In the last 48 hours, Benjamin Netanyahu raised the temperature by treating Turkey, openly and officially, as an enemy of Israel, at the same moment Israeli forces carried out another armed incursion into Syrian territory.

Days earlier, Turkey’s Ministry of Justice activated international police channels on the basis of arrest warrants originally issued on July 14.

So far, the reading is straightforward: the Turks are handing Netanyahu exactly what he wants, the idea, for the Israeli public, that there is another threat in the region. And why does Ankara feed that narrative? Because it is equally useful to Erdogan at home.

The problem is that for Nwtanyahu this is not only a narrative. There are real questions on the ground, and they run through Syria. This game cannot be played for domestic audiences alone.

On August 28, Israeli troops crossed the border and fired projectiles about 50 kilometers from Damascus. That is an act, not a speech. On August 18, Israel bombed the Syrian base at Abu al-Duhur. And why that base?

Turkey had already conducted inspections and was planning to position intelligence teams, logistics, drones and air-defense systems in the area. The main move pointed at Abu al-Duhur, with earlier probes at sites such as T4, Palmyra and Hama. It was that Turkish infrastructure push that triggered Israel’s strikes. Netanyahu appears determined not to let Turkey establish, or expand, support for Syrian forces.

This week, Defense Minister Israel Katz’s remarks about keeping troops in place reinforce the same point: Netanyahu is prepared not only to hold the occupation of southern Syria, but to keep striking the Syrian government.

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The Houthis have successfully struck a Saudi ship roughly 1,000 kilometers away from their typical stronghold. Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi group targeted the Saudi oil tanker Amzan off the coast of Yanbu, a major northern Red Sea oil port in Saudi Arabia. The distance from Houthi-controlled northern Yemen to the waters off Yanbu is roughly 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers. This confirms what I wrote a short time ago about the Yemeni arsenal and its capability.

The use of a long-range ballistic missile was confirmed by the Houthis. However, maritime security analysts and Western intelligence agencies raise the hypothesis that the Houthi announcement of a ballistic missile is mere propaganda, and that they actually used an evolution of the Quds-4 cruise missile. The thing is, unlike a ballistic missile that ascends into space, a cruise missile flies low, much like a small jet aircraft.

And why were some security analysts and agencies wrong? Because the projectile struck the upper main deck, triggering a fire on the surface area. Cruise missiles, such as the Quds or Paveh families, fly low and horizontally, typically striking the side of the hull. An impact coming directly from above is the textbook signature of a ballistic missile re-entering the atmosphere at a near-vertical angle. Furthermore, Western warships and air defense radars operating in the region recorded the thermal signature and parabolic trajectory of a ballistic missile launched from northern Yemen.

Why the shock? By launching precise, 1,000-kilometer strikes this far north, the Houthis are effectively demonstrating they can enforce their self-declared naval blockade against Saudi shipping along the entirety of the Red Sea.

And yes, the ship was moving when it was struck. The tracking of the vessel confirmed that the Amzan was sailing from Ain Sukhna, Egypt, to the Saudi port of Yanbu when the attack occurred.

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The Senior Military Advisor to the Supreme Leader, Yahya Rahim Safavi, has been pushing forward with the position of including Iraq in the Mecca Pact.

The idea appeals to the other members of the pact, primarily because it would ensure greater control and accountability over the actions of the PMF, which recently clashed with Saudi forces.

But this is where Iraq’s role becomes fundamental in the general’s thesis. Northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG), is historically used as a sanctuary by the PKK to launch attacks against Turkey, and by Iranian-Kurdish dissident groups, such as the PJAK, to challenge the regime in Tehran. By bringing the Baghdad government into the pact, Iran and Turkey would force the Iraqi state to suffocate these militias from within. Iraq would cooperate not with tanks or armies against external powers, but by acting as an internal police force to seal borders and cut off logistical funding to Kurdish sanctuaries.

And this would also reinforce the same policy in Syria. There, in the post-Assad era under Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have initiated a comprehensive process of integration into the national army. If Iran and Turkey lock in a strategic encirclement via the Mecca Pact by encompassing Iraq, the new Syrian government will face asphyxiating pressure on its borders to halt any process of autonomy concessions to Syrian Kurds, establishing a unified bloc policy against any aspirations for independence or greater Kurdish autonomy.

The timing is opportune because the Donald Trump administration has scaled back its focus on the SDF, declaring that the alliance’s primary objective, the fight against ISIS, is already over. This leaves the Syrian Kurds dependent on the protection of the new Syrian State, which, backed by the bloc, would no longer be as receptive to orders from Washington.

Regarding Israel, Tel Aviv holds no formal ties with the Syrian Kurds, but it maintains historical intelligence networks and deep sympathy for the Kurds of Iraq (KRG) and Iran, whom Tel Aviv views as natural allies against regional groups. Tensions between Israel and Turkey have exploded in recent days; in a recent episode, Netanyahu’s cabinet labeled Erdoğan an antisemitic dictator who has massacred the Kurds. Days prior, the Israeli Air Force bombed positions in Syria, such as the Abu al-Duhur airfield, to prevent Syria from allowing the deployment of Turkish troops near its security lines.

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Iran confirmed it was invited to join the Mecca Pact, the defensive military alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Although no word has been said by the 3 founding members, the secrecy is strategic. Officially confirming Iran’s entry before the terms regarding militias are negotiated would trigger immediate, harsh diplomatic retaliation from Israel and the United States.

This invitation directly involves what I addressed yesterday: who pays the bill for peace in the Gulf, and how. In geopolitical conflicts, imposing military agreements usually serve as a facade to solve urgent economic and logistical bottlenecks. The inclusion or rapprochement of Iran in the Mecca Pact is, fundamentally, a diplomatic gambit to end Tehran’s economic suffocation and secure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, within that regional economic arrangement I mentioned yesterday.

Saudi Arabia and its neighbors saw their ports and refineries become targets, and their economies faltered under the blockade of the strait. They need to reopen the maritime route at all costs to salvage their development plans, but such a move is impossible without looking like a military victory for Trump. Amidst all this, Iran signaled it accepts negotiating the management of the Strait of Hormuz and easing the blockade.

The invitation to the pact operates as a bargaining chip and a security guarantee that Arab neighbors will not support attacks on Iranian soil if the route is cleared. But more than that, by accepting dialogue or entering the Mecca Pact, Iran shatters the US and Israeli strategy of complete isolation. Sitting at the table with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan grants Tehran the status of a legitimate and indispensable political actor for stability.

For the GCC, financing the neighbor’s reconstruction is not an act of charity, but a security strategy. It must be consolidated within a regional bloc that also encompasses defense aspects.

Significant progress has already been made. The sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait would inject billions into the Iranian economy, but the disbursements would be tied to the gradual dismantling of armed militia financing, and this remains a hurdle.

What Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan are offering Iran is a political space for Tehran to control its militias without looking like it surrendered to the West. With adherence to the pact, these issues would be discussed internally, holding Iran accountable, which will continue to control its militias. The goal is not to achieve a perfect peace, but to create game rules restrictive enough to make Iran think twice before triggering its regional satellites. It looks like an arrangement that could work, not by itself, but because there is now a clear desire to resolve the bottlenecks that were halting the dialogue. Trump knows this and wants the same bottlenecks resolved, but without further damage to his image.

And where does Israel stand in this?

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The most solid plan ever formulated to end the war is currently underway in the Middle East, and very much in Trump style: it involves far more money than diplomacy.
Iran surprised the world and won a war that seemed impossible, yet emerged from it with immense damage and with its relations with the neighborhood more torn apart than ever. A large part of the prolongation of this war up to the present day is due to Trump’s refusal to accept defeat, but also to the fact that Iran is seeking revenues through a toll on the strait that would allow it to rebuild the country. And if that is not the case, who else could pay reparations to Iran? That is, without a doubt, the answer that resolves and pacifies the Middle East.

We are stretching a conflict today because we have not yet settled the question of who pays. And in the minds of all sides, the one who always pays is the GCC, and this premise is obviously in a phase of reflection in the Gulf.

What is being discussed today?
The first point that is already well advanced is that the Pentagon is studying not to rebuild military bases that were heavily hit by recent ballistic missile and drone attacks from Iran, but to abandon them. That’s right: reports indicate that the U.S. government is seriously considering the transfer of troops from the Persian Gulf to Israel, which would host these new command centers.

Many of these installations in the Gulf had already been emptied because they were considered highly vulnerable to Iranian attacks that resulted in the deaths of American soldiers. But now, according to military intelligence reports released this week, the American bases in the Persian Gulf region are in a state that makes any kind of direct transfer of control or local operation unviable.

They are inoperable and not even worth the at least US$ 5 billion that would be needed for reconstruction.
The Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which serves as the heart of American naval operations in the Middle East, has become one of the central points of this major strategic review. The base suffered severe damage and the conflict demonstrated the impossibility of operating ships inside the strait in a conflict against Iran.

By moving these bases to Israel, Trump meets an Iranian demand capable of amplifying the internal victory discourse of the Persians. In return, this increases by billions the support given to Israel for the maintenance of these bases, but under a different format.

Under the existing Memorandum of Understanding, which runs until 2028, Israel already receives a fixed US$ 3.8 billion annually in U.S. military assistance.
In this new model, the Pentagon would assume 100% of the running costs, contracts for troop feeding, security, sanitation and energy, paid to Israeli companies.

Estimates based on Pentagon reports and budget discussions in the U.S. Congress indicate that the transfer of assets from the Persian Gulf to Israel and the strategic reconfiguration of the alliance would inject between US$ 2 billion and US$ 5 billion directly into the Israeli economy and companies in the first years of this transition.

This is without counting all the investment in Israeli defense and technology companies so that they can meet the demand to protect American assets.
It is at this point that Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is working to change the format of the aid. Instead of Israel receiving traditional foreign aid, the funding to host the bases would be embedded directly in the Pentagon’s procurement accounts and in integrated supply chains.

The transition from the aid model to industrial and military partner integrates Israel’s financing directly into the Pentagon’s acquisition accounts, converting foreign aid into domestic U.S. security spending. This process eliminates political oversight by merging supply chains and embedding contracts into operational budgets. A great deal for the entire Netanyahu and Trump team, without a doubt.

But what about the Gulf countries that invested in these bases that would now be abandoned? They were surprised by a war, had their protection contract ignored, and now walk away with nothing but debts and a blockade on the strait.

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On February 28, Trump and Netanyahu ordered an attack on Iran which, in their assessment, would be swift and triumphant. What we witnessed was the exact opposite: a war against a resilient adversary that ended up exhausting several stockpiles of American weapons in just 40 days of combat.

The lack of long-term planning was evident from day one. Days ago, the WSJ reported that Iran carried out more than 2,000 attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and high-precision aerial drones against targets in the Gulf. The offensive managed to strike and severely damage at least 20 American military installations spread across 8 countries in the region, causing damages of at least 13 billion dollars.

Military bases became uninhabitable in the face of the Iranian onslaught, while the world felt the impact of Trump and Netanyahu’s war. A truce was then negotiated and put into effect, but Iran never accepted the terms for the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and this situation persists to this day.

I wrote some time ago that the cost of the war, added to aerial operations, defensive and offensive ammunition, damage to bases, and aircraft losses, already exceeded 120 billion dollars. If we add the material damages and economic losses of the Gulf countries, we will have a total figure in the range of 300 billion, not counting other global losses.

A defeat that Trump cannot change, even if he repeats the word victory every night on his social network. It was a war where all allies refused to get involved, an isolation felt even by remote countries that typically showed automatic alignment. Internally, there was a change of command and clear signs of excessive politicization.

But such an embarrassment did not stop there. It has now come to light that President Donald Trump carried out a top-secret plane-swapping operation, using a food truck as a disguise due to a threat of an attack from Iran. The highly unusual maneuver took place in Ankara, Turkey, right after the NATO summit, but the details of the farce were revealed by the American press and confirmed by Trump himself. Imagine the president of the United States of America hiding in a little food truck… What a situation these people got themselves into!

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The Iran-aligned Houthis ignored the announcement of the Mecca Pact and opened fire on Saudi and allied positions. Saudi Aramco’s refinery in Jazan was targeted by a drone attack in the early hours of this Sunday. The complex processes around 400,000 barrels of oil per day. In Najran Province, a region in the southern part of the kingdom that has suffered attacks over the last 72 hours, an offensive on Thursday left 11 injured and the airport closed indefinitely.

The Houthis also opened fire on the Port of Mokha and forces linked to the Saudi government. The operation involved a combined assault of ballistic missiles and more than 20 drones. Yemen’s Ministry of Transport confirmed severe damage to the commercial infrastructure of the historic pier and the deaths of at least 7 people. Military camps of Saudi-funded Yemeni government forces in Al-Ruwaik, Al-Thaniyah, and Al-Abr suffered massive missile attacks on Friday. The offensive resulted in the deaths of at least 58 soldiers, marking one of the worst escalations in the region in years.

The Mecca Pact does not intimidate the Houthi offensive precisely because Iran knows it is an alliance meant much more for intermediation with Iran itself. Neither the Turks nor the Pakistanis will enter a war against Iran, let alone the Saudis. The main issue is deterrence and managing the relationship with the Yemenis. But how can this be done without the Saudis sitting at the table and lifting the air blockade on Yemen? Riyadh will not accept the unification of Yemen under Houthi leadership, nor is it in any position to win a war today that it failed to win years ago.

There is no short or medium-term solution for Yemen, just as there is no stabilization for Lebanon and no withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Syria. All Middle Eastern problems seem to be at a standstill, and Israel appears to be expressing fresh concerns.

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Since the 1974 geopolitical arrangement structured by Henry Kissinger, the Gulf committed itself to recycling the cash surpluses generated by oil back into U.S. federal debt in exchange for protection.

Over the years, numerous American bases were installed across the region under an explicit model in which the United States sold security through a strategy of encirclement and deterrence.

I need not say that this strategy failed its first real test of war. It demonstrated that hundreds of billions of American taxpayer dollars invested in this policy, both in the United States and in Asia, were simply thrown away.

This approach, which continues to drain American coffers, becomes even more obsolete in Asia, where the Chinese possess a far larger and more precise missile arsenal than the Iranians. I would go so far as to say that in a conflict the U.S. Seventh Fleet would not last one hour if it failed to leave the region’s ports in time.

Returning to the analysis of the American model of selling security to the Gulf, the financial relationship between the GCC and the United States must be divided into two clear realities: the accumulated stock of capital transferred and spent over recent decades, and the multi-year future commitments formally assumed by Arab leaders with the American administration.

Overall, the historical financial volume that has flowed from the Gulf to the United States, considering investments and commercial contracts, stands somewhere between $3.5 trillion and $4 trillion, with another $3 trillion in additional future promises. We are talking about a $7 trillion relationship or even more.

Even with a $7 trillion relationship, Trump listened to Netanyahu and ignited a war in this backyard, causing severe damage across the entire region.

Defense-sector spending alone by the GCC on the American industry has reached approximately $1.0 to $1.2 trillion. And here is a revealing detail: for every $1 billion spent on physical military hardware, the Gulf countries transfer an additional $2 to $3 billion in lifecycle contracts covering continuous maintenance, electronic-warfare intelligence, satellites, and C4ISR cyber infrastructure. This does not even include the billions paid directly to American private security consulting firms that manage the internal logistics of Arab defense, nor the direct operational costs subsidized to maintain U.S. bases in the region.

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The trilateral pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, officially named the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, contains a collective defense clause: an armed attack against one member state will be considered an attack against all.

According to official statements from Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry and Turkish authorities, the agreement aims to strengthen collective deterrence and promote regional stability. They claim it is not directed against any specific nation.

In practice, this is a formal upgrade of the bilateral Saudi-Pakistani pact signed last year, now expanded to include Ankara. The terms provide for intelligence sharing, combined training, and joint defense-industry projects.

Saudi Arabia brings financial weight, Turkey contributes advanced military technology, and Pakistan offers a battle-hardened army. Interestingly, the technological exchange between Pakistan and Turkey is already a source of concern for China, particularly in the drone sector, where the three countries compete directly.

The Saudi-Pakistani alliance is longstanding, but it has always been highly volatile. In 2015, Riyadh expected Islamabad to send troops to fight the Houthis in Yemen, but the Pakistani parliament voted for neutrality. This decision deeply irritated the Saudi monarchy, leading to a diplomatic freeze and the temporary suspension of credit facilities and subsidized oil supplies.

Another critical issue is that the Saudis are about to restart the civil war in Yemen, which will inevitably trigger retaliations. Does receiving retaliatory strikes for waging war through proxies and allies activate the collective defense clause? I have a strong impression that we will face serious deadlocks here.

The 2025 bilateral treaty was designed by Islamabad as a straightforward transactional swap: Pakistan would provide formal military security guarantees to Saudi Arabia in return for massive, immediate investments into its battered economy. Months after the signature, however, frustration simmered in Islamabad. Pakistan complained that despite formalizing the pact and deploying around 8,000 troops, fighter aircraft, and air-defense systems to Saudi soil, Riyadh’s promised productive investments never materialized. The Saudis continued to withhold transfers, limiting themselves to bureaucratic deposits tied to strict IMF conditions.

What changed now?

The full-scale military escalation in the Middle East completely altered Riyadh’s survival calculus. To repair the broken trust with Pakistan and persuade it to sign a new strategic joint-defense treaty, Saudi Arabia had to concede on the economic front.

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A report by Amnesty International, confirmed by the Indian government, shows that Israel received 2,596 confirmed shipments of weapons between October 2023 and November 2025. These transfers did not stop there. As the organization has confirmed that exports and joint supply chains remain active in 2026, even after repeated international warnings, I dare to state that the total number of shipments, including those conducted in secrecy and those from 2026, exceeds 3,000. This places India’s military industry as an active participant in the devastation of Gaza, alongside those of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European countries.

In June and July 2026, Amnesty International sent official notifications to the Indian state and to nine companies involved, demanding explanations. No response was received from the authorities by the time the document was published. Meanwhile, the partnership between India and Israel continues to consolidate.

In June 2026, senior officials from Israel’s Ministry of Defense made official visits to India to align regional security interests and strengthen industrial ties. Indian companies operate in partnership with Israeli defense giants such as Elbit Systems, producing armaments under the Made in India policy. Cheap Indian labor is precisely what these corporations seek.

But the exports were not carried out solely by Israeli companies operating in India; they directly involved the Indian government and public-sector companies. There were direct shipments of weapons manufactured by enterprises owned by the Indian state itself and controlled by the Ministry of Defense, such as MIL and Yantra.

Even when production is carried out by an Israeli company operating inside the country, these weapons cannot leave India without explicit approval from the government in New Delhi. India’s Ministry of Commerce and its customs authorities had to issue specific military export licenses for each of the shipments sent throughout the conflict.

The Indian government has stated that the country maintains a robust export-control mechanism and that all military transactions comply with international obligations and laws. However, there is no dispute over legality here, the core issue is the morality of the act itself.

New Delhi is deepening ties with the Israeli defense industry, which already accounts for 15% of the country’s arms imports.

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Iran seems to have interpreted the phone call from the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, as something that immobilized Donald Trump. After all, the Saudi leader’s words reportedly threatened to touch the most sensitive organ in Trump’s body: his wallet.

Knowing that the US cannot carry out the attacks that would devastated its infrastructure, Iran decided to go on the offensive with a preemptive strike. Today’s attack, August 3, 2026, was carried out by drones against the base’s equipment and ammunition warehouses at Camp Doha. Before that, the base had already been bombed the previous week, on July 23.

On August 1, Ali Al Salem Air Base was also targeted, and on July 31, Iran carried out attacks against the Ahmad al-Jaber, Camp Udairi, and Camp Arifjan bases, with heavy achievements against the latter two.

It seems that the state of war will be maintained, as in recent months, but with limited attacks from both sides on this front. However, things should move on the Yemen and Iraq fronts, with Iran increasing pressure on the Saudi industry.

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The conflicts in Ukraine and the Gulf, though distinct, produce similar global shocks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine restored the division between the West and the Sino-Russian bloc, followed by other nations. It also accelerated European deindustrialization and deepened Russia’s ties with Asia. Europe is now structurally dependent on LNG imported from the United States and Middle Eastern suppliers, which is physically more expensive and requires maritime freight. With the conflict in the Middle East, the supply has largely fallen into the hands of American companies. Heavy industry, especially in Germany, has lost global competitiveness and is relocating production units.

The Ukraine war disrupted energy markets, generated inflation, and created mineral shortages. Those pressures had barely begun to stabilize when the attack on Iran delivered another jolt, intensifying inflationary pressures and disruptions along maritime routes. Both wars have produced thousands of civilian deaths, millions of displaced people, and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage.

But what should we expect from these conflicts?

In Ukraine, Russian forces advanced little this year, but enough for advanced assault units to approach within less than 5 km of the periphery. The administrative center of Sloviansk remains about 13 km away, and that of Kramatorsk less than 9 km from the direct contact line. Both cities are under constant drone and artillery attack covering infiltration units.

Even if the Russians push beyond these outskirts, it will still take many months before either falls. The Kramatorsk-Sloviansk belt is considered one of the densest fortresses in the Donbas. Beyond the fortified lines built by Ukraine, natural barriers such as the Siverskyi Donets River prevent rapid advances. Ukrainian forces have even dug extensive networks of utility tunnels to move troops and light supplies protected from drones. As a result, Russia must spend weeks of bombardment to gain just a few hundred meters.

The Russians also still have to win the hardest fighting in neighboring villages such as Kalenyky, Kostiantynivka, and the Lyman sector. Taking advantage of the situation, Ukrainian forces have advanced significantly in other sectors, almost entirely within the gray zone, where they did not establish fixed garrisons but restored fire control, expanding that zone to strips of 15-20 km in some areas.

I assess that the Russian capture will eventually occur, but it will require months of battle and heavy casualties. That is precisely the Ukrainian plan. They are intensifying strikes on refineries and storage facilities, aiming to impose a cost that forces the Russians to reduce support for the war and accept negotiations.

In Iran, the logic is similar: force the adversary to the table. Who will yield first, Trump under political and economic pressure, or Iran, unable to export by sea? Both want to enter negotiations from a position of advantage.

American and Gulf interceptor stocks stand at roughly 2,500-3,000. I do not believe they are sufficient for more than about 20 days of conflict with Iran. In those 20 days, American and Israeli strikes would destroy a great deal of Iranian infrastructure, and Iran would respond by hitting power plants, oil facilities, and industrial sites.

Will Trump ignore GCC requests and press ahead with attacks now that MBS has made his position clear? I do not believe he will.

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A CSIS report indicates that U.S. interceptor stocks have fallen significantly after the two conflicts with Iran, with Patriots reduced to 759-827 units and THAAD to 234-278.

If we include the naval systems, pre-war SM-3 inventory stood at 410; current estimates place remaining stocks between 180 and 260. SM-6 pre-war inventory was 1,160, of which roughly 200-300 have been expended.

In Israel’s case, during the final days of the fighting they were already launching interceptors manufactured only weeks earlier. This confirmed the figures I had written during the 12-day war. Israel entered the truce with a very limited number of David’s Sling missiles and an even smaller stock of Arrow. A coherent estimate is that they hold roughly 20-40 Arrow-2/3 interceptors, of which only 10-15 are produced annually, and around 400 Stunner missiles, with annual production, from what I track, between 200 and 400. During the 12-day war I correctly assessed the size of these inventories.

Gulf states still hold a meaningful number of Patriots: the Saudis retain at least 300-500, while the rest of the GCC together hold no more than about 300. These figures do not account for the reallocations Trump ordered from Asia nor for whatever the industry managed to produce during the truce period, so the real numbers will be somewhat higher.

None of this changes the fundamental picture. Even counting naval interceptors, the combined total sits between 2,500 and 3,000. In theory that would be sufficient for roughly 20 days of high-intensity combat of the kind seen in the first week of the war.

But interceptors are not the only constraint. Of the approximately 3,000 Tomahawks, around 1,000 have already been used, and these take considerable time to manufacture. On the PrSM side, estimates at the end of the fighting put the remaining inventory at no more than 20.

For JASSM, the pre-war total inventory was 4,400 units, but that included the shorter-range variants. Parallel reporting pointed to a critical level of only about 425 JASSM-ER missiles fully available for immediate global operations.

To these numbers we must add two adjustments: roughly 10 % of the inventory is normally in maintenance, and another 15 % constitutes the critical reserve that must be preserved.

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Amid strong rumors that Netanyahu had already agreed with Trump to resume bombings against Iran, Gulf countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were already working behind the scenes.

Qatar, in particular, had been warning about the imminent risks to its massive infrastructure and natural gas exports. This, however, was not enough to dissuade Trump, who was moving forward with his plan, especially since the two major American natural gas exporting companies are benefiting from the scenario and were donors to Trump’s campaign. The UAE had also been warning about the risks to its facilities, but with little progress.

In the last 72 hours, these countries informed Washington that local intelligence reports confirmed Iran had already mapped oil fields, refineries, and power plants across all GCC members for an immediate counter-attack should the US initiate the bombings, but also to no avail.

It was Mohammed bin Salman who aligned the GCC’s position. On Saturday, he placed a call to Trump and warned that Iran would respond to any bombings by directly attacking the energy infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbors. This was nothing Trump and Netanyahu did not already know and had not already ignored in advance when deciding on the attack.

But the Saudi leader went further: on behalf of the GCC, he expressly requested that Trump back down from plans for large-scale attacks against Iranian territory. He directly demanded clarification on Washington and Tel Aviv’s plan of action, arguing that missteps at this juncture would destabilize the global energy market for extended periods. In doing so, he implicitly conveyed two things:

The first is that, if destroyed, the GCC economies would be unable to honor the signed agreements, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), and long-term structural partnerships celebrated during Trump’s administration, values that range between $2 trillion and $3 trillion. This is not to mention the billions injected directly into the businesses of Donald Trump himself and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

To the wise, it became clear that these resources could be redirected toward investments in other blocs, including the Chinese.

The second is that, if Trump refused the request of the Saudis, acting as spokespersons for the Gulf and pressed ahead, he would be solely responsible for the destruction of local economies and a global economic crisis. Faced with structural disaster in their own territories, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries would close their airspace to American fighter jets and revoke permissions for the use of logistical bases in the region.

It was these two implicit messages that deterred Trump. Everything else he had already evaluated and, nonetheless, decided to proceed with the attack.

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Rumors indicate that Trump, together with Netanyahu, is preparing to resume intense bombing of Iran, this time focusing heavily on civilian infrastructure. Iran, for its part, has released a list of targets that could collapse the economies of Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states if it is attacked.

The United States and Israel appear to calculate that the operation will be so intense that the Iranians will be unable to do much more than they did during the previous 40 days of war. Netanyahu is confident and is already breathing the possibility of his own political survival.

But what about the Gulf countries? Trump and Netanyahu tried every available means to drag the GCC states into their war, without success. With the proven exception of the Emirates, these countries limited themselves to political pressure. Trump used the period of relative calm to pull Israel back from the front line and work on bringing the GCC into the conflict, still without success.

Continuous and simultaneous operations by the Gulf states against Iran was the second front Netanyahu and Trump dreamed of. It has not materialized. It has not materialized yet, because the Iranian target list will hit the populations of these countries hard and will once again pressure their governments to reconsider that decision.

The truth is simple: the greater the destruction, the smaller the chance of future reconciliation, and the higher the likelihood that the GCC will pivot toward the Abraham Accords.

The list of targets Iran has threatened to strike if the coalition attacks its territory includes:

Saudi Arabia

Ras al-Khair complex: one of the largest hybrid power-generation and desalination plants on the planet.
Shuaiba plant: a mega-facility on the Red Sea coast.
Jubail complex: a vital cogeneration facility that supplies the capital, Riyadh.

United Arab Emirates

Jebel Ali complex (Dubai): a massive desalination and power plant located near the port.
Taweelah complex (Abu Dhabi): a large reverse-osmosis desalination plant.
Fujairah F1 / F2: critical installations on the country’s eastern coast.
Barakah Nuclear Power Plant: included on maximum-retaliation lists.

Kuwait

Doha West complex: the massive plant that supplies the majority of Kuwait’s electricity and residential water.

Bahrain

Integrated coastal water co-generation plants that supply the island.

Qatar

Ras Laffan complex: the main industrial hub for processing, power generation, and LNG exports.

Jordan

Water-supply infrastructure: included because of the country’s logistical cooperation with Western forces.

If these targets are hit, they will trigger an economic, social, and environmental crisis across the region, a scenario I am not even capable of fully imagining.

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Anyone observing the war in the Middle East and hearing that Iran is still standing often asks how a country that has been bombed for months can possibly remain so resilient. What many people, including myself, had already been saying has now been told directly to President Trump. After successive waves of air attacks, the U.S. military leadership informed Trump that the campaign has lost its effectiveness. The top military chief, General Dan Caine, warned that there are no longer relevant pinpoint targets and that the region’s air defenses risk exhaustion.

On March 18, I wrote:

“They possess the technology, the strategic advantage of their geography, and are proving to be remarkably resilient. Their command and control chain is decentralized, with a backup plan for every leader, including a scale of three to seven pre-designated successors. The U.S. is fighting a war unlike any it has ever faced.”

Today, I would add that Iran realized the truce was a situation in which it could exercise no pressure at all. Consequently, it strategically mobilized and activated its regional allies to degrade the Saudi position, effectively opening a new front aimed at forcing the closure of the Bab El-Mandeb strait.

It decided to seize the initiative by cutting off the Oman route and expanding the operations of both the Houthis and the Iraqi PMF, just as it did with Hezbollah during the war, opening a new front against Israel.

There are already daily bombings and missile exchanges between Saudis and Yemenis, and none of this occurs without Iran’s hand. The trend is that the situation can escalate to the point of compromising Saudi oil production and triggering a larger conflict. Iran has moved from a purely reactive posture throughout the conflict and the truce to actively assuming the initiative at this stage of the war. Facing Trump’s lack of options, this reveals a White House exhaustion that will be difficult to cure.

Indeed, the United States is already feeling a strong and early war fatigue, driven by the contrast between Donald Trump’s promises and the harsh economic and military reality of the conflict. The war against Iran has completed five months and quickly turned into a strategic quagmire that exhausts the patience of the American population and institutions, feeding a general sense of frustration.

After all, Trump promised to play the role of peacemaker in his second term, yet the American voter finds himself trapped in a dynamic of mutual retaliation in the Middle East with no clear horizon for victory or an exit, all while public coffers are being drained.

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A diplomatic relationship marked by coups, embassy invasions, sanctions, public threats and assassinations was always going to drive militarization on both sides. For decades, Iran and the United States, aligned with Israel, prepared for confrontation.

Although a diplomatic channel existed between Iran and the United States that, on more than one occasion, coordinated mutual attacks for domestic consumption, Netanyahu’s policy hardened the dynamic. An attack without the usual theatrics became reality.

The core demands of the United States and Israel were clear: dismantle the nuclear program under IAEA inspections, dismantle the missile program, and end the financing and support for regional militias.

On 25–26 February, Araghchi told the press in Geneva that a historic agreement to avoid war was within reach. He did not mention the impasse still sitting on the table over the key points.

On the first day of the air campaign launched by the United States and Israel, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in Tehran. Several members of his family died in the same strike on the residential compound: one of his daughters, his son-in-law, a granddaughter, and one of his daughters-in-law, the wife of Mojtaba Khamenei, who later became the new Supreme Leader. The fact that the coalition killed Mojtaba’s wife received little attention, yet it would inevitably weigh on any future negotiation. Peace is not built on the assassination of political leaders and their families.

Even after the heavy blow to the command structure, Iran accepted talks in April through intermediaries such as Pakistan and Oman. That produced a temporary truce and, later, the June understanding.

Throughout the conflict Trump declared the war won, or practically won, on at least 32 occasions, according to NBC News. Only ten days after the operation began he held a press conference in Florida and stated textually: “The war is very complete, practically finished.”

In late March he gave precise numbers, claiming publicly that 90 percent of Iran’s missiles and launchers had been knocked out and destroyed. In mid-May he updated the figure for the press, this time saying 82 percent of all their missiles were gone.

Yet the Strait remained closed. In April he publicly instructed the U.S. Navy to “shoot and destroy every single Iranian fast boat if they harassed our ships at sea.” The order itself proved that Iranian naval forces remained highly active, exactly as I reported many times.

Also in March, CNN noted that Trump contradicted himself within a few hours, first accusing Iran of attacking a school on its own soil and then walking it back, admitting the evidence was generic. In July the Irish Star recorded four crude contradictions about the terms of a peace negotiation in a single Fox News interview.

Donald Trump announced or falsely suggested that a deal with Iran was already sealed, pre-approved or imminent on at least 38 different occasions throughout 2026, according to tallies by international agencies and CNN.

More recently, on 22 July, after signing a historic nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, Trump, within less than 24 hours of the official celebration, radically altered the understanding of the pact, adding further clauses and generating enormous confusion.

This is without counting how many times he claimed the Strait was open while ships were still being hit. Even with the MoU: right after signing, Trump declared that the agreement guaranteed the end of Iran’s nuclear program and the complete, free opening of the Strait of Hormuz. The document later leaked by NPR showed it was only a temporary 60-day ceasefire to open a window for negotiations.

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The war initiated by Trump and Netanyahu is on the verge of escalating into a full-scale regional conflict involving other nations and a vast militia network.

Following Saudi airstrikes on Sana’a Airport in mid-July, Yemen retaliated with direct strikes against Abha Airport in southern Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Yemeni forces imposed a naval blockade on Saudi shipping, successfully hitting three vessels attempting to break through: the Saudi tankers Encelia and Layla, and the chemical tanker NCC Ghazal.

Yemeni forces also launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting Aramco refineries at the port of Jizan, as well as refining facilities in Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. Furthermore, drone strikes struck the East-West Pipeline, damaging the crude oil transport infrastructure that cuts across Saudi territory to Yanbu, a pipeline responsible for moving approximately 5 million barrels of oil per day.

In response, the Saudis launched heavy bombardments against radar positions, telecommunications centers, and military bunkers in the coastal province of Hodeidah and neighboring Kamaran Island, areas used by the Houthis to monitor and launch missiles at shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Riyadh also targeted missile bases in Marib and Al-Jawf, while utilizing local militias to strike Houthi artillery positions on the Harib land front.

The entire Yemeni campaign operates under Tehran’s influence, as Iran seeks to pressure Saudi oil exports passing through the Red Sea.

Because the Houthis are not Iran’s only regional allies, the PMF, a militia umbrella group comprising over 200,000 combatants, likely directed by the IRGC, also opened fire on Saudi positions in late July. This triggered a joint US-Saudi retaliatory bombing campaign against PMF facilities, leaving over 20 fighters dead and more than 30 wounded. The PMF has vowed revenge, and hours after the attack, Iran launched missiles against American bases in Jordan.

The current geopolitical landscape is now firmly set: Iranian allies, coordinated by the IRGC, are locked in a direct conflict with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

This confrontation is poised to expand significantly. Saudi Arabia is expected to announce an international coalition next week to forcibly reopen the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an move that will inevitably require military force, as Yemeni forces refuse to back down.

According to leaks obtained by Al-Monitor, key Red Sea coastal states forming the African side of the strait: Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, have already agreed to participate. The Saudis have also invited France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, all of which already have warships in the region and are awaiting Washington’s green light. GCC members were invited as well, with the exception of the UAE, bringing the total list of potential coalition members to around 50 nations.

However, the Saudi strategy extends beyond the sea. Riyadh has aggressively mobilized its proxy militias within Yemen by significantly increasing salaries, recruitment, weaponry, and equipment. This ground force relies on Dir Al-Watan, with 20,000 to 30,000 men; 15,000 fighters from the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, and tens of thousands of former UAE-financed combatants who have now switched allegiance to Riyadh.

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On the 29th, Saudi Arabia, together with the United States, carried out a major airstrike on Iraqi soil against the PMF militia, killing at least 10 fighters and wounding dozens more.

The Saudis claim the attack was in retaliation for the launch of more than 30 drones against their territory in the previous 72 hours, carried out in coordination with Yemeni attacks.

The Saudi-American strike hit at least six Iraqi cities, including the PMF headquarters in Basra.

The PMF is a pro-Iranian militia with more than 200,000 members that was incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces and receives salaries from the government. Even so, it maintains strong loyalty to Iran, as do most of the region’s Shia militias.
This loyalty may explain the drone launches against Saudi territory conducted alongside the Yemeni attacks.

I have the intuition that Iran activated its allies in an attempt to curb Saudi exports through the Red Sea, since the Saudis were shipping 4.5 million barrels per day via that route. This way the market feels the closure of Hormuz more sharply, and Iran regains greater bargaining power.

The problem is that both the Saudis and the Americans appear to have recognized this move and decided to launch a large-scale bombing campaign against PMF facilities. And why not in Yemen? Obviously, because the Houthis would retaliate with missiles, sending Saudi oil facilities up in flames, even if the whole of Yemen were to burn.

The Americans and Saudis now plan to deal with Yemen, but the situation is far more complicated than that. Upon learning of the American attacks on PMF positions, Iran launched missiles against the U.S. base in Jordan, which suggests that the Iranians were deeply disturbed by the strikes and intend to maintain an offensive posture, at least for as long as the U.S. keeps its blockade in place.

This is precisely the point at which all sides decided to settle matters with force, leading me to believe that the Yemenis will continue their attacks and the blockade of Saudi ships in the Bab el-Mandeb.

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During coalition strikes on Iran launched from American bases in the region, and the subsequent Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) initiated a severe, sweeping crackdown on Iranian citizens and institutions. Residence visas held by Iranians who had lived in the country for decades were cancelled en masse, and harsh financial restrictions were imposed.

This strategy hit those outside the country particularly hard: Iranian citizens traveling for business or tourism were barred from re-entering the Emirates, even being prevented from collecting their personal belongings. Even the coveted Golden Visas, the 10-year residency permits granted to buyers of high-value luxury properties, were unilaterally cancelled without prior notice.

Furthermore, the government suspended operations for all entities linked to Iran and froze the accounts of hundreds of Iranian individuals and companies. Iranians were barred from transferring funds or registering new real estate. According to Tehran, the Emirati government confiscated or blocked the equivalent of $530 billion in total assets belonging to Iranian citizens and companies. Independent sources, however, put the figure closer to $350 billion, still a staggering sum.

As Iran intensified attacks on the Emirates and maintained its closure of the Strait, Abu Dhabi moved to de-escalate. The economic damage was simply too deep to ignore. In May, the total value of real estate transactions plunged 42% compared to April. The volume of units sold dropped 19% in a single month. In the second quarter of 2026, the overall value of transactions recorded a 45% decline year-on-year. Reports from Knight Frank confirmed that the number of homes changing hands in June fell 16.4% annually.

To offload completed properties on the secondary market, frightened owners and some developers began offering steep discounts relative to pre-war prices, hoping to attract buyers willing to take the risk.

What risk? The risk of Iranian missiles pointed directly at their windows from across the Strait.

The toll on oil exports, tourism, and airlines has already climbed into the tens of billions.

Consequently, the Emirates opened talks with representatives from the Tehran government, stitching together an agreement aimed at releasing $20 billion that had been frozen for years in Emirati banks under international sanctions. China acted as the guarantor of the entire agenda, leveraging its close partnership with both nations.

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