Unlike last season, when Como dominated both fixtures against Allegri’s Milan but picked up just a single point, this time the result favoured the Lariani. Credit goes to Fàbregas, to Como as a club (who have once again invested heavily), and his ideas. The first marquee clash of this nascent Serie A season delivered a clear, early, verdict: Como’s Champions League qualification was no fluke, and they intend to stay at the top table.

Napoli, meanwhile, remain stuck in midstream: a still-shapeless side offered little reinforcement in the summer transfer window. Logic dictates they should attack, but their current makeup, and their new manager’s instincts, suggest they are presently incapable of doing so.

The first half belonged entirely to the visitors, who punished two lapses from the hosts and dictated the tempo at will. Martin Baturina and Assane Diao ran riot between the lines, exploiting the visible struggles of Stanislav Lobotka, whose legs look unable to cope with such intensity, and Scott McTominay. In Allegri’s 4-3-3, the Scot is tasked with defensive cover for the left winger rather than runs into the box, a stark contrast to his near second-striker role under Antonio Conte. All eyes were on Nico Paz wearing the number 10 shirt in the stadium once graced by the greatest number 10 of all time, but the young Argentine shone only sporadically, still lacking match fitness despite limited minutes at the World Cup.

That Como can dominate and impose their philosophy away from home is no secret. But the real shift in approach, and Fàbregas’s true success, came after the restart. Holding a one-goal lead, Como traded their top hats for army helmets. They sat deep, lowered the tempo, a pace far more suited to this Napoli side, and looked to strike on the counter. Fàbregas had signaled as much before kick-off, calling it reckless to attempt high-intensity football in the stifling 30-degree heat.

(It raises the perennial question of why Italian football insists on scheduling afternoon matches in peak summer rather than kicking off after 9 or 10 pm to protect player welfare and the quality of the product.)

As Napoli laboured forward without seriously threatening Jean Butez, generating just 0.45 expected goals (xG) in the second half, Fàbregas committed what would be deemed heresy from La Masia to his former manager Arsène Wenger’s school of thought: defensive substitutions. First Marc-Oliver Kempf came on for Diao, followed by Kaiki and Maxence Caqueret replacing Paz and Baturina.

In the second period, Luis Milla took center stage. The least hyped of Como’s recent recruitment drives, the 31-year-old arrived this summer for just €6m from Getafe, where he had been an ever-present midfield enforcer for four years. Under José Bordalás, that Getafe side, often dubbed the antithesis of football in Spain, finished rock bottom in average possession (just 40%) and shots on target per game (2.8) last term, yet still secured Conference League qualification. “¡Esto es fútbol, papá!” is the mantra in those parts. Winning sometimes demands pure grit and resilience; a mindset that Milla brings to Como, which will prove crucial as their schedule expands across domestic and Champions League duties. Against Napoli, Milla tied for the most defensive actions (11) and led all players with 106 touches: pragmatism in service of aesthetic beauty.

Ultimately, Fàbregas delivered a masterclass in realpolitik right in the backyard of Allegri, the undisputed master of winning by "a nose" (corto muso). Allegri represents the traditional Italian school that had previously criticised Fàbregas for refusing to compromise his principles, even at the cost of defeat. Last season, the Spaniard had launched a scathing critique of calcio and its relentless obsession with results above all else.

Many were quick to condemn him, a young manager taking to the dugout dressed as if he had just stepped off a yacht. Yet, he seamlessly embodies the image of Como: a club that views football as a asset in a wider lifestyle brand built on the luxury of one of the world’s most breathtaking locations. But after enduring fierce reprimands last season, the Spaniard took his revenge on Allegri on the final day, pipping the Rossoneri to a Champions League berth. Sunday provided further proof that while Fàbregas is enriching Italian football, he is also absorbing its lessons.

For Napoli, their centenary year threatens to become a difficult campaign unless Allegri finds the right formula to unleash his top talent, from Kevin De Bruyne to David Neres and Antonio Vergara, in their preferred zones. Meanwhile, a clash against Inter awaits on Saturday, kicking off a weekend featuring three fixtures among six of Serie A’s seven European representatives (excluding Como).

Speaking of Europe, the Champions League returns next week, with Italian football aiming to get at least one team, on paper, strongest contenders Inter, into the top eight of the league phase. Recent knockout records against continental opposition have been unforgiving: over the last two seasons, Serie A clubs have featured in six play-off ties, progressing just once (Atalanta against Borussia Dortmund in February) while falling to Belgian (Club Brugge), Norwegian (Bodø/Glimt), Turkish (Galatasaray) and Dutch (PSV and Feyenoord) opposition, hardly continental royalty. Since the Champions League adopted its new format, Italian clubs have won just 38 of 80 matches while losing 25. Changing gear to avoid sliding down the UEFA coefficient rankings is now imperative.

Rather than tests against super powers like Real Madrid, Arsenal, and PSG, the true benchmark for Serie A sides will come against Borussia Dortmund and Stuttgart (for Inter), Manchester United and Lille (for Roma), and Real Betis, RB Leipzig, and Lens (for debutants Como). While Italian clubs cannot rival the riches of the top six Champions League contenders, Transfermarkt places all four Serie A representatives within the top 14 in the competition for squad market value.

The Premier League remains out of reach after setting a new transfer record of €4.12bn this summer. However, Italy’s top flight firmly holds second place with a €1.16bn outlay and a net spend twice that of La Liga (-€423.34m compared to -€257.63m). Now comes the real test: discovering whether that money was well spent or thrown down the drain.

*John Henry Patterson: "Only fools and dead men don't change their minds. Fools won't. Dead men can't.”

Just one in three starting players (66 out of 220, or 29.5%) across the opening weekend was Italian. It is a telling statistic, consistent with last season and hardly a promising sign for those hoping to see fresh blood for Roberto Mancini’s national side. Yet something is stirring: while potential Azzurri call-ups remain scarce, just 19 introduced off the bench, quality is certainly not lacking.

Pio Esposito scored a splendid backheel in Inter’s victory. Following his 10-goal tally last term, this needs to be his breakout campaign. The youngster possesses broad shoulders, and not just metaphorically. He showed resilience to recover from his penalty miss in the World Cup playoffs in Zenica, and keeping him purely as back-up to Lautaro Martínez and Marcus Thuram would be a crying shame.

Alphajo Cissè (written with an accent, but pronounced without) lived up to all the hype. New AC Milan boss Rúben Amorim handed him an immediate start in Turin, a big vote of confidence, as well as a clear signal to Rafael Leão to find a new club quickly. The 19-year-old repaid that faith with a fine goal. Although eligible for Guinea, he already has two caps for Italy’s Under-21s, boasting typical teenage bravado and the composure to try the audacious. On Friday, a San Siro test against Venezia awaits. A similar narrative applies to Alessandro Romano, sold by Roma (Nemo propheta in patria?) in the summer and on target on his debut for Cagliari; given his Swiss passport, Mancini and his backroom staff will need to do some persuading. Not forgetting Nicolò Pisilli, a 22-year-old with 79 appearances for the Giallorossi already under his belt, where youngster Luca Lulli also made his debut on Monday.

At the other end of the spectrum was Udinese against Como, a fixture featuring just a single Italian from the start: Nicolò Zaniolo, who must have felt almost like a stranger in his homeland. To make matters worse, the playmaker suffered an injury that will keep him out for two months, a rotten run of luck that continues to haunt him.

Taking an optimistic view, opening weekend offered tentative signs of recovery, even in a transfer market where made in Italy talent remains exceptionally rare. The very structure of the transfer system disincentivises investment in domestic youth: bank guarantees restrict internal domestic deals, whereas transfers from foreign clubs are not subject to the same financial hurdles. Transactions between Italian clubs pass through league clearing houses designed to protect the system. Clubs with a negative net balance on transfer receivables and payables must cover the deficit with bank or insurance guarantees, a hurdle that stifles domestic negotiations and encourages clubs to turn abroad, where payment terms remain flexible and negotiable.

It is a uniquely Italian distortion unseen in Europe’s other top leagues, penalising home-grown players despite the success of Italy’s youth sides on the international stage. The figures speak for themselves: in 2016-17, Italian U21s accounted for 45% of total players, rising to 52% in 2020, before plummeting to 29% last term, the lowest figure in a decade. Since 2020, Serie A has spent more abroad than any other European league. In this summer window alone, Italian clubs registered most departures (111 out of 190), yet spending on players from foreign leagues almost doubled domestic expenditure (€677.05m compared to €341.45m). Rather than simply handing out token rewards to teams fielding Italians, which risks filling squads with players just to make up numbers, the Italian FA (FIGC) urgently needs to ease these financial constraints.

Back on the pitch, the most striking takeaway from matchday one was the increase in effective playing time: averaging 59 minutes and 14 seconds, nearly four minutes more than last season. It is a shift driven by new officiating directives: a five-second countdown for throw-ins and goal kicks, accelerated substitutions (a 10-second limit), and a rule requiring players to remain off the pitch for a full minute after receiving medical treatment.

On Saturday evening, new Juventus goalkeeper Guglielmo Vicario went down in stoppage time with Juve holding a 1-0 lead. In years past, minutes would have been wasted; this time, he was promptly replaced by second-choice keeper Mattia Perin (already lined up for a move to Palermo). Broadly speaking, there was less simulation and time-wasting, drawing praise from almost all head coaches.

However, while referee designator Daniele Orsato’s directives aim to speed up play to match European intensity and curb VAR interference, a lack of clarity around officiating criteria is already raising eyebrows. The first controversy erupted on Saturday night: Napoli’s opener at Genoa was marred by a blatant shove from Kevin De Bruyne on Vázquez, a foul that would have been whistled anywhere else on the pitch. Referee Marco Di Bello let play continue and VAR declined to intervene: a costly error that paved the way for Massimiliano Allegri’s side, sparking outrage from Genoa. Incidents in Torino v Milan (a Nikola Vlasic handball) and Roma v Fiorentina (Mario Hermoso striking Franco Mastantuono) were only swept under the rug because of the final scores.

Despite a shake-up at refereeing executive level, following the departure of former designator Gianluca Rocchi amidst controversies and allegations of an illicit system (for which the Milan prosecutor’s office has requested dismissal), calcio’s officiating paradoxes endure. New measures are welcome, but only if criteria are consistent and clear, avoiding a repeat of controversies like the Bastoni-Kalulu incident that marred last season.

Looking back at the numbers, Inter saw off an injury-hit Monza, though they laboured more than the final score suggested (Ivan Jurić’s side actually won the expected goals battle), relying on moments of individual brilliance while awaiting the debut of their English contingent. The Nerazzurri remain title favourites, with complacency appearing to be their only real enemy; after all, the story of the “unplayables (ingiocabili)” (as Henrikh Mkhitaryan dubbed them in 2024-25) ended empty-handed.

Individually, no player in Serie A has had a more devastating impact in 2026 than Donyell Malen: 17 goals in his first 19 appearances, including back-to-back hat-tricks. Credit goes to Gian Piero Gasperini for reinventing him as a central striker, whereas Netherlands boss Ronald Koeman relegated him to the bench or the right wing at the World Cup, with results we know all too well. On Monday night, all three of Dutchman’s goals came from Paulo Dybala. The margin between a title-challenging Roma and a top-four side inevitably hinges on the fitness of La Joya, who missed 22 matches last term.

Amorim’s AC Milan showcased a far more proactive style than under Allegri, controlling 75% of possession in the first half in Turin, even if they only started threatening the goal after the introductions of Luka Modrić and Adrien Rabiot. Juventus were wasteful at Frosinone, living dangerously late on, though Randal Kolo Muani and Francisco Conceição will not remain this erratic for long. However, a foot injury to Kenan Yıldız will force the Bianconeri back into the transfer market in the frantic closing days of the window.

Opening fixtures are always a testing ground where getting points on the board is all that matters; stability offers an early advantage. In that regard, Kosta Runjaić’s Udinese (who, alongside Cesc Fàbregas, is the league’s longest-serving manager with just two seasons under his belt) remain a tough nut to crack. The campaign will truly spark into life on matchday three, when the six out of the seven Italian sides competing in European football (Inter, Napoli, Roma, Juventus, Milan, and Atalanta) go head-to-head in the season’s first direct clashes.

With the national team’s disasters put to bed, alongside the embarrassing summer farce surrounding the appointment of a new national head coach, the baseline for this restart is extremely low. Last season produced just 922 goals, the lowest total since the league expanded to 20 teams, averaging 2.43 goals per game, the worst across Europe’s top five leagues. Goals have virtually vanished, smothered by a prevailing “safety first” mentality: in the 2025/26 campaign, a staggering 208 matches ended with at least one team failing to score, a low point not seen since 2004/05. Goalless draws reached 36, compared to 28 the previous term.

Expanding the lens, Serie A ranked last for average goals even when compared across the top 12 leagues in UEFA’s ranking, the second divisions of the “Big Five” (including Serie B), and all three European club competitions. It is not just a matter of scoring roughly one goal fewer per game than in the Champions League: in Italy, fewer goals were scored than anywhere else. The numbers show a league where the ball moves slowest and the tempo is drastically low, a flaw for which Italian sides systematically pay a price on the international stage.

Unable to bridge the financial gap with the Premier League, Italian clubs opted this summer to construct a domestic “mini-English league,” raiding cross-Channel surplus wherever possible. The recent cases of Scott McTominay and Donyell Malen demonstrate how players struggling for minutes in England can become game-changers as soon as they set foot on the Peninsula.

Reigning champions Inter offer an emblematic example, developing a sudden British core by doubling the number of English players in their 118-year history in a single transfer window (having previously signed just three: Gerry Hitchens in the 1960s, Paul Ince, and Ashley Young). Appiano Gentile now hosts John Stones, Djed Spence, a second-choice wing-back following a failed move for Marco Palestra, and Curtis Jones. Arriving due to nagging injuries (Stones) or a lack of minutes at their parent clubs, these three Englishmen, two of them World Cup semi-finalists, undeniably elevate the squad’s technical ceiling.

The Nerazzurri‘s strength lies in a financial sustainability that allows them to hold on to prized assets like Alessandro Bastoni and Lautaro Martinez, while adding quality to a well-oiled machine. Inter remain Scudetto favourites backed by a solid structure and deep options for manager Christian Chivu. Their only limitation is having failed to address their true weakness: a player capable of creating numerical overloads through individual dribbling in the final third. Inter’s cushion over the chasing pack is real, but it may prove narrower than expected, depending heavily on how much energy they expend in the Champions League to avenge their disappointing play-off exit against Bodø/Glimt.

European headaches will not trouble Juventus or AC Milan, both having missed out on Champions League qualification on the final day of last season. Statistically, Juventus deserved a top-four finish: they conceded one goal fewer than Inter and scored more than second-placed Napoli, yet failed in crucial moments due to a lack of steel. The Bianconeri have now gone six years without a Scudetto, a drought this long (discounting the titles revoked following Calciopoli) requires a look back to the turn of the 1990s.

Italy’s most successful club spared no expense to erase past mistakes, though acting more on impulse than structured planning. How else to explain the near-€50m outlay (including add-ons) to sign Randal Kolo Muani? The Frenchman, who scored 8 goals in 16 appearances in 2025 in Turin, is expected to be for Luciano Spalletti what Dušan Vlahović, allowed to leave on a free transfer, never was: a focal point able to link play, stretch defenses, and convert chances squandered last year not only by the Serbian, but also by expensive missteps Jonathan David and Loïs Openda. In 2025/26, Juventus underperformed their Expected Goals (xG) by 6.81, the difference between Champions League football and failure.

With Michele Di Gregorio deemed not up to standard and sidelined, Guglielmo Vicario has arrived on loan in goal. Another Premier League surplus, Vicario has not played a competitive match since March, but in his final Italian campaign (2022/23 with Empoli) ranked in the top five for average saves and on the podium for goals prevented. Douglas Luiz has also returned from England following a bizarre back-and-forth between Turin and the Midlands. Should he stay and perform at his levels from three years ago, Spalletti might find the ideal playmaker in-house to make a leap in quality, though labelling the Old Lady as title contender remains risky.

At AC Milan, the rebuild has cut even deeper, sweeping from boardroom level right down to tactical philosophy. Club owner Jerry Cardinale, majority partner of the RedBird fund, wielded a heavy axe at the end of the season by dismissing both the executive hierarchy and manager Massimiliano Allegri to take matters in his own hands. The choice for the dugout fell on Rúben Amorim; had he arrived 18 months ago prior to his turbulent spell at Manchester United, it would have been hailed as a masterstroke. At 41, with his reputation dented by his time in England (despite reasonable results until January), Amorim represents the league’s most intriguing wildcard.

Despite skepticism among supporters, the Portuguese coach’s ambitions remain high. Milan restart under a manager with radical ideas and a distinct tactical identity, far more defined than under Massimiliano Allegri or Sérgio Conceição. Amorim’s concepts and Cardinale’s vision align on one principle: Milan must take risks and attack, prioritising higher possession, building from the back, and high pressing that carries inherent risk. In Allegri’s final campaign, the Rossoneri finished sixth for goals scored (53) and possessed the fourth-best defence (35 goals conceded, equal to Inter). Yet Milan ranked only seventh for shots on target, possession, and passes into the opposition final third, while finishing third-bottom for PPDA (passes allowed per defensive action), faring better only than Lazio and Cagliari. Two derby victories over Inter proved insufficient: after a 1-0 success in late February brought them within seven points of top spot, the team collapsed.

On the transfer market, Milan’s summer evoked memories of the golden Silvio Berlusconi era. By June, the club had already spent €105m, securing the most expensive signing in its history with Gonçalo Ramos from PSG alongside Mario Gila from Lazio. In recent days, 22-year-old Belgian winger Diego Moreira joined from Strasbourg, for around €45m, a crucial piece for Amorim’s system.

But revolution demands sacrifices: the main conundrum involves clearing unwanted players (from Youssouf Fofana to Fikayo Tomori and Santiago Giménez) and resolving the future of Rafael Leão. The hero of their last Scudetto, once the crown jewel, risks following in Vlahović’s footsteps and giving in to offers from Turkey.

Buying is sometimes easy; selling often proves a monumental task for Italian clubs, unless you are Aurelio De Laurentiis, capable of balancing the books while keeping the team competitive. Napoli, playing in Serie B twenty years ago, have featured in eight of the last 11 Champions League editions and have now appointed the most decorated Italian manager of the modern era, Allegri. The mantra has been clear: sell. They succeeded by shipping Miguel Gutiérrez to the Bundesliga for €26m and offloading Romelu Lukaku, deep in the twilight of his career following his mentor Antonio Conte’s exit, to Fenerbahçe for €6m. Awaiting Benoît Badiashile (yet another Premier League arrival), the sole new face in is young full-back Costantino Favasuli from Catanzaro. This apparent inactivity does not spook Allegri, a master of pragmatism, whose main challenge will be setting aside his preferred tactical safety nets (a back three and a reactive approach) to exploit an abundance of wide talent (Politano, Alisson, and Neres upon his return from injury) alongside midfield quality (Vergara, Anguissa, and Kevin De Bruyne).

To bridge the gap with Europe’s elite, Serie A must rediscover the courage to back pure flair. In that regard, it is encouraging that several clubs have bet on young playmakers, snatching them ahead of wealthier European rivals. From the aforementioned Moreira to Bosnian Kerim Alajbegović (signed by Juventus after dazzling in the infamous Zenica play-off), Roma’s €30m outlay for 19-year-old Rodrigo Mora, and Franco Mastantuono’s loan from Real Madrid to Fiorentina.

This high-quality youth movement builds on the exploits of Como’s Nico Paz, who has added spark to the league for two seasons. It is a heartening shift in trend: the pursuit of style proving functional too, with hopes that among these prospects lies the next Khvicha Kvaratskhelia, the last truly transcendent talent to grace Serie A, perhaps sold too soon.

Should these prospects deliver on their promise, the league’s appeal will benefit immensely. Roma have reinforced their attacking department to finally satisfy Gian Piero Gasperini. Como have maintained their aggressive investment policy (spending roughly €100m again this window), bringing in defender Trevoh Chalobah from Chelsea while staying true to Cesc Fàbregas’ philosophy: young profiles tailored to his tactical system with high resale value. Both the Giallorossi and Como face the demanding double commitment of Serie A and Champions League football, a stern test that has perhaps arrived ahead of schedule.

With four managers making their top-flight debut, including former Belgium head coach Domenico Tedesco and young managers Alberto Aquilani (Sassuolo) and Ignazio Abate (Torino), fresh narratives will not be lacking. Intrigue surrounds Maurizio Sarri’s Atalanta, who transition to a brand-new system after nearly a decade of playing a back three under Gasperini, Ivan Juric, and Raffaele Palladino. The Bergamo side represent Italian football’s most concrete hope of lifting European silverware, albeit in the Conference League. Realism is required: Juventus and Milan are unlikely to burn energy in the Europa League (with Milan still relying on 41-year-old Luka Modrić) when securing a top-four domestic finish remains vital to their balance sheets.

Italy’s new head coach, Roberto Mancini, will hope the league offers encouraging signs by giving minutes to young Italian talents, from Cher Ndour, to Francesco Camarda, Mattia Liberali and Alessio Cacciamani. Otherwise, following autumn Nations League fixtures against Belgium, France, and Turkey, he will need to conjure yet another tactical miracle ahead of Euro 2028 qualifying.

In four years’ time, the European Championship is scheduled to be co-hosted by Italy and Turkey. While Turkish clubs rival and often outspend Serie A in the market, on infrastructure they are light-years ahead. In July, the Italian FA (FIGC) submitted a bid dossier to UEFA featuring 13 candidate cities and 16 stadiums, from which only five venues will be selected, with Torino’s Allianz Stadium the only certainty. Despite a €4.5bn investment plan and repeated UEFA warnings, the situation remains tangled. The appointment of a designated commissioner has bogged down in familiar bureaucratic red tape, while the specter of white-elephant projects from Italia ‘90 looms large.

Submitted proposals include the new San Siro (construction from 2027, delivery in 2031, with the old ground demolished post-tournament), Florence, and Rome with three options: renovating the Olimpico (€140m), Roma’s new stadium at Pietralata (projected 2031 completion), and Lazio’s lagging Flaminio proposal. With an estimated economic impact of €800m to €1bn per host city, the final decision on 1 October represents a boat the football movement cannot afford to miss.

For Italy, this is a point of no return. Having watched three World Cups from the sidelines, Serie A faces a critical turning point, with the real risk of a permanent slide to the margins.

Calcio must take inspiration from disciplines like athletics, which dominated the recent European Championships, and get off their marks quickly. Time has officially run out.

Mockingly enough, the search for the new head coach of the Azzurri has ended right where it began in March, following a third successive World Cup elimination. Italy are restarting with Roberto Mancini, who in the aftermath of the Bosnia-Herzegovina defeat had been tipped as the primary candidate for the role.

In between came a chaotic dance of appointments: from FIGC (Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio) President Giovanni Malagò to the naming of Paolo Maldini as technical director alongside his former AC Milan teammate, the Brazilian Leonardo, in an ill-defined advisor role, all against the backdrop of a managerial hunt that quickly devolved into chaos.

For ‘il Mancio’, it marks a back-to-the-future moment. He was the last manager to taste glory with the national side, winning Euro 2021, but he was also largely responsible for its subsequent decline. First came the 2022 World Cup play-off defeat to North Macedonia, followed by his abrupt departure the following summer, delivered via email to the federation from a beach in Mykonos. It was an exit that felt like a permanent severance.

Mancini’s return came via a convoluted and absurd merry-go-round of contenders. Maldini and Leonardo, tasked with choosing the candidate, were betrayed by their own decisions, leaving Malagò red-faced for delegating such a vital call.

First, seeking a high-profile figurehead with a visionary project, the duo aimed for the top target available: Pep Guardiola. That charm offensive lasted barely two days, looking every bit like a PR stunt designed to showcase ambition rather than a realistic possibility. Financial constraints (Guardiola earned more than double what the FIGC could offer at Manchester City) and personal reasons (the Catalan had previously mentioned wanting a sabbatical) quickly scuppered it, alongside Guardiola’s reluctance to step into a flawed system. Even clumsier was Maldini’s attempt to lure his former teamate and manager, Carlo Ancelotti, who was formally under contract with Brazil. The same Carletto left untouched when Mancini walked out, when Luciano Spalletti was chosen instead.

Having received two polite rejections, Maldini and Leonardo turned to the man they genuinely considered their primary target: World Cup winner Andrea Pirlo. Another former teammate of Maldini, Pirlo was by far the least popular choice among the public and Italian media, largely due to his threadbare managerial CV. Tipped as a ‘chosen one’ in coaching, his lone Serie A stint with Juventus failed to establish a clear identity, defined by constant tinkering that ultimately snapped Juve’s nine-year Scudetto streak despite having Cristiano Ronaldo at his disposal. Maldini’s push felt driven more by friendship and shared ideals than logic, raising major doubts over Pirlo’s ability to revitalise Italian football.

Public skepticism around Pirlo swiftly turned into outrage when news broke of his recent ties to Russian betting site Fonbet and an appearance at a promotional match in Moscow last May. All hell broke loose. Questions of ethics and the optics of appointing a manager with even perceived pro-Russian ties quickly spilled into politics. Pirlo’s fate was sealed. He had never enjoyed the backing of Malagò, who always favoured his long-time friend Mancini, a fellow regular at Rome’s elite Aniene club and high-society circles.

Was the Russian money a convenient excuse to discard a manager many within the FIGC doubted anyway? Malagò claimed ignorance over the controversy, but it remains bizarre that no one in the federation, including Maldini and Leonardo, vetted the candidate’s recent dealings. It was a glaring blunder, followed almost immediately by the sudden resignations of Maldini and Leonardo, who had perhaps naively believed they held genuine decision-making power just a week into their roles.

Amid a smoke screen of names, from Raffaele Palladino to Thiago Motta and Stefano Pioli, meant to give the illusion of a debate at the top of the FIGC, the only true candidate from day one emerged: Mancini. Joining him as technical director is 74-year-old Claudio Ranieri, former manager and senior advisor at Roma, who, unsurprisingly, is another close friend of Malagò.

Mancini will ‘settle’ for a modest €2.5m a year, a fraction of the €25m salary he commanded in Saudi Arabia before being sacked for nearly derailing their 2026 World Cup qualifying campaign. Notably, Mancini also managed in Russia between 2017 and 2018 with Zenit St Petersburg, four years after the annexation of Crimea. Though full-scale war had not yet broken out, the regime in Moscow was the same. Nobody raised an eyebrow back then.

It remains to be seen what level of motivation the returning head coach brings to this new chapter. The system and wider landscape that Mancini himself branded “rotten” before walking away three years ago is arguably in an even worse state today. The hole Italy must dig itself out of is deeper than in 2018, when Mancini first took charge following their initial failure to qualify for the World Cup.

Back then, players like Leonardo Bonucci, Giorgio Chiellini, Jorginho, and Marco Verratti were in their prime, complemented by the emerging Nicolò Barella, Federico Chiesa, and Gianluigi Donnarumma. Mancini deserved immense credit for transforming the Azzurri’s identity, building a team confident in possession and intent on dominating opposition territory. Through bold experimentation, handing debuts to unproven youngsters like Nicolò Zaniolo and Willy Gnonto, and integrating naturalised striker Mateo Retegui, Mancini re-energised Italian football, albeit not without controversy.

His side remains the last to taste success, even if aided by a healthy dose of good fortune. Yet a 37-game unbeaten run, only recently surpassed by Spain, stands as testament to that era.

Mancini was hardly the choice of Serie A clubs, who favoured the pragmatism of Antonio Conte, and he knows he has plenty of lost trust to regain. He represents a compromise: a bridge to a glorious past, a safe pair of hands, and a nod toward change, but without rocking the boat too violently, in true Italian fashion.

One hopes it will be enough. At least until the next crisis or scandal. Trophies may come and go, but Italian football is never boring.

Fabio Grosso’s penalty, the final strike of the shootout that settled the 2006 World Cup final between France and Italy on 9 July, remains the last knockout-stage goal Italy has scored on the biggest stage. Since that night, the Azzurri have played just six World Cup matches, winning only one.

In that same timeframe, even Italy’s national cricket and baseball teams, sports far from mainstream in the country, have won more World Cup matches than the football team.

Today, for the third consecutive tournament, Italians are watching the tournament on television. They are forced to look elsewhere for entertainment: tracking Italian managers Carlo Ancelotti, Vincenzo Montella, and Fabio Cannavaro (all of whom have already bowed out bitterly), or scouting emerging talents that cash-strapped Serie A clubs will try to buy, Premier League permitting.

In an expanded 48-team World Cup still dominated by European sides, Italy finds itself on the periphery of the global sport. Newly elected Italian Football Federation (FIGC) president Giovanni Malagò only secured his role after getting the green light from Serie A clubs, and a permanent manager is still to be appointed.

Malagò reportedly wants Roberto Mancini back, a familiar face who fled in the summer of 2023, perhaps sensing the disaster on the horizon. However, the notoriously fractious Serie A clubs prefer Antonio Conte, viewing him as better suited to managing the delicate balance with those who ultimately hold the purse strings.

This is the same Serie A that, just a couple of months ago, rejected a proposal by former national team coach Gennaro Gattuso to organise a brief training camp. He wanted just a couple of days with his players to prepare for the World Cup play-offs. Instead, Gattuso had to settle for flying around Italy and Europe to have dinner with his squad. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s subsequent performances at the tournament, after eliminating the Azzurri on a tragic night in Zenica, have only deepened the regret.

When the future is this uncertain, looking to the past is all that remains. To a time when Italy were kings. Yet, the rot had set in long before that Berlin night 20 years ago. Since 2006, the situation has calcified, and the gap between Italy and its main European rivals now seems unbridgeable. The damage was actually done in the decade leading up to that 2006 triumph in Germany.

The narrative that Italy’s downfall is purely down to money, or a lack of resources in Serie A, is a myth.

Between the mid-2000s and the mid-2020s, Serie A’s role in the global transfer market shifted from a financially self-sustaining model to a league running a heavy deficit just to stay relevant in a hyper-inflated ecosystem.

In the 2003/04 to 2005/06 era, the three years preceding the World Cup victory, Serie A was a force, commanding 19.2% of total player transfer expenditure, though trailing the Premier League, which spent more than twice as much (41.15%), according to Transfermarkt. The Premier League was already better at marketing its product and even then, Italian clubs were struggling to compete. Remarkably, however, Serie A clubs maintained a positive financial balance of +€21.5m across those three years.

Two decades later, despite absolute spending exploding nearly six-fold to €3,970.00m, Serie A’s global market share contracted to 16.7%. Yet, it remains the second-highest spending league in Europe over the past three seasons. More critically, Serie A’s overall balance flipped to a deficit of -€491.92m since 2023, unlike La Liga, the Bundesliga, and Ligue 1, which are all in profit over the same period.

The core issue is that this heavy spending does not translate to results on the pitch. Serie A clubs are investing poorly, often targeting “ready-made” or declining foreign players in a desperate bid to compete with Europe’s elite.

This mounting deficit has drained vital resources that Italian clubs could, and should, have invested in youth academies and infrastructure to nurture the next generation of world champions. Instead, the system rested on its laurels, chasing short-term success, Champions League windfalls, and TV rights money just to keep its head above water.

While the overall quality of Italian teams has undoubtedly dipped, the primary issue is the scarcity of world-class domestic talent.

Consider the quarter-finals of the 2006 World Cup in Germany. Across the seven other participating nations, only 13 out of 161 players (8%) plied their trade in Serie A. Brazil had six (including Cafu, Kaká, and Adriano), Argentina had four (led by Inter Milan duo Javier Zanetti and Esteban Cambiasso), and France had three. Then, as now, there were no England internationals in the Italian top flight.

Two decades later, the landscape looks remarkably similar. Among the top eight national teams in the world, around 10% of the players (21 out of 208) play in Serie A. France, the pre-tournament favourites, feature three Serie A regulars in their ranks: Mike Maignan, Adrien Rabiot, and Manu Koné. Meanwhile, Belgium and Norway boast five players each who featured in Italy this past season.

The difference is that during the golden era of Italian football, foreign stars were merely the icing on the cake for clubs. The core of these teams remained fiercely Italian, and the entirety of Italy’s 2006 World Cup-winning squad was owned by Serie A clubs. By contrast, the national side that lost their play-off against Bosnia-Herzegovina featured six players based abroad. This overseas contingent included Italy’s two standout stars, Gianluigi Donnarumma and Sandro Tonali, as well as Mateo Retegui, the top scorer in Serie A for the 2024/25 season.

While playing in Italy was once the ultimate goal for players, it is now increasingly seen as a stepping stone to better horizons elsewhere. It is no surprise that Marco Palestra, a highly promising 21-year-old right-back, chose to accept an offer from Chelsea, who finished 10th in the Premier League, rather than join reigning Italian champions Inter Milan, who had courted him for over a year. The financial lure of London was irresistible: a salary of around €6m per season, double what the Nerazzurri were offering.

While romantic traditionalists argued the Lombardy-born youngster should have stayed “closer to home,” modern young players can easily hop on a plane to see family or fly them out to London at will.

A similar narrative surrounds Sandro Tonali. His €116m move from Newcastle to Tottenham made him the most expensive Italian player in history. Juventus, despite missing out on Champions League football, remains Italy’s most prestigious club and had shown interest for months.

Tonali and his partner reportedly wanted to leave the North East of England after three years and would have welcomed a return to Italy, but the economics made it impossible. Playing in the Premier League in London is simply more stimulating and lucrative, even if Tottenham, under Roberto De Zerbi, are in a rebuilding phase while Juventus aims for the Scudetto.

With the best Italian talent leaving and top-tier foreign stars using Serie A as a brief stopover (look no further than Khvicha Kvaratskhelia), Italy must broaden its horizons to inject new life into the national team, mirroring what rival nations have been doing for years.

Italy is home to a generation of youths born to foreign parents who could represent the Azzurri, but bureaucratic hurdles mean that by the time they are eligible, it is often too late. Other nations are capitalising on this talent pool. Amad Diallo grew up in Italy, but only obtained citizenship in 2020; a year later, he was already playing for the Ivory Coast Under-23s. He was one of his country’s best players at this summer’s World Cup, a raw, explosive talent that Italy so desperately lacks.

In Italy, being born to foreign parents is not enough. A child must wait until they turn 18, prove uninterrupted legal residency, and declare their intent to become a citizen before their 19th birthday.

Contrast this with France, where a child born to foreign parents can acquire citizenship between the ages of 13 and 15 at their family’s request, or apply independently at 16, subject to residency requirements. At 18, naturalisation can happen automatically. In Germany, a June 2024 reform slashed the standard residency requirement for naturalisation from eight years to five.

While newly elected FIGC president Malagò has proposed a sporting ius soli (birthright citizenship), the idea of granting citizenship solely for athletic merit remains controversial.

Yet, modern national teams are a reflection of a changing world, where migration and diasporas reshape socio-economic dynamics. A staggering 99 players at the current World Cup were born in France, 52 hailing from the greater Paris region alone. Other nations have treated international football like club scouting for years. Take the Morocco squad, featuring 19 players born abroad, from France, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Belgium. They are just an extreme example, but 23% of players at the tournament are not representing the country of their birth.

There are signs of movement in Italy. Michael Kayode, Jeff Ekhator, Filippo Mané, Luca Koleosho, Seydou Fini, and Samuel Ignacio, all born to foreign parents, have recently received call-ups to the national setup. However, almost none of them play regularly in Serie A. Providing these players with a platform is crucial to forging a new sense of identity and inspiring future generations.

The road back to the top is long, and the structural issues are profound. One thing is certain: Italy cannot move forward while living in the past.

Last Sunday provided just that. First came the Under-17 national team’s penalty shootout victory in the European Championship, closely followed by a win for the senior squad, though “senior” is a stretch, given their record-low average age of just 20.5 years, as they overcame Greece.

These two successes represent the culmination of a journey, albeit a shorter one for Italy’s senior side, led by interim manager Silvio Baldini, who stepped up from the U21s. They confirm what many of us have always known: high-quality young Italian footballers still exist in abundance, and talent production certainly did not grind to a halt in the early 2000s. Despite the wreckage left by failing to qualify for three consecutive World Cups, Italy remains one of the world’s footballing elite nations.

The victory in Tallinn marked Italy’s second European Championship title following their 2024 success, sandwiched around a bronze medal at the 2025 World Cup.

Three years ago, the U19s were also crowned continental champions, while the U20s fell just short in the World Cup final in Argentina that same year. Nine players from that youth crop have since made their Serie A debuts, but the sole link to the senior setup is Inter Milan striker Francesco Pio Esposito. Unsurprisingly, it was Esposito who netted the decisive goals in both 1-0 victories against Luxembourg and Greece last week.

At youth level, tournament victory rarely guarantees a glittering career in the elite game, particularly for those who are still minors. For context, Spain’s 2023 U17 European Championship squad featured Lamine Yamal and Pau Cubarsí, yet they failed to reach the final.

The willingness abroad to blood 17-year-olds in first-team football, ironically, flatters nations like Italy, where young players are routinely held back in their age groups for longer. Simply put, there is a distinct lack of trust when it comes to throwing them into the deep end.

None of the current U17 European champions have made a professional debut; they remain confined to Serie A or B youth setups, like the Primavera (Academy) squads. Whether their clubs will integrate them into senior squads this summer, or opt for older, likely foreign alternatives, remains to be seen. Of the 2024 U17 European champions who started the final, only AC Milan’s Francesco Camarda and Inter’s Mattia Mosconi have tasted Serie A action. Even then, Camarda was shipped out on loan to Lecce this year, while Mosconi featured just twice at the tail-end of the season after the Nerazzurri had already wrapped up the Scudetto.

Yet, just three months ago, Italian football hit another dismal low in Zenica. The response was to reset under interim manager Baldini, an experienced, maverick tactician deeply committed to developing players’ character both on and off the pitch, while implementing a distinctively more attacking brand of football.

True to his philosophy, and likely shaped by his U21 role and an extensive history across Serie C and B where working with youngsters is a necessity, Baldini called up the core of his youth side for June’s double-header of friendlies. It is a group he knows well, having guided them to seven wins and just one defeat in European qualifiers.

To supplement them, he added a couple of veterans: captain Gianluigi Donnarumma, the only player over 21, and the 21-year-old Esposito. The latter is virtually a veteran himself, having racked up 50 appearances and 11 goals for Inter this season, including several crucial strikes on their march to the Serie A title.

Granted, the opposition was modest, Luxembourg sit 98th in the FIFA world rankings, while Greece are 48th, but notably higher than eight teams participating in the World Cup, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Azzurri's executioners in the recent play-offs. Nevertheless, the results and, crucially, the attitude on display should not be dismissed. Above all, Italy won both matches on the road without conceding a single goal, a feat not achieved since 2023. In these lean times, that is nothing to scoff at.

Furthermore, despite the slow tempo, there was a visible appetite to fight, run, and ultimately win, traits that had gone missing during past key matches. It was a young, hungry Italy squad featuring several players with Serie B experience, five playing abroad, and multiple second-generation Italian youngsters with at least one parent born overseas. It finally feels like a more accurate reflection of modern Italy, a country where children of immigrants find opportunities and excel across major sports, with the traditional exception of football, which had begun to look starkly anachronistic compared to other European nations.

During the final 15 minutes against Greece, after the Azzurri were reduced to 10 men following the dismissal of Borussia Dortmund’s 18-year-old defender Luca Reggiani, Italy defended doggedly against the Greek onslaught. The jubilant celebrations at the final whistle laid bare just how much this victory meant to the players and staff. While victory was far from a given, failure to win would have severely damaged Italy’s FIFA ranking, with negative knock-on effects for future European Championship and World Cup seeding.

Credit must go to Baldini for executing his brief perfectly, and for acknowledging, after the game, that the long-term stewardship of the national team is not his to claim. Predictably, public clamour has grown for the interim boss to be appointed permanently, drawing comparisons to Luis de la Fuente’s transition from Spain U21s to the senior side in 2022, or Lee Carsley doing the same with England for a brief six-game Nations League spell in 2024. However, those Spanish and English sides were established sides, backed by an endless assembly line of elite talent, as club and international results have since vindicated.

Italy requires a manager who will buy into a comprehensive rebuilding project. This overhaul must start from the grassroots, requiring heavy investment in infrastructure and national training centres, alongside a likely restructuring of the domestic leagues, starting with Serie C, where dozens of clubs face financial ruin every year. Crucially, it demands a cohesive vision that encompasses the academy setups of the top clubs, incentivising them to give youth a chance.

First, a new FIGC (Italian FA) president must be elected. The race is a straight shootout between 75-year-old Giancarlo Abete, who previously held the role from 2007 to 2014, and Giovanni Malagò, who has presided over the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) for the last 12 years. The vote takes place on 22 June, with the appointment of the new manager closely following. That man will almost certainly be Roberto Mancini, who looks poised for a return after abruptly abandoning the Azzurri bench midway through Euro 2024 qualification.

It is a decision Mancini has evidently come to regret. After a two-year spell managing Saudi Arabia, where he suffered a bruising failure to qualify for the World Cup, matching his 2022 disaster with Italy against North Macedonia, he is currently at Al-Sadd. Mancini has been preferred over Antonio Conte, who publicly threw his hat into the ring back in March, due to his more recent international pedigree and his reputation for blooding youth.

His call-ups of a teenage Nicolò Zaniolo and Simone Pafundi before they had even made their Serie A debuts between 2020 and 2023 remain famous; it was a stark message from the coach highlighting the shallow talent pool at his disposal. Mancini was also the driving force behind the naturalisation of Argentine-born Mateo Retegui, who remains the last Italian passport-holder to top the Serie A scoring charts, though he too now plies his trade in the Middle East.

There is a powerful scene in the BBC’s recent hit drama Dear England, which charts how Gareth Southgate rebuilt the culture of the England national team from 2018 onwards. Walking into the dressing room for his inaugural team talk, he activates a digital countdown clock showing over 30,000 minutes. That was the exact time remaining until the 2022 World Cup final.

Southgate explained to his squad that while the 2018 World Cup loomed, the ultimate objective was to prepare for and win the tournament in Qatar. England fell short, but they subsequently reached two European Championship finals, completely transforming the toxic atmosphere that once surrounded the Three Lions.

As of today, 2,224 days remain until the final of Euro 2032, a tournament Italy will co-host alongside Turkey, stadium renovations permitting, with the showpiece finale likely on home soil. That is just over six years away.

While qualifying for the 2030 World Cup is an absolute necessity along the way, the true target must be returning to peak competitiveness to lift the trophy on home turf. This requires long-term planning, calculated risks, and blooding youth at both international and Serie A club level, rather than being held hostage by the demand for immediate results.

The talent is clearly there, as last Sunday proved. Fortunately, time is also on their side. But, for now, Italian football must settle onto the sofa to watch everyone else play at the World Cup.

In mid-March, after winning the second 'Derby della Madonnina' of the season against Inter, Milan were dreaming of a Scudetto push. Fast forward to the end of May, and they have slumped to a fifth-place finish. A dismal run of just 10 points from their final 10 games has cost them Champions League qualification, and an estimated €70m in lost revenue next season.

It was a calamitous end to the campaign, capped off by a 2-1 home defeat to a relaxed, already-safe Cagliari side. Perhaps the warning signs were there; all season, manager Massimiliano Allegri insisted a top-four finish was the ultimate goal, even when the Rossoneri were leading the table. But no one expected a collapse quite this severe.

Ultimately, the prophecy of Italian pundits and former players—most notably Daniele Adani and Antonio Cassano, long-time critics of Allegri’s pragmatism—has come to pass. Their mantra, “Father Time operates in silence,” rang true on the final day. Although Milan finished the season with seven more points than last term, failing to make it into the top-four, having already been dumped out of the Coppa Italia in early December 2025 and with no European fixtures to contend with, is an absolute sporting failure. For context, under similar circumstances last season, Antonio Conte won the Scudetto with a Napoli squad of comparable value.

The cracks had been showing for months. Milan rarely dominated games this season, relying instead on opportunistic moments, a trademark of Allegri’s style for years.

The Tuscan manager deployed a standard Italian 3-5-2 system that stifled the squad’s best talents, forcing Rafael Leão out of his natural winger role to play as a central striker, while leaving Christian Pulisic isolated and uncomfortable on the right flank, where he failed to score since late December. Compounding these issues was a chronic, season-long lack of a powerhouse centre-forward capable of guaranteeing goals. Harry Kane alone has scored more goals this season at Bayern Munich (61) than the entire Milan squad combined (58).

For most of the year, Milan survived on the work rate of 31-year-old Adrien Rabiot and the enduring class of 40-year-old Luka Modrić. But once their energy reserves emptied, the light went out. Last summer’s marquee signings, Ardon Jashari and Samuele Ricci, who cost a combined €55m, barely featured, overshadowed by their veteran teammates.

Defensively, the team frequently looked vulnerable, kept afloat only by goalkeeper Mike Maignan, whose performances prevented over 10 expected goals (xG). The January transfer window offered little relief. Bringing in Niklas Füllkrug yielded just a single goal, though in fairness, he battled through a broken toe for several matches. A late pursuit of Crystal Palace’s Jean-Philippe Mateta collapsed into a chaotic dispute over his fitness; Mateta went on to feature regularly for the Premier League outfit, scoring six goals from January onwards. This raises a glaring question: if the funds were available, why weren’t they spent sooner? Ultimately, a lack of a reliable number nine will wear any team down. Roma, by contrast, brought in Donyell Malen in winter and, thanks in no small part to his 14 goals, qualified for next season’s Champions League.

Much of the blame lies within Milan’s tangled chain of command. Chief Executive Giorgio Furlani, Sporting Director Igli Tare, and Technical Director Geoffrey Moncada all seemed to meddle without taking definitive accountability.

Adding to the confusion is the looming presence of Zlatan Ibrahimović. Formally employed by RedBird as a Senior Advisor to Cardinale, Ibrahimović’s role remains an enigma, characterised more by self-referential catchphrases and fleeting motivational visits to the Milanello training ground than clear executive action.

On Monday, Cardinale, a prominent supporter and donor of Donald Trump, resolved the crisis in true cowboy fashion. He pulled the trigger, delivering four swift “you’re fired” verdicts to Allegri and his three directors.

For American ownership, failure equals dismissal. We have seen a similar ruthless streak from the Friedkin family at Roma, who showed little hesitation in axing fan favourites coaches like José Mourinho and Daniele De Rossi.

Now, Cardinale is promising a more hands-on approach in Milan, starting with the appointment of a new manager. The criteria? A coach who can deliver attractive, attacking, and ultimately winning football. Milan is a vital piece of a broader global strategy for RedBird; it cannot be a loss-making enterprise. Financially, the ownership has done well, the club’s books are balanced, but the brand must project reliability and success.

Cardinale’s ambitions extend far beyond what happens at San Siro, which the club recently acquired, alongside Inter, and will invest to restructure. RedBird recently bough Paramount alongside Skydance in a massive $8bn deal, and they are currently working to bring an NBA franchise to Lombardy by October 2027.

“You see, it’s not just about Serie A. It’s about not showing up to the Champions League finals and losing 5-0; it’s about playing competitively in Europe,” Cardinale remarked just last week, taking a swipe at newly crowned Italian champions Inter following their heavy defeat against PSG last campaign.

Milan won’t have to worry about that particular problem next season. Confined to the Europa League, the Rossoneri face a long, patient rebuild.

Patience and meticulous planning are exactly what has driven success just a few miles up the road in Como, where the club secured a historic Champions League qualification.

Cesc Fàbregas has been coaching on the banks of the lake for four years. That’s a remarkable anomaly in a cash-strapped Serie A where clubs constantly cycle through managers due to an inability to attract elite talent. While Como’s project is backed by the wealth of the Indonesian Hartono brothers (ranked among the top 60 richest people globally), their success is built on structure, not reckless spending.

Despite having the financial power to outspend any team in Italy, Como focused on strategic investments, primarily targeting under-26 players with room to develop. Operating with only the 11th-largest budget in Serie A, they finished ahead of both Juventus and Milan.

The recently concluded Serie A campaign was widely criticised for its mediocre technical quality, characterised by the lowest goal average among Europe’s top leagues and a record-breaking 32 goalless draws.

Against this backdrop, Como have been a breath of fresh air.

They proved that clear ideas can triumph, ending the season with the best defense in Serie A and the most clean sheets, while simultaneously ranking in the top three for key attacking metrics.

It represents a genuine cultural revolution. Fàbregas was previously criticised for a lack of pragmatism, notably after dominating but ultimately losing to Allegri’s Milan earlier in the season. In the end, however, it is Cesc who has had the final word.

The Bianconeri’s Sunday lunchtime had begun with a controversial and bizarre scheduling decision, which saw five crucial Champions League-defining matches kick off at midday. The move was designed to ensure security in Rome for the derby and to avoid clashing with the final of the Italian Open tennis tournament. Two hours later, just as fans would normally be reaching for their dessert or digestif, Juventus had slipped to sixth.

Meanwhile, a Fiorentina side with nothing left to play for had stolen a victory in Turin, ruining their bitter rivals’ afternoon. “Calm down,” Spalletti replied to probing journalists post-match, as they demanded answers for a collapse that threatens to push Juventus out of next season’s Champions League.

With just 90 minutes of the campaign remaining, it is a defeat that could cost the club around €100m in lost revenue. It is a massive problem for Italy’s most successful club, who have failed to win, or even truly compete for, the Scudetto since the Covid-hit 2020 season. Maurizio Sarri was the last manager to win the title in Turin, only to be dismissed because his blunt, sometimes abrasive manner did not fit the Juventus ethos. Yet his side, despite a difficult campaign, was the last to truly dominate while playing attractive football. Five managers have occupied the dugout since then, but Spalletti risks becoming the first to miss the club’s baseline target.

In truth, the cracks have been showing for a while. Since they stopped fighting for the title, Juventus have finished fourth three times, third once, and seventh in 2022–23, though that was due to a 10-point deduction for the capital gains scandal.

Their recent points tallies read: 78, 70, 72 (-10), 71, 71, and 70. Even if they win the Turin derby this Sunday, they can reach a maximum of 71 points and will likely have to settle for the Europa League.

Last season, they were saved only ten minutes from time away at relegated Venezia thanks to a penalty. In May 2021, Gennaro Gattuso’s Napoli could only manage a 1-1 home draw against Verona, allowing the Bianconeri to sneak into fourth on the final game. Despite hovering near the same point thresholds as previous years, many believed Juventus were out of the woods this season. There was an air of optimism.

But looking at the numbers, it is clear that the team that won nine consecutive league titles between 2012 and 2020 has suddenly lost its competitive edge. This is the result of poor board decisions, a lack of clarity, and failed investments, quite simply, wasted money. While Bayern Munich signed Michael Olise from Crystal Palace for €50m two summers ago, the €40.6m Juventus splashed out on Lois Openda in 2025, yielding just two goals in 34 appearances, looks disastrous.

Despite these mistakes, including poor recruitment upfront, with Jonathan David scoring just six times in Serie A and Edon Zhegrova failing to find the net at all, Juventus had managed to steady the ship by swiftly replacing Igor Tudor with Spalletti. For months, the team seemed to rediscover its character, personality, and, in flashes, some fine football.

Following their Champions League exit at the hands of Galatasaray, where they fell just short of a historic comeback after a 5-2 first-leg defeat, in a return fixture where they deserved better, Juventus maintained a steady pace in the league. They went 10 games unbeaten, keeping seven clean sheets. Then came Sunday’s cold shower. Whatever Spalletti might say, the Fiorentina match was a must-win. Instead, fear crept in. Individual errors compromised the game, and the season, casting heavy shadows over the club’s future and Spalletti’s position in Turin.

“I will be meeting with John Elkann,” declared the former national team manager, who only a month ago extended his contract with the club until 2028. Could he really walk away so soon, after just over six months? Neither Spalletti nor Juventus deserve that. After years of turbulence, the club has finally found a coach who can, given time, restore a winning identity and mentality.

Of course, rather than Elkann, the club’s owner, Spalletti should really be meeting with sporting director Marco Ottolini or CEO Damien Comolli, assuming the latter even retains his position without Champions League football.

Here lies the problem: unlike the past, when the club was guided by heavyweights like Luciano Moggi, Antonio Giraudo, and later Giuseppe Marotta, whose move to Inter Milan marked a true passing of the torch in Italian football power, this Juventus hierarchy is lagging behind. The current management lacks a clear stance on many issues and is often invisible. They have certainly failed to grasp the delicate situation facing both the squad and their manager.

The numbers suggest Spalletti has not done a bad job. He has picked up 53 points from 28 league matches, an average of 1.89 per game. Projected over an entire season, that equates to just under 72 points, right in line with recent years. Since his arrival, only champions Inter Milan have picked up more points (68) in the same timeframe.

Other data points to a healthy Juventus:

• Expected Goals (xG): Second in the league with 66.96 (just three behind Inter).

• Shots per game: Second highest in Serie A, average 16.81 per match.

• Kenan Yildiz: Leads Serie A for xG + Expected Assists (xA) at 17.8, performing better than the three Inter players ahead of him in actual goal contributions this season: Lautaro Martinez (16.2), Federico Dimarco (16.1), and Marcus Thuram (12.0).

So, what has been missing? Luck, in large part. Looking at expected points derived from xG metrics, Juventus should be comfortably sitting in second place, with Champions League qualification secured long ago.

Instead, the blame is falling heavily on goalkeeper Michele Di Gregorio, who made another glaring error on Sunday, letting the opening goal slip under his legs. It is not the first blunder from the keeper, who arrived from Monza in the summer of 2024 for €13.5m, largely due to his proficiency with his feet, a trait that suited former manager Thiago Motta’s style of play.

This season, Di Gregorio’s reflexes have often let him down. Juventus have conceded a goal from the very first shot on target they faced in 46% of their league matches this season (16 goals conceded from 35 shots on target), the highest ratio in the division. When looking exclusively at games drawn or lost due to clear mistakes by Di Gregorio, Juventus have thrown away 10 points.

The contrast with their rivals, AC Milan and Roma, is stark.

• Mike Maignan (Milan): Has prevented 7.9 goals this season.

• Mile Svilar (Roma): Has prevented 3.7 goals this season.

If your forwards are not scoring, your goalkeeper simply has to keep the opposition out. It is not a matter of Spalletti’s philosophy; it is just the razor-thin margin between achieving your goals and failure.

These are the Serie C play-offs, the third tier of Italian football, equivalent to a grueling obstacle course, or perhaps, a circle of Dante’s Inferno. The format sees teams from every corner of Italy clash, first in localized knockout rounds based on the regular season’s three geographic groups, before moving into a national phase.

Is the mechanism complicated? One look at the bracket is enough to leave even the most seasoned fans scratching their head.

Serie C has long been a footballing purgatory from which escape is notoriously difficult. ‘Portaci via, da questa merda di categoria’ (get us out of this crap division) is one of the most common chants heard across the grounds of the third tier. It is less a battle cry and more a desperate prayer from supporters pleading with their players to drag the club out of anonymity.

In recent years, however, the stakes have been raised to an almost sadistic level. Only the champions of each group earn the luxury of automatic promotion. Everyone else, from the runners-up right down to 10th place, plus the winner of the Serie C Coppa Italia (Italy’s equivalent to the EFL Trophy), is cast into the play-off meat grinder for one final shot at glory.

This article was written for Aficionados Football Travel ahead of the “Emilia Romagna” tour in February 2027. The full article is available to read for free.

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The investigation, recently reopened by the FIGC (Italian FA) Prosecutor’s Office, is moving at high speed. Rocchi is scheduled to answer investigators’ questions on April 30.

Strategic appointments and “knocking” on VAR

The investigation focuses on claims that refereeing assignments were manipulated by Rocchi to suit club preferences. Specific incidents highlighted include:

• Inter vs. Bologna (April 2025): Allegations that Rocchi pushed for referee Andrea Colombo to officiate because he was “liked” by Inter.

• Inter vs. Milan (Coppa Italia Semi-final, second-leg, April 2025): Accusations that Rocchi worked to ensure Daniele Doveri officiated this match specifically so he would be unavailable for other Inter games during that period, as he was “not liked” by the Nerazzurri who were in the title race with Napoli.

• Udinese vs. Parma (March 2025): A potential breach of VAR protocol. It is alleged that Rocchi suggested an on-field review to referee Fabio Maresca to award Parma a penalty. Video evidence reportedly shows VAR officials looking surprised and asking, “is it a penalty?” while Rocchi was allegedly knocking on the glass door of the VAR room, a habit he was reportedly known for.

While Inter, Parma, Udinese, and other clubs are not officially involved in the investigation, the atmosphere is heavy with the memory of the 2006 Calciopoli scandal and the infamous phone calls of former Juventus General Director Luciano Moggi. However, Inter has expressed annoyance, noting they lost both matches cited in these allegations.

A house divided

The case stems from the claims of Domenico Rocca, an assistant referee who alleges he was a victim of “ostracism and mobbing” by Rocchi at the end of last season. The Italian Referee Association (AIA) is described as “very fractured and litigious.” Following the news, Rocca posted a cryptic message on social media:

“He who lives by the sword, dies by the sword…”

The fallout has already begun. VAR Supervisor Andrea Gervasoni has self-suspended, and the AIA must choose a temporary head to oversee the final games of the current season.

Beyond the allegations lies a deeper institutional war. Rocchi, among others, pushed to reform the system by introducing full professionalism, modeled after England’s PGMOL. Under this proposal, Serie A and B officials would split from the AIA starting in the 2026/27 campaign to form a standalone company funded by Serie A, Serie B and the FIGC.

The financial reality for referees today explains the push for change. Currently, an international official earns approximately €170,000 gross per year, but this figure masks a dangerous instability. Earnings are heavily weighted toward a variable match fee component: €4,000 per game in Serie A and €2,000 in Serie B.

In this scenario, a referee is essentially a freelancer under constant economic pressure; if they make a mistake and are suspended by the designator, their income drops drastically. Full professionalism would instead guarantee the economic independence and peace of mind required for the role.

Juventus coach Luciano Spalletti recently highlighted the issue: “On the field, there are 22 professionals and one precarious worker... The referee is not a professional: he goes home, has to think about other things, and doesn’t know if he will still be a referee next year. It’s not good.”

This move, however, is met with fierce resistance from the AIA which fears a loss of money and power. Today, the FIGC lacks the strength to impose a total overhaul, and the clubs remain divided on the idea.

Rocchi, who ranks third all-time for Serie A matches refereed and oversaw the 2019 Europa League final, was already expected to step down when his contract expires this June. His tenure has been controversial; he held the record for penalties given in 2015/16 and was backed by the recently resigned FIGC head Gabriele Gravina.

His signature initiatives, such as “Open VAR,” where audio of officials’ conversations was published and explained by Rocchi on television, and the “RefCam”, are expected to be scrapped next season. The leading candidate to replace him is Roberto Rosetti, the current UEFA referee chief, who in favour of a “less forensic” and less intrusive VAR system.

The timing could not be worse for the FIGC. With presidential elections due at the end of June, Sport Minister Andrea Abodi has warned that Italy’s FA could be placed under external administration if their responsibility in this crisis is proven.

As the debate over how referees are nominated reignites, reminiscences of the 1984/85 and 1998/99 seasons, the only times referees were chosen by a random draw, have returned to the conversation. This is a method that has never been popular with Italy’s major clubs. Back then, Verona and Lazio won the Scudetto. A pure coincidence, perhaps. But as the saying goes: thinking the worst is often the right way to guess.

When Simone Inzaghi left the Inter bench vacant following a demoralising defeat to Paris Saint-Germain in Munich, the Romanian was far from the first name on the board. That honour belonged to Cesc Fàbregas. However, in June 2025, the Catalan offered a polite but firm “thanks, but no thanks,” opting to remain by the shores of Lake Como.

Chivu was the alternative: the emerging coach, a product of Inter’s own youth system, but ultimately a massive gamble. With only 13 games at Parma under his belt last season, many doubted whether he had the gravitas to lead the Champions League finalists.

Yet, Chivu has passed his trial by fire with flying colours, and this week he stands on the cusp of a historic achievement.

No manager in their debut season at Inter has ever secured the domestic double of the Scudetto and the Coppa Italia. It is a feat achieved only by José Mourinho in 2010—though the Portuguese was already in his second year when he added the Champions League to complete the triplete.

The comparisons to ‘The Special One’ have intensified recently. It isn’t just the on-field success; it’s the shift in Chivu’s persona. The mild-mannered, nonchalant figure seen in August has been replaced by a sharper, more combative character in front of media.

His recent retort—”I am no fool”—when questioned about the narrative surrounding Inter, struck a chord with the Nerazzurri faithful. It echoed Mourinho’s iconic “I am not a pirla (idiot, in Milanese slang) “ remark made during his 2008 unveiling. Like Mourinho, Chivu has proven himself a master of psychology, revitalising a squad that appeared drained and demotivated after finishing last season empty-handed.

With five games remaining, Inter effectively have their 21st Scudetto in the bag. While critics often point to the perceived decline of Serie A as a litmus test for Inter’s dominance, the numbers tell a different story.

This is not a title won through Massimiliano Allegri’s corto muso (winning by a nose) philosophy, nor is it the efficiency of Antonio Conte’s Napoli, who took the title last year with a record-low 59 goals.

Inter have already plundered 78 goals this term. Their goal difference of +49 is actually higher than the total goals scored by either Napoli or AC Milan (48). Chivu has successfully evolved Inzaghi’s tactical foundations without tearing them down. He has retained the balance—Inter boast the second-best defence in Italy—but has demanded a faster, more vertical transition.

The season did not start seamlessly. After two defeats in the opening three matches, there were vociferous calls for Chivu to abandon the 3-5-2 formation. He remained calm. His priority was to restore confidence to a group of players who, he argued, hadn’t suddenly become donkeys after the Munich debacle.

The turning point came after the March international break. Despite losing captain and top scorer Lautaro Martínez to injury for the last three games, Inter found an extra gear, winning four straight matches and scoring 15 goals.

Perhaps most symbolic were the two victories over Fàbregas’s Como. In two of the most enthralling matches of the Italian season, Inter fell behind to the Lariani dazzling tactical setups, only to roar back through individual brilliance and a collective mental toughness. The introduction of youngsters Andy Diouf and Petar Sučić, two assists and the winning goal, in the Coppa Italia semi-final further highlighted Chivu’s growing tactical maturity.

Whether they secure the double or not, Inter’s domestic season has been a masterclass, especially considering Napoli began the campaign as heavy favourites. The Partenopei have been hindered by injuries and Antonio Conte’s perennial struggle to balance domestic and European commitments.

Yet Chivu’s success is also underpinned by a robust structure behind. In Giuseppe Marotta, Inter possess Italy’s most seasoned executive, tasked with navigating the accounts and investments of the American fund Oaktree.

With the financial turbulence of the Chinese-owned Suning era now a memory, the club has found a rare stability, avoiding the economic and emotional volatility that has affected their domestic rivals in recent times. This has manifested in shrewd, cost-effective recruitment and a deep-rooted belief in the long-term project.

However, to be competitive Europe, another step is required, and this summer will provide a true barometer of the club’s ambition. The squad requires further rejuvenation, and a high-profile exit—likely Alessandro Bastoni, who is being courted by Barcelona—may be necessary to fund the arrival of the quick, modern players Chivu needs to fully realise his vision.

In the game of sliding doors, Inter’s gamble has paid off. They wanted Fàbregas but got Chivu. While the Spaniard has made Como the neutral’s favourite with his proactive, attacking football, Chivu has brought the silverware.

The circle has closed, but for Chivu and Inter, the winning cycle may only just be beginning.

Last Monday, fresh from a victory over Milan that keeps his Napoli side in the Scudetto race, he finally dropped the mask. “If I were the federation president, I would take myself into consideration,” said the most successful coach in the history of Serie A. The numbers back him up; in terms of points per game, no one matches his 2.22 average.

Today, Conte stands as the primary candidate for the Italy bench. A return, following a previous tenure between 2014 and 2016 that was a masterclass in over-achievement. Back then, with a technically modest squad devoid of top-tier stars, save for the Juventus backbone of Buffon, Bonucci, Chiellini, and Barzagli, he managed to overcome world-class Belgian and Spanish sides at Euro 2016 through sheer determination.

Going back to the national team today, Conte would inherit a squad similarly devoid of talent, the result of a Serie A that has spent the last twelve years sliding backward compared to the rest of Europe. Yet, this is Conte’s ideal environment. He won the Scudetto in his first year at Juventus in 2012, who were coming off two consecutive seventh-place finishes, ended a decade-long title drought with Inter in 2021, and last season stepped into a chaotic Napoli side to win his fifth national title.

To many, he is the only figure capable of restoring the grit required for this Italian team to be competitive again, creating cohesion and a sense of belonging better than anyone else. Yet, a legitimate doubt persists: is he the right fit for this moment, or merely a prestigious band-aid for a systemic disease?

The financial reality of such a return is staggering. Conte is currently the highest-paid manager in Serie A, earning €8 million at Napoli on a contract running until 2027. The Italian FA (FIGC) has historically been unable to match such figures; for comparison, Luciano Spalletti earned roughly €2.5 million, and even Roberto Mancini’s peak contract sat at €4 million. During his first stint, Conte’s salary was only possible through external sponsorships, and he ultimately left for Chelsea’s €10 million offer because he felt the need to coach on a daily basis. This raises the question of whether a man who has not stayed at a club for more than two seasons since 2014 can truly lead a long-term project through to the 2030 World Cup.

The timing of this potential move is equally strange, occurring in the heat of a title race with Napoli as runners-up and only seven games remaining. Last summer, Conte was already skeptical about the Napoli project and seemed ready to leave as a “winner,” perhaps to accept an offer from Juventus. Napoli President Aurelio De Laurentiis managed to convince him by promising a high-level transfer campaign, though the results were mixed; summer signings like Noa Lang and Lorenzo Lucca were already sent elsewhere by January. Conte has made no secret of his discontent this season, famously describing his players as the “walking dead” as early as last October following a defeat in Bologna. While De Laurentiis might welcome the chance to hire a younger, less expensive manager like Thiago Motta or Vincenzo Italiano, the FIGC must decide if Conte’s demanding nature is what the movement truly needs. He would undoubtedly demand mid-season training camps, a luxury Gennaro Gattuso was denied ahead of the World Cup play-offs, as well as a radical overhaul of the Serie A calendar to ensure the domestic season concludes by mid-May ahead of a major tournament.

Ultimately, Conte sees a return to the national team as a solution to a problem—primarily his own. For the current state of Italian football, however, a more courageous and less conventional choice might be necessary. Italy needs more than just a few wins or a decent Nations League run; they need a long-term technical project. Considering that earning the right to play at Euro 2028 is relatively easy, with 24 teams qualifying and even the eight best runners-up advancing, this could be the opportunity to hire a younger coach who could act as a catalyst for change across the entire movement. While Conte has demonstrated greater tactical flexibility at Napoli, often playing without a recognised striker to avoid being stuck in his criticised 3-5-2 formation, his core principles remain the same. His Napoli side has achieved 30 clean sheets since last season and has won 14 games by a single-goal margin this year, more than any other team.

Left-field choices could include Raffaele Palladino, who has seen only Inter gain more points than his Atalanta in 2026, or Maurizio Sarri and Francesco Farioli, all of whom possess international experience.

Beyond the managerial issue, the state of Italian football remains precarious. Monday’s match between Napoli and the Rossoneri served as a manifesto for this stagnation: slow play and few chances, perfectly suited for those resistant to change. Watching Champions League ties during the week makes calcio look like a different sport entirely.

The lack of investment in home-grown talent is stark. Last weekend, which still felt like a period of mourning following Italy’s World Cup play-off defeat against Bosnia-Herzegovina, only 64 Italian players featured across the entire league. In the Udinese versus Como fixture, Nicoló Zaniolo was the only Italian starter.

The systemic issues were recently laid bare in a plan by the resigned FA head, Gabriele Gravina, which cited the poor promotion of youth and widespread economic fragility. CIES data confirms that Serie A is one of the oldest leagues in Europe; in fact, five of the fifteen clubs in Europe that give the least space to Under-21 players are Italian, with Napoli at 0% and Inter at a mere 0.8%.

Various hypotheses for a relaunch have emerged, from Juventus coach Luciano Spalletti’s proposal to mandate an Under-19 player in every squad, to reducing Serie A to 18 or even 16 teams. In the meantime, Silvio Baldini has taken over as interim national coach. An unconventional figure who is currently leading the Under-21s to seven wins in eight matches, Baldini will ferry the team through June friendlies against Luxembourg and Greece. The new president, to be elected on June 22, will then choose the permanent successor.

While the “dream” of Pep Guardiola remains a frequent topic for pundits and fans, it remains just that, a dream, much like the persistent rumours of a World Cup recall should Iran withdraw.

Even without the tone-deaf post-match comments from FIGC (Italian Football Association) President Gabriele Gravina (pictured below), who bizarrely labelled the Azzurri “heroic” following their defeat to Bosnia-Herzegovina, his position would be untenable. At 72, Gravina was at the helm when Italy won the Euros in 2021, but also when they slumped to a play-off elimination against North Macedonia a year later. Despite the failure of Euro 2024, he was re-elected in 2025 with a staggering 98.6% of the vote, a plebiscite that felt increasingly detached from reality.

Following a third consecutive failure to reach the World Cup, the corridors of power in Rome have waded in. Sports Minister Andrea Abodi has called for a total “refounding” of the game, while Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has reportedly intervened following pressure from 40 senators. Legally, their hands are tied; the FIGC is a private entity with organisational autonomy, funded largely by sponsorships and TV rights.

Yet, the national team has always been a political lightning rod. In 2000, after losing the European Championship final to France, then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi publicly lambasted manager Dino Zoff for failing to man-mark Zinedine Zidane.

“Even an amateur would have noticed it,” Berlusconi thundered. “Zidane was free to create. We should have put Gattuso on him.”

Zoff resigned that same day.

Gennaro Gattuso, the man Berlusconi once demanded as a tactical solution, is now part of the problem. Invited by Gravina to stay on as a caretaker until June, the former AC Milan midfielder has instead walked away. Joining him in the exodus is Head of Delegation Gianluigi Buffon. Buffon was chosen for his charisma and the golden aura of 2006, but his executive experience was non-existent. It was he who pushed for Gattuso. Along with his fellow Juventus and Italy’s teammate, Leonardo Bonucci, they formed a technical staff defined by medals on their chests rather than tactical innovation. It was a “triumvirate of old glories” in a sport that had quickly moved past them.

The Italian FA’s greatest sin was a lack of planning. When coach Luciano Spalletti’s methods failed to land at Euro 2024, the FIGC should have moved for elite coaches like Simone Inzaghi or Carlo Ancelotti, both of whom became available last summer. Instead, after a 3-0 defeat in Norway led to Spalletti’s departure, they improvised, gambling that the “spirit of Berlin 2006” would be enough to carry this squad to North America. It wasn’t.

Perhaps then, as now, the situation required a deeper understanding of modern dynamics. But the path to reform is obstructed by the very structure of Italian football. The next presidential elections on 22 June will see 274 delegates cast their votes, but the real power lies with the Amateur League (LND), which holds 34% of the total vote. It is a paradox: in his post-elimination frustration, Gravina dismissed Italy’s successes in sports such as tennis, rugby or athletics as “amateur” compared to the “professionalism” of football. Yet, it is the amateur wing that effectively chooses the leader of the Italian FA.

The names currently linked with the vacancy are familiar faces: 75-year-old Giancarlo Abete, a former FIGC President (2007–2014), and Giovanni Malagò, who has presided over the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) for the last 12 years.

The FIGC is a mirror of the country: ageing and stagnant. The average age of the leadership exceeds 60, higher than that of the Italian Senate (58.9). Of the top 20 executives, there is a total absence of those under 50, with the exception of Giorgio Chiellini and two women: Sara Gama (once the women’s team captain) and coach Silvia Citta. For the most part, it is a group of elderly men deciding the future of a game played by the young.

The decline was not an overnight event; it has been a 30-year slide. In 1994, Italy topped a “group of death” featuring Portugal, Scotland, and Switzerland to reach the World Cup in the USA. Today, with the tournament expanded to 48 teams, and three more European sides qualifying compared to 32 years go, the excuse that the qualifying format is “unfair” rings hollow. Italy simply isn’t competitive anymore.

For a quarter of a century, the production line of Italian match-winners has sat idle. Since 1994, only Fabio Cannavaro has claimed the Ballon d’Or. While the years leading up to 2006 saw a steady stream of Italians in the award’s top 20, the subsequent fall from grace has been vertiginous.

The “missing generation”, those born in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is almost entirely absent from the zenith of the world game. Today, the mantle of Italy’s finest belongs to Gianluigi Donnarumma. That he is a goalkeeper, following in the footsteps of Buffon, is the exception that proves a bleak rule: Italy no longer produces the creative, pacy wingers or clinical strikers required for the modern game. The national scoring record is still held by Gigi Riva (pictured below), who passed away in early 2025; his final goal for his country was scored in 1973.

The economic collapse of Serie A in the mid-2000s exposed the lack of investment in youth. Today, Italian professional clubs invest the least in Europe in their academies. In the Inter Milan Under-20 side (Primavera) that claimed the national title last year, there were 17 non-Italian players in the squad. Grassroots football has been outsourced to external clubs that charge families exorbitant fees. For the generation of Paolo Rossi or Francesco Totti, football was almost free. Today, it is an elite expense. Consequently, gifted children are migrating to rugby, volleyball, or tennis, disciplines that offer better facilities and structured pathways at a lower cost.

Beating Bosnia-Herzegovina didn’t require a revolution. It required Alessandro Bastoni to not get sent off and Moise Kean to finish a counter-attack in the second hald. But qualifying for the World Cup would have been nothing more than papering over the cracks, a temporary reprieve before an inevitable disappointment.

Italy is now at a crossroads. The system must be rebuilt from the ground up, a process that will take years. A national team must be entrusted to a new manager, and a European Championship must be organised in six years’ time. “I hope the infrastructure will be ready. Otherwise, the tournament will not be played in Italy,” warned UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin.

It is time to get a move on. For Italian football, the fear is that they will change the faces at the top while the rot at the foundation remains untouched.

The 2026 World Cup will be the largest in history—an expanded, 48-team festival—and Italy will not be there. They were eliminated by Bosnia-Herzegovina, a nation ranked 66th in the world that earned every second of its celebration. The statistics are harrowing: it has been 20 years since Italy won a knockout match at a World Cup. Since that night in Berlin in 2006, the timeline has been a wasteland: two group-stage exits and three consecutive failures to even qualify.

Check the calendar: is this some cruel April Fool’s joke? If only. Unfortunately, for Italian football, the pain is real.

Sweden, North Macedonia, and now Bosnia. These are nations that Italy once considered “minor” in terms of both footballing pedigree and demographic scale. But the World Cup is not won or lost in a playoff; the playoff is merely the safety net for the mediocre. The real decline started years ago, when Italy began losing, regularly and convincingly, to the likes of Spain, Norway, and Switzerland.

If you find yourself 11 meters away from qualification in a stadium the Italian media hysterically dubbed “The Gates of Dante’s Inferno,” you have already failed.

It is easy to point fingers at the individuals. We could blame Alessandro Bastoni for a reckless red card (it is time for the lad to leave Inter, for his own development), or Moise Kean and Federico Dimarco for their profligacy in front of goal. We could even blame 20-year-old Pio Esposito or Bryan Cristante for their missed penalties.

But the truth is more systemic. Just as they did in Bergamo five days earlier, Italy played with a high heart but low quality. They were sluggish, prone to defensive amnesia, and, most unforgivably, guilty of retreating into a defensive shell the moment they took an early lead.

What are the causes of Italian football failure? I spoke to Mark Chapman, alongside Italian football journalist James Horncastle, on BBC 5 Live Sport.

Once down to ten men, it was a desperate defense against a Bosnian side that looked technically superior and far more daring. In Esmir Bajraktarević and Kerim Alajbegović, Bosnia possessed true wingers—fearless 20-somethings who tormented Dimarco and Italy’s three-man defence. Only Gianluigi Donnarumma kept the pulse flickering with a string of vintage saves. But even his fabled penalty-saving intuition, the magic of Euro 2021, had evaporated by the time the shootout arrived.

Another summer wasted. Another July spent as spectators, denied the collective ritual of the wall chart and the frantic scheduling around “when Italy plays.” A whole generation of Italian adolescents will reach adulthood in 2030 having never seen their country play a World Cup match.

Perhaps for these kids, football is no longer the center of the universe. They have found new idols in Jannik Sinner or the world-conquering volleyball teams. Perhaps even the Baseball national team, capable of beating the US recently. In those sports, the common denominators are long-term planning, modern coaching, and a willingness to risk.

What does a summer with no Italy at the World Cup mean for the country? My analysis on BBC World Service with Leila Nathoo.

The FIGC (Italian FA), by contrast, has been paralysed since 2017. They have chased short-term fixes while the foundation rotted. While Germany overhauled their entire youth system after the crisis of 2000, Italy has clung to the fluke of Euro 2021 as a shield against criticism. Only recently has the Federation unveiled a “new blueprint” for youth development, aiming to mirror the French and Dutch models, but it feels like trying to fix a dam with a band-aid after the flood has already arrived.

The irony is that Italy’s youth teams, from the U21s down to the U16s, continue to win. They compete with their European peers and often dominate. The bottleneck is Serie A.

Less than 30% of players in the top flight are Italian. The league has become a retirement home for fading stars or a second-choice destination for scouts. In a league so starved of domestic opportunity, players like Marco Palestra (excellent on Tuesday) struggle to find a path into the “Big Three” (Juventus, AC Milan and Inter).

The fallout from Zenica will be total. Heads will roll at the top of the FIGC. President Gabriele Gravina has asked Gennaro Gattuso to stay, and in fairness, the blame does not lie solely with the coach. Gattuso did what he could with limited materials. He wasn’t even granted a three-day training camp in February because Serie A clubs deemed the idea “impracticable.”

Gattuso, in tears before the cameras after full time, was forced to rely on the only thing Italian players know: the 3-5-2. It is the mantra of the peninsula, a risk-averse, low-block system. Even if he had called up the exiled talents like Nicolò Zaniolo or Federico Bernardeschi, it’s doubtful he could have integrated them.

The Azzurri played for the counter-attack, forgetting that Italy no longer produces the world-class defenders required to sustain it.

Now, all that remains is nostalgia. Italians have a few months to decide who to support this summer: perhaps Vincenzo Montella’s Turkey or Fabio Cannavaro’s Uzbekistan?

Or more wisely, they’ll just turn the television off.

Hello darkness, my old friend
I've come to talk with you again
Because a vision softly creeping
Left its seeds while I was sleeping
And the vision that was planted in my brain
Still remains
Within the sound of silence

Simon & Garfunkel - The Sound of Silence

When the result was confirmed, fists were pumped. The consensus was clear: a trip to Zenica is a far more welcome prospect than a showdown in Cardiff.

On paper, the logic holds. Bosnia sits 66th in the FIFA rankings—closer in profile to the Northern Irish side Italy just dispatched than to 35th-ranked Wales. They play in the intimate, 15,000-capacity Bilino Polje, a far cry from the intimidating cauldron of the Cardiff City Stadium. Furthermore, the Balkan nation hasn’t reached a major tournament since 2014. Yet, these images of celebration in Bergamo risk coming back to haunt Italy. If they fail to qualify for a third consecutive World Cup, “be careful what you wish for” will be the motto of their campaign.

Despite the 2-0 scoreline momentarily “popping the cork” on the tension surrounding Gennaro Gattuso’s camp, Thursday’s performance was largely insufficient. For much of the first half, Italy was ponderous, unable to find the final ball against a disciplined Northern Irish block, that was missing its two best defenders, Conor Bradley and Dan Ballard.

Tactically, the Azzurri looked lopsided. The play was funneled almost exclusively down the right, leaving Dimarco—statistically Italy’s most dangerous asset with 15 goals and 7 assists for Inter this season—ignored on the left flank. When Italy did try to progress, the solution was often a speculative long ball for Moise Kean or Mateo Retegui, who found themselves swallowed up by the three central-defenders.

The Bergamo stadium, picked by Gattuso for its resilience, showed remarkable patience. The crowd held back the whistles even as the travelling Green and White Army grew more raucous by the minute.

The deadlock finally broke when Italy injected some much-needed tempo into the second half. Sandro Tonali, proving why he is a Premier League top player, was the catalyst. He struck a sweet half-volley from the edge of the box—a classic “second ball” recycled after an aerial duel from the tireless, if unpolished, Retegui.

The goal acted as an exorcism, partially banishing the ghosts of the North Macedonia disaster four years ago. When Northern Ireland boss Michael O’Neill rolled the dice with a double attacking substitution, Italy killed the game. Moise Kean’s finish (assisted again by Tonali) provided a rare moment of joy for a striker enduring a tough season.

Kean’s form is a paradox: at Fiorentina, he is a symbol of wastefulness, trailing his Expected Goals (xG) by a big seven-goal margin. For the Azzurri, however, he is a guaranteed return, boasting 12 goals in just 25 caps. He remains a godsend in these dark times for Italian goalscorers.

The late cameo of 20-year-old Inter starlet Pio Esposito offered another glimmer of hope. Esposito showed more technical composure in twenty minutes than Retegui managed in seventy, linking play with a maturity that begs the question: will Gattuso start him in Zenica?

It seems unlikely. Gattuso has built this squad on the concept of the “inner circle,” excluding in-form players like Nicolò Zaniolo and Federico Bernardeschi in favor of a core he trusts implicitly. Pio, at the moment, is well behind in the pecking order.

The coach is under no illusions about his own standing; his managerial career has been a rollercoaster, and a defeat next Tuesday would likely make him “untouchable” for top-tier Italian clubs for a long time.

“I haven’t slept in days. I wake up at 4:30 AM like a bat,” Gattuso admitted pre-match.

The Italian media has only fueled this fire, framing the playoffs as a “generational appointment”—a chance to give an entire cohort of Italian teenagers their first memory of a World Cup. Corriere dello Sport even went as far as using an AI-generated cover of children pleading “Do it for us.”

The message has certainly reached the stands. In Bergamo, a banner read: “Give us our first World Cup.” At this point, the Italian public isn’t even dreaming of winning it. They just want to be there. But as the Azzurri prepares for the game in Bosnia, they would do well to remember: the pressure hasn’t disappeared. It’s just moved house.

Twenty-eight players have been summoned to make history—or rather, to avoid being unceremoniously erased from the annals of modern elite football. Gennaro Gattuso, the Italian national team coach, has officially released its squad for next week’s World Cup play-offs. To call the selections uninspiring would be an understatement, but expectations were already on the floor for a side slumped at 13th in the FIFA rankings—their lowest ebb since 2019—following a humbling 7-1 aggregate defeat by Norway in qualifying.

Italy has not won a knockout match at a World Cup since the day they lifted the trophy on 9 July 2006. It is a sobering statistic which means at least two generations of Italians have never experienced the life-defining collective tension of a win-or-go-home match in the world’s greatest tournament. Meanwhile, Italian sport elsewhere has flourished: a world number one in tennis, Olympic gold in the 100m, a record winter medal haul, and a Formula 1 Grand Prix winner. Even the national cricket and baseball teams have impressed on the world stage. Everything, it seems, except the football.

“This is who we are” has become the weary mantra of late, reinforced by the dismal showing of Italian clubs in European competition this season. Young domestic talent is a rare sight in Serie A, and head coach Gattuso has opted for grit over imagination, sticking with the core group that dragged the Azzurri to the play-offs.

The squad list offers a clear blueprint for the tactical approach awaiting Northern Ireland in the semi-final in Bergamo, and a potential final away to either Wales or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Italy will almost certainly deploy the 3-5-2 system currently dominating Serie A, where 13 out of 20 clubs utilise such formation.

However, the sheer volume of defenders is striking. Seven centre-backs have been called-up, including Diego Coppola—currently on loan at Paris FC from Brighton—and Federico Gatti, who remains a dependable, charismatic figure for Juventus despite his last international appearance coming a year ago. When you factor in four goalkeepers and defensive-minded midfielders like Bryan Cristante and Manuel Locatelli, the number of players whose primary job is not scoring goals is wildly disproportionate.

But this is the reality of modern Italian football; the traditional ‘Number 10’ has long been an endangered species. There were whispers that Gattuso might turn to Bologna’s Federico Bernardeschi, who has found a second wind after three years in MLS, or Udinese’s revitalised Nicolò Zaniolo. Even Lorenzo Insigne, now back in Italy with Serie B side Pescara after his American adventure, was mentioned.

Ultimately, Gattuso has played it safe. He would likely have called upon Marco Verratti, currently playing in Qatar, but injury has ruled out the veteran.

Much has been made of the lack of “rhythm” in the Italian game compared to the Premier League, which makes Gattuso’s decision to snub some of his English-based contingent all the more curious. The likes of Michael Kayode (Brentford) and Willy Gnonto (Leeds) might have offered the energy and freshness required for a clash against British opposition. Both feature regularly in the top flight, unlike Federico Chiesa, who received a surprise recall despite playing just 10% of available minutes for Liverpool in the league this season.

With Sandro Tonali’s injury at Newcastle leaving fans anxious, the projected back three of Alessandro Bastoni, Alessandro Buongiorno, and Riccardo Calafiori appears talented but perhaps lacking a seasoned leader. Elsewhere, Inter’s Nicolo Barella and Davide Frattesi are struggling for form. To put it bluntly, the line-up looks like goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma plus ten others.

The contrast with European rivals is bruising. France boasts an embarrassment of riches including Kylian Mbappe, Michael Olise, and Ousmane Dembele. Even Bradley Barcola, fresh from a Champions League brace against Chelsea, cannot find a place in their squad.

Italy’s hopes instead rest on the shoulders of Pio Esposito, the robust 20-year-old Inter forward who has three goals in five caps. Given his physical profile, he will rely heavily on service—most likely from club teammate Federico Dimarco. The Serie A MVP has racked up 14 assists this season and remains Gattuso’s most potent weapon, though one the opposition will surely have highlighted in red.

With impeccable timing, the Italian FA (FIGC) this week unveiled a new blueprint for youth development, aiming to bridge the gap through better federal coordination.

“We want to emphasise the technical aspect,” said Maurizio Viscidi, the long-standing technical director for youth football. “We are noticing that in Italy we are perhaps over-complicating things with tactics and the obsession with results.”

Italy is attempting to mirror the models of France and the Netherlands in hopes of producing the next Roberto Baggio or Francesco Totti—players who have been absent from the Azzurri ranks for far too long. It is a necessary step, albeit one taken with a guilty sense of being late to the party.

For now, the focus is Northern Ireland, followed by a daunting trip to either Cardiff or Zenica. Italy is playing to avoid the abyss; they fighting to stay relevant.

First, an Atalanta equaliser tainted by a slight nudge on Denzel Dumfries; then, a clear penalty claim for the Nerazzurri after a blatant kick from Giorgio Scalvini on Davide Frattesi. Both incidents were met with lengthy “silent checks” from the VAR, which ultimately upheld referee Gianluca Manganiello’s on-field decisions without ever sending him to the monitor.

Inter were left incensed and in silenzio stampa (media silence). The title race appeared wide open—until it wasn’t, following Milan’s slip-up at Lazio just 24 hours later. Yet, the atmosphere is now as poisoned as ever.

Enter the alternative table (see below, source: Telelombardia), based on “errors admitted by the Italian Referees Association (AIA).”

The association confirmed just hours later that the failure to award Inter the last-minute penalty was indeed a mistake. In its own arbitrary way, this table confirms a common sentiment among those not blinded by fandom: over the course of a 38-game marathon, refereeing errors tend to balance themselves out.

Take Inter, for instance. Today they feel like victims, yet their ledger includes the favourable dismissal of Juventus’ Pierre Kalulu—a match the league leaders might well have lost at 11v11. Conversely, they missed out on a penalty for Pietro Comuzzo’s foul on Pio Esposito (in a match that still ended 3-0 for Inter) and last week’s unpunished handball by Samuele Ricci in the derby. It is worth noting that even last-minute penalties still have to be converted.

To those who claim “the system” or the “powers that be” carry out these compensations scientifically, one should point out how difficult it is for officials and VAR operators to make decisions in a timeframe that feels infinite to the viewer but is, in reality, incredibly tight.

The VAR has not eliminated human error; it has simply moved it to a different level. To its credit, the Referees’ Association has been remarkably transparent, admitting to blunders and even facilitating the broadcast of official VAR dialogues on the Monday night show Open VAR. Yet, it is the 'grey areas'—where errors are not deemed 'clear and obvious'—and the ongoing misunderstandings of the protocol that continue to provoke upheaval.

In Italy, the grievance is that referees whistle too frequently, which then penalises teams in European competition. One can only hope that the 2026 World Cup and the introduction of a new VAR protocol—including checks for corner-kick deflections and second bookings—will finally lead to a consistent officiating line.

As mentioned, AC Milan failed to close the gap on Inter to five points, losing 1-0 to Lazio in Rome—mirroring their Coppa Italia exit last December. The Rossoneri’s approach on Sunday was uncharacteristic; for once, they didn’t wait for their opponent as they had in the derby, but instead utilised a high press from the start, almost like a desperate “Hail Mary.” Lazio, decimated by injuries, realised they needed a high-tempo start, attacking space with decisive sprints, knowing that once energy levels dipped in the second half, Milan’s ball retention would take over.

It was a stoic performance from Maurizio Sarri’s side—complete with his trademark dismissal for dissent—featuring an unplayable Gustav Isaksen and Mario Gila acting as a defensive bulwark. Beyond the perennial striker problem (Massimiliano Allegri chose to bench his only two options, Christopher Nkunku and Niclas Füllkrug), Milan missed Adrien Rabiot. For the Rossoneri, the Frenchman remains the difference between night and day: they average 1.50 points in the 10 games he has missed, compared to 2.50 when he is on the pitch.

Inter now need 20 points from 9 games to stitch the 21st Scudetto onto their shirts. Five wins and four draws would all but guarantee them the title, provided Allegri’s side wins every remaining fixture—and big matches like Napoli-Milan and Milan-Juventus still loom. However, further twists cannot be ruled out. Last season, Inter managed only 17 points in their final nine games; though they were deep in the Champions League and Coppa Italia at the time, and were ultimately pipped to the post by Napoli

Now, the Nerazzurri seem to be flagging; since Lautaro’s injury, they have scored just five goals in four league games, four of which came from set-pieces. But the captain returns this Sunday at the Franchi against Fiorentina, and Inter’s only remaining distraction is the semi-final return leg against Como.

While AC Milan’s Allegri has always prioritised a top-four finish, the real regrets lie with Napoli. Built to retain the title, they struggled with the dual burden of domestic and European football, exacerbated by excessive injuries. Antonio Conte will have to ask himself some tough questions. Yet, with the return of Zambo Anguissa and Kevin De Bruyne, the Partenopei could finish the season strongly.

Regardless of the outcome, Inter are set to receive an award this year: the relatively obscure “Rosa Camuna,” established by the Lombardy Region in 1996 to recognise “commitment, creativity, and ingenuity” in the region’s development.

Last month, Alessandro Bastoni was at the centre of the season’s most glaring refereeing blunder: his simulation led to Kalulu’s red card in the Derby d’Italia. The defender’s celebration at his opponent’s second yellow drew the ire of Juventus fans and neutrals alike. Since that day, Bastoni has been booed at every away ground. While such behaviour is crude, fans would eventually have grown tired of it. Instead, two local politicians have nominated the Inter defender for this “coveted” prize.

The citation reads: “He distinguished himself through the maturity shown in publicly recognising his error and taking responsibility for his actions on the pitch. This is a rare attitude that testifies to a respect for the game, opponents, and fans.” While it is a “brilliant” PR move for the politicians involved, it is likely a nightmare for Bastoni, who surely would have preferred to avoid further time as the scapegoat.

Cesc Fàbregas, the Como manager, seems equally destined for the pillory. He is clearly not winning any popularity contests among his colleagues or the establishment. On Sunday, he clashed with Roma’s Gian Piero Gasperini, who reportedly refused to shake his hand after Como’s 2-1 win. Predictably, that match also featured a refereeing error—the dismissal of Roma’s full-back Wesley—though not one publicly admitted by the AIA. Cesc is young and has had some ill-advised outbursts this year, famously reminding Italians that in Serie A, only the result matters, not the “how.”

Yet, Como often outplays their opponents, and their young Spanish coach offers intriguing tactical solutions—sometimes bordering on arrogance. Against Roma, he opted for a striker-less formation, tasking one of his three centre-backs, Jacobo Ramón, with occupying the penalty area during the attacking phase to deny the Giallorossi defence a reference point. The gamble only half-worked; Ramón, perhaps due to a lack of familiarity with the role, missed two sitters in the first half. Como eventually scored when the actual striker, Anastasios Douvikas, came off the bench.

Italy, however, is no country for football mavericks. Rather than praising Fàbregas, the narrative consistently pits him against the more established, veteran pragmatists who 'get the job done.'

It has devolved into a guerra di religione—a holy war between the risultatisti (those who prioritise the result) and the giochisti (those who prioritise the play)—ideological labels that, now more than ever, have been stripped of all meaning

Como—a “small club” only in geography, given their substantial budget—deserves more credit. We will likely miss Cesc next season; it’s hard to imagine him staying in Serie A when he knows that in England or Barcelona, he would be far more appreciated.

As witnessed in previous seasons, the Bundesliga remains the perennial outlier with an average of 3.19 goals per game. The Premier League and French Ligue 1 are cruising at 2.77, with La Liga trailing slightly at 2.66. Before this weekend, only one player in Serie A—Inter’s Lautaro Martínez—had reached double digits (14). The Argentine is currently sidelined with an injury, meaning he won’t be adding to his tally this Saturday. Behind him sit six players on nine goals, while the top-ranked Italians, Gianluca Scamacca and Moise Kean, are stalled at eight apiece. The comparison with the rest of Europe is merciless: the Premier League already boasts eight scorers in double figures, La Liga and the Bundesliga have ten, and France has six.

Is Serie A simply lacking clinical finishers? The data suggests it isn’t merely a question of quality in front of goal. First and foremost, Serie A teams are taking fewer shots (see below, source: La Gazzetta dello Sport).

Less than one in three attempts finds the target—another negative record among the top five leagues. This “minus 3%” gap compared to the Bundesliga may seem small, but on a macro scale, it makes all the difference.

Is it a case of Italian defenses being better prepared than their European counterparts? Not anymore. Until the mid-2000s, Serie A was the “University of Defending” for strikers; they came here to test themselves against the best center-backs and goalkeepers in the world. Today, those icons are also in short supply, a fact reflected in the goals Italian clubs concede in Europe. This season, the four Italian Champions League representatives (Atalanta, Inter, Juve, and Napoli) have played a combined 39 matches, conceding 63 goals—an average of 1.61 per game. Despite recent English defeats this week, their average remains much tighter at 1.14.

The problem, beyond a lack of tempo (Serie A remains one of the slowest leagues in Europe), is tactical.

The vast majority of Serie A sides employ a 3-5-2, often “mirroring” their opponents. This leads to low defensive blocks where the space to accelerate or thread a pass behind the backline vanishes. In this system, the burden of creating numerical superiority and scoring chances falls to the wide midfielders—once called wingers, but now rebranded with the neologism “quinti” (wing-backs). It is a tactically hybrid role, often filled by former full-backs or strikers who lack a clinical touch but possess massive engines. They are asked to perform the grueling task of covering both phases of play. In the best-case scenarios—take Inter’s Federico Dimarco, who already has 15 assists—the “quinti” provide inviting crosses.

However, by attacking primarily from the flanks, many Italian teams lose the ability to create chances in the “danger zone”: the classic imbucata, the through-ball that puts a striker one-on-one with the keeper. When games are deadlocked—as seen in Inter’s return leg against Bodø/Glimt—Serie A teams resort to systematic crossing. In that match, the Nerazzurri produced a staggering 46 crosses, a literal godsend for the Norwegian defenders.

An analysis of Expected Goals (xG) reveals that while Italy lacks finishers (having lost Victor Osimhen and last year’s top scorer Mateo Retegui recently), the real void is in the “creators”—the Number 10s and fantasisti who once flourished here.

The only two players in Serie A to crack the top ten for Expected Assists (xA)—a metric evaluating creativity by assigning a probability value to every pass—who play as true playmakers are Atalanta’s Charles De Ketelaere (3 assists from 6.5 xA, meaning his teammates wasted at least three clear-cut chances) and Juventus’ Kenan Yıldız (6.2 xA, resulting in 5 actual assists).

The rest are mostly wing-backs who pad their stats with set-pieces, a couple of central midfielders, and Luka Modrić, who plays almost as a “quarterback” for Milan—hardly the epicenter of the Rossoneri attack (see below, source: FotMob).

The contrast with the Premier League is stark: offensive players like Bruno Fernandes (8.5 xA), Rayan Cherki (6.5 xA), Bukayo Saka (5.7 xA), and Pedro Neto (5.6 xA) boast significantly higher values. Certainly, more goals are scored in England, but talented players are given more room to breathe and create, free from tactical cages. The story is the same in La Liga, where the xA charts are dominated by world-class talents like Lamine Yamal and Kylian Mbappé, alongside Arda Güler, Julián Álvarez, and Raphinha. While Italian clubs may no longer afford such players, the ones they do have should at least be allowed to express themselves.

Faced with this drought of goals and creators, Italy coach Gennaro Gattuso is weighing complicated choices ahead of the World Cup playoffs. Among the latest names being discussed is Federico Bernardeschi, who returned to Italy this season after three years in Canada with Toronto FC. On Thursday, Bernardeschi—one of the 2021 European Champions—scored his sixth goal of the season for Bologna in the Europa League against Roma. He is arguably playing with a flair not seen since his days as the enfant prodige at Fiorentina. Born a Number 10, he evolved by necessity into a winger and then a wing-back; currently, given the inconsistent form of Matteo Politano and Riccardo Orsolini, Bernardeschi represents the best Italy has to offer on the right flank. Yet, he hasn’t played for the Azzurri since 2022.

The same applies to Lorenzo Insigne. He, too, is back from a three-year Canadian stint, returning in January—albeit in Serie B—to attempt the “mission impossible” of saving Pescara, the club that launched him into professional football fifteen years ago. And it is not outside the realm of possibility that “Lorenzo Il Magnifico” might succeed with his trademark tiraggiro (the curled shot from the edge of the box).

“I talk to Gattuso every day,” Insigne recently told La Gazzetta. While romantic and fascinating, recalling a 34-year-old Insigne alongside a 32-year-old Bernardeschi would be a move born of desperation.

But despite the rhetoric that Italian football must promote courage and youth, Gattuso needs experience in this delicate moment. The Azzurri must face Northern Ireland on March 26th with humility; better not to think about a potential play-off final in Bosnia or Wales for now.

Northern Ireland’s manager, Michael O’Neill, has been moonlighting since mid-February as the manager of Blackburn Rovers, trying to save them from relegation in the English Championship. Most of his squad plays in the English second or third tiers. Just like Insigne. It is a sad truth, but to beat the 69th-ranked team in the world (North Macedonia, who eliminated Italy in 2021, are 66th), the Azzurri might have to climb down from their pedestal and meet their opponents on their level.

Until Pervis Estupiñán, nicknamed “La Bala” (The Bullet), last night launched himself like a projectile behind a (still) drifting Luiz Henrique to coolly slot past Yann Sommer. And so, the South American full-back—who until Sunday had been a semi-mysterious figure (much like his choice to wear the number 2 shirt while patrolling the left flank) since arriving from Brighton last summer—writes his name into the long list of “nobodies” (or Carneadi, to borrow a term from Milan’s most illustrious writer, Alessandro Manzoni) who found glory in the Derby della Madonnina: from Massimo Paganin to Gianni Comandini, Federico Giunti, Joel Obi, and Ezequiel Schelotto, to name but a few.

Only 68 seconds earlier, the AC Milan defense had parted like the Red Sea before Moses for Henrikh Mkhitaryan—who is nearly the biblical prophet’s contemporary—only for the Armenian to fire straight at Mike Maignan. It was the best chance of a first half that had been intense but deadlocked, defying the expectations of those who believed the Rossoneri would start at full throttle, giving their all in a match that could reignite their Scudetto ambitions. Instead, Massimiliano Allegri, the ultimate “situationist”, did what he has done best for years: he waited. He let his opponents vent their fury and struck them exactly when, as so often happens, the red warning light of imminent danger failed to flicker. It happened in the first derby of the season—the Nerazzurri’s last league defeat before Sunday—and it happened like clockwork again last night. The rest was a slog toward the 95th minute; Daniele Adani, the former player turned firebrand pundit, described it as a “revolting derby.”

It wasn’t quite the “derby-cide” (derbycidio) of 1977—so dubbed by the legendary journalist Beppe Viola, who famously chose to broadcast highlights of an old 1963 derby on La Domenica Sportiva rather than show that Sunday’s drab 0-0—but it wasn’t far off.

In the end, as is usually the case, the post-match chatter centered more on Samuele Ricci’s alleged handball in the box and referee Daniele Doveri’s failure to consult VAR. While this infuriated the Inter camp, manager Christian Chivu remained silent. The Romanian sidestepped the incident, perhaps realizing that painting his players as victims after such a poor performance—especially after Inter benefited from a refereeing error against Juventus two weeks ago—would be a mistake. If the derby was lackluster, the blame lies primarily with the Serie A leaders: too soft when they should have found the knockout blow, predictable, and imprecise. The only alibi afforded the Nerazzurri was the absence of their starting strikers, Lautaro Martínez and Marcus Thuram. They were replaced by two youngsters, Francesco Pio Esposito and Ange-Yoan Bonny, who boast a combined age only two years greater than Luka Modrić and had never started together in the league. It showed.

Beyond that, the common thread linking this Inter defeat to last month’s Champions League collapse against Bodø/Glimt is a creeping fatigue and an inability to change gears or find a spark in moments of crisis. But for this, Chivu bears no blame. For two consecutive winter transfer windows, the club opted not to reinforce a squad that clearly lacks at least two profiles: a trequartista capable of beating his man to create an overload (the Ademola Lookman deal having collapsed in the summer) and an enforcer in the middle of the park—a true “mediano” or holding midfielder.

After yet another failed big-match test, Inter—who across six games against Napoli, AC Milan, and Juve have only managed a largely undeserved win over the Bianconeri in February—is bordering on being labeled the “worst Italian champions ever.” But every win is worth three points, and a side that followed their first derby loss with 14 wins and a draw (against Antonio Conte’s team) is more than capable of mounting another streak. Regardless, this summer must bring a revolution; Inter needs to de-age and renew the squad. But first, there is a Scudetto to win, and the path, at least on paper, looks increasingly uphill from here.

AC Milan, who now sit closer to the league leaders than they do to fifth place, can allow themselves to dream of the title—but with a certain lightness. After 28 games, the Rossoneri have 60 points, the same tally as last season’s champion Napoli at this stage; they have little to reproach themselves for. If anything has been missing, and will be until the end of the season, it’s the goals of a true poacher—those ugly, predatory goals that Rafael Leão, repurposed as a center-forward, can rarely guarantee. Elsewhere, playing only once a week, even Modrić and Adrien Rabiot have plenty of fuel left in the tank, still making the difference in a Serie A played at such a low tempo.

Title race reopened? “Calma,” to use Allegri’s favorite expression. Inter will have learned from last year’s stinging disappointment, where a hunt for the Treble ended with a handful of dust. Furthermore, they have no European distractions now. Unless the fuel light suddenly flashes red, a seven-point lead is more than reassuring.

History dictates that no one has ever lost a title after being 10 points clear in late February, as Inter were just a week ago. But, as the derby teaches us, there’s a first time for everything.

In reality, Boniperti was merely quoting Henry Russell “Red” Sanders, the UCLA American football coach, in 1950. The line was later popularized by NFL legend Vince Lombardi during his tenure with the Green Bay Packers.

It’s hard to argue with the sentiment. In football—as in most team sports outside of the Olympic podium—there is no silver medal. Finishing second is simply losing. Defeats suffered “with heads held high” are usually met with more derision from rival fans than recognition of sporting merit.

But the world of football is not an ecumenical community. There have always been those who choose a different path to reach the destination. The latest example in Serie A is Cesc Fàbregas. As a product of the Catalan school, forged by Arsène Wenger at Arsenal and a pillar of Spain’s era of tiki-taka and grueling possession, Fàbregas is a man for whom result and aesthetic are inseparable.

He is a “giochista” (an “idealist”), to use a trendy Italian neologism, set in opposition to the “risultatista” (the “pragmatists”)—the disciples of the school of Giovanni Trapattoni, José Mourinho, Antonio Conte, and Massimiliano Allegri. But labels are often reductive and risk obscuring the substance of the facts.

Fàbregas’ Como is undoubtedly one of the most visually pleasing teams of the season. He utilizes innovative training methods and has already built a distinct “brand.” They may be a “provincial” side, but they boast a budget that would make the league’s giants blush. This year alone, their net transfer spend sits at a deficit of €110.51 million. Since the project funded by the Hartono brothers—Robert Budi and Michael Bambang, among the 100 richest men in the world—took shape five years ago, Como has run a market deficit of €223.81 million. This is the third-highest in Italy, trailing only AC Milan and Juventus. Beauty, it seems, has a price.

Como is, therefore, anything but a “small” club. And they play like a big one, battling with the fourth-youngest squad in Serie A (averaging 25.6 years) to qualify for the Champions League for the first time. One would expect nothing but praise, yet many are still turning up their noses.

Perhaps what some find hard to swallow is that there are virtually no Italians in the squad (Edoardo Goldaniga has made only two appearances).

“Between a young Italian and a young Spaniard, I always try to take the Italian, but you don’t have any!” Fàbregas explained this year, poking a finger into the wound of Italian football’s greatest ailment: a lack of patience.

“In Italy, if you play a youngster and he doesn’t convince immediately, you drop him. If I bet on a young player, he plays at least seven or eight games so I have a way to actually judge him.”

But the real storm was triggered by results. In mid-January, Como lost 3-1 at home to Allegri’s AC Milan in a match they largely dominated. They recorded nearly 2 xG (Expected Goals) against Milan’s little more than 1; 18 total shots against 7. Yet, the Rossoneri took the three points. Cornered by pundits in the post-match interviews, Cesc lost a bit of his cool.

“We made 700 passes against 200, I don’t know what to say,” the Catalan began. “1-3, 1-3, 1-3. The result was 1-3. Risultatismo—which you love so much here.”

Cue the uproar. The debate over whether it is better to win or play well was reignited, and Cesc was scolded for trying to “lecture” Italians on his philosophy. It’s the same treatment once reserved for Roberto De Zerbi, and before him, Zdeněk Zeman. They were labeled “beautiful but losers,” conveniently forgetting they never managed squads capable of truly competing for the title.

Fàbregas certainly made amends. In the following weeks, he tweaked Como’s tactical setup. In the return fixture at San Siro against AC Milan, he mirrored the Rossoneri with a five-man defense, looking to play on the counter. The result: 1-1.

But what really grabbed the headlines was the incident with Allegri.

With about ten minutes left on the clock, Fàbregas tugged on Alexis Saelemaekers’ shirt to prevent him from dropping back into a defensive position. As a result, Allegri was shown a red card for—rightfully—defending his player.

The Spaniard apologised afterward, but the manager from Livorno wasn’t having it. As he was storming out of the press room, he shouted back at him: “You’re a child, you’re a prick—you’re just a child who’s barely started coaching!”

A few weeks later against Juventus, Como actually surrendered possession to the Bianconeri and attacked in transition, winning 2-0—their first away victory against the Turin club since 1951.

Yet even this display of flexibility and tactical acumen wasn’t enough to sway the critics of the “foreign” manager.

Last Tuesday, following a frankly soporific first-leg semi-final between Como and Inter, Cesc was asked if he had regrets about not going beyond a 0-0 draw at home. Yet, if there was one team trying to win the game, it was Como, while the Nerazzurri conserved energy for Sunday’s derby.

“Vindication through results? No, that’s for losers,” Fàbregas snapped.

“Regrets? I’d like to know how many times in recent years Inter has produced 0.07 xG.” The answer: the last time was two years ago.

Then came the controversy—a sterile one, admittedly—regarding the league schedule, as he highlighted the discrepancy in recovery time between Como and Inter. “Now we need to rest well because they’ve put our game on Saturday at 3 PM again, while Inter plays on Sunday,” the Spanish coach noted. This drew further criticism from those reminding him that TV rights decide the schedule in Italy—as if Fàbregas, with nearly 900 top-level appearances as a player, didn’t already know.

Serie A may not be the most spectacular league in Europe, nor the most intense. It is, however, certainly the most exhausting for managers. There is no unified metric for judgment, except for the result itself.

Well, they’ll stone you when you’re tryin’ to be so good
They’ll stone you just like they said they would
They’ll stone you when you’re tryin’ to go home
Then they’ll stone you when you’re there all alone.

So sang Bob Dylan in Rainy Day Women ♯12 & 35 back in the ‘60s, calling out social envy and conformism. He argued that no matter what you do—beautiful or ugly, good or bad—you will always be criticised.

Cesc—who turned down Inter’s advances last summer, fully aware that in Milan he would have been chewed up by the "victory-at-all-costs" meat grinder—has now realised that even Italy’s footballing provinces are not immune to this logic. And so, this summer, he will likely pack his bags to be welcomed with open arms by another league—the Premier League or La Liga (he would be perfect for Barcelona)—where results and aesthetics are finally allowed to walk hand in hand.