Earlier this month, a Hernando County jury convicted Jeffrey Crum of first-degree murder, among others, for killing Jennifer Odom.

The State sought the death penalty, so the case then proceeded to the penalty phase.

On Tuesday, after the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended that Crum be sentenced to death:

Before reaching its sentencing recommendation, the jury unanimously found that the State proved all five aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt:

After the jury’s recommendation, the State Attorney’s Office issued a press release about the result:

As the press release says, a hearing is scheduled for October 21.

Under Florida’s current capital sentencing statute, the trial court has the discretion to impose a sentence of life without parole rather than death despite the jury’s recommendation.

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Scheduling Order

Shortly after the Governor issued the death warrant, the Florida Supreme Court issued its standard scheduling order for warrant-related litigation, which sets forth the following schedule:

• Circuit court proceedings completed: 11:00 a.m., Friday, September 11, 2026.

• Notice of appeal and any writ petition filed: 1:30 p.m., Friday, September 11, 2026.

• Initial Brief: 2:00 p.m., Monday, September 14, 2026.

• Answer Brief: 5:00 p.m., Tuesday, September 15, 2026.

• Reply Brief: 2:00 p.m., Wednesday, September 16, 2026.

The warrant and scheduling order are currently unavailable on the Court’s docket.

Background

Curtis Beasley was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1995 murder of Carolyn Monfort.

Trial and Direct Appeal

The Florida Supreme Court outlined the underlying facts as follows:

On August 24, 1995, Jane O’Toole, who had not heard from her mother, Mrs. Monfort, for two days, traveled to her mother’s home in Dundee, Florida, to make sure that she was alright. Several morning newspapers lay in their wrappers outside the house. While searching through the home, Jane found her mother’s body in the blood-stained laundry room. Mrs. Monfort had been severely beaten and was dead.

The last time that Jane spoke to her mother was on August 21, 1995. On that day, Mrs. Monfort, who worked in real estate, had dressed in business clothes in anticipation of her Monday morning meeting. The defendant, Curtis Beasley (“Beasley”), was there, dressed for work. Mrs. Monfort knew Beasley through her daughter’s former husband, with whom Beasley had attended high school. Beasley was staying at Mrs. Monfort’s house for a few days, while doing some pressure washing and painting at the Lake Marie Apartments (the “apartments”). The apartments were owned by Mrs. Monfort’s son-in-law, Neal O’Toole (Jane’s husband), and managed by Mrs. Monfort.

. . . At th[e] time, . . . Beasley had no transportation of his own. For this reason, he had recently been staying as a guest in the Monfort home, so that Mrs. Monfort could drive Beasley to and from work at the apartments. Dale Robinson had the impression that Beasley spent the night at Mrs. Monfort’s house and remained at Benson’s home during the day. . . . Beasley apparently spent the night of the 20th at the Monfort home, because he was there at 8 a.m. the next morning, when the housekeeper, Mrs. Ferguson, came to clean the house. . . .

Later on the 21st, Jane called her mother and arranged for Beasley to help Jane move some of her grandmother’s furniture. Mrs. Monfort had transported Beasley to work at the apartments at about 8:20 a.m. that day, and he returned to the Monfort home sometime in the late morning, after the housekeeper had left for the day. Jane picked Beasley up before noon (he was by himself at the Monfort home at that time), and he helped her move the furniture. In the process of this furniture move, Beasley told Jane that he would be in Alabama the following week to take care of an inheritance. He also asked Jane for some money. She replied that she had only a few dollars with her, but that her husband would pay him (for pressure washing the apartments) later. After the work had been completed, Jane drove Beasley back to the Monfort home around noon. Again, no one else was at home at that time.

The evidence demonstrated that, until 7:01 p.m. on the evening of August 21, phone calls were being made from the Monfort residence. These phone calls, including some to the United Kingdom, were made to people Beasley knew, but Mrs. Monfort did not know. A newspaper lying on the coffee table in Mrs. Monfort’s living room had one of those telephone numbers written on it in Beasley’s handwriting.

The evidence established that, after Mrs. Monfort had transported Beasley to the apartments on the 21st, she went to her business meeting at 9 a.m. Later that day, she met with Mr. Rosario, a prospective tenant at the apartments, at 2 p.m. At 5 p.m., she again met with Mr. Rosario at the apartments. He gave her a deposit (first and last month’s rent) in the form of eight $100 bills, and another $100 for a bedroom set which Mrs. Monfort sold to him. She wrote a receipt for the money, a copy of which appeared in the receipt book later found in her car. She left the apartments sometime between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. That was the last time Mrs. Monfort was seen until the discovery of her body on August 24.

It was Mrs. Monfort’s habit, between 6 and 8 p.m. on week days, to prepare and consume one or two drinks before dinner. These would always contain vodka and tonic, with either a lime twist or a lemon twist. When Mrs. Monfort’s body was discovered, a drinking glass with a lime twist was found at her feet. Two empty tonic water bottles were in the kitchen garbage can, which the housekeeper had emptied earlier in the day. There were no other signs of food preparation in the house.

Sometime between 8:30 and 10 p.m. that night, Beasley drove Mrs. Monfort’s car to Haines City to visit Dale Robinson. At that time, Beasley was driving a light-colored car (either white or blue), which he told Robinson belonged to a lady friend Beasley was working for, and at whose house he had stayed a few nights. . . .

The next day, Beasley arrived at a bus station in Miami. He no longer had Mrs. Monfort’s car with him . . . . He told Mrs. Malcolm that he was vacationing in Miami after having visited unidentified friends in Fort Myers. He stayed with Mrs. Malcolm for a few days, then was permitted to stay at the house of Mr. Malcolm’s mother (Mrs. Bennis) while she was away for two weeks. During this time, phone calls began to appear on Mrs. Bennis’s bill to some of the same numbers (including calls to the United Kingdom) that had appeared on Mrs. Monfort’s bill on August 21. The phone numbers belonged to persons known to Beasley but not to Mrs. Bennis.

During this period of time, Mrs. Monfort’s body was discovered. She had been bludgeoned to death with a blunt instrument. Near her body was a bloody hammer head, wrapped in two dish towels. The head of the hammer protruded through the fabric of one towel. The hammer head had been broken off of its handle, which also lay near the body. Mrs. Monfort had some hairs in her right hand. There was blood on the floor, blood splattered everywhere in the laundry room, blood splattered in the dining room near the laundry room door, and some apparent blood smeared on the laundry room door frame. An earring was found in the dining room, lying next to a table leg. Mrs. Monfort’s purse was near her feet, and she was dressed in the same business clothes she had worn to work on the morning of August 21.

. . . .

After Mrs. Monfort’s body was discovered, an investigation of the crime scene was conducted. The only rooms which appeared to have been disturbed were the dining room, the utility (or laundry) room, and the garage. The investigators testified that they did not look under the beds in either the master bedroom or the guest room. All of the beds were made, and the master bed had folded linens on it, suggesting that no one had slept in the house after the housekeeper had cleaned. Photographs of the interior of the home demonstrated that, other than the three disturbed areas, the remainder of the home appeared to be in impeccable order. The garage door was closed, and Mrs. Monfort’s car was missing. The $100 bills Rosario had given to Mrs. Monfort were gone.

Beasley had also disappeared from the premises, but he had left behind a box of his business cards and a box of Doral cigarettes in the guest bedroom. He also left a shaving kit and a can of shaving cream on the back of the toilet fixture in the guest bathroom.1

After an investigation, officers looked for Beasley, who “was eventually found in Alabama, living in a motel with Jeff Ellis. Beasley had grown a beard, and was working at Herndon Electric Company under the false identity of ‘William Benson.’”2 When police found Beasley, “he identified himself as Curtis Wilkie Beasley, and offered no resistance.” While in custody, “Beasley told Jones that he knew he was in trouble because, when he had gone back to the house, it was surrounded by FBI agents. Beasley said that after he saw the FBI agents he left.”

A Polk County jury convicted Beasley of first-degree murder, among other charges. After a penalty phase, “the jury recommended death by a vote of ten to two. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation, sentencing Beasley to death for the homicide . . . .”3

On direct appeal, Beasley raised seven claims:

(1) the trial court erred in denying Beasley's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence; (2) Beasley's conviction for first degree murder (based either on premeditation or felony murder) is not supported by competent, substantial evidence; (3) the trial court erred in denying Beasley's request to invoke the rule of sequestration as to the victim's daughter and son, who were key witnesses in the case; (4) the trial court erred in finding the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance; (5) the trial court erred in finding the pecuniary gain/course of robbery aggravating circumstance; (6) the trial court erred in rejecting, as mitigating factors, Beasley's poor/rural background, the death of Beasley's father, Beasley's expressions of sorrow regarding the victim's death and gratitude for her kindness (coupled with his continued claim of innocence), and Beasley's claim of good behavior during the trial; and (7) Beasley's death sentence is not proportionate.4

In October 2000, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Beasley’s convictions and death sentence.

Initial Postconviction

On January 17, 2002, Beasley filed his initial motion for postconviction relief.5 After various amendments, Beasley ultimately raised the following claims:

Claim One—Ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial for failing to adequately investigate persons disclosed by discovery, failing to assert proper objections, and failing to otherwise adequately test the State's case; Claim Two—Ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of trial for failing to adequately investigate and prepare additional mitigating evidence, failing to present adequate evidence in support of mitigating circumstances raised, and failing to challenge the State's case; Claim Three—Improper jury contact denied Beasley the constitutional protection that all communications with the jury would be conducted in Beasley's presence; Claim Four—Florida's lethal-injection protocol is unconstitutional; Claim Five—Florida's capital-sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied for failing to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; and Claim Six—Cumulative error by counsel deprived Beasley of a fair trial.6

After an evidentiary hearing on some of the claims, the circuit court denied relief on all claims. On appeal, Beasley challenged the denial of claims 1-3. In July 2009, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of these claims, finding that Beasley did not show deficient performance or prejudice on any claim. Justice Pariente concurred, writing about the applicable legal standards.

Hurst Relief

After Hurst,7 Beasley filed a successive motion for postconviction relief seeking relief based on the jury’s nonunanimous recommendation for death. In January 2018, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of that motion because Beasley’s death sentence became final too early.8 Justices Pariente, Lewis, and Canady concurred in result.

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Yesterday, Conahan filed his Consolidated Initial Brief, which is not currently available on the docket. The State’s Answer Brief is due today at 5:00 p.m.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Conahan’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Previously pending litigation

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Also at the press conference, the State Attorney announced that the indictment indicates prosecutors will seek the death penalty under Florida’s 2025 legislation that directs that any illegal alien who is convicted of first-degree murder is automatically subject to the death penalty:

The indictment issued last month cites this statute:

In June, Islam pled not guilty. A revised indictment filed earlier this month includes additional charges but still cites the illegal alien statute on Count I:

From what I can tell, this is the first case in which prosecutors are seeking the death penalty under Florida’s illegal alien statute. There were two prior cases that did not proceed under this statute:

• Zsolt Zsolyomi was charged with second-degree murder in Miami-Dade County and, therefore, not subject to the statute.

• Ronald Andrade was convicted of first-degree murder in Miami-Dade County, but proseuctors did not proceed under this statute.

Note that Lake County was also the first jurisdiction to seek the death penalty under Florida’s child sex crime statute in 2023.

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Denial of Final Claims

On Friday, Silvia, through his attorneys, filed a petition for writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition presented the following question:

Silvia also filed an application for stay of execution.

As of 9:00 this morning, the petition was still pending. Around 10:30 this morning, the Court denied the petition and application.

Information About the Execution

The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) held its standard briefing schedule. The briefing schedule was not posted until this afternoon—later than usual.

At the 3:30 briefing, DOC reported that Silvia woke up at 6:00 a.m. He had a last meal of a burger, french fries, onion rings, dark chocolate, and root beer. He did not have any visitors today but did meet with a spiritual advisor. (Information from the 3:30 briefing provided by John Koch.)

According to John Koch, Silvia’s final words were:

DOC reports that Silvia’s time of death was 6:11 p.m.

USA Today reported that the victim’s mother, Betty Woodward, who was shot but survived when Silvia killed her daughter, his estranged wife, witnessed the execution.

After the execution, the victim’s family spoke. The victim’s sister said Silvia’s actions changed the lives of everyone who loved her, most significantly her mother who was significantly wounded during Silvia’s crimes.

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TFDP Prior Coverage of Silvia’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Emergency Motion to Modify Schedule

• Postconviction claims denied

• Appeal filed

• Florida Supreme Court denial

2026 Executions

Below is a map of where the crimes occurred that led to the 2026 executions. The relevant county is also where the execution-related litigation is venued in each case.

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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On July 30, after Gov. DeSantis signed Lucas’s death warrant, the State filed a motion for scheduling order in the circuit court.

The next day, the circuit court held a case management conference, which Mr. Lucas attended. Mr. Lucas’s counsel told the court that Mr. Lucas does not intend “to litigate []his death warranty.” The court then proceeded with a colloquy with Mr. Lucas regarding his waiver. In answering the court’s questions, Mr. Lucas indicated he’s currently taking medication for high blood pressure, diabetes, and thyroid. He is not currently taking medication related to mental illness and has never been diagnosed with mental illness.

The court then asked Lucas about his intent to waive:

Further:

Lucas also waived all federal habeas litigation.

As the court’s inquiries continued, Lucas said: “I just want it ended. I want it over with.” When asked why he waived, Lucas said he has “no desire to carry this any further”:

Later, Lucas asked the court to confirm he will be executed on September 1:

Lucas’s attorney then said that he does “not have concerns about [Lucas’s] competency going forward.” His counsel also reiterated that the legal team has been litigating Silvia’s and Lucas’s warrant simultaneously, to which the State responded and said that Lucas’s waiver “was independent of any concern” for his legal team litigating both warrants and that “Mr. Lucas is doing this because of his own free will.”

The court clarified for the record that Lucas understands his execution will proceed if he waives all claims:

Further:

On August 4, the court entered an order granting Lucas’s motion to dismiss all pending proceedings and waiving appellate review.

The court determined that Lucas was competent to make the waiver and that “[t]here is no reason or need for a further competency evaluation.” The court further found the waiver to be made “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”

Consistent with Lucas’s waiver, no appeal has been filed.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Lucas’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

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When Gov. DeSantis signed Daniel Conahan’s death warrant this week, he had claims pending in the circuit court. In July 2023, Conahan filed a third successive motion for postconviction relief asserting newly discovered evidence, which the circuit court denied just a month ago. Relatedly, Conahan was still litigating a motion for postconviction DNA testing and requests for public records that were unresolved. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing in August 2025.

On Wednesday, Conahan’s attorneys filed a motion at the Florida Supreme Court to modify the briefing schedule set after the Governor signed his death warrant, arguing that the current schedule does not provide enough “time to adequately address” Conahan’s pending claims or to conduct DNA testing, therefore creating a “grave risk that Mr. Conahan will be denied adequate process to which he is entitled and the State will execute an innocent man.”

Conahan also filed a motion to stay. The State responded to both motions.

On Wednesday, the Court entered a one-line Order denying Conahan’s motion to modify the briefing schedule. On Friday, the Court entered a one-line Order denying Conahan’s motion to stay. Justice Labarga voted that he would grant the stay.

Also on Friday, the circuit court entered an Order denying Conahan’s third successive motion for postconviction relief. The Order said that the Court was not aware of the pending motion until reviewing the court file in relation to Conahan’s DNA motion. The motion raised two claims: (1) newly discovered evidence based on “a new expert witness who asserts that certain injuries sustained by the victim . . . were inflicted after his death” and were, therefore, improperly considered as aggravation; (2) newly discovered evidence based on “a new expert witness to challenge the significance of fiber and paint chip comparison analysis” used in establishing his guilt.

On the first claim, the court found the claim is untimely because the evidence underlying the expert’s opinion has existed since trial. The Court also found that the claim failed on the merits because it would not have “resulted in a different outcome.”

On the second claim, the court found that the claim was procedurally barred because it was previously raised, litigated, and denied.

Conahan has appealed the ruling. You can view the filings in that case on the Court’s docket here.

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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First, the Court agreed with the circuit court that Silvia had waived all postconviction. However, because the State “agreed that Silvia could raise certain claims ‘solely attributing to the execution process,’” the Court addressed those claims.

As to Silvia’s claim “concerning the timing of the warrant and its impact on CCRC-M’s ability to effectively assist him while already assisting another defendant under an active death warrant, Occhicone,” the Court held that Silvia’s “statutory right to counsel was satisfied by the appointment of CCRC-M” and “CCRC-M did not cease being competent to handle postconviction proceedings because it was simultaneously representing two defendants under active warrants.”

The Court further rejected Silvia’s due process claim and claim regarding the Governor’s “absolute discretion” in signing death warrants based on prior decisions on similar claims.

As to Silvia’s claim challenging the circuit court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on his claim regarding the State’s shortage of etomidate, the Court found no error, writing: “Silvia’s claim based on his fears that his rights might be violated by a possible shortage of, or expired supply of, etomidate by FDOC—based on a pharmaceutical industry report that does not discuss FDOC or its supply of etomidate—is speculative and does not state a sufficient claim warranting an evidentiary hearing.” (Footnote omitted.) Further, “[a]s to Silvia’s policy arguments suggesting FDOC should donate its supply of etomidate (notwithstanding his suspicions that it is expired),” the Court said it is “neither a policymaker, nor is its role to ‘micromanage the executive branch in fulfilling its own duties relating to executions.’”

Justice Labarga concurred in result without an opinion.

Justice Tananbaum concurred in result with an opinion, writing that he would affirm the circuit court’s decision based on Silvia’s waiver alone. He further wrote about the purpose of Florida’s postconviction rule to “streamline” postconviction litigation and argued that the Court should significantly narrow this type of litigation going forward:

Those rules did not, and could not, create a new, substantive right of action to hold a state officer to account for how he implements a sentence the trial court imposes. Such an action, pursued in a criminal proceeding, makes no sense anyway—there being no corrections officer named as a defendant and subject to the court’s jurisdiction. Claims under these rules, in turn, ought not go any further than the writs they replaced. That is, a post-conviction claim still must be focused on whether the judgment or sentence is valid and legal based on facts arising prior to their entry. Indeed, the text in both rules still references vacating the “judgment and sentence”—and not a civil remedy having nothing to do with the validity of those final orders. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d), (e)(1), (2).

In 1990, this court simply ignored its long stretch of decisional history and tradition and “held” that a defendant’s rule 3.850 (a precursor to what became the separate rule for death sentences, rule 3.851) claim based on mistakes in the carrying out of another condemned prisoner’s otherwise constitutional death sentence was not procedurally barred—with a wink and a nod stating that the “claim rests primarily upon facts which occurred only recently.” Buenoano v. State, 565 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1990). In other words, the court, with no analysis, treated new, post-judgment facts as newly discovered evidence that could support an otherwise procedurally barred claim under the post-conviction-relief rules.

Doing this, the court, without authority, effectively expanded the rule’s scope to include a new substantive right of action to remedy claimed improper executive function. It is likely no coincidence that, after Buenoano, this court almost exclusively has cited to federal civil rights cases for the supposed constitutional standard to be applied in these method-of-execution claims brought under rule 3.851, especially to Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015). See id. at 867 (noting that review came in connection with civil rights suit filed under title 42, section 1983, of the United States Code); see also Asay v. State, 224 So. 3d 695, 701 (Fla. 2017) (relying on Glossip to set out the “condemned prisoner’s” burden of proof, based on current facts, to challenge the constitutionality of death sentence implementation under rule 3.851); see generally Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (review of state declaratory judgment suit against prison officials regarding implementation of death sentences); Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119 (2019) (review of method-of-execution challenge brought via civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (same).

This approach is based on a false equivalency. There is a substantive difference between a federal civil rights action—a statutory action to remedy post-sentence conduct by state officials who are subject to the court’s jurisdiction—and a post-conviction proceeding, which exists as a matter of substantive common-law to challenge the judgment and sentence itself, within the same criminal proceeding brought against the defendant, based on facts pre-dating those orders.

Simply put, absent a statute, this court has no authority to expand rule 3.851’s reach to allow the equivalent of a section 1983 suit. Moreover, this court consistently has overlooked the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that “imposition of the death penalty presupposes a means of carrying it out.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644. A challenge to “a particular means of effectuating a sentence of death does not directly call into question the ‘fact’ or ‘validity’ of the sentence itself,” because a state could “alter[] its method of execution” and “go forward with the sentence”—meaning such a challenge would be beyond the province of a post-conviction motion. Id. To properly challenge a death sentence as illegal, in turn, the post-conviction motion would have to challenge the whole way the State carries out its death sentences, e.g., by challenging the entire statutorily established lethal injection regime as cruel and unusual punishment. Cf. id. at 644–45 (suggesting this kind of argument “may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself”).

He then argues that warrant-related claims like those raised by Silvia are “frivolous”:

Of course, lethal injection repeatedly has been held to be an acceptable means of execution, and the defendant does not make such a challenge here. Instead, the defendant’s counsel brings forward frivolous claims that have nothing to do with the validity of the judgment and sentence—which the defendant long ago accepted as final when he waived his post-conviction claims.

Until this court returns to how it historically handled post-conviction claims, as described above, we will continue to receive frivolous claims like what we have here, ostensibly under the false justification that “death is different.” Rule 3.851(h) is useful to expedite what should be the rare, last-minute challenge to the validity of a judgment and sentence. But too many collateral counsel view it instead as an invitation to file something—anything, even if frivolous—just because the Governor has signed a warrant.

The warrant is supposed to mark the end of the road for a defendant on death row, not the beginning of one last attack on how the State implements its otherwise lawful sentences of death. We should not allow “method of execution” claims to be entertained under rule 3.851 unless the entire sentencing regime is challenged as being cruel and unusual. The defendant did not assert such a claim below (though he also previously waived it anyway), so the summary denial was warranted, there being no jurisdiction to consider the claims asserted.

The full Opinion can be downloaded from the Court’s docket here.

As of this post, no petition has been docketed at the U.S. Supreme Court.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Silvia’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Emergency Motion to Modify Schedule

• Postconviction claims denied

• Appeal filed

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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Scheduling Order

Shortly after the death warrant was issued, the Florida Supreme Court issued its standard scheduling order setting the following schedule for warrant litigation:

• Friday, August 21, at 11:00 a.m.: circuit court proceedings completed

• Friday, August 21, at 1:30 p.m.: notice of appeal and any writ petition filed

• Monday, August 24, at 2:00 p.m.: initial brief due

• Tuesday, August 25, at 5:00 p.m.: answer brief due

• Wednesday, August 26, at 2:00 p.m.: reply brief due

Background

Conahan was convicted of killing Richard Montgomery in 1996. The Supreme Court of Florida set out the underlying facts as follows:

On April 16, 1996, Richard Montgomery, who lived with his sister, was with Bobby Whitaker, Gary Mason, and other friends when he mentioned that he was going out to make a few hundred dollars and would be back shortly. When asked whether it was legal, he smiled. Montgomery also told his mother that someone had offered to pay him $200 to pose for nude pictures, but he did not tell her who made the offer. In the same conversation, Montgomery mentioned that he had recently met the defendant Daniel O. Conahan, Jr., who lived in Punta Gorda Isles and was a nurse at a medical center. The last time friends saw Montgomery alive was on April 16 between 4 p.m. and 7 p.m.

The next day, April 17, Thomas Reese and Michael Tish, who were storm utility engineers for Charlotte County, discovered a human skull in a remote, heavily wooded area off of Highway 41 and immediately notified the police department. While searching the scene, deputies found the nude body of a young, white male that was later identified as Richard Montgomery. He had visible signs of trauma to the neck, waist, and wrists, and the genitalia had been removed. The forensic lab personnel arrived and collected various items from the scene, including a rope found on the top of a nearby trash pile, carpet padding that covered the victim’s body, a skull and a torso (neither of which belonged to the victim), a gray coat, and various combings from the victim’s arms, hands, chest, pubic area, and thighs. On the following day, Deputy Todd Terrell arrived on the scene with a K–9 dog which showed significant interest in a sabal palm tree, specifically the side of the tree which was somewhat flattened and damaged.

An autopsy revealed that Montgomery died as a result of strangulation. He had two ligature marks on the front of his neck, two horizontal marks on the right side of his chest, and abraded grooves around his wrists. All of the grooves were of similar width, did not extend to Montgomery’s back, and were consistent with marks that would be left on an individual who had been tied to a tree.

Due to the unique nature of the homicide (being tied to a tree naked and then strangled), police reviewed a similar assault reported on August 15, 1994. The victim, Stanley Burden, was a high school drop-out who, like Montgomery, had difficulty keeping a steady job and had physical features similar to those of Montgomery. The report indicated that Burden met Conahan, who offered to pay him $100 to $150 to pose for nude photographs. Burden agreed and Conahan drove him to a rocky dirt road in a secluded area where Conahan pulled out a duffle bag with a tarp and a Polaroid camera. The two men headed into the woods where Conahan laid the tarp out and asked Burden to take off his shirt and show a little hip. After taking numerous pictures of Burden, Conahan then took out a new package of clothesline so he could get some bondage pictures. He asked Burden to step close to a nearby tree and then clipped the clothesline in several pieces, draping them over Burden to make it look like bondage. Conahan moved behind Burden, snapped the rope tightly around him, pulled his hands behind the tree, placed ropes around his legs and chest, and wrapped the rope twice around Burden’s neck. Conahan then performed oral sex on Burden and attempted to sodomize him. Burden fought to position himself in the middle of the tree while Conahan tried to pull him to the side to have anal sex. After many unsuccessful attempts, Conahan snapped the rope around Burden’s neck, placed his foot against the tree, and pulled on the rope in an attempt to strangle Burden, who tried to slide around the tree to keep his windpipe open. Conahan hit Burden in the head and unsuccessfully attempted to strangle him for thirty minutes. Conahan asked Burden why he would not die and finally gave up, gathered his possessions, and left. Burden freed himself, went to a local hospital, and received treatment for his injuries. The police located the crime scene and found that one of the melaleuca trees had ligature indentions that corresponded with Burden’s injuries.

Based on this information, the police began an undercover investigation of Conahan. . . .

On May 31, 1996, pursuant to a warrant, the police searched Conahan’s residence and vehicles and obtained paint samples from his father’s Mercury Capri, which Conahan occasionally used. The police then compared paint samples from the Capri with a paint chip from the victim’s body and found that they were indistinguishable.1

Trial and Direct Appeal

At trial, “Conahan waived his right to trial by jury” for the guilt phase.2 “After a bench trial, Conahan was found guilty of the first-degree premeditated murder and kidnapping of Richard Montgomery. The penalty phase was conducted on November 1, 1999, before a jury.”3 After the penalty phase, the jury unanimously recommended death.4 The trial court then sentenced Conahan to death.

On direct appeal, Conahan raised five issues. In his first two issues, Conahan argued “that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State's circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient.”5 Third, Conahan argued “that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the following two aggravating factors: (1) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); and (2) the murder was committed during the course of a kidnapping.”6 Fourth, Conahan argued “that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial by making improper comments in both his opening and closing statements to the jury in the penalty phase of the trial.”7 The first comment at issue was the following comment by the prosecutor during his opening statement at the penalty phase:

[PROSECUTOR]: The evidence will further show that the motive, the why that this crime occurred, again, to move from the mind of the Defendant Daniel Conahan to actually say that is he began to put it into plan, put the plan into effect in 1994, that is he moved beyond a reasonable doubt thinking about this fantasy to attempting to act it out.

The evidence will show in 1994, the Defendant while cruising Lyons Park in South Fort Myers-

On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that the “the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to comment upon Conahan's attempted murder and attempted sexual battery of Stanley Burden in its opening statement to the penalty phase jury.”8 The Court explained: “The trial court had the admissibility of that very evidence under advisement. Accordingly, it was improper for the State to comment in its opening statement upon evidence that was under advisement and which was ultimately determined to be inadmissible in the penalty phase of the trial.”9 However, the Court determined that the error was harmless and, therefore, Conahan was not entitled to relief.

As to the statements at issue in the prosecutor’s closing, the Court found no error.

Finally, for his fifth issue, Conahan argued “that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting inflammatory autopsy photos and certain photos from the crime scene.”10

The Court denied Conahan relief on all claims and affirmed his conviction and death sentence. Justice Harding concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that he did not find any error in the prosecutor’s statement during opening.

His sentence became final in 2003.

Initial Postconviction & State Habeas

“In October 2009, Conahan filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting twenty claims.”11 After an evidentiary hearing on several of Conahan’s claims in June 2010, the circuit court denied all of Conahan’s claims. Conahan appealed and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing “that his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to argue that the admission of the Williams rule evidence”—the evidence related to the Barnes crime—”was fundamental error because it was not established by clear and convincing evidence, was not sufficiently similar, and became a feature of the trial.”12

In March 2013, the Florida Supreme Court denied all of Conahan’s claims on appeal.

Federal Habeas

In his initial federal habeas petition, Conahan raised seven claims.13 He later supplemented the petition with two additional claims. In March 2023, the federal district court denied all of Conahan’s claims and also denied a certificate of appealability. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also denied a certificate of appealability.

Hurst Claim

After Hurst,14 Conahan filed a successive motion for postconviction relief. However, he was ultimately denied relief due to the jury’s unanimous recommendation.

DNA Testing

According to Floridians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, “Conahan has always maintained his innocence in this crime, and his request for additional DNA testing remains pending before the courts.”

TFDP Prior Coverage of Conahan’s Case

• Veterans on Death Row, Part III

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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Wednesday, September 9

Clay v. State

At approximately 10:20 a.m., the Court will hear oral argument in Clay v. State, which is Derrick Clay’s direct appeal from his death sentence imposed in August 2025 after he pled guilty to killing Joseph Chance, his cellmate.

On appeal, Clay raises two claims, each of which have several subclaims:

You can view the filings in this case here.

TFDP Prior Coverage

• Death sentence

Hertz v. State

At approximately 11:20 a.m., the Court will hear oral argument in Hertz v. State, which is Guerry Hertz’s direct appeal after resentencing. Last year, Guerry Hertz was resentenced to death following a new penalty phase in December 2024. The jury recommended death by a vote of 10-2.

You can view the filings in this case here.

TFDP Prior Coverage

• Florida Supreme Court stays resentencing

• State’s position on dismissal

• Hertz petition dismissed at Florida Supreme Court

• Death sentence

Thursday, September 10

Xaver v. State

At approximately 10:10 a.m., the Court will hear oral argument in Xaver v. State, which is Xaver’s direct appeal from his December 2024 death sentence. On appeal, Xaver raises four claims:

You can view the filings in this case here.

TFDP Prior Coverage

• Trial court rules 8-4 applies

• Jury recommendation for death

• Death sentence

Bargo v. State; Bargo v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs.

At approximately 11:10 a.m., the Court will hear oral argument in these two related cases. Bargo v. State is Michael Bargo’s appeal from the circuit court’s denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief. You can view the filings in this case here.

Bargo v. Secretary, Department of Corrections is Bargo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. You can view the filings in this case here.

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The State Attorney’s Office issued the following press release following the sentence, which was also posted on its Facebook page:

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Today, Silvia, through his attorneys, filed his Initial Brief and a motion to stay the execution. In his Initial Brief, Silvia raises the following claims:

The State’s answer brief is due tomorrow by 5:00.

The filings in this case can be found on the Court’s docket here.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Silvia’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Emergency Motion to Modify Schedule

• Postconviction claims denied

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Lucas is 74 years old and is one of Florida’s longest-serving death-row prisoners.

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Scheduling Order

Shortly after Gov. DeSantis signed the warrant, the Florida Supreme Court issued a scheduling order outlining the following schedule for warrant litigation:

• August 14 at 11:00 a.m.: circuit court proceedings completed

• August 14 at 1:00 p.m.: notice of appeal due

• August 17 at 5:00 p.m.: initial brief due

  • The Brief is due over the weekend.

• August 18 at 5:00 p.m.: answer brief due

• August 19 at 2:00 p.m.: reply brief due

Background

In 1977, Lucas was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of his girlfriend, Jill Piper, in Lee County. The facts are as follows:

The victim, Jill Piper, was [Lucas's] girlfriend. A week before her death, she and [Lucas] became embroiled in a heated argument which continued for several days. On the night of the murder, [Lucas] arrived at Jill's house carrying a shotgun. Anticipating a visit by [Lucas], the victim and her friends, Terri Rice and Ricky Byrd, armed themselves. They were surprised, however, when [Lucas] suddenly appeared from the side of the house, catching them in the yard, and began shooting. Jill Piper was struck immediately, but Terri and Ricky ran unharmed into the house to hide in a bedroom. The evidence is unclear as to what next occurred. According to Ricky's testimony, Jill came into the house, struggled with [Lucas], and was shot several more times. In any event, [Lucas] soon burst into the bedroom where Ricky and Terri were hiding and shot them. Jill's body was found outside the house.1

Five Direct Appeals

Lucas was sentenced to death several times, each one reversed and remanded, until the Florida Supreme Court upheld Lucas’s death sentence in 1992 in his fifth direct appeal.

First, on direct appeal in 1979, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but reversed his death sentence and remanded for “resentencing without benefit of a new sentence recommendation by a jury” because the Court agreed with one of the aggravating factors.2

On remand, Lucas was again sentenced to death. On his second direct appeal in 1982, the Florida Supreme Court again vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the trial court did not properly reweigh the aggravation and mitigation on resentencing.3

“The original trial judge died before the second resentencing, and another judge took over Lucas' case. The new judge refused Lucas' requests for a new jury and for permission to present additional evidence.”4 After “review[ing] all of the transcripts in the case” and “considering . . . the jury’s recommendation, the court again sentenced Lucas to death.”5 On his third direct appeal in 19866, the Florida Supreme Court again vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The Court determined that “the new trial judge did not err by not empanelling a new jury,” but “that both sides should have been allowed to present additional testimony and argument.”6 Further, the Court found an error with respect to the jury’s instruction on mitigation and determined it would “rather have this case straightened out now rather than, possibly, in the far future in a post-conviction proceeding” and, therefore, remanded “for a complete new sentencing proceeding before a newly empanelled jury.”7

At resentencing, the jury again recommended that Lucas be sentenced to death by a vote of 11-1,8 and Lucas was resentenced to death.9 However, on direct appeal in 1990, the Supreme Court again vacated Lucas’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the trial court’s findings on aggravation and mitigation were insufficient.10

On remand, Lucas was again sentenced to death. On appeal in 1992, Lucas’s fifth, the Court affirmed his death sentence.11

Initial Postconviction & State Habeas

On October 3, 1994, Lucas filed his initial postconviction motion, which was later amended several times through January 1999, raising seven claims in total. “At the time he filed his postconviction motion, he had been on death row for twenty-two years.”12 In August 2000, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. In October 2000, the trial court denied Lucas’s claims. Lucas appealed to the Florida Supreme Court and filed a state habeas petition “challeng[ing] the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty statute.”

On appeal, in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Lucas’s postconviction claims. The Court also denied his habeas petition, which raised the same claim that was ultimately granted in Hurst in 2016.13

Federal Habeas

Lucas filed a federal habeas petition raising 22 claims:

(1) Petitioner was denied his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution: (a) by the trial court admitting the testimony of a rebuttal witness whose name had not been furnished to the defense pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, without first conducting an inquiry into all surrounding circumstances, thus depriving Petitioner his constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses against him; and (b) when his trial counsel ineffectively assisted him by failing to point out the controlling case authority to the trial judge which mandated such an inquiry; (2) Petitioner was denied his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial during the guilt phase of his trial when his trial counsel ineffectively assisted him by failing to point out the controlling case authority to the trial judge, which mandated such an inquiry regarding a rebuttal witness; (3) The trial court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing so Petitioner could establish that the length of his incarceration on Death Row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial when his trial attorney failed to investigate what kind of drugs Petitioner had ingested within hours prior to the homicide and present expert testimony as to their effects on his ability to form the requisite intent and premeditation to sustain a conviction of First-degree Murder; (5) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his re-sentencing hearing in 1987 in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial when his trial attorney failed to investigate what kind of drugs Petitioner had ingested within hours prior to the homicide and present expert testimony as to their effects on his ability to form the requisite intent and premeditation to sustain a conviction of First-degree Murder; (6) The trial court based its finding of the aggravating factor of Heinous, Atrocious and Cruel (HAC) on non-existent evidence in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and a fair trial; trial attorney should have shown that there could not have been a beating inside the house, and in that respect, negate the HAC aggravator; (7) It was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the trial court to find as an aggravating circumstance that Petitioner had previously been convicted of another felony involving the use of the threat of violence to a person; (8) It was unconstitutional under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for the trial court to admit into evidence, and for the jury to hear and consider, non-statutory aggravating evidence and for the state to argue that evidence in support of the death sentence; (9) There are no constitutionally sustainable aggravating factors to support Petitioner’s death sentence, and thus, the sentence has been imposed in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (10) Petitioner’s conviction and sentences are unreliable and violate the provisions of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because of judicial and representational conflicts of interest, bias, and improper action by the State; (11) The jury’s sentencing recommendation was tainted by the prosecutor’s improper voir dire and closing argument, which misled the jury in its consideration of mitigating evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (12) The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that Petitioner was found guilty on January 14, 1977 of the attempted first-degree murders of Terri L. Rice and Richard Byrd, Jr., and in so informing the jury, violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (13) The trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce, at Petitioner’s penalty trial, evidence of the mental anguish and physical pain endured by Terri Rice and Richard Byrd, Jr., in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (14) The trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce damaging hearsay testimony against Petitioner, while denying Petitioner the opportunity to present hearsay testimony that was critical to his defense, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (15) The trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce prejudicial evidence of a collateral crime (burglary) when the State had failed to give Petitioner the statutorily required notice that it intended to introduce this evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (16) The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in permitting the jurors to take notes during Petitioner’s penalty trial, and to use their notes during deliberations, without instructing the jury on the proper way to take and use notes; (17) The prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, to systematically exclude all potential jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty, produced a jury that was uncommonly willing to condemn Petitioner to die and thereby violated Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury; (18) The Sentencing Order entered by the trial court is not sufficiently clear to establish that the court engaged in a reasoned weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and so will not support the sentence of death imposed on Petitioner, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (19) The trial court unconstitutionally misapplied Florida’s capital sentencing statute by including improper aggravating circumstances and excluding existing mitigating circumstances in the sentencing weighing process, in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and, (20) The Florida death sentencing statute as applied to Petitioner is unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, under the holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). (Doc. # 1, pp. 9-39.)14

On September 5, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the petition “in part as procedurally defaulted” and otherwise denied relief.15

On appeal in 2012, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.16

Hurst Claim

In 2018, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Lucas’s Hurst claim because his sentence became final too early—despite the fact Lucas raised this claim in his state habeas petition years prior and in his federal habeas petition years prior.17

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As TFDP previously covered, Silvia’s attorneys had asked the Supreme Court for more time to litigate Silvia’s claims because they were simultaneously representing Dominick Occhicone (executed this week). However, the Florida Supreme Court never ruled on that Motion.

After the Gov. signed his death warrant, Silvia filed a successive motion for postconviction relief, raising two claims: (1) that “his Sixth , Eighth , and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights were violated and a manifest injustice has occurred because the Governor of Florida signed his death warrant while his defense counsel was litigating another death warrant of another defendant; specifically, Dominick Occhicone,” and (2) “shortages of etomidate, the first drug administered under Florida’s current lethal injection protocol, create a violation of the Defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and the corresponding provisions of the Florida Constitution , as well as a manifest injustice to the Defendant.”

Yesterday, the circuit court held a Huff hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing was needed on Silvia’s claims. Silvia waived his appearance at the hearing. His attorneys asked for a stay of execution “in order to have rigorous and complete factual development . . . so [Silvia’s attorneys] can present our witnesses in support of an evidentiary hearing.” His attorneys explained the evidence they intended to present, which also elucidates the hardship defense attorneys are placed in litigating these serial warrants:

In claim one , we would want to put forth witnesses regarding the selection process of how and why Mr. Silvia was selected for an execution while his counsel was litigating a simultaneous death warrant . And that is how we’re making our argument . We’re not making any allegations of intent , but we do want to document for the Record that this happened . Mr. Silvia was selected for a death warrant while his counsel was representing somebody else and we will get into argument about that later , but as far as factual development , we want to call witnesses regarding the selection process , how it came about . And right now , it’s just pure negligence . It’s just purely negligence , just based on the facts as pled ; based on the Record as pled , and based on the fact that there’s a website where they can verify whether or not the person has counsel or not .

. . . .

And with regard to claim two , we’re asking for a stay of execution for factual development regarding the etomidate shortage . There’s a dispute whether or not a shortage even exists . We put forth evidence , evidence that came out within the last year , particularly April 7 , 2026 , which is less than four months ago maybe less than three . My math is a little rusty . Because we had the execution for Mr. Occhicone just last night . Back to claim one for a minute .

We’re asking for a stay of execution because Mr. Silvia’s also entitled to quality representation . And we are less than 12 hours from when Mr. Silvia was last excused -- I’m sorry , not Mr. Silvia . Mr. Occhicone . We are less than , less than 24 hours . He was executed last night at 6 o’clock . So we had to litigate that warrant up until we could no longer litigate . Which takes our motion going forward , we’re talking about interviewing counsel , which we learned in law school . We have to develop a relationship with our clients and when we develop a relationship with our clients , we have to talk to them , prepare them , in the death warrant stage , in many ways , to let them in . So we’re not robots . We’re human beings .

So for us to have to discuss these proceedings after losing an 81 year old Mr. Occhicone just last night at 6 p.m. is just , frankly , unconscionable . And it’s not the fault of this Court . It’s the fault of the State . It’s the fault of the State of Florida for scheduling these executions like this and scheduling these death warrants at the pace and rate that they’re doing them . So we’d also ask for a stay of execution to give Mr. Silvia the time and the emotional support that he needs .

But on to claim two , there’s an etomidate shortage . A documented etomidate shortage . There seems to be a factual dispute about whether that shortage even exists . Because of that factual dispute , we want to put it on the Record , based on proof that we have , that there actually is an etomidate shortage that manifested within the last year . And we want to put forth FDOC witnesses to talk about what their plans are for the shortage . Is there a plan in place ? Perhaps they are already reaching out to some of these institutions about accommodating them for their shortages .

. . . .

So we’d ask for a stay of execution for factual development , for a proper evidentiary hearing and for a stay of execution until there’s no longer an etomidate shortage . It’s a life - saving drug . There’s a medical need out there . And various institutions , hospitals , ICU units , particularly ERs , so we’d ask for a stay of execution until the shortage is no longer in place . And frankly , I don’t think that’s too much to ask .

In response, the State argued that Silvia’s claims “are speculative” and that Silvia is “on a fishing expedition.”

In its Order issued yesterday afternoon, the Court determined that “no postconviction evidentiary hearing is legally warranted” on Silvia’s claims “because there are no factual disputes relevant to any cognizable, colorable claim.”

Yesterday, the circuit court issued an Order denying Silvia’s postconviction claims, finding that Silvia “originally knowingly and voluntarily waived postconviction proceedings.” Therefore, the Court determined that the waiver “is binding and bars any claims challenging his conviction and sentence.” Further, the Court wrote:

Further, the Court found that even if Silvia hadn’t waived postconviction, his claims still fail “based on controlling precedent.”

As of this morning, no Notice of Appeal has been docketed at the Florida Supreme Court.

The full Order is available from TFDP here.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Silvia’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Emergency Motion to Modify Schedule

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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It is also the first time in modern history that the State has executed two people in one day. It was the 12th execution in the State so far this year.

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Denial of Final Claims

As of noon yesterday, Occhicone had two petitions for writ of certiorari pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. Around 12:15 p.m., the Court denied the first petition—with James Duckett. Around 1:00 p.m., the Court denied the second petition. There were no noted dissents.

Information About the Execution

The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) held its standard briefing:

At the 3:30 briefing, DOC reported that Occhicone woke up at 4:45 today and did not have any visitors but did meet with a spiritual advisor. His last meal was eggplant parmesan, salad, garlic bread, and soda.

The Tallahassee Democrat reported there “were 16 witnesses, five media members, and six corrections department officials and communications staff.” Further, the Democrat reported that “[a] man holding a rosary sat to Occhicone’s right, periodically adjusting the rosary from palm to palm and cupping it in his hands.”

The Democrat reported that Occhicone’s final words were:

And to the victims’ family, he said:

DOC reported the time of death as 6:13 p.m.

At the briefing following the execution, DOC Communications Director Jordan Kirckland read a statement from the victims’ children that said in part:

Today marks the end of a long and painful journey for our family. The person responsible for this forty-year journey has finally faced the ultimate consequence under the law for his crime.

We will continue to honor our parents by living with kindness and love for each other. We love you Mom and Dad and we will always honor you with love in our hearts.

When asked how the DOC staff was handling yesterday’s double execution, Kirkland said:

As you and many of your colleagues have been to these before . . ., you can attest that we carry these out in a humane and dignified matter. And that will continue.

Information from the DOC media briefings provided by John Koch.

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TFDP Prior Coverage of Occhicone’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Florida Supreme Court denial

• SCOTUS Petition filed

• 7/27 Update

• 7/28 Morning Update

2026 Executions

Below is a map of where the crimes occurred that led to the 2026 executions. The relevant county is also where the execution-related litigation is venued in each case.

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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Duckett’s execution was originally scheduled for March but was delayed pending protracted litigation related to Duckett’s innocence claims and requests for DNA testing and analysis of evidence that he claims could prove his innocence. (TFDP has followed Duckett’s warrant-related litigation since February. See the links at the bottom of this post.)

Duckett was 68 years old.

Denial of Final Claims

As of 12:00 p.m., when his execution was scheduled to proceed, Duckett had two petitions for writ of certiorari pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. Around 12:15 p.m., the U.S. Supreme Court denied all of Duckett’s pending claims, allowing the execution to proceed. There were no noted dissents.

Information About the Execution

The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) held two media briefings related to the execution.

As of the 9:30 a.m. briefing, Duckett still had two petitions for writ of certiorari pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. DOC Communications Director Jordan Kirkland reported that Duckett woke up at 4:45 a.m. He had a last meal of eggs, grits, bacon, biscuits, and chocolate milk.

Duckett met four family members last night and a spiritual advisor this morning. When asked about the double execution today, Kirkland stated: “Our team is confident in our preparedness and readiness” to conduct the executions in a “humane and dignified manner.”

Duckett declined to give a last statement. DOC reports that Duckett’s time of death was 1:19 p.m.

At the briefing after the execution, members of the victims’ family spoke. The victim’s mother said she waited 40 years for this day. The victim’s aunt said Duckett “lived too damn long.”

The State has another execution scheduled tonight at 6:00 p.m.

Information from the DOC media briefings provided by John Koch.

News Articles

• Tallahassee Democrat

• USA Today

TFDP Prior Coverage of Duckett’s Case

• Warrant signed

• DNA testing granted

• Actual Innocence claims

• Scheduling Order suspended

• Litigation Update as of March 23

• Stay Granted

• State reports inconclusive results

• Stay through April 2

• FSC Orders briefing past warrant period

• FSC grants additional DNA testing

• May 11 Update

• June 8 Update

• State seeks to vacate stay

• Florida Supreme Court lifts stay

• Governor reschedules execution

• July 16 litigation update

• New appeal filed to Florida Supreme Court

• Federal claims filed

• SCOTUS petition filed

• 7/27 Update

• 7/28 Morning Update

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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Both Duckett and Occhicone

Overnight, Duckett and Occhicone filed a new petition for writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in his and Occhicone’s claim regarding their double execution.

The question presented is:

The petition is fully briefed as of early this morning.

You can view the filings on the Court’s docket here.

James Duckett

James Duckett’s execution is scheduled for today at noon.

Petition for Cert (Supreme Court of Florida)

Duckett’s first-filed petition for writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision remains pending and is not yet fully briefed. You can view the filings on the Court’s docket here.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Duckett’s Case

• Warrant signed

• DNA testing granted

• Actual Innocence claims

• Scheduling Order suspended

• Litigation Update as of March 23

• Stay Granted

• State reports inconclusive results

• Stay through April 2

• FSC Orders briefing past warrant period

• FSC grants additional DNA testing

• May 11 Update

• June 8 Update

• State seeks to vacate stay

• Florida Supreme Court lifts stay

• Governor reschedules execution

• July 16 litigation update

• Florida Supreme Court appeal filed

• Federal claims filed

• SCOTUS Petition filed

• 7/27 Update

Dominick Occhicone

Dominick Occhicone’s execution is scheduled for today at 6:00 p.m.

Petition for Cert (Supreme Court of Florida)

Occhicone’s first-filed petition for writ of certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision remains pending and is fully briefed. You can view the filings on the Court’s docket here.

TFDP Prior Coverage of Occhicone’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Florida Supreme Court denial

• SCOTUS Petition filed

• 7/27 Update

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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NOTE: There is a lot happening quickly in these cases. Apologies in advance for the number of emails. I’ll do my best to combine and post in an efficient manner.

SCOTUS Petitions (Florida Supreme Court)

As TFDP previously covered, both Duckett and Occhicone have filed petitions for writ of certiorari at SCOTUS seeking review of the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in their cases issued last week.

As of this afternoon, Occhicone’s petition is fully briefed.

This afternoon, the State responded to Duckett’s petition. Duckett has not yet filed a reply.

No ruling has been issued on either petition.

Duckett’s Federal DNA Claim

This afternoon, the federal district court entered an Order granting the State’s motion to dismiss Duckett’s claim regarding denial of DNA testing and analysis.

First, on Duckett’s claim that Florida’s Rule for postconviction DNA testing is unconstitutional, the Court held against the State that the claim is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which essentially says that litigants cannot use federal courts to appeal a state court judgment. The Court also held against the State that Duckett’s claim is not barred by res judicata. However, the Court concluded Duckett’s claim should be dismissed because Duckett failed to state a due process claim. The Court wrote in part: “Precluding a defendant from filing successive Rule 3.853 motions—and requiring him to seek testing of all items of evidence known at the time of filing his initial Rule 3.853 motion—does not violate due process or offend fundamental principles of fairness.”

Second, on Duckett’s right to access to courts claim, the Court held that the claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “in that it asks this Court to ‘effectively nullify’ the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s appeal.”

Accordingly, the Court dismissed Duckett’s claims and denied Duckett’s Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution as moot.

As of this post, no appeal has been docketed at the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Double Execution Claim

As TFDP previously covered, Duckett and Occhicone together filed a federal lawsuit challenging their scheduled double execution. The federal court denied the claim. On Saturday, Duckett and Occhicone appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit. The appeal was docketed as case number 26-12595.

Yesterday morning, Duckett and Occhicone filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Execution. Yesterday afternoon, the Eleventh Circuit denied the Motion.

In its Order, the Eleventh Circuit determined Occhicone and Duckett did not “establish[] that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and . . . the equitable factors likewise counsel against a stay.”

On their first claim, the Court wrote:

The inmates contend that scheduling their executions on the same day constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is likely to exacerbate the stress on the execution team and thereby increase the likelihood that the team will make a mistake, which, in turn, could result in needless suffering for the inmates. This claim rests on pure conjecture that the execution team will fail to perform Florida’s lethal-injection procedures correctly—for in-stance, the complaint alleges, by neglecting to properly “maintain[] and stor[e] execution drugs” or to pay proper attention to each in-mate’s “vein viability.” Compl. ¶¶ 78–79, Dkt. 1. If a mistake is made, the theory goes, there is a risk that the mistake will “result in objectively intolerable pain and suffering.” Id. ¶ 82. The in-mates’ speculation does not establish that the state’s act of scheduling two executions in one day “presents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers.” Glossip, 576 U.S. at 877 (citation modified).

Like the district court, we acknowledge the inmates’ allegations that when the State of Oklahoma attempted to carry out two death sentences on the same day in 2014, one prisoner’s execution was “botched” when his “intravenous lines were mishandled.” Compl. ¶ 54. The inmates allege that an ensuing investigation found that the lines were mishandled “for several reasons,” including the “extra stress” that the execution team experienced as a result of having to conduct multiple executions on the same day. Id. We agree with the district court, though, that those allegations do not make the claim here any stronger, because the inmates have not provided a “meaningful factual basis to compare the circum-stances of those executions to Florida’s execution protocol.” Ord. Denying Stay of Execution, July 24, 2026, at 4 n.3, Dkt. No. 12.

On their second claim, the Court wrote: “The inmates have not cited any case that demonstrates, or even suggests, that the state’s act of scheduling two executions on the same day deprives them of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Further:

Because the inmates have not “advanced a carefully defined, fundamental right,” Humphreys, 161 F.4th at 1309, they have not demonstrated entitlement to heightened scrutiny. Even assuming the in-mates are similarly situated to all other Florida death-row inmates in the modern era, their claim is unlikely to succeed because it is not irrational for the state to conduct two executions on the same day, even if only, as the district court noted, “for the sake of convenience or efficiency.”

Finally, on their access to courts claim, the Court wrote that Plaintiffs “fail to cite any authority to support the proposition that they are entitled to a set number of days to bring such a challenge. The inmates’ access-to-courts claim is further under-mined by the fact that they have accessed the courts to litigate their same-day challenge, and have now been heard both by the district court and by this Court. For these reasons, the inmates are not substantially likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.”

As of this post, no petition for writ of certiorari on this decision has been docketed at SCOTUS.

TFDP Prior Coverage

TFDP Prior Coverage of Duckett’s Case

• Warrant signed

• DNA testing granted

• Actual Innocence claims

• Scheduling Order suspended

• Litigation Update as of March 23

• Stay Granted

• State reports inconclusive results

• Stay through April 2

• FSC Orders briefing past warrant period

• FSC grants additional DNA testing

• May 11 Update

• June 8 Update

• State seeks to vacate stay

• Florida Supreme Court lifts stay

• Governor reschedules execution

• July 16 litigation update

• Florida Supreme Court appeal filed

• Federal claims filed

• SCOTUS Petition filed

TFDP Prior Coverage of Occhicone’s Warrant

• Warrant signed

• Florida Supreme Court denial

• SCOTUS Petition filed

My thoughts are with everyone involved in the warrant- and execution-related process.

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