(I will tell specifically my buys and sells I make in my personal and family portfolio at the moment I make them from here for my premium suscribers). My personal portfolio is very concentrated so it is not that replicable and I don´t want people to do that. I have a relatively small amount invested (but good enough for my age) so I am willing to take huge extra risk and trade a lot. I hav

Firstly, here my job is very focused on filtering the market and selecting the best risk reward companies I find on the market and share it here. I am updating my view in some stocks I usually comment and follow on, but my highest conviction and concentration still is in P2 Gold and Fredonia Mining for many reasons. I have also published a simple financial model of Fredonia Mining for my paid suscribers here where you can modify gold price, AISC and other assumptions and directly get the final NPV figure of this model. This model is representative and approximate, but not extremely accurate.

P2 GOLD

Firstly I will start with P2 Gold. I bought heavily around 0.75 cad. It was so easy and obvious. The company is literally telling you how the FS is going to be with all the slides in the presentation. Taking into account the major derisking event this quarter (metallurgy and MRE), I expect the rally to continue.

The company is still very cheap in numbers compared to other developers in Nevada. They are advancing this asset fast, with an experienced management. A FS stage of a probable 2,5/3 billion (gold at 4000 usd and copper at 6$/lb) or so NPV trading at 215 million usd is not going to be the case for long (it is less than 10% of a nice project in terms of NPV to CAPEX, high IRR, open pit in Nevada with enough big scale and bulk tonnage → Check “all the boxes”).

But for having the rerate we just need that metallurgical testing and MRE goes as planned, derisking the project a lot. So for me, P2 Gold is a current hold in the portfolio, I expect the run to continue with these events. If I see a more reasonable valuation maybe I will consider reducing the large position or even sell it all. But at current prices I will continue to hold a large position in my family portfolio. Better to pick these obvious winners than to time the perfect turnaround story. I expect the stock to be trading at 1.5/2 cad before the release of the FS.

However, it is true that I expect a considerable increase in OPEX in the FS, but the improvements/optimizations probably offset it (partially or totally), holding an incredible NPV for the current market cap of the company.

AUSTRAL GOLD

The next company is Austral Gold, a company that has a very simple thesis: Just wait until they continue generating massive cash flows relative to their market cap and they continue to increase their cash position. With that cash they are funding exploration that will increase production profile. I believe it is a matter of time until the stock rerates. Furthermore, what makes more sense for the company is merging with Challenger Gold for instance or other companies reducing the majority shareholder structure that affects directly the stock perfomance and adding development assets to the company profile. The thesis is simple and straightforward: you don't need a lot of derisking events, just time. And the recent push in gold prices helps the company a lot given the high AISC they have. I will update in case anything changes the thesis, but if everything goes as planned and no surprises, it is an easy play.

Same here, Austral Gold is a current hold in my portfolio and I am waiting for a more fair valuation in order to sell my stake (if so). Here I have a lot smaller stake compared to P2 Gold. If the stock would be trading at 0.25 or so I would be selling probably, but it is not the case. With this company you need more patience, I dont speak a fast rerate in the short term.

AURUM RESOURCES

Moving on to Aurum Resources, the investment thesis is also very straightforward. The company currently trades at an enterprise value of around US$115 million, while its Boundiali project has a post-tax NPV of approximately US$1.5 billion at a gold price of US$4,076/oz. The current spot gold price is already materially above that assumption, meaning the project’s NPV should be significantly higher at today’s gold price.

There are several additional sources of upside. First, Aurum has significant operating leverage to the gold price given the project’s relatively high cost base, with AISC of close to US$2,000/oz. As a result, higher gold prices have a disproportionately positive impact on project cash flows and NPV.

Importantly, I do not expect the company to need to raise capital in the near term. Aurum has approximately US$40 million of cash and is fully funded through the Definitive Feasibility Study, which is expected in Q4 2026. Given its current cash position and funding requirements, the company should also have sufficient liquidity to progress meaningfully towards a construction decision without requiring a major equity raise.

The upcoming DFS provides another potential catalyst. The company is continuing to optimize the project, with potential improvements to recoveries and other technical parameters that could increase the NPV relative to the current PFS baseline.

Another important advantage is Aurum’s drilling capacity. The company owns its own fleet of approximately 16 drill rigs, which it operates at very low costs. Most of the current drilling is infill drilling, aimed at upgrading and improving confidence in the existing resource. However, there is also scope to continue expanding the size of the open pits, particularly at the current gold price. Even if this results in a somewhat higher strip ratio, the significantly higher gold price can make additional material economic and potentially allow Aurum to increase the size of the pits and the mineable resource.

There is also significant exploration optionality beyond the current economic study. Aurum is continuously drilling across its broader land package, including another substantial asset that remains at a much earlier exploration stage and has not yet gone through the same economic studies as Boundiali. Further drilling could therefore advance this asset towards a resource and eventually an economic study, creating another potential source of value that is not captured in the current project NPV.

So you effectively have a company trading at roughly US$115 million EV against a US$1.5 billion project NPV at a gold price below today’s spot, with significant gold-price leverage, no immediate financing requirement, a very low-cost in-house drilling operation, ongoing DFS optimization, potential pit expansion and a large exploration program that could generate additional resources and eventually another economic project.

So at current spot prices NPV is +2bill usd while the company is trading at a 115 million usd EV, which is almost 5% EV to NPV while the project is going to be DFS stage in Q1 27, with a nice NPV to capex ratio and a high IRR. They also have the Napie project with 1.5 mill oz, offering further upside to the current Boundiali project.

I think Aurum Resources is giving a clear buy for new potential shareholders, the graph looks amazing, valuation is cheapear than peers.

FREDONIA MINING

Moving on to Fredonia Mining, this remains by far the highest-conviction position in my personal portfolio. And I think the opportunity is quite simple: where else are you going to find a company valued at only around US$20 million that has a fully funded PEA, an active 10,000-metre drilling program, and, by lowering the cut-off grade while still maintaining a very competitive grade, more than 3 Moz of gold equivalent at today’s gold prices in M&I resource? I honestly don’t think you can find many opportunities like that.

The obvious question is: what is the downside?

Answering that question honestly is the most important part of this thesis, and it is where I want to go into real detail. In the rest of this piece I break down the specific risks I see in Fredonia, the full production and financial model I have built, my assumptions on capex, recoveries and the RIGI regime, and the NPV and price target I am underwriting. If you want the complete analysis behind my highest-conviction position, keep reading below.

Yes, the veins are narrow. That is a real risk, particularly for underground mining. But if you look at the project as an open-pit operation, the mineralized veins can still be mined. The company’s pit-shell work has also captured essentially all of the current resource within the conceptual pit shells. Even if the final project ends up with a somewhat higher strip ratio, I think the valuation is so low relative to the potential scale of the project that the risk-reward remains extremely attractive. And that is ultimately why I want to make a significant bet on the opportunity.

The reason Fredonia trades at such a low valuation is that there are still many things that need to be de-risked: metallurgy, recoveries, mine design, processing routes, capex, project economics and ultimately the development strategy. But these are risks that I can understand and progressively monitor.

The PEA should give us a much better understanding of the economics. Further metallurgical work should provide clarity on recoveries. The drilling program can continue to increase confidence in the resource. A PFS can further de-risk the mine plan, processing route and capex. And ultimately, the company can move towards a development decision. I believe Fredonia will be successful in de-risking these issues, and that is the bet I am making.

This is an important distinction for me when comparing Fredonia with some of my other investments. There are situations where the upside can be enormous, but the outcome is fundamentally binary and therefore very difficult to predict. With Fredonia, there are multiple identifiable risks, but they can be progressively addressed through technical work and development milestones. That makes the investment much more underwriteable in my view. Also they have to give more details in the MRE, explaining more assumptions about the resource.

In terms of the potential production profile, I would expect something broadly in line with other large-scale gold projects in the Deseado Massif, potentially combining a large heap-leach operation with a smaller CIL circuit.

Fredonia has previously indicated in their corporate presentation the potential for a heap-leach operation processing approximately 2–3 Mtpa. At the grades of the current resource, a 3 Mtpa operation could potentially support around 70,000 oz of annual gold production, depending on the final mine plan and recoveries.

I would then expect a smaller carbon-in-leach circuit focused on the higher-grade material. The CIL plant would process fewer tonnes than the heap-leach operation because of its higher processing cost, but should benefit from higher grades and potentially materially better recoveries. In my scenario, this could contribute another approximately 30,000 oz per year. That would give the project a potential production profile of around 100,000 oz of gold per year, with a mine life of more than 10 years. Similar production profile as Viva Gold, I would expect something similar I would say.

Metallurgy is one of the areas that still needs to be properly de-risked. The company has conducted limited metallurgical work to date, although historical bottle-roll testing has shown high gold recoveries in oxide material. Fredonia has also highlighted Cerro Vanguardia as a relevant regional analogue, given the similarities in mineralization.

There is also an interesting development strategy that management could pursue. Fredonia could potentially start with a heap-leach-only operation, using a more aggressive heap-leach configuration and then add the CIL plant in year three or four once the operation is generating cash flow. That would reduce the initial capex and allow the company to defer part of the development expenditure (similar case as P2 Gold). However, I think there could be a strong argument for being more aggressive with the initial capex if the economics support it. If Fredonia can qualify for Argentina’s RIGI regime (the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones) maximizing the size of the initial investment could generate significant fiscal benefits and potentially create a substantially higher NPV despite the larger upfront capex.

I have also built my own financial model based on this type of scenario.

I assume approximately 100,000 oz of annual production, incorporate the 4.5% royalties over the company’s properties, use an AISC of US$1,800/oz, a US$4,500/oz gold price and 98% gold payability. I assume initial capex of US$250 million, sustaining capex of approximately US$3 million per year and a 5% discount rate. I also incorporate the potential benefits of Argentina’s RIGI regime. Under those assumptions, my model generates an NPV of approximately US$1.2 billion.

Obviously, this is my own modelling scenario and not company guidance. There is still substantial work to be done around metallurgy, recoveries, mine design, processing routes, capex and the final development strategy. The PEA could therefore look materially different from my assumptions. But that is precisely what makes the current valuation so interesting.

At approximately US$20 million, I believe the company offers an exceptional margin of safety relative to the potential value of the project, while the PEA provides a potentially transformative catalyst on the upside.

And if the PEA comes out broadly in line with the type of production profile and economics I am expecting, I think the upside could be enormous. At a gold price closer to today’s spot levels, around US$4,500/oz, I believe the project could potentially support an NPV in the region of US$1.5 billion under a scenario broadly consistent with my model. Obviously, the PEA could look completely different. That is part of the risk.

Anyway, I expect the PEA to give a +1 billion usd NPV at 5% and gold at 4000 usd, that when comparing it to the current market cap… it is just too evident the discount and the margin of safety of the company. I believe a 150 million cad valuation after the PEA and a further MRE is viable if the production scenario is the one I expect. That´s my target for a full fair valuation in this hypothetical scenario. Now let's wait and see

From here on I explain my watchlist. These are several companies I follow very closely and where I am waiting for the perfect and adequate timing to rotate into them the capital I currently have invested in the stocks I follow today. It is the part of my process where I decide where the money goes next, and whenever I buy something in any of these watchlist companies I will comment on it here.

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Whether that converts to cash is what the next two quarters decide, so I have modelled them separately rather than annualising a quarter that cannot be annualised: Casposo’s pit delivers its annual tonnage in roughly six months, which makes Q1 × 4 and Q2 × 4 equally wrong. Built from the bottom up at US$4,200/GEO and no cost improvement at all, the second half generates US$13.7 million of free cash flow, US$9.7 million after debt service, on a run rate near US$15 million a year against an enterprise value of about US$45 million.

Below the paywall: the full quarter-by-quarter model for Q3 and Q4, every assumption written out so you can disagree with it line by line (price, volumes, C1 and AISC, the toll fee back-solved to US$108.90 per tonne, tax, capex, working capital), the valuation table from 1× to 6×, what US$15 million a year would actually buy in buybacks or dividends, the six things that would make the forecast wrong, and my own view on the gap between what the technical reports promise for 2027 and what this company has historically delivered.

You would have access to the financial update and the rest of financial models with dynamic assumptions where you can directly change gold price and others.

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Cheap Producer so overlooked and missunderstood

Austral Gold is, first and foremost, a cheap producer. At a market capitalisation of roughly US$46M (A$70M) and an enterprise value of only around US$36M net of its ~US$10M Unico Silver stake, the Company owns 100% of two currently producing gold-silver mines: Guanaco/Amancaya in Chile and Casposo-Manantiales in Argentina. At a base case of US$4,000/oz gold and US$60/oz silver, these two assets are modelled to generate a combined ~US$626M of after-tax free cash flow over their remaining mine lives, with a combined NPV at a 10% discount rate of ~US$411M. The share price does not come close to reflecting either figure.

Mine-plan production and asset-level valuation (Guanaco and Casposo technical-report models):

Figures are mine-plan production from the Guanaco and Casposo technical-report models..

On every standard producer multiple, Austral screens as extremely cheap. The Company currently trades at roughly 0.6x its own near-term E2027 free cash flow, versus mid-tier gold and silver producer peers on 4-6x. On an EV/EBITDA basis the gap is similar: roughly 0.4x today against a 4-6x peer range. On a price-to-NAV basis, Austral trades at only 0.09-0.11x the mine-level net asset value, versus 0.5-1.0x for comparable producers. Each of these three approaches, free-cash-flow multiple, net asset value and EV/EBITDA, independently points to the same conclusion: the market is pricing Austral as though its mines were barely worth anything, when the technical reports underlying Guanaco/Amancaya and Casposo say otherwise.

It is important to be precise about what that mine-level valuation does and does not include. The ~US$294M Guanaco NPV and ~US$118M Casposo NPV are asset-level numbers; they do not net off the corporate layer that sits above the mines. Austral carries roughly US$10-15M per year of corporate G&A and exploration spend (call it US$12.5M/yr as a working mid-point) that has to be deducted before arriving at the free cash flow actually available to shareholders. Any read of the thesis that stops at the mine-level cash flow, without deducting this corporate overlay, overstates what actually reaches the parent company.

NUMBERS DONT LIE, JUST MAKE SURE TO FOLLOW THE THESIS IN DETAIL IN CASE SOMETHING DOESNT SEEM TO WORK IN THE COMPANY. I WILL KEEP YOU POSTED

Twelve- to twenty-four-month free cash flow build (US$000, attributable, base case Au US$4,000/oz, Ag US$60/oz):

Mine Level:

Corporate Level Next 2 years (adding other expenses):

Note on the tax treatment of corporate costs: the “Corporate G&A + exploration” deduction in the table above is a straight, un-tax-effected cash outflow, with no tax shield applied. In principle, deductible corporate and exploration spend should shelter some tax, and at the ~31-32% blended effective rate implied by the mine-level cash-tax line above, a full shield on ~US$12.5M/yr would be worth roughly US$3.9-4.0M/yr (about US$7.9M over 24 months), lifting Net FCF. That shield has not been applied here: the US$12.5M/yr of corporate G&A and exploration spend is genuinely tax-deductible, but rather than assume the benefit is realised, the model conservatively treats it as a full, unshielded cash cost. As a result, actual Net FCF to shareholders could come in modestly higher than the ~US$105M shown above if some or all of that shield is ultimately realised.

Starting from a thin net cash position of roughly US$0.6M, this build implies the Company could accumulate on the order of US$105M of cash over the next 24 months at the base-case metal price assumptions, before any capital allocation decisions such as debt repayment or distributions, more than double Austral’s entire current enterprise value, generated from cash flow the technical reports already support.

That cash generation is also the mechanism for a re-rating. If the market simply moved Austral toward the low end of where peers trade (4-6x free cash flow, 4-6x EV/EBITDA, or 0.5-1.0x P/NAV), the implied enterprise value would land in a US$150M-580M range, against roughly US$36M today. Even the most conservative reading of that range (~US$160-370M, or roughly A$0.40-0.70 per share) implies four to seven times the current share price.

Four independent methodologies point to the same conclusion. A full breakdown of each scenario is set out in Why the Pieces Fit, below; the headline outputs are:

Even the most conservative reading of these ranges implies a market capitalisation several times today’s, without requiring anything beyond a re-rating toward where peer producers already trade and delivery of the production plan already set out in the technical reports.

The core of the thesis is that the numbers add up: Austral Gold appears to be trading at a small fraction of the cash flow its two existing mines can generate. If the technical reports underlying Guanaco/Amancaya and Casposo are reasonably accurate and the Company delivers against its production guidance, a shareholder holding the stock over the next one to two years stands to benefit from both meaningful free cash flow generation and a plausible re-rating of the trading multiple.

One caveat belongs up front. Combined production is not a smooth, ever-rising line; the consolidated model shows step-downs from 2031, as Casposo’s current five-year mine plan (2027-2031) runs out and Guanaco’s own grade and stripping sequence cycles lower before recovering later in its life. That should not automatically be read as a definitive long-term decline in production. Austral is actively exploring new targets at Juncal, within the wider Guanaco-Amancaya land package, and is running an approximately 8,500-metre drilling programme at Casposo aimed at converting resources and testing near-mine targets close to existing infrastructure. Both programmes have the potential to extend mine life and change the production profile discussed above, and are covered in detail in the Exploration section below.

Why So Cheap? What the Market Is Pricing In and Potential Turnaround into a Value Creation company.

The valuation gap set out above is not simply a market oversight; it is explained, almost entirely, by the two risks discussed in detail in Key Risks, below: a track record of missed guidance, and a controlling shareholder holding roughly 68% of the stock. Both are real, and both are rational reasons for a discount; the question for an investor is whether the current multiple already prices them in more than fairly.

The first is a credibility discount. Austral has a history of not always meeting its own production guidance, and Casposo in particular has a troubled operating past (see Key Risks, below). No matter how carefully the technical-report models translate into the free-cash-flow and NPV figures set out above, the market has learned to treat this management team’s forward guidance with scepticism until it is proven out quarter by quarter. That scepticism shows up directly in the multiple: investors are, in effect, discounting the model’s cash flow for execution risk before they even get to a view on gold and silver prices.

The second is a governance and liquidity discount. With roughly 68% of the shares controlled by one shareholder through IFISA (see Management & Shareholder Structure, below), the free float is thin, institutional ownership is structurally limited, and related-party dealings recur. Many institutional mandates simply cannot, or will not, own a stock this tightly held, however cheap it looks on paper, which removes a large share of the natural buyer base that would otherwise help close the valuation gap, and keeps the stock trading on thin, largely retail-driven volumes.

The valuation gap set out above is not simply a market oversight; it is explained, almost entirely, by the two risks discussed in detail in Key Risks, below: a track record of missed guidance, and a controlling shareholder holding roughly 68% of the stock. Both are real, and both are rational reasons for a discount; the question for an investor is whether the current multiple already prices them in more than fairly.

The first is a credibility discount. Austral has a history of not always meeting its own production guidance, and Casposo in particular has a troubled operating past (see Key Risks, below). No matter how carefully the technical-report models translate into the free-cash-flow and NPV figures set out above, the market has learned to treat this management team’s forward guidance with scepticism until it is proven out quarter by quarter. That scepticism shows up directly in the multiple: investors are, in effect, discounting the model’s cash flow for execution risk before they even get to a view on gold and silver prices.

The second is a governance and liquidity discount. With roughly 68% of the shares controlled by one shareholder through IFISA (see Management & Shareholder Structure, below), the free float is thin, institutional ownership is structurally limited, and related-party dealings recur. Many institutional mandates simply cannot, or will not, own a stock this tightly held, however cheap it looks on paper, which removes a large share of the natural buyer base that would otherwise help close the valuation gap, and keeps the stock trading on thin, largely retail-driven volumes.

Together, these two frictions are a reasonable explanation for why a company that screens this cheaply has stayed this cheap. They are not reasons to dismiss the thesis, but they are the reason it has not already closed: a re-rating most plausibly requires progress on both fronts, demonstrated delivery against guidance over several quarters, and some broadening of the shareholder register that dilutes the controlling stake toward a level institutional investors can hold (see Management & Shareholder Structure, below). Until then, the discount described here should be read as the market’s price for those two specific risks, not as evidence that the underlying asset value is wrong.

That re-rating does not have to wait solely on a change of ownership. For much of the recent past, Austral’s operating cash flow has gone largely toward servicing and paying down debt rather than building the balance sheet; the build set out in Cheap Producer, above, shows that dynamic starting to invert, from a thin ~US$0.6M net cash position today to an accumulated ~US$105M of cash over the next 24 months, generated purely by the two operating mines. Once cash starts to accumulate rather than simply repay debt, the Company has capital-allocation optionality it has lacked for years: a dividend or a share buy-back would be a credible use of it precisely because the stock is this cheap on every multiple, and either would be a direct signal that management has moved from debt-paydown mode to value creation.

A more aggressive option would use that same cash, and the controlling shareholder’s existing footprint, to address the ownership overhang directly. IFISA already holds roughly 12-13% of ASX-listed Challenger Gold, whose Hualilán ore Austral is currently toll-treating at Casposo (see Management & Shareholder Structure, below); a full combination with Challenger would let Austral fund Hualilán’s development with its own comparatively cheap operating cash flow, instead of Challenger relying on higher-cost instruments such as the convertible debentures and dilutive placements it has used in the past, while simultaneously diluting IFISA’s ~68% stake in the combined group toward a level institutional investors can hold. It is not the only route: a large capital raise to acquire an advanced-stage development asset elsewhere would achieve a similar dilution and growth effect. But given the existing toll-milling relationship, the shared San Juan geography, and IFISA’s stake on both sides of the table, a Challenger combination is the more obvious fit. None of this is assumed in the base case above; it is a plausible next leg of the thesis, not a certainty.

This is where the real investment thesis begins: a mine-by-mine breakdown of Austral Gold’s assets, financials and exploration portfolio and why the value of the company may be hiding in plain sight. Also I am attaching here at the final part all the detailed excel models from Guanaco, Casposo and the whole company.

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Independent analysis published by the author. Not investment advice. Just informative

Snapshot

Assets

Valuation

In brief

• Deep discount to value: ~0.29x EV/NAV and under 2x normalised free cash flow, versus a peer group at 0.7x–1.2x P/NAV.

• Fortress balance sheet: ~US$547M of net cash and investments (~26% of market cap) that fully funds the development pipeline with no dilution.

• Transformational, funded growth: El Domo (2027), Chaarat’s Tulkubash (2028), Condor (2029) and Kyzyltash (2031) lift attributable EBITDA from ~US$269M (2026) to ~US$1,224M (2032).

• Corporate overhead already embedded (~US$5–10M per mine), so the NAV and free-cash-flow figures are stated after head-office costs, no further adjustment needed.

Iñigo Ezponda Igea | inigoezpondaigea@gmail.com

July 16, 2026 | All figures in USD unless otherwise stated; years shown are calendar years | CADUSD: 0.73

Current Price: US$8.82 (C$12.08) | Independent analysis, not investment advice

Key Data

Silvercorp Metals Inc. (TSX / NYSE American: SVM) is a profitable, cash-generative precious-metals producer that, in my view, trades at a fraction of the intrinsic value of its asset base. Two long-life silver-lead-zinc mines in China (Ying and GC) throw off substantial free cash flow today, while a fully funded development pipeline, El Domo and Condor in Ecuador and the Chaarat gold project in the Kyrgyz Republic, is set to transform the company into a diversified, multi-asset gold-and-silver producer over the next five years. The balance sheet is exceptional: US$422M of cash and short-term investments plus a US$275M portfolio of marketable equity investments against just US$150M of convertible debt, leaving the company in a large net-cash position that fully funds the growth plan. On our estimates, the market is capitalising Silvercorp at roughly 0.3x the net asset value of its assets and under 2x normalised free cash flow, a valuation that discounts the growth pipeline to zero and ascribes little value to the treasury. As the development assets are built and brought into production, we see a credible path to a multi-year re-rating.

Key Investment Highlights

• Deep discount to NAV. Our consolidated model values Silvercorp’s five assets at a US$5,283M net asset value (8% discount, attributable). Against a current enterprise value of roughly US$1,376M, the company trades at about 0.26x EV/NAV, a fraction of the 0.7x–1.2x P/NAV at which comparable precious-metals producers trade.

• NAV grows as the pipeline is built. Today’s NPV is held down by near-term development capex and by production cash flows that are still heavily discounted. As each mine is built, that capex rolls off and the cash flows move closer in time, so the discounted value of the same stream rises purely as the valuation date advances: El Domo around mid-2027, Chaarat’s Tulkubash in early 2028, then Condor and Kyzyltash. The NAV is dynamic, and likely to step up materially as these assets come online.

• Fortress balance sheet. US$422M cash and short-term investments plus a US$275M marketable-securities portfolio (stakes in New Pacific Metals and Auro Metals) against US$150M of convertible notes, a net-cash-plus-investments position of ~US$547M, roughly a quarter of the entire market capitalisation, that fully funds the development pipeline.

• Fully funded, transformational growth. El Domo (first production 2027), Condor (2029) and Chaarat’s Tulkubash (2028) and Kyzyltash (2031) take attributable output from a ~7.5 Moz silver-equivalent producer today toward a diversified gold-and-silver company generating over US$900M of attributable free cash flow by 2032.

• Exceptional cash generation. Consolidated attributable EBITDA rises from ~US$269M (2026) to ~US$1,224M (2032); attributable free cash flow scales from break-even to ~US$939M over the same window, with a long plateau thereafter across a 20-year-plus consolidated mine life.

• Brand-new asset base primed to re-rate. Three of the five assets are completely new mines (El Domo 2027, Tulkubash 2028, Condor 2029, Kyzyltash 2031); once built and ramped, long-life producers of this quality typically re-rate to premium multiples. Technical-study mine lives already run to 2041 at Ying, 2043 at GC, 2038 at El Domo, 2041 at Condor and 2048 at Chaarat, and stated lives are routinely extended through reserve conversion and near-mine drilling, an upside carried nowhere in our numbers.

• 6x FCF fair value implies ~+160% upside. Capitalising normalised attributable free cash flow of ~US$815M at 6x, modest for assets of this life, implies an enterprise value of ~US$4.9B and an equity value of ~US$5.4B (US$24.6/share), against today’s ~US$2.1B market cap.

• Valuation already carries corporate costs. Each mine model embeds ~US$5–10M/year of corporate G&A, exploration and head-office costs, so the NAV and FCF figures are stated after corporate overhead, no separate holdco adjustment is required.

About Silvercorp Metals

Silvercorp Metals Inc. is a Vancouver-headquartered, profitable precious-metals producer and China’s largest primary silver producer. The company has operated continuously and profitably through multiple commodity cycles since 2003, generating free cash flow from two established underground silver-lead-zinc operations, the Ying Mining District in Henan Province (77.5% attributable) and the GC/Gaocheng mine in Guangdong Province (99% attributable). In Fiscal 2026 (year ended 31 March 2026) Silvercorp produced approximately 6.8 million ounces of silver and 8,723 ounces of gold (about 7.5 million ounces of silver equivalent), generated US$438.1M of revenue, US$310.6M of operating cash flow and US$181.3M of free cash flow, and reported adjusted net income of US$150.8M (US$0.69 per share) on a realised silver price of US$46.44/oz.

Since 2024 Silvercorp has used its cash flow and balance sheet to assemble a development pipeline that materially changes the growth and commodity profile of the company. Through the acquisition of Adventus Mining it added the El Domo (Curipamba) copper-gold VMS project and the Condor gold-silver project, both in Ecuador. In Fiscal 2026 it completed the acquisition of Chaarat ZAAV CJSC, adding the Tulkubash and Kyzyltash gold deposits in the Kyrgyz Republic and formally entering Central Asia. The company also holds strategic equity stakes in New Pacific Metals and Auro Metals, which it accounts for as marketable investments. Silvercorp’s stated strategy rests on four pillars: generating free cash flow from producing mines, organic growth through exploration, disciplined M&A, and responsible mining.

This report values each asset individually on a discounted-cash-flow basis using the company’s own technical reports and a consistent long-term price deck (gold US$4,000/oz, silver US$60/oz, copper US$13,000/t, lead US$2,000/t, zinc US$2,800–3,000/t), aggregates them into a consolidated attributable model through 2048, and then reconciles that intrinsic value to the current market price. All valuation figures are attributable to Silvercorp after minority interests and, in the case of El Domo, after the Wheaton Precious Metals stream.

A note on periods: all years in this report are shown as calendar years. Several of the underlying technical reports, in particular Ying, are presented on a fiscal year that runs across the second, third and fourth quarters of one calendar year plus the first quarter of the next; because complete quarter-by-quarter data is not available, those fiscal-year figures have been approximated directly to the corresponding calendar year. Silvercorp’s reported historical results (for example Fiscal 2026) remain stated on the company’s fiscal year ending 31 March.

Company Overview & Current Valuation

We begin by establishing what the market is paying for Silvercorp today. The company’s enterprise value (EV) is the market value of its equity, plus debt, less cash and less the value of its non-core investments. Because our asset valuations are stated on an attributable basis (net of the 22.5% Ying minority and the El Domo stream/JV), we build EV on the same attributable basis and do not add back minority interest, doing so would double-count value that our NAV does not capture.

Market Capitalisation (USD)

Silvercorp has 218 million common shares outstanding. At a recent share price of US$8.82 (C$12.08 at CADUSD 0.73), market capitalisation is 218M shares x US$8.82 = US$1,922.8M, or approximately US$1,923M. This is consistent with the ~US$1.92B market capitalisation reported by market-data providers in early July 2026. The shares have been volatile: after peaking near C$21 they de-rated following a June 2026 announcement of a temporary, safety-driven slowdown at the Ying and GC mines under new nationwide Chinese mining-safety rules.

Cash Position

The working assumption of ~US$400M cash is confirmed and slightly conservative. As at 31 March 2026, Silvercorp reported cash and cash equivalents plus short-term investments of US$422.3M. We use US$422.3M as the cash figure in the EV bridge.

Equity Investments / Marketable Securities

Separately from its treasury, Silvercorp holds a portfolio of equity investments, principally its stakes in New Pacific Metals (~28%), Auro Metals (~27%), and a ~5% stake in Omai Gold Mines Corp. (TSXV: OMG), a Guyana gold developer, worth roughly US$56M at Omai’s ~C$1.5B (~US$1.12B at CADUSD 0.73) market capitalisation, with a total market value of US$274.6M as at 31 March 2026 (all already reported in USD by the company). These are non-operating financial assets and are deducted from EV in full at market value.

Debt

Silvercorp’s only material debt is its 4.75% Convertible Senior Notes, issued in November 2024 for gross proceeds of US$150M. In Q4 Fiscal 2026 the company removed the cash-settlement option via a supplemental indenture, reclassifying the conversion feature to equity. We include the US$150M principal as debt in the EV bridge; readers who treat the (in-the-money) notes as equity would arrive at an EV ~US$150M lower.

Enterprise Value: Derivation

Enterprise value is built from the four components above: EV = Market Cap + Debt − Cash & Short-Term Investments − Equity Investments.

At a US$1,376M enterprise value the market is valuing Silvercorp’s entire operating and development portfolio, five mines with a combined attributable NAV of over US$5.2B, at roughly a quarter of that NAV, while ascribing effectively no value to the growth pipeline.

Net Cash Position

Silvercorp is in a substantial net-cash position. Netting debt against liquid assets: net cash (ex-investments) = US$422.3M cash − US$150M debt = US$272.3M; net cash + investments = US$422.3M + US$274.6M − US$150M = US$546.9M. The combined US$546.9M of net cash and investments is equivalent to roughly US$2.51 per share, or about 28% of the current share price, a large, liquid, and largely overlooked component of value that on its own more than funds the equity portion of the development capital programme.

Other Relevant Valuation Metrics

On trailing Fiscal 2026 numbers the shares screen cheaply on every cash-based measure: EV/EBITDA of roughly 5.2x on ~US$265M trailing EBITDA, falling to about 1.1x on our 2032 consolidated attributable EBITDA estimate of ~US$1,224M; EV/FCF under 2x on normalised free cash flow; and a P/NAV of ~0.33x (market cap ÷ corporate NAV) versus a peer group that typically trades at 0.7x–1.2x. The full FCF-multiple and P/NAV analyses are set out in the Valuation section below, after the asset-by-asset review.

Ying Mining District, Henan Province, China (77.5% attributable)

Overview. The Ying Mining District is Silvercorp’s flagship: a cluster of high-grade, underground silver-lead-zinc veins (the SGX, HZG, TLP, LMW, LME, DCG and HPG mines) in Henan Province, operated through the company’s 77.5%-owned subsidiary. Ying has been in continuous, profitable production for over 15 years and is the principal engine of the company’s current cash flow. It is a low-cost operation by global silver standards, helped by high silver head grades and meaningful lead and zinc by-product credits.

Current production. Ying processes roughly 1.5–1.65 million tonnes of ore per year and produces on the order of 8.0–8.6 million ounces of silver annually, alongside significant lead (~65–75 million lb) and zinc (~13–17 million lb) and modest gold and copper by-products. It accounts for the large majority of Silvercorp’s consolidated silver output and cash flow.

Mine life. The current mine plan runs 16.25 years (from 2026 through 2041, the final production year in our model), based on the updated NI 43-101 technical report for the Ying property effective May 2026. Ying has a long history of reserve replacement and mine-life extension through near-mine exploration, so we regard the stated life as a floor rather than a ceiling.

Reserve & resource summary. Over the 16-year plan the operation feeds roughly 24–26 Mt of ore and recovers well over 100 million ounces of silver plus substantial lead and zinc, at recoveries of approximately 92% silver, 91% lead and 64% zinc. Detailed tonnes, grades and contained metal by category (proven/probable reserves and measured/indicated/inferred resources) are set out in the company’s May 2026 technical report and in the model screenshots below. The resource remains open along strike and at depth across several of the vein systems.

Expansion plans & production profile. The plan sustains peak mill throughput of ~1,650 ktpa. Rather than a single step-change, Ying’s profile is a long, high-plateau of silver production maintained by ongoing development of additional veins and mining fronts, with output easing only in the final years as the plan winds down. Grade and mine-sequencing, not milling capacity, are the key swing variables year to year.

Timing of future increases. Throughput reaches its ~1.6 Mtpa plateau in the near term and is held broadly flat through the late 2030s. Upside to the profile comes principally from exploration success extending the higher-grade veins, which would lengthen the plateau, and from any future permitted mill expansion.

Important operational assumptions. Our Ying model uses a metal-price deck of US$60/oz silver, US$4,000/oz gold, US$2,000/t lead and US$3,000/t zinc; a total cash operating cost of ~US$111/t milled; and China’s tax regime, with a reduced 15% high-new-technology-enterprise income-tax rate through 2029 stepping up to the standard 25% from 2030. Results are shown 100% at the project level and at 77.5% attributable to Silvercorp.

Key risks. Chinese regulatory and mine-safety policy (as evidenced by the temporary June 2026 slowdown), silver/lead/zinc price volatility, grade variability inherent in narrow-vein mining, and the step-up to the 25% tax rate from 2030.

Key catalysts. Reserve/resource updates and mine-life extension from ongoing drilling; resumption to full throughput after the safety-driven slowdown; and continued strong by-product credits at elevated silver and base-metal prices.

Ying, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The model below projects Ying’s cash flows on the assumptions above. It sets out annual mill throughput, silver/lead/zinc/gold production, revenue by metal, cash operating costs, EBITDA, taxes, capital expenditure and free cash flow, shown both at 100% and at Silvercorp’s 77.5% attributable share.

What the projection represents: these figures are the annual, mine-level economics of Ying over the modelled period. They show a business already at full production generating consistently strong EBITDA and free cash flow from year one, with attributable free cash flow of roughly US$150–285M per year over 2026–2032. Ying is the anchor of the consolidated model, contributing an attributable NPV of ~US$1,775M at an 8% discount rate (~US$1,601M at 10%) and ~US$2,882M of attributable free cash flow over the life of mine.

GC (Gaocheng) Mine, Guangdong Province, China (99% attributable)

Overview. The GC/Gaocheng mine is Silvercorp's second producing operation, an underground silver-lead-zinc mine in Guangdong Province held through a 99%-owned subsidiary. GC has been in commercial production since 2014 and is a steady, lower-tonnage complement to Ying, contributing incremental silver and base-metal cash flow with minimal capital intensity.

Current production. GC processes approximately 345–373 thousand tonnes of ore per year, producing roughly 0.65–0.82 million ounces of silver annually plus lead (~2,500–3,000 t) and zinc (~6,000–8,000 t). Silver head grades run ~58–68 g/t with silver recovery of ~79%.

Mine life. The current plan runs 18 years, with production through 2043 in our model, per the SRK NI 43-101 technical report effective 31 December 2025. As with Ying, the life-of-mine is capped by permitted infrastructure, specifically the tailings storage facility, and there is potential to extend it further if a TSF expansion is completed.

Reserve & resource summary. The 18-year plan supports steady annual throughput of ~369 ktpa and roughly 0.7 Moz/year of silver alongside lead and zinc by-products. Tonnes, grades and reserve/resource categories are detailed in the SRK report and the model screenshots below.

Expansion plans & production profile. GC's profile is deliberately flat: ROM feed rises modestly to ~373 ktpa and is then held broadly constant across the plan, with grades and metallurgy driving small year-to-year variations. The principal expansion optionality is the tailings-capacity expansion that would allow throughput and mine life to be extended beyond the current plan.

Timing of future increases. Throughput reaches its ~373 ktpa plateau in the near term. Any step-up depends on the permitting and construction of additional tailings capacity; absent that, GC is modelled as a stable, long-life cash annuity.

Important operational assumptions. Price deck of US$60/oz silver, US$2,000/t lead and US$3,000/t zinc; silver recovery ~79%, lead ~86%, zinc ~86%; a 15% high-tech corporate income-tax rate; no initial capital and modest LOM sustaining capital of ~US$23.8M plus ~US$2M closure. GC carries no streaming or royalty encumbrance.

Key risks. Tailings-capacity constraints on mine life, Chinese regulatory/safety policy, and silver/base-metal price volatility. GC's smaller scale means it is less material to the overall thesis than Ying.

Key catalysts. A permitted TSF expansion (mine-life and throughput extension), reserve additions from exploration, and sustained high silver and zinc prices.

GC, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The GC model projects annual ROM feed, silver/lead/zinc production, revenue, operating costs, EBITDA, tax, sustaining capital and free cash flow at 99% attributable to Silvercorp.

What the projection represents: GC is a mature, capital-light cash generator. The model shows attributable free cash flow of roughly US$17–22M per year with virtually no growth capital required. GC contributes an attributable NPV of ~US$187M at 8% (~US$169M at 10%) and ~US$312M of attributable free cash flow over the life of mine, a small but dependable, high-margin annuity within the portfolio.

El Domo (Curipamba), Ecuador (Silvercorp attributable, post-Wheaton stream)

Overview. El Domo, part of the Curipamba project in central Ecuador, is a high-grade volcanogenic massive-sulphide (VMS) deposit, mined by a combination of open-pit and underground methods, that Silvercorp acquired through Adventus Mining. It is the company's most advanced development asset and its first foray into copper-gold, contributing copper, gold, silver, zinc and lead. Silvercorp is developing El Domo through a joint venture (Salazar holds ~25%) and has a construction-stage streaming agreement with Wheaton Precious Metals that funds a large share of the build.

Current status & production. El Domo is in construction, with first production modelled in 2027. At steady state the 666 ktpa plant produces on the order of 45–75 koz of gold, 0.6–1.5 Moz of silver and 5,000–18,000 t of copper in concentrate per year (contained), with zinc and lead by-products. It is a short-life, high-margin, high-return asset.

Mine life. 13 years, per the SRK technical report on Curipamba-El Domo (May 2026), with construction from 2026 and production spanning 2027–2038 in our model.

Reserve & resource summary. El Domo is a compact, high-grade polymetallic VMS orebody feeding a 666 ktpa plant over 13 years. Metallurgical recoveries are strong, ~90% copper, ~58% gold, ~68% silver, ~93% zinc, ~82% lead. Contained-metal and reserve/resource detail is in the SRK report and the screenshots below.

Expansion plans & production profile. Production ramps quickly to plate in 2028–2029 and then declines through the back half of the life as the orebody is depleted; profile is front-loaded, which maximises early cash flow and NPV. Regional exploration on the wider Curipamba licence offers resource-growth optionality beyond the current El Domo plan.

Timing of future production. First concentrate in 2027, ramp to full ~666 ktpa throughput in 2028, peak metal output 2028–2029, then a managed decline to 2039. This is the first of three development assets to come online and the first driver of the consolidated production step-up.

Important operational assumptions. Price deck US$4,000/oz gold, US$60/oz silver, US$13,000/t copper; initial capex US$283.7M (2026–2027), total LOM capex US$373.5M; Ecuador royalties of 6% (4% government + 2% Altius NSR) and a reduced 20% corporate tax rate. The Wheaton stream delivers 50% of payable gold (falling to 33% after 150,000 oz) and 75% of payable silver (falling to 50% after 4.6 Moz), against ongoing production payments of 18–22% of spot and a US$175.5M upfront that funds construction. Our valuation is stated after the stream and at Silvercorp's ~75% economic share via the JV waterfall.

Key risks. Construction and commissioning execution, Ecuadorian permitting and community/social factors, the drag of the Wheaton stream on precious-metal revenue, and copper-price sensitivity (copper is the largest revenue line).

Key catalysts. First production and ramp-up milestones in 2027–2028, conversion of construction risk to cash flow, Wheaton stream drawdowns funding the build, and regional exploration upside across Curipamba.

El Domo, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The El Domo model projects contained and payable metal, the Wheaton stream deliveries and production payments, revenue by metal net of the stream, operating costs, EBITDA, tax, capital expenditure and Silvercorp-attributable free cash flow via the JV waterfall.

What the projection represents: the model captures a high-return development asset net of its financing. After the ~US$283.7M initial build (with negative attributable free cash flow in 2026 during construction), El Domo swings to strongly positive free cash flow from 2027, generating roughly US$85–155M of attributable free cash flow per year at plateau. It contributes an attributable NPV of ~US$894M at 8% (~US$802M at 10%) and ~US$1,438M of life-of-mine free cash flow to the mine, with a project IRR near 100%, the highest-returning asset in the portfolio on a capital-efficiency basis.

Condor Gold Project, Zamora Chinchipe, Ecuador

Overview. The Condor project, in the prospective Zamora Chinchipe province of south-east Ecuador, is Silvercorp's larger, gold-dominant development asset (also carrying silver). It is the second Ecuadorian project acquired via Adventus and is the biggest single contributor of future gold ounces in the portfolio. Condor takes the company decisively into primary gold production. Unlike the underground silver-lead-zinc veins in China and El Domo’s polymetallic VMS sulphides, Condor is a primary-gold orebody, planned as an underground gold mine feeding a conventional mill.

Current status & production. Condor is at the development/permitting stage, with construction modelled from 2027 and first production in 2029. The 1,800 ktpa plant is designed to produce roughly 100–145 koz of gold per year plus silver, at a high gold recovery of ~94%.

Mine life. 13 years per the SRK NI 43-101 technical report effective 30 November 2025, with production spanning 2029–2041.

Reserve & resource summary. Condor feeds a 1,800 ktpa mill over 13 years at gold recovery ~94% and silver recovery ~64%. The deposit supports a large annual gold output for a project of its capital cost; tonnes, grades and reserve/resource categories are detailed in the SRK report and the screenshots below. The district remains prospective for resource growth.

Expansion plans & production profile. Production ramps from a partial first year (2029) to a full ~1,800 ktpa from 2030, then holds a high gold-production plateau of ~120–145 koz/year into the late 2030s before winding down. It is the single largest driver of the consolidated production and cash-flow step-up in the early 2030s.

Timing of future production. Construction 2027–2028, first gold pour 2029, full throughput 2030, plateau through ~2040. Condor's start-up is the key catalyst for the second leg of company-wide growth, following El Domo.

Important operational assumptions. Price deck US$4,000/oz gold, US$60/oz silver; initial capex US$292M (2027–2028), total LOM capex US$674M (including ~US$340M sustaining and ~US$42M closure); Ecuador 5% NSR royalty, 15% deductible profit-sharing and 25% corporate tax. No stream encumbers Condor; it is modelled at ~99% attributable.

Key risks. Construction and financing execution on the largest single capex in the pipeline, Ecuadorian permitting and social licence, gold-price sensitivity (Condor is almost purely gold), and the fact that first cash flow is several years out.

Key catalysts. Permitting milestones, a construction decision and financing plan, first production in 2029, and exploration upside across the Zamora Chinchipe holdings.

Condor, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The Condor model projects mill feed, gold and silver production, revenue, operating costs, EBITDA, tax, the initial and sustaining capital profile, and attributable free cash flow, with the two-year construction outflow ahead of 2029 first production.

What the projection represents: Condor is a build-then-harvest asset. The model shows two years of construction outflow (2027–2028, ~US$302M cumulative) followed by a rapid swing to ~US$170–250M of attributable free cash flow per year from 2029. It contributes an attributable NPV of ~US$1,118M at 8% (~US$968M at 10%) and ~US$2,063M of life-of-mine free cash flow, at a project IRR of ~50%, the largest NPV contributor among the development assets and the principal source of the company's future gold leverage.

Chaarat Gold Project (Tulkubash & Kyzyltash), Kyrgyz Republic (70% attributable)

Overview. Chaarat, acquired in Fiscal 2026 through the ~US$94.5M purchase of Chaarat ZAAV CJSC, is Silvercorp's entry into Central Asia and its largest long-life gold opportunity. It comprises two adjacent deposits: Tulkubash, a near-term open-pit heap-leach gold operation, and Kyzyltash, a larger, longer-life underground gold deposit developed second. Silvercorp is the 70% operator; the state-owned Kyrgyzaltyn holds a 30% free-carried interest (it funds no capital and receives 30% of positive distributable cash flow).

Current status & production. Both deposits are pre-production. Tulkubash is modelled to begin producing in 2028 at ~110 koz of gold per year over a six-year open-pit heap-leach life. Kyzyltash follows in 2031 at ~200 koz per year over an 18-year underground life. From 2031 combined output reaches ~310 koz of gold per year, making Chaarat the portfolio's largest single gold producer at plateau.

Mine life. Staged and long-dated: Tulkubash ~6 years (2028–2033); Kyzyltash ~18 years (from 2031, with production through 2048 in our model), extending consolidated production into the late 2040s and giving the group its longest-life asset.

Reserve & resource summary. Tulkubash is an oxide heap-leach resource supporting ~110 koz/year; Kyzyltash is a larger refractory/underground gold system supporting ~200 koz/year for 18 years. Resource and reserve detail is set out in the NI 43-101 technical report (effective 15 October 2025, amended February 2026) and the screenshots below.

Deposit types and cost assumptions. The two deposits are geologically and operationally distinct, which is why they are mined so differently. Tulkubash is the first deposit: an oxide orebody mined as a simple open-pit heap-leach operation, low-capex and quick to bring into production, producing ~110 koz of gold per year. Its stated life is short, but we assume the mine life is extended from roughly four years to six years using the adjacent oxide resource that sits right next to it; that extension is not automatic and depends on the company receiving the necessary permits. Kyzyltash is the second deposit: a refractory sulphide orebody mined underground, larger and much longer-life, producing ~200 koz of gold per year for more than 15 years.

A note on the cost assumptions. Because the final feasibility study has not yet been published, the operating costs used here are our own assumptions: an AISC of ~US$1,400/oz on the Tulkubash oxide heap-leach ounces and ~US$1,200/oz on the Kyzyltash underground sulphide ounces. Importantly, these AISC figures do not include the Kyrgyz fiscal take: the royalty, the 20% gold-revenue tax, and the 2% local infrastructure levy have all been deducted separately, directly off revenue, rather than being loaded into the AISC. Using these AISC levels on their own, without those charges baked in, is therefore if anything conservative, since the government take is already accounted for elsewhere in the model.

Expansion plans & production profile. The asset is inherently a two-stage growth story: first cash flow from low-capex Tulkubash heap leach, then a step-change to ~310 koz/year once the larger Kyzyltash underground mine is commissioned in 2031. This is the third and final leg of the consolidated production ramp and the source of the longest-dated cash flows.

Timing of future production increases. Tulkubash initial capex is spent 2026–2027 (US$160M) for 2028 start-up; Kyzyltash capex is spent 2028–2030 (US$400M) for 2031 start-up. The 2031 Kyzyltash start is the single largest gold-production step-up in the model.

Important operational assumptions. Gold price US$4,000/oz; Tulkubash AISC ~US$1,400/oz, Kyzyltash AISC ~US$1,200/oz; total initial capex US$560M across the two stages (US$160M + US$400M); Kyrgyz fiscal regime with a combined revenue-based government take of ~29% (5% royalty, 2% sales tax, 2% local levy, 20% gold-revenue tax in lieu of profit tax), plus ~US$10M/year Kyrgyz corporate G&A embedded in the model. Silvercorp funds 100% of capital and receives 70% of positive cash flow.

Key risks. Kyrgyz jurisdiction (political, fiscal and permitting risk is the highest in the portfolio), single-commodity gold-price exposure, execution of two sequential builds, and the free-carry structure that gives 30% of upside to the state partner while Silvercorp funds all capital.

Key catalysts. Tulkubash construction and 2028 first pour, Kyzyltash development decision and 2031 start-up, resource growth across the licence, and the de-risking that comes from a low-capex heap-leach start ahead of the larger underground build.

Chaarat, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The Chaarat model projects staged gold production from Tulkubash and Kyzyltash, gold revenue, AISC-based operating costs, the Kyrgyz fiscal take, the two-stage capital profile and Silvercorp's 70% attributable free cash flow after the Kyrgyzaltyn free-carry. Source figures are in US$ millions and are converted to US$000s in the consolidated model

What the projection represents: Chaarat is the portfolio's long-life growth option. The model shows early capital outflow (2026–2030) funding two sequential builds, negative-to-modest free cash flow through the Tulkubash-only years, then a major step-up from 2031 as Kyzyltash reaches ~200 koz/year on top of Tulkubash. It contributes an attributable NPV of ~US$1,412M at 8% (~US$1,109M at 10%; ~US$355M at 20%) and ~US$4,108M of attributable life-of-mine free cash flow, the single largest source of long-dated cash generation in the company, at a project IRR of ~40%.

Consolidated Analysis

Aggregating the five assets on an attributable basis produces the consolidated Silvercorp model. Each asset's own attributable free-cash-flow line is summed (Ying at 77.5%, GC at 99%, El Domo at its ~75% post-stream JV share, Condor at ~99%, and Chaarat at 70% after the state free-carry), with fiscal periods aligned to calendar years. The result is a company whose profile transforms over the next six years from a China-centric silver producer into a diversified, multi-jurisdiction gold-and-silver group.

Consolidated production & growth profile. Today's output is dominated by Ying and GC silver. From 2027 El Domo adds copper, gold and silver; from 2029 Condor adds a large gold stream; and from 2028/2031 Chaarat's Tulkubash and Kyzyltash add a further ~110 koz rising to ~310 koz of gold per year. The company moves from ~7.5 Moz AgEq today to a materially larger, gold-weighted production base by the early 2030s, with a long plateau thereafter.

Consolidated revenue. Attributable net revenue rises from ~US$449M (2026) to ~US$1,859M (2032) and averages well over US$1B/year across the following decade, for a life-of-model total of ~US$22.8B.

Consolidated EBITDA. Attributable EBITDA scales from ~US$269M (2026) to ~US$1,224M (2032), a 4.5x increase in six years, with a life-of-model total of ~US$14.6B, reflecting the high margins of the Chinese base and the strong economics of the new gold assets.

Consolidated free cash flow. Attributable free cash flow moves from roughly break-even in 2026 (as development capital peaks) to ~US$939M by 2032, with a life-of-model total of ~US$10.4B. The crossover point, where growth capital is funded and free cash flow inflects sharply higher, is 2028–2029.

Capital allocation & balance sheet evolution. The entire development programme is funded from internal cash flow, the existing treasury, the Wheaton stream and modest existing debt. Cumulative attributable capex across the plan is ~US$1.65B, front-loaded into 2026–2030; after that, the company becomes strongly free-cash-flow generative with limited reinvestment needs, creating substantial capacity for debt reduction, dividends and buybacks. The balance sheet evolves from net-cash-funding-growth today to highly cash-generative from the early 2030s.

Cash generation. Even through the peak-investment years the group remains broadly self-funding, and by the early 2030s it generates close to US$1B of attributable free cash flow annually against a current enterprise value of ~US$1.5B, an implied free-cash-flow yield on today's EV that is extraordinary for a producer of this quality and life.

Consolidated Summary: Attributable (US$M)

Figures are attributable to Silvercorp and are static summaries of the five source models; the consolidated block sums the mine rows. NPV of this attributable free-cash-flow stream is US$6,665M at 5%, US$5,283M at 8%, US$4,578M at 10% and US$2,499M at 20%.

Consolidated, Financial Model & Projections (through 2032)

The consolidated model below builds the full company income statement and cash-flow statement from the five assets, attributable revenue, operating costs, EBITDA, depreciation, tax, capex, stream/funding adjustments and free cash flow, year by year through 2032 (and to 2048 in the full model), together with the consolidated NPV schedule.

What the projection represents: this is the whole company on one page, the sum of the parts, net of minorities, streams and free-carries. It shows the ramp from a ~US$269M-EBITDA base in 2026 to over US$1.2B by 2032, with free cash flow inflecting sharply from 2028 as El Domo, Condor and Chaarat successively come online and development capital rolls off. This consolidated free-cash-flow stream is the basis for both the FCF-multiple and NAV valuations that follow.

Valuation

Price deck. All NPV, EBITDA and free-cash-flow figures in this report, including the net asset values below, are calculated on a single long-term, flat metal-price deck: gold US$4,000/oz, silver US$60/oz, copper US$13,000/t (about US$5.90/lb), lead US$2,000/t (about US$0.91/lb) and zinc US$2,800 to 3,000/t (about US$1.27 to 1.36/lb). Silver and gold are the principal value drivers; copper is the largest by-product line at El Domo.

Dividend assumption. The model assumes Silvercorp retains its cash and pays no dividends over the forecast horizon; free cash flow is therefore stated on a pre-distribution basis, and current net cash is added back in full in both the FCF bridge and the corporate-NAV build. This is deliberate and avoids double-counting: the free-cash-flow multiple already captures the cash the business generates, so whether that cash is subsequently distributed as dividends or retained on the balance sheet does not change intrinsic value in this framework; it only shifts shareholder return between capital appreciation and income. Distributing dividends would reduce balance-sheet cash over time, but by the same amount received directly by shareholders, leaving total value unchanged. Silvercorp's actual dividend has historically been nominal, so treating it as zero is immaterial to the conclusion.

1. Free-Cash-Flow Multiple Valuation

Our primary valuation capitalises Silvercorp's normalised free cash flow at a 6x multiple. Six times free cash flow is a deliberately modest multiple for a portfolio of exceptionally long-life assets, the consolidated mine life extends beyond 20 years, and the two Chinese operations plus Chaarat's Kyzyltash alone generate cash well into the 2040s. A quality, long-life producer would ordinarily command a higher multiple; we use 6x to keep the conclusion conservative.

Step 1: Normalised free cash flow. We use the average attributable free cash flow over 2030 to 2034, the first full plateau once El Domo, Condor and Chaarat's Tulkubash are all producing and development capital has largely rolled off: (599 + 895 + 939 + 869 + 774) ÷ 5 = US$815M normalised annual attributable FCF.

Step 2: Implied Enterprise Value. Apply the 6x multiple: Implied EV = 6.0 × US$815M = US$4,891M.

Step 3: Convert EV to Equity Value. Add back cash and investments and subtract debt (the reverse of the EV bridge): Implied Equity = US$4,891M + US$422.3M cash + US$274.6M investments − US$150M debt = US$5,438M.

Step 4: Implied Market Capitalisation & per share. Equity value is the implied market capitalisation: US$5,438M ÷ 218M shares = US$24.9 per share.

Step 5: Compare to today and compute upside. Upside = US$5,438M ÷ US$1,923M − 1 = +183% (US$24.9 vs US$8.82 per share).

Sensitivity: implied equity value and upside for a range of multiples and normalised free-cash-flow assumptions (each cell adds net cash and investments of +US$546.9M to the 6x·FCF enterprise value; upside is relative to the current US$1,923M market cap). Our base case, 6x on US$815M, is highlighted. Even the most conservative combination (4x on US$700M) implies +74% upside, underscoring the asymmetry.

2. Price-to-NAV (P/NAV) Valuation

Precious-metals producers are most commonly valued on P/NAV, the ratio of market value to the discounted net asset value of the mining assets. We build a consolidated NAV from the individual mine models and then compare it to Silvercorp's current market value.

Step 1: Asset NAV. Summing the attributable, discounted mine NPVs at an 8% discount rate:

We use the consolidated model NPV of US$5,283M as our asset NAV (the small difference from the US$5,386M sum-of-parts reflects calendarisation and the consolidated JV/free-carry waterfalls). At a 10% discount rate asset NAV is US$4,578M; at 5% it is US$6,665M.

Step 2: Corporate NAV. Add net cash and investments to asset NAV: Corporate NAV = US$5,283M + US$422.3M cash + US$274.6M investments − US$150M debt = US$5,830M (US$26.7 per share).

Step 3: Current EV/NAV and P/NAV. EV / asset NAV = US$1,376M ÷ US$5,283M = 0.26x; P / NAV = US$1,923M market cap ÷ US$5,830M corporate NAV = 0.33x.

How the discount should be read: producing and development assets do not deserve the same P/NAV. Producing mines with established cash flow (Ying and GC) typically trade around 0.9x to 1.1x NAV, whereas pre-production development projects (El Domo, Condor and Chaarat) trade at a steep discount, commonly 0.3x to 0.6x NAV, until construction and ramp-up risk is removed. Applying a stage-appropriate multiple to each bucket gives a fairer read of value today than a single blended multiple:

On this stage-adjusted basis the shares are worth roughly US$17.5 to US$21 per share today (producing NAV at about 1.0x, development NAV risked at 0.4x to 0.6x, plus net cash and investments), versus US$8.82, i.e. roughly +100% to +140%. The full unrisked NAV of US$5,830M (US$26.7 per share) is not a value for today: it is what is progressively unlocked as El Domo, Condor and Chaarat are built and re-rate from development multiples toward the roughly 1.0x that producing assets command. P/NAV therefore captures the same upside as the free-cash-flow approach, but phased over the build-out. We treat the 6x free-cash-flow multiple as the primary valuation; this stage-adjusted P/NAV corroborates it and shows how the gap closes as the pipeline is de-risked.

A dynamic, not static, NAV. A further point the market appears to miss is that NAV is not fixed; it grows mechanically with time. Today's NPV is depressed by two things that reverse as the pipeline is built: the large initial development capital sits in the near term as a cash outflow that subtracts directly from NPV, and the production cash flows that offset it are still years away and therefore heavily discounted. As each project is built, that initial capex is spent and stops penalising the NPV, while the production years that follow move closer in time and are discounted far less, so the discounted value of the very same cash-flow stream rises simply because the valuation date advances. El Domo should see a material step-up in its NPV around mid-2027 as it enters production; Chaarat's Tulkubash follows in early 2028, and Condor and Kyzyltash later still. In other words, even if today's NAV already looks attractive, it is likely to increase materially as these assets mature: the re-rating from development toward producing multiples and this rising discounted NPV compound in the same direction.

3. EV/EBITDA Multiple Valuation

As a third lens we value Silvercorp at 6x EV/EBITDA. Method matters here: we do not lift a peak future year (say 2030's ~US$1,060M) and capitalise it as if that EBITDA were available today. Instead we anchor on the annual EBITDA the portfolio delivers on average over its whole life, and then show what 6x implies year by year as each year's EBITDA is actually earned.

Step 1: Annual EBITDA. Average attributable EBITDA over the full life of mine (2026–2048) is US$14,568M ÷ 23 years = ~US$633M per year, deliberately a whole-of-life annual average, not a peak-year figure.

Step 2: Implied Enterprise Value. Implied EV = 6.0 × US$633M = US$3,800M.

Step 3: Equity value and upside. Implied equity = US$3,800M + US$546.9M net cash and investments = US$4,347M, or US$19.9 per share, about +126% versus the current US$1,923M market capitalisation, corroborating the FCF-multiple and P/NAV conclusions above.

Applied year by year, the same 6x lens shows the value path as the new mines come online and each year's EBITDA arrives:

Each row adds net cash and investments of US$546.9M to 6x that year's attributable EBITDA. For reference, today's enterprise value of US$1,376M equals just 5.1x 2026 EBITDA, 3.6x 2027 and 2.0x 2028; the market is paying about two times the EBITDA the portfolio generates in its first full post-El Domo year.

Why 6x is conservative: a brand-new asset base. Three of the five assets (El Domo, Condor and Chaarat's two deposits) are completely new mines. Once construction and ramp-up risk is retired, new long-life producers do not stay at 6x: quality mid-tier precious-metals producers routinely command 8–10x EBITDA, precisely because of the mine life on offer here: Ying producing to 2041, GC to 2043, El Domo to 2038, Condor to 2041 and Chaarat to 2048 per the current technical studies.

Mine-life extension is a further, unpriced upside. Those end dates are what today's technical reports support; in practice they are floors. Mine lives in this industry are routinely extended through reserve conversion, near-mine drilling and infrastructure expansions: Ying has replaced reserves continuously for over 15 years, and GC's life is capped only by tailings capacity that can be expanded. Every year of extension adds EBITDA beyond the model; none of that optionality is in the figures above.

Corporate Costs

A point on completeness that materially strengthens the valuation: corporate overhead is already embedded in every figure in this report. Each individual mine model carries approximately US$5–10 million per year of corporate charges, covering corporate general and administrative expenses, exploration and technical-study spend, head-office costs and other recurring corporate expenditures. For example, the Ying model carries US$10M/year of exploration and technical studies, GC and Condor each carry US$5M/year, and the Chaarat model carries a US$10M/year Kyrgyz corporate G&A line plus US$30M/year of technical studies in its pre-production phase.

Because these costs are deducted within each asset's cash flows before arriving at attributable free cash flow and NPV, the consolidated NAV (US$5,283M at 8%), the normalised free-cash-flow figure (US$815M) and every derived valuation are stated after corporate overhead. No separate holding-company or corporate-G&A deduction is therefore required, and none has been applied on top of the asset values. The valuation is a fully-loaded, look-through number: what remains after the assets have paid for the corporate structure that runs them. If anything, spreading US$5–10M of overhead across each of five assets is conservative relative to a single consolidated head-office cost, so the embedded charge is unlikely to understate true corporate expense.

Investment Thesis

The following points summarise why we believe the market is mispricing Silvercorp and where the re-rating comes from.

The market is mispricing the sum of the parts. Silvercorp trades at ~0.29x EV/NAV and under 2x normalised free cash flow, versus a peer group at 0.7x–1.2x P/NAV. The market is capitalising two profitable, long-life producing mines at roughly their standalone value while ascribing almost nothing to a fully funded, high-return development pipeline worth more than US$3.4B of attributable NAV on our estimates. The company is also perceived as a China-only silver miner, a legacy framing that ignores its transformation into a diversified gold-and-silver producer across Ecuador and Central Asia. Thin institutional coverage and the recent, temporary China safety-slowdown headline have compounded the discount.

The balance sheet is worth far more than the market credits. US$422M of cash and short-term investments plus a US$275M marketable-securities portfolio, against just US$150M of convertible debt, leave Silvercorp with ~US$547M of net cash and investments, around 26% of the market capitalisation, or US$2.47 per share. This treasury is not idle: it fully funds the equity portion of the development programme, so shareholders get the growth pipeline without the dilution that normally accompanies a build of this scale. A company that can self-fund its growth from cash on hand should not trade at a deep discount to the assets that cash is building.

Future production growth creates enormous, unpriced value. El Domo (2027), Chaarat's Tulkubash (2028), Condor (2029) and Chaarat's Kyzyltash (2031) collectively lift attributable EBITDA from ~US$269M to over US$1.2B and attributable free cash flow toward ~US$939M by 2032, a 4.5x EBITDA increase in six years, funded and scheduled. Each start-up is a discrete, de-risking catalyst that converts development NAV into cash flow, the transition at which the market historically re-rates a developer's multiple upward. Three of the four come online within the next three years.

Cash generation is exceptional and durable. By the early 2030s the company generates close to US$1B of attributable free cash flow annually against a current enterprise value of ~US$1.5B, an extraordinary free-cash-flow yield on today's price. Crucially, this is not a short-lived peak: the consolidated mine life exceeds 20 years, with Ying, GC and Kyzyltash sustaining cash flow well into the 2040s. Long-life, high-margin, low-reinvestment cash flow of this kind is precisely what supports a premium multiple and a growing return of capital.

The shares can re-rate on both multiple and estimates. The re-rating is double-barrelled. As the pipeline is built, the P/NAV multiple should migrate from ~0.33x toward the 0.7x–1.2x peer range; simultaneously, free-cash-flow estimates ratchet higher each year as new mines ramp. A move to even 0.7x corporate NAV implies ~US$18.7/share (+112%); 1.0x implies ~US$26.7/share (+203%); and 6x normalised free cash flow implies ~US$24.9/share (+183%). The balance-sheet backstop limits downside while the growth pipeline provides the upside, an asymmetric setup.

Catalysts are scheduled and numerous. Near-term: resumption to full throughput at Ying/GC after the safety slowdown; El Domo construction milestones and first production in 2027; Wheaton stream drawdowns funding the build. Medium-term: Tulkubash first pour (2028); Condor construction decision, financing and 2029 first gold; reserve/resource updates across all assets. Longer-term: Kyzyltash development and 2031 start-up, taking Chaarat to ~310 koz/year. Each is a defined, value-crystallising event.

Beyond the base case: two further sources of potential upside. The valuation above deliberately takes the company as it is today, with its current asset base and capital structure. But there are two additional levers, neither of which we include in our numbers, that could push per-share value materially higher over the next few years. Both are optional and speculative; we flag them as call options on top of the thesis, not as base-case assumptions.

Optimising the capital structure. Today Silvercorp is arguably under-levered: it funds an entire multi-mine build programme from cash and cash flow while carrying only US$150M of convertible debt against a fortress balance sheet. That is prudent through the construction phase, but once the pipeline is de-risked and the assets are generating close to US$1B of free cash flow, a business of this quality and cash generation can comfortably support a larger, cheaper pool of debt. To keep growing per-share value from here, the two most powerful levers are simply more assets and more (sensibly priced) debt in the mix: using low-cost debt rather than equity to fund incremental production adds NAV per share without diluting existing holders. A modestly geared balance sheet applied to accretive, long-life assets is the classic way a cash-generative producer compounds intrinsic value per share, and it is an option Silvercorp has barely begun to use.

A potential New Pacific Metals combination, with an Ecuador divestment. The second, more speculative lever is corporate. This is not a near-term event, more likely something that could play out over roughly the next three years than today, but it is worth framing. Silvercorp already owns ~28% of New Pacific Metals, whose Bolivian silver assets (Silver Sand and Carangas) are large, high-grade and, on their own, capital-hungry to build. One logical path is for Silvercorp and New Pacific to combine into a single, larger silver-and-gold vehicle. The attraction runs both ways. New Pacific’s assets would gain access to Silvercorp’s cheap, self-generated financing and operating capability instead of having to fund construction through dilution or convertibles at the project stage; Silvercorp, in turn, would be adding large, high-grade silver ounces with a low build cost relative to their potential annual output, feeding a step-up in group production.

Alongside such a deal, the cleanest way to fund and focus the enlarged company would be to divest the Ecuadorian assets, which are the smaller, more capital-intensive part of the portfolio, and redeploy that value into the larger silver base. The combined group would end up bigger, more liquid, more silver-weighted and better financed, and if the market rewarded that scale and financing advantage with a higher multiple, the per-share re-rating on top of the standalone thesis could be significant. We stress again that this is optional and uncertain, and none of it is in our numbers.

Risks

Jurisdiction risk. Silvercorp's cash flow is concentrated in China and its growth is concentrated in Ecuador and the Kyrgyz Republic. The June 2026 safety-driven slowdown at Ying and GC illustrates Chinese regulatory risk; Ecuador carries permitting, tax and community/social risk; and the Kyrgyz Republic is the highest-risk jurisdiction in the portfolio, with fiscal (a ~29% revenue-based government take), political and permitting exposure, and a 30% state free-carry at Chaarat.

Execution & construction risk. The thesis depends on building four new mines (El Domo, Condor, Tulkubash, Kyzyltash) largely in parallel. Cost overruns, commissioning delays or ramp-up shortfalls would defer cash flow, raise capital intensity and compress returns. Condor and Kyzyltash carry the largest single capital commitments.

Commodity-price risk. Our models use a long-term deck of US$4,000/oz gold, US$60/oz silver, US$13,000/t copper and US$2,000–3,000/t base metals. These prices are elevated versus long-run history; a sustained downturn would reduce revenue, NAV and free cash flow materially. The shift toward gold (Condor, Chaarat) increases gold-price sensitivity over time, partly offset by the silver/base-metal and copper diversification.

Model & assumption risk. The valuation relies on technical-report inputs (reserves, grades, recoveries, costs, capex) and on the aggregation of five separate models into one attributable stream. Changes to reserves, recoveries or cost assumptions at feasibility/execution stage would flow directly into NAV and free cash flow.

Financing & stream risk. While the programme is fundable from internal resources, adverse markets could force reliance on debt or equity on less favourable terms. The Wheaton stream at El Domo permanently diverts a share of precious-metal revenue, and any additional streams or royalties would further encumber cash flow.

Discount-rate & re-rating risk. At an 8% base discount rate the NAV is US$5,283M; at 10% it is US$4,578M. A higher required return, appropriate given the jurisdictional mix, reduces NAV. The re-rating thesis also assumes the market ultimately credits the pipeline; if coverage stays thin and the China perception persists, the discount could take longer to close than we expect.

Investment Summary & Conclusion

Silvercorp Metals is a rare combination in the precious-metals space: a profitable, cash-generative producer today, a fully funded and transformational growth pipeline for tomorrow, and a fortress balance sheet that de-risks the journey between the two. The market values the whole company at an enterprise value of ~US$1.5B, roughly 0.29x the US$5.28B attributable NAV of its assets and under 2x normalised free cash flow, while ignoring ~US$547M of net cash and investments and ascribing little value to four new mines scheduled to lift attributable EBITDA to over US$1.2B and free cash flow toward US$939M by 2032.

Our two independent valuation approaches converge on a value far above the current price. Capitalising normalised attributable free cash flow of US$815M at a conservative 6x implies an equity value of US$5,438M, or US$24.9 per share (+183%). A re-rating of corporate NAV (US$5,830M, US$26.7/share) toward the 0.7x–1.2x range at which quality producers trade implies US$18.7–26.7 per share (+112% to +203%). Both frameworks are stated after the corporate overhead embedded in every mine model, so no further adjustment is required.

On my two frameworks, fair value sits at roughly US$24.6 per share on 6x normalised free cash flow, with a P/NAV re-rating range of US$18.5–26.4 per share; even a partial re-rating to ~0.7x corporate NAV implies ~US$18.5 (C$25.3). As El Domo, Tulkubash, Condor and Kyzyltash come online over 2027–2031, I would expect both the multiple and the estimates to re-rate, with the balance sheet limiting downside throughout.

Mineral Resources & Reserves by Project

The tables below summarise the mineral reserve and resource base underpinning each model, as reported in the relevant NI 43-101 technical reports. Physical tonnes, grades and contained metal are independent of the price deck; the recovered-metal figures reflect each mine plan. Resources are reported inclusive of reserves unless stated. In several cases the measured and indicated resource is materially larger than the mine-plan reserve, which is the source of mine-life and production upside beyond the figures modelled in this report.

Ying Mining District (77.5% attributable). Per the 2026 AMC NI 43-101 technical report, Proven and Probable Reserves are 19.08 Mt grading 174 g/t silver, 0.17 g/t gold, 2.47% lead and 0.80% zinc, a 50% increase in tonnes versus the prior report, supporting production to about 2042 at peak throughput above 1.6 Mt per year. Measured and Indicated Resources are 42.18 Mt at 146 g/t silver, 0.17 g/t gold, 2.24% lead and 0.67% zinc, with a further 13.55 Mt Inferred. Reserves are under half of M&I tonnes, so there is a long resource-to-reserve conversion runway. The mine plan modelled here recovers roughly 98 Moz of silver over life, plus substantial lead and zinc.

GC / Gaocheng (99% attributable). Per the SRK technical report effective 31 December 2025, Measured and Indicated Resources are 18.3 Mt at 65 g/t silver, 0.91% lead and 2.24% zinc, containing 38.3 Moz silver, 167 kt lead and 408 kt zinc, with M&I tonnes up 59% versus 2024. The 18-year mine plan modelled here processes roughly 6.2 Mt (about one-third of the M&I resource), so the balance of the resource represents direct mine-life and throughput upside, particularly if the tailings-storage-facility expansion proceeds.

El Domo / Curipamba (~75% economic). Per the SRK technical report (May 2026), the high-grade VMS mine plan feeds roughly 8.6 Mt through a 666 ktpa plant over 13 years. Life-of-mine contained metal is approximately 582 koz gold, 11.0 Moz silver, 138 kt copper, 188 kt zinc and 18 kt lead (before the Wheaton stream). El Domo is small in tonnage but exceptionally high grade, and the wider Curipamba licence remains prospective for satellite discoveries.

Condor (~99% attributable). Per the SRK technical report effective 30 November 2025 (updated resource focused on the high-grade underground zones), the 1,800 ktpa mine plan feeds roughly 21.3 Mt over 13 years. Life-of-mine contained metal is approximately 1.47 Moz gold and 9.7 Moz silver, of which about 1.375 Moz gold is payable. The Zamora Chinchipe holdings remain prospective and a revised study could expand the mineable inventory.

Chaarat: Tulkubash & Kyzyltash (70% attributable). Per the NI 43-101 technical report (effective 15 October 2025, amended February 2026), the project hosts two gold deposits: Tulkubash, an oxide open-pit heap-leach operation, and Kyzyltash, a larger underground gold system. The combined mine plan modelled here produces roughly 4.26 Moz of gold over life (about 0.66 Moz from Tulkubash over six years and about 3.6 Moz from Kyzyltash over eighteen years). Kyzyltash is the larger, longer-life resource and carries the most exploration and expansion potential in the portfolio.

Kuanping satellite: upside not separately valued. Beyond the five modelled assets, Silvercorp is advancing the Kuanping project, a permitted silver-lead-zinc-gold satellite roughly 33 km north of the Ying Mining District, acquired at auction in 2021 for about US$8M and held 77.5% through Henan Found. Kuanping is being developed as an underground mine whose ore will be trucked to and processed at the existing Ying mill complex, so it requires little standalone processing or infrastructure capital; mine construction is already underway, with ramp development, exploration tunnelling and drilling ongoing. Exploration has defined six silver-lead-zinc vein structures plus one gold-silver vein (the main K3 and K4 veins remain open along strike and down-dip), and the deposit has now been incorporated into the 2026 Ying NI 43-101 as a mine start-up. The upside is twofold: Kuanping adds incremental, low-capital, high-margin feed that leverages spare capacity at the Ying plant, helping to sustain the roughly 1.6 Mt per year throughput and extend the district's mine life; and because our valuation credits Kuanping only to the extent it already sits within the Ying reserve, any further resource growth at Kuanping, or from the wider Ying district exploration programme, is upside to the numbers in this report rather than something we have paid for.

Note: reserve and resource figures are as reported by Silvercorp in the respective NI 43-101 technical reports; contained-metal totals are stated at the reported project basis and should be read against the ownership interests noted for each asset. Silvercorp's fiscal year ends 31 March; project years elsewhere in this report are shown on the approximated calendar-year basis described in the note on periods.