I wanted to mark my 25th birthday by finally publishing something I’ve spent years thinking about, working on, abandoning, revisiting, rewriting, and occasionally pretending I would finish “soon.”

Today, it’s actually finished.

The book is called Mastering Market Trends: A Field Guide to Understanding and Interpreting Real Estate Data. It’s now available on Amazon.

More info → MasteringMarketTrends.com

I wrote this book because I really like trying to make sense of the housing market.

That probably sounds like a strange hobby, but over the last few years I’ve spent an unreasonable amount of time staring at charts and spreadsheets, pulling apart market reports, and trying to figure out why the numbers were doing what they were doing.

And the more I did it, the more I realized how easy it is to know the numbers without truly understanding the market.

We say things like inventory is up, prices are down, days on market doubled, or sellers are making more price reductions. All of that can be true and still tell you surprisingly little on its own.

That became the idea I kept coming back to:
Market data is not market understanding.

The interesting part isn’t just knowing that a number changed. It’s figuring out why it changed, what else is happening at the same time, and whether any of it matters to the person sitting across the table from you.

The book covers the numbers I use all the time in my own work, but I tried to write it less like a statistics textbook and more like the guide I wish I had when I first started getting interested in market analysis.

Getting it finished took me a while.

There have been a lot of versions of this book on my computer over the last few years. I’d get really into it for a while, write a bunch, get pulled into something else, and then ignore it for months. Eventually I’d come back, decide half of what I had written needed to be rewritten, and start the cycle over again.

For a long time, it was one of those things I was always “working on” without ever actually finishing.

At some point, having an unfinished book sitting around became more annoying than doing the work required to finish it.

So I finished it.

There’s something pretty satisfying about getting to publish it on my 25th birthday.

I spend a lot of my time moving quickly from one project to the next, so it’s nice to have something tangible that represents several years of learning, changing my mind, getting better at this work, and forcing myself to sit down and write.

I’m proud of how it turned out, and I’m very glad I can finally stop telling people I’m “writing a book.”

If you’d like to give me a birthday present, buying a copy would mean a lot to me. And if you end up reading it, a quick review on Amazon would mean even more.

Mostly, though, I hope it’s useful. I hope there’s something in it that changes the way you look at a market report, helps you catch something you might have otherwise missed, or makes you a little more confident the next time someone asks, “So, how’s the market?”

Mastering Market Trends on Amazon

Thank you for reading my stuff, putting up with all the charts, and supporting what I do. I really appreciate it. ❤

Cooper

The first six months of the year produced dramatically different outcomes depending on where a property was located, what type of home it was, how much it cost, and how quickly the seller responded to the market.

To understand those differences, I analyzed 22,940 residential sales that closed between January 1 and June 30 across the seven-county Denver metropolitan area. The dataset included nearly 400 listing variables covering property characteristics, pricing, market time, financing, concessions, location, and transaction structure.

These ten findings capture the most interesting patterns from the first half of the year.

1. The Market Improved Sharply After January

January closings reflected the slowest conditions of the first half. The median property had spent 54 days in the MLS and sold for 95.7% of its original list price.

By April, median market time had fallen to 14 days, and the median sale-to-original-list ratio had risen to 98.9%.

Some of that improvement was seasonal. January included a larger share of homes that had carried over from 2025, while spring closings increasingly reflected properties listed during the more active part of the year.

Conditions softened modestly by June. Median market time rose to 18 days, the price-reduction rate reached 37.4%, and the median sale-to-original-list ratio slipped to 98.3%.

2. The Seven Counties Produced Very Different Results

Broomfield and Jefferson counties recorded the fastest median sales, at 14 days each.

Broomfield also posted the highest median sale-to-original-list ratio at 98.79%. Boulder County had the highest median closing price at $750,000, but properties there sold for a median of 97.67% of original list price. Douglas County had a median closing price of $703,500 and a lower sale-to-original-list ratio than Broomfield or Jefferson.

Adams County stood out for its reliance on concessions. Its median gross sale-to-original-list ratio was 98.59%, but 74.2% of transactions included seller concessions. After those concessions were subtracted, the median fell to 96.76%.

County averages reflect different combinations of price, property type, financing, and new construction. Even so, the results show how much variation a single metro-wide statistic can conceal.

3. Condominiums and Townhouses Trailed Detached Homes

The median single-family home sold in 16 days and closed at 98.55% of its original list price.

Townhouses required 32 days and closed at 97.64%. Condominiums required 40 days and closed at 96.62%.

Only 8.3% of condominiums sold above their original list prices, compared with 23.4% of single-family homes.

Lower purchase prices did not necessarily make attached properties more competitive. HOA dues and insurance expenses increase monthly housing costs. Meanwhile, financing restrictions and a larger pool of competing units give buyers more alternatives and negotiating leverage

4. The Middle of the Market Performed Best

The strongest sale-to-original-list results occurred between approximately $350,000 and $1 million.

Homes listed from $350,000 to $499,999 and from $500,000 to $749,999 both closed at roughly 98.6% of original list price.

Results were weaker at both ends of the market.

Properties listed below $350,000 closed at 97.02% of original list price and required 31 median days. Much of that segment consisted of condominiums and other attached properties.

Homes listed above $2.5 million closed at 94.51% and required 42 median days. Luxury properties are less uniform, comparable sales are thinner, and small percentage differences represent large dollar amounts. A 3% gap on a $3 million property equals $90,000.

5. Price Performance Changed Quickly After Two Weeks

Listings that sold within seven days received a median of 100% of their original list prices. Between eight and 14 days, the median remained relatively strong at 99.42%.

After that, the decline accelerated.

Homes selling between 15 and 30 days received 98.00% of original list price. That fell to 96.37% between 31 and 60 days and 94.82% between 61 and 90 days.

The price-reduction rate followed the same pattern. It rose from 8.3% in the eight-to-14-day group to 35.2% between days 15 and 30 and 63.9% between days 31 and 60.

Longer market time does not independently cause the entire decline. Properties that are overpriced or otherwise difficult to sell are also more likely to remain active longer. Still, the first two weeks provided a clear indication of whether the market supported the original pricing strategy.

6. Larger Reductions Reflected Larger Initial Pricing Gaps

Homes that never reduced their prices sold in a median of seven days and received 100% of original list price before concessions.

Listings reduced by less than 2% required 46 median days and closed at 97.78% of original list price.

Properties reduced by 5% to 10% required 91 days and closed at 91.80%. Listings reduced by more than 10% required 144 median days and ultimately received 84.44% of their original list prices.

Reductions generally do not create the gap in leverage. Rather, they documented how far the original price was from the market and how long the property remained listed at an unsupported level.

By the time a listing required a substantial reduction, it had usually accumulated both market time and evidence that the original price was not supported.

7. Concessions Made Financed Sales Look Stronger Than They Were

FHA transactions closed at a median of 98.68% of original list price, compared with 96.94% for cash transactions.

The gross ratios tell only part of the story.

Seller concessions appeared in 89.7% of FHA transactions, compared with 23.7% of cash transactions. After reported concessions were subtracted, FHA performance fell to 96.18% of original list price.

The difference between gross and concession-adjusted performance was 2.50 percentage points for FHA transactions, 1.70 points for VA transactions, and 1.27 points for conventional transactions. Cash transactions showed a difference of only 0.21 points.

A recorded sale price can remain close to list price even when the seller is paying a substantial portion of the buyer’s closing costs or interest-rate buydown. The gross sale-to-list ratio does not always reflect the seller’s economic result.

8. New Construction Relied Heavily on Incentives

New and under-construction homes closed at a median of 96.59% of original list price after 57 days on the market.

Updated resale homes closed at 98.56% after 16 days.

Concessions appeared in 75.7% of new and under-construction sales, with a median reported concession of $14,656. After those concessions were subtracted, median performance fell to 94.19% of original list price.

Builders often have reasons to preserve published prices while offering rate buydowns, closing-cost assistance, upgrades, or other incentives. That approach can reduce the buyer’s effective cost without establishing a visibly lower recorded price for the remaining homes in the community.

Close price data alone therefore understates the amount of negotiation occurring in new-construction transactions.

9. Listing Language Contained Measurable Performance Signals

Several phrases remained associated with sale-to-original-list results after accounting for price, size, age, lot size, parking, bedrooms, bathrooms, HOA status, basement, county, postal code, property type, condition, occupancy, photo count, and listing month.

Listings containing “motivated seller” were associated with 4.07 percentage points lower sale-to-original-list performance. Those properties had accumulated a median of 83 days in the MLS and ultimately received 92.66% of original list price.

The phrase “as-is” was associated with 1.86 percentage points lower performance. “Investment opportunity” was associated with a 1.34-point reduction.

References to solar, remodeling, and updates had modest positive associations of approximately 0.35, 0.24, and 0.23 percentage points.

The wording likely did not cause those results. In many cases, it reflected condition, seller motivation, or a listing that had already struggled. Public remarks nevertheless contained information that was not fully captured by the structured listing variables.

10. Property Variables Predicted Value, but Not Listing Performance

Property and listing variables made sale prices highly predictable.

Using characteristics such as location, size, age, condition, property type, schools, lot size, and parking, the sale-price model explained 93.1% of the variation in closing prices. Its median absolute percentage error was 6.4%.

Those same types of variables were far less useful in predicting how a listing would perform relative to its original list price.

Information available near the beginning of the listing explained only 5.7% of the variation in sale-to-original-list performance.

Once the model included what happened after the property entered the market, including final pricing, price reductions, market time, buyer financing, and seller concessions, the share of variation explained increased to 73.5%.

The distinction is straightforward: Property characteristics largely determined what a home was worth. Pricing, market response, and negotiation determined how much of that value the seller captured.

The First Half of 2026 Rewarded Precision

The first half of 2026 was not a market without demand.

Homes that entered the market near a supported price could still sell quickly and, in many cases, at or above their original list prices. Those outcomes were most common among detached homes, properties in the middle price ranges, and listings that secured a buyer within the first two weeks.

The results became progressively weaker as listings accumulated market time. Price reductions grew larger, concessions became more important, and sale-to-original-list ratios declined.

The clearest divide was not simply between buyers and sellers. It was between listings that found the market early and those that did not.

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Methodology

The analysis covers residential transactions that closed from January 1 through June 30, 2026, in Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Broomfield, Denver, Douglas, and Jefferson counties.

The initial dataset contained 22,940 transactions. The core analysis includes single-family residences, townhouses, and condominiums after excluding invalid prices, extreme sale-to-list ratios, negative or implausible market-time values, identifiers, contact information, and variables that directly revealed a modeled outcome.

Gross sale-to-original-list price divides the closing price by the original list price. Concession-adjusted sale-to-original-list price subtracts reported seller concessions from the closing price before calculating the ratio.

REcolorado® MLS data; analysis and interpretation by Cooper Thayer. Based on information from REcolorado®, Inc. for the period 1/1/2026 through 6/30/2026. Not all properties were listed and/or closed by Company. This representation is based in whole or in part on content supplied by REcolorado®, Inc. REcolorado®, Inc. does not guarantee nor is it in any way responsible for its accuracy. Content maintained by REcolorado®, Inc. may not reflect all real estate activity in the market.

I bought my first home in May 2023, a one-bedroom in the Golden Triangle neighborhood, a few blocks south of downtown. I still love the unit and the community. What I did not fully understand was how decisively the market had already turned, or how long the decline would run.

In June 2022, on trailing averages, the typical Denver condo sold in about a week and closed a little above its original asking price. By June 2026, the same measures had stretched to nearly seven weeks and roughly 5% below the original price.

At first, the pullback looked like a normal adjustment after the pandemic boom. Mortgage rates had risen, bidding wars had ended, and buyers were recovering leverage they had lost during two frantic years. Some adjustment was overdue.

Four years later, the numbers are harder to explain away. Denver condo prices sit further below their peak than at any point in the available record. Sales have fallen back toward levels last recorded in 2008. Inventory keeps accumulating, units take longer to sell, and more sellers are cutting from their original asking prices.

The Peak and the Slide

For more than a decade, Denver condo owners experienced near-uninterrupted appreciation. The median sale price rose from $137,950 in 2011 to $370,000 in 2022, with only a modest setback in 2019. By 2021, inventory was scarce, and buyers frequently paid full asking price or more. The annual median sale price climbed nearly $33,000 that year, and another $25,000 the next.

The annual median has fallen every year since: $350,000 in 2023, $340,000 in 2024, $325,000 in 2025, and roughly $317,000 through July 20 of this year. The 2026 figure covers a partial year and is not strictly comparable with the completed years beside it.

Denver condos have declined before, but not this far below their prior peak.

The record begins in 2008, which leaves earlier housing cycles out of the comparison, and annual medians can smooth over sharper moves inside a single year. Even so, the depth of this one stands out. In the years right after the financial crisis, when Denver was absorbing foreclosures and a national credit contraction, the annual condo median never sat more than 5.8% below its previous high.

A median is also sensitive to what happens to sell. If more small or inexpensive units close in a given year, the number falls even when comparable properties hold their value. Price per finished square foot helps check that problem, although imperfectly.

The close-price-per-square-foot ratio peaked at $405 in 2022 and stood at $314 through July 20 of this year. Neither series is a repeat-sales index, and neither follows the same properties over time, so the composition of sales can move either measure. But the median and the per-square-foot figure have both fallen, and the per-square-foot figure has fallen further. A market drifting toward smaller units would push the price paid per foot up while pulling the median down. Here, both measures moved down. That makes the decline harder to explain as a simple change in the mix of units sold.

Prices are the most visible part of the correction, but sales volume tells more of the story. A market can absorb falling values and keep functioning, as long as buyers and sellers keep reaching agreements.

The Market Stops Moving

In 2021, 4,901 Denver condos changed hands, the most in the available data. Sales fell to 3,676 the following year, then to 2,619, then 2,369, then 2,064. Through June of this year, 992 condos had closed. Applying the median first-half share of annual sales from 2013 through 2025 puts 2026 on pace for roughly 2,005.

Denver has added residents and housing units since 2008. Condo transactions have not kept up. On the current projection, the city would record almost exactly as many condo sales this year as it did during the first year of the financial crisis, out of a far larger stock of condominiums. Only 2009 through 2011 were weaker.

Fewer sales can come from fewer sellers, fewer buyers, or a widening gap between the two. Denver’s listing data points to the buyer side of the equation.

New-listing counts require some care. They record listing events rather than unique homes, so a property that is withdrawn and relisted appears more than once, and the difference between listings and sales does not convert into an equal rise in active inventory. Even with that limitation, the gap is large. Owners are still bringing condos to market at close to their 2022 rate, while far fewer are turning into closed sales. Some units sell after a reduction. Others expire, or return months later at a new asking price.

The imbalance is clearest in months of inventory, which weighs the supply of listed homes against the recent pace of sales. A market with one month of inventory has roughly enough supply to last a month if sales continue at the prevailing rate and nothing new is listed.

The figure is a trailing 12-month average, so the increase is not a seasonal artifact of the spring listing cycle. It has built steadily since the middle of 2022 without a meaningful interruption. October 2010 remains far worse at 17 months, and present conditions are not the aftermath of a credit crisis. But a measure that spent most of the late 2010s hovering near one month has returned to territory Denver had not seen in more than a decade.

Inventory has risen because demand has weakened faster than listing activity. Listings kept coming while buyers thinned out, so the supply on hand takes far longer to clear. The same shortage of buyers leaves more listings stranded, which expire or withdraw after months of carrying costs and never surface in the closed-sales statistics.

Low turnover keeps the correction gradual rather than abrupt. An owner who does not have to sell can turn down an offer and wait, and many have. Buyers, meanwhile, face a cost structure that four years of falling prices have barely touched.

Prices Fell. Payments Did Not.

In June 2022, Denver’s median condo sold for $375,000. By June 2026, the median June close price had fallen to $337,450, a decline of 10%. That is $37,550 off the median price. The down payment on a 20% purchase fell by more than $7,500, and the amount financed dropped by roughly $30,000.

The estimated principal-and-interest payment fell by three dollars a month.

Higher borrowing costs have absorbed nearly every dollar the price correction produced. Over the full decade, the increase is much larger. The same estimate for June 2016 was $888, which means the monthly cost of financing Denver’s median condo has risen 92% while the price itself has been falling for four years. Part of that reflects appreciation before 2022, but the persistence of elevated payments after prices began falling explains a good deal of why buyers have not returned in greater numbers.

Four years of falling prices have also split buyers into two groups. At the June 2026 median, a cash purchaser pays $37,550 less than a cash purchaser did in June 2022. A financed buyer, on the mortgage assumptions used here, pays essentially the same monthly amount. Most of the benefit has gone to cash buyers in the one segment that is supposed to be Denver’s affordable way into ownership.

Rates also affect sellers. An owner who bought or refinanced when borrowing was cheap faces a much larger payment on any replacement property, which makes staying put attractive even when the current unit no longer fits. Denver’s listing counts show that plenty of owners are still willing to test the market. What the rate gap influences is what happens after the listing goes live, and how large a discount an owner will accept when selling also means surrendering cheap debt.

The mortgage payment is only one part of the monthly cost. Association dues and property taxes arrive regardless of how much of the purchase was financed, and lenders count both when deciding what a buyer can afford. To see how those costs have moved, I pulled every Denver condo sale recorded in June 2016 and June 2026, 342 closings in the first period and 191 in the second. For each year, I took the median annual association fee and property tax reported in the MLS, converted them to monthly figures, and set them beside the mortgage estimate above.

The median association fee rose from $291 a month to $546, adding $255 to the monthly burden before insurance or maintenance entered the picture. Property taxes went from $91 to $153. Combined with principal and interest, the benchmark climbed $1,134 a month over the decade.

Two condos with the same asking price can carry very different monthly costs. One building’s dues fund amenities and a healthy reserve. Another building’s dues may be rising because of insurance, repairs, or reserves. Buyers see the monthly charge either way, and every additional dollar of it crowds out the mortgage payment that fits the same budget.

The benchmark still excludes unit-owner insurance, utilities, maintenance, and special assessments. Even without them, it shows why falling sale prices have delivered so little relief. Buyers pay far more each month to acquire and hold a Denver condo than they did ten years ago.

Those costs do not press on every kind of housing equally. The rate shock reached detached homes and condominiums at the same moment, and their prices did not respond alike.

Why Condos?

One way to see the condo-specific problem is to compare condos with detached homes, which absorbed the same jump in borrowing costs in the same city. Indexed to the summer of 2022, the two have moved in opposite directions ever since.

Price data alone cannot show whether the split reaches beyond the properties that happened to sell. Months of inventory provides a separate angle, weighing available supply against the recent pace of transactions.

Over four years, the inventory gap widened from less than a week to 5.8 months. Condo supply now runs nearly three times as many months of sales as single-family supply, which tells us the divergence is not a quirk of the units that closed. It also shows up in the homes still sitting on the market.

One condo-specific pressure is the cost of the homeowner’s association. Between June 2016 and June 2026, the median association fee rose 87.6%, while the median condo sale price rose 37.7%, from $245,000 to $337,450. The recurring cost of owning a condo climbed more than twice as fast as the value of the unit underneath it.

Insurance, repairs, and reserve funding drive much of that. A Colorado Legislative Council report found that average homeowners’ premium rates statewide rose 57.9% between 2018 and 2023, against 33.8% nationally. When a building’s master-policy premium or repair bill rises, the association can raise dues, cut spending, draw down reserves, or bill owners through a special assessment.

Each choice can affect a buyer. Higher dues leave less room in a monthly budget for principal and interest. A pending assessment can wipe out the apparent savings on a discounted unit, and inadequate insurance or deferred repairs can complicate conventional financing and shrink the pool of eligible buyers.

The market data cannot show how much of the condo decline came from association costs versus project-level financing trouble. The sequence is clear: a recurring cost climbed for a decade, and then the 2022 rate shock made the same units far more expensive to finance. Condos became costlier to carry at the exact moment buyers became less able to pay.

The Break Came in 2022

Denver entered 2022 with momentum from the pandemic boom. The annual data records that year as the peak, but the monthly data shows the market starting to turn before the annual numbers did. Inventory, selling times, and list-price ratios still read like an exceptionally tight market while financing conditions were deteriorating at extraordinary speed.

The Federal Reserve does not set mortgage rates, which are priced in financial markets against bond yields and inflation expectations. Its March 2022 policy shift nevertheless came as mortgage credit repriced quickly. Within ten months, the average 30-year mortgage rate more than doubled.

By June, the housing data and financing data were pointing in different directions. Condo inventory stood at 1.1 months, median Days in MLS at 7.1, and both sale-to-list ratios near 100.7%. Buyers were still competing in a market defined by boom-era scarcity, even as the cost of financing had moved sharply higher.

For a household shopping with a fixed monthly budget, the jump in rates cut the price it could support. A buyer could put more money down or settle for something smaller and cheaper. Many stepped back. Sellers, meanwhile, were still anchored to comparable sales from the boom. Contract activity weakened before prices fully adjusted.

Prices kept climbing for a few more months, because closed sales reflect agreements reached weeks earlier and because annual medians respond slowly at the margin. Volume moved immediately. Closings fell 25% in 2022 and another 29% in 2023, to 2,619, while the annual median dropped to $350,000. The Fed kept tightening into July 2023, when the federal-funds target range reached 5.25% to 5.5%, holding payments high even as condo prices came down. Denver recorded its highest annual condo price in the same year demand began to fade.

Fannie Mae did not incorporate the expanded critical-repair, deferred-maintenance, and special-assessment requirements into its Selling Guide until 2023, well after Denver’s market had turned, so that update cannot account for the initial break, though related temporary requirements were already in force under a 2021 lender letter. The 2023 change may have added friction later in buildings already fighting insurance or maintenance problems. Colorado’s insurance costs were climbing across the same period. The available data does not isolate condominium master policies, so the size of that contribution is unknown.

Waiting, Cutting, and Trying Again

For sellers, the correction is more concrete: a unit that once would have moved in a week now sits for months while its asking price slides.

Denver has seen slower markets. In June 2011, the same trailing measure reached 76.8 days, well above where it sits today. The reversal has been fast. Selling times fell through most of the decade after the financial crisis, stayed low through the late 2010s, dropped again during the pandemic, and have risen almost without pause for four years. Because the measure is a trailing average, the increase is not just a handful of stale winter listings.

A median also hides a widening spread. A well-priced unit in a financially healthy building can still sell in days. Another can sit for months, disappear, come back at a new price, and finally close after two or three reductions. That closing may look like a modest concession off the final asking price, because most of the retreat happened before the buyer ever negotiated. Denver condos sold for an average of 98.3% of their final list price in the 12 months ending June 2026, which by itself makes the market look almost orderly.

Measured against the original asking price, the ratio was just 95.1%.

In June 2022, the two ratios were indistinguishable at about 100.7%, meaning the first price an owner asked usually survived the whole process and the buyer often paid more. They began separating as the market weakened, with the original-price ratio falling faster from 2024 on. Both are averages of monthly aggregate ratios, not descriptions of a single typical sale, and the difference cannot be pinned entirely on negotiation, since the mix of units sold and the listings that leave without closing both move the result. What it does show is that more of the seller’s concession now happens before the final negotiation even starts.

An owner who bought near the peak is being asked to turn a market decline into a realized loss, and the best comparable sales they have to argue against it come from a market that no longer exists. Buyers see the same market from the other side. More inventory buys them time to compare buildings and read association documents, and a unit that has been active six weeks tells them the first price was wrong.

The two measures feed each other. A unit that sits invites a reduction, and a visible reduction gives the next buyer a reason to ask for another. The eventual closing becomes a comparable sale that shapes asking prices nearby, and it can complicate the appraisal on the next contract. Appraisers draw on broader comparables and adjust for differences, so one discounted sale does not set the next value by itself. In a small building with few recent trades, though, it comes close.

Closing data cannot show what happens to every unit that enters the market. It records the properties that eventually found buyers and leaves out the listing attempts that expired without a sale. Those attempts have become far more common.

In the 12 months ending June 2022, REcolorado recorded 663 expired condo listing events in Denver. Four years later, the total had reached 2,596, while new-listing activity held nearly flat at about 5,000 events a year. Some units are counted more than once as they expire and return, so the ratio is not a failure rate for unique properties. It shows how much more often a listing attempt now reaches its expiration date without producing a sale.

That rise is the missing context behind the orderly-looking 98.3% figure. Closing statistics omit the listings that never sold, along with the reductions made before a property was pulled and relisted. Repricing among the sales that did close, plus the growing pile of expired attempts, is how Denver produced a 14.3% decline in the annual median without a single dramatic year.

What Comes Next

None of the current readings shows a clear floor. Sales are tracking toward a 15-year low, new listings keep arriving at close to their 2022 rate, inventory sits at nine months, selling times are near seven weeks, and the gap between original and final asking prices is the widest since 2012.

Prices can fall further from here, but the data does not point to a sudden collapse. Owners who financed before 2022 hold mortgages that would be expensive to replace, which limits forced selling even as it thins the pool of people willing to transact. The pattern points more toward a slow, low-volume correction than a crash, with asking prices easing down by increments while financed buyers wait for the monthly math to work. Denver has already recorded four consecutive annual declines that cumulatively removed $53,000 from the median. Inflation has widened the real loss beyond the nominal 14.3%, and commissions and closing costs sit on top of that for anyone who bought near the peak.

A recovery would likely show up first in volume, not price. Buyers and sellers have to start reaching agreements before prices can find durable support, which means a real turn could begin while the median is still falling.

Pending activity is the earliest signal of that in the MLS. It records agreements before they become closed sales, so it can improve while annual prices are still declining. Against the flow of new listings, it is still weak.

The pending ratio hit a series low of 37.7 in February 2026 and has barely moved since. The change is too small and too recent to signal a broader recovery. Like the other listing measures, it counts events rather than unique properties, and some pending contracts fail before they close. A genuine turn would need the ratio to climb for several months and then show up in completed sales, with inventory growth slowing behind it. The condo-versus-single-family comparison would tell us whether the gap between the two segments had started to close.

A sharper decline would likely require a new source of pressure. A weakening labor market would force more owners to sell into a market that cannot absorb them. Large assessments could make individual buildings both expensive to stay in and hard to finance. Further insurance increases would push dues higher across the city. More projects losing conventional financing eligibility would shrink the buyer pool building by building rather than market-wide, and that last one is the risk the citywide statistics are least able to see. A well-funded association with adequate reserves and manageable insurance may hold its value while the building next door, carrying a failed project review and a pending assessment, does not. The median would report only the average of the two.

Living Through the Correction

I bought because I wanted to live in a neighborhood I liked, and that part worked. The financial side has been harder. I purchased in May 2023, after the market had turned but before the depth of the slowdown was clear, and every measure in this article has moved against that purchase since.

Thousands of people bought or refinanced Denver condos when they still looked like Denver’s affordable path into ownership. Some now hold units worth less than they paid. Others have equity from earlier years and no practical way to use it, because moving means trading a cheap mortgage for an expensive one.

I am not selling, which makes me part of the slowdown. The owners who do sell are the ones who have run out of reasons to wait, whether that is a relocation, a life change, an assessment they would rather not fund, or simple impatience. Their closing prices become the comparable sales the rest of us are measured against. Until more units close at prices buyers will actually pay, everyone still holding is left guessing at what they own.

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The national median existing-home sale price reached an all-time high of $440,600 in June, up 1.8% from a year earlier and marking the 36th consecutive month of annual price growth. At the same time, existing-home sales fell 2.4% from May to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of just 4.09 million. CBS News recently highlighted the apparent contradiction: home prices are setting records even as affordability continues to prevent many households from buying.

Mortgage rates are still a major part of the problem. According to Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey, the average 30-year fixed mortgage rate was 6.49% as of July 9. That was only modestly lower than 6.72% one year earlier and more than twice the average rate available in 2021.

Increasingly, sellers who cannot get the price they want are choosing a fourth option: removing the home from the market entirely.

Sellers are withdrawing at near-record rates

Nationwide, 5.8% of all homes listed for sale were delisted in April, according to Redfin. That was tied with December 2025 for the highest share since the housing market effectively froze at the beginning of the pandemic in March 2020.

Prior to 2020, delistings had never been as common as they are today.

That means approximately one out of every 17 listings left the market without producing a sale.

A delisting is not the same as a price reduction, an expired listing, or a temporary status change.

Under Redfin’s methodology, a delisting occurs when an active listing is removed from the market without selling. Temporary withdrawals that return to the market within 31 days are excluded. If the property returns between 31 and 365 days after the original delisting, it is counted as a relisting.

A delisting also does not necessarily mean that a homeowner is in financial distress or has permanently abandoned plans to move. The seller may decide to rent the property, wait for a different season, change agents, improve the home, or simply remain in place.

At minimum, it tells us that the seller could not or would not accept the price and terms the market offered.

The market is stuck in a price standoff

Redfin attributes the increase in delistings largely to a mismatch between sellers’ expectations and what today’s buyers are willing or able to pay.

Homes are taking longer to sell, buyers have become more selective, and sellers face more competition. Some homeowners are still anchored to the rapid price growth and bidding wars of the pandemic market, while buyers are evaluating every home through the reality of a substantially higher monthly payment.

This does not mean every delisted home was dramatically overpriced. It also does not mean every buyer is making an unreasonable offer.

It means the seller’s minimum acceptable price and the buyer’s maximum affordable price frequently do not overlap.

The seller may be looking at the home’s value, recent comparable sales, and the equity accumulated over the last several years. The buyer is looking at the total payment that must come out of their bank account every month. When those two numbers cannot be reconciled, a seller who does not urgently need to move can wait.

Instead of reducing the price until a buyer accepts it, the seller can remove the property and preserve the option to try again later.

Denver is experiencing the same standoff

Denver’s delisting data shows the same broad pattern, although there is an important distinction between a rate that remains elevated and one that is actively rising.

During the first six months of 2026, the share of Denver metro listings that were delisted ranged from 5.91% to 6.66%. The average for the period was 6.29%.

For comparison, Denver’s average monthly delisting share from 2016 through 2019 was 4.14%. The average during the first half of 2026 was approximately 52% higher than that pre-pandemic baseline.

Delistings remain historically elevated, but they are not currently surging higher. In June, 6.00% of Denver metro listings were delisted, down from 6.73% one year earlier.

That still means that approximately one out of every 17 Denver listings left the market without selling.

The more notable shift in Denver is in relistings.

In June, previously withdrawn homes represented 3.23% of Denver’s active listings. That was up 0.77 percentage points from one year earlier. The total number of relistings increased 25.6%.

Using the Redfin metro-level dataset, Denver had the fourth-highest relisting share among the 98 metropolitan areas with available June data, behind only San Jose, Oakland, and San Francisco.

Some Denver sellers are not giving up permanently. A growing number of withdrawn homes are cycling back onto the market for another attempt.

The monthly payment is the real negotiation

The average 30-year fixed mortgage rate was 2.96% in 2021, according to Freddie Mac’s historical mortgage-rate data. As of July 9, 2026, the average was 6.49%.

That difference completely changes what a given home price means to a buyer.

Consider the current national median existing-home price of $440,600. Assuming a 20% down payment, the buyer would finance approximately $352,480.

At a 3% mortgage rate, the monthly principal and interest payment would be approximately $1,486.

At 6.49%, the payment would be approximately $2,226.

That is an increase of about $740 per month, or nearly 50%, for the exact same purchase price and loan amount. That calculation does not include property taxes, homeowners insurance, association dues, or maintenance.

This is why the market can feel completely different to buyers and sellers even when the home’s nominal value has not fallen.

A seller may see a home priced similarly to comparable properties that sold in prior years, while the buyer sees a monthly obligation that is hundreds or even thousands of dollars higher.

The disagreement is not necessarily over the house itself. Rather, it’s over what the financing environment allows the buyer to pay for it.

Record prices do not necessarily indicate strong demand

Sale price data measures only homes that successfully sold.

It does not include homes whose sellers rejected the offers they received and allowed the listings to expire, homes whose owners decided to rent them instead, or listings that may return to the market six months later at a different price.

When a seller withdraws rather than accepting a lower offer, that potential lower-priced transaction never enters the sale-price data.

That is one reason elevated sale prices and weak transaction activity can coexist.

Closed sales represent the portion of the market where a buyer and seller successfully agreed on value. Delistings represent the portion where they did not.

This does not mean delistings are solely responsible for keeping prices high. Limited supply, accumulated homeowner equity, mortgage-rate lock-in, and the specific mix of homes that happen to sell are all important variables.

Sale-price data only captures the homes where a buyer and seller reached a deal. Delistings capture the growing number of listings where they did not.

Some of the missing inventory is waiting off-market

The increase in relistings also shows that some of the missing supply is simply waiting off-market.

A seller may return with a lower price, new photographs, completed repairs, a different agent, or simply a greater level of motivation. Others may relist without materially changing anything and receive substantially the same response.

Redfin reported that relistings represented 2.5% of active U.S. inventory in April, tied for the highest share since 2020. Redfin described some of these owners as sellers who withdrew when they could not get the price they wanted and are now returning with a more realistic understanding of the market.

Denver’s 3.23% relisting share is materially higher than that national figure.

This distinction is relevant when interpreting changes in inventory.

Inventory can decline because buyers are purchasing homes faster than sellers are listing them. That is generally a sign of strengthening demand.

Inventory can also decline because unsuccessful sellers are removing their homes. One represents absorption, while the other represents retreat.

Looking only at the number of active listings can obscure the difference.

What this means for sellers and buyers

For sellers, withdrawing a listing may be a reasonable decision. Personal circumstances are a critical factor in deciding to sell at any given time, and not every owner needs to accept the market’s current price.

But removing the home does not validate the original asking price.

A relisting resets the marketing campaign. It does not reset buyer affordability. Returning with the same price, condition, and presentation may simply reproduce the same outcome.

For buyers, a withdrawn listing is not necessarily gone forever. Properties that fail to sell may return after the seller’s plans, expectations, or level of motivation change.

For anyone analyzing the market, delistings and relistings need to be evaluated alongside inventory, new listings, pending sales, closed sales, price reductions, and days on market.

Lower inventory does not automatically mean a stronger seller’s market. It matters whether the inventory is disappearing because buyers purchased it or because sellers gave up.

Bottom line

The housing market is caught between sellers who do not want to accept lower prices and buyers who cannot comfortably support today’s prices at today’s mortgage rates.

Many homeowners have the equity and flexibility to wait. Many buyers have a hard monthly payment ceiling that cannot be negotiated away.

That does not necessarily produce an immediate decline in prices.

The result is fewer completed transactions, longer marketing periods, more withdrawn listings, and more homes returning to the market for another attempt.

High prices, weak sales, and elevated delistings are not contradictory. They are different symptoms of the same price standoff.

The housing market is not fully resolving its affordability problem through lower prices. Some of it is resolving the problem by not transacting at all.

-ct

The technical language changes by state: private listings, office exclusives, pre-marketing, pocket listings, private listing networks. The policy question underneath is the same. When a licensed broker takes a residential listing, how much control should that broker have over who gets to know the property is available?

I started tracking this because the movement was spreading faster than the industry conversation around it. The dashboard at legtracker.cooperthayer.com tracks the bills by state, bill number, sponsor, status, and policy model. It also separates the two structures that now define the national debate: the Wisconsin model, which allows private marketing after a seller signs a disclosure and opt-out form, and the Washington model, which requires concurrent public marketing whenever the property is marketed to any limited or exclusive group.

Two Different Models

Wisconsin and Washington are easy to group together because they are the two states to have successfully enacted private listing legislation. That grouping is useful for a map, but it is not useful for understanding the policy. The two laws are built on different theories of regulation, and the difference is important because other states are now choosing between them.

Wisconsin treats the issue as a disclosure and consent problem. Under 2025 Wisconsin Act 69, which takes effect January 1, 2027, a listing firm handling 1-4 unit residential properties must share information with buyer-side licensees, respond to inquiries, make the property available for showings, and publicly advertise or market the property within one business day of the listing agreement unless the owner signs a state-prescribed disclosure and opt-out form. The law does not eliminate private marketing. It makes the seller’s decision formal, documented, and tied to a state-mandated warning about the possible trade-offs of restricted exposure. (Wisconsin Legislature Docs)

Washington starts from a different premise. SB 6091, signed by Governor Bob Ferguson on March 16, 2026, and effective June 11, 2026, prohibits a broker from marketing residential real estate to a limited or exclusive group of buyers or brokers unless the property is concurrently marketed to the general public and all other brokers, with only a narrow exception for health or safety concerns. The bill passed 49-0 in the Senate and 92-1 in the House, which is part of why it matters beyond Washington. It was a landslide, not a marginal partisan bill that slipped through on a narrow vote. (Washington State Legislature)

The difference in ideology is substantial. In Wisconsin, a private-first strategy can survive if the seller signs the required opt-out and the file supports the decision. In Washington, the sequence itself is the regulated conduct. A broker cannot expose the property first to a brokerage network, preferred buyers, selected agents, or a private channel and then open the market later, unless the health or safety exception applies. Wisconsin regulates the decision to restrict exposure. Washington regulates the act of restricted exposure by a licensed broker.

Seller Consent vs. Broker Conduct

The Wisconsin model assumes seller consent can solve enough of the market-access problem to justify allowing private marketing in some cases. The mechanism is familiar: disclose the risk, document the client’s instruction, preserve the file, and allow the professional to proceed if the client chooses that path. It is the same regulatory logic behind many existing real estate disclosures. The state does not say the conduct can never happen. Rather, it says the seller must be told what the conduct may cost before the broker relies on that instruction.

The Washington model assumes disclosure is not enough. It treats broker-controlled restricted exposure as a market-access problem that cannot be cured by a signed form, because the harm is not limited to the seller who chose the private process. Buyers outside the selected channel lose access. Buyer agents outside the selected channel lose visibility. Competing brokers operate with incomplete information. Pricing information becomes less reliable when a larger share of inventory trades through selective distribution.

“These private listing models that are growing in popularity aren’t just a threat to consumer protections — they’re a way of excluding some people from being able to buy or rent homes in our state. This bill is fundamentally about fair housing. When buyers and renters have equal access to the market, we level the playing field so everyone can consider all available options when they’re searching for their next place to call home.”
- WA State Sen. Marko Liias (Washington State Senate Democrats)

Other Bills Now in Motion

The rest of the legislative map is beginning to organize around those two templates.

• Illinois’ HB 4964 follows the Wisconsin structure. The bill would require a listing licensee to share information with buyer-side licensees, respond to inquiries, make the property available for showings, and publicly advertise or market the property within one calendar day of the brokerage agreement unless the seller signs a disclosure and opt-out form prescribed by the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. (LegiScan)

• Connecticut SB 340 also tracks closer to Wisconsin than Washington. The bill establishes requirements for public marketing of certain real estate listings and creates an opt-out structure rather than a flat concurrent-marketing mandate. As of early May 2026, LegiScan shows the bill passed both chambers unanimously, with a 36-0 Senate vote and a 149-0 House vote. (Connecticut General Assembly)

• Hawaii SB 2806 is closer to Washington. It would prohibit brokers from listing or offering residential real estate to a limited or exclusive group of prospective buyers, brokers, or salespersons, with limited exceptions, and would treat violations as unfair or deceptive trade practices and grounds for discipline. The bill passed the Senate and was referred to the House Consumer Protection and Commerce Committee. (LegiScan)

• New York’s A10679, the Fair and Transparent Real Estate Listings Act, is more of a hybrid, though it leans toward the Wisconsin side because it allows non-public marketing after informed written seller direction. The bill is also worth watching for its definitions. It gives one of the clearer statutory treatments of a private listing network, and definitions can spread before full policy structures do. (New York State Senate Legislation)

The Industry Never Settled the Question

The statehouse activity is happening because the industry never reached a stable settlement on listing access. NAR’s Clear Cooperation Policy remains in place, but in March 2025 NAR added Delayed Marketing Exempt Listings through its Multiple Listing Options for Sellers policy. Sellers can now direct their listing broker to delay IDX and syndication for a locally defined period while the listing remains filed with the MLS and available to MLS participants. NAR also clarified that one-to-one broker communications do not trigger Clear Cooperation, while multi-brokerage communications do. (Washington State Legislature)

That compromise gave the industry another category, but did not resolve the underlying conflict. Compass has continued to defend and market its private exclusive and pre-marketing strategy, and its February 2025 analysis reported that Compass pre-marketed listings were associated with a 2.9% higher final close price compared with Compass listings that went directly to the MLS, based on a hedonic regression of 2024 Compass sell-side transactions. (Compass)

Zillow and Bright MLS point in the opposite direction. Zillow’s February 2025 study found that homes sold off the MLS in 2023 and 2024 typically sold for $4,975 less nationally, with California showing a reported median gap of $30,075. Bright MLS, working with Drexel University, found a 17.5 percent on-MLS premium across more than one million Mid-Atlantic transactions from 2019 through Q1 2023. (Zillow)

Those studies should not be treated as if they measure the same thing. Compass is studying its own pre-marketed listings that later moved through its system. Zillow and Bright are studying broader off-MLS outcomes. Different populations can produce different results without either side necessarily fabricating the conclusion. Data can be accurate, yet still misleading.

This Is Not Really NAR Versus Brokerages

The lazy version of this story is NAR versus Compass, MLSs versus brokerages, or portals versus private networks. Those disagreements may exist, but they are too narrow to explain why legislators are now interested. The better frame is transparent market ideology versus seller-directed control.

The transparent-market argument starts with access. A residential market works better when buyers, buyer agents, appraisers, brokers, and data systems can see available inventory. Broad exposure improves price discovery, makes comparable sales more reliable, and reduces the chance that access depends on brokerage affiliation rather than buyer qualification.

The seller-control argument starts with agency. Some sellers have legitimate reasons to avoid full public exposure, at least for a period of time. Privacy, security, timing, price testing, and time-on-market stigma are legitimate concerns. A seller with a public-facing job, a complicated family situation, or a property that is not ready for photography may have reasons to prefer a narrower process.

However, the challenging case is not a seller who wants privacy. Rather, it’s a brokerage model that turns seller privacy into an inventory distribution and marketing strategy. A seller choosing not to blast a home across the internet is distinct from a brokerage building a restricted listing channel around that choice.

The Seller Choice Argument Misses the Licensing Issue

A lot of the public commentary describes these bills as restrictions on seller choice. The argument is simple: the seller owns the property, so the seller should decide how it is marketed. I’d argue that framing sounds stronger than it is because it ignores the licensing implications.

A seller remains free to sell privately. They can skip the broker entirely, call a neighbor, hire an attorney, advertise through their own network, or run a narrow process without entering a licensed brokerage relationship. These bills do not create a general obligation for every homeowner to advertise publicly. They only regulate what a licensed broker may do after taking the listing.

Real estate licensing law already limits broker conduct in ways that sellers cannot waive casually. Advertising rules, agency duties, disclosure requirements, fair housing obligations, supervision standards, and trust-accounting rules all exist because the state has decided that licensed brokerage is not just private contract work. It is a regulated profession.

The cleanest critique of the seller-choice argument is that these bills restrict broker choice, not seller choice. The seller can choose not to use a broker. Once the seller hires one, the state can decide what obligations attach to the license. A serious opposition argument would say the state is overcorrecting, that informed consent should be enough, or that privacy cases are too varied for a statutory default. Those may be valid arguments, but they are certainly stronger when made as arguments about brokerage regulation, not as arguments that these bills prevent private owners from selling quietly.

Where the Wave Likely Goes in 2027

The next stage will not be measured only by how many bills pass, but by which model spreads. If Connecticut is signed into law, the Wisconsin structure gains another proof point because it is the easier political sell. Legislators can say they are not banning private listings; they are requiring disclosure, consent, and a public default. That gives state associations room to support transparency without telling every seller that privacy is unavailable.

Washington creates a different kind of momentum. Its vote margins were overwhelming, and the bill’s simplicity will appeal to lawmakers who do not want to litigate whether each opt-out was truly informed. A concurrent-marketing rule is easier to explain, easier to enforce, and harder for a brokerage to route around through paperwork.

My expectation is that private exclusive regulation bills appear in at least five to ten additional states during the 2027 sessions. California is the most important state to watch because the market is large, the luxury segment is visible, Compass has a significant market share, and the consumer-finance argument is easy to make after Zillow reported a $30,075 median off-MLS gap in the state.

Florida is less predictable because the legislature is not naturally inclined toward more licensing regulation, but the state has high transaction volume, large relocation markets, and enough luxury activity to make private marketing a live issue if the national conversation accelerates.

Texas is the wildcard. TREC and Texas Realtors have a long history of shaping licensing rules without much public drama, and the state’s major metros are large enough that a Texas bill would immediately change the national conversation.

Smaller states may move first because the politics are easier and the state associations can act more quickly. Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Maryland, Virginia, Minnesota, and Colorado are all plausible places for 2027 activity if the Wisconsin and Washington templates keep traveling. The precise state list will depend less on ideology than on who brings the bill, whether the state association supports it, and whether the language looks like disclosure policy or a private-network ban.

What’s Next?

The next year will clarify whether this becomes a broad licensing trend or a short burst of state-level experimentation. Connecticut is the first signal. If the bill is signed, the opt-out structure becomes the more politically proven model, especially for states that want to preserve seller-directed privacy while still regulating broker conduct.

California is the second signal. A California bill would not need to pass immediately to change the conversation. Introduction and consideration alone would force every national brokerage, portal, MLS, and state association to decide whether this is now a defensive issue or an offensive one.

Model language is the third signal. A wave of Wisconsin-style bills means legislators are prioritizing informed consent and file documentation. A wave of Washington-style bills means legislators are prioritizing concurrent access over private sequencing.

The industry spent years treating private listings as an MLS policy problem. State legislatures are turning it into a licensing problem. Once that happens, the debate stops being about which platform, MLS, or brokerage has the better rule and starts being about what the state expects from a licensed professional.

Wisconsin says a seller can opt out after disclosure. Washington says a broker cannot create exclusive access unless public access happens at the same time. Those are not variations of the same policy… they are competing theories of how much control a licensed broker should have over market visibility.

Track the legislation and latest news at: legtracker.cooperthayer.com
See something that I missed that should be included? Email me!

At the same time, NAR’s newer delayed-marketing framework has given local MLSs more flexibility, which makes the fight less about whether listings can be staged before full syndication and more about who controls the data trail when they are.

I won’t opine on what these changes may mean for consumers when it comes to listing visibility. However, a question from a slightly different perspective has been on my mind recently:

What happens to the beautiful, free-flowing wealth of market data that consumers and agents rely on if we lose the standardization of the MLS?

To me, probably nothing good. Here’s why:

The residential real estate market is essentially a near-fully transparent, information-abundant exchange. One of the purest examples of free-market supply and demand dynamics in action.

This week, an article by Nick Aufenkamp was guest-posted to Rob Hahn’s Notorious R.O.B. newsletter discussing the issue, and he makes some really good points.

Standardization Is the Product

Nick Aufenkamp’s framing is the right one. This is not mainly a fight about marketing. It is a fight about data. The hidden value of the MLS is not just distribution. It is standardization. It is the fact that thousands of brokers and agents operate inside a shared framework for status definitions, field names, timestamps, price changes, pendings, closes, and property attributes.

RESO’s Data Dictionary and Web API exist to keep listing data consistent and interoperable across tools, and NAR’s own policy states that the integrity of data is foundational to an orderly real estate market.

That matters because pricing is not built on information abundance alone. It is built on comparable information.

When agents and consumers know how to interpret the data, they should have a fairly clear view of the market environment. They can see whether inventory is expanding or tightening. They can read whether homes are trading quickly because demand is real or because pricing is aggressive. They can judge whether a seller is anchored to stale expectations or whether buyers are still paying up for scarce product.

That clarity only exists when the underlying record is broad, standardized, and trustworthy.

Pricing Depends on Complete History, Not Just More Search Options

This is where the conversation gets serious. A good CMA is not just a stack of recent sales. It is a time-based record of market behavior. Days on market. Price reductions. Back-on-market events. Pending timelines. Close prices. Seller concessions.

All of that helps agents and consumers understand not just what sold, but how it sold.

Aufenkamp’s point was that the MLS functions as a common market ledger. He is right. If a home spends weeks or months in a private network, gets tested at an aspirational price, fails to attract a buyer, and only then enters the MLS, the public record starts too late.

The home can look “fresh” when it is not fresh. It can look like it sold quickly when it did not sell quickly. It can look like pricing was validated when pricing may have already been rejected by the market behind the scenes.

That is not a small distortion. That goes directly to how future sellers are priced and how future buyers assess leverage.

This is the real danger in fragmented data availability. The issue is not merely that some listings become harder to find. The issue is that the market record itself becomes selectively incomplete.

Once that happens, time on market stops meaning one thing. Price-drop history stops meaning one thing. “New listing” stops meaning one thing. And when core fields stop meaning the same thing across the marketplace, the usefulness of the data starts to erode very quickly.

We Already Have a Case Study

We do not have to guess what reduced transparency looks like. We just lived through one version of it with buyer-broker compensation. As of the 2024 practice changes, offers of compensation can no longer be communicated through the MLS.

The settlement explicitly states that historical compensation information is no longer available through the MLS.

You can agree with the reason for that change and still acknowledge the cost.

The cost is that buyers and their agents lost a standardized reference point inside the MLS record itself. They can still negotiate. They can still structure compensation off-MLS. But they can no longer benchmark those terms inside the same shared database that houses listing history, status changes, and other transaction facts.

In other words, one layer of market intelligence disappeared. For an industry that constantly says informed consumers make better decisions, that is not insignificant.

That example should make us pause. If we were willing to accept less visibility around one economically meaningful part of the transaction, what happens if we normalize less visibility around listing exposure, price discovery, and market time? What happens when the same logic gets applied to inventory itself?

Private Exclusives Are a Data Strategy

One of the sharper observations in Nick’s piece is that private exclusives are not just a marketing strategy. They are a data strategy.

That is exactly right.

Compass’s own seller-facing material markets pre-MLS strategies as a way to limit visible days on market, reduce visible price-drop history, and let sellers control where their listing data appears. That is not simply about audience reach. That is about managing what the market gets to know, and when.

To be fair, that pitch is easy to understand. Every seller would prefer to look fresh. Every seller would prefer to test pricing without public consequences. Every seller would prefer to avoid a visible trail of reductions.

But a market cannot function efficiently if every participant is encouraged to privatize the unflattering part of price discovery while only publicizing the polished version later.

That is why I think the industry is asking the wrong question when it frames this as consumer choice versus MLS rigidity.

The harder question is whether consumer choice should include the right to selectively withhold market-relevant information from the shared record that everyone else relies on for pricing.

That is a very different issue.

Not Every Exception Is the Same

There is real nuance here. Not every off-MLS or limited-exposure strategy is abusive. There are legitimate reasons for an office exclusive.

Privacy. Security. Family circumstances. Tenant sensitivity. Health issues.

In fact, NAR’s consumer-facing materials explicitly recognize that sellers may want to limit exposure for privacy or other reasons.

That is also why the 2025 policy changes matter. NAR kept Clear Cooperation in place, but added a delayed marketing exempt listing option. Under that framework, a seller can choose to delay IDX and syndication, yet the listing still must be filed with the MLS and remain available to other MLS participants through the MLS platform.

NAR described that as a way to expand seller choice while still supporting fair housing and equal access to MLS property information. That is an important distinction. It preserves a common data record even while allowing some flexibility in public marketing.

That distinction, to me, is the crux of the issue. A true exception is not the problem. A permanent shift toward parallel listing ecosystems is the problem. An office exclusive for a narrow privacy reason is one thing.

A full-scale business model built around suppressing market history is something else entirely.

Direct Portal Input Could Make This Worse

The next risk is direct portal input.

If listings can increasingly bypass the MLS and flow straight from brokerage to portal, the industry starts creating parallel versions of the market.

One version lives in the MLS. Another lives inside a brokerage’s internal network. A third lives on a portal. Each may carry different timing, different price history, different exposure history, and different visibility rules.

At that point, what exactly is “days on market”? Days on which system? What exactly is a price reduction? Relative to which starting point? What exactly is a new listing? New to the MLS, new to the portal, or new to the public after weeks of private circulation?

Once those answers become platform-dependent, the market record stops being a common record.

And that is the part that should worry anyone who cares about consumer outcomes.

Consumers do not benefit from having ten places to browse if none of those places provides a clean, standardized, complete view of the market. More interfaces do not automatically mean more transparency. Sometimes they just mean more fragmentation.

This Is Ultimately a Consumer Protection Issue

I think the pro-fragmentation case is strongest when it talks about seller autonomy.

Of course sellers should have choices.

Of course the MLS should not dictate every marketing decision.

Of course the old model deserves scrutiny.

Rob Hahn is right to ask whether MLSs expanded too far into marketing and lead distribution. Nick is right to push back that the irreplaceable function of the MLS is the shared data set itself. Both points can be true at the same time.

But once we accept that the MLS’s most defensible function is its data function, the policy analysis changes.

We should be far less interested in protecting every legacy display rule and far more interested in protecting the completeness and comparability of the record.

That means being careful about anything that allows economically meaningful parts of listing history to disappear from the common dataset.

Consumers are harmed when the market picture gets blurrier. Buyers are harmed when urgency signals are exaggerated by incomplete DOM history

Sellers are harmed when they price off comps that look cleaner than they really were.

Smaller brokerages are harmed when access to inventory and history becomes dependent on private network affiliation instead of participation in a cooperative marketplace.

And agents are harmed because their advisory value depends on being able to interpret a market that is actually visible.

What Should Be Protected

I do not think the answer is that MLSs must preserve every old rule exactly as written. There is room for modernization. There is room for better local flexibility. There is room for smarter consumer display strategy. But three things seem non-negotiable.

First, publicly marketed listings should enter a shared record quickly. That is the logic behind Clear Cooperation, and it remains sound. Whether this is through Clear Cooperation policy or some other method is up for debate, but it’s nevertheless a critical concept.

Second, the shared record should preserve cumulative market history as completely as possible. If exposure happened, the record should reflect that exposure. If pricing failed, the record should reflect that failure. If the industry starts treating visible market history as optional, pricing quality will deteriorate.

Third, economically relevant terms should be standardized wherever possible rather than pushed into opaque side channels. The NAR settlement has made clear that offers of compensation cannot appear in the MLS, but seller concessions can still be communicated on the MLS, and local MLSs have discretion over concession fields. That suggests a broader principle: when the market needs a signal, the best answer is usually better standardization, not less reporting.

The Bigger Risk

The biggest risk here is not that the MLS loses some leverage over distribution. The biggest risk is that the housing market loses its most reliable common record.

Once listing availability, exposure history, price changes, and transaction structure begin to fragment across private networks and portal-specific feeds, we should expect noisier comps, worse pricing, weaker analytics, and less confidence in market reports.

The industry may describe that as innovation. Consumers may experience it as confusion.

That is why I keep coming back to the same point.

The MLS is valuable not because it is old, and not because it is powerful, and not because it deserves protection for its own sake.

It is valuable because standardized, shared, accurate market data makes everyone better at understanding price. Lose that, and we do not just lose a distribution system.

We lose market intelligence.

-ct

What wholesaling is (and why the disclosure part matters)

At a basic level, the ordinance defines a “residential property wholesaler” as someone in the business of soliciting or purchasing a home with the intent to either:

1. assign the contract, or

2. resell for a profit,

with explicit carve-outs for licensed real estate professionals and for buyers who substantially improve the property before resale. (I’m actually quite impressed they considered potential unintentional spillover into legitimate flippers, investors, and real estate practitioners.)

In practice, wholesaling often shows up in two forms: contract assignment or “double closing.”

The strategy itself is not automatically evil. There are legitimate cases where a seller wants speed, certainty, or simplicity and is willing to trade some proceeds for that.

The problem is the gray zone where “speed and convenience” can turn into misdirection.

I have heard versions of the same story from both sides: homeowners who felt manipulated by solicitation, and first-hand accounts from former wholesalers who say they were trained to blur the line between “actual buyer” and “middleman.” The common thread is this: some wholesalers work hard to make the seller believe they are the end buyer, and avoid clearly disclosing that they are trying to sell (assign) the contract for a profit.

That lack of disclosure can be very misleading and harmful for vulnerable consumers.

I generally think this is a good idea.

The proposed framework has three core pieces, and the presentation deck frames it the same way: licensing, a no-solicitation list, and prohibited or regulated conduct.

Here’s what the ordinance actually does:

1. It requires a city license to wholesale residential property in Denver

The ordinance makes it unlawful to operate as a residential property wholesaler without first obtaining a license from the city’s Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection. It also gives the Manager discretion to require supplemental materials and additional documentation for the application, which is a quiet but meaningful enforcement method if implemented well.

2. It creates a “no solicitation list” (opt-out list)

Real estate agents know best how excruciating spam calls can be. Denver would create and maintain a no-solicitation list that property owners can opt into, and wholesalers would be prohibited from contacting owners on that list.

This is not a complete solution (most homeowners will never sign up), but it gives the city a clean compliance standard and gives residents at least one clear pathway to opt out.

3. It prohibits misrepresentation, harassment, and bad-faith conduct

The ordinance prohibits wholesalers from knowingly making substantial misrepresentations or false promises, or otherwise engaging in bad faith or dishonesty while soliciting. It also prohibits repeatedly contacting an owner for the purpose of harassing, coercing, intimidating, or threatening them.

This is important for the worst-case edge behavior that everyone in housing has seen in one form or another. It is also hard to enforce unless the licensing office takes documentation seriously (complaints, phone logs, mailers, and patterns).

4. The key provision: disclosure required before an offer

The ordinance would require the wholesaler to disclose their intent to assign the contract or resell for profit at least three days before presenting an offer to purchase the property.

It also requires providing information (in a city-approved form) about resources for home appraisals or other information required by rule.

That is the cleanest way to force the conversation into the open: “Are you actually buying my home, or are you selling my contract?”

Once that is clear, a homeowner can make an informed decision.

Bottom line

If Denver is going to allow wholesaling activity (and realistically, it will exist either way), the minimum standard should be transparency.

We hold real estate licensees and sellers to a high standard when it comes to disclosure in Colorado, and wholesalers should not be treated any differently.

Licensing helps the city track participants. No-solicitation rules give residents a clear opt-out. But the disclosure requirement is the consumer-protection cornerstone, because it targets the most common ethical failure point: misdirection about who is actually on the other side of the deal.

Honestly, I wouldn’t be mad to see this idea hit the state legislature in the near future.

-ct

SB26-054 is one of those bills.

This is the Colorado bill that addresses security deposits in post-closing occupancy agreements (PCOAs), also known as seller rent-backs. It creates an exception to the statutory security deposit cap for those agreements, which is exactly the fix many of us in the industry have been asking for. In the current bill text, the exception is tied to qualifying post-closing occupancy agreements and applies on and after January 1, 2027.

The Problem

PCOAs are pretty common in most Colorado markets. They are usually not some dramatic landlord-tenant arrangement, rather justa short bridge so moving trucks, closing dates, job timing, school schedules, and possession dates can line up.

In many cases, both sides intend the occupancy to be effectively rent-free because the economics are already baked into the deal.

The buyer owns the home now, but the seller needs a little time to get out.

Here’s the problem under current law: Colorado’s security deposit cap is pegged to rent, and C.R.S. § 38-12-102.5 caps deposits at “two monthly rent payments.”

In a rent-free seller rent-back (PCOA), that means rent is $0, so the allowable deposit is effectively $0. That leaves buyers with no practical way to hold a deposit for a short post-closing occupancy, which is what drives the workaround SB26-054 is trying to fix. (SB26-054 amends this same statute, C.R.S. § 38-12-102.5, to create a PCOA exception.)

The Workaround and Its Consequences

To make a security deposit possible in a rent-free post-closing occupancy agreement (PCOA), parties often have to create rent on paper, not because they actually want rent, but because they need a legal basis for the deposit.

Then they offset that rent elsewhere so the arrangement remains effectively rent-free in net terms. In essence, the paperwork says one thing so the deposit legally works, while the economics say something else so the original deal intent is preserved. This is usually not anyone trying to game the system. Instead, it’s a normal possession-timing solution being forced into a rule structure designed for true rentals.

Here is the bigger issue, and this is the part I care about most as a market data person:

The recorded sale price is the number that tends to travel. It is the number brokers, appraisers, automated systems, and market participants see and use. But the private offset mechanics that made the PCOA work are often not visible in public records, and they are not always captured in MLS data in a way that lets future users properly normalize the comp. So you can end up with a sale price that looks higher than the true market price for the real estate itself. That is a distortion.

And when that distorted number gets reused as a comp, it can contribute to unnecessary upward pressure in pricing and valuation conversations. I am not claiming every PCOA comp is materially inflated, but this is a real incentive mismatch that creates noisy data where we should want cleaner data.

Why SB54 is the Right Fix

SB54 does not blow up security deposit rules for real rentals.

It carves out a narrow, targeted exception for a very specific scenario: post-closing occupancy agreements tied to a purchase contract, where the buyer has purchased the residence from the seller. This is a very different risk profile and economic context than a standard lease.

In a PCOA, the parties are already in a purchase transaction, and the occupancy is usually short-term and directly related to possession timing.

So the bill solves the real problem without forcing people into artificial rent structures that muddy pricing data.

That is good policy. It protects buyers, preserves flexibility for sellers, improves comp integrity, and removes an avoidable source of noise in the market.

A REALTOR® Policy Win

This is a good example of what effective industry advocacy should look like. The Colorado Association of REALTORS® worked closely with state legislators to draft this bill that reflects how transactions actually happen in the field, and that matters.

It’s not flashy, but it’s a practical, targeted fix to a rule that was producing unintended consequences.

The best legislative work is often exactly this kind of cleanup, where a small statutory adjustment prevents a lot of downstream friction and bad data.

BILL STATUS

As of today (Feb 24, 2026) the bill has already passed the Senate (including third reading) and is now in the House, where it has been introduced and assigned to the House Transportation, Housing & Local Government Committee, so it is roughly halfway through the legislative process. To become law, it still generally must pass House committee, House second reading, and House third reading, then go to the Governor. (and if the House amends it, the chambers may also need to resolve differences before it can be sent to the Governor)

Recent aggressive development of apartments, and, in turn, high vacancy rates, continue to drive net rents down and expand the buy-vs-rent cost differential.

1. The Rental Market is Working Against Buyer Motivation

The Apartment Association of Metro Denver reported this week that the apartment market ended 2025 with a vacancy rate of 7.6%, the highest in 16 years, with more than 34,000 units sitting empty.

That level of vacancy creates a simple renter’s market dynamic: landlords have to compete harder for renters, and renters do not have to rush. Average rents are down ~4.8% since Q4 2024 and -6.2% since Q4 2023 to $1,754/month, and that’s before factoring in concessions.

Average concessions last quarter were about $169/month, which equates to roughly 9.5% of gross rent, or about four to five weeks of free rent on an annualized basis. Newer properties in their initial lease-up phase are also commonly offering up to three months free, which forces older properties to respond to remain competitive.

2. A Problem for the Spring Resale Market

As of November 2025, Colorado has the 7th highest buy-versus-rent differential in the US, with housing payments for homeowners roughly 85.8% more expensive than renters. The typical annual cost of ownership is $42,888, versus a typical annual apartment rent of $23,082. That is ~$3,574/month to own vs. ~$1,924/month to rent, or roughly a $1,650/month gap.

Even if someone can buy, many will choose not to when the monthly payment premium is that large, and renters are being handed concessions (even if buyers are, too).

3. When Supply Outruns Demand

Negative net absorption in Q4 underscores just how renter-friendly the market has become. It means more apartment units were vacated (3,177 more units than leased) during the quarter, even as new supply continued to deliver.

In practical terms, occupancy fell not because of a lack of housing, but because demand failed to keep pace with available units. That dynamic forces landlords to compete more aggressively on price and concessions, extending the current period of rent softness.

4. This Hits Entry-Level/First-Time Buyer and Condo Segments First

Entry-level and first-time buyers are primarily motivated by monthly payment, and their alternatives are usually apartments or small rentals that are currently getting cheaper.

Condo buyers in particular are squeezed from both sides. The rent alternative is getting cheaper, while ownership costs can be pulled up by HOA dues, insurance, special assessments, and higher rates. The result is predictable: fewer “must buy now” decisions and more hesitation.

As net rents continue to drift down (or stay soft via concessions), buyer demand will be meaningfully diminished in the most payment-sensitive segments. That pushes the for-sale market towards:

• Longer DOM

• More price reductions

• More seller concessions

• More leverage for buyers

If landlords are offering 4-5 weeks free, the for-sale version of that is seller concessions and pricing discipline.

5. Entry-Level Ownership Has a Competition Problem

The core issue here is competition. Entry-level homes and condos are not just competing against other for-sale inventory. They’re competing against a rental market that is getting cheaper and increasingly generous for renters. When the alternative to buying your first home is a lower monthly payment, weeks of free rent, and no long-term commitment, motivation for ownership easily slips away.
(This is why the median first-time homebuyer is now 40 years old…)

Condos will feel this first and hardest. HOA dues, insurance, and assessments are fixed costs that do not adjust downward when rents soften. That makes it extremely difficult for entry-level ownership to compete on payment, even before considering risk or flexibility. As long as renters are being rewarded for renting, they’ll struggle to find reasons to buy.

-ct

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Some sellers began advertising concessions directly in their listing remarks. Others used subtle hints. Some included exact dollar amounts, while others used vague promises like “seller willing to help with closing costs.” And many sellers paid concessions at closing without ever mentioning them publicly.

That variation in strategy has raised a central question:

Does offering or advertising concessions upfront improve buyer traffic and net outcomes, or does it signal weakness that ultimately harms price performance?

The short answer:

Advertising Concessions Hurts Price Performance.

Across 13,317 closed listings included in the pricing-ratio analysis (after removing a small number of obvious data-entry errors), listings that advertised concessions in their remarks underperformed listings that did not.

Performance was measured using the net close price to original list price ratio (NCP/OLP), which reflects the seller’s outcome after concessions.

Listings that did not advertise concessions had an average NCP/OLP ratio of 94.0%, and a median ratio of 95.3%. Listings that advertised concessions had an average ratio of 92.8%, and a median ratio of 94.0%.

At the overall median original list price of $600,000, the median ratio gap translates to roughly $8,106 less in net proceeds for sellers who advertised concessions.

This top-line result answers the core question: advertising concessions tends to harm the pricing outcome.

But the full story involves deeper patterns: different types of concession language perform very differently, and the dollar amount sellers advertise often diverges from what they actually pay at closing.

How Different Concession Types Perform Against Original List Price

To analyze the motive and meaning behind concession language, I separated listing remarks into the following categories:

1. General credits (vague references to a seller credit or concession)

2. Closing cost or prepaid credits

3. Rate buydowns or discount points

4. Repair or condition-related allowances

5. No concession language at all

The counts for each category were:

• General credit language: approximately 244 listings

• Closing cost language: approximately 161 listings

• Rate buydown or points language: approximately 1,029 listings

• Repair allowance language: approximately 534 listings

• No concession language: approximately 11,349 listings

Each category had its own median and mean NCP/OLP ratio. The differences were not marginal. They were clear signals.

General Credits

Listings that used vague language like “seller offering a credit” or “seller willing to help the buyer” had:

• Mean NCP to OLP ratio: 91.9%

• Median NCP to OLP ratio: 92.7%

These listings performed the worst of all concession categories.

When a general-credit listing stated a number, the advertised median was about $2,500. For listings that both advertised an amount and reported concessions paid at closing, the median actual concession was about $10,800.

At the category’s median original list price ($559,121), its median NCP/OLP underperformance implies roughly $14,444 less in net proceeds compared to listings with no concession language.

Closing Costs or Prepaids

• Mean NCP/OLP ratio: 92.2%

• Median NCP/OLP ratio: 93.8%

Closing-cost language generally performed better than vague general-credit language, but still underperformed listings that avoided concession language altogether.

At this category’s median original list price ($510,000), the median ratio difference versus no-concession-language listings translates to roughly $8,075 less in net proceeds.

Rate Buydowns or Points

Rate buydown language produced:

• Mean NCP/OLP ratio: 93.1%

• Median NCP/OLP ratio: 94.1%

Rate buydown and points language performed better than general credits, but still meaningfully worse than silence on concessions.

At the category’s median original list price ($579,990), the median ratio gap implies roughly $7,436 less in net proceeds versus no concession language.

Repair Allowances

• Mean NCP/OLP ratio: 92.8%

• Median NCP/OLP ratio: 94.6%

Repair and condition-related credits tended to be used as a targeted solution for known defects or inspection concerns. Their pricing outcomes were closer to the no-language baseline than other concession buckets.

At the category’s median original list price ($520,000), the median ratio gap versus no concession language implies roughly $3,618 less in net proceeds.

What matters more: offering concessions, or advertising them?

In this dataset, 62.8% of listings paid concessions at closing. The majority of these listings did not mention concessions in remarks.

Among concession-paying closings (n = 8,366), 7,078 paid concessions without advertising them, while 1,288 both advertised and paid concessions.

Even within that apples-to-apples subset of concession-paying closings, the same pattern held: those that paid concessions without advertising them had a median NCP/OLP ratio of 95.2%, versus 93.9% for those that advertised concessions.

What sellers advertise versus what sellers actually pay

A separate pattern emerged when the analysis focused only on listings that advertised a specific dollar amount (for example, “$5,000 closing-cost credit” or “$10k rate buydown”).

• Listings that advertised specific dollar amounts: 709

• Listings that both advertised an amount and paid concessions: 536

Across listings where a specific advertised concession amount could be reliably extracted from remarks, the median advertised amount was approximately $5,700 (mean ~$8,800). In practice, sellers frequently paid more than they advertised, with actual concessions exceeding the advertised figure in roughly two-thirds of cases.

For the subset of listings that both advertised an amount and reported concessions paid at closing, the median actual concession was approximately $10,000 (mean ~$12,173).

In other words, sellers tended to advertise relatively modest credits up front, then concede materially more during negotiations. On a median basis, actual concessions were roughly 75% higher than the amount initially advertised.

In two-thirds of cases where both an advertised amount and an actual concession were present, the seller ultimately paid more than what was advertised. The median dollar gap was $3,000, and the gap exceeded $12,900 in the top 10% of cases.

Notably, within the weakest concession category, general credits, added specificity was not helpful. Listings offering general credits that named a specific dollar amount produced worse net pricing outcomes than comparable listings that kept concession language vague.

Practical takeaways for sellers and listing agents

1. Concessions are common, but advertising them is not. Roughly 62% of closings paid concessions, while only about 15% of listings mentioned concessions in remarks.

2. Advertising concessions is associated with lower net pricing performance, both in simple comparisons and after controlling for days on market, list price level, and property subtype.

3. If a credit will likely be negotiated anyway, silence tends to preserve leverage. Paying concessions at the end does not appear to carry the same pricing penalty as advertising them upfront.

4. If a concession must be disclosed up front (for example, a known repair issue), use narrow, specific framing rather than broad statements that imply general weakness.

5. Treat advertised amounts as marketing, not a cap. In most cases, actual concessions ended up higher than what was advertised.

Methodology

This analysis used 13,534 closed residential listings from the REcolorado MLS with close dates between August 1, 2025 and October 31, 2025.

For pricing-ratio calculations, 217 records were excluded due to obvious data-entry errors (for example, negative net close prices or implausible list prices that created extreme ratios). The final pricing sample size was 13,317.

The key performance metric was:

NetClosePrice reflects the seller’s proceeds after recorded concessions. OriginalListPrice anchors performance to the initial pricing decision, rather than later price reductions.

Advertising flag: a listing was treated as “advertising concessions” if either the public remarks or private remarks contained concession-related language (such as “credit,” “concession,” “closing costs,” “rate buydown,” “points,” “allowance,” or “repairs”).

Concession-category tagging: advertised listings were classified by the dominant motive referenced in remarks (general credit, closing costs, rate buydown/points, or repair/condition allowance). Listings without concession-related terms were tagged as “no concession language.”

Advertised dollar amount extraction: for listings that referenced a specific amount, dollar figures were parsed from remarks and matched to nearby concession-related phrases. This produces a practical estimate of what was advertised, but it may undercount cases where amounts were described without numerals (for example, “ten thousand”).

Limitations: MLS data is self-reported and may contain occasional input errors or inconsistent concession reporting. This analysis reflects the fields and remarks available at close, and should be interpreted as directional evidence rather than a precise causal estimate.

Source

All data from REcolorado MLS. Content maintained by REcolorado® may not reflect all real estate activity in the market. REcolorado® is a registered trademark of REcolorado © 2021 REcolorado.

2026 © Cooper Thayer/818 RE LLC. All Rights Reserved. This article and its content are protected by copyright laws. Unauthorized use or reproduction of any part of this presentation without prior written permission is strictly prohibited.

Because the most interesting thing in here is not whether consumers are right about 2026. It is what they believe about 2026, and how those beliefs change the way people show up to a transaction.

When people feel uncertain, they negotiate harder, they hesitate longer, they demand more certainty, and they become much more sensitive to monthly payment friction. When they feel optimistic, they stretch, they waive, and they move quickly.

This survey reads like a country that expects higher costs, more volatility, and at least some form of macro trouble, but still intends to buy or sell anyway.

That combination matters.

Starting with the emotional baseline:

• 93% of 2026 buyers and sellers expect challenges to their financial stability.

• 40% believe the U.S. economy is heading in the right direction.

• 40% are worried they will not be able to afford their housing payments in 2026 due to the economic climate.

• 48% say they are falling behind financially under current economic policies (and 48% also say the federal government is taking the right actions to address economic concerns, which is a very 2020s sentence to type).

You can simultaneously feel squeezed, disagree about the causes, and still plan to transact.

That is exactly how real estate markets stay active in “meh” years. Life happens. People move anyway. They just do it with sharper elbows.

Inflation remains the dominant economic pressure.

The survey keeps circling back to one theme: cost of living.

Buyers and sellers name inflation and rising costs as the top economic issue facing the country in 2026 (33%), and 65% expect inflation to get worse. Trade wars and tariffs show up as the clear runner-up, with 43% expecting tariffs and trade war issues to worsen next year.

What I think is happening here is simple: housing is no longer competing with “other” expenses. Housing is competing with everything.

When groceries, insurance, utilities, and health care all feel like they are marching upward at the same time, people get more protective of their monthly payment. Not their purchase price…their payment.

That is how you get a market that can look “stable” in headlines while feeling intensely affordability-constrained in the field.

Personal financial stability versus national economic pessimism.

This is one of the most useful parts of the survey: the mismatch between personal finances and national expectations.

A majority of buyers and sellers (51%) say they feel better off financially than in 2024. But they are still pessimistic about the U.S. economy and cautious about real estate.

From the chart:

• Personal finances (2026): 36% get better, 48% stay the same, 16% get worse

• U.S. economy (2026): 27% better, 33% same, 40% worse

• Real estate market (2026): 22% better, 47% same, 30% worse

That is the psychology of the “cautious transactor.”

They are not necessarily broke. They are not necessarily panicking. They are just more risk-aware.

And risk-aware buyers behave differently:

• more inspection leverage

• more demand for concessions

• more rate buydown conversations

• more value conscientiousness

• more patience

Household concerns: recession risk, affordability, and broader instability.

This section reads like people are bracing for instability on multiple fronts.

• 48% say they have more difficulty affording basic necessities than in 2024

• 47% expect more trouble affording necessities in 2026 than they do now

• 63% expect an increase in political violence

• 55% expect a recession or economic depression

• 40% are bracing for a potential real estate market crash

My real estate translation: when households carry that many macro worries into a housing decision, they try to “build safety” into the deal itself.

That usually means:

• stronger preference for homes that feel turnkey

• more sensitivity to deferred maintenance

• less tolerance for pricing that feels “aspirational”

• more financing creativity (concessions, buydowns, assumptions)

• longer decision cycles, especially above the median price tier

Price expectations: consumers see upside, agents see more two-way risk.

Clever’s headline contrast is clean:

• Buyers and sellers: 55% expect home prices to increase in 2026 (29% stay the same, 16% decrease)

• Agents: 42% expect prices to increase (28% stay the same, 30% decrease)

This gap is important because it sets up tension in negotiations.

Consumers are anchored to the last five years of “prices usually go up.” Agents are more attuned to the current mechanics: affordability caps, inventory pockets, insurance shock, and uneven demand.

My prediction: 2026 will be a market where both groups can be right, depending on the neighborhood and the price bracket.

• Markets and segments with tight inventory and stable job bases can still see modest appreciation.

• Segments where supply is rising, insurance is spiking, or buyers are payment-constrained can go flat or down without it being “a crash.”

The market does not have to choose one national storyline anymore. It is fragmenting.

Why buyers and sellers can both see opportunity in 2026.

Clever shows that buyers and sellers remain surprisingly positive about transacting:

The way I read this: people are not saying the market is easy. They are saying it is workable.

Workable markets are the ones where:

• pricing becomes more rational

• concessions become normal again

• buyers regain leverage without sellers collapsing

• time on market stretches slightly

• negotiation becomes part of the process again (instead of an exception)

That is not a 2021 market. It is also not 2008. It is a market where skill and strategy matter again.

Asking price expectations and negotiation dynamics.

This chart is basically the 2026 transaction in one image.

• Buyers: 16% expect to pay above asking, 54% at asking, 30% below asking

• Sellers: 27% expect above asking, 61% at asking, 12% below asking

Both sides are “reasonable” in their own minds, and both sides are pricing in leverage.

That is why I think 2026 looks like:

• fewer bidding wars overall

• more conditional offers

• more inspection and appraisal leverage

• more seller-paid concessions

• more price reductions, but concentrated in the listings that start too high or show poorly

In other words: a market where the first weekend is still the test, but not the entire game.

Life events remain the primary driver of housing demand.

One of my biggest takeaways is how normal the motivations are.

The survey shows most moves are personal-life moves (not dramatic economic bets). That matters because life-driven demand tends to be steadier. It does not vanish when rates wobble. It just gets more selective.

My prediction: transaction volume in 2026 is supported by life events, but limited by financial uncertainty. That is how you get “more activity than people expected,” but not a surge.

Buyer challenges and affordability constraints

Here are the top “biggest challenges” buyers expect:

• finding the right home (46%)

• staying within budget (44%)

• mortgage interest rates (36%)

• moving costs/logistics (32%)

• down payment saving (26%)

• closing costs (24%)

• low inventory (21%)

• qualifying for a mortgage (21%)

• competing with other buyers (20%)

And then this chart stacks the anxiety layer on top:

• 66% concerned a recession could impact their buying plans

• 64% worried rising prices could delay their decision

• 50% concerned about qualifying for a mortgage

• 48% expect to need financial assistance

The market will reward preparation. The cleanest pre-approval, the clearest plan, and the best match between budget and expectations will win.

Also worth noting: 63% of buyers are open to a fixer-upper. That is a signal that buyers are willing to trade sweat equity for payment relief, but only up to the point where repairs feel predictable.

Seller challenges: pricing, preparation, and buyer sensitivity.

Sellers expect challenges too, and the list is telling:

• preparing the home for sale (40%)

• negotiating offers (36%)

• high mortgage rates affecting buyers (35%)

• moving (35%)

• pricing correctly (31%)

Then the survey adds some very human behavior:

• 68% would consider pulling their listing if they could not get their desired price

• 52% expect to offer concessions

• 50% expect to make significant repairs or renovations before selling

• 48% would omit mentioning minor needed repairs

• 40% admit they would try to cover up issues

My prediction: 2026 is a condition-sensitive market. Not everywhere. Not in every price tier. But enough that sellers will feel it.

And when a market is condition-sensitive, staging, prep, and pricing become the difference between strong activity and “why is nobody coming?”

This chart reinforces that sellers think speed is driven by the macro backdrop, while agents lean more heavily on price:

Translation: sellers feel the economy in their bones. Agents are still trying to steer the conversation back to the controllables.

Both are right. But only one is actionable.

My 2026 market predictions, in summary:

1. Volume holds up better than the headlines, but does not surge. Life-driven moves keep the engine running. Payment friction keeps it from revving.

2. Price performance becomes more local and more segmented. Some neighborhoods still climb higher. Some go flat. Some correct modestly. The national narrative becomes less useful.

3. Concessions and negotiations stay normal. Buyer leverage is back in the form of concessions, buydowns, and price reductions on mispriced listings.

4. Affordability is increasingly about “total ownership cost.” Insurance, utilities, taxes, and maintenance matter more, and they will quietly reshape what buyers are willing to pay for different home types.

Methodology (from Clever)

Clever Real Estate conducted a survey of 804 real estate agents, asking them questions concerning their predictions for the real estate market in 2026. This survey was conducted from Oct. 3 to Oct. 21, 2025.

In addition, Clever Real Estate conducted a survey of 500 Americans with plans to buy and/or sell a home in 2026, as well as 500 Americans with no plan to buy or sell a home in 2026, asking about their real estate and economic expectations for 2026. This survey was conducted from Oct. 2 to Oct. 5, 2025.

At its core, AB 723 is a response to the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence in real estate photography and marketing. As AI tools become more powerful, the line between enhancement and misrepresentation has blurred. California’s approach prioritizes transparency, aiming to ensure buyers understand what they are seeing before making one of the largest financial decisions of their lives.

What AB 723 Actually Regulates

AB 723 adopts an intentionally broad definition of what constitutes a “digitally altered image.” Any photograph modified through photo-editing software or artificial intelligence to add, remove, or change elements of a property is captured under the law. This includes changes that affect the interior, exterior, or surroundings of a home.

Examples explicitly covered by the statute include alterations to furniture, fixtures, appliances, flooring, walls, paint colors, landscaping, hardscaping, facades, and even floor plans. The law also extends to elements outside or visible from the property, such as views through windows, neighboring buildings, streetlights, utility poles, and exterior scenery.

This scope is notable because it goes well beyond traditional concerns about misleading staging. Many edits that have become commonplace in modern listing photography now fall into a regulated category simply because they alter the visual reality of the property.

That said, the law makes a clear distinction between representational changes and standard photographic corrections. Adjustments to lighting, exposure, sharpening, color correction, white balance, cropping, straightening, and similar technical edits are permitted without disclosure, as long as they do not materially change the appearance or features of the property.

This Is Not Just an MLS Rule

One of the most important aspects of AB 723 is its reach beyond the MLS. The law applies to any image used to advertise a property, regardless of platform or medium. This includes social media posts, property websites, digital ads, flyers, brochures, magazines, and other printed materials.

In practical terms, this means compliance is required anywhere a consumer might encounter a listing image. Posting a digitally altered photo on Instagram or including it in a printed mailer triggers the same obligations as uploading it to the MLS.

This distinction matters because enforcement is not limited to MLS penalties or association discipline. Failure to comply can expose agents and others to state-level consequences. While the law is framed around consumer protection, its enforcement mechanisms raise the stakes significantly for marketing decisions that were previously treated as low risk.

Disclosure Requirements Are the Core of the Law

AB 723 does not prohibit AI edits, virtual staging, or enhanced photography outright. Instead, it centers on disclosure and access to original images. The law requires a “reasonably conspicuous notice” that an image has been digitally altered, along with a clear way for consumers to view the original, unedited version.

There are two primary methods for compliance. On platforms controlled by the agent or brokerage, such as the MLS or a listing website, the edited image must be labeled, and the original image must be easily accessible, typically by swiping, clicking, or navigating to an adjacent image.

In contexts where side-by-side images are impractical, such as social media or print materials, the law allows the use of a QR code or URL. That link must clearly direct viewers to the original images, and the purpose of the link must be explained so consumers understand what they are accessing.

The emphasis is on visibility and clarity. Disclosures buried in fine print or hidden behind vague links are unlikely to satisfy the standard envisioned by the law.

Virtual Staging, AI Tools, and Faux Twilights

The law’s impact becomes most apparent when applied to common real estate photography practices.

Virtual staging remains permissible, but with important caveats. Software that simply adds furniture to an existing photo without altering the underlying structure can still be used, provided proper disclosure is made, and the original image is available. However, many generative AI tools go much further, reconstructing rooms, changing proportions, or modifying architectural features. Those structural changes place such images squarely within the law’s restrictions.

As a result, workflows that rely on fully generative AI staging tools may become impractical for marketing use under AB 723, even if they are visually compelling.

Faux twilight photography and sky replacements are treated similarly. Even if a replacement sky comes from the same city or neighborhood, it still constitutes a change to elements visible from the property. These images must be disclosed and paired with access to originals.

Object removal also falls under the law. Removing a moving pod, vehicle, or temporary item from a driveway may seem inconsequential, but it is still considered a digital alteration that requires disclosure and original image access.

How This Changes Real Estate Marketing Strategy

From a marketing standpoint, AB 723 introduces meaningful friction. Enhanced images are often used to create strong first impressions and emotional engagement. Required labels, QR codes, and disclosures can dilute that impact and, in some cases, undermine the very purpose of the edits.

There is also a broader cultural context at play. Consumers have grown increasingly skeptical of AI-generated and manipulated content online. Seeing prominent disclosures that an image has been digitally altered may reinforce that skepticism, even when the edits are relatively minor.

At the same time, the law offers clear benefits for buyers. Accurate expectations reduce the risk of disappointment when a buyer visits a property in person. When buyers know in advance that images have been staged or enhanced, they are less likely to feel misled, which can improve trust and reduce friction during showings.

From this perspective, AB 723 aligns with longstanding truth-in-advertising principles that already underpin real estate law, but applies them more explicitly to modern technology.

Cost, Liability, and New Business Practices

Compliance with AB 723 introduces additional work. Managing original images, labeling edited photos, generating links or QR codes, and ensuring disclosures are consistently applied all require time and coordination. This has direct cost implications.

Photographers and agents may reasonably charge more for AI-edited images that require additional compliance steps. Contracts, invoices, and marketing agreements may need updated language clarifying who is responsible for disclosures and how images may be used.

Some professionals may choose to decline labeling images at a client’s request, documenting that decision in writing to limit liability. Others may adopt standardized compliance workflows to reduce risk.

It is also important to note a key exception. The law does not apply to images used solely for presentations that demonstrate potential improvements or future possibilities, rather than marketing a property for sale. Conceptual renderings used in listing presentations, commercial proposals, or redevelopment discussions remain unaffected.

A Gray Area: New Construction Renders in the MLS

One area that remains less clearly defined under laws like AB 723 is the treatment of new construction and pre-construction renderings when used in the MLS. Unlike virtual staging of an existing property, new construction listings often rely heavily on architectural renderings, conceptual images, and planned finish depictions because the home may not yet exist in its final form.

Historically, MLSs have allowed these images as long as they are clearly identified as renderings or artist concepts. Buyers generally understand that such images represent intent rather than current condition. However, under a framework like AB 723, questions arise about where the line is drawn between a permissible representation of a future build and a digitally altered image that could be interpreted as misleading if not properly disclosed or paired with additional context.

For example, renderings that depict upgraded finishes, enhanced landscaping, or idealized surroundings may raise similar concerns as AI-enhanced resale photos if they materially influence buyer expectations without adequate clarification. At the same time, requiring original “unaltered” images in a true new construction scenario may be impractical or impossible when no completed structure yet exists.

This creates a regulatory gray zone that MLSs and regulators will likely need to address explicitly. Possible outcomes include carve-outs for new construction renderings, heightened labeling requirements, or separate classification rules distinguishing conceptual imagery from photographs of existing improvements. Until clearer guidance emerges, builders, agents, and MLSs may need to proceed cautiously, ensuring renderings are clearly labeled, limitations are disclosed, and marketing materials do not blur the line between what is planned and what is guaranteed.

As AI-generated architectural imagery becomes more realistic and accessible, this issue is likely to move quickly from a theoretical concern to a practical compliance challenge. How regulators resolve this distinction will have meaningful implications for developers, builders, and agents operating in markets with significant new construction activity.

Existing MLS Rules Are Already Laying the Groundwork

It is also important to recognize that California is not starting from zero. Long before AB 723, many MLSs across the country had already implemented detailed rules governing virtual staging, photo manipulation, and disclosure. In practice, these MLS policies have functioned as early consumer-protection frameworks, even if they were enforced administratively rather than through statute.

Many MLSs distinguish between cosmetic enhancements and material alterations. Adding virtual furniture or décor is often permitted, while changes that alter permanent features, conceal defects, modify finishes, enhance views, or misrepresent scale are typically prohibited. Disclosure and transparency requirements are also common, including mandates to upload original, unaltered photos and to clearly label virtually staged images within the MLS system.

A clear example is the Pikes Peak Multiple Listing Service (PPMLS). PPMLS maintains a detailed visual matrix outlining what is allowed and not allowed for both interior and exterior images. Under PPMLS rules, agents may add virtual furniture or décor, but may not change paint colors, upgrade flooring, modify landscaping, enhance scenic views, conceal defects, or alter permanent fixtures. PPMLS also requires that original photos accompany virtually staged images and that listings be explicitly flagged as containing virtually staged photos.

Frameworks like this already reflect the same underlying philosophy as AB 723: buyers should not be misled by images that materially alter the reality of a property. What California’s law does differently is move these concepts out of MLS rulebooks and into state statute, extend them to all advertising channels, and attach state-level enforcement authority.

This distinction matters when considering whether other states may follow. Legislatures do not need to invent entirely new standards. In many cases, they can look directly to existing MLS policies as proof that these rules are workable, familiar to industry professionals, and aligned with consumer expectations. AB 723 effectively takes norms that already exist within MLS ecosystems and applies them universally to how real estate is marketed in the modern, multi-platform environment.

Will Other States Follow, Including Colorado?

California has long served as a regulatory bellwether, particularly in areas where consumer protection, technology, and real estate intersect. AB 723 fits squarely within that tradition. While the law is specific to real estate imagery, it reflects a much broader shift occurring across state governments, one led largely by state Attorneys General and legislatures responding to rapid advances in artificial intelligence.

Over the past several years, state Attorneys General have become increasingly active in scrutinizing how AI is used in consumer-facing contexts. This includes investigations and enforcement actions related to deceptive advertising, algorithmic bias, data privacy, and misrepresentation. In many cases, AG offices are relying on existing consumer protection statutes rather than waiting for AI-specific laws, arguing that traditional truth-in-advertising and unfair practices standards already apply, regardless of whether deception is accomplished by a human or an algorithm.

Real estate has emerged as a particularly sensitive area in this broader enforcement trend. Housing transactions involve large financial commitments, emotional decision-making, and historically protected classes. As a result, regulators are especially attuned to technologies that could mislead consumers or create distorted expectations. AI-enhanced listing images sit at the intersection of these concerns, which helps explain why California moved decisively in this area.

Legislatures across the country are also actively exploring AI-related legislation, even if few have gone as far as California in the real estate context. Recent state-level efforts have focused on transparency requirements, disclosure obligations, and limits on deceptive or materially misleading uses of AI in advertising and consumer communications. While many of these bills are not specific to real estate, they establish a clear policy direction: consumers should know when AI has been used in ways that affect their understanding of a product or service.

Colorado already operates within a strong consumer protection framework. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act, along with existing real estate licensing laws and MLS rules, places a clear emphasis on accurate representation and disclosure. To date, these standards have been applied largely through professional discipline and civil enforcement rather than criminal statutes. However, as AI tools become more capable and more accessible, pressure is building to clarify how those existing rules apply in practice.

A future Colorado response could take several forms. The legislature could enact a targeted statute similar to AB 723, particularly if prompted by high-profile complaints or enforcement actions. Alternatively, MLSs or the Division of Real Estate could adopt more explicit guidance or rules around AI-generated or digitally altered imagery. Another possibility is a more informal but still impactful approach, where brokerages proactively adopt disclosure standards to reduce liability exposure and align with emerging best practices.

Importantly, states do not need to copy California’s law verbatim for the impact to be felt. Even incremental changes, such as formal disclosure requirements or clearer definitions of what constitutes a misleading image, would significantly alter how AI tools are used in listing marketing. In that sense, AB 723 may function less as a one-off rule and more as a reference point that other states adapt to their own regulatory environments.

Taken together, the actions of Attorneys General, legislatures, and regulatory agencies suggest a consistent theme. AI is no longer being treated as a novelty or a gray area. It is being folded into existing consumer protection frameworks, with an emphasis on transparency, accountability, and preventing misrepresentation. Real estate, given its economic and social importance, is likely to remain near the front of that regulatory line.

The Bigger Picture

AB 723 reflects a broader shift in how technology, trust, and transparency intersect in real estate. As AI becomes more capable of reshaping reality, regulators and consumers alike are demanding clearer signals about what is real and what has been enhanced.

In a transaction as significant as buying a home, confidence in the accuracy of information matters. Laws like AB 723 are designed to reinforce that confidence, even if they introduce new complexity for marketing professionals. Whether through legislation, MLS rules, or industry standards, greater transparency around listing imagery appears inevitable. California may simply be the first state to formalize what many others are already considering.

Agents, photographers, and brokerages that adapt early, by refining workflows, disclosures, and client education, will be best positioned as similar policies emerge elsewhere.

“First-time homebuyers accounted for an impressive 84.31% of starter-home purchases in the Denver, CO metro area, leaving investors with just 15.69%, a significant gap compared to the national average.”
- Jake Vehige, President of Mortgage Lending at Neighbors Bank

Denver sits at the intersection of three structural forces: compressed cap rates, weakening rent fundamentals, and a policy environment that consistently disadvantages landlords. Together, they have altered investor behavior and reshaped the lower end of the for-sale market.

Cap Rates Have Collapsed to the Point of Negative Cash Flow

Denver’s cap-rate profile is one of the least favorable in the country for leveraged rental investors. According to Reventure, the metro’s cap rate has fallen from 5.3% in 2011 to 3.7% in 2025, placing Denver 14th lowest out of 109 U.S. metros with populations above 500,000.

At today’s valuations, even moderate leverage produces neutral to negative cash-on-cash returns, with only marginal improvement under short-term or medium-term rental strategies. Investors are effectively underwriting long-duration appreciation plays rather than cash-flow assets, a shift many are unwilling to make at current interest rates.

This is the fundamental reason investors have retreated. When the spread between cap rates and financing costs turns sharply negative, investor demand compresses. First-time buyers step into that vacuum, particularly in the $400,000–$600,000 segment where investor purchases previously set pricing floors.

Rent Trends Have Turned Against Landlords

The second driver is rent performance. Denver’s rental market no longer delivers the dependable year-over-year growth investors counted on during the 2015–2021 expansion. The Colorado Sun’s recent reporting highlights a consistent pattern: Rents have flattened or declined across many Denver submarkets, driven by elevated multifamily deliveries and slower household formation.

Three dynamics are notable:

• Supply pressure remains persistent. Metro Denver continues to absorb a wave of new apartment inventory, and lease-up concessions have expanded materially.

• Vacancy rates are higher than pre-pandemic norms. The added slack reduces landlords’ pricing power.

• The rent-to-income ratio has reached affordability limits. Many renters have little room for further increases.

For institutional and small investors alike, softer rents mean weaker DSCR, lower NOI, and increased risk of operational losses when paired with rising insurance, labor, and maintenance costs. This is a materially less attractive environment for building rental portfolios, and market entry calculations have adjusted accordingly.

Denver and Colorado Have Become Increasingly Hostile to Landlords

The final factor is policy. While regulatory sentiment varies across the country, Denver and Colorado have clearly moved toward a non-landlord-favorable legal and political environment. In the past 24–36 months, several ordinances and state bills have meaningfully altered investor underwriting assumptions:

• Strict limits on late fees (HB 23-1120) constraining cost recovery for delinquency risk.

• Expanded eviction protections and elongated timelines, increasing carrying costs for non-performing tenants.

• Stricter habitability standards and enforcement mechanisms, raising compliance and maintenance costs.

• Short-term rental restrictions in multiple Denver-area jurisdictions, reducing revenue optionality.

• Ongoing proposals for transferable rental-licensing regimes that add administrative burden and upfront costs.

• Persistent discussions around local rent-control exceptions, which, even without full implementation, create uncertainty for yield-focused investors.

Regulatory friction directly reduces investor willingness to scale portfolios. Beyond the financial impact, the cumulative administrative load has pushed many small landlords to exit the market entirely. Those units often return to the for-sale market at price points accessible to first-time buyers.

Denver’s position atop the list of metros where first-time buyers are outpacing investors is not an anomaly. It reflects a structural reshaping of the market. Compressed cap rates undermine investor returns. Softening rent trends erode cash-flow durability. And an increasingly adversarial legislative environment has elevated both financial and compliance risk for landlords.

The result is a market where investors have pulled back—not due to lack of interest in Denver, but because the economics no longer justify the exposure. First-time buyers benefit directly from that retreat, and for now, that advantage appears durable.

The share of first-time buyers has dropped by roughly half since 2007. This means the typical “starter” buyer is entering the market a decade later than the historical norm. The implications are multiple: reduced time to build housing wealth, higher down-payment requirements, and likely smaller home sizes or less favorable terms. NAR calculates that delaying homeownership until age 40 instead of ~30 can cost roughly $150,000 in equity on a typical starter home.

“The historically low share of first-time buyers underscores the real-world consequences of a housing market starved for affordable inventory,”
- Jessica Lautz, NAR deputy chief economist and vice president of research

Monthly cost pressure: mortgage rates + hidden layers

While home prices remain elevated, the mortgage rate environment has amplified the monthly payment burden. Last year, Zillow reported typical U.S. mortgage payment nearly doubled between January 2020 and January 2024, rising 96.4% to reach $2,188 per month (assuming a 10% down payment). Over that same period, home values rose 42.4%, and mortgage rates jumped from ~3.5% to roughly 6.6%, meaning buyers today face not only higher prices but a far higher cost of borrowing. Even before adding taxes, insurance, or HOA dues, the monthly payment on a median-priced home has become substantially more burdensome than it was just four years ago.

In 2020, a household earning $59,000 annually could comfortably afford the monthly mortgage on a typical U.S. home, spending no more than 30% of its income with a 10% down payment. That was below the U.S. median income of about $66,000, meaning more than half of American households had the financial means to afford homeownership.

Now, the roughly $106,500 needed to comfortably afford the mortgage payment on a typical home is well above what a typical U.S. household earns each year, estimated at about $81,000.

- Anushna Prakash, Economic Analyst at Zillow

Insurance

Homeowners insurance has become one of the fastest-rising components of the monthly payment, and Colorado’s data is among the most striking in the nation. According to recent analyses, Colorado homeowners have experienced a 57.9% increase in premiums from 2018–2023, driven by higher replacement costs and a rapidly intensifying pattern of catastrophic losses. Construction materials and labor—core inputs for rebuilding—are up ~38–40% since 2019, making every claim more expensive to settle.

Extreme-weather risk is now a defining feature of Colorado’s insurance landscape. The state ranks #2 nationally for hail claims, with more than 380,000 claims filed from 2017 to 2019. From 2010 to 2023, Colorado recorded 48 billion-dollar disasters, double the total of the previous 29 years. The Marshall Fire alone generated more than $2 billion in damage. These losses have repeatedly exceeded premium dollars collected, pushing carriers to raise rates, tighten underwriting, and reduce risk exposure.

Nationally, homeowners’ insurance premiums are up ~24% over the past three years, with cumulative increases nearing 40% over six years. Some Colorado-specific analyses place the five-year cumulative rise closer to ~76.6% from 2019–2024, depending on the dataset and carrier mix.

Property Taxes

Property taxes have quietly exerted increasing pressure on monthly housing budgets. Nationally, median property tax bills rose 10.4% between 2021 and 2023, with average payments increasing 5.5% from 2023–24 and nearly 27% since 2019. Even as effective tax rates remain relatively stable, rising home values and reassessment cycles are materially increasing escrow requirements for homeowners.

Colorado homeowners have not been immune. CoreLogic reports a 10.6% year-over-year increase in median property tax payments from 2023–24, driven by reassessments and the broader inflation in replacement costs and service contracts. For first-time buyers, these increases, usually folded directly into their monthly payment, often come as a surprise and can push borderline borrowers above allowable DTI thresholds.

HOA / Condo / Community Fees

HOA dues have quietly become one of the most important drivers of rising monthly housing costs, especially for attached homes that traditionally serve as the “affordable” entry point for first-time buyers. Colorado’s data makes this trend unmistakable. According to REcolorado MLS records, typical HOA payments have risen sharply from 2019 to 2025. Among all property types, average monthly dues increased from $150 in October 2019 to nearly $197 in October 2025, a jump of more than 30%. Median dues grew as well, rising from about $81 to just over $100 during the same period.

For attached housing (townhomes, condos, and multifamily units), the increases have been even more dramatic. Average HOA dues in this segment climbed from roughly $312 to nearly $428 over six years, a 37% rise. The median bill moved from $275 to $389, an increase of more than 40%. On a per-square-foot basis, attached homes saw dues climb roughly 28% on average and nearly 18% at the median. These increases materially elevate the monthly burden for buyers who are already constrained by higher interest rates, insurance premiums, and property taxes.

Implications for first-time buyers

These cost layers tighten buyer qualification in several ways: higher monthly payments reduce the maximum purchase price a given income can support; elevated insurance or HOA dues increase monthly expenditures that lenders count; rising taxes may affect escrow requirements. For first-time buyers entering at older ages (median 40), the margin for error narrows, and fallback options (e.g., downsizing, rent-back, investment home later) shrink.

If buyers are deterred by higher carrying costs, this depresses demand for the lower end of the market. That can reduce turnover, amplifying inventory constraints. In markets like Colorado, where supply is already tight, fewer qualified first-time buyers mean slower entry and potentially more competition for non-starter homes—pushing upward pricing pressure elsewhere.

The move to age 40 for the median first-time buyer is telling. It indicates that accumulating sufficient savings (down payment + closing costs + reserves) is taking longer in the current environment. The elevated monthly carrying cost simply means entry is deferred. For this cohort, the affordability challenge is not just down payment but also monthly serviceability: higher monthly outlays (insurance + taxes + fees + debt service) mean more years of income growth are required to “qualify” as a buyer.
From a strategic vantage, that is why first-time buyer share has dropped to 21%: affordability isn’t just list-price constrained—it is monthly-payment constrained. According to NAR, “today’s first-time buyers are building less housing wealth and will likely have fewer moves over a lifetime.” In other words, each month of delay means reduced lifetime housing-wealth accumulation, fewer move opportunities, and altered life-cycle trajectories for homeowners.