If historical consensus and practical development answer the question of what ethnic unity is, then the promulgation of the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law marks the formal elevation of that consensus into a legal norm.

As stated in the preamble to the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China: “Upholding national unity and ethnic solidarity is the responsibility of all Chinese citizens.” This is not only a profound summary of the Chinese nation’s historical experience over thousands of years but also a legal expression of the unity and common development of all ethnic groups in advancing Chinese modernization.

History shows that ethnic unity is a natural consensus among all ethnic groups

The Chinese nation is a great nation with a civilization spanning more than 5,000 years. Through long periods of interactions, exchanges, and integration, the people of all ethnic groups in China have jointly developed the country’s vast territory, forged a unified multiethnic state, written a glorious chapter in Chinese history, created a splendid Chinese culture, and nurtured a great national spirit. This profoundly reveals the historical inevitability of the Chinese nation evolving from diversity to unity and fully demonstrates that ethnic unity and progress are historical certainties forged through the shared lives and efforts of all ethnic groups.

Looking back on the formation and development of the Chinese nation, unity has always been the mainstream of history, and ethnic unity and progress have consistently been the common aspiration of all ethnic groups. As early as the pre-Qin period (before 221 BC), the notion of “great unity” had already taken root on Chinese soil, and Confucius put forward the idea that “Within the four seas, all men are brothers.” From the Qin (221 BC-207 BC) and Han (202 BC-AD 220) dynasties onward, the concept of “great unity” gradually became the core political ideal of the Chinese nation. Despite periods of division throughout history, the unwavering belief—the territory cannot be divided, the country cannot be destabilized, the nation cannot be dispersed, and the civilization cannot be severed—has always been deeply embedded in the hearts of people of all ethnic groups, ultimately converging into an unstoppable historical trend. Through long-term migration, trade, and cultural exchange, the various ethnic groups have formed a pattern of “unity in diversity,” in which they are closely interconnected and inseparable.

After 1840, China was gradually reduced to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. In the heroic struggle for national salvation and resistance against foreign aggression, people of all ethnic groups came to a profound realization: only through unity, could they repel foreign invaders and defend their homeland. It was during this period that the Chinese nation underwent a great transformation from a “self-being” national entity to a “self-conscious” national entity. Since its founding, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has regarded the pursuit of happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as its original aspiration and mission. It has united and led the people of all ethnic groups in achieving national independence and the liberation of the people, establishing the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and ensuring that all ethnic groups genuinely enjoy equal political rights and equal status as masters of the country.

As socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, the CPC has adhered to integrating Marxist ethnic theory with the realities of China’s ethnic issues and the finest traditional Chinese culture. It has made fostering a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation the overarching guiding principle for both the Party’s work on ethnic affairs and all work in ethnic regions, blazing a trail in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxist ethnic theory and achieving historic progress in building the community for the Chinese nation.

History has fully demonstrated that ethnic unity is the lifeblood of all ethnic groups and the fundamental guarantee for the development and progress of the Chinese nation. Upholding ethnic unity is not the responsibility of any single ethnic group alone but the shared responsibility of all Chinese people. This consensus is the crystallization of several thousand years of the Chinese nation’s historical development.

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Rules established by law, and the consensus of the entire people codified

If historical consensus and practical development answer the question of what ethnic unity is, then the promulgation of the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law (hereinafter referred to as the Law) marks the formal elevation of that consensus into a legal norm that all Chinese people must observe, answering the question of why promoting ethnic unity and progress is the shared responsibility of all Chinese people. The life of the Law lies in its implementation, and the prerequisite for implementation is a clear definition of the responsible parties and their respective responsibilities.

From the perspective of responsible parties, the Law assigns the duty to safeguard ethnic unity to all government agencies, armed forces, political parties, social organizations, enterprises and public institutions, and every Chinese citizen, achieving full coverage. Article 10 of the General Provisions of the Law states: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the duty to safeguard national unity and the solidarity of all ethnic groups in the country.” Articles 41 through 48 of Chapter V, “Safeguards and Supervision,” respectively specify the duties of Party committees, governments, people’s congresses, mass organizations, enterprises and public institutions, religious groups, grassroots mass self-governing organizations, and the armed forces in promoting ethnic unity and progress. This comprehensive, multi-level allocation of responsibilities transforms ethnic unity from an abstract moral principle into concrete legal rights and obligations.

From the perspective of responsibilities, the Law establishes a systematic framework encompassing spiritual, social, and economic dimensions. On the spiritual level, Chapter II, “Building a Shared Spiritual Home,” requires the whole of society to share responsibility for building a shared spiritual home for the Chinese nation—from promoting the nationwide use of the standard spoken and written Chinese language, to integrating the sense of community for the Chinese nation into the national education, cadre education, and social education systems, and to encouraging news media to carry out publicity and reporting. Every organization and individual has clearly defined responsibilities for fostering shared spiritual and cultural values. On the social level, Chapter III, “Promoting Interactions, Exchanges, and Integration,” requires people’s governments at all levels to coordinate efforts to build closely connected communities, facilitate cross-regional population mobility, employment, and entrepreneurship, and support schools in carrying out joint learning activities and cross-regional exchanges among students of different ethnic groups. These provisions require the whole of society to create the institutional conditions for the all-around integration of all ethnic groups. On the developmental level, Chapter IV, “Driving Shared Prosperity and Common Development,” requires the relevant departments under the State Council and local people’s governments at or above the county level to promote high-quality development in ethnic regions, strengthen infrastructure, rationally allocate public service resources, and advance initiatives to revitalize border areas and improve the well-being of their residents. This demonstrates that the responsibility to promote ethnic unity and progress is not merely a negative obligation of “non-discrimination” and “non-separation,” but also a positive duty to actively promote the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups.

The ultimate purpose of everyone fulfilling these responsibilities is to ensure that everyone shares in the outcomes. The fundamental goal of promoting ethnic unity and progress is to achieve the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups and ensure that people of all ethnic groups share the fruits of reform and development. Article 4 of the Law stipulates that advancing the building of the community for the Chinese nation should “comprehensively realize the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups and ensure that the people of all ethnic groups are masters of the country.” Ultimately, all the safeguards and institutional arrangements established under the Law are intended to enhance the sense of gain, well-being, and security of all Chinese people.

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Acting in accordance with the Law and integrating ethnic unity into everyday life

Promoting ethnic unity and progress is the shared responsibility of all Chinese people. These responsibilities and requirements are not abstract moral appeals but statutory obligations and guidelines for action established by the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, which must ultimately be reflected in the daily conduct of every member of society.

First, deepen identification through cultural immersion. Ethnic unity begins with shared understanding and emotional connection. Every citizen should, by learning and using the standard spoken and written Chinese language, develop a deeper understanding of China’s fine traditional culture, revolutionary culture, and advanced socialist culture, and continuously strengthen their identification with the great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the CPC, and socialism with Chinese characteristics. A collaborative effort involving families, schools, and the wider community is essential to weave the values of a shared national identity into the fabric of everyday life. When the symbols of Chinese culture and the image of the Chinese nation are incorporated into urban planning and the construction of public facilities, and when the traditional festivals of various ethnic groups become cultural celebrations shared by the entire population, ethnic unity is transformed from an abstract concept into a tangible, lived experience.

Second, promote interactions, exchanges, and integration through integrated and interconnected communities. The high mobility of modern society has created unprecedented opportunities for interactions, exchanges, and integration among different peoples. Urban and rural planning, housing policies, and the allocation of public service resources should enable people of different ethnic groups to live, study, develop, share resources, work, and enjoy life together. When people of different peoples live in the same neighborhoods, work in the same workplaces, study in the same classrooms, and trade in the same markets, ethnic unity is naturally fostered through everyday interactions.

Third, safeguard unity through rational words and deeds. In the internet age, information spreads with unprecedented speed and reach. As a result, any inappropriate remark can cause serious social harm in a very short time. Every citizen has an obligation in cyberspace to express themselves rationally, interact in a civil manner, and refrain from disseminating false information, sowing discord among ethnic groups, or inciting extremist ethnic sentiments. Citizens have the right to file complaints or report information that undermines ethnic unity to the competent authorities. If state organs and their staff fail to perform their statutory duties, citizens also have the right to report them. In daily life, disputes involving ethnic issues should be resolved rationally through legal channels, and conflicts must not be deliberately provoked or escalated on the basis of ethnic identity. The rational words and deeds of every citizen contribute to ethnic unity.

Fourth, serve the broader interest by fulfilling duties and responsibilities. For state organs and their staff, promoting ethnic unity and progress is not only a personal obligation but also a statutory duty. Organs at all levels should integrate the task of fostering a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation throughout the entire process of policymaking, administrative implementation, and public service delivery. For public officials in ethnic regions, it is particularly important to play an exemplary and leading role in developing the economy, improving people’s well-being, and maintaining social stability. When every organization regards ethnic unity as part of its own responsibilities, the cause of ethnic unity and progress gains sustained institutional momentum.

Fifth, safeguard the bottom line through law-based thinking. The Law is the strongest safeguard for ethnic unity. Citizens should consciously strengthen their awareness of the nation, citizenship, and the rule of law, and clearly recognize that acts undermining ethnic unity are not only moral transgressions but also legal violations or even criminal offenses. The Law imposes severe criminal penalties for violent terrorist activities, separatist activities, and religious extremist activities. It also explicitly opposes and holds accountable acts carried out by external forces under the pretexts of ethnicity, religion, human rights, or other causes that undermine China’s ethnic unity and progress or incite ethnic division. Every citizen should serve as a guardian of national security and resolutely oppose all acts that endanger ethnic unity and national unity.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The authors are Zhou Hongbo, professor and doctoral supervisor at Southwest Minzu University; Zhao Xin, lecturer at Southwest Minzu University.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

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Translator/ Wang Li

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Stretching more than 2,000 meters, the Pingtang Grand Bridge in Guizhou province is a masterpiece of steel and concrete. At dawn, its three diamond-shaped blue towers emerge from and disappear into the mist. Together with the main girder and cables, the skirt-like towers create a graceful, slender-waisted silhouette.

Spanning the Caodu River Gorge in Pingtang county, Qiannan Buyi and Miao autonomous prefecture, Guizhou province, the Pingtang Grand Bridge is a masterpiece of steel and concrete. Stretching more than 2,000 meters, it features the world’s tallest reinforced-concrete bridge tower at 332 meters, standing as a testament to China’s extraordinary engineering capabilities. More than a transportation link, it tells a contemporary Chinese story through its architectural aesthetics, cultural integration, and development vision.

The bridge’s appeal lies not only in its striking form but also in its innovative interpretation of traditional culture. Home to diverse ethnic groups, including the Han, Bouyei, and Maonan, Pingtang drew on its rich cultural heritage to inspire the bridge’s design.

At dawn, its three diamond-shaped blue towers emerge from and disappear into the mist. Together with the main girder and cables, the skirt-like towers create a graceful, slender-waisted silhouette. Their blue-and-white color scheme, reminiscent of natural dyes, harmonizes with the surrounding landscape, blending ethnic design elements into the mountains and rivers.

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“These bridges spanning natural chasms do more than connect communities; they have become an indispensable part of Guizhou’s cultural fabric,” said Zhong Ronglian, chief engineer of Guizhou Road and Bridge Group and the project lead.

The bridge exemplifies China’s ability to overcome engineering extremes. Faced with complex karst terrain, the construction team solved dozens of technical challenges, reinforcing Guizhou’s reputation as a national leader in bridge engineering. It has since received prestigious international honors, including the 38th Gustav Lindenthal Medal and the IABSE Outstanding Structure Award.

Its significance extends far beyond transportation. Through an innovative “Bridge + Service Area + Scenic Spot” model, it has opened a gateway to prosperity. Adjacent to the bridge, the “Sky Bridge” tourist service area, designed around an “interstellar” theme, welcomes more than 300,000 visitors each year and has become a destination for sightseeing, leisure, and science education.

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For Pinglihe Village at the foot of the bridge, geography once made it difficult to bring premium produce to market. Today, consignment agreements with the service area enable local specialties such as loquats and passion fruit to reach more consumers. Returning villager Luo Chaopin now earns more than 150,000 yuan a year from his orchards and vegetable fields, enjoying an increasingly prosperous life.

By spanning deep gorges and connecting communities, the bridge has narrowed both physical and social distances. Neighboring villages are now more closely connected, writing a shared story of development. Pingtang county has further integrated the bridge with the “China Sky Eye” and the “Pingtang Sinkholes” to create a premier tourism route, turning “green mountains and clear waters” into tangible economic value.

As a crowning jewel in Guizhou’s “Museum of Bridges,” the Pingtang Grand Bridge rises from land once described as having “not three feet of flat ground.” It stands as a testament to a remarkable achievement: more than 30,000 bridges now span the province, including half of the world’s highest bridges.

China’s bridge builders cut through mountains and span rushing rivers. From swift waterways and steep gorges to broad bays, they continue to push the boundaries of engineering. These steel rainbows carry the people’s aspirations for a better life.

Today, “Chinese Bridges” continue to shine as a national calling card, writing a new chapter of connectivity, coordinated development, and common prosperity.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

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In the modern era, Japan embarked on a path of militarist expansion, regarding the seizure of Taiwan as a central objective of its "Southern Advance Strategy." Taiwan was plunged into half a century of brutal colonial rule. Those 50 years also stand as a history of Taiwan compatriots' unyielding struggle to preserve the spirit of the Chinese nation.

“To this day, the wound inflicted 130 years ago by Japanese imperialism during the First Sino-Japanese War remains unhealed across the Taiwan Strait.” These words, spoken with profound grief by Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wun during her April 2026 visit to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, express the deepest historical trauma borne by Taiwan compatriots in modern times.

In the modern era, Japan embarked on a path of militarist expansion, regarding the seizure of Taiwan as a central objective of its “Southern Advance Strategy.” In 1894, Japan deliberately provoked the First Sino-Japanese War. The following year, it forced the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, under which the entire island of Taiwan and its affiliated islands, and the Penghu Islands were ceded by force. Although Taiwan’s military and civilian population issued the defiant cry, “Better to die defending Taiwan than surrender it,” and mounted heroic resistance against the cession, the island was ultimately plunged into half a century of brutal colonial rule. Those 50 years stand not only as a record of the Japanese colonizers’ atrocities and plunder, but also as a history of Taiwan compatriots’ unyielding struggle to preserve the spirit of the Chinese nation.

Coveting and seizure: A premeditated aggression

Japan’s covetous designs on Taiwan did not begin with the First Sino-Japanese War. In November 1871, more than 60 Ryukyu subjects engaged in tributary trade were shipwrecked by a typhoon off the southeastern coast of Taiwan, where 54 were mistakenly killed by members of the local Mudan community. The Qing government rescued and escorted the remaining 12 back to Ryukyu.

Seizing upon the incident as a pretext, the Japanese government falsely claimed suzerainty over the Ryukyu Kingdom. In November 1873, Japanese Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi traveled to Beijing to press Japan’s claims. In February 1874, Japan crafted the Essentials for the Disposition of Aboriginal Territories in Taiwan—a programmatic document for the invasion of Taiwan. That May, under the false pretext of avenging the shipwrecked Ryukyu subjects, Japan brazenly dispatched troops to invade Taiwan, massacring local inhabitants—an atrocity known as the “Mudan Incident.”

Although the Qing court dispatched Shen Baozhen, minister of the Fujian Navy, to respond, its diplomatic weakness ultimately forced it to sign the unequal Treaty of Beijing. By referring to the Ryukyu subjects as “Japanese nationals” and demanding an indemnity of 500,000 taels of silver, the treaty created a serious latent danger, paving the way for Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879 and its invasion of China two decades later.

The Mudan Incident was no accident; it was Japan’s first act of aggression following the Meiji Restoration. Over the next 20 years, Japan systematically infiltrated spies into Taiwan to survey the terrain, produce detailed maps, and gather intelligence, while massively expanding its military in preparation for war.

In July 1894, Japan launched the First Sino-Japanese War, pursuing a premeditated strategy of “striking Weihaiwei and seizing Taiwan” that made the occupation of Taiwan a central strategic objective. In February 1895, the Beiyang Fleet of the Qing government was annihilated. The following month, Japanese forces seized the Penghu Islands, severing Taiwan’s link to the mainland and creating a fait accompli of occupation. On April 17, 1895, the Qing government was coerced into signing the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki, through which Japan sought to legalize its forcible occupation of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

Shackles and plunder: A catastrophe of survival under brutal colonial rule

On June 17, 1895, Japan officially imposed colonial rule over Taiwan. From that moment, Taiwan was reduced to a captive overseas colony, subjected to half a century of colonial enslavement.

To enforce its domination, Japan instituted a totalitarian governor-general system that concentrated executive, legislative, and judicial powers in a single office, backed by a regime of “police repression.” The governor-general wielded absolute power over the lives and deaths of the people in Taiwan. Through the Baojia system—a regime of collective punishment that bound 10 households into a Jia and 10 Jia into a Bao—the people in Taiwan were kept under constant surveillance and oppression, entirely stripped of their basic political rights and human dignity.

The police were deeply intertwined with the Baojia system, forming the core apparatus of the governor-general’s autocratic rule and extending its reach into every alley and household. According to Japanese records, between 1898 and 1902 alone, more than 11,900 Taiwan anti-Japanese patriots were hunted down and persecuted, with battlefield casualties too numerous to count. The chilling warning used to frighten children—”The police are coming!”—stands as a grim testament to that era of terror.

Behind these iron political shackles lay a campaign of rapacious economic exploitation.

To fuel its expansionist wars, Japan forcibly integrated Taiwan’s economy into its wartime command system, implementing a colonial strategy of “Agricultural Taiwan, Industrial Japan” to plunder the island’s resources. The Japanese colonial authorities established strict monopolies, granting Japanese conglomerates exclusive control over vital commodities such as opium, camphor, tobacco, tea, and salt, thereby extracting enormous monopoly profits. For example, Taiwan produced four-fifths of the world’s camphor supply; the “Governor-General’s Office” appointed Mitsui & Co. as the sole agent, reaping more than 3.58 million yen in profits in 1898 alone.

At the same time, Japan seized arable land through forced expropriation to consolidate its colonial fiscal base. Rice and sugar became Taiwan’s two primary exports to Japan. Taiwan’s sugarcane farmers were forced to sell their crops to Japanese-owned refineries at rock-bottom prices, while more than 90% of the island’s sugar output was shipped to Japan—leading historians to conclude: “The history of Taiwan’s sugar industry is a history of Japanese colonization.” With most of the rice harvest likewise exported to Japan, chronic food shortages plagued the island, giving rise to the term “hunger export.”

By the 1930s, Japan had repositioned Taiwan as a “Southern Advance Base” for its invasions of China and the Pacific. To sustain its war machine, it tightened economic controls, intensified the exploitation of mineral resources, and relentlessly extracted the wealth of the people. Taiwan’s economy was reduced to a mere appendage of the Japanese empire, with trade dependence reaching 75.02% by 1935. This prolonged exploitation drained the island’s resources, stunted its development, and left Taiwan people in persistent poverty.

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The “Kōminka Movement”: Spiritual annihilation and cultural erasure

To crush the will of Taiwan people and cement its colonial rule, the Japanese colonial authorities enforced a policy of forced assimilation, vainly attempting to fully integrate Taiwan into the Japanese imperial system.

Before colonization, Taiwan’s education system followed the traditional Chinese model of private academies and county schools. In early 1896, the “Governor-General’s Office” designated Japanese as the “national language” and established “National Language Institutes” to enforce its use. To accelerate assimilation, the Japanese colonial authorities replaced these institutes with “public schools” in July 1898, enforcing compulsory education for Taiwan children. In these schools, Japanese-language instruction accounted for 70% of classroom hours, and even traditional Chinese private schools—derogatorily labeled “shufang” (study rooms) by the Japanese—were forced to incorporate Japanese-language instruction. Consequently, the number of these Chinese traditional schools plummeted from 1,707 in 1898 to just 129 by 1933, and to a mere 17 by 1940.

Following Japan’s full-scale invasion of China in 1937, the Japanese colonial authorities launched the “Kōminka (Japanization) Movement,” pressing people in Taiwan into Japan’s war machine.

In January 1937, the “Governor-General’s Office” abolished the Chinese-language editions of major newspapers, including the Taiwan Daily News, Taiwan News, and Tainan News; by June, all Chinese-language newspapers had been banned. After the outbreak of the full-scale War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Japanese colonial authorities imposed a total ban on the Chinese language: fines were levied on those who refused to learn Japanese, and officials who spoke Chinese were removed from their posts. Students were forced to speak Japanese exclusively and were even expected to compel their families to do the same. Discrimination permeated every aspect of life—education, employment, and public services—with reports of train stations refusing to sell tickets to anyone unable to speak Japanese. The Japanese colonial authorities indoctrinated the population, especially children, with propaganda glorifying Japan while degrading Taiwan people as “third-class subjects.”

The colonial regime mandated the wearing of kimonos, residence in Japanese-style houses, and the abandonment of traditional folk beliefs and ancestor worship in favor of Shinto. It abolished Chinese surnames in favor of Japanese names and purged Chinese history, Confucian thought, and literature from the curriculum, aiming to excise the Chinese roots embedded in the bloodline of Taiwan people.

This spiritual oppression was starkly evident in the reaction to the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As Kuomintang Chairperson Cheng Li-wun aptly observed: “On the mainland, mourning Dr. Sun Yat-sen is natural and open. In Taiwan, mourning Dr. Sun Yat-sen required caution, secrecy, and evasion.”

Furthermore, the Japanese colonial authorities forced students to undergo “Japanese Subject Training,” cultivating a character defined by “ferocity, competitiveness, and blind obedience.” They instilled the notion that they were “children of the Japanese Emperor” and conscripted tens of thousands of young people from Taiwan to fight across Chinese mainland, Japan, and the South Pacific, resulting in more than 30,000 battlefield deaths.

The essence of the “Kōminka Movement” was a campaign of cultural genocide. It sought to destroy the local Chinese cultural foundation, erase the Chinese national identity of the people, and sever Taiwan’s historical, cultural, and emotional bonds with the motherland, and ultimately transform the people in Taiwan into submissive colonial subjects of Japan.

Guardians on two fronts: The road to restoration and the sacred cause of the nation

When news of the Qing court’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s forcible seizure of Taiwan reached the mainland, the entire nation was shaken, and compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were stricken with grief. In Beijing, provincial juren (successful candidates in the provincial-level imperial examinations) waiting for the metropolitan imperial examinations, overcome with indignation, launched the famed “Petition of the Examination Candidates” (Gongche Shangshu). On the island of Taiwan, “cries of mourning pierced the heavens,” and the people of Taipei sounded gongs and closed their shops in protest. With the defiant vow, “Better that every man die defending Taiwan than surrender it with folded hands,” Taiwan’s military and civilian population took up rustic firearms and broadswords to resist the better-equipped Japanese invaders.

From June to October 1895, Taiwan’s volunteer militias and Qing troops fought wave after wave, enduring more than 100 engagements in a resistance that lasted more than five months. Their stand resulted in 4,800 Japanese dead—including Prince Kitashirakawa-no-miya Yoshihisa, commander of the Imperial Guard Division—and 27,000 wounded. Japanese casualties were nearly double those Japan sustained during the entire First Sino-Japanese War.

With the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, the revolutionary ideals of national salvation and rejuvenation crossed the Strait and spread widely throughout Taiwan. Between 1912 and 1915, the island witnessed nine large-scale uprisings under the banner “Expel the Japanese invaders and recover Taiwan.” By the 1920s, resistance had evolved from armed uprising to cultural awakening. Patriotic intellectuals such as Lin Xiantang and Jiang Weishui founded the Taiwan Cultural Association, resisting colonial assimilation through nonviolent means while preserving the roots of Chinese culture.

After consolidating control over Han Chinese resistance, the Japanese colonial authorities pushed into the mountains to conquer, plunder, and massacre the island’s indigenous peoples. In the face of this brutal rule, on October 27, 1930, Mona Rudao, chief of the Seediq people, rallied six tribes from the Wushe area and seized the occasion of the Japanese colonial authorities’ “Shrine Festival” athletic meet to launch an armed anti-Japanese uprising—the Wushe Uprising.

In response, the Japanese colonial authorities deployed more than 1,400 troops and police, backed by aircraft, artillery, and even chemical warfare agents, to crush the revolt. Mona Rudao and his warriors held out in the mountain forests for weeks, resisting with unwavering resolve before ultimately taking their own lives after exhausting all their ammunition and supplies. Statistics show that 343 locals were killed in battle and 296 died by suicide. The Japanese colonial authorities then forcibly relocated hundreds of surviving tribal members from their ancestral lands and placed them under prolonged surveillance.

Mona Rudao once declared: “The Japanese are denser than the leaves of the forest, more numerous than the stones in the Zhuoshui River—yet my resolve to resist is firmer than Mount Qilai.”

This solemn awakening—”Better to die than live as slaves of a fallen nation”—led many progressive Taiwan youths to a profound realization: “To save Taiwan, one must first save the motherland. To devote oneself to the Taiwan revolutionary movement, one must first see the Chinese revolution succeed. Only when China grows strong can Taiwan be restored; only when China wields power can the people of Taiwan break free from the Japanese shackles.” They crossed the Strait one after another to join the tide of resistance on the mainland. From the Taiwan National Revolutionary Alliance to the Taiwan Volunteer Corps and the Taiwan Revolutionary Alliance, these anti-Japanese organizations of Taiwan compatriots bound Taiwan’s destiny inextricably to that of the motherland. By 1945, approximately 50,000 Taiwan compatriots had returned to the mainland, organizing in various capacities to join the National United Front Against Japanese Aggression and building the political and ideological strength for Taiwan’s eventual restoration.

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History illuminates the future: From blood-soaked struggle to inevitable reunification

The 50-year heroic struggle finally gave way to the dawn of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. On December 9, 1941, the Chinese government formally declared war on Japan, announcing the abrogation of all unequal Sino-Japanese treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Subsequently, the 1943 Cairo Declaration explicitly stipulated that all Chinese territories seized by Japan, including Taiwan, were to be restored to China. The 1945 Potsdam Proclamation reaffirmed this unequivocally.

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, declaring its acceptance of all the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation.

On October 25, 1945, the Chinese government held a surrender ceremony in Taipei, solemnly declaring to the world that, from that day forward, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands are formally restored to Chinese territory.

From the Cairo Declaration to the Potsdam Proclamation and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, this series of international legal instruments—each of profound political and military significance—forms a complete and rigorous legal chain. They explicitly required defeated Japan to return Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to China, jointly constituting the solid legal basis for Taiwan’s postwar restoration to China.

The historical fact of Taiwan’s recovery embodies the unity of international law, Chinese bloodline, and national identity. Yet the current DPP authorities in Taiwan have brazenly fabricated a “pro-Japanese” historical narrative, with Lai Ching-te going so far as to peddle the preposterous claim that “colonial rule was superior to what followed.” This constitutes not merely a distortion of history but a deliberate erasure of the national memory of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and Taiwan’s recovery, deeply wounding the national sentiments of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

History must not be tampered with; national sentiment must not be trifled with. Just as the wound hewn across the Taiwan Strait will ultimately heal, the course of cross-Strait relations cannot be altered by a handful of discordant voices. China will be reunified—and indeed must be reunified. This is the irresistible tide of history and the most just reckoning for those 50 years of blood and tears.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Xu Xiaoquan, Researcher, Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

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Translator/ Li Li

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Qiaopi letters recorded the arduous journeys and struggles of overseas Chinese who crossed the oceans, carrying with them a deep longing for their families and homeland.

“I have been away for many years, yet my endeavors have not prospered... Enclosed herewith is a Tianyi bank draft for 150 yuan, along with another 6 silver dollars remitted separately. Please acknowledge receipt of both.” These are lines from an ordinary qiaopi (overseas Chinese remittance letter). Without ornate rhetoric, these few short sentences capture the arduous journeys and struggles of overseas Chinese who crossed the oceans, carrying with them a deep longing for their families and homeland. In 2013, “Qiaopi Archives—Overseas Chinese Remittance Letters” were inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register, elevating these documents from the collective memory of overseas Chinese and their homeland to a shared heritage of all humanity.

Qiaopi refers to the letters and remittance vouchers sent home by overseas Chinese in the old days. They served not only as an economic lifeline for transnational families but also as a spiritual bond connecting overseas Chinese to their native soil. They bear witness to the historical process of the Chinese nation reaching out to and integrating into the world in modern times, serving as enduring testimony to transnational migration and cultural continuity.

Each qiaopi letter records the hardships of seeking a livelihood abroad

“Business here in Jambi is extremely bleak; making a profit is harder than reaching the sky.” Such laments recur frequently in qiaopi letters. From the mid-19th century onward, as world trade expanded and Southeast Asia and the Americas developed, the demand for overseas labor grew steadily. Large numbers of Chinese people from the coastal regions of Guangdong and Fujian embarked on journeys across the oceans in search of a livelihood. For them, going abroad was not about chasing wealth, but about finding a way for their families to survive in the face of barren land, frequent disasters, and social upheaval.

The history of overseas Chinese is both a history of suffering and a history of struggle. After perilous sea voyages, many arrived in foreign lands to work in mines, plantations, docks, and construction sites, performing the heaviest and most dangerous labor. Scorching heat, disease, language barriers, and racial discrimination were the shared realities of their lives. Qiaopi letters record all of this: “meager wages,” “working day and night,” “afraid to see a doctor when ill,” “in tattered clothes,” “unable to return home”... Without embellishment, each line reflects the hardships of survival abroad.

Heavier than the hardships of life was the sense of responsibility to family. No matter how difficult their circumstances, overseas Chinese would scrimp and save to send money home. Some never returned to their homeland in their entire lives, yet for decades, they regularly sent remittances to support their parents and raise their children. Some lived in cramped shacks but insisted on sending money for their younger siblings’ education. On their deathbeds, some entrusted others to send their hard-earned savings back to their home villages.

For countless families in the qiaoxiang (home villages of overseas Chinese), a qiaopi letter was more than a family letter—it was a lifeline. It might mean a family’s daily sustenance, a child’s tuition, or a tiled roof to shelter them from wind and rain. It helped families through one hardship after another.

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Rooted in the homeland while growing in foreign lands

Qiaopi letters record not only the struggles of overseas Chinese crossing the oceans but also their gradual establishment and development in foreign lands. Most early overseas Chinese started with the most menial labor. Through diligence, integrity, and perseverance, they gradually gained a foothold in their host countries. Chen Wusheng, an overseas Chinese, left for Surabaya, Indonesia, at the age of 20. Starting as an odd-job worker in a local produce shop, he later founded “Indonesia Xinji Chen Wusheng Co., Ltd.,” which primarily traded in sugar. Later, Chen’s eldest son, Chen Zhengzong, also came to Indonesia. Father and son worked from dawn to dusk, peddling goods from shoulder poles. To save money, they even avoided using kerosene lamps, and plain rice with pickled vegetables was their daily meal. Through integrity and shrewd business acumen, “Xinji Company” grew steadily to become the third-largest Chinese-owned enterprise in the region by the 1930s. Such stories of rising from humble beginnings abound in qiaopi archives. Some ran grocery, hardware, or herbal medicine shops; others worked on rubber plantations and in mines; and still others contributed to railway and port construction, becoming important participants in and contributors to local economic development.

In 1869, the Pacific Railroad, stretching west from Sacramento, California, to Omaha, Nebraska, was officially joined, completing the first transcontinental railroad across North America. From 1865 to 1869, approximately 12,000 Chinese laborers participated in the project, accounting for 85% of the workforce on the western section. They completed most of the hardest tasks, including digging granite tunnels and building trestles along cliffs.

In the qiaopi letters, some authors wrote about the construction of roads and factories, some introduced local customs and social conditions, and others encouraged relatives and friends to learn foreign languages and acquire new skills. These contents show that overseas Chinese were not merely seeking to survive abroad, but also building homes, integrating into local societies, and actively participating in their development.

At the same time, overseas Chinese never severed their ties to Chinese culture. They established Chinese-language schools, launched Chinese-language newspapers, founded clan associations, built ancestral temples and shrines, and celebrated traditional festivals such as the Spring Festival, Lantern Festival, and Mid-Autumn Festival, ensuring the continuation and transmission of Chinese culture overseas. In 1905, the Ying Fo Fui Kun (Yinghe Clan Association) in Singapore founded Yingxin School, pioneering modern education in Singapore. In 1913, the Hakka General Association in Thailand established Jinde School, one of Thailand’s earliest renowned Chinese-language schools. These cultural commitments, rooted in foreign soil, ensured that traditional Chinese culture and values were passed down through generations in overseas Chinese families.

An unwavering commitment to home and country across the ages

“The war between China and Japan has begun... The overseas Chinese here are deeply concerned. Though our town is but a small place, we have already raised more than 10,000 guilders, and we will continue monthly donations and contributions until the barbaric aggressor is defeated.” Such words are common in qiaopi letters from the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, documenting the profound sense of patriotism and responsibility that bound overseas Chinese to their motherland in times of national crisis.

After the September 18 Incident in 1931, overseas Chinese actively joined the movement for national salvation and resistance against Japanese aggression. Following the outbreak of the Lugou Bridge Incident in 1937, they donated and contributed even more enthusiastically. Through fundraising, purchasing medical supplies, transporting materials, and organizing medical teams, they lent their strength to China’s war effort. In 1937, overseas Chinese Zheng Chaojiong, upon hearing of the Lugou Bridge Incident, resolutely decided to sell sunflower seeds to raise funds for the resistance. Over the following years, he traveled through theaters, teahouses, docks, and railway stations across Southeast Asia, ultimately donating the full 180,000 yuan he had raised through charity sales to the Relief Committee of Nanyang Overseas Chinese for China’s Refugees. This sum could have purchased 200,000 kilograms of rice at the time. Overseas Chinese Lin Shichen wrote to his eldest son, Lin Xuanying, who was in China: “Since the July 7 Incident, I have participated in 90% of the fundraising campaigns here.” Even though his own Da You Company was not doing well, he insisted on making monthly donations of 10 guilders. Many qiaopi letters explicitly mention contributions “for national defense bonds,” “for the national salvation fund,” “for aiding refugees,” and “for supporting frontline soldiers.” Statistics show that during the War of Resistance, overseas Chinese donations totaled more than 1.3 billion yuan, remittances exceeded 9.5 billion yuan, and they subscribed to more than 1.1 billion yuan in various national salvation bonds issued by the government, providing crucial support for China’s protracted resistance. At the same time, many young overseas Chinese resolutely returned to join the war effort—some as pilots in the air force, others in battlefield medical care and material transport—contributing through direct action to the national salvation movement.

In 1941, the Pacific War broke out, and the Japanese army blockaded China’s southeast coast. The traditional maritime qiaopi channels were completely cut off, and more than one million dependents of overseas Chinese who relied on qiaopi remittances were left in dire straits. In the spring of 1942, qiaopi traders in Fujian and Guangdong, using Mong Cai in Vietnam as a breakthrough point and Dongxing in Guangxi as a hub, leveraged existing cross-border remittance networks to open a long-distance route for secretly transporting qiaopi through inland Guangdong and Guangxi back to the qiaoxiang. What had been scattered cross-border routes expanded and matured into the fully established “Dongxing Route,” which became the main strategic corridor for overseas Chinese remittances into China. The Dongxing Route stretched approximately 3,000 kilometers, passing through war zones, bandit territories, and blockades, with deliveries taking one to three months. Qiaopi couriers often risked their lives. At its peak, Dongxing port hosted 30 to 40 qiaopi transit points, processing hundreds of thousands of qiaopi letters each month. This “lifeline,” which existed for only three and a half years, stands as the most vivid historical testimony to the deep bond between overseas Chinese and their homeland during the war years.

The commitment of overseas Chinese to their homeland did not fade with the end of the war. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, overseas Chinese returned home in large numbers to participate in socialist construction. A large number of overseas-educated scholars, including Qian Xuesen and Hua Luogeng, gave up comfortable lives in the West and returned to China, becoming leading figures in various academic fields. Sports talents such as Tang Xianhu, Hou Jiachang, and Lin Huiqing returned to coach in China, making significant contributions to the development of sports in the new country. In 1951, patriotic overseas Chinese leader Wang Yuanxing, with China in ruins and awaiting reconstruction, brought all his overseas capital back to invest in the new country, establishing its first Sino-foreign joint venture and overseas Chinese-funded enterprise. Overseas Chinese businessman Li Yintong, overcoming immense difficulties, introduced rubber saplings to Hainan Island, filling a gap in China’s rubber cultivation. Tan Kah Kee, in addition to his vigorous efforts in education, actively promoted railway construction in the new country, proposing the construction of a railway in Fujian and playing a key role in the construction of the Yingtan-Xiamen Railway. Many hospitals, schools, bridges, and roads in qiaoxiang such as Guangdong and Fujian bear the imprint of the support and contributions of overseas Chinese.

Since the reform and opening up, overseas Chinese have once again become important participants in China’s opening-up to the outside world. They were among the first to return to invest and set up factories, introducing overseas capital, technology, markets, and modern management expertise and injecting strong momentum into local economic development. In 1978, 82-year-old Thai Chinese business leader Chia Ek Chor resolved to return and invest in China. While many foreign and overseas Chinese investors were still hesitant, he had firm faith in China’s development prospects. In 1979, he established Chia Tai Conti Ltd. in Shenzhen, Guangdong, building China’s first modern feed factory. In 1980, Indonesian Chinese business leader Sudono Salim (Liem Swie Lion), together with more than 10 fellow overseas Chinese from Fuqing, pooled US$10 million to build a factory in his hometown, establishing Qinghua Sugar Factory, the first foreign-invested enterprise in Fujian province.

Qiaopi letters bear witness to this historical transformation: Early letters wrote of “sending money to support the family,” while later ones recorded “returning to set up factories”; earlier concerns were for one family’s subsistence, while later ones turned to hometown development and national progress. The “home” in qiaopi letters gradually expanded from the immediate family to encompass the ancestral homeland and the motherland. This sense of responsibility, transcending time, continues to this day.

Chinese modernization still calls for unity across the seas

Over the years, more than 60 million overseas Chinese residing in nearly 200 countries and regions, together with more than 40 million returned overseas Chinese and their dependents in China, have never been absent from China’s reform, opening up, and modernization. They have continuously contributed their wisdom and resources to promoting exchanges and cooperation between China and the rest of the world.

The Chinese government has closely integrated the promotion of overseas Chinese affairs with serving major national strategies, placing special emphasis on attracting overseas Chinese talent and capital. It has implemented various measures to facilitate the work and lives of overseas talent in China, creating a favorable environment for them. It has promulgated the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations, revised the negative list for foreign investment multiple times, and substantially relaxed market access restrictions for foreign investment, including overseas Chinese capital. It has hosted the Industrial and Commercial Convention of Worldwide Overseas Chinese and the Overseas Chinese Businessmen Investment Conference, and supported the hosting of World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conventions both domestically and internationally, encouraging overseas Chinese businesspeople to contribute to China’s high-quality economic development.

Overseas Chinese from Fujian and their invested enterprises have actively participated in Fujian-Ningxia cooperation. They have taken root in Minning Town at the eastern foothills of the Helan Mountains, transforming the Gobi wasteland into a vast vineyard, and leveraging overseas Chinese talent and capital to promote the achievements of Fujian-Ningxia cooperation internationally.

The Shantou Overseas Chinese Pilot Zone in Guangdong has leveraged overseas Chinese capital and talent to build a cross-border digital economy industrial park. Through the digital industry, it has erected a bridge connecting China with the world and enhanced the city’s level of openness.

From deep engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative to strengthening people-to-people bonds between China and the rest of the world, from disseminating fine traditional Chinese culture to energizing nongovernmental exchanges, the innovative contributions of overseas Chinese in the new era can be found across all industries and sectors.

These stories of overseas Chinese in the new era are in the same spirit as those carried by qiaopi a century ago. What has changed is the context of the times, not the sense of responsibility; what has changed is the means of communication, not the bonds of kinship; what has changed is the content of the messages, not the enduring attachment to hometown and motherland.

Today, electronic payments have long since replaced traditional qiaopi, and digital communications have made it possible for people separated by oceans to remain connected. Yet the spirit embodied in qiaopi has not faded away. It bears witness to the historical journey of the Chinese nation reaching out to the world through openness and exchange, and it demonstrates the profound and unbreakable bond—shared blood, shared hearts, and a shared future—that unites overseas Chinese with their ancestral homeland and motherland.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The authors are Qin Yunzhou, Associate Professor at the School of Marxism and Researcher at the Research Base for Forging a Strong Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation, Jinan University, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Studies on the Qiaopi Culture; Xu Wenfang, Lecturer at the School of Marxism and Researcher at the Research Base for Forging a Strong Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation, Jinan University, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Studies on the Qiaopi Culture.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Dong Mei

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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From a geographical perspective, there does indeed exist a Kunlun Mountain Range in western China. More importantly, Kunlun Culture has long been woven into the cultural fabric of the Chinese nation, becoming a shared spiritual bond.

The discovery of a Qin-Dynasty (221–206 BC) cliff inscription on the northern shore of Lake Gyaring (Zhaling Hu) in Qinghai, China, has sparked intense debate within archaeological circles. Known as the Garitang Qin Cliff Inscription, the 37-character text records that Emperor Qinshihuang (259–210 BC) dispatched people to Kunlun Mountain to gather medicinal herbs. Scholars hold differing views, but the debate ultimately converges on one pivotal question: Could this inscription offer a crucial clue in the millennia-long inquiry into Kunlun?

As is widely known, the Chinese pursuit of Kunlun has never ceased, from antiquity to the present.

What is Kunlun?

From a geographical perspective, there does indeed exist a Kunlun Mountain Range in western China. Stretching approximately 2,500 kilometers from the eastern Pamirs in the west, it traverses regions including Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Xizang, with an average elevation of 5,500 to 6,000 meters. Revered as the “Ancestor of All Mountains,” this immense mountain system extends eastward to the Qinling-Huaihe Line, connects northward with the Altun, Qilian, and Helan mountain ranges, and branches southward into the Bayan Har and Hengduan ranges before linking to the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau in southwestern China. Such an expansive system forms a fundamental skeleton of China’s territorial geography.

In fact, Chinese reverence for Kunlun predates concrete geographical knowledge of this specific mountain range.

The name “Kunlun” appears frequently in ancient Chinese texts, with its earliest known mention in the Yugong (Tribute of Yu) section of the Shangshu (Book of Documents). Its core meaning is often understood as “heaven,” with the primary function of “connecting to heaven.” Some scholars suggest that ancient people associated Kunlun with the cyclical daily movement of the sun’s rising and setting.

Because of its unique significance, Kunlun has long been revered in traditional Chinese culture as a sacred and holy mountain. The worship of Kunlun is closely aligned with ancient veneration of “heaven” and the “sun.”

In the ancient mythological text Shanhaijing (Classic of Mountains and Seas), Kunlun is portrayed as the earthly capital of the Heavenly Emperor, a celestial realm where immortals reside. It serves not only as the setting for stories such as Houyi Shooting the Suns, Kuafu Chasing the Sun, and Chang’e Flying to the Moon, but also as the backdrop for legends including Yu the Great Taming the Floods, Fuxi and Nüwa Creating the World, and Pangu Separating Heaven and Earth. These Kunlun-centered myths reflect early understandings of natural phenomena and admiration for heroic spirit, while also embodying the Chinese nation’s cosmology and its core value of “harmony between heaven and humanity.”

Notably, although the question of whether mythological Kunlun corresponds to the geographical Kunlun Mountains remains unresolved, Kunlun Culture has long been woven into the cultural fabric of the Chinese nation, becoming a shared spiritual bond.

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Was the ancient worship of Kunlun confined to mere romantic imagination?

Archaeological discoveries suggest otherwise, offering tangible evidence that the concept of “revering heaven” embodied in Kunlun Culture emerged early in the formative stages of Chinese civilization.

According to historical records, the circular mound (yuanqiu) used by ancient peoples for heaven worship—particularly those featuring a three-ring design—was known as the Kunlun Mound. Remains of such mountaintop “circular mounds” dedicated to heaven worship have been identified at sites including the Gaomiao site in Hongjiang, Hunan (more than 7,000 years old), as well as the Niuheliang site in Jianping, Liaoning, and the Lingjiatan site in Hanshan, Anhui (both more than 5,000 years old).

Beyond ritual practice, the pursuit of Kunlun by successive central dynasties left clear traces in historical records. Within Kunlun Culture, Kunlun was regarded as the “center of the world.” As such, it evolved into a symbol of universal sovereignty, closely tied to the political core of the state.

Around 3,000 years ago, during the Western Zhou period (c. 1046–771 BC), stories circulated of King Mu of the Zhou Dynasty (reigned c. 976–922 BC) traveling west to Kunlun to meet the Queen Mother of the West (Xiwangmu). The recently discovered Garitang Qin Cliff Inscription provides important material evidence that Emperor Qinshihuang, after completing the great unification, undertook an exploration of Kunlun more than two millennia ago.

During the Han Dynasty (202 BC–AD 220), Emperor Wudi (141–87 BC) for the first time anchored the legend of “Kunlun” to a concrete geographical entity, identifying the southern mountains of Khotan (near present-day Hetian county, Xinjiang) as Kunlun and thereby defining the western frontier of China at the time.

In later periods, successive dynasties continued to reinterpret Kunlun’s location. The Tang Dynasty (618–907) regarded Mount Menmoli (today’s Bayan Har Mountains) in south-central Qinghai as Kunlun; the Yuan Dynasty founder Kublai Khan (1215–1294, r. 1260–1294) identified Mount Yirmabumola (today’s Aemye Ma-chhen Range) in Xizang as Kunlun; and during the Qing Dynasty (1616–1911), Emperors Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) and Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) successively identified the Kailas Range in Tsang, southwestern Xizang, and the Kundulun Mountains in southern Xinjiang as the Kunlun Mountains.

Historically, understandings of Kunlun evolved “from the abstract to the concrete.” Its geographical identification gradually shifted westward from the Central Plains, the perceived point of origin. Once its location was situated in the Western Regions, Kunlun came to function as a symbolic geographical marker of the westernmost frontier.

The central dynasties’ search for Kunlun’s geographical location was therefore not merely an effort to identify a mountain range. It was also an attempt to define the territorial scope of “China” and to situate China within the wider world. The exploration of Kunlun was, in essence, a quest for “all under heaven” and for the origins of Chinese civilization.

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Does the millennium-long pursuit of Kunlun still hold profound meaning today?

Over the long course of exploring Kunlun, interactions between the Central Plains and the Western Regions grew ever more frequent. Kunlun, imbued with imagery of purity, sanctity, and fortitude, gradually became a shared emotional anchor for the Chinese nation.

Today, Kunlun has long transcended its role as a mere geographical concept, sublimating into a Chinese cultural symbol that bridges antiquity and the present. Students reciting the line “Ascending Kunlun, I gaze afar; my heart soars, vast and unbound” inherit a cultural gene carried across millennia; China’s naming of its strategic bridge-erection crane “Kunlun” exemplifies the fusion of traditional spirit with modern engineering. All of this attests to the singular place Kunlun occupies in the spiritual world of the Chinese nation.

Whether as a geographical coordinate, a mythological image, or a cultural symbol, Kunlun Culture—through millennia of accumulation and sublimation—embodies core Chinese values such as “revering heaven and honoring ancestors,” “harmony between heaven and humanity,” and “great unity.” This “sacred mountain” continues to provide the Chinese nation with inexhaustible spiritual nourishment and cultural confidence.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhang Weiwei

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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The repeated hype by Western politicians, media and think tanks over these false issues is a textbook case of committing human rights violations in the name of human rights.

On June 24, 2026, the Information Office of the State Council of China held a press conference on the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China. When asked by journalists about Western media’s hype over the so-called “forced labor” affecting ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, the spokesperson firmly refuted such claims.

Earlier, on June 2, the Office of the United States Trade Representative invoked Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to launch an investigation into 60 economies, including China, baselessly alleging their “failure to impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor,” and imposed tariffs on all 60 economies. Certain United States-funded think tanks and media outlets have continued to peddle the false “forced labor” narrative, arbitrarily targeting Xinjiang’s textiles, tomatoes, polysilicon and cargo flights, and even the employment of ethnic minorities in the region.

This attempt to manufacture trouble under the pretext of “forced labor” is, in essence, a political maneuver to “contain China through Xinjiang-related issues.” It has no basis in international law, seriously violates international human rights principles and the rules of the multilateral trading system, and completely disregards the remarkable progress achieved in Xinjiang’s human rights cause. The repeated hype by Western politicians, media and think tanks over these false issues is a textbook case of committing human rights violations in the name of human rights. It not only undermines the rights to subsistence and development of people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, but also constitutes a blatant provocation against China’s state sovereignty.

The U.S. allegations of “forced labor” lack any legal basis

The Forced labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced labor Convention, 1957 (No. 105), of the International labor Organization, grounded in the spirit of human rights, regulate labor exploitation and clearly define the three constituent elements of “forced labor”: work or service exacted under the menace of penalty and without the voluntary consent of the individual.

However, certain Western politicians, media outlets and think tanks have politicized and weaponized human rights in a bid to place themselves on the moral high ground and interfere in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights—conduct that seriously violates the core tenets of international law concerning forced labor.

In 2022, China ratified both of these international conventions and has actively fulfilled all obligations arising therefrom. In no part of China—Xinjiang included—do any circumstances exist that would satisfy the three constituent elements of “forced labor.”

From a legal perspective, China’s Constitution, Labor Contract Law and a series of other laws and regulations fundamentally prohibit all forms of forced labor, labor discrimination and personal restriction. The recently promulgated Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law goes further by, from the vantage point of ethnic affairs, explicitly providing for rights protection and legal aid for cross-regional workers. It upholds the core principles of complete voluntariness, mutual selection, full legal compliance and freedom to stay or leave, thereby safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of workers of all ethnic groups.

For instance, Article 25 of the Law clearly stipulates: “People’s governments at and above the county level shall, in accordance with law, protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens engaged in cross-regional employment and entrepreneurship between ethnic regions, as well as between ethnic regions and other areas; support the provision of training in laws, regulations and policies, the standard spoken and written Chinese language, and vocational skills; and offer services such as career guidance and job referral.”

These provisions are designed to uphold the equal right to development for people of all ethnic groups, broaden channels for income growth, and promote interaction, exchange and integration among all ethnic groups. Including those from Xinjiang, people of all ethnic groups have the entirely lawful and legitimate right to seek employment across the country and share in the nation’s development opportunities and achievements.

From a practical perspective, Xinjiang’s labor transfer and employment programs are implemented on the premise of respecting the free will of people of all ethnic groups. Their purpose is to help expand employment opportunities and increase economic incomes—they are purely practical measures undertaken for the genuine benefit of people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. All Xinjiang residents who take up employment elsewhere do so on their own initiative, driven by the personal desire to improve their family livelihood and enhance their own skills.

Xinjiang also conducts regular vocational skills training to broaden employment channels. People of all ethnic groups may, in accordance with their own wishes, freely choose to work either within Xinjiang or anywhere across the country, and freely select their preferred industries. There exists absolutely no such thing as the so-called “forced relocation” or “forced labor.” Such claims are utterly preposterous and indefensible.

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The United States is in no position to accuse China

Unlike China, the United States has not ratified either of the two conventions mentioned above, but has instead arbitrarily established its own criteria through the so-called “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act,” which prohibits U.S. importers from importing products from China’s Xinjiang region or designated related entities unless they can provide clear and convincing evidence that the products were not made with so-called “forced labor.” This double-standard practice, which places domestic law above international law, is utterly indefensible and has no legal or moral leg to stand on.

In reality, the U.S. itself suffers from one of the world’s most severe forced labor problems. As is widely known, the U.S.—a major immigration country—has long been plagued by the chronic scourge of human trafficking. Women, children and immigrants have long endured forced labor and modern slavery. This dismal record has drawn prolonged criticism from the international community and relevant international organizations. Ironically, rather than confronting and rectifying its own historical and ongoing forced labor issues, the United States has wielded human rights double standards to baselessly smear Xinjiang, China. This constitutes not only blatant interference in China’s internal affairs, but is essentially a form of hegemonic political manipulation. The U.S. allegations against China are completely illegitimate and legally null and void. They will only expose its hypocritical double standards and hegemonic conduct in the realm of human rights before the eyes of the world, laying bare the absurdity of such rhetoric for all to see.

The U.S. fabrication of the “forced labor” lie aims to serve its own selfish interests

The U.S. fabrication of the “forced labor” narrative in Xinjiang is a distorted projection of its domestic and diplomatic predicaments amid the relative erosion of its global hegemonic dominance—and a concrete manifestation of its pursuit of narrow self-interest. At present, class and racial contradictions within the United States are severely intensifying, populist ideologies are running rampant, and social problems have become deep-seated and intractable, compelling the U.S. to externalize its domestic governance failures. Meanwhile, in his second term, President Trump has been fixated on tariff politics and trade sanctions, exploiting the “forced labor” pretext to suppress China’s globally competitive industries. His true intention is to preserve U.S. economic dominance and hegemonic interests.

Should China alter its employment support policies for people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, the region’s relevant industries would inevitably suffer devastating blows. The immediate effect would be the exclusion of local enterprises from global supply chains, ultimately depriving Uygur people of employment opportunities and causing severe income losses. This makes clear that the U.S.-called “forced labor” are by no means motivated by a desire to protect the human rights of Xinjiang’s workers; rather, they aim to cut off the livelihoods of all ethnic groups and foment social chaos in China. China must maintain its strategic composure and unswervingly advance the building of a modern Xinjiang, refusing to fall into the trap set by the United States and the West through their “forced labor” allegations. Safeguarding the rights of all ethnic groups to equal employment and lawful labor is the firm and unwavering choice of the Chinese government and its people!

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Xinjiang’s remarkable achievements speak for themselves, rendering U.S. lies unsustainable

China is a unified multi-ethnic country. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, it has pioneered a sound path with Chinese characteristics for addressing ethnic issues. Despite the deliberate smears and fabricated narratives of “human rights issues” in Xinjiang by the United States and other Western forces, facts speak louder than words.

By the end of 2020, all 3.0649 million impoverished rural residents in Xinjiang had been lifted out of poverty, marking the historic elimination of absolute poverty in the region. Between 2012 and 2024, Xinjiang’s GDP surged from 749.947 billion yuan to over 2 trillion yuan, while per capita GDP jumped from 33,495 yuan to 78,660 yuan. Over the past five years, Xinjiang has rolled out a comprehensive suite of measures to expand employment, generating 2.392 million new urban jobs and facilitating 16.1 million instances of off-farm employment for the agricultural labor force. The per capita disposable income of urban and rural residents grew at average annual rates of 5.3% and 8.1%, respectively. These tangible dividends of development have benefited all ethnic groups. Today, Xinjiang’s development achievements are there for all to see. Ultimately, the people of Xinjiang are the best judges of their own well-being.

Led by the United States, certain Western nations invoke the pretext of so-called “universal values” to concoct lies—including those regarding “forced labor”—in Xinjiang. By politicizing and weaponizing human rights to interfere in China’s internal affairs, they deliberately turn a blind eye to Xinjiang’s monumental achievements. Such despicable maneuvers are not only firmly opposed by the Chinese government and people but will inevitably face universal condemnation and rejection by the international community. China maintains that the rights to subsistence and development are the primary, fundamental human rights. This principle has been successfully practiced in Xinjiang, yielding substantial results in poverty alleviation, employment promotion, educational access, healthcare enhancement, and social security improvement. All this irrefutably demonstrates that Xinjiang is by no means a “low point” of human rights; on the contrary, it stands as a vibrant testament to the global cause of human rights protection.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Bai Fan, deputy director and associate researcher at the Xinjiang Research Office of Institute of the Chinese Borderland Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

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Translator/ Li Li

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China's united front work is conducted openly in broad daylight; there is no such thing as a "covert operation," and its institutional guarantees are clear and verifiable.

For years, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) authorities in Taiwan have deliberately stigmatized the “united front,” labeling normal cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation as negative, fomenting social antagonism across the Taiwan Strait, and obstructing people-to-people contacts in every possible way. Recently, mainland official agencies and media outlets have spoken out frequently to clarify the origin and true meaning of the united front and restore a proper understanding of the Communist Party of China’s united front work.

Giving the DPP a proper lesson on the united front

At the regular press conference of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council on July 8, 2026, spokesperson Chen Binhua responded to the claim by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council that one must “distinguish normal cross-Strait exchanges from united front activities.” Chen fired back with a series of questions: “Do the DPP authorities know what ‘united front’ means? Do they know its origin and original meaning?” He then stated plainly that “united front” (tongzhan or tongyi zhanxian), whose essence is great unity and great alliance, means rallying people’s hearts and pooling strengths, uniting all forces that can be united and mobilizing all positive factors that can be mobilized on the basis of shared interests, shared goals, shared sentiments, and a shared future, so as to strive together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Shortly before, on July 2, the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee published on its website an article titled It Is United Front Work! So What? The piece called the DPP’s stigmatization of the united front a typical case of “fraudulent claims,” emphasizing that united front work seeks consensus, expands solidarity, and enhances public welfare—nothing to shy away from—and openly declared: “Speak about the united front with composure; do united front work with perfect justification.” On July 8, its official WeChat account United Front New Voice published A Cause Written into the Party Constitution and State Law, How Can It Be Stigmatized? The article affirmed the legality and legitimacy of the united front from the institutional perspective of the Constitution, the Party Constitution, and the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on United Front Work, pointing out that the united front, inscribed in the Party Constitution and state law, is a cause conducted in broad daylight.

Tuanjie News, a flagship publication under the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, carried an article on June 27 titled Giving the DPP a Lesson on the United Front That Restores the True Meaning, deconstructing layer by layer the rhetorical logic with which the DPP deliberately distorts and stigmatizes the united front, and reiterating its original connotation of uniting compatriots and rallying the nation’s strength. Xinhua News Agency and other mainstream media also ran commentaries refuting the DPP authorities’ deliberate smearing of the united front.

This wave of statements is no random act. The DPP’s stigmatization campaign has lasted years: Almost every normal cross-Strait interaction has been stripped of its livelihood attributes and tagged politically. The Straits Forum, held for 18 consecutive editions, is maliciously framed as a “united front platform.” In 2024, the mainland dance craze Kemusan (Subject 3) at a Taipei night market was accused of being “cultural united front.” In 2023, a visiting group of teachers and students from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan was blasted as a “united front” delegation. From folk exchanges to business activities, from youth visits to cultural contacts, the DPP has built a systematic “anti-united front” discourse machinery.

From the on-the-spot rebuttal by the Taiwan Affairs Office, to the authoritative keynote set by the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, and then to the in-depth interpretation by mainstream media, this authoritative campaign to reclaim the name of the united front is both a frontal breakthrough against the erroneous discourse system on the island and a key move to restore the bright original meaning of the united front and reshape the correct perception of cross-Strait exchanges.

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The united front is an open strategy, not a plot—it is solidarity

The united front is not a new invention, but a crucial experience distilled from the CPC’s centennial struggle. In October 1939, Mao Zedong, in the foreword to the journal The Communist, summarized the CPC’s 18-year revolutionary experience and explicitly listed “the united front, armed struggle, and Party building” as the three magic weapons with which the CPC defeated its enemies in the Chinese revolution. This judgment was a profound revelation of the winning logic of the Chinese revolution after the failures of the Great Revolution, the Agrarian Revolutionary War, and the early, arduous exploration of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.

During the War of Resistance, which was also an important part of the World Anti-Fascist War, the united front played a decisive role. Facing the Japanese militarist invasion and the national crisis, the CPC resolutely raised the banner of the Chinese united front against Japanese aggression, shifting from “resist Japan and oppose Chiang” to “press Chiang to resist Japan,” facilitating the peaceful settlement of the Xi’an Incident and the second KMT-CPC cooperation. Under that banner, domestic forces set aside differences and sought common ground; hundreds of millions of Chinese descendants, sharing a bitter hatred of the enemy, threw themselves into the national calamity, converging into the mighty power of total resistance against Japanese aggression by the whole nation. The War of Resistance ended in the first complete victory against foreign invasion in modern Chinese history. In 1945, at the end of World War II, Taiwan—occupied by Japan for half a century—was restored to the motherland, a historical fruit of the Chinese united front against Japanese aggression and a powerful testimony to the united front’s capacity to rally the nation’s strength.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Democratic United Front took up the historic mission of winning the hearts of Taiwan compatriots and opposing division. Relying on the united front, the CPC united patriotic figures on the island, continuously expressed goodwill toward the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, and dissolved the U.S.-Taiwan scheme of “two Chinas,” laying the historical groundwork for the later policy of “peaceful reunification.” After China’s reform and opening-up, the Patriotic United Front was formally established, with promoting the peaceful reunification of the motherland as one of its core tasks. In 1979, the NPC Standing Committee issued the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, officially ending the military confrontation across the Strait and gradually thawing family visits, trade, and cultural exchanges.

History has made it clear: the united front is not a conspiracy but an open strategy; not deception but solidarity; not exclusion but inclusion; not one-sided extraction but the search for the greatest common denominator under a shared goal. For the CPC and the Chinese government, uniting Taiwan compatriots and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland is never a shameful “infiltration” or “buying-off,” but a national righteousness, the common aspiration and historic responsibility of all Chinese people.

The united front is grounded in law and beneficial to the people

China’s united front work is conducted openly in broad daylight; there is no such thing as a “covert operation,” and its institutional guarantees are clear and verifiable.

The Constitution of the Communist Party of China stipulates the united front explicitly. The General Program states that the Party shall “further develop and expand the broadest possible patriotic united front embracing all socialist workers, all those working for the socialist cause, all patriots who support socialism, all patriots who support the reunification of the motherland, and all patriots who are dedicated to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Party shall work continuously to strengthen the unity of all the Chinese people, including compatriots in the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese.” The Constitution of the Communist Party of China revised and adopted at the 20th National Congress of the CPC in 2022 specifically added the clause “resolutely oppose and deter separatists seeking ‘Taiwan independence,’” clearly demonstrating the steadfast stance of advancing complete national reunification through the united front.

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China provides fundamental legal protection. The 2018 Amendment to the Constitution, in its preamble, states: “Through the prolonged process of revolution, development, and reform, a broad patriotic united front was formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, with the participation of other political parties and people’s organizations. This united front includes all socialist working people, people engaged in building socialism, patriots who support socialism, and patriots who support the reunification of the motherland and are dedicated to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This united front will continue to be consolidated and developed.” The Constitution also stipulates that “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China.” At the level of the fundamental law of the state, the status, scope, and direction of the united front are self-evident—grounded in law and backed by clear provisions.

On the common political foundation of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing “Taiwan independence,” the mainland has strengthened communication with Taiwan’s political parties, groups and figures from all sectors, continuously promulgated policies benefiting Taiwan compatriots, smoothed channels for cross-Strait economic cooperation and personnel exchanges to facilitate Taiwan compatriots and businesses in sharing the mainland’s development opportunities, and steadily enhanced the interests and well-being of compatriots on both sides.

Since 2018, the Taiwan Affairs Office, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and other departments, has successively issued the “31 Measures” and “26 Measures” for cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges, the “11 Measures” supporting Taiwan businesses during the pandemic, and the “22 Farming and Forestry Measures” supporting Taiwan compatriots and enterprises in developing such sectors on the mainland. The mainland has persistently promoted the issuance of Residence Permits for Taiwan Residents, pushed forward the water supply project from Fujian to Kinmen, and established cross-Strait integrated development demonstration zones. In addition to such pragmatic measures, the mainland has established regular platforms such as the Straits Forum, the Cross-Strait Youth Summit and clan-root-seeking activities, and gradually extended equal treatment to Taiwan compatriots in study, entrepreneurship, employment and daily life.

This April, KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen led a delegation to the mainland. To promote peaceful cross-Strait relations and enhance Taiwan compatriots’ well-being, the mainland unveiled 10 policies and measures covering party communication, youth exchange, economic and trade contacts, and livelihood convenience, continuously broadening the depth and breadth of cross-Strait cooperation. These open measures are the substantive content of the united front work toward Taiwan—delivering dividends and well-being to Taiwan compatriots and letting them share the mainland’s development opportunities.

Over the years, farming, fishery, industrial, commercial and youth associations on the island have repeatedly spoken out in public, urging the authorities to lift exchange restrictions and seize mainland development opportunities—fully proving that cross-Strait integrated development is the mainstream will of Taiwan’s public and an unstoppable, irreversible trend of the times.

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Why does the DPP fear the very term “united front”?

The DPP’s instinct to “oppose anything Chinese” runs deep in its bones. Since Lai Ching-te came to power, he has deliberately stirred up “anti-China and resistance to China” sentiment—from TikTok and Xiaohongshu (RedNote) to offline cross-Strait exchange events, everything is treated as an enemy camp to be banned or restricted. Beneath the wanton slander lies nothing but unconcealable panic and guilt.

First, it fears the information cocoon being broken and Taiwanese public opinion seeing the truth. The Taiwan Affairs Office has repeatedly pointed out that the DPP authorities’ smearing of the mainland and hyping of the so-called “threat of united front infiltration” rest on information blockade and cognitive misguidance. They fear compatriots on both sides drawing closer, fear ordinary Taiwanese learning about the real mainland, and thus seeing through the carefully woven “information cocoon.” Once that “anti-China and resistance to China” narrative collapses, how can the DPP not tremble?

Second, it fears the mainland’s winning of popular support and the failure of its “anti-China” political manipulation. The DPP authorities are not ignorant of the united front—they understand its stakes all too well. They know the mainland’s Taiwan work derives its power not from empty slogans but from tangible interests, opportunities, conveniences and emotional bonds. Taiwan youth find jobs on the mainland, Taiwan enterprises expand markets there, and Taiwan farming and fishery products find outlets there. These visible, tangible realities render its “anti-China, hating China, resisting China” political theater ineffective. How can the DPP not be anxious?

Third, it fears the formation of shared cross-Strait interests and the loss of living soil for “Taiwan independence.” The deeper the economic integration and the denser the people-to-people contacts, the more shared interests accumulate and the smaller the space for separatism. The DPP is terrified of a genuine community of shared interests and of compatriots on both sides growing closer; therefore, it must first demonize the term “united front,” smear the mainland’s goodwill as a “trap,” call exchange “dangerous,” cooperation “buying-off,” and integration “annexation.” Facing the relentless advance of integration and the successive bankruptcies of its separation narrative, how can the DPP not panic?

The DPP authorities’ decades-long stigmatization of the united front and demonization of cross-Strait exchanges ultimately stem from the fundamental opposition between the selfish gains of “Taiwan independence” separatists and the great righteousness of the Chinese nation’s rejuvenation. For the DPP, the solidarity of the united front, the integrating tide of exchanges and the reunification consensus among the people are precisely the greatest nemesis of its secessionist plot. Confronted with governance dilemmas—sluggish wages, a depressed tourism industry, piled-up livelihood problems—the DPP authorities cannot break the deadlock, so they divert public attention by manufacturing cross-Strait confrontation topics and hyping the “united front threat,” wielding “green terror” to shore up their rule. Precisely because they know they swim against the current and lack popular support, they can only distort definitions, stigmatize a legitimate cause, block civil exchanges and build information cocoons to mask their hollow core and prolong their political fraud.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Dong Mei

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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ZXMOTO is not an isolated success story. Its trajectory points to a new model emerging in Chinese manufacturing: rather than relying on imported technology or waiting for industrial transfer, companies drive forward innovation through close engagement with core users.

On March 28, 2026, at the Autodromo Internacional do Algarve in Portugal, a race motorcycle bearing Chinese lettering—the 820RR-RS—crossed the finish line with a commanding lead of nearly four seconds, rewriting history at the World Superbike Championship (WSBK). That day, ZXMOTO, a Chinese brand less than two years old, claimed two consecutive titles on a circuit that had been dominated for 37 years by European and Japanese giants such as Ducati, Yamaha, and Kawasaki.

On June 13, at the WSBK round in Italy, ZXMOTO staged a dramatic comeback, securing its sixth championship of the season and setting a new record for Chinese motorcycles in the world’s premier racing series.

These victories invite deeper reflection: When Chinese motorcycles ascend to the pinnacle of international racing, how should the world reassess “Made in China”?

A distinctly Chinese story on the track

For a long time, “Made in China” appeared at top-tier international events largely as sponsor signage—paying the bills was acceptable, but competing was not.

In economics, signaling theory holds that high-quality producers must incur costly, credible signals to distinguish themselves in markets characterized by information asymmetry. The world of elite motorcycle racing is precisely such a signal—the most expensive that Chinese manufacturers can send.

Motorcycle racing has never been simply about riding fast. Every lap in WSBK simultaneously tests the explosive power and durability of the powertrain, the frame’s balance of rigidity and lightweight construction, and the millisecond-level responsiveness of the electronic control system. It is the ultimate test of industrial manufacturing capability.

ZXMOTO’s victories have sent three irrefutable signals to the world about Chinese manufacturing.

First, core technologies have achieved independent and self-controlled development. Rather than navigating the patent thickets surrounding Japanese four-cylinder and European twin-cylinder engines, the Zhangxue team chose a technological path long overlooked by international giants: an 819cc inline three-cylinder engine. Its proprietary dual-phase counter-rotating balance shaft design suppresses engine vibration to within 3 microns—roughly one-twenty-fifth the thickness of a human hair. With a dry weight of just 52 kilograms—30 percent lighter than comparable imported models—it delivers 153.6 horsepower at a redline of 16,000 rpm, achieving a specific output of 187 hp per liter, well beyond comparable Ducati models. This is not the product of reverse engineering, but of genuine forward innovation that charts a new technological path around existing patent barriers.

Second, system integration capabilities have reached the world’s top tier. ZXMOTO’s self-developed MTC1000 electronic control system, powered by Huawei’s Ascend AI chips and a six-axis IMU sensor, achieves an 8-millisecond response time—30 percent faster than comparable Bosch solutions. More importantly, the system was developed alongside the engine, collecting 100,000 sets of track data per lap while its AI model automatically optimizes parameters for the next lap, enabling continuous self-improvement with every run. The decisive overtake in the final corner at the Hungarian circuit, maintaining precise grip while leaned over at 200 km/h, was made possible by a fully integrated technical system spanning the powertrain and electronic controls, as well as hardware manufacturing and a closed-loop data ecosystem.

Third, supply chain efficiency is rewriting the rules of global manufacturing. Leveraging Chongqing’s industrial cluster, ZXMOTO has reduced the distance to its suppliers to 50 kilometers, allowing parts to move from design modification to production testing in just 48 hours, compared with the typical three-month cycle of international manufacturers. The motorcycle achieves 97 percent localization, with all core components self-developed, while reducing R&D costs to one-third of those of international brands. The production version of the 820RR-RS is priced at just 43,800 yuan, delivering performance comparable to imported models in the 200,000-yuan price range.

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What is happening beneath the “low price, low quality” label that has obscured Chinese manufacturing?

In the 1980s and 1990s, China entered the global division of labor by leveraging low-cost labor and resource advantages. As a result, “Made in China” became closely associated with low prices, low-end products, and imitation. Over the following decades, the three labels of “lack of innovation,” “low price and poor quality,” and “weak supporting industries” were repeatedly reinforced in international markets. Developed countries retained control of core technologies and brand premiums, while Chinese enterprises earned only modest assembly fees.

This prejudice has proved remarkably persistent because it reinforces itself. As a latecomer, China was expected to remain at the low end of the value chain; even when it entered higher-end markets, its success was often dismissed as luck or the result of taking shortcuts. For years, mainstream global business media largely explained the rise of Chinese manufacturing through two lenses—cheap labor and government subsidies—while the broader story of industrial upgrading received far less attention.

China now ranks first in the world in the output of more than 220 industrial products, has a manufacturing product quality pass rate of 93.93 percent, and possesses the world’s largest, broadest, and most complete manufacturing system. In ultra-high-voltage power transmission, State Grid’s technical standards have surpassed those of Germany and Japan. In deep-sea manned submersibles, Jiaolong reached a depth of 7,062 meters in 2012, exceeding the operational depths achieved by crewed deep-submergence vehicles from the United States, France, Russia, and Japan. In regional aviation, China’s ARJ21 has entered commercial service, while Japan’s MRJ, conceived around the same time, was ultimately shelved after repeated delays and cost overruns.

In just two years, ZXMOTO has reached the top step of the world’s premier motorcycle racing podium through technological capability alone. This may not mark the end of historical prejudice, but it has at least prompted some observers to reassess the meaning of “Made in China.” The transformation of Chinese manufacturing from follower to leader, however, did not happen overnight. Viewed alongside ZXMOTO’s rise, the broader industrial journey reveals three distinct stages in China’s manufacturing ascent.

The first stage: Passive integration into the global division of labor (1990 to around 2010). China entered the lower end of global value chains through low production costs, accumulating capital through processing trade. This was the period during which many of the enduring perceptions of “Made in China” took shape, characterized by OEM production, assembly work, and razor-thin profit margins.

The second stage: Breakthroughs in key sectors and system integration (2010 to 2020). High-speed rail, ultra-high-voltage transmission, construction machinery, and communications equipment led the way. Major achievements such as Sany Heavy Industry’s excavators, Huawei’s 5G base stations, and State Grid’s UHV equipment demonstrated that Chinese manufacturers had begun competing with international leaders in high-end markets. At this stage, however, these advances remained isolated breakthroughs rather than evidence of comprehensive product capability and global brand strength.

The third stage: Forward innovation and brand premium (2020 to the present). This is the phase unfolding today. The logic of Chinese manufacturing has undergone a qualitative shift—from cost-driven to technology-driven, from imitation and catch-up to forward innovation, and from OEM exports to globally recognized brands.

ZXMOTO is a quintessential example of this stage. Founder Zhang Xue began as a motorcycle repair apprentice at age 14. In 2006, he rode more than 100 kilometers through the rain to find the production crew of Hunan Satellite TV, determined to earn a place on a professional racing team. In 2013, carrying just 20,000 yuan, he moved to Chongqing and began selling motorcycle parts through online forums. In 2017, he co-founded Kove Moto and led the team into the Dakar Rally, becoming the first Chinese motorcycle team to complete the race. In 2024, he left the successful Kove Moto to establish a brand bearing his own name. His words could serve as a manifesto for a new generation of Chinese manufacturers: “Putting your name on the brand means betting yourself on the line—with no way back, you find even more drive.”

And Zhang Xue is far from alone. More broadly, China now accounts for more than 60 percent of the global market for new energy vehicles, produces more than 80 percent of the world’s photovoltaic modules, and holds a dominant position across the lithium battery supply chain. DJI commands more than 70 percent of the global consumer drone market. BYD has expanded its manufacturing footprint overseas, CATL has entered European and American markets through technology licensing, and Haier’s COSMOPlat industrial internet platform connects 900,000 enterprises worldwide. These are not isolated success stories but evidence of an ecosystem coming into its own. Chinese manufacturing is no longer content to serve as a passive processor in the global division of labor. It is increasingly defining product standards, charting technological pathways, and shaping global brand perceptions.

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China’s solution to the development dilemma facing global manufacturing

Global manufacturing is currently caught in a deep-seated dilemma.

Developed countries face the challenge of “industrial hollowing-out”—the overexpansion of financial capital, the continued contraction of manufacturing employment, and over-reliance on overseas supply chains. The United States’ recent push for reindustrialization and the Biden administration’s CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 both reflect these concerns. Developing countries, meanwhile, face the risk of the “middle-income trap”: as labor costs rise, they struggle to complete industrial upgrading, leaving them squeezed between the low end of the value chain and increasingly competitive high-end markets.

China’s answer is to build on the strength of a comprehensive industrial chain, make independent innovation in the driving force, and use exceptional efficiency as the lever—pursuing systemic upgrading rather than isolated technological breakthroughs.

ZXMOTO illustrates the micro-level logic of this approach. At the industrial-chain level, a supplier cluster within a 50-kilometer radius in Chongqing has shortened product iteration cycles from three months to just 48 hours. At the technological level, self-developed engines, self-developed electronic control systems, and the integration of Huawei’s AI chips with the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation Limited’s IMU algorithms have created a complete innovation system that does not depend on external technology. At the operational level, founder Zhang Xue has eliminated routine management meetings, insisting that “when problems arise, go directly to the site and solve them.” This emphasis on rapid trial and error is intended to close the decades-long experience gap with Japanese manufacturers. As Zhang put it, “There is no need to wait decades. Five to eight years is enough to catch up.”

This logic is increasingly being validated on a broader scale. In new energy, high-speed rail, drones, 5G communications, quantum computing, and other fields, Chinese enterprises have evolved from participants to rule-makers.

ZXMOTO is not an isolated success story. Its trajectory points to a new model emerging in Chinese manufacturing: rather than relying on imported technology or waiting for industrial transfer, companies drive forward innovation through close engagement with core users, offset the disadvantage of later market entry through exceptional supply chain efficiency, and break into fields once considered impossible to master in a short period. This is not the luck of “overtaking on a curve,” but the result of an entrepreneur fully leveraging the advantages of a comprehensive industrial chain while combining efficiency, technological capability, and bold execution. In the authors’ view, it represents a Chinese solution to the development dilemma facing global manufacturing.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The authors are Shan Depeng, Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at the School of Economics and the Research Base for Fostering a Strong Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation, Southwest Minzu University; Yin Zhiqiang, Graduate Student at the School of Economics, Southwest Minzu University.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Dong Mei

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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It is evident that China's educational policies in ethnic regions have consistently aimed to guarantee the equal development rights of all ethnic groups while, on the premise of respecting diversity, building a shared cultural identity and social foundation.

For a long time, Western media has linked China’s educational support measures in ethnic regions with “forced assimilation.” Such rhetoric not only disregards the fundamental reality of China as a unified multi-ethnic country but also selectively ignores the positive role and notable achievements of China’s educational policies in promoting the development of ethnic regions and safeguarding the right to education for all ethnic groups.

To understand China’s educational policies, one should first acknowledge the objective realities of ethnic regions—their vast territories and dispersed settlement patterns. Policies such as boarding schools and cross-regional educational support, along with the legal protections for educational rights enshrined in the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law), which officially took effect on July 1 this year, share one common goal: to ensure that every child, regardless of birthplace, enjoys the statutory right to education.

Ensuring access to education

China’s border ethnic regions are geographically remote, sparsely populated, and characterized by imbalanced and insufficient educational development. Take the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau and the Hengduan Mountains region, for example. The average altitude exceeds 4,000 meters, with some areas surpassing 5,000 meters. The region accounts for about one-quarter of China’s land area but has a sparse population, making it one of the country’s least densely populated areas. Most local herders migrate seasonally and live in highly dispersed settlements, making it more difficult for school-age children to enroll in school. Constrained by historical and geographical conditions, educational development in these regions has long lagged significantly behind that of the eastern coastal areas.

Imagine a herder family in Nagqu, Xizang: They live at an altitude exceeding 4,500 meters, with the nearest school tens of kilometers away and no public transportation available. For their children to attend school, they would need to set out before dawn, cross mountain passes, and return home under the stars—this was the reality faced by many plateau families in the past. “How do we ensure that children in remote mountain areas have access to education?” This is precisely the primary issue that China’s educational policies for ethnic regions must address.

Boarding schools were established precisely for such families. Their core legal basis is Article 17 of the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China, which stipulates: “People’s governments at or above the county level may, in light of need, establish boarding schools to ensure that the school-age children and adolescents who live far from school receive compulsory education.” Notably, the legislative intent behind boarding schools is to “ensure” the right to enrollment, not to “compel” children to leave their homes.

China’s boarding schools are essentially institutions that provide accommodation and meal services to students, rather than enclosed or militarized facilities. Parents and students have the right to choose between day attendance and boarding based on family circumstances. Boarding students can return home on weekends, holidays, and winter and summer vacations; parents can visit their children at any time and pick them up as needed. A fundamental principle of the Xizang Autonomous Region Education Department’s boarding school policy is “voluntary participation and convenience for the people.” The decision to board rests with the family, not the government or the school.

What do the results show? Data and case studies best illustrate the outcomes. In old Xizang, there were no modern schools; the enrollment rate for school-age children was less than 2 percent, and over 95 percent of the population was illiterate. According to statistics released by the Xizang Autonomous Region in 2024, the enrollment rate for school-age children in the region reached 99.98 percent. Boarding students account for over 60 percent of compulsory education enrollment, and the proportion of farmers’ and herders’ children enrolled in boarding schools exceeds 80 percent.

Boarding schools are not unique to Xizang. In Sichuan, in 2024, the provincial government allocated 1.503 billion yuan to subsidize the construction of 25 middle schools and 37 high schools with boarding facilities. Notably, in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan, where geographical dispersion and inconvenient transportation pose significant challenges, boarding schools have systematically addressed the dropout problem caused by poverty and difficult transportation through centralized funding, facilities, faculty, and management.

Promoting the equitable allocation of educational resources is also a key focus of boarding school development in ethnic regions. In the Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province, one boarding school uses remote networked classrooms to enable students in the heart of the grasslands to interact in real time with renowned teachers from Beijing—bringing quality educational resources across mountains and rivers to the plateau. A boarding primary school in Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, with support from a public welfare project, has established an AI classroom, addressing gaps in hardware infrastructure and allowing pastoral children to gain exposure to new experiences in artificial intelligence education. These efforts are narrowing the educational gap between urban and rural areas and across regions, placing children on a more equitable starting line.

International public opinion often carries a stereotypical view of “boarding schools,” largely stemming from the forced assimilation policies imposed on Indigenous children in countries such as Canada and Australia during the colonial era. Those schools, which were government-run, forcibly separated Indigenous children from their families, prohibited them from using their native languages, and implemented various policies and measures aimed at cultural genocide.

China’s boarding schools represent a regional policy arrangement based on modern educational systems and concepts, fundamentally different from the “boarding schools” of Western history. The core differences lie in three aspects: first, enrollment is voluntary, with parents and students exercising choice; second, family connections remain intact, with parent committees participating in school management and regular open-campus events and on-demand video calls helping maintain emotional bonds; third, cultural heritage is protected, with schools specially developing bilingual teaching materials and organizing cultural activities to systematically preserve ethnic cultures.

A brief review and comparison reveal that these two schooling models are diametrically opposite—one aimed at cultural deprivation, the other at safeguarding rights. Equating the two shows disrespect to the historical victims of Western countries’ Indigenous boarding policies and constitutes a distortion of the facts surrounding China’s educational development.

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Ensuring access to quality education

How to ensure that children in remote mountainous areas also have access to quality educational resources is another challenge China must address. Through institutionalized cross-regional collaboration, China channels teaching staff, management expertise, and educational resources from more developed eastern regions to western ethnic regions. This approach is known as educational “paired assistance” and is positioned as a government-led model for promoting educational equity.

In 2016, the “group-style” educational talent assistance program for Xizang was officially launched. The “group-style” model involves sending teams of 10 to 50 teachers from 17 partner provinces, as well as affiliated primary and secondary schools of universities directly under the Ministry of Education of China, to provide concentrated support to individual primary or secondary schools in Xizang. The first cohort comprised more than 800 teachers. Over the past decade, more than 2,500 dispatched teachers have provided paired support to 21 primary and secondary schools in Xizang. Dispatched teachers have formed nearly 3,000 mentoring pairs with local teachers, assisted in more than 200 teaching teams. Meanwhile, the government facilitated the participation of more than 2,700 local teachers in on-the-job training in partner provinces and cities, building a core teaching force that “will not leave.” The Shanghai Experimental School in Xigaze, Xizang, supported by Shanghai’s aid program, serves as an example: The assistance team not only introduced teaching methods but also participated in revising the Chinese-Tibetan bilingual teaching plan and establishing a teaching quality assurance system. Leveraging educational aid resources, the digitalization of education and teaching in Xizang has achieved leapfrog development.

In 2021, the “group-style” educational talent selection program for Xinjiang was launched, fully leveraging the quality educational resources of partner provinces and cities to send outstanding educational professionals to Xinjiang to strengthen its teaching force. One “group-style” team consists of approximately 10 educational administrators and full-time teachers, providing concentrated support to one school. The recipient level covers the four educational stages of kindergarten, primary school, middle school, and high school (including secondary vocational schools).

In 2022, China implemented the “group-style” educational talent assistance program, extending it to 160 key national rural revitalization assistance counties in 10 western provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Eastern provinces and cities send professional teams composed of principals, core teachers, and teaching researchers to assume overall management or provide in-depth support to local high schools.

The Education Law of the People’s Republic of China explicitly stipulates that the state shall support the development of educational undertakings in remote border areas and ethnic regions. The “group-style” educational talent programs implemented by the Chinese government vary in scale across different periods and regions, but they are united by a sustained institutional commitment—a long-term dedication to “educational equity” by the nation.

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Ensuring the protection of rights

If boarding schools and cross-regional assistance are specific policy tools, the recently implemented Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law provides a more systematic legal framework for safeguarding the educational rights of young people in ethnic regions.

Article 15 of the Law stipulates that “the state comprehensively promotes the use of the standard spoken and written Chinese language nationwide” and that “the state respects and guarantees the learning and use of the spoken and written languages of ethnic minorities.” The comprehensive promotion of the standard spoken and written Chinese language aims to equip every child with the ability to participate in broader national development; respecting and guaranteeing the learning and use of minority languages protects the rights and interests of all ethnic groups to preserve and pass on their linguistic and cultural heritage. The two objectives are mutually reinforcing. A Tibetan language teacher named Tashi, who has taught in Xizang for many years, sums it up succinctly: “We can preserve our culture through Tibetan and also use the standard language to engage with the world.”

The textbook system also enjoys clear legal protection. Article 16 of the Law explicitly stipulates that schools and other educational institutions at all levels and of all types shall use national unified textbooks in accordance with relevant regulations. The use of national unified Chinese language, history, and ethics and rule of law textbooks in classroom instruction shall help students develop a correct view of the state, history, ethnicity, and culture.

China has never overlooked the fact that ethnic regions are home to numerous minority groups, including Tibetan, Yi, and Uygur communities, with rich and diverse languages and cultures. Consequently, ethnic regions have simultaneously introduced locally compiled textbooks and school-based reading materials, actively undertaking the function of preserving ethnic cultures. For example, Liangshan in Sichuan has organized the compilation and publication of over 1,200 types of Yi-language textbooks and readings, totaling some 120 million characters; Jinzhong No. 1 Primary School in Danzhai County, Guizhou, has developed the optional textbook Miao’s Jax Lil (a traditional form of oral literature). This “unified plus diverse” textbook framework ensures standardization in educational content while leaving ample room for the protection and transmission of diverse ethnic cultures.

China’s educational practices in ethnic regions represent a pragmatic response to multiple practical challenges. It is evident that China’s educational policies in ethnic regions have consistently aimed to guarantee the equal development rights of all ethnic groups while, on the premise of respecting diversity, building a shared cultural identity and social foundation. The common goal is to ensure that every child, regardless of birthplace or ethnicity, has access to fair and quality education.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Li Dongsheng, Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies and Part-Time Research Fellow at the Institute of China’s Borderland Studies, Zhejiang Normal University.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhang Weiwei

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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Coordinator/ Yingge

Copyeditor/ Zhang Weiwei

ZXMOTO, a two-year-old Chinese brand, secured victory in Race 1 of the FIM Supersport World Championship at Italy's Misano World Circuit on June 13, claiming its sixth win of the season. What has enabled this Chinese racing motorcycle to compete at the highest level of international racing?

For 37 years, the World Superbike Championship (WSBK) had been dominated by established European, American, and Japanese motorcycle brands, with no Chinese marque ever standing atop the podium. That pattern was completely rewritten on March 28, 2026, at the Autodromo Internacional do Algarve in Portugal. ZXMOTO, a brand just two years old, claimed back-to-back victories with commanding margins aboard its 820RR-RS race motorcycle. The team maintained its momentum, capturing additional titles in Hungary and the Czech Republic before staging a dramatic comeback at Italy’s Misano World Circuit on June 13 to bring its season total to six championship trophies. As Chinese-made motorcycles shine on the world’s premier racing stage, one cannot help but ask: What has enabled this Chinese racing motorcycle to break the dominance of established global manufacturers and compete at the highest level of international racing?

How does the rise of a homegrown motorcycle serve as a vivid example of “Made in China”?

Part of the answer lies in the rules themselves. Unlike MotoGP, which uses prototype machines, WSBK requires all competing motorcycles to be based on production models with only limited modifications, earning it the nickname “the showroom on the circuit.” In other words, what competes on the track is fundamentally the same motorcycle available to consumers.

The second race of the Portuguese round provided a compelling demonstration of this principle. ZXMOTO rider Valentin Debise took the lead early in the race but slid wide through a corner on lap 14, dropping to third place. The 820RR-RS’s outstanding acceleration out of corners soon came into play, allowing him to overtake his rivals and reclaim the lead, which he held to the checkered flag. Portuguese motorcycle expert Rui Belmonte described the performance as a “turning point” for Chinese brands in high-performance racing, noting that the ability to recover quickly and regain the lead after a mistake is precisely the kind of hard-earned capability required at this level of competition.

That performance under extreme racing conditions rests on the 820RR-RS’s solid technological foundation. The motorcycle is powered by a self-developed 819cc inline three-cylinder engine producing more than 130 horsepower. It makes extensive use of magnesium-alloy pistons and titanium-alloy connecting rods, while the engine has a dry weight of just 52 kilograms. Together, these features deliver three key advantages in its displacement class: the highest power output, the lightest weight, and the lowest center of gravity. Behind these achievements lies the R&D team’s relentless pursuit of engineering excellence. Zeng Zhiyong, the engine project leader, recalled that when Zhang Xue proposed pushing engine speed beyond 15,000 rpm, the team initially considered the goal unattainable because it surpassed what was then regarded as the international state of the art. Zhang Xue, however, believed that success on both the racetrack and the technological front depended on extreme precision—controlling every micron of error and every gram of material at high rpm. During development, the valve spring alone underwent more than a dozen design iterations, while fuel-consumption testing alone cost several hundred thousand yuan.

As a vivid example of “Made in China,” another defining strength of ZXMOTO is the high degree of commonality between its race motorcycle and production model. The base racing model achieves a domestic content rate of 97 percent. Its three core systems—the engine, electronic control system, and chassis—are all independently developed, while 12 key components, including the crankshaft, connecting rods, and cylinder liners, are supplied by Chinese manufacturers. Rather than remaining confined to the racetrack, these race-proven technologies have been incorporated into a production model starting at 43,800 yuan, capable of accelerating from 0 to 100 km/h in 2.81 seconds. By proving itself on both the racing circuit and in the consumer market, ZXMOTO has earned “Made in China” a credible place in the premium motorcycle segment.

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How does the success of a single brand reflect the strength of China’s supply chain?

How can a company less than two years old build a world championship-winning motorcycle? Zhang Xue’s answer is straightforward: what drew the company to Chongqing was the city’s world-class motorcycle industry ecosystem. China’s motorcycle industry has long been concentrated in three major regions—Guangdong, Chongqing, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area—with two principal industrial clusters in the Pearl River Delta and Chongqing. Among them, Chongqing has the highest level of industrial concentration, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the country’s motorcycle sales, revenue, and profits. Known as the “Motorcycle Capital,” Chongqing is home to 51 motorcycle manufacturers above designated size and more than 410 parts suppliers. In 2025, it produced 7.857 million motorcycles, the highest output in the country. For a start-up, this means there is no need to build a supply chain from the ground up.

In industrial economics, the benefits of industrial clustering are often described as spillover effects: companies in the same location share markets, knowledge, and specialized expertise while collaborating through a highly divided supply chain. The supplier list for ZXMOTO’s championship-winning motorcycle offers a vivid example of this phenomenon. The motorcycle’s electronic control unit (ECU) comes from Shanghai Keboda; the six-axis inertial measurement unit’s (IMU) ABS and traction control system (TCS) algorithms are developed by the CETC Chongqing team; and its vehicle connectivity functions are supported by Huawei Device in Guangdong. A single motorcycle brings together the specialized capabilities of the Sichuan-Chongqing region, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta. Within this network, manufacturers can quickly find experienced partners for virtually any technical requirement. The vehicle manufacturer’s role is to integrate these distributed capabilities into a competitive final product.

This industrial network did not emerge overnight. Twenty years ago, China relied almost entirely on imported large-displacement engines, while domestic manufacturers were largely confined to low-end assembly and trapped in relentless price competition. In the early 2000s, many companies expanded aggressively into Southeast Asia but suffered setbacks because of cutthroat competition and inconsistent quality control, leaving Chinese motorcycles associated primarily with low-end commuter models. The turning point came around 2004, when industrial bases such as Chongqing began scaling back low-end production and redirecting R&D toward large-displacement multi-cylinder engines and leisure motorcycles. That strategic shift laid the foundation for the championship-winning engines of today.

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From individual breakthrough to collective rise, what are the trends of “Made in China”?

Looking beyond a single company, the outlines of a broader transformation come into focus. In 2025, China produced 22.1093 million motorcycles and sold 21.9677 million units. Motorcycle exports reached 18.2346 million units, up 25.77 percent year over year, while imports totaled 58,100 units, down 6.81 percent from the previous year. Brands such as QJMOTO, CFMOTO, and Loncin have already demonstrated their ability to compete head-to-head with established international manufacturers. In Chongqing alone, Qiulong Technology has carved out a niche in lightweight electric off-road motorcycles, while Voge and Cyclone are targeting the premium multi-cylinder, large-displacement segment. ZXMOTO is not competing alone—it is simply the fastest runner in a much larger field.

One clear trend is the shift from “selling more” to “creating higher value.” From January to February 2026, China’s motorcycle exports increased by 22.25 percent in volume and 24.90 percent in value year over year, while the average export price per unit continued to rise steadily. On the eve of the racing season, ZXMOTO opened pre-orders for two new models and received 5,543 orders within 100 hours, setting a new record for a domestically produced mid-displacement race replica motorcycle. The market has confirmed what the racetrack has already demonstrated: the competitive edge of Chinese-made motorcycles has shifted from price to technology and brand.

Another trend is growth through openness. The move up the value chain cannot take place within a closed factory. The standards of premium markets, the credibility built over time, and the world’s most demanding testing grounds all lie beyond national borders. ZXMOTO’s victory itself is the product of collaboration: China’s manufacturing and supply-chain capabilities, the skills of French riders, and the rigorous standards of European racing circuits were all indispensable. Competitive motorsports have long been one of the most direct arenas for international exchange: competitors follow the same rules, sharpen their skills through competition, and, beyond victory and defeat, build mutual understanding and respect. Rui Belmonte has observed that Chinese motorcycle manufacturers are no longer viewed merely as low-cost producers, and that their progress through collaboration with experienced international teams has been particularly striking. More broadly, such breakthroughs are not confined to motorcycles. In new energy vehicles, industrial robots, drones, and other industries, the same transition from “Made in China” to “Created in China” is unfolding.

Rooted in independent innovation, Chinese manufacturers have strengthened the foundation for competing globally. Through open collaboration, Chinese brands have found their place on the world stage. From the breakthrough of a single newcomer to the rise of an entire industrial cluster, these championship trophies bear witness to a new path for Chinese manufacturing to engage with the world—not through low prices, but through technology; not by advancing alone, but by moving forward together.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The authors are Zheng Changde, professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of Economics and the Research Base for Fostering a Strong Sense of Community for the Chinese Nation, Southwest Minzu University, and Xie Zhiyun, Ph.D. candidate at the School of Economics, Southwest Minzu University.

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Boarding education in Xizang is a policy adopted by the Chinese government to ensure equal educational rights for all ethnic groups. It differs fundamentally from boarding schools established under Western colonial rule, and the two are not meaningfully comparable.

At a recent press conference held by the State Council Information Office, officials introduced the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China (the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law) and discussed matters concerning China’s ethnic affairs, followed by a question-and-answer session. Journalists raised questions about Xizang’s boarding schools, which have been characterized in some foreign media reports as “forced assimilation,” “compulsory boarding,” and “human rights violations.”

Western media outlets often project the dark history of boarding schools for Indigenous peoples in their own countries onto Xizang’s universally accessible boarding education system. In doing so, they disregard the fundamental differences in geographical conditions, policy objectives, governance systems, and public preferences among countries, while deliberately misleading distinct concepts to construct a negative narrative about China.

In fact, boarding education in Xizang is not an externally imposed means of control but a policy adopted by the Chinese government to ensure equal educational rights for all ethnic groups in China—not any specific group—in accordance with the country’s national conditions. It is implemented in line with the will of the people. Its core objective is to guarantee the basic right to education for children in remote areas, reflecting China’s commitment to ethnic equality and educational equity—a fundamental institutional difference from the historical practices with which some Western media have compared it.

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The necessity of boarding education in Xizang

Xizang has a vast territory and a highly dispersed population. In some farming and pastoral areas, villages are separated by tens or even hundreds of kilometers. This scattered settlement pattern has long made it difficult for children in these areas to attend schools, posing a significant challenge to providing equal access to education. To safeguard the equal right of children from farming and herding families to quality education, Xizang has, over decades of development, gradually established a boarding school model tailored to the realities of the plateau.

In old Xizang, there was not a single truly modern school. The enrollment rate for school-age children was less than 2 percent, and more than 95 percent of the population was illiterate. Most children born to serf families were denied the right to education. In the early years following Xizang’s peaceful liberation, local educators introduced innovative “horseback schools” and “tent schools” to accommodate the nomadic lifestyle and dispersed settlements of farming and herding communities. Teachers traveled through pastoral areas carrying blackboards and textbooks to provide itinerant instruction. However, these mobile schools could offer only basic literacy education. They could not support a standardized, continuous system of modern compulsory education or meet local communities’ long-term demand for quality schooling.

In the 1950s, Xizang piloted small-scale boarding classes in remote areas, achieving positive results. However, because of the region’s economic and social conditions at the time, large-scale expansion was not yet feasible. In 1985, Xizang became the first region in China to implement the “three guarantees” policy, which covered food, accommodation, and educational expenses for children from farming and herding families during the compulsory education stage. The policy provided strong support for the expansion of boarding schools across Xizang. By 2000, the number of schools had grown from fewer than 100 to approximately 200, forming an initial education network serving farming and pastoral areas.

As the boarding school system continued to improve, educational access in Xizang steadily expanded. In 1999, the autonomous region achieved the goal of “primary schools in every township and secondary schools in every county,” with the enrollment rate for school-age children reaching 83.4 percent. In 2011, Xizang achieved the “Two Basics” goals—universalizing nine-year compulsory education and largely eliminating illiteracy among young and middle-aged adults—while the number of boarding schools exceeded 680. By 2024, the enrollment rate for primary school-age children had reached 99.98 percent across the region. The compulsory education retention rate had reached 96.94 percent, meaning that nearly all students who enter primary school remain in the system through the end of junior high school. Boarding students accounted for more than 60 percent of all students in compulsory education, and more than 80 percent of children from farming and herding families attended boarding schools. Through years of coordinated development, Xizang has established a boarding education framework consisting of township-level primary schools, county- and district-level secondary schools, and prefecture- and city-level senior high schools.

From mobile “horseback schools” and “tent schools” to small-scale boarding pilots in pastoral areas, and ultimately to a standardized boarding system serving both urban and rural communities, Xizang’s boarding education model has evolved in response to the region’s distinctive geographical, demographic, and economic conditions. It reflects an approach developed through decades of practical experience, shaped with respect for public preferences, and aimed at achieving universal access to education.

Boarding education is Xizang people’s own choice

Boarding education in China is a system in which schools provide students with accommodation, meals, and other support services. It does not mean that campuses are closed or that schools adopt military-style management. In Xizang, this model has always been implemented with the genuine support and recognition of local communities. Farmers and herders have consistently shown a strong willingness to send their children to boarding schools.

First, it frees farmers and herders to pursue their livelihoods. Most farming and herding families in Xizang rely on agriculture and livestock grazing for their income. In recent years, many working-age family members have taken long-term jobs away from home, making it difficult to balance their children’s education with daily caregiving. Many parents have said, “At boarding schools, teachers guide our children’s studies, and staff take care of their daily lives, so we can work with peace of mind.” This reflects one of the most immediate and practical needs of local families.

Second, it reduces the financial burden on families. The boarding school’s “three guarantees” policy significantly lowers educational expenses for farming and herding families, helping ensure that school-age children in both urban and rural areas do not drop out due to financial hardship, making compulsory education genuinely accessible to all.

Third, it compensates for the limited educational support available in many farming and pastoral households. Many parents in these areas are unable to provide academic assistance with their children’s schoolwork. Boarding schools offer regular after-school tutoring and specialized enrichment courses, giving students systematic, professional academic support. At the same time, schools maintain regular home-school communication, creating a collaborative partnership between families and schools to support children’s development.

Fourth, it broadens students’ horizons and supports their well-rounded development. On boarding school campuses, children from different ethnic groups study and live together, helping one another and forming lasting friendships. Schools also organize regular study tours and exchange activities that broaden students’ perspectives. By emphasizing both academic achievement and students’ mental well-being, they lay a solid foundation for further education and diverse opportunities for personal development.

Today, boarding schools in Xizang are no longer simply residential schools—they are modern campuses that integrate learning, daily life, sports, the arts, and personal development. Campuses are equipped with classroom buildings, laboratories, libraries, sports fields, student dormitories, cafeterias, bathhouses, and other facilities. Some schools have also added multimedia classrooms, cultural activity rooms, and other amenities, significantly improving both the learning environment and students’ quality of life.

Bianba, principal of Lhasa Nagqu No. 2 Senior High School, was born on the grasslands of northern Xizang. The nomadic lifestyle of local herding communities posed significant challenges to expanding access to education. In the 1990s, Bianba completed his secondary education at a boarding school in Nagqu before being admitted to a normal university. After graduation, he returned to his hometown to devote himself to education. Reflecting on his experience, he said, “Boarding education solved the school access problem for children of Xizang’s farmers and herders.”

Champa Chosang, a student from Qusong Township in Zanda County, Ngari Prefecture, lives a three-hour drive from his school. Having grown up in a boarding school, he developed strong self-care skills through communal living and often took the initiative to look after younger students. Gyatso, principal of the nine-year school in Zanda County, noted that the school currently has roughly equal numbers of day students and boarding students. Many families who live close enough for their children to commute still voluntarily choose boarding because they value the school’s high-quality educational resources and well-balanced meal program. Many parents have commented, “Children who board at school are physically stronger.”

These stories are representative of the development of boarding education in Xizang. Countless children from farming and pastoral areas have gained stable, continuous educational opportunities through the boarding system, enabling both academic progress and personal growth. At the same time, many ordinary families have found greater hope for the future through their children’s access to quality education.

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China’s Boarding education is different from its Western counterpart

Some external forces have hyped up Xizang’s boarding education to smear and attack China’s Xizang policies. In doing so, they intentionally equate Xizang’s universally accessible boarding education system with the Indigenous boarding schools of the European colonial era. This approach neither reflects the historical record nor recognizes the fundamental differences between the two. In reality, Xizang’s boarding education differs fundamentally from boarding schools established under Western colonial rule, and the two are not meaningfully comparable.

In terms of intent, Indigenous boarding schools during the Western colonial era were instruments of notorious colonial rule used to suppress local cultures and pursue ethnic assimilation, leaving a legacy of abuse and injustice. By contrast, Xizang’s boarding schools were established in response to the region’s vast territory and dispersed population. They have addressed the challenge of providing school access for children in remote farming and pastoral areas while ensuring, in accordance with the law, that all ethnic groups have equal access to quality compulsory education. Schools provide bilingual instruction in Chinese and Tibetan while also offering English and other general education subjects to meet students’ diverse learning needs. They also systematically offer courses on traditional Tibetan culture to preserve and pass on its heritage. Their core objectives are to improve educational access on the plateau, cultivate local talent, promote coordinated regional development, and enable all ethnic groups to share in the educational and developmental opportunities associated with modernization.

In terms of governance and operation, Western colonial boarding schools were administered by colonial authorities or religious organizations and operated through compulsory systems in which Indigenous children were forcibly separated from their families. Daily management was marked by discrimination and oppression. By contrast, Xizang’s boarding education is supported and coordinated by the central government and planned and developed under the unified direction of the People’s Government of the Xizang Autonomous Region. Boarding is entirely voluntary and chosen by students and their parents, with no compulsory attendance. All schools operate within China’s public compulsory education system and are fully funded through central and local government budgets. Campus management respects the living customs and cultural traditions of all ethnic groups, while regular home-school communication mechanisms foster a collaborative educational environment.

In terms of outcomes, Western colonial boarding schools caused lasting and profound harm to Indigenous peoples. Countless families were separated, Indigenous cultures were severely damaged, and large numbers of Indigenous children suffered both physical and psychological trauma. This remains an unhealed historical wound for many Indigenous communities in the Americas and Oceania.

By contrast, decades of boarding education in Xizang have fundamentally transformed the severe educational underdevelopment that characterized old Xizang. The system has provided children in farming and pastoral areas with stable and continuous educational pathways, steadily raised the overall educational attainment of all ethnic groups in the region, and consistently cultivated local professionals to support long-term economic and social development. At the same time, campuses provide opportunities for interaction, exchange, and integration among students from different ethnic groups, strengthening the sense of community for the Chinese nation while preserving and passing on the fine traditions of each ethnic culture. They also promote national consciousness, civic awareness, and awareness of the rule of law.

Facts speak louder than words. Xizang’s boarding education is a voluntary choice made by people of all ethnic groups based on their practical needs. It is also an important public welfare initiative through which China, in accordance with the law, safeguards the equal right to education for children of all ethnic groups, promotes balanced regional educational development, and advances the continued progress of human rights in Xizang. The smears and attacks of Xizang’s boarding education by external forces reflects their erroneous projection of Western historical experiences onto a different context. It can never alter the fact that education in Xizang has been developing prosperously.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Kelsang Dolma, Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the Institute of Socio-Economics, China Tibetology Research Center.

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Rather than simply compiling a series of provisions, the Ecological and Environmental Code systematically reorganizes, revises, and supplements existing legal norms under a unified legislative framework, creating a cohesive and integrated legal system.

On March 12, 2026, at the Fourth Session of the 14th National People’s Congress of China, the Ecological and Environmental Code of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Ecological and Environmental Code” or the “Code”) was adopted by vote. It is China’s second law to be designated a “code,” following the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China. Comprising five chapters with 1,242 articles, the Code will take effect on August 15 of the same year. This landmark legislative achievement not only marks the beginning of a new era of codified ecological civilization construction in China but also strengthens the legal foundation for the sustainable development of the Chinese nation. Furthermore, the Ecological and Environmental Code also offers China’s legal wisdom and solutions for global environmental governance and other shared challenges facing humanity.

From “single-law governance” to “systemic governance”

The Code marks a formal leap from “single-law governance” to “systemic governance.” Rather than simply compiling a series of provisions, it systematically reorganizes, revises, and supplements existing legal norms under a unified legislative framework, creating a cohesive and integrated legal system.

As part of this process, 10 core laws, including the Environmental Protection Law and the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Law, were incorporated into the Code through compilation and revision. These laws will cease to have effect once the Code takes effect. At the same time, the core provisions of more than 20 related laws, including the Forestry Law and the Yangtze River Protection Law, have been selectively incorporated while the laws themselves remain in force. The Code also introduces forward-looking, principle-based provisions addressing contemporary issues such as climate change and green, low-carbon development.

“Systemic governance” is the defining principle of the Code. Article 2 defines “ecology and environment” as “the entirety of all natural and artificially transformed natural spaces, natural elements, and their interrelationships and interactions that affect human existence and development and ecosystem functions,” underscoring the systemic and holistic nature of ecology and environment. Article 6 further establishes “systemic governance” as one of the Code’s fundamental principles.

This means that future law enforcement and judicial practice will no longer focus solely on reducing pollution but will instead emphasize restoring and maintaining the integrity of entire ecosystems. This conceptual shift reflects the evolution of China’s legal approach from “fragmented governance” to “integrated protection.”

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Protection of border ethnic regions and key river basins

If systemic integration forms the “skeleton” of the Code, then targeted protections for specific regions are its “flesh and blood.” China’s border regions inhabited by ethnic minorities are largely located along river headwaters, plateaus, and grasslands. These areas serve as critical ecological security barriers, playing irreplaceable roles in water conservation, biodiversity protection, and desertification control. Protecting their ecology and environment is therefore essential not only to the livelihoods of the ethnic groups who live there but also to strengthening the country’s overall ecological security and ensuring the sustainable development of the Chinese nation. To this end, the Code moves beyond the traditional “one-size-fits-all” approach by significantly strengthening legal protections for these regions.

At the institutional level, the Code establishes a legal framework for coordinated ecological and environmental governance across administrative boundaries, clarifying responsibilities at every level of government. Through its General Rules, Ecological Protection, and Supervision and Administration, it defines the statutory responsibilities for ecological and environmental protection in border regions. It formalizes mechanisms including central ecological and environmental protection inspections, joint cross-regional monitoring, and coordinated law enforcement, while authorizing local governments to formulate differentiated environmental quality standards and regulatory measures suited to plateau, grassland, and river valley conditions. In doing so, it translates the national strategy of building an ecological security barrier system into practical, measurable, and enforceable legal norms. The Code also includes a dedicated chapter on ecological protection compensation. Article 114 expressly provides that the central and provincial fiscal systems may guide and support interregional horizontal ecological protection compensation in priority areas across provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, autonomous prefectures, and cities divided into districts, where ecological functions are especially important. The aim is to address imbalances of interests at the institutional level by ensuring that the benefits of middle and downstream development are channeled back to support upstream conservation, thereby providing equitable compensation for those who protect the environment.

To strengthen implementation and enforcement at the grassroots level, the Code addresses practical challenges in border ethnic regions, including vast territories, dispersed farming and pastoral communities, limited local regulatory capacity, and the difficulty of supervising remote areas. Drawing on long-term experience in grassroots environmental governance, it refines enforcement mechanisms to better match local conditions. Its provisions on supervision and administration authorize municipal ecological and environmental authorities to delegate administrative penalty powers to dispatched offices, extending enforcement into county- and township-level pastoral areas and helping resolve situations in which violations can be identified but cannot readily be addressed. For key national ecological function zones—including the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau, the headwaters of the Yangtze and Yellow rivers, and the northern windbreak and sand fixation belts—the Code includes a chapter titled “Protection of Important Geographical Units” in “Chapter Three: Ecological Protection.” The chapter incorporates provisions from the Law on the Ecological Protection of the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau into a concise set of high-standard rules, providing a direct legal basis for environmental law enforcement and judicial adjudication in border ethnic regions. In Qinghai province, for example, where multiple ethnic groups live together and the ecosystem is particularly fragile, the Code’s streamlined public-interest litigation rules and expedited procedures for minor violations allow frequent, low-level offenses—such as forage-livestock imbalances and unauthorized grazing—to be handled on-site through simplified enforcement measures. Through the model of coordinated cross-regional governance of major river basins and the prompt resolution of minor ecological cases, the Code extends its legal protections and enforcement mechanisms to grasslands, villages, and pastoral communities alike, achieving comprehensive coverage.

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Contributing China’s solution: Institutional advancement from a global perspective

Moving from “fragmented governance” to “systemic governance,” the Code offers the world a “China solution” for environmental improvement. Compared with environmental legislation in other countries, it represents a notable institutional advancement.

First, through one of the world’s most comprehensive efforts at systemic integration, the Code addresses the fragmentation that characterizes many environmental legal frameworks. Few countries have integrated pollution control, ecological protection, low-carbon development, and even governance related to border ethnic regions into a single, unified code. Second, the Code adopts a forward-looking approach that places it at the forefront of global environmental legislation. By codifying emerging priorities such as “carbon peaking and carbon neutrality,” it seeks to address the policy fragmentation that has challenged the legal frameworks of many developed countries. Its most distinctive feature, however, is the breadth of its governance scope. The Code fully embodies the principle of “holistic conservation and systematic governance of mountains, rivers, forests, farmlands, lakes, grasslands and deserts,” adopting an integrated spatial approach to ecological protection that goes beyond the element-by-element framework characteristic of many traditional Western environmental laws. In doing so, it offers a more systematic and forward-looking legal paradigm for global ecological governance.

The journey from the Code’s initial proposal to its promulgation also reflects the pace of China’s ecological civilization development. This rapid advance in legal development illustrates China’s transformation from a “follower” to a “leader” in environmental protection over the course of just a few decades. The momentum behind this progress stems from China’s decision to elevate ecological civilization to a national strategic priority, together with its ability to translate the vision that “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” into a broadly shared public commitment. Through this combination of institutional capacity and a shared commitment to green development, China has completed the transition from single-element governance to comprehensive ecosystem management in a relatively short period.

In essence, the Code is both a legal codification of China’s historic improvements in ecological and environmental quality and a significant demonstration of the country’s commitment to addressing global challenges such as climate change.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Yang Jiwen, associate professor at the School of the Chinese Nation Studies and the Law School of Minzu University of China.

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The key to this humble bowl stepping beyond Qinghai and becoming a distinctive industry that enriches livelihoods lies in its precise "mastery" of the diner's palate—and in using noodles as a bond to deepen exchange, communication, and integration among all ethnic groups.

“Thwack! Thwack! Thwack!” On the early-morning streets of Xining, the crisp slap of dough against the worktable rings through the lanes. Between kneading, stretching, swinging, and pulling, the hand-pulled noodle master transforms the dough into thin, resilient, chewy silver strands. Boiled in bubbling water, ladled with bone broth, topped with beef, drizzled with chili oil, and sprinkled with cilantro, a steaming bowl of hand-pulled noodles kicks off a busy day for the people of Qinghai.

Hand-pulled noodles boast a long history. In 2002, at the Lajia site in Qinghai, archaeologists discovered an overturned pottery bowl. When it was lifted, a clump of coiled, entangled noodles was revealed. About 50 centimeters long and merely 3 millimeters wide, these noodles bear a striking resemblance to today’s hand-pulled noodles and were mixed with meat, Sichuan pepper, and other seasonings. Research confirmed that the bowl of noodles is more than 4,000 years old, making it the oldest noodles discovered in the world to date—hailed as the “world’s first noodles.” It attests to the sophisticated skill mastered in China 4,000 years ago for turning ground powder into “noodles” with an almost circular cross-section.

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Today, Qinghai hand-pulled noodle shops can be found across China, from alleyways to shopping malls. By the end of 2024, there were 30,278 Qinghai hand-pulled noodle restaurants nationwide, spread across 337 cities. Yet in the 1980s and 1990s, Qinghai hand-pulled noodles were little more than a common street snack. Vendors traveled north and south carrying “one stove, two pots, three tables, and four benches,” with husband-and-wife noodle shops the prevailing business model. Later, guided by government policies and through noodle makers’ commitment to tradition and innovation, Qinghai hand-pulled noodles completed a remarkable transformation—from “mobile stall operation” to a branded, standardized, and internationalized industry.

The key to this humble bowl stepping beyond Qinghai and becoming a distinctive industry that enriches livelihoods lies in its precise “mastery” of the diner’s palate—and in using noodles as a bond to deepen exchange, communication, and integration among all ethnic groups. In Fujian, the noodles “adapt to local customs,” adding chicken to the beef broth for a more umami-rich flavor. In Yunnan, where people “revel in mushrooms,” a “with wild mushrooms” option is offered. Coastal cities favor seafood, giving rise to a “seafood noodle” series. In Hong Kong, where tastes lean lighter, the use of chili oil is reduced. Innovative new varieties—such as Golden Soup with Green Sichuan Pepper and Lemon Pickled Vegetable—have also been launched to meet diverse needs. From the fusion of Northwestern flavors with coastal seafood, to the pairing of highland bone broth with Yunnan mushrooms, and the emergence of diverse new-style noodles, the journey of Qinghai hand-pulled noodles across mountains and seas stands as a vivid footnote to the pluralistic unity of Chinese culinary culture.

The overseas journey of Qinghai hand-pulled noodles is a vivid example of Chinese local cuisine “going global.” Today, Xining, the capital of Qinghai, hosts the International Noodle Culture Festival each year, inviting visitors from abroad to savor the food and engage in cultural dialogue. From the plateau to destinations overseas, hand-pulled noodles deliver not only “Chinese flavor” but also build bridges for cultural exchange.

Along the Belt and Road, Qinghai hand-pulled noodles have taken root in 35 countries and regions worldwide, including Malaysia, Europe, and the United States. Abroad, they have entered everyday local life. It is now common to see “foreign masters” in noodle shops energetically working the dough. To better serve international diners, noodle makers invest great care in service and flavor—substituting traditional seasonings with locally familiar European and American spices, reducing salt and fat in classic Chinese bone broth, and proactively asking about cutlery preferences and dietary habits to ensure a comfortable dining experience.

To help overseas diners intuitively experience Chinese hand-pulled noodle culture, some restaurants feature open kitchens, allowing guests to watch noodles pulled thin enough to thread a needle and dance into shape as they enjoy their meal. Others design thoughtful menus with diagrams illustrating the noodle-making process, inviting customers to engage more deeply with Chinese food culture. Some decorate their walls with Qinghai-themed photography and play Qinghai folk music, bringing Chinese style within easy reach.

Honest people, genuine ingredients, quality meat, chewy noodles, flavorful broth—one bowl of hand-pulled noodles leaves the world not only with savory satisfaction on the palate but also with an impression of the Chinese people’s simplicity, sincerity, and integrity.

Indeed, a bowl of Qinghai hand-pulled noodles is a “golden bowl” that boosts incomes and livelihoods. It is also a “heart-connecting bridge” that fosters exchange, communication, and integration among all ethnic groups, as well as mutual learning between Chinese and Western civilizations—and a “golden business card” for sharing Chinese culture with the world.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

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The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law advocates that civilizations should engage with one another on the basis of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness, rather than treating differences as the root cause of conflict.

In today’s world, there is an urgent necessity to transcend the Western mindset of “binary opposition.” On July 1, 2026, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China officially came into effect. In this episode, Professor Wang Yiwei offers a systematic interpretation of how the ideas embedded in this law provide insights into resolving the global challenges of civilizational conflicts and ethnic antagonism. He also explores the underlying logic connecting the building of a sense of community for the Chinese nation with the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind.

Q: This Law embodies the principle of “enhancing commonalities while respecting and embracing differences.” How does the “unity in diversity” of the Chinese nation that it reflects transcend the Western mindset of “binary opposition”?

A: In Western political thought, binary opposition serves as a fundamental cognitive framework, often reducing ethnic relations to mutually exclusive choices such as “majority or minority,” “mainstream or marginal,” or “assimilation or separation.” Concepts such as unity and diversity, state and nation, and commonality and difference are frequently viewed as either-or propositions. Under this logic, the resulting approaches tend toward forced assimilation, neglect of differences, or even ethnic fragmentation that rejects unity.

Accompanying this is a competitive logic that prioritizes individual rights and ethnic interests, viewing different ethnic groups as engaged in a zero-sum relationship, where one group’s gain comes at another’s expense, making confrontation and conflict more likely.

Even at the governance level, Western models often emphasize management and control while placing less emphasis on proactively fostering cohesion and strengthening a sense of community. A deeper problem lies in cultural hegemony: the notion of “one nation, one state” is used to deny the identity of the Chinese nation as a multiethnic country, while the superiority of a single culture is asserted and the development of diverse cultures is suppressed. In essence, this represents a continuation of the logic of cultural colonialism and racial hierarchy.

In contrast to the Western mindset of binary opposition, China has developed over thousands of years a civilizational pattern of “unity in diversity,” in which diversity constitutes the constituent elements and unity provides the overarching thread.

The core principle is to understand diversity and unity as a dialectical, symbiotic, and mutually reinforcing relationship. Guided by this philosophy, China respects differences among ethnic groups while simultaneously strengthening identification with the community for the Chinese nation, embodying the Chinese civilizational ideal of “harmony in diversity and all flourishing in prosperity.” Centered on the goal of building the community for the Chinese nation, China’s ethnic groups are viewed not as separate and independent entities but as an interdependent community with a shared future.

This Law follows the principle of “enhancing commonalities while respecting and embracing differences.” At the policy level, it acknowledges and protects the linguistic and cultural differences of all ethnic groups while promoting the standard spoken and written Chinese language as a common bond for communication among ethnic groups. Differences are not erased, nor are commonalities diminished. Instead, the two are organically integrated through institutional arrangements: differences are accommodated within the system, while commonalities are strengthened through social cohesion.

The deeper foundation lies in the inclusive and accommodating cultural tradition of Chinese civilization. For thousands of years, people of all ethnic groups have learned from one another, integrated with one another, and developed together. This inclusive and symbiotic civilizational foundation has made “unity in diversity” a natural outcome of historical development, grounded in deep cultural identification and historical continuity.

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Q: What kind of approach does the thought embodied in this Law offer for resolving the pressing global challenges of civilizational conflicts and ethnic antagonism?

A: In today’s world, civilizational conflicts, ethnic antagonisms, and religious tensions continue to emerge. The thought embodied in the Law offers an approach to these challenges that differs fundamentally from the entrenched logic of confrontation prevalent in Western societies.

The Law advocates that civilizations should engage with one another on the basis of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness, rather than treating differences as the root cause of conflict. China’s philosophy of “harmonious coexistence” stands in sharp contrast to the Western “clash of civilizations” theory. Civilizations can serve as sources of mutual enrichment, and diverse cultures can coexist in harmony, transcending the Western presupposition of binary opposition.

The Law’s provisions both protect the cultural identities of all ethnic groups and strengthen a shared Chinese national identity. At the core of this approach is the pursuit of a state in which “diversity does not lead to separation, and unity does not lead to suppression,” resolving ethnic antagonisms through the principle of “unity in diversity.”

Moreover, the Law identifies development as the key to addressing ethnic issues. Poverty, injustice, and marginalization are often the underlying causes of ethnic tensions. The Law further demonstrates China’s commitment to eliminating the material and social conditions that give rise to such antagonisms at their source, thereby promoting the common development and shared prosperity of all ethnic groups.

The Law explicitly calls for promoting all-around inter-embedding, extensive interaction, exchange, and integration among all ethnic groups, fostering a closely interconnected social fabric. This approach seeks to strengthen emotional bonds and shared identification through sustained everyday interactions and closer engagement among different ethnic groups, thereby building a community with a shared future.

The Law institutionalizes the principles of equality, inclusiveness, unity, and development, providing a legal framework for regulating inter-ethnic relations, preventing conflicts, resolving disputes, and maintaining social stability. The rule of law safeguards the rights of all people rather than the privileges of any particular group, thereby strengthening the foundation for social harmony.

The Law also embodies a “global vision” and “humanitarian concern,” extending the experience of building the community for the Chinese nation to a global context by advocating the building of a community with a shared future for mankind and promoting peaceful coexistence and common development among all countries. This concept of “one world, one family” transcends narrow nationalism and notions of civilizational superiority.

Taken together, this logic suggests that the Law offers a non-confrontational approach to civilizational conflicts and ethnic antagonisms. It does not regard differences among civilizations as the root of conflict but rather as opportunities for mutual learning. It does not impose “value export” or any single model but instead promotes equal cooperation through the rule of law. Nor does it pursue a homogenized state of “cultural uniformity”; rather, it seeks to build a shared future while preserving diversity. This approach offers a useful reference for addressing some of today’s most pressing challenges, including ethnic antagonism, religious conflict, and the integration of immigrants and refugees.

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Q: What is the intrinsic connection between the core concept of advancing the building of the community for the Chinese nation as embodied in this Law and the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind? And what significance does it hold for advancing the building of a community with a shared future for mankind?

A: There is indeed an intrinsic connection between the core concept of advancing the building of the community for the Chinese nation embodied in this Law and the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind.

The two “communities” share the same value foundations. The principle of “harmony in diversity and all flourishing in prosperity” is not only a guiding principle for handling ethnic relations within China but also a fundamental principle guiding China’s approach to international relations—respecting differences, pursuing common interests, and resolving issues through consultation rather than confrontation. Whether at the domestic level through ethnic unity or at the international level through the building of a community with a shared future for mankind, both advocate symbiosis, shared prosperity, and a shared future while opposing zero-sum competition and hegemonism. In both cases, the foundation lies not in eliminating differences but in fostering a shared sense of common destiny and a collective commitment to a shared future on the basis of mutual respect for diversity.

Furthermore, as reflected in the expression, “Only with the unity of the Chinese nation can we contribute to uniting the world as one family,” a country capable of achieving unity, harmony, and shared prosperity among its 56 ethnic groups possesses governance experience with significance extending beyond its own borders.

At the conceptual level, the building of both communities adopts a community-oriented approach rather than one centered on individuals or nation-states. This approach prioritizes the common good over zero-sum competition; embraces diversity and inclusiveness rather than simple uniformity and homogenization; pursues shared development rather than winner-takes-all outcomes; and advocates peaceful cooperation rather than conflict and confrontation. This way of thinking transcends the deeply rooted logic of binary opposition in Western political traditions.

At the practical level, the efforts to build the two communities reinforce one another. The successful practice of building the community for the Chinese nation provides a replicable model for building a community with a shared future for mankind by demonstrating how to strengthen unity, reduce antagonism, and safeguard harmony. In turn, advancing the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind provides a broader international environment and value support for the building of the community for the Chinese nation.

From a domestic perspective, by forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, the Law brings together the strengths of all ethnic groups to safeguard national unity, promote shared prosperity, and advance national rejuvenation, thereby providing a united and stable domestic environment for Chinese modernization. Through institutional design, the Law translates the principle of “unity” into sustainable and practicable governance.

From an international perspective, the Law offers a Chinese solution for multiethnic countries and the multicultural world in resolving conflicts, achieving unity, and pursuing shared development. It responds to global challenges such as civilizational conflict, ethnic antagonism, and hegemonism with the philosophy of harmonious coexistence and common development. The vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind promotes peaceful coexistence, win-win cooperation, and mutual learning among civilizations while opposing unilateralism, hegemonism, and power politics.

More importantly, the implementation of the Law demonstrates China’s confidence in its path, theory, system, and culture, and injects positive momentum into the development of a more just and equitable international order.

This Law is not only a milestone in advancing the rule of law in China’s ethnic affairs but also an institutional model that China offers for the governance of multiethnic countries. It strengthens the institutional foundation and cultural identity underpinning Chinese modernization through the great unity of the Chinese nation, while enhancing China’s international competitiveness and global voice. It responds to skepticism in Western discourse, transcends the limitations of “imagined communities” and identity politics in Western ethnic theories, and further demonstrates that “unity in diversity” is a viable path toward civilizational coexistence.

At a time of rising deglobalization and intensifying ethnic conflicts, the Law carries significance that extends well beyond China’s borders.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The interviewee is Wang Yiwei, vice president of The Academy of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Renmin University of China.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhang Weiwei

Translator/ Wang Li

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Nadam has long transcended the scope of a traditional festival. With culture at its core, tourism as its vehicle, and industry as its support, Nadam generates momentum across multiple dimensions, including cultural-tourism integration and rural revitalization.

Nadam, from the Mongolian word meaning “entertainment” or “game,” is a centuries-old mass gathering on the grasslands. Born of nomadic civilization, this ancient tradition has evolved across today’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region into a multifaceted festival that integrates culture, sports, tourism, and trade—serving as a “new engine” for high-quality regional development.

A millennial festival on horseback: engraving the cultural gene of the grasslands

Throughout history, Nadam has served as an important occasion for grassland communities to celebrate harvests and pray for favorable weather. More than that, it represents a cultural gene etched into the very bloodline of the region’s ethnic groups.

The term “Nadam” first appears in the Genghis Khan Stone Inscription, which records a grand gathering held in 1225 in the Buhasuqihai region, located along the present-day border between Xinjiang and Gansu. The “Three Manly Arts”—Bökh (Mongolian wrestling), horse racing, and archery—form the core of Nadam. Bökh emphasizes the fusion of strength and technique; horse racing tests the coordination between rider and horse; and archery showcases precision and composure. Together, these three skills reflect both the practical survival abilities of nomadic peoples and the spiritual character of the grasslands’ sons and daughters.

In 2006, Nadam was inscribed on China’s first national list of intangible cultural heritage. Its enduring vitality over the centuries stems from its embodiment of the spiritual aspirations of grassland people—valuing strength, cherishing unity, and revering nature. These core values closely align with those of Chinese civilization.

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Tradition and modernity interwoven: contemporary practices in the transmission of living heritage

No matter how times change, Nadam has continued to uphold grassland traditions. At Nadam festivals across Inner Mongolia, ancient rites remain fully preserved: the ovoo (stone heap) offering ceremony at the opening celebration, the eagle-spread gesture of Bökh wrestlers, and the time-honored eulogies to horses at the racetrack.

While honoring tradition, innovation remains rooted in the festival’s original spirit. In recent years, Nadam has continued to expand in both content and form. At the 2025 Nadam in Xilinhot City, 18 intangible cultural heritage items and their 18 inheritors staged live demonstrations, while heritage products such as shagai (animal anklebones), felt embroidery, and silver ornaments were displayed and sold on site. Activities including travel photography, hands-on handicraft workshops, and contemporary cultural merchandise allowed visitors to immerse themselves in the charm of grassland culture.

The Nadam Village Evening Gala created by Xin Barag Right Banner, set against the backdrop of herders’ daily lives, integrates cultural performances, sports competitions, and intangible cultural heritage displays. It was selected as a representative example of China’s mass-culture brands. Damao Banner has also developed the “Four-Season Nadam” brand, expanding the traditional summer Nadam into a year-round series of activities spanning spring, summer, autumn, and winter.

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Activating development momentum: A new engine driving high-quality development

Nadam has long transcended the scope of a traditional festival, becoming a powerful engine for Inner Mongolia’s economic and social development. With culture at its core, tourism as its vehicle, and industry as its support, Nadam generates momentum across multiple dimensions, including cultural-tourism integration and rural revitalization.

Regions across Inner Mongolia have used Nadam as a focal point for developing grassland-themed tourism routes, driving growth in scenic attractions, homestays, catering, and related industries. During the July 2025 Nadam festivities, Xilinhot City received 1.913 million domestic tourists, a year-over-year increase of 270 percent, and recorded total tourism spending of 2.104 billion yuan, up 418.2 percent year over year.

Nadam is also becoming an important lever for transforming pastoral economies and increasing the incomes of herders and farmers. Through the Nadam platform, products including horses, beef and mutton, dairy products, handicrafts, and other local specialties can reach consumers directly, making the leap from “products” to marketable commodities. At the food exhibition area of the Nadam festival in Siziwang Banner, the aroma of grassland specialties such as whole roasted lamb, dairy products, and lamb offal filled the air. Li Weihong, a tourist from Tianjin, held a bowl of authentic Siziwang Banner lamb offal and said excitedly, “I’ve watched videos about Siziwang Banner lamb offal online for a long time, and today I finally got to taste the real thing—there’s no gamey smell at all. It truly lives up to its reputation.” This model of “online attention driving offline consumption” is becoming a new pathway for pastoral products to move from rural areas into urban markets.

At Nadam festivals, people from across the grasslands gather together, strengthening mutual understanding, deepening bonds, and promoting unity amid laughter and celebration. On the competition grounds, cheers rise one after another. As night falls, bonfires are lit beneath the stars, and visitors sit together sharing stories of their journeys. Here, the joy of harvest, the transmission of culture, and the power of unity come together in some of the grasslands’ most moving scenes.

Nadam is also becoming an important window through which the world can better understand China’s grassland culture. Through overseas platforms such as the China Cultural Center in Moscow, Nadam has reached multiple countries along the Belt and Road, including Russia and Mongolia, enabling more international audiences to appreciate the cultural richness and unique charm of the festival and to witness a great, socialist China that is rapidly developing and advancing confidently toward modernization.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Zhang Ziling, associate research librarian at the Library of the China Tibetology Research Center.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Kang Mengting

Translator/ Zhu Jianting

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Known collectively as China's three great epics, Manas, Gesar, and Jangar are "living epics" rooted in the everyday lives and labor of ordinary people. Preserving and passing on these traditions is therefore a long-term, systematic cultural undertaking that requires sustained commitment.

On the evening of January 30, 2026, a grand performance at the Xinjiang People’s Theatre offered a resounding answer. As the melodies of The Epic of Manas, The Epic of Gesar, and The Epic of Jangar resounded in succession, several nationally recognized inheritors of intangible cultural heritage (ICH) took to the stage. Through their compelling oral renditions, they brought sweeping tales of heroism vividly to life. Presented under the theme “Heroic Epics, People’s Living Heritage,” the showcase demonstrated how these ancient epics continue to thrive on the contemporary stage.

Known collectively as China’s three great epics, Manas, Gesar, and Jangar are “living epics” rooted in the everyday lives and labor of ordinary people. For centuries, they have been passed down primarily through the oral traditions of folk performers. Without fixed written texts or a definitive date of composition, each region and performing tradition has developed its own distinctive versions and variations. This reliance on oral transmission makes the epics inherently fragile—”When the singer lives, the song endures; when the singer dies, the song falls silent.” The passing of each inheritor may mean the permanent loss of a unique version of an epic. Preserving and passing on these traditions is therefore a long-term, systematic cultural undertaking that requires sustained commitment.

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During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the central government continued to increase fiscal support for cultural heritage preservation, with a focus on nationally recognized representative ICH projects. Within this framework, the preservation and transmission of the three great epics received prioritized policy support and investment from multiple sources.

A landmark step came on May 1, 2025, with the enactment of the Regulations on the Protection of Manas Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region—the first local regulation specifically dedicated to one of China’s three great epics. The regulation establishes a comprehensive framework for safeguarding the ICH of Manas, covering protection and transmission measures, research, translation and publication, artistic creation, public outreach, and international exchange. It also provides, for the first time, clear definitions of the geographic areas where Manas is traditionally practiced and of its representative inheritors.

This institutional support provides a solid foundation for veteran artists while empowering younger inheritors to explore new forms of expression. In the Kizilsu Kirgiz autonomous prefecture of Xinjiang, the electric rock band named “Manas” is exploring new ways to present the ancient epic. Centering its performances on Manas, the band boldly blends rock music and Peking Opera with the epic tradition. In 2025, the band performed at the Nanjing Midou Music Festival, where young audience waved to the music and joined in the performance, experiencing the harmony between tradition and modernity. From dedicated ICH showcases to major music festivals, and from offline performances to online dissemination, this millennia-old epic is reaching young people in forms they readily embrace.

The core value of a living epic lies in its people and is rooted in everyday life. In West Ujimqin Banner, this transmission begins in the classroom. The Youth Activity Center introduced Jangar into the First Primary School, where inheritor Buyant uses engaging stories and interactive presentations to help the heroes of the grasslands take root in children’s imaginations. Similar practices are also carried forward in Hanggin Banner.

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In 2023, the Institute of Ethnic Literature of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences established the Research Base for the Creative Transformation and Innovative Development of the Jangar Epic in Hanggin Banner. Through regular epic performances, inheritors training programs, and Jangar folk culture festivals, the base provides academic expertise and a platform to support local transmission efforts. Primary schools have also established “Little Jangar Performers” clubs, incorporating epic performance into after-school programs. Their performances have even graced the Children’s Spring Festival Gala. This model—”classroom introduction + base support + public outreach”—has been promoted across many areas of Inner Mongolia.

In Balin Right Banner, 35 schools offer a total of 146 ICH courses, bringing epic culture to more campuses. Through living transmission that is rooted in daily life, embedded in real-world settings, and sustained as a regular practice, the ancient epic of Jangar is gradually weaving into contemporary public cultural life and radiating new vitality in the new era.

Digital preservation has built a lasting safeguard for these epics, enabling them to transcend the boundaries of time and space. For generations, field researchers have carried recording equipment across the snowy plateau and the grasslands, tracing the paths along which these epics have been passed down. With cameras and microphones, they have captured every precious melody and preserved every weathered handwritten manuscript.

The artist Samdrup, acclaimed as a “living library of epics,” became the focus of a decades-long documentation effort by a team from the Xizang Academy of Social Sciences. Accompanying him from village to village, the team recorded 2,114 hours of his epic performances and compiled them into The Vocal Texts of Gesar by Artist Samdrup. Representing the work of a lifetime, this extraordinary cultural legacy is the longest known epic text performed by a single individual and an irreplaceable cultural treasure preserved for future generations.

In Qinghai, researchers traveled throughout farming and pastoral areas to collect handwritten manuscripts from elderly inheritors. They scanned and archived these materials to establish China’s first cross-dialect multimedia database of Gesar. Today, these digital treasures are reaching the public through official digital exhibition halls, cloud-powered performances, and audiobooks. With a tap on a screen, people thousands of miles away can listen to the pristine melodies of the snowy plateau and experience the majestic spirit of a millennia-old epic.

From the institutional safeguards established through pioneering legislation, to living transmission rooted in schools, to digital preservation that transcends time and space, these millennia-old heroic narratives embody the shared aspirations of China’s ethnic groups: supporting one another, honoring learning and righteousness, and protecting the homeland. They stand as vivid testimony to the Chinese nation’s unity in diversity. Through sustained, practical, and multifaceted efforts, these ancient epics will continue to be passed down from generation to generation, allowing the unique charm of Eastern oral epics to flourish well into the new era.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhong Xin

Translator/ Wang Li

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Copyeditor/ Zhang Weiwei

Thanks to rapid advances in transportation infrastructure, that picture has changed. Small items priced as low as 23.99 yuan can be delivered free to homes in Xinjiang, and express parcels can travel from Hangzhou in Zhejiang province to Karamay, Xinjiang in as little as two days.

The old notion that “Xinjiang is too vast for free shipping” has long been a thing of the past. Covering about 1.6649 million square kilometers—roughly one-sixth of China’s land area—Xinjiang was once excluded from free-shipping policies because of its size. Online shoppers there previously often paid shipping fees as high as 24 yuan and waited a week or more for delivery.

Now, thanks to rapid advances in transportation infrastructure, that picture has changed. Small items priced as low as 23.99 yuan can be delivered free to homes in Xinjiang, and express parcels can travel from Hangzhou in Zhejiang province to Karamay, Xinjiang in as little as two days.

The shift from a “non-free-shipping zone” to a “free-shipping zone” reflects major improvements in Xinjiang’s transport network over the past seven decades. At the time of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang had just 3,361 kilometers of highways. By the end of 2024, total highway mileage had grown to 230,000 kilometers. A comprehensive, multimodal transport system—integrating highways, railways, and civil aviation—is rapidly taking shape, giving strong momentum to Xinjiang’s development.

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Once divided by the Tianshan Mountains, Xinjiang today sees formidable barriers turned into smooth thoroughfares.

Where mountains and deserts once posed natural obstacles—crossing the Tianshan range could take half a day or a full day—the completion of the Tianshan Shengli Tunnel has cut the traverse to about 20 minutes. The fastest travel time between Urumqi and Korla is now under three hours, making the vision of “crossing northern and southern Xinjiang in one day” a reality.

Today, modern school buses shuttle across the Tianshan Mountains and along the Tarim River, freeing children from arduous journeys and ensuring they reach school safely and comfortably. The railway network now connects all prefectures and cities, covering more than 80% of county-level administrative regions. Expressways and provincial and national highways reach even the most remote towns, enabling the seamless flow of people and goods. With 28 civil airports—the most in China—and 595 air routes, including 25 international passenger routes linking Xinjiang with 17 countries and regions, the region has built an aerial bridge to the world.

The integration of “Internet Plus Transportation” has made convenience genuinely within reach.

Hetian roses and Kashi cumin, still bathed in morning sun on the field ridges, can be loaded onto logistics trucks bound for first-tier cities in eastern China by the afternoon. Fresh fruits from Gobi orchards reach dining tables across China within 72 hours thanks to cold-chain logistics. Tajik herders on the Pamir Plateau can order a wide variety of goods via smartphone and receive them as early as the next day—connecting them not only to the rest of the country but also to the world.

When roads reach every doorstep, prosperity sweetens every heart.

Transportation is more than an extension of steel and concrete—it is the vital artery that brings prosperity and opportunity. Highways such as the Lianyungang–Khorgos Expressway (G30) and Beijing–Urumqi Expressway (G7) link Xinjiang closely with the national economy. Shipping costs for a 5-kilogram box of crayfish from Zhengzhou, Henan province, to Urumqi have dropped from 12 yuan to 5.8 yuan, while cold-chain truck costs per trip have fallen by 17,000 yuan, making dining tables in Xinjiang more abundant and diverse.

Improved transportation has also made scenic sites—like the grasslands of Ili, Kanas Lake, and the Muztagh Ata—more accessible. Herders along these routes have launched homestays, specialty restaurants, and ethnic cultural experience programs, exchanging their herding whips for new sources of income. An elderly herder on an Ili pasture said with a smile, “Now that the asphalt road reaches our yurt, self-driving tourists come in a steady stream. Visitors love my wife’s freshly stewed lamb and milk tea. We’ve opened a yurt guesthouse, and our two sons run horseback-riding experience programs. Our household income is several times what it was when we only herded livestock.”

Transport development has also created numerous jobs in logistics, tourism, and cross-border trade. In 2024, the per capita disposable income of rural residents in Xinjiang exceeded 19,400 yuan—higher than the national average—offering tangible evidence that better roads support greater prosperity. A dynamic Xinjiang is brimming with opportunities for wealth creation.

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Connecting all directions, linking the world—the frontier region now stands at the forefront.

Today, Xinjiang is seamlessly connected to the world and has become a key hub in China’s westward opening-up. By July 2025, China–Europe (Central Asia) Railway Express saw more than 10,000 train trips passed through the Alashankou and Khorgos railway ports. The Alashankou port handled 9.778 million tons of cargo, a year-over-year increase of 3.7%, while Khorgos handled 7.96 million tons, up 20.3% year over year. A growing volume of goods now flows from Xinjiang into Central Asian and European markets.

Leveraging the massive throughput of its ports, related local industries in Xinjiang are accelerating their growth: from customs-clearance services and logistics support to cross-border e-commerce livestreaming and processing in comprehensive bonded zones, and extending to high-end equipment manufacturing and exports of new energy materials. A cohesive, evolving “port economy” is taking shape.

In October 2023, the China (Xinjiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone was officially established. In the first five months of 2025, the combined import and export value of its three sub‑zones accounted for 44% of Xinjiang’s total foreign trade; the four comprehensive bonded zones together recorded imports and exports worth 81.57 billion yuan.

As a multidimensional, interwoven transport network now underpins a new development paradigm—one that turns Xinjiang’s vast territory from barrier into bridge—we witness not merely the flow of vehicles, but the convergence of knowledge, the gathering of new prosperity, and a spirited outlook driven by the vigorous advancement of Chinese modernization. Today, Xinjiang stands open—sharing prosperity with the nation and welcoming the world with wide-open arms.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Tian Tian, assistant research fellow at the Institute of Ethnic Studies, Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Dong Mei

Translator/ Li Li

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For the international community, the promulgation of this Law and the values it embodies demonstrate advances in China's ethnic theories and related legal practices compared with both Western and former Soviet models.

The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China came into effect on July 1, 2026. From an international perspective, Professor Wang Yiwei systematically elaborates on Chinese-style view of ethnicity and governance embodied in this law, and how the law, through clear legal language, responds to international public opinion, particularly the discussions regarding China’s human rights development.

Q: From the perspective of international exchanges, how does this Law convey a Chinese-style view of ethnicity and governance to the world, and how does it help the international community understand China’s ethnic work and policies?

A: From the perspective of international exchanges, the promulgation of the Law clearly conveys China’s distinctive views on ethnicity—”ethnic equality, ethnic unity, and common prosperity for all ethnic groups”—as well as its governance philosophy centered on the rule of law, equality, and unity.

In managing ethnic relations, China has not adopted either the Western model of “ethnic autonomy” or the “melting pot” approach. As the late Chinese historian Qian Mu (1895–1990) observed, ancient Greece had a people without a state, ancient Rome had a state without a people, while ancient China had both a state and a people. China’s ethnic landscape is characterized by a pattern of large mixed communities alongside small concentrated settlements, intricately interwoven—a vivid embodiment of the concept of a “shared homeland.”

The Law upholds the principle of enhancing commonalities while respecting and embracing differences, placing holistic identity and shared development at its core. Centered on the building of the community for the Chinese nation, it transcends the Western logic of competing individual rights. Guided by the philosophy of “harmony in diversity and all flourishing in prosperity” and “‌harmonious coexistence‌,” the Law systematically presents to the international community what it describes as the essence of China’s ethnic policies: neither assimilation, nor discrimination, nor suppression, but a governance model grounded in equality, inclusiveness, and development.

For the international community, the promulgation of this Law and the values it embodies demonstrate advances in China’s ethnic theories and related legal practices compared with both Western and former Soviet models. It encourages the international community to set aside prejudices, respect differences, and engage in dialogue on the basis of equality. It further presents a Chinese approach that transcends binary confrontation and offers a pathway for promoting unity and prosperity while addressing ethnic conflicts, providing a reference for the governance of multiethnic nations.

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Q: What challenges does China currently face in international public opinion regarding ethnic affairs? What significance does placing ethnic affairs governance on a legal footing have in responding to misunderstandings and misinterpretations within the international community?

A: In recent years, China’s policies and practices in ethnic affairs have increasingly been the subject of questioning and criticism in Western public discourse.

Certain Western forces, disregarding the fundamental fact that China’s ethnic policies safeguard the equal rights of all ethnic groups and promote shared development, have fabricated narratives such as “forced assimilation,” “cultural genocide,” and “human rights violations,” piecing together fragmented information to distort reality and stigmatize China’s ethnic policies. Some countries, despite grappling with their own human rights challenges, including racial discrimination, have long portrayed themselves as “human rights defenders,” applying double standards by judging others more harshly than themselves while selectively criticizing China’s ethnic affairs.

More alarmingly, certain external forces, under the guise of “ethnicity, religion, and human rights,” openly or covertly support separatist forces in an attempt to undermine China’s national unity and border stability. These actions demonstrate that their fundamental objective is not to protect human rights but to weaponize human rights as a pretext for interfering in China’s internal affairs.

In fact, “great unity” is presented as a distinctive feature of Chinese civilization that sets China apart from Western countries. The unified Roman Empire never revived after its collapse, whereas China’s tradition of great unity has endured to the present day. However, China has long been interpreted in the West through theoretical frameworks such as binary opposition, the nation-state, and racial hierarchies, making it difficult to understand the Chinese nation’s complex pattern of “unity in diversity.” This cognitive gap often leads to policy analyses that are detached from China’s historical experience and practical realities.

In response to these challenges, placing ethnic affairs governance on the track of the rule of law carries profound significance in several respects. By establishing the basic principles and core tasks of ethnic affairs governance through national legislation, with legal provisions that are public and stable, the Law provides a solid legal foundation for refuting rumors and resisting external interference, thereby effectively responding to unfounded accusations.

Governing ethnic affairs according to law, protecting the lawful rights and interests of ethnic groups, and promoting common prosperity and development for all ethnic groups are presented as manifestations of China’s institutional strengths. A law-based governance system demonstrates China’s accumulated experience and institutional capacity in managing complex ethnic relations.

Conducting international exchanges through the language of law helps challenge Western dominance in international discourse and enables China to gain greater initiative in shaping public opinion. Given the neutrality and normative character of legal language, the Law provides the international community with a more reliable basis for understanding China’s ethnic policies.

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Q: What provisions does this Law include regarding human rights protection? How do these provisions reflect consistency with current international human rights standards and embody a Chinese perspective on human rights?

A: The human rights provisions of this Law are fully aligned with the fundamental principles of human rights protection embodied in China’s national policies. The Law explicitly stipulates that all citizens are equal before the law, that all ethnic groups are equal, and that all forms of ethnic discrimination and oppression are prohibited, fully reflecting the importance of the right to equality. Its provisions also safeguard the right to development by guaranteeing ethnic groups’ equal right to participate in development and share its benefits, while supporting ethnic regions in achieving high-quality development and common prosperity, thereby giving these rights legal protection.

Cultural rights are protected through the systematic preservation and transmission of minority languages, scripts, traditional cultures, customs, and intangible cultural heritage. The right to education is safeguarded through a dual-track approach that promotes education in the standard spoken and written Chinese language while also supporting education in ethnic languages. Freedom of religious belief is protected in accordance with the Law, while adhering to the principle of adapting religions in China to the Chinese context and opposing religious extremism.

Political rights are protected by ensuring the equal participation of ethnic minorities in national governance and in the management of their own ethnic affairs, making people of all ethnic groups active participants in national governance. Among the deputies to the 14th National People’s Congress, 442 are from ethnic groups, accounting for 14.85 percent of the total—a proportion significantly higher than the share of ethnic minorities in China’s total population—and all 55 ethnic minority groups are represented in the country’s highest organ of state power.

These provisions are highly consistent with the core principles of current international human rights instruments. The principles of equality and non-discrimination established in Universal Declaration of Human Rights are fully reflected in the Law’s provisions on ethnic equality. Its prohibition of discrimination and oppression against any ethnic group and its guarantee of equal participation echo the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, including its commitment to “the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination” and “to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law.”

It is worth noting that China has consistently emphasized the rights to subsistence and development as the primary and fundamental human rights, a position that closely aligns with that of many developing countries in global human rights governance. For developing countries, ensuring the rights to subsistence and development provides the foundation for realizing all other human rights.

The distinctive features of the Chinese perspective on human rights lie in its emphasis on the priority of the right to development, the unity of collective rights and individual interests, and the principle that “unity” is a prerequisite for the realization of rights, with individual interests coordinated with, rather than placed in opposition to, the interests of the community.

Several core dimensions of this perspective are reflected in the Law’s specific provisions. The unity of collective and individual human rights protects individual rights while placing greater emphasis on the overall development of all ethnic groups and the interests of the community, rejecting the tendency toward individualism prevalent in Western human rights discourse.

Priority is accorded to the right to development, with development regarded as the foundation of human rights protection and shared prosperity as the driving force for the all-round realization of human rights. This goes beyond the limitations of the Western view of human rights, which tends to prioritize political rights over economic and social rights.

The unity of rights and obligations means that while citizens enjoy rights, they must also fulfill their obligations to safeguard national unity and ethnic solidarity. The unity of sovereignty and human rights maintains that the protection of human rights must be grounded in respect for national sovereignty and that interference in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights must be firmly opposed.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The interviewee is Wang Yiwei, vice president of The Academy of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Renmin University of China.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhang Weiwei

Translator/ Wang Li

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Coordinator/ Yingge

Copyeditor/ Zhang Weiwei

In recent years, international hotel groups have increasingly turned their attention to Xinjiang. Their decision to accelerate their presence in Xinjiang rather than retreat can only mean one thing: their compliance reviews found workers of all ethnic groups to be employed voluntarily, free to choose their occupations, and protected by law.

In international discourse, Xinjiang has long been portrayed by certain Western politicians and media outlets as a place of “forced labor” and “human rights oppression.” Yet a striking development is unfolding: rather than pulling out, leading Western hotel chains—known for their rigorous global labor compliance standards—are expanding into Xinjiang at an unprecedented pace and scale, with marquee brands such as the Ritz-Carlton, InterContinental, and Sheraton leading the way.

This presents a compelling contradiction: If the “forced labor” narrative were true, why are these same brands—highly cautious about crossing their own compliance “red lines”—competing to invest there? In practice, these multinational companies are voting with their investment capital, sending a clear market signal that the “Xinjiang narrative” peddled by certain Western powers has no factual basis whatsoever. What they portray as a “compliance risk” is nothing more than a fabricated pretext.

Billions in investment “ballots”: Global hospitality giants double down on Xinjiang

In recent years, international hotel groups have increasingly turned their attention to Xinjiang, competing for a foothold in what has become an emerging investment hotspot in China’s hospitality market. This expansion exhibits two defining features. First, strategic clustering. For example, China Green Development Group (CGDG) introduced four premium brands—Ritz-Carlton, InterContinental, Indigo, and Renaissance—in a single initiative. Similarly, Hilton deployed a multi-brand portfolio, including Conrad, Hilton, and Canopy by Hilton, at the Altay Ski Resort. Second, concentrated milestones. Data shows a flurry of activity between May and July 2025 alone: the topping-out of the Urumqi Ritz-Carlton complex; the opening of InterContinental Yining and Even Hotels; and the openings of Renaissance Korla and Courtyard by Marriott Korla. Preliminary statistics indicate that more than 10 luxury brands under major international hotel groups currently have projects under construction or signed agreements in Xinjiang, with a total investment exceeding 10 billion yuan.

Commercial investment represents a more credible “ballot” than political rhetoric. Before entering a new market, industry leaders such as Marriott, IHG, and Hilton conduct extensive due diligence, particularly on labor compliance—a critical consideration directly tied to global brand reputation and operational risk. Any substantiated evidence of “forced labor” would prompt an immediate withdrawal. Their decision to accelerate their presence in Xinjiang rather than retreat can only mean one thing: their compliance reviews found workers of all ethnic groups to be employed voluntarily, free to choose their occupations, and protected by law.

International investment has validated Xinjiang’s labor environment through rigorous corporate compliance processes, providing one of the strongest possible endorsements. If Western media truly care about human rights, they must confront this question: Why do these global brands, for which compliance is a core business imperative, report a reality in Xinjiang that differs so sharply from the prevailing Western political narrative?

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Beyond the political tint: Why is capital flowing into Xinjiang?

Despite the deliberate disinformation campaign waged by certain Western politicians and media outlets, Xinjiang continues to attract investment. This is driven by three underlying factors.

First, the full release of market dividends is fueling surging demand for high-end accommodation. In 2025, Xinjiang’s cultural and tourism sector maintained strong momentum, receiving 323 million visitors and generating 370 billion yuan in revenue—both record highs, representing year-on-year growth of 8 percent and 8.4 percent, respectively. As consumption patterns shift from “checklist sightseeing” to “immersive, in-depth experiences,” tourist stays are becoming longer and per capita spending is increasing. As a result, a severe shortage of quality hotels during peak travel seasons has created a significant supply-demand gap. The “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Cultural and Tourism Industry Cluster Development Plan (2025-2030)” targets more than 400 million annual visitors and comprehensive tourism revenue of 1 trillion yuan by 2030. This clear, well-defined long-term growth outlook serves as a powerful confidence boost for global investors.

Second, a continuously improving business environment provides strong legal and institutional safeguards. Through systematic policy support, Xinjiang has worked to create a transparent and efficient environment for investors. Taking effect on October 1, 2025, the “Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region” establish comprehensive protections across five key areas, including the market environment, government services, and the rule of law, reflecting the principle of “non-intrusive governance coupled with proactive responsiveness.” Furthermore, Xinjiang strictly enforces the Labor Law of the PRC and other applicable laws and regulations, safeguarding workers’ rights to equal employment, remuneration, rest and leave, social insurance and other statutory entitlements. Workers of all ethnic groups seek and obtain employment voluntarily and sign labor contracts in accordance with the law. Improved government service efficiency has reduced institutional transaction costs, enabling business registration to be completed online within one day at no cost, fostering an environment in which foreign enterprises are willing to invest, establish operations, and expand.

Third, sustained improvements in people’s livelihoods and well-being, coupled with rising living standards, have laid the most solid foundation for consumption upgrading in the hospitality sector. Significant progress in employment and income growth continues to fill residents’ wallets, acting as a fundamental driver of growth in tourism, accommodation and broader service sectors in Xinjiang. In 2025, Xinjiang’s per capita disposable income reached 32,881 yuan, a real increase of 6.4 percent. Per capita disposable income reached 45,106 yuan for urban residents and 20,793 yuan for rural residents. Notably, the urban-rural income gap has narrowed for nine consecutive years. Per capita consumer spending rose to 22,657 yuan, up 6.1 percent year on year, with service consumption accounting for an increasing share. Policies such as the special action plan to boost consumption have delivered tangible economic benefits to all ethnic groups, providing sustained momentum for the hotel, catering, and retail sectors.

Stringent compliance review: Whose lies does it expose?

In stark contrast, the “forced labor” narrative peddled by certain Western politicians collapses under the weight of reality. In Xinjiang, people of all ethnic groups have raised their incomes and improved their livelihoods through work. As per capita disposable income continues to rise, workers voluntarily seek and obtain employment, using their labor to improve their lives and pursue their aspirations—a reality that stands in direct contrast to Western smears. In fact, Western sanctions have disrupted exports of Xinjiang’s products—from cotton and tomatoes to photovoltaic modules—making workers across the industrial chain the principal victims. While Western politicians profess concern for ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, their baseless economic sanctions have, in practice, reduced employment opportunities and blocked their pathways to prosperity.

Unlike this “barrier-erecting” approach, China remains committed to opening up, providing a sound environment for global enterprises to invest and operate. As foreign companies deepen their presence in the Chinese market and share in its growth, they also create jobs and provide skills training, bringing tangible benefits to Xinjiang’s workforce. The question, then, is clear: Who is genuinely working to improve the well-being of the people of Xinjiang, and who claims to defend human rights while causing tangible harm?

An open Xinjiang welcomes scrutiny. The central government provides nearly 400 billion yuan in transfer payments to Xinjiang each year, complemented by paired-assistance programs from 19 provinces and municipalities that contribute more than 15 billion yuan annually. These efforts have significantly enhanced the local population’s sense of gain, happiness, and security. In recent years, Xinjiang has hosted tens of thousands of overseas visitors, including foreign dignitaries, diplomats, representatives of international organizations, entrepreneurs, and journalists. Witnessing firsthand the region’s employment conditions and socioeconomic achievements, an increasing number of visitors have offered objective and impartial assessments, challenging narratives peddled by some Western media. Meanwhile, allegations and disinformation propagated by Western politicians—many of whom have never visited Xinjiang and base their claims on unsubstantiated accounts from purported “witnesses”—are crumbling before the region’s undeniable vibrancy and progress.

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More than business: The world needs a prosperous and stable Xinjiang

The concentration of international hotel brands in Xinjiang represents far more than commercial investment. From a global perspective, Xinjiang’s development is creating historic opportunities for the world. As the core area of the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s western gateway, Xinjiang possesses globally rare tourism resources. With steadily improving transportation infrastructure and visa facilitation policies, the region is well positioned to develop into a world-class tourist destination. The expansion of multinational hospitality groups in Xinjiang reflects not just a bid for China’s vast domestic market, but also a strategic effort to establish an early presence in a regional hub expected to see continued growth in business and leisure travel.

Facts are stubborn things, and justice prevails in the hearts of the people. A prosperous and stable Xinjiang serves the common interests of all parties, offering significant market potential and opportunities for cooperation with neighboring countries and the wider world. The investments made by these global hospitality brands testify to Xinjiang’s commercial prospects, sound legal framework for business, improvements in people’s well-being, and strategic role in connecting the Eurasian continent. Crucially, the rigorous labor compliance audits conducted by these internationally scrutinized brands have found no evidence of “forced labor,” laying bare the hypocrisy of politically motivated smears by certain Western nations. Today, a stable, prosperous, and open Xinjiang is steadily becoming a destination of “poetic charm and distant horizons” for travelers from around the world.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The author is Zhao Biao, assistant researcher at the Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Wang Xinyi

Translator/ Li Li

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Coordinator/ Yingge

Operation/ Zhang Weiwei

The enactment of the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is not only an inevitable step in advancing China's ethnic work under the rule of law but also a major institutional measure to address practical challenges, consolidate social consensus, and improve the national governance system.

The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China came into effect on July 1, 2026. The official promulgation of this law marks a historic step in advancing ethnic unity and progress in China through the rule of law. By safeguarding security and promoting progress through unity, the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law contributes Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to the governance of ethnic affairs for countries around the world.

In this episode of DeepChina, we feature an exclusive interview with Wang Yiwei, vice president of The Academy of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Renmin University of China. Focusing on the Law’s legislative background, guiding principles, China’s system of ethnic affairs governance, and the significance of placing that system on a legal footing, the interview explores the Law’s contemporary value and practical relevance.

Q: Given the achievements of China’s ethnic work and the country’s current conditions, what is the legislative background behind the enactment of the Law? What conditions made it possible to distill decades of accumulated experience in ethnic affairs governance into a fundamental law in this field?

A: From the perspective of China’s achievements in ethnic work and the current national conditions, the enactment of the Law is deeply rooted in the demands of the times. As a unified multiethnic country, China faces multiple challenges in contemporary development, including unbalanced and inadequate development, large-scale population mobility, complex ideological issues, and interference from external forces.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation has been established as the overarching theme of ethnic work. Significant progress has been made, and extensive practical experience has been accumulated. These achievements have provided both a solid theoretical foundation and a strong body of practical experience for the Law. At the same time, a gap remained at the legal level: how to elevate the successful practices developed since the 18th National Congress of the CPC in fostering the building of the community for the Chinese nation and advancing ethnic unity and progress into binding legal provisions that embody the state’s will. In 2018, the National People’s Congress adopted an amendment to the Constitution, introducing the term “Chinese nation” formally into the Constitution for the first time. The Constitution explicitly provides that “The state shall protect the lawful rights and interests of all ethnic minorities and uphold and promote relations of equality, unity, mutual assistance and harmony among all ethnic groups.” This amendment established the fundamental legal basis for handling ethnic affairs and carrying out ethnic work in the new era. Against the backdrop of intertwined international misunderstandings and complex domestic ethnic issues, the enactment of a comprehensive law to promote ethnic unity and progress became an urgent necessity.

At this stage, several key prerequisites for promulgating the Law had already been met.

First, a clear theoretical foundation had been established. A relatively systematic theoretical framework for the community for the Chinese nation had taken shape, with core concepts clearly articulated, including sharing weal and woe, honor and disgrace, life and death, and a common destiny, as well as strengthening identification with the great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the CPC, and socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Second, a solid legal foundation was already in place. The socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, with the Constitution at its core, had continued to improve, while local legislation had accumulated extensive experience.

Third, rich practical experience had been gained. Over the past decades, a series of replicable and scalable models had been developed, including ethnic unity and progress initiatives, pairing assistance programs, inter-embedded community development, and cooperation between China’s eastern and western regions. Together, these efforts fostered mature and effective mechanisms for promoting common prosperity and development, as well as interaction, exchange, and integration among all ethnic groups.

Fourth, broad social consensus had been established. People of all ethnic groups widely identify with the concept of the “community for the Chinese nation,” providing extensive public support for the implementation of the Law.

Therefore, the enactment of the Law is not only an inevitable step in advancing China’s ethnic work under the rule of law but also a major institutional measure to address practical challenges, consolidate social consensus, and improve the national governance system.

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Q: What role will the implementation of this Law play in enhancing the modernization of China’s system and capacity for ethnic affairs governance?

A: The implementation of this Law marks a milestone in advancing ethnic work under the rule of law in the new era and carries profound significance for further modernizing China’s system and capacity for ethnic affairs governance. By clearly defining the responsibilities of governments at all levels, the rights and obligations of citizens, and mechanisms for resolving disputes, the Law helps prevent arbitrary enforcement while significantly improving the systematic, standardized, and refined nature of governance. This represents an important milestone in the modernization of the ethnic affairs governance system.

The Law establishes a governance framework for ethnic work characterized by “Party committee leadership, government administration, united front coordination, departmental accountability, and social participation,” defining the rights and responsibilities of all parties in legal form. This framework helps build a governance system with clear divisions of responsibility, coordinated collaboration, and efficient operation, providing a solid institutional foundation for modernizing ethnic affairs governance capacity.

By integrating the building of the community for the Chinese nation into all areas of economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological development, the Law promotes more comprehensive ethnic affairs governance across a broader range of public policies and enhances overall governance effectiveness.

Through core institutional arrangements that promote common prosperity and development, foster interaction, exchange, and integration among all ethnic groups, strengthen identification with Chinese culture, and safeguard national unity, the Law further consolidates the institutional foundation of the community for the Chinese nation. As a result, ethnic affairs governance is grounded not only in law but also in clearly defined values and practical implementation pathways.

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Q: From the perspective of the cause of ethnic unity and progress in China, can we see the differences between the Chinese and Western paths to modernization?

A: Western modernization is rooted in colonial exploitation, with its early capital accumulated through colonialism, genocide, and the slave trade. Behind its prosperity lies the deprivation of the human rights of Indigenous peoples and people of color.

This process was accompanied by increasingly severe ethnic divisions. Modernization did not eliminate racial disparities; rather, it coincided with institutionalized racial discrimination and entrenched social hierarchies, leaving many ethnic minority communities trapped in long-term poverty and marginalization.

At the cultural level, Western modernization has pursued policies of cultural homogenization and linguistic uniformity, suppressing minority cultures under the guise of the “melting pot.” Its capital-driven development model has widened the gap between rich and poor and intensified social polarization, while the development gap between ethnic minority regions and majority populations has continued to expand. This has contributed to recurring ethnic tensions, religious conflicts, and separatist movements, resulting in persistent—and in some cases intensifying—social fragmentation and instability.

In contrast, the Chinese path to modernization embodies a fundamentally different logic and vision in its approach to ethnic affairs. One of its defining features is common prosperity, under which all ethnic groups advance together in unity toward shared development, ensuring that no ethnic group is left behind. Through institutional arrangements such as cooperation between China’s eastern and western regions, pairing assistance programs, and coordinated regional development, China has effectively narrowed regional development gaps, enabling all ethnic groups to share the benefits of modernization while providing targeted policy support for disadvantaged communities.

In the cultural sphere, China adheres to the principle of unity in diversity. It enhances commonalities while respecting and embracing differences, protecting the spoken and written languages of ethnic minorities and preserving their traditional cultures and customs. Language education, cultural heritage preservation, and the preservation of traditional customs reinforce one another, together fostering a cultural pattern that is both diverse and unified.

Perhaps even more noteworthy is that China’s modernization follows a path of peaceful development—one that is endogenous and self-determined, without plunder, expansion, or hegemony. It engages with the world in a spirit of mutual benefit, openness, and inclusiveness, offering the world a new paradigm of peaceful modernization.

Viewed from the perspective of the cause of ethnic unity and progress, the differences between the two paths to modernization are clear. Western modernization has often been intertwined with colonial expansion, Indigenous assimilation, racial segregation, and “melting pot”-style cultural assimilation. By contrast, Chinese modernization emphasizes that all ethnic groups should advance together toward socialist modernization, ensuring that “not a single ethnic group should be left behind.”

The Chinese path to modernization provides a useful reference for multiethnic countries seeking to achieve shared development and balance the relationship between the individual and the collective. It offers a powerful rebuttal to the entrenched notion that “modernization equals Westernization” and presents an alternative path for multiethnic countries exploring modernization.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DeepChina.

The interviewee is Wang Yiwei, vice president of The Academy of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Renmin University of China.

Chief Editor/ Yang Xinhua

Editor/ Zhang Weiwei

Translator/ Wang Li

Related articles

Coordinator/ Yingge

Copyeditor/ Zhang Weiwei