That might actually undersell what Yoann Damet’s (yay) side did to Bruce Arena’s (nay) side.

3 goals on 3.11 xG

1 goal conceded on 0.22 xG

2.83 expected points.

We talked ad nauseam when things weren’t going great, that when CITY underperformed the ##’s, points were dropped. In this one, CITY managed to underperform both and wiped the floor with San Jose.

2.83 expected points is a lot. The great folks over at ASA have a slightly different model than my own, and they calculated the xPts at 2.91. 2.91 xPts is currently the second-highest expected points by an away team in MLS this year (2.92 is the highest, an away team at Furniture Mart Park FC).

But back to 2.83, Saturday night was MLS game number 122 for the Boys in Pink Who Only Wear Gold, and 2.83 is also CITY’s second-highest tally, behind that still totally awful Dallas performance at the end of last season.

So what worked?

Everything

Goals from the 9

Simon Becher's scoring proves helpful. He scored twice, on 1.81 xG, and largely did absolutely nothing different to what he’s been doing all season - playing defense, holding up play, laying off passes to teammates, and receiving balls in dangerous areas. The difference? He scored.

Last season, he was the worst finisher in the league. This season, he is the worst finisher in the league. These two seasons rank fourth and fifth worst, individually, since tracking began in 2013, and among the top 30 worst-finishing seasons ever, only one other player appears twice: Christian Benteke, who scored 23 goals on 32.65 xG in 2023 and 2025.

As Welch alluded to, xG creation has not been a problem for CITY and Becher. Hartel was sixth in MLS in chances created, just shy of 3 per 90, and CITY sits ninth in the xG table. Now, that chance creation may be more questionable moving forward in the AH (After Hartel) era, but, needless to say, the offense generates enough to score most of the time. It’s the scoring part that proves difficult.

His hold-up play has improved dramatically in 2026, to the point where it could be considered a strength. He has largely cut out one of the worst parts of his game—the willingness and eagerness to dribble through defenders without succeeding—and replaced it with one-touch passes to more advantageous teammates.

So when Simon Becher scores, you’d expect good things to happen. CITY has managed to go on this run and sit sixth in the West without the CF scoring. Of the 18 teams currently in playoff positions, only one team, Minnesota, has scored fewer goals (21) than CITY (27). Going into Saturday night’s game, CITY’s AH leading goal scorers were all tied at two. Simon doubled his tally to four.

Duel of the Eights

Yoann Damet does not care what I, Michael/CCT, think about how a midfield should look and operate—a philosophical difference. I’m more of a brushstroke on canvas — sweeping lines, beautiful, intricate. Bob Ross.

Yoann Damet is hellfire and brimstone. Dante Alighieri.

Oh, this pain isn’t enough for you? How about a different circle of hell?

Your name’s Sisyphus? Nice to meet you; we are the boulder.

Thanks to the Turkey for this wonderful illustration of Damet’s midfield, as Matthew Doyle described them:

When it goes right, it can be literal hell to play against. Ninety minutes of pain, because Chris Durkin doesn’t have any regard for your toes, shins, or thighs; that inevitable yellow card is a sign of victory. Daniel Edelman, quieter, more composed, but no less effective. If your side struggles to progress from the defensive third into the attacking third, it's not fun. Now, that’s not to say this midfield is invincible.

We’ve seen, especially earlier in the season, what can happen with this midfield pairing if the opponent has a foothold in the game - slow, languid, ineffective. Neither is capable of serving as the team's foothold when it needs to move the ball forward. Neither can change the tempo of the game when the ball is at their feet.

But, especially in San Jose, it was beyond effective. It was stifling, like a corn-sweat Missouri afternoon in July.

Slide to the Right

In the BH era, whether it be Löwen or Hartel, the creative thrust of CITY has largely been on the left.

We are in the AH era now, and might soon also be in the AL era, and Carlo Holse is readying to be the DP on the right side.

And honestly, it’s a bit of a bummer.

Sang-bin continues to look more and more comfortable, becoming more and more involved in possession, and more willing to link up with his wide partner, Wallem. The latter has fought through whatever malaise, discomfort, uncertainty, etc., from the first quarter of the season and is now showing some of the traits we/I expected of him in the preseason predictions, while the former, who looked like a half-fit for Damet, has become a problem for the opponent. His skillset was also a differentiator that the rest of the squad lacked, one of the reasons I was so pleased with his arrival, but the rest of his game has rounded into a useful article for Damet, to the point where it begs the question: will he be resigned this winter? It would’ve been a near-unanimous “probably not” this Spring. I imagine it’s a near-unanimous “probably” this Fall.

But back to San Jose, that first goal happens because these two in particular manipulate space. While the ball is near the left side, JSB stays extremely high and wide, pleading for the ball. Durkin plays him. Meanwhile, Wallem has tucked so far infield he’s essentially playing at the 9. This drags the fullback inside and keeps the centerback pinned, presenting that passing angle from Durkin to JSB. The second Wallem recognizes the ball is getting to JSB; he makes the run we see so often from JSB, vertical, between the defenders, which creates a moment of confusion as to who switches to Wallem, and that moment gives enough space for JSB to play a ball to space for Wallem to run. Chris breaks it down well here:

And that brings me to the biggest question mark of the evening and of the next phase of this side: where does Carlo Holse fit in? He’s going to play in that R10 occupied by JSB. If not, fire everyone. He’s also an incredibly talented off-ball runner, but in a much different way than JSB. Where JSB has both the burst and speed, Holse’s revolves around his timing of the pass and backline. And as a left-footer, he’s often wanting to shift the ball inside onto his left as he cuts in toward goal. Will he be as wide as JSB was in this clip? Or will he want to be more central, where Wallem was, and Wallem will then need to be in that wider role, and how does that impact the improved play of Wallem in recent weeks?

Lots of questions, we’ve all got thoughts; only time will tell how Damet answers them.

Final Thoughts

Saturday night in San Jose was both a celebration and a stark reminder: a celebration because Damet’s CITY is not to be overlooked, regardless of roster upheaval, and a stark reminder of that upheaval. Where would this team, led by what looks to be a brilliant head coach, be if this front office hadn’t maneuvered an out for its starting center forward, wasted over one million dollars of general allocation money and three months on Sergio Cordova, and, as the clock strikes midnight, gone 10 months without finding a solution?

Yoann Damet has taken a team without a reliable center forward to 6th in the West.

Where would this team be if Damet’s offense didn’t boil down to the coin flip of finishing at the center forward position this season (and a coin flip has a 50% conversion rate, which is nowhere near STL’s reality from that position)?

Yoann Damet, in his first moment without that center forward and having just lost his team’s talisman, heartbeat, and best player, went to San Jose and beat the doors off the Earthquakes.

Belt. To. Ass.

What else does Yoann Damet have to do to earn a center forward worth a damn walking through those doors?

As of this publication, this front office has two weeks left before the window shuts. Two weeks left before they’ll have spent an entire calendar year toiling to find an answer at that position.

Almost nothing in this life or the next is black and white, but this is:

Sign a nine.

Final Final Thoughts

St. Louis CITY SC is currently a good team. kansas is a bad team. A really, really bad team.

The third, fifth, and sixth most one-sided expected-points matches of the season have included kansas on the other side. I’ll be disappointed if tonight isn’t the first.

We are walking into the Furniture Mart looking like fools, wearing gold.

The #RavioliMerchants best not leave like fools.

Thanks for being here.

Winning is fun; winning tonight is mandatory.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

#DiegoOut

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Since I wrote something on #AllForCITY, or so it feels like.

An entire World Cup happened! I watched Australia shock the Turkish world in Vancouver; Amtrak decided Belgium-Egypt wasn’t worth watching; the USMNT looked great and then terrible.

Here’s how these last three games shaped up:

kansas

• 3 goals on 3.15 xG

• 2 goals conceded on 1.55 xGA

• 2.23 expected points

  

Underperforming xG and xGA while getting three points and beating kansas? Hell to the yeah.

Galaxy

• 3 goals on 2.16 xG

• 1 goal conceded on 1.29 xGA

• 1.92 expected points

  

and 10-man Kroenke

• 1 goal on 1.11 xG (blegh)

• 0 goals conceded on 0.15 xGA

• 2.19 expected points.

  

6.33 expected points is a lot of expected points in three games. 9 points from those is a lot more actual points in three games.

But we care about Rounds around these parts. (Refresher that Rounds are 5-game windows)

CITY after 10 games played (Rounds 1 & 2):

• 6 points on 15 expected points

• 9 goals on 16.07 xG

• 18 goals conceded on 13.82 xGA

CITY after 14 games played:

• 16 points on 20.1 expected points

• 16 goals on 21.6 xG

• 20 goals conceded on 20.23 xGA

CITY after 17 games played:

• 25 points on 26.5 expected points

• 23 goals on 28 xG

• 23 goals conceded on 23.2 xGA

After Rounds 1 and 2, CITY was underperforming by 9 points, 7 goals, and 4 goals against.

Going into the World Cup break, four games later, CITY was underperforming by 4.5 points, 6 goals, and 0.9 goals against.

Improvement.

After these three results coming out of the break, CITY is underperforming by 1.5 points and 5 goals, while overperforming by 0.2 goals against.

Improvement on improvement.

You know how much I love a visualization of numbers.

How has CITY performed in each round so far?

What jumps off the page? CITY should’ve done much more in that first round, but when you score 3.7 fewer goals than expected and concede 2 more than expected, success generally isn’t in the cards. It wasn’t four months ago, and we know that now as well as we did then.

There’s always a danger in making sweeping assessments based on chart numbers, but the biggest difference between where we were and where we are? Well, everything.

The only categories in which early CITY outperforms current CITY are two of the volume categories. With three more games to reach equal-sized sets, those seem likely to turn green as well.

Offensively, this is the CITY that, minus that 0.026 xG Ostrák winner, is performing 0.8 goals over expected xG. That’s normal.

Defensively, CITY have benefitted from a couple of 10-man oppositions, which helps keep opposition chance creation to a minimum, but there’s definitely some overperformance here, as they’re conceding 4 goals less than expected. On the season, the xGA differential is essentially normalized (-0.3), but the path to get there has been a valley-to-peak climb.

Before the break, we talked about the 6-7 (hello, fellow kids) point playoff pace per round:

But remember, the goal of all of this is the playoffs.

Round 1: 4 points (-2.5 points)

Round 2: 2 points (-4.5 points)

Round 3 so far: 7 points (+0.5 points)

CITY is still -6.5 points behind the historical playoff pace. Win on Saturday, CITY goes into the break -3.5 points behind. Cannot understate just how massive a difference that would be.

CITY did win on that Saturday and went into the break -3.5 points behind the pace.

Round 3 ended with 13 points, a whopping +6.5 over the pace, putting CITY where they needed to be - 19 points on the 19.5 pace.

Round 4 already has CITY picking up 6 points through two games, which puts us on a 50-point pace.

50 points was good enough for the 6th seed in 2025, the 7th seed in 2024, and the 5th seed in 2023. Translation? Playoffs, comfortably.

Which is a pretty incredible thing to write given where CITY sat just a few months ago. With the season crossing the halfway mark, let’s hand out some report-card honors.

Heroes & Villians

Through the first half, here are my five heroes:

1. Damet’s system. 26.5 xPts and +4.8 xGD are great metrics, but the most important metric is how quickly he has managed to change a side from ball-chasing “please don’t give us the ball” soccer to ball-chasing “we want the ball” soccer. That’s a seismic shift in 9 months, which might show how misaligned the previous HC’s were with the roster they were given.

2. Marcel Hartel. One of MLS’ best has been, one of MLS’ best. Apart from the few random people who diminish his value by comparing him to unworthy teammates, it appears the fanbase has fully realized how good this dude is.

   

3.  Sangbin Jeong. A personal favorite of mine and probably the most difficult player to predict under Damet, he’s become a problem for the opposition. His speed and willingness to run vertically open up so much space for Hartel and others to operate in, and he’s begun taking on wingbacks more regularly. He’s most likely to lose out due to the addition of Holse, but Sangy has earned plaudits and playtime in 2026. Will it also result in a new contract?

   

4. Tomas Totland. Injured and forgotten by previous managers, and overlooked early under Damet, Totland has been a standout performer in CITY’s resurgence, doing so in an unlikely way - defense. Going into 2026, no one would argue that Tots' strengths lie in playing high and wide, on the receiving end of long passes and meeting dangerous balls at the back post. We’ve still seen that, but we’ve also seen efficient, effective defending against some of MLS’ most prolific attackers. With Rafael Santos being bad and Conrad Wallem’s continued underperformance, Totland may be Damet’s single most important player.

   

5. Timo Baumgartl. CITY’s most consistent performer at the back. Some pull their hair out at his insistence on standing with his studs on the ball, but his composure in doing so gives those nearest him, especially the less composed (looking at you, Durkelman), a chance to breathe. Defensively, he’s been good, and while he’s largely neutral with the ball at his feet, every once in a while he hits a long switch that makes you want him to do it more (although he probably shouldn’t).

   

No one wants to read about villains after 8-straight undefeated, 7 wins, and a ticket to the USOC semifinal punched.

But if I had to pick one (I’ll pick two), it’s the lack of Fallou playtime (shocker) and the decision by the FO to roll into 2026 with that CF group.

Those are relatively minor complaints in the middle of an eight-match unbeaten run.

But the bigger question isn’t what has gone right. It’s whether this level can actually continue.

WARNING: CAUTION AHEAD

or is it

CAUTION: WARNING AHEAD

Here’s where I will try my best to exercise extreme caution in what I am about to say, in all efforts to avoid negative Nancy claims.

CITY has never overperformed to this degree before outside of the club’s first five matches.

So what does that mean? This trajectory will almost certainly not continue. This isn’t the movie The Big Short, and I’m definitely not playing the role as well as Steve Carell, but we can all see the bubble - we just don’t know when it’s going to pop.

In my view, the bubble is most likely to pop from three places:

1. An injury, or injuries, to key players that CITY cannot replace with their current roster, such as Hartel, Totland, Baumgartl, or Bürki.

2. Gigliani and Wray fail to bring in a value-adding CF, panic, and repeat the Córdova signing all over again, and CITY have to continue hoping on Becher + committee.

3. Opponents (namely, better opponents than CITY has seen post-WC) analyze and target CITY’s weaknesses in possession, and CITY’s DP-tandem attack doesn’t get enough touches around the attacking penalty box.

The second scenario is particularly important because this attack should get better. With the additions of Mățan and Holse (more to come on that), the offensive expectation should be to maintain this level of performance and even improve upon it if CITY, Gigliani, and Wray can find a TAM-valued center forward to score goals.

At the same time, CITY has finally begun seeing positive regression in the standings, while Simon Becher once again leads MLS in xG underperformance (-5.11).

A center forward who finishes chances at an average rate, for example, Klauss, who is not returning and shouldn’t, no matter what my heart wants, has scored 30 goals on 30.5 xG in four MLS seasons. Again, I am not advocating for the return of Klauss. I am advocating for a rate of return that is Klauss-like.

With Hartel and Holse beneath/beside, someone finishing at that 10ish-goals-a-season clip and performing as expected would be a significant boost to this offense and this team. And that may not seem like a lot, but in my eyes, the Hartel+Holse tandem is a duo with 30-goal contributions. Add in a 10-15 goal contribution CF, and the attack has the potential to be three-pronged in different, productive ways.

The third scenario is a bit more tactical.

Many reading this will be aware of that particular weakness, which stems from Polvara at LCB and the Durkelman pairing in central midfield. All three provide average to good defensive value, which is why they are repeatedly chosen by Damet over more progressive yet riskier players.

Damet has made it pretty clear he’s not willing to add risk to his game states. He’s valuing off-ball quality over on-ball quality, and that’s not likely to change. The question for me is: in the third pop scenario, if that were to happen, would he change? He didn’t pre-break, and as a believer in eyes seeing rather than ears hearing, I won’t assume he will change unless he does.

Final Thoughts

Salt Lake and San Jose should be demonstrably more challenging opponents than what we’ve witnessed so far, although credit is due to Colorado for playing as well as they did with 10 men in the suffocating heat, for as long as they did, in keeping CITY at bay.

If CITY manages to win one or both of those games before the mid-week derby, it’s fair to say that fanbase confidence will reach levels we haven’t seen in over three years.

And wouldn’t that be fun.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

But winning doesn’t fix everything. #DiegoOut

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We lost none of them, which is very nice.

I also don’t remember what I had for lunch yesterday… so recalling three or four games ago is both a monumental and a tedious task because… does it matter?

So, I want to touch just briefly on the individual games, mostly to do some data accounting, and then talk about the Open Cup.

Some quick numbers to reference as we go through these:

CITY after 10 games played:

• 6 points on 15 expected points

• 9 goals on 16.07 xG

• 18 goals conceded on 13.82 xGA

F - - - Stan Kroenke

In Colorado, Sang-bin (who will be a consistent contributor in this recap) proved the difference as CITY left with a MASSIVE three points on the road, with the snapshot looking like this:

1 goal on 1.69 xG

0 goals conceded on 1.75 xGA

1.35 expected points

A fairly even game in which neither team generated much from open play, Colorado missed a huge chance from a corner, and CITY was a threat on the break.

And one of my favorite players to watch in this league (I have an affinity for left-footed centerbacks, as many of you know) is at fault for the goal. Ironically, this will not be the only time a left-footed CB favorite of mine is beaten over the top for a goal in this breakdown.

CITY were most definitely aided by one of the worst red-card decisions I’ve seen in some time, before Durkin lost his head late. I doubt many will remember this game 6 months from now, unless it’s shown in Sang-bin Jeong’s Ballon D’Or highlight reel, but as Troy Bolton and Gabriella Montez once sang, it could be the Start of Something New.

The Battle of the Tina Turner Kits, Where One Team Has Tina Turner Kit Colors and The Other Team Wears Them Too

Four days later, CITY were at it again, this time playing against the great but not-so-great lately Son and LAFC.

2 goals on 2.01 xG

1 goal conceded on 2.29 xGA

1.24 expected points

LAFC, much like ourselves, is suffering from a lack of CF. As a result, they had the ball a lot but failed to capitalize until their game-changing sub, David Martinez, one of the league’s most exciting young attackers, came on. Insert here the second instance of a left-footed CB, a favorite of mine, beaten over the top, as substitute Martinez absolutely cooked substitute Fallou Fall to make the game uncomfortable for the final twenty minutes. Going up against a fresh, chasing the game, Martinez was not a fun ask for Fallou, and he didn’t perform admirably against the challenge. Thankfully, though, Martinez was not the best player on the pitch that night, or the game may have ended differently.

This game may be remembered as the reintroduction of Tomas Totland. A good player, Tots had a great start to his STL tenure in 2024 and looked set to be even better in Olof’s system, which asked so much of him, before injury and then excommunication from Critchley left some wondering whether Totland would even make the squad in 2026, much less play. Through two months, 2026 looked much like a continuation of 2025, with Tomas riding the pine.

But in this LAFC game specifically, he showed what some of us and some vocal others have been saying - play the man. Not only did he open the scoring on the end of one of CITY’s most aesthetically pleasing goals in recent memory, but he also went on a 90-minute defensive rampage, to the point where Dénis Bouanga switched sides late on to avoid Totland and target Fallou, much like Martinez had done.

Frankly, that was the type of performance that CITY has rarely, if ever, seen from a fullback or wingback in club history. Through the slog that has been Pidro, Nelson, Dyhr, Markanich, Reid, Hiebert, Watts, Horn, Wallem, Orozco, Padelford, Santos… CITY has never, ever, found a consistent contributor at LB who could be counted on for more than 2-3 months.

(I love this grainy little sticker we use when talking about CITY LBs)

And even with Tots, we’re talking about a month and a half’s worth of contributions, so the consistency disclaimer still applies. But for most of those listed, you knew which side of the field they would impact, offensively or defensively, but rarely both. Tots has the ability and the engine to impact both. He’s not Seattle’s Nouhou, an absolute terror to attack, or Nashville’s Espinoza, creating chances at an absurd volume. Still, he can be above-average defensively, to run the full length of the pitch regularly, to be an outlet on the left wing or to stretch the defense with runs behind, and, perhaps most importantly, on a team without a CF to score goals, he’s always been quite good at getting into positions to score goals.

I could go on and on, but I digress.

That’s 6 points on 2.59 expected points, if anyone is keeping track.

D.C. United

Three days after LAFC, CITY was back at it in D.C. to play what I would consider a bad soccer team.

1 goal on 1.07 xG

1 goal conceded on 1.27 xGA

1.24 expected points

An away point was good, but it was a bad performance, folks.

There were some great moments, however - Fallou Fall with his first start of 2026, Sang-bin continuing his streak of form, and Durkin shooting and scoring rather than Durkin-ing it.

I did wonder, on replay, whether there is any possibility, however small, that someone like Durkin, with an affinity for shooting the soccer ball out of the stadium, could, if done with enough height and speed, enter restricted airspace as an unidentified flying object and prompt fighter jets to scramble?…

Anyway, neither team looked like a playoff team in this one - Only four total chances met the Good xG (0.15+) threshold.

This is something we are going to touch on more in the big-picture first-third-of-the-season takeaways, but CITY is quietly becoming a team content to hold on to leads.

While not a great example, the lack of real offense after taking the lead has been noticeable as CITY begins to take the lead and win games.

There will be varying reactions to this - some pleased with a team playing to the game state and the lead, some displeased with a team not trying to do more, and others indifferent, believing each game to be self-contained and isolated from another, making it harder to formulate opinions on the philosophies of the squad.

But perhaps what this game will be remembered most for is that red card and an overall indictment of how the first part of 2026 went for Conrad Wallem.

Conrad of House Wallem

This is what I had to say about Wallem in the Crystal Ball:

He has most definitely not been “excellent.” While he hasn’t been physically outmatched, he hasn’t been either an aggressive carrier or an assertive passer, and he most certainly hasn’t been another real goal threat from wide areas.

The fact that he hasn’t put a single shot on target through thirteen games is shocking. Even with the move to Córdova (ew) and now Sang-bin wide to allow him to play more centrally, it’s just not been good enough from a player whom many others, including myself, were quite high on.

His report card doesn’t look that bad at first glance, but upon a second glance, you see that he’s been one of the worst passers in the league while playing a position for us in which creativity is required, not optional. His fouling, which now includes penalties and red cards, is bottom-of-the-league bad, and while shooting props up the overall grade, we know from above, as my father would love to say, he couldn’t hit water if he fell out of a boat.

If CITY makes the playoffs in 2026, you’d expect a turnaround from Wallem to play a significant role in that.

7 points from 3.81 expected points won’t hurt, either.

CITY after 10 games played:

• 6 points on 15 expected points

• 9 goals on 16.07 xG

• 18 goals conceded on 13.82 xGA

CITY after 13 games played:

• 13 points on 18.9 expected points

• 13 goals on 20.84 xG

• 20 goals conceded on 19.13 xGA

CITY was underperforming by -9 expected points three games ago. That’s down to 5.9.

CITY was underperforming xG by -7.07 goals. That’s increased to -7.84 goals.

CITY was underperforming xGA by -4.18 goals. That’s down to -0.87 goals.

Two good trends. One bad trend: our CFs are still Becher and Córdova, our CMs are still Durkin and Edelman, and our WCBs don’t pass.

But remember, the goal of all of this is the playoffs.

Round 1: 4 points (-2.5 points)

Round 2: 2 points (-4.5 points)

Round 3 so far: 7 points (+0.5 points)

CITY is still -6.5 points behind the historical playoff pace. Win on Saturday, CITY goes into the break -3.5 points behind. Cannot understate just how massive a difference that would be.

I HATE CHRISTIAN LAETTNER HÉCTOR HERRERA

[Insert GIF of Héctor Herrera missing the game-losing penalty so it may play for all of eternity here]

That was, arguably, some of the worst soccer I have watched live in some time from both teams over the course of 120 minutes. We’re talking goals from an inexplicable defensive error - half-pass/missread/mispass - a goalkeeper slipping, a backup goalkeeper (soon to be hero) committing the cardinal sin of goalkeeping in waiting and anticipating a deflection and being unable to stop the ball when the deflection doesn’t occur, and a 15-yard penalty, automatic first down, and a penalty kick for unnecessary roughness.

Hartel quietly has 6 goals and an assist in 14 games now. 0.5 per 90, which is second best to only JSB in qualified players for CITY so far.

But I don’t really want to talk about any of that.

CCT wants to be CAF. Chat About Feels.

Because it felt awesome.

Sitting behind the south goal (South side best side), next to friends and readers. My wife, our son, and my dad are to my left. STL Soccer News and Soccer Datavizer wizard Chris is in front of me. The Ball Watching boys, Justin and Jake, are to my right. The Soccer Zombie, Red Smoke Rising, and STL CITY Academy's famous Tom Franklin, alongside. Flyover Footy and CITY’s second-best ginger Matt Baker, and so many more.

We sat, we stood, we talked and chatted nervously.

We jumped in joy when Hartel scored, high-fives flying.

The collective disbelief as Bürki slipped 30 feet in front of us, followed by the groans of sadness as he looked uncomfortable before signaling he could not continue.

The heads in hands as Lundt badly misplayed the ball to give Houston in the lead.

They listened while I shouted at Polvara, begging him just once or twice to go to his left.

The entire section rising to our feet as Córdova was tackled by Michael Strahan in front of us. Hands on heads and hips, in utter silence while Hartel waited, and waited, and waited, before making it 2-2.

They rolled their eyes when I screamed, “Hey Héctor, you suck,” as that man entered the pitch.

Discussing, analyzing, and scheming about which subs to bring on, who might be needed now, and who could maybe come on if things go to extra time and possibly penalties.

The pure agony of seeing Polvara misplay that pass, followed by the absolute silence as the ball went around Lundt, and the sheer head-shaking disbelief that Dante covered all that ground to make that block.

The excitement of seeing Joyner enter, knowing the kid could absolutely thwack a penalty.

The confusion of seeing Fall subbing on for 3 milliseconds.

The plotting of who the five would be and my comment that if your CF isn’t taking a penalty, you should cut him (true!).

The fist bumps and silent nodding after Lundt’s first save, knowing that could be the difference.

The gasps when Timo strode forth as the third penalty taker, followed by the guttural yells following his ridiculous strike.

The astonishment at Durkin being the fourth taker, and the fear for the safety of those standing behind that north goal, before he laced it into the back of the net.

And then watching Lundt dive and save Herrera’s shot, followed immediately by the phone camera’s lighting up, the jumps, the hugs, the highfives, the laughter, and the euphoria of the moment. Holding my son, and watching him see everyone around him celebrating with such joy that he balled his hands into fists and shook them toward the sky like the rest of us. Knowing that this may have been the biggest win in our club’s short history.

Hearing the laughter of everyone around us. The joy in those voices as we knew CITY is only 90 minutes away from the final. The singing, the music, and the feeling of everyone as we walked up Market Street back to our cars.

Now knowing the only thing standing between us and that final is a team owned by Enos Stanley Kroenke.

Who gives a shit how many people were at the Park that night? I already don’t remember the attendance. But I’ll always remember that night for the people who were around me. Family, friends, colleagues.

I would love to be in Denver this September, cheering on the boys with all of you. It would be amazing if the club put something together to get a big, loud, and pink crowd into Stan’s backyard.

Anyone can win two soccer games. And that’s all we need to do. Two games of soccer.

But even if we don’t, that won’t erase the memories of what happened in St. Louis on Tuesday night.

It was a terrible game of soccer, truly. But it was an amazing game of joy and friendship.

And that’s what it’s all about, nerds.

Thanks for reading. Let’s go out with a BANG on Saturday.

#AllForCITY, forever and always. #DiegoOut.

2 goals conceded on 2.17 xG

and a completely and utterly brutal xG timeline to look at:

Shameless plug, check out SoccerDatavizer.com.

CITY after 10 games played:

• 6 points on 15 expected points

• 9 goals on 16.07 xG

• 18 goals conceded on 13.82 xGA

With the weekly CITY manager comparison looking like this:

The theme continues - Damet’s side continues to perform well in just about every expected metric you can find, whilst continuing to underperform all of those expected metrics in actual metrics.

With 30% of the MLS season already behind us, lines are being drawn in the sand: Those on the expected side can continue to point at the should be and could be, and they would be right in doing so, while those on the actual side can point at the results, and they would be right in doing so.

A weird, unrelated coincidence - CITY, from 2023-2025 underperformed xPoints by -9.4. Based on the beliefs of the Temple of Progression/Regression to the mean, you’d expect that to correct itself. Instead, CITY has doubled it, with -9 xPoints in 2026.

The xProblem

CITY, once again, underperforms its xG in Austin. In fact, it’s the second-worst xG underperformance in club history, at -2.52.

Three players have taken 10+ shots so far for CITY in MLS play, and all three are underperforming their xG: Becher is -2.89, Hartel is -0.85, and Teuchert is -1.14. Many people are jumping on the anti-Becher train, and I think some of it is, frankly, unfair, because he has shown improvement in other aspects of his game. But, and this is a big but, he had the fourth-worst xG underperformance MLS has seen in the last 14 years and has the second-worst in MLS so far in 2026 (ironically behind goal-scoring extraordinaire Heung-Min Son, who hasn't scored so far in 2026 but does have an MLS-leading 7 assists). There are an overwhelming number of data points at this stage suggesting he is not going to go on a massive hot streak to progress toward the mean.

I want to reiterate that Simon Becher alone is not the xG problem. He is a significant contributor to it, but good soccer teams have a multitude of primary and secondary goal scorers, whereas City has no primary goal scorer and currently only Hartel as a secondary goal scorer.

And it’s also not fair to say that xG underperformance is the reason this team has 6 points in 10 games. For as bad as the offense has been (-7.07 xG underperformance), the defense (-4.18 xGA underperformance) deserves its fair share as well.

CITY has shown an ability to score once, and not much more than that, in any given 90+ minutes of MLS gameplay. CITY has also shown an inability to keep the ball out of the net, ever.

I made a comment over a year ago, when the criticism of Olof was reaching a boiling point, that while his defensive style was off-putting to many, the game is easier when you only have to score once to win.

In no way am I turning this into a pro-Olof, anti-Damet conversation, but I think that comment holds water today.

CITY has zero, 0, clean sheets so far, and we’ve been held to 1-1 draws three times. Scoring goals is hard. Having to score multiple goals every week is even harder.

If CITY only had to score once to win, there is no question we’d have more points than we do right now. And if CITY could score more than once, we’d also have more points than we do right now.

So you are more than right to point the blame at the offense, especially when you see a miss like that Hartel-Becher debacle, and say, “This offense is not good enough to win games.” But you’d also be right in saying, after watching the 9 goals conceded in the last three games, that “this defense is not good enough to win games.”

But don’t you worry, if we know anything about 2026, it is that consistent underperformance will warrant replacement in the starting lineup.

How Dare You

To quote from Matthew Doyle’s latest Power Rankings:

Retweet, reskeet, repost, whatever it is these days.

Courtesy of my friends over at Red Smoke Rising, we have, in writing, this… inexplicable quote from Yoann Damet:

Why is it unexplicable, you might ask? Here is a fresh, made-to-order new CCT viz: the Minute Budget.

“Again, it was the third game of the week for us, and I think we lacked a little bit of freshness in some key moments.”

Roman Bürki has played every minute of every game so far in 2026. That’s fine; no issues there. Jaziel Orozco, prior to his injury, had played 99.7% of all available minutes (sitting out just 3 minutes). Timo Baumgartl has also played every minute of every game in 2026. Dante Polvara is 26 minutes shy of a perfect appearance record and hasn’t had a minute off since Matchday 5 on March 21st. Lukas MacNaughton has featured exactly as you’d expect from a depth center-back: 15-to-30-minute cameos at first, followed by essentially every minute of every game following Orozco’s injury.

As a reminder, CITY had played 11 games prior to the Austin FC (ATX) match. Mamadou Mbacke—of whom I’m not a huge fan—was not rostered for MD1. He then sat on the bench for eight games, totaling just 42 minutes before ATX. Fallou Fall—of whom I am a huge fan—was injured for MD1–3 and was left off the gameday roster for the following four games. He played eight minutes in the Open Cup—not at LCB or LWB, but endearingly at Left [Wing/Mid?]—before returning to the bench for the next three games. That is eight minutes total prior to ATX.

How dare Yoann Damet use “freshness” as an excuse? Who decided to play Orozco, Baumgartl, Polvara, and MacNaughton every available minute? Whose decision was it to keep the Senegalese players off the roster or use them as mere cheerleaders on the sideline?

Conrad Wallem has struggled; he has now started 11 of 12 games and logged 950 minutes. Rafael Santos was previously undroppable, playing 612 minutes in the first seven games. During that same span, Tomas Totland was a substitute, then injured, then an unused bench option, totaling only 31 minutes. Since then, the roles have flipped: Totland has started four of the last five games (405 minutes), while Santos has managed only 79.

Again: how dare Yoann Damet use freshness as an excuse? Whose decision was it to play Santos for 612 minutes while Totland got 31, only to now grind Totland for 405 minutes while Santos gets 79?

Chris Durkin has already played over 1,000 minutes—93% of the season—and has started all 12 games. Daniel Edelman had started 10 of 11 games and played 88% of minutes before missing the gameday roster entirely due to exhaustion. Miguel Perez, clearly the third-choice CM, started MD2 (with Hartel absent) and the Tulsa game. Outside of that, he’s been an unused substitute six times and had played only 57 minutes off the bench prior to Austin. Tomas Ostrák was unavailable for the first five matchdays. He was then left off the roster twice, played 15 minutes against Tulsa (scoring in the process), and has been excluded from every roster since. Zero MLS minutes; heck, zero MLS gameday appearances.

Whose decision was it to play Durkin and Edelman together so constantly that Edelman was too tired to even make the bench in Austin? Whose decision was it to let Perez, the depth CM, sit on his hands and jog on the sideline while the starters tire out every week? Who has decided to excommunicate Tomas Ostrák from the squad altogether?

Up front, there has been an ever-rotating cast: Simon Becher has played a lot of minutes, Sergio Córdova features regularly, and Brendan McSorley has subbed on 10 times (ironically, not in the two victories over MLS opponents). Sang-bin featured early but hasn’t been seen since his training injury. Pompeu is out for the season. Teuchert has appeared in nine games.

You get the point. The “attackers”—excluding Marcel Hartel, who has started 11 of 11 games and played all but 33 minutes—have played 12%, 24%, 18%, 30%, 51%, and 70% of available minutes. That represents some level of rotation, even if playing Becher and Córdova’s minutes together is silly.

Eduard Löwen’s unavailability hasn’t helped. He missed the first eight games but is seeing his minutes increase: 8, 14, 40, and finally a 61-minute start against ATX. That should help alleviate the miles on Durkin and Edelman’s legs, provided Perez and Ostrák aren’t seen as viable options. Never mind—he’s playing at the R10.

My stance is to never believe what a person says into a microphone; it is almost always a half-truth or a non-truth. But this Damet quote is very much the truth. It was the third game in a week, and it was obvious the team lacked “freshness.”

However, that isn’t a defense. It’s the opposite. It’s damning. It’s Damet-ing.

As this season unfolds, I’m coming around to a wild idea: CITY might need to hire a manager. Damet can clearly coach. You can see his well-drilled ideas translating from training to the pitch. The pivot from the “hit-and-hope” soccer we previously saw in STL to this 2026 side is a stark contrast. But I’m not sure he can “manage.” He certainly hasn’t shown much in that regard so far.

Thanks for reading.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

#DiegoOut

The Whitecaps belong in Vancouver. Relocation sucks.

Be much better.

Secondly, it’s Open Cup Wednesday again! If you’re making the trip up I-55, do us proud.

CITY metrics for that loss in Seattle:

• 1 goal on 0.83 xG (overperformance!).

• 4 goals conceded on 1.77 xGA (oof).

• 0.75 expected points.

And for that loss to San Jose:

• 2 goals on 2.76 xG

• 3 goals conceded on 1.62 xGA

• 2.02 expected points

St. Louis CITY has generated 2+ xG twice this season. St. Louis CITY has generated 2+ xPoints twice this season. They are the same two games. CITY has one point from them.

As we approach the end of Round 2, the last full round of managerial comparisons, here is how Damet is stacking up:

Now, let’s vent.

Set-Pieces in Seattle

Yesterday’s news, covered ad nauseam at this point, is that CITY’s set-piece defending was woeful.

49 minutes into the game, CITY is losing three-nil on two identical corner kicks and a penalty. Not exactly an ideal game state.

Instead of rehashing the issues you’ve undoubtedly seen and heard about a week ago, I present this to you.

Seattle scored three goals and made four substitutions, and the game had gone on for over an hour before Yoann Damet felt it was worthwhile to try anything different.

While that may seem drastic, if your team is playing well, being proactive, creating chances, etc., then there’s not necessarily a need for change. Making substitutions to make substitutions is not beneficial.

Was that the case, Yoann?

Ope, not really. Any idea how much xG CITY generated between the 41st minute and the sub timer, some 24 minutes of gametime later?

0.00 xG.

And with only 0.63 xG generated in the game, it felt like a great time to get the ball rolling and inject some fitness into the legs of CITY’s heartbeat, Mr. Eduard Löwen, who had just completed his first 45 minutes a week earlier.

Or, hearing there’d be a few minutes of stoppage time, which ended up being seven, the 89th minute was determined to be the best for a guy building up fitness to… play fewer minutes. I’m not a physiotherapist, nor do I have any medical expertise. But what I do have is a fair bit of common sense, and it seems, to me, guys who need fitness should have their minutes increasingly ramp up, especially in a game state that doesn’t require much of them. But I suppose the medical recommendation could’ve been to wait until CITY was four goals down?

Hell of a tor, Löwen. Welcome back. We’ve missed you, and more importantly, we are here for you.

Bruce’s Thunderdome (ThunderArena?)

I audibly vented some frustrations about this loss on Tuesday with the Ball Watching boys.

Saturday night for me was a continuation of the theme of the past two months.

CITY played “well.” 2 goals on 2.76 xG is not great. 3 goals conceded on 1.62 xGA is not great, but 2.02 expected points is good!

But you don’t have to pause if you’ve heard this before, because you’ve heard this before. CITY underperformed xG against San Jose. Sergio Córdova scored a goal thanks to a lovely assist from Marcel Hartel (and the fact that he was in the middle of the box, because that’s where center forwards play, hence the term, “center”), and Marcel Hartel scored a great goal thanks to a well-timed tackle by Edelman and a perfectly weighted first-time pass from Becher.

Córdova had two shots in this one, a 0.07 xG miss and a 0.29 xG goal. Becher had three shots, with 0.02, 0.16, and 0.04 xG values, all of which missed, continuing the trend of his 2026 season. He now has 19 shots on the season, and 17 have been off target (note that OPTA has made a mistake, crediting Totland’s close-range effort in the 11th minute to Becher, so many of our favorite websites will have some incorrect data until it is hopefully fixed).

Córdova scored his first goal, and doing so from a central area is good. Becher, while a non-factor at this point in actually scoring the goals, had his season’s best work in hold-up play. Hartel had both a night you’d expect and a night you wouldn’t. 6 shots, 7 SCA1s and 4 SCA2s, or 17 shot events, while CITY managed 20 total shots, is indicative of absolutely everything running through him, to no one’s surprise. The 0.38 xG miss is the chance that everyone is going to think about, and rightly should, because that’s just not the type of finish you expect from him. Over 50% of his shots in 2026 are on target, and he rarely opts for a power-over-finesse finish; it was a chance left squandered. And then a minute later, he has a 0.61 xG chance (0.63 xGOT) that is saved. The quick math there is 0.99 xG, but 0 goals from those two chances, which is fuel for the fire of “he’s got to score one of those.” He makes up for it in turning that 0.06 effort into a 0.73 xGOT goal to give CITY the lead, so in those three chances, 1 goal on 1.05 xG.

A good reminder that finishing is largely random.

But that was Hartel at his creative best - 0.61 xA, five chances created, three of them “big chances,” and both scoring and assisting. Overall, he managed to both disappoint and play quite well.

According to OPTA’s data, CITY finished 1/6 in big chances, while San Jose was 2/2.

All of which means you are absolutely vindicated in feeling frustrated about what happened on Saturday night.

Because it sure felt like that wasn’t the result that should’ve happened.

Remember, in Seattle, when Seattle proactively made four subs and had scored three goals before CITY reacted?

Bruce Arena, a very unlikeable person but a fine soccer coach, had to make a substitution for the injured keeper Edwards in the first half. At halftime, winning 1-0 and coming off an MLS game three days prior, Arena made two more subs, including bringing on one of MLS’s young revelations, Niko Tsakiris. Shortly thereafter, CITY hit for the double salvo, and it was suddenly 2-1 in our favor. Arena quickly made his fourth substitution. San Jose capitalized on a stupid Wallem penalty foul, and now that it was 2-2, Bruce Arena made his fifth and final substitution of the night.

Please note that there have been two lead changes, two equalizers, and five substitutions after 70 minutes of play.

Yoann Damet stands stoically on the touchline, maybe realizing, maybe failing to realize, that he is standing in Bruce’s Thunderdome. Bruce is conducting the orchestra, doing everything he can to make sure it plays to his tune.

Yoann Damet might as well have been sitting in the audience, tapping his foot and nodding along.

You know how others and I have been shouting into the void that playing Becher + Córdova is not great, bad even. Apart from not scoring goals, creating chances, and playing a guy wildly out of position, it also means there is no center-forward option on the bench. So, 10 minutes after San Jose equalized and Damet realized he didn’t buy a ticket to Mickey’s PhilharMagic, he made two subs - McSorley & Teuchert for Becher + Córdova, and CITY found themselves without a center forward in a 2-2 game with ten minutes remaining!

Add to that, two minutes later, Werner scored his second, and now CITY were left chasing a game they deserved on paper to win, and to chase without a CF! Two more subs, our underperforming LWB and Löwen, entered the fray in the hopes of salvaging a point, but apart from that, we remained content to leave Joyner and others on the bench with an unused sub slot, knowing full well Damet had just been outcoached.

Damnit Damet.

(Thanks, Tim)

Frustration has fully boiled over for me with Damet and his roster management.

CITY has played nine games. Eight players have started all nine. Hartel has started all eight he was available for, and Santos started the first eight before he was rightfully dropped for Totland against San Jose.

CITY has scored 9 goals on 13.55 xG this season, an underperformance of 4.55 goals.

CITY has conceded 16 goals on 11.65 xGA this season, an underperformance of 4.35 goals.

Who, exactly, amongst that core 10, has earned the right to be a locked-in starter, week in, week out, when a team doesn’t score like it should and concedes far more than it should?

Marcel Hartel is an 86th-percentile MLS player so far in 2026. Jaziel Orozco is a 76th-percentile MLS player so far.

No one else is in the top half. Look:

We’ve talked about it twice, but 2.02 expected points against San Jose! That’s very good! But we’ve hit the 25% marker on the season, and time is quickly running out.

This team has 6 points in 9 games.

I don’t think this is a playoff team, but it should be.

How much longer are we going to sit here and pretend these are the only players on the roster? Tomas Totland started this game and was a breath of fresh air, actually providing some ooooomph down the left, even though, long-term, his lack of a left foot could be an issue.

Mamadou Mbacke was one of MLS’s best centerbacks four years ago. Fallou Fall had one of the most promising half-seasons we’d seen from a young CB in some time last fall.

They both sit on the bench, playing for neither CITY2 nor CITY, likely hoping to get a runout on Wednesday in the Open Cup.

Mykhi Joyner has consistently been one of MLSNP’s best players over the last two seasons, yet he also has to hope for another Open Cup appearance.

So here’s my question, and my frustration, built into one.

What, exactly, has this core of players accomplished in 2026 to warrant their place in the squad? Is it the lack of offense? Is it the porous defense? Is it sitting in 28th place out of 30 teams in MLS?

Damet will get a longer leash than those before him at this organization for two main reasons: 1) the people who hired him cannot afford another disaster, and 2) he plays a style, unlike his predecessor, that is more “sellable” and more pleasing to the eyes of the masses.

And anyone thinking Damet should be fired at this point is silly.

But,

Damnit Damet.

Thanks for reading. An Open Cup win on Wednesday would be well received.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

Usher is a role that suits him much better than his current one. And that’s likely an insult to ushers. #DiegoOut

1 goal on 1.05 xG.

1 goal conceded on 1.67 xGA.

0.96 expected points.

CITY after seven games played:

• 6 points on 10.7 expected points

• 6 goals on 9.96 xG

• 9 goals conceded on 8.26 xGA

With the weekly manager comparison looking like this:

There is still a lot of green in the Damet metrics, especially for expected metrics. Here’s a little fun fact that likely means nothing, but may mean something if the trend continues: CITY has underperformed its xG in six of seven MLS games this season. The game in which we overperformed our xG is also the lone victory so far, and it was a sizeable overperformance of three goals on 1.35 xG.

Is it too simple to say that CITY needs to overperform xG to win games? Most likely.

But if it were to prove to be the case, this is probably why.

9 + 9 =/= 18

This would’ve been a great moment to include an astronomical reference (because Artemis II was incredible) about how our center forwards are like a black hole - a void of nothingness (even though technically, it’s the opposite because a black hole is an immeasurably dense concentration of mass, so it’s not nothing, it’s a lot of something…)

Anyway.

The point is that CITY might be struggling to score enough goals to win games because they have two center forwards incapable of doing so.

Since Simon Becher’s opening goal of the season and the opener against New England, in the 29th minute, almost a month ago, he has taken a grand total of four shots.

A second shot against New England, for 0.08 xG, which was blocked.

Two shots against NYCFC, a 0.08 xG, and a 0.04 xG, both of which were blocked.

And a set-piece header against Dallas, worth 0.06 xG, which was blocked.

That’s two full games, plus an hour after he scored, in which the number 9 doesn’t have a shot on target, or off target for that matter (blocks are not considered off target).

Alongside xA totals of 0.03, 0.06, and 0.05.

He’s a complete non-factor for CITY at the moment, and these aren’t outlier games. He’s had two big events - his goal accounts for 30% of his xG this season, and his assist to Hartel in MD1 accounts for 76% of his xA this season.

Said differently, outside of his two goal contributions, he has 0.78 xG and 0.21 xGA on the season. Which illustrates the point: there’s no offense generated directly through Becher, which was a concern of mine in the offseason Crystal Ball:

Becher generated a TON of g+ value last season in receiving the ball in dangerous areas and shooting (albeit not scoring).

But he’s not shooting, and where he receives the ball in 2026 is significantly less dangerous than in 2025.

When you are playing a system like Damet is choosing to do - three centerbacks, two wingbacks, and two central midfielders, it is imperative that the three attackers can spearhead attacks, create chances, and score goals.

Becher is not doing that, but he is not helped by what Damet has done over the last two weeks with our “DP no. 9”.

Sergio Córdova’s first start wide against NYCFC produced:

• 71 minutes

• 0.05 xG that missed by a Durkin (this is going to become our internal measurement, similar to a Kelvin, Newton, Watt, etc.)

• 0.00 xA

• Zero touches in the box

Damet saw that and thought, “Hell yeah, let’s do that again,” and Córdova against Dallas tallied:

• 83 minutes

• 0.04 xG

• 0.01 xA

And this moment…words escape me:

(H/T Chris @ STLSoccerNews)

Timo plays an excellent ball through the lines to Becher, who receives it and plays it to Hartel in one touch, perfectly. Hartel, rightly, opts for Wallem as the defender shadowing Córdova turns his hips inside to follow him, leaving Wallem free. Córdova, asking for the ball from Hartel but not receiving it, throws his arms up in frustration and slows down, only for one second later Wallem to play a pass that would, in my view, perfectly meet Córdova in stride to attack the goalkeeper 1-on-1 with Becher steaming down the left flank as an option as well.

Those are moments that do not show up in xG, xA, or xPoints talk, and those moments can often be the defining ones.

But big picture? Córdova was a bad signing. That’s not hindsight; some of us said it immediately. A large, physical striker with “target nuisance” data cannot touch the ball once in the penalty area across two matches. If Damet continues playing Córdova in the R10 role, we are likely to continue experiencing attacking malaise.

9 + 9 =/= 18.

9 + 9 = 1 goal in seven games.

Yoann is the Manager

I am increasingly frustrated by Yoann Damet's selections, and know I am not alone in that.

CF has been a problem, LWB has been a problem, RWB has been a problem, R10 has been a problem, CM has been a problem, and CB has been a problem (not you, Jazy O, although we need to take brain injuries seriously).

Nine players have started all seven games, Hartel has started six, and would have started seven if not for Baby Hartel.

Ten out of eleven starters being consistent week over week is a level of consistency that we have not seen at CITY. And this is going to go against the nerds and the data on xPoints, Strength of Schedule, and all the rest of it.

But here’s the uncomfortable truth: there is a mathematical possibility that CITY could be 30th out of 30 teams after this weekend. Wooden Spoon. If that happens, the question I asked last week re consistency might have some different answers:

There has been lots of praise, and reasonably so, in Damet’s insistence on sticking with largely the same XI.

At what point, for you specifically, would that change from praise to frustration?

I asked because I’m already there, especially with Löwen’s feature at the R10 for CITY2 last weekend, if that is a foreshadowing of things to come.

But if I were the Manager

Polvara out, Fall in, because obviously.

Wallem at R10 and Totland RWB. Tots gets to play high and wide, as he prefers, and we saw him at his best, which is also what Damet wants. Wallem plays much more inverted, with Tots outside him, and can play off Hartel and [insert CF here] to try to bring some dynamism to CITY’s worst position in 2026.

Löwen comes in for Durkin, even though Edelman has continued to have bad moments on the ball.

And as for [insert CF here], I think you give Córdova a go at the 9, not because he’s any better than Becher, but because his skill set likely fits the need more. If it doesn’t work, then you switch them.

BUT FOR THE LOVE OF ALL THINGS, LET’S CUT THIS BECHER AND CÓRDOVA TOGETHER ON THE PITCH NONSENSE OUT.

It’s frankly a worse version of Klauss & Sam, and that was bad.

And what happens is, you get something like this:

And in the final third, it looks a bit like this:

This significantly upgrades the right side of the pitch while maintaining the desired vertical width. On the left, you are blessed with three incredibly technical players in Fall+Löwen+Hartel who can combine in tight spaces. Edelman, unlike Durkin, can be trusted not to venture too far forward and will be tasked with sweeping up whenever the ball exits the final third and recycling it to either side.

It’s balanced, in line with what Damet wants from his fullbacks and CBs, and it maintains defensive rigidity and structure.

Which is exactly why I am expecting 80 more minutes of Córdova, a short cameo of McSorley, and a couple more overcooked crosses from Santos.

That XI is both a week or two away from existing and likely never to exist, simultaneously. Which frustrates me because when you watch how this team is playing, you see the patterns in the buildup and the ideas.

Damet has this team playing a certain way, which is good, regardless of what that style is.

But he might not know how to put together a lineup that can execute his plan, which could prove problematic.

But it’s not all doom and gloom.

This is the 10th time in club history that CITY has taken points in three consecutive games, and it happened only twice in 2025.

Heading into this incredibly difficult, cross-country away series against New York, Dallas, and Seattle, I had hoped we would get two points. Three points, meaning either a road victory or three road draws, would have been excellent. Four-plus points would have been dreamy.

Well, we’ve gotten those two points, and this Saturday, CITY has the chance to make it an excellent or even dreamy road trip.

10.4 points would be the historical playoff pace as of the conclusion of MD8; CITY sits on 6, and I don’t need to do the math for you; a win would be massive.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

Go to the Open Cup! Hopefully, I’ll see ya there!

I think we all know who would be perfect for this role.

#DiegoOut

1.16 expected points.

I’ve decided to stick with this format because I like that we get straight to the metrics, both actual and expected.

So here’s where CITY sits after six games played:

5 points, 9.7 expected points; 5 goals, 8.91 xG; 8 goals conceded, 6.59 xGA.

Those Charlotte xPts (2.33) still hang heavy over our heads, the offense is still struggling, and the defense has been leaky. And because comparison is a dish best served… cold? hot? via Excel?

It’s a continuation of the conversations we’ve had thus far - underperformance on both sides of the pitch has resulted in CITY having a top-half xPts performance so far in 2026, and you also have to consider, using Six One Five Soccer’s Power Rankings, CITY has played the toughest schedule in MLS.

Which is both a fun and frustrating conversation to have, because we’ve played some really good teams, and largely played well enough to not lose:

But looking just at NYCFC…

Hell. Yeah.

What a way to steal a point in NYC, especially on the first leg of what should prove to be an incredibly tricky three-game road stretch of NYC, Dallas, and Seattle. And as the first fixture in Round 2, a reminder of where we sit after failing to meet the 6 points per Round playoff pace, which compounds those missed points as the rounds continue.

Round 1: 4 points (-2)

Round 2: 1 point (-7) with 12 potential points remaining

It’s difficult to envision that CITY will meet that pace in this difficult Round 2, but we need to not bleed too many points here and really dig a hole for ourselves early.

Which is hopefully a conversation we don’t have to have, but this next one is one we do.

The McConversation

McSCOREly has demonstrated a knack for scoring goals in MLSNP and his brief MLS stint. With 465 MLS minutes, 20 shots, an expected goals (xG) of 3.6, and 3 goals, he shows clear goal-scoring ability. Since scoring is the main purpose of a player, it’s easy to point out and say, “He needs to play more!"

Using that logic, it’s hard to disagree. There’s solid evidence that he can contribute in limited cameo minutes when focused on scoring. The challenge comes with everything else. Watching him play reveals gaps in his game that are unlikely to improve much beyond his current mid-20s.

The key question is, where do you fit him in? Last year, we knew he was not suited to wide roles in MLS because his game is centered on exploiting penalty-area chances, and he lacks the attributes to impact the game from wide positions. The right-10 spot fits his skill set perfectly. But it’s also a poor fit for the team - having Hartel and McSorely underneath either Becher or Córdova results in two non-Hartel players who are subpar ball-players. Neither Becher nor Córdova is a strong on-ball player; both are below-average dribblers and passers, though they are significantly better with the ball than McSorely.

Damet’s CITY isn’t aiming to be a smash-and-grab team. They prefer to control possession and, ideally, break down opponents. Having two-thirds of your attack not fitting this style would be problematic, and that alone might justify not playing more McSorely.

But maybe you see it differently. Perhaps you view McSorely as more of a striker; instead of playing alongside Becher or Córdova, you want him to play in their place, because he scores goals, and you lack confidence in the others.

There’s some merit to that argument, but I disagree, and here’s why: As a center forward, he would need to play back-to-goal—winning first and second balls, holding off defenders, having good first touches, and maintaining control. We’ve seen Becher struggle in this exact role because those skills aren't his strengths, and he’s better at them than McSorely.

So, you’d likely end up with a forward who isn’t impacting the game because he’s not built for it. And Becher is already occupying that role, so why do it again, but probably worse?

Here’s what I suggest. Wallem has shown improvement in his offensive output over the last two weeks, possibly because he’s been able to play a bit more narrowly while the R10—first Pompeu, now Córdova (which was so silly)—play wider.

Conrad Wallem is a good soccer player, and we should proactively work on ways to help him be that good soccer player.

And if he needs that width to be more effective, I think we should play the R10 role with a player who naturally plays wider, who’s also played quite well from a wide position in MLSNP: Mykhi Joyner.

But I know that’s not gonna happen at this point, so here’s the alternative - play Teuchert and Totland, move Wallem to LWB, allowing him to invert naturally while Totland provides width on the right.

And then, depending on the game situation, McSorely can be the 10-15 minute “set’s bull loose in a china shop”—a striker who creates chaos and takes shots in the box.

Wallem to LWB and Totland into the fray, you say, Michael ey?

Yeah, because Rafael Santos might stink.

How Many Balls Can a Crosser Cross if a Crosser Crosses Balls

Here’s the thing about Rafael Santos - he has one standout skill - set-piece ball striking, and one good skill - passing the soccer ball. We now have three full seasons plus 2026 data to consider, and it’s difficult to see him as anything other than a replacement-level MLS player at best. 2023 still seems to be the exception rather than the norm.

The reason I frame Rafael Santos as potentially stinking rather than saying Rafael Santos stinks is twofold: 1) we’ve played six games, and 2) he might be lacking ideas in the final third.

I won’t go on repeatedly about the need for consistent offensive strategies, but you get the point—good teams and offenses have a “playbook,” and in the final third, they have “plays” that are proven to create chances, similar to red zone offenses. STL currently lacks such an offensive playbook to generate those proven opportunities. Some might argue that our high press creates chances consistently. I disagree, but it’s debatable. The issue is that pressing is often reactive rather than proactive. We press when the ball moves to position X, or after situation Y, or at point Z. If those don’t happen, the press doesn’t occur.

But back to Santos - he has delivered 40 crosses in about 5.3 games’ worth of minutes, averaging 7.55 per 90. In 2023, that number was 3.89; in 2024, it was 4.35; in 2025, he played only 11.7 games; and after moving to Colorado, his number skyrocketed to 9.05 in 4 games. What I’m getting at is Santos has always shown good passing ability; look at those consistent 70% g+ numbers. But his passing skills aren’t limited to crossing. As the crossing hater, it’s also worth noting that the crosses themselves aren’t necessarily problematic. But who on this team actually scores from crosses?

Sergio Córdova, in last week's game, the tall guy over 6 feet, spent his time hugging the touchline, and there was a cross Santos sent in at one point where Córdova was not even inside the penalty box! He’s there to be a target because, based on evidence from nine different teams over his 11-year career, that’s about all to expect.

Simon Becher isn’t designed to thrive on crosses, nor is Marcel Hartel. So why flood the box with crosses?

That’s not the only problem. Santos also suffers from the same slow touch issue that our now-injured Pompeu and former resident left-footer Vassilev had. Every touch is painfully S L O W. Three players who love standing there with the ball, waiting for defenders to get into position—that’s why Pompeu struggles after beating his man, because he wastes passing angles with time. That’s why Vassilev was so frustrating to watch in STL and now PHI. And that’s what’s frustrating about Santos—he has really good technical ability to pass the ball quickly. He’s not blessed with a burst of acceleration or close dribbling skill, so he can’t beat defenders off the dribble. But he has it within him to receive and make a quick pass within 1-2 touches. For an example of how that can keep a defense off-balance, watch Wallem and MacNaughton do for McSCOREley’s equalizer. 

The defending, while poor, does not have time to get set, communicate marking, etc., because the ball is hit F A S T.

That’s been, in my eyes, CITY’s largest failing under Damet through 6 weeks in the final third.

There is no urgency. There are rare occasions of someone trying to up the tempo. And what results is settled, prepared defenses.

I framed a question the other day to members of the Discord, and I’ll ask it again here to generate some thoughts as we wrap up.

There has been lots of praise, and reasonably so, in Damet’s insistence on sticking with largely the same XI.

At what point, for you specifically, would that change from praise to frustration?

Think on it and let me know.

Six One Five has Dallas ranked as MLS’s 6th-best team in 2026, and they are 2-2-0 at home so far. As with NYC, a point would be good, however we can get it.

But as a result of better offensive and defensive play, it would be nice.

Thanks for reading.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

“Diego brings an incredible amount of international soccer expertise that will help us take the next step in our ambitious journey to become a global soccer brand.”

I’m sure the next step was to swing and miss as a World Cup training host. #DiegoOut

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1.72 expected points.

We ended last week’s discussion on belief, talking about two things: 1) Matchday 5, New England coming to St. Louis, was as “must-win” as it gets in the first month of the season, and 2) Damet’s actual versus expected metrics were vastly different so far in 2026:

Here’s how that changed after 90 more minutes:

Actual: 4 points, 4 goals, 7 goals conceded

Expected: 8.6 points, 7.59 xG, 4.92 xGA, and a positive 2.67 xGD.

That’s Round 1 done and dusted, and CITY are 2ish points behind the average playoff points pace. If they had beaten Charlotte in that season opener, as they should have (2.33 xPoints), do we look back at Round 1 as a success? Probably. 6 points, two home wins, and on playoff pace. But we didn’t, so that conversation can only happen between our ears, or over a cold one at Blue Jay Brewing Co. (I’m told it’s the place to be).

Here’s one more “believable” to sink your teeth into: the 5-game rolling xGD under Damet comes in at +0.53, meaning on average, CITY is performing half a goal better than its opponent through the first 5 games of 2026. Which doesn’t seem like much, or particularly significant for a team that has only won once.

But to show its significance, I must remind you of how bad some of these teams in St. Louis have been:

Carnell season 2 was a disaster (hello, my beautiful city of Philadelphia), Hackworth was a disaster (but we just let him stay here because why not), Mellberg was a disaster, and Critchley wasn’t great but got decent toward the end. Now, Damet, the Gateway to the [Expected Goal Difference].

Red is often bad; CITY Red (it’s pink) is good, and we are currently pink, which is good!

For those who’ve been around a long while, you know where this is going.

“Michael, you’re being awfully positive. What’s the catch?”

The Catch

This is my Believe It or Not.

On one hand, our spectacular xG/xGA underperformance suggested that a correction was “due.”

Three goals on 1.35 xG is a truckload of due.

Literally.

But on the other hand, it’s not like CITY scored these goals by strict adherence to repeatable processes. The first came from good pressure by Edelman, who exploits a slip and finds Becher, making a nice move and finishing from close range. The second involved the Revs’ set-piece coach still likely yelling… And the third was outright ridiculous.

While CITY also gave up several odd-man breaks, the first of those was embarrassingly off target by Feingold (0.59xG from FOTMOB), and you’d expect at least one to be converted.

This feels more like a debate than a breakdown, because again, you’d expect us to get some “luck” and move toward the xG average, and capitalizing on opponents’ mistakes is what the sport is all about—rarely does a goal not come from exploiting an error.

And scoring from mistakes is good!

However, my hesitation—my “catch’—comes from thinking about future games.

Hartel won’t do that every week, nor will the opposition’s marking schemes. So, how will we score in the next game?

We’ve created three out of our four goals this season by creating turnovers in the opponent’s half. That’s encouraging, but it’s not enough to sustain consistent goal scoring over the long term.

How do we break down defenses, get the ball out wide to the WBs, and ensure enough central service so Hartel can be involved creatively on both ends? Those questions are key to winning consistently. But to win consistently, you first need to win the game—so, yay, but also nay?

The other thing you need to win games? Better play from those guys in front of our goal.

Centerbacks

We need more.

Not more bodies — we all know we’ve got enough.

We need more oomph with the ball, and a lot more removal of oomph without it.

I’ve been critical of Dante Polvara’s defensive game, and nothing I’ve seen this season has meaningfully changed that. But what has changed is the compounding effect of pairing him with Baumgartl, which has only heightened the concerns.

Polvara is clearly more comfortable with a proactive, step‑forward style of central defending — engaging the ball, engaging the man, using his size, and fitting CITY’s goal of pinning opponents in. When it works, it works because he wins the duel early.

But CITY is learning the cost of not doing so.

The 12th‑minute NER miss is the perfect encapsulation.

Baumgartl steps high but doesn’t win the ball. The ball moves around the pressure. Polvara charges forward to recover it. For a midfielder, that instinct is fine. For a centerback, it’s reckless knowing that Baumgartl has just tried the same, unless Polvara wins the ball. Polvara has to win the ball. He does not, and there is no central cover.

The gap behind him is enormous. NER finds it instantly, and suddenly, CITY is staring at a 2v0 from eight yards out.

That’s not an unlucky moment; it’s a structural vulnerability because of the personnel on the field. NER identified it and attacked that space around Polvara.

Expect more to target that channel as the season goes on.

But CITY also needs more with the ball from Polvara, or from someone else, because we have a left-sided progression problem.

Shoutout to Orozco, who has shown a willingness to break lines centrally — something we didn’t consistently see last year. But Polvara on the left isn’t doing the same.

He has eight progressive passes in five games.

Why?

A few potential factors:

• Durkin doesn’t show for the ball?

• Santos is so wide and high that the angle becomes difficult?

• Left‑foot passing angles are uncomfortable for every right‑footed LCB CITY has ever tried? (Because it’s hard)

• Or… is it simply no Löwen, no one demanding the ball in dangerous pockets?

This is where Damet’s insistence on continuity over experimentation in the XI leaves us guessing. We don’t know if the reluctance is a Polvara issue or a system issue.

When Fallou Fall returns, we’ll find out.
If he resumes his usual cross‑field spraying, it points the finger at Polvara.
If Fall also tightens up and plays safe, it points the finger at the system.

Personally, I hope it’s a Polvara issue — because CITY is desperate for defenders who can break lines and destabilize settled blocks — and a Damet issue would be much more difficult to fix.

So what happens next?

Fallou might be ready to go after the international break.

Baumgartl is almost certainly staying at CCB.

Orozco has been CITY’s best CB through five matches.

So, assuming Fallou takes the spot that should be his:

• Does Orozco retain RCB?

• Does Polvara shift to the right?

• Does Mbacke earn MLS minutes instead of MLSNP minutes and jump the queue? (This seems both the most and least likely option simultaneously)

We shall see.

Conrad Wallem

was a section last week where I said I don’t know what the problem is. It is still a bit of a mystery to me, but he had some really nice defensive moments in the second half of this one. His offensive game remains lacklustre at best, and it would be much appreciated if it improved.

What’s Next?

An away trip to the Bronx is next. Six One Five Soccer dropped some genuinely cool, data‑backed MLS rankings this week: NYCFC sits 6th in MLS, though they’ve played one of the easier schedules so far. CITY sits 17th, despite having played the third‑toughest schedule in the league.

And here’s the reality of MLS life: road points are hard.

CITY historically averages 0.85 points per road match, and across that same stretch has posted a –32.09 expected goal difference away from home. That’s a lot of uphill climbing.

So yeah — 1 point would be a good result. Not a moral victory, not a participation ribbon. Just a realistic outcome given the venue, opponent, and history.

But maybe more important than the result itself is the timing.
This short break gives CITY real training time to fully integrate Córdova, Fall, and Mbacke.

Emphasis on Córdova and Mbacke, because neither is sitting due to fitness.

So in this CITY off‑week, do what you should already be doing:

Support the lads on Thursday in their quest for the World Cup.

COME ON IRELAND!

As for CITY, I’m choosing to believe, but I don’t think Saturday night was dreams becoming reality.

You don’t have to believe in miracles. You just have to believe.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

#DiegoOut

Thanks for reading.

St. Louis has not scored a goal in six straight halves of soccer, and in seven of eight halves so far in 2026.

On my first Ball Watching appearance of 2026, and later in tweet/post form, I made a tongue-in-cheek comment about how pivotal Marcel Hartel would be for a side lacking both creativity and clinicality.

Since then, it’s become slightly ominous that there is not a single other player on the roster who has been able to find the net for CITY in 2026. If that trend continues and we maintain a 1:1 Hartel G+A-to-point ratio, 40 points would be nowhere close to Cup good, and CITY would likely miss the playoffs, even with arguably the greatest individual season in MLS history.

And all that really tells us is that, with Round 1/7 of the five-game rounds to be completed this weekend, we are subject to nothing more than the fantastic and whimsical “small-sample-size” (SSS) disclaimer in everything that we do here.

But let’s do it anyway.

Conrad Wallem

is a problem. I don’t have an answer yet. When I do, we will talk about it.

Batman and Robin

Chris Durkin had, in my memory, possibly his best game in red (jokes on you, we didn’t wear red, we wore LAFC colors at LAFC).

Why, might you ask?

Because he’s getting to do what he is good at. See ball, chase ball. 7 ball recoveries, 3 interceptions, 2 tackles.

Here are his goals added values through four games (SSS):

You can see it on the viz, provided by the fantastic Paul Harvey, but his offensive G+ against average is -0.11, while his defensive G+ against average is a whopping 0.40. If you’ve been paying attention whatsoever the past two-plus seasons, that makes sense, because Durkin has always been an active and tenacious defender and presser of the ball. Often over-active and over-tenacious, but the desire is there, and it fits into the more structured but still high-pressure system Damet is trying to implement.

It might also be part of the reason why CITY can’t score any goals.

Durkin is the more advanced central midfielder, and it’s helping CITY press high, recover the ball earlier, and do everything else off the ball. But as the more advanced midfielder, his lack of value in dribbling, passing, receiving, shooting, and other on-ball metrics makes it harder to create scoring opportunities against defenses.

However, that’s not just Durkin’s fault — he’s providing a lot of defensive value for CITY, and he deserves credit for his performance in Los Angeles.

The fault also lies with his partner, who has generated far less value across four games.

Edelman’s mistake directly led to LAFC’s opening goal, and his -0.44 Net G+ (comprising -0.41 in offense and -0.03 in defense) isn’t helping a team that isn’t picking up points.

With that -0.41 offense, he offers no value on the ball, and combining that with an error that results in a goal for a team that struggles to score is a recipe for disaster. CITY can’t afford errors, and that mistake became the difference.

As discussed last week, the question is whether this is due to personnel or the system.

Together, this midfield duo has an offensive G+ of -0.52. When/if Löwen returns, we face a dilemma. Edelman plays deeper than Durkin, allowing Durkin to be an aggressive ball-winner.

Löwen could replace Durkin in the more advanced number 8 role, maximizing his goal-scoring and playmaking, and adding creativity alongside Hartel. It would also likely eliminate CITY’s press, which Durkin helps facilitate, because Löwen isn’t a good defender and isn’t close to Durkin’s space-closer abilities.

So, should you replace Durkin with Löwen or Edelman?

Löwen performs near his best in his deeper, playmaking role, and that change could improve progression from backline to midfield — knowing Löwen can get through pressure.

But that deeper role also means a different defensive setup. Löwen can’t sweep or position to clear danger like Edelman. If he’s tasked with that, he’ll be playing more to facilitate play and moving around the pitch, which is the opposite of Edelman, who’s often in the right positions when the ball turns over.

We also know that a Löwen/Durkin midfield creates large gaps between midfield and defense, leaving the backline exposed, especially given Baumgartl's and Polvara's issues against direct runners.

So what do you do? What does Damet do? If Löwen can play, Löwen will play. Löwen will help CITY score more goals and concede more goals. Damet is paid the big bucks to figure that out, and we are paid the small bucks to watch and see if he does.

Right now, Damet is playing two Robins.

Löwen is Batman.

Damet’d if you do, Damet’d if you don’t.

Roman Bürki…

MLS’s highest-paid goalkeeper, a 35-year-old, signed a new designated player deal keeping him in STL through age 37, with an option through age 38.

In four games, he has conceded 1 goal on 0.75 xG, 2 goals on 1.16 xG, 1 goal on 1.00 xG, and 2 goals on 1.14 xG. In other words, he has conceded 6 goals on 4.05 xG, for a differential of -1.95. Using the xGOT metric, which is often more forgiving to goalkeepers, he’s conceded 6 goals on 4.581 xGOT, for a differential of -1.42.

Whether you prefer one metric or the other, he’s underperforming again.

That wasn't the case in 2023 or 2024.

It has been the case in 2025 and continues into 2026. If, and it’s a big if, this trend- which is quickly becoming more than just a trend- persists…

Bürki as a DP, without knowing if he can be bought down from DP status next year, would be problematic.

Goals.

Simon Becher has played 34 games over the last calendar year, scored 2 goals, and is underperforming his xG by 6.31 goals.

Yips.

Unfortunately, the data for MD4 is not yet complete and available, so through three weeks, here‘s how MLS is generating shots so far, how MLS is expected to generate shots based on historical data, and what CITY has done (h/t Cata):

More Poor and Average shots than their counterparts so far, and two “Great” shots in three games have them well below the MLS average. Obviously, these are waaaaaaayyyy too SSS to actually take anything from them, but they may offer a narrative to explain why CITY hasn’t scored.

Season Over?

Here are each of CITY’s managers' metrics through four games, both actual metrics (points, goals scored, goals conceded) and expected metrics (expected points, xG, xGA, xGD, etc.):

It should point you in a couple of directions—firstly, it highlights how laughably overperforming we were at the start of 2023, and secondly, how laughably underperforming we are in 2026.

The actual metrics for Damet are damet-ing: 1 point, 1 goal, 6 goals conceded.

The expected metrics for Damet are excellent: 6.9 points, 6 xG, 4 xGA, and a positive 2.19 xGD.

CITY has faced Charlotte (borderline Eastern playoffs), San Diego, Seattle, and LAFC (all potentially top-four teams in the West). CITY should have beaten Charlotte (2.33 xPoints), and they need to beat New England on Saturday night at Energizer Park. CITY has a positive 16.90 xGD and an xPoints-per-game of 1.55 in home games. Earning 1 point in the first round wouldn’t be the end of the world, but it would ramp up the pressure in the next rounds.

Making the playoffs is a must in MLS; don’t forget that.

The best moment of the first month? Tap at your screen and laugh at those who believe Bradley Carnell is a good manager and/or a good person.

See you on Saturday.

Help us, Marcel Hartel, you’re our only hope.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

#DiegoOut

As I mentioned in my update regarding our shift from Monday to Wednesday, I want to remain mindful of the “New Manager, New Season, New Roster, New Style” mantra. You’ve heard it from every #AllForCITY creator this month. But here is where I differ:

If CITY had banked five, six, or nine points, we wouldn’t be preaching patience. We wouldn’t be dismissing the success as a “small sample size anomaly.” We’d be crowning the new era. If we’re willing to validate the process when the points are there, we have to be honest when they aren’t.

One point and one goal is bad. It’s okay to say it.

We’ve done this math before: in the parity-driven chaos of MLS, you need between 6–7 points every five-game “round” to stay above the playoff line. Fall behind, and you’re chasing the pack. Get ahead early, and you can suffer a little as the season goes on. Predicting this league game-by-game is folly, which is why five-game rolling averages are better snapshots, but we aren’t there yet.

There are still 6 points outstanding in this round. Two wins are unrealistic from these last two, but that’s the playoff pace, whether we like it or not.

For now, though, let’s look at the games.

In Possession: The Illusion of Control

For those familiar with “Nancy-ball” in Columbus, it’s no surprise Yoann Damet wants the ball at our feet. In our two home games, we attempted 251 more passes than Charlotte and Seattle combined. We are executing the gameplan—specifically using the width of our wingbacks—but we lack the chemistry in the center to make it dangerous.

Outside of center-back lateral play, Orozco-to-Wallem and Polvara-to-Santos have been our most frequent pathways. While it’s magical to finally have a left-footed LWB with Rafael Santos’ striking technique, it’s equally worrisome that a supplemental-roster veteran, who was looking for a home as preseason approached, is currently the most vital cog in the system.

The following are the touch maps of the three games from our WBs:

Attacking from left to right against Charlotte, you see fairly equal touches and balanced verticality from both sides, with Santos providing those free-kick attempts at goal and Wallem receiving inside the penalty area.

Attacking from right to left against San Diego, you see almost no final third activity, and Totland’s not-included 11 total touches, 8 of which were in our own half, don’t help the visual.

And attacking from left to right against Seattle, you see one touch inside the penalty area, Santos hugging the touchline, and Wallem essentially meeting an invisible wall 12 yards from the end line.

Now, at the risk of making this sound too simple, if you really looked at these touch-maps from Santos and Wallem, you could likely figure out which game CITY scored and which games CITY did not without ever looking at a scoreboard.

San Diego did not let CITY do anything in the final third with their wingbacks, and Seattle kept Santos at a distance, and Nouhou kept Wallem in solitary confinement. And at this moment, with the current iteration as Damet OS 1.0, the wingbacks have to contribute in a big way. OS 1.1 will need to eliminate some bugs and fix some user issues that have popped up frequently, especially this next one.

The Midfield Paradox

You will be hard-pressed to find a successful team, at any level, in the last decade that couldn’t progress through the middle. I’ve been a vocal critic of the Daniel Edelman signing for this exact reason: CITY lacks a central profile capable of dictating tempo, and he was not designed to fix it.

Currently, we have Durkin—a pure destroyer—and Edelman, who is neither Durkin nor Löwen. He’s a significant on-ball upgrade on Durkin, but a significant downgrade on Löwen. And without Löwen, there is just not enough “oomph” here. Neither is the architect this system demands. If/when the Lion returns and Fall or Mbacke can provide incisive verticality from the back, maybe everything changes?

That’s the biggest question point I have at this moment - is this a personnel or systemic issue? If it’s personnel, we should see some drastic improvements. If it’s systemic, I fear we are in trouble.

Out of Possession: Data in Flux

I’m tabling the deep dive on our defensive structure for now. Between Dean Smith’s “English Olof Mellberg” bunker with Charlotte, a San Diego game-state that shattered after three minutes, and a depleted Seattle side looking toward the CCC, we haven’t seen the “true” Damet out-of-possession yet.

So I’ll leave this here for now as a placeholder of what is to come, but that is all.

And that feels like everything, unless I forgot something?

Oh yeah, sorry, I almost pulled a Diego Gigliani and Corey Wray.

I almost forgot about scoring.

Goals.

It would be a mistake not to mention the name currently haunting Diego Gigliani and Corey Wray: João Klauss. He’s the guy who asked his team in Los Angeles to wear black armbands in honor of Ilona Löwen, while the person still sitting in St. Louis, who runs this whole operation, fined Klauss for returning to Brazil for pre-announced family matters. That’s just one transgression among many, including last year’s decision to stand against those opposing childhood cancer.

Klauss leads MLS with 4 goals for the Galaxy. CITY has one. Simon Becher and Sergio Córdova have zero. This isn’t a claim that Klauss would have four goals in this specific STL system, but it does serve as an indictment of the front office’s honesty.

Because if we were honest, we would admit 2026 will be another tough year, whether we call it rebuilding, retooling, or whatever term you prefer.

By trading Klauss and replacing him with a $1M+ GAM rental in Córdova, they’ve effectively punted on the 2026 season. But since they don’t want to face questions and the heat, they’ve opted for a 12-game rental DP because it’s the “project.” They’re hoping a summer DP signing will retroactively justify a wasted spring.

But they don’t want to face that reality, so they do what people in their position always do when a microphone is shoved in their face—and it’s a rule I try to live by —

If they are talking into a microphone, they are lying into a microphone.

And they talk into microphones a lot. 

That’s really all I wanted to say about those first three games because, as mentioned, there isn’t much to take away from three completely different game states in three weeks. Instead, let’s use data to quickly discuss two scenarios—one in which CITY improves and one in which CITY does not.

Why things might turn around

STL is 25th in the table, but based on expected points, the outlook is not so dire.

ASA has STL at 8th through three games, with 5.19 points, which differs only slightly from my CCT expected points model of 5.08. (However, using OPTA data, those expected points decrease to 4.02). What does that imply? Well, that CITY has been much better on paper than its 1 point suggests. Charlotte was there for the taking, San Diego was, well, San Diego, and a half-fit, half-motivated Seattle did not come to Energizer Park intending to play expansive soccer.

Additionally, CITY ranks 1st in the ASA xG tables in underperformance. While Simon Becher is third individually in that poor statistic, CITY as a whole has underperformed, which isn’t surprising when you have only 1 goal in three games. If you believe in “due,” this might be your moment.

Do the rules of probability (The Gambler’s Fallacy) actually permit “due” to exist? Well… Anyway.

On top of all that, the XI is missing Löwen, Mbacke, and Fall. Mbacke may debut this weekend for what could be the toughest game of the season — away to LAFC. So, while the upcoming weekend might not look promising (though LAFC is fielding a near-ideal XI in their midweek CCC game on Tuesday), some small-sample data suggest that CITY has just been unlucky, not bad.

Why things might not

Well, after that first season, CITY has significantly underperformed their xPoints metrics over the past two seasons—16.5 points, to be exact. But it’s not just xPoints; it’s xG too.

You’d expect us to “progress to the mean,” except for some inconvenient facts: 1) Simon Becher led MLS in xG underperformance in 2025 and is currently third in that same category in 2026, and the team is utterly dependent on him or Córdova, who has similarly underperformed his xG in previous MLS stints; and 2) the team’s overall goal-scoring has underperformed our collective xG by almost 20 goals over the past two seasons.

Or, perhaps the team and system rely too heavily on the wingbacks and never develop a method for meaningful contributions and offensive inputs from central midfield.

I’ll leave you with this: a small-sample-size snippet from our first three games under all of our permanent and interim managers, which doesn’t account for any internal or external factors surrounding them. It’s simply—did they score points, should they have, how many goals they should’ve scored, and how many they should’ve conceded.

While the soccer hasn’t been all that pleasant, it feels great to be back at Energizer Park, and it feels great to be back here amongst friends.

#AllForCITY forever and always.

I’m excited once again to watch Heung-Min Son this weekend.

#DiegoOut

So in 2026, St. Louis finished ___ in the West, and ___ was fired.

That could read “8th” and “no one.”
It could just as easily read “14th” and “everyone.”

No one knows. And that uncertainty — the absurdity of trying to predict a club that has changed every 6 months — is the fun.

We will make our best estimate anyway. But before we get to predictions, let’s start with what we actually know.

What We Know About Yoann Damet’s 2026 CITY

Yoann Damet wants the ball.
More than Mellberg.
And certainly far more than the pure transition religion of the Carnell era.

From preseason, we’ve also seen evidence of a press. It’s not the full‑throttle, red‑line, run‑until-your-eyes-bleed Carnell version. And it’s not the Olof Mellberg “Retreat!” approach either.

Will it work? I have early reservations.1 But there have been moments when it has looked functional in preseason.

The attacking phase… well, it looks like the middle of preseason. There’s a very clear emphasis on getting the ball wide to the wingbacks and firing service into the box from those channels. And so far, those entries have been mostly futile.

I am, of course, well on the record about my feelings toward a cross‑heavy approach — if you need a refresher, please consult that Dallas game last season. Blind volume does not equate to chance creation, and CITY has learned that lesson multiple times.

Crossing is a tool. Crossing as a philosophy is a trap.

During the first month of the season, we need to monitor final-third patterns. To build a balanced attack in 2026, CITY will need more than just wide play. CITY will need combinations. Underloads into overloads. Runners manipulating the back line. Midfielders appearing between lines with purpose.

But those are big picture ideas.

Which brings us to the real question: do we actually have the players to make any of this work?

Pressing shape, possession ideas, wide service — all of it only matters if the roster has the profiles to execute.

CITY has been busier than we’ve come to expect during the winter window (I’ve included the rumored Sergio Córdova addition), so to keep track of the ins and outs, I created a transfer flow visualization. Then I graded the individual flows, but we will talk more about the grades in a bit:

And after moving all of those pieces around, this is most likely where the roster stands today:

It should be noted that, in a league that is quite restrictive in roster building but offers creative ways to circumvent those restrictions to add expensive or promising talent, CITY has failed to maximize either: 2 DPs, 2 U22s, and a loaned swing-and-miss. If 33% of your premium roster slots are unused, that doesn’t give great confidence. Crafting a depth chart of that underutilized roster would look something like this:

But to understand what 2026 might actually look like on the field, we need to go line by line.

Before we start carving up this roster position by position, we need to level‑set on one thing: not all MLS players are created equal. Some are starters. Some are backups. Some are “break glass in case of emergency.” Some are emergencies.

So before the knives come out, here’s the scale I’m using to keep this honest — and to keep you from yelling at me too much.

MLS Player Rating Scale

GK

The data seems to support the opinion that Roman Bürki is past his best, and at 35, that makes sense. His technical ability remains elite for MLS standards — he’s still great with his feet, still capable of breaking lines, and still comfortable as the first point of calm in a possession‑heavy buildup. That part of his game will help both Damet and the back line.

Ben Lundt is a decent MLS backup goalkeeper who cannot play in possession-heavy buildup. If Lundt plays meaningful minutes in 2026, there should be no drop-off in shot-stopping, but Damet’s possession formula would have to change significantly.

But back to the shot‑stopping. Bürki simply failed to keep the ball out of the net in 2025 as he had in the two previous years. The underlying numbers, the eye test, and the frequency of “that’s a save he used to make” moments all pointed in the same direction.

And looking ahead to 2026:

1. CITY may concede more high‑quality chances — structurally and stylistically — under Damet’s system, especially if the CBs are exposed in transition.

2. If 2025 wasn’t an anomaly, then Bürki isn’t going to bail the team out the way he once did.

The question isn’t whether Bürki can still play.

He can.

The question is whether he can still erase his teammates' mistakes.

Player Ratings: Bürki - 8, Lundt - 5

LCB

This should be CITY's most exciting position in 2026. In Fallou Fall, CITY has one of the most promising left‑sided centerbacks in the league. His 2025 minutes were small, but the flashes were undeniable. You saw glimpses of almost everything a modern CB needs:

• calmness and confidence in possession,

• physical presence and range,

• aggression when stepping into midfield,

• and the capacity to break lines with purpose.

You also saw the other side — the moments of chaos, the over‑ambition, the “please don’t do that” passes.

There’s a phrase I live by when it comes to creativity and passing in this sport:

There are good passers and there are risky passers. You can be a risky passer without being a good passer. But you cannot be a good passer without being a risky passer.

Fallou is firmly in that developmental middle space right now — risky, and sometimes good, sometimes not. But risk is a prerequisite for becoming a top‑end distributor at center back. That’s why his projection is so intriguing. He has the tools you cannot teach, and the mistakes you can coach out with time, reps, and better structure around him.

If CITY is going to defend large spaces, build through pressure, and give Damet the platform he wants, Fallou might be the highest‑upside piece we have. He’s not a finished product. But he’s the type of profile you build around.

And in his understudy, you have one of the more perplexing moves of CITY’s existence. Dante Polvara is many things, but one of them has never been a left‑sided center back. What we’ve seen from him in preseason can be broken down into two parts:

1. The on‑ball quality is exactly what you’d expect from a natural central midfielder. He’s calm under pressure, comfortable receiving the ball, and shows no panic when someone closes him down. The technical floor is high — that part translates to an easier position on the ball.

2. We have absolutely no idea if he can defend in the penalty area or maintain a disciplined offside line. The reads, the timing, the body orientation, the line‑management instincts… a complete unknown.

If he can defend?
Great. Genuinely great. It would be one of the smartest, most cost‑effective moves CITY has pulled off.

If he can’t?
It becomes an objectively bad decision — because CITY needed a backup for Fallou, and there was absolutely no requirement to sign someone who has never played the position before.

Most things live in the gray.
But when you sign a player to play a brand‑new position, the evaluation is ruthlessly binary: He sinks or swims.

Kyle Hiebert is third in line for this role. He is who he is — and that’s fine. He’s a limited but useful depth piece, and every team in MLS has one. If he ends up playing a lot of minutes in 2026, it almost certainly means there are serious issues along the backline, and those circumstances won’t exactly set him up for success either.

Every team has players like Kyle.
The good teams don’t have to rely on him.
The bad teams rely on him far too much.

Player Ratings: Fall - 7, Polvara - 3, Hiebert - 4

CCB

This should be the “easiest” of the three center back roles. You’re rarely defending in space, you’re often sweeping and covering for the other two center backs, and your distribution asks are the simplest: move the ball side to side, hit the wingbacks, occasionally break a line. It’s the ideal spot for Timo Baumgartl.

He’s big.
He’s slow.
He does not defend space well.

And he’s a risky passer — not a good passer.

We saw how effortlessly someone like Henry Kessler can make this role look. Timo will not be doing that. But he can absolutely be competent. He can win loose balls, battle with opposing center forwards, and keep the ball moving without turning it over in catastrophic areas. That’s enough for this position within Damet’s structure—competence, not brilliance.

Behind him, CITY made an interesting choice. Lukas MacNaughton has all the on‑ball qualities to be a useful backup CB in MLS—when his team has the ball. He’s essentially the yin to Kyle Hiebert’s yang:

• Kyle is good defensively. Lukas is not.

• Lukas is good offensively. Kyle is not.

It’s a stylistic argument with no correct answer:
Do you want your depth CB to be better at keeping the ball out of the net or better at helping you get the ball into the net?

What matters is which version of MacNaughton CITY gets.

For context: Joakim Nilsson played more minutes in 2024 than MacNaughton did in 2024 and 2025 combined. That’s how unavailable he has been.

If 2023 MacNaughton shows up, CITY will get solid value for what they paid.
If 2024–25 MacNaughton shows up—or rather, doesn’t, because he’s never healthy—then it’s a waste, and what we’ve ended up doing is pay for a guy to not play, while paving a path for Josh Yaro minutes in the year 2026.

Josh Yaro is the third choice here. John Hackworth should not have been allowed to resign weeks after re-signing Josh, because he should’ve been fired for suggesting it. We currently have eight centerbacks on the MLS roster. He should not see the field. And if he does, that means the centerback room is nothing short of a disaster.

Player Ratings: Baumgartl - 6, MacNaughton - 4, Yaro - 1

RCB

Sigh. I can’t help myself. Sitting there, watching the ball roll out to the RCB, and seeing the passing angles, seeing the ability to carry the ball forward. We had a guy who would be chef’s kiss perfect at that. But we don’t, so let’s talk about what we have - one of the biggest question marks of the 2026 offseason.

Mamadou Mbacke, aged 19 and 20, posted some absolutely incredible data seasons for LAFC in 2021 and 2022. And that 2022 LAFC team was league-winning good. CITY will not be that good.

In 2022-23, he played in Spain’s second tier, and was, by all accounts, fine, and then returned to LAFC before quickly moving to Barcelona B, where he played 23-24, and 24-25 in the third division of Spain, and then he and Barcelona B were relegated to the fourth division of Spain in 25-26.

Here’s why he is one of the biggest question marks. There is essentially no information available on him over the past 3.5 years, and what is available is dubious at best. Is he the same player who was blossoming in MLS as a teenager?

A hypothetical for you - Orlando’s Alexander Freeman, age 20, just made his move to La Liga and Villareal, much like Mbacke did at 19. If, in three years, he is playing in the fourth division of Spanish soccer and coming back to MLS, would the narrative be about how amazing he was for Orlando as a teenager, or about the concern of playing in vastly substandard leagues compared to MLS and a seeming failure to meet the standard? OPTA (gross) ranks the third and fourth divisions of Spanish soccer as the 57th- and 101st-best leagues in the world, while MLS ranks 12th.

And none of that fixes the issues of our season starting this week. He may be in his “midseason”, but he hasn’t played in over a month, and he missed out on preseason. That’s a bad start.

He very well may return to the Mbacke we saw in Southern California. But there is also the very real possibility that those years were the peak. A young flame that burnt out quickly. He has struggled with injuries and has consistently gone down in league quality. Those are typically not the signs of a player who is ready to retake a much better league by storm.

Backing him up is Jaziel Orozco. He made his CITY debut during a tumultuous time in 2025, playing across the defense but most often finding himself at leftback. He is most certainly not a leftback. Short, right-footed, and not particularly brave with the ball, he seems most natural in the wide right centerback role. He’s played a lot more in preseason than many would have anticipated after last season, largely due to Mbacke’s absence, and his 2025 data was horrendous: he conceded two penalties in 5.9 games worth of minutes.

The positive view is that Orozco can be a more well-rounded Hiebert, offering the same level of dogged determination on defense, while being a better version of Hiebert in possession. The negative view is that he is too small to play CB in MLS, that his technical abilities are not good enough to play depth minutes at wingback, and that he offers no value in either role. The positive view would be preferable.

Player Ratings: Mbacke - 5, Orozco - 3

LWB

There likely won’t be many similarities between Mellberg and Damet, but based on what we know and don’t know, it’s clear that, much like his predecessor, the system will hinge on the play and availability of the wingbacks.

In 2025, that was Totland, Zalinsky, Wallem, and Reid. Didn’t work.

Hello, Rafael Santos. It long felt like CITY had a self-imposed prohibition on left-footed soccer players. In Santos, not only will CITY have a player who plays on their preferred foot, but they have also gained a differentiator for set pieces, now offering threatening service with left or right-footed players.

Santos has extensive MLS experience, and his expectations here will match what we’ve seen elsewhere: a quantity-and-quality ball-deliverer from wide left, average physically, not an aggressive ball-carrier, and will play substandard defense.

If CITY can maintain consistent positive ball possession, Santos can play to his strengths and avoid his weaknesses. If CITY struggles to build from the back and doesn’t maintain possession in the middle or final third, Santos may struggle, and his defense will be lackluster.

The exact same scenario awaits his understudy, Célio Pompeu, who will likely be playing significantly out of position. At this point, Pompeu’s game: slowly beating a defender through skill, is not a surprise to the CITY faithful. Nor so, are his long list of weaknesses - defense, work rate, ball delivery. If CITY pushes up the field and pins the defense back, Pompeu will have great lanes to dribble by the marking defender. He will need to improve his ball delivery to be impactful. If we are playing defense, Pompeu will be a liability.

Player Ratings: Santos - 6, Pompeu - 4

RWB

I spent much of the final days of the David Critchley era annoyed that he consistently chose Conrad Wallem over Totland. That frustration was never about talent. It was about the simple reality that giving minutes to Totland—our player, under our control—benefits the club long‑term in a way that playing a loanee doesn’t.

Wallem returned to Czechia, and we then permanently acquired him. And both things remain true in my mind:

Critchley was wrong then, and CITY was right to bring Wallem back now.

He’s a damn good soccer player. But his “versatility” often gets overstated or miscast as a value‑add when it isn’t what actually makes him effective. He’s an average left wingback on his off foot. He’s not an especially good central midfielder—the risk outweighs the reward in his play. His versatility often means that his best position and best contribution to the team are sacrificed because we don’t have adequate personnel elsewhere. But at right wingback? He’s legitimately excellent. Like, really excellent, and we saw that under Critchley.

Cristian Espinoza—and that absolute administrative meltdown in San Jose—was one of the big offseason stories because he’s really good. Wallem has that kind of upside. Especially if CITY actually commits to proactive play and playing forward with intent, as we just discussed with the left wingbacks. Physically, he won’t be outmatched, and he’s both an aggressive carrier and an assertive passer. His experience playing higher up the pitch also gives CITY another real goal threat from wide areas.

And speaking of scoring from wide areas: to be CITY’s deepest position group requires a second good player, and that’s Tomas Totland. By all accounts, 2025 was rough for him, and 2026 is going to require a real level‑up if he wants to take minutes from Wallem or Santos. But in this 3‑4‑2‑1 setup, it wouldn’t surprise me at all if Totland pops up with 3–4 goals at that right‑hand post. I do still have questions about whether Totland and Sangbin can function together.2 Still, in the absurd era of MLS roster rules, Totland as a backup is about as good as you can realistically hope for.

Originally, this looked like the season we’d see homegrown Tyson Pearce earn meaningful MLS minutes. With Santos arriving and Wallem likely shifting over to the right, Pearce suddenly becomes the third‑choice right wingback, which is probably correct for where he is developmentally. I’d love to see him get 400–500 minutes in 2026 and a couple of Open Cup starts. Worst‑case scenario: he doesn’t play for CITY2, and he doesn’t play for CITY, which is the one thing that absolutely cannot happen. Playing time is paramount.

Player Ratings: Wallem - 8, Totland - 7, Pearce - 2

6

If you’ve watched three seasons or three minutes of St. Louis CITY, you understand that the (6) six has been the biggest need since, well, yes.

In comes Daniel Edelman.

It’s a hard judgment, going from the NYRB system to what the expectation will be under Damet.

CITY has needed a couple of things from the 6, and, at least on paper, he fits the need.

First and foremost, can he protect the backline? Not quite as important in this 3-4-2-1 as it was under the various iterations of 4-2-3-1, but there is still the at-a-bare-minimum requirement that he shield the backline from transitions, cut passing lanes, and sweep up loose balls in front of the defense. From everything we’ve seen in New York, Edelman possesses those attributes.

Second, can he be the possession pivot? Can he receive, back to the field, from his centerbacks, turn, and move the ball forward?

This is the most difficult job on the field. Do it well, and pressure is immediately relieved, and the team can push forward toward the goal. Do it poorly, and it will result in untimely turnovers when a defense is set up to begin progression, and perhaps, at their most vulnerable. His passing and progressive passing numbers are decent, and his touches indicate a willingness to be on the ball, all of which are a significant upgrade on what CITY had to offer in 2025. But the caveat is that all of those numbers occurred in a system vastly different from what he will be asked to do in 2026.

There are concerns about Edelman’s willingness to drive forward, but it remains unclear whether that’s even required in Damet’s system. (Even if it isn’t, it probably should be.)

Overall, Edelman is the type of player who could start on any MLS team. But—and this is the important part—if he were starting for one of those genuine cup contenders, they’d immediately be looking to upgrade on him. As a fanbase and as an organization, we’ve become obsessed this offseason with “raising the floor,” and Edelman absolutely does that.

The guy he’s replacing, Chris Durkin, is someone I’ve spent an unhealthy amount of time dissecting.

My stance hasn’t changed: in 2026, there is no room in MLS for a central midfielder who neither values nor possesses the soccer ball. This isn’t cherry‑picking visualizations. You can pick any chart, any data point, any scout’s eye test—they all come to the same conclusion. He’s a decent defender (while not capturing his inability to effectively shield the backline), but he actively harms his team when the ball arrives at his feet.

Best-case scenario: Durkin refocuses in a new pressing structure and provides defensive stability, while letting his teammates shoulder the responsibility of progressing the ball.

Worst-case scenario? The same Durkin we’ve watched over the last two seasons, but now playing heavy minutes alongside Edelman due to injuries or unavailability at the eight.

Player Ratings: Edelman - 7, Durkin - 4

8

The heartbeat of CITY, but at present, a heart arrhythmia. This team goes as Eduard Löwen goes. Last year, he didn’t play enough, appearing in just over half the games and logging 1400 minutes. Based on everything we are hearing and seeing, 2026 may be more of the same, which would be a significant setback for CITY.

Now, I want to be clear. That is not Löwen's fault. That is a fault of those responsible for ensuring this team can compete, with or without him. In 2025, Pfannenstiel failed to address that, with an aged Alfredo Morales having to cover for both Löwen’s and Durkin’s absences. Wray has similarly done little. Edelman is a Durkin upgrade. He is not a Löwen cover. Edelman and Durkin would be a different version of 2025, not a better one, and could arguably be a worse version if Damet’s system demands it. When Löwen is on the pitch, outside of LAG’s Puig, there might not be a better deep-lying playmaker in MLS. He has 31 goal contributions in 71 MLS games, and a 0.50 G+A per 90. Even in the stop/start nature of his 2025, he posted this:

Just look at these numbers when he was available in 2023:

If he’s available and present, in this system, he should be playing at a level MLS rarely sees at the 8. The problem is “if.”

His understudy, Tomas Ostrák, has been the most consistent underperformer in CITY’s history. Brought in as one of CITY’s highest TAM earners in 2023 at age 22, Ostrák felt like one of the pillars of the present and future of CITY. Now, going into year four, he has only 34 starts to his name, and he’s not even averaging 1000 minutes a season. When he does play, we’ve seen glimpses of what CITY saw in 2022 - flashes of high-quality technical play. But mostly, we’ve seen a player who hasn’t been available, and when he has, has been largely ineffective in his preferred AM role. He has slowly moved back to a position (8) that places greater emphasis on both his strengths (the ball) and his weaknesses (not having the ball). If I were to predict 2026, I would say it’s his make-or-break year. But to be honest, that felt like 2025. His contract expires this year, with an option for 2027, and as we head into 2026, he will again be unavailable. When the league resumes after the World Cup, don’t be surprised if he has been moved on. 

Among many feel-good stories in 2023, Miguel Perez was the feel-good story of the year. 2024 and the USL were not kind to Miguel Perez, and 2025 saw him regain some form for CITY2 in MLSNP, but the discussion has shifted greatly from those magical moments in 2023. There are concerns about whether he has the physical or technical ability to play at this level and, if so, where he would play. His most natural position is at the 8, but we’ve seen him play wide, farther back, and farther forward for CITY2. Will he play in 2026? Perhaps, but if he is playing with the need to be a contributor, the failure to bring in another talent to central midfield will be scrutinized heavily. 

Player Ratings: Löwen - 9, Ostrák -5, Perez - 2

AM/10

RWB is CITY’s deepest position, but AM gives it a run for its money. In Marcel Hartel, CITY has one of MLS’s best playmakers, and he just came off a 13 G+A season in 2025, when he was asked to play as a goal scorer, goal creator, ball progressor, fullback, and just about everywhere else. He started 34/34 games and was 38 minutes short of playing every available minute. And, none of that takes into account how good this guy was at creating chances for a team that was allergic to scoring.

He should be the focal point of this whole shindig. Damet should do whatever is necessary to ensure this system centers on Marcel Hartel's talents. MH17 is the system, and if, in 2026, we find that the system doesn’t fit Hartel, it’s a poor system. 

Opposite Hartel is what I am officially dubbing the “OM,” rather than an “AM,” for attacking midfielder.

OM/10

“OM” stands for opportunity midfielder, because the other three guys playing here all have an Opportunity. An Opportunity to find themselves at the end of Hartel’s creativity. An Opportunity to make this spot their own and flourish. An Opportunity to play.

At the end of 2024, it would have been an easy guess that Cedric Teuchert would have already seized that Opportunity. But he was injured and terrible in 2025. In this system of wingback chance creation, Cedi has the Opportunity to do what Cedi does best - find space inside the penalty box and score. Last year, there wasn’t much scoring. There should be less reliance on him receiving the ball and helping progress toward the goal, which in turn should allow him to get into those spaces and find the back of the net. But none of that means the job will be his.

Because Jeong Sangbin offers a completely different skill set, which may align better or worse in this new CITY era. A much more direct, pacey, in-behind threat, there is the chance that more possession removes JSB’s best asset of surging into space, but his short-burst acceleration might give him the extra half yard needed in congested areas to find teammates or the back of the net. His Opportunity never came to fruition in Minnesota, but in St. Louis, that Opportunity is now. 

And if neither of those guys takes their Opportunity, one of the most promising young Americans in MLS Next Pro over the past two seasons, Mykhi Joyner, is waiting. 

The quality difference between MLS and MLSNP is significant. But what he hasn’t had in MLS the past two seasons is an Opportunity. 415 MLS minutes, 14 games, 1 start. He’s likely not first in line for OM, and he’s probably not second either, but he will get his Opportunity. We can only hope he takes it.

Caden Glover is theoretically here, too. His development has not gone according to plan.

Player Ratings: Hartel - 9, Sangbin - 6, Teuchert - 6, Joyner - 3, Glover - 1

CF

Simon Becher is a topic of much debate within the CITY fanbase and MLS coverage as a whole.

Some point to his quite unbelievable xG underperformance in 2025 as a sign that he will progress toward the mean and score more goals in 2026. Others point out that his finishing didn’t seem “unlucky” but rather poor in both placement and technique.

What happens in 2026? Who knows. This will be his 5th season of professional soccer and his first as “the“ starter in MLS. In Vancouver and STL, he has served as a backup, while in his brief stint in Denmark, he started 14 games and scored 3 times. So, for a guy with 62 MLS games and 12 goals (0.2 goals per game) but 0.45 goals per 90, there’s a lot of variance here.

Setting aside all the data talk, though, I think Simon will struggle to find his place in this Damet system. He does a great job receiving the ball in dangerous areas, but that often results from getting on the end of balls over the top of the defense. If CITY pens in the defense like it may want, that space over the top, much like for Sangbin, disappears. Can Simon make himself relevant and dangerous in tight spaces? Can he strike the ball cleanly and consistently? Can he score goals? These are the questions around CITY’s starting CF in 2026, and that’s not a great place to be. His original backup (before the latest rumored incoming) has a similar number, but different questions to ask.

Brenden McSorley is not an old man, but under CITY2's leadership in MLSNP, he was an old man at 24, playing in what is ideally a youth league.

He was really good, too good, really, for MLSNP. 22 goals, 12 assists in 54 games is great. Is that a result of a man playing largely against kids?

We don’t know. In 273 MLS minutes, he scored 2 goals on 2.28 xG, which is nice. He has a lot of those “intangibles” that people like to talk about, but with his playstyle and physique, he’s never going to be a focal point in the way that Klauss was for CITY or what you see from the standard 9, finding space and chances for himself and others. He has to McScore goals because that’s what he can contribute at an MLS level. And he was primed for significant gametime, perhaps even more if Becher’s 2025 struggles continue into 2026.

However.

This will be Sergio Córdova’s 9th club in 11 domestic league seasons. In those 10 previous domestic campaigns, he has never reached 10 goals. In his two MLS seasons with RSL and Vancouver, he played 52 games, made 36 starts, and logged over 3,100 minutes; his return was 11 goals and 1 assist.

His data in the Swiss league reads as a prototypical target forward - lots of aerial duels, headed goals, long passes received, etc.

All of these, when building a profile for the need at CF, make sense when the emphasis is on getting the ball wide and then whipping it into the penalty area.

But it also raises a concern—few shots, few goals. There are exceptions to every rule, but generally, when a player moves clubs as often as Córdova, it’s a verdict on their talent, effort, personality, or a combination of some or all.

That’s the problem with shopping in February and March, when most of the world has stopped transfer business. The pickings become a list of those not wanted, not valued, not performing, not re-signing, or injured.

But Córdova’s better than nothing, right?

This time last year, CITY fans had a similar reaction to the signing of Xande Silva. “Anything is better than nothing” was a frequently uttered phrase that did not turn out to be true. Hopefully, that is not a story that repeats itself, but you know what they say about hope.

So he’s better than nothing, unless he becomes nothing. CITY was never going to find an adequate replacement for Klauss, and that was always going to be the problem.

It wasn’t a proactive process from the front office; it was reactive. As a result, CITY is left short.

We’ve discussed this system and the opportunities for chance creation.

You can see where goals could come from, but it’s hard to see where goals will come from.

Player Ratings: Becher - 5, Córdova - 4, McSorley -3

And the sum of all of those parts…

If you’ve been keeping tabs, here’s where the squad ended up for me:

It's welcome that CITY brought in players I’ve rated 8, 7, and 6 in this winter window. It should also be concerning that the players tasked with scoring goals have grades of 5, 4, and 3.

But let’s go back to that Transfer Flow from earlier:

In my eyes, Wray and Co. did two things this offseason:

1. They raised the floor.

2. They lowered the ceiling.

Raising the floor for a team that finished 12th and 13th in the West should naturally bump you a couple of places. Lowering the ceiling, however, narrows the range of possible outcomes—removing the top‑end variance that could have delivered something genuinely meaningful if the offseason had broken differently.

In a world where Wallem, Edelman, Santos, and Mbacke/Polvara join a roster that retains both Klauss and Kessler, you have the framework of an easy playoff team—somewhere in that 5–7 range in the West.

Back in December, during my three-part WWMD offseason series, I ended the final piece, The Additions, with this line:

I want to see a world where we didn’t waste the prime years of Klauss, Hartel, and Bürki only to look back on a handful of missed playoffs. I’m aiming higher — for talent that provides the framework of a team capable of actually challenging for titles.

But that world doesn’t exist. The one we live in relies heavily on quantity‑over‑quality at centerback and on three attackers who haven’t had the chance or haven’t taken it to score goals in this league.

The world we live in with CITY has another theme - this roster isn’t prime. If the USDA were grading it, it might not even be choice.

CITY has 10 players in the “prime” of their career, only three of them (Becher, Wallem, Baumgartl) are starters in 2026, and Totland is really the only other member with any claim to starter-like playtime.

Raising the floor probably moved CITY up a couple of spots.

But, like we said, this squad isn’t primed for success. Leaving premium roster spots on the table and removing higher-end talent will keep the club from reaching the postseason.

St. Louis CITY finishes 11th in the West.3

And if you take I‑70 four hours west and end up in that familiar furniture store parking lot, bring a wooden spoon.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

In Part 1, we walked through the expiring contracts: what Michael (me) would’ve done, what CITY actually did, and where those two paths diverged. In Part 2, we focused on the roster, going position by position and player by player to assess strengths, weaknesses, and overall squad composition.

Now, in Part 3, we get to do the fun stuff.
The fantasy stuff.
The transfer stuff.

This is the part that was largely put on ice while we waited on clarity at the top — first a Sporting Director, then a Head Coach.

Well, now we’ve got Wray and Damet, so damnit… let’s do this thing. (I promise you, there are 150+ Damet jokes locked and loaded for 2026.)

Before we dive in, a couple of important disclaimers.

I’m operating within a limited scope — one defined almost entirely by publicly available data. And that matters because publicly available data excludes nearly all tracking data, which is enormously helpful for evaluating players as athletes, for lack of a better term. There are plenty of players out there who post strong statistical profiles, but whose physical limitations — too slow, too small, not explosive enough — might quietly undermine a move to MLS, or to St. Louis specifically. Those flags often live in data we simply don’t have access to.

In a perfect world, an internal recruitment department would filter players using a blend of statistical data and tracking data, layer in video analysis and traditional scouting, and then build target lists from there. We don’t have that luxury here.

So instead, we’re taking a less-than-ideal but still structured approach:

1. First, we define specific “roles” for each roster need, with clear statistical benchmarks tied to how those roles function on the field.

2. Then, use that statistical data to filter out players who don’t meet what I believe should be CITY’s baseline standards. This data is limited in which leagues/players are included. Fallou Fall, for example, would’ve been excluded.

3. If that passes, we move to Transfermarkt — one of my least favorite websites, but unfortunately, the most comprehensive valuation tool available to us laymen.

4. From there, we apply some reality checks: filtering out players who simply aren’t coming to MLS, or at least not to St. Louis — an honest acknowledgment of where CITY sits in the global food chain.

5. If the financials seem feasible, we do the impossible: hunt down match footage or highlights to get some sense of on-pitch athleticism and movement.

If a player checks all of those boxes, they make a list — and then I filter that list down even further, to get what you will read here.

Let’s get into it.

Going back to the Audit - by my count, this roster has:

• 8 “needs”

• 4 question marks, each for different reasons

• 3 players who should be gone before the season kicks off in February

That’s a lot of work to accomplish with only 6 available roster slots.
Mathematically, it borders on impossible.

The Needs

and here are the roster spots:

Centerback

A couple of issues here - we don’t know if Damet is planning on a back four or five. I am operating under the Great Assumption of 2026. What is the Great Assumption, you may ask, and is that a holy day of obligation? The Great Assumption is that Damet is going to play 3/5 defenders, or 3 centerbacks, and no, it is not a holy day of obligation, so no need to cancel your lunch plans.

With centerbacks aged 31, 30, 28, 21, + 21 (JGR), CITY needs a prime-aged player to bridge the gap not only in just age, but also quality, with the Kessler-sized hole here.

So what am I looking for? A ball-progressive right-sided CB in his prime. A player who puts up good defensive metrics but also wants to push the ball vertically.

Henry Kessler

Age: 27
Current Club: N/A
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: Expired
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $2.1M

The first option is to just bring back Henry Kessler. He’s 27, a starting RCB, and will likely cost less than just about anyone else of a similar skillset.

The issue? He can’t stay on the pitch, and CITY as an organization has a truly terrible record in physiotherapy. So much so, in fact, that it would surprise no one if Kessler were hesitant in returning based solely on that track record.

Emanuel Mammana

Age: 29
Current Club: Vélez Sarsfield
League / Country: Argentina
Contract Status: 2028
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $3M

A strong, ball-progressing center back at peak age. He’s under contract through 2028, which means prying him out of Argentina would require a meaningful fee, and likely a significant salary commitment. And alongside Fall, an experienced CB who’s played in Argentina and Europe and won titles in both would be a strong deleopmental partner. But even more so, he would significantly raise the technical ability of our backline. At 29, this would be a win-now move with little to no resale upside, and it would likely require lots of TAM to do so.

Aiham Ousou

Age: 25
Current Club: Royal Charleroi SC
League / Country: Belgium
Contract Status: 2028
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $3.5M

A current Syrian international who came through the Swedish youth setup and earned a senior call-up there as well, Aiham profiles as an aggressive ball-carrying center back with a well-rounded radar. At 25 — unlike Mammana above — there is real resale value if CITY were willing to spend the likely $3–4M required for his signature.

There’s another factor here, and one that checks a box firmly in the “good” column: he’s Charleroi’s captain. Twenty-five, current international, experience across four European leagues, multilingual, and a captain — on paper, that’s a fantastic résumé to both partner with and help develop Mr.Fallou Fall.

Those are three examples of the RCB profile I believe CITY should be targeting. All project as higher-end TAM acquisitions, with a twofold objective: find a player who immediately makes CITY better, and find one who actively helps make Fallou Fall better. If both boxes are checked, it’s a success.

Under that assumption — with Player X signed on a TAM deal — CITY would be left with three senior roster slots and three to four supplemental slots to work with as we move forward.

Now, the infamous left back.

Left Back

CITY need so much here. A good starting point would be finding any left back who sticks at the club for more than six months.

But CITY don’t just need a left back — they need two. And this was easily the most frustrating position group to work through. The data is often flat-out uninspiring, and without knowing whether a guy is a wingback in a back five or a fullback in a back four — which are wildly different jobs — it becomes even more difficult to evaluate what actually translates.

Vasilios Zagaritis

Age: 24
Current Club: Heerenveen
League / Country: Netherlands
Contract Status: 2028
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $2.5M

Vasilios won Serie B with Parma in 2023–24 before making the jump to the Eredivisie, first with Almere City and then to Heerenveen this past summer. He’s started 17 matches, logged nearly 1,500 minutes, and chipped in three goal contributions — while also producing one of the cleaner radars I came across in this exercise.

Heerenveen acquired him for roughly $1M, and a 100–200% return would be good business for both sides. For CITY, this checks several long-missing boxes: a legitimate long-term solution at left back, help on the age curve at 24, and real sell-on potential at a position that has laughably been held together by short-term stopgaps. This is a TAM signing all day long.

This next one is not going to blow you away, but with our roster logjam, versatility and cost are important, and you know who offers that?

Conrad Wallem

Age: 25
Current Club: Slavia Praha
League / Country: Czechia
Contract Status: 2027 - $500k
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $2.5M

I know, I know, I know, I know what you’re gonna say… Michael, weren’t you the one that was advocating against signing him permantently? Why yes, yes I was. What’s changed? Two things. First, the price. The rumored asking numbers a year ago were laughably high, and that appears to have cooled. Second, with the Great Assumption, Wallem suddenly makes a ton of sense.

He can play either wingback spot or push higher up the field (I’m still out on him centrally), and if his salary lands anywhere near the ~$500k range from last season, the value proposition shifts dramatically. I’m already spending TAM money at center back and elsewhere — so any opportunity to avoid that while still adding usable, system-fitting talent absolutely needs to be explored.

Andrew Gutman

Age: 29
Current Club: Chicago Fire
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: 2026 - $600k
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $2M

A domestic option who’s spent the last seven years in MLS — and one I would’ve been hesitant to recommend twelve months ago. In 2023 and 2024, he failed to play more than 12 matches for Chicago Fire FC, which was a massive red flag given CITY’s needs and his injury history.

But last season changed the conversation. He made 34 starts, logged nearly 3,000 minutes, and chipped in 11 goal contributions. Friendly reminder: only Hartel and Klauss had more for CITY last year, and no one else cracked double digits.

Is he flashy? No. Is it a sexy signing? Also no. But MLS competence should not be underestimated, and even half that level of production would represent the most productive left back CITY has ever had. He enters the final year of his deal at 29 and should be attainable for a reasonable fee — whether that’s GAM or straight cash.

A quick update of where we are:

Backup Left Back

This one’s going to be quick — partly because there’s an obvious name here, and partly because this is an impossible position to scout. What we’re really hunting for are productive MLS supplemental players. And guess what? No one wants to sell those guys. When they do, you end up paying more than they’re worth, and the entire premise of the “bargain” evaporates.

Devin Padelford

Age: 22
Current Club: Minnesota United
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: 2026 - $121K
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $1M

Yes, I can already hear it: Michael, why are we bringing back pieces from a roster that wasn’t good enough? Fair question. My rebuttal is simple — we brought back the wrong guys and let the better ones walk. This is a correction.

Under the Great Assumption of 2026 — a return to a 3/5 ATB — a player who can cover LB, LWB, and LCB, costs supplemental money, and doesn’t need to start is genuinely valuable. We know he can play at this level, and at a reasonable price, the risk is minimal.

And here’s the kicker: it also gives CITY the flexibility to move on from a center back, which I would’ve done 2 months ago, but alas.

Goodbye Yaro. Hello Padelford.

Backup Right Back

Remember the issue with finding a backup LB? Same thing applies here, but with the caveat that we don’t even have a Padelford to snag as a known commodity at a known price.

Is this when we shout “Play the kids!” and play Tyson Pearce? Is another year of MLSNP beneficial to development? If Totland goes down, is the system then reliant upon an 18-year-old kid?

So, while knowing it’s completly foolish to do this in searching for this role, I did it anyway.

Jonathan Dean

Age: 28
Current Club: Chicago Fire
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: 2027 - $130K
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $825K

Continuing the raid of our future division rivals, Dean is a prime aged RB, playing a lot games (29), a decent amount of rotational minutes (1672), and is making a cheap $130k. Would that make it more difficult for Chicago to rationalize selling him, becasue he is so cheap? You bet your butt it does.

But Dean is also a very average MLS player — and that’s not a bad thing. He defends well, likes to dribble, and offers a skill set that complements Totland without being a copy-and-paste.

And yes, this is 100% a waste of both my time and yours in the sense that it’s not exciting nor is it at all predicitive of what will happen, but this is the type of profile that makes sense for CITY: not great, not flashy, just competent MLS depth.

The 6

Here is the current midfield pairing for CITY:

One guy does a lot, the other guy does very little. The goal here is to find a central midfielder who compliments the Lion, increases our defensive stability, and improves our ability to progress the ball centrally. Additionally to that, because Löwen is such a high risk and high volume passer, I think it becomes more important that this player be willing and able to turn and dribble through the opposition to offer a varied possession approach for Damet.

And unfortunatley, there is another question to this conversation in finding Löwen’s partner.

Will Löwen be available?

We don’t know, so anyone here has to be able to pick up the slack.

Now, here are some major improvements.

Emeka Eneli

Age: 26
Current Club: Real Salt Lake
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: 2028 - $375K
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $3M

An all-action midfielder who carries the ball frequently and successfully, a high volume passer, and roams the pitch recovering balls. All things that CITY need in a midfielder. Defensive statistics are notoriously difficult, but in doing this, I have found that Ball Recoveries tell one heck of a story. Players that have accumulate BR tend to either be where the ball is - indicating pressing, counter pressing, defensive covering, etc, or they are roaming the pitch as a ball-winner. Either way, that would be an improvement for CITY.

At 26, he’s prime aged, he doesn’t make a fortune, and we know he can hack it in the Western Conference (RIP for one last ride in 2026). One more check mark? Not an international slot.

Yassine Titraoui

Age: 22
Current Club: Royal Charleroi SC
League / Country: Belgium
Contract Status: 2027
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $6M

My DP signing.

There isn’t much else to say other than this: he’s really, really good. Transformatively good. He does everything — and he does it at a very high level. Imagine him alongside Eduard Löwen.

You don’t have to imagine it. Here’s what it could look like.

Yassine Titraoui is valued around $6M, just 22 years old, and playing in Belgium — one of Europe’s best talent-exporting leagues. This is where you push all the chips in. This is where you spend $7–8M and sign a player who instantly becomes one of the best midfielders in MLS.

All of a sudden, you have a midfield where Löwen and Titraoui can operate freely, move the ball vertically, and solve problems on their own — while Marcel Hartel floats into dangerous areas waiting for that ball. And maybe most importantly, it eliminates CITY’s biggest kryptonite.

When Löwen is on the field, every MLS manager worth a penny presses and man-marks him out of the game, knowing there’s no one next to him who can independently figure it out. With Titraoui, you could argue Löwen might be the worse of the two — which would be a laughable upgrade on the current reality.

This exercise is about finding roles rather than names — but this is the exception. This is the guy. Red smoke in the app.

Everyone appreciates a nice pair of Titraoui.

Nicolás Acevedo

Age: 26
Current Club: Bahia
League / Country: Brazil
Contract Status: 2029
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $5M

A former MLSer from NYCFC, and he plays exactly like the Uruguayan stereotype — skillful, feisty, and extremely hard to play through. He’s a high-quality ball-winner who can also progress the ball cleanly, a valuable combo.

Currently a rotational piece at Bahia, the question is straightforward: would he welcome a return to MLS for significantly more minutes than the 1,690 he logged across 18 starts last season? At 26, there’s still upside here — but the long contract and $5M valuation make this one more complicated than it first appears.

Alhassan Yusuf

Age: 25
Current Club: New England Revolution
League / Country: MLS
Contract Status: 2027- $850k
Estimated Value (Transfermarkt): $3.5M

Yusuf profiles very similarly to Eneli — an all-action midfielder with high passing volume, strong dribble success, and plenty of ball recoveries — just at a much steeper salary. Yusuf and Eneli kept popping up throughout this research, and when names repeat, that usually means something.

The g+ metrics were brutal to Yusuf this season. Hopefully New England’s internal evaluations say the same, because that’s the path to availability. He’s still a good player, even if this year’s card is covered in red, look at those dots in 2024… and if the Revs are looking to move on, this is a profile worth splashing some cash on.

Those are four good profiles. What am I doing? Signing Titraoui AND Yusuf/Eneli. The Löwen question marks loom, and there is simply not enough quality on the bench of this CITY squad to make up for it by only bringing in one player.

It might cost ever bit of $8-10M, but bringing in two of these players allows CITY one more shot in this closing window of our best players.

So, where are we after all of that?

If you’re keeping score, CITY are now full on Senior Roster slots, with one Supplemental slot remaining — possibly two, if one of the Homegrowns (Glover or Pearce) slides into a Slot 31 designation.

Doing the rough math, CITY are spending approximately $9M on Zagaritis and Titraoui. Kessler comes with no transfer fee, Padelford and Dean are GAM-able, and Eneli/Yusuf would likely require some combination of cash and GAM. All in, you’re probably looking at $11–12M in total spend.

For a club that’s barely dipped its toe into the transfer market since inception, that’s an astounding number. Is it outlandish? Absolutely. Is it realistic? That’s the point.

These signings don’t just aim to marginally improve a team enough to sneak into the playoffs. The goal here is to compete for trophies — and when you’re relying on aging, post-peak stars, the window to do that is short. You either push the chips in, or you waste the prime years entirely.

And importantly, look at the age profile of these moves:

• Kessler (27): prime

• Zagaritis (24): prime

• Titraoui (22): pre-prime

• Eneli (26): prime

• Padelford (22): pre-prime

• Dean (28): late-prime

This dramatically resets the age curve, as we talked about in the Audit, but also shown here:

No longer is the roster devoid of meaningful contribution from prime-aged players. This is a squad built to be good now, but also one that avoids falling off the Father Time cliff under these contracts — and in several cases, retains real resale value.

But it does leave one need unfilled.

And yes — it’s the one many will argue is the most important.

A couple thoughts on why I ultimately landed here.

First, MLS SuperDraft pick Zack Lillington likely lands on the Supplemental roster. His positional versatility across the back line and wide areas, paired with his technical ability and size, makes him a strong bet to earn meaningful minutes. He likely occupies that final non–Slot 31 Supplemental spot.

Second, remember the Great Assumption of 2026. If (when) CITY return to a 3/5-at-the-back, the depth chart begins to make a lot more sense — especially with Lillington included.

Yes, there’s a glaring need at LW. I agree. But under the Great Assumption, that role functionally disappears. It becomes Hartel — not a weakness, but a strength.

The result? CITY fill every available roster slot (with the potential for one more Supplemental, depending on Slot 31 usage), retain an international slot, and arrive at a roster that is coherent, balanced, and competitive.

It’s a lot. I get it. And your goals may be different than mine.

I want to see a world where we didn’t waste the prime years of Klauss, Hartel, and Bürki only to look back on a handful of missed playoffs. I’m aiming higher — for talent that provides the framework of a team capable of actually challenging for titles.

Will this happen? Probably not.

Will CITY spend $10M? Doubtful.

Would these players even entertain St. Louis? Who knows.

But that’s why people love the transfer window — and transfer talk in general. Because it offers that beacon of light, that lighthouse on a distant shore, suggesting there’s something out there, cutting through the darkness.

It’s called hope.

Be hopeful with me, #AllForCITY.

Forever and always.

Since then, I’ve been vocal about the process and those leading it. And now, with Corey Wray officially appointed as CITY’s second Sporting Director and his comments on the state of the roster, it’s the perfect time to dive into Part 2: evaluating the current squad.

Note: This analysis now reflects Yaro’s newly announced contract extension.

Roster Snapshot

As of Yaro’s extension, CITY has 23 players under contract for 2026 (plus Girdwood-Reich on loan). MLS rosters max out at 30 players, divided into 20 Senior Slots and 10 Supplemental Slots—plus the special Slot 31, used for a young player loaned to a lower-division team (which CITY used on Miguel Perez in 2025 for his loan to CITY2).

On paper, that leaves CITY with seven open roster slots as of the Yaro signing—but not really. The functional breakdown shakes out as four senior slots and three supplemental slots (or four, if someone like Glover or Pearce occupies Slot 31 in 2026).

A depth chart of the current group would look something like this:

And as you can see—borrowing the name from a childhood favorite—this roster has… “Holes.”

CITY currently does not have a starting CB to pair with Fall, with Kessler out of contract. They do not have a left back in the building in any capacity after Horn left in the summer, Wallem and Padelford’s loans expired, and Reid’s contract situation remains unresolved. Do they have a right back? Hard to say. Critchley practically acted as if Totland didn’t exist, to the point it wouldn’t be shocking if Totland pushed for a move. And Zalinsky isn’t under contract either.

CITY also does not have a 6, and they badly need upgraded attacking firepower—whether on the left or the right.

To highlight just how much work is in front of them, I highlighted the holes here:

And circling back to that nauseating Senior/Supplemental distinction: that’s a lot of holes to fill with only four senior slots. At minimum, CITY needs four starters at RCB, LB, the 6, and W10.

But here’s the real kicker: Supplemental slots are more complicated to fill than Senior slots.
Why? Because good supplemental players are like cheat codes in MLS. Teams that land productive supplemental contributors have struck gold—they’re cheap, they allow roster flexibility, and 20 senior slots alone don’t give you a starting XI and real depth.

As a result, it’s almost impossible to pry another team’s productive supplemental players away. The teams that have them know exactly how valuable they are. That reality forces you to chase players like Padelford—talented, under-utilized pieces from other clubs who might break through with a change of scenery. But even then, CITY only got him on loan, which isn’t ideal for long-term squad building.

And that’s essentially where this roster sits right now, strictly from a numbers and positions standpoint.

But an accurate roster audit goes deeper than filling holes. It requires evaluating the squad’s age profile, career arcs, and where players are heading—not just where they are. Managing who is entering, exiting, or in their primes is a core part of planning the next two to three roster cycles.

Roster Age

A couple of years ago, The Athletic and its team of nerds conducted an exercise to map out the “peak” or “prime” ages by position. Is that an exact science? Absolutely not. For every Wayne Rooney exploding onto the scene at 16, there’s a Niclas Füllkrug who doesn’t fully bloom until 28. The point isn’t precision—it’s getting a general sense of when players, on average, enter their prime.

We all understand this intuitively. Fallou Fall is not in his prime; he has years of development ahead of him. Roman Bürki, meanwhile, is firmly on the downturn. And that’s not an insult—Father Time is just like gravity: undefeated. Fight all you want, but eventually, both pull you right back down to earth.

Using the groundwork from The Athletic, I applied those positional windows to the 24 players under contract for 2026, as of their age at the start of the 2026 season, to gain a clearer picture of where this roster stands today and where it’s headed. The results look like this:

A few things jump off the page right away:
— Center forwards? Perfect. That age profile is right where you want it.
— Centerbacks? They’re either old… or 21.
— And Bürki? Yeah, he’s old.

When I finally got all the kinks out of the coding and it spit out this graphic, I asked myself a couple of questions:

1. What does this say about our best players?

Bürki is well past his prime.
Löwen and Hartel have aged out of it.
Klauss is in the thick of it.

That’s a squad-planning problem. Perhaps not a 2026 problem, but definitely a 2027–2028 and beyond issue. Your best players shouldn’t all be aging out at the same time unless you’re planning a rebuild. CITY has consistently pushed back on this idea of rebuilding.

2. What about the not-yet-in-their-prime group? Any stars coming?

Yes—Joyner and Fall. Both years away from their peaks.

Suitable for long-term planning.
Not great for 2026 if you expect them to be difference makers.
They aren’t ready. They shouldn’t have to be.

3. And the biggest question: Are the prime-age players the “core” of the team?

They’re supposed to be.
This is the group that should define your identity, drive your results, and carry the squad through the grind of the season.

Instead?

Your prime-aged group is:
— a backup GK
— a backup CB
— a right back the interim coach iced out
— one CM who’s never lived up to the price tag
— another CM who doesn’t have a place in a modern midfield
— and a LW who dribbles a lot, scores a crazy goal here and there, and that’s about it

These are supposed to be the cornerstones—giant neon arrows pointing where the club is going. Instead, outside of the Klauss/Becher CF bromance, you can argue that not a single prime-aged player on the entire roster should be starting in 2026.

That’s… not good, folks.

CITY needs a massive infusion of prime-aged players to raise both the floor and the ceiling of this squad. And with only four senior slots open, they need to go 4-for-4.

No misses. No flyers. No “maybe he’ll pan out.”
They need four starters in their prime.

Or 2026 is going to look a lot like 2024 and 2025—but with even less margin for error.

The Squadit

(Squad Audit… get it?)

We’ve looked at the roster construction. We’ve looked at the age profile. Now it’s time to dig into the part that actually decides matches: the players themselves, and What Would Michael Do?

Goalkeepers — 3/3

Ages: 35, 30, 24
Roster Slots: DP, Senior, Supplemental

CITY has the full goalkeeper archetype chart covered: an overpaid, aging Designated Player starter, an average MLS backup, and a young project.

It’s functional, but far from efficient. Most front offices won’t risk giving the No. 2 job to a cheaper, younger option—because if it blows up, someone’s unemployed—but burning a senior roster slot on a backup goalkeeper is still bad roster economics. Those spots need to move the needle, not sit behind Bürki for 90% of the season.

WWMD: I’m not touching GK1 or Olivares, but I’m absolutely freeing that senior slot. A supplemental backup goalkeeper is perfectly fine, and in case of emergency, just lean on short-term call-ups from CITY2 to back up the backup. Use the reclaimed senior spot on an outfield player who can actually influence results. CITY won’t do that—and I think it hurts their ability to turn this ship around.

Centerbacks — 4/5 + 1

Ages: 31, 30, 28, 21, + 21 (Loaned)
Roster Slots: Senior, Senior, Senior, U22, + U22 (Loaned)

This is exactly what you don’t want from squad planning: three backup CBs soaking up Senior slots, one U22 spot wasted on a player currently operating on Australia time, and one genuinely promising U22 LCB in Fallou Fall. This is a picture of a position group filled with warm bodies, just to show they’re occupied.

Breaking news, St. Louis CITY SC: warm bodies do not win games. But they sure lose them.

Two of these guys are serviceable MLS backups—you can squint and see 1,000–1,500 minutes in that role and be fine. The third, the one CITY extended on Thursday, November 13th (a move that multiple people with knowledge have suggested was finalized before Wray’s appointment), is a tiny glimpse into exactly why this team has missed the playoffs in consecutive seasons.

CITY is drowning in inadequate supplemental-level talent, both on the actual supplemental roster and—more critically—on the fringes of the XI where depth should live. Rewarding one of the worst CBs in MLS in 2025, who didn’t play a single minute in the final three months of the season, is just stupid.

Re-signing Josh Yaro does not guarantee 2026 will fail. It also won’t guarantee it succeeds. What it does provide is yet another window into how fundamentally broken this club’s internal processes are. Corey Wray appears to be very good at his job, and CITY fans should be thrilled he’s here. But as long as two-thirds of the braintrust that built one of MLS’s worst teams continues to call shots, it’s hard to imagine Wray turning water into wine.

WWMD: Sign a real starting RCB—Senior/TAM money—especially someone who’s comfortable on the ball. Henry Kessler would be a great option. Maybe we should do that. And whatever you need to do with the JGR signing? Do it. A Carnell-inspired signing for a system allergic to the ball, he needs a clean runway to a permanent home elsewhere. Ideally, his stint in Australia goes well, he sticks, and CITY gets the roster space back.

Fullbacks— 1/4

Age: 27
Roster Slot: Senior

Yep. CITY currently has one rostered fullback—and nobody would be shocked if he left this winter after being placed in tactical solitary confinement for the entire second half of the season. Jannes Horn was CITY’s longest-tenured left back, and he wasn’t even here for 12 months (and half of that was spent playing left-sided centerback).

If we assume Totland sticks around, CITY still needs, at minimum:

• a starting left back,

• a backup left back, and

• a backup right back.

Three missing players. One position group. One guy under contract.
This is roster malpractice.

WWMD: Padelford and Zalinsky are my choices for backup, supplemental fullbacks. Reid clearly wasn’t the same after his injury, and he needs real minutes to find out if he can still be the player he was trending toward becoming. That won’t happen as a backup, and CITY needs the stability Padelford showed during his loan.

For the starter, I’m looking for a LB—domestic or international, doesn’t matter—who is stable, reliable, and not a liability in either phase. Doesn’t need to be flashy. Doesn’t need to overlap like Alphonso Davies. Just someone who consistently does their job and doesn’t start fires they can't put out themselves.

A few names come to mind…
But we’ll save that teaser for the next episode.

Utility - 1/1

Age: 21
Roster Slot: Supplemental

This is a new category I’m introducing: the Utility spot. Due to MLS roster limitations, every team needs at least one player who can fill holes across multiple positions. In CITY’s case, that’s Jaziel Orozco.

Is he great? No.
Is he good? Probably not.

But he is young, and he is cheap. Both are things you cannot say about the other defender with a sub 10% Net g+ percentile.

He offers almost nothing on the ball, and he’s already conceded the second-most penalties in CITY history… in 531 minutes. But here’s the thing—he doesn’t need to be great or good. He needs to be available, positionally flexible, and not actively harming the team when he plays. That last part is still a work in progress.

WWMD: Orozco should be the third-choice left back, the third-choice right back, and the 5th/6th centerback, spending most of his time playing with CITY2 to stay match sharp. This is the warm-body slot, the break-glass-in-case-of-emergency role. Players don’t dream of being this guy, but every successful MLS team has one.

Hopefully, Orozco can grow into that role for CITY in 2026.

Math

Goalkeepers: 3/3
Centerbacks: 4/5 +1
Fullbacks: 1/4
Utility: 1/1

1 DP, 5 Senior, 2 Supplemental, 1 U22 + 1 U22 (loaned)

That’s 9 players filled out of 13 possible spots, across the back line and utility roles—leaving 4 clear holes and using a U22 spot on a loaned player.

Moving on.

Central Midfield (6s & 8s) - 4/5

Age: 29, 26, 26, 20
Roster Slot: Senior, Senior, Senior, Supplemental

Where do we begin?

Eduard Löwen is one of the best deep-lying playmakers in MLS. He fully justifies the Senior slot and the TAM it took to bring him here. But he’s also 29, likely past his positional peak, and that’s before considering the very real off-field challenges weighing on him and his family. He’s CITY’s starting 8—no question.
But who’s backing him up?

Ostrák has shown flashes of central ball progression, but defensively, he’s a mess. For one of the most expensive players on the roster to still not have a position or a clear starting role in four years is more than a concern—it’s a verdict. He’s probably just not good enough, and CITY needs better value for that salary and slot.

Miguel Perez had a far better showing in MLSNP with CITY2 than he did in the USL with Birmingham. Should that be concerning? Probably. He’s young, and there’s plenty of runway for a 20-year-old midfielder. Still, the gulf between MLSNP and MLS is enormous—especially when CITY exploits the league by pitting grown men against teams fielding actual teenagers. Projecting Perez with confidence is nearly impossible. He’s almost certainly not a 6, but he’s perfectly fine as the third 8 on the depth chart.

And then there’s Chris Durkin. The 26-year-old former U22 player, now a senior, who can’t really play the 6. CITY needs help here—desperately.

WWMD: Sell Ostrák. Bring in a more well-rounded, even if less flashy, 8 who can actually contribute when Löwen is out. Sell Durkin. Spend real DP money on a game-changing 6—a midfielder who can control possession from deep, protect the backline, and allow Löwen and Hartel to operate higher up the pitch where they’re most dangerous.

And because Durkin is gone in this scenario, replace him with a proper backup 6. Whether that’s a veteran like Morales or a young flier from the supplemental/USL pool, the key is simple: you cannot play modern soccer with a midfielder who can’t retain and control the ball. Full stop.

Both of those guys are in their prime. Need to replace them as such or with younger ones.

The absence of any colors pointing south is not something CITY can stomach in 2026.

Exercising Durkin’s option makes sense only as a transactional move—to extract any return possible. But there is no long-term place for his skill set in this squad. CITY must move forward with midfielders who can actually… move the ball forward.

Wingers— 3/4

Ages: 26, 23, 19
Roster Slots: Senior, U22, Supplemental

Pompeu might be the single hardest CITY player to evaluate in the club’s existence. On paper—and in the stands—he does exactly what people pay to see. He’s a get-butts-out-of-seats winger. Flicks, tricks, beating defenders 1v1. And he’s extremely good at that part.

The issues are… everything else.

Outside of the occasional Goal-of-the-Year contender, he doesn’t really score. And he doesn’t really assist. In 3,700 MLS minutes, he has 6 goals and 6 assists—overperforming xG, underperforming xAG, but landing perfectly on their combined total of 12.0. For a winger who regularly roasts his defender in isolation, it’s a pretty underwhelming return for someone in his prime. Add in his frequent defensive lapses, and the picture gets murkier.

He’s good enough to be a squad player.
He’s also good enough—and valuable enough—to sell.

Sang-bin, now extended through the final year of his U22 deal, is the most likely starter on the right unless CITY brings in a true marquee addition. At 23, that’s a great place to be for long-term planning. His physical traits are elite; his technical ceiling is still a work in progress. As he approaches his prime, CITY needs that curve to keep rising.

Joyner, the wunderkind, complicates the calculus. Bringing in a star left winger naturally cuts into the kind of minutes everyone—fans, the club, and the league—would prefer Joyner to see. However, relying on a Pompeu/Joyner platoon on the left keeps CITY short on proven firepower, continuing the trend of a team punching below its weight in terms of attacking output.

He’s years away from his best. He just needs meaningful minutes. Any additional playtime for him with CITY2 would be a waste of time.

WWMD: CITY needs an upgrade here—full stop. The cleanest solution is to sign a right-footed LW who actually produces goals and assists. That immediately raises the floor of the attack, and because Joyner exists, that player doesn’t have to be in their prime. You can sign someone slightly older, knowing that as they decline, Joyner should be pushing for more and more minutes.

Yes, that puts some weight on the shoulders of a teenager—and the most dangerous word in sports, potential—but CITY should be capable of reinforcing the position while still giving Joyner room to breathe and grow.

At the very least, however, CITY needs a fourth winger, ideally a left-footed player, to provide different angles, shapes, and profiles in the attack.

Math 2.0

Goalkeepers: 3/3
Centerbacks: 4/5 (+1 loaned)
Fullbacks: 1/4
Utility: 1/1

Central Midfield: 4/5
Wingers: 3/4

Roster Slot Breakdown:

• 1 DP

• 9 Senior

• 4 Supplemental

• 2 U22 + 1 U22 (loaned)

That puts CITY at 17 players and 6 holes—and that’s before factoring in my recommendations to sell two central midfielders.

Moving on.

Attacking Midfielders

Ages: 30, 29, 24, 18
Roster Slots: DP, Senior, Supplemental, Supplemental

This group is split cleanly into two: the post-prime stars and the kids.

The two older players are, simultaneously, the best player in the squad and the most frustrating player in the team.

Let’s start with the easy one: Marcel Hartel. There’s no need to wax poetic—he’s just really, really good. He quietly had the second-best G+A season of his career last year, and yet not enough people are talking about it. He’s the engine of this team.

Cedric Teuchert, however, is a far more complicated conversation. Ironically, for a guy who couldn’t buy a goal last season, he’s still the best pure finisher on the roster. The problem—one everyone saw—is everything that happens when he isn’t scoring.

He doesn’t contribute to buildup.
He won’t beat a man off the dribble.
He doesn’t have the pace to stretch defenses.
And most importantly: where does he play?

Hartel can play inverted from the left, but we’ve all seen how much more freedom—and impact—he has centrally, drifting into whichever pocket the game demands. Slotting Teuchert into a front four with Klauss and Hartel turns CITY into the Need for Speed’s DMV: painfully slow. Even if you added Usain Bolt, the collective profile is still too slow to threaten MLS defenses.

And then there’s Teuchert’s contract. It expires in the summer. He’s expensive. He’s aging. And he’s boxed in by worst-case economics:

• Great season? Too expensive to extend.

• Bad season? Walks for free.

• Average season? No transfer value, extension through ‘26 doesn’t change anything.

This is the definition of a value trap.

The kids are a different story.
McSCOREly arrives just as he’s entering his prime at 24. He should be given every opportunity to take over Teuchert’s role once Cedric leaves, but for now he’s depth and an impact sub.

As for Glover, Slot 31 has his name written all over it.

WWMD: Do nothing—for now. Teuchert leaves one way or another after 2026, and then the real work begins: finding a younger 10 who can understudy Hartel and eventually take the mantle. That succession plan should be a priority the moment Teuchert’s contract clears.

Center Forwards— 2/2

Ages: 28, 26
Roster Slots: Senior, Senior

Finally—some clarity.

CITY’s striker group is the one position in the entire squad that is both set and competent, and shockingly, both players are in or just entering their primes.

Let’s start with Klauss.
He is who he is at this point: a high-effort, high-chaos, back-to-goal forward who can create his own shot, bully centerbacks, and drag defenses into uncomfortable zones. When he’s healthy and engaged, he’s one of the better all-around No. 9s in MLS. When he’s not? Well… we’ve seen the streaks. But the talent is undeniable, and he is a locked-in starter for 2026 unless someone drops a bag on the CITY doorstep.

Then there’s Sam Adeniran’s spiritual successor—just kidding.
It’s Becher.

Becher is a good modern MLS backup No. 9:

• intelligent movement

• works hard defensively

• consistently finds dangerous pockets

• And, he’s CHEAP

Could CITY upgrade from either? Sure. But is that where the focus should be? Absolutely not.

This is one of the few areas where CITY actually executed squad planning correctly: two strikers in their mid-late 20s, different enough to complement each other, and both capable in their own right (if Becher can start scoring again).

WWMD: Nothing. This is the one position that is stable, efficient, and aligned with proper roster construction. Reinforce the wings and midfield, and let Klauss and Becher do what they do. If anything, keep an eye out for a young, cheap third forward for CITY2, who offers more speed and who can be an emergency call-up—but this position does not need Senior-slot resources.

The End

Goalkeepers: 3/3
Centerbacks: 4/5 (+1 loaned)
Fullbacks: 1/4
Utility: 1/1

Central Midfield: 4/5
Wingers: 3/4

Attacking Midfield: 4/4
Center Forwards: 2/2

Roster Slot Breakdown:

• 2 DP

• 12 Senior

• 6 Supplemental + Pearce

• 2 U22 + 1 U22 (loaned)

In compiling this list, I purposefully excluded Tyson Pearce. Not because I don’t think he has a future, but because I genuinely don’t know where to put him. Some conversations suggest that he is viewed as a right-back; others indicate that he could play centrally. Either way, he’s 18, on a supplemental slot, and a strong candidate for Slot 31. His time will come—just not in this audit.

So that’s the 24-man squad as it currently stands. A mix of old and young, with very little contribution from the prime-aged core. There’s a ton of work to do. Let’s bring that colored depth chart back into view.

By my count, this roster has:

• 8 actual “needs”

• 4 question marks, each for different reasons

• 3 players who should be gone before the season kicks off in February

That’s a lot of work to accomplish with only 6 available roster slots.
Mathematically, it borders on improbable.

Anyway—I hope you enjoyed this Roster Audit, or at least found it informative. In Part 3 of the WWMD Offseason Series, we’ll shift from identifying the problems to solving them:
New faces, new signings, and rebuilding a roster that needs it.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

You’ve probably heard of Jesus of Nazareth and the timeless question: What Would Jesus Do?

Allow me to introduce Michael of Washington, Missouri — and a new gospel for the CITY faithful:

What Would Michael Do?

The 2025 offseason is here.

The roster? Unknown.
The cap? Unknown.
The club’s identity? Unknown.
The manager? Unknown.
And the front office? Also… unknown.

This series exists to provide my answers to some of those unknowns.

The first edition of WWMD is a player-by-player breakdown of STL CITY’s roster — centered around one critical question:

Should the club exercise this player’s option for 2025?

We’ll look at:

• Position, age, contract status, and salary

• Performance vs. cap hit

• Tactical fit and long-term upside

• WWMD verdicts: Keep, decline, renegotiate, or trade

This isn’t just about cutting dead weight — it’s about building a smarter, sharper, more competitive squad for 2026 and beyond.

Because what we’ve seen lately? It simply hasn’t been good enough.

So grab your rosary beads and your roster spreadsheet.

It’s time to ask the only question that matters in the CITY offseason:

What Would Michael Do?

Goalkeepers

Roman Bürki

Probably the single largest question mark of the 2025 offseason. The Captain. The cornerstone. The face of this club so far. Once the only DP goalkeeper in the league — and still CITY’s second-highest-paid player.

He’s 35 now and made $1.7 million in 2025, the final year of his contract.

In 2023 and 2024, there was no doubt he earned the right to be the league’s highest-paid goalkeeper. Whether that premium — roughly 36% more ($458K) than the next-highest-paid — was justified is another debate entirely. But the facts back him up.

In 2023, Bürki was MLS’ best. His +0.28 PSxG-GA ranked in the 97th percentile. In 2024, he followed it with +0.25 (96th percentile). A positive number like that means one of two things: luck or elite shot-stopping. We’ve seen enough to know it was the latter.

This year, at 34, the regression finally arrived. His +0.07 PSxG-GA still suggests above-average shot-stopping, but the percentile dropped to 59th.

That’s from OPTA/FBREF, and the American Soccer Analysis Goals Added cards tell the same story.

Some will ask: Wasn’t that just because CITY’s defense wasn’t good?
Probably not. xGA was 57.4 in 2024 and 57.3 in 2025 — basically identical. The team around him didn’t suddenly collapse; the keeper simply regressed.

Is it a blip? Could he bounce back at 35 and beyond? Possible. But not probable.

So what do you do with a goalkeeper this important — to the locker room, the fanbase, and the club’s identity?

You re-sign him — but smartly. This isn’t about nostalgia. It’s about building a sharper, more competitive roster for 2026 and beyond.

I’d offer a 2 + 1 extension (through 2027 with an option for 2028). Sit him down, share the vision (which the club currently lacks), and find common ground on a reduced salary that gives CITY flexibility to actually improve.

Because, bluntly, no other MLS club would pay a goalkeeper that much. If Bürki wants to stay in the league, his options are here — or a massive discount elsewhere.

WWMD: Contract Extension. 2 + 1 deal at ~$1.5 M AAV.

And when it’s all said and done, he walks away on his terms — the first captain of St. Louis CITY SC.

Danke, Roman.

(Editor’s Note: This is, of course, not what CITY actually did. With Gigliani and Hackworth steering the ship, the extension was indeed a 2+1 — but somehow, they gave him more money, made him a DP again, and rumors suggest he’ll once again be CITY’s highest-paid player. My grade on that decision: D.)

Before we get into Big Ben, here’s what I want out of my backups.

If the starter goes down or needs a rest, the backup should be able to come in and do the same job — not as well, but well enough.

Backups shouldn’t reinvent the system or need the entire XI to change around them. They should just step in, play the role, keep the floor from falling out, and get out alive.

Competent. Reliable. Worse — but still functional. That’s what I ask.

Ben Lundt

His $172,833 senior contract expires this year and has no future options.

For all intents and purposes, Ben seems like a great guy — great in the locker room, good teammate, all that.

I don’t care.

Fans know next to nothing about locker room dynamics. We see a TikTok of guys goofing around and suddenly someone’s a “culture guy.” We don’t know. We guess.

Ben, as the backup to Roman, has to fit my criteria for a backup in this exercise:

Competent. Reliable. Worse. Functional.

Competent? Absolutely. He showed this year that MLS isn’t above his level and qualified for his first g+ card.

Reliable? Yep. He’s consistent. Fans, teammates, coaches — they all know what they’re getting from Ben week in and week out.

Worse? Obviously.

Functional? That’s where it falls apart.

If you recall from those Roman cards — or from watching him the past three seasons — he’s an elite ball-player. He can hit passes with either foot, stay composed under pressure, and facilitate play from the back — something CITY wants to do.

Ben can’t do that. He requires a different playstyle when he’s on the pitch. You can’t pass back to him, expecting calm distribution and buildup. At 30, there is little expectation of development in that regard, either. And I can’t have that in my backup, because backups shouldn’t force the system to change.

So Ben — thank you, and best of luck.

WWMD: Release.

(Editor’s Note: CITY released Ben, but has said they’re discussing a potential return. Grade: B.)

Christian Olivares

Outside of a few die-hards, most fans probably haven’t even heard of this young man. He’s not quite Big Ben, but at 6’4”, he’s got plenty of size.

He’s on an expiring contract at the reserve minimum ($80,622), with club options for 2026 and 2027 — and most importantly, he’s registered on the supplemental roster, not the senior one.

Looking at his Goals Added (g+) cards over the past three seasons, it’s notable how much his passing has improved — once a weakness, now arguably his biggest strength. Questions about his shot-stopping remain, but he appears capable of playing the facilitator role, which matters a lot to me.

WWMD: Exercise the 2026 option. Keep him on the supplemental roster. It frees up a senior slot and keeps the cap hit minimal, which is critical if you’re spending truckloads on your starter.

If Olivares ever needs to start, use short-term call-ups to bring a CITY2 keeper (Welsh) up in reserve. Some leagues require three goalkeepers. MLS doesn’t. So don’t waste a roster spot on one.

(Editor’s Note: CITY exercised the 2026 option. Grade: A.)

Goalkeepers done. Time to talk about the guys standing in front of them — at least, the ones who are supposed to make their lives easier.

CITY’s defensive unit has been… something. Equal parts chaos and commitment, sometimes heroic, sometimes tragic, and almost always busy.

But let’s get this straight: defending in this system isn’t just about blocking shots or winning duels. It’s about structure, spacing, and decision-making under pressure. And lately, we’ve had more of the last one than the first two.

So as we move through the defenders, the lens stays the same:

• Are they good enough to play the role asked of them?

• Do they fit the system we claim to be running?

• And do they help build a backline that doesn’t need a superhuman in goal to survive?

Let’s get into it.

Defenders

Henry Kessler

At 27, Henry Kessler is the best center back at the club — by some distance.

I also think he’s one of the best ball-playing center backs in MLS and, when healthy, should be in the USMNT conversation (especially when you look at some of the names that get called up). But that’s the catch — when healthy.

There’s a sick, cruel irony in the fact that CITY has, in pure talent, had two of the better center backs in this league… and neither one can stay on the field.

Over the last three seasons, Kessler has started 46 of a possible 102 matches — just 45%.

CITY traded fan favorite Tim Parker for Kessler for three reasons:

1. He’s younger.

2. He fits the system better.

3. He’s better.

But in doing so, they also took on a hefty contract. His salary sat at $1.33M in 2025, and reports suggest his 2026 option includes a significant raise on top of that.

That’s expensive. Really expensive. Especially for a club that just bit the bullet and ate money owed to another injury-prone (but talented) center back.

It feels like forever ago, but remember back in February and March — fans were clamoring for Kessler to make the Team of the Matchday without even scoring. He was everywhere. That early form didn’t even showcase his expansive passing range, which remains elite among domestic CBs.

His g+ card backs it up: in just 1,551 minutes, his defensive work was unparalleled among MLS center backs.

But again — that option is expensive.

WWMD: Decline the option, but negotiate an extension (2+1) around $1.4M AAV. Keep him through age 30.

(Editor’s Note: Option was declined, and CITY is reportedly discussing a potential return. Grade: C. Improves if they land the details right; it’s an F if he walks.)

Josh Yaro

Josh Yaro has been here since the beginning — a day-one guy, a leadership presence, and by all accounts, a genuinely good human being.

But good humans don’t necessarily make good defenders.

At 30 years old, Yaro’s profile is what it’s been for years: an athletic, undersized center back with recovery speed, decent positional instincts, and limited ability to progress the ball under pressure. You can love him as a person and still admit that his on-field ceiling was reached a long time ago.

In 2023, he got the “emergency starter” tag and wore it well. In 2024 and 2025, he became a recurring feature in lineups that badly needed an upgrade. The problem? When Yaro plays heavy minutes, it’s a symptom — not a plan.

And in 2025, Yaro put up one of the worst seasons in MLS history according to g+. Of the 5,860 players who have met the five-game threshold for a CCT card, 5,509 (95%) have posted a better individual season than Yaro’s 2025. He finished as a bottom-40 player in the league, with a Net g+% of just 4%.

Tactically, he’s misaligned with how CITY want to play. He’s not comfortable breaking lines with the ball, and when pressed, he defaults to clearances and long balls. That’s fine in certain systems — just not the one St. Louis keeps insisting it runs in the post-Carnell era.

Defensively, he’s serviceable in low blocks or emergency cover, but his timing in duels and lack of aerial presence make him a liability against strong or tall forwards. Combine that with CITY’s tendency to compress the pitch, and it’s a bad fit for everyone involved.

At this stage, Yaro’s role should be what it always should’ve been — a guy on the outside looking in. He hasn’t seen the pitch since July 19th. And if CITY want to evolve, those minutes have to go to younger, more system-fitting defenders.

His $200k contract expires this year, and he has an option for 2026.

WWMD: Decline the option and release. Thank him for his service, his professionalism, and his 10,000 miles of running behind a broken press. Wish him well — preferably in a league or system that suits his skill set.

(Editor’s Note: CITY declined Yaro’s option. Correct decision. Grade: A. CITY is reportedly discussing a potential return — if that happens, the grade drops to F.)

Jaziel Orozco

A promotion that got a lot of people excited.

Jaziel hit the ground running by doing one simple thing — not making mistakes. And because CITY make a lot of mistakes, that got the people going. So much so that he earned a bump from CITY2 to the supplemental roster, signed through 2025 on a reserve-minimum deal (like Olivares above), with options for 2026, 2027, and 2028.

And then… he started making mistakes.

Those compounded with the fact that he wasn’t really doing much of anything on the pitch. CITY brought in a loanee to play Orozco’s position without an option to make that loanee permanent — which tells you how they evaluated his play — and his minutes all but dried up over the final two months.

So what is Orozco in 2026? He’s the break-glass-in-case-of-emergency defender. The third left back. The third right back. The fifth or sixth center back. He’s a body when you need a body — and he’ll be perfectly serviceable in that role.

Is that the role he envisioned or dreamed of? Definitely not. But I’m in the business of building a competitive roster, not a sentimental one. And that’s that.

(Editor’s Note: CITY exercised his 2026 option. Grade: B — as long as everyone understands he’s not meant to play a meaningful role.)

Michael Wentzel

The original Jaziel Orozco.

In an era when CITY had no healthy center backs under Bradley Carnell, Wentzel weirdly stayed on the sidelines. Then — in what we can only assume was pure coincidence — just hours after Carnell was sacked, Wentzel received his promotion to the supplemental roster.

He’s appeared in six matches over the past two seasons, totaling 271 minutes. In those limited minutes, he’s looked the part of a depth center back: a bit plodding and slow, but calm on the ball and technically solid. He put up good numbers in MLSNP, and should be able to find a home with another NP side or in the USL.

He was under contract in 2025 on a reserve-minimum deal, with a club option for 2026.

WWMD: I didn’t see a reason to have both Orozco and Wentzel on the same roster in 2025, and I don’t see one in 2026. Wentzel profiles better as a pure center back, but Orozco’s added positional flexibility gives him the edge for that supplemental slot, which needs to prioritize versatility.

(Editor’s Note: CITY declined Wentzel’s option. Correct call. Grade: A.)

Joey Zalinsky

A second-round draft pick in 2025, Zalinsky was immediately signed to a supplemental-roster contract on the reserve minimum ($80,622), with options for 2026, 2027, and 2028.

At first, I was surprised he signed a senior-team deal right away — a sign that the staff believed he was ready to contribute real minutes.

Well… that never happened.

Starting right back Totland missed serious time with injury. That didn’t matter. Joey played in seven matches, totaled 221 minutes, and didn’t feature for CITY2 either. In the end, he became part of a familiar theme from the Lutz Pfannenstiel era — a wasted roster spot.

Did the front office misfire by giving him that deal so early?
Did the coaches mismanage him by not playing him in MLS or MLSNP?
Who knows.

WWMD: This one could go either way. Because he’s cheap and under control, I’d lean toward exercising his option and seeing if he can actually provide fullback depth in 2026 — but I’d understand if they cut him.

(Editor’s Note: CITY is currently discussing his contract option. Grade: N/A.)

Jayden Reid

His 2025 looked nothing like his 2024. The spark was gone. No drive, no take-ons, no progression, no offense — nothing. And we can’t even blame the Olof excuse; only 28 of his 452 minutes came under Olof’s tenure.

So what happened?
Could he just not recover from last season’s injury?
Was last season’s version of Reid a one-off flash?

A lot of question marks, and they’re not easy ones. The physical traits are still there — he’s quick, strong, and athletic enough to bail himself out of mistakes — but technically and mentally, the edge disappeared. And when you’re already a below-average defender, you can’t afford to lose your forward thrust too.

WWMD: Tough call. If Reid’s regression was fitness-related and he can rediscover that 2024 form, there’s still value here at $104K and a 2026 option. But if 2025 was the new normal, you move on. I’d keep him through preseason, let the staff (assuming there is one and Diego isn’t playing Manager, General Manager, and President like he’s a Jerry Jones cosplayer) see which version shows up, and decide before summer.

(Editor’s Note: CITY has not yet made a decision on Reid’s option. Grade: N/A.)

Akil Watts

A cult favorite who quietly became one of the more divisive players in the CITY fanbase — and then everyone kind of came to the same conclusion.

At 25, Watts has now been through it all: starter, depth piece, bench guy, emergency midfielder, even the occasional scapegoat. His 2025 season summed up the issue perfectly — a player who’s fine at everything, good at very little, and increasingly hard to justify on a senior roster spot. His Goals Added (g+) card fell from the 21st percentile in 2023, to 28th in 2024, and all the way down to the 15th percentile in 2025. Over 1,400 minutes, that’s simply not good enough.

Watts’ strength has always been his versatility. He can fill multiple roles — right back, wingback, even central midfield. The problem is, he doesn’t really excel in any of them. In possession, he’s tidy but not progressive; defensively, he’s undersized, not blessed physically, and often late to recognize space; and in transition, he plays like a man caught between instructions.

By the numbers, his g+ output has been bad for three straight seasons. Watts made $104K in 2025 (senior minimum), occupies a supplemental slot, and carries an option for 2026.

If CITY want to evolve, the depth has to evolve too. You can’t modernize your backline while keeping players whose tactical ceilings are already defined.

WWMD: Decline the option. Thank him for his minutes, his versatility, and his willingness to do the dirty work — but it’s time to move on. Those senior roster spots are too valuable for players who no longer push the ceiling.

(Editor’s Note: CITY declined Watts’ option. Correct decision. Grade: A.)

Midfielders

Seth Antwi

Promoted immediately to a senior roster slot, there should be just about zero discussion on this one. There’s no argument to be made that he should be taking up one of those 20 senior spots based on his MLSNP play.

He was under contract for 2025, with options for 2026 and 2027.

His 2025 contract was, in truth, a reward — recognition for two seasons of hard work and consistency with CITY2. And that deserves to be celebrated. But that’s where it ends.

WWMD: Decline the option. Appreciate the grind, acknowledge the effort, and move forward. Senior roster spots are for contributors, not commendations.

(Editor’s Note: CITY has not yet made a decision on Antwi’s option. Grade: N/A.)

Miguel Perez

Miggy’s had one of the strangest arcs of any CITY player so far. From hometown hero in 2023, to struggling for minutes in USL in 2024, to becoming the new Slot 31 — the unavailable, off-roster player — in 2025, it’s been a full career rollercoaster before age 21.

He’s on a $104K contract with options for 2026 and 2027. On paper, that’s low-risk depth. In reality, it’s hard to see what role he actually fills right now.

It’s a weird evaluation, because Miggy doesn’t really do any of the core things you want from a central midfielder particularly well. He’s played some fullback too, but that experiment should end — he simply doesn’t have the physical tools to make that transition work at the senior level.

Posting a 73rd-percentile g+ in 2025 is solid in MLSNP, but when you dig in, nearly all of that value comes from shooting and receiving. For a player who projects as a deep-lying 8 — like Löwen — that’s not a fit. The underlying profile still doesn’t translate to the MLS level.

That said, there’s still time. He’s young, cheap, and a St. Louis product. I’d keep him around in 2026, but with clear eyes — he’s not nearly as close to MLS-ready as people thought in 2023, or as some are starting to believe again after this 2025 campaign.

WWMD: Exercise his 2026 option and keep him in the supplemental slot.

Alfredo Morales

A trialist pickup who ended up sticking around for $205K, Morales quietly turned out to be one of CITY’s smartest moves of 2025.

At 35, he wasn’t flashy, but he provided something this club has sorely lacked since joining MLS — technical calm and positional discipline. He sat deep, recycled possession, and anchored transitions without panic. For a team that too often confuses intensity with control, Morales’ willingness to actually hold shape was a breath of fresh air.

You could argue he’s been the best, most well-rounded No. 6 the club has had — though, to be fair, that’s a pretty short list. Still, his brief run here showed how valuable a steady, technically sound deep midfielder can be in a system that constantly leaves space behind the ball.

The issue isn’t performance — it’s projection. Morales will be 36 next season, and while the head is still sharp, the legs aren’t getting younger. CITY need to replace his positional awareness and technical ability with a younger version of the same profile, and that player simply doesn’t exist on the current roster.

WWMD: Decline the option, but only because of age. Morales proved the role’s importance — now go find someone who can do it for the next three years, not the next three months.

Chris Durkin

Chris Durkin is one of those players who feels like he should fit — but never really does.

At 25, he’s got the résumé, the MLS mileage, and the domestic familiarity that make you want to believe he’s part of the solution. But in practice, he’s just another cog that doesn’t mesh with the system.

Durkin’s 2025 g+ card tells the story: 11th percentile.

That’s not “struggling,” that’s “actively hurting you.” He doesn’t show the positional awareness you need from a holding midfielder, and when CITY try to build with possession, he looks completely lost.

And just look at his radars. This isn’t the result of a player battling through injury in 2025 — this is not a drastically different player. He’s been limited, and he’ll remain limited.

We’ve seen him used as a 6 and an 8, but let’s be honest — he’s not either of those. He doesn’t progress the ball, doesn’t cover space quickly enough, and doesn’t break lines with passing or movement.

So let’s run the backup test I laid out earlier:

• Competent? Marginally. He can fill minutes.

• Reliable? Sure — you know exactly what you’re getting.

• Worse? Yes.

• Functional? No. He breaks the system.

That last part is the dealbreaker. When he plays, CITY has to adjust the way they build, the way they press, and the way they defend. That’s not a backup — that’s a structural liability.

WWMD: Decline the option. Durkin’s a perfectly fine MLS player in the wrong system. CITY need mobility, awareness, and press resistance in midfield — not another square peg.

(Editor’s Note: CITY exercised Durkin’s 2026 option. Grade: D. A predictable, safe decision — and the wrong one.)

Forwards

Brendan McSorley

Another member of the promoted group from MLSNP to the big leagues, McSCOREly did what he does — score goals. Two goals and an assist in just 277 minutes of MLS play. Small sample, same story.

In 2024, he posted the 4th-best g+ in MLSNP, and followed it up in 2025 with the 39th, still good for the 92nd percentile. Across those two campaigns, he’s tallied 17 goals and 9 assists, finishing second in key passes in both seasons at the club. Production, consistency, and reliability — three things CITY don’t have a lot of in the attacking pipeline

.

Can he play at the next level? Hard to say. Like a few others in this roster bubble, he doesn’t quite have the physical tools to make the jump in his current role as a wide attacker. His comps? Think Cedric Teuchert or Brian White — dangerous receivers who stretch play at times, drift centrally, and finish chances.

The fit question is real. That second-striker archetype doesn’t really exist in CITY’s current structure. But at a reserve-minimum contract with options for 2026 and 2027, this is a no-brainer. You keep him, let him keep scoring, and see if he forces the system to bend around him.

WWMD: Exercise the option. Easy call. Goals translate.

Sangbin Jeong

A recent arrival, Sangbin quietly showed why he might be one of CITY’s most important long-term pieces — not because of his stats, but because of what he brings stylistically.

He notched 1 goal and 1 assist on 2.5 xG+A in 633 minutes of play. On paper, that’s not going to blow anyone away. But what will is his speed — something CITY has quite literally never had in their attacking group.

He’s a sharp reminder that good fits are better than good players. CITY has desperately needed a line-breaking attacker who’s willing to stretch defenses vertically, provide secondary goal contributions, and press with intent. JSB does all three.

I think he can fulfill that Niko role from 2023, albeit on the opposite flank — a direct, vertical runner who forces backlines to drop and opens space for the midfield to breathe. And in doing so, score 7-8 goals. If CITY can pair him with a game-changing attacker on the other side, the balance of this front line could finally click into something genuinely dangerous.

He’s currently on a U22 contract with an option for 2026, and exercising it should be a no-brainer, even with the expected bump from his $737K salary in 2025. Regardless of what happens in the winter window, Sangbin should feature regularly across the front line in 2026. Ideally, we get more of the version that terrorized MLS defenders — and CITY specifically — in 2024.

In an ideal world, JSB would be the worst starter in the XI in 2026 — and that would be a good thing. It would mean CITY has finally built a unit with real top-end talent, and Sangbin is providing the depth, balance, and vertical threat that makes everything else work.

WWMD: Exercise the 2026 option. Fast, vertical, and direct — exactly what this attack has been missing.

(Editor’s Note: CITY exercised Jeong’s 2026 option. Grade: A. The right kind of player for how this team should want to play.)

Klauss

Hero. Then hated. And now — maybe not the fan favorite again, but pretty damn close. CITY’s main DP, sits at the center of just about every conversation surrounding this club. His contract carries an option for 2026, and he made $1.37M in 2025. The key detail: if that option is exercised, he no longer carries a Designated Player tag — which opens up massive roster flexibility in the current 2 DP / 4 U22 structure.

(Editor’s Note: Diego and Hackworth laughed in our faces and handed that slot to Bürki instead.)

On the field, Klauss’ trajectory has mirrored CITY’s — up, down, and back to somewhere in between.

In 2023, he posted 12 G+A on 6.6 xG+A in just 19 games.
In 2024, over 27 matches, those numbers dropped to 8 on 10.2 xG+A.
And in 2025, he rebounded to 12 G+A on 15.3 xG+A across 33 appearances.

That’s consistency at a respectable clip — and importantly, no signs of regression. His 24 non-penalty goals have come on 24.8 npxG, a -0.8 differential, meaning he’s doing exactly what’s expected: finishing at an honest, sustainable rate.

So, is that enough? Depends on the rest of the attack. I’ve always said Klauss’ ceiling is 15 goals and 5 assists. If he hits 20 G+A, that’s 12th in MLS in 2025 for goal contributions. If he’s the only goal scorer, that’s not enough. But if he’s one of three, that’s a top-tier attack.

Which makes this the easiest decision on the list. Of course, you’re bringing him back.

For all the noise about him “not being a DP-level player,” congratulations — if the option’s exercised, he’s not a DP anymore. Now you can just sit back and enjoy him.

In his three seasons, he’s produced g+ seasons between the 70th–81st percentiles — consistently in the top quarter of the league.

That’s not elite DP value, but it’s nowhere near dead money either. And now that he’s a TAM player? That value skyrockets.

And hey, he’s South American, which for some people is a big deal!

WWMD: Exercise the option. A reliable striker on a non-DP salary, producing at an above-average clip — that’s good business every day of the week.

(Editor’s Note: CITY exercised Klauss’ 2026 option. Grade: B. Putting that DP slot to work immediately was… not Grade A.)

No fanfare for the two loanees, Wallem and Padelford, or the last two, Alm and Pidro. Those options are not our decision, and for the last two, not worth our collective time.

So that’s the book of WWMD: Expiring Contracts.

If you’ve made it this far, you care about this roster more than some of the people who built it — and that’s saying something. The purpose of this series wasn’t to tear down; it was to clear the slate. To separate the pieces worth keeping from the ones collecting dust.

Because before you can build, you have to clean house.

Here’s how the ledger looks after all the calls:

🧾 WWMD Summary

Goalkeepers

• Roman Bürki: Contract Extension (2+1, $1.5M AAV)

• Ben Lundt: Release

• Christian Olivares: Exercise 2026 Option

Center Backs

• Henry Kessler: Decline Option, Negotiate Extension (2+1, $1.4M AAV)

• Josh Yaro: Decline Option

• Jaziel Orozco: Exercise 2026 Option

• Michael Wentzel: Decline Option

Fullbacks

• Joey Zalinsky: Lean Exercise Option

• Jayden Reid: Exercise 2026 Option (Short Leash)

• Akil Watts: Decline Option

Midfielders

• Seth Antwi: Decline Option

• Miguel Perez: Exercise 2026 Option

• Alfredo Morales: Decline Option

• Chris Durkin: Decline Option

Attackers

• Brendan McSorley: Exercise 2026 Option

• Sangbin Jeong: Exercise 2026 Option

• Klauss: Exercise 2026 Option

The next chapter isn’t about who’s leaving — it’s about who’s coming. It’s about identifying players who actually fit the system CITY say they want to play, not just the ones who look good in a press release.

The offseason doesn’t end with subtraction. It starts with addition.

Next up: WWMD — Roster Audit.
The first step is to acknowledge that you have a problem.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

Remember just 17 days ago, when I spent thousands of words dissecting what was arguably the worst watch in STL CITY’s short existence? There’s one tried-and-true statement that applies to all things, everywhere, all the time:

Winning fixes everything.

But before we talk about winning, let’s talk about losing. Specifically, the losers from the past two games:

The Losers

Montréal.
Now that is what bad ownership looks like. Joey Saputo owns the club. The club plays at Saputo Stadium. The soccer experts have been run out of town in favor of the widely acclaimed… sons of Saputo. In the last ten years, they’ve finished in the top ten in MLS just once. The roster is bad. The ownership is bad. The fans have it terrible. And to top it all off, Saputo bought Genoa in Italy’s Serie A four years ago — so who really cares if Montréal is awful, right?

It’s just a little reminder that while we fans tend to see everything in a vacuum — and assume the grass is always greener — oftentimes, it’s not.

Is it alarming that the xG battle against the worst team in MLS was just 1.6–1.4 in favor of CITY? Kinda. But also… kinda not.

Simon Becher.
I don’t want this to sound like we’re just picking on Simon because he’s had a rough year. But as in all things in life — when you falter, someone is often there to take your step. And when there are winners, there have to be losers.

Becher has scored 2 goals this season. His expected goals (xG) sits at 7.9. That -5.9 Goals minus xG is the worst mark in MLS.

Now, to be fair to Simon — and to goalscorers in general — scoring goals is inherently random. Even elite strikers go through stretches where the ball just doesn’t bounce their way. But when the gap between chances and conversion gets this wide, it’s not just bad luck. It’s a signal.

To make matters worse — or at least more revealing — Becher’s post-shot expected goals (PSxG) is 7.0, compared to his xG of 7.9. That’s a -0.9 PSxG minus xG differential, which suggests that even when he’s getting good chances, the shots themselves aren’t great.

In other words: not only is he not finishing the chances, he’s also not striking them well.

This is where the nuance comes in. xG tells us Becher is getting into the right spots. PSxG tells us what he’s doing with the ball once he shoots. And the gap between the two — nearly a full goal — suggests that the issue isn’t just bad luck. It’s poor shot execution.

Again, scoring goals is random. But when both the volume of chances and the quality of shots are underperforming, it’s not just variance. It’s a trend.

And now let’s talk about the winners.

Because when someone falters, someone else steps forward. And CITY has had a few step forward.

The Winners

Designated Players.

João Klauss and Marcel Hartel — CITY’s two DPs — are finally producing. Both are up to 11 goal contributions in 2025. Yes, it took too long. But let’s be real: only three CITY players have scored 5+ goals this season, and Edu Löwen has only played in half the games.

I’ve said it before — Klauss is a 15G + 5A guy. That’s his ceiling. He’s an average finisher. Not elite, not poor — just average. And that’s fine. In 2025, 17 of 30 MLS teams don’t have a player with 15 goals. Only three players have hit 20+. So if Klauss finishes with 10 goals and 3 assists, that’s a solid TAM-level striker. I’m excited for what TAM Klauss brings in 2026.

Last year, I spent a lot of time defending Klauss. This year, it feels like the fans have turned on CITY’s actual best player — Marcel Hartel.

Hartel has 9.1 expected assists — 6th in MLS. The guy in 7th? Lionel Messi, by the way. Hartel only has 4 assists, tied for 54th in the league. That’s a stat people care about, but it’s one that depends on teammates actually finishing chances. And CITY is underperforming xG by -7.3 — so yeah, Hartel’s assist numbers are suffering.

In a league full of attacking-only talent, Hartel is a borderline All-Star on a bottom-tier team. It’s time to wake up.

Two games — two wins.

• Klauss: 2 assists (not including the rebound that Wallem buried for the opener)

• Hartel: 2 goals, 1 assist

Five goals. Every single one contributed by #9 or #17.

They are winners in a week of winning. Klauss and Hartel did what DPs are supposed to do — they showed up, they produced, they led.

But there’s one real winner here, folks.

Brendan McSorley.

In 2024, G+ ranked him as the 4th-best player in all of MLS Next Pro — a 99th percentile performer. In 2025, reality hit: he dropped to 39th-best (joking). But let’s be honest — he’s too good for MLSNP, and two standout campaigns prove it.

Is he good enough for MLS? Maybe. Should we be swayed by an incredible 78 minutes in San Jose? Absolutely not. But if he plays well in these final three games, then yes — let’s talk about BMc in 2026.

That “someone falters, someone steps forward” thing? That’s about this guy. Becher has stumbled through 2025, and Run BMc took his first chance.

He’s not an MLS winger, first and foremost. He doesn’t have the physical traits or technical profile to excel out wide. But put him in the shoehorn of CITY’s squad, and he’s a bit of a blend of Teuchert and Becher. He has that knack — the instinct to find soft defensive spaces and receive the ball. He strikes it well, like Teuchert should. And he’s willing to do the dirty work, like Becher. Both of those guys — and BMc too — are putrid when playing wide. It doesn’t suit them. At all.

His goals against San Jose? Central. Penalty box. Poacher-type finishes. Yes, he was listed as a “right wing” in that game, but let’s not kid ourselves — this wasn’t a winger’s touch map.

In an ideal world, he’s a second striker, a raumdeuter, or whatever label you prefer. It’s the role Teuchert thrived in last year: find space, create chaos, score goals.

The problem? Marcel Hartel is playing the 10. Full stop. He’s creating goals on both flanks and scoring centrally. He owns the middle — or the half-spaces, if you want to get technical.

Klauss is your 9. Hartel is your 10.

Need a goal? Look to the bench. Becher and BMc are both sitting there. Your backup center forward is an unproven young lad. BMc should get the call.

And that’s why Becher lands in the “losers” column of this winning streak.

Now, I realized in the editing process that I had some other big-picture winning/losing thoughts that more than doubled the length of this piece — and that’s too much, even for my long-winded rambles.

So I’ll leave you with the more concise version:

CITY played well enough against Montréal to win, and the scoreline in San Jose flattered us greatly. My xPoints model has CITY at 8.78 points over the last 7 games dating back to Nashville. CITY has taken 10 points.

15 goals on 13.5 xG in that span. Are these signs of the season’s underperformance correcting itself as we near the end? Or is it more reflective of the fact that Nashville has collapsed, Montréal is awful, and San Jose massively underperformed?

It’s probably both. Because that’s how these things work.

I posted a couple of polls on X, and the sentiment has swung wildly — from Critchley for sure in 2026, to hell no, to maybe? — all within 7 games. A good reminder of why:

Winning fixes everything.

See you Saturday night.
#AllForCITY, forever and always.

And please, start the kid.

Nice one, Sonny!
Nice one, Son!
Nice one, Sonny!
Let’s have another one!

“STL hit 60 crosses… and still couldn’t resurrect their attack.”

STL’s weekend: all cross, no salvation.

Think some of those are pretty good.

Hello. If you sensed frustration, congratulations — your tactical sixth sense is working. Today, we’re talking numbers. And what they say about CITY’s tactical identity.

If you haven’t heard, CITY hit 60 crosses on Saturday night against 10-man Dallas (we lost one on a stat correction). They took 42 shots and generated 3.5 xG.

Let’s talk about all three of those numbers.

Crosses: The Obsession

Let’s start with the crosses. Yes, 60 is a lot. But it’s not the number itself that — I was going to say annoys, but it’s more than that — angers me.

It was the insistence. The doubling and tripling down on that crossing was the way to break through Dallas. That it was the only way to create chances against a team down a man. Wallem and Pompeu alone attempted 25 crosses.

Two weeks ago, CITY averaged 16.5 crosses per game under Critch through 12 games. In 15 games under Olof, CITY averaged 16.3 crosses.

In the last two games? CITY hit 100 crosses, skyrocketing the season average from 16.3 to 21.3 per game.

Forgive me if I’m miscounting; I’m reasonably sure CITY scored three goals in those two games — two of them being absolute screamers from distance, Goal of the Week contenders, and neither coming from a cross.

So, another way to phrase it: CITY hit 100 crosses in a week and scored once from one (shoutout Myhki). That’s a 1% conversion rate.

I, along with people much smarter than I, have talked about crosses in depth before. The gist? Crosses are low-probability events. They’re often overhit, underhit, claimed by the keeper, or cleared by a defender. Completion rates vary, but on average, 20–25% of crosses reach a teammate.

But completing a cross doesn’t mean it results in a goal. Most crosses are headed, and heading is hard. Rarely does a player get a clean, uncontested header with perfect timing and power. Usually, they’re jostling with a defender, off-balance, or misjudging the ball’s flight.

Even when it all lines up, the conversion rate of crosses is about 1.6% — 1 in 64.

And I’m a believer in efficiency and optimization.

CITY hit 60 crosses against Dallas. That was supposed to win us the game?

The math says there’s a ~70% chance we don’t score more than one goal from all those crosses. That’s the tactical identity?

CITY hit 100 crosses this week. CITY scored one goal from those crosses. The math says that’s precisely what we should expect. Again, CITY is choosing to do this?

So while it may seem like I’m harping on the number of crosses, my intent is to highlight the number of crosses as a means to, frankly, insinuate that the methodology is broken at St. Louis CITY SC.

Shots: Quantity vs. Quality and xG Accumulation

A reminder: xG is the best metric we have for predicting soccer results, but it’s not perfect. It wasn’t designed to explain a single game — especially not one as chaotic and low-scoring as soccer often is. But over time, xG correlates strongly with goals scored. Teams that consistently generate high xG tend to win more.

CITY took 42 shots against a 10-man Dallas side — a number that suggests dominance. But when you break those shots down by quality, the story shifts from control to inefficiency.

Here’s how CITY’s 42 shots stack up:

• Poor: 17 shots

• Average: 21 shots

• Good: 3 shots

• Great: 1 shot — and it was blocked

That’s right — CITY created just one “Great” chance all night, and it didn’t even result in a shot on target.

The lone goal? A deflected long-range effort from Célio Pompeu with an xG of 0.03 — firmly in the “Poor” category.

So while CITY generated 3.64 xG, the conversion rate was just 2.38%. The volume was there, but the quality was not. Most shots were speculative, hopeful, or heavily contested. And against a team down a man, that’s not just inefficient — it’s tactically negligent.

We know crossing is difficult and inefficient, so let’s just overwhelm that with sheer volume. The crossing isn’t working, and when it does work, we’ve already discussed the conversion rate of crosses. So let’s just shoot everything?

Against a compact, undermanned side, CITY could’ve exploited central overloads, quick one-twos, or vertical passing lanes — instead, they chose the least efficient path.

xG accumulation can be misleading. A team can rack up xG through sheer shot quantity, even if most attempts are low-quality. CITY generated 3.64 xG, but only one shot was in the “Great” category — and it was blocked. Game state, momentum, and psychological pressure aren’t captured. A 0.20 xG chance in the 5th minute isn’t the same as one in the 90th. Build-up play and tactical intent aren’t rewarded. A beautiful sequence that ends in a blocked shot gets the same xG as a hopeful long ball.

Still, xG remains the most reliable tool we have. It separates volume from value and allows for objective comparisons across games, teams, and leagues.

If CITY wants to improve, they need to shift from volume-based attacking to value-based chance creation. They took 42 shots, but only four were in the “Good” or “Great” category. That’s not a finishing problem — it’s a chance creation problem, and it’s something myself and others have been talking about ad nauseam for months, years even.

This will be hard to hear for the “SHOOOOOOT” crowd, but CITY needs to stop settling for low-probability efforts and start prioritizing central areas and high-percentage zones inside the box. It’s a fine line, certainly. CITY should be aggressive — take shots when the opportunity is there — but also know when to pass up an average shot in the hopes of creating a better one.

Turnovers in promising areas will happen, and that’s actually okay. Not enough turnovers means you’re not trying. Too many means you’re reckless. Good teams find that thin threshold — the balance between bravery and opportunity — and CITY needs to start walking that line.

Too often, CITY forces crosses or long shots when a cutback or through ball could create a better look. Positional rotations, third-man runs, and quick combinations can open up space in dangerous areas — especially against a compact or undermanned defense.

Against a 10-man Dallas, CITY should have overloaded central zones, drawn defenders out, and created mismatches. Instead, they chose the least efficient path — flooding the box with crosses into a crowd.

Final Thoughts

So what are we left with?

A team that hit 60 crosses, took 42 shots, generated 3.64 xG, and scored once, from a deflected long-range effort with a 0.03 xG value. That’s not dominance. That’s noise.

CITY didn’t lose because of bad luck. They didn’t draw because of poor finishing. They failed to win because the tactical approach was flawed from the start — a stubborn commitment to low-efficiency methods, executed with volume instead of precision.

And this brings me back to a point I’ve been making subtly for weeks: the right back situation. Totland is a fine RB. Wallem is also a fine RB. Playing Wallem over Totland is fine — if the tactics and the results are working. But they’re not. Totland hasn’t started the last six games, and only featured in the latest one out of desperation. CITY has 4/18 points in that stretch. That’s not the sign of tactical nuance working. That’s the sign of tactical stubbornness failing.

The short-term manager is playing the short-term player and not achieving any short-term results. The long-term people — Totland, the club, the fans — are going to be the ones left holding the bag when the short-termers are gone. And that’s unacceptable.

And I’ll say one last thing on this point. Olof had 15 games in charge before he was run out of town with 11 points and 0.73 PPG. David Critchley has 14 games in charge, also with 11 points, sitting at 0.79 PPG. If CITY loses this weekend, it’s identical. The difference? Not much. I’m not Pro-Olof or rethinking the firing, but let’s call a spade a spade. This entertaining, field tilt, blah blah blah brand of soccer that Critchley promised to bring back? It’s shit. It’s as shit as Olof’s. And both are slightly better shits than Hackworth’s, who was really shit — and got absolutely walloped in his 14 games with a -8.3 xGD.

The sporting side of the club needs a reset. And that doesn’t even touch on the fact that the business side of the club is too cowardly to allow promotion of a cause against childhood cancer.

Losing on the pitch. Losing off the pitch. Be better, St. Louis CITY SC.

I am #AllForCITY, forever and always, but make it easier, please.

We’ve followed nearly the same format for two straight years now: discussing team selection and interesting tactical nuances, then touching on individual performances, and usually concluding that this win wasn’t as good as it seems and that loss wasn’t as bad as it appears.

And I want to try something a little different; something a bit closer to the Chat City Tactics concept of, well, chatting tactics. I’m not a superstitious person. I’m not even a little stitious person. But this format has seen some absolutely putrid soccer, and I think, for our collective sanity, we should look at it from a different perspective.

Team Selection

I made my opinions clear throughout and following the match. I think with 8 matches to go and a Wooden Spoon up for grabs, we shouldn’t be doing dumb things with this. Alas.

Goal. CHI. 1-0.

CITY has possession, and Kessler, under pressure and on the sideline, fires a ball into JSB, who does his best to try a quick bit of skill and beat the defender behind him, but we lose possession. No big deal; that’s the game.

Seconds pass, and Jonathan Bomba finds himself near the halfway line with the ball at his foot. Gutiérrez, who’s standing directly in front of Orozco, shows for the ball. Orozco does not follow him because Gutman is standing unmarked on the sideline. JSB is likely waiting for Bomba to pass it outside, where he will then close down the ball; he could follow Gutman and help out, but CITY is likely not wanting to move down the line of engagement to do so. All of this sets up the following:

CITY is in what can only be described as the laziest mid-block the world has ever seen.

Ostrák is doing a decent amount of side shuffling without actually going anywhere. Durkin is standing between the lines, then decides to jog to Bomba, then jogs quicker, but doesn’t even get within 5 yards of Bomba before he easily finds Gutierrez, who finds Gutman. Five seconds later, a great ball by Gutman finds Cuypers, who outran Baumgartl. 1-0. 0.34 xG. GREAT chance, goal. 0.92 PSxG, a good shot.

That Bomba pass, at 15:33 for those watching along, splits the entire defensive shape/midfield of CITY without anyone marking either the man with the ball, the man receiving the ball, or the man receiving the second ball.

Yes, it’s 11v11, actually more like 7v9 because CHI’s backline, Klauss up top, and the goalkeepers, and somehow, CITY are “pressing” or “blocking” in a way that allows 3 of the 7, defended by 9, to be unmarked.

Make it make sense to me.

Goal. STL. 1-1.

Bürki kicks the ball to the halfway line. Klauss settles, shields the defender behind him, avoids pressure from a second defender, then sends JSB through on the right (That’s Klauss's ball, baby). After some final third possession, Padelford floats in a decent cross, causing some chaos. Ostrák takes two nice touches and scores. It begins as a well-executed transition by players 1, 9, and 77, and ends somewhat luckily because possession fizzles out and crosses are weak. 0.21 xG is a good chance, resulting in a goal. 0.81 PSxG indicates a good shot.

Goal. STL. 1-2.

Another transitional goal (but that’s kind of the modern style). CITY overloads the right side with JSB, Ostrák, and Wallem. (A right back supporting the attack? What a concept!) JSB makes an out-to-in dummy run, drawing defenders away as Ostrák moves toward the corner of the box, then passes to the overlapping Wallem. Chicago's defense struggles here—two defenders marking no one let Wallem slip it to Ostrák inside the box, and he crosses it across the face of the goal (much better than just floating one in). Chicago mimics CITY, with two defenders both swinging and missing at the cross. Hartel chests it down and calmly scores a missile into the roof of the net. 0.16 xG, GOOD chance, goal. 0.14 PSxG.

Goal. CHI. 2-2.

CITY regains possession, but Durkin, under pressure, chips a ball to Klauss, hoping he can replicate his first goal. However, he fails to control the pass on his chest, and Chicago regains possession while CITY is completely out of shape. Löwen can’t catch Zinckernagel, Fall is beaten too easily to the inside, and Durkin isn’t in a position to help. The chance has an average 0.14 xG, with a PSxG of 0.44. It’s right inside the penalty area, at the top of the box, in the center. That’s not great, folks. The effort isn’t there from the 8 and 10, and Fall looked like a 21-year-old center back, guessing and getting his feet all wrong.

Goal. CHI. 3-2.

Tell me if you’ve heard this one before, maybe even just a few minutes ago. Chicago has the ball on the halfway line, CITY is in a mid-block, there’s no pressure on the ball, and it’s an easy pass that splits JSB and Morales. Timo steps up (slowly, wildly, and dumbly, I think) and doesn’t come anywhere close to closing that ball down. Zinckernagel gets to play with the ball right at the top of the arc, an easy layoff to Gutiérrez. It’s a 0.03 xG shot with a 0.04 PSxG. It’s either a perfect shot, or Bürki has to save it. I think it’s the latter, but he’s not helped by the fact that no one wins balls or closes people down right outside his penalty area.

Here’s how it played out: 2 goals on 1.1 xG, 3 goals conceded on 1.4 xG. Using my recently updated expected points formula, based on the xG and xGA from this game, CITY could reasonably expect 1.15 points; instead, they left the Windy City with 0. Sounds familiar? That’s what happens when you’ve been a bad soccer team since almost Day 1, or maybe Day 31. Sometimes, you need to ignore random outliers in data. Exclude that first month, and this team, this club, is terrible.

How terrible, Michael? We’ve played thirty-one (31) away games over the past two seasons. We’ve won twice.

126.2 xG, 152.4 xGA. The transfer window ends tomorrow, August 21.

We’ll talk about everything on Friday.

Thanks for reading. #AllForCITY, forever and always.

Not gonna sign a 6, huh.

Class, open your books to page 44, and let’s begin. #MLSMondays #STLvNSH

Team Selection:

There are currently two questions for me in this team selection. In a hypothetical scenario where everyone is fit and ready, who is the third attacker behind Klauss, and who plays the number 6 position?

There are three options for that third attacker: Pompeu, Teuchert, Ostrák. The first guy—fans like him, dribbles a lot, and that’s about it. The second guy—fans don’t like him, but he should be good at scoring goals; however, he hasn’t scored any and doesn’t do much else. The third guy—not very effective higher up the field. There is no clear answer for this role right now. Someone needs to step up and win it.

Totland is the best right back at the club. I think Orozco might be playing there because of the next talking point.

Who exactly plays the six? Morales, alongside Löwen, is interesting, but I worry that it’s too reliant on passing, not very resistant to pressure, and defensively average. Durkin hasn’t improved at all, and like an X commentator said, treats the ball like a grenade. JGR, currently playing as a backup center back. Ostrák loves sliding into tackles but has no sense of dangerous spaces or how to cover them. Wallem isn’t eager to receive the ball, takes too many risks with dribbling, and turns it over often. So again, there’s no clear answer here. I’d like to find one, and I think CITY should find one through the Transfer Window.

That’s why I think Orozco might be playing right back—adding more defensive bite since there’s no designated six (even though that 'bite’ has conceded two penalties and was unreasonably close to a third on Saturday).

Tactics!

A noticeable tactical development recently, which is undoubtedly player availability related; CITY is making bounce passes, and not the bounce pass you’re likely thinking of in basketball.

A CITY CB is standing with possession of the ball. Nashville is set up in their base pre-press defense. CITY’s deepest-lying midfielder, often Löwen, is behind the first line of the Nashville press, comes toward the ball, the CB fires it to him, and he hits a first-time pass right back to the CB. The ball essentially “bounces” off Löwen’s back to where it came from. Why are we talking about this? Seems kinda marginal? It can be an almost immediate press-breaker.

Notice in the clip how both Nashville defenders step in, trying to win that ball. When done correctly, that bounce pass should be back at the CB’s foot before those guys get back into their base position, and all of a sudden, there are two new lanes to move the ball vertically that weren’t available just a few seconds ago.

And a minute after that clip, CITY does it again. But this time, there’s no pressure on Löwen’s back, and he turns to receive it and immediately drives forward through midfield, breaking the press in a different manner.

(I’m hoping these clips work, if not, they’ll be on Bsky/X)

Same exact setup, two different ways to break pressure and immediately create vertical progression. Why didn’t we do that before? The two players who can do it haven’t been playing. Löwen and Morales, the deep-lying playmakers in this squad, have both missed significant time. Ostrák has shown the ability at times, but his inclination to take multiple touches eliminates the bounce pass threat, and all of the other midfielders just aren’t good enough, full stop.

It would probably be beneficial to find a defensive midfielder who can take on some of that responsibility. So this development is fun and exciting, at least to me, and it should get better with Kessler. I would classify Baumgartl as an aggressive passer rather than a good passer, and he struggles to up the tempo when necessary. I have no such concerns with Kessler.

Lasting Thoughts

There have been a lot of “we could’ve/should’ve won that game" opinions this season. That season opener against Colorado sticks in my mind as to how different this season could’ve been. And that’s the nature of low-scoring sports. All it takes is one mistake or one moment of magic. Was CITY deserving of 3 points? I think so. Willis should be saving at least one of those first two goals in my mind.

CITY were outshot, but Nashville took 10 POOR xG shots (less than 0.06 xG). Those are box score stuffers, but they’re called POOR for a reason. CITY had 4 GOOD, Nashville had 0. CITY had 2 GREAT, Nashville had 2 (and a penalty). Just look at @begriffis’s match report.

CITY didn’t enter the box all that often, but they were much more efficient than Nashville, and that’s why Nashville went home with nothing.

We should avoid focusing too much on 90 minutes of soccer, especially when discussing the new players. However, we do need to talk about them a bit. There has been a lot of chatter about Fall on social media, and he had a pretty solid debut. I also think he was the least impressive of the three on Saturday, not negatively, but more in how positive the other two were.

Padelford has impressed me greatly. It probably reflects how poor our LB play has been historically. Still, he was composed defensively, showed incredible work rate in both recovery defense and overlapping runs, and demonstrated eagerness and aggressiveness in taking on defenders with the ball. If this keeps up, Lutz and the team should do everything possible to make this loan permanent.

And just like with LB play, JSB’s work at RW has shown what CITY has been missing. His effort and pressing have been excellent; he’s both coming short for the ball and making dangerous runs behind the defense, and his speed is a real threat. I’m undeniably a big fan of Sang-bin and have been for some time. I believe his profile is nearly perfect for what CITY needed.

Thanks for reading!

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

Have we signed a 6 yet?

We’ve got a lot to talk about in this one, and there might be some yelling at the end. #STLvMIN

Team Selection:

One of the more interesting team selections in recent memory.

What even is the BEST XI anymore? I *think* I know it, and for me, this is a 7/11, but it could also be an 8-9/11. Regardless, the debut of the Minnesota boys against Minnesota brought some change. Padelford, whom I originally thought would play the LCB/LB role that Orozco had been deputizing for, played as a standard, modern, overlapping linebacker… and I liked it. Maybe someday, I should write a book about iconic sports things: Yankees pinstripes, Brazil’s number 10, the orange-wearing Dutch, and by then, the 837th left back in St. Louis CITY history.

But Padelford, whose pronunciation is alongside Caden Glover (reportedly rhyming with “clover” and not “cover”), as the worst thing I’ve heard today, was effective, energetic, and enthusiastic. Orozco received a lot of praise in his debut at LB, but didn’t offer much in possession. Padelford, whose dribbling and perfectly weighted cross should’ve resulted in an assist if not for a MIN clearance, showed what CITY could be down the left.

On the right side, it was completely different. Probably because a player who plays right wing was playing right wing. Here’s a fun fact - did you know that Rasmus Alm, or the ghost of Rasmus Alm, started and finished a total of 1 game for St. Louis CITY in MLS play? 90 minutes once. A role similar to Becher’s, aiming to stretch the defense, but the differences here are twofold: 1) Sang-bin’s pace gives him more freedom to time his run and poses a greater threat behind; 2) Becher is one of the league’s worst passers, so putting him in a chance creation role doesn’t fit, but it certainly could suit Sang-bin. Will he be disappointed he didn’t finish that incredible ball from Löwen? Sure, but this is an xG house, and we don’t lose sleep over 0.1 xG misses. Those shots are expected to miss nine out of ten times.

The other half of that right side was Wallem. Since returning under Critch, Totland has been the focus in getting the ball high and wide. There’s less emphasis on him contributing to build-up, and more on him playing that final pass. Against Dallas, Totland had the third fewest touches. Against Minnesota, Wallem had the second most. Similar styles of opposition, very different RBs. Against a low-block defense like Minnesota, I think Wallem as RB works, offering more intricate, combination play than Totland in possession. However, I’m not sure I can handle 90 minutes of Wallem defending against a team trying to keep possession. It’s good to remember he’s on loan and not part of the future, so there shouldn’t be much effort to fit Wallem into the team. If he fits, he fits; if not, we’re playing for 2026 anyway.

But just look! (h/t @begriffis)

It’s balanced! That’s good!

That was a lot, and we haven’t even touched on the 10-7 midfield pairing. Again, since Minnesota doesn’t want to hold the ball, the need for that defensive 6 lessens, so Löwen and Ostrák could work together. Both are comfortable receiving under pressure—Löwen looks for switches, long diagonals, and other ways to move the ball vertically, while Ostrák tries to receive, turn, and beat pressure. CITY needs a dribbling presence alongside Löwen, and a more defensive option in the long run, but like Wallem as RB, this pairing could work in specific scenarios.

Enough already with the tactical nerd stuff. Let’s get angry.

Anger.

On the dumb or dumber scale, you can choose which conceded penalty goes where.

You may have seen my post on Sunday while watching the replay, but here it is again:

I, too, would have an #AllForCITY center back roster of

Kessler, Girdwood-Reich, Nilsson, Hiebert, Yaro, Wentzel, *Orozco, *Baumgartl, *Padelford, soon-to-be Fall

which is 33% of the entire roster

and play Durkin there.

Seems optimal.

And that roster talk is coming, soon, but seriously, what are we doing? How is it even remotely possible that this current CITY team has NINE center backs (see you soon, Fall), and yet we are playing Durkin there. A Durkin who hasn’t played for nearly two months. Quite literally, two centerbacks were standing on the sidelines. One even entered the game shortly after CITY went down to ten. Is that Critchley and Co. preferring Durkin to the other options? Because if so, again, as of today, one third, 33%, of the entire roster is made up of centerbacks. Even if you don’t count Padelford, that's back to nine. 30%. Silver lining? Our roster is full, so until we move someone on, we can’t bring in yet another center back. We prefer Durkin to all those dudes? Cool. Optimal.

As for the play itself, it’s just bad, man. We can put some of the blame on the press, but at the end of the day, it’s just bad from Durkin.

Oh, goody—let’s talk about the other one too.

Some of us are hesitant about a 5’9” guy playing center back. “Lisandro Martinez is that short!” Yeah, and that’s partly why a 37-year-old Otamendi was still playing for Argentina. Orozco had a decent first couple of outings, earning that supplemental slot contract. But two penalties in seven days? That’s inexcusable. Imagine if Yaro, Hiebert, Watts, Silva, or any other often-criticized players did that? Sure, the penalty last week was minor. But on Saturday? That’s the game. Unacceptable. Young players get more leeway to make mistakes, but not when those mistakes decide the game.

So I’m annoyed. I think CITY played pretty well for 50 minutes. The npxG was 0.9 - 0.4 in CITY’s favor. Heck, with the penalties included, it was still close at 1.7 - 1.9. Sure, it could’ve been better. We didn’t create any GOOD or GREAT opportunities, but we didn’t concede any either.

And if you’re David Critchley, you’re standing there, arms folded, thinking to yourself, “How?”

And we are too.

Thanks for reading.

#AllForCITY, forever and always.

P.S. If you’re one of those people blaming Bürki… Stop it. Get some help.

0/2. Why, might you ask, did I not need a 36/17/11 trio? Because it stinks.

No explainer needed for Klauss. He plays with his back to goal, draws multiple defenders, looks for quick combination plays, flicks, and so on.Hartel is the best player on the team. (Don’t interpret this as most important, but as the best.) Like Klauss, he seeks quick combinations, allowing him to pass to a teammate or run onto one himself for a chance. And for those who truly care about this kind of detail, those are also the “Designated Players.”

So build a damn team around them. (Teaser alert.)

Instead, we have Teuchert, who also wants the ball played to his feet but has been utterly incapable of doing anything with it in 2025, and Becher, who contributes nothing to any phase of possession besides running beyond the defense, looking to get on the end of passes.

Dallas, especially after taking the lead, bunkered down, daring CITY to break through their defensive walls of five. What they, and every other team in Major League Soccer over the past two full years, have learned is that St. Louis CITY SC, in its current form, lacks the profiles of players who can break down these compact defenses, especially in the wider attacking areas.

Let’s set aside Edu from this discussion for now. As we talked about, your two best players are comfortable playing together—short, quick, crisp one-twos. When there are many defenders in a small area, there’s no room for that in the center. Also, Dallas was okay sitting in their own third, removing the threat of Becher running beyond (which also limits Totland’s ability to do the same). So, what’s left is the need to do something on the wide areas—stretch defenders, beat them, and create passing lanes for cutbacks, crosses, or just give Klauss and Hartel space to operate.

Cedric Teuchert is slow and struggles with 1v1 dribbling. He is below average as a passer, and right now, all he really contributes are shots and goals—though he isn’t doing either at the moment.

Simon Becher is also slow and has difficulty with 1v1 dribbling. He ranks near the bottom among MLS passers. His main contributions are a strong work ethic, pressing, and a willingness to run beyond the defense to get to the end of passes, but that isn’t very helpful in this scenario.

Neither of these players will help beat a team playing like Dallas out wide, and neither was built to play in their current roles. David Critchley knows that, 100%. But if you look at this CITY roster as it stands, here are his Wide-10 options:

And Mykhi Joyner? Not on the roster.

Ostrák played there for a few minutes, and looked more threatening than either 11 or 36, while completing a grand total of 0 passes into the penalty area. Again, Ostrák looked more threatening than Teuchert or Becher in the wide attacking areas, and he didn’t even complete a pass into the penalty area.

So, what exactly was this roster built for? Two years of ineffective 4-2-3-1 soccer, followed by a switch to a 5-man back line, but only kinda because we didn’t really bring enough depth to make that work, and then we spent a lot of time publicly criticizing that manager and his system. So, we go back to the 4-2-3-1 and, guess what, the roster isn’t built for that either? You see where I’m going with this. That’s why this one is short.

Because Saturday night’s result doesn’t really *matter* in the grand scheme of things. This season has been over for a while, and the transfer window is coming up. There’s a much more critical discussion to be had, which is why we will be back soon with a lot of thoughts, opinions, and xPassion.

We are #AllForCITY, forever and always, and we suck. So, fix it.