CONTROVERSY IX: Whether Christ is the Mediator between GOD and men, according to both natures?

SECTION I: On the State of the Controversy

§ 1. This controversy is agitated between Us and the Papists. They contend that Christ is Mediator only according to his human nature: but on the contrary, our people teach that Christ is Mediator according to both his divine and human nature. But in order that the state of the controversy may be rightly formed, it must be noted 1. that someone is called a Mediator either properly or improperly. He is a Mediator properly who unites men with God, by satisfying His justice, and by reconciling men to Him: improperly, he who in any way intervenes between God and men, who is a messenger, so that however he does not satisfy God, nor by satisfying reconcile men, in which manner Moses was a Mediator between God and the Israelite people, for he did not reconcile the people to God, nor did he satisfy for them, but he acted with the people in the name of God, he was a messenger: so even now the Ministers of the Church can be called Mediators between God and men improperly, because they are Legates of God, and they cooperate toward the union of men with God ministerially. In this place, Mediator is taken properly, and the question is, whether Christ according to both natures is a Mediator between God and men properly, so that he has satisfied divine justice, and has reconciled men to God.

§ 2. Then, just as he is called a Mediator, who between those who are at variance is a middle p. 677 mediates, that he may join them: thus this mediation is one thing substantial, another accidental. It is called substantial, when the person himself mediates between those at variance, so that he can be referred absolutely to neither party; in this manner Christ is called Mediator, insofar as the person of Christ mediates between the divine and human nature, that is, between God and men, who is referred absolutely and exclusively to neither party, for he is not only God, but God and man, nor only man, but man and God at the same time. Mediation is called accidental, when someone exercises the operations which are required for the union of the parties at variance, and thus Christ is Mediator, insofar as he exercises or has exercised those operations which are necessary for reconciling sinful men to God; of which kind are, for example, to carry back and forth pacts and conditions, to intercede and by intercession to move the other party to remit the offense, to pay and satisfy for one party on behalf of the other: such is the mediation of Christ, when he proposed in the Gospel the will of God concerning our salvation and the means to obtain it, caused the word of the Gospel to be preached, and worked through it, similarly when he interceded for men, and by his intercession moved God, that he might be propitious to men, when he paid to God the Father a ransom (λύτρον), and satisfied for sinful men. In this place the question is concerning the Mediator, properly so called, primarily regarding accidental mediation, and the question is: whether Christ exercised the operations which were necessary for the union and reconciliation of men with God according to both, or indeed only according to his human nature.

§. 3. Furthermore, Bellarmine, book 5 on Christ, chapter 1: when he wishes to set forth the common opinion of the Papists in this controversy, he distinguishes between the principle ‘Quod’ [that which] of mediatorial works, which is that which performs, and the principle ‘Quo’ [that by which], by which it performs. Concerning the principle ‘Quod’, there is no question, for Bellarmine concedes that the principle ‘Quod’ is God and man, the God-man (θεάνθρωπον). Concerning the principle ‘Quo’, therefore, he says the question is, by which, namely, Christ performed those works; that is, mediatorial ones; whether he did that by both divine and human nature, or indeed by the human alone, for example, whether he interceded and satisfied for us according to both, or indeed only according to the human nature, which latter Bellarmine desires.

§ 4. Finally, a distinction must be made here between the attributes of human nature and the mediatorial works: concerning the attributes of human nature, such as to suffer, to die, there is no question here, for we concede that they belong per se and formally to the human nature of Christ according to his human nature, for according to his divine nature he could neither suffer nor die: the question therefore in this place is concerning the mediatorial works, for example, to have suffered for men, to have died for the human race, and in this manner to have made satisfaction for it; the question therefore is, whether Christ performed such mediatorial works according to both, or indeed only according to his human nature?

SECTION II: On the true Opinion

§ 1. Our opinion, and that a true one, is that Christ is the Mediator between God and men properly so called, and that he performed mediatorial works according to both, the divine and human nature, and not according to the human only.

§ 2. This opinion of ours is proved as follows. I. According to that nature by which Christ satisfied justice, expiated sins, and crushed the head of the serpent, according to that he is the Mediator between God and men. But he is so according to both. Therefore. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved, because for these works not only were suffering and death required, but also infinite value: therefore the suffering is from the human nature, the infinite value is from the divine nature.

§ 3. Argum. II. If human nature alone is the principle by which (principium Quo) in mediatorial works, and if satisfaction was performed according to it alone, it was not necessary for the Son of God to be incarnate. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is also. The consequence is proved, because God could have created a holy human nature with its own personality, and such a holy man could have performed the office of Mediator without a personal union with the divine nature, if human nature alone had been sufficient for the office of Mediator.

§ 4. Argum. III. Thus, because a personal union had to be made for the sake of the office of Mediator, it follows that not only the human, but also the divine nature concurs in the works of the mediatorial office, and therefore that Christ is the Mediator according to both natures. The antecedent is true. Therefore also the consequent. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved from the Epistle to the Hebrews 11, 14. 15. where it is said: As the children are partakers of flesh and blood, i.e., they have a human nature, so also Christ became a partaker of the same, namely of flesh and blood, i.e., he has a human nature; the reason is added why the Son of God assumed a human nature, namely that through death he might abolish him who had the power of death, i.e., the devil. But Christ is said to have abolished the devil not by reason of substance, but insofar as he overturned his kingdom, empire, and tyranny, which was done when by his death and passion he reconciled men to God, and brought back to eternal life, from which they had fallen, all who believe in him and declare their faith through good works, so that Satan might have no more power over them: this abolition of Satan and his tyranny and empire is the work of the mediatorial office, and for this very work Christ is said in this place to have assumed a human nature, which was the antecedent of the argument.

§ 5. IV. Argum. If in mediatorial works, besides the human nature, the divine person also operates, it follows that the divine nature cannot be excluded from such works. But, as Bellarmine admits, besides the human nature, the divine person also operates in mediatorial works. Therefore, the divine nature cannot be excluded from these works, and thus Christ the Mediator is such both according to his human and according to his divine nature. Bellarmine grants the antecedent. The consequence is clear, because the divine nature is not really distinguished from the divine person: If therefore the divine person concurs in the works of the Mediator, the divine nature also concurs in the same, and thus Christ is Mediator not only according to his human, but also according to his divine nature.

SECTION III: In which answer is made to the arguments of the Papists.

§ 1. Bellarmine, book 5, on Christ, chapter 3, following, for the opinion of the Papists- tific arguments brings forward, to prove that Christ is Mediator only according to his human nature. Argument I. is sought from I Tim. 2:5, “One Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.” Here, by the word “man,” Bellarmine, along with other Papists, says that the nature according to which Christ is Mediator is indicated, namely, the human.

Response 1. Granted that by the word “man” the nature according to which Christ is Mediator between God and men is indicated, namely, the human, yet nothing else follows than this, that Christ is Mediator according to his human nature; from this, however, it is not permitted to infer that he is Mediator according to his human nature alone, since a consequence from an absolute to an exclusive does not hold.

2. If, where Christ is denominated from his human nature, the human nature must necessarily be understood exclusively, or alone, it follows that when he is denominated from his divine nature, the divine nature must also be understood exclusively. Therefore, when in I John 3:8 it is said, “The Son of God appeared, that he might destroy the works of the devil,” from this it could be inferred that Christ performed this mediatorial work according to his divine nature alone, which is contrary to the Papists themselves.

3. The Apostle, therefore, denominated Christ here from the other, namely, the human nature, for the sake of consolation, and by the word “man” he refers us to the most sweet promise concerning the seed of the woman as the true man who would crush the head of the serpent (Gen. 3:15), yet he makes mention of no exclusion.

§ 2. Argument II. Bellarmine: A mediator must be a middle, i.e., distant from each dissenting party in some way. But Christ as God is not distant from God in any way. Therefore, according to his divine nature, he is not Mediator.

Resp. 1. Either Bellarmine speaks of a Mediator by reason of substantial mediation, or by reason of accidental mediation: if the former, that does nothing for the present, because here the question is not about a Mediator regarding substantial mediation, but regarding accidental mediation, and it is asked whether, for mediatorial works, the divine nature did not also concur and contribute something besides the human nature.

2. If it be understood even in the highest sense as Mediator by reason of substantial mediation, Christ is also such a Mediator, for he is distant from each dissenting party in his own way, from God, insofar as he is not only God, but also man is, by men, insofar as he is not a naked man, but at the same time God.

3 It suffices in this place for a Mediator, that he performed the works of the mediatorial office, of which kind are, intercession, satisfaction; to these indeed, as shown above, concurs not only the human, but also the divine nature, from which such works have virtue and infinite value.

§ 3. Argum. III. If Christ is Mediator also according to the divine nature, it follows that all three divine persons are Mediators. The consequent is absurd. Therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is proven, because all three persons have the divine nature.

Resp. The consequence is denied. It must be noted therefore, that the divine nature can be considered in two ways; (a) as it is common to the three persons, (b) as it is determined by the hypostasis of the λόγῳ [Word] or of the Son of God. The consequence is therefore limited in this manner: If Christ is Mediator also according to the divine nature, insofar as it is common to all divine persons, all persons will be Mediators; thus the antecedent is denied. For Christ is Mediator also according to the divine nature, insofar as it is determined by that hypostasis of the λόγῳ [Word], i.e., of the Son of God. 28

§ 4. Argum. IV. If Christ is our Mediator also regarding the divine nature, it follows that there is a confusion of operations, and consequently also of natures, which is not to be admitted.

Resp. The consequence is denied. This at least follows, that in the mediatorial work there is given a communication of idioms, so that each nature contributes something to the mediation, the human by suffering, by dying, the divine by adding infinite value to the passion and death, so that it is the passion and death of God or of the Son of God, which cannot but have infinite value.

QUESTION XVII: Whether the Oral Eating of the Body of Christ, Which the Lutherans Urge, Is a Capernaitic Eating?

What our theologians mean by the oral eating of the body of Christ, and by what arguments they prove and defend it from the divine word, we taught and demonstrated deliberately in the immediately preceding chapter, section 4, p. 452, from which also what is relevant here may be sought.

The arguments of the Calvinist adversaries, enumerated in Question 1 as the third Calvinist error, brought together in summary, are as follows:

I. That the flesh of Christ is spiritual food (John 6:55, 58), and therefore can be received only spiritually. II. That the body and blood of Christ are offered in the word of promise, and therefore can be received only by faith — since this is how divine promises are received. III. That there is absolutely no proportion between the body of Christ, endowed with true quantity, and our mouth; but there must be a proportion between what receives and what is received. IV. That man consists of body and soul: the former is served by bread and wine as food; but the body and blood of the Lord are destined to nourish the latter. V. That the same reasoning applies to the sacramental eating of Christ in the Supper as applies to union with him; but this union is spiritual. VI. That Christ himself rejects the oral eating of his body in John 6:63. VII. That we become participants in Christ through the Sacraments in no other way than through the Gospel; but this participation takes place not by the mouth but by faith. VIII. That whatever enters through the mouth goes into the stomach (Matt. 15:17) and does nothing for spiritual life. IX. That oral eating necessarily implies the tearing apart of the body of Christ by the teeth. X. That oral eating is useless.

These arguments are to be resolved with a succinct treatment.

I. The flesh of Christ is spiritual food (John 6:55, 58) — not because the body of Christ, now that Christ is glorified, is of a spiritual substance, consisting not of bones, flesh, and skin: for this opinion we openly refuted in the article on our Saviour Jesus Christ, chapter 1, section 16, q. 3, p. 374. Rather, the body of Christ is called spiritual food: partly because it is not common and natural food by which our bodies are nourished for this natural life; partly because the body of Christ is not an earthly and corrupt body but a glorious and spiritual body in its qualities (1 Cor. 15:46; Matt. 26:28); and partly, finally, because the mode of reception is not earthly and natural but supernatural and inexplicable. There is therefore an ambiguity in the word “spiritual.” For τὸ πνευματικόν (to pneumatikon — “the spiritual”)

(i) is used in its most general sense for anything that is not natural and physical and cannot be judged by the rules of Logic and Physics. In this sense our theologians do not reluctantly conclude that the sacramental eating of the body of Christ can be called spiritual. For the eating of the body of Christ is by no means a physical eating, but mystical and wholly singular, inexplicable in every respect.

(ii) “Spiritual” is said of what is done and accomplished by the spirit and faith alone; in which sense spiritual eating is that personal participation in the body of Christ and in the benefits acquired by the death of Christ, which takes place by faith — when, namely, believers are incorporated in spirit into their Savior Christ through faith and become his members. In this sense we deny that sacramental eating is spiritual eating — partly because sacramental eating is also accomplished through the organ of the mouth and not by faith alone, as we most efficaciously proved in the immediately preceding chapter, section 4, p. 452; and partly because the unworthy, who are entirely destitute of faith, eat the body of Christ sacramentally — as we showed in the chapter that precedes, section 4, and as is demonstrated more openly in the nineteenth question of this chapter, p. 479.

Although therefore we do not deny that there is a certain spiritual eating of the body of Christ, accomplished by faith alone, we nonetheless taught at length in the immediately preceding chapter, section 4, p. 452, that this is most distinctly different from the sacramental eating of the body of Christ — to which chapter I refer the reader.

II. The argument drawn from the divine promises is resolved in more than one way. For:

(i) the words “Take, eat: This is my body” are not words of promise but of command.

(ii) A promise is received both by the external ear and by faith.

(iii) Even granting that a promise is received by faith, the thing promised is not always received in the same way. This is clear from the example of the Apostles, who received the promise of obtaining the Holy Spirit by faith, but received the promised thing also with the body itself — for the Holy Spirit was seen in the Apostles in the manly form of fiery tongues (Acts 2:1 and following).

(iv) The thing promised ought to be received by the mode and means by which the one who promises commands. But Christ in the institution of the holy Supper commands that his body be received by eating, not by believing.

III. The proportion alleged between the body of Christ, truly endowed with quantity, and our mouth, is pressed perilously. For by that argument two conclusions of the utmost absurdity would follow. One is that all things recorded in the sacred writings about the Personal Union are false — namely, that between the human and divine nature of Christ there is absolutely no proportion. The other is that more credence should be given to human reason, which attacks the substantial eating of the body of Christ on the basis of physical principles and the natural properties of the human body, than to Christ, most truthful and omnipotent, who commands that together with the bread in the holy Supper we eat his very body. Against such sophistries therefore let these words of the Spirit of God be opposed: “With God no word is impossible” (Luke 1:37); “Abraham was fully persuaded that God was able to do what he had promised” (Rom. 4:21) — although it was contrary to nature and far exceeded the common order of nature (v. 19).

IV. The argument drawn from the claim that the flesh of Christ is nourishment for the soul alone is resolved in two ways:

(i) The best Fathers denied that the body and blood of the Lord in the holy Supper are nourishment for the soul alone — and among them Irenaeus, contending in book 5, chapter 4, p. 318, n. 3, that our bodies are restored by this food unto eternal life. And who, I ask, can doubt that the flesh of Christ, worthily received in this Sacrament, most intimately joins our members with Christ (John 6:56), and makes them weapons of righteousness for God (Rom. 6:12–13), and ultimately vindicates them from corruption (John 6:50–51)?

(ii) Even if the flesh and blood of Christ were food for the soul alone, nothing from this could be concluded against us. For the word of God is similarly food for the soul and immortal seed (1 Pet. 1:23), and yet it is received through the bodily organ of hearing (Rom. 10:17). By the same reasoning, the flesh and blood of Christ — although they are food by which we are nourished unto eternal life — are nevertheless received through the bodily organ, namely the mouth. For these are the words of the institution of Christ: “Take, eat: This is my body.”

V. Scripture speaks chiefly of a threefold union with God and Christ. The first is that general union by which we live and move and have our being in God (Acts 17:28). The second is spiritual in this present life, by which believers coalesce into one with God and Christ in spirit (John 17:20–21; Gal. 3:28). The third is likewise spiritual, but is attained only after this life, and is that by which God is all in all (1 Cor. 15:28). But the discourse is now about the middle union.

When therefore the Calvinists press: “Such is the sacramental eating of the body of Christ as is the union of Christ and those who participate in the flesh of Christ; but this union is spiritual” — we absolutely deny this statement. For the sacramental eating of the body of Christ and the spiritual union with Christ are so far from being inseparably connected that Paul expressly says that there are those found in this Sacrament who eat the body of the Lord unworthily and to judgment and damnation (1 Cor. 11:28–29).

VI. That the Capernaitic eating of the body of Christ, which is condemned in John 6:63, is far removed from the sacramental eating of the body of Christ, can be shown most clearly from the Johannine context. For the Capernaites wanted:

(i) the flesh of Christ to be the flesh of a mere man;

(ii) it to be eaten in the natural and common mode, in exactly the same way as other flesh is eaten;

(iii) it to be consumed in eating. How absurd these things are, and how different from sacramental eating, we clearly taught in the immediately preceding chapter, section 4.

VII. The reasoning governing participation in Christ through the Gospel and through the Sacrament of the Supper is not the same. For in the Gospel, the ordinary but external medium by which we participate in Christ is the external hearing of the word (Rom. 10:17). But in the Sacrament of the Supper, the external medium by which we participate in Christ is eating and drinking — according to the words of the institution of the Supper and the admonition of Paul in 1 Corinthians 10:16.

VIII. It is blasphemously to compare natural and common food, which is what Christ treats of in Matthew 15:17, with the life-giving flesh of the Son of God, which was given for the life of the world (John 6:56–57 and following; 1 John 1:8; Heb. 6:21; Acts 20:28).

IX. If the sacramental eating of the body of Christ were a physical eating, then it could truly be concluded that the body of Christ cannot be eaten without trituration by the teeth and other things proper to physical eating. But the flesh of CHRIST, which is the very flesh of GOD and is truly life-giving (John 6:56–57 and following), is eaten by us in the Sacrament not in a natural but in an inscrutable manner — as it is received in truth by the mouth itself. And let the adversaries say by what truth they can deny the true eating of the body of Christ, a true food (John 6:55), on the grounds that the mode of eating is unknown and does not conform to the accustomed laws of nature? By the same argument you would deny the generation of the Son of God, the Personal Union, the birth of CHRIST from a virgin, and innumerable other things, on the grounds that they deviate as far as possible from the ordinary law of nature.

X. The argument drawn from the alleged uselessness of oral eating, Luther solves both solidly and piously when he responds: “The command of Christ alone suffices, without any expressed mention of fruit and utility.” For who is so unjust toward Christ as to wish to say that he institutes something which is idle? What? If there is no other fruit of oral eating: this at least is most abundant: “You are my friends if you do whatever I command you” (John 15:14).

And let this suffice to have said about oral eating.

§1. Although it ought never to have been called into controversy that Jesus Christ died for the sins of each and every man of the entire world — since, if this is denied, the certainty of salvation cannot stand firm in the souls of men, especially in times of temptation — yet Satan strives to cut away and loosen from the human race this unshakeable anchor of salvation, so that it is necessary for us to defend and uphold this part of heavenly doctrine against his fiery darts.

§2. The question, therefore, is this: Did Jesus Christ die and make satisfaction for the sins of all, of each and every man, of the entire world?

§3. Some deny this; others draw distinctions in order to obscure and conceal, rather than remove, the denial. We affirm it simply, and in this disputation we will show that no man whatsoever — not even the reprobate — lacks a ransom [λύτρον] for his sins, but that it is harmful to the reprobate only because they do not lay hold of it by faith and apply it to themselves.

§4. To make this plain, we will show from the testimonies of Scripture that the death and satisfaction of Christ — and likewise the promises and warnings concerning the apprehension of it — first, extend as broadly as the universality of the entire human race extends; where we will draw all the parts from the whole. Second, reciprocally, that it pertains to the reprobate as much as to the elect; where we will establish the whole from all the parts.

§5. For in the elect and the reprobate, and in the universality of the entire human race, there is a reciprocal relation of the parts with the whole and the whole with the parts.

§6. And the first member of the former part — namely, that the death and satisfaction of Christ extends as broadly as the universality of the entire human race extends — is asserted throughout Scripture.

§7. In Romans 5, the holy Apostle draws a comparison between the sin introduced into the world through Adam and the righteousness restored through Christ, saying: “Just as through one trespass condemnation came upon all men, so also through one act of righteousness justification of life came upon all men.”

§8. Therefore, in whomsoever Adam’s trespass was unto condemnation, in the same the justification of Christ is unto justification of life. But Adam’s trespass was unto condemnation in all men — both reprobate and elect. Therefore all could also be justified by the force of Christ’s merit, were unbelievers not themselves standing in their own way by their unbelief.

§9. Otherwise the comparison made by the Apostle between the two members, in the same quality, would not hold.

§10. In which comparison, to all those to whom condemnation [κατάκριμα] is ascribed on account of Adam’s fall, to them likewise — in the manner just stated — justification [δικαίωσις] is said to have been procured by the satisfaction of Christ. §11. Indeed, the death and satisfaction of Christ not only equals but also surpasses the sins of all men.

§12. “For where sin increased, grace abounded all the more” (Romans 5). But this would not be so if more perished through Adam’s sin than were redeemed through Christ’s death.

§13. For, as the Apostle says in the same place, “just as through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one righteous man shall many be made righteous.”

§14. Here, however, we can interpret the word “many” only as meaning “all,” because the comparison would not hold if more were made sinners through Adam’s sin than righteous through Christ’s merit.

§15. For the word “many” sometimes signifies not some men but all men — who, on account of their vast multitude, are called “many” — and denotes not a part of the multitude but the whole multitude and universality, as in Daniel 12 and Matthew 26.

§16. Therefore, just as there is no man among all men who has not been made a sinner through Adam’s disobedience (Romans 5), so also, according to this comparison of the Apostle, there is no man among all men for whom righteousness has not been procured through Christ — even though not all apply it to themselves through faith.

§17. The power of Christ is greater than that of the Devil, whose force and power He broke and destroyed — not in part, but entirely — and whose universal arms He stripped away and divided as spoils (Luke 11; Hebrews 2); He led the principalities and powers stripped bare, triumphing openly over them (Colossians 2).

§18. But Christ would not have broken and abolished all the force and power of Satan if, having led away only a few from his kingdom, He had left the remainder of his dominion over all others untouched.

§19. And for as long as satisfaction has not been rendered by Christ on behalf of certain ones, for so long Satan’s power over them has not been shaken.

§20. Nor would He have received power over all flesh from the Father, as He himself testifies in John 17; nor could He proclaim the reconciliation of grace to each and every man, since He could not confer it upon all who had not yet been freed from Satan’s power by His satisfaction.

§21. But in fact He causes the Gospel to be proclaimed through His Apostles for the salvation of each and every man (Matthew 28; Mark 16).

§22. Furthermore, St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 extends the satisfaction of Christ to the whole universality of the human race, when he says: “Just as through Adam all die, so also through Christ shall all be made alive.”

§23. Hence in 1 Timothy 2: “Who desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave Himself as the price of redemption for all.”

§24. He commands that prayers, supplications, intercessions, and thanksgivings first of all be made for all men, because this is good and acceptable before God our Savior, who desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

§25. For those, therefore, whom the Apostle exhorts us to pray for — God desires them to be saved, and Christ gave Himself as a redemption for them. But he exhorts us to pray for all, even the reprobate; because nearly all who then sat at the helm of the world (for express mention is made of them here) were ignorant of Christ and opposed to Him (1 Corinthians 1). Therefore Christ also gave Himself as a redemption for them, and desires them to be saved.

§26. The Apostle’s conclusion, accordingly, is this: Because Christ gave Himself as a redemption for all and desires all to be saved, therefore prayer must be made for all. If this were not so, one would have to say: “Because Christ gave Himself as the price of redemption for some, therefore prayer must be made for all” — which, besides the fact that the conclusion would not correspond to its premise but a universal would be concluded from a particular, would also mean that, the cause being denied, the effect that follows from it alone would still remain — since salvation is in none other than Christ alone (Acts 4). That ransom [λύτρον] is the cause; to deny this produces a contradiction.

§27. Furthermore, so that no room for doubt might remain about the Apostle’s meaning that Christ made satisfaction for all, he says: “For there is one God, and one mediator between God and men.”

§28. Just as, therefore, there is one God of all men, to whom all must flee, from whom all must await help and assistance (Isaiah 45), so also there is one mediator of all, who recovered lost salvation for all, so that the God of all might show mercy — which, without full satisfaction, He could not do with His justice unimpaired.

§29. In Titus 2, St. Paul exhorts us all to deny ungodliness and worldly lusts and to live soberly, righteously, and godly in the present age, because “that saving grace of God has appeared to all men.”

§30. Therefore, just as that saving grace reproves all and invites them to an innocent life (as we will demonstrate plainly below), so also it has appeared to all.

§31. And for this reason Christ is called that true Light, “which enlightens every man coming into the world” (John 1), and “the light of the world” (chapter 8).

§32. And indeed, that Christ bore and expiated the iniquities of all men, the Holy Spirit shows quite plainly when He lays upon His neck the sins of the whole world and its reconciliation.

§33. John 1: “Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world.” 2 Corinthians 5: “God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself.”

§34. And lest we fabricate here some modified sense of “the whole” standing for a part (which usage is otherwise sometimes found with this word in other passages and matters), St. John meets us forcefully in his first epistle, chapter 2, with these words: “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for those of the whole world” — by which words he removed that modified sense of “world” meaning the whole standing for a part, and established and confirmed its proper meaning.

§35. So also, because Christ is called “the Savior of the world” in John 4 and 1 John 4 — lest anyone take this as referring only to the elect, supposing the whole to be put for a part — St. Paul accommodates that designation to all parts of the whole by asserting that Christ is “the Savior of all men, and especially of believers” (1 Timothy 4).

§36. There is no room for the quibble here: “He is the Savior of all men, that is, of all the faithful only.” For if that were the Apostle’s meaning, this added restriction — “especially of believers” — would be entirely idle and pointless.

§37. Which restriction most clearly demonstrates that by “all men” in the preceding member of this saying, all are designated without exception or exclusion of any.

§38. But with respect to the fruit of this grace, it is restricted to believers, who lay hold of it by faith.

§39. Otherwise, if by “all men” in Paul’s words only the faithful were to be understood, this most monstrous paraphrase would emerge: “God is the Savior of all faithful men, especially of the faithful” — which would be the most idle tautology [ταυτολογεῖν], employing restrictions that are plainly empty and worthless; a thing utterly foreign to the divinely-inspired [θεόπνευστος] Paul.

§40. “For God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, so that everyone who believes in Him should not perish but have eternal life.”

§41. Concerning the sins of each and every man, Isaiah writes in chapter 53: “All we like sheep have gone astray; each one has turned to his own way; and Jehovah has laid upon Him the iniquities of us all.”

§42. This was elegantly foreshadowed in the Old Testament goat signifying Christ, of which it is written in Leviticus 16: “And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the living goat, and shall confess over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions with all their sins; and he shall place them upon the head of the goat, and shall send it away by the hand of a man appointed for the purpose into the wilderness. And the goat shall bear upon itself all their iniquities into an uninhabitable land, and he shall release the goat into the wilderness.”

§43. Among the people of Israel there were certainly many reprobate, many who perished — struck down from heaven in the fury of the Lord, aroused by their many committed crimes — as both God Himself and Moses frequently complain of this people’s stubbornness; and yet the goat received upon itself and carried away into the wilderness the sins of each individual who was among this people.

§44. So in the testimony of Isaiah just cited, the sins of all those who had gone astray and wandered like sheep were laid upon Christ.

§45. Since (as it is written in Colossians 1) “it pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell in Him, and through Him to reconcile all things to Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross — both things on earth and things in heaven.”

§46. And Ephesians 1: “That in the dispensation of the fullness of times He might gather together all things in Christ, both things in heaven and things on earth.”

§47. Genesis 13: “In your seed shall all nations be blessed” — in which individual men of all nations are comprehended, as thesis 69 will show.

§48. Finally, a firm argument for our proof is furnished by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, from which we say that all men are redeemed and freed, because Christ became man in order that He might redeem and free in His humanity all that is man, or that has a human nature.

§49. For (he says in chapter 2): “We behold Jesus crowned with glory and honour, who for a little while was made lower than the angels on account of the suffering of death, so that by the grace of God He might taste death for all. For it was fitting for Him, for whom are all things, who had brought many sons to glory, to perfect the author of their salvation through sufferings. For both He who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all of one — for which reason He is not ashamed to call them brothers.”

§50. And again: “Since therefore the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also likewise became a partaker of the same, so that through death He might abolish him who held the power of death, that is, the devil, and might set free those who through fear of death were throughout their entire life subject to bondage.”

§51. Because all are of one, therefore all are brothers; if brothers, then Christ is the author of their salvation; if the author of their salvation, then sanctification also has been procured for them. He became a partaker of flesh and blood in order to free flesh and blood.

§52. Furthermore, He tasted death for all, so that as many as were subject to bondage through fear of death might be set free.

§53. All of which applies to all men — therefore redemption also applies to all.

§54. Wherefore we conclude: those whose nature He assumed, He redeemed. But He assumed the nature of all men, both reprobate and elect. For they are men, because they have human nature. Therefore He redeemed them all.

§55. These most sweet consolations are wrested from the human race, so that, although one may see his nature restored in Christ, he nevertheless hears that the greatest and principal part of humanity has been excluded from it by some eternal decree, and despoiled of the common benefit of a common nature.

§56. For the restoration of nature cannot necessarily pertain to you, if it is bound to a few by some fate. This is impious and contemptuous toward the incarnation of Christ.

§57. Indeed, because someone is a man, he ought therefore — on account of the humanity assumed by Christ — to promise and assure himself of his salvation, since in Christ he also has his fellowship [κοινωνία], on account of his nature held in common with Him (Hebrews 2).

§58. The Apostle applies this consolation in the matter of justification in Romans 8, when he says: “For what was impossible for the Law, in that it was weakened through the flesh — God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin in the flesh on account of sin.”

§59. But certain ones make a distinction and, in order to appear to agree with us, concede that Christ made satisfaction sufficiently but not efficaciously — a distinction that is mere evasion and does not help our opponents in this contrivance.

§60. For they understand it thus: that the satisfaction of Christ would indeed have been sufficient if God had willed it to be made for all — whereas He destined it only for certain ones, to be saved by some fated decree.

§61. But we now demonstrate from the plain testimonies of Scripture not what could have been done, but what has been done. Nor is it the same thing to be able to be done and to have been done. This therefore contributes nothing to the matter, but what we have said remains: that they deny Christ to have made satisfaction for all.

§62. Then, to bring aid to their needy cause, they gather certain sayings of Scripture in which it is read that Christ made satisfaction “for many.”

§63. But we showed above that the word “many” is sometimes used in the sacred writings in place of “all,” because all men are certainly not few, but altogether many.

§64. This is clearly demonstrated by comparing the sayings of Scripture. For those passages in which Christ is said to have shed His blood “for many” and to give His life as a redemption “for many” — St. Paul in 1 Timothy 2 expounds as referring to all, as John also does concerning all of the whole world.

§65. So Daniel 12: “Many who sleep in the graves shall rise” — which must necessarily be understood as referring to all the dead.

§66. For it is not that some shall rise and others shall not, but all those many, and those many are all.

§67. And lest anyone should quibble that by this word “many” only the resurrection of the righteous is indicated, the prophet himself refutes this interpretation by the distribution he adds: “Many who sleep shall rise — some to eternal life, others to eternal reproach.”

§68. So much for the first member of the first part. The second follows: that the promises and warnings concerning the apprehension of Christ’s satisfaction pertain to all men everywhere.

§69. In Mark 16, Christ sends His disciples into the entire world to offer and confer upon all the redemption accomplished by Him, saying: “Go into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature; whoever believes and is baptized shall be saved.” Matthew 28: “Go therefore and teach all nations.” Where what Matthew ascribes to all nations, Mark interprets as referring to the creatures of all nations — that is, to the individual men of all nations.

§70. But how the Apostles received this command and carried it out in the universal manner Christ prescribed, let us learn from their own writings.

§71. Acts 17: St. Paul says: “God now commands all men everywhere to repent.” But all men everywhere are the individual men of all places.

§72. Colossians 1: “Whom we proclaim, warning every man and teaching every man in all wisdom, that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus — for which I toil, struggling according to His working, which works in me powerfully.”

§73. 2 Corinthians 5: “Therefore we serve as ambassadors on behalf of Christ, as though God were making His appeal through us; we beseech in Christ’s name: be reconciled to God.”

§74. That the Apostle wished not only the Corinthians — among whom many were reprobate — but all men everywhere and each individual of all to be reconciled, is apparent from the fact that in the preceding verse he said that God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself, not imputing their sins to them, and had placed in the Apostles this word of reconciliation.

§75. That this reconciliation pertains not to some part of the world but to the whole world, we showed clearly above from 1 John 4. Therefore the word of reconciliation also pertains to all.

§76. Luke 2: The angels announcing the birth of the Messiah say: “Behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all the people.”

§77. How widely this people of the New Testament extends, Isaiah explains in chapter 45 when treating the benefits of this testament: “Turn to me and be saved, all the ends of the earth.”

§78. God therefore calls to the grace of the Gospel not some or certain ones, but the entire world, all creatures, all nations, all men everywhere, every man, all the ends of the earth — that is, each individual of all men — and invites them to repentance.

§79. Nor has God by some eternal hatred deprived certain ones of this grace.

§80. But by His antecedent will He loves the entire human race and desires to have mercy on all men, as Scripture testifies.

§81. Sirach 18: “The compassion of a man extends to his neighbor, but the mercy of the Lord embraces all mortals; He chastises, instructs, teaches, and like a shepherd brings back His flock.”

§82. “For His mercy is great even to the heavens, and His truth even to the clouds” (Psalm 57).

§83. And Psalm 145: “For Jehovah is good to all, and His mercy is over all His works.”

§84. The Wisdom of Solomon, marveling at and proclaiming the immense goodness and mercy of God toward all, exclaims in chapter 11: “But you have mercy on all, because you are able to do all things, and you overlook the sins of men so that they may repent. For you love all things that are in nature, and abhor nothing that you have made; for you could not have made anything that you hated. But how could anything have endured, had you not willed it? Or how could that which was not called by you have been preserved? But you spare all, because they are yours, O Lord, you lover of souls.”

§85. Although these testimonies of Scripture are plain and perspicuous — that God loves all, desires the destruction of none but the salvation of all, and admonishes all to repent — yet our adversaries are not ashamed to write that God has not determined to bestow His grace on all.

§86. Likewise, that there never has been nor will be a time when God has willed, wills, or will will to have mercy on each individual — but that from eternity, by His good will, which cannot be resisted, He determined on whom He would have mercy and whom He would harden in Christ.

§87. Christ, on the contrary, testifies that He did not come into the world to condemn it but to save it (John 12). He calls all to Himself: “Come,” He says in Matthew 11, “all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest.” John 7: “If anyone thirsts, let him come to me and drink.” Revelation 21: “I will give to the thirsty from the fountain of the water of life, freely.” Isaiah 55: “All you who thirst, come to the waters.”

§88. And lest anyone exclude the reprobate, Isaiah adds a little further on: “Let the wicked forsake his way, and the man of iniquity his thoughts; and let him return to Jehovah, and He will have mercy on him; and to our God, for He is abundant in forgiveness.”

§89. For the reprobate are not to be separated from the wicked. For God Himself in Ezekiel 18 swears most solemnly by Himself — the eternal and immovable Truth — that He desires even the dying sinner to return; concerning which more below.

§90. Let all come therefore; let no one exclude himself; let no one be his own obstacle — Christ will not cast out the one who comes. John 6.

§91. The Apostle calls this a faithful saying, worthy to be embraced in every way: that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.

§92. But who these sinners are whom Christ came to save, the Apostle explains in Romans 11, when he says: “God has shut up all under unbelief, that He might have mercy on all.”

§93. The word “all” here cannot be understood as meaning some from among all, since each and every man has been shut up under unbelief (Romans 3). Therefore God also desires to have mercy on each and every man.

§94. In Acts 17, all men everywhere are aroused to repentance, because God has appointed a day on which He will judge the world in righteousness through the man He has designated, having given assurance to all by raising Him from the dead.

§95. God admonishes all men everywhere to return to the way, to lay hold by faith of Christ raised from the dead — for the escaping of wrath on the day of judgment and the obtaining of eternal salvation.

§96. And He announces this so earnestly that He moreover entreats us through His servants to be reconciled — as we said above from 2 Corinthians 5 — where He assigns the same reason for escaping judgment and says: “For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that each one may receive what is due for what he has done in the body, whether good or evil. Knowing therefore the fear of the Lord, we persuade men to faith.”

§97. “For the Lord does not desire any to perish, but all to return to repentance” (1 Peter 3).

§98. Furthermore, if we assent to this opinion, every certainty of our salvation — upon which we rest as upon an unshaken foundation — however we may prop it up, is undermined, shattered, and collapses.

§99. For if the Lord desires to have mercy not on all but only on certain ones, how do you know — especially under temptations — whether you are among their number? In vain do you console yourself with the promises of the Gospel; in vain do you seek God’s help; in vain do you believe Christ to be your Mediator — so long as you do not know whether He has destined you to eternal destruction or eternal life; so long as you do not know whether by His eternal and immutable decree He has determined you to be a partaker of grace or excluded from it. Here you must remain stuck, and you will never be able to extricate yourself. And if from particularity you wish to promise grace to yourself, the inference from the undistributed to the distributed does not hold, as they say.

§100. But from faith, if you have it, you may be assured of your salvation as from a certain testimony of election. But what if your faith is a vain and false persuasion — such as that of all heretics and the ungodly (James 2)? What if you have not faith itself but its shadow, and are affected with nearly the same sense as the elect, so that by your own judgment you differ in nothing from the elect (as they concede and say of the reprobate)? What will you make of yourself then? Your hope has deceived you; your faith is in vain; that certain criterion [κριτήριον] upon which you relied is uncertain; you cannot distinguish true faith from its counterfeit.

§101. Indeed, you have no faith at all, because faith rests on the word (Romans 10) — but you have only a particular word from which you can establish nothing certain about your salvation. You do not know whether the Lord desires to have mercy on you; particularity, as we said, does not produce an inference.

§102. What if that which often happens should occur — that that criterion [κριτήριον] wavers, and faith, shaken by the waves of temptation, grows faint and diminishes, so that you fall into doubt concerning the promised grace? As we read of holy David in Psalm 31: “I said in my alarm: ‘I am cut off from before your eyes’” — shall we therefore cast away all hope of obtaining salvation?

§103. Rather, let us heal and strengthen faith when it is sick and wavering, by means of the universal promises; let us believe God, who promises His mercy to all men everywhere.

§104. For the holy Apostle has most solemnly forbidden ascending into heaven and, outside the revealed word, speculating and searching out some fated decree (Romans 11).

§105. But they ask of us: If He made satisfaction for all and desires all to be saved, why does He not bring it about?

§106. The answer is ready at hand: He has indeed made satisfaction and does will it — but in such a way that they hear the word and obey it, lay hold of the means of obtaining salvation divinely ordained in the word, and believe in God. If they have not done this, but have neglected, spurned, or despised it, they shall also pay the penalties for their unbelief and ungodliness in hell with heavier punishment (Matthew 11).

§107. Thus far we have shown by arguing from the whole to all the parts of the whole that Christ died and made satisfaction for the sins of each and every man, and that the promises and warnings concerning the apprehension of that satisfaction pertain to each and every man. Now we shall argue in reverse, from the individual parts of the whole to the whole.

§108. The Savior divides all men of the entire world into believers and unbelievers, of whom the former are not condemned and the latter are condemned (John 3).

§109. Concerning believers, since they are the elect, no one contends about this matter — all concede that Christ died and made satisfaction for them.

§110. But concerning unbelievers, certain ones wrangle, and this statement seems intolerable to them — that Christ died for the damned — and on this account they are most grievously indignant, as though it were some crime.

§111. We therefore, in order to establish credibility for this as well — just as we have done generally up to this point, so now also specifically — will first adduce the testimonies of Scripture that affirm this expressly.

§112. St. Peter writes in his second epistle, chapter 2, concerning false teachers: that they deny the Lord “who purchased them.”

§113. He speaks of those, as is apparent from that whole chapter, who introduced destructive heresies, who blasphemed the way of truth, who traded in men with fabricated words out of greed, who indulged the lust of the flesh, who delighted in their deceits, who solicited the unstable, who cursed men, and who drew back with smooth promises those who had escaped the snares of ungodliness.

§114. Nor can it be objected that the Apostle had in view those who would return to Christ through repentance — for he says in the same place that they bring upon themselves swift destruction, that many follow their debaucheries, that their condemnation from of old is not idle, that their destruction does not slumber, that they are to be handed over to damnation, that they perish in their own corruption, that they shall receive the wages of unrighteousness, and that the blackness of darkness is reserved for them forever.

§115. These were certainly none other than the reprobate.

§116. These, he says, Christ has purchased — that is, redeemed and freed by His satisfaction — as he expresses it in the first epistle, chapter 1.

§117. What price it is by which Christ purchased them, he explains in the same place, saying: “Knowing that you were not redeemed from your futile way of life inherited from your fathers with perishable things such as silver or gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot.”

§118. And the Apostle asserts here concerning those reprobate ones that they denied τὸν ἀγοράσαντα αὐτοὺς δεσπότην — the master who purchased them — a term the elect use of themselves in Revelation 5: “Because you were slain and redeemed (ἠγόρασας) us to God by your blood”; and likewise St. Paul of all together in Galatians 3: “Christ redeemed (ἐξηγόρασεν) us from the curse of the Law.”

§119. St. Peter therefore ascribes redemption — the effect of Christ’s death — to the reprobate; and St. Paul ascribes the death itself to them in Romans 14: “Do not by your food destroy him for whom Christ died.” And 1 Corinthians 8: “So that brother of yours who is weak will perish, on whose account Christ died, through your knowledge.”

§120. Concerning that brother who, offended by the untimely abuse of others’ Christian liberty, falls away from the evangelical truth — and on that account is destroyed and perishes — concerning him, the Apostle writes, Christ died.

§121. Whence in the same passage he rebukes those who provoked that offense as sinning against Christ — because they so robbed and snatched away from Christ a man redeemed and freed by the blood of Christ.

§122. In Hebrews 6, those whom, if they fall away again, it is impossible to renew unto repentance, are said “to crucify the Son of God afresh to themselves.”

§123. Not that they are able to afflict Him with punishment again — for He dies no more, nor suffers (Romans 6) — but that by their unbelief they bring disgrace upon this crucifixion once accomplished for the removal and abolition of sins (Hebrews 9), and deny its force and efficacy.

§124. They would not be said to crucify Christ afresh to themselves, unless He had previously been crucified for them.

§125. This is confirmed by chapter 10 of the same epistle, where it says of the reprobate: after receiving the knowledge of the truth, “there remains no longer a sacrifice for sins, but a certain terrifying expectation of judgment and a fury of fire that will devour the adversaries.”

§126. Therefore we must concede to them that prior sacrifice — namely, Christ.

§127. For a little further on, these same ones are said to regard the blood of the covenant, through which they were sanctified, as a common thing, and to insult the Spirit of grace.

§128. But how could this be, if that blood had nothing to do with them, had profited them nothing, and the benefits procured by that blood did not pertain to them? — among which benefits of Christ’s passion and death, no sane person doubts that sanctification is included.

§129. In chapter 6 of the same epistle, he speaks of certain ones who by apostasy so fall away from grace that they are no longer renewed to it. Of these he pronounces that they had been enlightened, had tasted the heavenly gift, had been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and had tasted the good word of God and the powers of the age to come.

§130. From this an unshakeable argument is constructed: if those reprobate ones were at some time enlightened, then they were redeemed through Christ.

§131. Since apart from the redemption of the Savior there is never any enlightenment, no participation in the Holy Spirit — inasmuch as He was obtained for us men solely through the passion of Christ.

§132. So much for the testimonies of Scripture that expressly testify that Christ died and made satisfaction for the reprobate. Let us now proceed to the promises and warnings by which God stirs and, as it were, compels them to lay hold of this satisfaction.

§133. Ezekiel 33: God announces to the wicked: “As I live, says Jehovah, I do not desire the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn and live. Turn, turn from your ways; and why will you die, O house of Israel?”

§134. That this was said also to the reprobate is apparent from chapter 18, where the Lord Jehovah said: “I do not desire the death of the dying — turn therefore, that you may live.”

§135. The dying sinner who does not repent but dies in his sins — that is, the reprobate — the Lord therefore confirms to us by oath, swearing by Himself, the immutable Truth, the most solemn and most true oath, that He does not will his perishing but wills his return.

§136. So earnestly and eagerly does He desire the salvation of the reprobate: He also stretches out His hands all day long to a perverse, disobedient, and contradicting people (Isaiah 65).

§137. And as the Prophet directed this to the whole people of Israel, so St. Paul in Romans 11 accommodates it both to that people and expressly to the reprobate Jews.

§138. Christ besought, warned, and rebuked the Jews most frequently — at times even weeping copious tears in lamentation — desiring that they would return to the knowledge of their salvation and avert the impending temporal and eternal destruction; “but they would not” (Matthew 23 and elsewhere).

§139. John 8: Even to those who would die in their sins, Christ does not simply announce damnation, but says: “Unless you believe that I am He, you will die in your sins.”

§140. This same point is most firmly confirmed by all those testimonies of sacred Scripture that testify that the ungodly despisers of the Gospel will receive the heavier judgment on the last day because they were unwilling to lay hold of the grace of God and the merit of Christ’s passion offered in the Gospel (Matthew 21; Mark 16; Acts 13).

§141. Thus John 12: “He who rejects me and does not receive my words has one who condemns him; the word that I have spoken will judge him on the last day.” John 16: “The Holy Spirit will convict the world that it has not believed.” 2 Thessalonians 2: They perish because they did not receive the love of the truth, that they might be saved. 2 Thessalonians 1: The Lord Jesus will inflict vengeance on those who do not know God and do not obey the Gospel. John 3: “And this is the condemnation, that the Light came into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light.”

§142. But if God had never destined the passion of His Son for those reprobate despisers of evangelical grace — but by an eternal and absolute decree willed the passion of Christ and its merit and benefits to be restricted to those alone who are saved — would not God’s justice be imperiled, indeed overthrown, if He were to offer them the merit of His Son’s death from which, however, they had been simply excluded from all eternity by an invariable decree?

§143. Certainly, if one asks why the fallen angels are damned, the answer cannot be that they are damned because they do not apply to themselves the merit of Christ’s passion — but that they are damned solely on account of their defection and fall from God the Creator, in which they persist without any change.

§144. But if Christ had no more died for the reprobate than He did for the fallen angels, then by the same reasoning they would be condemned not on account of the unbelief by which they reject the benefits of Christ’s death, but only on account of their other sins.

§145. Now because Scripture locates the cause of the world’s condemnation in the unbelief by which men reject the benefits of Christ’s death offered in the Gospel, it follows necessarily from this that our Lord suffered and died for them as well.

§146. God therefore did not, as they falsely suppose, appoint by some eternal decree the destruction of the reprobate, nor the intermediate causes upon which that necessarily depends — among which number sin is counted.

§147. For our destruction is not from God but from ourselves (Hosea 13); God is not one who wills iniquity (Psalm 5); “all His ways are justice; God is truth, and there is no iniquity in Him; He is just and upright” (Deuteronomy 32); “the word of Jehovah is upright, and all His work is in faithfulness; He loves righteousness and justice” (Psalm 33) — and yet they do not fear to bespatter and contaminate the most pure essence of God with the foul and shameful stain of so many and such great sins, as if all those iniquities depended upon His eternal decree.

§148. Since, therefore, we have clearly demonstrated by plain testimonies of Scripture that the death and satisfaction of Christ — and likewise the promises and warnings concerning the apprehension of it — first extend as broadly as the universality of the entire human race extends, and second pertain to the reprobate as much as to the elect: we rightly conclude that Jesus Christ died and made satisfaction for the sins of each and every man of the entire world.

Exhibiting the Thesis and Antithesis, Which, with God helping, under the Presidency of Christian Dreier, Doctor of Holy Theology and Public Professor, at this time Dean, For obtaining the Faculty of opening Theological Lectures, To be publicly discussed, is proposed by Magister Martin Posner of Reuss. On the 22nd day of June in the morning hours, In the greater Auditorium. Königsberg, By the types of Johann Reusner, In the year 1657.

To the most serene and most powerful, Prince and Lord, Lord Frederick William, Margrave of Brandenburg, Arch Chamberlain and Prince Elector of the Holy Roman Empire, Duke of Magdeburg, Prussia, Jülich, Cleves, Berg, Stettin, Pomerania, the Kashubians, the Vandals, and also in Silesia, of Crossen and Jägerndorf, Burggrave of Nuremberg, Prince of Minden and Halberstadt, Count of Mark and Ravensberg, Lord of Ravenstein, my most clement Lord.

Most serene and most powerful Prince Elector, most clement Lord. What the passengers and sailors are once said to have acclaimed to Augustus Caesar, namely, Through Him we live, Through Him we navigate, Through Him we enjoy liberty and fortune, that same thing this our Academy more truly attributes and acclaims to Your Most Powerful Highness, since so many provinces have been subjected to You by God. Through You we live, Through You we imbue and are imbued with the arts, Through You we enjoy immunities and all our fortunes. For among so many calamities, slaughters, and fires, the fact that we still pass halcyon days and safely occupy our seats, we refer uniquely as received, after God, to Your Tutelary and Most Powerful Patronage. It is the greatest, and never to die, glory of the Divine Albert, the Most Glorious Prince, who gave the beginnings to this most highly praised Academy.

But no less Glory will await Your Most Serene Highness, who among so many public calamities have most clemently preserved it and still preserve it. We owe no less gratitude to him who preserves life than to him who gave it. But to pursue this with a worthy proclamation of praise is not within my powers, nor is it of this my purpose. I recall and look up to this one thing with a devoted mind, that because of Your Munificence, by an example most rare among whatever Most Powerful Heroes, You have ordered not even the least thing to be detracted hitherto from the Electoral Dining Hall, and by Your Clemency You have cared for it. Which Grace has nourished me, the least among so many cast down at Your Feet, for some years, so that without impediments I could devote myself to my studies and lectures, and not only by learning, but also by teaching, I could promote the efforts of others. I will never hand over this benefit to oblivion. I will never not think about a token of most humble gratitude. Now what shall I offer, except a slender literary document, which I lay down at the Feet of Your Most Serene Highness with the most devoted subjection of mind, before I am called away from here and return to Jena. Receive this little gift, whatever it is, Most Powerful Prince, from Your most humble servant, who thought that what is Yours must be returned to You, and by Your Clemency toward the lettered, further breathe a benign breeze upon my studies, so that at some time, if it shall have seemed good to God, an opportunity may be given to me to strive toward greater things under Your Most Clement Protection. May God preserve You, Most Serene Prince, unharmed for as long as possible in Your Lands, and may He further prosper Your Counsels, so that just as in former years Peace was restored to the universal Empire throughout Germany by Your most august auspices, so also under Your Leadership may the same return in these Regions both to the Church and to the Republic, and may the pristine flower be restored to the Academy, and its own increment be restored to right studies. Of Your Most Powerful and Serene Highness, The most subject, Magister Martin Posner.

THESIS II. The bread and wine in the Eucharist are not converted through transubstantiation into the body and blood of Christ.

The status of the controversy.

1. It is to be noted that there is no question concerning the real and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Eucharist. For we willingly grant this, because we confess that that which we eat and drink there according to the institution of the Lord is His true body and true blood.

2. That it is not asked concerning consubstantiation, impanation, inclusion, or any other mode of presence determined by us. For we assert that it is neither lawful to be inquired into nor able to be found by us. But rather we condemn this in the Papists, that not content with a simple presence, they attempt to inquire into the mode of the presence, asserting that the body of the Lord is present through transubstantiation.

3. That the Papists by transubstantiation understand a total conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of the Lord, although in the mode of explaining it they somewhat disagree (Robert Bellarmine, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, book 3, ch. 18). But they agree in this, that the whole substance of the bread is lost, with only the accidents remaining, namely quantity, figure, color, taste, and the body and blood of Christ are placed in its place under the same accidents.

ARGUMENT I. For the thesis.

Whatever is often called bread in the scriptures without any indication that the word is taken improperly, that is also true bread. But the Eucharistic bread after consecration is also often called bread in the scriptures without any indication of improper acceptation. Therefore the bread after consecration is still true bread.

The Major premise is evident. Because names are placed for things, and one must adhere to the proper signification of words for as long as no evident necessity urges that we depart from it. We use a general rule, he says, and we say that everywhere the propriety of words must be preserved, unless it is evidently taught that there is a trope somewhere (Robert Bellarmine, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, book 1, ch. 11). And again, the proper and literal sense is always to be chosen, unless the contrary is evidently proved (Robert Bellarmine, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, book 1, ch. 12). Nor ought the adversaries to ask from us why we follow the proper sense of the words. For it would be similar to this, as if someone asked from those who are on a journey why they follow the common and beaten path, for no sane person asks this, or why we enter through the door, not through the window.

The Minor premise is proved from the words of Paul (1 Corinthians 11:26-27). As often as you shall eat this bread, namely the consecrated bread, and drink this chalice, etc. Therefore whoever shall eat this bread and drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. But let a man prove himself and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice. Likewise (1 Corinthians 10:16-17). The chalice of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? Because we being many are one bread, one body, since we all partake of the one bread. Here not once, but very often the Apostle, without any indication of improper acceptation, calls the consecrated bread, bread, just as Christ also after consecration calls the Eucharistic drink wine or the fruit of the vine (Matthew 26:28).

They make an exception to the Major premise through an instance, that not necessarily that which is said to be something is also that very thing in the present, because the rod of Aaron is still called a rod when already converted into a serpent (Exodus 7:12), which is the example of Bellarmine. Becanus objects that saying, The blind see, the lame walk (Matthew 11:5).

I respond. In these places the words are taken not in a state, as they speak, but broadly. For the rod is called a serpent which had been a rod, and the blind are said to see who had been blind, and that not without a manifest indication. For it is expressly said that the rod had been changed into a serpent, and concerning the blind, that Christ made them seeing, concerning the lame, that He made them walking. And besides, the mutation made could be perceived by the senses and seen by the eyes.

They make a second exception to the Major premise through another instance. Manna is very often called bread in the scriptures, which nevertheless was not true bread, but was so called only on account of similitude (Psalm 78:24). Nay, even all food is called bread on account of the power which it has of nourishing. So say Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, and Lessius.

I respond. The senses here again show that Manna and any other food are not bread properly so called. And in the cited places manna is not simply called bread, but is also described, that it was heavenly bread or sent from heaven, and the food of angels or prepared by angels (Psalm 78:24-25). The wise man adds that it accommodated itself to the appetite of each one (Wisdom 16:20).

Then they make an exception to the Minor premise first, that indications entirely occur in the text from which it becomes manifest that this bread is understood improperly, because in the same context where the Apostle speaks concerning the Eucharistic bread, it is said, We being many are one bread, which is understood concerning the Church (1 Corinthians 10:17), and then, because the Apostle before the consecration named the bread absolutely, but after the consecration always added a pronoun to indicate the mutated bread. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. 1. That the Church or men are not bread properly so called is again manifest to the judgment of the senses, and the Apostle adds the explanation through the word body, We being many are one bread, one body. 2. The argument is to be inverted. Paul after consecration always adds the pronoun, therefore he does not speak concerning bread mutated substantially, but the same of which he had made mention before, when he said, He took bread and giving thanks He broke it (1 Corinthians 11:23). Then it is a begging of the question. You say the Apostle says the bread had been consecrated, therefore he made an indication that it had been mutated substantially. Finally, the Apostle would have at least once indicated in clear words so great a mutation, if it had been made, and would have said, As often as you shall eat this body which was bread, as John says concerning the water in Cana of Galilee, The chief steward tasted the water that had become wine (John 2:9), which was not so necessary to say. For it was perceived by sense that the wine was what was drunk, but here the judgment of the senses plainly ceases.

They make a second exception to the other proof of the Minor premise, that from Luke it is openly gathered that those words concerning the fruit of the vine pertain to the chalice of wine which the Lord gave to the Apostles after the eating of the paschal lamb before the consecration of the mysteries. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. The transposition of the words in Matthew and Mark would be clumsy if the Lord had spoken those words only after the paschal cup, not after the distributed Eucharistic cup. For immediately to the institution of the Eucharist Matthew subjoins these words, But I say to you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine (Matthew 26:29), and similarly Mark (Mark 14:25). Nay, the Evangelists would even have offered an occasion for erring to the readers, who from these words gather that the Eucharistic cup had in itself the true fruit of the vine. Therefore it must be entirely said that Christ brought forth those words twice, once when the paschal cup was extended, which Luke reports (Luke 22:18), and afterwards again at the distribution of the blessed cup. Nor indeed, he says, could he drink with Him, who was not going to drink in the kingdom, when He promised that all those then drinking would drink with Him afterwards from the fruit of that vine (Hilary of Poitiers, Commentary on Matthew, canon 30).

They except otherwise to the same words, even if the Lord had brought them forth afterwards, that nevertheless they are not referred to the consecrated chalice, but to the one drunk before, as Anselm explains them on Matthew. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. 1. If they were not referred to the sacred chalice, Christ would not have brought them forth after the distribution of it, lest He disturb the understanding of the proposed mystery. Immediately when He had extended the blessed chalice, He subjoined, But I say to you, I will not drink anymore τούτου τοῦ γενήματος (of this fruit) of the vine, namely such as has already been exhibited to you. 2. Anselm upon this place indicates nothing else than that Christ by those words signified that the ceremonies of the Old Testament are antiquated. I will not drink, he says, that is, I will not delight from now on in the ceremonies of this people, among which the Sacraments of the paschal lamb are the chief (Anselm of Laon, Glossa Ordinaria on Matthew). And before him Bede annotated words of this kind on Matthew 26, Mark 14, Luke 22. But the exposition is allegorical, since they judge that not properly called wine, but the Synagogue and its ceremonies are understood by the wine and the chalice, from which Christ as it were drank as long as He tolerated them.

ARGUMENT II. The second argument.

Whatever is the κοινωνία (communion), the communion of the body of Christ, that is not mutated through transubstantiation into the body of Christ. But the Eucharistic bread already consecrated is the κοινωνία (communion) of the body of Christ. Therefore the bread already consecrated is not mutated through transubstantiation into the body of Christ.

The Major premise is proved first by induction by taking a more general proposition. Whatever is the communion of a thing is not substantially mutated into that thing which is communicated, as a cup is the communion of wine, a dish of food, a saltcellar of salt, a purse of money, a sponge of water, a sheath of a knife, and so in a thousand others. On the contrary, those things which are mutated substantially are not called the κοινωνία (communion) of that into which they are mutated, as the water of wine in the Cananean nuptials, wine of vinegar, wood of ashes, water of air, air of fire, and so in the rest. Truly such things are the matter from which that is made which we receive, but because they do not remain, neither in the present are they said to be a communion. Secondly it is proved by reason a priori. Because to bread and wine, while it is called κοινωνία (communion), an affection is attributed which requires the existence of a subject. For what exhibits another thing, it behooves that it was not, but is. For how will those things which are not walk or speak, Aristotle says (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 4, ch. 4). And we can add this, that we understand the Major premise concerning such communion as is attributed to a sacrifice, when it is called the communion of the altar, and to food, when it is called the communion of the table. For a sacrifice is by no means transmuted into the altar, nor food into the table.

The Minor premise is proved from (1 Corinthians 10:16). The chalice of blessing which we bless, is it not the κοινωνία (communion) of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? Where the discourse is not simply concerning the chalice, but already blessed, nor simply concerning the bread, but already broken after the blessing. And (1 Corinthians 10:18). Behold Israel according to the flesh, are not those who eat the sacrifices κοινωνοί (partakers) of the altar? And (1 Corinthians 10:21). You cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons. Whence just as those who eat the sacrifices are partakers of the altar, so also those who eat the bread are partakers of the body of Christ.

They except to the Minor premise, that the accidents of the bread remain and they are the communion of the body of Christ, because in reality they exhibit the body of Christ. So say Bellarmine and Gregory of Valencia.

I respond. 1. The Apostle says not concerning the accidents, but concerning the chalice and the bread, that they are the communion of the blood and body of Christ. The chalice which we bless, he says, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? Therefore also he used the substantial word of chalice, not of wine, which they say has been mutated, so that we might think about substance. 2. The propriety of words here, with the Papist doctors confessing, is entirely to be retained, and consequently by bread we understand not what was, but what is bread, nor the accidents of bread, but the substantial bread itself. Not even the metaphorical customary acceptation of bread has a place here, much less such an acceptation as has not been heard from the ages, that bread signifies the accidents of bread without the substance.

ARGUMENT III. The third argument.

Whatever deprives the Eucharist of an external element, without doubt is a false dogma. But the dogma concerning transubstantiation deprives the Eucharist of an external element. Therefore it is false.

The Major premise is evident from the nature of Sacraments, which require a visible external element. For the word accesses to the element and it becomes a Sacrament, as Augustine speaks (Augustine of Hippo, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tractate 80). Nay, such an element is required which has a certain analogy with the thing signified, as water is the element in baptism, and as it washes the body, so grace inwardly washes the filth of sins. If Sacraments did not have a certain similitude of those things of which they are Sacraments, they would entirely not be Sacraments, Augustine further says (Augustine of Hippo, Letters, letter 98 to Boniface).

The Minor premise is proved, because the accidents of bread are not an element, nor do they have an analogy with the thing signified. But the analogy here is threefold. For just as first, a true substantial body is a body, so also it is represented and exhibited by true substantial bread. Secondly, just as bread nourishes the body of man, so also the grace of Christ nourishes and sustains the soul. Thirdly, just as out of many collected grains one bread is made, so also out of many collected believers one mystical body of Christ, the Church, is made, as the Apostle teaches (1 Corinthians 10:17).

They make a first exception to the proof of the Major premise, that the Sacrament requires only a sensible sign, to which it happens by accident that it has a substance annexed or not. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. Not just any kind of sign is required, but one that is an element. But an element is a substance, as water in baptism, to which Augustine looked back when he said the element is required here. For the element is not taken here Metaphysically for any first inexisting and indivisible thing, as Aristotle takes it (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 4, ch. 3), but more Physically, as fire, water, and earth are called elements. Thence Hugh of St. Victor adds an explanation, when he says, A Sacrament is a corporeal or material element set forth sensibly on the outside representing from similitude and signifying from institution and containing from sanctification some invisible and spiritual grace. He adds, Every thing which has these three is a Sacrament, and everything which lacks these three cannot properly be called a Sacrament (Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, book 1, part 9, ch. 2).

They make a second exception to the proof of the Major premise, that the analogy of Sacraments requires, not that the sensible sign be truly that thing which it signifies, but only that it naturally represent that thing, as in baptism the body is not washed, but the washing of the body is only signified. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. 1. If the representation of the signifying thing sufficed, then also the representation in the thing signified would suffice, and thus Sacraments would not effect that which they signify, but would only represent it. 2. The element always has a first act towards doing that by which the grace of the Sacrament is signified, although the second act is not always present, which is not even necessary, since the effect of grace does not always follow, namely in those who are not disposed, just as the actual washing of the filth of the body is not required for baptism, yet it is necessary that the first act be present, namely it behooves that the one being baptized be sprinkled with such water by which the filth of the body can truly be washed. For by this very thing it is signified that man receives that by which he can be washed inwardly from sins, unless he resists.

They make a third exception to the proof of the Minor premise, that the accidents of the bread which remain represent the body of Christ sufficiently, since also a dove represented the Holy Spirit, when there was no need that it be a true dove as to substance, and the bronze serpent represented Christ on account of the analogy between the serpent and Christ, although it was not a true serpent as to substance. So says Bellarmine.

I respond. 1. Accidents cannot represent a substance, since there is no agreement and similitude between a substance and an accident. 2. Tertullian establishes that the Holy Spirit appeared in a true dove (Tertullian, On the Flesh of Christ, near the beginning). It was as truly a dove, he says, as also the Spirit. Augustine says, Nor do we say this thus, that we say the Lord Jesus Christ alone had a true body, but the Holy Spirit appeared fallaciously to the eyes of men, but we believe both those bodies to be true bodies. For just as it was not fitting that the Son of God should deceive men, so it was not becoming that the Holy Spirit should deceive men (Augustine of Hippo, On the Christian Struggle, ch. 22). 3. If that dove was not a living animal, nevertheless it was a true body, just as also the bronze serpent, and this suffices.

ARGUMENT IV. The fourth argument.

The explanation which has many difficulties, nay, and implies a contradiction, is not to be preferred to the easier one which has no or certainly fewer difficulties. But the explanation of the words of Christ concerning transubstantiation has many difficulties and implies a contradiction. Therefore it is not to be preferred to the other, that the substance of the bread remains, which has no difficulties.

The Major premise is evident, because although we simply have faith in the words of Christ, when it is clearly evident concerning their understanding, nevertheless when the doctors of the Church explain the scripture, we attend to from which explanation fewer and smaller absurdities follow. In believed things handed down to us according to universal understanding, that mode does not seem to be determinable which is more difficult to understand and to which more inconveniences seem to follow, says Scotus (John Duns Scotus, Commentary on the Sentences, book 4, distinction 11, question 3).

The Minor premise is proved first from the nature of conversion. (1) A substantial conversion is when from a substance a substance is produced which before was in potency, not in act, and that either through nature as a chick is generated from an egg, a worm from cheese, or through the absolute power of God, as the rod of Moses was mutated into a serpent, water into wine. But a production of this kind does not happen here. For the body of Christ is not produced, but already exists beforehand. (2) The Eucharistic symbols nourish and can be corrupted, and thence something else can be generated, as experience testifies, and that according to this doctrine without matter and without substance, and thus a substantial mutation is given without a substance, or matter returns or is created anew through a miracle and is conjoined with the form of a worm, and thus miracles are feigned and multiplied without necessity, nor nevertheless is the matter explained.

Secondly, from the nature of an accident. (1) An accident by nature is a sign of an existing substance. If therefore anyone should say the substance is not there, he takes away that natural signification of accidents, and places false signs in the Eucharist, which is adverse to a Sacrament. (2) It belongs to an accident to be in, nor can it exist separated from a substance, ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι ἐν ᾧ (it is impossible to be apart from that in which it is), as Aristotle has it (Aristotle, Categories). And he says, None of these is apt by itself to be or to be separated from a substance. Whence also these seem more to put on the nature of a being, when they are brought forth thus, walking, sitting, healthy (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 7, ch. 1). (3) Substance both in λόγῳ (definition) and cognition and time and nature is the first of all (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 7, ch. 1). Now the things which are prior by nature, the rest so depend upon them that without them they cannot be (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 4, ch. 11). If therefore an accident exists separately, it ceases to be an accident. Then the things which are prior in definition, their definition is included in the definitions of the posterior ones, and thus also an accident includes the definition of a substance. In definition, the Philosopher says, this is first, because it is necessary in the definition of each thing for the definition of the substance to be in it. And he teaches that the reason of a substance is so included in an accident as a nose in snub, for a snub is a curved nose (Aristotle, Physics, book 1, ch. 3, text 28). But who would judge that snubbiness could be separated from a nose? (4) The substance itself of bread consists in those things which the adversaries call accidents, because namely they are predicated essentially and primarily. For from such predicates is the definition (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, book 1, ch. 4). Hence others are predicated essentially as necessary consequences, and finally accidents, which are not necessarily said, but can be present and absent, and consequently do not produce knowledge. Bread is a body not accidentally, but essentially, and a body is a quantum essentially, because quantity is its essential difference. Ammonius Hermiae says, They ask why he numbered a body among the species of quantity, when a body is a substance? I say that quantity also is substantial, as in fire heat is a substantial quality, in a body threefold dimension is a substantial quantity (Ammonius Hermiae, Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle, Quantity). As quantity is essential to a body, so also qualities are essential to the elements, and by them they are defined, but the elements are of the essence of bread. Aristotle indeed defines fire as an ὑπερβολήν (excess) of heat, and ice of coldness (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, book 2, ch. 3, text 21). For heat in fire and cold in ice are not accidental qualities but substantial ones. Simplicius distinguishes with Porphyry into a first and second subject. In the first subject, that is, in prime matter, he says all qualities are accidents, but in the second subject, as in fire, heat is not an accident, because it completes its substance. Thus you say whiteness in wool is an accident, but in snow it is not an accident, but a part of the substance (Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle). Say therefore that the substance of bread is separated from such predicates, you will say the thing defined is separated from the definition, which is a contradiction.

They make a first exception to the proof of the Minor premise, that this conversion is adductive, because the body of Christ is adducted as it were to this place, although it does not leave heaven. So says Bellarmine. And he gives an example, because in that mode the soul is attracted into the flesh which is from the nourishment.

I respond. 1. It is one thing for a substance to be adducted into some place, another thing for a substance to be converted into a substance, because the former is a mutation according to place, while it is placed in a place in which it was not before. But the latter is a mutation according to substance. 2. The example is entirely alien. For nourishment is not converted into the soul, but into flesh not pre-existing, but which before was in potency and afterwards was produced so that it might be in act. Whence here a composite is made which was not before, but when the body of Christ is adducted to this place, no composite is made, and thus neither is the conversion here substantial. And what if we should say with Aristotle that the soul as to substance resides only in the heart, and thence diffuses its virtue into all parts of the body, and which is the common doctrine of the Greek commentators (Aristotle, Parts of Animals, book 3, ch. 3, and Motion of Animals, ch. 10)?

They make a second exception, that inherence is not of the essence of an accident, and they prove this first because the light created on the first day remained for three days without a subject according to Basil (Basil of Caesarea, Hexaemeron, homilies 2 and 6). So says Bellarmine.

I respond. Basil does not say that the primordial light existed without any subject, but he says this, that it was without the Sun. For there was a shining substance diffusing and contracting itself, but still unformed until the sun should be created. Likewise he says light is a simple nature consisting in the similitude of parts, like gold (Basil of Caesarea, Hexaemeron, homily 2). He compares light with fire, the sun with a lamp (Basil of Caesarea, Hexaemeron, homily 6). Gregory Nazianzen, his intimate friend, not much from the beginning, says, Nor indeed, in my opinion at least, did it produce that organic and solar thing from the beginning, but incorporeal and devoid of a sun, but afterwards it was given to the orb to illuminate the orb of the earth (Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 43, which is on the New Sunday). Theodoret says, Light is a substance and subsists, and when it has set, it rises again, and when it has departed, it returns (Theodoret of Cyrus, Questions on Genesis, question 7). And he says, Just as He distinguished the nature of the waters by the firmament and placed some upwards, and left the rest downwards, so distinguishing that light for His own decision He established the great and small luminaries (Theodoret of Cyrus, Questions on Genesis, question 14). The same is the sentence of Dionysius, who is called the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, section 4), and of Thomas (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part, question 67, article 4).

They prove this secondly, because according to Aristotle magnitude is one thing, the essence of magnitude is another (Aristotle, On the Soul, book 3, text 9). For if the very being, that is, the existence of an accident is distinguished from its essence, much more is inherence distinguished, which is a mode of existence. And he asks whether space should be reckoned a vacuum where there would be only color or sound (Aristotle, Physics, book 4, text 58). So says Bellarmine.

I respond. 1. Aristotle in the prior place by the being of magnitude understands not its existence, but the τῷ ἦν εἶναι (quiddity), which is explained by definition, by magnitude the composite itself from quiddity or form and intelligible subject or matter. For he speaks concerning Mathematics, which have intelligible matter. Thus also in Physics, which have sensible matter, water is one thing, the being of water is another. For the being or quiddity of water is its form. For Aristotle seeks the proper object of the intellect, so that he can show that an intellect separated from matter is given. For the intellect apprehends the quiddities and forms of things and intuits the intelligible, as sight the visible. But it does not cognize forms in matter or a composite unless it is assisted by the senses in Physics, or by the phantasy in Mathematics, as Themistius rightly explains this place (Themistius, Commentary on Aristotle). Now the intellect understands the quiddities of accidents without matter, therefore they can exist separately from matter, but that in truth does not follow. Things which are separated in λόγῳ (definition) are not immediately also separated in τόπῳ (place). 2. In the posterior place Aristotle refutes those who said that a vacuum is that in which there is no tangible body, and he asks what must be said if there is color and sound in it, not indeed without a subject, but with a subject. The hypothesis is not impossible, says Philoponus. For a celestial body is such a thing. For it is colored and effects a sound according to the Pythagoreans, while it is moved, but it does not have gravity and levity (John Philoponus, Commentary on the Physics). Simplicius says, If the air which they call a vacuum should receive color or sound, or another sensible quality differing from those which are perceived by touch, does it still remain a vacuum, or not (Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics)?

The consensus of the Church.

In the first century, Saint Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, the successor of the Apostle Peter and Evodius in that see, writes thus concerning the Eucharist in his Epistle to the Philadelphians. One bread broken for all (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Philadelphians). And in the Epistle to the Ephesians. Breaking one bread, which is the medicine of immortality, the remedy which is given against death (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians).

In the second century, Justin, the Christian Philosopher and holy Martyr, in his second apology to the Emperor Antoninus Pius near the end thus writes. Those who are called Deacons distribute to each one of those present, that he may participate in that in which thanks have been given, bread and wine and water, and they carry it away to the absent. And this aliment is called by us the Eucharist. For we do not receive these things as common bread, nor common drink, but that aliment in which through the prayers of the Word proceeding from Him thanks are given, whence our blood and flesh are nourished through mutation, we have been taught to be the flesh and blood of that incarnate Jesus (Justin Martyr, Second Apology to the Emperor Antoninus Pius). In the same century Irenaeus flourished at Lyons in Gaul, who left these writings. He took him, who is bread from the creation, and gave thanks saying, This is My body. And similarly the chalice, which is from that creation which is according to us, He confessed to be His blood (Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 4, ch. 32). And he says, Perceiving the bread which is of the earth the invocation of God, it is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two things, earthly and heavenly. But we offer to Him, not as if to one indigent, but giving thanks for His donation and sanctifying the creature (Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 4, ch. 34). Clement of Alexandria, the Master of the Catechetical School, disciple of Pantaenus and Preceptor of Origen, disputing against the Encratites, who abstained from wine, thus writes. He Himself also the Lord a man blessed the wine, when He said, Take, drink, this is My blood, the blood of the vine. But that it was wine which was blessed, He shows again by saying to the disciples, I will not drink of the fruit of this vine until I shall drink it with you in the kingdom of My Father (Clement of Alexandria, The Instructor, book 2, ch. 2).

Near the beginning of the third century, Tertullian of Carthage in Africa, a Presbyter, the first of the Latin Fathers, proves against Marcion that Christ had a true body, from this, because the bread in the Eucharist, by which His body is represented and exhibited, is a true body, and among other things he thus says near the end. Having taken the bread and distributed it to the disciples, He made it His body by saying, This is My body, that is, the figure of My body. But it would not have been a figure, unless there were a body of truth. Otherwise an empty thing, which is a phantasm, could not take a figure (Tertullian, Against Marcion, book 4). Origen Adamantius, a Presbyter of Caesarea in Palestine, has these words. Hence therefore also in the bread of the Lord there is utility for the one feeding, when with an unpolluted mind and pure conscience he is a partaker of that bread, and that food which is sanctified through the word of God and through supplication, according to that which it has materially, passes into the belly and is cast out into the draught. Otherwise according to the prayer which acceded to it in proportion to faith it becomes useful, effecting that the mind becomes perspicacious, looking to that which is useful. Nor is it the matter of the bread, but the word spoken over it, which profits the one eating it not unworthily of the Lord (Origen, Commentary on Matthew, ch. 15). Cyprian the Martyr, Bishop of Carthage, refutes those who had only water in the Eucharistic chalice, and teaches prolixly that wine also ought to be present. Nor can His blood, he says, by which we have been redeemed and vivified, seem to be in the chalice, when wine is lacking to the chalice, by which the blood of Christ is shown (Cyprian of Carthage, Letters, letter 63 to Caecilius). And afterwards. Whence it appears that the blood of Christ is not offered if wine is lacking to the chalice. But how shall we drink new wine from the creature of the vine with Christ in the kingdom of the Father, if we do not offer wine in the sacrifice of God the Father and of Christ (Cyprian of Carthage, Letters, letter 63 to Caecilius)?

In the fourth century, in the Acts of the first Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, these things are read. Again also here in the divine table let us not be humbly intent upon the proposed bread and cup, but lifting up the mind by faith let us understand that placed upon that sacred table is that lamb of God taking away the sins of the world (Council of Nicaea, Acts of the Council, book 3). Cyril, Bishop of Jerusalem, thus says. Just as the bread of the Eucharist after the invocation of the Holy Spirit is no longer common bread, but is the body of Christ, so also this holy ointment is no longer naked ointment, nor, if anyone prefers to call it thus, common, after it has already been consecrated (Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catecheses, catechesis 3). And he says, In the new law the heavenly bread and the cup of salvation sanctify soul and body. For just as bread is suited to the body, so also the word is suited to the soul. Therefore do not consider it as naked bread and naked wine, for it is the body and blood of Christ (Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catecheses, catechesis 4). Ambrose, Bishop of Milan in Italy, has these words. You see how operative the word of God is. If therefore there is so much force in the word of Christ, that those things should begin to be which were not, how much more operative is it, that those things should be which were, and should be changed into another thing (Ambrose of Milan, On the Sacraments, book 4, ch. 4). Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, the brother of Basil the Great, not much from the beginning, says. This holy altar to which we stand adjacent is a stone common in nature, but since it has been consecrated and dedicated to the worship of God and has received a blessing, it is a holy table, an immaculate altar. Likewise bread is at first common bread, but when the mystery has sanctified it, it becomes and is called the body of Christ. Thus the mystical oil, thus the wine, since they are things of small price before blessing, after sanctification which proceeds from the Spirit, each of them operates excellently (Gregory of Nyssa, Oration on the Baptism of Christ).

In the fifth century, John Chrysostom, Bishop of Constantinople, when he had said that Christ Himself had drank from the consecrated chalice, subjoins. But for the sake of what thing did He drink not water, but wine after the resurrection? He wished to pluck out by the roots a certain pernicious heresy of those who use water in the mysteries, so as to show that both when He handed down this mystery He handed down wine, and now after the resurrection without the mysteries in a simple table He used wine from the fruit of the vine, which certainly does not produce water (John Chrysostom, Homilies on Matthew, homily 82). And in the Epistle to the Monk Caesarius in the time of his second exile. Before the bread is sanctified, we name it bread, but with divine grace sanctifying it through the mediation of the priest, it is indeed freed from the appellation of bread, but is held worthy of the appellation of the Lord’s body, even if the nature of bread has remained in it (John Chrysostom, Epistle to the Monk Caesarius). Augustine, Bishop of Hippo in Africa, thus speaks. What therefore you see is bread and a chalice, which your eyes also report to you. But what your faith demands to be instructed about, the bread is the body of Christ, the chalice is the blood of Christ (Augustine of Hippo, Sermons, sermon 272). Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrus in Syria, in the middle of dialogue 1, which is inscribed Immutable, says. He honored the visible symbols with the appellation of body and blood, not mutating the nature, but adding grace to the nature (Theodoret of Cyrus, Dialogues, dialogue 1). And in dialogue 2, which is called Unconfused. For neither do the mystical symbols after sanctification they do not withdraw from their nature: For they remain in their prior substance, and figure, and form, and they can be seen and touched, just as before. Moreover, they are understood to be what they have been made, and they are believed and adored, as being those things which they are believed to be. Gelasius, the Roman Bishop, writes thus (Gelasius, Book Against Eutyches and Nestorius): Surely the Sacraments of the body and blood of Christ which we receive are a divine thing, on account of which we are also made partakers of the divine nature through them, and yet the substance or nature of the bread and wine does not cease to be.

In the sixth century, Gregory the Great, the Roman Bishop (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, book 4, ch. 58): Who of the faithful can have any doubt that at the very hour of the immolation, at the voice of the Priest, the heavens are opened, that the choirs of Angels are present in that mystery of Jesus Christ, that the lowest things are associated with the highest, that earthly things are joined to heavenly things, and that one thing is made from visible and invisible things? At the same time flourished also Hesychius, Bishop of Jerusalem, who has these words (Hesychius, Commentary on Leviticus, book 2, ch. 8): Therefore commanding the flesh to be eaten with the breads, so that we might understand that mystery to be spoken of by him, which is at the same time bread and flesh. In the same place, explaining those words, Whatever shall be left of the flesh and the breads, the fire shall consume, he indicates that it was the custom then in the Church that whatever was left after the participation of all should be burned with fire. But if they had believed in transubstantiation, how would they have dared such a thing?

Germanus, Bishop of Constantinople, who flourished at the beginning of the eighth century, testifies in the Contemplation of Ecclesiastical Things at the end (Germanus, Contemplation of Ecclesiastical Things, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 12) that to represent the warm blood of Christ poured out from his side, they poured some warm water into the already consecrated cup. How could they have done this if they had determined that there was nothing but the blood of Christ in the cup? At the end he has these words: The type of the virginal body, the participation of the blessing and of the oblation, is broken indeed as bread, but is distributed as the communication of an ineffable blessing. And thus afterward with such a thought we eat the bread and drink the cup as the flesh and blood of the Son of God.

They object, first, to Irenaeus, that by the earthly thing he understands the accidents of the bread and wine. Thus Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia.

1. I answer. What Irenaeus understands by the earthly thing, he himself explains, namely that bread which is from creation or from the earth, which is made from the grain growing from the earth, and therefore is true bread, but not common bread, inasmuch as it is sanctified through prayers.

2. He disputes against the Gnostics and the ancient heretics, who said that Christ is not the son of God the creator, but of another, which he refutes because Christ uses the creatures of God in his mysteries. If the dogma of transubstantiation were supposed, they could have promptly objected that Christ uses creatures, but transubstantiated or destroyed ones.

3. Of whatever kind he understands the heavenly thing to be, he also understands the earthly thing to be of such a kind; but the heavenly thing is a substance.

They object, secondly, to Tertullian, that he speaks not of the Eucharistic bread, but of another under the Old Testament, which was a type and figure of the body of Christ. Thus Bellarmine.

1. I answer. In this way it would not have been necessary to make mention of the Eucharist, but it would suffice to cite passages from the Old Testament in which the body of Christ is shown to be prefigured by bread.

2. He refutes the Marcionites, who determined that Christ did not have a true and solid body, but a phantasmal one. But if the Church had then defended transubstantiation, could not the adversaries have objected that the bread is no longer bread, since it represents the body of Christ, but only apparently so; and likewise that the body of Christ is not a true substantial human body, but only a phantasm.

They object, thirdly, to Ambrose, that Lanfranc already formerly answered that in certain codices those words are not found: That they may be what they were, but instead of them these are placed: That what they were, may be changed into another thing. Then that these words make this sense: That they may be what they were regarding the exterior species, and yet be truly changed regarding the interior substance. Thus Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia.

1. I answer. Since those words are contained in all the codices, the judgment of Lanfranc can in no way prejudice the truth here, who was among the first defenders of transubstantiation. For even Algerus of Liege, who attempts to solve the same argument from Ambrose, does not have this exception (Algerus of Liege, On the Sacrament, book 1, ch. 7).

2. Everyone sees that the two words, may be, and, could not have crept into the text, being placed in the right place so that the sense is the best.

3. Ambrose asserts that not only the exterior species, but also the substance of the bread remains when the bread is changed, which the examples he adds demonstrate: You yourself were, he says, but you were an old creature; after you were consecrated, you began to be a new creature. Against the institutions and order a man was born from a virgin. By divine command the rod of Moses touched the waters and the wave divided itself.

They object, fourthly, to Chrysostom, that these are not his words, since in the whole of Chrysostom the Epistle to Caesarius does not exist. Thus Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia.

1. I answer. Although that Epistle is not now found in the works of Chrysostom, it nevertheless existed in the Florentine Library under the name of Chrysostom, who wrote it at the time of his second exile against Apollinaris and others who confused the divinity and humanity in Christ, although it was not printed, as Peter Martyr testifies, who also cites many things from it (Peter Martyr, Common Places, class 4, ch. 20, sec. 31).

2. Even if it were not of Chrysostom, it would nevertheless be this testimony of another ancient doctor, agreeing with the words of the other fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries.

They object, fifthly, to Theodoret, that by substance he understands the essence and nature of the accidents. Thus Bellarmine.

1. I answer. He says that the symbols remain not only in their prior figure, form, and species, but also in substance, namely as contradistinguished from figure, form, and species, which is the subject in which the accidents inhere.

2. From the hypothesis of the adversaries, the Eutychians against whom he disputes would have had something to object, namely, just as the bread is substantially changed into the body of Christ, so also the body through the resurrection was changed into the divinity.

They object, sixthly, to Gelasius, that he was not the Roman Bishop, but the Bishop of Caesarea, and then, that he likewise by the substance and nature of the bread and wine understands only the nature of the accidents. Thus Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia.

1. I answer. This book was always held to be a writing of Gelasius the Roman Pontiff, and was originally published with this title: Gelasius the Roman Bishop on the Two Natures in Christ against Eutyches and Nestorius, as it exists in the Heresiology and in volume four of the Library of the Fathers of Margarin de la Bigne (Margarin de la Bigne, Library of the Fathers, vol. 4), who wishes it to be a certain epitome of a greater work of Gelasius, of which Gennadius makes mention (Gennadius, Book on Illustrious Men) and Anastasius in the life of Gelasius (Anastasius, Life of Gelasius). The style agrees with the style of Gelasius in his Epistles to Laurence and to the Bishops of Dardania. At the end also he commends his Apostolic see and demands persevering communion with it. And finally, Pope John II cites him not under the name of Caesarean, which he absolutely would have done, but simply of Gelasius, namely his predecessor, toward the end of the book of Gelasius in the Heresiology.

2. Just as after the personal union the human nature remains as to substance, so also after the consecration the bread and wine remain as to substance. For thus Gelasius concludes.

Origin of the Antithesis.

The Church, content with the simple sense of the words of Christ, did not publicly have a controversy concerning the Eucharist until the eighth century after the birth of Christ, when certain men seem to have departed from the pristine simplicity in the conflict concerning images. For the image-breakers, in order to attack images, sought among other things also an argument from the Eucharist, asserting that the bread and wine in the Holy Eucharist are the only one image of Christ, as is in action six of volume three of the Acts of the Second Synod of Nicaea, volume five of the Councils (Acts of the Second Synod of Nicaea, act 6, vol. 3; Councils, vol. 5).

The defenders of images contradicted them, as Epiphanius in the cited place (Epiphanius, ibid.) and John Damascene, first a Monk, afterward a Presbyter in Palestine, who says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 4, ch. 14): The bread and wine are not a figure of the body and blood of Christ; let this be absent, but even the very Deified body of the Lord, the Lord himself saying: This is my, not figure of the body, but body, and not figure of the blood, but blood. However, he so teaches that the bread and wine are truly the body and blood of Christ, that nevertheless he makes no indication of transubstantiation by any word, but he says that the divinity is conjoined to the bread and wine and thus they become the body and blood of the Lord in a thoroughly inscrutable manner. The body, he says, is conjoined to the divinity according to truth, the body which is from the holy virgin: not that the assumed body itself descended from heaven, but that the bread and wine themselves are transmuted into the body and blood of God. But if you require the manner, by what way it is done, let it be enough for you to hear that the word of God is true and efficacious and omnipotent, but the manner is inscrutable. And afterward: Isaiah saw a coal, but the coal is not simple, but united to fire; thus the bread of communion is not simple bread, but united to the divinity.

Thus it began to be disputed concerning figures in the Eastern Church. Thence the controversy flowed into the West, so that there also they began to inquire whether the bread and wine were only signs and figures of an absent body and blood, or truly the very body and the very blood of Christ in truth, especially because a certain John Scotus had proposed the opinion concerning naked signs and figures in a specific book, which however no longer exists.

The emperor Charles the Bald, in the ninth century, disturbed by the new question, proposed the matter to be explained by Bertram, then a Presbyter of Corbie, who also wrote a Book on the Body and Blood of the Lord to Charles the Great, that is, the Bald (Bertram, Book on the Body and Blood of the Lord), where in the preface he testifies concerning the controversy that had arisen with these words: Certain of the faithful say that the mystery of the body and blood of Christ, which is celebrated daily in the Church, is done under no figure, under no veiling, but is performed with a naked manifestation of truth itself; but certain ones testify that these things are contained under the figure of a mystery and it is one thing which appears to the bodily senses, but another which faith beholds, and no small diversity is discerned to be among them. Furthermore, he inclines much toward the opinion of Scotus concerning figures and signs of an absent body. His book exists in the Orthodoxographs.

Thence Paschasius Radbertus, at that time Abbot of Corbie, likewise wrote a Book on the Body and Blood of the Lord to the Abbot Placidus (Paschasius Radbertus, Book on the Body and Blood of the Lord), by which he seems to want to refute Bertram, although his name is suppressed. It exists in volume six of the third edition of the Library of the Fathers. He is entirely occupied in asserting that the Eucharist is not only a figure, but also the very body and blood of the Lord in an ineffable mystery, the reason and manner of which is plainly incomprehensible to us, but that he still acknowledged true bread and wine after consecration is evident from chapter ten (Paschasius Radbertus, Book on the Body and Blood of the Lord, ch. 10). Therefore, he says, the mystery of salvation is rightly celebrated in the same substance, because Christ is the bread which descends from heaven and the wine which gladdens the hearts of believers. And afterward: Providently indeed in the bread and wine without any decoloration of substance this mystery is performed inwardly by divine force and power. And in the Exposition of the Words (Paschasius Radbertus, Exposition of the Words): And as they were eating: He says, The same and very blood was already in the cup, which was also in the body, just as the flesh or body was in the bread.

Others followed him afterward, and while they instituted a refutation of the defenders of the figure and signs, they deflected too much into the other part, such as in the tenth century Fulbert, Bishop of Chartres, who says in his first Epistle to Deodatus in volume three of the Great Library of the Fathers (Fulbert of Chartres, Epistles, ep. 1, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 3): That substance of bread and wine which appeared outwardly, now becomes the body and blood inwardly. And afterward: The earthly matter, transcending the merit of its nature and kind, is commuted into the substance of Christ. And again: He has the power to transfuse the creatures into the substance of his body.

The disciple of Fulbert was Berengarius, a Deacon of Angers in Gaul in the eleventh century, who discovered that his Preceptor and others spoke less correctly concerning the Eucharist, as if a substantial change were made in the bread and wine through consecration, and therefore he opposed himself to them, but deceived by the book of Scotus which he had read, as Lanfranc testifies, at that time Bishop of Canterbury in England, in his Book on the Sacrament of the Eucharist in volume three of the Great Library of the Fathers (Lanfranc, Book on the Sacrament of the Eucharist, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 3), he slipped into the other extreme, so as to assert that the bread and wine are only signs of the body and blood of Christ.

Hence the question was agitated with greater contention and they were already beginning to hate each other and condemn each other of heresy in this divorce of opinions, and Berengarius was driven by force and threats to abjure his doctrine. Having been condemned already in several councils under Pope Nicholas II, a certain Humbert of Burgundy, recently made a Cardinal, dictated the formula of the oath, which is contained in the works of Lanfranc and in the Canon Law concerning consecration, distinction two, chapter Ego Berengarius (Gratian, Decretum, de consecratione, dist. 2, ch. Ego Berengarius): I, Berengarius, swear that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, after consecration are not only a Sacrament, but also the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and are sensually, not only in the sacrament, but in truth, handled and broken by the hands of the Priests and crushed by the teeth of the faithful, as the words of the oath have it.

Afterward, when Berengarius vehemently pursued Humbert and the Roman Church, especially because they determined that the substance of the bread and wine by no means survives on the altar after consecration, which Lanfranc likewise testifies, Pope Hildebrand, called Gregory VII, anew drove him to swear to his words, having convened the sixth Roman Council for this purpose, in the Acts of which in volume seven of the Councils and in Baronius, volume eleven, year 1079, number two (Acts of the Roman Council VI, in Councils, vol. 7; Baronius, Ecclesiastical Annals, vol. 11, year 1079, no. 2), the words of the oath among other things have it thus: I, Berengarius, believe in my heart and confess with my mouth, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, through the mystery of the sacred prayer and the words of our redeemer, are substantially converted into the true and proper and life-giving flesh and blood of Jesus Christ our Lord, etc.

Lanfranc wrote his Book on the Sacrament of the Eucharist against Berengarius (Lanfranc, Book on the Sacrament of the Eucharist). Adelmannus also, Bishop of Brescia, who himself had been his fellow-disciple under Fulbert, wrote a hortatory Epistle to him, so that he would desist from his purpose, in volume three of the Great Library of the Fathers (Adelmannus, Epistle to Berengarius, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 3). Guitmund, Bishop of Aversa in Gaul, opposed three books concerning the truth of the Eucharist to him and his followers in volume six of the Great Library of the Fathers (Guitmund of Aversa, On the Truth of the Eucharist, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 6). And this man indeed, in book two, immediately at the beginning denies that the bread and wine in the Eucharist are corrupted: To us, he says, that heavenly bread of God is never corrupted, it never putrefies. He adds that corruption appears only according to the species, and thus the bread is not gnawed by mice, but can be seen in such a species, and that under those species is truly the body of Christ. The Greeks meanwhile do not seem to have been infected by this error.

Theophylact, Bishop of the Bulgarians, who flourished among the Greeks in this century, speaks inconsistently indeed, while he refutes the naked figures which some contrived, yet he does not feel the same with the Latins. In his Commentary on Matthew 26 (Theophylact, Commentary on Matthew, ch. 26) he says: By an ineffable operation it is transformed (μεταποιεῖται), even if it seems to be bread to us. And on Mark 14 (Theophylact, Commentary on Mark, ch. 14): Condescending to our infirmity, he preserves indeed the species (εἶδος) of the bread and wine, but it is transelementated (μεταστοιχειοῖ) into the virtue of flesh and blood. But he does not speak of a substantial change, because he says that the transelementation is made into the virtue (εἰς δύναμιν) of flesh and blood, and because in his Commentary on John 6 (Theophylact, Commentary on John, ch. 6) he writes that he who eats Christ is transelementated into him. Indeed, Moses Bar-Kepha, the Syrian Bishop who lived around these times, in part one of his Commentary on Paradise in volume one of the Great Library of the Fathers (Moses Bar-Kepha, Commentary on Paradise, part 1, in The Great Library of the Fathers, vol. 1) says that Christ gave his body in the bread and his blood in the wine, which is the custom of speaking of the ancient Fathers.

But the Berengarian conflict lasted for a long time in the Latin Church. In the twelfth century, the Scholastic Algerus of Liege likewise opposed three books to the Berengarians concerning the Sacraments of the Lord’s body and blood, in volume six of the Library of the Fathers (Algerus of Liege, On the Sacraments of the Lord’s Body and Blood, in The Library of the Fathers, vol. 6). In book one, chapter two, among other things he says (Algerus of Liege, On the Sacraments of the Lord’s Body and Blood, book 1, ch. 2): Since those species are without the substance of bread and wine, how they can grow moldy and putrefy rather than be digested, the cause is not easily apparent. They can nevertheless be seen to be moldy and putrid, although they are not so. Thus therefore those who opposed Berengarius said that the substance of the bread and wine is converted or changed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, and they defended transubstantiation with great effort, although they did not yet usurp the vocabulary of transubstantiation.

Algerus also recounts in the Prologue equally, as Guitmund did before, the diverse opinions which were then among the doctors. For the preposterous inquiry into the manner, to which they had then given themselves over, cannot but produce diverse opinions and quarrels. Among other things he says thus in book one, chapter six (Algerus of Liege, On the Sacraments of the Lord’s Body and Blood, book 1, ch. 6): Certain men, erring concerning certain words of the Saints, say that Christ is so personally impanated in the bread, just as God is personally incarnate in human flesh. This heresy, which he calls new, he says he will extirpate by the roots. However, this opinion is attributed to Rupert, Abbot of Deutz, by what right I do not now dispute, it suffices that he did not approve of transubstantiation. It is evident from On the Divine Offices, book two, chapter nine (Rupert of Deutz, On the Divine Offices, book 2, ch. 9), and Commentary on Exodus, book two, chapter ten (Rupert of Deutz, Commentary on Exodus, book 2, ch. 10), where he has these words: He does not change or destroy the substance of the bread and wine according to the exterior species subjected to the five senses, when he conjoins these things to the same word into the unity of the same body which hung on the cross and of his same blood which he poured out from his side.

Peter Lombard also, Bishop of Paris, in book four, distinction eleven (Peter Lombard, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11), although he prefers the dogma of transubstantiation, nevertheless indicates not obscurely that others at that time still felt and could feel otherwise, provided that they defended the substantial presence of the body of Christ. But if it is asked, he says, what kind of conversion this is, formal, or substantial, or of another kind, I am not sufficient to define it. Among other opinions he reports this one also, that the bread and wine remain: But others, he says, thought that the substance of the bread and wine remains there and that the body and blood of Christ are in the same place, and for this reason that substance is said to become this one, because where this is, that is also, which is a marvel.

Hence an occasion was given to the Scholastic doctors to dispute what should be felt concerning transubstantiation. But the necessity of defending this dogma was injected into them through the Lateran Council under Pope Innocent III at the beginning of the thirteenth century, which also usurped the vocabulary of transubstantiation and gave an occasion to others to usurp it. In its decrees, chapter one, volume seven of the Councils (Decrees of the Lateran Council, ch. 1, in Councils, vol. 7), these words are contained: Jesus Christ himself is the same Priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly contained in the Sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, the bread having been transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood by divine power.

The same Innocent wrote a Treatise on the Office of the Mass (Innocent III, Treatise on the Office of the Mass). In part two, chapter twenty-six, he recounts three opinions approved by doctors; the first is that the bread remains and the true body is present under the bread; the second, that the bread does not remain, nor is it changed, but it ceases to be; the third, that the bread is changed into the body of Christ and the wine into the blood of Christ. Afterward he adds: Any one of these wished to save this common point, that the body of Christ is truly there, because to deny that is plainly against the faith. Whence he seems to have felt that it is not against the faith if anyone should determine that the substance of the bread remains.

Alexander of Hales, in the fourth part of his Summa, which he wrote by the command of Pope Innocent IV (Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 4), in member one and following, defends by all means that the whole substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ and that this is not an annihilation, but a change for the better, and that the returned substance of the bread nourishes and putrefies and generates worms, and he subsequently appeals to Innocent III. But in this he confesses that he dissents from him in question forty-five, member one, article two (Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 4, q. 45, membr. 1, art. 2), that the body of Christ ceases to be there and the substance of the bread returns when it is swallowed by a brute animal, which was the opinion of Innocent; on the contrary, he himself says: If a dog or a pig were to swallow the consecrated host whole, I do not see why or how the body of the Lord would not be passed simultaneously with the species into the belly of the dog or pig.

The disciples of Alexander were Thomas and Bonaventure, of whom the former in part three, question seventy-five, article two (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part 3, q. 75, art. 2) says that this position, that the bread remains, is to be avoided as heretical; that the bread is converted into the substance of the body of Christ, but is not annihilated. In question seventy-seven, article five (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part 3, q. 77, art. 5), that something is generated from the species without substance and that the same nourish. In question eighty, article three, ad three (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part 3, q. 80, art. 3, ad 3): The substance of the body of Christ does not cease to be under the species of the bread, even if a mouse or a dog eats the consecrated host.

Bonaventure, although he consents with Alexander and Thomas in other things, nevertheless dissents from them in this, that they determine that a mouse or a dog swallows the body of Christ, in book four of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, question one (Bonaventure, Sentences, book 4, dist. 13, q. 1). However much, he says, this opinion may be fortified, nevertheless pious ears abhor to hear this, that the body of Christ is in the belly of a mouse or in a sewer, as long as the species subsist there. Thence others in subsequent times restrained themselves from this question.

In the fourteenth century, John Duns Scotus, although he himself also defends transubstantiation, nevertheless does not think it is held except on account of the authority of the Church, especially on account of the definition of Innocent III in the Lateran Council. In book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question three (John Duns Scotus, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 3), when he had solved the arguments of Thomas, he determines the question and among other things says thus: But principally it seems to admonish that concerning the sacraments it must be held just as the holy Roman Church holds, as is contained in the Extravagantes concerning heretics at the section ad abolendam (Decretals of Gregory IX, Extravagantes on Heretics, ch. ad abolendam). But now she herself holds that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood. Hence he subjoins the words of the said council. And he subjoins: It must be said that the Church has declared that this understanding is of the truth of the faith in that symbol published under Innocent III in the Lateran Council: We firmly believe, etc. And briefly, whatever is said there to be believed, must be held to be of the substance of the faith, and this after that solemn declaration made by the Church. In many things also in explaining transubstantiation he dissents from the others, while he teaches that the body of Christ can be present in the Eucharist even without conversion, distinction twenty, question one and following (John Duns Scotus, Sentences, dist. 20, q. 1); that the substance of the bread is annihilated, distinction eleven, question (John Duns Scotus, Sentences, dist. 11, q.); and other such things.

Durandus of Saint-Pourçain likewise teaches that the substance of the bread not only can remain, but also that this opinion, that it remains, is much easier to explain and more accommodating, but that the opposite is held on account of the definition of the Church, book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question one, section nine (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1, sec. 9). Although, he says, this manner is of fact, it must not however be denied that another manner is possible for God, namely so that God could cause that, with the substance of the bread and wine remaining, the body and blood of Christ would be in this Sacrament. The first is evident by the authorities of the Saints and from the determination of the Church. And section fourteen (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1, sec. 14): It is also hard enough and seems to derogate from the immensity of divine power, to say that God cannot make his body to be in the Sacrament through another manner than through the conversion of the substance of the bread into himself, especially since by positing that a conversion is made, it is most difficult to see how it contributes anything to this, that the body of Christ is in the Sacrament. Section fifteen (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1, sec. 15): But because this manner must not be held of fact, since the Church has determined the opposite, which is not presumed to err in such matters, therefore holding the other part of fact, we must respond to the arguments.

In question three, section five (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 3, sec. 5), he confirms that not the whole substance of the bread is destroyed, but only the form, while the matter remains and is constituted under the form of the body of Christ. And he subjoins: But the other manner, which is more commonly held, is unintelligible, nor is one of these more approved or reprobated by the Church than the other. Nor is it fitting to superadd difficulties of faith to difficulties, but rather according to the document of Scripture we must endeavor to elucidate obscurities.

Thus the Scholastics saw that the opinion that the bread remains is more probable and less difficult to explain, but on account of the definition of the Church, that is, of the Lateran Council, they did not dare to protect that which seemed probable to them and which they could better defend. But all were so immersed in darkness that they did not judge themselves to sin by scrutinizing the manner in the mystery, or they were ignorant that they were scrutinizing the manner. Durandus, in the cited place, question one, section six (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1, sec. 6), says: It must be noticed that since among all the miracles which our faith contains, this is one of the greatest. And soon after: He who is not pleased by this manner which we intend to posit, let him study to posit another, and let him know that perhaps it will suffer as many or more calumnies than ours; nor will it suffice for anyone to say in general that there is another manner, although unknown and hidden to us, because any idiot and ignorant person could say this. Thus therefore, by their own confession, the cause does not lie hidden why they were implicated in such absurd and inept opinions.

At this very time Nicholas Cabasilas, the Greek Bishop of Thessalonica, wrote an Exposition of the Mass, which is contained in volume twelve of the Library (Nicholas Cabasilas, Exposition of the Mass, in The Library, vol. 12), in which he still speaks of the bread after consecration as of true bread. Among other things, in chapter thirty-seven (Nicholas Cabasilas, Exposition of the Mass, ch. 37), he recounts the ancient custom of the Greeks then still observed, by which they poured a little warm water into the already consecrated wine to signify the descent of the Holy Spirit into the Church. How could they have done this without expiation, if they had thought that there was nothing but the blood of the Lord in the cup? Furthermore, also in the Latin Church John Wycliffe the Englishman with great effort proved and publicly defended that the bread remains after consecration, in the Trialogue, book four, chapter four (John Wycliffe, Trialogue, book 4, ch. 4).

Huss and the Hussites followed in his footsteps in the fifteenth century, as is evident from the Treatise of John Huss on the Body of Christ, part one of his works (John Huss, Treatise on the Body of Christ, part 1). And therefore in the Council of Constance he was accused because he had approved the articles of Wycliffe, session fifteen of the Acts of that Council, volume seven of the Councils (Acts of the Council of Constance, sess. 15, in Councils, vol. 7). But the first two articles of Wycliffe condemned in that Council were these: The material substance of the bread and similarly the material substance of the wine remains in the Sacrament of the altar. The accidents of the bread do not remain without a subject in the same Sacrament, as they are referred in session eight (Acts of the Council of Constance, sess. 8).

In the Council of Basel indeed, among the four articles which the Bohemians offered to the Council, and which exist in the Appendix of the Acts of that Council, volume eight of the Councils (Appendix to the Acts of the Council of Basel, in Councils, vol. 8), that one concerning transubstantiation is not posited; nevertheless John of Ragusa, in his oration on Communion under both species (John of Ragusa, Oration on Communion Under Both Species), which he held in that Council against the Bohemians, having adduced the arguments of Thomas, attempts to prove that in no way does the substance of the bread and wine remain after consecration, and that the opposite is entirely heretical. Pope Eugene IV disturbed this Council, having convoked in its place the Council of Florence in Italy, to which came John Palaiologos, the Greek Emperor, and Joseph the Patriarch of Constantinople with many other Eastern Bishops.

There, when they had disputed much concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit and the addition to the symbol, the Latins urged that they should also act concerning other controversies, and among them concerning the consecration of the sacramental matter. But the Greeks responded that they did not have the faculty to act concerning these things from the Eastern Synod, yet privately they wished to speak their opinion, as is in the Acts of the Council of Florence, session twenty-five, volume eight of the Councils (Acts of the Council of Florence, sess. 25, in Councils, vol. 8). In the subsequent acts these words are contained: Then they discoursed concerning the sacred bread, that the words of the Lord consecrate and transmute it into the body of Christ, but not the prayers of the Priests. Here indeed the controversy was most powerfully concerning the words by which the consecration is made, yet nevertheless the question concerning the substantial change of the bread was implicated. And this is evident from the decree of Eugene IV to the Armenians, who arrived when the Synod was already dissolved, near the end of the Acts (Eugene IV, Decree to the Armenians, in Acts of the Council of Florence), where among other things he says thus: By the virtue of the words themselves the substance of the bread is converted into the body of Christ, and the substance of the wine into the blood, yet so that the whole Christ is contained under the species of the bread and the whole under the species of the wine.

Accordingly, the Greeks and Armenians did not know that dogma which Eugene inculcated into them with such solicitude, although Bessarion, the Bishop of Nicaea, created a Cardinal of the Roman Church by Eugene, consented with the Latins and wrote a book against Mark of Ephesus concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist, in which he also protects transubstantiation, volume six of the Library of the Fathers (Bessarion of Nicaea, Book Against Mark of Ephesus on the Sacrament of the Eucharist, in The Library of the Fathers, vol. 6). The Scholastics meanwhile, following the example of Scotus and Durandus, asserted that transubstantiation is believed on account of the definition of the Church, but that the other opinion, that the bread remains, has fewer difficulties, whatever the Thomists determined to the contrary. Peter of Ailly, the Cardinal Bishop of Cambrai, in book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question six, article one (Peter of Ailly, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 6, art. 1), speaks thus: The third opinion was that the substance of the bread remains. Whatever however may be concerning this, it is evident that that manner is possible and is not repugnant to reason, nor to the authority of the Bible; rather it is easier to understand and more reasonable than any of the others, which posits that the substance of the bread abandons the accidents without a subject, which is one of the difficult things which are posited here.

Therefore, when Luther found this question thus prepared in the sixteenth century, not undeservedly he himself also began to doubt whether the Roman Church, having followed Thomas and the Thomists in this part, was teaching correctly, concerning which matter he himself testifies in his book on the Babylonian Captivity, chapter on the Lord’s Supper, volume two of the Jena Latin edition (Martin Luther, On the Babylonian Captivity, ch. On the Lord’s Supper, in Jena Latin Edition, vol. 2). Formerly, he says, when I was drinking in Scholastic Theology, the Lord Cardinal of Cambrai gave me an occasion of thinking, disputing most acutely in book four of the Sentences (Peter of Ailly, Sentences), that it is much more probable and fewer superfluous miracles are posited, if it were asserted that true bread and true wine are on the altar, and not however only accidents, unless the Church had determined the contrary. Afterward, seeing what Church it was which had determined this, namely the Thomistic, that is, the Aristotelian, I became bolder, and I who was sticking between a rock and a sacred place, finally stabilized my conscience in the prior opinion. But this opinion of Thomas so fluctuates without Scriptures and reason, that he seems to me to have known neither his own Philosophy nor Dialectic. For Aristotle speaks far otherwise concerning accidents and subject than Saint Thomas, so that it seems to me to be lamented for such a great man, who attempted to deliver opinions in matters of faith not only from Aristotle, but also to establish them upon him whom he did not understand, a most unhappy structure of a most unhappy foundation.

Besides, Luther left it free for the adversaries to opine what they wished, provided that they did not condemn as heresy that opinion that the bread remains, which he immediately adds: Permit therefore whoever will to hold either opinion; this only I now do, that I may take away the scruples of consciences from the midst, lest anyone fear the iron of heresy, if he should believe that true bread and true wine are on the altar. This moderation of Luther ought deservedly to have been accepted by the untimely defenders of the new dogma. Furthermore, he adds this admonition also in the following things as most worthy of noting: What shall we say here? when we make Aristotle and human doctrines the censors of such sublime and divine matters? Why, with that curiosity having been exploded, do we not simply stick to the words of Christ, prepared to be ignorant of whatever is done there, and content that the true body of Christ is present there by the virtue of the words? Is it necessary to altogether comprehend the manners of divine operation?

But notwithstanding these and other pious monitions, and also solid probations, the adversaries did not cease to obtrude their opinion concerning transubstantiation upon the Church as a necessary dogma and article of faith, but even in the Council of Trent, from which an emendation of abuses was to be hoped for, under Julius III, an anathema was pronounced upon those who would not approve an article of faith contrived the day before yesterday. Its words are, session thirteen, canon two (Council of Trent, session 13, canon 2): If anyone shall have said that in the Sacrosanct Sacrament of the Eucharist the substance of the bread and wine remains together with the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and shall have denied that marvelous and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the body and of the whole substance of the wine into the blood, with only the species of bread and wine remaining, which conversion indeed the Catholic Church most aptly calls transubstantiation, let him be anathema. Hence, what the opinion of the more recent doctors is, becomes evident.

CHAPTER I. Argument for the antithesis.

That without which the truth of the words of Christ cannot be saved: This is my body, that must necessarily be asserted. But without transubstantiation the truth of those words of Christ cannot be saved. For since the word “this” denotes the bread, the proposition is accepted either properly or improperly; if improperly, the bread will be called only a figure of the body of Christ; if properly, the bread either unchanged will be called the body of Christ, which is impossible, since the subject and predicate suppose for the same thing, but here a disparate thing is spoken of a disparate thing, or changed, and thus transubstantiation is inferred. Therefore transubstantiation must be asserted. Thus Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, and others.

1. I answer. We deny the Minor premise, because thus the best and most outstanding Scholastic doctors themselves have taught us. Scotus in book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question three (John Duns Scotus, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 3). If you say, he says, just as one doctor says (Thomas), that in Matthew 26 by saying, This is my body, he expressly insinuates that the bread does not remain, because then the proposition would be false. This does not compel, because given that the substance of the bread were to remain, the substance of the bread is not demonstrated, but the content under the bread; just as now the accidents are not demonstrated, because then the proposition would be false, but the sense is: This being contained under that sensible sign is my body. Durandus in book four, distinction eleven, question one, section fifteen (Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1, sec. 15): On account of the third, he says, similarly it is not fitting to say that the substance of the bread does not remain, because from the fact that the body of Christ is posited to be really in this sacrament, a true locution can be rendered for it, so that not only is it said the body of Christ is this, but it is said, this, that is, the content under this is my body, because an indefinite is verified for one alone. Nor is it fitting that the substance of the bread should be demonstrated, given that it were there, just as it is not fitting that a demonstration should be made of the species existing in the same place. With these agree Paludanus in book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question one (Peter of Palude, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 1), Ockham in book four of the Sentences, distinction eleven, question six (William of Ockham, Sentences, book 4, dist. 11, q. 6), in Quodlibet four, question thirty (William of Ockham, Quodlibeta, quodlibet 4, q. 30), and others. And therefore Bellarmine himself in book three on the Eucharist, chapter twenty-three (Robert Bellarmine, On the Eucharist, book 3, ch. 23), says: Even if the Scripture which we have adduced above seems to us so clear that it could compel a man who is not impudent, nevertheless whether it is so can deservedly be doubted, since most learned and acute men, such as Scotus especially was, feel the contrary.

2. Who has so constricted the omnipotence of God, that he would think that he cannot make the words of Christ, This is my body, true without a substantial change, since on account of any accidental union occurring very often in common speech it is rightly said: This is wine, pointing out the cask; this is money, pointing out the purse; this is oats, pointing out the sack; this is meat, pointing out the dish; this is an infant, pointing out the cradle, and thus in a thousand other things in which the subject and predicate stand for the same thing, which has resulted from the mere accidental union of two things? For not only by themselves, but also by accident certain things are called the same and one, and this in various manners according to all categories, according to Aristotle in book five of the Metaphysics, chapter six (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 5, ch. 6). Nor is there reason for them to say that thus the trope of Synecdoche is inferred upon the words of Christ. For I deny that this is a Synecdochic or Tropical locution, since always the subject in the proposition is a certain whole, but the predicate is a part, as man is an animal, man is white.

3. The truth of such propositions is more saved if a certain change intervenes, as if water is poured into wine, or sugar is put into it, if iron becomes white-hot, if a silver cup is gilded, if cloths are connected by thread and become a garment, if woods are bound together by glue, which things Aristotle refers to those which are one by themselves in book five of the Metaphysics, chapter four (Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 5, ch. 4). Nor do we deny that the bread is changed or that it is converted into the body of Christ, as the ancient doctors of the Church speak. For from common bread it becomes sacred bread, it becomes the communication of the body of Christ, it becomes the very body of Christ, because, although before the consecration it would not be called the body of Christ, after the consecration it is called and is the body of Christ; but that change is not substantial, but accidental.

4. Still more the truth of such propositions is saved, if a mystery is involved in them, just as Peter says to Christ: You are the Son of the living God, Matthew 16:16. Jacob said, pointing out the Angels appearing in visible form: This is the camp of God, Genesis 32:2. Moses said as the ark was advancing: Let the Lord arise, Numbers 10:39. John, having seen the dove, said that he had seen the Holy Spirit descending, Matthew 3:16, John 1:32, namely because in a singular manner which is not thoroughly known to us by all things, God and the Angels were present to these symbols and were manifesting themselves through them. Thus Christ also could rightly say: This is my body, because his body in a mystery incomprehensible to us is both present to the bread and is one thing with it. In a personal proposition the foundation is personal identity, thus in sacramental propositions the foundation is mystical and sacramental identity, by which two things become one sacrament, one Eucharist, one food nourishing us unto eternal life. For the unanimous consensus of the Church is that the manner how this is the body of Christ is hidden to us in a mystery, known to God alone. Let the adversaries put a measure not to the omnipotence of God, but to their own curiosity, and there will be no controversy.

CHAPTER II. Argument from the fathers.

Cyprian in his Sermon on the Lord’s Supper (Cyprian, Sermon on the Lord’s Supper) says that the bread is not in appearance, but changed in nature then made flesh by the omnipotence of the word. But whoever the author was, he does not speak concerning the destruction of the nature of the bread, but concerning the addition of a new nature and virtue; for he immediately subjoins: Just as in the person of Christ humanity was seen and divinity lay hidden; so into the visible Sacrament the divine essence infuses itself ineffably. And in the antecedent things: The nourishment of immortality is given differing from common foods, retaining the species of corporeal substance, but proving the presence to be present by the invisible efficiency of divine virtue.

Cyril of Jerusalem in Mystagogical Catechesis four (Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catecheses, cat. 4) says: Under the species of bread the body is given to you and under the species of wine the blood is given to you, and below: Knowing this and holding it as most certain, that this bread which is seen by us is not bread, even if the taste feels it to be bread.

1. But Cyril has ἐν τύπῳ (in the type) of the bread, that is, in the bread which is the type and sign of the body of Christ, just as the other Fathers also speak. And by this reason he calls the body the ἀντίτυπον (antitype) in Mystagogical Catechesis five (Cyril of Jerusalem, Mystagogical Catecheses, cat. 5). Tasting, he says, they are not commanded to taste the bread and wine, but the ἀντίτυπον σῶμα (antitype body) and blood of Christ.

2. When he says that this bread is not bread, he subunderstands, naked. For thus he speaks from Justin and Irenaeus in the preceding words: Therefore do not consider them ὡς ψιλοῖς (as naked) as naked bread and naked wine. And in Catechesis three concerning the sanctified Ointment (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catecheses, cat. 3) he says: See that you do not think it is μύρον ψιλόν (naked ointment) naked ointment; and he immediately adds: Just as the bread of the Eucharist after the invocation of the holy Spirit is no longer λιτὸς (simple) simple, common bread.

Ambrose in the book concerning those who are initiated into the mysteries, chapter nine (Ambrose, On Those Who Are Initiated Into the Mysteries, ch. 9), says that this is not what nature formed, but what the blessing consecrated, and that the force of the blessing is greater than that of nature, because by the blessing even nature itself is changed. But he thinks that the nature of the bread is changed in such a way, that it may be what it was and be commuted into another thing, so that the prior nature remains and is carried up into a better state through the new added one. For the examples which he subjoins demonstrate this, as in the red sea the water separated itself, the Jordan was turned backward, the rock vomited water, iron swam, fire descended from heaven, in which no transubstantiation was made. Hence he subjoins: Therefore cannot the word of Christ, which could make from nothing what did not exist, change those things which exist into that which they were not? For it is not less to give new natures to things than to change natures.

Gregory of Nyssa in the Catechetical Oration, chapter thirty-seven (Gregory of Nyssa, Catechetical Oration, ch. 37), writes that the bread sanctified by the word of God is transmuted into the body of God the Word, not indeed through transubstantiation, but through sanctification and the inhabitation, as he speaks, of the Word. He treats the question there, how the body of Christ distributed whole through a part is in each one and remains whole in itself, and he gives a certain congruous reason for the Catechumens, although by no means exhausting this mystery, because his body was nourished by bread, and the bread through that nutrition came into the communion of the Deity; likewise he says that we also are nourished by the bread sanctified by the inhabiting Word, which by power was that body of Christ, and thus the body of Christ, although it remains whole and undivided in itself, is distributed to many. But from this it follows much more that the bread is not substantially changed, because we are thus nourished by it just as the body of Christ was nourished by it. And therefore he says at the end of the chapter that Christ inserts himself into us, for whom the σύστασις (consistency) consistency is out of bread and wine, so that through union with that which is immortal, man also may become a partaker of incorruption. Moreover, he gives these things by the virtue of the blessing, μεταστοιχειώσας τῶν φαινομένων τὴν φύσιν (transelementating the nature of the things seen) transelementating the nature of the things which are seen into it, namely by elevating the bread and wine above their proper nature and virtue.

Nothing can be concluded from the word transmutation. For the Greeks use it for any change whatever. And in the same place in the antecedent things Nyssa says: The body affected by death by God, when it is within ours, μεταποιεῖ καὶ μετατίθησιν (transmutes and transfers) transmutes and transfers the whole into itself. And soon after: He μετεποίησεν (transmuted) transmutes the universe into his nature.

PROLEGOMENA:

Amongst the numerous errors of the papacy, one which the Evangelical (Lutheran) churches stand opposed to is the sacrilegious practice of withholding the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist under the form of wine from the people. Against the clear institution of Christ, the Roman church has decided, despite her recognition that Christ and the ancient Orthodox Church instituted and practiced communion according to the Word of the Lord, that she by her own authority has decreed the validity of communion under a single kind only, namely, the body under the form of bread.

This is set forth in two major decrees; the first from the Council of Constance (1414-1418) which says: “Certain people, in some parts of the world, have rashly dared to assert that the christian people ought to receive the holy sacrament of the eucharist under the forms of both bread and wine. They communicate the laity everywhere not only under the form of bread but also under that of wine, and they stubbornly assert that they should communicate even after a meal, or else without the need of a fast, contrary to the church’s custom which has been laudably and sensibly approved, from the church’s head downwards, but which they damnably try to repudiate as sacrilegious. Therefore this present general council of Constance, legitimately assembled in the holy Spirit, wishing to provide for the safety of the faithful against this error, after long deliberation by many persons learned in divine and human law, declares, decrees and defines that, although Christ instituted this venerable sacrament after a meal and ministered it to his apostles under the forms of both bread and wine, nevertheless and notwithstanding this, the praiseworthy authority of the sacred canons and the approved custom of the church have and do retain that this sacrament ought not to be celebrated after a meal nor received by the faithful without fasting, except in cases of sickness or some other necessity as permitted by law or by the church. Moreover, just as this custom was sensibly introduced in order to avoid various dangers and scandals, so with similar or even greater reason was it possible to introduce and sensibly observe the custom that, although this sacrament was received by the faithful under both kinds in the early church, nevertheless later it was received under both kinds only by those confecting it, and by the laity only under the form of bread. For it should be very firmly believed, and in no way doubted, that the whole body and blood of Christ are truly contained under both the form of bread and the form of wine. Therefore, since this custom was introduced for good reasons by the church and holy fathers, and has been observed for a very long time, it should be held as a law which nobody may repudiate or alter at will without the church’s permission. To say that the observance of this custom or law is sacrilegious or illicit must be regarded as erroneous. Those who stubbornly assert the opposite of the aforesaid are to be confined as heretics and severely punished by the local bishops or their officials or the inquisitors of heresy in the kingdoms or provinces in which anything is attempted or presumed against this decree, according to the canonical and legitimate sanctions that have been wisely established in favour of the catholic faith against heretics and their supporters” (Sess. XIII, 1415).

Likewise, in response to the reformation, the Council of Trent reaffirms: “I. If any one saith, that, by the precept of God, or, by necessity of salvation, all and each of the faithful of Christ ought to receive both species of the most holy sacrament not consecrating; let him be anathema. II. If any one saith, that the holy Catholic Church was not induced, by just causes and reasons, to communicate, under the species of bread only, laymen, and also clerics when not consecrating; let him be anathema” (Sess. XXI, Canons 1-2, 1562).

This is demonstrated further by their common practice, where only the priest is permitted to receive both kinds of the Sacrament, as it has broadly been in numerous places for over 600 years now. This dogma was rightly attacked by all churches of the reformation as being both contrary to Scripture and opposed to the ancient and orthodox Church. However, Rome has nevertheless continued unrepentant in her opposition to the Word of God and continued to attack the true teaching preserved in our churches to this day. Because of this, to vindicate and defend the truth, as well as strengthen the conscience of the weaker brethren, it has seemed right to write an article defending the practice of our churches who desire to build their doctrine upon the Word of God rather than the word of men (Mark 7:6-7). May God open my lips, that my mouth shall show forth His praise. Amen.

THE ANTITHESIS OF OUR CHURCHES & STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY:

In order that we might proceed with clarity, it is important that we first define the status of controversy, so that misunderstanding may be avoided, and that the point of this article not be missed. Hence, we make state the following observations that are to be considered:

I. The question is not whether Communion under both species is free, or one offers a more full sign to be preferred over another, but whether it is necessary by virtue of Christ’s institution, and thus a divine command.

II. The question is not whether it is necessary only for Priests and those consecrating, but whether for all Communicants who wish to rightly receive the sacrament.

Bellarmine (Bk. IV, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Ch, XX) thus formulates the question well; “Whether it is necessary that the Eucharist be participated under both species, or is it enough under one?” (either one). This we and our churches affirm, the Papists deny.

III. The question is not whether from ecclesiastical antiquity can be produced certain examples of some who received only the Eucharistic bread, but not the cup; for we do not argue from examples, nor do they make a rule, nor do they serve as a rule or norm for determining and settling questions of doctrine, but the question is about the words of Institution, and whether from them a divine mandate regarding taking of communion under both species should be observed (there will be a lengthy section of the this work dedicated to a treatment of the fathers).

Within the Evangelical Church we confess;

I. In the Augsburg Confession, “To the laity are given Both Kinds in the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, because this usage has the commandment of the Lord in Matt. 26:27: Drink ye all of it, where Christ has manifestly commanded concerning the cup that all should drink. And lest any man should craftily say that this refers only to priests, Paul in 1 Cor. 11:27 recites an example from which it appears that the whole congregation did use both kinds. And this usage has long remained in the Church, nor is it known when, or by whose authority, it was changed; although Cardinal Cusanus mentions the time when it was approved… Only custom, not so ancient, has it otherwise. But it is evident that any custom introduced against the commandments of God is not to be allowed, as the Canons witness (dist. III., cap. Veritate, and the following chapters). But this custom has been received, not only against the Scripture, but also against the old Canons and the example of the Church. Therefore, if any preferred to use both kinds of the Sacrament, they ought not to have been compelled with offense to their consciences to do otherwise. And because the division of the Sacrament does not agree with the ordinance of Christ, we are accustomed to omit the procession, which hitherto has been in use” (Aug. XXII).

II. In the Defence of the Augsburg Confession, “It cannot be doubted that it is godly and in accordance with the institution of Christ and the words of Paul to use both parts in the Lord’s Supper. For Christ instituted both parts, and instituted them not for a part of the Church, but for the entire Church. For not only the presbyters, but the entire Church uses the Sacrament by the authority of Christ, and not by human authority; and this, we suppose, the adversaries acknowledge. Now, if Christ has instituted it for the entire Church, why is one kind denied to a part of the Church? Why is the use of the other kind prohibited? Why is the ordinance of Christ changed, especially when He Himself calls it His testament? But if it is not allowable to annul man’s testament, much less will it be allowable to annul the testament of Christ” (XXII. 1-2).

II. In the Formula of Concord, “On the other hand, we unanimously reject and condemn all the following erroneous articles, which are opposed and contrary to the doctrine presented above, the simple faith, and the pure confession concerning the Lord’s Supper… 3. That the sacrilege whereby to laymen one form only of the Sacrament is given, and, contrary to the plain words of the testament of Christ, the cup is withheld from them, and they are thus deprived of His blood” (FC - E: VII. 21, 24).

III. In the Smalcald Articles, “And that not only one form is to be given. For we do not need that high art which is to teach us that under the one form there is as much as under both, as the sophists and the Council of Constance teach. For even if it were true that there is as much under one as under both, yet the one form only is not the entire ordinance and institution ordained and commanded by Christ. And we especially condemn and in God’s name execrate those who not only omit both forms but also quite tyrannically prohibit, condemn, and blaspheme them as heresy, and so exalt themselves against and above Christ, our Lord and God” (SA: III.IV. 2-4).

Therefore, with the position of our churches clearly set forth from our public confessions, we shall move to establish our antithesis against the Papists, and the foundations upon which our doctrine and confession rest.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANTITHESIS:

1. The primary and most immovable argument which, of its own weight, ought to be enough to settle the entire controversy, we demonstrate from the clear command and institution of Christ Himself, who by a necessity of precept, a necessity by virtue of divine commandment, instituted this sacrament to be offered and received in both kinds. We argue; Whosoever were commanded by Christ in the institution of the eucharist to eat the blessed bread, the same were also commanded to drink the blessed wine. But all the Apostles, and under their name all adult faithful were commanded by Christ in the institution of the supper to eat the blessed bread and drink the blessed wine. Therefore. The major is clear;

I. Since to the same ones, and not another, that Christ prescribes to “eat”, He similarly commanded, “drink”; “And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to the disciples and said, ‘Take, eat; this is My body.’ Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you. For this is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins’” (Matt. 26:26-28). Hence, those same ones commanded to eat, are likewise, by divine command, to drink.

II. In Luke’s account (22:20) he connects the distribution of the other part by the particle “likewise” (ὡσαύτως), and also the copulative particle “also” (καί), linking the second part of the supper by an indissoluble bond in the one command with an immediate nexus to the first. From this, we argue: Whatever things are required for the continuance and integrity of an act cannot be separated from it without damage to its integrity. But the taking of the cup likewise (καί) with the bread is required and comprehended in the same command, therefore.

III. Christ expressly added the words“Drink from it, all of you” (Matt. 26:27), a universal particle, to which Mark adds, “Then He took the cup, and when He had given thanks He gave it to them, and they all drank from it” (16:23). Hence it is clear that Christ commands universally all to whom His testament is spoken and offered (Matt. 26:28), that those same ones are commanded to take and drink. But we ask, does Christ’s testament, “For this is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins” (Matt. 26:28), pertaining to the apostles and their successors the priests alone? Or does this same testament pertain also to all the faithful?

IV. Luke records the command of Christ, “do this in remembrance of Me” (22:19). From this we argue that He expressly commands the repetition and remembrance of the entire sacramental act given to us by the ordinance, command and will of the testator Christ, in which is likewise included not just the act of consecration but also the very distribution and reception of both the bread and the cup, and encompasses the entire form of the Sacrament.

In support of this, we produce the following arguments;

a) In the institution of any sacrament, there is the institution of the matter, or material of the sacrament, both an earthly and heavenly component; as well as the form, which consists in the solemn action instituted and commanded to be done, with the promise of an evangelical grace attached. In the Sacrament of the Eucharist, the twofold matter are the bread and wine, and the body and blood of Christ. The form of the sacrament is the entire external action that formally constitutes the sacrament as the sacrament and not an ordinary meal, which on the part of the minister, who is represented by Christ as the first minister at the last supper, consists in the consecration of the symbols by the repetition of the words of institution, and the administration of the blessed elements to those receiving. On the part of the communicant, it is the reception, which is completed in both the eating of the blessed bread and drinking of the blessed wine. This is what is performed and commanded by Christ to be done in faith, or remembrance of Him, and to be repeated at every celebration of the sacrament, without which it would be no sacrament: “And He took bread, gave thanks and broke it,and gave it to them, saying, ‘This is My body which is given for you; do this in remembrance of Me.’ Likewise He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood, which is shed for you’” (Luke 22:19-20).

b) The apostle Paul, who by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, interprets the application of this command for us, “For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you: that the Lord Jesus on the same night in which He was betrayed took bread; and when He had given thanks, He broke it and said, ‘Take, eat; this is My body which is broken for you; do this in remembrance of Me.’ In the same manner He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood. This do, as often as you drink it,in remembrance of Me.’ For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death till He comes” (1 Cor. 11:23-26). If Christ and the Apostles so commanded the continued repetition and remembrance of not only one part but the entire sacramental action with a command, then we ought not to depart in the least from these express words and follow them both in their word and in their deed.

The truth of the minor concerning the Apostles is plain; For to all of them whom the Lord says: “Take, drink”, Mark adds (14:23): “they all drank of it.” It has already been established above that there exists a firm connection and bond between both parts of the Supper in this one command, and thus we move to establish that it is also plain concerning all adult faithful;

I. From 1 Cor. 11:28, “But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup”. The Apostle clearly demonstrates, by his repetition of the institution and further commands, how these words are to be understood and the Supper to be celebrated amongst the people. In this context, and with this express statement, he says those permitted to the Supper are the faithful who examine themselves, and not merely the clergy alone. Hence it follows by the established major, that the laity who self examine are permitted equally to the use of the chalice as of the bread.

II. We propose that the Apostles, whom Christ commanded to eat and drink on the night before He was betrayed, represented either only themselves, only the clergy succeeding them in their ministry, or both the clergy and the laity by the common bond of being Christians, those to whom His final will and testament pertain, and therefore all guests of the Supper who are repentant and self examine themselves. But they cannot represent themselves only, since;

a) otherwise it would follow that no other Christian, even those living at the same time as the Apostles, apart from them are permitted a share in the Sacrament;

b) Christ did not institute a Supper only for them and another one separate for the whole Church succeeding them, but one and the same Supper as a continued and perpetual ordinance;

c) Since the Apostle Paul himself explains clearly that these words are handed on to others beyond the 12 gathered in the upper room, “For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you: that the Lord Jesus on the same night in which He was betrayed took bread” (1 Cor. 11:23), etc. Furthermore, they cannot represent only the clergy, because thus no Christian layman ought to receive the sacrament of the Supper, under either one or both species, since as we have demonstrated by the major premise above, the two are linked by an indissoluble bond and comprehended under a single sacramental dispensation and command. Whoever is commanded to receive the one part is likewise commanded to receive the second. It would follow that there is no prescription or command of the Supper instituted for the Church laity in the words of Christ but only for the successors of their ministry. Therefore, they necessarily represented all adult faithful, whom Christ under the name of the Apostles, as followers of Christ, not as Apostles per se, commanded to eat the consecrated bread and drink the consecrated wine.

III. This consideration, as observed by the Bl. David Hollatz (Exam. Pt. III, § II, Ch. V, Q. XIX), also has great weight: that the blood of Christ is not just some part of this sacred action, but is also the principal part, which is effected from this principle: Without the shedding of blood there can be no remission of sins (Heb. 9:22). Therefore, the death which Christ suffered for us, if it had not been bloody, would not have been valid for expiating the sins of men and these benefits of His death are thus communicated to us in the Sacrament of the Supper (Matt. 26:28) of the New Testament (As the very words and institution of Christ testify, in which He bestows and communicates to us His very own body and blood for the remission of sins). Therefore, if someone partakes of the body of Christ, given over to death for us, but does not likewise drink His blood, shed for us, He will have only a general remembrance and communication of the death of Christ, but not a special one of the bloody death, in which lies the greatest force of consolation and communication of that same forgiveness of sins. Hence, the minor is thoroughly established.

Obj. I: But Bellarmine persists (Bk. IV, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Ch. XXV), in Mark, that they all drank from it cannot be understood of any but the apostles thus present, therefore to them alone contextually does the force of Matthew’s command apply: “These words are said to the Apostles alone, who were sitting at the table with Christ” (Ibid.).

In defence of this proposition, he argues, “The particle ‘all’ is not always taken in Scripture in the most universal sense for all of a certain kind”, and that the command, “Drink from it, all of you” is to be taken universally of a certain kind; Not universally of all men, since then it would follow Christ commands it to be given to Turks, Jews and pagans; not all men, since then women would be excluded; not all believers, since infants would be included; not all adult believers, for thus abstinent persons would be included. Hence, finally, he argues that Mark contradicts this interpretation since he says, “And they all drank from it”, by which statement Matthew’s command is to be interpreted: “Therefore, the meaning is the same in Matthew and in Mark. But in Mark, ‘all’ does not mean all adult believers; for it would not be true to say: ‘They all drank from it’; thus, it cannot mean all adult believers in Matthew either. If they say that ‘all’ in Mark means all adult believers because all drank from it among the Apostles, we gather that believers are not bound to drink the Lord’s cup, as they have already fulfilled the command; for they have already drunk, as it was commanded. Therefore, it remains that the command was given only to the Apostles. This can also be confirmed by the context of the whole passage in Matthew’s Gospel. For everyone exclaims that these words were spoken only to the Apostles: ‘To them,’ he says. What is meant by ‘to them’ if not to the Apostles?” (Ibid.).

Resp: I. An examination of this argument has already been provided above, where contrary to Bellarmine’s assertion, “They will say it means all adult believers. But initially, they would be stating this gratuitously, for they would not easily be able to prove it” (Ibid.), we have demonstrated by good and necessary consequence, which even a school boy would be able to recognise, that the Apostles in receiving the Testament of the Lord must represent not themselves as Apostles per se, nor even as priests, but necessarily as those to whom the Testament of the death of Christ and forgiveness of sins pertains. Bellarmine cannot avoid tying himself up in knots in his response, which we demonstrate with the following; let us grant his request, “Therefore, it remains that the command was given only to the Apostles”, hence we ask, are the Roman clerics of today, comprehended in those who have already drank from all of it? (Mark 14:23) If the command to drink given in Matthew is said to have already been fulfilled according to Mark, then not even consecrating clerics today are commanded, nor even permitted to drink, since it was given only to the Apostles there present, as Mark said, they all drank from it, and thus it pertains to no one else contextually according to the reading of Bellarmine, as the office of Apostle has long since ceased, which even our adversaries will concede. But lest we be tied up in the cardinal’s knots, that the Apostles were commanded not as Apostles per se, but as Christians who needed the forgiveness of sins is clear both from the text and by the absurdity of the contrary as established.

II. We grant that Christ’s command is not taken universally of all men, but restricted to all of a certain kind, but we deny the consequence. The command is given to all those approaching the Supper, who hear the invitation of Christ, who can discern themselves with faith to apprehend the promise that is offered, as St. Paul has, almost according to divine providence in anticipation of Bellarmine’s deception, interpreted for us: “But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup” (1 Cor. 11:28). Thus also the Decalogue was given to the faithful present at Mt. Sinai, but was given to them as the people of God in Covenant with Him and thus is passed on to all their posterity who inherit the Covenant by faith. From Bellarmine’s line of reasoning, one could just as easily and validly conclude that the Decalogue was not given but only those there present, as very many of the antinomians very much do argue. Everyone will see how weak his pitiful attempt is against so clear and simple an argument.

III. Many of the Papists themselves admit this already; thus see George Cassander (Conslt. Articles. 22. Pg. 981), Juan Maldonado (Matt. XXVI., num. 85: “The twelve Apostles, who were present, represented the person of the whole Church, with which Christ was making a covenant”), as well as Francis Coster (In Enchridion, Ch. XIV, Solution of Objection I., pg. 461: “The Apostles were receiving this Sacrament from its Institutor in the name of the whole Church”). Therefore, whilst the command was spoken to those present, under their names were represented all the Church who would come after them as faithful Christians who can examine themselves as the words of the Apostle testify (1 Cor. 11:26). Bellarmine and his followers should seek the wisdom of his own brothers in this matter.

IV. In the celebration of the Sacrament, we ask the adversaries, does the consecrating priest, in the celebration of the mass and offering of the Sacrament, represent the Apostles and faithful who receive the Sacrament, or does he stand in the person of Christ as the one offering and distributing? Hence, the Apostles, in the celebration of the Supper and reception of the Sacrament from the hand of Christ, do not represent the offering clerics who are to succeed them in their ministry, but they represent the repentant and receiving people in need of the forgiveness of sins and those receiving the divine pledge of the Sacrament given for them. By the adversaries’ own common practice they undermine their pitiful answer to the very clear prescription of the Lord.

Obj. II: Under the command, “Eat from this - drink from this”, “Christ intends to propose not the manner of the thing, that is, the sacramental species, but the thing itself, namely the body and blood in their presence, although by accident He proposes it to the Apostles present under both distinct species; and on the other hand, what is proposed is equally fitting for all the faithful, as is especially clear from the words added: ‘The body, which is given or delivered for you,’ and ‘The blood of the New Covenant, which will be shed for you and for many for the remission of sins’ (cf. p. 52 and the Canon of the Mass), in which the universal reason for reception is assigned” (Doronzo: De Eucharistiae, tom. I, art. 27., Pt. A, Concl. II.I).

Resp. I: This argument presupposes the false hypothesis of concomitance (which will be treated at length in its own section). Therefore it is easily done away with. Let the adversaries first prove the assumption, which they cannot.

II. They assume what they cannot prove, that the institution of the Sacrament under a double species is only accidental the Sacrament and not essential. They cannot and will never prove this, since our answer is easy: let us look the will and express word of the Testator to discern the integrity and constitution of the Sacrament: “And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to the disciples and said, ‘Take, eat; this is My body.’ Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you. For this is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins” (Matt. 26:26-28). Christ assigns to each distinct and individual species its Sacramental signification; to the bread He joins His body and to the wine His blood, hence we have the confirmation of the Apostle Paul: “The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?” (1 Cor. 10:16). Therefore any reasonable and honest student of Scripture will see that Christ proposes not just the thing of the Sacrament to be received, but also, contrary to Doronzo’s assertion, the manner whereby they are to receive each thing of the Sacrament under its own distinct sign. The very words of Christ Himself prove this clear as day, for He, in handing them bread and wine proposes the very manner in which they are to receive the body and blood of Christ given and shed for them: “Take, eat… Drink from it, all of you”. Who will not here recognise that Christ proposes His body and blood to be eaten and drunk not just in any manner, but under a specific and designated manner, by way or oral participation through eating and drinking.

III. As we will demonstrate more fully further on, the adversaries continue to undermine themselves with these arguments; for if in the command to take and eat, take and drink, Christ proposes no specific manner of reception, only the thing itself to be received, then there exists no prescribed manner of reception for the clergy to receive under a double species, since this is accidental to the integrity of the Sacrament. But they themselves thoroughly condemn and reject this proposition, citing the very same institution and words of Christ to prove the prescribed manner of reception, not just the thing itself: “Communion under both species is necessary by divine precept for celebrating clerics… The precept of Christ in Luke 22:19: ‘Do this in memory of me’, as it refers to the Apostles and their successors in the priesthood, implies the necessity of both consecration and communion under both species, in imitation of what the Lord Himself did at the Last Supper. The same meaning is conveyed by Christ’s words in Matthew 26:27: ‘Take and eat... Drink from this, all of you’, and in Luke 22:17: ‘Taking the chalice... He said: Take and divide this among yourselves.’” (Doronzo: De Eucharistiae, tom. I, art. 27., Pt. A, Concl. I). From whatever arguments they propose the divine necessity of reception under a double species for priests, we prove the same for all who use the Supper, as we have already demonstrated (and will further do so) is the proper force, meaning and implication of the text.

IV. If Christ proposes merely the thing itself at the last supper, and not the manner or mode of its reception, then on what basis do the adversaries require the reception even of a single species at all? If the thing of the Sacrament (Christ Himself) can be and is received by the faithful in the hearing and mediation of the Word apart from the use of the Sacrament (John 6:35ff), then the entire establishment of the Supper under either species is entirely unnecessary and accidental. Preposterous and absurd.

V. Will the reader, even the adversaries themselves, see what fuel they provide the Sacramentarians and fanatical spirits who deny the very bodily presence and oral eating of Christ within the Sacrament with very similar arguments? We assume it is well known to them how the Sacramentarians interpret the words of Christ to eat and drink in the last Supper as to be taken improperly and by way of a figure of speech for believing, thus overturning the true and bodily sacramental presence of Christ in the Supper:

“It is necessary therefore that the mode of receiving these same things should be spiritual, and that it should be carried out by the soul’ s proper instrument, that is, by faith, just as in the simple word, so also in the Sacraments. (r) Then the earthly taking of earthly signs is a pledge of something else, the spiritual thing. And the language of eating and drinking is used for this reason, just as it is when taking the signs, but it is used FIGURATIVELY about the things signified, by Sacramental METONYMY, in which what corresponds with the signs is attributed to the thing signified. Therefore taking both of these by mouth neither can nor should happen” (Beza: Collq. Mont., Foundation of Thesis IV).

“We think on the contrary that the words of the Lord’s institution, as also the interpretation of the passages of Scripture, without any exception, ought to be brought back to the rule of faith comprehended in the Apostles’ creed, as was said above, and explained from a comparison of Scriptures. We think also that it is impossible for them to be accepted according to the plain, literal meaning, if the analogy of faith is to be preserved. Another reason that could be cited is that the institution of the Lord’ s Supper should be considered unclear, in that a metaphor exists in it” (Beza: Collq. Mont., Resp. 1st Dogma).

“The orthodox affirm that the thought (tēn dianoian) or tropical and figurative sense ought to be followed” (Turretin: Vol. III. Topic XIX. Q. XXVI).

“Insofar as the outward speech is concerned, they are figurative or tropological, as is clear from the link between the predicate and the subject. Not because there is a trope in the sentence as a whole (for trope belongs to a word) but there is a trope of the whole sentence. For words themselves are not tropological, but they converge into a sentence that results in a trope” (Leiden Synopsis: Disp. XLV, Thesis LXI).

“This Question has respect to the thing which is signified by the Lord’s supper. The eating of the body, and the drinking of the blood of Christ is not corporal, but spiritual” (Ursinus: Comm. on the Heidelberg, Q. LXXVI, Exposition).

“Christ, then, calls the bread his body, meaning thereby, that it is the sign of his body, attributing by a figure of speech, the name of the thing signified to the sign; because he appoints this bread as the sign, and sacrament of his body” (Ibid., Q. LXXVII, Exposition).

Against them we have long laboured to assert that the literal sense of the text is to be taken, and the words as they read and in their native sense are to be maintained:

“We believe, teach, and confess that the words of the testament of Christ are not to be understood otherwise than as they read, according to the letter, so that the bread does not signify the absent body and the wine the absent blood of Christ, but that, on account of the sacramental union, they [the bread and wine] are truly the body and blood of Christ” (FC - E: VII. para. VII).

But in the institution of Christ, the native sense and force of the text teaches us that the thing of the Sacrament is to be received according to the manner of eating and drinking, and thus indeed is a certain mode of reception commanded and presented by the words of Christ. Therefore.

Obj. III: Luke records in 22:17-20: “Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, ‘Take this and divide it among yourselves; for I say to you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God comes.’ And He took bread, gave thanks and broke it,and gave it to them, saying, ‘This is My body which is given for you; do this in remembrance of Me.’ Likewise He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood, which is shed for you’”. Therefore the command to “Drink from it, all of you” (Matt. 26:27) is to be understood as a command for each of the Apostles to share in the one cup, that is, that it not be consumed by one but shared by all. The command concerns the distribution of the chalice at that supper, not an immovable law governing all future receptions. Therefore this passage is to be counted as descriptive, not prescriptive.

(Cf. Doronzo: “A probable reason why Christ added the word ‘all’ to the invitation to drink the cup is to prevent one or the first drinkers from draining the one cup He offered, as is suggested by the words of Luke 22:17: ‘Take this and divide it among yourselves’” (De Eucharistiae, tom. I, art. 27., Pt. A, Concl. II.I))

Resp: I. We invert the argument; if the words of Christ to drink from it all of you, provide a command that apply to all guests of the supper to whom the previous command to take and eat applied, then it will follow that the Apostles, and represented under them all adult faithful who can examine themselves (according to the Apostle Paul’s interpretation as proved above), are commanded to share in the chalice and the conclusion of our thesis will follow by the very argument of the adversaries themselves.

II. That the Apostles represented not only themselves or the clergy but all adult faithful has already been demonstrated by the proof of the minor.

III. The adversaries argue for more than they want; for if the institution of Christ is descriptive and not prescriptive, it follows that there exists no command of Christ for reception of either part of the Sacrament from His words, and thus no one, not even the clergy, will be obligated to receive them. If this argument of theirs is true, that His words contain no prescription, from where will the adversaries derive their dogma of the sacrifice of the mass? Or the consecration and reception of the clergy in both species? Certainly not from the words of Christ, or the narrative of the Supper, since they argue this is only descriptive and provides no prescriptive command governing the manner of reception, only the thing itself (Cf. Obj. II).

Obj. IV: “Many things have been instituted by God, which nevertheless have not been commanded to all, such as matrimony, the ecclesiastical order, the preaching of the Gospel, the office of baptizing, and many other things. For not all are bound by a divine precept to enter matrimony, to undertake ecclesiastical orders, to preach the Gospel, to baptise catechumens. Whence, just as this consequence is not valid: ‘Matrimony was instituted by God, therefore it is commanded to all,’ so likewise this is not valid: ‘communion under both species was instituted by Christ, therefore it is commanded to all.’” (Becanus; Disput. on Communion Under Both Species, Ch. I).

Resp: I. We grant, as has already been explained above (Obj. I, Resp. II), the command to eat and drink does not extend absolutely universally, but universally to those of a certain kind. Therefore, this conclusion is firm: Those to whom Christ has instituted the Holy Supper, to them He has also commanded it; for it is a prescriptive and explicitly testamentary institution, binding the receiver to a certain order and manner of act. But to all adult faithful, and not just the clergy alone Christ has instituted and commanded the reception of both species, therefore.

II. The adversaries confound precepts which concern the exercise of acts, with precepts prescribing the species of act. For precepts are of two kinds;

a) Some concern precisely the specification of acts, or sanction and prescribe the thing itself according to itself and in its substance; that is, how an act ought to happen, when the sanctioned thing is to be translated into act. For example, such a precept is the law of matrimony, that two are to be joined by an indissoluble bond in one flesh (Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:4-5), which does not command the entering of matrimony, but sanctions matrimony itself according to itself, and prescribes how the spouses ought to be joined among themselves, when they enter matrimony.

b) Other precepts have as their object the exercise of acts, and simply command or prohibit an act to be done, which are the precepts that prohibit killing, committing adultery, stealing, and which command praying, giving alms, etc (Ex. 20).

When, therefore, it is asked, whether Communion under both species was commanded by Christ, the question is to be understood especially about the precept, which sanctions the very act of communicating and prescribes how communion ought to happen, which even the added words, “under both species”, suggest, and does not consider communion simply as an act of communicating considered with respect to exercise. Put more simply, the controverted question concerns this:“Whether for any who are about to communicate, a precept has been given, that they communicate under both species”? This we affirm, arguing from the specification of the act commanded by Christ in His institution, the Papists deny. For every Institution of Christ is formally a law or precept, prescribing how the thing instituted ought to be done. The force of this truth is so great, that even Francisco Suarez, a highly esteemed Jesuit, laboriously proves; “Every Institution of Christ has the nature of precept, not only affirmative, so that whoever wishes to do what is instituted, does it in conformity with the institution, but also negative, so that if it cannot be done as prescribed, it should rather be omitted, than done in another way” (Third Part of Thomas, Disput. XLIII. Sect. IV. Concl. IV), and from this he concludes, that by divine law it is prescribed, that whoever wishes to confect the sacrifice of the Mass, should confect it under both species; an error deserving of its own treatment but nonetheless demonstrating that even the adversaries recognise the force of a precept given in the words of Institution regarding the specification of the act instituted. Hence we present the assent of Fr. Doronzo:

“Communion under both species is necessary by divine precept for celebrating clerics… The Church has always unchangeably preserved the practice of communion under both species for the celebrating priest, even though it has otherwise adapted or changed its discipline regarding the communion of the laity, granting it either under one or both species according to circumstances or times. This is indeed a clear indication of the existence of a divine precept regarding the communion of the celebrating priest under both species. The Roman Missal (De Defectibus, X, 4, 6, 7), following the ancient rules of the Church, teaches that a priest who does not receive both species sins gravely and prescribes that if one species alone has been consecrated, the consecration of the other species must be repeated so that communion under both species can be received. This holds in cases where the previously consecrated host or wine cannot be consumed without grave inconvenience (such as danger of death or vomiting, due to poison or some other harmful substance). These regulations serve as serious indications of the existence of a divine precept” (De Eucharistiae, tom. I, art. 27., Pt. A, Concl. I).

For example; marriage was instituted and commanded to all men and women who are fit for marriage and do not have the gift of continence, so that they may avoid sexual impurity;

a) Since sexual attraction towards the opposite sex is given unto all people by nature, to which its proper expression is added and commanded by God in marriage, “Then God blessed them, and God said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth’” (Gen. 1:28); “And Adam said: ‘This is now bone of my bones And flesh of my flesh; She shall be called Woman, Because she was taken out of Man.’ Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and they shall become one flesh” (Gen. 2:23-24).

b) Christ and the Apostle Paul both add explicit exceptions to this command for those who are blessed with the gift of continence; “But He said to them, ‘All cannot accept this saying, but only those to whom it has been given: For there are eunuchs who were born thus from their mother’s womb, and there are eunuchs who were made eunuchs by men, and there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven’s sake. He who is able to accept it, let him accept it.’” (Matt. 19:11-12); “Nevertheless, because of sexual immorality, let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband… For I wish that all men were even as I myself. But each one has his own gift from God, one in this manner and another in that. But I say to the unmarried and to the widows: It is good for them if they remain even as I am; but if they cannot exercise self-control, let them marry. For it is better to marry than to burn with passion” (1 Cor. 7:2, 7-9).

Let the adversaries therefore produce a single testimony from the Lord or the Apostles where such an exception is permitted in the command of the Sacrament.

IV. The adversaries arbitrarily and without any justification divide the prescribed command in the Supper, since they admit that Christ does indeed command reception under at least one species here, a division they cannot defend from the text. Either both or neither species will be prescribed by the Lord in this command, as the institution and Apostles reiteration both make explicitly clear by their indissoluble connection. Let them choose which absurdity they prefer.

Obj. V: The Apostles commanded by Christ to eat represented all the faithful, but commanded to drink represented only the priests.

Resp: I. If Christ had regarded the Apostles in a different respect when He said “eat”, then when He said “drink”, certainly He Himself, or Paul repeating the institution of the Lord in 1 Cor. 11, would have made at least any indication of that double respect. Rather, the contrary is manifestly true from both the words of the Lord Himself and Paul’s explanation of them. How easy it will be by this reasoning to establish propositions without any evidence!

II. Christ in the first institution regarded the Apostles not insofar as they were priests, but insofar as they were communicants in need of the forgiveness of sins and a testament to that fact, as has already been demonstrated sufficiently.

III. If the adversaries admit a prescription as to the mode of reception or specification of the act in the words of institution, they have already conceded the argument, since any honest person will easily see how the integrity of the Sacrament is linked to the Lord’s Words, such that our initial syllogism holds firm and is established.

Obj. VI: “Luke placed the command ‘Do this’ after the giving of the Sacrament under the form of bread, but did not repeat it after giving the cup, so that we might understand that the Lord intended the Sacrament to be distributed to everyone under the form of bread; under the form of wine, not so. Nor does the term ‘likewise’ (which Kemnitius emphasizes so much) carry any weight; it refers only to taking, not to all that Christ did concerning the bread. For Christ did not only take, bless, and give the bread, but also broke it, and divided the broken pieces among those reclining; however, He did not break or divide the cup, but gave it whole, for one to pass to another. Furthermore, Paul in 1 Corinthians XI uses the same term ‘likewise,’ yet he does not mention ‘gave,’ but only ‘took.’ Therefore, ‘likewise’ cannot be referred to the word ‘gave.’ That the command ‘Do this’ does not apply to the same extent is evident from the context; for we read: ‘Likewise the cup, after supper, saying: This cup,’ etc. Here it is appropriate to understand a verb that fits well with the accusative ‘cup’; such a verb is not ‘Do this.’ What would this phrase mean: ‘Likewise the cup, do this’? The correct interpretation is: ‘Likewise the cup He took, saying’ etc.” (Bellarmine: Bk. IV, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Ch. XXV).

Resp. I: He should tell this argument to the apostle Paul, who interprets the command of Christ in Luke’s account to be consonant with that of Matthew’s and Mark’s: “In the same manner He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood. This do, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of Me.’” (1 Cor. 11:25), where he attaches the command to do this to the distribution of the cup; in Matthew’s we have: “Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you’” (Matt. 26:27), where he again recounts the distribution of the cup to all with the command to drink from it, all you who receive this cup; and in Mark’s we have him explain how Christ distributed the cup to all those who had received the bread: “Then He took the cup, and when He had given thanks He gave it to them, and they all drank from it” (Mark 14:23). Hence our response is easy; we, along with the mind of the apostle Paul, read all the accounts together as consistent and merely emphasising different aspects whilst all united in the same sense and purpose, for all are consistent and rather beautifully support our argument in interpreting one another that we may be beyond doubt regarding the will of Christ and the form of the sacrament he has bequeathed to us.

II. We have already explained above, regarding the particle “likewise”, we do not argue that the cup was also broken, but was, likewise as the bread, distributed to all in accordance with the command of Christ and form of the sacrament. Therefore Bellarmine’s objection conveniently misses the point of Chemnitz’s argument, which is to clearly demonstrate, as he most certainly has, with us repeating, that likewise the cup and the bread are joined within the one command to administer, distribute and take the entire sacrament to all the people and repeat the entire action as a continuous one. To this, he responds with nothing of weight.

2. We argue from the Apostle’s repetition and explanation of the Supper: “For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you: that the Lord Jesus on the same night in which He was betrayed took bread; and when He had given thanks, He broke it and said, ‘Take, eat; this is My body which is broken for you; do this in remembrance of Me.’ In the same manner He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood. This do, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of Me.’ For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death till He comes” (1 Cor. 11:23-26).

Observe: I. St. Paul repeated the words of institution (1 Cor. 11:23-25), where he exhorts all who can examine themselves to eat of this bread and drink of this cup (v. 28). Hence prescribing the specification of the act as well as who those are who are permitted to the use of the act.

II. This letter of the Apostle is addressed to the whole church and not just the clergy: “Paul, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ through the will of God, and Sosthenes our brother, To the church of God which is at Corinth, to those who are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all who in every place call on the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, both theirs and ours: Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor. 1:1-3). Paul testifies that he teaches all who are called and sanctified in Christ to use both kinds of the Supper, and asserts that he had received what he taught the Corinthians from the Lord Himself (11:23). Thus, he applies the commandment of Christ about the use of both kinds to the whole church and not just the clergy.

III. The Apostle here tells not only the bare story of the institution of the Lord’s Supper, describing a mere historical event, but the whole context and purpose of the Apostle in recounting this institution is to correct the practice and doctrine of the church at Corinth from the authoritative foundation of the institution of Christ, from and by which he teaches them the correct way to administer and practice the Supper. Hence we argue; whatever rule and norm the Apostle adduces for correction and right instruction of the Supper, that same norm ought we to use for the correction and right instruction of the Supper. But the words of institution are the rule and norm of the Apostle. Therefore, etc. Upon this foundation are we justified in having recourse to the words of the institution in dealing with controversies surrounding the doctrine and practice of the Lord’s Supper in all disputes.

IV. The Apostle’s audience consists not of clergy only but also laity, as the context evidently shows (v.17-34). Therefore not only clergy but also laity are instructed on how they ought to examine themselves when they partake not only of one kind but of both: “For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death till He comes. Therefore whoever eats this bread or drinks this cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup. For he who eats and drinks in an unworthy manner eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord’s body” (v. 26-29). Hence he also establishes the essential parts and the integrity of the Sacrament as consisting of both eating and drinking.

V. The context of his discussion is to address malpractice taking place at the Supper (v.17-22), to which he provides remedy by both recounting the commanded prescription of the Lord (v. 23-26) and further providing an application of that prescription for them (v. 27-34). Hence the Apostle, in addressing the Corinthians as Christians, not as priests, has recourse to the words of institution, which serves to vindicate our first argument.

VI. The Apostle, in recounting the institution of the Supper, establishes it as a divine tradition: “For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you” (11:23). This language of Paul is much stronger than if he were to say “I command you”, since by this he reveals that he acts as the mouth of God in passing on the divine norm and rule of the Supper. We compare this with the words of the same Apostle in 1 Cor. 7:10 where he says: “Now to the married I command, yet not I but the Lord”. Therefore when he says “that which I also delivered to you”, it is the same as if he had said: “So far as the administration and use of the Lord’s Supper is concerned, I do not give advice but have a precept from the Lord”. For he recites the history and institution of the Lord in this way so that he may presently apply it to the Corinthians and to all to whom he has addressed the epistle, those who can examine themselves and are called and sanctified in the Lord.

VII. The Apostle understands and interprets the words of institution to include eating and drinking of both species so intimately that they cannot be separated (v.26, 27, 28, 29). Therefore, those who vainly divide these acts from one another to be separate commands are against the mind of the Apostle.

VIII. It is worthy of note here that the Apostle understands by the command “This do, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of Me” (v.25), the entire Sacramental action, most especially of which the eating and drinking of both species: “For as often as you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death till He comes” (v.26).​​ Hence by the command to “do this”, the Apostolic interpretation understands not primarily the consecration but the reception. This is further strengthened by the context; for when Paul introduces his discussion of the Supper: “Now in giving these instructions I do not praise you, since you come together not for the better but for the worse” (v.17), he does not list amongst their abuses any errors in consecration on behalf of the priests, but abuses in the reception and administration of the Sacrament on behalf of the people (v.18-22), which he corrects with the repetition and application of the words of institution. Hence, how can Bellarmine and those following him believe that this command, “do this” applies chiefly to the sacrifice and consecration of priests over and against the reception of the people? Surely his mind is far from that of the Apostle, who did not have this in mind when addressing and applying the institution of Christ and commanded repetition.

Obj. I: The Corinthian church used both species because Paul, either from the Lord’s words or from elsewhere, showed and delivered that communion under both kinds is licit. But Paul never adduced the command of Christ, “Drink from it, all of you”, nor taught with any word that communion under both species is necessary.

Resp: I. We have already produced many arguments why communion under both kinds is a command from the words of institution for all who approach the Sacrament above and hear nothing that has not already been answered.

II. If they acknowledge that communion under both kinds is both the Apostolic practice and licit by the Apostle’s words, then why do they condemn us under the name of heretics and anathema for practicing the same which the Apostle gives as licit? The reason is because we do not accept their vain pretense that they can change what God has established.

III. The Apostle does not draw this opinion from anywhere else but the explicit command of Christ, from which it follows that the correct doctrine and practice of the Supper is to be sought from the Lord’s words at the last supper.

IV. That Paul does not adduce the command of Christ to drink from the cup is manifestly false; for he repeats the whole and entire institution, a part of which includes the command to “drink”. Hence he says: “This cup is the new covenant in My blood. This do, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of Me” (v.25). Is the word of Christ to “this do, as often as you drink it” not a command? Do the adversaries themselves not refer to this command “do this” to establish their thesis on the sacrifice of the mass as a command? But here this command is applied to the drinking of the cup, not its offering.

Obj. II: “The Apostle does not command the faithful to eat the bread and drink the cup absolutely; but he prescribes the manner they should use if they wish to eat or drink profitably” (Bellarmine: Bk. IV, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Ch. XXV).

Resp: I. On the contrary, he not only prescribes the manner in which they ought to receive it, but by force of the repetition of the words of institution demonstrates that all to whom they are spoken ought to receive both, which has been thoroughly proven already.

II. We invert the argument; if the Apostle recounts the prescribed manner in which the Supper ought to be practiced when it is repeated, then it pertains to its proper, prescribed practice to receive both; therefore it is not placed in human liberty to dispense with the cup if one desires to rightly use the Sacrament profitably.

III. If it is true that these words possess no command for the Church to receive the Supper, it follows that the Supper itself is something free the Church can dispense with entirely, since who will not recognise that something not commanded can be done away with without sin? But the adversaries rightly despise the consequence, therefore they ought also to despise the antecedent.

Obj. III: “The words ‘I delivered to you’ in no author ever signified ‘I commanded’ or ‘I ordered.’ And then, how beautiful would be the connection of Paul’s words if they were expressed as: ‘I delivered to you, that is, commanded, as the Lord Jesus on the night in which He was betrayed.’ And in 1 Corinthians XV: ‘I delivered to you, that Christ died,’ how beautifully would we interpret: ‘I commanded you that Christ died’?... For, first, it is false that Paul delivered Christ’s command about receiving both species. For what he delivered is explained when he says: ‘For the Lord Jesus, on the night He was betrayed, took bread,’ etc. Here we see the delivery of the history of the institution of the Sacrament, not the command about receiving both species” (Bellarmine: Bk. IV, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, Ch. XXV).

Resp: I. A distinction must be made between a tradition of doctrine and of a sacramental rite. The tradition of Christ’s death pertains to the tradition of doctrine or of some article of faith; but the tradition of the institution of the Holy Supper pertains to the tradition of a rite. Traditions of the former kind require faith; traditions of the latter kind require observation, and therefore in reality contain a precept. Bellarmine and the adversaries themselves acknowledge this, since in this same tradition handed down from Christ, by the command, “do this”, they understand a divine prescription regarding both the sacrifice of the mass as well as the reception of both species by the clergy, as we have demonstrated already from the witness of Fr. Doronzo.

II. It has already been established above that to deliver something from the Lord and the evangelists is therefore a divine tradition and cannot be abrogated by human authority: “It is not in the power of the Pope or a Council, or the Church, to change the traditions given by the Evangelists and by Paul, as some rave” (Jean Gerson: On the Spiritual Life of the Soul, Lecture 2, Corollary 7).

III. What hypocrisy is this? Those same papists who assert along with the Council of Trent: “seeing clearly that this truth and discipline are contained in the written books, and the unwritten traditions which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating, have come down even unto us, transmitted as it were from hand to hand; the Synod, following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety, and reverence, all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament–seeing that one God is the author of both - as also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, either by Christ’s own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession” (1st Decree, 4th Session). If it is your own dogma to affirm with equal reverence those traditions received from the Lord by the hands of the Apostles and Fathers, as the written Word itself, why do they think so lightly of this tradition, containing a command specifying the right use of the Sacrament, handed on from the Lord which is also contained in explicit words in Sacred Writ?

Obj. IV: There are many things in the epistle that do not refer to the entire Church but only to some. Therefore also does this command pertain only to some, namely priests, not to the whole faithful.

(Cf. Bellarmine (Ibid.): “Finally, it is false that the letter to the Corinthians was written to all believers, so that everything there pertains to all. For does it pertain to all: ‘It is reported that there is fornication among you, such as is not even named among the Gentiles’? And: ‘One says: I am of Paul, another: I am of Apollos, another: I am of Cephas’? Moreover, the inscription: ‘With all who call on the name of the Lord,’ does not signify that the letter was written to all, but means it was written to the Corinthians, to whom the Apostle prays for peace and grace with all who call on the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Nor do we deny that the letter pertains in some way to all; for the doctrine delivered there is common to all; but not all things said there pertain to all, as if it were written to all”)

Resp: Paul’s instructions on the Supper pertain, as we have demonstrated immovably from the context and exegesis of the words of institution in their own place, as well as the immediate context of Paul’s delivery and explanation of them in ch. X, not to the priests only, nor just the Corinthians, but also to the entire Church Catholic, which suffices for our purpose, and which he himself admits already.

Obj. V: Paul says, “Therefore whoever eats this bread or drinks this cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord” (v.27), thereby showing that one part of the Supper can be separated from the other; since one is considered guilty of the body and blood from the other species. Therefore the whole Christ is present under each and Paul does not require the reception of each but of either.

Resp: I. This subtlety subverts and contradicts the context of the Apostle, who, in reciting the words of Christ at the last supper, perpetually joins the eating and drinking together in a single and continuous act, which has already been demonstrated above.

II. It could be reasoned the same way: as the Apostle uses the disjunctive particle “or” (“ἤ”), therefore the chalice alone suffices for the laity and not the bread as the chief part. But many of the Papists object that the bread is the chief part of the Supper and not the chalice.

III. We argue therefore that the disjunctive particle “or” (“ἤ”) has not the force of separating but of distinguishing. For although eating and drinking are essential and inseparable parts of the Supper, since drinking is distinct from eating (which the adversaries also collapse into one through their hypothesis concomitance), the Apostle wished to use the disjunctive particle. Likewise does Christ use the same particle in Matt. 5:17: “Do not think that I came to destroy the Law or (“ἤ”) the Prophets. I did not come to destroy but to fulfill”, but no one would posit this indicates a separation between the two, but instead a distinction between two united things. We therefore invert the argument: The Apostle distinguishes between eating and drinking by the particle “ἤ” (“or”), therefore he manifestly rejects the figment of sacramental concomitance where the blood of Christ is drunk through the act of eating the bread, or the body of Christ eaten by means of drinking the wine.

IV. They will be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord, not through some papistical concomitance, but because both the body and blood of Christ, sacramentally united to the bread and the wine, whilst distinct are joined together to form a single sacrament, joined by an indissoluble bond and comprehended in the one command of Christ, to be considered jointly and not separately.

3. From the communion of the cup with the blood. The same Apostle in 1 Cor. 10:14-16 says: “Therefore, my beloved, flee from idolatry. I speak as to wise men; judge for yourselves what I say. The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?”

Observe: I. Paul addresses all the faithful of Corinth, both teachers and learners, and exhorts them with an argument (among others) taken from the communion of the whole supper (see also the previous argument).

II. If St. Paul dissuades the whole Church of Corinth, consisting of both priests and laity, from idolatry with an argument taken from the complete communion of the Holy Supper, therefore he wanted the whole Holy Supper by virtue of the divine institution to be, and therefore also ought to be, common to the whole Church, consisting mostly of laity. But the former is true, therefore also the latter. The connection of the major is proven: Because if the communion of the Holy Supper, including the drinking of the blessed cup, pertained only to consecrating priests, then he would not have been able to deter the laity themselves from idolatry with an argument drawn from the communion of the blessed chalice. The assumption is also clear; because the Apostle not only says: “The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ,” but also says, and indeed first; “The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ,” and thus he takes the argument for this dissuasion from the complete communion, and especially from the communion of the cup.

III. He himself distinguishes the blessed cup from the broken bread, calling the former the “communion” of the blood, the latter of the body of Christ. Therefore it is clear that the apostle establishes each sign as the communion of the corresponding thing signified, not one kind as the sacramental communion of both as the adversaries vainly and without any justification concoct.

4. From the connection of the imperatives. If only one species were instituted for the laity, it would be more probable that the chalice was instituted than the bread. For if two imperatives of the same order concur, one of which is conceived as an indefinite proposition, the other as a universal, the latter, in the judgment of all logicians, will seem to obligate all without exception more, because of the added universal sign, than the former, which lacks the sign. But the two imperatives, EAT and DRINK ALL, are so composed. Therefore, the latter seems to obligate ALL more, consequently not only the Clergy, but with them also the laity, than the former. Hence the invincible argument: If the indefinite proposition EAT obligates all, much more in the same command will the universal proposition DRINK ALL obligate.

(Regarding the doctrine of concomitance, and how it is used by the adversaries to establish their thesis, this will be treated at length in its own section).

5. From the condition of a Testament. No part of the Testament established by Christ can be changed or abrogated without sacrilege; “Brethren, I speak in the manner of men: Though it is only a man’s covenant, yet if it is confirmed, no one annuls or adds to it” (Gal. 3:15). But the offering of the chalice is a certain and definite part of the Testament, confirmed by the death of Christ; “Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you. For this is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins’” (Matt. 26:27-28), therefore it cannot be changed in the least, lest Rome has so decided that her authority is so great as to be able to abrogate the very Testament of Christ.

Obj. I: Bellarmine objects: “The inheritance left to us is not the bread nor the wine, but the body and blood of the Lord, which two are given as much under one as under a double species. This therefore is the only difference, that those who drink from the chalice receive the inheritance in two tables, those who do not drink, receive it in one table” (Bk. IV, On the Eucharist, Ch. XXVII).

Resp: This objection does not satisfy the argument, since it begs the question by relying upon the hypothesis of concomitance which will be dealt with sufficiently in its own place. It does not satisfy, since whoever departs from the will of the Testator and corrupts the tables of the Testament does not become a partaker of the legacies of the Testament. But the mutilation of the chalice departs from the will of the Testator as expressed clearly in the tables of the Testament. Therefore it stands in the way of anyone becoming a partaker of the legacies of the Testament, which is to receive the body and blood of Christ and the forgiveness of sins. It must be shown:

I. That Christ’s words do not indeed give or include a Testament; or

II. That withholding the chalice does not depart from the will of the Testator prescribed in the tables of the Testament. The adversaries will prove neither, since both are founded upon the simple, explicit and clear word of Christ, as we have shown.

6. The consequence for consciences. Whatever robs the faithful of such firm consolation, which they ought to seek from the use of the Holy Supper, that is to be deservedly abhorred. But the withholding of the chalice by these Papists so robs the faithful of the comfort found in the blood of Christ, therefore. The minor is proved by the testimony of Christ, who in establishing the Sacrament said; “Then He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you. For this is My blood of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins’” (Matt. 26:27-28). As is the function of a Sacrament, not only do they communicate but also sign, seal and testify by some physical element an invisible spiritual grace, given by God’s immense mercy upon us who are weak in faith, that we may derive comfort from the assurance the sign gives as something objective that brings to mind and communicates the higher spiritual reality appended to the testamentary seal. Hence the Apostle Paul likewise points the faithful to the comfort of their baptism; “Or do you not know that as many of us as were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into His death? Therefore we were buried with Him through baptism into death, that just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been united together in the likeness of His death, certainly we also shall be in the likeness of His resurrection” (Rom. 6:3-5). Likewise does Christ give us His blood present in, with, under and sacramentally joined with the wine. As discussed above (argument 1), this Testament is signed and sealed in blood, and Christ especially makes mention of the Testament made in His blood; from which consolation the faithful are certainly robbed by the Papists.

Obj. I: There is no doubt that in the drinking of wine the palate and sore throat are very sweetly consoled, but Catholics do not seek in the Sacraments that corporeal consolation for the body, but the spiritual consolation of the body and blood of Christ.

Resp: That this is an absurd and calumnious charge anyone can see. None of our theologians have ever dreamt of such a thing or sought a corporeal consolation for the throat by the taste of wine, but maintained and asserted that consolation drawn from the thing joined and signified by the wine, the blood of the New Testament shed for us, which the faithful are deprived of without the use of the cup.

Obj. II: The entire blood of Christ is contained under both species through concomitance; therefore whilst reception in both species offers a more full and complete sign, the sign is still offered equally under each individual sign. For example; just as Baptism by immersion is a more complete sign than by sprinkling, as to the thing signified it is no less present and offered under one mode of administration than the other.

Resp: I. The adversaries confuse the matter and form of the Sacrament with the mode of its reception. Matter and form are essential parts of a Sacrament and cannot be taken away without injury to the Sacrament itself, whereas the mode of its reception is something accidental and can be changed without damage to the integrity of the sacrament. The matter of the Supper consists of both the earthly elements (bread and wine) and the heavenly things signified and communicated (the body and blood of Christ). The form of the Supper consists in the entire action, which comprehends the blessing of the external symbols, the distribution of the same, and their reception, that is, through eating and drinking. This is what is comprehended by the command to “do this in remembrance of Me” (Luke 22:19; Cf. 1 Cor. 11:23-26). All these, therefore, are essential to the Sacrament. There is a very great difference between this and the mode of reception in Baptism. Nowhere does Christ or the Apostles prescribe the mode of reception of either Sacrament; it is free that Baptism to be applied either by sprinkling, pouring or immersion; likewise, it is free in the Supper whether the elements be received into the hand or directly into the mouth of the communicant from the priest. It is not free, and pertains to the very form of Baptism, that water be applied in the Triune name (matter and form); “Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Matt. 28:19); as likewise it pertains to the Supper to be eaten and drunk; “Take, eat; this is My body… Drink from it, all of you” (Matt. 26:26-27). More on this will be discussed regarding the integrity of the Sacrament below.

II. This argument relies upon the false hypothesis of concomitance; a doctrine which will be refuted in its own place and which the adversaries cannot prove and even admit cannot be demonstrated from the plain institution of Christ.

7. From the integrity of the Sacrament. Whatever conflicts with the matter and form of the Sacrament, undermines the essence and integrity of the same. But the withholding of the chalice in the administration of the sacrament conflicts with the matter and form of the Sacrament. Therefore, the theft of the chalice undermines the integrity of the Sacrament. The major is clear and conceded by all logicians and will be beyond dispute. The minor we have demonstrated already above (Argument 6, Obj. II, Resp. I), to which we further add; Christ instituted and the Apostle Paul confirmed that in the same words, in a parallel manner, the use of both the bread and the wine (Matt. 26:26-28; Mark 14:22-24; Luke 22:19-20; 1 Cor. 11:23-26) and commanded the repetition of the entire sacramental act, which the words undoubtedly show include also its reception by those who approach worthily, which command comprehends the form of the Sacrament. But to deny the reception of both kinds contradicts with the form of the Sacrament by the express words of Christ, therefore. The withholding of the chalice also contradicts the matter of the Sacrament, since the matter is connected to the form which includes the whole Sacramental act; “In the same manner He also took the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in My blood. This do, as often as you drink it,in remembrance of Me.’” (1 Cor. 11:25), therefore we argue; by the continuance of the Sacramental act, if one part of the matter is omitted in the consecration, distribution and reception, there will be a contradiction within the integrity of the Sacrament. But the matter consists of both the blessed elements, therefore if one element is omitted there results a contradiction in both matter and form. Will not the adversaries see the strength of this argument by their own admission? We ask them, if the wine were omitted from the consecration, would there therefore result in a contradiction with the matter and form of the Sacrament? We adduce the words of Christ and the Apostle Paul, that join these two parts of the Sacrament (as explained above) by the particle “likewise”, showing that whatever pertains to the one pertains likewise to the other to form the single Sacrament, and thus they cannot be divided without destroying the integrity of the Sacrament. The adversaries themselves even grant this as it regards the completion of the Sacrament’s integrity by the priests:

“It is of the necessity of divine precept that the sacrament be completed in both species, otherwise the institution would be futile in both. Furthermore, it is of the necessity of divine precept that the sacrament be completed not only in its consecration but also in its use in communion, for the sacrament in itself is entirely and essentially ordered toward use. Therefore, speaking abstractly and considering the very nature of the sacrament, communion under both species is necessary by divine precept… for the use of the Eucharist, which is distinguished from its confection itself, the minister also participates passively, receiving this sacrament as the other faithful do. Therefore, the precept also concerns the minister as one who passively uses the sacrament, so that he is obligated to receive it, and indeed according to its perfection, that is, under both species, as has been shown” (Doronzo: De Eucharistiae, tom. I, art. 27., Pt. A, Concl. I).

If the integrity of the Sacrament depends upon its completion through use, as the Sacrament is ordered towards its use, then to withhold its use would result in contradiction to the integrity of the Sacrament. By whatever reasons the adversaries argue for the completion and prescription of use amongst the clergy, we invert against them as evidence in support of our thesis, the justification for which has already been at length demonstrated.

End of Part I.

§ I. Upon Baptism there follows the other sacrament of the New Testament, which we call the Supper of the Lord.

Notes. Baptism is not thereby abrogated, but rather, as a sacrament of confirmation, the Supper is to be conferred upon those who have already been initiated. The designation follows the lead of Paul (1 Corinthians 11:26). Besides this, several other names have been received into common usage: the Table of the Lord, according to 1 Corinthians 10:21; the Eucharist, with respect to the particular act occurring therein (Mark 14:23; Luke 22:19; 1 Corinthians 11:24); Communion, from 1 Corinthians 10:16; Synaxis (σύναξις), with respect to the sacred assemblies in which it is customarily celebrated (cf. 1 Corinthians 11:20); the Mass, either from the rite of sending forth offerings and gifts, or from the formula of dismissing the people; and the Sacrament of the Altar, not indeed with a view to sacrifice properly so called, but with respect to the sacred table upon which the offerings were placed. The doctrinal foundation for this sacrament is found in Matthew 26:26ff., Mark 14:22ff., Luke 22:19ff., and 1 Corinthians 11:23ff.

§ II. The principal efficient cause of this sacrament is Christ, who instituted this sacrament, commanded that it be frequently observed, and even now brings it about that the action performed upon the outward symbols, administered according to his prescription, possesses the nature and power of a sacrament.

Notes. Christ determined each and every element pertaining to the substance or to the specific character of the sacramental act (cf. Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Paul in the passages cited above). He so ordained it that he is also the cause with respect to the exercise of the act, inasmuch as he commanded it to be celebrated until his return for judgment, as Paul interprets (1 Corinthians 11:26). For Christ himself joins his own body and blood with the blessed symbols, so that they may be received together, and thus he confirms and increases faith, as we shall see below. Moreover, because the authority, power, and omnipotence that Christ employed in effecting this sacrament are shared in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit, it can rightly be said that the Triune God is the principal efficient cause of this sacrament.

§ III. The internal impulsive cause for the institution of this sacrament is the goodness and love of Christ toward his own; the external cause is the very merit of his passion and death. Specifically, with regard to the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in each administration of the Supper, the institution of Christ itself has the nature of the principal impulsive cause; and the consecration of the symbols performed by the minister according to the institution of Christ is the less principal impulsive cause.

Notes. By goodness is meant that quality by which Christ is good toward others, that is, his gratuitous favor, as is evident from what follows. To this pertains what we read in John 13:1 concerning the love with which Christ loved his own who were in the world, even to the end; to which love are also ascribed those things that were done at and after the Last Supper. For although in the Holy Supper the very body of Christ, delivered unto death for us, and the blood of Christ, poured out for us, are exhibited to us, nevertheless, just as Christ, through that delivering of his body unto death and the pouring out of his blood, merited spiritual benefits for us, so also he merited that those benefits should be applied, sealed, and confirmed through this seal of the new covenant. That is to say, the act by which the body and blood of Christ are rendered present in the Holy Supper and united with the earthly symbols depends upon the divine power and the free will of Christ together. After Christ determined to render his body and blood present and to unite them sacramentally with the bread and wine in the Holy Supper, whenever it is celebrated in conformity with his institution, and after he openly declared this in the words, "This is my body; this is my blood" (concerning which we shall see more distinctly below), it is certain that the will of Christ is moved by virtue of his own institution to effect that very thing which the words "This is my body; this is my blood" signify. Concerning the consecration, we shall speak presently in the following section. In the meantime, it should be noted that the words of consecration move the will of Christ not by any power of their own or as they are uttered by the minister, but by virtue of the institution proceeding from Christ himself.

§ IV. The ministerial cause is the ordinary minister of the Church, who consecrates the external elements and distributes them to the communicants.

Notes. That is, the cause which, by the authority of another as of a superior, puts the sacrament into use. Indeed, Christ himself, on the night on which he was betrayed, first administered the Eucharist while still clothed in the form of a servant, although, as the God-man, he acted by his own authority. But after that first celebration of the Eucharist, this office belongs to the ministers of the Church (cf. 1 Corinthians 4:1; 11:23). Unlike Baptism, this sacrament is not to be administered by a layperson at any time, nor by a woman, for the same necessity does not attach to both sacraments. However, when, in the absence of an ordinary minister, a faithful person anxiously desires this sacrament, it is better to persuade that person of the sufficiency of spiritual eating, and to point out the danger of other temptations that might arise if the sacrament were administered by another person without a legitimate calling, and therefore with a doubtful mind and outcome. The earthly elements in question are bread and wine, concerning which more will be said presently. The minister consecrates these elements; that is, having offered prayers to God, he sets apart the external symbols from common use and designates them for sacred use (which practice is also called Blessing or Thanksgiving, and among us is customarily performed with the Lord's Prayer). Then, by pronouncing the words of Christ that He used at the first institution of the Supper, speaking in the person of Christ, the minister brings it about that the body and blood of Christ, united with the symbols of bread and wine, are simultaneously dispensed, eaten, and drunk. This is Consecration strictly so called. The minister effects this not by any physical or intrinsic power of his own, whether principal or instrumental, but by moving the free will of Christ, so that Christ himself, through his own omnipotence as the physical efficient cause (that is, as the cause exerting real influence), renders his body and blood really present in the Holy Supper for true eating and drinking together with the earthly symbols. Indeed, those words of consecration, inasmuch as they are the words of the omnipotent Son of God, have a divine operation conjoined with them the very moment they are pronounced, by which what they declare is truly accomplished (cf. Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper against J. Vorstius, section 75; and what we have said in notes d and e to Section III above). The distribution may be made either by giving the blessed bread and cup into the hands of the communicants or by bringing both to their mouths, for nothing has been determined here; distribution can be done in either manner. Hence, there is no need for the breaking of bread in the very act of administration itself; it suffices if the bread is brought already broken or divided and prepared for distribution. For we know that Christ himself, at the first administration, broke the bread for no other purpose than that of distribution.

§ V. The matter of the Holy Supper is twofold: earthly and heavenly.

Note. So our theologians commonly hold, following the lead of Irenaeus, who writes: "The bread which is from the earth, receiving the invocation of God, is no longer common bread but the Eucharist, consisting of two things, an earthly and a heavenly" (Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 4, ch. 34, p. 363, Feuardent edition). On the genuine sense of these words, see Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper, sections 81ff., pp. 73–75.)

§ VI. The earthly matter consists of true bread and true wine with respect to their substance; unleavened bread equally as leavened bread, and a thinner or finer bread equally as a coarser, common, or ordinary bread; not only wheat bread but also bread made from other grains. Likewise, red wine as well as white wine, and whether it be unmixed or slightly diluted with water.

Notes. The earthly matter is not abolished through consecration but retains its substance, for in 1 Corinthians 11:26–27 the communicants are said to eat bread, namely bread already blessed or consecrated; not something that was bread and has ceased to be so, but bread itself, still existing. Other elements, foods, or drinks substantially different from these may not be substituted in their place. The unleavened bread is of the kind that Christ is believed to have used, since he had just celebrated the sacrament of the paschal lamb. The leavened bread is the kind that the Greek Church used from the most ancient times, and indeed the Latin Church as well, up to the time of Alexander I, Bishop of Rome. The round breads, or small wafers, which are called Hosts or Oblates, are rightly used in our churches, for with respect to their material and form, and therefore with respect to their substance, they are true bread, since they consist of purer wheat flour mixed with water and baked by the heat of an oven. They can also serve for the nourishment of the body if taken in greater quantity, although in the Eucharist such a quantity is not required, since bodily nourishment is not to be sought therein. Although grains of wheat may differ in their species, they nevertheless agree in having the nature of bread. Christ determined only wine, that is, γέννημα τῆς ἀμπέλου (the fruit of the vine) (Matthew 26:29), leaving the rest to Christian liberty. As for the admixture of water, in those regions where stronger wines are scarcely used in any other way than tempered with water for common use, it is established that the same practice was followed of old also in the Eucharist. In our regions, however, where wines are not so strong, there is no reason why they should be diluted with water. Certainly Christ, in the institution of the Holy Supper, made mention of wine but not of the admixture of water.

§ VII. Bread and wine have the nature of matter in the Holy Supper insofar as they are dispensed and received, eaten and drunk.

Notes. Hence some here also employ the distinction between remote and proximate matter. The remote matter, they say, consists of the symbols themselves; the proximate matter consists of the aforementioned acts performed upon those symbols. These actions, however, as such, do not have the nature of form in this sacrament, for they are actions in themselves indifferent, and are determined to be sacramental actions only from another source, namely by the addition of the Word of Institution, as will be said shortly.

§ VIII. The heavenly matter of the Holy Supper is the true and substantial body, and likewise the true blood in its substance, of Christ. The former is sacramentally united with the bread, and the latter with the blessed wine, so that the body of Christ with the bread and the blood of Christ with the wine are truly and really dispensed and received equally by all communicants with the mouth of the body; the body is eaten and the blood is drunk.

Notes. The heavenly matter is so called not as though it remains only in heaven, or as though it were of a heavenly or ethereal substance, but because it is present in a heavenly, that is, supernatural manner, yet truly and really, and is conjoined with the earthly matter. It is this very body that was delivered for us (Luke 22:19; 1 Corinthians 11:24), and that very blood which was poured out for us and for many for the remission of sins (Matthew 26:28; Mark 14:24; Luke 22:20). The sacramental union is neither substantial, nor personal, nor merely local or juxtapositional, much less merely significative; rather it is such that each of the things said to be united remains in its own being, yet both are simultaneously, truly, and really received in one act by those who use the sacrament. Hence it is manifest that the Impanation and Consubstantiation, which adversaries have falsely attributed to the Lutherans, are rather excluded (cf. our special disputation On Impanation and Consubstantiation, held in the year 1677). Although it is not necessary to define the precise moment at which the body and blood of Christ begin to be sacramentally united with the bread and wine, it is nevertheless certain that the sacramental union pertains to the use in such a way that, according to the rule of the ancients, nothing has the nature of a sacrament outside the use that was instituted by God. Hence we also believe that the symbols reserved after the consecration and placed outside the use do not retain the nature of a sacrament, and that the body and blood of Christ are not sacramentally united with them outside the use. The body and blood of Christ are received not only by the worthy, that is, believers, but also by the unworthy, that is, unbelievers and the impious. Paul declares (1 Corinthians 11:27) that such persons are guilty not merely of abusing the sacred symbols but of sinning against the very body and blood of the Lord, and this because they do not discern the body (and blood) of the Lord; that is, because they eat the very body of the Lord unworthily, approaching this feast at which they receive the true body of the Lord without faith and reverent devotion, as though it were a common meal (cf. Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper against J. Vorstius, section 10, pp. 6–7). The sacramental eating encompasses in one act both the natural and sensible eating of the blessed bread and the eating, not indeed sensible and natural but nevertheless real, of the body of Christ sacramentally united with the bread. Similarly, the sacramental drinking, which is performed with the mouth of the body, encompasses both the sensible and natural drinking of the blessed wine and the drinking, not indeed sensible but nevertheless real, of the blood of Christ. For this reason, the sacramental eating and drinking is also customarily called oral, on account of the unity and identity of the act, or to denote the organ of the mouth by which the eating of bread and of the body, and likewise the drinking of wine and of the blood of Christ, is performed. The food and drink on each side are diverse, however, and the manner of eating the bread differs greatly from the manner of eating the body, and the manner of drinking the wine from the manner of drinking the blood of Christ. For it does not belong to the formal nature of eating as such (but only to the nature of natural eating) that food be received in a sensible manner, ground by the teeth, and sent down into the stomach; nor does it belong to the formal nature of drinking as such (but only to the nature of natural drinking) that we experience by tongue and palate the moisture and flavor of the drink. Here, the presence and the eating of the body and the drinking of the blood of Christ are insensible, supernatural, and unknown and incomprehensible to the human mind, yet so real that they truly exist whether or not anyone perceives them. We may confess our ignorance as to the determination of the manner in which the body and blood of the Lord are present and received in the Supper, even while we firmly hold to the reality itself (cf. Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper against J. Vorstius, sections 91–92, pp. 83ff.). The true and real presence, eating, and drinking of the body and blood of Christ is proved from the very words of institution, where Christ, having extended the bread, said to the disciples: "Take, eat; this is my body"; and having extended the cup in which there was wine: "Drink; this is my blood." These words, inasmuch as they undoubtedly speak of oral eating and drinking, most clearly signify, when taken in their native force and character, that what Christ commands them to take and to eat with the mouth of the body, and therefore declares to be really present, is his very own body; and that what he likewise commands them to drink from the blessed cup is his very own blood. The sense of the declaration by which Christ, having extended the bread and pronounced the words "Take, eat," continues, "This is my body," when the words are taken properly and without trope, is this: "That which I give you, and which I command you to take and eat, is my body." Similarly, the sense of the words by which Christ, having extended the cup in which there was wine and added the words "Take, drink," then said, "This is my blood," is this: "That which I offer you, and command you to take and drink, is my blood." Although only bread and wine were shown to the senses, something else, namely the very body and blood of Christ, not equally apparent to the senses but nevertheless conjoined and united with what is shown to the senses, is declared by the added words to be really present and truly exhibited (cf. Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper against J. Vorstius, sections 109ff., p. 103; section 140, p. 134; section 144, p. 137; section 158, p. 153).

That these words of Christ are to be taken in their native force and character, and that one must not deflect from their proper signification to a trope, is established on the following grounds. (1) From the common rule of interpretation, founded in reason itself, that the proper signification is to be retained unless an urgent necessity compels one to descend to an improper signification; a rule that must be observed with particular care in matters that contain supernatural realities and pertain to faith. (2) From the fact that although three Evangelists and Paul, writing at different times and in different places, commemorated the institution of the Holy Supper, none of them indicated by even a single word that a tropical signification of the words should be embraced to the effect that not the body but a sign of the body is eaten, and not the blood but a sign of the blood is drunk. (3) From the agreement of the passages in 1 Corinthians 11:27–28 and 10:16. (4) From the nature of testaments, in which the propriety and clarity of words is most especially required, and in which it is least of all to be supposed that Christ, most wise and most truthful, would have given occasion for disputes and quarrels by any impropriety of words in his testament (cf. Musaeus, Disputation on the Holy Supper against J. Vorstius, sections 4ff. to 13, pp. 2ff.).

§ IX. The form of the Holy Supper consists in the words of institution.

Notes. That is, the formal principle by which the action in which the symbols of bread and wine are dispensed to the communicants and received by them has the character of being the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. For the fact that the dispensation of the symbols is a sacramental dispensation of the body and blood of Christ derives from its being performed according to the institution of Christ and conjoined with the word of institution. And the fact that the eating of bread and the drinking of wine is formally the sacramental eating of the body and drinking of the blood of Christ derives from its being an eating and drinking of the symbols performed according to the institution of Christ and conjoined with the word of institution. Nor does it present an objection that the word of institution also pertains in part to the efficient cause. For just as it happens elsewhere in accidents and beings by aggregation, so also here it can and does happen that a thing (the action of the Holy Supper) is constituted in its specific being and receives its formal principle from that (the Word of Institution) which in its own way also pertains to the efficient cause.

§ X. The end for which, or the subject to be admitted to participation in the Holy Supper, consists of Christian persons who are able to examine themselves.

Notes. These are those for whose benefit this sacrament was instituted by its Author. To whom this sacrament, as a means of grace, ought to be applied. Some call this the personal Object, which is the correlate of the person administering the Holy Supper. These are persons professing the Christian faith or religion, and endowed with, that is baptized by, the sacrament of initiation. See cf. 1 Corinthians 11:28. To examine oneself here means to test oneself according to those things that ought to be absent from or present in a person who would rightly and profitably use the Holy Supper, so that sins that are adverse to the salutary use of the sacrament are retracted through repentance, while on the other hand, faith exercises itself in the contrite heart and is directed toward the body and blood of Christ as present and as the cause of the remission of sins.

§ XI. To all those who are admitted to the communion of the Holy Supper, both blessed symbols must without exception be given.

Notes. No distinction between clergy and laity is to be admitted, since it must be acknowledged that this sacrament, as a means of grace, was destined for the faithful as such, without distinction of ecclesiastical or secular estate; and that in the first administration, the Apostles themselves were regarded not as Apostles or ministers of the Church but as Christians and believers (see Musaeus, Disputation on Communion under Both Kinds, latter disputation, sections 15ff.). Not only bread but also, in addition, the consecrated wine must be given; and this not for the ablution of the bread or host, but as the second part of the sacrament. The term "both kinds" is commonly used, not as though only the external appearance or bare accidents of the symbols, without the substance itself or in an alien substance, were present, but because the symbols of bread and wine themselves differ from each other in kind (see Musaeus, Disputation on Communion under Both Kinds, prior disputation, section 2). This is required by the institution of Christ, which by its nature implies a precept concerning the specification of the act and does not leave the Church the liberty to administer this sacrament in one way or another (see Musaeus, Disputation on Communion under Both Kinds, prior disputation, sections 3ff.).

§ XII. The end for the sake of which, which is also the fruit or effect of this sacrament and which is the intermediate end, is as follows.

(1). The remembrance and commemoration of the death of Christ, which is accomplished by faith.

(2). The sealing of the promise of the remission of sins and the confirmation of our faith.

(3). Our engrafting into Christ and spiritual nourishment unto life.

(4). The mutual love of the communicants.

The ultimate end is the eternal salvation of the communicants.

Notes. For the sake of obtaining this, this sacrament has been instituted to be celebrated. Indeed, the sacraments are efficacious means in relation to the end; this also we will show here in detail. So Christ himself says in Luke 22:19: "Do this εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν (in my remembrance)." Paul, repeating this in 1 Corinthians 11:24-25, adds in verse 26: "For as often as you eat this bread and drink of this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes." This sacrament, in which Christ himself really exhibits his own body and blood to us, assuredly possesses a mighty power to move the mind to remembrance of him. This remembrance is to be exercised by faith, namely that we may consider and believe that Jesus Christ, the God-man, our King and Priest, himself offered his body to God the Father as a sacrifice for us on the altar of the cross, and poured out his blood for us, in order to obtain for us the grace of God and the remission of sins. Faith, insofar as it is directed toward the body of Christ delivered unto death for us, is called the spiritual eating of the body of Christ; and insofar as it is directed toward the blood of Christ poured out for us, it is called the spiritual drinking of the blood of Christ; concerning both of which, see John 6:35, 53ff. Since we eat that very body of Christ which was delivered unto death for us by means of the blessed bread, and drink that very blood of Christ which was poured out for our sins by means of the wine, we are thereby made certain (and Christ wills that we be made certain by this means) that by grace through faith there are bestowed upon us all the benefits that Christ merited on the altar of the cross by the delivery of his body and the pouring out of his blood, namely the remission of sins, the grace of God, and eternal life (so Gerhard, combining the end and the fruit of the Holy Supper, in his Theological Commonplaces, vol. 5, Locus on the Holy Supper, section 212).

Although the promise of the Gospel, that everyone who believes in Christ should not perish but have eternal life, is universal, nevertheless, because anxious consciences, terrified by the sense of sin, divine wrath, and their own unworthiness, frequently doubt whether this promise pertains also to them as individuals, so that they might by true faith rest upon it before the judgment of God and by it raise themselves against the accusation of the law, of sin, and of Satan, therefore Christ distributes to them individually his body and blood, so that, as ὁ μάρτυρ ὁ πιστός (the faithful witness) (Revelation 1:5), he may confirm them against all the assaults of various temptations: namely, that the promises of the Gospel and the blessings offered therein truly pertain also to them, since in the Holy Supper they are fed and given drink with the body of Christ delivered unto death and his blood poured out for sins, which are the source and foundation of the Gospel promise. These are the words of Gerhard in the same passage. Nothing is more closely and intimately conjoined with the Son of God than the assumed human nature, which he united to himself by a personal bond; conversely, nothing is more closely conjoined with us than what we eat and drink, since it is converted into the substance of our flesh. Christ, therefore, desiring to unite himself most closely with us and us with himself, instituted this sacrament in which, by means of the blessed bread, we eat his body, and by means of the blessed wine, we drink his blood (so Gerhard again, following the observation of Tauler, in section 213). Gerhard cautions, however, that he does not maintain that this spiritual food is altered and transmuted in us, but rather that it transmutes and alters us, so that we become partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) and members of the mystical body of which Christ is the head (Ephesians 5:30). Thus it is evident that not only does the intention of Christ as the author look to this engrafting as its end, but also that our engrafting into Christ is efficiently conferred through the sacrament itself. When the sacramental eating and drinking is conjoined with the spiritual eating and drinking, and the body and blood of Christ are received in both ways, then the contrite heart, burdened by sins, is refreshed, the fearful mind is raised up, sustained, and nourished unto eternal life, so that it neither hungers nor thirsts but has life in itself, has eternal life (John 6:33, 54ff.). Gerhard teaches in the same place that from this union with Christ it comes about that we, as branches from the vine, receive new strength for fighting against Satan, resisting the desires of the flesh, and growing in grace. To this end, among other things, pertains the administration of the Holy Supper in the public assemblies of the Church, as the bond and sinew of ecclesiastical gatherings (1 Corinthians 11:20). And when Paul exhorts to Christian charity and concord, with the exclusion of schisms and divisions, among his other arguments he says: πάντες εἰς ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν ("we were all made to drink of one Spirit") (1 Corinthians 12:13). The further fruits of the Supper may be seen in Gerhard at the same place. For all sacraments, as means and instruments of evangelical grace, tend ultimately toward this end.

We deny, however, that the celebration of this sacrament, when performed by others, benefits those who are absent or dead, whether by virtue of the work performed (ex opere operato) or by way of a sacrifice properly so called. For neither can the celebration of the Holy Supper be called a commemorative sacrifice, if it is distinguished from the Eucharistic genus of sacrifice (see the Detailed Explanation, book 18, question 90, pp. 695ff.; cf. Chemnitz, Examination of the Council of Trent, part 2, p. 250f., where he teaches in what sense the liturgical action can rightly be called a sacrifice according to Scripture; and p. 275ff., where he explains in what sense the ancients called the liturgy a sacrifice).

§ XIII. The Holy Supper may be defined as a sacred action instituted by Christ, in which, together with the blessed bread, his body is given to Christian communicants to be eaten, and together with the blessed wine, his blood is given to be drunk; and both are received by them: the body is eaten with the bread, and the blood is drunk with the wine, in commemoration of the death of Christ, for the sealing of the remission of sins, and for the confirmation of faith unto eternal life.

Notes. In this definition, the genus common to all sacraments is denoted by "sacred action." The principal efficient cause is indicated by "instituted by Christ" (cf. Section 2, p. 684). The earthly matter is the bread and wine (cf. Section 6). The consecration performed with the words of institution constitutes the form of the Holy Supper (cf. Section 9). The heavenly matter is the body and blood of Christ (cf. Section 8). The end for which, or the subject of the Holy Supper, is denoted by "Christian communicants" (cf. Section 10). And the final end is indicated by the commemorative, sealing, and confirmatory purposes described (cf. Section 12). 303

Question XI. Who is to be baptized?

The Subject of Baptism. To be baptized is a true human being a), carnally begotten b), and brought forth into the light c), whether male or female d), whether an adult who is not resistant e), or an infant f).

Prob. a. From Matt. 28:19. Therefore, a true human being is to be baptized, not a bell, not a monster incapable of regeneration.

Prob. b. From John 3:5-6: "Unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of heaven. That which is born of the flesh is flesh." The reason why men need baptism is that they are flesh of flesh, i.e., conceived in original sin.

You say: Christ was baptized, who yet was not flesh of sinful flesh.

Resp. Christ was baptized by the same economy, or special dispensation, by which he was circumcised; namely, that by the contact of his body he might sanctify the baptismal waters, and apply to us by the baptism of water the righteousness procured by his blood, Matt. 3:16.

Prob. c. No one can be reborn unless he has been born. Hence an embryo is by no means capable of baptism.

Prob. d. We read that Lydia, a woman, was baptized, Acts 16:15. "There is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ," Gal. 3:17.

Prob. e. History teaches that at the very beginning of the nascent church many adults were tinged with the sacred wave. This is the difference between infants and adults, that infants indeed cannot be instructed beforehand, but adults must first be taught and afterwards baptized, so that from the hearing of the word they may conceive both a hatred of sin and faith in Christ, Matt. 28:19; Matt. 3:6; Acts 8:27. Wherefore, through baptism, faith and that which follows it, justification and renewal, are not first conferred on adults, but are sealed and increased.

Prob. f. That infants are capable of baptism is evident 1) from the universal necessity. Whatever is born flesh of flesh, that must be regenerated of water and the Spirit under peril of salvation, John 3:5-6. But infants are born flesh of flesh. Therefore... 2) From the universal command of Christ, Matt. 28:19, where Christ commands all nations to be baptized. Under all nations, infants are also comprehended. 3) From the universal promise, Acts 2:38-39, coll. with Gen. 17:7, from which we gather: Those to whom the promise of grace and the evangelical covenant has been made, they are to be baptized, so that by baptism they may be constituted heirs of eternal salvation: But the promise has also been made to infants. Therefore... 4) From the parity with circumcision. To whom the circumcision of the old testament pertained, to them also pertains the baptism of the new testament (because the latter has succeeded in the place of the former, Col. 2:11. Nor is the grace of the old testament greater than that of the new): But circumcision also pertained to infants: Therefore... 5) From their fitness for the kingdom of heaven. Those to whom the kingdom of heaven belongs, to them pertains baptism as a means of arriving in that kingdom. The kingdom of heaven belongs to infants, Mark 10:14. Therefore... 6) From the practice of the primitive church; since indeed the Apostles baptized entire houses and families (to which infants also pertain), Acts 16:15; c. 18:8; 1 Cor. 1:16.

Antithesis is that of the Anabaptists and Socinians, who impugn paedobaptism with the following arguments:

I. We do not have an explicit divine command to baptize infants: Therefore, we are not obliged to paedobaptism.

Resp. A universal command, which admits of a descent to infants, is sufficient for us. Otherwise, we conclude by the same reasoning: There is no explicit divine command to baptize Transylvanians: Therefore, no Transylvanian is to be baptized. There is no explicit command that the eucharist is to be offered to women. Is it therefore not to be offered to them? But just as from the words "drink all of you" we rightly conclude for women, so we argue invincibly for infants on account of the words "baptize all nations."

II. Christ was baptized in his thirtieth year of age: Therefore, baptism should be deferred to the thirtieth year of age today.

Resp. Christ was circumcised in his infancy, at which time baptism had not yet been instituted; since indeed John the Baptist first administered baptism in the 29th year of Christ. Add that the baptism of the most holy Jesus (which he undertook out of free economy) could be deferred without danger: but our infants, conceived in sin, are subject to various dangers.

III. If infants are fit to receive baptism, they will also be fit to receive the preaching of the divine word (because both baptism and the preaching of the word are means of regeneration): The consequent is false: Therefore, so is the antecedent.

Resp. We deny the consequence of the major; because for receiving the preaching of the word with fruit, hearing and meditation are required, of which infants are not capable due to the lack of the full use of reason. Nothing, however, impedes them from being baptized.

IV. If infants are capable of baptism, they will also be capable of the Lord's supper (for both are sacraments of the N.T.): The consequent is false: Therefore, so is the antecedent.

Resp. We deny the consequence of the major; because one who is about to approach the Lord's supper, δοκιμαζέτω ἑαυτὸν, let him examine himself, 1 Cor. 11:28. But such a δοκιμασία (examination) does not apply to infants, nor is it required of those to be baptized.

V. Whatever baptism is not voluntary, that is not legitimate: The baptism of infants is not voluntary: Therefore... The major is established: because the whole Christian religion is voluntary, therefore also baptism, a notable part of the Christian religion. The minor is proved: because προαίρεσις, or purpose of the will, does not yet apply to infants.

Resp. Something is called voluntary, either that which is elicited by the will, or that which is admitted by a non-repugnant will. Although infants do not actively choose baptism, they do not, however, resist; but they admit it spontaneously.

VI. Whoever cannot enter into a covenant with God, they are not to be admitted to baptism: For in baptism a pact or covenant is entered into with God: Infants cannot enter into a covenant with God: Therefore... The minor is clear: because a covenant is entered into between those who possess the use of reason, which infants lack.

Resp. On the part of the one who makes a covenant with another, the full use of reason is not always necessary, which is clear from the example of circumcised infants. Not infrequently among men, covenants are sanctioned in which parents vouch in place of infants, and so the covenant also embraces infants not yet possessing the use of reason. The same thing happens in baptism, where, when infants are received into the covenant, others vouch for them, namely those who offer them for baptism.

VII. Infants are not capable of faith: Therefore, neither are they fit to receive baptism.

Resp. That infants are capable of regeneration and of faith, we have given proof in the preceding section, ch. IV, on regeneration.

THESIS XV.

Faith is not to be denied to baptised infants, nor is it to be admitted that they believe only with someone else's faith, or virtual, or equivocal faith, even if we cannot sufficiently explain how faith exists in infants. Against the Socinians and Calvinists, who deny faith to infants. See Socinus, On the State of the First Man, p. 311, and Book of Salvation, p. 53, to whom it seems ridiculous that infants believe; Beza, pt. 2, response to the colloquy, p. 97, as well as the Colloquy of Montbeliard, p. 475, who denies that infants are justified by their own faith, to whom they ascribe only the faith of parents or the Church; P. Martyr, Hieronymus Zanchi, Perkinsius, the Hungarians, Bucanus, Marlorat, Snecanus, Ursinus in the Catechism, p. 370, who with Piscator, Polanus, Sebastian Benefeld, Zepperus, Martinius, and Calvin, with whom Trelcatius, Junius, Sobnius, and Fest. Hommius attribute only the seed of faith to them; Johann Bergius attributes equivocal faith to them; the Britons in external judgment to the Synod of Dort, p. 207, deny true faith to them, etc.; and the Papists, who likewise deny proper actual faith to them, Bellarmine, book 1, On Baptism, ch. 11, and Cassander, who, denying that faith is conferred on infants through Baptism, asserts that the faith of those offering them is imputed, in Consultation on the Augsburg Confession, arts. 8–9. The idolizers of Cassander accede to this, especially Latermann, pronouncing that consultation golden, likewise asserting that infants believe from another's confession, thesis 54, on predestination.

Explanation:

(1) The question is about baptised infants. (2) Through Baptism as a means of regeneration, faith is conferred. (3) But we do not only attribute to infants alien faith, such as that of parents or the Church, for which the Papists, Calvinists, and Innovators labor; rather, their own is attributed to them, so that they truly believe, and the Holy Spirit works faith in them through Baptism. (4) Nor is the question about faith in potency or virtual faith, but about actual faith, which we say infants have. (5) We exclude the mere seed of faith, for infants have faith itself. (6) The question is not whether infants will sometime have faith when they have grown up, but whether they actually obtain it in infancy, so that if they die in it, they will attain eternal life through this faith. (7) We remove equivocal faith and assert a properly so-called faith for infants. Although we may be ignorant of the mode, yet the thing itself is not therefore to be denied.

Confirmation:

From Matthew 19:14, “Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such as these.” Here observe (1) the approach to Christ. From this we argue: To whomever Christ commands to come to Him, faith should not be denied to them, for it is through faith alone that we come to Christ, Heb. 11:6, John 14:8, Rom. 5:1–2, Eph. 3:12. The former is true of infants. Therefore, the latter is also true. (2) The inheritance of the kingdom of heaven assigned to infants. From this we argue: Those who are heirs of the kingdom of heaven cannot be denied faith, without which no one can enter the kingdom of heaven or be a child of God. Infants are heirs of the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, faith cannot be denied to infants. (3) The blessing given to infants through χειροθεσία (cheirothesia / laying on of hands). From this we argue: To those to whom spiritual blessing is imparted, faith must also be granted, through which they are made partakers of it. Spiritual blessing is imparted to infants. Therefore, faith must also be granted to infants. (4) Compare Matt. 18:6, “Whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to stumble,” etc. Here infants are explicitly said to believe. Those whom Christ affirms believe are not endowed with potential or equivocal faith; indeed, we are commanded to become like them if we wish to enter the kingdom of heaven, especially in the simplicity of faith. Here observe (a) If potential faith is sufficient for an actual covenant with God, even hypocrites could actually be in the covenant, since they might eventually believe at some point, even if they are hypocrites here and now. (b) If no infants, even the elect, have faith, then no elect receive the kingdom of heaven if they die in infancy. But this is contradictory. (c) Those who are regenerated through Baptism actually obtain faith, not merely having virtual faith. Infants are regenerated through Baptism. Therefore, infants actually obtain faith, not merely having virtual faith. (d) If infants have only the seed of faith, then they do not actually apprehend the merit of Christ, and so cannot be heirs of eternal life, or it must be conceded that there is a double means of eternal salvation, one for infants, another for adults, and no longer will all be justified by faith alone. All of these are false. Opponents respond that the Holy Spirit supplies the place of faith in infants. But this is quite absurd. Does the Holy Spirit believe for infants and apprehend the merit of Christ? He is the efficient cause of faith, but does not take its place. Others, like Beza, say that the faith of parents is imputed to infants. But this is equally absurd. For as no one can live with another’s soul, or be wise with another’s wisdom, so no one can believe with another’s faith, Hab. 2:4. No one believes with another’s heart, yet it is with the heart that one believes unto righteousness, Rom. 10:10. And what is to be thought of impious parents—will their impiety be a detriment to infants, contrary to Ezek. 18:20? And how can the faith of parents be appropriated to infants, certainly not by transfusion, nor by imputation, because although by faith alien righteousness is imputed to the believer, yet alien faith is not imputed to an unbelieving person. Others say that equivocal faith is sufficient, but those who have only this will also be only equivocally in the covenant, their salvation will only be equivocal. Therefore, our conclusion remains invincible: He who is not actually believing, endowed with true and properly so-called faith, is truly an unbeliever, and consequently is condemned.

Objection and Solution:

Romans 10:14, “How shall they believe without hearing?” Response: (1) The discussion is about adults, not about infants. (2) The discussion is about the Gentiles, that they cannot aspire to salvation by the light of nature; therefore the Apostles had to be sent out. Hence, there is no valid inference: Gentiles do not believe without hearing; therefore, neither do infants. (3) The inference does not follow: From hearing, therefore only from hearing. The assertion of one thing is not the exclusion of another. Baptism also contributes to regeneration and faith.

THE DISTINCTION OF THE WILL OF THE SIGN AND THE WILL OF GOOD PLEASURE

Moreover then the Calvinist spirit rages, and strives to assail the universality of this Grace, contending: “that God indeed offers His grace to all: but confers it only upon those whom He knows to be His own,” or as others speak: “that God indeed wills all to be saved, by the will of the Sign, not however by the will of good pleasure.” But this distinction is full of most impious deceits and impostures, nay rather it is joined with accursed blasphemy—since it makes God a hypocrite—who under the flattering will of the Sign secretly conceals the cruel decree of devoting to eternal destruction those very persons whom He sweetly but insincerely calls and draws to His grace, which decree they are accustomed to call the Will of good pleasure.

Formerly indeed the Scholastic Doctors defined the Will of the Sign to be the Effect of God, when He goes forth to us, dealing with us through some covering or through external things which we can apprehend—as are the word of God and the Sacraments instituted by Him; but they said the Will of good pleasure is the substantial will of God, or the bare divine majesty, which is God Himself—from which will the eyes of men are to be turned away, since it cannot be apprehended—as is to be seen in Sentences, book 1, distinction 45. This same distinction Blessed Luther also repeats and approves in his commentary on Genesis, and indeed on its sixth chapter. And certainly, if it be permitted to apply those definitions of each will in God to the business of predestination—this distinction would by no means have to be rejected—yet in such a way that by the Will of the Sign you understand that which, concerning things pertaining to our salvation, is set forth in the revealed word and is enclosed in the voice of the Gospel; but by the Will of good pleasure you understand those wondrous judgments of God, that is, those ἀνεξιχνιάστους [unsearchable] ways of God—the traces of which can be seen in the marvelous government of all orders of human life, and especially of the Church—as when it is asked:

“Why would God will to exhibit, through bread and wine, the Body and Blood of His Son in the Sacrament, and not rather through other, more noble means? Why would He will to work regeneration in the baptized infant through Water and not through Wine, or some other external means? Why would He once will to choose the Israelite people as His own possession, with the other nations set aside? Why at Wittenberg, and not rather at Rome or Constantinople, and why through the poor monk Luther, and not through the Emperor or other monarchs, would He have willed to undertake that divine work of the Evangelical Reformation?”

This indeed, if that Scholastic distinction be taken in this way, can in some manner be tolerated, although (as Blessed Luther rightly admonishes) the Will of good pleasure is improperly taken of those secret ways and judgments of God—since the Will of good pleasure is that very one which the Gospel shows—the Apostle being witness in 1 Corinthians 1:21, “εὐδόκησεν ὁ Θεός [it pleased God], through the foolishness of preaching, to save those who believe”; the Saviour Himself also being witness, John 6:40: “This is the Will of God, that he who sees the Son, and believes in Him, may have eternal life.”

But moreover the Sacramentarians most wickedly abuse this distinction of the Scholastics—referring both the Will of the Sign and of good pleasure to one and the same object—in this sense: That God, the very one whom He calls by the Will of the Sign to the kingdom of His grace, by the Will of good pleasure (and indeed moved by this alone), with no regard had to his unbelief, has from eternity devoted to damnation. Which crude theology feigns contradictory Wills in God, and holds that God has revealed one thing in His Word concerning the salvation of men, but another and plainly different He has kept back in secret; at which kind of doctrine heaven and earth rightly shudder, nay, the demons themselves are astonished and tremble. In order that the prodigious impiety of this execrable dogma may be made known the more forcefully, it must be held as the firmest anchor of faith, that there is absolutely no secret or hidden Will in God which indeed concerns the matter of our salvation; and which has not long since been most clearly revealed, to such an extent that whatever God has ever willed, decreed, purposed, determined, inasmuch as it concerns the substance, parts, causes, means of our salvation, He has not kept even the least thing in secret, but has revealed all in the Gospel to us. A witness beyond all exception can be the Apostle, who in Acts 20:27 openly testified that he had announced to the Ephesians the whole counsel of God, and in 1 Corinthians 2:7 affirmed that he had spoken the wisdom of God in a mystery, namely that hidden [wisdom], which God had foreordained before the ages for our glory. Nor does it stand in the way that the Apostle in many places, if you look at the surface of the letter, seems to hint at some secret mystery of the will of God: as when he makes mention of “the mystery kept silent for eternal times,” Romans 16:25; “the mystery of the will of God,” Ephesians 1:9; “the mystery hidden from eternity,” Ephesians 3:9.

For what or what sort of mystery he understands, he explains himself, namely that very thing which through the Gospel today in the New Testament is revealed; in such a way indeed that that Mystery is nothing other than the very discourse or preaching of the Gospel concerning Christ, and concerning the gratuitous remission of sins. Whence the Apostle Paul in Romans 16:25 defines the preaching of the Gospel by the Revelation of that mystery which had been silent for eternal times. And in Ephesians 1:9 he affirms that that Mystery of the divine will concerning the salvation of men has been revealed. The same is repeated in Colossians 2:2, 6; 2 Timothy 1:10.

But moreover the Apostle therefore calls this preaching of the Gospel a Mystery hidden from ages and generations:

1. Because the Fathers of the Old Testament had a somewhat more obscure knowledge of the Gospel, as it were overlaid and darkened by many shadows, types, and figures: whence the Apostle also compares that knowledge to Night, Romans 13:11.

2. Then indeed therefore for this reason, because that Decree of the most holy Trinity, which concerning the sending of the Son in the flesh is revealed through the Gospel, is without controversy a great mystery, 1 Timothy 3:16.

With these things thus standing, we deservedly consign the Calvinistic distinction of the Will of the Sign and of good pleasure, together with its authors, to Orcus.

But at this point Theodore Beza makes a clamor, and strives to confirm this distinction by sacred examples: as, that the Lord by the Will of the Sign commands Abraham to offer his son Isaac, whom, however, by the hidden Will of good pleasure He willed to be preserved alive. Likewise when GOD many times shows Himself severe and angry toward His own: such as Christ also showed Himself, by the Will of the Sign, toward the Canaanite woman; while yet by the hidden Will of good pleasure the fatherly disposition of divine Clemency, as it were concealed, lay hidden. But I reply that there is a huge dissimilarity in the examples:

1. As to the object. For in the examples adduced the question is of bodily benefits; but here the question is of the eternal salvation of men, which God Himself never and nowhere willed to be placed in uncertainty, as bodily goods are.

2. Then as to the end. For those examples show that under the will of the Sign there lay hidden the fatherly good pleasure of God, by which He turns the temptations or δοκιμασίας [tests] of His own to the best end; but the Calvinists, with the order of things reversed, imagine that under the Will of the Sign there lies hidden, not a fatherly, not a benevolent, not a saving—but a hostile, bloodthirsty, and destructive good pleasure of the divine Will—so that those whom by the Will of the Sign God seems to will to save, those He has simply, without any hope of pardon or mercy, adjudged to eternal damnation.

How then, and with what faith and conscience, the examples adduced by the Calvinists are applied to the present business, let the whole Christian world judge, nay, let the Calvinists themselves judge also, and consider well what they will someday reply to the Apostle, who extends the good pleasure of God to the restoration and salvation of the whole human race in Christ: Ephesians 1:9 and 10. “He has made known to us the mystery of His will, according to His good pleasure, which He purposed in Himself for the economy of the fullness of times, to restore ALL THINGS in Christ.” And Colossians 1:19 and 20: “It pleased the Father, through Christ, to reconcile ALL THINGS to Himself.” This very good pleasure of His will God has notably attested both in the sending of the Son, and indeed especially in the universal calling; as He willed that the whole human race be seriously called to the kingdom of His grace, Matthew 28:19; Mark 16:15; Luke 24:47; Acts 17:30: “God indeed overlooked the times of ignorance: but now He announces that ALL men EVERYWHERE should repent.” Which same universal calling God has brought into act so very earnestly, that not only at the time of the original Church—which was contained within the narrow bounds of the Adamic family—nor yet after the flood only to the house of Noah—which then represented the whole human race—and thus in both cases He called as well the ungodly Cain and Ham as the godly Abel and Shem. But also in the latter times especially, after the ascension of the Savior, He took care that the whole world be called through the preaching of the Gospel; so that in the times of St. Paul the Gospel had already been announced to every creature that is under heaven, Colossians 1:23.

But that Cain, that the ungodly Ham, that the peoples descended from those two, that after the age of the Apostles many nations despised, neglected, and stubbornly not only rejected but also persecuted this most holy deposit of the calling of the Gospel; the cause of this matter surely faith and piety themselves demand that we transfer not onto God—who by a just judgment vindicates the unyielding contumacy of the parents even in the descendants—but onto the men themselves.

But moreover at this point human reason rises up, and is accustomed to raise many sufficiently dangerous and curious questions, which it will be worth the effort to touch upon briefly. And at the beginning indeed it clamors thus: “Divine justice is always consistent with itself. Now indeed God Himself has declared that He will not punish sons on account of the sins of their parents, according to this: ‘The son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father: but the soul which has sinned, it shall die.’ Therefore it least of all accords with divine justice to restrain, by the privation of His word, the injustice of the parents in their children and descendants, and indeed with their eternal destruction—and consequently those words of the Concord are to be branded with an obelus: ‘For they are richly-deserved penalties of sins when God so punishes a land or nation for despising His Word that the punishment extends also to their posterity, as is to be seen in the Jews.’”

But in order that we may cut through that knot, which variously exercises many, two things above all must be considered:

1. What and what sort of penalty of impious parents, as of the Turks, the Jews, and similar unbelievers, remains today for their children on account of the impiety of the parents?

2. How, according to the prophetic oracle, divine Justice bears itself toward that penalty?

As to the former: That penalty which awaits the children of impious and unbelieving parents is not a simple and absolute privation of the means of salvation, as though God simply willed those children to be prevented from every access to the Church of God. Such a penalty would certainly neither accord with divine Justice, which does not will that the son bear the iniquity of the father; nor with the Mercy of God, which wills in earnest that the means of salvation be equally open to all. And indeed we neither understand such a penalty, nor did the Formula of Concord wish it to be marked, when it affirmed that the contempt of the divine word is very often punished in parents in such a way that this evil also overflows into their posterity; but under this assertion is to be understood that external and temporal penalty, namely that such infants or posterity are born outside the Church, and thus are outside. Which temporal penalty nevertheless does not at the outset undermine the Justice of God, since in bodily benefits of this sort He acts most freely. Then it does not clash with the mercy of God, since this penalty does not exclude or shut off those descendants from access to the Church. For God in individual times and in all times has placed the worship of His people and the Church in a notable position, so that its report might always spread itself to the farthest nations; and therefore the children and descendants of such parents could have, and even now can, inquire into that true worship of the true God, join themselves to the external fellowship of the Church, and hear the preached word.

In this manner of old there joined themselves from Gentilism to the people of God Jethro the father-in-law of Moses, Rahab the harlot, the Gibeonites, Job, Ruth, Hiram king of Tyre, the Queen of the South, Naaman the Syrian, the Ninevites, Nebuchadnezzar, Darius, Cyrus, Ahasuerus, the Persians converted by the Jew Mordecai; and innumerable others of whom the sacred writings make mention. But when now the children and descendants of unbelieving parents not only persist stubbornly in the idolatry of their parents, but also haughtily neglect, despise, persecute that renowned report of the divine worship: then indeed it comes to pass that to that bodily penalty there is added also a spiritual one, namely eternal damnation, not by the fault of the parents, but by the proper fault of these persons.

Where now straightway that other point shines forth: namely, that in this case also the Justice of God bears itself evenly: as that which does not simply and absolutely will that the Son not bear the iniquity of the Father, but with this condition, “if indeed the Son shall have turned himself away from the evil way and the injustice of the parents.” For thus God in Ezekiel: “But if a father shall have begotten a son, who, seeing all the sins of his father which he has done, has feared, and has not done like to them, but has done my judgments, and has walked in my precepts: this man shall not die in the iniquity of his father, but shall surely live. And you say: Why shall not the son bear the iniquity of the father? Because the Son has wrought judgment and justice, etc. But if anyone shall have begotten a Son, who has done the sins of the father, he shall die the death, his blood shall be upon himself,” Ezekiel 18:10, to the end of the chapter.

But furthermore human reason clamours: “That reply perhaps obtains in the case of those more grown, but not likewise in infants, very many of whom God often destroys in infancy together with their parents, and so permits to perish eternally: about whom it cannot be affirmed that they were willing to seek the true worship of God and to join themselves, as they were at that time, for lack of the use of reason, destitute of the Church of God.” But I answer

1. with the Apostle: “Who are you, O man, who answers back to God? Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, why have you made me thus? Or has not the potter power over the clay, from the same lump to make one vessel indeed for honour, but another for dishonour,” Romans 9:20 and 21. And from chapter 11:33, “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments! and His ways past finding out?”

But moreover, lest by thus answering we seem δυχ αιραίνειν [to cavil] or to turn aside, perhaps another sufficient reply can be given, and indeed one in no way dissenting from the analogy of faith. For a foundation to this reply I lay beneath, in the place of groundwork, a twofold theological hypothesis, each indeed infallible: one sought from the immense mercy of God; the other from His infinite omniscience. The former is this: “God is immensely merciful, and does not will that anyone perish, but wills that all, through the means of salvation, may come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved.” This hypothesis is universal, and concerns as well those who are born outside the Church as those who are citizens of the same. The latter is this: “God, as by nature He is all-knowing, so from eternity He knows who are going to accept the offered means of salvation, who are not; who are going to join themselves to the fellowship of the Church, who are not.”

But furthermore the question is asked here: “Does not God, who is supremely merciful, by a kind of right, by the force of His mercy, stand bound to send at all times to all peoples, in act, heralds of the word, and in act to offer to individuals the means of salvation?” To which question I answer in the negative. First, indeed, by the force of mercy God owes nothing to anyone. For debt and mercy are so opposed to each other that they cannot stand together: since the one excludes the other, the Apostle being witness, Romans 11:9. Then indeed God has more than sufficiently declared the abyss of His mercy, in that not once, not twice, but thrice He actually called the whole human race to the kingdom of grace, especially after the ascension of CHRIST the Savior, the Apostles having been sent and dispatched into the whole world: nay even to individual and to all nations, or, as the Apostle speaks, to every creature that was under heaven they actually preached the Gospel concerning Christ. Since most nations have disdainfully despised this grace, and have stubbornly driven it away, and thus have rendered themselves unworthy of this most holy deposit, surely by no right is God bound to thrust upon such headstrong despisers, even against their will, the word of salvation: since this would be “to cast pearls before swine,” and “to give the holy to dogs.” That this not be done, the Savior Himself is a most weighty admonisher, Matthew 7:6. What? even if God were to do this to the utmost, nevertheless every labor and effort that should be expended in converting men of this sort would be fruitless and vain. Nay, in this way the very providence of GOD would seem as it were to labor: in that to those peoples He would thrust upon them, even against their will, the means of salvation, from which, however, He had most clearly in view that not even one would be converted. Wherefore, by the most just judgment of God, these men are rather to be left to themselves, than that one should anxiously and curiously inquire about their conversion. Add that God even toward those obstinate despisers of the word always declares His mercy most sufficiently in this, that by no absolute decree has He forbidden them access to the Church: but He always allows the report concerning the true worship of GOD to come to them, so that perchance, the unyielding contumacy having been cast off, they may inquire about that true worship of GOD, and may join themselves to the eternal fellowship of the Church, may give outward hearing to the preached word. If they should do this, then surely God, mindful of His promise, through that hearing of the word, by the power of the Holy Spirit would even convert them, and would bestow saving faith. And it is only the empty dream of human reason that many suppose this: If God today were to send in act to the Turks and other barbarian and unbelieving peoples heralds of His word, then many of them would be converted and saved. For relying on those two hypotheses of which we spoke a little before, we invert this reasoning. For this very reason God does not send to those unbelieving peoples heralds of His Word, because as all-knowing He knows that they will not obey the word of salvation, but will rather stubbornly repel it from themselves. For if He knew that there was even a single individual, whether a man in the midst of Turkey, or in the farthest and most remote islands, who would accept the means of salvation: surely God, who does not will that anyone perish, but come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved, would gather and unite such a man to the fold of His Church, even through the most remote intervals of places. With all these things observed, a compendium will be ready for us, of most solidly answering to the greater part of the questions which are wont and can be raised concerning the universal Calling, and indeed the Calling of unbelieving peoples. But moreover not even thus does human curiosity rest, without inquiring more deeply into this Universal calling, and indeed with respect to those who are engaged in the society and bosom of the Church. “Because it is clear that scarcely a fourth part of the Hearers of the word are saved, it argues that the fault lies in the calling itself, and indeed on the part of God Himself, as if He Himself does not will all to be seriously called: but rather for this reason permits the Gospel to be announced to many, that through it they may be more grievously hardened and blinded”: as it pleased Beza to write, Response 2 to the acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, p. 96 and 149. But against this curiosity that parable of the Savior is most rightly opposed, Matthew 13:3 and Luke 8:5 and following, concerning the fourfold field. For the fault of this matter does not lie either in God who sows, or in the seed of the divine word that is sown. One man has a heedless heart: he hears the word negligently and drowsily: where, the Savior being witness, “the Devil comes and takes this word from his heart,” lest he be saved. Another has a heart sown with rocks and stones: that is, he does indeed receive the word with joy: but because he has no roots, but is a hypocrite, therefore he becomes πρόσκαιρος [for a while], he believes for a time, and when temptation unsuitable arises he falls away. Another, finally, has a heart wrapped up with thorns and briars, that is, he indeed hears the word, but in such a way that the thorns of pleasures, of riches, and the blocked-up habit of sinning choke it, so that it cannot bear fruit. Nor does it stand in the way that in Colossians 2:12, Philippians 1:29, and 2 Thessalonians 3:2 “Faith is said to be the gift of God.” For God bestows or gives Faith to men not ἀμέσως [immediately] but ἐμμέσως [mediately], and indeed out of mere grace: namely to those who hear the word, and keep it in a good and upright heart, and bear fruit with patience, Luke 8:15. Whence the Apostle affirms, “Faith is from hearing; but hearing through the word of the Gospel,” Romans 10:17. Now since very many either plainly do not, or carelessly, or with prejudice, hear the word: it surely happens that they do not conceive faith. It also happens that the Gospel, which in itself and by its nature is “a savor of life unto life,” and “the power of God unto salvation to everyone who believes,” 2 Corinthians 2:16; Romans 1:16, nevertheless by the fault and guilt of these persons, by the perverse disposition of the hearers, and thus accidentally and eventually to many “is a savor of death unto death,” as the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians 2:16, which in the intention and ordination of God ought to be an organ of faith and of salvation.

CHAPTER XI. ON CONSERVING GRACE, AND THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE FAITHFUL.

Question I. What is the conservation of the faithful?

Definition of conservation.

Conservation is an act of grace, by which the Holy Spirit dwelling in justified and renewed men fortifies these against the temptations of the devil, the world, and the flesh, by which they are solicited to sin and apostasy from God, with supernatural powers, and confirms and increases their faith and the holiness of their life, lest they should fall from the state of grace, but persevere in the same, and be eternally saved.

Question II. Who is the author of this conservation?

Efficient Cause.

The author of the conservation of the faithful is the triune God: the Father, the Son of God, and the Holy Spirit, to whom this act of grace is ascribed in a peculiar manner, both by reason of the powers conferred in regeneration and renewal, and by reason of actual help.

Proof a. From Phil. I, 6. “Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ.” God, who planted Christianity among us, and regenerated and sanctified us, will complete this very work of His in us, provided we use the divinely granted powers properly, and do not place an impediment before the conserving God.

Proof b. From 1 Thess. V, 23. “And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” God the Father sanctifies the spirit of man, lest it be corrupted by diffidence or error; the soul, lest it succumb to inordinate affections; the body, He preserves, lest it be defiled by some pollution.

Proof c. From John X, 27, 28. “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my Father’s hand.” Christ, the good shepherd, protects His sheep, so that they may remain in the Father’s hand, and obtain eternal life. To this Paul refers his own perseverance in faith, 2 Tim. IV, 17. “Notwithstanding the Lord stood with me, and strengthened me; that by me the preaching might be fully known, and that all the Gentiles might hear: and I was delivered out of the mouth of the lion.”

Proof d. To the Holy Spirit is peculiarly ascribed the conservation and confirmation of the faithful; for from Him, by the benefit of regeneration and renewal, they have received the powers to persevere, Tit. III, 6. He bears witness with the spirit of justified men, that they are the sons of God, Rom. VIII, 16. He helps their infirmities, ibid. v. 26. He is their paraclete, John XV, 26. He is the earnest, by which they have been sealed, 2 Cor. I, 22.

Question III. What moved God to conserve faith and holiness of life?

Impulsive Cause.

To conserve and strengthen the faith no less than the piety of the justified and renewed man, God was moved internally by mercy a), and externally by the merit and intercession of Christ b).

Proof a. From 1 Peter V, 10. “But the God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory by Christ Jesus, after that ye have suffered a while, make you perfect, stablish, strengthen, settle you!” The Apostle teaches that from the same fount of grace flow both the first call to celestial glory and the final consummation of this benefit, namely, confirmation in good and introduction into celestial glory.

Proof b. From Rom. VIII, 34. “Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?” God has so loved us in Christ, that He has furnished us with the gift of perseverance; because Christ died for our sake, rose again, and being exalted to the right hand of God the Father, intercedes for us. “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not,” says Christ to Peter, Luke XXII, 32.

Question IV. By what means are the reborn conserved by God in faith and holiness?

Means.

The means of conserving and confirming faith in Christ and holiness of life are the word of God a) and the sacrament of the supper b).

Proof a.

1. By the word of God we are preserved from the filth of sin. “Thy word have I hid in mine heart, that I might not sin against thee,” says the Psalmist, Ps. CXIX, 11.

2. By the word of God heard, and put into practice, our heart is comforted, lest our faith be shaken by any temptations. “Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock: And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock,” Matth. VII, 24, 25.

3. By the word of God, as by a sword, we conquer and rout the spiritual enemies of our soul, Eph. VI, 17.

Proof b. By the use of the Holy Eucharist, the mystical union with God and the state of grace are conserved. “He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him,” John VI, 56. From this union with Christ it comes that we, as branches from the vine, obtain new strength for conquering the world, the devil, and our flesh through faith, and for bearing more copious fruits of justice.

Question V. What ministers does God use to confirm faith and holiness of life?

Ministerial Cause.

Ordinarily, God uses sacred preachers to confirm the weak a). Extraordinarily, any renewed man, partly by the proposition of the divine word, partly by his own example, can incite others to the perseverance of faith and piety b).

Proof a. Sacred preachers offer their hearers milk and solid food: milk to infants, and to those unskilled in the word of justice, that they may grow in grace and in the knowledge of Christ; solid food to the perfect, who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil, that they may be preserved from evil and confirmed in good, Hebr. V, 13, 14.

Proof b. It is the duty of all more perfect Christians to lift up the hands which hang down, and the feeble knees; and make straight paths for their feet, lest that which is lame be turned out of the way, but let it rather be healed, Hebr. XII, 12, 13. This pertains especially to confirming the soul in faith, because the Apostle does not want the hands of faith to be slack, nor the knees feeble, when one is to approach the throne of grace. Wherefore, let the more mature Christians make straight paths for their feet, i.e., by the proposition of the divine word and by their own example, let them shine before the inexperienced, lest those who are weak should utterly fall from faith and deny Christ.

Question VI. Whose faith and holiness does God conserve?

Subject.

God conserves the faith and holiness of men who are reborn, justified, united to God and Christ, and renewed by the Holy Spirit.

Proof. The conservation of a thing presupposes its existence. For which reason, since faith and holiness of life exist only in men who are reborn, justified, united with God, and renewed, they are divinely conserved only in them. This we gather from Rom. V, 1, 2: “Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand;” and from 1 Cor. XV, 1: “Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand.” To stand, in the sacred writings, is the same as to persist, or to persevere. For here standing is not opposed to running, since Christians must not stand idly, but run, by the example of Lot; but to a lapse, whether in doctrine or in life. Thus standing in the present context denotes perseverance.

Paul teaches that only those brethren stand who have received the gospel and, being justified, enjoy the friendship of God. It remains firm and fixed that their faith and piety alone are divinely conserved.

Question VII. Is only the soul with its faculties, or also the body with its members, confirmed in good?

Subject which.

Primarily the soul and its faculties—the intellect, will, and sensitive appetite; secondarily the body and its members—are preserved from evil and confirmed in good.

Proof. “And your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,” 1 Thess. V, 23. Observe: for Paul, the spirit is the higher faculty of the soul, by which we understand and will. Faith, as it involves knowledge and assent, is in the intellect; as it involves trust, it is in the will. The soul is the lower faculty, by which we feel and desire that which is pleasing to the senses. The workshop of holiness of life is both the spirit and the soul; that is, the intellect, will, and sensitive appetite are capable of sanctification. Holy actions are exercised through the members of the body as instruments and weapons of justice. For this reason, primarily the soul, secondarily the body and its members, are preserved from evil and confirmed in good by the Holy Spirit.

Question VIII. In what does the conservation of the faithful formally consist?

Form of conservation.

The conservation of the faithful comprises:

a) Preserving or pre-arming grace, by which God fortifies justified and renewed men against the temptations of the devil, the world, and the flesh with supernatural powers, lest they be snatched away by those enemies headlong into apostasy from faith and piety;

b) Confirming grace, by which, through divinely ordained means, the faith and piety of justified and renewed men are established. To this also pertains consoling grace, by which the faithful, pressed by the burden of afflictions of body and soul, are raised up;

c) Enriching grace, by which both faith in Christ and piety of life are from time to time augmented with new and greater powers by the Holy Spirit.

Proof a. From 2 Thess. III, 3. “But the Lord is faithful, who shall stablish you, and keep you from evil.” The Apostle’s meaning is that God is faithful and constant; therefore He will not allow you to fall from the gift of faith conferred upon you, but will establish you in it and keep you from all evil—from the fiery darts of Satan, from the snares of the world, from the enticements of the flesh—lest they shake or undermine your faith. To this end, the most merciful God in regeneration and renewal has imparted such powers that, being girded with them, believers are not unequal to restraining and overcoming their enemies. “Resist the devil, and he will flee from you,” says St. James, chap. IV, 7. And St. John commends the pre-arming grace of God, 1 Ep. V, 4: “For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.”

Proof b. St. Paul proclaims the confirming grace of God with a memorable array of words, 2 Cor. I, 21, 22: “Now he which stablisheth us with you in Christ, and hath anointed us, is God; who hath also sealed us, and given the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts.” The evangelical promises, most certain in themselves, God confirms in us through the anointing and bestowal of divine gifts, by which we not only believe them but also conceive the greatest joy of soul and conscience from them. God has confirmed our faith, resting on the promises, with the sacraments as with seals, and with the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit as with an earnest—binding more firmly than any pledge—by which the bridegroom binds his faith to the bride and renders her certain of his enduring love. From this infallible testimony of the Holy Spirit, this grace is also called co-witnessing, because it testifies in our hearts that we are the children of God and can confidently address Him: “Abba, Father!” Rom. VIII, 15. Thus divine grace renders the hope of salvation ever more certain. To this confirming grace is also referred consoling grace, by which the afflicted souls of the faithful are refreshed and sustained, lest they fall into despair. Of this Paul speaks, 2 Cor. I, 3: “Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, and the God of all comfort; who comforteth us in all our tribulation. For as the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so our consolation also aboundeth by Christ.”

Proof c. God, by conserving faith and holiness of life, enriches and strengthens them with more abundant increase: “For this cause we also… do not cease to pray for you… that ye might walk worthy of the Lord… being fruitful in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God; strengthened with all might,” Col. I, 9–11.

Question IX. What duty is required of all the reborn and renewed, so that they may be conserved in faith and holiness?

Duties of Conservation.

That the faith and holiness of Christians may remain whole and inviolable, it is their duty:

a) To make proper use of the means divinely ordained for the perseverance of faith and holiness;

b) To implore divine help with most ardent prayers;

c) To be vigilant and cautiously avoid all stumbling blocks to faith and occasions of sinning;

d) With all the spiritual powers received in regeneration and renewal to fight fiercely against the enemies of the soul;

e) with unwearied effort to strive for the increase of faith and piety.

Proof a. The means of confirming faith are the word and the sacraments. He who meditates on the word of God day and night is like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season; his leaf also shall not wither, Ps. I, 2, 3. He who worthily eats the flesh of Christ in the sacrament of the supper, and drinks His blood, remains in Christ, and Christ in him, John VI, 56.

Proof b. “Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation,” Matth. XXVI, 41. King David prays: “Hold up my goings in thy paths, that my footsteps slip not,” Ps. XVII, 5.

Proof c. St. Peter gravely exhorts: “Ye therefore, beloved, seeing ye know these things before, beware lest ye also, being led away with the error of the wicked, fall from your own steadfastness,” 2 Petr. III, 17. Men who are ἄθεσμοι, or wicked, are those who can be kept in order by no law, no statutes; their company is to be avoided, lest, being led away by their deception from the way of truth and piety, we lose the firmness of our faith.

Proof d. From Eph. VI, 10 ff. “Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might. Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil.”

Proof e. From 2 Petr. III, 18. “But grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.” The faithful grow in grace when they embrace it with firmer trust; they grow in the knowledge of Christ when, eagerly drinking the milk of the gospel, they grow thereby, tasting more and more how gracious the Lord is, 1 Petr. II, 2, 3.

Question X. Is saving faith conserved by good works?

Properly speaking, faith is not conserved by good works, but by the same causes through which it is generated, namely by the word and the sacraments a); by good works it is exercised, manifested, and becomes known b).

Proof a. The word and sacraments are the means, divinely instituted, for kindling, nourishing, strengthening, and conserving saving faith in the hearts of men; but the pursuit of good works is its consequence, which testifies to faith, just as fruit testifies to the tree.

Proof b. The faith of Abraham ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἐτελειώθη was known as perfect from his works, James II, 22. Calov, in his illustrated Bible, explains these words: a thing is understood to be perfected, from the use of Scripture, which either acquires a just perfection of its parts or of its degrees, or even becomes more evidently known to others from its excellence. Thus we do not deny that the faith of Abraham was also intrinsically strengthened in its degrees by these signal works of obedience; that it became more known extrinsically to all who now and in the past would hear of them can be doubted by no one. The words of the Apology of the Augsburg Confession (p. 117) also deserve note: “Alms are exercises of faith, which receives remission, which conquers death, as it exercises itself more and more, and in those exercises receives strength.”

Question XI. What is the end of the conservation of the faithful?

The End and Effect of Conservation.

The ultimate end of this conservation, on God’s part, is the glory of God’s grace a); on the part of men, eternal salvation and standing firm in the final judgment b). The proximate end and effect is perseverance c).

Proof a. From 2 Thess. I, 3. “We are bound to thank God always for you, brethren, as it is meet, because that your faith groweth exceedingly, and the charity of every one of you all toward each other aboundeth.”

Proof b. “But he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved,” Matth. X, 22. “Watch ye therefore, and pray always, that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all these things that shall come to pass, and to stand before the Son of man,” Luke XXI, 36.

Proof c. “For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure,” Phil. II, 13. Whence, “he which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ,” chap. I, 6. Perseverance is therefore a gift of God, concerning which Augustine, in his book De corruptione et gratia (ch. VI), writes: “If we should say that this perseverance, so laudable, so happy, is of man, so that it is not from God, we nullify that which the Lord said to Peter: I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not.”

Question XII. What is the perseverance of the faithful?

Definition of perseverance.

The perseverance of the faithful is a gift of God, by which the faith and holiness of a justified and renewed man are conserved and remain.

Homonymy.

Question XIII. How many kinds of perseverance of the faithful are there?

The perseverance of the faithful is either temporary or final. The former is that by which justified and renewed men persist in faith and holiness of morals only for a time, but not until the end of life a). The latter is that by which Christians, retaining faith and a good conscience until the end of life, remain in the state of grace b).

Proof a. There are men who hear the word of God, receive the hearing with joy, but have no root and are πρόσκαιροι, or temporary. Therefore, when affliction or persecution arises because of the word, they are immediately offended, Matth. XIII, 20, 21. Their perseverance is temporary.

Proof b. On the other hand, there are men faithful unto death, to whom is given the crown of life, Apoc. II, 10. Their perseverance is final, which final perseverance is called perseverance κατ’ ἐξοχήν.

Question XIV. How many kinds of final perseverance are there?

Final perseverance is either continuous or interrupted. The former is that by which the faithful, from the time he first began to believe and was justified, remains in the state of grace and in union with God to the end, so that he never falls from grace or interrupts the union with God. The latter is that which indeed suffers some interruption, but, being subsequently restored, endures to the very end.

Obs. I. Distinction between the reborn and the elect. The reborn are judged by their present faith; the elect by their final faith. Therefore, not all the reborn are elect, nor are all the elect always and at all times reborn. For there are reborn persons who, having lapsed into mortal sins, are reprobated because of final impenitence. There are also elect persons who, because of deliberate sins in which they indulge, are for a time not in the state of regeneration. The reborn can lapse totally and finally, that is, through mortal sins they can fall from the state of grace so as never to be restored to it. The elect can lapse totally, but not finally; that is, their perseverance is interrupted for a time by deliberate sins, so that from sons of grace they become sons of wrath, yet they cannot remain in that state, but return to friendship with God through serious repentance. This is because, in view of their persevering faith—which would embrace the merit of Christ—they were elected by God, and the foreknowledge of God is never mistaken.

Obs. II. Continuous perseverance, with respect to time, belongs to those who sin only from infirmity, never from determined malice, or who commit only venial sins by consequence. Because of indwelling sin (Rom. VII, 17), the weakness of the flesh (Rom. VIII, 3), and the imperfection of renewal in this mortal life, this happens to believers rarely, if at all. This is even more true of equal perseverance (unchanging degree). For who can be found in whom, throughout life, the degree of faith and piety is never diminished even slightly?

Obs. III. That perseverance—not only of the reborn, but also of the elect—can be interrupted for a time has already been shown.

Question XV. What is opposed to the perseverance of the faithful?

Opposite.

Opposed to the perseverance of the faithful is a lapse from faith and piety, which, if continued with deliberate attachment, is called apostasy.

Question XVI. What is apostasy?

Definition of apostasy.

Apostasy is a deliberate and deceitful falling away from faith and piety, continued through repeated acts of infidelity and impiety, accompanied by a settled delight in them and contempt for the divine word.

Obs. Apostasy is not a lapse committed through ignorance or sudden impulse—even if serious—when followed by repentance. Rather, it is a clearly deliberate and sustained rejection of faith and piety, involving repeated acts, persistent indulgence, and contempt for the word of God.

Question XVII. How many kinds of apostasy are there?

Division of apostasy.

Apostasy is twofold: dogmatic and moral. The former is a defection from the true doctrine of the Holy Spirit, by which saving faith is extinguished a). The latter is a deliberate abandonment of holy living, continued through repeated sinful acts, leading to the ruin of faith b).

Proof a. The starting point from which apostasy occurs is faith. Therefore, the Apostle warns in Hebr. III, 12: “Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God.” This shows that apostasy consists in the malicious rejection of faith. Faith is lost both by denying its doctrine and by deliberate sin. Hence apostasy is divided into dogmatic and moral. Paul speaks of dogmatic apostasy in 1 Tim. IV, 1: “Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils.” One who abandons true doctrine and embraces false teaching is, in this sense, an apostate. Some traditions define apostasy more strictly, as a complete renunciation of the Christian faith (for example, becoming a follower of another religion).

Proof b. From 1 Tim. I, 19: “Holding faith, and a good conscience; which some having put away concerning faith have made shipwreck.” The Apostle teaches that faith cannot endure unless a good conscience is maintained and deliberate sins—by which the conscience is wounded—are avoided. He confirms this with examples of those who, having cast away a good conscience through intentional sin, have suffered shipwreck in regard to faith.

Question XVIII. Should reborn and renewed men doubt the perseverance of faith and piety?

Certainty of perseverance.

The present state of grace in which the reborn and renewed live excludes every reason for doubting the perseverance of faith and piety; for of this they are certain—not indeed with absolute certainty, but with an ordered and conditional certainty.

Proof a. The reborn and renewed are certain that:

a) God the Father will grant perseverance in faith, as Paul testifies, 1 Cor. I, 8.

b) They are certain of the intercession of Christ, which He Himself promised, Luke XXII, 32.

c) They are certain of the sealing of the Holy Spirit, 2 Cor. I, 21, 22 (see the citations above).

Therefore they are persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord, Rom. VIII, 39.

Proof b. The reborn, justified, and renewed are certain of their perseverance not absolutely, but conditionally—if they duly perform their duty (see above, Question IX). This the Formula of Concord teaches (p. 803): “It is the eternal decree of God, that He wills to promote, confirm, and conserve to the very end that good work begun by Him in them, if only they constantly lean on His word as on a staff, implore His help with ardent prayers, persevere in the grace of God, and faithfully and well employ the gifts received.”

SUSPIRIUM.

Protect and seal in my heart, O eternal God, the true faith which by pure grace You kindled in regenerating me. Preserve and strengthen in my soul Your image, which You restored in renewing me. For indeed, the devil, the world, and the flesh strive both to extinguish saving faith and to destroy Your image. The devil solicits me to apostasy, the world and the flesh to impiety. To repel these enemies I am unequal unless You, O Savior, continue what You have begun, fortify me with Your divine strength, and support me with Your ever-present help. Wherefore I implore and beseech that by Your most Holy Spirit You may continually rule, sustain, and strengthen me, that against all enemies I may fight the good fight, run the course of piety without stumbling, retain a persevering faith until my last breath, and from Your most generous grace receive the crown of righteousness and glory.

Question XLVIII. What is the hypostatic character of the Holy Spirit?

The hypostatic character, or personal property of the Holy Spirit, is passive spiration, or the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

Proof. Passive spiration belongs solely to the Holy Spirit, distinguishes Him from the Father and the Son, and constitutes Him in the being of the Spirit. Therefore, it is the personal property of the Holy Spirit.

Question XLIX. What is the passive spiration, or procession of the Holy Spirit?

Procession, or passive spiration, is the eternal origin of the Holy Spirit, by which He, within the bosom of the deity, is produced from the Father and the Son, by the communication of one and the same essence in number, as the common spiracle of both.

Obs. 1. It is called passive spiration, not physically, as if it implies passive power, or imperfection; but grammatically, because the Holy Spirit is said not to spirate, but to be spirated. Nor are active and passive spiration two spirations, but it is one and the same spiration, which, with respect to the spirating and producing principle, is called active spiration, and with respect to the produced term, passive. For the rest, the emanation of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is most pure.

Obs. 2. Spiration is here understood not as external, such as was the breathing of Christ upon the disciples in John 20:22, but internal and immanent, since it occurs within the very bosom of the deity; not transitory and vanishing, such as is the breathing of men, but eternal and permanent; because the Holy Spirit proceeds from eternity, as the breath of the Almighty, Job 33:4, and the Spirit of the mouth of the Lord, Psalm 33:6; not an accidental spiration, but a substantial one: for accident does not fall upon God, nor can the Holy Spirit, as a divine person and substance, be produced by an accidental act.

Question L. How will you prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son?

That the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, the sacred scripture teaches αυτολεξεί (in the very words) and in express terms (a). That the same proceeds from the Son of God is validly collected from the denomination of the Spirit of the Son (b), the ὁμουσία (consubstantiality) of the Father and the Son (c), the reception of omniscience from the Son (d), the apocalyptic vision of the river proceeding from the throne of the Lamb (e), the mission of the Holy Spirit from the Son (f), the breathing of Christ upon the disciples (g), the order and distinction of the divine persons (h).

Proof a. The words of Christ are clear, John 15:26. “When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the spirit of truth, who from the Father ἐκπορεύεται (proceeds), He will testify of me.” The Savior speaks of the eternal and internal procession of the Holy Spirit, by which He receives His essence from the Father, not of the temporal and external mission for the work of sanctification, which the Socinians want this classic passage to mean, but wrongly. For (1) the mission is openly distinguished from the procession. “Whom I will send to you from the Father, who proceeds from the Father.” (2) The mission is said to occur in the future tense, the procession in the present tense, so that we may understand the discourse to be not about a temporal mission, but about the eternal emanation of the Holy Spirit. For eternity is a most present and immovable now. (3) Christ’s purpose was to assert the authority of the heavenly witness, namely that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is irrefutable and greater than any exception, since He proceeds from the Father Himself, and searches and looks into His τὰ βάθη (deep things), or depths. (4) The origin of the Holy Spirit is designated in parallel places by the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι (to proceed), Daniel 7:10; Revelation 22:1.

Obs. To this express assertion of Holy Scripture concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, other arguments can be added, namely (1) that the Holy Spirit is from God, 1 Corinthians 2:12; (2) that He is the Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10:20, the Spirit of the mouth of the Lord, Psalm 33:6, the breath of the Almighty, Job 33:4—therefore, because He is spirated by the Father and proceeds from His mouth as His breath, yet in a divine and ineffable manner; (3) because He is sent by the Father, John 14:26. The temporal mission is a sign of the eternal procession. Only the Father is not read to have been sent, because He has His origin from no one.

Proof b. In the same way that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father, Matthew 10:20, in the same way He is called the Spirit of the Son, Galatians 4:6, the Spirit of Christ, Romans 8:9, the Spirit of the lips of Christ, Isaiah 11:4, the Spirit of the mouth of Christ, 2 Thessalonians 2:8, because just as He is spirated from the Father, so He is spirated in an ineffable manner from the Son of God, and proceeds from His mouth like a divine breath.

Proof c. “All things, whatever the Father has, are mine: for this reason I said that He will receive from mine, and will announce it to you,” John 16:15. From which words of Christ not only the ὁμουσία (consubstantiality) of the Father and the Son, but also the origination of the Holy Spirit from the Son is gathered. “For whatever is said of the Father, this must be said of the Son in every way, except for this very thing, that He is the Father,” says Cyril in his Thesaurus. We argue: whoever has all things that God the Father has, except for paternity alone, has the power of spirating the Holy Spirit. But the Son of God does; therefore. Proof d. John 16:13–14: “When that Spirit of truth comes, he will lead you into all truth. For he will not speak from himself, but whatever he will have heard, he will speak, and he will also announce future things to you. He will glorify me, because he will receive from mine, and will announce it to you.” He from whom the Spirit of truth receives the knowledge of speaking and announcing future things, from the same he receives his essence. But from the Son of God, etc.; therefore. The major premise is established because in the Holy Spirit essence and knowledge are the same; the knowledge of future things is divine and eternal, which on the part of the thing is the divine essence itself.

You say: if the discourse had been about the reception of knowledge through eternal procession, Christ would not have used a verb in the future tense, but in the present or past.

I respond with the words of Augustine in Tractate XCIX on John: “Nor should it move you that a verb of the future tense is used; for it is not said, whatever he has heard, or whatever he hears, but whatever he shall hear, he will speak; for that hearing is sempiternal, because the knowledge is sempiternal. But in that which is sempiternal, without beginning and without end, a verb of any tense may be used, whether past, present, or future; it is not used falsely.” But Christ used a verb of the future tense because he was speaking of the reception in relation to the annunciation, which at that time was still future, as is clear from verse 14.

Proof e. Revelation 22:1: “Moreover, he showed me a pure river of the water of life, splendid as crystal, ἐκπορευόμενον ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀρνίου (proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb).” Where observe (1) that by the throne of God and of the Lamb is understood the essence of God the Father and the Son, marked with a hypostatic character, insofar as it is most glorious and majestic; (2) that by the river is understood the Holy Spirit, as the phrase of Scripture teaches, which is accustomed to describe the Holy Spirit thus by water, by which we are refreshed, Isaiah 44:3; John 4:10; 7:38–39; (3) the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι (to proceed or to go out) is appropriated by John to the Holy Spirit, John 15:26; (4) since this river is said to go out from the throne of God and of the Lamb, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is indicated. Having premised these things, we argue: whoever proceeds like a river from the throne not only of the Father but also of the Lamb, that is, of the Son of God, proceeds from both. But the Holy Spirit does; therefore.

Proof f. The Holy Spirit is sent equally by the Son as by the Father, John 15:26 and 16:7. But the temporal mission, since it is of a divine person, presupposes an eternal origin and procession from that person by whom He is sent. A divine person is not sent in time except by Him from whom He eternally proceeds. Hence the argument: the principle of the mission of a divine person in time is the principle of the origin of the same in eternity. But the Son of God is, together with God the Father, the principle of the mission of the Holy Spirit in time; therefore, the Son of God is, together with God the Father, the principle of the origin of the Holy Spirit in eternity.

You say: the Holy Spirit, with respect to the Son of God, is the principle of the mission in time, Isaiah 61:1, and yet not the principle of the origin of the same in eternity.

Response: Christ was sent by the Holy Spirit as man, not as God. We are speaking of the mission of divine persons insofar as they are divine.

Proof g. John 20:22: “Saying this, he breathed on them, and said to them: receive the Holy Spirit.” From which words Augustine, book IV of his Doctrine, chapter 19, collects the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son of God: “We cannot say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, nor is the same Spirit in vain called the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. Nor do I see what else he meant to signify, when, breathing on the face of the disciples, he said: Receive the Holy Spirit. For that bodily state, proceeding from the body with the sense of being bodily touched, was not the substance of the Holy Spirit, but a demonstration by a suitable signification that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son.”

Proof h. If the Holy Spirit did not also proceed from the Son, then He would not be really distinguished from Him. For every distinction in God arises from relations founded in origin. Indeed, the reason for the order of the persons in the Holy Trinity would also expire, for no reason could be given why the Son is the second and the Holy Spirit the third person of the Trinity if there is no order of origin. Finally, this absurdity would follow, that the Son of God does not have His own Spirit.

The antithesis is of (1) the Nestorians, (2) the modern Greeks, who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son of God, (3) the Socinians, who maintain that the procession of the Holy Spirit is His temporal mission, and (4) the Weigelians, who assert that the Holy Spirit, before the birth of Christ, proceeded from the Father alone, but after the ascension of Christ also proceeds from the Son; who attack the orthodox opinion with the following arguments.

I. Sacred Scripture testifies that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, John 15:26. It does not assert the same of the Son of God.

Response: the words of Christ in the cited passage are not to be understood exclusively, for He does not say that the Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father alone; rather, when the Savior says, “Whom I will send to you from the Father,” He also implies that the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself. For a divine person is not sent in time except from Him from whom He eternally proceeds. Add this argument: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father either as such, or insofar as He has the Son as coessential. If the former, the Holy Spirit will be the Son; because He who proceeds from the Father as such proceeds in the image of Him from whom He proceeds. If the latter, then He proceeds from both.

II. Whoever communicates essence to another generates the same. The Son of God does not generate the Holy Spirit; therefore, the Son of God does not communicate essence to the Holy Spirit. The major premise is established because generation is formally the communication of essence.

Response: I deny the major, for the formal reason of generation is not completed by the mere communication of essence, but by the communication of essence in the image of the producer. The procession of the Holy Spirit indeed denotes the communication of essence, but not in the image of the producer, rather so that it may be the common spiracle of the Father and the Son.

III. God the Father is either a sufficient principle of spiration, or not. If the former, He will not need the help of the Son; if the latter, imperfection will fall upon God the Father.

Response: (1) by way of example, God the Father is either a sufficient principle of creation, or not. If the former, He does not need the help of the Son of God and the Holy Spirit; if the latter, imperfection will fall upon God the Father, the Creator. (2) There is one power of spiration in the Father and the Son; therefore, God the Father, in the spiration of the Holy Spirit, does not need the help of the Son of God because of imperfection, but the Son of God concurs in the spiration of the Holy Spirit because of the identity of the spirative power.

IV. Whoever is not the fount and root of the deity, the Holy Spirit does not emanate from him (for a river emanates from its fount). But the Son of God is not; therefore. The minor is proven because only God the Father is the fount and root of the deity, as Athanasius says according to Dannhauer in his Hedosophia, p. 230.

Response: the Father is called the fount of the deity because He is unoriginated, and because both the Son and the Holy Spirit derive their origin from Him. In this strictest sense, that the Son of God is not the fount of the deity is evident. But if by “fount” is understood the principle of origin, nothing prevents the Son of God from being called the fount of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

V. If the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son, it would follow that the Son is more similar to the Father than the Holy Spirit is. The latter is absurd; therefore, so is the former. The consequence of the major premise is proven because, if the Son spirated the Holy Spirit with the Father, He would be similar to the Father not only by reason of essence, but also by reason of the spirative power, of which power the Holy Spirit is destitute. The absurdity of the latter is clear, because the divine persons are of the same majesty as they are of the same essence.

Response: similarity in divine matters is considered not according to relations, but according to essence, and therefore the consequence of the major premise is null.

VI. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from both, namely the Father and the Son, He either proceeds by one simple procession or by a double procession. If by one, a contraction of persons follows, for the Father and the Son will be contracted into one spirating person, and the Holy Spirit will be the other person, namely the spirated one, and thus the Holy Trinity will be overturned. If by a double one, the Holy Spirit will be duplicated or composed, for a double action implies a double term.

Response: (a) the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son by one procession; yet it does not follow that there is a contraction of both into one person, because the Father and the Son agree in the same essence but are distinguished by a distinct hypostatic character. But spiration is not the constitutive character of a person, but a personal notion that is γνωστική (gnostic), or merely notificative, common to God the Father and the Son because of their common power of spirating. (b) The three persons of the divinity created the world without any contraction of persons. Instance: from two persons one spirit cannot proceed, since individual persons have their own spirit. Response: from two persons essentially different, one spirit does not proceed. But God the Father and the Son have the same essence and the same power of spirating, and stand for one principle.

VII. The ancient doctors asserted that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son (see Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, p. 102).

Response: the preposition “per” (through) is used by the ancient fathers only for the sake of order, not for inequality or diversity of principle. Namely, they taught that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son so that the property of each person might be preserved, because the Son, by being born of the Father, has this, that the Spirit proceeds from Him; but the Father has it from no one, but from Himself. Yet the ancients did not deny that the Son of God is the principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Instance: if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son so that the latter is as much a principle of origin as the former, the Holy Spirit will proceed from God the Father mediately and from the Son of God immediately, and thus the Holy Spirit will be more closely and familiarly joined to the Son than to the Father. Response: The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father ἐμμέσως (mediately), that is, through the intervention of the Son; in this way He would indeed be closer to one person than to the other. Rather, He proceeds ἀμέσως (immediately) from both, as from one essential fount. For just as the Father and the Son are one in essence, so in producing one and the same consubstantial Spirit they are one essential principle; yet in such a way that the Father has that spirative faculty from Himself, while the Son receives it from the Father through an ineffable generation.

CHRISTIAN DONATUS:

Public Professor at Wittenberg.

USUAL METAPHYSICS.

WITTENBERG.

PRINTED BY AUGUSTUS BRUNING.

YEAR 1682.

PREFACE TO THE READER:

For the benefit of my students, if there should be any, I have written this little metaphysical book, which I would want beginners to be imbued with first before they are brought to absorb the more profound moments of this art, or even the very principles which are established here; whence I have also accommodated myself to their understanding with as much clarity as I could manage in forming descriptions and providing examples as diligently as possible. And indeed in most parts, and especially in the final ones of this discipline, I have followed the footsteps of Peripatetic philosophy, and I have sometimes spoken more from its hypothesis than from my own opinion and the propriety of truth (for it did not seem entirely advisable to me to do otherwise). But where I have sometimes departed from the received doctrines of many and from their manner of defining, I have done this either from the urgent necessity of the matter, or certainly from the use of students (which I have carefully considered everywhere) demanding it thus. To which you may also attribute the fact that you will find certain chapters of doctrines repeated, which others both omit and I myself hardly think I can defend under the name by which they are transmitted; for it was all the same to me here whether each thing truly sustains the title by which it is called or not, provided that nothing of those things was omitted which, since they do not find a suitable place elsewhere, ought by no means to be passed over here on account of the more notable use which they afford. Whence I also hope more easily to obtain forgiveness from the more learned if they should discover that I sometimes disagree with them and propose the matter somewhat differently than they are accustomed; and I am plainly confident that anyone will be so much more equitable in judging when it will be permitted to set forth in the middle the reasons of my plan and doctrines (which I know I do not entirely lack). For the rest, whoever wishes to use this little work of mine, that it may happen successfully and with great fruit, I wish again and again—and at the same time I strongly exhort—that he should not cease to advance to more mature regions in this most useful kind of study (with me as guide, if it pleases) to be undertaken.

GENERAL PART: SECTION II. On the Attributes of Being.

CHAPTER VI. On Union and Communion or Communication.

§1. The word Union is taken chiefly in four ways: (1) actively, for the action of uniting, in which way Union is more rightly said; (2) passively, for that passion of the unible which belongs to things themselves when they are mutually united with each other; (3) consequently, for the state of conjunction which results from union as from a foundation; and finally (4) relatively, for the relation of united things and the mutual respect which follows their connection. Of these, indeed, the penultimate acceptation chiefly belongs to this place.

§2. But thus nevertheless Union still varies greatly. For Union is first one thing improperly so called, another real and properly called.

§3. Union improperly called is that by which, through some trope or through mere cogitation of the mind, some things are united.

§4. And it is either verbal, or mental, or notional, or virtual, or relative.

§5. Verbal Union is said to be that by which diverse things through bare agreement of name are as if united.

§6. Of this kind obtains in figurative and improper expressions between subject and predicate, as when I say: Herod is a fox; Meadows laugh, etc.

§7. Mental or Imaginary Union is that by which those things are joined in mind which are not actually joined, or cannot otherwise be joined.

§8. Such is, for example, in goat-stag, between goat and stag; in irrational man, between man and irrationality; in a heap of coins which someone imagines for himself through sleep, between conceived coins; and so forth.

§9. Notional Union is that by which either in simple apprehension genus and specific difference, and species to individual, or in enunciation predicate to subject, or in syllogism conclusion to premises is united and connected.

§10. As when Man as species is united in mind to Peter as individual; or when with God as subject the predicate immortal is connected through the enunciative copula; or when with these propositions as premises, Everything material is quantified, and Every body is material, through the known illative Therefore this proposition is connected as conclusion, Every body is quantified.

§11. Virtual Union is called that by which something is said to be present to another through its virtue.

§12. Such is between the sun and caverns of the earth in which it exercises its virtue; likewise between a magnet and distant iron which is attracted by it.

§13. Relative Union is named that by which things through some relation without their presence are in some way mutually connected.

§14. And it is one thing social, another moral.

§15. Social Union is said to be that by which some are joined by some bond of society.

§16. And it is furthermore either Conjugal, or Economic, which is between husband and wife; or Civil, or Political, which is between prince and subject, between master and servant, between citizen and citizen, between colleague and colleague; or Spiritual, or Ecclesiastical, which intervenes between members of the church, or Christians.

§17. Moral Union finally is that by which two or several men consent with each other in mind and will.

§18. Such is given between friends to such a degree, who therefore are declared to be one soul in two or several bodies.

§19. But Real and properly called Union is that by which, without impropriety of word and beyond all work of intellect, some things are united.

§20. And it formally infers some mutual connection or conjunction, or cohesion of distinct things or terms, by which they constitute one something.

§21. And it is first either External or Internal.

§22. External Union, or Παράτακτική (Parataktē / juxtaposition), is called that by which two or several substances, without unity of suppositum, are joined by some connection.

§23. Such is, for example, in a table, between two boards glued together; in a wall, between lime and stone; likewise between wood and cement; likewise between wood and nail fixed to it.

§24. Internal Union is that by which two substances, in one suppositum mutually pervading each other, coalesce confusedly.

§25. Of this kind is, for example, in ignited iron, between fire and iron; in man, between soul and body; in Christ, between divine and human nature.

§26. Where it must be attended to diligently concerning its very nature, both matter and form, from both of which the description is taken. Namely the matter, or extremes of that, are two substances (not accidents, nor substance with accident), and they as diverse and disparate natures otherwise complete in being, otherwise incomplete; of which one has the notion of potency, which is to be perfected and actuated; the other the notion of act, which perfects and actuates. But the form infers (α) unity of suppositum, (β) mutual pervading of those substances in the same suppositum, and finally (γ) confused coalescence of the same in that suppositum.

§27. And concerning that pervading (which they call περιχώρησιν (perichōrēsin / circumincession) in Greek, in Latin Circumincession, Immeation, and intimate Permeation) this chiefly must be held: it is to be called mutual; not that in both substances it behaves actively, but that in that which is act it behaves actively, in the other truly, which is potency, passively; and thus indeed so that the former pervades, but the latter is pervaded.

§28. But that Internal Union is divided into Accidental, Natural, and Personal.

§29. Accidental Union is that by which two substances complete in being, accidentally joined, constitute one through accident. It is otherwise called Improper Real Union.

§30. Such is given, for example, in ignited iron, between iron and fire; in salt water, between water and salt. Therefore the matter, or unible extremes, are two substances, of which each is complete in being, and one of them simultaneously also complete in subsisting; the form, their accidental conjunction; the terminus, the very one through accident.

§31. For the rest, Accidental Union in view of its terminus and its subject, from which it is thus called, is sometimes accepted so loosely that they refer to it not only that Real External Union which we transmitted in §22, but also those Mystical ones supplied to theologians, namely Sacramental or Symbolic, which is between earthly and heavenly thing in the Sacrament; Spiritual or Gracious, which is between God and believer in this life; and Heavenly or Glorious, which is given between God and blessed souls in heaven; but with this caution added, that those Mystical Unions are to be interpreted according to the law of analogy and not to be understood thus except with eminence and removal of imperfection which usually accompanies vulgar Accidental Union.

§32. Natural or Essential Union is that by which two incomplete natures, naturally joined, constitute one complete nature.

§33. And it is given in any natural body between its very matter and form; and in man specially between his body and soul. And therefore the matter, or unible extremes of that, are two natures or disparate substances, incomplete both in being and in subsisting; the form, their natural conjunction; the terminus, complete nature resulting from conjunction of incomplete ones.

§34. Personal or Hypostatic Union is that by which two natures complete in being, joined from singular ordination of God, constitute one person.

§35. And it is given in Christ himself θεάνθρωπῳ (theanthrōpō / God-man), between his divine and human nature. Therefore the matter, or unible extremes of which are two natures, divine and human; divine namely complete both in being and in subsisting, but human complete indeed in being yet incomplete in subsisting; the form, conjunction of these natures made from singular ordination of God; the terminus finally, one person arising from said conjunction of those natures.

§36. Now as to Communion, or Communication, it also is either Improper or Proper.

§37. Improper Communication is said to be that which does not have real and internal union for foundation.

§38. And it is either Verbal, or Intellectual, or Tropic, or Relative, or Effective, or Transitive, or Usurpative.

§39. Verbal Communication is called that which infers only communion of name. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ λέξιν (koinonia kata lexin / communion according to word).

§40. Such is when the name of man is attributed to statue or picture, the name of cancer to disease or star, the name of God to magistrate.

§41. Intellectual or Quidditative Communication is that by which through essential identity one communicates to another itself and its properties. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ μεθέξιν (koinonia kata methexin / communion according to participation).

§42. Of this kind is that by which man as species is conceived to communicate to Peter as individual; and by which animal as genus communicates to brute as species its whole nature and essential predicates. To which also belongs that by which the same thing in several modes, or one attribute, communicates itself to other attributes of the same subject.

§43. Where you will note that this κοινωνία κατὰ μεθέξιν (koinonia kata methexin / communion according to participation), Communication Quidditative, must be carefully distinguished from that Mystical one by which divine essence, one in number without its division or multiplication, is common to all three persons of Deity; which they otherwise call κοινωνία καθ᾽ ἑνότητα κατὰ περιχώρησιν (koinonia kath henoteta, kata perichoresin / communion according to unity, according to circumincession), and καθ᾽ ὁμοουσίαν (kath homousian / according to consubstantiality), for the sake of distinction theologians call. For the former, as said, is at least intellectual; but this most real, although incomprehensible.

§44. Tropic Communication is that by which the property of a part is communicated to the whole. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ συνεκδοχήν (koinonia kata synekdochen / communion according to synecdoche).

§45. Such obtains when, for example, an Ethiopian is called white on account of teeth; or man immortal, invisible, illocal on account of soul, etc.

§46. Relative Communication is when through some respect something is communicated to another. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ σχέσιν (koinonia kata schesin / communion according to relation).

§47. Of this kind is that by which husband communicates to wife his title and honor; by which master to servant, friend to friend, appellation made from his name.

§48. Effective Communication is that by which an agent produces another and as for the most part similar to itself. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατ᾽ ἀλλοποίησιν (koinonia kat allopoiesin / communion according to alteration).

§49. Such is that by which father in humans through generation communicates to son his nature and properties; by which God through creation communicates to creature his goodness; by which teacher to disciple his erudition; by which architect to building his artificial form.

§50. Transitive Communication is that by which that which is communicated, leaving the communicating one, passes to another to which it is communicated. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ μετέκβασιν (koinonia kata metekbasin / communion according to transition).

§51. Such is when friend sends gift to friend; when innkeeper gives wine and beer to one asking; when merchant grants merchandise to buyer; when orator communicates words to listeners; when physician leads new blood from lamb into sick man through infusory art.

§52. Usurpative Communication is that by which something is conceded to another only for use. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ χρῆσιν (koinonia kata chresin / communion according to use).

§53. Of this kind is when teacher communicates book to disciple; friend to friend servant, garment, money, or anything else apt for usurpation; likewise when air, river, fishpond, meadow, forest, and such things are said to be of common use.

§54. Proper Communication is that which arises from real and internal union. In Greek it is called κοινωνία καθ᾽ ἕνωσιν καὶ κατὰ συνδυασιν (koinonia kath henōsin, kai kata syndyasin / communion according to union and according to combination).

§55. And it is divided into Accidental, Natural, and Personal.

§56. Accidental Communication is that by which of several essences accidentally conjoined but intrinsically affecting each other, one communicates to another itself and its properties. It is otherwise called Real Improper, and it is especially conspicuous in ignited iron.

§57. And it is further subdivided into Subjective, Conjunctive, and Confusive.

§58. Subjective Communication is that by which either accident to subject, or two or several accidents joined in one subject, are mutually common to each other.

§59. Of this kind communion is given in learned man, for example, between man and doctrine; or in wise virtuous man, between wisdom and virtue; or in philosopher theologian, between philosophy and theology, etc.

§60. Conjunctive Communication is that by which of two substances unible by nature one participates in the other and its properties.

§61. Such is in ignited iron, for example, where namely iron becomes participant both of the substance of fire and of its splendor, heat, and burning; so also in salt water, in honeyed water, and similar things.

§62. Confusive Communication is that by which unible natures, joined through some mixture, become mutually common to each other. In Greek it is called κοινωνία κατὰ σύγχυσιν (koinonia kata synchysin / communion according to confusion).

§63. Of this kind is in medicated wine and other medical potion made from various herbs and mineral spirits; likewise in ointment and similar mass composed from pulverized things.

§64. And all these Accidental Communications are vulgar. But to these they also add Mystical ones: namely Sacramental, Spiritual, and Heavenly; of which the former is that by which through sacramental union participation of earthly symbol is communication of heavenly thing; the latter that by which God graciously inhabiting believers communicates himself to their soul and in it perfects spiritual operations; this one that by which God in eternal life communicates himself totally to the blessed, as is more extensively expounded in theology.

§65. Natural Communication is that by which two incomplete essences, united to constitute one complete essence, communicate both themselves and their properties to each other mutually.

§66. Therefore the communicating subjects here are two incomplete essences united to constitute one complete essence; the matter of communication, both those very essences and their properties.

§67. And therefore this kind of Communication occurs in natural inanimate body between matter and form and their properties; so also in living thing between body and soul; and specially in man between his essential parts and their properties.

§68. And there are two grades of it: Communication of Essences and Communication of Properties.

§69. Communication of Essences is that by which two incomplete essences united to constitute one complete essence participate truly and really in each other mutually, but thus nevertheless that one of them perfects the other, the other receives perfection.

§70. Therefore the matter of this Communication are two incomplete essences united to constitute one complete essence; but the form of it consists in participation of these essences (by which namely one as if possesses the other and makes it its own and claims it for itself and appropriates it, etc.), and that indeed mutual, true, and real, but of this kind nevertheless which behaves actively on the part of one, passively on the part of the other.

§71. Of this kind Communication is given generally indeed in any natural body between matter and form, but specially in man between his organic body and soul; where namely body truly and really participates in soul, and soul conversely in body, thus indeed so that in this mutual appropriation soul, as act and active principle, actuates and perfects body; but conversely body, as potency and passive principle, is actuated and perfected by soul.

§72. And the propositions hence resulting and conversely expressing the same are these: Matter is informed; and Form is immaterialized; likewise Body is ἔμψυχον (empsychon / ensouled), animate; and Soul is ἐνσώματος (ensomatos / embodied), incorporate.

§73. Communication of Properties is that by which properties of one essence are participated by another essence, and therefore by the whole united thing.

§74. And it is completed by three genera or grades.

§75. The first genus of Communication is that by which the property of each incomplete essence, contradicting the property of the other essence, is attributed through and on account of union to the whole united thing in the concrete.

§76. And the propositions expressing this are, concerning Man for example: Man insofar as he has soul is immortal, is invisible, is illocal; likewise Man is visible, is local, is colored, and so forth; in which therefore in place of subject the whole united thing to which communication is made, but in place of predicate that property which is communicated is placed.

§77. The second genus of Communication is that by which properties of nobler essence to other essence truly and really, without however their transfusion or multiplication, through common possession, usurpation, and denomination, are common.

§78. Therefore the mode by which this Communication is made consists generally in this: that truly and really the property of nobler essence becomes common to ignobler essence, but specially that this happens without both transfusion and multiplication of communicated property, and that through common possession, usurpation, and denomination; through common, I say, that is, so that while it has proper and special possession in its native subject, it simultaneously should have common possession, usurpation, and denomination; through common, I say, that is, so that while it has proper and special possession in its native subject, it simultaneously should obtain common possession in the other to which it is communicated.

§79. And the propositions expressing this genus of Communication are, for example: Human body is living, is sensitive, is appetitive, is mobile, etc.; so that here in place of subject the ignobler essence is always placed to which communication has been made, in place of predicate truly the property of nobler essence which has been communicated to it.

§80. But it must be carefully held concerning this genus of Communication: I. According to that, properties of nobler essence are communicated indeed in the said mode to ignobler essence, but not conversely properties of ignobler essence also to nobler.

§81. For not, for example, divisibility, locality, visibility, composition, which are properties of body, are communicated to soul so that it might be denominated thence divisible, local, visible, or composite.

§82. II. All properties of nobler essence are to be communicated indeed universally through common possession, but through usurpation and denomination simultaneously only those which are receptive and operative and make for the end of union.

§83. Thus for to body from soul are communicated indeed in the posterior mode life, sense, and movement, but not also spirituality, simplicity, indivisibility, illocality, invisibility, immortality, etc.

§84. III. To be communicated thus, so that nevertheless the mode of having should remain diverse in both, that is, so that to the essence from which they are communicated they belong πρώτως (prōtōs / primarily), through the first, immediately, originally, through itself and through nature; to the other to which they are communicated δευτέρως (deuterōs / secondarily), secondarily, mediately, communicatively, through another and through grace of union.

§85. So although life, sense, and movement of soul are communicated from soul to body, they belong otherwise to soul, otherwise to body: to soul namely they belong in the prior mode, but to body in the posterior, as is evident.

§86. IV. Finally, to be communicated the same from the first moment of union as to first act, but second act not to follow immediately.

§87. Thus in the very moment of generation vital, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive potencies, of laughing, of speaking have been communicated to body from soul, although man does not immediately in the maternal womb, or where he has just been brought forth into this light, generate, feel, speak, etc.

§88. The third genus of Communication is that by which operations come simultaneously from both incomplete essences, and therefore should also be claimed for the whole united thing, not according to one or the other, but according to both parts.

§89. To which therefore belong propositions: Man is moved; Man generates, feels, sees, touches, desires, progresses, speaks, etc., in which therefore in place of subject the whole united thing is always placed, but in place of predicate action coming from both essences is placed.

§90. And what have been said hitherto concerning these two grades of Natural Communication and concerning three genera of Communication of Properties, those can in their mode also be accommodated to Accidental Conjunctive Communication (concerning which §60 and following). For also in ignited iron not only mutual participation of united substances is given, by force of which ignited iron, and perhaps also conversely ferrated fire might be called, but also those three genera of communication of properties occur; so that according to the first genus the whole complex (ignited iron namely) is thick and heavy; according to the second, iron is splendid, hot, burning; according to the third, the whole united thing according to both parts can be said to heat and burn.

§91. Personal Communication is that by which two complete natures, united in one person, communicate both themselves and their properties to each other mutually, and it is given in Christ alone.

§92. And therefore it again involves two grades, namely Communication of Natures and Communication of Idioms, of which the latter is again completed by three genera, in almost the mode as we have just now received concerning Natural Communication.

§93. Whence although that which is foundation and also communicating subjects and matter of communication is plainly singular and unusual, yet the mode of communicating agrees not a little with the Natural, as is sufficiently manifest from theologians, to whom that business properly belongs.

QUESTION IX - Whether the Infants of Christians are holy and in God’s covenant, even before they are baptized?

State of the Controversy.

The question between us and the Calvinists is not about external ecclesiastical holiness (which corresponds to Levitical holiness, see D. Menzer, Volume 3 of Marburg Disputations, Disputation 14, thesis 116) and covenantal potestative holiness, which is the right to the thing, but about spiritual internal holiness, actual covenantal holiness, which exhibits the right in the thing. We concede the former, but that the latter is understood by the Reformed is clear from their clear words, many of which D. Hutter has collected in his Irenicum, page 319, and which we shall adduce later. That is, the Calvinists attribute to infants born in the Church of God, before baptism, such holiness, by which according to the formula of the covenant they are thus rendered holy, that they not only have from the womb the right to the thing, or to obtaining the inheritance of the covenant, but are also in the thing, as the legal experts say, not only enjoying that prerogative over the children of the Gentiles, or that privilege, that access to baptism is open to them, as a sign of the covenant with God, and thus they pertain to God’s covenant and have the right of citizenship, but also are actually contained in God’s covenant. We deny this.

Thesis:

Although the children of Christian parents enjoy this prerogative and privilege over the children of Gentiles, that in their infant age, before they are instructed in the true religion, they can and should be baptized, nevertheless before baptism, because of this birth from Christian parents, they are not in God’s covenant nor holy, but by nature children of wrath, Ephesians 2:3.

Exposition.

I. Observe: Pareus indeed in his Irenicum, Chapter 28, Article 9, page 262, teaches that his associates, when they write that the children of Christians are born holy, understand by “holy” those segregated from the heathens, and pertaining to the Church and the covenant of God. But he tries to cast a glaucoma over us, and to palliate his own harmful opinion, and that of his associates, which is this, that the elect children of faithful parents through natural birth from them and before it, considered in relation to God’s covenant, are holy with spiritual holiness, embracing the remission of sins, as will be demonstrated later.

II. Observe: The Calvinists want to distinguish between habitual and covenantal holiness, which is relative; not with the former, but with the latter the infants of the faithful are born, i.e., the children of Christians before baptism are federally and relatively holy, but after Baptism qualitatively. But I ask: Does holiness precede regeneration as a cause, or does it follow as an effect? The Apostle affirms that it follows, 1 Corinthians 6:3, “you were washed, you were sanctified”; to Titus 3:5, “By His mercy He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit,” where regeneration is prior to renewal or sanctification. But if παλιγγενεσίαν (palingenesian / regeneration) true holiness only follows, how can it be said to be before it? You will say, we state that covenantal holiness precedes. But what is that covenantal holiness which is prior to the covenant itself? Where is that new covenant, except in baptism, in which we first obtain the right of the sons of God? If they obtain qualitative holiness in baptism, therefore baptized persons are not holy by imputation, but either by inherence or infusion in the Papist sense. The Calvinists say infants are holy by nature, although not from nature, but by the privilege of the covenant, as Calvin distinguishes in Romans 9, page 104.

III. Observe: The question is not whether infants can be called holy because they are soon to be sanctified through baptism, for this also could be conceded in some way, since one who is about to be girded is considered as girded. Valentin Forster, on inheritances which are deferred without testament, Book 9, page 588, says: “There is a general rule, that one who is about to be girded is considered as girded.” If an infant is near to baptism, or already engaged in the sacred action or work itself, who would begrudge calling him holy or a servant of God?

IV. Observe: The speech is not about infants of parents who are established outside the boundaries of the Church; not about the children of Gentiles, Mohammedans, Jews, who are still in the power of their parents, unless perhaps through legitimate adoption or just servitude properly called they are ascribed and grafted into the families of the faithful as their own, but about the infants of Christians, and those who are born in the bosom of the Church from Christian parents; to them by a certain right belongs the benefit of baptism.

V. We distinguish between external, ecclesiastical, or political holiness, and internal and spiritual holiness; infants of Christians enjoy the former before baptism, not the latter, 1 Corinthians 7:14.

VI. Keckermann distinguishes, Book 3, Logical System, Chapter 3, between holiness which is immunity from sin, and holiness of the covenant or of calling and promise, and thus the Reformed do not ascribe the former but the latter to infants. But this is false, for they speak of that holiness which makes it unnecessary for infants to be regenerated through baptism, as Beza explicitly writes, Part 2, response to the Acts of the Montbéliard Colloquy, page 102. Is this not that holiness which is immunity from sin and frees children from Original Sin, with respect to which Zwingli in his Confession denied that Original Sin in the children of Adam is sin properly called?

VII. Observe: The contradictions with which the opposite opinion conflicts are these: Can these stand together—to be born holy and to be born a sinner? To be by nature a child of wrath, and by being born to acquire the right to eternal life? Also, that the holiness of the elect depends on the decree of predestination, and that absolutely, as Peter Martyr teaches in his Commentary on 1 Corinthians 7, and on generation from pious parents. For if the sanctification of infants is from election and promise, it will not be from generation through the flesh, and conversely.

VIII. Observe: If infants, who otherwise are by nature children of wrath, are simultaneously children of grace and adopted into God’s covenant, both before and after baptism, then the condition of both will be equal. If this is so, why does Christ distinguish between both state and time? That is, why does He close the kingdom of heaven to men, whether infants or adults, before baptism, but open it after baptism (John 3:5)?

IX. Observe: The infants of believers who are still ἀβάπτιστοι (abaptistoi / unbaptised) should not be called “plain heathens” with the simple mob, since they enjoy external, ecclesiastical, and political holiness, are born in the Church from believing parents, and have access and right to baptism, and thus a certain prerogative over those who are outside, 1 Corinthians 5:12. See Blessed Balduin, Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, Chapter 2, second part, Question 2, page 792, folio edition.

Antithesis.

OF THE CALVINISTS, who teach that the children of believing parents are born holy, immune from all guilt, pleasing to God, accepted by hereditary right from the mother’s womb, indeed before they are born, are contained in the covenant, are in the people of God; that propagation itself from pious parents opens for them the entrance to salvation, and the right to eternal life is acquired for them by being born from pious parents.

Thus Calvin, in Book 4 of the Institutes, Chapter 5, Section 20, says: “But,” he says, “there is a danger that he who is sick, if he departs without baptism, will be deprived of the grace of regeneration. Not at all! God pronounces that before they are born, He adopts our infants as His own, when He promises that He will be our God, and the God of our seed after us. In this word, their salvation is contained,” etc. From this I thus conclude: Calvin attributes to the infants of believing parents, before and apart from baptism, that holiness which (1) embraces regeneration, (2) adoption as children of God, and (3) salvation, (4) which is connected with the grace of God promised in Genesis 17:7. But mere sequestration from the heathen, and external holiness, does not embrace these things. Therefore Calvin does not understand this.

The same Calvin, in Book 4 of the Institutes, Chapter 16, Section 24, teaches: “An infant begotten from a believing parent is already contained in the covenant by hereditary right according to the formula of the promise from the mother’s womb.” Also: “Infants who derive their origin from Christians are immediately received by God into the inheritance of the covenant, as soon as they are born.” Also Book 4, Chapter 15, Section 22: “The children of believing parents are not baptised in order that they may then first become children of God, who before were strangers to the Church, but rather they are received into the Church by a solemn sign, because they already previously belonged to the body of Christ by the benefit of the promise.”

Wittaker, Volume 1, page 376, says: “The salvation of little ones does not depend on Sacraments.” Although Pareus, in Romans 11 (doubts 12 and 13), in 1 Corinthians 7, and in Galatians 2, and also in his Irenicum, Chapter 28, Article 9, writes that by holiness he and his colleagues understand segregation from profane Gentiles, yet this is an empty evasion. For in Genesis 17 he says: “The circumstance of the eighth day pertains to male infants. These were in the covenant from the womb, indeed in the maternal womb by the power of the promise: ‘I will be your God and your seed’s.’ For those dying before the eighth day were not in danger concerning salvation, because they died in the covenant.”

Therefore the cloud of distinction does not help him, which he uses in 1 Corinthians 7, namely that to be in God’s covenant is said in two ways, either with respect to the right of the covenant or with respect to the benefits of the covenant. For we have already heard that he asserts that those infants who died without receiving circumcision were so in God’s covenant from the mother’s womb and in it that they obtained salvation. This opinion standing, it indubitably follows that those infants were in God’s covenant from the mother’s womb and in it with respect to benefits, since among their number is salvation and eternal life. We shall adduce Beza’s statements in the defense.

Peter Martyr, in his Commentary on 1 Corinthians 7:14, says: “Infants have the Holy Spirit and the grace of Christ before baptism. The children of the faithful are holy by the power of the covenant, even before baptism, but baptism is added as a seal of holiness.” This is the gloss of Tremellius on 1 Corinthians 7:14.

The public Confessions of the Reformed Churches propose similar things. Thus the Acts of the Synod of Dort, page 344 (Hanover edition): “The children of the faithful are holy, not indeed by nature, but by the benefit of the gracious covenant, in which they are comprehended with their parents.” Compare the Syntagma of Confessions, and especially the Palatine, Anglican, and Helvetic Confessions, and also the Heidelberg Catechism, Question 47, Massonius Universal Anatomy, Part 3, Chapter 11, page 277ff. “Of infants born from the faithful” (thus the later Helvetic Confession, page 90), “is the kingdom of God, and they are in the covenant of God; why then should the sign of God’s covenant not be given to them?”

Confirmation of the Thesis.

We take the foundations of our opinion:

I. From those passages of Scripture which teach that we are by nature (by being born) children of wrath, Ephesians 2:3; unclean from unclean seed, Job 14:4; conceived and engendered in sin, Psalm 51:7.

Note (1): Here “children of wrath” are not called actively (i.e., irascible), as a little earlier “children of contumacy” or “of diffidence,” that is, contumacious, diffident people, but passively, i.e., according to God’s sentence, guilty of eternal and temporal death—just as in Hebrew a “son of death” is one guilty of a capital crime, a “son of perdition” one devoted to perdition (John 16:12).

Note (2): Those who are τῇ φύσει (tē physei / by nature) children of wrath are not φύσει (physei / by nature) children of grace and of the covenant, nor are they free from sin and guilt, for these are opposites. But all, even the children of holy parents, are τῇ φύσει (tē physei / by nature), or by physical, carnal generation, children not of grace but of wrath, i.e., devoted and liable to divine wrath and to the punishments which God inflicts in anger against those sinning against His majesty according to the rigor of eternal justice, as D. Georg Calixt explains in the literal exposition of this passage. From which flows this argument: By whatever a person is a child of wrath, by that he is not a child of divine grace; for these are opposites. But τῇ φύσει (tē physei / by nature) the pious are children of wrath, notwithstanding the previous giving of the divine promise of the covenant in Genesis 17:7. Therefore they are not τῇ φύσει (tē physei / by nature) children of grace.

Note (3): David, saying, “I was formed in iniquities, and in sins my mother warmed or engendered me,” accuses himself and argues lest anyone should think that he is recounting the sins of his parents. Thus (1) he speaks of his sins, not those of his parents, and asks forgiveness for his sins (verses 6–7); (2) there is no hyperbole in these words, because there is no trace of this in the whole Psalm; (3) these are verified not only of David, but of all men. Hence we argue: Those who are conceived and born in sin are born with the guilt of divine wrath, death, and condemnation, and cannot be called holy and clean. The children of Christian parents are conceived and born in sin. Therefore.

II. From the words of Christ in John 3:6: “Whatever is born of the flesh is flesh,” and therefore needs regeneration. But all men are born of the flesh; therefore they are flesh, i.e., polluted with sins, and consequently need to be washed, cleansed, and regenerated. Note: Man, and the mind of man polluted with sin, is called flesh because it is carnal, and hence the necessity of spiritual regeneration is demonstrated.

III. From those places in which we are said to be cleansed through baptism, as in Ephesians 5:27, from which we thus conclude: If Christ cleanses His Church with the washing of water in the word, that it may be spiritually holy, then the assembly of Christian believers, according to God’s fixed order, through carnal birth from pious parents, is not spiritually holy apart from baptism. For otherwise there would be taken away from baptism what is attributed to it by Christ and assigned instead to carnal generation, which the Holy Spirit denies. But the former is true; therefore also the latter. And also from Acts 22:16, where we are said to be washed from sins through baptism; therefore it is clearly inferred that we have sin before baptism.

IV. From the words of Peter, Acts 2:38: “Repent, and let each of you be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is made to you and to your children,” etc.

Observe: The Apostle (1) asserts that the promise has been made to those to whom he was speaking; therefore he clearly indicates that the gate of grace is open to them. And thus they were comprehended under the covenant—but how? By right, not by fact. For if by fact, it would certainly not have been necessary for them to be seriously admonished to do penance and apprehend Christ by faith, for one who in fact or by application enjoys the promise made in Christ has no need at all of repentance, but is already in the number of the regenerate and justified, in the covenant, grace, and adoption of sons.

(2) He shows the organ and medium by which men can and should apply to themselves the general promise; he does not say that it is done either by the power of the promise, or by the right of birth, or in some other way, but that it happens through repentance and baptism.

(3) He indicates what δύναμιν (dynamin / power) and efficacy baptism has, namely the remission of sins and the reception of the Holy Spirit.

Lest anyone should object that this Petrine saying is to be understood about adults, who at that time heard Peter’s sermon, not about infants, we respond: (1) Calvin himself proves his opinion about the hereditary holiness of infants from this very passage; (2) Peter is speaking about those to be baptized, but not only adults, but also infants, according to the catholic faith, are to be baptized; (3) he explicitly includes children, saying: “To you the promise is made and to your children.”

It is clear from this that Peter speaks generally both of adults and of infants, whom he wanted, having put off the old man, to be saved.

V. From John 1:12–13: “As many as received Him, He gave them power to become children of God, to those who believe in His name, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God”; compare Galatians 3:27.

From which passages we thus conclude: If we do not become children of God from blood, nor from the will of the flesh, nor from the will of man, but through birth from God—when namely through baptism we put on Christ—therefore in the wombs of our mothers and from them we are not spiritually holy and children of God.

Since to become a child of God from blood, from the will of the flesh, and from the will of man denotes becoming a child of God through generation from parents, not only common, but also most excellent. For John uses not only the term “flesh,” but also “man.” For “son of man” denotes in sacred language a common man, just as “son of man” can signify an excellent man (see Psalm 49:3 and Psalm 4:3). But the former is true, according to the testimony of John and Paul; therefore.

Hence Tertullian, in the Apologetic, Chapter 17, says: “Christians become; they are not born.” And Augustine, Book 3, On the Merits of Sins and their Remission, Chapter 9: “Not generation, but regeneration makes Christians.” The same, Book 2, Chapter 27, says: “Not from the first fruits of newness, but from the remnants of oldness, the renewed parents generate carnally.” By the sacrament of regeneration through the Holy Spirit, the children of the promise are born again—not in the womb of the mother, but in the power of baptism, says Leo the Great, Letter 98.

How well these agree with that statement of Pareus, he himself may see: “From Christians are born Christians, just as from Jews, Jews; from Turks, Turks,” in his Irenicum, page 262.

VI. From John 3:5, where the Savior affirms with an oath: “No one will enter the kingdom of heaven unless he is born again of water and the Spirit.”

This is a universal pronouncement: “Unless anyone,” i.e., everyone who is not, etc. To this is directly opposed the pronouncement of the Reformed: “All who are born from believing parents can enter the kingdom of heaven, even if they are not born again of water.” For thus would be taken away from baptism what is attributed to it by Christ and would be ascribed to carnal generation.

We should note also that Christ speaks these words not to a heathen or Gentile, but to Nicodemus, who drew his origin from the Israelite people and the posterity of Abraham, and thus wanted to teach that even those who are born in the Church are contaminated with sins and guilty of eternal death, unless they become partakers of the kingdom of heaven by being born again of water and the Spirit, i.e., through baptism.

From which we thus conclude: Those who are conceived and born flesh of flesh, i.e., most miserable sinners lacking the remission of sins, are neither conceived nor born spiritually holy. For spiritual holiness embraces the received forgiveness of sins. But even the children of believing parents are conceived and so born. Therefore.

A parallel passage is 1 Corinthians 15:50, from which we thus argue: “Flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God.” Every man after the fall, with the sole exception of Christ, is born flesh (John 3:5). Therefore no man, through carnal generation from believing parents, will inherit the kingdom of God; and consequently, neither through it is he actually in God’s covenant and in possession of salvation. Otherwise, through that birth he would inherit the kingdom of God.

VII. From the absurd: Parents generate holy children either as holy or cleansed, or as they are simply men, or as they are sinful men.

The first cannot be; for parents generate not in the part in which they are Spirit and regenerate, but in that in which they are flesh and polluted. Thus Peter Martyr writes on 1 Corinthians 7 (folio 175, face 2): “And although the parents are Christians, they nevertheless do not generate in that part in which they are cleansed (in the mind, I say, where faith has place, by which they are reconciled to God), but they procreate by body and flesh, which, while we live here, have not at all put off impurity, as it is derived from Adam, so it brings with it his infection and stain.” So Martyr.

Not the second, because even those who are outside are men and generate, but there is no holiness with them (1 Peter 9:3). And since our birth is natural, how will it produce spiritual holiness?

Nor the third, for what purity or holiness emanates from him who drinks iniquity like water, whose righteousness is like a menstruous cloth (Isaiah 64:6)?

Finally, this opinion about uterine holiness (as D. Dannhauer calls it in the cited place, page 1061) wholly favors the Catabaptists, whose assertion is that infants are holy, therefore not in need of baptism.

If the children of the faithful, from the maternal womb by hereditary right, are holy, they will either all be holy, or only some, or none. Not all; for Adam and Eve, most holy people, generated the impious Cain. Perhaps the Calvinists say: Cain initially drew holiness from his parents by hereditary right, but afterwards by his own fault fell away. I respond: This is against their own principle, by which they maintain that one truly regenerate and holy can never fall from the grace of God. Therefore, if Cain had that holiness, he would certainly (according to the ὑπόθεσιν, hypothesin / hypothesis, of the Calvinists) have retained it; but he did not retain it, as is manifest. Therefore he did not have it.

Nor some; for let them say what is the reason that some children of the faithful derive that holiness by which they are in the covenant, but the rest do not. The Calvinists indeed take refuge here in their absolute decree, by which it pleased God from eternity that this one should draw holiness from holy parents and be in the covenant, while another cannot because of the same absolute decree. But that absolute decree has long since been exploded. It remains, therefore, that no children of the faithful from the maternal womb by hereditary right are holy.

VIII. From Psalm 51:6: “Behold, I was conceived in iniquity, and in sin my mother warmed me.”

From this I thus deduce: Whoever is conceived and born in sin is certainly not holy and in God’s covenant from the womb by right of birth. But all infants are conceived in sin. Therefore.

The major is certain: to be in sin, to be conceived and born, and to be in grace and God’s covenant are contraries and cannot stand together. The minor depends on the words of David just adduced.

Now if we ask the Calvinists at what time the holiness of children begins: if they respond, at the time of conception, David refutes this, asserting, “My mother conceived me in sins.” But if they say, at the time of birth, the same dispels this, saying, “I was brought forth in iniquity.”

Defense.

To the passages in Ephesians 2:3 and Psalm 51:7, the Calvinists object. In particular:

I. Pierius, Crocius, Chamier, etc., distinguish that men are born children of wrath according to nature, but Christians and citizens of the Church according to grace. But this is a contradiction in terms, since: (1) One and the same subject, at one and the same moment of time and through the same propagation, would be both under wrath and under grace, which is impossible. (2) This distinction cannot be applied to infants before baptism, according to that saying of Christ: “Unless one is born again,” etc., and “Whatever is born of flesh is flesh.”

II. Beza and Peter Martyr object that they attribute this benefit of adoption and holiness not to the generation of the flesh itself, but to grace, election, and the promise of God. And Trelcatius, in Places, Book 2, page 116, says: “Infants ought to be considered in two ways, either according to the common reason of nature, or the singular reason of covenant and grace: in the former way they are conceived in sin, but in the latter they have obtained remission of sins by grace.” Calvin, Book 2 of the Institutes, Chapter 11, Section 7, writes: “Guilt is from nature, sanctification from supernatural grace.”

We respond:

(1) Beza attributes this benefit to the generation and birth itself from the flesh when he says: “For infants, the first entrance to salvation is their very propagation from pious parents; holy parents are a domicile of holiness, adoption, justification, to transmit to their children,” in his Second Response to the Montbéliard Colloquy, page 102. “Children being born are grafted into Christ” (page 106); “they are born holy, and salvation is theirs, for this reason (note the cause) that they are born from pious parents, whether proximate or more remote” (page 118); “they obtain the right of eternal life by being born from pious parents” (page 129).

(2) What is adduced concerning the gracious election and promise of God is here inappropriate and weak for the solution of the argument, because of the vain begging of the principle. Nor do the Reformed themselves have anything certain to promise here. For if Martyr, in Places, Chapter on Original Sin, Section 31, says: “Concerning the little ones of Christians who depart without this Sacrament, if I were asked, I would respond: good hope is to be had for them, and this rests on the word of God, namely the covenant and pact begun with Abraham, in which God promised that He would be the God not only of him, but also of his seed. Which promise, since it is not so general as to comprehend all, therefore I would not dare to promise certain salvation particularly to anyone thus departing.” So Martyr.

Evangelical election and gracious promises are indeed gratuitous, but not absolute; rather they are determined to a certain order of means (Genesis 17:7, 10; John 3:18, 36; Mark 16:16). But what is determined by God to a certain order of means, this we cannot promise to ourselves without that order. But the holiness, adoption, justification, and salvation of children is determined by God to a certain order, namely baptism and faith. Therefore we cannot promise to children, without baptism and faith, holiness, adoption, justification, and salvation.

Furthermore: The children of God are not born of the flesh, but become so from God through faith (John 1:12–13). Those who are born from parents are born of the flesh. Therefore, those who are born from parents are not born children of God.

Beza, Response to the Acts of the Colloquy, Part 2, page 102, objects: “Holy parents assume a double person: one, as children of the former Adam, flesh generating flesh; the other, as adopted in the latter Adam (Christ) through faith, transmitting that domicile to children, no longer theirs, but God’s,” etc. And a little below: “For the infants of the pious, the first entrance to salvation is not baptism, but the very propagation from pious parents, and the signing of that covenant through baptism arises from nowhere else than from the power of faith of the parents, intervening according to the formula of the covenant.”

We respond: Pious parents, insofar as they are adopted in the latter Adam, do not generate children; otherwise children of God would be generated from blood, which John expressly denies. It would also follow that impious Papist dogma, that seeds of faith lie hidden in the nature of the Christian man and would be propagated into offspring. But rather the contrary is true, because seeds of unbelief and diffidence are propagated, while faith is the work of God alone (John 6; Philippians 1; etc.).

Pareus objects in Galatians 3 that nature should be distinguished, and birth considered either absolutely outside the covenant or in relation to the covenant. Absolutely, all are born sinners; in relation to the covenant, they are born Christians or confederates of God.

We respond: Birth from believing parents, even in relation to God’s covenant, does not make us spiritually holy, but baptism does. “Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot (speaking of the common order) enter the kingdom of God” (John 3:5).

Resolution of Objections.

I. Observe: From Genesis 17:7, “I will be your God and your seed’s after you,” Peter Martyr, in 1 Corinthians 7 and in Genesis 17, collects that the children of the faithful, from the formula of that covenant, are holy before God even before the use of baptism. So also Calvin, in Book 4 of the Institutes, Chapter 16, Section 6, seems to argue: “The grace of the New Testament is not less than that of the Old, but in the Old Testament children before circumcision were in the covenant; therefore also in the New before baptism is received.” He proves the minor from Genesis 17:7 and 1 Corinthians 7:14.

We respond:

(1) On the Pauline saying we shall treat later; in the Mosaic, that promise does not have the mark of present time but of future.

(2) This covenant promise with respect to children is not to be accepted except with the determination of faith to be conferred through circumcision or baptism (μεγάλην περιτομήν, megalēn peritomēn / great circumcision, according to Epiphanius), as is clear from Galatians 3:7: “Those who are of faith, these are the children of Abraham.” Therefore not through natural generation, but through circumcision, the infants of the Hebrews were inserted into the covenant, just as the infants of Christians are not inserted through propagation from pious parents but through baptism put on Christ (Galatians 3:27).

With remarkable fallacy, therefore, the promise of grace is separated from circumcision and baptism, to which it is annexed (says D. Pelargus, Commentary on Genesis 17, page 308). For this was the pact which they were commanded to receive through circumcision (whence the Protomartyr calls it the covenant of circumcision, Acts 7:8), as we today receive baptism, where God promises that He will be our God and that of our children. Peter, having proposed to the Jews the promise, nevertheless commanded that they repent and be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins (Acts 2:38–39).

Then therefore God is to our children a God, and most benign, when through baptism they are assumed into His covenant. And thus that promise in Genesis 17:7 is not absolute but ordered and conditioned, if they have not neglected the means necessary and efficacious for generating, preserving, and confirming faith.

(3) Holiness not having true faith in Christ is fictitious, and nowhere prescribed in the Word of God.

(4) The genuine use of that promise and its sense is: (1) that through it access is opened to the means by which grafting into God’s covenant is accomplished; (2) that the fruit of that promise is possessed if one’s own faith is obtained.

(5) If a bare promise constitutes us heirs of good things without application, what prevents all men, without exception, from being holy and pure before God, since the promise is universal? It would also follow that even today’s Jews, blasphemous and insulting to Christ and His merit, are holy and just before God.

II. Calvin, in the cited place, Section 15, thus reasons from Acts 2:39: “To whomever the Gospel ought to be preached by covenant right, they certainly derived some holiness from their parents; but to the Jews the Gospel ought to be preached by covenant right; therefore they had that right through natural generation.”

We respond:

(1) The preaching of the Gospel to the Jews at the beginning was not due to any holiness derived from parents (which indeed was none, for they were rebellious and impious), but because of the promise, good pleasure, and highest disposition of God toward the Jews, often promised to Abraham and the fathers.

(2) The Gospel ought also to be preached to the Gentiles by the power of promises often made. Therefore, according to the Calvinists, were they also from the womb in God’s covenant? Did they also derive holiness from their parents? Absurd.

(3) The Petrine passage does not speak only of Jews and their children, but of all whom the Lord has called. But divine calling does not respect only the Jews but all men universally. Therefore what Calvin assumes concerning hereditary right pertaining to the Jews, by the same reasoning may be applied to the Gentiles, for thus the text reads: “For to you is made the promise and to your children, and to all who are far off, whomever the Lord our God shall call” (Acts 2:39).

III. There Calvin, Section 15, urges Acts 3:25, where the Jews are called “children of the Testament διαθήκης (diathēkēs / covenant),” which God made with their fathers, but in vain; for thus the Apostle wishes to say: “You are the children of those men with whom God made a covenant, leaving other nations.” Therefore it does not follow: “Therefore you are in the covenant by hereditary right.” Rather this follows: “Therefore give far more care that you receive that new covenant, and embrace Christ raised from the dead with His merit, since He is born from your family according to the flesh.”

IV. They object: Baptism is profaned because it is given to one who is not Christ’s but a child of wrath (Ephesians 2:3). Who does not know that the royal seal is profaned if a false diploma is sealed with it?

We respond:

(1) Between the children of Turks and Gentiles and of Christians there is a great difference, and baptism would be profaned if it were given to the former, but not when to the latter. The former depart from the Church; the latter approach the Church. These are Christ’s, and Christ is theirs—not by υἱοθεσίᾳ καὶ ἁγιασμῷ (huiothesia kai hagiasmō / adoption and sanctification) (for before receiving baptism they cannot be holy), but they are Christ’s as the sick are the Great Physician’s, as captives are the liberator’s, as the naked are His who clothes them with the garment which He moistened in His passion with His most precious blood; as those of the rich Lord who redeems His poor servant at great price; as of Him who remits sins to those burdened with sins, giving eternal life to the dead.

V. Observe: From Romans 11:16, “If the root is holy, so are the branches; if the first fruits are holy, the lump also will be holy,” the Calvinists try to prove that holy children are born from holy parents.

But: (1) The Apostle does not say that the root or branches were holy before circumcision or baptism.

(2) He speaks not of actual but of potential holiness.

(3) Or of a certain external, not internal holiness; for the Jewish nation, about which the Apostle speaks in this chapter, was not holy but blinded, and some branches were broken off (verse 17), and they did not imitate the holiness of the first fruits, i.e., the Patriarchs.

(4) The Apostle intends to teach that the Jewish nation ἁπλῶς (haplōs / simply), or ὁλικῶς (holikōs / wholly), or καθολικῶς (katholikōs / universally) has not been rejected by God, but that there have always remained some remnants who ought to be converted to Christ and, through Word and Sacraments, be won for Him, and then after that conversion be made participants and conformers of the holiness of the Patriarchs by grace. Finckius of Giessen, Disputations, cited Volume 6.

In a word, the Apostle speaks there not about spiritual and internal holiness, which is from the Holy Spirit through faith (Acts 15), but about external holiness, whether it be called ecclesiastical, civil, or legal, by which the Jews had access before the rest of the Gentiles in the Old Testament to the right of the Church and all of God’s promises.

When therefore the Reformed argue from this passage: “Whoever are holy branches of a holy root are rightly called holy from the mother’s womb; but the infants of the faithful are holy branches of a holy root; therefore—”

We respond: We deny the minor. For just as by “holy root” Paul does not understand any holy parents, so neither does he pronounce any children of holy parents as holy, much less that they are holy before receiving baptism. Rather, he only wishes to show that the Jews in the New Testament have not been so rejected by God that none of them can be saved.

Others concede that spiritual holiness is here treated, but they interpret it not as actual possession of holiness, but as possibility of acquisition, in this sense: that if their first fruits, which were also impure, could be sanctified, why not also the fruits? If the root, also the branches? But that this holiness, which is from the Holy Spirit through faith, is not intended here is shown both by the scope of the Apostle and by the comparison itself.

VI. The disciples of Zwingli especially urge the passage in 1 Corinthians 7:14, “Now your children are holy.” We respond: There is ambiguity in the word “holiness,” for Paul is not speaking about spiritual internal holiness; otherwise even the unbelieving husband would be spiritually holy, since he is said to be sanctified through the believing woman; but he is speaking about external ecclesiastical or civil holiness. And so children are called holy, not because they are born holy and without sin, or in birth itself obtain the remission of sin, but because they are sanctified by parents, i.e., are brought to the mysteries by which they are sanctified, and are educated in faith and holy doctrine, just as the unbelieving husband is here said to be sanctified by cohabitation with a believing wife, i.e., often to be drawn to faith.

They are holy, that is, ecclesiastically, i.e., by the power of promises and covenant, they are admitted to the sacrament of initiation, through which they conceive faith; they are holy because they are born in the Church, and the goods of the Church pertain to them, namely in respect to access, not however in respect to members or true parts. They are holy insofar as they are separated from Turks and Jews and all others who live and are born outside the Church.

Therefore the Calvinists here commit the fallacy of ἑτεροζητήσεως (heterozētēseōs / asking a different question). For the question (1) between us and them is whether infants are born holy before baptism; and this the Apostle does not say here, but simply affirms that they are holy, making no mention of birth and baptism. (2) The Apostle speaks about ecclesiastical, legal, or civil holiness, and this is clear from the scope of the argument, which is not about holiness before God or spiritual holiness.

We argue thus: About whatever sanctification the Apostle speaks in the antecedents, saying in verse 14, “The unbelieving husband is sanctified in the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the believing husband,” about the same he certainly speaks in the subsequent words, saying: “Your children are holy.” But Paul in the antecedent does not speak about that holiness by which we are in the covenant and holy before God; therefore neither in the subsequent words. Indeed, in that whole chapter the Apostle does not deal with ἁγιωσύνη (hagiōsynē / holiness) or hereditary holiness by which we are in God’s covenant. And if Paul were speaking about Christian holiness, it would follow that impious and ἄθεοι (atheoi / godless) people using believing spouses are in God’s covenant and grace.

VII. Observe: The Calvinists also draw an argument for hereditary Christianity, or natural holiness, from the example of (1) John the Baptist, who from his mother’s womb was filled with the Holy Spirit (Luke 1:15), (2) Jeremiah, who was sanctified in the maternal womb (Jeremiah 1:5), (3) Jacob the Patriarch, whom not yet born God loved (Romans 9:13; Genesis 25:23).

But we respond:
(1) If the rest of the children of believing parents are filled with the Holy Spirit from the womb, then John becomes an example that is new, unheard of, unusual, wonderful, and singular.

(2) The example of the Prophet Jeremiah is dissimilar, for there to sanctify signifies the same as to destine for ministry and to separate, as Augustine explains in Letter 57. Nor do the Calvinists want to say that infants before baptism are ordained ministers of the Church because of birth from holy parents.

(3) It is not said that John was filled with the Holy Spirit in the maternal womb, but ἐκ κοιλίας μητρὸς αὐτοῦ (ek koilias mētros autou / from his mother’s womb), i.e., from early infancy.

(4) The cited passages do not speak about Jacob’s person, but about his posterity, as if to say: God preferred the Israelites to the Idumeans and gave greater blessing to Jacob’s posterity than to Esau’s.

VIII. Observe: It is said in Galatians 2:15, “We are by nature Jews.” Hence the Calvinists palliate their error concerning the σύμφυτος (symphytos / connate) holiness of children born from Christian parents, namely that the children of Christians are not sinners from the Gentiles, but by nature, i.e., born Christians. For if formerly Jews were born from Jews and so were by nature Jews, much more today Christians are born from Christians and so will be by nature Christians, as Pareus in his Irenicum argues.

We respond:
(1) No one can be said to be by nature a Christian; for they are not born Christians, but become so through baptism. Regeneration and putting on Christ (Galatians 3:27) depend on baptism as effect on cause and benefit on means.

Pareus insists: “Just as from Mohammedans are born Mohammedans, from pagans, pagans, so from Christians, Christians are born.”

We respond:
(1) I deny the consequence, since those opposites are not of equal scope. To be born a Mohammedan or pagan refers only to natural birth, which is polluted and unclean; but to be born a Christian implies not only natural birth but also spiritual birth, which is of the sons of God. There is not the same principle of carnal and spiritual birth.

(2) Augustine declares that the holy are not born from the holy, by the similar example of a circumcised Jew generating sons having the foreskin (Book 2 against Julian, Chapter 2).

Therefore, to be by nature a Jew is not to be a Jew born in the covenant. For no one is born in the covenant, but once born is received into it through faith (ordinarily conferred through Word and Sacraments).

You object: If the children of Christians are not born Christians, then they are born Gentiles.

We respond: The connection is false. For they are not born Christians internally and spiritually called, nor are they born Gentiles; for these are said to be “outside and strangers to the testament of God.” But those begotten in Christianity are said to be “inside and near and (ecclesiastically) holy” (1 Corinthians 5:12–13; 7:14; Ephesians 2:12–13), yet they are born children of wrath (Ephesians 2:3).

Therefore, to become children of grace, i.e., Christians internally and spiritually called, they need the washing of water in the word.

IX. Against those Calvinists who pronounce the children of the faithful to be holy by the power of the promise, the distinction must be carefully noted between promise and its application, or between offering and conferring. A twofold universality of the Evangelical promise presents itself in Scripture: one broader, extending to all men universally; the other stricter, respecting only believers. Or: The offering of the promise respects all men to a man; the conferring pertains only to believers, who apply the general promise to themselves by true faith. The Calvinists err concerning these in two ways: (1) while they utterly deny the promise of grace to the children of unbelievers, (2) while they assert that the promise without any medium of application constitutes the children of the faithful holy from the womb before baptism.

X. Peter Martyr objects: “Unless the Hebrew boys before circumcision had been contained in this covenant, if they had died on the fifth or sixth day, before they reached the eighth day, they would be judged damned.”

We respond:
(1) The Hebrew boys before circumcision were not in the covenant; they had access to it.

(2) That Hebrew infants who died on the fifth or sixth day were not damned, the cause was this: that God had precisely set for them the eighth day; by which thing those infants who died before that day had not transgressed the divine mandate, namely that which obligated those who remained alive until the eighth day.

XI. Observe: That the infants of Christians pertain to the Church is equivocal; for it can be understood either so that they have access to the Church, and thus are holy before baptism, which we also assert; or that they are members of the Church before baptism, and thus partakers of eternal life, as the Calvinists understand, and especially Martyr, since he adds: “Outside the Church there is no salvation.” This we deny. For “unless one believes and is baptised, he will be saved” (Mark 16:16).

The children of Christians are considered to pertain to the Church generally because of their parents; specifically and singularly only then, when through baptism they are inserted into the Church, and ascribed to the number of συμπολιτῶν τῶν ἁγίων (sympolitōn tōn hagiōn / fellow-citizens of the saints) and domestics of God (Ephesians 2:19).

XII. Beza in the Acts of the Montbéliard Colloquy, page 102, argues from hereditary succession in civil contracts, and says that this is much more valid in the spiritual pact and divine covenant.

We respond: The reason is most different: since all children through birth from parents have this, that they are sons, through the same they also have this, that they are heirs. But Christians are not born, but become so. And Beza himself says: “Nothing here is hereditary by nature.”

XIII. Pareus objects and urges: “These are not contrary: to be born a child of wrath, according to nature; and to be born a Christian according to grace. Also: not to be born Christians in the Church, namely regenerated, yet to be born Christians in the Church, namely to be regenerated.”

We respond: Christianity is not of natural generation, but of spiritual regeneration; therefore it befalls no one except one who uses those means by which God receives us into the covenant of grace. But the medium is not carnal propagation or natural generation (through which original sin is transmitted, and not grace), but baptism, which is therefore called the washing of regeneration, because by means of it they are born again and become Christians or children of God, who carnally are children of wrath.

Baptism is that key which admits us into the house of God, which is the Church. To what purpose else would there be need to put on Christ in baptism, if we were Christians even before baptism and citizens of the Church? Therefore it is an inept phrase, and contradictory, to be born a Christian and to be regenerated. For an infant to be regenerated has not yet put on Christ; but an infant Christian has put on Christ in baptism.

AUTHORS.

Those opposing the thesis are mentioned in the Antithesis.

Those defending it are: B. Gerhard in Theological Commonplaces, Place on Baptism §211ff., and in Academic Disputations, page 133 and page 535; Eckard in Fascicle of Controversies, Chapter 19, Question 12; the Theologians of Giessen, Volume 5, Disputations, Disputation 13, Question 2, page 258ff.; Hutter in Irenicum, Article 9; the Theologians of Wittenberg, Volume 3, Theological Disputations, Disputation 1, Thesis 15ff.; Feurborn, Fascicle 2, Theological Controversies, Disputation 8, Thesis 31ff.; Balduin in Commentary on the Pauline passages Romans 11:16, 1 Corinthians 7:14, Galatians 2:15; Pelargus, still orthodox, in notes to Candidus, page 28ff.; D. Calovius, Volume 9, System, Article 5, Chapter 6, Question 1; D. Dannhauer, Hodomoria of the Spirit of Calvinism, Part 1, Phantom 5, page 1058ff.; M. Philip Arnold in a special dissertation on the saying of 1 Corinthians 7:17, “Your children are holy.”

Question XV. Are the infants of Christians, before receiving baptism, holy and in the divine covenant?

The infants of Christians, before receiving baptism, are holy with an external holiness, or that of the church a), but they are not holy with an internal holiness, or that of faith b). The promise of the covenant belongs to them, but they are not yet in the exhibited covenant c).

Prob. a. From 1 Cor. 7:14: "But now your children are holy." An external or ecclesiastical holiness is understood, which consists in this, that the infants of the faithful have the closest access to divine grace, and therefore to the participation of the means through which, by divine ordinance, eternal salvation is conferred. For they are born within the camp of the church, and have a right to the thing, although they do not yet have a right in the thing, i.e., they have immediate access to the federal divine grace, but they are not yet actually partakers of the federal divine grace. Ecclesiastical holiness is so called, not as if unbaptized (ἀβάπτιστοι) infants of Christians are citizens or members of the church, but because they have the right and power of obtaining the privileges of the citizens of the church, which are not so easily granted to others who are outside. This external holiness is called by D. CALOV, in bibl. illustr. on 1 Cor. 7, p. 317, a merely relative holiness, and such according to an extrinsic denomination. By D. BALDWIN it is called Levitical and legal; by D. DANNHAVER, corresponding to Levitical purity, in hodos. p. 1093.

Prob. b. 1) Because infants before receiving baptism are flesh of flesh, John 3:6, children of wrath, Eph. 2:3, unclean, conceived of unclean seed, Job 14:4; Ps. 51:7. 2) Because by baptism we are cleansed from sins, Eph. 5:26. Therefore, before baptism we were unclean and not holy. 3) Because by baptism the first access into the kingdom of heaven is opened to us, John 3:5, whence by the confession of all, baptism is the sacrament of initiation. Hence TERTULLIAN says: “Christians are not born, but made.”

Prob. c. The divine covenant is indeed promised to the infants of the faithful, but not yet exhibited or applied, Gen. 17:10; Acts 2:39, 41. For since the promise of the covenant is conditioned, or determined by the condition of receiving circumcision or baptism, infants, before receiving the sacrament of initiation, are not actually grafted into the divine covenant. Antithesis is that of the Anabaptists, asserting that the infants of the faithful, before receiving baptism, are holy and co-opted into the divine covenant. Their arguments are:

I. The infants of the faithful are expressly called holy, Rom. 11:16; 1 Cor. 7:14. Resp. The infants of the faithful before receiving baptism are holy with an external holiness, or that of the church, but they are not yet holy with an internal holiness, or that of faith.

II. Those to whom the divine covenant pertains, they are holy: But to the infants of the faithful etc. Therefore... The minor is evident from Gen. 17:19; Acts 2:38. Resp. Those to whom the divine covenant pertains as exhibited and applied through the means of grace (circumcision and baptism), they are holy with an internal and spiritual holiness; but indeed, to the infants of the faithful not yet circumcised or baptized, pertains only the promise of the covenant, determined by the condition of receiving circumcision or baptism.

III. Many unbaptized persons have believed, e.g., Cornelius, Acts 10:47; the Eunuch, Acts 8:37. Therefore, before receiving baptism they were holy with the holiness of faith. Resp. A distinction is made between infants and adult catechumens. In infants, with the intervention of baptism, faith is kindled; in adult catechumens, by means of baptism, faith is increased and confirmed.

IV. If those born of Jews are called Jews by nature, then also those born of Christians will be Christians by nature. The antecedent is true, with Paul as witness, Gal. 2:5. Therefore, so is the consequent. Resp. A distinction is made between Jews according to the flesh and according to the spirit. Jews according to the flesh are those who are born of Israelites, and they are opposed to Gentiles, just as Germans are contrasted with Gauls, Spaniards, etc. A Christian is not such a gentilic name, but he who is anointed with the oil of the Holy Spirit, he is called a true Christian, who is not born such, but is made so by baptism; just as a Jew according to the spirit is he who by circumcision has been grafted into the divine covenant and remains in the same covenant by true faith.

Instance: If the infants of Christians are not Christians by nature, there will be no difference between the infants of Gentiles and of Christians, since both those and these are devoid of holiness. Resp. There certainly is a difference. For the infants of Christians enjoy an external and ecclesiastical holiness, because they are begotten in the church from faithful parents and have an immediate or proximate right to the means of grace, so that a certain prerogative belongs to them above those who are outside, 1 Cor. 5:12. Therefore, they are wrongly called by the common people "young heathens."

With God!

ON THE COMMUNICATION OF PROPERTIES ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΝΔΥΑΣΙΝ [ACCORDING TO CONJUNCTION]

Dissertation, which, under the presidency of the most highly reverend, most distinguished, and most excellent man,

Mr. John Scharf,

Licentiate of Sacred Theology and of the same Extraordinary Professor, but Ordinary of Logic and Metaphysics,

his promoter and teacher most highly to be venerated, he proposes to be held publicly,

by Master John Frederick König, of Dresden,

in the Great Auditorium on the 6th day of November, in the morning hours.

Wittenberg.

At the press of Michael Wendt

In the year 1645.

With God!

In Nomine Jesu

§1. The communication of properties is taken in various ways. For us, a real one is understood here, which they call κατα συνδυατιν [according to conjunction] from συνδυαζεσθαι [to be combined], which denotes to be combined, because such communication results from the combination or coupling of two.

§2. It is usually taken either παχυλῶς [coarsely] and improperly for the communication of several things connected with one another in whatever way; such communication is between an integral part and the integral whole, when, namely, the property of the component part is attributed to the whole on account of the part itself: likewise between the container and the contained; as when a cup filled with wine is said to be moist on the outside because of the wine. Or ἀκριβῶς [precisely] and properly for the communication flowing from the real and proper union of two extremes essentially different; which for that reason is also called communication κατ’ ἕνωσιν [according to union].

§3. In the latter sense, which alone pertains to this place, the Communication κατα συυδυστον [according to conjunction] is that by which the properties of one substance to another substance indeed essentially distinct, yet nevertheless conjoined, on account of the closest union, truly and really, without any multiplication of itself or transfusion, are communicated to common possession, usurpation, and denomination.

§4. This definitive statement sets before us four things chiefly: I. The Object of the Communication. II. Its Extremes. III. The Foundation. IV. The Mode.

§5. The object, or that which is communicated, comes under the name of properties. In how many ways “proper” is said, Aristotle teaches in Topics I.4 and V.1; Porphyry likewise in the Isagoge, and Damascene in Dialectics, ch. 14. First, what is understood here by us is the property of the fourth mode according to Porphyry, called by Aristotle απλῶς και καθ αυτο ἴδιον [simply and in itself proper], which includes the unity of the species, the universality of individuals, and the perpetuity of time, and is predicated reciprocally with the subject in discourse, since it accompanies the essence of that which it belongs to with a perpetual and indissoluble bond. Hence it is also called επουσιῶδες [consequent to essence], which (if it were permitted so to speak) could be rendered “possessential”; and it is distinguished from that which is ουσιοδις [essential], in Latin called the constitutive essential, of which sort is the specific Difference, by which a species is constituted in its being. Therefore those επουτιωδη [consequent to essence] or consequential essentials, such as are all the δυναμεις [powers] and natural powers of created things, are to philosophers simply proper. Otherwise ἴδιον [proper] is taken more broadly for whatever is not common, and so belongs to one alone: in which sense even a Definition is said by Aristotle to be a certain “proper.” Likewise theologians call proper the very τα ουσιωδη [the essentials], as the Divine omnipotence, omniscience, etc., which are the very essence of God, and they intend the subject not of inherence, but only of attribution.

§6. Then we here take as properties those which are called ἴδια [proper things], and are of the third mode according to Porphyry and Damascene... Such are all ἐνέργειαι [energies] and operations flowing from natural powers; as actually to count, to speak, to laugh, to burn, etc..

§7. Finally, from properties compared προς τι [with respect to something], that is, to another; which, namely, are ascribed to a species, insofar as it is compared with another to which those things are called properties, and which coincide with the Porphyrian properties of the second mode, here pertain those which are said to be ἀεὶ [always], and are present indeed to the subject universally and always, but not to it alone, and therefore cannot be reciprocated with it, as to be light with respect to fire. Some also refer here the properties προς ἕτερον [toward another] in the species so called, which belong at least sometimes to one species when compared with another, as to be born and to die are properties of man with respect to God. But these rather constitute a suppositum than any of the united extremes.

§8. The extremes between which the communication is made are two substances: and indeed (1) essentially different. Things essentially different are those which differ in species and therefore obtain one and another definition as disparate; just as fire and iron are different in form and matter. Therefore the Communication κατὰ συνουσίαν [according to consubstantiality] is set in contrast to that which is between extremes different only in reason, of which the one enters into the essence and definition of the other. And we see this in the communication both μεθεκτικῆ [participative], where several things share in both the name and the definition of the same thing: for example, species share in genera and differences; likewise individuals in species: which is called μέθεξις [participation] of Logic; and συνεκδοχικῆ [synecdochic], where an integral or essential part constitutes in being the whole, integral or essential; as a finger with respect to the hand, the soul with respect to man; and συγχυτική [confusive], when two or more things, having been mixed with one another, concur to constitute a Whole Confused or Mixed, the example of which is afforded by hydromel. But what we have said above about the essential diversity of the extremes has place not only outside the union but also in the union itself, inasmuch as the union does not take away the disparity of things.

§9. (2) Conjoined. For although the substances between which the communication is made are essentially distinct, yet they must also be coupled to one another; otherwise the συνδυαστικη [conjunctive] communication cannot follow; which on that account is set in contrast to communication between disjoined substances: namely both the μετεκβατικη [passing-over], by which the accident that is communicated passes from the communicating subject to another subject locally disjoined, as sound passes from the mouth of one delivering an oration to the hearers; and the αλλοποιητικῆ [alterative], by which a substance communicates to another not the property itself but at least its likeness and different in number, as God communicates his goodness to creatures, a father body and soul to his children, a teacher learning to disciples. It remains therefore that the true extremes of συνδυσιακῆς [conjunctive] communication must be indeed essentially distinct, yet not locally separated but conjoined: of which below, more at large.

§10. (3) Having, or of act and potency. Thus indeed the substances between which the communication is made ought to be so compared that one be apt by nature to be perfected and to receive an alien perfection, or to be affected by the other united, and thus to undergo the condition of δυνάμεως [potency]: but the other be able to perfect and to affect, and so to act upon the other by way of ἐντελεχείᾳς [actuality]. Hence that which is nobler or more perfect has the standing of the terminus from which, or of the communicating subject: but that which is baser and more imperfect, the standing of the terminus to which, or of the participating subject. If, however, something seems to be conferred by this upon others, this results not in the nobler of the united, but in the whole suppositum. But whether sometimes each of the extremes may communicate, even the more imperfect its imperfection to the more perfect, this, however, seems to be doubtful.

§11. The foundation is the closest union of the extremes, which the communication of properties necessarily follows. We here, however, understand at least a real Union, that by which two substances essentially distinct are most closely present to one another in one common essence or one suppositum, without any confusion or mixture of themselves.

§12. And the formal account of such a Union, as from what has been said is not so difficultly evident, is completed by two things: (1) by the true and real concurrence of two substances in one ἑνοπτιω [unitive] terminus, which is either a common essence or a composite, as in a natural union; such as is between matter and form: or a suppositum, as in the union of fire with iron. (2) by the closest presence of the extremes to one another, so that wherever one of the united is, there the other ἀδιαστατως [indivisibly] cannot but be. For the things that are united constitute one indivisible: which could not be if those things were locally disjoined from one another: since it would be the same thing indivisible in itself and divided from itself: indivisible on account of the union; divided on account of local separation.

§13. Accordingly the united extremes regard one another in the most present way; which relation by another, more common name is also called the mutual περιχώρησις [indwelling] of natures. But we here understand περιχώρησιν [indwelling] not as it denotes an act and an active immission, by which the perfecting [thing] penetrates intimately and all around the perfectible and communicates itself whole to it as a whole. Thus taken, περιχώρησις [indwelling] rather pertains to the distinction of unition and precedes the union; nor can it be called reciprocal or mutual: for of the united, the more perfect there behaves actively, namely by pervading the more imperfect; but this merely passively, namely by admitting and receiving the immission directed to its own perfection. περιχώρησις [indwelling] therefore for us on this occasion is the state and σχέσις [relation] of the united, whereby they are most present to one another so that never is the one outside the other. Just as in the union of soul and body the whole body and each of its parts is most present to the soul, and this whole to it. Thus iron, so long and in so far as it is ignited, contains nothing in itself which does not have fire most present to it; and there is nothing in the substance of fire which does not have iron most present to it.

§14. And this union, as it has thus far been set forth by us, presupposing the unition and that circumincessory action by which of the extremes the one which bears the role of ἐντελέχεια [actuality] intimately actuates and pervades the other which continually has the character of potency, is established as the proximate foundation of the communication. For how could it be possible to agree with another in one and the same ἑνόπτιον [unitive] terminus and to possess the perfecting nature; yet that the nature of properties which perpetually and necessarily accompany it, and which, in the same mind indeed, cannot be excluded from fellowship otherwise than by simple abstraction and separable precision, should be excluded? Nay, as the most excellent Mr. President, Theor. Transcendent. Disput. 16, page 917, warns, “the nobler is united; for this reason it unites to itself another substance, that it may also give its properties to it for the performance of the duties on account of which they are united.” Thus what would it profit, for example, matter, if the bare substance of form were united to it and not at the same time its act?

§15. The mode of communication is expressed when it is said to take place truly and really; namely, in such a way that not only the name of some property is predicated of some other subject; but also the thing itself signified by that name is truly communicated to the same. Otherwise than happens in verbal communication, by which at least the name of some thing, not the thing itself, is ascribed to another; as we see in a tropic and false enunciation.

§16. And these regards are further explained partly negatively, partly positively.

§17. Negatively: (1) that the communication of a property takes place without any multiplication of itself. For this happens in the communication κατ’ αλλοπτιητιν [according to alter-making], by which the communicating substance produces in the other something like to the property which it itself possesses, and by that very production communicates. Such αλλοπτιησιν [alter-making] or διπλασιν [doubling] of a property we do not acknowledge here. For a property is not straightway doubled if the subject is twin in its own way, just as sight, although in its own way it is in diverse subjects, namely in the eye and in the soul, is nevertheless not duplicated. Then, however, a property would be multiplied if it were laid down to be in several things which alike would have themselves as πρῶτον δεκτικὸν [first recipient]. But the common saying among philosophers is: “Of one property there is only one πρῶτον δεκτικὸν [first recipient].”

§18. (2) Without transfusion. For this is between substances locally separated as to existence. But the communication of which we here treat is between extremes indeed essentially distinct, yet not locally disjoined but conjoined and most closely united. Hence, the first subject being communicated, its properties also are communicated: not by running forth or by being carried over first, but by distributing itself to the other; just as Basil the Great says: “Fire does not run out to the iron, but remaining in its place it distributes to it its proper power, nor is it diminished by the distribution; and the participant is filled from it with the whole.” (find) For because the power of burning or of shining is communicated not without the subject, which is the substance of fire, but by its means to the iron, therefore that power remains by inherence in its subject always, nor ever becomes proper to the iron, but belongs to it only communicatively. Thus therefore also every property which is communicated remains in its first subject by inherence, although κατὰ συνδυασιν καὶ μεταδοσιν [according to conjunction and imparting] it is also possessed by the other of the united.

§19. Positively the mode of communication is expressed when it is said that this takes place (1) to common possession. It is called common with respect to the properties which on both sides are had and possessed as numerically the same; not with respect to the mode of having and possessing, which is one with respect to the communicating, another with respect to the participating. The former possesses its properties as πρῶτον δεκτικὸν [first recipient], and so per se, immediately, and according to nature; the latter secondarily, through another, by means of the first subject and on account of the union. Thus in fire there inheres the power of burning and of shining first, per se, immediately, and according to nature; but in the iron with which it is united, secondarily, mediately, and on account of the union.

§20. (2) To usurpation. The mode here is connected with the former: for since the united subject possesses the properties of the other united by the force of the closest union, neither will some usurpation of the possessed properties be denied to it. I say some: for in this it differs from possession, which is universal and in its breadth extends itself to all the properties; for when the subject of the properties is possessed, all those things which necessarily and inseparably are in it cannot but be possessed through the mediation of the subject. But Communication to usurpation is particular and regards at least certain properties, namely:

1. δεκτά [receptible], that is, of which the perfectible extreme is capable, not απαραδεκτα [irreceptible], which contradictorily are repugnant to it and overturn its nature if they are usurped.

2. ἐνεργητικὰ [operative], that is, by which and according to which the subject does something; as the power of shining and burning in iron, the vital sensitive faculty in the soul: not ἀνενέργητα [inoperative], that is, quiescent things which keep themselves within the bosom of their subject and do not go forth outside by operating; such as in fire lightness and rarity; in the soul immateriality, invisibility, immortality.

3. with a view to the end which the union more effectively regards. Thus the body receives from the soul those properties to be usurped which are required for the producing of αποτελεσματων [results], which the soul cannot accomplish without the body. Which producing is in the manner of the end for which the union is made between those two extremes. But those things which contribute nothing to the end are also not communicated for usurpation.

§21. (3) To denomination. Which does not follow possession but usurpation. Hence it is said to be either immediate or mediate. Mediately and through the intervention of ἐνεργητικῶν [operative] attributes, indeed even those which, without any operation, are turned only within themselves and the subject, denominate the participating subject. Thus I do not say: “The body is immaterial”, but, “The body has immaterial faculties of sensing and understanding.” So I do not say: “The iron is light”; but, “The iron is of a heat that makes light”. Immediately and without the intervention of another, at least those properties which are busy and effective in acting denominate the participating subject. Thus I say immediately: “The body is sensing, the iron is hot.”

COROLLARIES

I. Properties are truly communicated. It is proved thus: Between those things between which there intervenes a real, intrinsic, most close, and permeable union, there the nobler of the united always communicates its own properties to the baser united. But indeed between certain substances there intervenes a real, intrinsic, most close, and permeable union. Therefore. The major proceeds from the position of a sufficient cause to the position of the effected, and has hitherto been asserted by the sounder philosophers with invincible arguments. The narrowness of these pages forbids repeating them here. Compare also §§ 11, 12, 13, 14. The minor likewise is evident from the examples of form united with matter, of soul with body, of fire with iron, etc.

II. The communication of properties to usurpation and denomination is not universal. For the perfectible subject is not capable of all things; many also, as being quiescent, contribute nothing to the end of the union.

III. A property, when it is communicated, does not become common. For common, strictly and as it is set in contrast to proper, is that which exists inhering in several supposits that are diverse, just as sweetness is in sugar and in honey. But a property remains the property of its first subject and is present to it alone and always ἐνυπαρκτικῶς; to the other of the united it belongs communicatively or συνδυστικῶς, and only as to a subject of attribution.

IV. A property is communicated without confusion, conversion, or equalisation of the subjects. It has been said above that the extremes of the communication, though united, are nevertheless in the union itself essentially different and remain so. But things that are really distinct and remain so cannot be really confounded. Also the very property which inhered by nature in the one subject, while it is communicated, does not inhere by nature in the other subject. Therefore the subject is not converted into the subject. And although the same thing is had by two, nevertheless it is not had in the same or equal mode, as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore, no confusion of natures.

DEO SOLI GLORIA

PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE TRUE, REAL, AND SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF THE BODY AND BLOOD OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

On these propositions, God the Father being propitious through Christ, our true Liberator, by the power of the Holy Spirit granting and governing, under the presidency of the Reverend and most distinguished man, Dr. Andreas Musculus, Doctor of Sacred Theology, Professor in the Academy of Frankfurt, and General Superintendent of the Churches of the March, for the purpose of obtaining the degree of Doctor in Theology, there will respond in public disputation:

Magister Christophorus Cornerus, Professor of Sacred Theology. Magister Christophorus Albinus, Professor of the Hebrew Language. Magister Ioannes Hedericus. Magister Thomas Brendike.

On the 10th day of September.

At Frankfurt on the Oder, in the year 1573.

PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE TRUE, REAL, AND SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE OF THE BODY AND BLOOD OF JESUS CHRIST IN THE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR:

That there may stand a public testimony that in our Church we retain the form of sound words which Christ used in the institution of the Supper; and that it may be made plain to good and pious ministers of sound doctrine, and to those who rightly judge concerning the presence of Christ in the sacred assembly, that we think the same as they and from the heart abhor the perverse and blasphemous dogmas of the Sacramentarians and of the Calvinists, both ancient and recent; we have undertaken in this disputation and public examination of learned men, who seek from us permission to receive the degree of Doctor in Theology, the defense of the true, real, and substantial presence of the body and blood of the Son of God and of Mary in the Sacrament of the Altar.

I. And first of all, we disapprove the sinister and vain opinion of certain men, not a little favoring the Calvinists, who, that they may seem to wish to provide for the tranquility and concord of the Church, being led by human wisdom, plausibly indeed, yet not without danger of losing the truth of the institution of the Holy Supper, judge and affirm that this sacramentarian controversy detracts nothing from the articles of faith or from the symbols of the Church. And therefore they think that those act wrongly who, from zeal for contradiction, set themselves against those who think differently and stir up disputes in the Church concerning matters not so necessary, and in which there ought to be freedom of opinions, and that each one may without peril to faith and salvation embrace and follow whichever judgment and opinion he wishes according to his own pleasure.

II. But we, called to the contrary judgment not by the decision of reason nor by bare opinions, but by the authority of the Word of God, determine that this very controversy concerning the Lord’s Supper pertains altogether to the article of our faith and to the second part of the Symbol, which is concerning the incarnation of the Son of God, and that it must be discussed concerning this piously and soberly. For when the true and sound understanding of Christ’s words according to the letter is destroyed and removed, and another, foreign sense is affixed and assumed in place of the simple and significant words which the Lord used in the institution of the Supper, the whole of this adorable mystery of faith is at the same time overthrown.

III. Therefore those who piously and with zeal according to knowledge sharply oppose themselves to the frenzies of the Calvinists appear to us to act rightly and well, and to deserve good praise in the Church of God; nor do they give any scandal or trouble Israel, but in fact bear witness that they shun fellowship with them and do not wish, by silence or connivance, to approve their dreadful errors.

IV. For these are not light and tolerable errors, but the very heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches, condemned many centuries ago and cast out and driven from the Churches, which they renew and reintroduce.

V. For while, bewitched by a perverse and impious imagination, they teach that Christ according to the human nature is circumscribed and bound to a certain place in heaven, and that there He will remain until the times of the restoration of all things, it follows that they deny the true, real, and substantial presence of the Son of God and of Mary in the Supper, and separate and tear apart the union of the two natures, which from the very beginning of the conception has never at any time been separable.

VI. Moreover, falling from error into error, by removing the Trinity in the unity of the divine substance, they establish a quaternity.

VII. For Christ, God and man, the Son of God and of Mary, subsisting in one hypostasis, not in two, wherever He is, there also He is God and man, the whole and entire Christ.

VIII. For if one place be granted in which God is said to be, but the man not to be, the person is thereby irrefutably divided; which, wherever it is, is inseparable, subsisting whole and entire from the union of the human and the divine nature.

IX. Therefore, instructed by the orthodox and catholic faith, we retain this adorable union, inseparable from the womb of His mother; and we believe with firm and undoubted faith that the whole Christ was in the womb of the Virgin, in the garden, on the cross, in the sepulchre, in heaven, and on earth, and thus consequently in the Holy Supper.

X. And with that piety we steadfastly deny that the Son of Man is contained by heaven, shut up therein and held bound to a certain place, as with impiety the enemies of the Lord’s Supper affirm this very thing. And we assert without doubt that Christ, the Son of God and of Mary, at once and together, indeed in the twinkling of an eye, in diverse and several places, wherever He wills to be, is present whole and entire, according to both natures subsisting in one hypostasis.

XI. Standing firm in this orthodox confession, and instructed by the Word of God, we do not fear to affirm that, since the properties of our human nature are too narrow to correspond and agree in every respect with the wonderful and to reason incomprehensible union of the two natures, the Son of God in the womb of the Virgin, in the personal union, assumed into it, beyond the properties of the human nature, certain others also beyond the natural; so that there is one Christ, one Mediator and Savior, in one person God and man, according to both natures, the whole and entire Christ, the Son of God and of Mary, present to His Church, present in the Supper, present everywhere to His own in His kingdom delivered to Him by the Father.

XII. From this foundation it is not obscure how miserably those ignorant of spiritual things are blinded who, because the Son of God was made man and has the properties of human nature, teach and contend that, by consideration of these, He is rightly placed in a certain location and contained and enclosed by heaven as a man; since, though they suppose themselves to know, they do not know that the Son of God is not only said in Scripture to have been conceived and born of the Virgin Mary, but to have been conceived of the Holy Spirit, the power of the Most High overshadowing Mary. In this conception and overshadowing by the power of the Most High, Scripture surely shows and teaches nothing other than that, above the common formation of man, there was effected in the womb of the Virgin a formation from the Spirit and the overshadowing power, suited to the inseparable union of the human and divine natures, with preternatural properties added, so that God and man is one Christ, God and man in one person, the natures not torn apart or separated, present everywhere in His kingdom according to both natures.

XIII. Thus they themselves, bewitched by a physical assertion of the properties of the human nature, glory in a victory not yet won, and mock the pious who rightly think concerning the conception and union of Christ’s natures; and this mystery of the conception effected by the Holy Spirit and the overshadowing power of the Most High, as though there were nothing at all of importance in it, they silently and cunningly pass over.

XIV. But we, not led by reason and human wisdom, but enlightened by heavenly light and instructed by the Word of God, adore in faith this wonderful, heavenly conception, formation, and union of the two natures, divine and human, hidden from reason and the judgment of the rational creature; and everywhere we know, everywhere we acknowledge, the whole and entire Christ, nor do we seek Him divided in place, nor one nature separated from the other.

XV. Upon this firm and immovable foundation, with sure and undoubted faith we believe, believing we speak and testify, that in the most holy Supper, instituted and celebrated by the Son of God and of Mary, and which is celebrated and shall be celebrated in the holy Church until the consummation of the age, the true body and the true blood of Jesus Christ are truly and substantially present and are exhibited to those who receive them, together with those things which are seen, bread and wine.

XVI. And we believe that, just as in the first Supper, so also now, beyond all conjecture of reason, through the ministry of the hand of the minister, He offers His body and His blood to all and each who approach the sacred assembly, worthy and unworthy alike, though perhaps receiving unequally, as the Church sings.

XVII. We also confess, resting upon the most firm rock of the Word, that in this Supper we receive and eat by faith and with the mouth no other flesh than that which was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered on the cross, and rose again from the dead.

XVIII. And that from what has been set forth we may establish a certain definition of the Lord’s Supper, we say that the sacred assembly is a sacred action or divine service instituted by Christ, in which Christ Himself, whole and entire according to both natures, present on earth, offers His body present—not absent, not remote, not fixed to a certain place in heaven—true, substantial, and natural, and His true blood in the bread and wine to those who receive, both worthy and unworthy: to the latter indeed unto judgment, but to the former unto a testimony of the application of the remission of sins and unto other salutary uses and fruits.

XIX. We also execrate the philosophical conjectures and imaginations of the corrupters of the Supper concerning only a physical conception and formation of Christ in the womb of the Virgin, and other vain reasonings and doubts as to how Christ, even according to the human nature, can be in so small a quantity of bread and wine. But we, guided by Holy Scripture, know that nothing is so great that God is not greater, nothing so small that God is not smaller, nothing so long that God is not longer, nothing so short that God is not shorter—Jesus Christ true God and man, inseparably existing in one person.

XX. And disregarding their philosophical speculations, we do not fear to affirm, though perhaps not very physically yet theologically, that the whole and entire Christ in one person can be in a place according to every philosophical mode: circumscriptively, definitively, and repletively.

XXI. And just as we believe that Christ was in the stone and in the closed door without the dissolution of the union or confusion of the properties of the natures, so also we hold with catholic faith that His flesh and blood are in the bread and wine.

XXII. In this simple and true faith we rest, and we ascribe such reverence, power, and efficacy to the simple and clear words of Christ as they sound; and by faith and with the mouth we receive without doubt His body and blood.

XXIII. Therefore, since He who can do all things, to whom all things yield, and outside of whose power nothing exists, has said in His most holy Supper, “This is My body; this is My blood,” we do not allow, nor will we ever allow ourselves to be led away or turned aside by any verbal sleights of hand of the enemies of the Supper from the simple sense of the words concerning the true and real presence of Christ.

XXIV. Therefore we receive these words of Christ according to their genuine, true, and grammatical sense; nor do we affix to them, nor permit to be affixed, a symbolic, denominative, metonymic, or any other sense devised and fabricated by the Sacramentarians and Calvinists.

XXV. But curious minds seeking the mode and order—since there is no one who can explain these things in words, nor even attain them by thought—we leave to their own impiety and blasphemous curiosity, and to no uncertain peril of their salvation.

XXVI. For this great mystery of godliness is not subject to the common order of nature; rather, its rationale is in the power of Christ, its knowledge in faith, its cause in His authority, and its effect in His will.

XXVII. Thus also the union itself of the bread and the body of Christ is incomprehensible; for it is not personal, nor natural, nor formal, but sacramental and supernatural.

XXVIII. For the body of Christ is not locally enclosed in the bread, nor in a natural mode, but it is present really and substantially.

XXIX. Nor is the body of Christ drawn down from heaven by the sound of the words, nor is a new body feigned; but the true and living body of Christ is established in the Supper as present really, substantially, and naturally.

XXX. Therefore, communicating with most firm faith, we receive and with the mouth eat the true body and the true blood of Christ, only in a manner of wonder and adoration.

XXXI. Much less do we imagine any division of the body; nor do we say that by this hidden, preternatural, and bodily eating the flesh of Christ is altered in us or even defiled.

XXXII. Thus we also utterly deny that Capernaitic tearing of the body of Christ, and that Scythian gulping of the blood of the Lord.

XXXIII. Likewise we do not understand a physical, geometrical, or mathematical presence concerning smallness or greatness; but we hold that in the Supper the true body and the true blood of Christ are present in a supernatural and heavenly manner.

XXXIV. Therefore we assert that the body of Christ is received and eaten not visibly nor sensibly; we indeed confess that both things are truly and substantially present in the Supper: bread and wine sensibly and visibly, but the body and blood of Christ invisibly and incomprehensibly.

XXXV. Nor is common bread eaten, but that bread with which the body of Christ is truly and substantially present and exhibited to those who eat.

XXXVI. Therefore let human reason and every understanding be held captive under the faith and obedience of the words of Christ, and kata to rheton (according to the literal expression) let the words of Christ be received as they sound. Indeed, let the woman keep silence in the Church, and let philosophy restrain her lip with the finger; let Plato and Aristotle be silent in these sacred mysteries.

XXXVII. And let us also revere this mystery with fear and trembling, and say with the hymn of the Church: to strengthen the sincere heart, faith alone suffices; let faith provide the supplement for the deficiency of the senses.

XXXVIII. With worthy veneration let us embrace also these words of the hymn against the blasphemous fury of the Sacramentarians: What you do not grasp, what you do not see, a resolute faith affirms beyond the order of things. Under diverse species, only signs and not the things themselves, lie hidden the most excellent realities. Flesh, food; blood, drink—yet Christ remains whole under both species. From the receiver He is not cut, not broken, nor divided, but received whole. One receives, a thousand receive; that one only as much as these, nor is the reception diminished. The good receive, the evil receive, yet by an unequal lot of life or death.

XXXIX. Therefore with grateful mind, together with the holy Church, let us recognize and celebrate from the very beginning of the institution this immense goodness of the Son of God, that He does not disdain to unite His most holy body and His purest blood with our bodies, polluted in many ways and defiled with horrible infirmities.

XL. At the same time let us detest the various and manifold glosses and interpretations of both the ancient and the new Sacramentarians concerning sign, type, figure, and symbol.

XLI. For no passage can be found in Scripture that testifies that Christ is not present in the Supper, so that it would be necessary to flee to allegories, tropes, and figures.

XLII. For Christ most properly speaks in the Supper, nor did He will to envelop this most sacred treasure of His Church in any figurative expression.

XLIII. Therefore let us apprehend these clear and genuine words of Christ with most firm and undoubted faith, in that genuine sense which their nature, customary grammar, and their certain signification yield.

XLIV. Nor can the words of Christ, who is Truth itself, be false; but our sense and understanding, which we do not derive from the Word but rather bring in and impose upon it, can deceive us, as indeed it does.

XLV. So many interpretations and such widely differing opinions as there are heads among the Sacramentarians bear witness to this. For you will not find even one among them who agrees with another in these matters, and does not rather defend a different opinion.

XLVI. Whence it may easily be judged that they are driven by an evil spirit and, by the just judgment of God, are confounded in their own wisdom, by which they presume to judge heavenly wisdom.

XLVII. Therefore the perverse understanding of the new Calvinists is also to be condemned and avoided, who, against the clear and perspicuous words of Christ, do not fear to assert that Christ indeed truly and substantially in the Supper distributes His body and blood to those who receive, yet so that it is nevertheless so far absent as heaven is distant from earth; and thus that, grace and saving power being spread in the Church, the mind and faith perceive the substance of the absent body and blood, but as most far removed from bodily eating.

XLVIII. This is the latest blasphemous spirit to have gone forth from its darkness against the most sacred Supper of the Son of God, and, transformed into an angel of light more speciously than the other enemies of the Sacrament, it is to be feared lest with even greater applause it defile the Churches of Christ with its filth. But may the Son of God and of Mary, the author of the most precious treasure of the Church, restrain the furies of these and of others, and graciously preserve and defend this treasure of the Church for us and for our posterity whole and uncorrupted.

QUESTIONS:

I. Whether the ascension of Christ into heaven detracts in any way from His substantial presence in the Supper.

II. Whether it is rightly said that Christ in the Supper is truly and substantially present through the communication of idioms—that is, according to the divinity but not according to the assumed human nature.

III. Whether the body of Christ is exhibited in the Supper corporally, or only effectively according to power and efficacy, and not according to substance.

IV. Whether bodily eating without spiritual eating profits, or rather harms more.

V. Whether the sixth chapter of John can rightly be referred to the bodily eating in the Supper.

VI. Whether koinōnia (communion, participation) in Paul, 1 Corinthians 10, is to be understood not only of the fruit and efficacy, but rather of the substance of the body of Christ.

VII. Whether also the wicked and impious receive the true body of Christ and His true blood.

VIII. Whether the faith of those who give or of those who receive makes the Sacrament, or rather the institution and words of Christ alone.

IX. Whether the adoration of Christ present in the Supper is to be approved.

by Abraham Rothe

Quod Deus Bene Vertat [May God grant a favorable outcome]

Σὺν τῶ Θεῳ [With God]

PREFACE

How great is the efficacy of Baptism, this the throng of the Scholastics and their followers strive to express with many words, but, sinning κατ ὑπερβολὴν [by excess]. Hear from among these only Bonaventure, Part 3, Centiloquium, Section 48:

“The effect [of Baptism] is the impressing of a character, the infusion of grace, and the restoration of innocence, the opening of heaven: Grace, I say, is poured in, regenerating, rectifying, and purifying from every guilt, original and actual, both mortal and venial: absolving no less from eternal punishment, and from every temporal punishment of satisfaction, even in purgatory. For,” as he says, William Peraldus, the Sixth Sunday after the Octave of Pentecost, Sermon 1: “it extinguishes the fire of hell and even purgatory, as regards Baptism itself, so that thereafter the fire of hell or of purgatory can do nothing against him, [the baptized,] unless he himself by sinning rekindles it against himself.”

But the errors, which are not obscurely contained in these words, and many others besides, our theologians νῦν ἐν ἁγίοις [now among the saints] have refuted in great number, of whom at least Johann Gerhard and Johann Conrad Dannhauer may be named. Although indeed those sworn to the Roman See go too far in this manner, and endeavour nevertheless to assert and defend what they can less prove from Scripture, and, ascribing to Baptism an excessive efficacy, seem, in this respect, to support us Orthodox more than those who say that the efficacy of Baptism is plainly none: yet they do not remain in this one extreme, but also slip into the other, when namely they deny to it in the future the same efficacy which before they had claimed for Baptism even to abundance; indeed they strike us, who defend the contrary, with the thunderbolt of anathema: for thus the Council of Trent, Session VII, On Baptism, Canon X: “If anyone shall say that all sins which are committed after Baptism are either remitted by the mere remembrance and faith of the Baptism received, or become venial, let him be anathema.” But the more grossly, the more clearly in this matter the Calvinists (so as to say nothing of the Socinians and Arminians) fail, who, sinning κατ’ ἔλλειψιν [by deficiency], contend that Baptism (external, which nevertheless alone is properly Baptism) is not a means of salvation, but a bare sign, an internal, as they speak, signifying Baptism, not however exhibiting it. For thus the Belgic Confession has: “The water signifies the Blood of Christ, the Holy Spirit to bestow and effect inwardly in the soul the same which the water works outwardly in bodies.” And Theodore Beza in the Colloquy of Montbéliard, Latin ed., p. 445: “The washing with water,” he says, “is only a signification and representation of the spiritual washing; it is not, however, the absolution or the washing itself, nor can it bestow or effect anything at all.” By this very thing, however, who does not see that all consolation is snatched away from the tender minds of the baptized? To be silent about that which ought altogether to have been put in the first place, that the adversaries just now named openly contradict the testimonies of Scripture. It is indeed also a very great consolation which godly parents draw from thence, when they believe that their children, after Baptism, dying in tender age before any use of the Holy Eucharist, by the power and efficacy of the Baptism received after birth, by faith in Christ depart peacefully and blessedly, and that they truly and happily enjoy in the heavenly fatherland the peace which they have obtained from God and with God in Baptism through faith; to be silent again, that the still very tender souls themselves can be raised by the remembrance of their Baptism, the Holy Spirit effectively increasing and confirming the faith kindled in them through Baptism: all of which indeed would collapse, if we were willing to stand by and rely upon the opinion of our adversaries. Which matter I, since I have hitherto weighed it variously in my mind, induced moreover by the command of my venerable father that I should publish a certain academic specimen, wished to set forth briefly and, such as it is, in this Theological Dissertation in a few words. May He, whose glory alone is here in view, bring it to pass that all things result happily!

CHAPTER 1

Concerning our Thesis

§I. Passing over those things which pertain to the name of Baptism, since they are most trite and occur everywhere, we include the matter itself in a compendium of definition, and indeed that most exact one which the great Johann Adam Scherzer νῦν ἐν ἁγίοις [now among the saints] once set forth in the System:

“Baptism properly understood is the sacrament proper to the N. T., or an action instituted by God and Christ, who also sent John to baptize, indeed never administered by the Savior αὐτοχειρὶ [with his own hand], but to be administered ordinarily by the ministers of the Church alone, whereby every living human being, born, an infant of our jurisdiction, or a faithful adult (and thus not resisting), in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, is immersed with natural water, yet united with the Spirit, by an ordained necessity, or is sprinkled with the same, so that, regenerated and renewed out of water and the Spirit, with all guilt removed, even for the future he may become a son of grace and of glory. Of which efficacy exorcism is a certain image.”

§II. In this Definition, you have before your eyes at a single glance the things which can be said about Baptism; but to set these forth and examine them is not our plan. This at least, which touches our aim, we say: the efficacy which we too propose to ascribe to Baptism is indicated by express and plain words in it, when namely it is said that man, regenerated and renewed out of water and the Spirit, with all guilt removed, may even for the future become a son of grace and of glory. Concerning this efficacy we must now speak further.

§III. But efficacy is the force which is inherent in a thing, so that it operates in the very act itself. Among the Germans it is called Eine Krafft [a power]; among the Greeks δύναμις [power], ἐνέργεια [operation]: although that word seems to designate the first act of efficacy, or δύναμιν ἐνεργητικήν [operative power], the power of operating, but this the second act of efficacy, or the operation itself. Whatever the case may be, we say that both belong to Baptism; Baptism, I mean, considered in the action (which is to be well noted) or in its use. By this indeed Baptism, together with the Sacrament of the Supper, differs from the divine Word, which absolutely, even before and outside the use, has intrinsic power and efficacy for producing the spiritual effects for which it is appointed by God; but the Sacraments, and thus also Baptism, outside their use neither have nor exercise power, nor are they able to produce any spiritual effects at all.

§IV. That force and efficacy, however, which we assign to Baptism, is organic or instrumental. For God has appointed to work efficaciously, as through the Word, so also through the Sacraments, so that Baptism, when it is administered, by nature and by divine ordination is already a powerful and efficacious means for kindling faith and attaining salvation: a means, I say, instrumental and in its very essence supernatural (insofar as at once it consists of an earthly and a heavenly thing), which from the first institution and production has been endowed with sufficient, that is, divine and highest power and efficacy, so that it does not need anything new, other, and particular for producing the spiritual effect.

§V. Which efficacy of Baptism, while we say is organic, we at the same time imply that it is not

(α) physical, as if the power of regenerating and of conferring faith adheres to the baptismal water as to a subject φυσικῶς [naturally], and thus is in it by a certain habitual inherence, and has the grace of the Holy Spirit bound to itself by an almost indissoluble bond and a supernatural power implanted, which, as it were seconded, would from there pour it forth; nor

(β) moral, as if the divine power for producing the effect of grace should certainly and infallibly assist Baptism in an ordered way and by means of the symbol of water, but not through this symbol flow into the effect—which opinion, equally as the former, is opposed not only to the Holy Scriptures, but also to the nature of the instrument; nor

(γ) an objective mediate or representative efficacy, as if the Sacrament of Baptism should only externally show and represent what the will of God is, what the way to eternal life is, what faith is, what regeneration and renewal are, what also eternal salvation is, etc.; nor finally

(δ) miraculous, the word being taken strictly. Although we concede that no small affinity intervenes between Baptism and a miracle, nevertheless we cannot at once say that Baptism and a miracle are one; for in a miracle the very nature of the thing itself is changed, but in Baptism only the use of that thing is changed. For the water in Baptism remains the same water in number, yet in its sacramental τάξει [order] it is not bare water and a merely natural thing, devoid of the heavenly treasure, but is a sacramental thing and the washing of Regeneration in the Word; this water is full of the Holy Spirit and united with the Most Holy Trinity in an ineffable manner. Hence it is the means through which the Holy Spirit works, and from this we say that its efficacy is organic or instrumental, yet true, real, and effective.

§VI. But in what this efficacy of Baptism consists, we have already indicated in the definition (§I): that a man is regenerated and renewed out of water and the Spirit, and that all guilt is removed, so that he may even for the future become a son of grace and of glory. Indeed this we say and confess, the Augsburg Confession, Article IX, going before us: “that by Baptism grace is offered to man, and that the same man is also by Baptism received into the grace of God”. But that the grace of God is offered through Baptism not objectively or representatively (for thus the objective efficacy of Baptism would be, which, however, in §V we denied), but truly, really, and effectively, those words teach when in the same place it is said: “By Baptism man is received into grace.” But a man is received into grace when through Baptism he is regenerated; for in it and through it he is born a son of God, that is, he is endowed with faith in Christ, by whose merit, being apprehended, all his sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, are remitted; the righteousness of Christ, offered through Baptism, is imputed to him therein, and thus he is adopted as a son of God and an heir of heavenly goods, whereas before Baptism is received and (ordinarily) without it he is by nature a son of wrath (Eph. 2:3). Whence the baptized man, through the same Sacrament—insofar as it is called the washing of renewal (Titus 3:5)—is renewed; that is, the righteousness and holiness lost in him through the fall of Adam, the Holy Spirit now poured out upon him, are restored, so that, new strengths having been received and the errors of the mind driven away, with the will corrected and the appetite trained, a new man may from thence emerge, who has been created according to God in true righteousness and holiness. In this way the man regenerated and renewed through Baptism is truly a son of grace and of glory, which the Holy Spirit, the pledge and earnest of eternal life, bears witness in his heart, giving testimony that he also is a son of God and blessed here in hope, and in reality itself in the life to come (Rom. 8:16, 24). And this is the efficacy which the Calvinists elsewhere attribute to Baptism as internal, of the elect alone.

§VII. As to the cause and origin, I add also the foundation, of this efficacy of Baptism, we say that the former is the triune God and His immense goodness and wisdom, but the latter is the Word and the evangelical promise annexed to the baptismal water. For it is His to give the justifying grace and the power of the Sacrament, the grace of conferring it upon us, since He alone instituted the Sacraments as means of salvation, and through them bestows His grace κυρίως καὶ αὐτεξουσίως [as Lord and of His own authority], as the principal Author. And there are three persons of the undivided Trinity; for this reason Christ, as the Author, instituting in the assumed humanity αὐτοπροσωπῶς [in His own person], commands His disciples to baptize in the name of the three Persons of the Deity (Matt. 28:19). Terminatively, however, not inappropriately the Holy Spirit is called the author, or the efficient cause producing the efficacy of Baptism, since He, not excluding the other persons, is also the author of regeneration and renewal. But by the will of this triune God, by the power of the word of institution and of the divine promise, Baptism with water obtains such great efficacy and is elevated to produce supernatural effects—namely of regeneration, renewal, and salvation—that it is ὄργανον [instrument] and ὄχημα [vehicle], through which God presents and applies to believers the promise of the Gospel concerning the remission of sins, righteousness, and eternal life. For the water of Baptism is not of itself and by itself and by its natural power, without the operation and power of the Holy Spirit, so efficacious for producing spiritual effects, but it has this—that it works inwardly in the manner of a fitting instrument—from the efficacious appointment of God the Author, from the institution of Christ, and from the operation of the Holy Spirit. For God is He who can do ὑπὲρ νοῦν, ὑπὲρ λόγον, ὑπὲρ φύσιν καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν [beyond mind, beyond reason, beyond nature and all comprehension] (Eph. 3:20), to whose goodness, since He is supremely good, it is not repugnant to increase the means of salvation and, besides the Word and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, to give and institute also the Sacraments, especially Baptism, in order that, in the ordinary way, even infants may be saved, since it is not His will that one of those little ones should perish (Matt. 18:14), who does not will that any should perish (2 Pet. 3:9). Thus, therefore, what Baptism works, God is said to have worked through Baptism.

§VIII. Although this efficacy of Baptism is true, real, and effective—or, to speak more clearly, although the baptismal water, when joined with the Word of God and applied in legitimate use, with the Holy Spirit operating through it, is sufficiently efficacious—yet in the second act, or ἐνέργεια [operation] itself, it cannot always exert itself with respect to the effects, on account of an impediment sometimes interposed by the subject. Although indeed in infants the efficacy of Baptism always exerts itself, for this reason that they put no impediment to the operation of the Holy Spirit, since they lack the fault of hypocrisy; in adults, however, the matter stands otherwise, for these can set up a barrier by actual impenitence or hypocrisy and hinder the operation of the Holy Spirit, which can be shown by the example of Simon Magus alone (Acts 8:13, 21). In which case indeed Baptism by no means can profit them by the work worked, but rather it turns to judgment and condemnation for them. Although, however, to those hypocrites Baptism, through their own fault, is not profitable, nevertheless the efficacy of Baptism remains; for it remains an efficacious instrument through which the Holy Spirit offers justifying grace and wishes both to confer and also to apply it to them, if they do not resist and oppose.

§IX. But the power and efficacy of Baptism is such that it not only produces effects with respect to the past and present time, but also extends itself even into the future. As to the past and the present time, it is clear that Baptism removes the stain of original sin, although not utterly, yet entirely as to guilt and liability; indeed it confers remission not only of original sin as to liability, but also of sins previously committed in act, and, in order that the candidates for Baptism may lay hold of these and apply them to themselves, it kindles faith in infants, but in adults it confirms and seals it, and thus, all liability having been taken away, it cleanses from every impurity and clothes them with the garments of the righteousness and salvation of Christ, whose benefits procured by death it effectively applies and seals, and thus it makes from a son by nature of wrath a son of God—all of which both catechisms of the blessed Luther assert when they say: “Baptism works the remission of sins, delivers from death and the Devil, and grants eternal blessedness to all and each who believe.”

§X. So great and suchlike goods and gifts, since they are perpetual and Baptism confers them upon its candidates, we cannot but affirm that these very things, by the power of Baptism once received, endure forever and are altogether beneficial to the baptized faithful. In particular concerning adults indeed, or those who prove themselves that they may approach the Holy Supper of the Lord as worthy, concerning these it is most true that in the enjoyment of the heavenly goods previously conferred in Baptism they are confirmed through that Sacrament and that these are again sealed to them; but concerning infants and the youth of boyish age it is no less certain, and we firmly assert, that Baptism also in them exerts its efficacy, since through the same they have been rendered acceptable to God in Christ Jesus, the only beloved One. Who then will deny that the operation of the Holy Spirit, whom they also received in Baptism as a pledge and earnest of eternal life, is especially then exerted, when, God so commanding, they ought to allow Him full scope? Truly the Holy Spirit, who does not disdain to procure from their mouth praise and proclamation for Christ (Ps. 8:2), then most of all works in them most efficaciously and kindles faith in Christ in them; nor does He despise the prayers of godly parents, whom He well knows often to remind their children of the Baptism received by them and to raise those lying grievously ill by that very thing; He knows how to employ these pious acclamations for confirming and sealing faith in those little ones.

§XI. One thing still remains: namely, that we speak of that which in some way also can be called the efficacy of Baptism. As we have already said above, the Christian man in Baptism and through the same has been regenerated and made a son of God; the Holy Spirit Himself has been given to him as a pledge, by whose grace also powers for pious living according to the commandments of God—although not without great imperfection in this frailty of life—have been given and conferred upon him. If he who was once initiated by Baptism considers these things, and further weighs that in Baptism he renounced the Devil and all his being and works, that he bound himself to God according to his faith, that he wills to serve Him as his Lord and Father, by whom he has been received into the number of sons—if, I say, he seriously ponders these things, he truly flees the filth of sins, worse than a dog and a snake, lest he lose again the grace of God received in Baptism; and thus he walks before God in a manner becoming the sons of God, persists in faith in Christ, whom he put on in Baptism, and imitates His example. Nor does he grieve the Holy Spirit, of whom he himself has been made a shrine, but rather follows His leading, putting to death the lusts of the Old Man and fashioning himself day by day more and more according to the example of God; this he does as much as possible and with every effort. For this is what Paul commands his once-baptized Ephesians: that they put off, according to the former manner of life, the old man who is corrupted according to the lusts of deceit, but be renewed in the spirit of their mind (Eph. 4:22–24). But why these things ought to be done the same apostle explains in Romans 6:3–4, where he teaches that, on account of the Baptism undertaken, one must by all means strive for new life, as if he were saying: you assuredly and most certainly know that all those who have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death, have therefore been buried together with Him through Baptism into death, that just as Christ has been raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so also those once initiated by Baptism may walk in newness of life. Therefore, if through Baptism the Holy Spirit and the powers necessary for spiritual life are conferred, why should we not also say that it is efficacious for arousing the pursuit of piety as well? And if this—since that is in itself most true—why not say that its efficacy extends also into the future? The blessed Luther expressed this efficacy of Baptism for arousing to a godly life when he hints at a certain general signification of Baptism with respect to the end and effect, saying: “This signifies” (the immersion into water) “that the old Adam, who is still in us, ought by daily mortification and repentance to be sunk and extinguished in us again and again, and that in turn the new man should daily emerge and rise again,” etc.

§XII. Finally, since the Sacraments are also marks of profession among men, according to the Augsburg Confession, Article XIII, this effect too is to be ascribed most of all to Baptism, namely that it distinguishes the faithful from the unbelievers and is their κριτήριον [criterion] most certain. Beware, however, lest with the Socinians you think that Baptism was instituted for this sole end, or at least primarily. See Interesse Religionum of the President, Art. 8, p. 380 ff.

CHAPTER 2

On the Proof of Our Thesis

§I. The question is: Is Baptism efficacious?—and indeed not with a physical efficacy, nor a moral, or objective, or miraculous strictly so called (for we have already removed all these above, ch. I, § 5), but with an organic or instrumental efficacy? And this we affirm and vindicate for the Sacrament of Baptism, because the Holy Spirit, as through the ministry of the Word, so also through the Sacraments, is efficacious—and first indeed through Baptism as the Sacrament of initiation, as through the chosen means of salvation. Moreover, we shall prove this our assertion in a twofold way: first in general, that Baptism is efficacious; then in particular, as regards the past, present, and future time.

§II. We presuppose, moreover, that Baptism is a Sacrament, to which the essential requirements of a Sacrament truly belong: namely, that it is “a sacred and solemn action, divinely instituted, involving a certain visible thing united with the heavenly, by which God, through human ministry, to those using it worthily, applies and seals the evangelical promise,” as B. Johann Adam Scherzer defines the Sacrament in Brevic. p. m. 128, § 94. That Baptism too has these things is evident even from the definition of it set forth above (ch. I, § 1). We, since most adversaries regard Baptism as a true Sacrament, will raise no dispute here foreign to our purpose.

§III. Now, that the Sacrament of Baptism is efficacious, we prove in general:

(α) From the nature of the Sacraments, which of course also pertains to Baptism. Now the nature and quality of the Sacraments is that they are a seal and pledge of the divine promises to be presented and fulfilled to men; but the nature of a seal is properly this, that if it be affixed to promises, it presents and seals them; hence therefore Baptism likewise will be an efficacious means of salvation, or a seal unto the faith which God gives on account of the promise of salvation to be presented and fulfilled.

(β) If the Sacrament of Baptism is not an efficacious means offering, exhibiting, and applying to the believer divine grace with all goods, and thus, as a seal, effectively sealing, it will on this account be a merely bare sign and only signify divine grace—which, however, none of the Orthodox will assert; because the word of promise is present to the Sacrament of Baptism, having not a signifying power but the force of efficacious operation. Moreover, Scripture attributes to Baptism the effects of an instrument that offers and applies divine grace, which, in order that it may not be neglected or omitted, is even strictly commanded; therefore it is necessary that Baptism also be an efficacious means of salvation. (γ) It is clear that the Gospel and the Sacraments are conformable: for that is a word ἀκοῦστον [audible], these are a word ὁρατόν [visible], and appendices—nay rather the epitome—of the Gospel; since therefore it agrees with the Gospel that it is an efficacious means by which the grace of God, the remission of sins, and eternal salvation are offered to men and applied to believers, we certainly cannot deny to the Sacraments, and among these to Baptism, instrumental efficacy.

(δ) Scripture affirms that circumcision was the seal of the righteousness of faith—that is, a means efficaciously confirming and sealing the righteousness of faith, which is the promise of the free remission of sins (Rom. 4:11). It likewise affirms that the Sacrament of Baptism has succeeded in the place of circumcision: for thus Paul says in Colossians 2:11–12, “You have been circumcised in Christ with a circumcision made without hands, by the putting off of the body of sin in the flesh, namely by the circumcision of Christ, in that you were buried together with him through Baptism,” etc. By these words Paul teaches the Colossians that they, dead before in the uncircumcision of the flesh through sins, are now made alive (v. 13) and have been raised with Christ from the dead (v. 12), after they have been buried together with Him through Baptism (v. 12), which in v. 11 he calls a circumcision ἀχειροποίητον [not made with hands] and the circumcision of Christ, which is the putting off of the body of sins in the flesh. And thus (1) he intimates that Baptism, which he calls the circumcision ἀχειροποίητον and distinguishes from that old χειροποίητον [made with hands], has succeeded to it; and (2) also is of the same efficacy with that former one. For as he had taught in Romans 4:11 that the χειροποίητος circumcision was the sign and seal of the righteousness of faith—a seal, I say, confirming the promises of the covenant (what sort of covenant circumcision was, Gen. 17:10, and now Baptism is, 1 Pet. 3:21)—so in this place, Colossians 2:11–12, he asserts it to be of the same efficacy. Whence: if circumcision in the Old Testament was such a seal as conferred and sealed the grace promised to the Jews, it follows that the circumcision in the New Testament, which Paul calls ἀχειροποίητον, is of no less efficacy; therefore we rightly conclude that Baptism, which Paul asserts to have succeeded to the χειροποιήτῳ circumcision, likewise is an efficacious means of salvation. And just as circumcision in the Old Testament was a means by which faith was conferred upon infants, and through this righteousness, but in believing adults the same faith was confirmed and sealed, so also one must believe about Baptism, that it is a means by which infants as well as adults are made partakers of the righteousness of Christ and of all spiritual goods—while to those it confers faith, to these it confirms and seals it.

(ε) Finally, a great absurdity would follow if we were willing with the adversaries to deny the efficacy of Baptism: for then the ἐνέργεια [operation] and efficacy of the washings of the Old Testament would have been greater than that in the New. On this reasoning the waters of the Jordan (2 Kings 5) and of the sheep-pool (John 5) would have profited much more than the baptismal water. Surely, if by the word of a prophet and the touch of some angel those waters were so effective, why should we not also believe that to the baptismal water—by divine τάξει [order], included and comprehended in the word and command of Him who is greater than the prophet and the Lord of angels—there belongs such and even greater efficacy?

§IV. These things concerning the proof in general. In particular, as regards the past time, there occurs

(α) Galatians 3:27, where Paul says: “For as many of you as were baptised into Christ have put on Christ.” What, pray, does Paul mean by this phrase, you have put on Christ? Certainly he means this: that just as the Galatians before Baptism were dead in sins, without Christ and sons of wrath because of dead works—namely sins—according to Ephesians 2, so now in Baptism all their sins have been taken away; for the righteousness and innocence of Christ, on God’s part through this Sacrament of Baptism, but on their own part through faith, have been conferred, imputed, and sealed to them, so “that now there is nothing sinful and damnable in them, because they are in Christ Jesus” (Rom. 8), and thus, justified or absolved from sins, “they have peace with our Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom. 5). Elegantly Augustine of Hippo says: “When in the saving water Christians are plunged for the third time, then the Egyptians—that is, original sins or actual crimes—are buried as it were in the Red Sea; from this it is that by Baptism we are said to put on Christ” (Gal. 3). Likewise Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 2: “We are sure concerning our Baptism that it is both the absolution of sins and grants the gift of the Holy Spirit.”

(β) Titus 3:5: “God saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit.” In these words Paul understands by washing Baptism, because in it, by the institution of Christ, we are sprinkled with water sacramentally united with the blood of Christ, and thus we are washed in conscience from our sins or dead works (Heb. 9:14). Moreover, the Apostle, to designate further the efficacy of Baptism, calls it the washing of regeneration, for this reason: because Christ says that in it we are born again (John 3:5), while we are born sons of God (John 1:12–13); which takes place when we gain supernatural powers of believing, so that by faith in Christ and His merit—all of which Baptism confers upon us—we, washed from sins, are transferred into a new life, namely a spiritual one. Whence assuredly there is thereafter no remembrance of former sins (Ezek. 18:22), for by that water of Baptism we have been made clean from every impurity (Ezek. 36:25).

(γ) The words of Peter (Acts 2:38) and of Ananias (Acts 22:16, compared with 9:17) establish most strongly the efficacy of Baptism with respect to the past time. For Peter, to the hearers asking counsel about salvation, urges this: that each be baptized for the remission of sins, for thus, he says, they will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. Which Ananias confirms when, Paul himself being witness, he announces to him through the mouth of the Lord that, arising, he be baptized and wash away his sins. From these statements it is certainly clear that remission of sins is attributed to Baptism as to the effect of its cause—an organic one—and thus it is necessarily efficacious with regard to the past time, yet that very thing not from itself and its own nature, but from divine ordination and the operation of the Holy Spirit.

§V. But the present almost coincides with the past time; for in the very act by which sins are remitted to a man—whether infant or believing adult—the grace also of the Holy Spirit and all the goods obtained through Christ are conferred upon him, confirmed, and sealed to him, and that by virtue of the divine promise. This very point we prove: (α) Ephesians 5:26. Paul says: “Christ cleansed the Church by the washing of water in the Word.” What is understood by the washing of water we stated above; the Apostle here intimates that, sins having been remitted in Baptism both as to guilt and punishment, the righteousness and obedience of Christ are imputed to the candidate for Baptism, the Old Man is put to death, and powers are conferred for leading a pure and holy life. Moreover, he calls it the washing of water in the Word, because on account of the word of command and promise (which the Apostle means) Baptism is the means of cleansing, according to Mark 16:16, insofar as it is dispensed in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, according to Christ’s institution (Matt. 28:19). Hence that saying of Augustine of Hippo: “Let the word come to the element, and it will become a Sacrament.”

(β) Peter supports Paul, who in 1 Peter 3:21 says that Baptism, the ἀντίτυπον [antitype] of the flood, “saves us—not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the appeal (or answer) of a good conscience toward God through the resurrection of Jesus Christ.” The Apostle here predicates of Baptism that it saves. You ask how? He answers: when there is made the appeal of a good conscience unto God. By this phrase he signifies that Baptism is a covenantal and stipulatory act between God and man, born of mutual interrogations and responses, in which both parties bind themselves to reciprocal duty: God, who by that obligation confers and seals grace and all goods; and the conscience of man, made certain of God’s grace, which bears witness that he believes and binds himself to observe His will. Peter therefore ascribes to Baptism eternal salvation, yet in such a way that he indicates whence that power descends—namely from the resurrection of Christ, the completion of His merit (cf. Rom. 5:10).

§VI. Most importantly, we prove that the efficacy of Baptism extends even into the future, even to the end of the Christian man’s life. (α) Mark 16:16: “Whoever will have believed and will have been baptized will be saved; but whoever will not have believed will be condemned.” Here the Savior uses the future tense and thereby indicates the great efficacy of Baptism. For of how great necessity He declares Baptism to be—by necessity of means (John 3:5) and of command (Mark 16:16)—of so great utility He also declares it to be, saying, “will be saved.” What is to be understood by salvation I cannot fully set forth; but I will say this: here it consists in the fruition of the imputed righteousness of Christ; there in the fruition of those things which eye has not seen nor ear heard. And we affirm that the baptized obtain and will obtain this salvation. Yet it must be carefully observed that we never exclude faith from the efficacy of Baptism, since this, broadly taken, presupposes repentance; lest we seem to affirm that those who fall into sins, if without repentance and faith they merely recall Baptism in a bare historical way, immediately obtain remission and salvation. So far from that, in such a case Baptism turns to their destruction. Rather, as we warned above, the power and efficacy of Baptism endure throughout the Christian’s life, so that one who has fallen after Baptism can and ought to confirm his faith—stirred anew by the Word through the Holy Spirit—by remembrance of the covenant once initiated in Baptism. Thus many, unable at life’s end to receive other sacraments, have been raised and saved through serious remembrance of Baptism, as history testifies. Not only adults but even infants are saved through Baptism, for Christ’s word concerns them also: “Whoever will have believed and will have been baptized will be saved.” We do not doubt that those departing in tender youth are blessed—especially since it is not the Father’s will that any of these little ones perish (Matt. 18:14). Christ shed His blood for them; they have been baptized according to His command; and they believe—not setting up barriers to the Spirit as adults often do. Therefore the Spirit operates most efficaciously in them, arousing the faith implanted in Baptism (especially when godly parents remind them of it), so that they apply to themselves Christ’s merit and are confirmed in saving confidence.

(β) Again, 1 Peter 3:21 calls Baptism a covenant. Though a man may fall through sin, that covenant on God’s part is not dissolved; for the unbelief of men does not nullify God’s faithfulness (Rom. 3:3), nor does He deny Himself (2 Tim. 2:13). He calls us back to the covenant once made (Jer. 3:12). Moreover, Baptism has succeeded circumcision (Col. 2:11), which was the seal of righteousness (Rom. 4:11); and since a seal is efficacious also for the future, so too Baptism. Elegantly Johann Gerhard says in his Catholic Confession: if any leap from the ship of Baptism into the sea of destruction by voluntary sins, the ship itself is not broken but remains whole; to which, if they return by true repentance, they are borne into the harbour of salvation. Thus Peter raises both himself and others by the word that Baptism saves (1 Pet. 3:21); Paul restores the Corinthians and Galatians by recalling their Baptism (1 Cor. 6:11; Gal. 3:27); and as circumcision once gave consolation to Jonathan and David, so Baptism gives abiding consolation to the faithful.

(γ) Finally, we also prove the efficacy of Baptism for the future from this: that it is called the washing of renewal (Titus 3:5), because righteousness and holiness, lost by the fall of Adam, are restored in the baptized—not indeed by the power of the water in itself, but by the Holy Spirit. Therefore the beginning of renewal is in Baptism; yet it ought to be continued throughout the whole life, as is proved from Romans 6:12–13; 12:2; Colossians 3:10; and Ephesians 4:23–24. Since this is so, it follows that Baptism is also an efficacious means for the future; whence, with good reason, it is called by the Apostle the washing of renewal.

§VII. From what has been said, it is now clear how abundant a wealth of consolation any person dipped in this sacred font may draw from the efficacy of Baptism. There is certainly no calamity against which this saving washing cannot most efficaciously raise him up and preserve him. Even the great number of infants and of those somewhat further advanced in age rejoice, against every adverse event, in this efficacious means of salvation. Whence, one may ask, comes such patience even in the most grievous and stubborn diseases? Whence so many sighs and prayers, such trust in God with such fervor as scarcely uttered by any adult, as the tender offspring of godly parents—even when set in the agony of death—often expresses?

Truly all this proceeds from the most efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, since by Him these little ones were anointed and sealed in Baptism. By His operation they have put on Christ; in Him, justified by the faith conferred in Baptism, they have peace with God through Jesus Christ. Therefore Christian parents, when their children lie ill and depart this life, cannot but acquiesce, knowing that their children cannot depart more blessedly, so to speak. Indeed, they ought rather to desire and pray with all zeal that, according to Christ’s saying, they themselves may in this respect also become like their children—so that, abiding in the covenant struck with God in Baptism, it may someday be granted to them also, released from the debt of this life, to pass away as peacefully and as blessedly.

CHAPTER 3

Concerning the antithesis of our true opinion.

§I. I enter a field broad enough, being about to speak of the opinion of the Adversaries opposed to us at last. This, however, is of various kinds, according as the Adversaries themselves also are: for these either altogether deny the Efficacy of Baptism (external), such as the Calvinists together with the Socinians and Arminians; or they deny to Baptism its Efficacy only insofar as it is affirmed by us to endure also into the future; such adversaries here we have the Papists.

§II. As for the Calvinists, their error is otherwise well enough known, namely that they plainly derogate from the efficacy of Baptism: we adduced the words of their Confession in the Preface. Moreover, they imagine a twofold one and the same Baptism, external and internal: the former they say is a bare sprinkling of water, having only σχέσιν [relation] and signification; but the latter, the immediate action of the Holy Spirit regenerating the baptized. Whence, although they sometimes concede that Baptism is an organ and an ordinary means by which God efficaciously confers and applies His Goods, yet the words are only empty; since they understand those things either of the internal Baptism, or also sacramentally, or, as they explain, significatively, of the external Baptism. For they say that Baptism is the washing of Regeneration, but in such a way that what belongs to the thing signified, i.e., the Blood of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, is ascribed to the external action by a sacramental metonymy. They rely, however, on a false hypothesis, in that they maintain that the Sacraments are only bare signs signifying divine grace, either already before conferred, or to be conferred afterward.

§III. To whom the Socinians give their assent, denying that through the Sacraments the grace of God is efficaciously conferred and the evangelical promises sealed: For thus Smalcius, Disputation 9 against Franzius: “They are fables,” he says, “that there is any internal efficacy in Baptism or the Lord’s Supper, since both are nothing else than external actions of men, by which they wish to express something that lies hidden in their mind.” The Arminians, who must be subjoined next to these, are willing that Baptism be on God’s part only a certain signification of grace, but on our part only a public profession of the name of Christ. Thus Episcopius, Disputation 29, ibid. VIII: “The effect,” he says, “or the end of Baptism is not any real bestowal of grace, but only the mere signification of divine grace and of our profession.”

§IV. But the Calvinists object:

(α) That Baptism, as an external sign, cannot be an efficacious means of salvation, when it is said that it regenerates and confers the remission of sins, for the reason that in this way the merit of Christ is set behind, whose Blood rather cleanses us from all sin, according to 1 John 1:7 and 1 Corinthians 6:11. But we reply:

(1) We deny that Baptism is only an external and bare sign, such that it is so efficacious for producing spiritual effects; rather we say this, that because it has the Word, the promise, and the operation of the grace of the Holy Spirit joined to itself, therefore it also efficaciously confers and seals, as a seal, the Goods promised in the word to those baptized.

(2) Things subordinate to one another are not to be set in opposition: it is true, cleansing from sins is ascribed in that place to the Blood of Christ, it is ascribed also to Baptism, to the former, however, as the principal meritorious cause, to the latter as the secondary organic cause; cf. 1 Peter 3:21, Hebrews 10:22.

(β) They object that we sin in a twofold way; first, that we ascribe to Baptism what ought nevertheless to be attributed to the Word; for this indeed is said to regenerate us: James 1:18; 1 Peter 1:23; second, that because we attribute to the element of water the power of cleansing souls, we detract this efficacy from the Blood of Christ and the Holy Spirit, to whom that should wholly be ascribed; and on this account they say that an idol is set up by us, and that we assert the water of Baptism to profit ex opere operato [by the work worked]. But indeed we reply:

(1) Holy Scripture itself attributes such efficacy to the baptismal water, 1 Peter 3:21; Titus 3:5.

(2) To the Blood of Christ and to the Holy Spirit, to be sure, that power of cleansing souls is to be ascribed, yet it is not to be denied also to the water of Baptism, lest we contradict Holy Scripture.

(3) We deny that we make an idol out of the water of Baptism, as though we wished to assert that a hidden efficacy inheres in it physically, so that it profits ex opere operato, etc.; rather we say this: those effects of regenerating, saving, etc., we ascribe wholly to the Holy Spirit; yet in such a way that through the water of Baptism, fortified and sanctified by the Word of God, He wills those heavenly benefits to be dispensed, and thus to Baptism assuredly an efficacy, albeit organic, must be affirmed.

(γ) They object that Baptism is not a means, but only a sign and seal of Regeneration, just as Circumcision is called only a sign in Genesis 17:11; therefore it is absurd, they say, to assert that the grace of God is affixed to this sign: But we reply:

(1) Circumcision in Genesis 17:10 is called a covenant, and by Paul in Romans 4:11 the τὸ [the] sign is explained by “seal”; such we also say Baptism is, which has succeeded in the place of Circumcision.

(2) Baptism is assuredly the means of Regeneration, because it is expressly called the Washing of Regeneration and Renewal, by which God saves us, Titus 3:5 and John 3:5.

(3) We grant that the grace of God is not so affixed to the signs as to prevent God from regenerating infants extraordinarily even without Baptism: We deny, however, that it is rightly inferred from this, as though Baptism were not the ordinary means of Regeneration, to whose use we are not bound, the statements of Scripture standing in the way, John 3:5; Mark 16:16.

(δ) They object finally: But indeed Baptism in Adults is not a means of Regeneration, since they have already been regenerated through the word: If therefore Baptism cannot exercise its Efficacy in these, then neither in Infants: Reply. Baptism is assuredly a means of Regeneration in Infants as well as in Adults: of Regeneration, I say, in the former for being conferred and confirmed, in the latter indeed for being confirmed and sealed. For Baptism is a certain verbum ορατόν [visible], through which God works efficaciously, just as through the verbum ἀκοῦστον [audible].

§V. As for the Socinians, they indeed argue quite cleverly against the Efficacy of Baptism, yet not in such a way that they cannot be refuted from Holy Scripture.

(α) They object, moreover, that Baptism is a type of inward washing, whence in Hebrews 9:10 it is reckoned among the righteousnesses of the flesh: Now indeed all types in the N.T. are abrogated. But I reply:

(1) There is an equivocation in the word Baptism; for this word in the place cited, Hebrews 9:10, denotes those various ceremonies of the O.T. performed by sprinkling of water, which we indeed confess to have been abrogated in the N.T.; but what, pray, is that to Baptism, which is a Sacrament of the N.T.?

(2) Baptism is expressly called not a type but ἀντίτυπον [antitype] by the Apostle Peter, 1 Peter 3:21, and by Paul the washing of Regeneration and Renewal, Titus 3:5.

(β) They object that from Circumcision, the Sacrament indeed of the O.T., it is not permissible to argue to Baptism, the Sacrament of the N.T.: since the rationale of the former was far different, and God said that He would give it as a sign of the covenant, which, however, is read nowhere concerning Baptism. Moreover the new covenant has far more divine seals than that faith in it ought to rely on external rites. But I reply:

(1) From Circumcision to Baptism it is certainly permissible to argue, because it succeeded in the place of Circumcision, Colossians 2:11.

(2) The rationale of Circumcision and of Baptism is indeed different, yet not opposed to each other: different, because Circumcision conferred and applied the benefits to be obtained through Christ yet to come; but Baptism confers and seals those obtained through Christ already present.

(3) That Baptism also is a sign of the covenant is evident even from this, because it is called ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν [appeal to God], which makes me certain of divine grace, 1 Peter 3:21.

Thus understood, as we also confess in our Catechesis; whence, although the Socinians urge that Baptism is among external things in which the kingdom of God does not consist, according to Romans 14:17, they are nevertheless mistaken and mistaken, because we do not say that purely external things, by their native force, confer spiritual goods, but by a given force and divinely imparted: then also the Apostle speaks of purely external things pertaining to the use of this natural life, which, however, Baptism is not.

§VI. The remaining things which the Socinians urge, namely from Acts 22:16 that the washing from sins is attributed to Baptism only declaratively and as a sign, likewise that in Acts 8:37 faith from the whole heart is required before Baptism; and also when they say that by Baptism the remission of sins is only adumbrated; these, I say, do nothing against the efficacy of Baptism, since in Baptism the water is not only natural, but sacramental, or water in the Word; next, to wash away sins, Acts 22:16, to be saved and regenerated, Titus 3:5, to be baptized for the remission of sins, Acts 2:38, is certainly not to adumbrate, but truly to confer heavenly goods; and finally it is true that faith is required before Baptism, in adults, which nevertheless does not hinder but that, after the example of Abraham, Romans 4:9, faith in them is sealed by Baptism.

§VII. We have refuted the Arminians together with the Calvinists: It remains that we make mention of the Papists. These, colluding with the Messalians, say that the efficacy of Baptism is only as to the past and present, by no means as to the future time; wherefore they compare it with the first plank that is seized after a shipwreck, and with a razor. But they most audaciously contradict Holy Scripture; for Peter, 1 Peter 3:21, compares Baptism not to the first plank but to the intact ship, the ark of Noah, and ascribes to it the salvation of souls. Not to mention that they contradict themselves; for Thomas and Scotus, with Gregory of Valencia not differing, Tom. IV. col. 1568, compare Baptism with the intact ship. Then if, with the Messalians, we should say that Baptism, like a razor, takes away only past sins, why, pray, is it said indefinitely: Baptism takes away sins? Acts 2:38. Why are we said in Romans 6:3 to be baptized into the death of Christ? Is it that the death of Christ is efficacious only as to past sins? Absurd!

Since therefore their opinion so openly contradicts Scripture, and moreover has been refuted time and again by our own, we delay here no further; rather we humbly beseech God that He would further graciously be present to His Church, and mightily defend it against all the machinations of Satan and the assaults of enemies, that to Him here and there also may there ever be Praise, Honor, and Glory!

Ἐπίμετρον [supplement]

Well, among the Papists themselves, Adrian and Peter of Walenburch, Vol. 2 of the Works, at the end, in the Rule of the Catholic Faith, chap. 1, § 3:

“Nothing is of divine faith among all those things which we know from revelations made after the times of the Apostles, even to any Saints, to Ambrose, Cyprian, or others, those ancient or more recent, of which there are myriads in the lives of the Saints, of Catherine of Siena, of Bridget, etc., even if such visions were approved by some councils, even universal ones, as some are reported in the Second Nicene, etc. Because those things were not revealed to the Prophets and Apostles. The faith, therefore, which can be had in these is human, which depends on the authors reporting; wavering, probable; certain or improbable, according to the quality of the reporters and the circumstances of such revelations. Most things either waver or are false.”

Thus the not ignoble pair of those brothers. Far be it, therefore, that we orthodox should ascribe or attribute more to such revelations today.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PAPACY,

Outlined with Divine Inspiring Grace in its principal lines,

and under the PRESIDENCY of the Most Magnificent, Most Reverend, and Most Excellent

Dn. Johann Wolfgang Jäger,

Doctor of Sacred Theology, Most Distinguished Chancellor of our Illustrious University, Vigilant Provost of the Church, and Celebrated Professor of Controversies,

Author and Devoted Student submissively presents to his revered Instructor and Patron Christian Albert Christhold Oettinga-Suevus, Student of Sacred Theology and Pupil of the Serene Prince of Oettingen,

for the peaceful examination of the learned, on the day of March 5, 1708, in Tübingen, printed by Joh. Conradi Reisi.

Although we were inclined to give some account of our studies of whatever kind, yet because of the narrowness of time within which we have been confined for a definite reason we have not been able to examine the subject of the dispute more carefully and curiously, nor to produce anything more elaborate. We had to serve the time available. Therefore, setting forth brief theses with the reasons joined to them which seemed to us the weightiest, we shall present our opinion concerning the foundation of the Papacy. Now, while reflecting on this argument, the most distinguished presiding professor advised that I should especially consider the meaning of Christ’s words: “You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church” (Matthew 16:18), since it is well known that this passage places many upon the rack (i.e., greatly troubles or perplexes many). Here we think it should be noted, with Spanheim the Younger, that nothing remains to be said which has not already been said before. Therefore, we shall touch upon the more important points, reserving the rest for further conflict (i.e., debate).

Thesis I. Christ, by performing many miracles, stirred up great admiration among the people, who nevertheless did not agree in their judgments concerning Him. Hence the faithful One, after the example of a teacher, took the occasion to inquire into the faith of the disciples, who all answered through the mouth of Peter. For He questioned them all; therefore Peter alone answers on behalf of all not because the others did not know what Peter answered. For who would suppose, says Casaubon, that the Apostles, now already spending their third year with Christ, were ignorant that Christ was the Son of God? They had seen the Holy Spirit descending upon Him thus Casaubon adds; they had heard the Father bearing witness from heaven (Matthew 3:17). Indeed, Andrew knew this even before Peter (John 1:41), and Philip likewise when something is done suddenly, the cause of the act ought not to be inquired into. Indeed, the assertion of Baronius is far too rash; he does not blush to say that Peter defined the matter, decreed it, and established a rule of faith, as though the first council had been held here! So absurd is this opinion that it scarcely deserves to be refuted. It is remarkable that, in the Council of Jerusalem, he did not define and decree the matter although he was then more fully endowed with the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Acts 15:7, 19). Philip and Nathanael had already made a solemn confession before Peter (John 1:45, 49); and if the authority of many very learned men is of weight, the confession made by Peter in the name of all (John 6:69) precedes this one in time. The Fathers indeed allege many reasons why Peter alone responded; yet none of them is able to support the primacy of Peter. Very much to the point is the saying of Chrysostom, who declares that where the Holy Spirit is present, there is no need to inquire into the cause of what is done. Bellarmine maintains that the meaning of the words in favor of Peter’s primacy is plain and obvious. Yet it is remarkable that, in the Council of Jerusalem, Peter did not define and decree the matter although he was then more fully endowed with the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Acts 15:7, 19).

Thesis II. Therefore, what Christ answered to Peter in verse 18, He answered to all. If you consider the name, it had already been given to him by Christ before this confession (John 1:41). Leonhard Osiander gives a most elegant paraphrase of the words, “You are Peter”: “You please me greatly, Peter, because of your confession. I long ago surnamed you Peter; nor do I now repent of that act. For you have now made such a confession concerning me as is the true rock and foundation of religion.” If you consider the promise, it pertains to all the Apostles, as is most clearly demonstrated by the words in Matthew 18 and John 20:23. Hence the profound Doctor of Paris, Ellies du Pin, acknowledges that Christ, in the person of Peter, promised the keys to the Church and to all the Apostles. The Apostles were either shameless or utterly foolish, if according to Bellarmine’s view they contended about primacy (Luke 22:25) after setting aside these words of their Saviour. Christ, the best interpreter of His own words, could have more briefly repressed the ambition of the disciples (according to Bellarmine) by saying that they were desiring what He had already given to Peter. Compare Matthew 20:22ff.; Mark 10:30ff.

Thesis III. By the “rock” upon which Christ built His Church, the Pope cannot be understood. The pontificians above all Bellarmine, Maldonatus, Cornelius à Lapide, and others try every possible argument so as not to be compelled to concede the thesis just stated. They do this because this saying seems to them the strongest shield, which they can turn against the opponents of the Roman See. One of the principal exceptions they wish to raise is that Christ spoke in the Syriac language, in which “Cepha” signifies both Peter and rock. But did Matthew not understand Syriac, who varies the gender so subtly? It is false that the Syriac language does not allow a change of gender, for Cepha is feminine when it means “rock.” What the Syrian interpreter observed was that he assigned the masculine gender to the proper name Cepha, but the feminine gender to the common noun meaning “rock.” Other passages prove that Cepha can indeed be of feminine gender when it signifies “rock” (cf. 1 Corinthians 10:4; Matthew 23:42; Mark 16:4). Therefore, Saint Matthew, writing in the Greek language, faithfully expressed the words of Christ. It must be believed with certainty that the Holy Spirit willed, in the authentic Greek text, to change the speech for the sake of clarity, so that no one might mistakenly refer to Peter what is to be understood about Christ’s doctrine and confession or about Christ Himself. Certainly, among the Jews, proper names and common nouns are very wisely distinguished in writing. Among the Greeks, however, the custom and usage are not the same. For in Greece, no one makes a surname or proper name from a common noun without changing its gender and inflection. The Fathers whom the pontificians cite in support of their explanation Ellies du Pin and others can easily be opposed by many who understand petram as referring either to Christ Himself or to Peter’s confession about Christ. Nor can the wisdom of Christ be reconciled with the idea that He built the Church upon a fragile, sinful man, subject to change and inconsistency in his thoughts and judgments. Who could doubt that what has been proclaimed about Peter could be stated? Let the thoughtful reader consider verses 23 and 24 of our chapter, in which the history of Peter’s denial is repeatedly recounted (Matthew 26:70.). Bellarmine’s frivolous exception that Peter fell from charity but not from faith is false: a malicious denial cannot coexist with faith. It is impossible for even a small measure of divine love to be torn from faith. According to Bellarmine’s reasoning, God would even deny a faithful man (Matthew 10:33). Moreover, the pontificians are troublesome when they try to impose upon us the infallibility of the papal office, a notion which they themselves cannot convince their people to accept. Pope Adrian VI himself said: “It is certain that the Pope can err even in matters touching faith, teaching heresy through his determinations or decretals.” For there have been many Roman pontiffs who were heretics. Bellarmine indeed wrote this while he was still a theologian in Levanium, yet when he became Pope, he did not retract it in the repeated editions of his Commentaries on the books of sentences. Indeed, the same Adrian VI, in 1522, sent instructions to the Nuremberg assembly via Francesco Cheregato, Bishop of Aprutium, commanding him to declare publicly to the German princes: “We know that in this holy See, for some years now, many abominable things have occurred, abuses in spiritual matters, excesses in mandates, and all things have been perverted. And shortly thereafter: You shall promise that we will apply every effort so that these matters may be reformed as soon as possible.” The final point that Bellarmine and others try to evade is this: no one should doubt that Christ is indeed the primary foundation of the Papacy; yet it can be stated quite accurately that, in the strict and immediate sense, foundation and Peter are distinct Peter, the rock, is placed upon the foundation, that is, upon the foundational stones of the building. It is certain that Paul excludes all things as foundation except Christ (1 Corinthians 3:11). Nevertheless, our argument is not weakened if we say that Peter may also be called a foundation, though not the sole foundation. Hence Jerome, in his commentary on Amos (c. 6), says: “Christ is the rock, who gave to all the Apostles that they themselves also be called rocks.” Metonymically, the Apostles may be called foundations insofar as the effect is attributed to the efficient cause. This is how Panstrat, Nazianzenus, Batius, and Aretas understood it in reference to Revelation 21:14. We therefore rightly conclude this thesis with the words of Erasmus in his annotations on Matthew 16: “I am amazed that anyone should twist this passage to apply to the Roman Pontiff,” and shortly after: “Truly, they are insane who think nothing is sufficient except what is excessive.”

Thesis IV. But Christ Himself is the rock upon which the Church is built. For such a rock must necessarily be understood as one against which the gates of hell cannot prevail. Christ, as the rock, was already prefigured in the Old Testament and promised in the New Testament, as is shown in Exodus 17:6; Numbers 20:11; 1 Corinthians 10:4; Isaiah 28:16; and the Psalms. Exodus 17:6; Numbers 20:11; 1 Corinthians 10:4; Isaiah 28:16; Psalms 118:22; Matthew 21:42; 1 Peter 2:6–7 these are considered as the foundation of the Church both subjectively (1 Corinthians 3:10) and objectively (Ephesians 2:20). To this passage Calovius in Biblia Illustrata aptly remarks: “Here the Apostles and Prophets are not regarded as architects who laid the foundation, but their teaching is called the foundation upon which the faithful are built; in this doctrinal foundation shines the doctrine concerning Christ.” With this distinction, the explanations of our authors are easily reconciled, which divide into two parts: one, that Christ Himself was indicated by gesture or sign, whom Peter confessed; the other, that, according to Calovius, Peter’s confession looked upon Christ. Clearly, as Casaubon observes, Calovius here uses either the relative or the demonstrative pronoun. If it is relative, it refers to something more remote, not to the immediately preceding word; examples of this observation are given by Glassius. If the demonstrative pronoun is to be properly interpreted, as Sextius Gr. and Philologians allow, it may be so according to the rules of good interpretation. As Danhauer remarks, the ancients often expressed the sense of the mind by gestures, as may be gathered from Matthew 27:10, 24, and Acts 21:11. Likewise, oration was often assisted by gestures. This custom, clearly used by Christ our Savior, is most evident in John 2:20.

Thesis V. Building upon the rock signifies a most intimate union with it. Hence Grotius himself, who nevertheless interprets this passage in favor of the pontificians, illustrates this phrase from 2 Corinthians 6:16 and Ephesians 2:21: “You are the temple of God” (cf. 1 Corinthians 3:16–17; 6:19). There is clearly a connection between the one who builds and the Church that is built, between the head and the members (Ephesians 4:15–16), and between the vine and the branches (John 15:5). Such a union, however, cannot exist between Peter and Christians. Even if we were willing to concede that the pontificians understand this as a union with Peter’s faith, it would profit them nothing, because they cannot demonstrate a universal consent with Peter’s faith. See the following theses.

Thesis VI. Even if we allow that Peter the Apostle is understood by “the rock,” the Roman pontiffs gain nothing from it. Whence, then, could they prove that only Peter is the rock? Should we not rather understand that all are Peter, that is, that all are to be steadfast? Peter himself calls any Christian a living stone (cf. 1 Peter 2). According to Dannhauer, a stone is, in the strongest, most supportive, and suitable sense, that by which other stones are raised. How, then, from this metaphorical expression which the pontificians themselves cannot explain from other places in Scripture can the primacy of Peter be carved out? We do not see it. The Fathers who understood per petram as referring to Peter never even dreamed of the primacy of Peter that the pontificians boast. Rather, they used Peter and the confession of faith as equivalent, as Casaubon learnedly explains from Epiphanius and Theophylact. It is well known how eagerly Gregory I seized the title “Universal Bishop” from his pontifical successor, opposing it with zeal. If Peter had some personal privilege, of which the pontiffs can boast in the same way, it was no greater than Abraham’s relationship to God, which Christ immediately restrained, saying: “If you were Abraham’s children, you would do the works of Abraham” (John 8:39). Even if it were true, as they constantly claim, that they are the successors of Peter, it should be noted that the chair does not make succession, but doctrine does, as Chemnitz beautifully remarks. The pontiffs long since departed from Peter’s faith; if our institution were maintained, this could easily be demonstrated from two of his epistles (1 Peter 2:1–19). What does the Pope as Successor do? Here he receives and venerates with equal piety the traditions pertaining both to faith and to morals, as if orally delivered by Christ or dictated by the Holy Spirit, with reverence and devotion (cf. Council of Trent, Session 4). He also ensures that these teachings are instilled in youth through the German Catechism of Canisius, where the Catholic Christian is taught what to believe, whether or not it is explicitly written in the Bible. In the end, this saying profits the Roman Pope nothing if Peter was not the first Bishop of Rome, which seems very probable to us from the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of Peter and Paul. Nor is this disputed even by some pontiffs themselves Johannes Baptista Mantuanus, Marsilio of Padua, Johannes Aventinus, Carlo Nolinus, and Litanius as seen in Turretin and Calovius.

Thesis VII. It is therefore evident that the sole foundation upon which the entire machinery of the Roman pontificate rests is ambition. For the childish lust for domination is not from Christ (Luke 22:25–26), nor did Peter institute it (1 Peter 5:3), but it comes from the world (John 2:16) and from the proud heart, perhaps never content with its own desires (Ecclesiastes 7:30). Everything that is seen in Rome does not breathe the simplicity of a fisherman or the humility of an apostle, but everywhere exhibits abominable arrogance. On this point, Luther testifies with these words: “No bishop dares to call the Pope a brother, as it has been done in Carpi, but they must call the Pope the Most Gracious Lord of all,” as the recent convention of cardinals has shown, approved by the Pope, even in the presence of kings, without removing their hats. An equally abominable example of ambition was given a few years ago by Clement XI, who, unjustly contradicting the coronation of the Most Powerful King of Bohemia, misused Scripture, saying in letters to King Charles: “Kings are constituted without me” (Hosea 8:4), and did not hesitate to abuse it. Hence political magistrates, eager for domination, submit to legitimate authority. If only they would learn from Aaron, whom Bellarmine presents not only as a type of Christ but also of the Roman Pontiff, and imitate him, for he acknowledged his own fallibility and sought pardon from Moses (Numbers 12:11; cf. Exodus 31:22). The entire Old Testament, according to Bellarmine, is figurative with respect to ecclesiastical hierarchy. Princes, then, should not be misled by the vices of those who manage ecclesiastical affairs. They should consider the example of Hiskias (2 Chronicles 29:2ff.) and ask: will they treat Solomon, who punished a priest (2 Kings 1:26–27), as a tyrant?

Thesis VIII. Since wealth and resources serve as a certain splendour in the exercise of power, the pontiffs have carefully provided these for themselves. For money is the sinew of affairs, and riches are a part of temporal felicity, as is well known from Bellarmine regarding the Church. Hence, in Rome, all things are for sale, as the poet once sang (John Baptist Mantuanus, Carmelite): Temples, priests, altars, sacred objects, crowns, fires, incense, prayers; the column is for sale, and even God regarding the insatiable greed of the pontiffs, the German princes complained in the Gravamina presented to Maximilian I in 1510, whose grievance is as follows: New indulgences, with revocation or suspension of old ones (while the laity murmur against the clergy), were granted to collect money. Tithes were demanded under the pretext of fighting the Turks, yet no expedition followed. Similar complaints were made regarding remedies for the Gravamina of the German nation: it was grave and intolerable to endure such expenses and burdens, because it is known that for the confirmation of the see of Mainz, which had once required only ten thousand florins, twenty thousand florins were eventually extorted. And not without reason was it recently proposed at the Ratisbon assembly that Annates and the Redemptio Palliorum in Germany should be formally abolished. Former expenses were justified so that resources would be available against barbarians, Turks, and other enemies of the Christian Church, yet these funds were already being spent to enrich the nephews of the Pope—as seen under Urban VIII, Innocent X, Alexander VII, and others.

Thesis IX. Hence the pontiffs regard the Mass and Purgatory as instruments of avarice of such great value. Hence Luther gravely says about the Mass: “Even if it were possible for them to grant all other articles to us, this one alone they would never concede, that the Mass is truly a Mass.” This is the hook, as Chemnitz demonstrates. Indeed, the very notion of the Mass was unknown in the first three centuries, as the most distinguished professor has thoroughly shown. According to the words of the Lutheran Symbolical Books, the Mass is, like the tail of a dragon, what produced Purgatory, which finds no foundation in Holy Scripture. Moreover, as is well known, the ancients indeed prayed for the dead, but these prayers were not satisfactory or expiatory in the sense of later doctrine; rather, they were public celebrations, applications, and confirmations of divine promises for the pious deceased, as well as exhortations to the living, consolations for mourners, and declarations of faith. These practices could not replace God’s justice, as Campegius said in Rome; they did not pull all torments, dismemberments, and death to themselves, so that one might imagine the prophet was pointing at them (Habakkuk 1:15–16). Yet, as it exists today among the pontificians, the primitive Church was unaware of this view of pious feelings toward the deceased.

Thesis X. Hence it is clear that reconciliation with the Papacy is morally impossible. For who could believe that the pontiffs would ever renounce their own infallibility? Infallibility of the Pope is the cornerstone upon which the Roman Curia rests. If this were removed, the entire machinery would collapse. And if those things invented to amass wealth were taken away, soon the greatest part of the clergy would be reduced to hunger. Therefore, as long as light does not agree with darkness, Rome remains irreconcilable.

Σὺν Θεῷ [With God].

ON COMMUNION
UNDER BOTH KINDS,

whether it has been commanded by Christ;

TWO DISPUTATIONS,

set forth against the Papists,

by JOHANNES MUSÆUS,
Doctor of Sacred Theology and
Public Professor.

JENA,
Printed by Sengenwald,
In the Year 1654.

OF THE RESPONDENTS.

In the former disputation, the role of respondent was sustained by
M. CHRISTIANUS SCHRÖTELIUS, of Nuremberg.

The latter, up to the year LXIIX,
M. MARTINUS NORDANUS, a Holsteiner of Husum,

defended the remaining part,
HENNINGUS SPORCKENIUS, of Hildesheim.

Σὺν Θεῷ [With God].

ON COMMUNION UNDER BOTH KINDS,
whether it has been commanded by Christ;

THE FIRST DISPUTATION.

I. On Communion under Both Species, Whether it is commanded by Christ; a question of no slight importance, which, just as it was formerly debated between the Hussites and the defenders of papal decrees, so today is disputed and contested between Protestants and Roman Catholics.

II. When, however, we speak of communion under both species, we do not take the term species in the sense of the assertors of transubstantiation, as referring to the bare accidents of bread and wine, but rather to the symbols themselves or external signs—bread and wine—which we therefore designate by the name of the two species, because they constitute two distinct kinds of signs, through whose mediation the body and blood of Christ are presented to the communicants; so that the sense of the question is this: whether it has been commanded by Christ that all who are to partake of the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ should communicate under both symbols, bread and wine.

III. For the clarification of this matter, we judge it necessary first of all to note that, just as the objects of precepts, or those things which are accustomed to be prescribed by laws, can be considered in a twofold way:

1. According to themselves and by reason of their own definition, substance, and quiddity, as the Scholastics are accustomed to speak, with respect to the specification of the act; 2. Insofar as they must be carried out and brought into action, or, as they otherwise say, with respect to the exercise of the act. Thus, precepts are of two kinds. Some concern precisely the specification of the act, or, to speak more clearly, they sanction and prescribe the thing itself according to itself and in its substance, and prescribe how the act must be performed when the sanctioned thing is to be carried into act. Of this kind of precepts we number the law of marriage, that two persons are to be joined in an indissoluble bond into one flesh (Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:4–5), which does not command that marriage be entered into, but sanctions marriage itself according to itself, and prescribes how spouses must be joined to one another when they enter into marriage; likewise, when in civil law it is enacted that, in the establishment of a testament, a certain number of witnesses and other solemnities must be employed, no one is commanded to make a testament, but it is only prescribed how a testament must be made, if it is to be valid and binding.

Others, however, have for their object the exercise of acts, and simply command or forbid that an act be done; such are, for example, the precepts which forbid killing, committing adultery, stealing, or which command giving alms, praying, and so forth.

IV. This distinction of laws or precepts was well observed and emphasised by Francisco Suárez, On Laws, Book I, chapter 1, section 8, whose words are these:

“It must be considered that sometimes a law is given concerning the exercise of an act, and then it obliges to that act, as, for example, the law of giving alms; sometimes, however, a law is given only concerning the specification or mode of an act, which, although it does not oblige to the exercise of the act, nevertheless obliges that, if the act is done, such a mode be observed, as, for example, the law of attentive prayer, which, although it does not oblige one to pray, obliges that, if prayer is made, it be made with attention.”

V. Therefore, when in the present matter it is asked whether communion under both species is commanded by Christ or not, the question is to be understood chiefly concerning a precept which concerns the exercise of the act itself, which sanctions the substance of communicating and prescribes how the communion ought to be carried out, as the added words “under both species” indicate. For from these words no one fails to understand that communion is considered here not simply as an act of communicating viewed with respect to its exercise, but as such an act which must be performed in such a manner, namely under two species of signs, bread and wine, so that the proposed question finally comes to this: whether all who are to communicate are commanded by Christ to communicate under both species or symbols, namely bread and wine.

VI. The Papists defend the negative, contending that nothing at all has been commanded by Christ concerning this matter, but that whether the faithful ought to communicate under one species or under both is placed in the discretion of the Church, which may rightly prescribe either this or that, as it seems good to her. We, on the contrary, following the guidance of Sacred Scripture, embrace the affirmative side of the question, and steadfastly teach that it has been commanded by Christ himself that all guests at the Lord’s Supper communicate under both species, and that the chalice cannot be withdrawn from communicating laypeople in the Papacy without great sacrilege.

VII. For establishing our position, the institution of this sacrament alone can suffice. For although our adversaries today cry out with one voice that institution is one thing and command is another, and although they grant that communion under both species was indeed instituted by Christ but deny that it was commanded, nevertheless, when we are dealing with a command which merely prescribes how something ought to be done, we find no distinction at all between institution and command.

VIII. As to what some say, that institution has regard to the thing which is instituted, whereas a command additionally involves reference to persons; we admit this concerning a command which pertains to the exercise of an act itself, that is, concerning a command which simply requires something to be done or forbids it to be done. For then the words of the law customarily include reference to persons as well, so that it may be clear whom the author of the law intends to bind, whether to doing what he commands or to avoiding what he forbids. But in a command by which the thing itself is sanctioned according to itself, or by which it is prescribed how something ought to be done, it is of no importance to add reference to persons. For since the thing itself, considered according to itself, abstracts from the exercise of the act, what prevents something from being sanctioned by law according to itself, or from it being prescribed how it ought to be done, without mention being made of the persons by whom it must be brought into act?

IX. But in order to show more clearly that no difference at all intervenes between institution and command with respect to a thing considered according to itself and with regard to its substance, it must further be noted that for a command of this kind two things are required. One is the determination of the thing itself, considered according to itself and with regard to its substance; for example, in civil law the determination of the solemnities required for the substance of a testament, and the like. The other is that this determination be made by the will of a superior, which induces an obligation, so that whoever wishes to bring into act the thing constituted by law must do so in conformity with the law; just as, for example, he who intends to make a valid testament is bound to the prescribed solemnities, or, if he neglects them, the testament will be void. Now the reason inducing the obligation is the will of the superior, by whom those solemnities have been sanctioned so that they be employed in the making of a testament. Beyond these two nothing can be given which would be required for the constitution of such a command.

X. But these very requisites are also found in institutions. For (1) every institution is a sanctioning of some thing according to itself, which not even the adversaries can deny. Hence institution is described by Gregory of Valencia (Tom. IV, Disp. VI, q. VIII, p. V, col. 1253) as being properly, as it were, a production of a thing, namely that which sanctions the nature and substance of the thing itself according to itself and constituted. (2) To this the further requirement belongs, that it proceed from the will of a superior, which induces obligation; or, if it does not depend upon a superior, no one will be bound to its observance.

XI. Hence I argue as follows: Every prescription or sanction of something according to itself, made by the will of a superior, is formally a law or command prescribing how the thing ought to be done. Every institution of Christ is a prescription or sanction of something according to itself, made by the will of a superior. Therefore every institution of Christ is formally a law or command prescribing how the thing ought to be done.

XII. Both premises have already been proved. Therefore the conclusion stands, which the adversaries up to now have most stubbornly denied.

XIII. From this we further infer in this manner: Whatever has been instituted by Christ, that—according to itself and with respect to the substance of the act—has been commanded by Him, so that whoever wishes to use it must use it in conformity with the institution. But the Sacrament of the Supper has been instituted by Christ. Therefore the same, according to itself and with respect to the substance of the act, has been commanded by Christ, so that whoever wishes to use it must use it in conformity with the institution. The adversaries freely grant the minor proposition. The major was established in the preceding thesis IX and following. For if every institution of Christ is formally a law or command prescribing how a thing ought to be done, and yet every such command induces an obligation that whoever is to do what is prescribed must not do it otherwise than as it is prescribed—which both points have been shown—it necessarily follows that every institution of Christ induces an obligation that those who are to do what has been instituted do it in conformity with the institution, that is, in the manner prescribed in the institution.

XIV. This same point can be confirmed (1) from the nature of the act by which the instituted thing is put into use. For since that act is nothing other than the instituted thing itself insofar as it is placed in use, it derives its specification, that is, its substance and quiddity, from no other source than from the institution itself. For the institution sanctions and constitutes the nature and substance of the thing according to itself, and thus gives being to the instituted thing, as we saw above. Hence one of these two must be admitted: either that the act by which the instituted thing ought to be placed in use must be in conformity with the institution; or, if it is not in conformity with it, that what is placed in use is not the instituted thing but another thing, or at least that the act will not be correct or will not be without defect. For example, the communication of the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ is nothing other than the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ placed in use; and unless the act of communicating is in conformity with the institution, so that the body and blood of Christ, as they were instituted, are received—namely, that the former is eaten under bread, and the latter is drunk under the blessed wine—there will not be a communication of the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ effected thereby, or at least it will not be correctly effected and will not be without defect. The reason is that the act of communicating, by which the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ is placed in use, has its substance and quiddity from the institution, nor can anything apart from the institution be shown on which it depends in its essential elements.

XV. Nor does it stand in the way that Gregory of Valencia, in the place cited, objects that the institution prescribes nothing concerning use. “And although,” he says, “the institution of a thing ultimately refers to its use, since every thing exists for the sake of its use, nevertheless the institution itself properly prescribes nothing concerning use. A command further prescribes whether and how a thing must necessarily be used.” These points, I say, do not undermine our position. For either they are understood of use with respect to the exercise of the act, or of use considered with respect to the species of the act. If the former, the objection is irrelevant to the present matter; for here we are dealing with a command which obligates with respect to the species of the act, that is, obligates that, if the act is to be done and through it the instituted thing is to be placed in use, such and no other act be performed. If the latter, it is false that the institution prescribes nothing concerning the use of the thing instituted. For although it does not prescribe by whom the instituted thing must necessarily be used, it nevertheless prescribes how it must necessarily be used, as has been proved at length. And if this is admitted, from where, I ask, will the use of the instituted thing have its specification? Or from where will it have, that it is the use of this thing which has been instituted, and not of another? For example, from where does the act of baptism have that it is baptism and not some common washing, unless from the institution? What is the cause that no human washing is baptism unless it is done in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit? What, I ask, is the cause of this, if not that no other washing is conformable to the institution of baptism? Why say more? Institution, according to Valencia, sanctions and constitutes the substance of the thing according to itself, and that for the sake of its use. Therefore institution sanctions and constitutes the use of the thing with respect to the specification of the act. For to sanction and constitute the use of a thing with respect to the specification of the act is the same as to sanction and constitute the substance of the thing which must be present in the act by which the thing is placed in use. But to sanction and constitute the substance of the thing which must be present in the act by which the thing is placed in use—what else is this than to prescribe that, if the instituted thing must be placed in use by an act, the substance of the thing constituted by the institution be present in the act? But this very thing is to prescribe the use of the thing with respect to the specification of the act.

XVI. 2. The same is proved by an induction of examples. With every institution it is so arranged that, when the instituted thing must be placed in use through an act, the act must be in conformity with the institution; or if it is not conformable to it, even apart from every other command, solely by this fact—that it is not conformable to the institution—it is defective and blameworthy. This the Savior placed entirely beyond any possibility of doubt, so that, when He was to respond to the question proposed to Him by the Pharisees—whether it is lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause whatever—and to prove that this is by no means lawful, He appealed to the institution of marriage, and from the fact that God instituted marriage in such a way that the two should be one flesh; from this He without hesitation inferred that the reckless custom of dismissing wives, which had become prevalent among the Jews, was unlawful, and that whoever dismisses his wife and takes another—except in the case of fornication—commits adultery (Matthew 19:4 ff.). But this inference would have been precarious if the institution did not have the force of law, or of a precept, and did not bind to this effect: that whoever wishes to make use of the instituted thing—for example, to enter into marriage—must do so in conformity with the institution, and for example must become and remain one flesh with the wife once taken, by an indissoluble bond. The same holds with respect to the institution of other things. For example, whoever wishes to undertake the office in the Church of teaching and administering the sacraments must undertake and exercise it in conformity with the institution of Christ, or if he does otherwise, he will sin. Whoever wishes to assume and exercise the magistracy must necessarily do so in conformity with its institution; and thus it is in all other matters. Nor has any contrary example been produced up to now, nor will one ever be produced. Therefore every institution entails a precept, or, with respect to the thing itself, is equivalent to a precept concerning the specification of the act by which the instituted thing is placed in use.

XVII. 3. And that this is the case even in the sacrament of the Eucharist itself, and that the institution has by that very fact the force of a precept, Paul himself testifies, when he recalls the Corinthians—who were behaving improperly in its use and reception—to the institution of Christ; and from the fact that the Eucharist was instituted in remembrance of Christ’s death, he rightly concludes that communicants are bound to use it in remembrance of His death, and for that reason that it lies upon them first to examine themselves before they eat of the blessed bread and drink of the blessed cup; or if they do otherwise, that they will act wickedly and will eat the body of the Lord unto judgment and condemnation and drink His blood (1 Corinthians 11:21, 23 ff.). But if, therefore, the Corinthians were obligated in the use of the Eucharist to commemorate the death of the Lord because the Eucharist was instituted in remembrance of it, why should not all who are to communicate be equally obligated to drink the blood of Christ under the blessed wine? For this was instituted no less than that. For Christ did not institute the sacrament of the Eucharist otherwise than so that those who are to communicate should eat His body under the blessed bread and drink His blood under the blessed wine.

XVIII. 4. The force of this truth is so great that it has even drawn to its side Francis Suárez, a celebrated writer among the Roman Catholics, who in Theological Disputations III, Disputation XLIII, Section IV, Conclusion IV, laboriously proves that every institution of Christ has the character of a precept—not only an affirmative one, so that whoever wishes to do what has been instituted must do it in conformity with the institution, but also a negative one, so that if it cannot be done as it is prescribed, it ought rather to be omitted than done in another way. From this he concludes that by divine law it is prescribed that whoever wishes to consecrate the sacrifice of the Mass must consecrate it under both kinds. I will quote his words, although they are somewhat lengthy:

“Therefore,” he says, “it must be especially observed that this precept (he is speaking of the institution of the Lord’s Supper) is not of just any sort, but one that contains an institution and prescribes the manner of sacrificing, to which it is intrinsically annexed that, if it cannot be done as it is prescribed, it should rather be omitted than done in another way; as may be seen in all similar precepts, both of the New Law and of the Old. And therefore it does not have merely the force of an affirmative precept to sacrifice in this way, but included in this is also a negative precept—not to sacrifice in another way. Just as in the precept to pray attentively, there is included the negative precept not to pray if attention cannot be applied. And this is confirmed because, if this precept were to be interpreted merely as an affirmative precept, which can bind at one time and not at another according to occurring occasions, it would follow that not only by public authority, but even by doctrine alone, or by knowledge of Scripture, sometimes such an interpretation can be held, especially if no explicit prohibition is made therein, so that some, speaking probabilistically, have argued from certain counter-arguments.

And it can easily be shown by other examples and reasons. It must therefore be understood that this (precept) is divine, as it were, instituting the manner and rite of sacrificing to God. Just as divine law regarding consecration—for example, for the priests of the law—not only contains a precept, but also institutes the manner and rite of consecrating those things which must either be observed or, if for some reason they cannot be observed, are not to be substituted with another rite, but rather are to cease from such an action; and the same applies to the other Sacraments. Therefore, also in the rite of sacrificing.

This is better explained, so that it has the force of a negative precept, inasmuch as an interpretation is easily applied, especially in cases which depend on the institution. For when something, which has no other efficacy except what it receives from the institution, is divinely instituted to be done in such a manner, it is thereby prohibited to be done otherwise: and if it cannot be done in the prescribed manner, it must rather be considered omitted from such an action than allowed to be done in any other way than what has been instituted. Just as, for example, the anointing in Confirmation, or the anointing of the sick, is divinely instituted to be done with consecrated or blessed oil; if a case arises in which the union cannot be made with the blessed oil, it cannot be interpreted as lawful to do it otherwise, but it must rather, very likely, be considered omitted in such an event. Thus, in the present matter, it must be said likewise”.

XIX. In this, Suárez indeed very rightly teaches that, as regards this institution, it has not only the force of an affirmative, but also of a negative precept. How, then, in spite of this, can it be defended that communion under both species is not divinely commanded, which some have ventured to defend (see Disputation LXXI, Section I-II), is by no means clear to us. For if, on account of those who wish to consecrate, it is not lawful to consecrate one species without the other, because this is instituted by Christ beyond the rite itself, and the institution of Christ is not any sort of precept, but a precept containing and prescribing the manner of sacrificing (to speak in the words of Suárez), to which is intrinsically annexed that, if it cannot be done as prescribed, it is rather omitted than done otherwise; for the same reason, it will not be lawful for anyone communicating to communicate under only one species. For this is instituted by Christ not apart from the rite. Christ indeed instituted that His body be eaten under the symbol of bread, and His blood be drunk under the symbol of wine.

This institution, much less than the pontifical rite of consecration, could be considered as any precept, but with greater reason it must be considered such a precept, because it contains and prescribes the manner of communicating, and therefore intrinsically has annexed a negative precept, so that if both species are not taken according to Christ’s prescription, it is not permitted, and rather the communication should be omitted than one species alone taken. For the rite of communication under both species is expressed in the institution of this Sacrament in the clearest words; the pontifical rite of consecration, by which the bread is or the wine is converted into the body and blood of Christ, is neither expressly laid down nor instituted by Christ, but is a human invention.

XX. But I return from this digression, and from what has been presented so far, I further argue for the precept of communion under both species: To all to whom it is commanded by Christ to use the Sacrament of the Supper according to the institution, it is also commanded that they communicate under both species. But to all and each who communicate, it is commanded by Christ to use the Sacrament according to the institution. Therefore, to all and each who communicate, it is also commanded that they communicate under both species. And this is the principal conclusion, which it was incumbent upon us to prove.

XXI. The minor proposition of the above thesis XIII has been proven; the major, however, is evident from the terms. For if under both which species Christ instituted this Sacrament, it follows that no one can use it conformably to the institution unless they communicate under both species. Hence, to whom this is commanded, it is necessary that the same also be commanded simultaneously.

XXII. That Christ instituted the Sacrament of the Eucharist under both species, there is no reason to doubt, as the testimony of the three Evangelists and of the Apostle Paul, who recorded the history of the institution in writing, shows by unanimous consent. Let us produce the words of each.

Matthew 26:26-28 writes: “While they were eating, Jesus took bread, and having given thanks, broke it, and gave it to the disciples, and said: ‘Take, eat; this is my body.’ And having taken the cup, having given thanks, he gave it to them, saying: ‘Drink from this, all of you; for this is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out for the forgiveness of sins.’”

In Mark 14:22–23 we read: “While they were eating, Jesus took the bread, and having blessed it, broke it, and gave it to them, saying: ‘Take, eat; this is my body.’ And having taken the cup, having given thanks, he gave it to them; and they all drank of it. And he said to them: ‘This is my blood of the new covenant, which is poured out for many.’”

Luke 22:19-20 recounts the same: “And having taken the bread, having given thanks, he broke it and gave it to them, saying: ‘This is my body, which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me.’ Likewise, after supper, he took the cup, saying: ‘This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which is poured out for you.’”

Finally, Paul, who received the rite of the institution not from men but from Christ Himself, exalted by the Father, I Corinthians 11:23-25 says: “The Lord Jesus, in the night in which He was betrayed, took bread, and after giving thanks, broke it, and said: ‘Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you. Do this in remembrance of me.’ Likewise he did with the cup after supper, saying: ‘This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me.’”

XXIII. Where it must be well observed:

1. That Christ instituted both His body and His blood to be dispensed under a certain sign and external medium: the body indeed under the symbol of bread to be eaten, the blood under the symbol of wine to be drunk.

2. That Luke and Paul, when describing the institution of the chalice, use the word ὡσάντως (“in like manner”) similarly, signifying that just as Christ, in the prior instituted species, commanded His body to be eaten by means of the blessed bread, so He commanded His blood to be drunk by means of the blessed wine of the chalice, and He wished the participants of this sacred feast to be obligated no less to this part than to that.

3. That just as Christ, when presenting the bread to His disciples, did not speak to the sacrificers but to the faithful communicants, saying: “Take, eat,” so likewise, when presenting the cup, He said to them: “Drink from this, all of you.” Which again clearly demonstrates that the use of both parts is instituted for the communicants, and that they are equally bound to both, as we will further show below with several arguments.

4. That when Christ, presenting the bread to be eaten, said according to Luke to His disciples: “Do this in remembrance of me,” this also pertains to the cup; and that they must drink from it in commemoration of Christ is attested by Paul (I Cor. 11:25). Which is also indicated by the particle ὡσάντως, which immediately follows the institution of the prior part.

5. That when Christ, according to Matthew, says with the cup presented: “Drink from this, all of you,” the reason for the precept is immediately added, explaining why all must drink from it: namely, because that which is instituted to be drunk under the symbol of wine, and is presented in the cup, is His blood of the new covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins (v. 27). And this reason applies to the use of the chalice just as much as to the use of the bread.

XXIII. The use of both species is thus made necessary for all communicants. Therefore, the minor premise of our argument is established: that the sacrament under both species was instituted by Christ—something even the adversaries do not dare to deny.

Hence the Council of Trent, Session XXI, on Communion under Both Kinds, Chapter I, writes: “And if Christ the Lord instituted this venerable sacrament in bread and wine at the Last Supper, and delivered it to the Apostles, nevertheless…” In Chapter III: “Although our Redeemer, as stated above, instituted this sacrament at the Last Supper in two species, and delivered it to the Apostles, it must nevertheless be held…”

And Becanus, in De Sacramentis, Chapter XXIV, point II, no. I, similarly, affirm: “all are obliged, and rightly so, because the words of the institution are clear and evident”.

XXIV. And so this concerns the institution of the Eucharist, which we have established as a precept for communion under both species.

XXV. What remains is to consider and refute the objections brought by adversaries. Gregory of Valencia, in Commentariorum Theologicorum, Tertia Pars, De Eucharistia (Disputation I), takes up the matter for proof, arguing that one cannot derive a precept for communion under both species merely from the fact that the sacrament is instituted under both species. This point will soon be addressed.

XXVI. His argument runs as follows: If the institution of both species, insofar as it is divine, necessarily contained a precept obliging all and each to use both species, it would follow that the use of all other things divinely instituted would also be commanded to all and each. But this consequence is clearly false. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow from the premise.

The prior proposition fails: for that which is proper and necessarily fitting for a thing, as such, does not always apply universally. For example, if a divine institution were to have, in its purpose, a precept for the use of the instituted thing, it would not follow that everyone is thereby bound to act in that way.

The posterior proposition of his argument is proven as well. For example, marriage is divinely instituted, yet not everyone is thereby bound to enter into marriage.

For example, marriage is divinely instituted, yet not everyone is thereby bound to enter into marriage at any particular time or in any way except as the institution itself permits. Likewise, the authority of the Church in ministry is certainly divinely instituted, yet not all are commanded to assume that ministry.

Turning more directly to the matter at hand, in the divine institution of Luke 22 and 1 Corinthians 11, Christ instituted the very office of celebrating and administering the Eucharist. Yet no precept is necessarily joined to the institution obliging all to exercise this office. Indeed, not everyone, and no single individual, is thereby commanded to exercise this ministry.

The same principle is seen in the Old Law: in Exodus 29, Numbers 15, and Leviticus 12 and 29, many sacrifices were divinely instituted to be offered together with some portion of wine. Yet not all those who could otherwise partake of the sacrificial meat were obliged to use the wine as well.

Therefore, when the adversaries confuse the institution with the precept because of ambiguities in wording, their error or ignorance must be refuted by these and similar examples. Becanus almost always adduces such examples to illustrate this point.

XXVII. It follows that Valentianus cannot reasonably claim that we are confused, ignorant, or acting fraudulently when adducing examples to support our position. He may think these examples somehow prove his case, but in reality, they demonstrate his own error or ignorance.

We do not confuse the institution with the precept, for, as we consider them, there is no distinction to be made in that regard. Rather, Valentianus confuses precepts that concern the exercise of acts with precepts that prescribe the species of the act. Whatever he asserts, it all tends toward the notion that an institution necessarily carries a precept obliging all to exercise the act in question—which is not the case.

Instead, we assert a precept regarding the specification of the act, that is, that the act must conform to the institution with respect to the thing itself. Hence, if the Jesuit’s argument is restricted to a precept obliging all and each to exercise the act, it is false, and consequently his claim is openly refuted.

The argument will be as follows: If the institution of both species, insofar as it is a divine institution, necessarily contained a conjoint precept which obliges all and each of those who will communicate to do so in no other way than under both species, it follows that the use of other things, which are divinely instituted, is likewise commanded to all and each in accordance with the specification of the act; that is, that those who wish to use them cannot do so otherwise than as they are divinely instituted. We take this consequent in both hands, and we fear nothing from examples brought against it, which, since they all speak only of the exercise of the act with an obliging precept, no one can pertinently bring against us here. For who does not know that the precept, by which all are bound to enter into marriage, or to use it in every way and at all times, or likewise the precept, by which all are bound to undertake the ministry in the Church, and specifically to discharge the duty of administering the Eucharist, are precepts concerning the exercise of the act, which the institution itself and by its nature does not import—this we have already noted at the outset of this disputation.

XXIX. But if, in these examples, we look precisely to the specification, substance, and quiddity of the act, it is far from infringing upon our argument; rather, they confirm it solidly. For each thing owes its own nature and quiddity to the institution, and whoever is about to perform such a thing is bound by the force of the institution to act in accordance with it; and if he acts otherwise, it is said that he has acted less properly: for example, he who is about to contract a marriage is bound by the force of the institution to contract it as it is instituted, or he will not have the marriage validly. And although one who lives in marriage is not bound to make use of marriage in every way and at all times, so that he could otherwise make use of it according to its institution (for this itself pertains also to the exercise of the act), nonetheless he is bound that, when he makes use of marriage, he do so in accordance with the institution, perform it formally. It is compared in the same way with the ecclesiastical ministry: he who is about to perform the office of teaching or administering the sacraments, or both together in the Church, is bound by the force of the divine institution to perform it in accordance with the institution; and he who, having already undertaken such a duty, wishes to discharge it properly, is similarly bound to act in accordance with the institution. The same reasoning applies to the sacrifices of the Old Testament, as Valentianus adduces from Exodus 29, Numbers 15, 18, 28: namely, those who were about to offer some sacrifice, in whose institution it was prescribed that a certain measure of wine be offered at the same time, were bound by the force of the institution to offer that prescribed measure of wine. But that they also drink the offered wine, when otherwise they were allowed to partake of the flesh of the sacrifice, we read nowhere as divinely instituted. Hence, by the force of the institution, they were not bound to drink the offered wine.

XXIX. Therefore, from these and other similar examples, neither the nerve of our argument is cut, nor can our position, whether as fraud—which does not exist—or as ignorance, be refuted; rather, our adversaries’ fraud or ignorance is clearly exposed in the sight of all.

XXX. Becanus saw this; hence, when he brought forward these things we have now considered, as examples by way of illustration, he comments in this way: “You will say: These examples only show, not that one is bound to use those things which are instituted by God; yet if anyone wishes to use them, he is bound to do so according to the divine institution: for example, if anyone wishes to baptise or enter marriage, he is bound to do it in the way that God instituted. Therefore, similarly, if anyone wishes to communicate, he is bound to do it under both species, because Christ so instituted it.”

XXXI. The exception is well taken. Let us hear how Becanus responds to this. “This rule,” he says, “generally accepted without doubt, is false, which even your adversaries must admit. But why is it false? For,” he continues, “if it were true, anyone who wishes to communicate would be bound to do so in the evening after the meal, because Christ so instituted it”. But where, my Becanus, did Christ institute that whoever wishes to communicate must communicate in the evening after the meal? Show the place in Scripture, and with what words this institution is contained. Truly, these are mere trifles, by which you rashly attempt to cast darkness over so manifest a matter.

XXXII. We do indeed read that Christ instituted the sacrament of His body and blood, and that He dispensed it to His disciples in the evening; but that after this other disciples or the faithful should do the same in the evening, we read nowhere instituted by Him. And because this is not instituted, the institution of Christ cannot, by necessity, compel anyone to communicate in the evening; yet it can, and indeed does, compel all who communicate, that when they eat the body of Christ under the bread, they also drink His blood from the consecrated cup: since Christ, as Becanus himself admits, has no less instituted that His blood be drunk from the consecrated cup than that His body be eaten under the bread.

XXXIII. Therefore, a distinction is necessary, as Becanus adds there. For things instituted by God can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance; second, with respect to the accidental circumstances. If anyone therefore wishes to make use of some sacrament instituted by God, he is bound to do everything that pertains to the substance of that sacrament, but he is not bound to apply all the accidental circumstances or modes.

XXXIV. Answer: Whatever in the consecration of the sacraments has been instituted by Christ, whether it pertains to the substance or to the modes or accidental circumstances, is binding by the force of the institution on those who wish to use the sacrament. Concerning the substances, we have Becanus consenting, who extorts from this an ingenuous confession of the truth: that if anyone wishes to make use of some sacrament instituted by God, he would have to admit that he is bound to do all things that pertain to the substance of that Sacrament. But as for the accidental circumstances, even if in the sacraments of the New Covenant none can be found that were instituted by Christ, nevertheless, if in the Sacrament of the Eucharist one or the other had been instituted by Him together with the substance of the Sacrament itself, it would hardly be possible to deny that those communicating would be bound by the force of the institution to observe them as well. For that institution is nothing else than a determination of an accidental circumstance, indifferent in its nature, to one particular, made by Christ as head of the Church, so that those who wished to use the Sacrament would use it under this determined circumstance. And this determination, precisely because it depended on the will of Christ, would have the force of law and would bind those communicating to its observance, as the example of circumcision alone shows, in whose institution God had commanded that it be performed on the eighth day, Gen.17:12. Although this temporal determination did not pertain to the substance of circumcision, but only to some accidental circumstance of it, nevertheless, because it was added in that institution by God, whose will binds all mortals, it had the force of law among the Jews and compelled them to perform circumcision not otherwise than on the eighth day. Therefore, in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, either species, whether bread or cup, could indeed be considered merely an accidental circumstance; yet because both were equally instituted by Christ, why should not the institution of Christ bind those communicating to use both, just as the institution of circumcision once bound the Jews to the eighth day, on which infants were to be circumcised?

XXXV. But what, finally, do the adversaries think regarding the bread and consecrated cup, and whether one or both in accidental modes or circumstances of the Eucharist, we will consider more thoroughly.

XXXVI. Now, the brothers of Walenburch in response to Johannes Hundius do not dare to assert either way, but are pressed by this argument of Hundius: The cup is either a part of the Eucharist or it is an accidental circumstance. It is not an accidental circumstance, therefore it must be a part. But if it is a part, then it must be taken by all, whenever they wish to partake of the Eucharist; they try to resolve this by a distinction. They say, on page 69: “If the cup is considered absolutely, according to that which it truly is, it is neither a part of the Eucharist nor a circumstance, but the whole Eucharist, because it is the entire Sacrament. But if it is considered insofar as it was taken simultaneously by the Apostles with the species of bread, then it is a part of the communion: because the Communion is one morally, even if the species are taken successively; and thus it is one Sacrament, because it is one meal, as if someone were to take many small pieces of bread at once. Therefore, for one communicating under the single species of bread, the cup is neither a part of the Communion, because it is not taken; nor a circumstance, because it is independent. Then, also, the cup is neither a part nor a circumstance of this Sacrament; because the Eucharist is taken under the single species of bread, it has the significance of the entire Sacrament. But if you understand the cup as the blood of Christ, independently of the species of wine, it is always a part of the Eucharist”.

XXXVII. The summary of the response, as far as I can gather, is this: Neither the cup nor the bread is in any way an accidental mode or circumstance of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, but each, absolutely and according to what it truly is, has the significance of the whole Sacrament; yet considered insofar as it is taken together with the other species, it is a part of the Sacrament.

XXXVIII. But this distinction—which even before them Robert Bellarmine used (Book IV, De Eucharistia, chapter 22, proposition 4), and others as well—is rashly invented, as is shown thus:

The blessed cup contains only a part of the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, it can never have the character of the whole Sacrament of the Eucharist.

The antecedent is proved as follows: because the blessed cup contains only the blood of Christ sacramentally. For that alone is said to be contained sacramentally in the cup which is contained in it under its proper sign. But only the blood of Christ is contained in the blessed cup under its proper sign. For the wine contained in the blessed chalice is not a sign of the body of Christ, nor is it read anywhere in the Scriptures to have been instituted by Christ for this purpose, namely, that it should be a sign of His body. Therefore, only the blood is contained sacramentally in the blessed cup.

Moreover, the blood of Christ alone, sacramentally contained in the cup, is not the whole Sacrament of the Eucharist; because the body of Christ also, sacramentally contained under its own proper sign, pertains to it as a part, as is evident from the history of the institution. But the body of Christ is not sacramentally contained under wine as under its proper sign, since the proper sign or symbol of Christ’s body is bread, not wine.

Therefore, for the complete character of the Sacrament, besides the blessed cup there is furthermore required the body of Christ, contained under the blessed bread.

Whether, therefore, the cup be considered absolutely according to what it really is, or insofar as it is taken together with the other species, yet in neither way, so considered, can it have the character of the whole Sacrament; since, whether considered in the one way or in the other, it contains no more sacramentally than the blood of Christ, which alone is contained in it under its proper sign, and which does not constitute the whole Sacrament of the Eucharist, but only one part of it.

Whence the force of the argument proposed by Hundius is not yet cut off but still remains: that the cup must either be regarded as a part of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, without which no one partakes of the whole Sacrament, or else be numbered among accidental modes and circumstances—which even the Walenburchs themselves are afraid to assert.

XXXIX. But when the same authors, in the place already cited, say that for one communicating under the species of bread alone the chalice is necessarily neither a part of the communion (because it is not received), nor a circumstance (because it is independent), this is frivolous.

For the present question is not whether, for one communicating under the single species of bread, the chalice is a part or a circumstance of the Sacrament; rather, the hinge of the controversy turns on this: whether, in relation to the Sacrament of the Eucharist as it was instituted by Christ and considered according to the rationale of its institution, the chalice has the character of a part, or whether it ought to be reckoned among accidental modes or circumstances.

The former is affirmed by Hundius, nor can the Walenburchs themselves deny it, since they admit that the chalice, taken together with the bread, is a part of the Sacrament of the Eucharist. But it could not be a part of it unless it had been instituted by Christ so as, together with the blessed bread as another part, to constitute the whole Sacrament.

But if by force of the institution it is a part of the Sacrament, it is inconsistent to class it among its accidental modes or circumstances. Therefore, when we say that the institution has the force of law and obliges all who would use the Sacrament of the Supper to the use of both species, because both species were instituted by Christ, to what purpose do our adversaries distinguish between the substantial elements of the Sacrament and its accidental modes and circumstances, if neither the blessed bread nor the blessed chalice has the character of an accidental mode or circumstance, but from both, as from its parts, one Sacrament is composed?

And since they concede that the chalice, together with the bread, constitutes one Sacrament as another part of it, why do they deny that the same pertains to its substance?

XL. Perhaps they will say: the chalice is not an essential part, but only an integral part of the Sacrament. But what then? For that reason, is it therefore not of its substance? Do not integral parts participate in the essential parts of the whole—namely, matter and form—and thereby pertain to the substance of the whole?

Certainly it is so. For example, in the human body the head, hands, feet, etc., participate in the matter and form of man, nor would anyone readily deny that these pertain to the substance of a man.

In the present case likewise, both the blessed bread and the blessed chalice involve something of the essence of the Eucharist. For the blessed bread, besides being a sign of the sacred reality—namely, the body of Christ—also has that reality sacramentally united to itself. And the blessed chalice contains not only wine, which is the sign of the other part of the sacred reality—namely, the blood of Christ—but also the very blood of Christ sacramentally united with the wine.

But the blood of Christ is, beyond controversy, something essential to this Sacrament, and likewise the body of Christ; and consequently both the blessed bread and the blessed chalice contain something of the essence of the Sacrament.

But if they contain something of its essence, how will they not pertain to the substance of the Sacrament itself?

XLI. Finally, what the Lords Walenburch add in the same place: “If by the chalice you understand the blood of Christ independently of the species of wine, it is always a part of the Eucharist”—this again does nothing to the point.

Although someone perhaps might not without reason have doubted whether the blood of Christ, independently of the species of wine, as they speak—that is, without wine as the proper sign of the Eucharistic Sacrament—constitutes a part; since this sacrament includes in its formal concept both the sign of the sacred reality and the sacred reality itself which is signified and exhibited through the sign, and the sacred reality does not enter into the constitution of the sacrament except when and insofar as it is united with its sign—yet concerning this we shall not now be greatly concerned.

For the question at present is not about the blood of Christ considered in itself and apart from the symbol of wine, but about the blessed chalice itself, in which the blood of Christ and its symbol, namely wine, are sacramentally united and contained: whether by force of the institution it must always be a part of the Eucharist, or whether it is rather an accidental mode or circumstance?

Here, what they thought, the brothers Walenburch ought to have expressed more clearly. But they mutter, and by saying many things they answer nothing to the point.

XLII. We return, therefore, to Becanus, who even there (Theologiae Scholasticae, Pars tertia, Tractatus secundus: De Sacramentis Ecclesiae) expresses his judgment on this matter obscurely and rather timidly.

So far as I can gather, his view comes to this: that each symbol, taken determinately, pertains to the accidental modes and circumstances of this Sacrament; but that for its substance some sign in a general or confused sense suffices, whether it be this one or that.

For after, by means of his usual distinction, he had taught that those things which are instituted by God can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to their substantial elements; secondly, with respect to their accidental elements—and that if anyone wishes to use a sacrament instituted by God, he is bound to do all things which pertain to the substance of that sacrament, yet not all are bound to employ its accidental modes and circumstances—for example, in Baptism the washing and the form of words are necessary; but it is not determinately necessary whether there be a triple or a single immersion, rather one is free to use either a single or a triple immersion according to the custom of each place—after this, he applies the same to the communion of the Eucharistic Sacrament in this way:

“Similarly, therefore, in Communion it is necessary to receive Christ under an external species, because this pertains to the substance of the Sacrament; but by divine law it is not necessary that this be done determinately under both species.”

This application would be worthless unless he held that the symbols of bread and wine, taken determinately, belong among the accidental modes, and that for the substance of the Eucharist some external sign in general, whatever it may be, suffices.

XLIII. But if he thinks thus, he is gravely mistaken. For:

(1) The symbols of bread and wine, taken determinately, were instituted by Christ—the former indeed to be the sign of His body, the latter to be the sign of His blood.

(2) For the consecration of each there was prescribed by Him a definite formula of words, by which, when it is used, He wills to make present His body with the bread and His blood with the wine, and to dispense them sacramentally united for the use of communicants.

From this it is evident that both this and that species of sign, taken determinately, pertain to the very thing instituted, and that both together, along with the body and blood of Christ, constitute its substance.

And because the thing instituted and the accidental modes and circumstances of the same are opposed to one another, it further follows that neither the blessed bread nor the blessed chalice can be called an accidental mode or circumstance of the instituted Sacrament; since, as has been said, they are themselves the thing instituted.

Or, if they must be reckoned among accidental modes or circumstances, what then will be the thing instituted? For accidental modes or circumstances cannot subsist without the thing instituted.

XLIV. You say: The thing instituted is Christ with some external sign, and in these consists the nature and substance of this Sacrament?

XLV. I reply: this is indeed imagined by our adversaries, but it cannot be proved.

Let whoever wishes examine all the passages of Scripture in which the history of the institution is recorded in writing; he will find none in which it is taught that Christ instituted the Sacrament of His body and blood in any other way than in the manner often insisted upon—namely, that His body under blessed bread is to be dispensed to communicants for eating, and His blood under blessed wine for drinking.

But the institution of the whole Christ to be sacramentally dispensed under some one sign, and that an indeterminate one, was never made by Christ, but has been devised in the brain of the Papists.

XLVI. For the reader’s benefit, we shall trace the origin of this fiction somewhat more deeply from their own principles.

The Romanists suppose that under either species the whole Christ is present; and since each is some external sign under which the whole Christ is contained, they say that in this common concept consists the formal notion and substance of the entire Sacrament of the Eucharist. But those things which lie outside that concept, and yet are joined with the Sacrament of the Supper, they hold to be the material and accidental aspects of the Sacrament, concerning which the Church or the Roman Pontiff may dispose according to their pleasure.

And this is what Becanus writes in the said place (Theologiae Scholasticae, Pars tertia, Tractatus secundus: De Sacramentis Ecclesiae): “In Communion it is necessary to receive Christ under an external species, because this pertains to the substance of the Sacrament; yet by divine law it is not necessary that this be done determinately under both species, since it can be done under one.”

Namely, in the formal concept of the Eucharist which they have devised, there is included the notion of a sign in general, and thus in a confused way some external species, and Christ contained under an external species. Hence it is necessary for the communicant to receive Christ under some external species, whether this one or that one, because this pertains to the substance of the Eucharist; for its very formal notion is placed in that.

But that he receive Christ determinately under either the species of bread or of wine, or under both together, is not necessary; because this is not contained in the formal concept of the Eucharist, and therefore pertains not to its substance but only to its accidental modes.

XLVII. But upon how slippery and rotten a foundation these speculations rest will easily become clear to anyone who considers this one point: that the substance of the Sacraments must be judged from nothing other than their institution.

For the Sacraments have their entire being from their institution—that is, from the fact that they were instituted by Christ thus and not otherwise. Hence, what was not instituted by Christ in no way pertains to their formal concept; on the contrary, those things which in the institution were established and determined not as some circumstance but according to themselves can neither be nor ought to be excluded from their formal concept.

For the formal concept of any thing requires that it be conformed to its object. And since the Sacrament of the Supper, according to the testimony of the three Evangelists and Paul, was instituted by Christ in such a way that under blessed bread His body is to be dispensed for eating, and under blessed wine His blood for drinking for the use of communicants, it is evident that neither the symbols of bread or wine, nor the body or blood of Christ taken separately, can be excluded from its formal concept; nor can or ought the whole Christ, as the sacred reality, to be dispensed under some one sign, be included in it.

Not the former, because both those symbols determinately and the body and blood of Christ distinctly and according to themselves were instituted by Christ. Nor the latter, because it was not instituted that the whole Christ be sacramentally dispensed under either sign.

XLVIII. Therefore it must be said that this Sacrament, in its substance and formal concept, is nothing other than the body of Christ with the blessed bread and His blood with the blessed wine, sacramentally united for the use of communicants.

But if under the bread there are present, besides the body, also the blood, soul, and divinity of Christ, and under the wine, besides the blood, also the body together with His soul and divinity, nevertheless these do not pertain to the formal concept of this Sacrament, since neither the bread nor the wine was instituted for this end—that through the former we might become partakers of the blood of Christ, or through the latter of His body, or through both also of His soul and divinity.

Hence, when considered in this respect, these things will relate to the Sacrament of the Eucharist only materially or accidentally, and will in no way enter into its substance and formal concept.

XLIX. In this way, from the institution of Christ, those things which constitute the formal concept of the Eucharistic Sacrament ought to have been investigated and separated from those which are joined to it accidentally. But our adversaries, philosophizing preposterously about this most abstruse mystery, proceed in the reverse order.

They put far from their eyes and mind the institution of Christ, which alone gives being to the Sacrament, and, calling reason to their aid, lay down as a foundation this assertion: that under either species the whole Christ is present. Although we leave this for its proper place, it is nevertheless certain that it has not yet been solidly proved by the Romanists; nor does it appear upon what supports they can establish it, who maintain that Christ, according to His human nature, exists nowhere outside the Sacrament of the Eucharist except in heaven.

For what Bellarmine urges in the said place (book IV, chapter XXI) from Romans 6:9—that Christ, being raised from the dead, dies no more, and that death no longer has dominion over Him, and therefore that the body of Christ under the species of bread is not without soul and blood—this he himself will be forced to acknowledge is weak, if he rightly considers what he there cannot deny: that God by absolute power can bring it about that the body of Christ alone, without the soul, exist under the species of bread, and that Christ nevertheless be and remain alive in heaven.

For if this involves no contradiction, it will certainly be possible, without prejudice to the truth of Paul’s statement that Christ, raised from the dead, dies no more and that death no longer has dominion over Him, that His body separately be made present under the symbol of bread and His blood separately under the symbol of wine; nor will it be absolutely necessary that, if the body of Christ, who no longer dies, be under the bread, His blood and soul must also be under it; or if His blood be under the wine, that His body and soul must also be under it.

Nor does it avail that Bellarmine there replies that the question is not what God could do absolutely if He willed, but what He is going to do and what He in fact does. For what Christ is going to do His own words teach, when, handing the bread, He said: “Take, eat; THIS IS MY BODY”; and when presenting the cup: “Drink of it, all of you; for THIS IS MY BLOOD of the new covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins” (Matt. 26:26 ff.). By these words He clearly signifies that He will dispense His body under the bread and His blood under the wine to communicants.

And since by the ordinary way and mode it cannot happen that, while Christ remains alive, His body be separately present under the bread and His blood separately under the wine, it must indeed be further inquired whether this can be done by the absolute power of God. And if it is established that it can be done—or at least if it does not clearly appear that it involves a contradiction—I have no reason, in so great a mystery, to believe that Christ does something else and exhibits more under the bread or wine than what He promised in such clear words He would do and exhibit under each symbol.

Hence, even on Bellarmine’s own hypothesis, it remains at least uncertain whether under either species the whole Christ is dispensed to communicants; and therefore scholastic speculations about the formal concept of the Eucharistic Sacrament rest upon a sandy foundation.

L. Let us admit that, under the symbol of bread, besides the body of Christ, His blood, soul, and divinity are also contained by concomitance, and that, under the symbol of wine, besides the blood, His body, soul, and divinity are also contained by concomitance. Yet even so it cannot be defended, as the Romanists claim, that the formal concept of the Eucharist includes within its ambit any external species, and Christ is contained under it, and nothing else.

For the blood, soul, and divinity of Christ are not present under the bread by the words of the institution—“This is my body”—but only accidentally, by reason of the body of Christ with which they are joined. For by the force of the words of the institution, only the body of Christ, as distinguished from the soul and blood, is under the bread, as Bellarmine himself admits. The blood, soul, and divinity are present under the bread either because of the body or because they are united with the body of Christ—the former by natural union, the latter by the hypostatic union.

Therefore, since they are not present under the bread per se and by the force of the words of the institution, but only accidentally and by reason of the body with which they are united, they cannot be regarded as part of the Eucharistic Sacrament in any other respect than accidentally, in the part which consists in the symbol of bread, just as the leavened or unleavened bread, when joined with the same, pertains to the bread but in no way to its formal concept. The same must be said of the other species. For under the wine, the body, soul, and divinity of Christ are not present per se and by the force of the words of the institution, but accidentally, and because they are joined with the blood of Christ, which alone is present under it per se and by the force of the words of the institution. It follows that neither the body, nor the soul, nor the divinity of Christ pertains to the substance or formal concept of that part of the Eucharist which consists in the symbol of wine.

Hence, the Romanists philosophize most poorly about this matter, as if those things which are outside the formal concept of each species, and cohering elsewhere with instituted realities, should themselves be included within the formal reason of the Sacrament; and for example, because by the force of the words of the institution the body of Christ is under the bread, and the blood, soul, and divinity are united with the body, they most foolishly infer that the whole Christ pertains to the formal reason of the species of bread.

LI. Finally, since Christ has determined in the institution of the whole Sacrament external symbols—one indeed as a sign and means of partaking of His body, the other as a sign and means of drinking His blood—those (the Romanists), on the contrary, insist that nothing is determined with respect to the reason and substance of this Sacrament, and thus, by a nefarious abuse, exclude from its substance that which Christ willed to include by His express institution. For this reason, it cannot be admitted that the entire essence of the Eucharistic Sacrament is found in a single species.

LII. Nor does any demonstration, such as Bellarmine adduces in c. XXII, prop. III, to prove that the whole essence and reason of the Sacrament (of the Eucharist) is found in each species—namely, that the Eucharist, consecrated without the species of wine, is truly and properly a Sacrament, and not a mutilated or halved Sacrament—succeed. He states it in these words: “In whatever Sacrament signification and causality are required, for a Sacrament is a sign and cause of grace. These, however, are found in each species, that is, both in the species of bread and in the species of wine themselves.”

But does this prove anything, that in each species the whole essence and reason common to all Sacraments is found? Presently, the answer is no. What Bellarmine intends to prove—namely, that in each species the whole essence and reason of the Eucharistic Sacrament is found, so that the Eucharist consecrated without the species of wine is absolutely, truly, and properly the Sacrament, not mutilated or halved—the reasoning he adduces proves no more effectively than if someone were to argue: in a living rational animal, the whole essence and nature is found in any individual organ, saying: “In every animal the body and the sensitive soul are required, for an animal is a body animated and sensing.” These elements are indeed found in the animal; therefore, the whole essence of a rational animal is found in the animal.

But does it follow affirmatively about a species? Bellarmine’s intended consequence is this: in each species (both bread and wine), the whole essence and reason (generic) of the Sacrament, common to all Sacraments, is found; for being a sign and cause of grace is a certain generic reason which pertains to all Sacraments. Therefore, in each species, the whole essence and reason of the Eucharistic Sacrament—or of that Sacrament which Christ instituted on the night He was betrayed and dispensed to His disciples—is found. This consequence, even schoolchildren laugh at.

LIII. Just as, in general, the essence of any species intrinsically contains its whole generic essence and reason, and in addition also the difference by which it is distinguished from others under the same genus, so too, in this place, the essence of each Sacrament, beyond the reason and essence common to all Sacraments, intrinsically includes something by which it is constituted in its own specific existence and distinguished from other Sacraments.

In the Eucharistic Sacrament, however, these are the special symbols of bread and wine, and the sacred realities, the Body and Blood of Christ, united by the words of institution with their symbols. Nothing beyond these can show by which the Sacrament is constituted intrinsically and distinguished from others; if these are removed, the very essence of the Eucharist itself is taken away.

LIV. It therefore remains firm that, through the species of wine, it pertains to the substance of the Sacrament instituted by Christ at the Last Supper, and that both species are parts of it.

LV. Nor does it matter that each species has its own proper matter, its own proper form, and its own proper action in the consecration, as Bellarmine objects. The matter and form that each species has are not the matter and form of the whole Eucharistic Sacrament, but only of one part. For the matter of the whole Sacrament simultaneously consists of Christ’s Body and Blood, as has been said above, and this is also acknowledged by the Pontificians themselves. But neither species, by itself, has both as its matter: the matter proper to the species of bread is the Body; the matter proper to the species of wine is the Blood of Christ, as the words of institution teach: “This is my Body”, “This is my Blood”, etc. The Body and Blood of Christ are not the Eucharistic matter unless united with their symbols, bread and wine. Hence, just as the Body and Blood together pertain to the matter of the whole Sacrament of the Supper, so too are the symbols of bread and wine required together. But the symbols, together with the Body and Blood of Christ, are not found in a single species. Therefore, the whole matter of the Eucharistic Sacrament is not contained in one species. Consequently, each species is only the matter of the part it possesses. The same reasoning applies to the form and consecration of each species. Bellarmine differs at length here, but his distinctions are of no weight. Due to the limitations of space, they are not presented here; we shall discuss them later when occasion arises.

End of First Disputation.

Question XIX. Is the sacrament of the supper to be offered to the laity under both species?

The sacrament of the supper is to be offered not only to the clergy, but also to the laity under both species.

Proof. 1) Whoever were commanded by Christ in the institution of the eucharist to eat the blessed bread, the same were also commanded to drink the blessed wine: But all the Apostles, and under their name all adult faithful, were commanded by Christ in the institution of the eucharist to eat the blessed bread. Therefore, all the Apostles, and under their name all adult faithful, were commanded to drink the blessed wine. The major is clear: for to the same to whom Christ said: “Eat,” he similarly said: “Drink.” Indeed, he also expressly added: “Drink from it, all of you!” Matth. XXVI, 27. The truth of the minor concerning the Apostles is plain: For to all of them the Lord says: “Take, drink.” Mark adds in ch. XIV, 23: “they all drank of it.” It is also plain concerning all adult faithful. The Apostles, whom Christ commanded to eat and drink, represented either only the clergy, or both the clergy and the laity. But not only the clergy; because thus no Christian layman ought to receive the sacrament of the supper, either under one or under both species; Therefore, they represented all adult faithful, whom Christ under the name of the Apostles commanded to eat the consecrated bread and drink the consecrated wine

(This consideration also has great weight: that the blood of Christ is not just some part of this sacred action, but is also the principal part, is effected from this principle: Without the shedding of blood there can be no remission of sins, Hebr. IX, 22. Therefore, the death which Christ suffered for us, if it had not been bloody, would not have been valid for expiating the sins of men. Therefore, if someone partakes of the body of Christ, given to death for us, but does not likewise drink his blood, shed for us, he will have only a general remembrance of the death of Christ, but not a special one of the bloody death, in which lies the greatest force of consolation.)

You say: I. Communion under both species was indeed instituted by Christ, but not commanded. Not all things which God instituted did he command to all. God instituted matrimony by imperative words, yet he did not command it to all. Response: Although divine institution and command differ; if, however, the persons for whom the institution was made are added, the institution is equal to a command, especially if it is done by imperative words, such as are here, “eat! drink!” For matrimony was not only instituted by God, but also commanded to all persons who are fit for marriage and do not have the gift of continence, to avoid fornication and all impurity.

II. The Apostles commanded to eat represented all the faithful, but commanded to drink represented only the priests. Response: a) If Christ had regarded the Apostles in a different respect when he said: “Eat,” than when he said: “Drink,” certainly he himself, or Paul, repeating the Lord’s institution in 1 Cor. XI, would have made at least a slight indication of that double respect. b) Christ in the first eucharist regarded the Apostles not as priests, but as communicants.

Proof 2) Paul repeated the words of institution, 1 Cor. XI, 23, where he exhorts all who can prove themselves to eat of this bread and drink of this cup, v. 28.

Proof 3) The same Apostle in 1 Cor. X, 14, says: “Wherefore, my dearly beloved, flee from idolatry. I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say. The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ?” Where observe: 1) That Paul addresses all the faithful of Corinth, both teachers and learners, and exhorts them with an argument (among others) taken from the communion of the whole supper. 2) That he himself distinguishes the blessed cup from the broken bread, calling the former the κοινωνία of the blood, the latter of the body of Christ.

The antithesis is of the Pontificians, who maintain that the blessed cup is not to be offered to the laity. Who rely on the following arguments:

I. Whoever receive the blood of Christ under the consecrated bread, to them the blessed wine is not to be offered; But the laity, etc. Therefore. The major is proved; because those who have received the blood of Christ under the blessed bread have no need to receive the blood of Christ under another symbol. The minor is established: because the body of Christ is not bloodless.

Response: 1) If this argument is valid, it can be inferred that not even to the clergy is the blessed wine to be offered, since they also receive the body of Christ full of blood under the blessed bread. 2) We distinguish between the natural union of the body and blood of Christ, and the sacramental union of the body and blood of Christ under distinct symbols, instituted by Christ. If you look at the natural union, the body of Christ is never without the blood, and the blood is never without the body of Christ; yet if you consider the sacramental union, it pleased the Savior, under a distinct symbol to give and distribute to us his body, and under a distinct symbol his blood, the former for eating, the latter for drinking. We ought not, however, to be wise beyond what is written and instituted by Christ, 1 Cor. IV, 6.

II. Whoever both by words and by deeds approved the celebration of the Holy Supper under one species, he did not will the same to be necessarily celebrated under both species: But Christ, etc. Therefore. The minor is proved: Christ approved the celebration of the Holy Supper under one species 1) by words, John VI, 50 ff., where he four times promises eternal life to those who eat his flesh, with no mention made of drinking. 2) He approved the celebration of the Holy Supper under one species by deed, Luke XXIV, 30, where Christ offered the sacrament to two disciples in the inn at Emmaus under the species of bread alone.

Response: John VI deals with spiritual eating: Luke XXIV deals with a common breaking of bread, or a charitable meal, not a eucharistic one. For the same words are read of the feeding of the people, Matth. XIV, 19; Mark VI, 41. Grant that Luke XXIV is to be understood of the celebration of the Holy Supper; yet the position of one will not be the exclusion of the other. The breaking of bread does not exclude the distribution of wine.

III. There are abstainers who cannot taste even one drop of wine. To these the sacrament of the supper must be exhibited under one species.

Response: 1) Those abstainers are few and rare, on account of whom the blessed wine is not to be stolen from all the laity. 2) Abstainers are to be well instructed, so that with true faith they may spiritually eat and drink Christ, with all his benefits.

IV. The Catholic church did not approve communion under one species without grave causes; to wit, a) because there is not a supply of wine in all places: b) because irreverence for the sacrament is to be feared, if one drop should fall into the beard, clothing, or onto the ground; c) it has, however, meanwhile conceded the ablution cup.

Response: a) In any place there is as much supply of wine as is required for the celebration of the Holy Supper. b) The blessed cup, outside the use of drinking, is not the κοινωνία of the blood of Christ. c) The ablution cup is a common cup, not a blessed cup.