would without doubt not have neglected if they had judged that the Council is above the Pontiff, and not that the Pontiff is above the council. Indeed at the end of the council there exists a letter of this kind to Leo, in which he is acknowledged as both Head and Father; and likewise the same council condemned Dioscorus together with the second Synod of Ephesus, for other reasons but also especially and principally because they had dared to judge and condemn Leo, the Roman Pontiff. Which Nicholas I also writes in his epistle to the Emperor Michael — saying that Dioscorus was condemned not so much for heresy as for the horrible presumption by which he had dared to pronounce sentence against the Supreme Pontiff. But if Dioscorus, who was Patriarch of Alexandria, the first after the Pontiff, could not rightly judge the Pontiff together with a General Council, it certainly follows evidently that the Council is not above the Pontiff.
In the eighth general Synod, Action 7, it is also said that the Roman Pontiff has judged about the Primates of all the Churches, but that no one has ever judged about him, namely by right and legitimately, in such a way that that judgment would be held ratified by the Church. Hence the Council of the Lateran under Leo X, session iii, expressly teaches that it belongs to the Pontiff alone, as one having authority over all Councils, to have the full right and power of convoking or dissolving Councils — and that this is manifestly established not only from the testimony of Sacred Scripture, the sayings of the Holy Fathers, and other Roman Pontiffs, but also from the confession of the councils themselves.
To this doctrine of this council some seem to respond that it was not a General Council — but this is wrongly said, because it is established that it was generally convoked, and access was open to all, although fewer Bishops actually attended. Furthermore, it is established that a true and undoubted Pontiff presided over it. With greater probability therefore others say that that doctrine does not altogether determine this question, because the Council does not define it as a Catholic doctrine to be held — for it does not say anathema to those who hold the contrary; and for this reason it is held, and those who think otherwise are not to be held heretics.
It is proved thirdly from various Pontiffs who teach this same thing: Saint Leo, epistle 48 to Athanasius at the end; Gelasius in his epistle to the Bishops of Dardania; Nicholas I to the Emperor Michael: “It is clearly established,” he says, “that the matter is to be retracted by the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is greater.” Saint Gregory, book 9, epistle 39. Pope Paschal, as found in the chapter Significasti, Extra, De electione: “They say,” he says, “that statutes are not found in councils, as if the councils of the Roman Church have prescribed the law, when all councils have been made and have received their strength through the authority of the Roman Church, and in their statutes the authority of the Roman Pontiff is openly received.” Innocent III, sermon 2 on the Consecration of the Pontiff. Boniface VIII in the extravagant Unam sanctam, De majoritate et obedientia: “If,” he says, “the earthly power errs, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; but if a lesser spiritual power errs, it shall be judged by a greater, by its superior; but if the supreme one errs, it can be judged by God alone, not by man.” This conforms to the parable of Matthew 24 — for the Pontiff is particularly the servant “whom his lord hath appointed over his family, to give them meat in season”; of whom it is said in the same place: “But if that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a coming; and shall begin to strike his fellow servants; the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth not, and at an hour that he knoweth not, and shall separate him, and appoint his portion with the hypocrites.” Here there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth — because namely the universal and supreme steward placed over the household by the Lord cannot be judged or punished by the household, even if he acts badly; but his cause is reserved to the judgment of his Lord. So therefore also, if the Pontiff who is the supreme Steward of the household and Church of Christ has acted badly and has not governed the household of Christ or the Church well, he nevertheless cannot be judged and punished by the Church, but is reserved to be judged by his Lord. Saint Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, a man of great authority, writes thus about the Roman Pontiff: “He who is to judge all shall be judged by none, unless he be found to deviate from the faith,” as is cited in distinction 40, canon Si Papa.
It is proved finally by reason. First: because the governance of the Church is monarchical — for the Church in the Scriptures is everywhere compared to a kingdom or household, in which one rules, in whom supreme power resides — therefore not in the multitude of the faithful, nor in the council of Bishops, does the supreme power reside, but in some one person; because otherwise it would not be a Monarchy, but a Democracy or Aristocracy, and the Church itself would not be a Kingdom, but a certain community or republic.
Secondly, because appeals always proceed from inferior or lesser things to superior and greater: but it is established that the practice of the Church has always been that appeal was made from a Council to the Pontiff, when it was thought that the latter was not aware of or was not giving assent to the council — but not conversely.
Hence Pope Gelasius writes to the Bishops of Dardania: appeal must be made to the Apostolic See from whatever part of the world, but no one is permitted to appeal from it. And lest anyone say that the Pontiff speaks only of particular judges and judgments, and not of the judgment of councils, he adds: the Roman Pontiffs have often loosed those whom councils had bound. Manifest examples of this exist: for Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, and Paul, Bishop of Constantinople, deposed by a council, appealed to Pope Julius and were restored to their sees by him, as Sozomen reports, book 3 of the History, chapter 7. Likewise Flavian, Bishop of Constantinople, appealed from the second Council of Ephesus to Pope Leo, as Leo reports in epistle 25 to Theodosius. Likewise from the same council Theodoretus, Bishop of Cyrrhus, appealed to the same Pontiff, as is clear from his epistle, which is found at the end of the works of Saint Leo. Saint John Chrysostom also, when deposed, appealed to Innocent, as is gathered from the epistles of Chrysostom which he wrote to Innocent.
Thirdly, because all councils are customarily submitted to the examination of the Pontiff — and those which he approves and confirms are received, while those which he disapproves are rejected. It is established indeed from the proceedings of the councils themselves that they sought the confirmation of the Pontiff, and that he approved very many of them. It is likewise manifest that Pontiffs have often disapproved councils — sometimes altogether, sometimes in part. Hence Saint Basil, epistle 52 to Athanasius, writes that it seemed advisable to him that the Roman Pontiff should be asked to send some to Greece who in his name might recall and annul the Acts of the Council of Ariminum — which Damasus also accomplished. Leo also annulled a certain constitution of the Council of Chalcedon, as we said before.
Fourthly, because a general council without the Pontiff can err, but the Pontiff, even without a General Council, cannot err, as was shown above.
Fifthly, if things stood as others wish and explain, then the Pontiff would not be the proximate and immediate Vicar of Christ, but only of the Church itself — while the Church would immediately bear the role of Christ, which is condemned, as appears in the Council of Constance, session 8, among the articles of Wyclif, one of which was: “The Pontiff is not the immediate and proximate Vicar of Christ and of the Apostles.”
Second Conclusion: A General Council together with the Pontiff does not have power intensively (so to speak) greater than the Pope alone, although it can be said to have greater power extensively. This is proved because if it had greater power intensively, it would receive it either from the other Fathers who are there with the Pontiff, or from the Pontiff himself, or finally it would arise from the reason of the assembly itself; but none of these can be said. Not the first, because the Pontiff is established to have greater power than any others assembled in the Council — therefore by them no greater power intensively is added. Not the second, because the Pontiff does not confer or bring to the council more authority or power than he himself has. Not the third either, because it was demonstrated above that the supreme power of the Church was attributed immediately to Peter and his successors by Christ. For nowhere is it read that to the Church, or to the assembly and gathering of the faithful in itself, by reason of its totality, some power was granted; but it is well read that the power of feeding the lambs and sheep of Christ was given to Peter. Likewise that to the other Apostles was given the power of preaching the Gospel to every creature, of baptizing in the name of the Father and Son, etc., and of remitting and retaining sins — but not that to the Community itself by reason of its assembly — therefore, etc.
From this it follows that the Pontiff is not coactively bound by laws enacted by the General Council, even with his own or his predecessors’ consent, but only directively; indeed that he alone can dispense in them, and for reasons change or abrogate them.
The Council is said to have greater power extensively, however, not because it can be exercised over more people, but because here the power of many comes together, and the power of the Pontiff himself in a certain way informs the whole Council — and thus there is found there a power more extended, because it is in more persons than in the Pontiff alone.
Third Conclusion: A General Council is not only not above the Pope, but neither can the Pope so submit himself to the Council that the Council can or may exercise coercive power over him. So the authors cited above to the first Conclusion commonly hold, and many others. This is proved because the Pontiff by divine right is superior and head of all the Fathers even assembled in the Council; but the Head cannot dispense with this right, or transfer the superiority to another, as long as he retains the Pontificate — therefore, etc. Furthermore, an inferior cannot commit causes reserved to a Superior to be judged by another — but God reserved the causes of the Pontiff to Himself to be judged, as we just said — therefore he himself cannot as it were transfer them and commit them to be judged by the Council with authority.
The Pontiff can however commit his cause to be examined by Bishops and submit himself to their sentence, not indeed in the manner of a perfect judgment, but only in the manner of a kind of arbitration — for several Pontiffs have done so when they were accused of something, as is established from the canons Mandastis and Item auditum, cause 2, question 5; and from the fourth council under Symmachus — yet the Bishops did not dare to judge simply. Hence in the aforesaid Council, when they subscribe, they affirm that they leave the whole judgment to God.
But against the stated conclusions, it is objected first: Saint Leo in epistle 63 congratulates himself on the fact that his epistle sent to the Council of Chalcedon was received and approved by the same Council — therefore the supreme power and ultimate determination resides with the council.
It is replied by denying the consequence — because Leo had not sent the epistle as the definitive sentence of the Apostolic See, but in the manner of instruction and information about the matter to be treated, so that aided by it the Fathers might judge better and more certainly, as we explained this above. Leo therefore rejoices that the Fathers of the Council followed that information and consented to the same sentence — because by this having been done there was no occasion or danger of schism, and those who were bringing in erroneous doctrine were more forcefully and effectively overcome and repressed. But after the Fathers of the council had consented to the epistle of Leo, then at last the ultimate determination and definition was issued in the name of the Pontiff and the council.
It is objected secondly: Matthew 18 says Christ: “If thy brother shall offend against thee” etc., “tell the Church” — therefore the Pontiff too must sometimes bring sinners before the Church, and consequently must acknowledge some tribunal of the Church greater than his own. This is confirmed because Christ there was speaking to the Apostles, among whom was also Peter, whose successors the Pontiffs are.
It is replied by denying the consequence — because Christ there properly instructed the Apostles, and in them all the faithful, how they ought to live according to charity with brothers and equals; but He does not direct this instruction to inferiors with respect to superiors, or to superiors with respect to inferiors. Hence when Christ advises that if a brother does not hear you fraternally reproving him — neither alone, nor even with witnesses added — you should bring him to the Church; then by the name of the Church is understood either the Prelate or Bishop himself in that place, as Saint Chrysostom and Innocent III explain that passage in the chapter Novit, Extra, De Judiciis — which sense the ancient and everyday practice of the Church also confirms; or certainly by the name of the Church is understood the assembly of the faithful together with its head — for according to Cyprian, epistle to Florentinus, the Church is the people united to the Priest, and the flock cleaving to its Pastor, but not a multitude without a head. The sense therefore is that brothers who sin and cannot be corrected by private reproofs, in whatever place they are, are to be brought by a brother to the Prelate or Bishop of the place, so that he, bearing the person of the Church, either by himself alone or also with others taken to assist, may rebuke such sinners, and if they persist contumaciously, punish them.
To the confirmation it is replied that this was indeed said to the Apostles, among whom was Peter — but who at that time had not yet been constituted superior and Pastor of the Church and of the other Apostles, although he had the promise of this; and therefore this discourse was directed to him also as a private person and merely as a brother of the rest. But when a superior himself learns of a fault of a subject, he will rightly follow this instruction in it, in that he also first rebukes privately and fraternally — but if the brother is not corrected, he ought not to refer the matter to the Church, because he himself is and sustains the person of the Church. Therefore then he ought to rebuke and punish him no longer as a brother, but as a superior. But if he himself as a superior sins, he ought not to be rebuked by inferiors so much as rather to be implored, as a father — as the Apostle advises this to be done with elders. But if he does not acquiesce and has another above him, then the matter should be brought to that one — but if it is the Supreme Pontiff, then it is reserved to the judgment of God, because there is no Church, as has been sufficiently demonstrated before, to which the matter could be brought.
It is objected thirdly: The Pope is a member of the Church — therefore he is lesser than the Church itself, and subject to it, just as a part is lesser than its whole.
It is replied: In the consequent, either the Church is taken separately without the Pontiff, and thus it is not the whole of which the Pontiff is a part, because it is supposed to be contra-distinguished against the Pontiff — it will truly be a co-member, together with the Pontiff constituting one whole and perfect body, just as the head and the rest of the trunk of the body; and in this sense the Church is a greater co-member, but in mass, not in virtue and power — just as the trunk of the body in a man is greater in mass than the head, but not in sense and faculties. Or it is taken for the Church together with the Pontiff, and thus it is not something greater in virtue or power intensively; but, as we said, only extensively. And the reason is that the Pontiff is that member of that whole body to whom all the power which is found in the rest of the whole body has been immediately attributed, so that from him it is derived into the rest of the body — such that he himself has more, and the body has whatever it has in that kind from that member, while that member receives nothing from the body.
It is objected fourthly: The Council of Constance, session 4, among the things it there disposes and declares, places first that the Synod itself, legitimately assembled in the Holy Spirit, making a General Council, representing the Catholic Church Militant, has power immediately from Christ, to whom anyone of whatever state or dignity, even if papal, is bound to obey — therefore it must be acknowledged that a General Council is simply above the Pontiff.
It is replied by denying the consequence — because that Session was not legitimately celebrated, for there was no certain Pontiff to preside over that Council and from whose authority such a matter would be proposed for discussion and determination — for John XXIII, who had begun the Council, had by then already departed, as is clear from the decree immediately following there; which also sufficiently indicates that he had not been present in any way, but had departed with the intention of dissolving, or transferring, or deferring the Council — for it seems that the second decree there was specifically enacted against such an attempt.
But someone will say: even if that declaration was not then legitimately made, yet it seems to have subsequently passed into an absolute and legitimate determination through the subsequent confirmation of Pope Martin V, who approves and ratifies all and singular things determined, concluded, and decreed conciliariter in matters of faith by the said Council, as is found in session 45, or the last, in the closing of the Council — therefore, etc.
It is replied that the Pontiff does not simply and absolutely approve all the acts of that Council, but in the first place those things which have been conciliariter determined and decreed — that is, in the manner of other Councils, with matters and questions having been first proposed and diligently examined. But it is sufficiently clear that the alleged declaration was issued by the Council without any prior inquiry or examination concerning this point, unlike what they premise concerning other matters. Furthermore, which is very much to be observed, the Pontiff approves and ratifies only those things which are determined, concluded, and decreed in matters of faith — but now it is manifest that the Council in Session 4 does not treat ex profeso matters or questions of faith, nor does it intend there to establish dogmas of faith or condemn heresies or errors, but only to enact certain decrees which serve to remove the schism then prevailing and to preserve or restore the unity of the Church. Hence such a preface is placed before: “This holy Council of Constance, for the extirpation of the present schism, and for the union and reformation of the Church in head and members to be accomplished, ordains, decrees, declares as follows,” etc.
Nor does it matter that the question about the power of the Pope above the Council, or conversely, belongs more to matters of faith than to morals — because it is sufficiently established that what the Synod there makes as a declaration concerning that thing, it does not make in the manner of a determination or definition of that question, but only places it in the manner of a kind of presupposition and explanation of its opinion and sense about its supreme power — and this so that, with that presupposition made, the following decrees which it would enact might have greater authority and force with all. That they did not do it in the manner of a definition is clear first from the fact that they did not first commit the matter for examination, as they did commit other matters and questions concerning the doctrine of Wyclif and Hus for examination, before proceeding to determinations. Furthermore, because it is not added that this is to be so held according to the Catholic faith, nor is anathema said against those who think or teach the contrary — as the same Council prohibits all Catholics under threat of anathema from daring to preach, dogmatize, hold, or at any time allege the articles, or any of them, of John Wyclif which it reprobates and condemns, etc. Therefore this declaration made in the said Session is not comprehended among those things which are conciliariter determined, concluded, and decreed in matters of faith — and therefore neither does it fall under the approbation of Martin V, which relates only to the doctrine of Wyclif and Hus condemned by the said Council.
It is objected finally: The Council of Basel defines, in session 33, that it is to be held by the Catholic faith that the Council is above the Pope; and that Council was legitimately convoked — therefore, etc.
It is replied that that council was indeed legitimately begun — for at the beginning there were present both the Legate of the Supreme Pontiff and very many Bishops; but afterward the Legate withdrew, and all the principal Bishops. Nevertheless some wished to continue it, and a certain Cardinal of Arles took upon himself the office of presiding over it — and because few Bishops remained, very many Presbyters were introduced, so that contrary to the form of the ancient Councils, it was now the Synod not of Bishops but rather of Presbyters — indeed not a Synod, but a schismatic, seditious conciliabulum of no authority, as is declared in the last Lateran Council, session ii. Therefore its acts are of no value or authority.
Nor is it true, as a certain Sectarian alleges, that Nicholas V, the successor of Eugenius, confirmed that Council with its acts — because this Pontiff, as is clear from his Bull annexed to that Council, only approved what the said council had ordained and established concerning benefices and ecclesiastical censures; the rest neither this Pontiff nor any other confirmed. Indeed, as is clear from session 28 of the same Council, Pope Eugenius — whom the same Council had attempted to depose — shortly afterward disapproved those definitions about the power of the Council above the Pontiff, as the Lateran Council likewise afterward did in session ii.

DOUBT V.
Whether a General Council can revoke its own, or preceding universal Councils’, decrees?

It is replied briefly: Dogmatic decrees of faith, when they have been formed with the approbation of the Pontiff, cannot in any way be changed. For the truth of faith, like divine truth, is altogether immutable. Decrees which concern reformation, however, and which follow the nature of human law, can be changed in the manner in which we said in the Treatise on Laws in the Prima Secundae that human laws can sometimes be changed.

DOUBT I.
Whether Christ the Lord placed one person over His whole Church — namely Peter — when He Himself was about to depart from it according to His visible presence?

The heretics of our time deny this, for they are unwilling to acknowledge a monarchical government instituted by Christ the Lord and entrusted to men; instead they contend that it is aristocratic and democratic. Yet even among themselves they do not agree on the explanation of this, as Bellarmine shows in Book 1, On the Pontiff, ch. 5.
All Catholics, on the contrary, teach that Peter was placed by Christ over the whole Church, and was thus constituted the head of the whole Church, and that universal governance was committed to him as the Vicar of Christ on earth. This is a certain doctrine of the faith, which Sanders treats at length in Book 6 of the Visible Monarchy, and Bellarmine in Book 1, On the Pontiff.
It is proved from the Sacred Scriptures, especially from two passages: in one of which the Primacy is promised to Peter, and in the other it is conferred upon him; and also from the ancient Fathers, both Greek and Latin, who so understand and interpret those same passages.
The first passage is found in Matthew 16, where Christ says to Peter: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; I will give you the keys of the kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in Heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in Heaven.” The plain and obvious sense of these words is that we should understand, under two metaphors, the Primacy over the whole Church to have been promised to Peter. The one metaphor consists in the form and rationale of a foundation and a building: for what the foundation is in a building, that a Superior is in the body of a community; a King in a kingdom; a Magistrate in a city; a Father of a family in a household. The other is taken from keys: for he to whom the keys of a city are handed over is recognized either as its Lord, or is appointed Rector and Governor — to admit whom he will, and to exclude whom he will.
But in order to destroy, or rather to evade, the force of the argument drawn from this Scripture, the heretics invent various tortured interpretations of those words, alien to every manner of speaking. Hence they first of all deny that Peter is designated by the word “rock” when Christ said: “And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church” — which is manifestly to do violence to the discourse and its context.
This is demonstrated, first: for that pronoun “this,” when it is said “upon this rock,” points to some rock of which the Lord had spoken just before; and the Lord had just recently called Peter a rock. For He was speaking in Syriac, and in the Syriac language Peter is called Cephas, as is clear from John ch. 1: and Cephas means rock, as Jerome teaches in his commentary on Galatians ch. 2, and as is very well known to those skilled in that language. The Lord therefore said: “You are Cephas, and upon this Cephas I will build,” etc. — which in Latin reads: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church.” It is therefore evidently clear that the pronoun “this” cannot, without the greatest distortion, be referred to anything else, or point to anything other than Peter, whom Christ had already called the rock. Furthermore, it would be pointless what Christ first sets down: “Because you are Peter, or Rock.” It should also be added that it was not without a purpose that Christ in John ch. 1 said to Simon that he was to be called Cephas — which would, however, be emptied of meaning and come to nothing if “upon this rock” were twisted to refer to something other than Peter.
The Greek interpreter in the first place used Petros (Πέτρος), and in the second place Petra (Πέτρα), because among the Greeks Petra and Petros signify the same thing. He judged it more fitting that the name should be attributed to a person — especially a man — in the masculine gender rather than the feminine. But to explain more forcefully and clearly the metaphor which the Lord uses in those words, he chose in the second instance not to say or translate “upon this Petros,” which would have made the sense and intent more ambiguous and obscure, but “upon this Petra” — a word which, since it means nothing other than a rock, makes it clearly and fully understood that the Lord wished Simon, already called Peter or Rock, to be constituted the rock and foundation of the Church. Hence the Latin interpreter, for the same reasons, followed the Greek, and likewise rendered Cephas in the first place as Petrus, and in the second place as Petra.
Moreover, besides the fact that this sense is in itself plain and evident, and presents itself to the mind of all readers so that the words scarcely permit the conception of any other interpretation, it is further confirmed by the holy Fathers. First of all, the entire Council of Chalcedon — in which there were 630 Fathers — in its third Session calls Peter the rock, beyond doubt having these words of Christ in view. Also, for twelve hundred years there has been sung in the churches the verse of St. Ambrose: “Upon this very rock of the Church singing, he washed away his fault,” as St. Augustine attests in Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 21, who says that this sense “is also sung by the mouths of many in the verses of the most blessed Ambrose, where he speaks of the crowing of the cock: ‘Upon this very rock of the Church singing, he washed away his fault.’” St. Athanasius, in a letter to Felix, written in his own name and in that of the Alexandrian Synod, says: “You are Peter, and upon your foundation the columns of the Church — that is, the bishops — have been firmly established.” Basil, in Book 2 Against Eunomius: “Peter, on account of the excellence of his faith, received upon himself the building of the Church.” Gregory Nazianzen, in his Oration on preserving moderation: “Peter is called the Rock, and to him is entrusted the foundation of the faith of the Church.” Chrysostom, Homily 55 on Matthew: “The Lord said: You are Peter, and upon you I will build my Church.” See the same in Homily 4 on ch. 6 of Isaiah. Euthymius interprets those same words as though Christ had said: “I will make you the foundation of believers.” Cyril, Book 2 on John, ch. 2: “He predicts that Simon’s name shall henceforth no longer be his, but Peter, conveniently signifying by that very name that upon him, as upon a rock and most firm stone, He was to build His Church.” Tertullian, On Prescriptions against heretics: “Was anything hidden from Peter, who was called the rock on which the Church was to be built?” Hilary, on ch. 16 of Matthew: “O the happy foundation of the Church in the bestowal of the new name! Worthy is that rock of such a building as would dissolve the laws of hell. Blessed is the janitor of heaven,” etc.
At this point Erasmus most inappropriately — or rather with malicious intent — appended these words in the margin: FAITH IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE CHURCH — whereas Hilary in that passage did not even mention faith; and it is sufficiently clear that it is not faith, but Simon named with a new name, who is the one called “the blessed janitor of heaven.” Ambrose, Sermon 47: “Finally, on account of the solidity of his devotion to the churches, he is called the Rock, as the Lord says: You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; for he is called the rock because he was the first to lay foundations in action, and holds together as an immovable stone the whole structure and mass of the Christian work.” Jerome, on ch. 16 of Matthew: “According to the metaphor of the rock he is rightly told: I will build my Church upon you.” Augustine, on the Psalms against the Donatists: “Count the priests, even from the very seat of Peter. That is the rock which the proud gates of hell do not overcome.” And in Sermon 15 on the Saints: “Therefore the Lord named Peter the foundation of the Church, and for this reason the foundation of the Church is rightly honored, upon which the height of the ecclesiastical building rises.”
St. Leo, Sermon 2 on the anniversary of his own assumption to the Pontificate, after reciting those words of Christ — “You are Peter,” etc. — adds: “The disposition of truth therefore remains, and blessed Peter, persevering in the firmness of the rock he received, has not abandoned the helm of the Church committed to him.” St. Gregory, Book 6, Letter 37: “Who does not know that the Church is confirmed in the solidity of the Prince of the Apostles?” In the same way spoke very many most ancient Pontiffs — such as Clement, Anacletus, Marcellus, Pius, Julius, and others.
From all this the impudence of the heretics is apparent, who wish to deny that the words of Christ were so understood by the ancients. And Calvin indeed says that he could produce the ancients in favor of his own interpretation, but that in so clear a matter he does not wish to trouble the reader — adding this in order to conceal the rashness of his statement.
However, St. Augustine may be objected against us, since in his last Tractate on John he indicates that in Matthew ch. 16 the rock is to be taken as Christ, not as Simon son of John: “Upon this rock which you have confessed,” he says, “I will build my Church.” And in Book 1 of the Retractions, ch. 21, he expressly retracts what he had said somewhere — that the Church was built upon Peter — and teaches that it should rather be said to be built upon Christ, and that the passage we are dealing with is to be understood in this sense. Hence Calvin also seems to expound the same passage in this sense, though he speaks rather obscurely; for he says it is perspicuous upon what rock the Church is built, since the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 3: “No one can lay another foundation besides that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus.”
In reply, it is acknowledged that St. Augustine inclined more toward the understanding by which “this rock” is taken to designate Christ rather than Peter — and this on account of the heresy of the Donatists, who wished to make holiness depend on the man who baptizes; and they might have taken from it an apparent argument, had it been admitted that the Church was founded upon the man, the Apostle Peter. Nor did Augustine easily perceive that this sense was too ill-fitting to the words of Scripture, because he was ignorant of, or did not sufficiently attend to, the force of the Hebrew or Syriac expression used by the Lord, and in which Matthew composed his Gospel.
For the argument of Augustine is this: that it is not said “You are Petra” but “You are Petrus” — which he takes to be a derivative or denominative name with respect to Petra, as Christian is with respect to Christ — and therefore it was not inconvenient to understand the text thus: “I say to you that you are Petrus, and upon this Petra, namely from which you are called Petrus or Petrius (so to speak), I will build my Church.”
But from what has been said above it is already clear that Christ used in His own speech the word Petra or Cephas; and that nevertheless the Greek and Latin interpreters put the name Petrus in the masculine form rather than the name Petra — with which it signifies exactly the same thing — for the reason explained in the same place. Hence St. Augustine seems to have been deceived by the name Petrus, thinking it to be a concrete or denominative form derived from Petra. Therefore this Scripture has always been understood by the other Fathers in our sense. It should be added that St. Augustine does not disapprove of the sentence of the other Fathers, nor does he think it blasphemous — as Calvin does — to say that the Church is built upon Peter. For he writes in the cited place: “I said in a certain place about the Apostle Peter, that the Church was founded upon him as upon a rock — a sense which is also sung by the mouths of many,” etc.; and shortly after: “But I know that I have very frequently since expounded it in such a way that ‘upon this rock’ should be understood as referring to Him whom Peter confessed. For it was not said to him: You are Petra, but You are Petrus: but the rock was Christ.” He then adds: “Let the reader choose which of these two opinions of mine seems more probable.” From which it is clear that St. Augustine agrees with us on the matter itself, even though he is uncertain about, or inclines toward another interpretation of, the Scripture text — for otherwise he would not have left the reader free to choose, had he thought that one side contained doctrine contrary to the truth of the faith.
As to what Calvin cites from the Apostle to the Corinthians, it must be said that no Christian doubts that Christ is the foundation of the Church — and indeed the first and principal foundation, and in its own order altogether singular by reason of many titles.
For He Himself is the foundation of the Church because faith and religion revolve around Him as its principal object, insofar as He is God and the second person of the Trinity; and insofar as He is the Son of Man, that is, as having assumed human nature He freed us from sin and restored us to the freedom of the children of God. Hence all who wish to have a Father in the building of the Church must above all believe and confess that Christ is the Son of God, who was sent into the world — not to judge the world, but that the world might be saved through Him, as Sacred Scripture proclaims everywhere.
Furthermore, He is Himself the foundation of the Church because by His own proper and lordly authority He is Teacher of the Church, Legislator, and Ruler. Hence in Hebrews 3 it is said of Him: “For this man was counted worthy of more glory than Moses, inasmuch as he who has built the house has more honor than the house. And Moses indeed was faithful in all his house as a servant, in testimony of those things which were to be said: but Christ as a son in his own house; which house are we,” etc.
Thirdly, He is the foundation because as author and principal cause He flows into the Church and its members all supernatural life and motion. Finally, He is the end and the supreme good of the Church, by participation in and association with which it hopes to be made blessed in eternity. In all these ways, therefore, Christ is the foundation of the Church — and indeed a wholly singular foundation — so that no one can lay another foundation of that order besides what has been laid and proclaimed by the Apostles and by Paul, which is Christ Jesus: for whoever wishes to lay another of that order, or to deny this one, immediately subverts and overthrows the whole Church and its religion — as the Mohammedans, Jews, and Gentiles do.
But just as in a material building one can identify a double foundation — one first and placed and founding the others by itself, and not resting upon any other, such as, for example, a firm ground or rock upon which a building is erected; and another secondary foundation, founded in the first, like stones superimposed upon a solid ground — so also in the spiritual building of the Church a double foundation can be identified: one first, not founded upon another but founding the others; and another secondary, founded upon the first. The first foundation of the Church, therefore, according to what has been explained, is Christ, and indeed He alone; but the secondary is Peter, constituted by Christ and placed in the ecclesiastical building — who accordingly also in the Church, not as an heir and lord in his own house, but as a servant in the house of God, presides over and governs the Church of Christ: which all can see can be done without injury to Christ.
Against the argument drawn from this passage there is a second objection from certain other Fathers, by whom it seems to be signified that the Church is built not upon Peter, but upon faith or the confession of faith — as from Hilary, Book 6 On the Trinity, where he writes thus: “Upon this rock of confession the building of the Church is erected.” And likewise: “This faith is the foundation of the Church; by this faith the gates of hell are powerless against it; this faith has the keys of the heavenly kingdom.” From St. Ambrose, Book 6 on Luke, ch. 9: “The foundation of the Church is faith.” From Chrysostom, Homily 55 on Matthew: “Upon this rock I will build my Church, that is,” he says, “faith and confession.” And finally from Cyril, Book 4 On the Trinity: “By the rock, I think, he called nothing other than the unshaken and most firm faith of the disciple.” And in this manner the Lutherans commonly expound the cited words of Christ, so as to understand the Church to be built upon faith — which seems to be proved by the texts cited.
But in reply it must be said that faith or the confession of faith can be considered in two ways: one way, absolutely in itself and without relation to Peter; and in this way the heretics wish the Church to be said to be built upon faith — but most incongruously. First, because if it were so, there would have been no reason, when Christ said “I will build,” not to say rather “I have built” or “I am building” — for already many had believed in Christ, both as coming and afterwards as having come, such as the Patriarchs, the Blessed Virgin, Simeon, and others. Then, there would be no connection in the sentence: for Christ says “Because you are Peter, and upon this,” etc. — where that pronoun “this” necessarily points to something which had just immediately preceded. Thirdly, although faith taken absolutely may rightly be called the foundation of justice, it cannot be called the foundation of the Church — for a foundation and the parts of a building are things of the same kind; but the Church is an assembly of men, like living stones as it were, as is said in 1 Peter ch. 2; therefore the foundation of this building ought also to be a living stone from among men, not some quality.
In another way, therefore, faith or the confession of faith can be considered — namely, in relation to the person of Peter — and in this way it can indeed be said that the Church is to be built upon the confession or faith not of just any man, but of Peter: and not even as a private man, but as Pastor of the Church. For this, as regards the matter itself, coincides with what we have been saying — namely, that the Church is signified as to be built upon Peter, who by his teaching is to sustain the edifice of the Church in sound faith, according to those words of Christ in Luke 22: “But I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail; and you, when you have turned, confirm your brethren.” For the customary manner of speaking permits an action or property to be attributed now to the subject, now to the virtue or quality by means of which or by reason of which the subject causes or receives the property. And in this sense the holy Fathers spoke. Cyril in particular expressly refers this to the unshaken and most firm faith of the disciple — not to the faith of all believers — which Hilary in the cited place also sufficiently declares: for he adds that Peter, by his eminent blessed confession of faith, merited his position, so as to be set as the foundation and head of the Church. And a little below: “Hence,” he says, “he has the keys of the kingdom of heaven; hence his earthly judgments are heavenly,” etc. Which is also sufficiently clear from the rest of the Fathers, since in other places they say indifferently that the Church is built upon Peter, and that Peter is the foundation of the Church, or that his faith is the rock.
But a certain sectarian objects in reply: If the Church had been founded upon Peter, or his faith and confession, it would have to be said to have immediately collapsed: for in that very chapter Christ says to Peter: “Get behind me, Satan; you are a scandal to me, because you do not savor the things that are of God,” etc. And then during the Passion he denied Christ three times; therefore this cannot be said.
In reply, first, with St. Jerome on the cited chapter of Matthew: When Peter heard “Get behind me, Satan,” and when he denied Christ, he had not yet in fact been constituted as the foundation; because in this passage the Lord only made a promise, which He fulfilled after the Resurrection.
Furthermore, when He said to Peter “Get behind me, Satan,” Peter was not then erring in faith, but laboring under a certain ignorance and not sufficiently understanding the mystery and necessity of Christ’s Passion — and this all the less because he had such a high opinion of Christ and had just made such a great confession of Him; hence he was apprehending those things which Christ described as about to come upon Him as too unworthy of Christ.
Similarly, when he denied Christ during the Passion, he fell not from faith but from charity, as will be said more fully below.
Such are the arguments of one class, by which the heretics strive to weaken the Primacy of Peter, so that it cannot be established from the words spoken by Christ. They then add others of another class — namely, that even if it were true that “this rock” there designates Peter, and that the Church is said to be built upon him, it would still not follow that Peter is therefore the Ruler and head of the whole Church. For in other passages all the Apostles are called the foundations of the Church: Psalm 86: “His foundations are in the holy mountains,” that is, in the Apostles and Prophets, as Augustine expounds there. And in Apocalypse 21: “And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the twelve names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb.” Therefore, from the fact that Peter is called the foundation of the Church, it cannot be efficaciously concluded that he is more the head of the Church than the other Apostles.
In reply: from that promise made so singularly to Peter — while the other Apostles were also present — it is rightly concluded that he was to be in a special manner the foundation of Christ’s Church, and that the Church was to be built upon him in a special way; and consequently, although elsewhere the other Apostles are also called foundations of the Church, they are not so in every way and manner in which Peter is, but in their own manners which do not impair the prerogative, primacy, and general authority of Peter.
They are therefore called foundations: first, because all the Apostles everywhere founded churches; for it was not Peter alone who by himself converted the whole world to the faith, but different ones undertook different regions and brought them to the faith of Christ. Hence St. Paul says in Romans 15: “Thus I have preached this Gospel not where Christ was already named, lest I should build upon another’s foundation” — that is, upon a foundation already laid by others, or Christ already announced — “and in 1 Corinthians 3: As a wise architect I laid the foundation, but another builds thereon.” In this way all the Apostles are foundations because they were all the first to found churches.
Secondly, the Apostles and Prophets are called foundations by reason of the doctrine of faith divinely revealed to them: for the Church is built upon the revelations received by the Apostles and Prophets. For, as we said above, after the times of the Apostles the Church does not grow in new articles of faith newly revealed, but persists in the doctrine which the Prophets and Apostles learned from God and transmitted to posterity either by word of mouth or in writing. Thirdly, the Apostles are called foundations by reason of governance: for all of them had a certain universal power to preach everywhere, to found churches, and to govern and administer them — but not in the same manner as St. Peter. For they had this universal power only as Apostles and Legates; but Peter had it as universal ordinary Pastor. Whence, although the others had that most ample power extending to all parts of the world, they were nevertheless also subject to the care and power of Peter himself, so that they depended upon him in the use and exercise of that power, and not conversely he upon them — as will be shown more fully below. And this is what is specially promised to him when Christ says: “And upon this rock I will build my Church.” Hence Chrysostom, Homily 55 on Matthew, writes on these words: “He appointed him the Pastor of the Church.” And a little below: “Christ placed Jeremiah as father over one nation; but Peter over the whole world.” And St. Gregory, Book 4, Letter 32: “It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the voice of the Lord the care of the whole Church was committed to the holy Peter, Prince of all the Apostles; for it is said to him: You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,” etc. And St. Jerome, Against Jovinian: “Although,” he says, “the solidity of the Church is equally built upon all the Apostles” — that is, in the ways already explained above — “yet for this reason one among the twelve is chosen, so that, a head being appointed, the occasion of schism might be removed.”
We therefore admit that all the Apostles are rightly called foundations of the Church in their own ways; but we add that a special manner of being a foundation belongs to Peter, and that this was to be prefigured by those words of Christ. Whence it follows that he is the universal Ruler and Head of the Church constituted by Christ, as we have already explained.
Similarly, against the other proof of the same truth taken from the metaphor of the keys which Christ there promises to give to Peter, the heretics cavil no less, in order to evade the force of this argument. And first of all, although the words are so clear that hardly any other thought could arise than that the keys are promised to Peter, and that it is said to him: “And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of Heaven” — nevertheless, they wish that nothing special is here promised to Simon Peter; but that whatever is here said is said and pertains to the whole body of the Church.
But before we come to their motives, or rather their tricks, the truth must first be declared and established. And indeed all the circumstances of Christ’s words most evidently signify that this promise is directed particularly to Peter and is made to his person: for Christ brings together so many and so great circumstances to designate the person of Peter, that not even notaries in public instruments are accustomed to describe any certain man more fully, as Cajetan noted. For He expressed the substance of the person when He said “To you I will give”; and He prefixed the proper name given from birth, Simon; and He added the father’s name, Bar-Jona, that is, son of Jonah; and the name freshly imposed by Christ, Cephas, or Peter — so that that person could not be more accurately designated. But to what purpose so accurate a description of this person, if nothing is said and promised to him in particular?
Furthermore, the reason and connection of the text require that the keys be said to be promised to him who had just said: “You are Christ the Son of the living God,” and to whom Christ had said: “Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven.” And again: “And I say to you that you are Peter,” etc.
To this is added the consent of the ancient Fathers. For Hilary, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Theophylact, on the said chapter of Matthew, expressly teach that it was said a little later to the same person: “Get behind me, Satan,” to whom it had previously been said: “To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven” — and that the latter was said to Peter in his own person the heretics themselves acknowledge; therefore they must also confess that the former was said to him in the same way. St. Augustine teaches the same in Book 2 Against the Two Letters of Gaudentius, ch. 23; and Ambrose in his book On Isaac, ch. 3, expounding those words of Christ in John ch. 13, “You cannot follow me now,” says: “He had promised him the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and indicated that he was not yet equal for following.” Finally, if He had not intended to promise something particular to Peter in particular, He would without doubt have changed the mode of speech and said in the plural: “And I will give you all the keys of the kingdom of heaven.”
But objection is made against this: Peter responded in the name of all the Apostles and said: “You are Christ the Son of the living God”; therefore also in the name of all, or of the College of Apostles, he heard and received this promise of reward: “To you I will give the keys,” etc. And consequently nothing particular is here promised to Peter above the others, and much less any power over or above the others. The antecedent is proved first: because all the Apostles were asked by Christ, “But who do you say that I am?” — therefore it must be admitted that Peter answered in the name of all, or the others would have to be charged with rusticity and stupidity for having neglected to answer the Lord. It is proved secondly: because St. Chrysostom, Homily 55, signifies the same, where he calls Peter the mouth of the rest. Similarly St. Augustine, Sermon 13 On the Words of the Lord, says that one answered for all. The consequence is proved first: because where there is a common honorable confession, and therefore a common merit — even if it is brought forth by the mouth of one — there a common and equal reward following upon it does not seem to be denied, even if the promise seems to be directed to one who spoke in the name of all. It is proved secondly: because several ancient Fathers seem to have so understood it. St. Cyprian, On the Unity of the Church: “Certainly the other Apostles were what Peter also was, endowed with an equal share of honor and power.” St. Hilary, Book 6 On the Trinity: “You, O holy and blessed men, by merit of your faith have obtained the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the right of binding and loosing in heaven and on earth,” etc. Augustine, Tractate 50 on John: “If in Peter there were not the sacrament of the Church, the Lord would not have said to him: To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatsoever you shall loose,” etc. “If this,” he says, “was said to Peter alone, then the Church does not do this — namely, loose and bind.” And below: “If therefore this is done in the Church, then Peter, when he received the keys, signified the holy Church.” He makes similar remarks in various other places, as in the last Tractate on John, in his commentary on Psalm 108, in Sermon 13 on Psalm 118, and in Book 1 On Christian Doctrine, ch. 18. Finally, St. Leo, Sermon 4 on the Anniversary of his Assumption, expounding the words “And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc., says: “The force of this power passed to the other Apostles, and the institution of this decree flowed to all the Princes of the Church.” It is proved thirdly: because what is here promised to Peter is in Matthew 18 given in common to all, when Christ said to all: “Amen I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.”
In reply: the antecedent can be understood first in this sense — that Peter answered in the name of all, as one who had received instruction and commission from them to answer in that way and to make such a confession in the common name. Secondly, that he answered in the name of all because what he first learned and confessed by divine revelation, the others, adhering to his confession by their silence, approved. Taking therefore the antecedent in the former sense, the consequence would have an appearance; but in that sense the antecedent is false and to be denied. For that Peter did not answer from human consultation or commission is sufficiently declared by those words of Christ the Lord: “For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven.” In the latter sense, however, the antecedent is admitted — and this suffices to prevent the other Apostles from being charged with rusticity or stupidity on account of their neglect to respond.
And in this sense alone the Fathers say that Peter spoke or answered for all — which is sufficiently clear from Chrysostom in the same passage, where he says: “When Christ asked about the opinion of the people, all answered; but when He asked about their own opinion, Peter immediately sprang forward and, anticipating the others, said: You are Christ, the Son of the living God.” And Hilary, Book 6 On the Trinity, writes about this matter thus: “He who, amid the silence of all the Apostles, understanding by the Father’s revelation that Jesus was the Son of God beyond what the measure of human weakness allows, merited by his superlative blessed confession of faith the glory” — and on this passage of Matthew he speaks of Peter thus: “Judged worthy to be the first to know what was of God in Christ.” Cyril, Book 12 on John, ch. 64: “As Prince and head of the rest,” he says, “he is the first to exclaim: You are Christ the Son of the living God.” And Augustine, Sermon 14: “This is Peter, who by divine revelation first of all merited to confess the truth, saying: You are Christ,” etc. Leo, Sermon 2 On the holy Apostles Peter and Paul: “The common word of the answerers endures as long as the ambiguity of human understanding is being resolved; but where what the mind of the disciples holds is required, he who is first in Apostolic dignity is first in confessing the Lord.”
The antecedent being admitted in this sense, therefore, the consequence is denied. And the reply to its first proof is sufficiently clear from what has been said: for although that confession was in some way and sense common to all, as we have explained, yet it was very differently the confession of Peter and of the other Apostles. For Peter’s was that of one speaking his judgment first, not out of consultation or commission of the others, but as the more principal and outstanding among them, instructed and illumined by more gifts and greater divine light — so that, although he had not yet received the primacy among the Apostles at that time, he was being prepared for them by divine gifts. Hence he was also looked upon by the others and held among them in his own way as the more principal; but the confession of the others was that of subscribers to Peter’s judgment, since they did not know what in particular they ought to have answered — but being instructed by Peter’s confession, they recognized and approved the faith. Therefore it is sufficiently clear that the merit was not altogether equal, nor was there an equal reason for rewarding all equally with the same reward; and consequently neither should the promise of reward following, directed to one, be extended equally to all.
Just as, if some king were to propose a case to a College of Doctors assembled together, and one of them, more principal and outstanding in learning and quickness of intellect, were to respond on the spot with the full satisfaction of the one questioning — which resolution the other colleagues should applaud, though perhaps it had not occurred to them at first — and the Prince, upon hearing the response, should say to him who had answered: “I will make you Chancellor of the kingdom,” no one would think that promise equally concerned all the Doctors of that College, even if he who first gave his judgment could be said in some way to have answered in the name of all.
As regards the authority of the ancients, first the reply to St. Cyprian is easy: for we admit indeed that all the Apostles had a certain equal share of Apostolic power and honor — namely, in relation to preaching the Gospel to every creature and to instituting, erecting, and governing churches throughout the whole world, just as we said above that all the Apostles were foundations and founders of the Church. But we say that consistently with this they were not equal in relation to one another; for the honor and universal power which the others had as Apostles and Legates only, Peter had as ordinary universal Pastor of the Church — and by that title the other Apostles themselves, who otherwise had power over the whole world, were also subject to the care of Peter.
This Cyprian openly signifies in the same place: for he immediately adds: “But the beginning proceeds from unity; and primacy is given to Peter, so that one Church of Christ and one chair may be shown.” And a little before, after reciting Christ’s words from Matthew 16 and from John 21, he adds: “Upon him alone He builds His Church” — namely, upon Peter — “and commands His sheep to be fed by him; and although after His Resurrection He assigns equal power to all the Apostles and says: ‘As the Father has sent me, I also send you: receive the Holy Spirit,’” etc., nevertheless, he says, in order to show unity, He established one Chair, and by His authority disposed the origin of that same unity beginning from one — because namely He constituted one Peter as universal ordinary Pastor, upon whom all pastors should depend, and gave him one universal Chair to which all should be subject. This St. Leo, in Letter 84, where he seems to look back to Cyprian’s words, rightly explains, writing thus: “Among the most blessed Apostles there was in the likeness of honor a certain distinction of power; and although their election was equal in all, yet it was given to one to be preeminent over the others.” The words of Jerome likewise signify the same thing, quoted above from Book 1 Against Jovinian, about the middle.
Similarly we say to Hilary: it is true that all the Apostles received the keys and the right of binding and loosing; but we add that they did not receive them in the same manner as Peter, as has been said and explained. Hence Hilary in the same place writes that Peter, amid the silence of all the Apostles, merited by his blessed confession of faith a surpassing glory. And on Matthew 16 he says singularly of Peter: “Blessed is the janitor of heaven, to whose judgment the keys of eternal access are given.”
For the explanation and understanding of the various passages of St. Augustine pertaining to this point, it should be observed first that Augustine posits two modes of loosing and binding in the Church. For besides the one by which priests are said to remit or retain in the administration of the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance — which is the mode properly so called, and which Augustine commonly acknowledges along with the other Fathers — he is also accustomed to speak in such a way as to say that the Charity of the Church remits the sins of its members, as in Tractate 134 on John; also that remission of sins is given through the prayers of the Saints and through the moaning of the Dove, that is, the Church, as in Book 3 On Baptism, ch. 17 and 18; also Book 5, ch. 21; Book 6, ch. 3; and elsewhere. Augustine seems to have used this manner of speaking on account of the Donatists, to whom it seemed strange and extraordinary that heretics could justify men through Baptism and introduce them into the Church, seeing that they themselves are covered with sins and outside the Church. To remove this wonder, therefore, Augustine says that it is not so much the one who baptizes as the moaning of the Dove that remits sins — because the ministry of the baptizer is accepted not so much on account of the baptizer himself as on account of the Church, whose minister he is, and whose charity is extended to the one being baptized: both insofar as through the prayers of the Saints as the moaning of the Dove, faith and penitence are obtained for him; and also insofar as in Baptism the same form of charity is infused into him and he becomes a living member of the Church. But this remission, insofar as it is thus effected through the moaning of the Church and the prayers of the Saints, is not exercised by authority — as it is given through the Sacrament of Penance — but rather by way of supplication and communication of the goods which are in the Church.
It should be observed secondly: that St. Peter can be considered in two ways — one way, as a particular and private man; another way, as a public person instituted and ordained for the common utility of the Church, namely as Pastor and head of the Church.
With these premises stated, the reply is: when St. Augustine writes that “in Peter there was the sacrament of the Church,” that “Peter when he received the keys signified the holy Church,” or that “Peter in signification bore the person of the Church” — by these things he does not deny that what he says Peter received in this way truly belongs to Peter in his own person. For in his Commentary on Psalm 118, Sermon 13, he also writes that Peter signified the person of the Church according to certain of its members when in the Passion of the Lord, disturbed by fear, he temporarily denied the Lord — and yet no one can doubt that Peter himself truly denied the Lord in that way. Therefore by these kinds of speeches and formulas of expression, Augustine intends to teach nothing other than this: that Peter did not receive the keys as a private man for his own particular use or honor alone, with the keys destined to perish with him; nor were the keys given to him as such and to that effect and end by Christ. Rather he received them under the character of a public person, under which he signified and sustained the person of the Church — keys which accordingly were not to die with Peter, but were to remain in the Church always for its building up and utility. He received them, I say, not as if by a procuratorial name, as if he had received them for the Church only and not for himself, as the heretics wish to contend; but he received them as universal Pastor and true head of the Church, yet in such a way that he received them not for his person alone, but also for all his successors, and at the same time for the other Prelates and Bishops of the Church, to whom he and his successors are to communicate them according to the grade and order of each.
In this way, therefore, Peter in signification received the keys of the kingdom of heaven — and this has the illustrious meaning which Augustine requires in his commentary on Psalm 18, and says is not found if the things said by Christ are thought to pertain only to Peter in such a way as to serve his use and utility alone and to cease with him. He therefore received them in the person of the Church, just as some king would receive in the name of the kingdom and community what was added to the Crown for the use and convenience of the subjects. That this was the mind of Augustine is manifestly gathered from the fact that nearly everywhere he says Peter bore the person of the Church, he explains himself as saying this by reason of the Primacy of Peter: as in his last Tractate on John: “The Apostle Peter, whose person the Church bore in a figurative universality on account of the primacy of his Apostolate.” And in his commentary on Psalm 108: “Whose person — that is, of the Church — he is acknowledged to have borne by reason of the primacy which he held among the disciples.” And in Sermon 23 On the Words of the Lord: “Peter, surnamed from the Rock, carrying the blessed figure of the Church, holding the principality of the Apostolate,” etc.
Then the same Augustine expresses this more clearly in his last Tractate on John toward the end, where he writes thus: “Therefore, on behalf of all the Saints inseparably belonging to the Body of Christ — for the sake of this most stormy governance of life for the binding and loosing of sins — Peter, the first of the Apostles, received the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and John the Evangelist, on behalf of those same Saints for the sake of the most secret and most tranquil harbor of that other life, reclined upon the breast of Christ. For neither does he alone bind and loose sins, nor did the other alone drink from the fountain of the Lord’s breast the Word God in the beginning with God, and the other things about the divinity of Christ; but the Lord Himself spread abroad His same Gospel to all His own, to be drunk by each according to their capacity, throughout the whole world.” Here Augustine wishes that Peter received the keys of the kingdom of heaven in the name of all, or on behalf of all — just as St. John drank on behalf of all from the fountain of the Lord’s breast the mysteries of the Incarnation and divinity of Christ. And yet it is certain that John in his own person reclined upon the breast of Christ and drew from that fountain the knowledge of those mysteries — though not for himself alone nor for his own advancement only, but in order to communicate that same knowledge to others and to serve the salvation of all the faithful. Therefore Augustine likewise wishes only that Peter received the keys on behalf of all or in the name of the Church — not that Peter himself in his own person did not possess them principally and in the supreme degree, just as John principally and in the supreme degree drew those mysteries from the fountain of the Lord’s breast; but because he received them not for himself alone, but also in order to communicate them to the other Prelates of the Church according to their grade and order, and for the common utility and salvation.
To this I add, for a fuller understanding: just as we said Augustine posits two modes of binding and loosing in the Church, so also does he hold that Peter bore the figure of the Church by reason of his Primacy in two ways, according to the same Augustine. For first Peter, as supreme Pastor of the Church, receiving the keys signified that the Church in its Prelates was to have the keys, as we have explained: and in this sense Peter was the figure of all the ministers of the whole Church — in which sense Augustine speaks in Tractate 50 on John. In another way, the same Peter receiving the keys was the figure of the whole holy Church or of the just who are in the Church: for in that he himself, being just and holy, by communicating charity to others through prayers, supplications, instructions, fasts, and other works of piety, was loosing his neighbors from their sins — which mode of loosing, however, we said above was less properly so called — he prefigured that similarly there would always be in the Church a communion of Saints and of those who fear the Lord, and that the Church through charity in coming to the aid of sinners would obtain for them pardon and remission. And to this mode Augustine seems most to look back in Book 3 On Baptism, ch. 17, and in his commentary on Psalm 108.
Finally, as regards St. Leo: we say likewise that the force of the power of the keys passed to the other Apostles, and the institution of this decree flowed to all the Princes of the Church — but not in the same mode and degree as to Peter, as has now been explained very many times. The same Leo sufficiently acknowledges this in the same place, for he had previously set down: “From the whole world one Peter is chosen, who is to be set before the calling of all nations, and before all the Apostles, and before all the Fathers of the Church.” Similarly: “If He wished anything to be in common between the other Princes and him, He never gave except through him whatever He did not deny to the others.” From which some conclude that the Apostles themselves received their entire power of jurisdiction immediately from Peter — though the more common opinion holds that they received it through an extraordinary manner immediately from Christ, inasmuch as they had been and were corporally present together when He was instituting the kingdom of the Church and committing it to His servants.
To the third proof of the Consequence it is replied: it is denied that in Matthew 18 what is promised to Peter in Matthew 16 is in fact conferred. Rather, a promise is made there also of the granting to the Apostles and to the Church in its Prelates of the power of binding and loosing — but not with that first superiority which had been promised to Peter, to whom it was particularly said by Christ: “To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” For although all were to receive the power of binding and loosing, they did not receive it in the same mode and authority as Peter, to whom as ordinary head the keys of the kingdom of heaven are specially promised; but to the other Apostles as extraordinary ones and Legates; and to the other Prelates as subordinates to Peter the universal Pastor of the whole Church. The heretics therefore try in another way to weaken the argument drawn from the metaphor of the keys promised to Peter, to demonstrate his Primacy; and they contend that it does not follow: “The keys of the kingdom of heaven were promised and given to Peter by Christ; therefore he is constituted universal Prefect of the whole Church.” For, they say, by the keys nothing other is implied than the ability to bind and loose: for the Lord Himself seems to explain it when He adds: “And whatsoever you shall bind,” etc. But what it is to loose and to bind is explained in John 20, where the Apostles are given the power of remitting and retaining sins. How sins are remitted and retained, Scripture teaches throughout, they say — since it attests that men are enlightened and freed from the corruption of vices through the preaching of the Gospel.
So, roughly, Calvin in Book 4 of the Institutes, ch. 6 and 11; and in confirmation of his words he adduces that of Paul in 2 Corinthians 5: “And he has placed in us the word of reconciliation: we therefore perform the office of legates for Christ, as if God were exhorting through us; we beseech you for Christ, be reconciled to God.” Hence according to them, the one who brings men to faith through the preaching of the Gospel is said to remit sins; but the one who declares those whom he sees to be obstinate as destined to everlasting punishment is said to retain them. And consequently, to receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven is not to receive any power of governance, but to receive the bare ministry of the Word.
And they confirm this by the following reason: if by the aforesaid words the Primacy had been given or promised to Peter, the Apostles would not afterwards have disputed or doubted which of them seemed to be the greater, as they disputed in Mark 9, Luke 9, and Luke 21. Or at least the Lord, to resolve their difficulty, would have said to them: “Do not contend among yourselves about this matter; for I have promised it to Peter, and I will constitute him Prince and ruler over you, and he will be the greater among you.” But Christ said nothing of the sort; therefore, etc.
But against these fictions of the heretics all Catholics, together with the ancient Fathers, maintain that by the keys of the kingdom of heaven promised to Peter is signified that supreme power over the whole Church was to be given him, and that he was to be constituted universal Pastor of the Church. This is proved first, because from other passages it is clear that in Sacred Scripture it was customary, by the name of keys used metaphorically, to designate not a bare ministry of the word, but authority and principate. In Isaiah ch. 22, the deposition of one Pontiff or Prefect of the temple and the institution of another is described in these words: “I will call my servant Eliakim son of Hilkiah, I will clothe him with your robe, and I will strengthen him with your belt, and I will give your power into his hand.” And immediately there follows: “And I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder; and he shall open, and there shall be none to shut; and he shall shut, and there shall be none to open.” Here by the donation and placing of the keys upon his shoulder it is manifestly signified that supreme power and principate over the house of David is to be given to him. Hence also it is predicted of Christ: “And the government is upon his shoulder” — because the Cross upon which He triumphed was placed upon His shoulders, just as keys signifying principate were accustomed to be placed upon the shoulders, as gathered from the cited words of Isaiah, perhaps to signify that the principate carries with it a heavy burden. Apocalypse ch. 3: “These things says the Holy and True, who has the key of David, who opens and no man shuts,” etc. — here again by the key of David the dominion of Christ is signified, just as the Angel had foretold of the same in Luke ch. 1: “And the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of David his father, and he shall reign in the house of Jacob forever.” The same is secondly sufficiently proved by the common and ancient practice by which keys are offered to a prince or victor as a sign by which his dominion is acknowledged, or by which dominion and governing power are as it were conferred upon him.
Thus also the holy Fathers understood the words of Christ: for Chrysostom, Homily 55 on Matthew, expounding this promise of Christ, says that the whole world was committed to Peter and that he was made Pastor of the whole Church. St. Gregory, Book 4, Letter 42: “It is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the voice of the Lord the care of the whole Church was committed to the holy Peter, Prince of all the Apostles; for it is said to him: To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc. St. Leo, Sermon on the Anniversary of his own Assumption: “Blessed Peter, persevering in the firmness of the rock received, has not abandoned the helm of the Church committed to him.”
Hence, to what is urged in the contrary by the heretics, it is replied that the promise and subsequent donation of the keys made to Peter does indeed imply that he can bind and loose — but not just in any way, rather in the manner of an ordinary Rector who is the head of the household or the Church of Christ. Whence, although Christ gave also to the other Apostles the ability to bind and loose, He nevertheless neither promised nor said to them: “To you all I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven” — because not every one who in some extraordinary manner has some power over a community or household is simply and absolutely said to have the keys of the Province or house; but rather he who has the power of administration as a Prince or ordinary Vicar.
Furthermore, it is not true that what it is to bind and loose is expounded in John 20, when Christ said: “Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained” — and that what is there given to Peter together with the others is what is specially promised to him in Matthew 16 by these words: “And to you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc. For although the power of binding and loosing also comprehends the power of remitting and retaining sins, yet the former is more universal and extends to more things; for the power of binding is not only the ability to retain sins, but generally is the power of commanding, forbidding, instituting penalties, adjudicating and punishing: for by commanding, forbidding, instituting penalties, and condemning transgressors to them, men are bound and obligated to do what is commanded, to avoid what is forbidden, and to undergo or expiate the penalties inflicted by law or sentence. The same is more manifestly gathered from Matthew 18, where Christ, teaching how rebels are to be punished by the Church — namely, that they are to be separated from the communion of the faithful and held as Gentiles and Publicans — added: “Amen I say to you: whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven” — by which words also, even by Calvin’s confession, the power of excommunication is conferred. So also in Matthew 23 the Lord says: “They bind heavy and insupportable burdens upon the shoulders of men” — where to bind is nothing other than to impose burdensome precepts. Therefore to bind or to bind fast is not only to be able to retain sins, but also to be able to impose precepts and to obligate. Similarly, to loose is more general than to remit sins: for one is also said to loose who frees from precepts, from vows, from oaths, from penalties due. Wherefore, by what the Lord added — “Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth,” etc. — the use of the power of the keys promised to Peter as future universal Pastor through those words “To you I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven” is indeed explained; but the use signified there is not confined to the sole remission or retention of sins.
Furthermore, it is again false that to remit sins is nothing other than to preach faith and the Gospel, as Calvin seems to wish: for preachers can indeed not incongruously be said, by preaching, to enlighten and rouse from the sleep of sin — insofar as from hearing men conceive faith, fear, and the spirit of penitence. But they are not said, by preaching alone, to remit sins. Hence in Acts ch. 2, Peter, after the sermon by which he had moved many to faith and compunction, added: “Repent, and let every one of you be baptized for the remission of your sins.” Therefore the power of remitting sins is the power of administering the Sacraments — principally that of Penance, and also of Baptism, as Cyril and Chrysostom teach on the passage of John 20, and St. Jerome in his letter to Hedibia, ch. 9. But St. Paul in 1 Corinthians distinguishes those two things — to evangelize and to baptize — saying that he was sent not to baptize but to evangelize.
From what has been said it will be easy to reply to what Calvin adduces from Paul. For it is to be said that it is indeed true that the preaching of the Gospel is there called the word of reconciliation — not because preaching alone reconciled us, but because it proposes the reconciliation made through Christ, and disposes and leads us to the communion or participation of that reconciliation, in the manner already explained above.
Finally, to the confirmation which he adds, it must be said: the Apostles did not fully understand the promise made to Peter — just as they also did not sufficiently grasp many other things before the Resurrection of Christ, as is clear from the same passages. In the meantime, however, they had suspected — both from those words of Christ and from other indications — that Peter was to be constituted first and head of all; and therefore the contention arose among them as to which of them was to be the greater — as Origen, Chrysostom, and Jerome teach on Matthew 18, where this contention is also mentioned. Nor does it matter that Christ did not immediately in clear and express words tell them that it had been thus ordained that Peter was to be the greater — for on account of the weakness still laboring in the Apostles at that time, it was not fitting that this should be explained to them so openly. But in its own time, as with many other mysteries pertaining to the Church, they were to understand this. Yet Christ did not omit to indicate to them even then that someone among them was to be greater, when in Luke ch. 22 He said: “But you shall not be so; but he who is greater among you, let him become as the lesser, and he who is the leader, as one who serves.” And a little after: “But I am in the midst of you as one who serves” — by which words He signifies that there will indeed be someone greater among them, but He curbs ambition and teaches that the principate is not to be sought for the sake of honor or personal advantage; but that whoever obtains it ought to administer it with all modesty and humility for the benefit of others.
The other principal Scripture passage from which the Primacy of Peter is established is found in John 21, where Christ, after having asked three times — “Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?” — said to him first: “Feed my lambs”; second, likewise, as our version has it, or as St. Ambrose has it in the last chapter of Luke: “Feed my little sheep”; and third: “Feed my sheep.” By these repeated words He commits to the care of Peter the lambs — that is, the common faithful who have no pastoral care and are only children of the Church; the little sheep — that is, the lesser priests and parish priests, who are indeed begotten but are still to be nurtured and are under the care of Bishops; and finally the sheep — that is, the greater priests and Bishops, who are set over the lambs and little sheep, and beget sons for the Church, and yet are also submitted to Peter. This understanding of the passage is indicated by St. Leo, Sermon 3 on the Anniversary of his Assumption, where he writes that Peter was set by Christ over all nations, all Fathers, and all the Apostles. Ambrose in the cited place understands by the distinct discourse about lambs, little sheep, and sheep, that Peter is committed with those who are beginning, those who are progressing, and those who are perfect — and thus all the faithful.
And indeed that the general care and governance of the flock of Christ and the Church is here committed to Peter, the holy Fathers teach throughout. Epiphanius, in the Ancoratus: “This is he who heard: Feed my sheep; to whom the flock was entrusted,” etc. Chrysostom, on this passage: “Passing over the others,” he says, “He addresses Peter alone: He commits to him the care of the brethren.” And below: “For when the Lord had communicated great things to Peter, He had entrusted to him the care of the whole world,” etc. Ambrose, on the last chapter of Luke: “He who was about to ascend into heaven left him as the Vicar of His love, so that we might have Peter who would cherish us with a fatherly and pastoral love, as Christ Himself had done.” And there: “Because he alone of all professes it, he is set before all.” St. Gregory signifies the same in the words recited above. Theophylact, on the last chapter of John: “When the meal was ended,” he says, “He was entrusting to Peter the prefecture of the sheep of the whole world: and not to another, but to him did He hand it over.” St. Leo teaches the same in Sermon 3 cited above. Bernard, Book 2 On Consideration: “To whom,” he says, “I say not of Bishops but even of Apostles, were all the sheep so absolutely and without distinction committed? ‘If you love me, Peter, feed my sheep’ — whose sheep? Of this or that people, city, region, or certainly kingdom? ‘My sheep,’ he says” — by which Bernard manifestly attests that by the fact that Christ said absolutely and indefinitely “Feed my sheep,” all the sheep of Christ were simply committed to Peter.
But the heretics cavil against the argument taken from this passage also; and first of all they wish that “Feed my sheep” was not said to Peter alone. In confirmation of which may be adduced St. Augustine, in his book On the Christian Combat, ch. 30: “When it is said to him” — namely to Peter — “it is said to all: ‘Do you love me? Feed my sheep.’” Then Chrysostom, who in Book 2 On the Priesthood says that Basil — whom he was urging to accept the Episcopate offered to him — would then show his singular love for Christ if he fed His flock, since it is written: “If you love me, feed the sheep” — by which he seems to indicate that those words of Christ pertain not to Peter alone but to all Bishops.
But against this, all the circumstances of the text prove the opposite: for first of all, Christ addresses Peter by his proper name, saying “Simon, son of John” — by which same name He also called him in Matthew 16 when He was promising him the keys of the kingdom of heaven, which He here gives and hands over when He constitutes him Pastor of His flock. Then it is said to the same one “Feed the lambs, feed the sheep” — from whom Christ asks “Do you love me more than these?” — which without doubt cannot be understood as asked simultaneously of all: because when He says “more than these” He distinguishes Peter from others — not only from just any men, but also from the Apostles then present. Finally it is clear from the context of the discourse that “Feed my sheep” was said to the same one to whom it is immediately said: “Amen, amen I say to you, when you were younger you girded yourself and walked where you would; but when you are old you will stretch out your hands, and another shall gird you and lead you where you do not wish.” And yet this is said to Peter alone — for it is added: “And this He said, signifying by what death he was to glorify God.” For He did not foretell that kind of death to all, but to Peter. Similarly all the ancients cited above understood these words of Christ; and St. Chrysostom, Cyril, and Augustine on this passage say that “Feed my sheep” was said to him by Christ who had once denied Christ three times — and this was undoubtedly Peter alone.
To what is adduced from Augustine and Chrysostom, it is therefore replied: the words of Christ “Feed the lambs, feed the sheep” are per se and proximately directed to Peter, and are specially said to him, as we have shown. Nevertheless, in their own way they also belong to all Bishops: for all who are called into a share of solicitude by Peter ought to imitate the form of Peter in feeding the flock. Therefore what was said to him who is constituted the supreme Pastor is in its own way, with due proportion observed, also said to the other inferior pastors. And in the fact that the Lord thrice asked Peter whether he loved Him more than the others, He admonished those to whom it will belong to elect and constitute Pastors, that they should take for the episcopal office those who excel more in charity toward Christ and neighbor.
Secondly, the heretics cavil and contend that by the words “Feed my sheep” no power of superiority and governance is given, but only the office of directing, preaching, and teaching is enjoined upon Peter: for “to feed,” they say, is not to be set over, but to provide and minister food — which can also be done by an inferior. Hence, they say, the Lord does not command the faithful to obey Peter, but Peter is given the command to provide them with nourishment. But against this it must first be said: one is not properly said to feed others who ministers food in whatever manner, but who provides and procures food for others — which is the function of a prefect or head of a household. For although servants bring food to the table, it is not they but the father who is said to have the household to be fed and to feed it. This is also indicated in Luke 12: “Who, do you think, is the faithful and prudent steward whom the Lord will set over his household, to give them their measure of grain in due time?” Therefore, in the fact that the sheep are committed to Peter to be fed, he is at the same time constituted Prefect and Governor of the sheep. Furthermore, by the word “feed” in the common manner of speaking all pastoral acts are understood to be signified: for to feed the flock and to act as shepherd of the flock are the same thing. But a pastoral act is not only to provide nourishment, but also to lead, defend, rule, and even compel: for shepherds of sheep not only provide nourishment but also go before them, direct them, and with the shepherd’s staff compel those who stray to walk the right way.
Hence the word “to feed” is most commonly taken in Sacred Scripture for “to govern.” In Psalm 2, where we have “You shall rule them with a rod of iron,” the proper meaning of the Hebrew word sounds: “You shall feed them with a rod of iron.” And it is certain that those who are fed with a rod of iron are not only nourished but also governed by him who so feeds them. And in Psalm 77: “He took him from behind the ewes with young to feed Jacob his servant; and he fed them in the innocence of his heart,” etc. — where by “to feed” is manifestly understood “to govern.” Isaiah ch. 44: “Who says to Cyrus: You are my shepherd” — where not a ministry of feeding but the most ample sovereignty is foretold to Cyrus, as is clear from the beginning of the following chapter. The same is more clearly signified by the Greek word used by the Evangelist here, which properly means “to feed by presiding and governing.” And in this way the ancients also always understood this passage: Augustine on these words says: “He commits the sheep themselves to be fed, that is, to be taught and governed.” Chrysostom, in Book 6 On the Priesthood, frequently calls a “prefecture” the office committed to Peter here by the word “feed.” St. Gregory likewise speaks throughout in his Book On Pastoral Care.
From all this it is clear what must be said in reply to the opposing arguments. For first of all it must be denied that “to feed” is only to provide nourishment and not to be set over or to govern — for the contrary has already been sufficiently shown. To the other it must be said: in the word “Feed,” a command is indeed implied to perform the office of pastor; but by that command an ecclesiastical principate is simultaneously instituted and attributed to him to whom the command was given. This is not altogether unheard of even in human affairs — that by a word in the imperative mode a person is simultaneously placed over things and at the same time commanded to carry out the office of a good prefect, as when a king says to someone: “Go and govern such a province,” or “Go and lead my army in such a war.”
Thirdly, the heretics deny that when Christ said “Feed my sheep,” the whole Church is understood by “sheep.” But this has already been sufficiently demonstrated above from the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Furthermore, reason also supports this: for since Christ says indeterminately “Feed my sheep,” there is no reason why these rather than those should be said to be committed to Peter’s care by that discourse — therefore all are understood to be committed; for otherwise the commission would be of no effect. This is explained as follows: if someone dying were to say indefinitely “I commend my children to you,” without doubt all the children would be considered commended to him. For “sheep” and “children” are there considered to extend as widely as the pronoun “my”: but all the faithful are the sheep of Christ. Hence those indefinite locutions, according to common understanding, are equivalent to universals of this kind: “Feed all my sheep,” “I commend to you all my children.”
But against this, a first objection is made: St. Paul in ch. 2 of the Letter to the Galatians acknowledges no subjection to Peter — any more than to John or James. For he writes thus: “To whom we did not yield subjection even for an hour.” And below: “But of those who seemed to be something, they imparted nothing to me.” And again: “James and Cephas and John, who seemed to be pillars, gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship.” And a little before: “What they once were is nothing to me.”
In reply, the assumption is denied. To the words adduced in the first place in confirmation, it must be said that the pronoun “whom” does not refer to James, Cephas, and John, but to the pseudo-apostles: for immediately before it says: “But because of false brethren who were secretly brought in, who came in secretly to spy out our freedom which we have in Christ Jesus, so that they might bring us into slavery” — and then follows: “To whom we did not yield subjection even for an hour.”
As to what is alleged in the second place, it must be known that Paul’s purpose was not to declare that he was not subject to Peter or inferior to him as regards governance — nor indeed does he make any mention of that matter — but rather, in both chs. 1 and 2, his chief aim is to show that his own Gospel which he preached was equally true and divine as the Gospel which Peter or John preached, and that he had received it from Christ equally immediately as they received theirs — and this against rivals and false brethren who, in order to diminish Paul’s preaching, boasted that Paul was only a disciple of men, who had learned the Evangelical doctrine from men, and therefore his preaching and Gospel were not to be valued so highly, nor to be held as equally unquestionable, as the Gospel and doctrine of the great Apostles who were directly taught by Christ. Hence he begins his letter thus: “Paul, an Apostle, not from men nor through man, but through Jesus Christ.” And below: “I make known to you, brethren, the Gospel which was preached by me — that it is not according to man; for I neither received it from man, nor was I taught it, but through the revelation of Jesus Christ.” Therefore when Paul says “But of those who seemed to be something, they imparted nothing to me,” he signifies only that he received nothing of Evangelical doctrine from the other Apostles, but was instructed and taught in all things immediately by Christ.
To what is adduced in the third place — namely, “they gave the right hand of fellowship” — it must be said that from this only this much follows: that they admitted and approved Paul and Barnabas as true companions in the office of preaching the Gospel. But it is entirely consistent with this that Peter was greater than Paul in the office of governance — just as also today the Pontiff gives the right hand of fellowship and confraternity to all Bishops, calling them brethren, and yet they are not thereby equals in authority and power of governance. And finally, the words “What those who seemed to be something once were is nothing to me” — Paul does not say by way of contempt for Peter, James, and John, as the heretics seem to apprehend; but rather by way of commendation of them. For he gives the reason why he conferred his Gospel with them: although they had once been unskilled and simple fishermen, yet now by God’s grace they had been exalted and instructed by the Holy Spirit — and therefore were great Apostles and pillars of the Church.
Indeed from the whole course of the argument it is sufficiently gathered that if the preaching or doctrine of anyone were then held suspect, or were called into controversy, that doctrine ought to be compared with Peter and his companions, to be either approved or disapproved by him, and so satisfy the faithful wavering over such doctrine. For Paul says that he went up to Jerusalem to confer with them about the Gospel, “lest perhaps he had run or was running in vain.”
They object secondly, from the same chapter, that the Apostle signifies there that jurisdiction had been divided by common consent between Peter and Paul — and that the people of the Jews was attributed to Peter, but that of the Gentiles to Paul — and that this was done by divine dispensation. “But on the contrary,” Paul says, “when they saw that the Gospel of the uncircumcision was committed to me, as the Gospel of the circumcision was to Peter — for he who worked with Peter in the Apostolate of the circumcision worked also with me among the Gentiles” — “they gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, that we should go to the Gentiles, and they to the circumcision,” etc. Therefore Peter was not a universal Apostle and Pastor, nor did his care extend to us who are of the Gentiles.
In reply: the division of which Paul speaks there is not of jurisdiction, but of provinces or peoples, for the more conveniently and more quickly spreading the Gospel far and wide among diverse nations. Yet this division is to be understood in such a way that Peter was to devote his principal effort, for that time still, as he had already done before, to the conversion of the Jews — not however that he was thereby deprived of the power of preaching to the Gentiles, or was prohibited from preaching among the Gentiles. On the other hand, Paul was principally to apply himself to converting the Gentiles to faith — but not in such a way that it was therefore forbidden to him also to announce the Gospel to the Jews by occasion and opportunity.
That this partition is to be understood in this way is manifest from the Scriptures: for Peter in Acts ch. 10 preached to Cornelius and his whole household; and there by a heavenly vision he had been three times admonished and had learned that he also was destined for the Gentiles, to announce the Evangelical grace to them. Hence also in Acts 15 Peter says: “You know that from the early days God chose among us that through my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the Gospel and believe” — yet in such a way that from the beginning he was bound to devote himself to the conversion of the Jews first, as we said. This order Christ indicates in Acts ch. 1, when He spoke to the Apostles: “And you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and to the uttermost parts of the earth.” And for this reason also we said that for that time still Peter was principally to apply himself to preaching among the Jews: for after he came to Rome, he disseminated the Gospel far and wide among the Gentiles also, through himself and through others, so as to fulfill in abundance what he had heard in Acts ch. 10 — “Arise, kill and eat” — as Estius notes concerning the said words of St. Paul.
That Paul also was not prohibited from preaching to the Jews is clear from Acts ch. 9, where Christ says of him: “He is a chosen vessel to me, to carry my name before Gentiles and kings, and the children of Israel.” Where although it is signified that he is primarily destined for the conversion of the Gentiles, who are named first, yet it is also indicated that he can — indeed, that he will also — carry the name of Christ before the children of Israel. Hence also it happened that wherever he was traveling through the Gentiles and nations, he also entered and evangelized in the synagogues of the Jews wherever they were found, as is read in Acts ch. 13 at Salamis and Antioch of Pisidia; and in ch. 14 at Iconium; in ch. 16 at Thessalonica; and in 1 Corinthians 9 he says: “And I became as a Jew to the Jews, that I might gain the Jews.” St. Jerome teaches that this is how things stand, in commenting on this passage of Paul, where, after proposing the question whether it was not lawful for Peter to draw a Gentile to the faith and for Paul a Jew, he answers that it was entirely lawful — indeed, that this was the purpose of both of them, to gather the Church from the whole world — but that Peter had the principal mandate concerning the Jews, at least to begin with them, as we have explained; and Paul concerning the Gentiles.
They object thirdly, that Paul writes in the same place that he resisted Peter to his face — therefore he was not subject to him, but was greater or at least equal. In reply, the conclusion is denied. And the reason is: because sometimes it is lawful even for inferiors to admonish and correct superiors, when the matter requires it — provided due reverence is maintained. There was here a just cause for Paul to speak: because he had so preached and instructed the Gentiles that through faith in Christ the law of Moses was abrogated and the observance of legal rites by no means necessary for obtaining justice and salvation. This Peter had also at the beginning confirmed there by his own example — inasmuch as he had already begun to associate with the Gentiles, and was eating with them without discrimination of foods; but when certain ones from the circumcision arrived, he withdrew and separated himself and began to act as a Jew, fearing those who had come — namely, lest he offend and scandalize them. Paul observed that Peter’s action would lead to great scandal for the Gentiles converted to faith, inasmuch as they would take occasion therefrom to doubt the truth of Paul’s preaching and doctrine and the sincerity of Peter, and consequently perhaps to cast off the whole faith of Christ which they had embraced.
This probable inconvenience Peter had perhaps not noticed in time, or had not reflected upon it — as one who was chiefly intent on the care and salvation of the Jews specially entrusted to him for that time. Hence Paul could and, as it were, was bound to admonish Peter to forestall the scandal which was likely to arise among the Gentiles from this not sufficiently considered manner of acting on Peter’s part. Just as, if some Patriarch or Metropolitan were to act inconsiderately in the diocese and district of his Suffragan, and the Bishop were to notice there that it was likely to cause great offense and many inconveniences, it would be lawful for the Bishop with due reverence to admonish him that it is not fitting to act thus — and all the more so because the Bishop ought to exercise particular care for the sheep committed to him.
This opposition or resistance of Paul, therefore, does not undermine the Primacy of Peter or his superior authority, but rather commends his virtue and humility, as St. Gregory beautifully explains in Homily 18 on Ezekiel, writing thus of Peter: “He also yielded to a lesser brother in agreement, and in that same matter became a follower of his inferior, so that in this too he might lead the way — inasmuch as he who was first in the height of the Apostolate should also be first in humility” — and thus he fulfilled that teaching of Christ: He who is greatest among you, let him be as a servant. And further: Behold, he is rebuked by one lesser than himself, and he does not disdain to be rebuked.
Augustine likewise, in Letter 19 to Jerome, writes: “Peter offered a rarer and holier example to posterity — that they should not disdain to be corrected by those who came after them — than Paul did, by which lesser men might confidently dare to resist their superiors in defense of truth, with charity preserved.” Here Augustine, commending the example of Peter, altogether assumes that Paul was posterior and lesser than Peter, although he moved Peter and resisted him, with charity preserved, in defense of truth.
They object fourthly: The Apostles sent Peter to Samaria, as is recorded in Acts chapter 8. He was not therefore their head or superior, but rather was subject to their authority. This is confirmed because in Acts 11 he is also rebuked by others who were of the circumcision, for having entered in with the Gentiles.
It is replied by denying the Consequence. For the word “sending” does not necessarily imply superiority in the one who sends and subjection in the one sent; for anyone is said to send another who is the principle or author of that person going somewhere — whether this is done by command, as when a master sends a servant, or by counsel and persuasion, in which manner an equal sends an equal, and a lesser sends a greater.
Thus in Matthew 2 Herod is said to have sent the Magi to Bethlehem; and in Joshua 22 the people of the Jews sent the priest Phinehas to the sons of Reuben and Gad, even though the high priest by divine right presided over all the sons of Israel. The Apostles therefore sent Peter by persuasion and counsel, on account of the greatness of the matter, so that he himself would go to Samaria, which was said to have received the word of God — just as counselors are said to send a king to war, or to this or that province, where they judge his presence to be necessary or likely to be of great benefit.
To the Confirmation it is replied: Indeed many among the Jews, even among the converted, supposed that the grace of the Gospel was not to be extended to the Gentiles, and that some of these disputed with Peter on that matter. This dispute or debate does not work against the superiority of Peter, for they immediately fell silent and acquiesced, having been better instructed by Peter, as is said in the same chapter.
The Primacy of Peter is proved thirdly and principally from those Scriptures which indicate the various prerogatives of Peter above the other Apostles.
The first of these is indicated in Mark 3, Luke 6, and John 1, where the Lord changes his name and says: Thou art Simon, son of Jonah; thou shalt be called Cephas. For a change of name divinely made always indicates a particular excellence of the person and includes more hidden mysteries, as St. Chrysostom notes on the cited passage of John.
Thus in Genesis chapter 17, the Patriarch Abraham, who had previously been called Abram, was afterward given the name Abraham — that is, “father of a multitude” — so that by the imposition of this name it might be signified that this man, who was already old and had an aged and barren wife, would nonetheless be made so fruitful with offspring as to become the father of very many sons, indeed of many nations and peoples.
Therefore a twofold preeminence of this person can be considered in this change of name, whereby one who was called Simon is named Cephas or Peter. One is that Peter alone among all the Apostles had his name changed — for although in Mark chapter 3 the sons of Zebedee are named Boanerges, yet that was more of a surname than a proper name, and accordingly they are nowhere afterward called Boanerges by the Evangelists, but only James and John, as they were called before. Peter, however, is thereafter almost always called Peter. And Paul in Galatians 2 names him frequently, and never otherwise than Peter or Cephas, which is the same. John he names often indeed, but always as John, never as Boanerges.
The other preeminence is that the name Cephas was given to him; for in Syriac, Cephas signifies Rock, as we taught above and as Jerome attests in chapter 2 of the Epistle to the Galatians. In Greek, moreover, it signifies head, as Optatus noted in Book 2 against Parmenianus. Now Rock is one of the most celebrated names of Christ, for nothing is more frequent in the Scriptures than Christ being called the Rock — see Isaiah chapters 8 and 28, Daniel 2, Psalm 117, Matthew 21, Romans 9, 1 Corinthians 10, Ephesians 2, 1 Peter 2, and elsewhere.
Christ, therefore, in sharing his own name with Peter alone, and that name by which he himself is signified as the foundation and head of the universal Church — what else did he wish to indicate, but that he was making Peter the foundation and head of the Church in his place? And so St. Leo rightly writes in Letter 89 to the Bishops of the Province of Vienne: “This one, taken into the fellowship of indivisible unity, he willed to be named what he himself was, saying: Thou art Peter, etc.” And in Sermon 3 on the Anniversary of his own elevation to the Pontificate, he introduces Christ speaking thus to Peter: “As my Father has manifested my divinity to thee, so also I make known to thee thine own excellence, because thou art Peter — that is, since I am the inviolable Rock, I the cornerstone who makes both one, I the foundation besides which no one can lay another, yet thou also art a rock, because thou art made firm by my strength, so that those things which are proper to me by power may be common to thee with me by participation.”
The second prerogative is found in all those Scriptures where Peter is enumerated with the other Apostles, whether with all of them together or with some of them only — and it consists in the fact that he is consistently placed in the first position in order and in enumeration. This without doubt indicates and implies that Peter was greater than the other Apostles and was held as first among them.
Matthew 10: Now the names of the twelve Apostles are these: first, Simon who is called Peter, etc. Similarly he is enumerated with all and placed first in Mark 3, Luke 6, and Acts 1. Likewise among some, where not all are enumerated, he is placed first in Mark 5 and Luke 8: He did not permit anyone to follow him except Peter, James, and John. Luke 22: He sent Peter and John. Mark 13: Peter, James, John, and Andrew asked him. Similar instances are found in Matthew 17 and the final chapter of John. Although the order of the other Apostles is often changed among themselves, Peter is nonetheless always named in first place.
Now in order to diminish and weaken this prerogative, so that no argument for the primacy of Peter may be drawn from it, heretics say that he was placed first either because he was first called to the Apostolate, or because he was the eldest of all, or because it happened so by chance — for someone from among all of them must be enumerated first.
But that it was not on account of the first reason is clear, because it is manifest from chapter 1 of John that Andrew was called and followed Christ before Peter: Now Andrew, the brother of Simon Peter, was one of the two who had heard from John and had followed him. He found first his own brother Simon, and brought him to Jesus. Similarly, it was not on account of the second reason either, because the ancients relate that Andrew was older than Peter. St. Epiphanius in Heresy 51: “The meeting with Andrew occurred first, when Peter was younger in age.” The Magdeburgians themselves in Century 1, Book 1, chapter 10, acknowledge that Andrew was in all likelihood older than Peter.
That it was finally not done by chance is gathered: First, from the fact that he is always enumerated first in so many various places. For if the order were arranged without reason, then just as the others do not always follow the same order among themselves, so neither would Peter always be placed in first position. Second, not only is he always placed first, but in Matthew 10 it is also expressly added that Simon who is called Peter was first — which plainly signifies that he is not enumerated first by mere coincidence, but by reason of some dignity and excellence above the rest. Third, he is not only placed first and said to have been first, but Scripture speaks of him in such a way that by its manner of speaking it signifies him to be the Leader and head of the rest. For just as in Apocalypse 12 it is said “the Devil and his angels,” and likewise “Michael and his angels” — by which expression it is indicated that Michael was the Leader of the other Angels mentioned, and that the Devil was the leader of the angels adhering to him who fell with him — so also in Mark 1 it is said of Peter: And Simon and those who were with him followed him. Likewise in Luke 8: Peter and those who were with him said. Acts 2: Peter standing with the eleven. Acts 5: Peter and the Apostles said. 1 Corinthians 9: Have we not power to carry about a sister, a woman, as also the other Apostles, and the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas?
Peter is not placed first by chance, therefore, but because he was the Leader and head of the other Apostles. Otherwise, why is he always singled out specifically, if he was merely an equal and fellow Apostle with the rest? To this is also added the fact that Peter almost always speaks in the name of all: Matthew 19: Behold, we have left all things. Luke 12: Dost thou speak this parable to us, or likewise to all? John 6: Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. On which passage Cyril writes: “Through the one who presided, all gave answer.”
But against this prerogative it can be objected that in Galatians 2, James is enumerated before Cephas or Peter: When they perceived the grace that was given to me, James and Cephas and John, etc. — therefore from the fact that Peter is placed first elsewhere, no particular prerogative of his can be established.
It is replied by denying the Consequence: for first of all it is doubtful whether Paul enumerated those three Apostles there in that order; for Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, both in the text and in the Commentary on that passage, read in this order: Peter, James, and John, etc. Likewise Chrysostom in the Commentary: “Peter,” he says, “James and John” — whence it is credible that this is how Paul wrote it. Moreover, even granting that he wrote it as we read it, yet what was done once without observing the order of rank ought not to be considered as detracting from the order so consistently observed elsewhere always in the Scriptures.
Now Anselm and St. Thomas consider that James was placed first here because he was Bishop of Jerusalem, where those Apostles of whom Paul speaks then were. That Peter was nonetheless held to be greater than the other Apostles he indicates sufficiently in the same epistle, chapter 1: Then, after three years, I went to Jerusalem to see Peter — he does not say “to see James,” even though James was also at Jerusalem. And in 1 Corinthians 1, ascending by degrees, he places Peter immediately below Christ: Everyone says: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas, I of Christ.
The third prerogative of Peter is that Christ in diverse occasions wished to have particular communication and fellowship with Peter. Thus Peter alone walks with the Lord upon the waters, Matthew 14 — on which St. Bernard writes in Book 2 of On Consideration: “Walking after the manner of the Lord upon the waters, he designated the one unique Vicar of Christ, who was to preside not over one people but over all — for many waters are many peoples.” To this Bernard likewise refers in the same work that deed of Peter in John 21, where, while the other disciples were coming to the Lord in a small boat as he waited on the shore, Peter cast himself into the sea. Of which Bernard writes: “What does this signify? It is the sign of Peter’s singular Pontificate, by which he undertook to govern not one ship, as each of the others did his own, but the whole age — for the sea is the age, the ships are the Church.”
Matthew 17: The Lord commands the tribute to be paid for himself and Peter: Give it to them for me and thee. From these words Origen, Chrysostom, and Jerome, in their commentaries on chapter 16 of Matthew, write that the other Apostles gathered that Peter was placed above all others. And the author of the Questions on the Old and New Testament, in Augustine’s works, question 73, says that Christ paid two didrachmas, one for himself and one for Peter, because just as in Christ, so also in Peter all were contained — for he established him to be their head, he says, so that he might be the shepherd of the Lord’s flock.
The fourth prerogative of Peter is indicated in Luke chapter 5 and John 21, where two miracles performed in the fishing from Peter’s boat are explained. The first of these, according to Augustine, Tract 122 on John, signifies the Church Militant, and the second the Church Triumphant — for the first was done before the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the second after the Resurrection.
Moreover, in the first Christ said generally: Launch out into the deep and let down your nets for a draught — for both good and evil, the elect and the reprobate, are called to the faith. In the second he said to cast the nets to the right, for only the elect are gathered into the Kingdom. So also in the first the fish are caught without any definite number being expressed, and the net is broken; but in the second a certain number of fish is read to have been caught, and it is recorded that the net was not broken.
The notable prerogative of Peter in all this is that he is always found to be the principal figure and, as it were, the Leader: for in Luke 5, when the Lord saw several boats, he entered into one which was Simon’s, and from it he taught — so that we might understand that Christ is and teaches only in that Church whose governor is Peter. Hence Ambrose in Sermon 11: “The Lord boarded this one ship alone, in which Peter is appointed Master.”
In the same passage, to Peter alone it is said: Put out into the deep — where, as the supreme helmsman, he is commanded to lead the others into the deep sea, that is, the world, for the fishing of men; which the Lord mystically signifies and explains to Peter, saying there: Fear not; from henceforth thou shalt catch men. And in John 21: Simon Peter went up and drew the net to land — by which figures nothing else is indicated but that it is Peter who brings men from the world to the faith and the Church Militant, and who, caring for them, leads them to the Triumphant Church.
The fifth prerogative is drawn from Luke chapter 22 and John 21, where in the first passage Christ peculiarly prays for Peter that his faith may not fail, and charges him that after the fall which he foretells, he should himself confirm his brethren — by which words he plainly signifies that the care of the others is to be committed to him. Hence Leo in Sermon 3 on the Anniversary of his own elevation: “Intercession is made for Peter’s faith, as if the condition of the others were to be the more assured if the mind of their Prince were not overcome.”
In the latter passage, Christ peculiarly foretold to Peter his death, and indeed a death conformable with the death of Christ himself — so that just as he had given him his own name of Rock and laid upon him his own office, so also he willed to have him as a companion in the manner of death. The sixth and last prerogative to be recited here is found in various places in the book of Acts, and consists in the fact that Peter is shown in the assemblies of the Apostles always conducting himself after the manner of a Father of a household, or a Rector and head.
Thus in chapter 1, he himself rising in the midst of the brethren says that one of these men must be made a witness of his resurrection together with them. In chapter 2, after the receiving of the Holy Spirit, Peter is first of all to speak and to proclaim the Gospel of Christ, and by that first discourse converts three thousand men — on which passage St. Chrysostom writes: “Peter was the mouth of all; but the eleven stood by him, confirming by their testimony what was said by him.”
In Acts chapter 3, he himself performs the first miracle in testimony of the faith, saying to the lame man: Silver and gold have I none; but what I have I give thee: in the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk. Acts 5: as supreme Judge, he divinely recognized and condemned the hypocrisy and fraud of Ananias and Sapphira. Acts 9: it is said of him, And it came to pass, that as Peter passed throughout all parts — that is, as St. Chrysostom also teaches in that same place, just as a general in an army going about observed what part was assembled and what part had need of his coming. “See him,” he says, “running about everywhere and being found first.”
Acts 10: Peter is the very first of all to begin preaching to the Gentiles, just as he had been the first of all to preach to the Jews — and to him alone is the vision given by which it was signified that the time for preaching the Gospel to the Gentiles had arrived.
However, someone might object against this that in Acts chapter 8 Philip is read to have instructed and converted the Ethiopian Eunuch; and in chapter 9 Paul is read to have spoken and disputed with the Greeks — from which it appears that Peter was not the first to have preached Christ to the Gentiles.
It is replied by denying the Consequence: because, as regards that Eunuch, although he was of Gentile nationality, yet in profession and religion he was already a Jew and a proselyte — which is clear because he had come to worship in Jerusalem, as is said in the same place, and was reading the prophet Isaiah; therefore he is to be reckoned among the Jews.
Hence in Acts chapter 11 it is still expressly said that those who had been scattered by the tribulation which arose over Stephen went through various regions evangelizing, yet speaking the word to none but Jews only. As for what is also alleged concerning Paul, that he dealt with the Greeks: to this it must be said that there by “Greeks” are meant Jews who had been born in Greece and spoke Greek and had returned from there to Jerusalem, as Chrysostom and Oecumenius indicate in that passage. Or if anyone considers that the reference is to Gentile Greeks, it will have to be said that Paul did not officially preach the Gospel to them, but spoke and disputed with them only in responding to their calumnies which they cast against the faith and by which they were turning Jews further away from the faith — and so that disputation was principally directed toward the conversion of the Jews.
Acts 15: Peter in the Council speaks first, and his opinion is followed by James and all the others, as Jerome teaches in the letter to Augustine which is number 11 among Augustine’s letters.
To this is also added that in Acts chapter 12 unceasing prayer is made by the Church for Peter — which is read to have been done neither for Stephen when he was stoned earlier, nor for James when he was also placed in prison and killed before; but peculiarly for Peter — because the body is wont to be more solicitous for the head than for the other members.
More prerogatives of Peter can be gathered both from the Scriptures and from the writings of the Saints, which can be seen more fully explained in Bellarmine’s work On the Roman Pontiff, Book 1, chapter 23, to the confirmation of which many further testimonies of the ancients could be added. But enough has been brought forward on the occasion of explaining the sense and meaning of the cited Scriptures. From all of which it is clearly established that Peter was appointed by Christ the Lord as Prefect over the other Apostles, and the universal Rector and Prince of the whole Church.
But besides the objections of the adversaries proposed and resolved above on occasion, there remains yet one or another still to be proposed.
And first: Luther in his book On the Power of the Pope (following Wiggers in 2.2) objects that James was greater than Peter. He proves this because: Christ was Bishop of Jerusalem, not of Rome; therefore James, who after the passion of Christ obtained the Bishopric of Jerusalem, ought to be said to succeed Christ or to be called his general Vicar — not Peter. Furthermore, Jerusalem is the mother of all Churches, because it is said in Isaiah chapter 2: Out of Zion shall go forth light, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem; therefore, etc.
To this can be added what Clement, as found in Eusebius, Book 2 of the History, chapter 1, is read to have written: “Peter, James, and John, after the Assumption of the Savior, although they had been preferred above almost all by him, did not claim for themselves the glory of the Primacy, but established James, who was called the Just, as the Apostles’ Bishop.” And what St. Chrysostom has in Homily 3 on Acts: “See the modesty of James,” he says, “he had received in Jerusalem the hands of a Bishop, and yet here he says nothing. Consider also the singular modesty of the other disciples, how they yield to him the chair, and no longer contend in rivalry among themselves.”
It is replied by denying the Assumption. To the first proof it is said that Christ was not the Bishop of any particular city, but was the Pontiff not of Jerusalem alone, nor the particular Bishop of that city, but of the whole Church. Nor does anyone succeed him, since he always lives and continues as Pontiff forever. But because he does not converse visibly with the Church, he therefore appointed a general Vicar on earth — whom we have said to be Peter — to fulfill those things which are necessary for the temporal and visible governance and condition of the Church, over which he himself nonetheless invisibly presides as the supreme and principal head.
Nor does it follow that this general Vicariate ought to have been conferred on the Bishop of Jerusalem, for this in the first place depended on the free disposition of Christ. Furthermore, it appeared less fitting for the same reason that just as through Christ’s coming the Law and Priesthood were changed, so also it was fitting that the seat of the High Priest should be transferred.
To the second proof it is replied that the Church of Jerusalem can indeed in certain respects and ways be called the mother of all Churches: first, because the Evangelical preaching took its origin in Jerusalem, and there Christ himself, Peter, and the other Apostles first announced the Gospel — and this is what is foretold in Isaiah in the passage and words cited. Second, it can also be called mother because the mysteries of our redemption were accomplished and consummated in that place. Nevertheless it is not the mother of all Churches in terms of superiority, right, and jurisdiction; but that Church is mother in this manner and by that right whose Episcopate is joined to the supreme Pontificate, conferred rather by the free will of Christ upon Peter. And therefore all the ancients always recognized the Chair of Peter as the matrix and mistress of all Churches.
As for what is alleged as from Clement in Eusebius, it is replied that that passage in Eusebius is cited corruptly. For although it is so read in the Basle codex of Rufinus’s translation, yet in the Cologne codex, translated and published by a Catholic, the word “Primacy” is not found, and instead of the words “Bishop of the Apostles,” the reading is “Bishop of Jerusalem” — which reading coheres with Nicephorus citing this passage in this way, and with the opinion of Eusebius himself, who in the same Book 2, chapter 14, writes that Peter was the greatest of the Apostles and the Prince of the chief ones.
And so according to this reading the meaning of Clement will be the same as that of Chrysostom — namely, that even the chief Apostles did not seek their own glory, and therefore did not claim for themselves the Episcopate of Jerusalem, which at that time was esteemed the most noble of all on account of reasons peculiar to that place and already explained by us, but deferred it to the younger James and granted him the chair or see of that Church. And therefore Chrysostom commends the modesty of the Apostles, in that they no longer ambitiously contended for the first place or the first dignities, as they had done before the passion of Christ. But these things do not detract from the Primacy of Peter, who for just reasons established his See not in Jerusalem — though that city was in other respects already ennobled above other places by many titles — but elsewhere. That St. Chrysostom preferred Peter to James is evident from the final Homily on John, on those words of Christ: Follow me — by which words, he says, Christ again showed his care and familiar affection for him. “But if anyone should ask how James received the See of Jerusalem,” he says, “I would answer that Christ appointed this Peter as teacher of the whole world.” Here Chrysostom acknowledges that James was established in the See of Jerusalem by Peter as teacher of the whole world.
It is objected secondly: that Paul is accustomed to be called the Apostle by antonomasia — therefore he rather ought to be called the Primate and Prince of the Apostles than Peter. This can be confirmed because on ancient seals with which the documents of the Supreme Pontiff were sometimes sealed, images of Peter and Paul are found, but Paul on the right and Peter on the left — therefore, etc.
It is replied by denying the Consequence. For St. Augustine in Book 2 To Boniface, chapter 3, teaches by what other reasons Paul is designated by the name of Apostle by antonomasia, briefly in these words: “When ‘the Apostle’ is said, if it is not specified which Apostle, none other than Paul is understood” — and he adds the reason: because he is better known through more epistles, and labored more than all the others. For he himself planted the faith of Christ from Jerusalem all the way to Illyricum, as is indicated in Romans chapter 15. Nor only there, but also from the Red Sea to the ocean he preached the Gospel, as Jerome attests in his commentary on chapter 5 of Amos, on those words of the Prophet: He who calls for the waters of the sea and pours them out upon the face of the earth. Therefore, because he excelled so greatly in the office of writing and in Apostolic labors, he is understood to be called by the name of Apostle singularly — not because he had power or superiority over others.
From this also it follows that just as Peter is called Prince of the Apostles because he was established as head and shepherd of the sheep, so also Paul can be called Prince, but for a different reason — because he fulfilled the Apostolic office in the most excellent manner.
To the Confirmation it is replied: this is not consistent in the ancient images, that Paul should be on the right — for in those which still exist in Rome today, as Bellarmine notes in the book cited above, chapter 27, in some Paul holds the right, while in no fewer others he is seen on the left. The ancients could have done this deliberately to signify that they did not wish to judge between them as to excellence of life and merits toward the Church — for although Peter excelled in authority, Paul appears to have excelled in labors and doctrine. In the honors rendered to Saints after death, it is not so much the dignity of ecclesiastical power in which they shone that is attended to, as their holiness, labors, and merits. Hence in the Litanies Lawrence is placed before Sixtus, as also in the solemnity of the office, although the latter was a Pope and the former only a Deacon.
There is added the further point that it is not universal and constant that the right side has always been and everywhere is considered more honorable, as Bellarmine also notes from other examples.
Finally, Peter Damian offers a not incongruous reason why Paul was placed on the right — namely because Benjamin was called by his father the son of the right hand. Now in Benjamin, Paul was typified, as Augustine teaches in Sermon 14 On the Saints, where, on account of Paul who was of the tribe of Benjamin, he teaches that it was foretold in the blessings of Jacob in Genesis chapter 49: Benjamin is a ravenous wolf; in the morning he shall devour the prey, and at evening he shall divide the spoil — which Augustine himself there applies to St. Paul.

DOUBT II.
Whether Peter Has a Successor in the Primacy of the Church by Christ’s Institution, and Who That Person Is

The heretics deny not only the primacy of Peter, but contend that even granting it, it does not follow that anyone succeeds him in that dignity and universal power over the whole Church — since he has no successor in the Apostolate, nor in the gifts of miracles, nor in many other things. For what is granted to one person in particular ought not straightway to be extended to others.
But against them the FIRST CONCLUSION is: The Primacy, or universal and supreme Pontifical power, which Peter held over the whole Church, was not temporary, so as to end with his life; but was given and instituted in such a way that it would endure perpetually, for as long as the Church is militant here on earth, and that someone should always succeed him in that primacy or supreme Pontificate, who would by office preside over and govern the whole flock of Christ and all the other Pastors. This is a matter of faith, as is clear from the Council of Constance, where among other articles of John Hus this one is condemned, which is the 27th: There is not the slightest appearance that it is necessary for there to be one head governing the Church in spiritual matters, who always dwells with and is preserved together with the Church Militant.
This is proved first: because whatever was the reason for instituting this principate at the beginning and conferring it upon Peter, that same reason subsists and endures throughout the entire course of the Church Militant — therefore there will always be someone to be substituted for Peter in that prefecture. This is confirmed: because Christ did not institute nor confer this power upon Peter merely to elevate and honor Peter above the rest, or so that he might dominate the clergy in his own time; but so that he might best provide for his Church and all the faithful.
And for this reason Augustine says in his commentary on Psalm 108 that that promise of Christ, I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, etc., does not have its full and clear meaning unless it is referred to the Church — that is, unless it is understood not as pertaining only to the personal privilege and honor of Peter, but as looking to the perpetual governance of the Church and its benefit and fruit, as we explained more fully above. For after the death of Peter, the Church is no less in need of such a Vicar of Christ and general Pastor on earth than it was during his life. Indeed even more so — both on account of the greater multitude of the faithful, which by reason of the diversity of minds is more difficult to hold in unity of faith, and because the faithful today are not so perfect and fervent in the faith and in observing its laws as the first Christians were, and finally because the other Apostles were not equally in need of instruction and direction from Peter as bishops today are, being much more imperfect, who nevertheless succeed the Apostles in the episcopal office.
It is proved secondly: because in Matthew 16, where the primacy of the Church is promised to Peter, that Primacy is expressed metaphorically under the name of a foundation. But the foundation upon which a building is erected must endure for the same duration as the building itself; therefore that Primacy must be as perpetual as the Church which is built upon it. Furthermore, Christ adds in the same place: And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it — therefore the foundation upon which the Church so solidly rests must always remain for as long as the Church is assailed by the gates of hell. Hence St. Leo in Sermon 2 on the Anniversary of his elevation: “As that which Peter believed in Christ endures,” he says, “so also that which Christ instituted in Peter endures. Likewise, the disposition of truth remains, and Blessed Peter, persevering in the rock-like strength he received, has not abandoned the governance of the Church entrusted to him — because his dignity does not fail even in an unworthy heir,” as the same Leo says further on.
It is proved thirdly: because in John 21, where the care of lambs, little sheep, and sheep is committed to Peter, the universal Shepherd of the flock of Christ is there instituted. But the office of Shepherd ought not to cease as long as the sheepfold and the sheep subsist.
SECOND CONCLUSION: The successor of Peter in the primacy and general governance of the whole Church is the Roman Pontiff. This also is certain and a matter of faith.
It is proved first from the Councils, and principally from the Council of Nicaea, which was the first general Council, whose sixth Canon reads as follows, as it is cited in the Council of Chalcedon, Action 16: The Church of Rome has always held the primacy; let the ancient custom likewise endure in Egypt, Libya, and Pentapolis, so that the Bishop of Alexandria may have authority over all these, since this is also the custom of the Bishop of Rome. I said “as it is cited in the Council of Chalcedon” because in the volumes of the Councils where the Nicene Council stands by itself, that opening of this Canon — The Church of Rome has always held the primacy — is not found. But this need not cause great wonder, since the acts of that Council are very mutilated, given that the Arians everywhere destroyed, mutilated, and corrupted copies, especially in the Greek Churches, as is evident from Athanasius’s letter to all the Orthodox — so much so that he himself, although the Council had been celebrated in Nicaea in Greece, judged that its acts or Canons should be sought from the city of Rome.
Moreover, even setting aside that opening, the primacy of the Roman Pontiff can nonetheless be gathered from those final words: since this is also the custom of the Bishop of Rome — namely that he permits and grants to the Bishop of Alexandria to preside over all the Bishops and Churches of those regions, as Nicholas I understood this Canon in his letter to the Emperor Michael, as did Leo I in his letter to Marcian Augustus, and others cited by Turrianus and Bellarmine. To this is added the fact that this Synod sought confirmation of its decrees from Pope Sylvester of Rome, and they were confirmed by him, as Turrianus reports in Book 3 of his work in defense of the Pontiffs’ epistles, chapter 8. He also cites another Canon of the same Council from the Arabic codex, which reads: He who holds the See of Rome is superior, and the Prince of all Patriarchs; for he is the first, as Peter, to whom the principate was given, etc. And without doubt in those times, when there were so many Greek Arian bishops striving to abolish the Nicene Synod, the acts of that Council could more easily have been preserved in their integrity in some foreign language than in Greek — thus those Canons collected from codices other than Greek also deserve their own credit.
Likewise the second general Council, celebrated at Constantinople, writes in a letter to Damasus — found in Theodoret, Book 5 of the History, chapter 9 — that it had assembled at Constantinople by the command of Damasus himself; and there the Fathers acknowledge that the Church of Rome is the head, and that they are its members. And that Council was also confirmed by Damasus, the Roman Pontiff, as Photius the Patriarch reports in his work on the seven Ecumenical Councils.
The third general Council, held at Ephesus, declares that it deposed Nestorius by mandate of the letters of Pope Celestine of Rome, as is found in Evagrius, Book 1 of the History, chapter 4. And in a letter to that same Celestine it writes that it had not dared to judge the cause of John, Patriarch of Antioch — which was more doubtful than that of Nestorius — but had reserved it for the judgment of Celestine himself; whose Vicar, namely Cyril, and the three other Legates sent in his name — Arcadius, Projectus, and the Priest Philip — professed by both words and deeds the primacy of the Apostolic See, with the approval of the sacred Council.
The fourth general Council, which is the Council of Chalcedon, in Actions 1, 2, and 3, repeatedly calls Leo the Pontiff of the universal Church; and in its letter to him it writes: “After all these things, he” — meaning Eutyches — “has even extended his madness against you yourself, to whom the custody of the vineyard was entrusted by the Savior” — that is, says the Council, against your Apostolic Holiness as well; by which the Synod openly acknowledges that the custody of the vineyard of Christ, which is the whole Church, was commended and entrusted to the Roman Pontiff by the Savior. In the Second Council of Constantinople, Action 4, the following is read: We follow and obey the Apostolic See, and those who are in communion with it we hold to be in communion, and those condemned by it we condemn. If then the whole Council follows and obeys the Apostolic See, it thereby acknowledges it as its leader and superior.
The Second Council of Nicaea, in Action 2, receives and approves the letter of Pope Adrian to Tarasius, in which among other things these words are found: Its See, holding the primacy throughout the whole world, shines forth and stands as the head of all the Churches of God, etc. Similar things are found in chapter 5 of the Lateran Council celebrated under Innocent III: The Church of Rome, by the Lord’s disposition, holds the ordinary primacy over all others, as the universal mother and teacher of all the faithful of Christ. The Council of Lyon under Gregory X, found in the Sixth Book of Decretals, On Elections, in the chapter Ubi periculum, calls the Pontiff the Vicar of Jesus Christ, the successor of Peter, the Rector of the universal Church, and the Director of the Lord’s flock. Finally, the Council of Florence under Eugene IV states: We define that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over the whole world, and that the Roman Pontiff himself is the successor of Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, the true Vicar of Christ, the Head of the whole Church, and the Father and Teacher of all Christians; and that full power was given to him in Blessed Peter by our Lord Jesus Christ to feed, govern, and guide the universal Church. And so we have here nine Councils, attended by both Greeks and Latins, which together attest to and approved this Catholic doctrine.
Besides these, there are other general Councils, not attended by the Greeks, such as the Council of Constance, in which in Session 8 this article of John Wycliffe is condemned: It is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is supreme over all other Churches. The first Council of Lyon under Innocent IV, found in the Sixth Book, On Homicide, chapter 1, states three things: first, that the Lord, about to ascend into heaven after the Resurrection, so as not to leave his Church without a Shepherd, committed its care to Blessed Peter the Apostle, so that by the stability of his faith he might strengthen the others in the Christian religion. Second, that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of that same Apostle. Third, that he holds the place of the Redeemer on earth. The same is indicated in various places of the Council of Trent, as in Session 6, chapter 1 on Reform, and in Session 14, chapter 7, where it says:
Therefore the Supreme Pontiffs have rightly been able to reserve certain graver causes to their own particular judgment, by virtue of the supreme power entrusted to them over the whole Church.
It is proved secondly from the Supreme Pontiffs, who in their Decretal letters both presuppose and attest to this same truth. Regarding these, since heretics judge different ones differently, Bellarmine rightly distributes them into three classes in Book 2, chapter 14, On the Pontiff. The first class contains those Pontiffs who sat and issued such letters in the first three hundred years. Among these the first is Clement, who in his first Epistle acknowledges and teaches the Primacy of this See of Rome. The same is done by Anacletus in Epistle 3, Evaristus in Epistle 1, Alexander in Epistle 1, Pius in Epistle 2, Anicetus in Epistle 1, Victor in Epistle 1, Zephyrinus in Epistle 1, Callistus in Epistle 2, and Miltiades in Epistle 1.
As regards these Pontiffs, the heretics admit that the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff is established in the cited letters, and also that these were true and holy Roman Pontiffs. They respond to these testimonies only by claiming that those letters were recently forged and falsely attributed to those Pontiffs. But against this stands the fact that they are known to be most ancient from ancient authors who make mention of them. For Isidore mentions them in the Preface to his Collection of Sacred Canons. Likewise the Council of Vaison cites the letters of Clement as they now exist — and this Council was celebrated in the time of Leo I, and thus three hundred and fifty years before Charlemagne, before whose time the Magdeburgians wish to assert that these letters had been cited by no author of any significance. Likewise Rufinus, who preceded us by four hundred years, in his Preface to the Recognitions of Clement which he translated from Greek, makes mention of the letter of Clement to James. Therefore, even granting that certain errors or corruptions may have crept into the said letters of the Pontiffs — which Bellarmine does not altogether wish to deny — nevertheless on that particular point on which all of them so agree, they deserve their credit, and cannot reasonably be regarded with suspicion, as if that point had been fabricated and inserted spuriously in all of them. See Turrianus in his work defending these letters, where he rightly defends them. The second class contains those Pontiffs who flourished from the year 300 up to 600, and who likewise expressed the preeminence and authority of the Roman See over all other Churches, such as Julius I in his letter to the Orientals, which is found in the second Apology of Athanasius; Damasus in his letter to all the Eastern Bishops, which Theodoret cites in Book 5 of the History, chapter 10; and likewise in Epistle 4 to the Bishops of Numidia: Cease not to bring to us, as the head, as has always been the custom, all matters that can admit of any doubt. Siricius in his letter to Himerius, Bishop of Tarragona; Zosimus in his letter to Hesychius, Bishop of Salona: Whoever neglects this, setting aside the authority of the Fathers and the Apostolic See, let him know that he is to be strictly called to account by us. Innocent in Letter 22 to the Bishops of Macedonia: I observe that injury is being done to the Apostolic See, to which, as to the head of the Churches, reports were sent running, etc. And in his letter to the Council of Carthage, which is number 19 among the letters of Augustine, he says that the Roman See is the fountain and head of all the Churches.
Leo teaches the same in many places, and from him it is evident that the Roman Pontiff exercised jurisdiction not only over the West but also over Greece, Asia, Egypt, and Africa, as can be seen from Letter 84 to Anastasius, Bishop of Thessalonica; from Letter 46 to Anatolius, Bishop of Constantinople; and from Letter 81 to Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria: What we know to have been preserved by our predecessors with particular care, we wish to be observed by you also. Here Leo gives commands to the Patriarch of all Egypt and Libya. See the same Pontiff in Letter 87 to the Bishops of Africa. Finally, in Sermon 1 on the Feast of the Apostles, he addresses Rome in these words: Through the holy See of Blessed Peter, made the head of the world, thou presidest more broadly by divine religion than by earthly dominion; though thou hast extended the right of thy empire over land and sea by many victories, yet what the toil of war subdued is less than what Christian peace has made subject. The same is taught by Gelasius in his letter to the Bishops of Dardania, and in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius — and all these Pontiffs were holy men.
Likewise John II in his letter to Justinian the Elder Augustus, found in the Code, Title 1, writes that both the rules of the Fathers and the statutes of rulers declare that the Roman See is truly the head of all the Churches. Gelasius II in Epistle 1 to the Bishops of the East: The Roman See, he says, by the Lord’s institution is the head of all the Churches. Finally, Gregory the Great, Book 4, Letter 56: Know that we have sent the pallium to our brother John, Bishop of the Corinthians, whom it greatly behooves you to obey. Here the authority of Gregory over the Greek Bishops shines forth, as he creates the Bishop of Corinth Archbishop by the transmission of the pallium, and admonishes the other Bishops of that province that they must obey him. And in Book 7, Letter 63 to John, Bishop of Syracuse: As for the Church of Constantinople — who doubts that it is subject to the Apostolic See? This is constantly professed by both the most pious Lord Emperor and our brother Eusebius, Bishop of that city. And in Book 11, Letter 42 to John, Bishop of Palermo: We admonish you that the reverence of the Apostolic See be not disturbed by any presumption; for the condition of the members remains intact when no injury strikes the head of the faith.
117 As for the testimonies of these Pontiffs, the heretics do not dare to deny that these are their writings, nor that they were true Pontiffs. But they respond to them in essentially two ways. First, they accuse some of excessive ambition and lust for domination over others — notably Calvin, in Book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 7, makes this charge against St. Leo. But all these men were always held by the Church to be good men and nearly all of them saints. Nor was St. Leo accused of pride or ambition by anyone before Luther and Calvin; on the contrary, in various letters of Councils and Emperors addressed to Leo himself, and especially in the letters of the Bishops of Gaul, his pious authority is very highly commended.
Second, they respond that although the Roman Pontiffs did interpose themselves in the causes and difficulties of other Bishops, they did not do this by authority and power, but only sought to settle disputes and make peace to the extent that the law and the reason of ecclesiastical communion permitted.
But these two responses sit poorly together. For if they only inserted themselves fraternally and to the extent that ecclesiastical communion permitted, they certainly ought not on that account to be accused of ambition or lust for domination, since that would be to perform an act of charity. But the heretics fabricate this in vain, since the manner of writing and the words of the aforementioned Pontiffs too manifestly declare that they do not merely fraternally advise and exhort all the other Bishops, Archbishops, or Patriarchs, but that they deal with them by authority, as their true superiors who have the power of judging and punishing.
The third class embraces those Pontiffs who in their letters likewise attest to the same Primacy of the Apostolic See, and who sat from the year 600 down to our own times, and who are also very numerous. As regards these, the heretics readily admit that they taught thus, but say that they are not worthy of credit and were pseudo-Pontiffs, not true ones. But this response contains nothing but manifest calumny, and argues that the Church of Christ has already for a thousand years fallen away and been extinguished — for they will not be able to demonstrate that there was anywhere any congregation of the Christian people regarded as the true Church of Christ that did not communicate with the Roman See. And therefore, if from that time the Roman Pontiff has been a pseudo-Pontiff and the Roman Church has strayed from the truth and the faith of the Gospel, it follows that throughout all that time the true Church of Christ existed nowhere.
It is proved thirdly from other ancient Fathers, both Greek and Latin. Irenaeus, Book 3, chapter 3: For to this Church — he speaks of the Roman Church — on account of its more powerful principality, it is necessary that every Church agree, that is, those who are everywhere faithful; in which the tradition that comes from the Apostles has always been preserved by those who are from everywhere. Here Irenaeus teaches that we are able to confute all heretics from the doctrine of the Roman Church, because in it the Apostolic tradition has always been preserved; and therefore all other Churches must always have recourse to it as the one that holds the principate.
Epiphanius, Heresy 68: Ursacius and Valens, he says, doing penance, went together with their written declarations to Blessed Julius, the Bishop of Rome, to give an account of their error and offense. These men were certainly Bishops. Therefore there was no reason for them to seek pardon for their offense from the Roman Pontiff, unless they acknowledged him as the Judge and head of all Bishops.
Athanasius in his second Apology declares that the aforementioned Bishops had sought pardon for their error from Blessed Julius; and in his letter to Pope Felix: For this reason he has placed you and your predecessors — namely Apostolic Prelates — in the high seat of eminence, and has commanded you to have care of all the Churches, so that you may come to our aid, etc. See the same Athanasius in his book On the Opinion of Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, where he indicates that Dionysius was accused before the Roman Pontiff by certain men — undoubtedly before him as the recognized and acknowledged common Judge of all Bishops and Patriarchs as well.
Basil, Letter 52 to Athanasius: It seemed fitting, he says, to write to the Bishop of Rome, that he might look into our affairs and interpose the decree of his judgment — where he also adds many other things pertaining to the supreme power of the Roman Pontiff. Chrysostom, Letter 1 to Innocent: I beseech you, he says, to write that these iniquitous acts have no force; and that those who have acted iniquitously may be subject to the penalties of the ecclesiastical laws. Here Chrysostom petitions the Roman Pontiff to declare null and void the unjust sentence pronounced against him by Theophilus, Bishop of Alexandria, in a council of many Bishops; and to have Theophilus himself punished along with his associates according to the ecclesiastical laws. Chrysostom therefore acknowledges that the Roman Pontiff has power and jurisdiction even over the Bishops of Greece.
Theodoret in his letter to Leo: I await the sentence of your Apostolic See, and I beseech and implore your Holiness to come to my aid, as I appeal to your just and righteous judgment, etc. Sozomen, Book 3, chapter 9: Since, by reason of the dignity of his own See, the care of all things pertained to him, he restored each one to his own Church — where he speaks of Julius I, whom he says restored Athanasius to the see of Alexandria and Paul to that of Constantinople.
Justinian the Elder Augustus likewise, in his letter to John found in the Code, Title 1: We do not permit anything pertaining to the state of the Churches to be unknown to your Holiness, which is the head of all the holy Churches.
The Latin Fathers teach the same consistently. St. Cyprian, Book 1, Letter 8: God is one, he says, and Christ is one, and the Church is one, and one Chair founded upon Peter by the Lord’s word: another altar cannot be set up, nor a new priesthood made, apart from the one altar and the one priesthood; whoever gathers elsewhere, scatters. Here Cyprian teaches that just as God is one and the Church is one, so there is also one Chair — namely the first and principal one — which contains, governs, and teaches all the other Churches; and that this Chair is the Chair of Peter, founded by the voice of the Lord.
Likewise in the same Book, Letter 3 to Cornelius, where speaking of the schism of the Novatians who refused to acknowledge Cornelius as Pontiff, he writes: For heresies have arisen and schisms have been born for no other reason than this, that obedience is not given to the priest of God; nor is it considered that there is at any one time in the Church one priest and one judge in the place of Christ: if the whole brotherhood would obey him according to the divine teachings, no one would stir up anything against the college of priests. The same writer in Book 4, Letter 8, calls the Roman Church the root and matrix of the Catholic Church; and in his book On the Unity of the Church says that heresies arise from not returning to the origin of truth, nor seeking the head, nor keeping the doctrine of the heavenly Master — and immediately afterward he explains where that origin of truth, and head, and doctrine of the heavenly Master are to be sought: The proof, he says, is easy and brief by the compendium of truth: the Lord speaks to Peter in Matthew chapter 16: I say to thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and to thee I will give the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, etc. The same, he says, after the Resurrection says in John 21: Feed my sheep. And then a little further on he adds: That he might manifest unity, he established one Chair, and by his authority arranged that the unity of the same origin begin from one. By which words he plainly declares that from the Chair of Peter the origin of unity depends, and that it is the Head and contains the doctrine of the heavenly Master.
But notwithstanding these things, the heretics contend that Cyprian stands on their side and that he does not acknowledge the Roman Pontiff as having power over the whole Church. They allege first from his book On the Unity of the Church, where he writes: The episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each in its entirety — therefore, they say, there is not one Bishop of the whole Church, but rather there exist many Bishops who each hold one part of the episcopate in its entirety and administer it.
For a fuller understanding of these words, it must be noted that the purpose of Cyprian in that passage is to declare that all those who through heresy or schism abandon the unity of the Church and the Chair of Peter upon which the Church is founded — as he says in the preceding passages — cannot and ought not to expect the rewards promised by Christ to the Church and its children, but will be deprived of the goods of Christ. He shows this to the end that some, flattering themselves deceitfully, might not suppose that although they separate themselves from the body of the Church, yet because they profess the name and religion of Christ in their own conventicles according to their own sense, they would not therefore be deprived of the merits and benefits of Christ.
To demonstrate this, he teaches that the Church is one, and the episcopate is one and undivided — and he proves this first because Christ builds the Church upon one, namely upon him to whom it was said: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church — whence, he says, the Primacy is given to Peter so that one Church of Christ and one Chair might be shown. Second, he demonstrates the same from chapter 6 of the Song of Songs, where the Holy Spirit, speaking in the person of the Lord, designates one Church in these words: My dove, my perfect one, is one, etc. Of this one episcopate he admits there are many parts, but which must be held by each in their entirety — that is, without being split off or divided from the whole.
These things being premised, it is replied by denying the consequence with respect to the first part of the consequent: because it can stand simultaneously that of the whole episcopate there is one universal Bishop, and that of its individual parts there are individual Bishops who hold one part whole, not torn or rent asunder, but cohering with and joined to the whole episcopate — just as of the entire governance of, say, Belgium, there can be one Governor-General, and yet a certain part of it can be held by several in entirety without separation from the one governance, inasmuch as individual provinces also have their individual Governors adhering to the same general governance.
Moreover, that part of the episcopate must be so held by each in entirety without separation, that if anyone separates it, he thereby loses the nature and status of the episcopate. This Cyprian beautifully declares in the same place, because namely this episcopate is one, and the Church is one, yet in such a way that it is extended more broadly into a multitude by the increase of fruitfulness: As the rays of the sun are many, but the light is one; and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded in its deep root; and as many rivers flow from one source, but unity is preserved in the origin. Just as therefore a ray of the sun cannot be severed from its body because unity does not admit division of light; and just as a branch cut from the tree cannot bud, he says, and a river cut off from its source dries up — so also no part of this episcopate, nor any part of the Church, separated from the body, can subsist in its own proper condition.
For although the parts of the Church and its episcopate are spread widely and far, yet, says Cyprian, there is one head and one origin, and one mother, fruitful and rich in successive offspring. And therefore anyone is mistaken who thinks he can tear off one part and constitute a particular Church of Christ severed from the rest of the body — because by that very act of being separated from the head, which is one, and from the origin, which is one, it must forthwith die and be unable to bring forth fruit, but will wither away, as is shown by the likenesses cited by Cyprian.
But someone will say: Cyprian teaches that a part of this episcopate, which is one, is held in entirety by each individual — therefore a part is also held by the Roman Bishop, and therefore not the whole.
It is replied: it is true that a certain part of that episcopate is also held by the Roman Pontiff, insofar as he is specifically the Bishop of the Roman See; but this does not mean that he does not also hold the whole. In the same way, a certain part is held by each of the Governors of Belgium in entirety, insofar as individual provinces have their own Governor, and yet one Governor also holds the whole governance, insofar as the Governor-General reserves to himself the particular governance of one province. Thus, therefore, he who is placed over this part which is the particular Church of Rome simultaneously receives the universal governance of the episcopate of the whole Church; because this part which is committed to him to govern holds in the Church the place which the root holds in the tree, the head in the body, and the source in the streams of water — and therefore his power extends itself to all the other parts.
I said moreover in the first response to the argument that the consequence must be denied in respect of the first part of the consequent, but not in respect of the posterior part — because it is true that of that great episcopate of which Cyprian speaks there are many true Bishops, each of whom holds one part of it; for any particular Bishop of any Church is a true Bishop, not a Vicar of the Pontiff.
They object secondly, from the same Cyprian, that when present at the Council of Carthage he spoke to his fellow-brethren thus: Neither does any of us set himself up as a Bishop of Bishops; nor by tyrannical terror does any compel his colleague to the necessity of obedience; since every Bishop has, according to the allowance of his liberty and power, his own proper right of judgment, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another; but let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the only and sole one who has power to judge of our acts — as St. Augustine reports in Book 2, On Baptism Against the Donatists, chapter 3, and Book 6.
128 It is replied that St. Cyprian is speaking only of the Bishops gathered in the Provincial Council of Carthage, of whom he rightly and deservedly said that none of them had set himself up as Bishop of Bishops — for indeed none of them was such. But this does not prejudice the Roman Pontiff, who was not present there, nor was included in that number.

As for what he adds in the same place — that our Lord Jesus Christ alone has the power of judging their acts — it is replied that this is to be understood in a limited sense, according to the subject matter with which Cyprian is there dealing. The meaning would be: that while some obscure and controverted matter is being examined in a Council, then for the more secure and certain investigation of truth, it is lawful for each Bishop to freely state his opinion on the matter, without having to fear on that account the judgment or ecclesiastical censure of anyone else — but that as to whether he conducts himself well or badly, sincerely or deceitfully in this, he is left to be judged by the Lord.

This is how Augustine understands it in Book 3, chapter 3 of the work cited above, where after reciting the aforementioned words of Cyprian he adds: I therefore think that in these questions that have not yet been discussed with the most refined clarity — for he knew how great a depth of Scripture the whole Church was then turning over in diverse disputation — namely whether baptism conferred by heretics was valid — he was making the right of inquiry free, so that examined truth might be laid open. For that a Bishop who is a heretic or schismatic can be judged according to Cyprian’s opinion for his crime and even deposed by the Roman Pontiff is manifestly clear from his letter to Stephen, Book 3, Letter 13, where he advises and urges Stephen to order Marcianus, Bishop of Arles in Gaul, to be deposed and another to be established in his place: Let letters be sent by you to the province and to the people dwelling at Arles, by which, Marcianus being removed, another may be substituted in his place.

Ambrose, in his commentary on chapter 3 of 1 Timothy: Although the whole world is God’s, yet his house is said to be that of which the Rector today is Damasus. See the same Ambrose in Book 3, On the Sacraments, chapter 1, where he professes that in all things he desires to follow the type and form of the Roman Church.
You will say: Ambrose also adds in the same place: But we too have a mind; therefore what is observed more correctly elsewhere — meaning more correctly than at Rome — we also observe correctly. Therefore Ambrose did not think that he could be absolutely prejudiced in everything by the Roman Church.
It is replied: that as regards those things which were held or observed as necessary for salvation by the Roman Church, Ambrose undoubtedly permitted himself to be prejudiced in all of them, and to have the doctrine or tradition of the Roman Church prescribed to him. But in certain lesser things which were freely observed in different ways among different people, he did not consider himself bound to the usage and custom of the Roman Church — indeed if in such a case something seemed to be done more correctly or more fittingly elsewhere than at Rome, he thought it preferable to follow that rather than what was done at Rome. Of this kind was the ceremony of washing the feet of the baptized, which is what Ambrose is discussing there.
Optatus of Milevis, in his book against Parmenianus, chapter 3, sets down five marks of the Catholic Church, and says the first is the unique and singular Chair of Peter, in which unity must be preserved by all. That this singular Chair belongs not only to Peter but also to his successors, he shows by enumerating the Roman Pontiffs down to Siricius, as we reported above.
St. Jerome, in his letter to Gerontia on monogamy: Some years ago, he says, when I was assisting Damasus, Bishop of the city of Rome, in matters of ecclesiastical correspondence, and was responding to the synodical consultations of the East and the West, etc. From which it is clear that from the whole world, from all the Churches of both East and West, recourse was had in questions and difficulties to the Roman See, and responses and determinations were sought from it.
Likewise in his letter to Damasus: On the name of hypostasis — though the greatness of your dignity frightens me, your humanity invites me: I, the sheep, seek protection from the Shepherd; I speak with the successor of the Fisherman and the disciple of the Cross. Following no one as first but Christ, I unite myself with your Beatitude, that is, with the Chair of Peter — whoever eats the lamb outside this house is profane. And a little further on: I know not Vitalis, I reject Meletius, I know not Paulinus: whoever does not gather with you, scatters, etc.
Note here: first, that Jerome, although he was a priest of Antioch and its Bishop was Paulinus, yet counts himself a sheep of Damasus. Second, that Damasus is called by Jerome the successor of the Fisherman, that is, of Peter. Third, that Jerome wishes to adhere to Damasus even after setting aside all the Bishops of Palestine under whom he himself lived. Fourth, that he holds all to be profane who eat the lamb outside this house of which Damasus was the Rector — that is, those who receive or administer the Sacraments outside the Church that adheres to Damasus.
But the heretics object from a letter of the same Jerome to Evagrius, where he writes: If authority is sought, the world is greater than a city; wherever a Bishop may be — whether at Rome, or at Eugubium, or at Alexandria, or at Tanis — he is of the same merit and the same priesthood; the power of riches and the humility of poverty do not make a Bishop higher or lower. Therefore, they say, St. Jerome did not consider either the Roman Church or the Roman Pontiff to be the head of the other Churches or of the Bishops.
It is replied by denying the Consequence. For he left a sufficiently clear testimony to the contrary in the passages cited above. As for the objected text, the response is as follows. In the first place, he is there dealing with a certain particular custom or abuse which Deacons were introducing at Rome — namely that they began to make themselves equal to, or even to be placed above, Presbyters, and to sit among them; and this because they were fewer in number and presided over the treasuries and revenues of the Church and their distribution, whereby they began to elevate themselves and others began to venerate them, as is accustomed to happen even in our time with those who administer monetary affairs. St. Jerome took this ill, and adds: What ails this dispenser of tables and of widows, that he should arrogantly lift himself above those at whose prayers the body and blood of Christ is made? He therefore reproves this custom that had begun in the Roman Church — and rightly so, because the ancient usage, in conformity with and proportioned to the dignity and state of each order, required that when Presbyters sat with the Bishop, the Deacons stood and did not sit. In such customs and practices which have not been approved by Superiors but have been introduced abusively through ambition or greed by some, the authority of the world is greater than that of the city. This teaching is consistent with that of St. Ambrose which we just explained.
That the Pontiff did not himself approve of this, the same Jerome indicates when he writes that he had seen in the Roman Church a Deacon sitting among the Presbyters — but in the absence of the Bishop. They were presuming therefore in the absence of the Pontiff what they would not have dared to do in his presence.
As for the other point, where Jerome says that all Bishops are of the same merit and priesthood, it is replied that Jerome understands this by looking at and evaluating the Episcopate from the standpoint of the dignity and power of orders — for in that respect all are of the same merit or dignity and of the same priesthood. But not according to the criterion of jurisdiction. For he knew that the Patriarch of Alexandria had wider jurisdiction than the Bishop of Tanis — whom he nevertheless compares with one another, the former presiding over three great provinces and the latter over only one small town, for which reason undoubtedly greater honor and respect was also owed and given to the latter. But Jerome here attends only to that which is most principal and noble in a Bishop, namely the Sacrament of Orders.
St. Augustine, Letter 126: In the Roman Church the Principate of the Apostolic See has always flourished. Likewise Letter 92 to Innocent: Since the Lord has placed you by a special gift of grace in the Apostolic See, and has made you such in our times, it will rather count as negligence on our part, if we are silent before your Veneration about the things that ought to be brought to the Church’s attention, etc. Here Augustine together with the whole Council of Milevis asks Pope Innocent to deign to apply Pastoral care to the Church, namely by restraining the Pelagians who were infecting Palestine and Africa. He would certainly not ask this of him unless he believed him to be the Pastor of Palestine and Africa as well — and that his authority there was greater than that of any other Bishop or Patriarch of those places. See the same Augustine in Book 1 To Boniface, chapter 1.
Prosper, Book 2, On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 6: Rome, through the Principate of the Priesthood, has been made more ample in the citadel of religion than in the throne of power. We cited a similar saying from St. Leo above.
Finally, passing over many others, let there be the last witness — St. Bernard, whom Calvin also cites in his favor and calls a saint — who in Book 2, On Consideration to Eugenius, writes thus: Come, let us investigate still more diligently who you are, what role you bear for the time being in the Church of God: Who are you? A great Priest, the Supreme Pontiff; you are the Prince of Bishops, you are the heir of the Apostles. And a little further on: Thou art he to whom the keys were given, to whom the sheep were entrusted; there are indeed others who are doorkeepers of heaven and shepherds of flocks, but thou the more gloriously, the more eminently hast inherited both names above all others. Which he goes on to explain thus: They have flocks assigned to them, each to his own; to thee all are entrusted, to one one; nor only of sheep but also of shepherds art thou the one Shepherd of all. And much more follows.
Calvin, however, objects many things which the same Bernard writes in the same work On Consideration against the abuses and vices of the Roman Curia. But these require correction and amendment, not dissolution — for as the same Bernard teaches in Sermon 66 on the Canticles, evil customs of Prelates do not prevent their still being Prelates and our being bound to obey them, since the Lord says in Matthew 23: What they say, do; but according to their works, do not do.
It is proved finally by reason. First, because no Bishop has ever asserted himself to be the successor of Peter in the primacy and general care of the Church, nor has any such been regarded, except the Bishop of Rome. For although the Bishop of Antioch has been acknowledged as the successor of Peter with respect to the particular Episcopate of the Church of Antioch, where Peter had first resided, yet no one ever considered the Bishop of Antioch to have succeeded Peter in the universal Pontificate of the Church — because when Peter left the See of Antioch and another succeeded him there, he did not abandon the universal governance and care of the Church.
Hence also in the Nicene Council, Canon 6, the Bishop of Antioch is declared only the third Patriarch; nor have the Bishops of Antioch claimed a higher place or rank. But we showed in the preceding Doubt that the Pontificate of Peter was not temporary for the duration of his life, but perpetual by succession — therefore, etc.
This is confirmed: because no time can be designated at which the primacy of the Church began to be attributed to the Bishop of Rome without its being demonstrable that from an earlier time the Primacy was acknowledged in the Roman Bishop all the way back to the Apostle Peter — therefore it must be said that the Bishop of Rome has successively and simultaneously succeeded Peter both in the Roman Episcopate and in the universal Pontificate, or Primacy of the whole Church. Hence rightly does Gregory I, Book 6, Letter 37 to Eulogius: Peter himself exalted the See in which he also deigned to rest and to end his present life.
It is proved secondly by the argument drawn from the authority which the Roman Pontiffs have always exercised over the Bishops of the whole world with respect to institution, deposition, and restoration. Thus in the Council of Chalcedon, Action 7, it is read that Maximus, Bishop of Antioch, was confirmed by Leo; and concerning the confirmation of the Bishop of Constantinople the same Leo writes in Letter 54 to Marcian: You know that by the help of your piety and with the assent of my favor, he obtained the Episcopate of so great a city. Many examples of recourse to the Roman See for deposition or restoration can be gathered from the above-cited opinions of the Pontiffs and the holy Fathers.
It is proved thirdly from the authority of enacting laws and decrees, and of dispensing and punishing, which the Roman Pontiffs have always exercised over all the sons of the Church everywhere, however great and however far distant. Thus when Pius I had decreed that Easter should not be celebrated with the Jews on the 14th day of the first month, but on the following Sunday, and the Asians refused to comply, Victor I excommunicated them all, as Eusebius writes in Book 5 of the History, chapter 24.
Nor does what Calvin objects against our position present any obstacle — namely that Irenaeus and some others rebuked Victor for that act — because they did not rebuke him as if he had done something which he had no power to do, or as if he had exercised power over those not subject to him, but because that action had not been undertaken prudently and with consideration for the good of the Church. Hence Eusebius writes about this: There are extant even their own letters in which they rebuke Victor more sharply, as one who was not consulting the good of the Church usefully. Therefore those men judged that Victor had done what he was able to do, but not what he ought to have done according to prudence, as they saw it.
Meanwhile he had his reasons for which he also acted prudently, even though others did not know them. For at that time a certain Blastus was beginning to secretly introduce Judaism, teaching that Easter was to be observed only according to the law of Moses on the 14th day of the month, as Tertullian says in the book On Prescriptions — and he was sowing this at Rome, as Eusebius reports above in chapter 15. Therefore, in order to oppose this more effectively, Victor rightly judged that the law of his predecessor Pius, concerning not celebrating Easter with the Jews, ought to be urged more strongly and put into execution everywhere.
Innocent I excommunicated the Emperor Arcadius, resident in Constantinople, and his wife, on account of the exile of Chrysostom, as is clear from the letter of the same Innocent found in Nicephorus, Book 13 of the History, chapter 34. Nicholas I threatened Lothair the King with excommunication, and in fact excommunicated his concubine and the Archbishops of Cologne and Trier. Leo I in Letter 1 imposes four laws on all Bishops established throughout Campania, Picenum, Tuscany, and all the provinces, and finally adds: Whoever acts contrary to this, let him know that he is to be removed from his office. Similarly in Letter 81 to Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, he imposes two commands and adds that he wishes these to be observed by him. Gregory I frequently did the same, as is clear from his letters — who also dispensed with the English regarding prohibited degrees when they were first converted, as is clear from Letter 31 of Book 12 of his Register.
The fourth reason is drawn from appeals lodged with the Roman Pontiff from the whole world by Bishops and other Churches — so that from the judgment of others it was always possible to appeal to him, but from his sentence it was not possible to appeal to others. This is the most manifest indication of his Primacy over the whole Church. This right of appeal is also confirmed in the general Council of Sardica, celebrated shortly after the Nicene Council, with which it is almost counted as one, because it deals with the same matters and only defines and determines them more explicitly — hence it is not enumerated among the general Councils as distinct from it. But its Canon 4 reads: If any Bishop has been deposed and shall have proclaimed that he has a case to plead in the city of Rome, no other shall be ordained in his see unless the cause has first been determined by the judgment of the Bishop of Rome.
Thus Athanasius, deposed by the Eastern Bishops, appealed to Julius I, who also restored him, as Sozomen reports in Book 3 of the History, chapter 7 — and this happened before the Council of Sardica, lest anyone should perhaps suppose that this right belonged to the Roman Pontiff only by concession of the Council. Chrysostom, deposed by Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, appealed to Innocent I, as is clear from his two letters to Innocent. Fortunatus and Felix, deposed in Africa by Cyprian and other fellow-Bishops, appealed to Pope Cornelius, as is clear from Letter 3 of Cyprian, Book 1. Likewise Basilides, deposed in Spain, appealed to Stephen, as the same Cyprian attests, Book 1, Letter 4.
Nor does it matter that Letter 3 as cited — as also Letter 4 — reproves those who had appealed to the Roman Pontiff. For he does not reprove them as if there were no right of appeal to the Roman See; but he reproves them in this: that after their causes had, in accordance with synodal statutes, been examined in their own places, and their crimes had been plainly detected — indeed so that they were established even by their own confession, as he reports of Basilides — they nonetheless ran about to the city, undoubtedly with no other aim or hope than to be able to mislead the Roman Pontiff, who was at a greater distance, and to harass and bring trouble upon the Bishops by whom they had been judged. And thus, as Cyprian says in the same place, so that by their deceitful and fraudulent audacity they might shatter the cohering harmony of the Bishops.
Moreover, that Cyprian wishes nothing other than this is clearly gathered from Letter 4 cited above, where after reproving Basilides for this reason he immediately adds: Nor is he — meaning Pope Stephen — so much to be blamed, who was carelessly deceived, as this man is execrable, who fraudulently deceived him. Where although he appears to blame Stephen somewhat for perhaps not having paid sufficient attention to whether the case of Basilides was such as to merit being admitted and heard in the Roman court, and to have thus been carelessly imposed upon — he nonetheless does not argue that he permitted the cause to be brought to him. This he would certainly most of all have condemned, if he had been persuaded that the Roman Pontiff had no right to hear Bishops of other Churches in their causes and appeals, and that this was not the practice — for such would have been an intolerable presumption and rashness on the part of the Roman Bishop. You will say: Cyprian in the same Letter 3 seems to reprove those appellants in this, that by so doing they show that the authority of the Bishops established in Africa is considered less among them than that of the Bishop of Rome — therefore, etc.
It is replied: Cyprian reproves them in that they seem to judge the authority of the Bishops of Africa as less — not less than that of the Roman Pontiff, since he does not add that — but less than what suffices to adjudicate their cause. This he rightly reproves, because their cause was clear and evident and presented no difficulty, as we said. Therefore there was no need of a higher power or authority, but the authority of the Bishops established in Africa was plainly sufficient for so manifest a cause.
The fifth reason is drawn from this: that the Roman Pontiffs had everywhere in other places their own Vicars, yet wished graver causes to be referred to themselves — from which it is clear that they had power over the whole Church. Thus Leo I had Anastasius, Bishop of Thessalonica, as his Vicar in the East, as is clear from Letter 84. Pope Hormisdas had Salastius for Spain, as is clear from his letter to Salastius. Likewise Gregory had the Bishop of Arles for Gaul, as is clear from Letter 52 of Book 4; and Gelasius had the Bishop of Constantinople, as is clear from his letter to the Bishops of Dardania.
The sixth and final reason is: that the Bishop of Rome cannot be judged by anyone, as is clear from the Council of Sinuessa, which says that the first See is judged by no one, as Nicholas I reports in his letter to the Emperor Michael. Also from the Roman Council under Sylvester, Canon 18, which reads: No one shall judge the first See, since all the Sees desire justice to be administered from the first See; and the Judge shall not be judged by Augustus, nor by a King, nor by the whole clergy, nor by the people. Nicholas I also mentions this Canon, as cited above. Similar things are found in the Roman Council under Adrian, whose words are cited in the Eighth General Synod, Action 7: We read that the Roman Pontiff has judged the Prelates of all the Churches; but that anyone has judged him, we do not read.
Nor does it matter that Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, at some time presumed to pass sentence against the first See by excommunicating the Roman Pontiff — because the Council of Chalcedon condemned this same Dioscorus both for other reasons and especially for this, as is clear from the letter of that Council to Leo I, found in Action 3.
And the fundamental reason is that the true Superior and Prince of the whole Church holds his power not from the Church, but directly from Christ the Lord. Hence even the whole Church together has no authority over him, and much less do secular rulers — for their task is of themselves to care for what pertains to the external and temporal tranquility of the commonwealth, which is entirely ordered toward the spiritual good as its end. The procurement of this good and end belongs to the Pontiff as the supreme Prince and King of sacred things.
But against what has been said above, it is objected first: St. Gregory, in Letter 32 of Book 4, strongly reproves the name of “Universal Bishop” and says it is a name of blasphemy; and elsewhere that it is profane and sacrilegious, and that his predecessors did not wish to accept or use that name, even though it had been offered to them by the Council of Chalcedon in honor of Blessed Peter.
For the explanation of St. Gregory, it must be noted that the name “Universal Bishop” can be understood in two ways. One way, as excluding from all other Bishops the true nature of a Bishop — so that they would be regarded as having only the office and character of a Vicar of him who is or is called the universal Bishop, and would not be true Bishops of their own Churches, just as Apostolic Nuncios or Legates, in the places in which they exercise their legation, act in the place of the Pontiff but are not the Bishops of those places. Another way, one may be called universal Bishop who has care of the whole Church, but in a general and higher sort of way, such that it does not exclude the particular Bishops of particular Churches — just as the King of Spain is the universal Lord of Belgium, having the supreme lordly authority over the whole of Belgium, who nevertheless does not prevent many Dukes and Counts from being also true particular lords of certain places in Belgium.
It is therefore replied that St. Gregory speaks more harshly about the name “Universal Bishop” and does not wish to accept it, understanding it according to its first meaning, according to which in truth it belongs to no one, and it is not to be tolerated that it be attributed to anyone in that sense. That Gregory is speaking about that name in that sense is clear: first, from that same letter, when he says: But let this name of blasphemy be far from the hearts of Christians, in which the honor of all the Priests is taken away while it is madly arrogated to himself by one; and from Letter 34, where he writes: It is sad that it should be patiently borne that, all being despised, the said brother and fellow-Bishop should strive to be called Bishop alone; and Letter 36 of the same Book 4: If one Patriarch is called universal, the name of Patriarch is derogated from the rest; and Book 7, Letter 69: If one is universal, it remains that you are not Bishops. St. Gregory therefore took that name in the sense in which it deprives others of the true character of Bishop, when he thus argued against it.
That in its posterior meaning, according to which we speak of it, it can also be attributed to the Roman Pontiff even according to the mind of St. Gregory, is demonstrated from his own writings. First, because in the same letter he writes that it is clear to all who know the Gospel that by the Lord’s voice the care of the whole Church was committed to the holy Apostle Peter, the Prince of all the Apostles. For to him it is said in John 21: Peter, dost thou love me? Feed my sheep; to him it is said in Luke 22: Behold, Satan hath desired to sift you; to him it is said in Matthew 26: Thou art Peter, and upon this rock, etc. Behold, he says, he receives the keys of the heavenly kingdom; in Matthew chapter 16, the power of binding and loosing is granted to him; the care of the whole Church and the Principate is committed to him — and yet he is not called Universal Bishop. Here he manifestly allows that the meaning of that name in its posterior acceptation belongs to Peter — for we understand by the name Universal Bishop nothing other than him who has the care and principate of the whole Church, without exclusion of other particular ones from the true character of Bishop — though he meanwhile adds that Peter was not called Universal Bishop, namely in that sense by which this name would exclude others from the true character of Bishop.
Secondly, because he acknowledges in the same place that the Council of Chalcedon — which he himself everywhere acknowledges as true and Catholic, as indeed it was — attributed that name to the Roman Bishop in honor of Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles; and yet he does not reprove the Synod, although he commends his predecessors who did not use it. Therefore he understood that that name in a certain sense is fitting and can be attributed to the Roman Bishop — although for diverse considerations they preferred not to assume it.
Thirdly, although the Roman Pontiffs did not call themselves “Universal Bishops” — as Gregory rightly notes — they did call themselves “Bishops of the Universal Church,” which as regards the substance of the matter coincides with what we are saying about that name. This is established from Letter 2 of Sixtus I, Letter 1 of Victor I, and Letters 54, 62, and 65 of Leo.
But someone will ask: if that name admits a fitting meaning, why does St. Gregory so reject and detest it? It is replied, first of all, on account of the ambiguity of the name; and because it was new and unaccustomed in the Church, and was being broadly apprehended by everyone in the prior signification — whence the greatest difficulties and contradictions arose among all the Bishops when the Bishop of Constantinople wished rashly and arrogantly to claim that name for himself. About this he writes in the same letter cited: Behold, all are scandalized by this matter. Furthermore, because this name was being sought for a person to whom it was in no way or sense fitting. Therefore, both to calm the commotion of the other Bishops arising from the novelty of this Bishop of Constantinople, and to more easily suppress his arrogance and rashness, St. Gregory judged that this name should be entirely eliminated, just as he himself likewise did not wish to assume it, although by true reasons he could have; but he preferred to call himself the servant of all priests, as he calls himself in the same place.
It is objected secondly: St. Augustine in Letter 162 writes that the cause of Caecilianus was judged by the Pontiff together with certain others at the command of the Emperor; and then judged a second time by the Bishop of Arles, the Emperor so willing; and then judged a third time by the Emperor himself — therefore the Pontiff is not the supreme Prince and Judge of the Church.
This is confirmed: because he judged not on his own initiative but at the command of the Emperor, in a cause that was plainly ecclesiastical, dealing as it did with the deposition of a Bishop. Moreover, if he were the Supreme and Sovereign authority, the cause could not after his judgment have been referred to the Bishop of Arles, nor finally been judged by the Emperor.
It is replied by denying the Consequence. As for what is adduced for confirmation, it must be said that the Pontiff judged only when the Emperor so ordained, because the Donatists who were prosecuting the cause against Caecilianus had not first brought it to the Pontiff as they should have, but in the manner of heretics and schismatics, evading the judgment of the Pontiff, had brought the matter to the Emperor — in which they acted badly, as Augustine teaches in the same place, and adds that Constantine acted more correctly in not daring to judge a cause first brought to himself.
To this I add: the Pontiff permitted these others assigned by the Emperor to sit and judge with him, in order to satisfy the Donatists, who otherwise held the judgment of the Pontiff suspect. I say thirdly: that after the Pontiff, the Bishop of Arles and later the Emperor judged again, not because it was necessary or ought to have been so — as Augustine says in the same place — but so that the Donatists might be most fully satisfied and their mouths completely stopped. Hence also the Emperor, who was about to seek pardon from the Bishops, unwillingly took cognizance of that cause, as Augustine attests in the same letter. From which it is clear that this act does nothing against the Primacy of the Roman See.
It is objected thirdly: the Pontiff can be judged and deposed by the Church, at least in the case of heresy — therefore he is not above the whole Church. The Antecedent is proved: first, by the argument of Cajetan who holds this, because the body of Cardinals can elect a Pope and be the cause of the Pontificate being applied to this person — therefore if the Pope became a heretic, it could also separate the Primacy and Pontificate from this person and depose him. It is proved secondly: because otherwise the Church could at some time have a heretical man as its head, which seems absurd — for it is not credible that Christ wishes to retain as his Vicar one who holds and fosters false doctrine and thus does not supply the true food of heavenly doctrine to the flock of the faithful.
It is replied by denying the Antecedent. As to the first proof, it is replied by denying the Consequence. For when a Pope is elected, he is not yet their Superior — therefore the Electors do not exercise power over a Superior, but only designate the person upon whom Christ confers superiority and supreme power. Furthermore, election is not an act of jurisdiction over him who is elected, nor is it necessarily exercised with respect to an inferior — it can also be exercised with respect to an equal or superior. But if the same persons were to depose the Pope, they would then need to exercise power over a superior, because he is now superior, and indeed throughout the entire time and every moment before he is deposed or deprived. Furthermore, to depose is a kind of punishment — but it does not befit inferiors to punish superiors; quite the contrary. Cajetan himself, however, acknowledges that the Church is not above the Pontiff — from which it evidently follows that it cannot depose him. From all this therefore the reason for the distinction is clear, and why the argument does not proceed.
To the other proof it is replied by denying the Assumption, if we speak of a manifest heretic. And the reason is that the Pope, by the very fact that he becomes a manifest heretic — though not deposed by the Church — would nonetheless by that very fact cease to be Pope and Head of the Church, just as he ceases to be a Catholic and a member or part of the Church; because he remains united to or cohering with the body of the Church neither by internal nor by any external bond. For as St. Jerome rightly says on those words of Paul in Titus chapter 2, A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: Other sinners are excluded from the Church by the sentence of excommunication; but heretics depart of themselves and are cut off from the body of Christ. Similarly the other Fathers commonly teach that a manifest heretic is not a Christian — thus Cyprian, Book 4, Letter 2; Athanasius, Sermon 2 against the Arians; Augustine, On the Grace of Christ, chapter 20, and elsewhere. If therefore the Pope by manifest heresy ceases to be a Christian and a member of the Church, it follows necessarily that he ceases to be head and Pontiff.
I said, speaking of a manifest heretic; because the case is different with a hidden one. For it is truer that the Pope through internal and hidden heresy — even if he should fall into it, whether this can happen is a matter of debate, of which more below — does not lose the Pontificate, nor cease to be the head of the Church; because he at least adheres to the Church by external profession of the faith and remains in some manner its member. And since the Church does not rely on his internal thoughts but on his external doctrines, his hidden heresy would not bring harm to the Church with respect to the true doctrine and profession of the faith. Although it may seem in some way troublesome and quasi-violent that such a person should sustain the chair and profession of the truth of the Christian faith, nevertheless this can harm the Church less than if he were deprived of the Pontificate on account of internal or hidden heresy — both on account of the many calumnies which could on that occasion be devised and constructed against the Pontiff, not without great dangers of disturbance and schism, and also because the Church would more often be doubtful and uncertain about its head.
It must therefore be noted that if a Council were to declare the Pontiff to be liable to heresy, this ought not on that account to be considered as deposing the Pontiff. Rather, positing the declaration of the Council as a condition sine qua non — if the heresy were not otherwise notorious by the evidence of the fact — he would be deprived by Christ himself, or by Christ’s institution; and thus, without any human person’s judicial authority intervening in the deposition, the Pontiff would of himself cease to be Pontiff and head of the Church.

DOUBT III.
By What Right Is the Roman Bishop the Successor of Peter in the Primacy of the Church?

I RESPOND and Say First: It was ordained by divine right, or by the institution of Christ, when Christ conferred upon Peter the Pontificate of the universal Church, that in perpetual future times he would have some successor in the same office. This is sufficiently established from what was said in the preceding Doubt, chiefly around the first Conclusion.
I Say Secondly: It does not seem that it was at the same time and simultaneously defined by Christ that the future Bishop of this or that particular and determinate Church — to be founded and governed by Peter himself as its particular Bishop — should succeed Peter in the Primacy. This is proved because it seems that Peter was free never to choose any particular See for himself, since for the first five years he assumed none. Furthermore, it appears that he was free to assume indifferently either this or that Church. Hence he first resided in the Church of Antioch and afterward changed it. But if it had happened that Peter died in those times before he had established and fixed his Chair at Rome, the Bishop of this determinate Roman Church — who now succeeds — would not have succeeded to the Primacy; but rather either one whom the Church had delegated, or certainly the Bishop of Antioch, if he had died in that See. Therefore Christ, from the beginning when he instituted the Primacy with its future succession, did not at the same time and immediately determine the manner of succeeding, nor designate a certain successor as Bishop of some determinate Church.
I Say Thirdly: From the act of Peter has its beginning the succession by which the Roman Bishop succeeds to the universal Pontificate rather than the Bishop of Antioch or anyone else — because Peter left the See of Antioch, fixed his See at Rome, and chose for himself the particular Episcopate of that Church, holding it until his death. This is the common opinion of all the Doctors, and the holy Fathers acknowledge the Roman See as the first, as being the See and Chair of Peter.
I Say Fourthly: It does not appear, however, that Peter did this by his own will alone, but by the intimation and command made to him by Christ the Lord, who thus willed that the Pontificate of the universal Church should in perpetuity be annexed to the Roman Episcopate. And so the Roman Bishop can by divine right be called the successor of Peter in the Primacy. This Conclusion is not altogether certain as a matter of faith, but is nevertheless most probable and very consonant with divine providence, as Driedo teaches in Book 4, chapter 3, part 4, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas and Writings, and Bellarmine in Book 4, chapter 4, On the Pontiff.
It is proved first: because Pope Marcellus, a Pope and Martyr, writes in his letter to the Bishops of Antioch that Peter transferred his See from Antioch to Rome at the Lord’s command. The same is attested by St. Athanasius in his second Apology For His Flight, and by St. Ambrose in his Oration On the Surrender of the Basilicas, where they report that Christ entirely willed that Peter should die at Rome. Ambrose adds that when Peter was fleeing, Christ met him and said: I am coming to Rome to be crucified again — which is a manifest sign that God willed that through the death of Peter his See and Pontificate should be established at Rome.
St. Leo also signifies this in Sermon 1 on the Feast of the Apostles Peter and Paul, when he writes: Thou wast bringing the trophy of the Cross of Christ into the citadel of Rome, whither the honor of power and the glory of suffering led thee before by divine predestination.
It is proved secondly: because the holy Fathers indicate that perfidy can never gain access to the Roman Church. But this is only so by reason of the Pontificate and because its Bishop is the successor of Peter, for whom the Lord prayed — therefore they also judge that the Pontificate can never be separated from that Church. St. Cyprian, Book 1, Letter 3: They dare to sail to the Chair of Peter and the principal Church, etc., not thinking that these are Romans, to whom perfidy cannot have access. Jerome, Book 3 of the Apology Against Rufinus: Know that the Roman See, praised by the Apostolic voice, does not receive such impostures; though an angel should announce otherwise than what has once been preached, it cannot be changed, being fortified by the authority of Paul. Nazianzen in his poem On His Own Life: Ancient Rome from ancient times holds the right faith and always retains it, as befits a city which presides over the whole world always to have an upright faith concerning God. Therefore it is also rightly believed that the people and clergy of Rome as a whole can never fall away from the faith, so that there would be no faithful in the Roman Church adhering to the Pontiff.
It is proved thirdly: because very many and very grave difficulties have arisen for the Roman Pontiffs, such that there were most pressing reasons for transferring the Apostolic and first See elsewhere — and yet the Pontiffs never transferred the Primacy to another Church. Therefore they judged that according to divine ordinance this ought not to be done.
The Antecedent is clear: for in the first place, the pagan Emperors for three hundred years mounted the most grievous persecutions against the priests of God and the Pontiffs, to such an extent that they killed nearly all of them or had them deported into exile. They bore it most unwillingly that the seat of a Priest was established at Rome, so much so that St. Cyprian writes in Book 4, Letter 2, that the Emperors heard with far more patience and tolerance that a rival Prince was being raised up against them than that a Priest of God was being established at Rome.
Second, because the Goths also for very many years harassed Rome and ravaged it repeatedly, as is clear from the letter of Jerome to Principia on the death of Marcella, and from other histories. The Lombards likewise troubled Rome for many years. Third, the Roman people itself for many years was most hostile to the Pontiff, as is clear from the letters of Bernard — Letter 242 to the Roman people and Letter 242 to the Emperor — and from other histories. Finally, for seventy years the Pontiffs resided in France, yet they never separated the Pontificate from the Roman Church — therefore, etc.
The Conclusion is proved finally because by this arrangement it comes about that by the continuous and perpetual succession of the Supreme Priest in one See, all the faithful are rendered more certain and secure concerning the head of the Church; and therefore the head itself becomes more illustrious and visible to the whole world than if it were to reside in different Sees across different periods of time. Therefore it appears to have pertained to divine providence that, for the greater progress and solidity of the Church, it should ordain and institute that the Primacy of the Church should perpetually be united to one certain and determinate See, whose Episcopate would be elevated into the universal Pontificate. Therefore it must altogether be judged that this was done by Peter at the command of Christ.
Someone may ask: from whom does a new Pontiff receive his power? It is replied briefly: he receives it immediately from Christ the Lord, of whose Vicar he is the first and general in the Church Militant. This is the common teaching of the Doctors, both Theologians and Canonists. And the reason is this: all power is given either by a Superior, or by a multitude which in this matter has the right and authority to govern itself. But the Pontiff has no superior other than Christ. He does not receive this power from the multitude in the way that Kings and Emperors ordinarily receive it from the Republic — because a community cannot give a power which does not originally reside in itself. But it is manifest that this spiritual power of governing the Church of God does not originate in the people, but depends solely on Christ; and therefore it must be conferred by him.
Nor does it matter that the Pontiff is elected by the College of Cardinals, because in electing they only designate the person to whom Christ now entrusts his authority and grants the power of governing the Church — as we said before. Just as when Canons elect a Dean or the clergy elect a Bishop, it is not the electors who grant them the power of governing and administering, but the superior who institutes or confirms those already elected.

DOUBT IV.
Whether the Successor of Peter, or the Roman Pontiff, Is the Supreme Judge in Adjudicating Controversies of Faith and Morals

It is replied affirmatively, and is proved first from the Scriptures. For in Deuteronomy chapter 17 it is clearly taught that doubts arising in matters of religion must be referred to the Supreme Pontiff for adjudication: If thou perceive that there is among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment between blood and blood, cause and cause, leprosy and leprosy — and thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary, arise and go up to the place which the Lord thy God shall choose, and thou shalt come to the priest, etc. And further: But he that will be proud, and refuse to obey the commandment of the priest who ministereth at that time to the Lord thy God, and the decree of the judge, that man shall die, and thou shalt take away the evil from Israel.
Here it must be observed that two persons are distinguished in that text — the Pontiff and the judge or ruler — and that indeed the judgment of the cause is entrusted to the Priest, while the execution is entrusted to the ruler. 2 Chronicles chapter 19: Every question concerning the law, the commandment, the ceremonies, and the justifications shall be referred to the Levites and the Priests — and it is added: But Amariah your priest and pontiff shall preside in those matters which pertain to God.
John 21: it is said to Peter, Simon, son of John, feed my sheep. Here Peter is established as the universal Shepherd of the whole Church, and in him all his successors, as was demonstrated above in Doubts I and II. But it is the role of the Shepherd to discern and judge between pastures that are beneficial and those that are harmful to his flock — therefore, etc.
Hence St. Jerome, a man most learned, in a question and controversy about the three Hypostases, trusting neither in his own learning, nor in the opinion of the Eastern Bishops, nor even in the authority of his own Bishop Paulinus, Patriarch of Antioch, writes thus to Pope Damasus: The sheep begs protection from the Shepherd; decide, if you please — I will not be afraid to speak of three Hypostases if you command it. Here Jerome manifestly acknowledges the Roman Pontiff as the supreme Judge in matters of faith.
Similarly Theodoret, also a most learned man among the Greeks, writes to Leo I in these words: If Paul, the herald of truth, the trumpet of the Holy Spirit, ran to the great Peter to bring from him a resolution for those who at Antioch were contending about legal customs, how much more do we, who are humble and little, run to your Apostolic See to receive from you medicine for the wounds of the Churches.
Prosper in the Chronicle of the year 410: At a Council held at Carthage of two hundred and sixteen Bishops, he says, the synodal decrees were brought to Pope Zosimus; and upon his approving them, the Pelagian heresy was condemned throughout the whole world.
From all of which it is clear that Bishops and Fathers have always referred the supreme and final judgment in controversies of faith to the Roman See. St. Gregory, who was by everyone’s judgment a man most modest and assuming nothing arrogantly to himself, writes thus in Letter 52 of Book 4 to all the Bishops of Gaul: If any contention — which may divine power keep far away — should happen to arise over a matter of faith, or if any affair of great doubt should emerge and by reason of its gravity should require the judgment of the Apostolic See, let them take care, after the truth has been diligently examined, to bring it to our knowledge by their report, so that it may without doubt be settled by a fitting sentence from us.
It is proved finally by theological reasoning: because it has already been shown above that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of Peter in the primacy of the universal Church, and therefore is himself the Shepherd and head of the whole Church. But it is evident that to the supreme Prince of any commonwealth or community belongs the supreme and final judgment of all controversies which concern the condition of that commonwealth. Therefore the same must be said of the Roman Pontiff in adjudicating controversies of faith and morals — and this all the more, because he receives his power and supreme Pontificate not from the multitude or from the Church, but directly from God.

DOUBT V.
Whether the Judgment of the Pontiff in Adjudicating Controversies of Faith and Morals Is Certain and Infallible

For the resolution, let the FIRST CONCLUSION be: The judgment of the Roman Pontiff together with a general Council in defining controversies of faith or questions of morals is altogether infallible and most certain. This is the opinion of all Catholics, and the Conclusion is certain as a matter of faith against the heretics of our time, such as Luther in his book On Councils, and Calvin in Book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 9, and their other followers, who contend that the Pontiff even together with the whole general Council can err and teach and define heresy — and so they hold that this has in fact sometimes happened. Therefore they judge that no doctrine of the Church is ever to be held so certain that it is not always lawful to bring it back to the anvil and examine it, as Arminius says, against the Word of God as the Lydian stone; and so according to each person’s own dull mind it will be lawful to repudiate every doctrine handed down and received from the ancients and to thrust forward new fabrications and fantasies.
From this it would follow that there would be absolutely no certainty whatsoever about any opinion or conclusion of faith, not even if it were expressed word for word in the holy Scriptures — because it would be lawful for anyone to call its meaning into doubt and to refer it again to other passages of Scripture and examine it, notwithstanding that its plain meaning has hitherto been sufficiently clearly handed down and explained to the Church by the Apostles and Apostolic men, or even defined by the unanimous consent of the Church. This doctrine is in itself most absurd and sufficiently confutes itself. But the truth of the Conclusion will be more fully confirmed from what will be said both in the following Conclusions and in the Treatise on the Church which we will append.
I Say, and let this be the SECOND CONCLUSION: The judgment of the Pontiff in determining questions of faith, not only together with a general Council but also whenever he speaks from the Chair and teaches the whole Church with the obligation of believing and teaching accordingly, is altogether certain and infallible. This assertion is not only against the heretics, but also against certain Catholics — against Gerson and Almain On the Power of the Church; against Alphonsus a Castro, Book 1, chapters 2 and 4, Against Heresies; against Adrian in the 4th, question On Confirmation, to the second principal point near the end. It is however held commonly by other Catholics, so that the opposing opinion is held to be improbable. Thus it is held by St. Thomas here, article 10; Waldensis, Book 2 of The Doctrine of Faith, chapters 47 and 48; John of Torquemada, Book 2 of the Summa, chapter 109 and following; Driedo, Book 4, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 3, part 3; Cajetan, in the opuscule On the Power of the Pope and the Council; Eck, Book 3, On the Primacy of Peter, chapter 11; John of Louvain, On the Perpetual Protection and Firmness of the Chair of Peter, chapter 11; Peter Soto in his Apology, part 1, chapter 83 and following; Melchior Cano, Book 6, On Theological Places, chapter 3; and all more recent authors throughout.
It is proved first from the Scriptures: Matthew 16. Peter is declared the Rock upon which the Church is to be built, against which the gates of hell shall never prevail. That this was promised by Christ not to Peter alone for his own time, but in him to all his successors, was shown above — therefore the successor of Peter, or the Roman Pontiff, can never fail in sustaining the edifice of the Church. For if the foundation were shaken and were to fail in its office, the edifice would necessarily totter and fall at once, and so the gates of hell would prevail against the Church. But if the Pontiff, as universal Shepherd and teaching the Church from the Chair, were to hand down and propose to it erroneous doctrines and heresies to be held and believed, he would manifestly be failing in his role as foundation and support of the Church — because he would no longer be sustaining it, but inclining it toward ruin and causing it to collapse. Therefore it must altogether be said that this can by no means happen.
Someone will say: the Pontiff is the Rock and foundation of the Church and of sound faith, but only with the Church herself or the general Council also involved. But against this stands the fact that in that case the foundation would not provide solidity to the edifice, but would receive solidity from the edifice — which is contrary to all reason.
Luke 22: Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren. Here the Lord first prays that Peter, however much he might be tempted by the Devil, should not fall away from the faith. This is taught by Augustine in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 8: When he prayed that his faith should not fail, he prayed that he might have a most free, most strong, most unconquered, most persevering will in faith. And Chrysostom, Homily 83 on Matthew: He did not say, Thou shalt not deny, but, that thy faith fail not — for by his care and favor it came about that the faith of Peter should not altogether vanish. Theophylact has similar remarks in chapter 22 of Luke.
Now the Lord in this passage did not pray only for Peter, but also for the other Apostles, at least mediately. This is gathered first from the cause of the prayer which he premises, namely: Satan hath desired to sift you — he does not say Peter alone, but you. Then from what the Lord adds: And when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren — by which he signifies that he had obtained that however much Peter was to be disturbed in his confession of faith, he would nonetheless through the faith preserved be turned again to repentance, and that through the firmness of Peter in this way, the other Apostles also would afterward be confirmed in the faith.
And so Christ here obtained for Peter two gifts: the indefectibility of faith for his particular person — which the Fathers cited above signify — and the infallible firmness in rightly instructing and confirming the brethren in sound faith, which belongs to him insofar as he was to be the Primate and Prince among his fellow Apostles, whom Christ willed to be confirmed by Peter.
Whether moreover that first gift passes to his successor is debated, of which we shall say something below. But since the latter was obtained for him not so much for Peter’s own benefit as for the benefit of the brethren and fellow-Bishops and of all the faithful, there can be no doubt that this also pertains to his successors, and that Christ by this prayer of his obtained for them the same favor in the Church. Hence Almain admits that by this prayer it was obtained that the faith of the Church should never fail — but he holds that the Lord prayed proximately and immediately for the universal Church, or for Peter insofar as he bore the figure of the whole Church.
But all the circumstances of the text openly indicate that the Lord prayed peculiarly for Peter and for his successors, and for the rest through Peter, that they might receive through him what was fitting for their firmness. For first he addresses Peter twice by his proper name: Simon, Simon. Then, after having said Satan hath desired to sift you — meaning all the Apostles, and in them the whole Church — he suddenly changed from the plural form of speech and said: I have prayed for thee. Certainly if he had been praying proximately for the whole Church, he ought rather to have said: I have prayed for you — for there could have been no reason to change the form of speech.
Likewise he does not say: that your faith fail not, which could have been understood as said to the whole Church assembled together, but: that thy faith fail not. Third, because it is added: And when thou art converted — for this cannot be applied to the whole Church, unless we wish to say that the whole Church falls at some time, at least from its perpetual gift of holiness, so as to be converted again afterward. Fourth, because he for whom it is proximately prayed is told: Strengthen thy brethren — but the universal Church has no brethren whom it can or ought to confirm. Therefore Christ prayed immediately for Peter as Shepherd of the universal Church, and for his successors in that function, and obtained for them an infallible firmness so that they might perpetually and without error teach and confirm the brethren in matters of sound faith.
This meaning of the said Scripture passage, and at the same time the Conclusion itself, is finally confirmed by the authority of holy Pontiffs and Fathers.
Pope Lucius I, Pope and Martyr, Epistle 1 to the Bishops of Spain and Gaul: The Roman Church is Apostolic, and the mother of all Churches, which has never been found to have deviated from the path of Apostolic tradition, nor has it succumbed, corrupted by heretical innovations, according to the promise of the Lord himself, who said: I have prayed for thee, etc.
Felix I in his letter to Benignus, speaking of the Roman Church, says: As it received from the beginning of the Christian faith from its authors, the chief of the Apostles of Christ, it remains inviolate, according to that saying: I have prayed for thee, etc.
Leo, Sermon 3 on his own elevation: The special care of Peter is undertaken by the Lord, and intercession is made specifically for Peter’s faith, as if the condition of the others would be the more assured if the mind of the Prince were not overcome. In Peter therefore the fortitude of all is fortified, and the divine grace so arranges its help, that the firmness which is given to Peter through Christ is conferred through Peter upon the other Apostles. Here St. Leo acknowledges both gifts which we said were obtained here for Peter: the former, when he says: If the mind of the Prince were not overcome; and the latter, when he adds: In Peter therefore the fortitude of all is fortified, so that firmness may be conferred through Peter upon the other Apostles.
Pope Agatho in his letter to Constantinople: It was said to Peter: Simon, Simon, behold Satan, etc., but I have prayed for thee — here the Lord promised, he says, that faith would not fail Peter, and admonished him to confirm his brethren; which it is acknowledged by all that the Apostolic Pontiffs, my predecessors in my humble position, have always confidently done.
Nicholas I in his letter to Michael: The privileges of that See — namely the Roman — are perpetual, divinely rooted and planted. And further, adding the reason: For among other things, he through whom these privileges were principally conferred upon us heard from the Lord: When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren.
Leo IX in his letter to Peter of Antioch: He alone it is for whom, that his faith should not fail, the Lord and Savior declared that he had prayed, etc.; which venerable and efficacious prayer obtained that the faith of Peter has not failed hitherto, nor is believed about to fail in his throne.
Innocent III, in the chapter Majores, On Baptism and its Effect: He who knows that the Lord prayed for him that his faith should not fail understands that the greater causes of the Church, especially those touching articles of faith, are to be referred to the See of Peter.
St. Augustine — or whoever the author is — of the Questions on the Old and New Testament, question 75: In praying for Peter, he is known to have prayed for all — for in the person of the head the people are always either rebuked or praised. Here it is manifestly presupposed first that Peter is the head of all; and it is also signified that the Lord prayed for him also in the capacity of head — for the benefit of all, namely so that he himself might confirm the rest.
Theophylact on this passage: Because I have thee as the Prince of the disciples, confirm the others — for this teaches thee, who after me art the rock and foundation of the Church.
St. Bernard, Letter 190 to Innocent: All dangers and scandals of the kingdom of God, especially those touching the faith, ought to be referred to your Apostolate; for I judge it worthy that the losses of faith be repaired most especially there where the faith cannot feel defect. For to what other See was it ever said: I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not?
The Conclusion is proved finally by theological reasoning: because the Roman Pontiff is the universal Shepherd and Teacher of the whole Church, as one to whom it was said in John 21: Feed my lambs, feed my sheep, as was more fully explained above. Therefore the whole Church must hear and follow him — for the sheep must follow their Shepherd. If therefore he could err in teaching the things of faith, it would follow consequently that the whole Church would err in the faith.
Perhaps someone will say: the Church must hear him if he teaches correctly, but otherwise God must be obeyed rather than men. But from that objector a response must be sought: who will judge whether the Pontiff teaches well or badly? Since Christians acknowledge no other greater Judge or Teacher divinely given to them to whom they can have recourse, as is manifest from the words of St. Jerome and other Fathers cited above. Perhaps he will say that recourse can be had to a general Council. Against this, first: because if he speaks of a general Council without the Roman Pontiff, it is certain that such a Council can err — and indeed some have in fact erred, such as the Second Council of Ephesus, the Council of Ariminum, and certain others.
If however the discussion is of a general Council with the Pontiff — against this it stands first that the Lord said to Peter alone: I have prayed for thee, etc. And again: Feed my lambs, feed my sheep. Also that he called Peter alone the rock upon which the Church is to be founded and built — all of which we already deduced more fully above. Therefore no more certainty and firmness is to be placed in the whole Council than in the Pontiff, inasmuch as the Council receives its firmness from the Pontiff. Moreover, if the Pontiff and the rest of the body of the Council were to disagree among themselves, who then would judge?
There is also the fact that it often happens that a general Council cannot be convened or assembled — whether on account of persecutors or on account of other disturbers of the Church — and yet grave controversies in matters of faith arise frequently. Thus in the first three hundred years general Councils could not be convened on account of various persecutions, and yet diverse questions arose which necessarily had to be settled, lest the pure faith be infected — because the speech of heretics spreads like a cancer. If therefore it were always necessary to wait for a general Council before anything certain could be determined and defined, very many inconveniences would befall the Church.
It is proved secondly by reason: because very many Roman Pontiffs have condemned various errors as heresies without a general Council, and these have afterward been held by the universal Church as heresy. Thus the errors of Pelagius were condemned by Innocent, Zosimus, and Celestine without a general Council, as is clear from Prosper Against the Collator. The same is clearly established as having been done by Sixtus in condemning the remnants of Pelagianism. Leo I condemned the errors of the Priscillianists, as is clear from his Letter 23. Victor II, Nicholas II, and Gregory VII condemned the errors of Berengarius. Likewise Innocent II condemned the errors of Peter Abelard, as is clear from Letter 194 among the letters of Bernard. Thus other Pontiffs condemned other various errors. Similarly very many particular Councils have been celebrated at Rome and elsewhere, in which various errors were condemned and which were confirmed by the Pontiffs — and from then on their definitions are held by the Church as determinations of faith, and what they condemned is rejected as heresy.
Perhaps someone will say that such definitions were received rarely because they were received by the universal Church. But against this: because such a judgment of the Roman Pontiff has never been seen to be rejected or doubted by the Church, and the dogmas so condemned have always also been rejected by all Catholics. Therefore these determinations ought not to be called certain and infallible because the Catholic Church accepts them; but on the contrary, the Church accepts them and always has accepted them because they proceed from the Supreme Shepherd, whom it acknowledges as foundation, and for whose stability it knows that Christ prayed. Hence particular Councils celebrated without the Pontiff always took care to have their decrees concerning the faith approved by Roman Pontiffs — because without that approval they knew them to be by no means to be regarded as settled and certain by others; but once that approval was added, they believed on the contrary that they were to be approved and received by all.
But someone will ask: whether a definition of the Pontiff in difficulties of faith is also certain and infallible if he issues it by himself alone, even without a Council of Cardinals and learned men, and proposes it to the Church. It is replied that every determination whatever of the Pontiff in doubtful questions of faith is always certain and infallible whenever he speaks and defines from the Chair and proposes under anathema that it is to be held and believed by all the faithful — even if he has not convoked a Provincial Council on the matter, nor employed a Council of Cardinals or others.
You will say: all teach that the Pontiff in such matters must proceed prudently and maturely according to the gravity of the thing or question — therefore if he acts otherwise, his judgment is not to be held certain and infallible.
It is replied: it is true that he ought to act and proceed prudently and maturely. But it must altogether be held and presupposed that whenever he defines from the Chair and proposes to the whole Church something to be believed under anathema, he never proceeds rashly — but always then employs the requisite maturity and prudence. For this must altogether be trusted and believed of Christ the Lord: that just as he promised and by his prayer obtained for Peter that he might infallibly teach and confirm his brethren, so also he will never be wanting to him in the necessary means required to achieve that end. And therefore he will so perpetually direct him who sits in the Chair of Peter that he will never omit anything required for the certainty and infallibility of doctrine proceeding from the Chair. Otherwise, concerning every definition of the Pontiff pronounced at least outside a general Council, doubt could be raised whether he had proceeded with sufficient gravity and prudence in such a determination.
Indeed a similar question could always be raised even about things defined by the general Council itself together with the Pontiff. Therefore, although Pontiffs are never accustomed to determine questions of faith without the Councils at least of Cardinals and other learned men most versed in the law of the Lord — and they are bound to do this ordinarily, because God governs and teaches his Church according to the ordinary law, with human care, diligence, and learning also concurring — nevertheless if it should happen that the Pontiff from the Chair determines some question by himself alone, that definition is not thereby to be held rash or imprudent; but rather it is to be presupposed that the matter did not require a more extensive inquiry, or that the Pontiff proceeded wisely and defined the matter by a special instruction and impulse of the Holy Spirit.
THIRD CONCLUSION: Similarly, the judgment of the Roman Pontiff in decrees of morals which he prescribes to the whole Church is also altogether certain and infallible — such that it cannot come about that by a universal law concerning the whole Church he commands something in itself evil or contrary to salvation, or prohibits something that is necessary for salvation; for example, that he commands circumcision, or forbids the use of baptism, or of the Sacrament of Penance.
I explain it thus because otherwise it is not inconvenient to say that the Pontiff can commit certain errors in the enacting of some laws — for example, that he enacts some law that is superfluous or less useful, or that he attaches a graver penalty than the transgression deserves — though it is not for subjects to judge of such things.
The Conclusion is now proved first: because if the Pontiff were to err in a law concerning morals that are in themselves good or evil, he would consequently also err concerning faith — for the Catholic faith teaches that every vice is evil and to be avoided, and conversely that every virtue is good and to be embraced at the proper time and place. But if he were to forbid virtues and command vices, the Church would have to believe those to be evil and these to be good, if it did not wish to act against conscience. Furthermore, this would also impede the holiness of the Church, to which it belongs that its profession and laws be holy and in nothing opposed to right reason. Similarly, if he were to ordain anything else contrary to salvation, the whole Church would be gravely harmed and would err in necessary things — which is by no means consonant with divine providence, and is contrary to the promise of Christ in John 16: When the Spirit of truth shall come, he shall teach you all truth.
But against the Conclusions, it is objected first: if the judgment of the Pontiff in determining questions of faith and in issuing decrees of morals is certain and infallible in the ways explained, then Councils are sometimes convened in vain, or at least they are not at all necessary.
It is replied by denying the Consequence. For in the first place, although the Holy Spirit infallibly assists the Pontiff in adjudicating such matters, he ought nonetheless not to neglect the ordinary means by which true knowledge of the matter in question can and ordinarily is reached — for through these the Holy Spirit more frequently causes the truth, originally revealed and deposited in the bosom of the Church, to become known, even though it may afterward have become somewhat obscured. Hence also the Holy Spirit moves the Pontiff to employ these means when through them he wishes to instruct him in the difficulties proposed. One of these ordinary means is principally a Council, greater or lesser according to the gravity of the matter at hand. For it is an obvious and easy means of knowing the truths deposited in the Church that Bishops from all or from several provinces should convene together and each report the sense and custom of his Church concerning the controverted matters.
Hence also the Apostles in Acts 15 convoked a Council, although there is no doubt that Peter had the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in proposing and teaching the doctrine of the faith to the Church — and not he alone, but also Paul and the other Apostles, already wholly filled with the Holy Spirit, who in every instance would teach them all truth.
There is also the fact that Councils are moreover most useful so that decrees may more quickly become known everywhere and be more smoothly received throughout the whole Church — since otherwise some could plead ignorance; others complain that they were not called to such definitions; and others finally also carp and say that the Pontiff could have erred when he did not employ a general Council. All of which is avoided when Bishops from all provinces have been summoned and have subscribed.
And indeed these considerations are of such great moment that for these reasons many ancients speak of general Councils as well as if they were at times necessary for maintaining pure faith and sound governance of the Church. Augustine, Book 4 Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 12, and Book 1 On Baptism, chapter 7; Isidore in the Preface to the Councils; and Constantine is also reported to have written that the Christian Religion could not be fully settled unless either all the Bishops or the greater part of them had assembled together — not that they are simply necessary, but because for the reasons stated they are so useful, notwithstanding a certain definition of the Pontiff, that they can in a certain sense at times be judged necessary.
It is objected secondly: St. Cyprian persistently resisted Pope Stephen, who defined that those baptized by heretics were not to be rebaptized, as is clear from his letter to Pompeius — and yet he was not for that reason held to be a heretic or separated from the Church. Therefore the definition of the Pontiff is not to be held certain and infallible as a dogma of faith.
This is confirmed from St. Augustine, who in Book 2 Against the Donatists, chapter 7 and following, teaches that diverse persons spoke and felt differently about that question, debated between Stephen and St. Cyprian, and that St. Cyprian and others could, with charity preserved, disagree among themselves when the definition of a general Council had not yet been added.
It is replied: Cyprian was not a heretic — both because Stephen had not defined as a matter of faith that heretics were not to be rebaptized, but had only commanded that the ancient custom of the Church of not rebaptizing should be observed by all. For the Supreme Pontiff did not wish to define the matter absolutely without a general Council. Hence after the death of St. Cyprian, and before the birth of St. Augustine, that question was finally determined and defined in a general Council, as St. Augustine teaches above in Book 2, On Baptism, chapter 8. And from this the response to the Confirmation drawn from St. Augustine is clear.
You will say: Augustine in the book On the One Baptism, chapter 14, writes that Stephen did not rebaptize heretics, and indeed judged that those who did so, or decreed that it should be done, were to be excommunicated — therefore it seems that Stephen defined that question absolutely.
It is replied by denying the Consequence: because Augustine does not say that he excommunicated them, but only that he judged them worthy of excommunication, or that he threatened them with excommunication. Moreover, that he did not absolutely condemn them with authority is clear from the same St. Augustine, who says in the same place that Cyprian remained with Stephen in the peace of unity, and that they were two most eminent Bishops, both established in Catholic unity.
It is objected thirdly: the African Council, in its letter to Pope Celestine, indicates that a Provincial Council can err less than the Roman Pontiff. For it writes: Unless perhaps there is anyone who believes that God can inspire the justice of examination to each individual, and deny it to innumerable priests gathered in a Council. But it is certain that a Provincial Council can err — therefore, etc.
It is replied: that Council is not dealing there with a judgment of faith, but with a judgment of fact — that is, with causes of Bishops and Presbyters who were accused of some crime. A judgment of this kind the Fathers of that Council judged could be more smoothly and certainly rendered by the Bishops of the places where the crimes had been committed, than by the Roman Pontiff, who on account of the distance of the places could not be so correctly and certainly informed, and who therefore could in many ways be circumvented and deceived by impostors. Hence they did not accept so well that those at Rome seemed to be too easy in admitting appeals of criminals from the judgment not only of their own Bishop but of the whole Provincial Synod. There is also the fact that that letter does not contain determinations, but only declares and explains the opinion and sense of the Bishops of that province.
FOURTH CONCLUSION: The Pontiff can, however — not only as a private person but also as a public one, not only without a Council but also together with a Council — err in judgment on particular questions and controversies of fact, the determination of which depends only on the depositions and testimonies of men, and does not pertain to the generality of morals. Likewise he can err as a private Doctor in questions of universal law, both of faith and of morals, through ignorance, as happens to other Doctors. This Conclusion in both its parts is common to all Catholics, and the heretics readily admit it as well — they who hold that he can also err from the Chair in questions of faith, as was said, and as has conversely been refuted.
Thus according to the Conclusion the Pontiff can err, for example, in deposing a Bishop for a crime falsely charged against him by adversaries. Similarly in absolving him from a crime as if he were not guilty of it, when it is in truth truly charged against him. And so the Sixth Synod can be said to have erred in the condemnation of Honorius, whom it judged from faulty information, or from his writings not rightly understood, to have been a Monothelite heretic — when in fact he was not, as will be explained more fully below.
So also John XXII, as a particular Doctor, erred in a general question when he held that the souls of the just departed would not see God before the Day of Judgment — who was not for that reason a heretic, because at that time the matter had not yet been determined.
And although he was at some time inclined to issue a definition from the Chair, he did not bring it to effect — because while he was in preparation and consultation, he was prevented by illness and death supervening. Hence John Villani in Book 11 of the History, chapter 19, reports that Pope John the day before his death explained himself privately and privately retracted his opinion; and first declared that he had never had in mind to define that difficulty when he disputed about it, but had only wished to investigate the truth. Then he added that even if he had held the other opinion, yet having then changed his opinion, he now judged the opposite to be more probable and true.
So too Celestine erred when he judged that the marriage of the faithful is dissolved by heresy, such that one whose prior spouse has lapsed into heresy would be permitted to take another spouse. But neither is it established that he held this with pertinacity, nor did he define from the Chair that the matter was thus.
Someone will say: that opinion of Celestine once existed in the Decretals, as Alphonsus a Castro testifies to have seen, in Book 1, On Heresies, chapter 4 — therefore it seems that Celestine defined an erroneous proposition in faith.
Also: Alexander III, in the chapter Licet, On the Betrothal of Two, when he had defined that ratified marriage with one is not dissolved by subsequent consummated marriage with another, adds: Although it has sometimes been judged otherwise by some of our predecessors — therefore certain Pontiffs seem sometimes to have defined errors.
It is replied: whatever be the case about that matter — whether that resolution or opinion of Celestine was ever in the Decretals or not — the Consequence must nonetheless be denied, because not all rescripts and responses of Pontiffs which are enumerated in Canon Law are to be held as having been delivered from the Chair. Hence neither do all of them make the matter upon which they are given a matter of faith.
This is sufficiently manifestly indicated in the first place by Innocent III in the chapter Quanto, On Divorces, speaking of this very response of Celestine, and writing thus: In the same case, although one of our predecessors seems to have felt otherwise. For in that he says that one of his predecessors felt otherwise, and does not say defined or determined otherwise, he sufficiently declares that that predecessor only responded according to his own particular opinion as a private Doctor — just as also Innocent III in the same place resolves the contrary from his own private opinion, when he writes: But if one of the faithful spouses either lapses into heresy or passes over to the error of paganism, we do not believe that in this case the one who is deserted, the other being alive, can contract a second marriage. That he is not responding from the Chair is sufficiently clear from the fact that he speaks only in an opinionative manner: We do not believe, etc.
Hence certain persons assign as it were certain Rules by which it can be discerned when such responses of the Pontiffs did not have the nature and force of a definition from the Chair. The first of these is: whenever the Pontiff does not speak altogether assertively, but only in the manner of one who is of an opinion, or with some hesitation — this is a certain sign that he does not intend to define the matter from the Chair; as when he says, As far as appears, or We feel thus, or We are of opinion, or something similar. The second is: when the Pontiff in his responses adds something beyond that about which he is principally consulted, that addition is not held to pertain to the definition he makes, but only to proceed from his particular opinion — as when Pope Nicholas, responding to the consultations of the Bulgarians, added his private opinion on the validity of baptism conferred in the name of Christ alone. The third is: when the Pontiff writes back only to some private person or to some particular Church, and does not signify that he is prescribing this universally to the whole Church by commanding it under anathema, so that it should thus be held by all, or by adding that according to the Evangelical or Apostolic doctrine it is thus to be held — then also the rescript is not to be considered a definition from the Chair that makes the matter one of faith.
Nor should these things seem strange, because many matters are referred to the Supreme Pontiff as supreme Judge, not always so that he as the Doctor of the universal Church by the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit should adjudicate them; but more often only so that by his supreme authority, according to his own particular wisdom and prudence, he may give judgment upon them and put some end to the difficulties that arise in fact — at least until a fuller examination having been premised, if the matter is graver and bears upon faith or good morals, it may be defined from the Chair by the Pontiffs.
Hence also it has come about that when Pontiffs have thus responded erroneously from their own opinions as particular Doctors, and those responses could tend to graver harm — whether to faith or to morals — it has come to pass, soon afterward through divine providence, that through their successors, matters having been better examined, the Church was otherwise instructed; as is clear from what was here objected. Therefore what Alexander III says in the cited chapter Licet — that it was sometimes judged otherwise by some of his predecessors — must also be understood as having proceeded from their particular opinions, as was now explained about the resolution of Celestine in the other case.
SIXTH AND FINAL CONCLUSION: 204 It must nonetheless be altogether held that the Pontiff never errs in the Canonization of Saints. It is to be noted here that by the name of Canonization is here understood the public testimony of the true holiness and heavenly glory of some deceased person, and the judgment and ordinance by which the honors are decreed for that person which are fitting and due to those who reign happily with God in heaven. This is the common Conclusion of Theologians — St. Thomas in Quodlibet 9, last question, last article; Driedo, Book 4, On Scriptures and Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 1; Sylvester V, Canonization; Melchior Cano, Book 5, On Places, penultimate chapter; Bellarmine, Book 2, On the Church Triumphant, or On the Veneration of Saints, chapter 9.
And it is proved: because this Canonization is not to be regarded as a mere determination of a question about a particular fact, but is something intermediate according to St. Thomas between determinations of things of faith or good morals, and judicial sentences which concern only a particular fact. For from this judgment, if it were erroneous, grave inconveniences would follow throughout the whole Church — for it would be most absurd that those who are perhaps hateful to God, his enemies, blasphemers against him, and buried in hell should be honored with public offices and triumphs by all the faithful as citizens and members of God’s household in heaven, and at the same time invoked as friends of God, so that through their intercession we might obtain the desired benefits.
Likewise, that those who died in sin should be proposed to the faithful to be imitated as masters and models of virtue. Into which inconveniences it is not credible that God will ever universally allow his Church to fall, when it for its part employs due diligence, as it is accustomed to do. For the Church is not light-hearted, nor does it straightway believe every spirit; but it uses great providence and circumspection in such a matter — for it most diligently investigates the entire life and conduct of the one whose Canonization is in question; it also enjoins and employs prayers and fasts; and it does not ordinarily proceed to effect unless it finds that true and certain miracles have intervened, principally after death, which God appears to work as testimony to that person’s holiness and glory.
But some object an uncertain passage of Augustine, where he says: The bodies of many are honored on earth whose souls are tormented in hell — therefore it appears that the Pontiff sometimes errs in Canonization.
It is replied, whatever be the case about that passage, by denying the Consequence. For it is certain in the first place that it cannot be said that the reference is to those who have been enrolled in the number of the Saints by this solemn rite of which we are speaking — because in the time of Augustine this Canonization was not yet in use, but appears to have begun around the times of Pope Leo III, before whom Bellarmine says he has not read that any Pontiff canonized Saints.
Very many, however, even before that time were regarded not only in particular provinces but also throughout the whole Church as Saints and venerated as such — but not so much by some law or express judgment or decree as by the pious desires and custom of the devout, which could gradually have obtained the force of law from at least the tacit approval of the Supreme Pontiff.
Hence I add secondly: not even in such a custom universally received by the Church and already approved at least by the tacit consent of the Pontiff has any error ever been found. Therefore as regards the opinion alleged under the name of Augustine, it can have other meanings. First, that it be understood of the impious, whose bodies are here honored with magnificent and splendid tombs, while their souls are nonetheless in hell. Or also of the bodies of those not canonized, who were at some time erroneously held by particular persons or some particular people to be holy and were venerated as such.
For the removal and prevention of such particular abuses, that solemn Canonization of Saints appears to have been principally instituted, so that without it no one can be publicly honored and venerated as a Saint by anyone in public offices. Or finally, that it be understood of the martyrs of the Donatists, who were celebrated by the heretical Donatists as martyrs of Christ, while without doubt their souls were being tormented in hell.

DOUBT VI.
Whether the Roman Pontiff, as a private person, can be a heretic?

It can be piously and probably believed that the Roman Pontiff cannot, even as a private person, become an absolute heretic — although the opposite is held by many. So teach Pighius in book 4 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 8; Bellarmine in book 4 On the Pontiff, ch. 6; and several more recent authors.
It is proved first: because this seems more consonant with divine providence, which reaches from end to end mightily and disposes all things sweetly, that He who appointed the Pope to instruct and confirm His Church in sound doctrine should also so assist and direct him that He would never permit him to adhere with pertinacious assent of the mind to a foreign and condemned doctrine — for it would be incongruous to hold one opinion privately in matters of such great moment, and to publicly teach others something different by authority.
It is proved second: because up to this point no pontiff has been found of whom it is clearly and certainly established that he has himself fallen into heresy.
The sectarians of our time indeed raise various objections against different pontiffs, by which they attempt to show that not only were many of them heretics, but that they also professed and taught heresy. But to those objections, a sufficiently apt and solid response has already been given by many Catholics. Here we shall only examine the case of a few, whom even some of the ancients seem to mark with heresy.
The first of these is Severinus, concerning whom Tertullian writes in his book Against Praxeas: that the Bishop of Rome, having already recognized the prophecies of Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla, and on account of that recognition being about to bring peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia, was persuaded by Praxeas to revoke the letters of peace which he had issued. By these words Tertullian indicates that the Roman Pontiff — who at that time was Severinus, although some think it was Eleutherius — had entered into communion and adhered to the Montanists, who had nevertheless already been condemned by the Church. For as Tertullian there indicates, the chief reason by which Praxeas had induced the Pontiff to revoke the letters of peace was that his predecessors had condemned the doctrine of Montanus.
It is replied, first, that not much weight ought to be given to Tertullian in this matter, since he had already at that time defected from the faith to the heresy of Montanus, and would therefore gladly, for the sake of the authority of his error, represent the Roman Bishop as a supporter and associate of the same sect.
I add, however, that Tertullian does not say that the Roman Bishop was a Montanist, but that he had restored peace to the said Churches on the basis of certain prophecies or revelations (which were in reality fictitious or illusory) — not because he consented to or approved the errors of Montanus, but because it had plausibly been persuaded upon him by the Montanists that the doctrine of Montanus was not different from the doctrine of the Roman Church, and that he himself had been falsely accused of errors which the predecessors of the Roman Pontiff had condemned as contrary to sound doctrine.
For heretics are sometimes accustomed to use this device: to conceal their errors under a certain obscurity or ambiguity of speech, or to dissemble before those from whom they fear that their doctrine will be immediately condemned, suppressed, or forced to be retracted. Thus Ruffinus writes in book 10 of the History, ch. ii, that Arius, in order to persuade the Emperor Constantine that he was Catholic, wrote his creed with such artfulness that it could be regarded as Catholic by Catholics, yet recognized for what it truly was by his own followers. And St. Leo, in letter 86 to the Bishop of Aquileia, warns him to order the Pelagians returning to the Church to abjure their heresy in the most explicit words, because they are generally accustomed to deceive the Church with a confession of faith so carefully composed that they appear Catholic, though they are not. Augustine also writes that Pelagius did the same. By a similar device, therefore, was the said Roman Bishop circumvented; and even when he detected the deception, he promptly revoked the letters of communion and peace — which is a clear sign that he never approved the errors and heresy of Montanus, as indeed no one else charges him with this.
The second, concerning whom doubt might arise on account of the writings of the ancients, is Pope Liberius. Two things are certainly established about him.
The first is that from the beginning of his pontificate up to his exile, which he underwent for the Catholic faith, he was a most vigorous defender of the Orthodox faith, as St. Athanasius amply testifies in his letter To Those Living the Solitary Life and in both his Apologies; Jerome in the Chronicle and in the Catalogue of Writers under Fortunatianus; and many others.
The second is that the same man, when he again held the pontificate after his exile, was also truly Orthodox and conducted himself piously. For as Socrates reports in book four, ch. ii, after he returned from exile, he refused to receive the Macedonians back into the Church unless they openly detested their heresy. After his death he was regarded as a saint — as St. Ambrose indicates in book 2 On Virgins, at the beginning: “It is time, Sister,” he says, “to revisit the precepts of Liberius of blessed memory, so that the holier the man, the more welcome his words may be.” The same is indicated by Epiphanius in Heresy 75 and Basil in letter 74 to the Bishops of the West.
The difficulty, however, concerns the intermediate period: how he conducted himself and what his character was. For Jerome writes of him, in the passage above under Fortunatianus: “Liberius, Bishop of the City of Rome, as he was going into exile for the faith, was first solicited and broken by Fortunatianus and compelled to subscribe to the heresy.” And St. Athanasius, in the above-mentioned letter To Those Living the Solitary Life, says: “Liberius, after two years spent in exile, was bent, and was led by threats of death to subscribe.” From these passages some are of the opinion that Liberius truly became an Arian and professed heresy, since from the passages cited he appears to have subscribed to heretics and to heresy.
And this is confirmed, because otherwise Pope Felix II, who held the see during the intermediate period and died, would never have been a true Pontiff, since two true Pontiffs cannot exist simultaneously. And although Liberius was in exile, he is not found to have abdicated the pontificate. Yet Felix is received and venerated in the catalogue of pontiffs as a true pontiff — indeed, as a holy martyr. Therefore Liberius must, by reason of heresy, have been deprived of the pontificate during the intermediate period.
Notwithstanding these arguments, it is more true that Liberius was never truly and sincerely a heretic, nor ever openly and formally professed heresy.
The former point is sufficiently gathered from Athanasius himself in the cited passage, where he writes of him: “But that very fact itself — both the violence they used against him, and Liberius’s hatred of heresy, and his vote in favor of Athanasius — is sufficiently demonstrated by his free sentiments: for the things that arose under torture, contrary to his previous position, must be attributed not to the will of those who feared, but to those who compelled them.” By these words he signifies that Liberius, in that he had at last subscribed out of favor to the Emperor, did so not from his heart but unwillingly, and therefore did not truly and sincerely consent to the heretics.
The latter point is similarly shown — namely that he did not expressly and formally profess heresy. For what Athanasius writes, that he was bent and led by threats of death to subscribe, he does not understand as a subscription by which he approved the Arian doctrine and confession, but as a subscription by which he approved the condemnation and expulsion of Athanasius. This is sufficiently gathered from the same Athanasius, who in the cited letter writes beforehand: “The eunuch, having gone to Rome, first incited Liberius to subscribe against Athanasius and to communicate with the Arians — for this was the Emperor’s will and his imperial command.” It was therefore to the Emperor’s will that Liberius at last accommodated himself.
Furthermore, although the heretics were in truth persecuting Athanasius on account of the faith, they were nonetheless putting forward another pretext for his expulsion — namely various crimes which they imputed to Athanasius. Hence Liberius’s subscription was not a formal profession of heresy. Similarly, from the communion he had with the Arian heretics, it is not conclusively proved that he formally professed heresy. For in his letters he says that he had communicated with the Eastern Bishops because he found their faith to be consonant with the Catholic faith and alien to Arian perfidy — whether meanwhile he believed this because he had been deceived, thinking that they were concealing their heresy under ambiguous words, or whether he wished to use this as a pretext to show to Catholics that he did not consent to the heresy.
As for what St. Jerome writes — that Fortunatianus was the first to solicit and compel Liberius to subscribe to the heresy — this too must be understood in the same way as the words of Athanasius. For what he adds, “to subscribe to the heresy,” is said because, although not expressly and formally, yet in an interpretive sense he is judged to have approved the heresy and to have been guilty of such approval: for he permitted and subscribed to the condemnation of Athanasius, whom he well knew was suffering persecution on account of the faith, whatever other pretext was being put forward. And when he communicated with Valens, Ursacius, and other Arians, even if they perhaps concealed their heresy, he did not entirely ignore what kind of men they were.
Before we respond to the confirmation, the history of the pontificate of Felix must be explained at somewhat greater length. He is also a third case in which one might doubt whether he himself was a heretic.
Felix II was thus a deacon under Liberius when the latter was being sent into exile. Some wish to say that he was an Arian, which St. Jerome seems to favor in the Catalogue of Writers, under Acacius — where he writes of Acacius that he was so influential under the Emperor Constantius that he caused Felix, an Arian bishop, to be installed in the place of Liberius at Rome.
But whatever the truth of that matter may be — of which we shall say something shortly — it is at least true that Felix endeavored to please the Arians and maintained communion with them. The result was that, through the favor and recommendation of the Arians, and especially of Acacius, Bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, he was thrust into the Roman episcopate, as is clear from the cited passage of Jerome, and is attested by Ruffinus in book 10 of the History, ch. xxii, where he says that Felix, his deacon, was substituted in the place of Liberius by the heretics; and by Theodoret in book 2 of the History, ch. 17, where he writes: “Liberius was succeeded by a certain faithful deacon of his named Felix, who, although he himself kept the faith as set forth at the Council of Nicea inviolate, nevertheless communicated freely with those who were striving to undermine it.”
Neither the clergy nor the people of Rome were willing to adhere to Felix thus intruded, nor to acknowledge him as pontiff. Theodoret judges as much when he adds: “And therefore not one of the inhabitants of Rome was willing to enter the church while he was about to officiate.” Rightly did the Romans refuse to receive him — both on account of the communion he maintained with heretics, and because the true Pontiff Liberius, still living in exile and at that time still outwardly conducting himself in an Orthodox manner, was alive; while he lived, the Roman clergy had bound themselves by oath not to admit another to the episcopate, as is gathered from Jerome in the Chronicle.
But after two years, with the lapse of Liberius having occurred — namely, that he subscribed to the condemnation of Athanasius and made peace and communicated with the heretics — then the Roman clergy went over to the side of Felix, whom they knew to be Catholic. This is indicated by St. Jerome in the Chronicle, when he says that very many of the Roman clergy had perjured themselves (that is, had not kept the oath they had made not to admit another bishop while Liberius lived — in which however there was no true perjury) and had gone over to Felix. And indeed at that time, without doubt by God’s inspiration stirring his heart, while Felix was thus being accepted as the true pontiff and regarded as such by the Church, he not only withdrew from communion with the Arians, but also, having convened a council, declared the Emperor Constantius and the Bishops Ursacius and Valens — with whom Liberius had made peace — to be truly heretics. And therefore, when Liberius was remitted and returned to the city, Felix was expelled by the Arians from his position, and Liberius was once again placed in his stead. Felix himself died not long afterward, whether he was beheaded or was worn out by hardships — for this is not so certainly established.
He was, however, numbered by the Church among the martyrs. When, in the year 1582, a debate arose in Rome as to whether this Felix ought to be placed in the new Martyrology — because some of the ancients are found not to have included him in the catalogue of pontiffs, such as St. Augustine in letter 165 — at that time a marble chest was by chance discovered in the Basilica of Cosmas and Damian, with this inscription carved into the marble in ancient characters:
Here lies the body of Saint Felix, Pope and Martyr, who condemned the heretical Emperor Constantius.
He was therefore placed without doubt in the new Martyrology, just as he had been found in the ancient ones. After the death of Felix, Liberius once again reconciled the Roman clergy and showed himself in all things to be a Catholic bishop, as we showed above in the case of the Macedonians. For which reason, by the consensus of all, he then began legitimately to hold the see again, and held it until his death.
To the confirmation, therefore, which was formed above against Liberius, it can be replied that, although Liberius was not a heretic in his heart, nor even expressly and formally ever professed heresy, yet on account of his subscription to the condemnation of Athanasius, and on account of the peace and communion he entered into with those who were known heretics, and on account of similar acts that contain an interpretive profession of heresy, he was justly held by the Church as a heretic according to external profession. For the Church could not examine the inward things of the heart, and therefore he was judged and declared to have fallen from the pontificate — and so it was that Blessed Felix began legitimately to exercise the pontificate from that time.
As to whether Felix, before that time, had been an Arian, one might doubt from the words of St. Jerome cited above in the Catalogue of Writers under Acacius. But Ruffinus and Theodoret teach sufficiently openly that he was not an Arian, even though he maintained communion with the Arians. Wherefore what St. Jerome says — that Felix was set up as an Arian in place of Liberius — must be understood as referring to his communion with Arians; or else it must be said that the word “Arian” was added not by St. Jerome himself, but by someone else, as Bellarmine shows in the passage cited above.
The fourth pontiff, about whom much is disputed, is Honorius I, whom many believe to have been a Monothelite heretic — because in two letters given by him to Sergius he appears to approve the doctrine of the Monothelites: for he commands that two operations in Christ not be spoken of, and says that He has not two but one will.
And this is confirmed, because in the Sixth Council — where these letters are also cited, one in session 12 and another in session 13 — Honorius is condemned as a heretic. Similarly, in the Seventh Council, in the final session, the whole council says “Anathema” to Honorius, Sergius, Cyrus, and the other Monothelites. And in the Eighth Council, session 7, the letter of the Roman council under Adrian II is read and approved, in which it is said that Honorius after death was judged as suspected of heresy. Finally, various writers, both Greek and Latin, seem to testify to the same thing.
Nevertheless, in defense of Honorius, the contrary is written by Albert Pighius in book 4 of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 8; Hosius in book 2 Against Brentius; John of Louvain in his book On the Perpetual Protection of the Chair of Peter, ch. ii; Bellarmine in book 4 On the Pontiff, ch. ii; and others.
Therefore, to the objections, it can be replied — as far as those letters are concerned — that first, it may be doubted whether they were not fabricated by heretics, just as it is established that certain letters purportedly from Pope Vigilius and Mennas, Patriarch of Constantinople, inserted into the Fifth Council, were fictitious, which was detected at the Sixth Council when the Acts of the Fifth Council were being reread.
Furthermore, even granting that these are truly letters written by Honorius, it matters nothing: because if they are read attentively, it will easily be seen that they contain no error. For on the substance of the matter, the author confesses sufficiently openly two wills in Christ, divine and human, and two operations. For he writes thus in the second letter: “We ought to confess both natures in one Christ, joined by natural unity with the communication of the other, as acting and operative: and the divine nature operating in the things that are of God, and the human nature carrying out the things that are of the flesh — not dividedly (that is, on the part of the person), nor confusedly (that is, on the part of the natures), nor teaching that the nature of God is converted into man, or the human nature converted into God, but confessing the differences of the natures intact.” This position is Catholic and overturns the heresy of the Monothelites.
The names of both “one operation” and “two operations” are, however, forbidden, and abstinence from both is commanded. This the Pontiff could have done prudently for that time, because up to that point neither term had been in customary use, nor was the question about that manner of speaking. It was only at that point beginning that a Syrian Alexandrian was preaching only one operation in Christ, while Sophronius of Jerusalem, opposing him, was preaching two operations in Christ. Honorius, therefore, being anxious when the controversy was brought before him — lest this contention should break out into a serious schism (as in fact happened) — thought at first to suppress it, by explaining what ought to be felt and confessed about the reality itself, and at the same time by commanding that the terms “one operation” or “two operations” be avoided, so that both parties might more easily acquiesce, since neither would seem to have won the victory. Hence he writes in letter 1 that the term “one operation” should be avoided, and likewise the term “two operations”: “Lest,” he says, “offended by the term ‘two operations’ they should think that those who follow the Nestorians hold madness; or certainly, if we should decide that ‘one operation’ ought to be professed, we should seem to the stunned ears to be professing the foolish madness of the Eutychianists.” And in the second letter: “Setting aside therefore the scandal of this new invention, neither should you preach by defining ‘one’ or ‘two’ operations: but instead of ‘one operation’ — as some say — we ought truthfully to confess one Christ the operator in both natures; and instead of ‘two operations,’ having set aside the term ‘double operation,’ rather to preach the two natures themselves in one person of the only-begotten Son of God, without confusion, without division, as we have explained above, and without conversion, operating their own proper works.” Here, although he removes the term “two operations,” he nevertheless manifestly admits the proper operations of each nature.
But you will say: a little further on he openly posits only one will, in these words: “Wherefore we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ.” It is replied that there the discourse is only about the will of the human nature, and the Pontiff teaches that in Christ the man there were not two opposing wills — one of the flesh and another of the spirit, as there are in us — but only one, namely that of the spirit. This is clear from the reason appended: because, he says, our nature was assumed by the divinity, not our fault — that nature, certainly, which was created before sin, not that which was corrupted after the transgression. For this reason rightly proves that in Christ there were not those conflicting wills that exist in us; it does not, however, prove that in Christ, God and man, there are not two wills — divine and human.
And thus St. Maximus, in his Dialogue Against Pyrrhus the Monothelite, explains the words of Honorius, saying that he was always Catholic; and he confirms his explanation by the testimony of the very secretary of Honorius himself, who had written down the letters dictated by Honorius and was at that time still alive. For this man asserted that it had never been Honorius’s intention to deny two wills in Christ, but that if any words seem to present this, they are to be understood as referring to two contrary and conflicting wills in his human nature — as in us, which arise from sin — which was not in Christ.
To the Sixth Council therefore it can be replied, first, with Bellarmine above, that the name of Honorius, among those condemned by the council, was inserted afterward by some enemy of the Roman Church. This he demonstrates with several arguments; among which one notable argument is that after Honorius, St. Agatho, Pope, in his first letter to the Emperor — which was also read in the very council and approved in sessions 8 and 18 — indicated that as Christ had admonished Peter, whose faith He promised would not fail, to confirm his brethren, so too had his Apostolic predecessors always done, and that this was acknowledged by all. Likewise, that the Apostolic Church of Christ (that is, the Roman Church) had never by the grace of Almighty God strayed from the path of Apostolic tradition, nor had it succumbed to being corrupted by heretical novelties.
For if Honorius had been a Monothelite, and had been condemned as such in that very council, how would Blessed Agatho, while treating of that very heresy, have dared to write that all his predecessors had always confirmed their brethren in the sound faith, and that this was perfectly well known to all? And again, how could he have commended the Roman Church above the other churches stained by the errors of their bishops, as one which alone had always remained spotless — if Honorius had so recently been infected with that heresy whose extirpation was at that very moment being pursued? Or how would the council have approved that letter of Agatho? Also relevant here is what Pope Nicholas wrote to the Emperor Michael about the Roman Pontiffs: “For not even the slightest rumor has ever touched them with holding erroneous views together with those who held them” — which would be far removed from the truth if in a general and most celebrated council “Anathema” had been repeatedly proclaimed against Honorius as a heretic.
Secondly, it can be replied, with Torquemada in book 1 On the Church, ch. 39, who admits that condemnation of Honorius in the Sixth Council, but says it proceeded from ill information — namely from false rumors spread about him, and from the aforesaid letters not being well understood. His successors had understood them better: John IV, Martin I with a most numerous Roman Council, Agatho, and Nicholas I — under all of whom the cause of the Monothelites was frequently examined. And although many were condemned by name in the council under Martin, yet no mention is made of Honorius.
But you will ask: if the Latins, and especially Pope Agatho, were better informed about the case of Honorius, why then did the Legates of Agatho at the Sixth Council not protest against this condemnation of Honorius?
It is replied that, assuming Honorius was in fact condemned in the Sixth Council as one who had been a Monothelite, this seems to have been passed over by the Legates of the Roman See in order to avoid a greater evil. For there was danger that if they had not dissembled, or if they had wished to protest against the condemnation of Honorius, the definition of the right faith would have been impeded, and the Schism which had already lasted sixty years could not have been resolved. For in that Council many patriarchs were being condemned — of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch — whose successors would not easily have acquiesced, unless Honorius too were condemned, since he was accused together with them as one who had shared their opinion and teaching.
To the Seventh Council it is replied that the Fathers of that Council followed the Sixth Council and merely repeated what they had read therein, and were therefore misled by it — which either had been corrupted, as we said, or had erroneously condemned Honorius.
As for the letter of the council under Adrian II: it is replied that in it, Honorius is not asserted to have been a heretic, but only that “Anathema” had been said against him by the Eastern Bishops because he had been accused of heresy. Where notably the council seems to have said that Honorius was condemned by the Easterners — precisely, it seems, because it knew that he had not been condemned by the Westerners, namely by the Roman council previously held under Martin. It is added, however, that the Easterners had not dared to pronounce sentence against Honorius unless the consent of the Roman See had preceded — which, as we just explained, was nothing but a certain toleration to avoid greater evils. Note here that this council under Adrian also presupposes from the Sixth Council (just as we said the Seventh Council presupposed the same) that Honorius had been condemned therein.
As to the final objection — that various authors have written in this way about Honorius — it is replied: granted, it may be so; but on the other side, many also and very ancient writers have written otherwise, and excuse Honorius. Therefore from the former it can indeed be shown that there is a certain obscurity or doubtfulness in the matter; but the truth of the matter cannot be certainly proved thereby.
See further other pontiffs in Bellarmine, whom he enumerates in book 4, ch. 8, and the five following chapters, as having been accused of errors and heresy — at least by our sectarians — but whom he himself clears and defends.