A War Misread in the West

Beebe argues that the trajectory of the war was predictable, but that Western political and media discussions largely ignored developments that contradicted the expectation that Ukraine would ultimately prevail. Ukrainian attacks have received extensive attention, while Russian battlefield advances and strategic airstrikes have often been minimized.

In his view, this creates a serious danger. If Western governments suddenly confront a reality very different from what they have been led to expect, they may enter a “do-something mode” and make decisions that escalate the conflict, including potentially provoking direct military confrontation with Russia.

Ukraine and the “Steel Porcupine”

Beebe argues that Russia’s strategic air campaign is undermining the possibility that Ukraine can emerge from the war as a heavily militarized “steel porcupine”: a state capable of deterring Russia indefinitely through a large military and extensive Western support.

Instead, he believes Ukraine risks emerging economically devastated, unable to rebuild its infrastructure, generate sufficient electricity, trade effectively or finance its own government. In this scenario, Ukraine would become permanently dependent on European financial support and could move toward becoming a failed state.

He considers Ukraine’s demographic crisis particularly serious. The country’s population has fallen dramatically since the Soviet period, while refugees continue to leave and a large share of those remaining are pensioners or people affected by the war. In his view, these demographic realities make it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to maintain a large military over the long term.

Odessa and Russia’s Economic Leverage

Beebe considers the closure and destruction of Ukraine’s Odessa transport complex especially significant because it affects not only Ukraine’s present economy but also its future. Without functioning ports and transport infrastructure, Ukraine’s ability to export agricultural products and rebuild its economy is severely constrained.

He argues that Russia has effectively acquired a veto over Ukraine’s reconstruction. Western countries cannot provide enough air-defense systems to prevent Russia from continuing its strategic air campaign, while Russia can produce missiles, drones and glide bombs faster than the West can manufacture interceptors such as Patriot missiles.

Consequently, he believes Russia could continue threatening Ukrainian reconstruction even after major ground fighting ends. Any major industrial or military facility built inside Ukraine could remain vulnerable to Russian strikes.

Attrition Beyond the Battlefield

Beebe argues that the nature of the war changed after Russia’s initial attempt at a rapid victory failed. The conflict subsequently became a war of attrition, in which progress should not primarily be measured by territorial advances.

Instead, he believes manpower, military production, economic sustainability and infrastructure resilience are more important indicators. In these areas, he argues, Russia has substantial advantages. Attritional pressure accumulates gradually before potentially producing rapid changes.

He points to Ukraine’s manpower shortages, disputes surrounding forced mobilization, attacks on energy infrastructure and the closure of Odessa as evidence that this process is intensifying.

The Need for Diplomacy

Beebe argues that Ukraine’s worsening economic, social and political position makes a negotiated settlement increasingly important. However, he believes the window for such an agreement is closing because Russia is becoming doubtful that the United States can deliver a meaningful compromise.

He argues that negotiations should address broader European security concerns, not only the immediate battlefield. He also believes the United States should avoid policies that unnecessarily push Russia and China closer together.

Regarding the conflict with Iran, Beebe argues that Washington should work with Russia and China to end it, because both countries have influence with Iran and have incentives to prevent wider economic and geopolitical damage.

Preserving a Future Settlement

Beebe ultimately argues that even if a diplomatic breakthrough is not immediately possible, the United States and Europe should avoid actions that make one impossible later. The priority, in his view, should be keeping open the possibility of a broader diplomatic settlement and a new balance among the major powers.

He argues that the emerging multipolar order will require understandings among the great powers and an equilibrium that accommodates the interests of the United States, Russia and China. Until such a settlement becomes politically possible, he believes the immediate objective should be to avoid provoking further crises and preserve the possibility of diplomacy in the years ahead.

The threat against Netanyahu is part of Iran’s broader response to the attacks it has faced. Iran does not regard the Israeli leadership as untouchable, and if Israel continues its military actions, Tehran has the ability to respond directly. The question is therefore not whether Iran can retaliate, but when and how it chooses to do so.

For Iran, targeting Netanyahu would demonstrate that the Israeli leadership cannot wage war against Iran while remaining personally insulated from the consequences. The message is that those responsible for attacks on Iran can themselves become targets.

Iran Is Preparing for a Larger Confrontation

Iran is not returning to the situation that existed before the recent conflict. It is preparing for the possibility of a much larger confrontation and has increased its ability to sustain a prolonged war.

Iran has moved toward a war economy and expanded its production of missiles and drones. The country has also gained experience from the fighting and has a clearer understanding of how to respond to Israeli and American military pressure.

This means that any future confrontation would not simply repeat what happened previously. Iran would be better prepared, and its response could become considerably more severe.

Pressure on the United States

Iran also has significant means of putting pressure on the United States. Washington’s military presence throughout the region creates vulnerabilities, while American economic pressure on Iran can be met with measures that impose costs on the United States and its allies.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important. Iran has not completely closed the strait, but it retains the ability to influence the movement of energy through it. If the United States continues trying to economically strangle Iran and prevent it from selling its oil, Tehran can respond by increasing pressure on regional energy supplies.

Iran therefore does not have to accept economic warfare passively. It can make the continuation of such policies increasingly expensive for Washington.

Iran Will Not Accept Endless Concessions

Iran also rejects the idea that it should repeatedly make concessions to the United States in exchange for promises that Washington may later abandon.

From Tehran’s perspective, previous agreements have demonstrated that American commitments cannot simply be taken for granted. Iran therefore wants existing commitments to be implemented rather than entering negotiations in which it is once again expected to surrender additional capabilities or accept further restrictions.

The continued pressure on Iran, combined with Israeli military actions, reinforces the view that Tehran must maintain its ability to defend itself.

A Changing Regional Balance

Iran’s position is also connected to a wider transformation of the Middle East and the international system. The United States can no longer assume that it can determine regional outcomes through military power and economic pressure alone.

Iran has developed stronger relationships with regional partners and other major powers, while its own military capabilities have expanded. This creates a different balance of power.

Iran’s strategy is therefore one of endurance and retaliation. If Israel continues its attacks, Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders cannot assume they are safe from Iranian retaliation. If Washington continues its economic and military pressure, Iran can increase the costs for the United States.

The central message is that Iran will not simply absorb attacks or economic coercion. It intends to respond, and Netanyahu himself can become one of the targets.

The return of great-power politics

Mearsheimer argues that the liberal international order was essentially a Western order that expanded globally after the Cold War. Its underlying conditions no longer exist. China has become a major economic and military power, Russia remains a major great power with enormous military capabilities, and the United States can no longer dictate the rules of the international system as it once did.

The problem, in his view, is that many Western policymakers continue to behave as though the unipolar era is still intact. They underestimate the importance of balance-of-power politics and assume that other major powers will simply accept an expansion of Western influence into areas they regard as strategically vital.

Russia and the Ukraine war

Mearsheimer argues that the Ukraine war is fundamentally connected to NATO expansion and the security dilemma surrounding Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, the continued expansion of a powerful Western military alliance toward Russia’s borders represents a serious strategic threat.

He argues that Russia has repeatedly made clear that Ukraine’s movement into the Western security sphere was unacceptable because of its geographical position and importance to Russian security. The central mistake, in his view, was treating Russian security concerns as irrelevant rather than recognizing that great powers react strongly when hostile military capabilities move toward their borders.

He distinguishes between containment and rollback. Containment seeks to prevent an adversary from expanding its power, while rollback seeks to push that power backward and alter the existing balance. Mearsheimer argues that Western policy toward Russia increasingly moved beyond containment toward rollback, creating a far more dangerous situation.

Iran and the nuclear danger

Mearsheimer also warns against any attempt to solve the Iranian problem through extreme military escalation. He argues that the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons against Iran is particularly dangerous and strategically unsound.

Iran is a large country with substantial military capabilities and a population capable of sustaining resistance. A nuclear attack would not simply eliminate the Iranian problem; it could produce unpredictable consequences and encourage further escalation. Mearsheimer argues that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from conventional weapons because once they enter a conflict, controlling the escalation becomes extraordinarily difficult.

The same logic applies to Russia. A nuclear-armed great power cannot be pushed indefinitely without creating the possibility that it will respond in ways that neither side intended.

The danger of escalation

Mearsheimer argues that Western leaders are operating in an increasingly dangerous international environment without adequately understanding the security dilemma. Actions that one side considers defensive can appear offensive to another side, prompting countermeasures that then reinforce the original fears.

He argues that this dynamic is particularly dangerous because the world now contains several major powers with nuclear weapons. Military pressure, arms transfers and attempts to weaken an adversary can therefore produce escalation rather than capitulation.

The essential lesson, in Mearsheimer’s argument, is that the United States and its allies must recognize the limits of their power. Great powers have security interests, and those interests cannot simply be wished away. The international system has returned to multipolarity, and successful foreign policy requires accepting that reality rather than attempting to recreate the conditions of the unipolar era.

Russia, Ukraine and the Failure of Sanctions

Armstrong argues that Western policy toward Russia is based on a misunderstanding of Russian interests. He rejects the idea that Putin wants to conquer Europe, arguing that there is little economic benefit for Russia in doing so. In his view, the conflict in Ukraine is primarily connected to the Donbas and the long-standing hostility between Russian-speaking populations and the Ukrainian government.

He believes the Minsk agreements offered a potential settlement by allowing the Donbas to separate, and argues that honoring them could have prevented the war. Armstrong also emphasizes the importance of language, religion and ethnic identity, arguing that attempts to suppress Russian cultural and religious affiliations made reconciliation increasingly difficult.

He argues that sanctions and military attacks cannot simply force Russia to surrender. Instead, pressure could strengthen harder-line political forces within Russia. The same principle applies to attempts to remove foreign leaders: eliminating a leader does not necessarily resolve the underlying conflict and may produce an even more confrontational successor.

Iran and the Consequences of War

Armstrong applies similar reasoning to Iran. He argues that policymakers repeatedly focus on the first step of military action without considering what follows. Removing Iran’s leadership, he argues, does not guarantee stability and could instead create an even more dangerous situation.

He believes sanctions have repeatedly failed to bring governments down, while encouraging countries to seek alternative financial and trading arrangements. Armstrong also argues that Iran understands the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz. Closing or disrupting it could put significant economic pressure on the Gulf states, which have accumulated substantial debts and depend heavily on oil revenues.

Europe’s Economic Crisis

Armstrong sees the euro’s structure as one of Europe’s fundamental weaknesses. European countries share a currency but never fully consolidated their national debts. Consequently, investors still assess Germany, France, Italy and other countries separately. When one country encounters financial difficulties, markets immediately begin asking which country will be next.

He argues that Europe ultimately needs monetary reform and genuine debt consolidation. He also rejects tariffs and economic nationalism, favoring the principle of comparative advantage and free trade. In his view, tariffs increase costs for consumers and reduce living standards.

Armstrong believes these economic weaknesses, combined with cultural and political tensions, could ultimately cause the European Union to break apart, potentially by around 2029.

China, Russia and the Financial System

Armstrong argues that Western financial sanctions are accelerating the development of alternative financial systems. After Russia was removed from SWIFT, Russia and China had stronger incentives to develop independent mechanisms for international payments. He sees China’s movement away from Western government debt and toward gold as part of this process.

For Armstrong, the attraction of gold is primarily political and strategic rather than speculative. A country preparing for possible conflict does not want to hold large amounts of an adversary’s debt, because that debt could be defaulted upon or weaponized. Gold, by contrast, is neutral.

He argues that the increasing use of financial sanctions is therefore undermining international trade and encouraging countries to move away from the existing dollar-based system.

(Article that summarises the transcript has been created with the assistance of AI)

Gaza Has Changed the Picture

Parsi argues that Gaza is essential to understanding the growing sympathy for Iran. The war in Gaza has profoundly changed how many people around the world view the United States, Israel and the wider international order.

Across the Global South, and increasingly within Europe, there is growing frustration with governments that continue supporting Israel despite the destruction and civilian suffering in Gaza. Parsi argues that this has created a much broader rejection of Western foreign policy than existed previously.

The issue, therefore, is no longer simply whether people support Iran. Many people can oppose the Iranian government while simultaneously believing that Iran should be able to resist American and Israeli attempts to impose their will on the country. Gaza has reinforced the perception that international law is being applied selectively, weakening the credibility of Western governments that claim to uphold it.

Quietly Rooting for Iran

Parsi argues that some of the most striking support for Iran exists behind closed doors. He has spoken with officials from countries firmly within the American and Western camp who privately hope that Iran will continue resisting.

Their motivation is not necessarily sympathy for Tehran. Rather, they fear the consequences of a rapid American victory. If Trump demonstrates that the United States can quickly defeat Iran, they worry that Washington could become emboldened to use military power against other countries.

Parsi points to conversations in which officials expressed concern that countries such as Cuba could become future targets, while even Greenland was mentioned as a possible consequence of an increasingly confident American president. From this perspective, Iran’s resistance serves the interests of countries that want to prevent further American military adventures.

Iran as a Check on American Power

Parsi argues that Iran’s ability to resist has therefore acquired importance far beyond the Middle East. The longer Iran prevents Washington from achieving an easy victory, the more difficult it becomes to demonstrate that overwhelming American power can quickly force another country to submit.

This explains why countries that have no desire to become Iranian allies can nevertheless quietly want Iran to succeed. They can maintain economic relations, refuse to participate fully in sanctions, continue trading with Iran or simply hope that Tehran prevents Washington from establishing another precedent for military coercion.

The same logic applies to China. Parsi argues that serious efforts to prevent Iranian oil exports could create confrontation with Beijing, which has its own economic interests and is increasingly unwilling to accept Washington’s ability to dictate the terms of international trade.

Trump’s Economic Pressure

Parsi argues that Trump’s threats of further economic pressure may be designed more to maintain leverage than to trigger a genuine escalation. Washington wants to avoid allowing Iran to dominate the political agenda ahead of the US midterm elections, particularly if a confrontation contributes to higher energy prices.

Iran, meanwhile, is maintaining a diplomatic strategy. Tehran is engaging countries such as Qatar, Oman and Pakistan and putting forward proposals that Washington may reject, but which allow Iran to demonstrate that it is pursuing diplomacy and establish principles for future negotiations.

Parsi argues that this could become important if Trump seeks a deal after the midterms, because Iran will already have established the framework within which it is prepared to negotiate.

A More Multipolar World

For Parsi, the growing support for Iran is ultimately part of a wider shift. The ability of the United States to remove countries from the international financial system, particularly after sanctions against Russia, has alarmed governments across the Global South.

These countries increasingly want alternatives and greater strategic autonomy. They do not necessarily want to replace American dominance with Iranian, Russian or Chinese dominance. They want to ensure that no single power can determine the political choices of sovereign states.

Iran’s resistance therefore has a significance beyond Iran. In Parsi’s argument, the quiet support accumulating around Tehran reflects a growing international desire to place limits on American power and create a world in which countries have greater freedom to pursue their own interests.

This is particularly dangerous because there is no such thing as a controllable or limited nuclear war. The development of lower-yield nuclear weapons and the growing discussion of their potential battlefield use creates the illusion that nuclear weapons can be used in a limited manner without triggering wider escalation. Once nuclear weapons are introduced into a conflict, however, other nuclear powers cannot simply accept the precedent that nuclear weapons can be used successfully to impose military outcomes.

Iran and the Nuclear Threshold

Iran is now at the centre of one of the most dangerous nuclear questions. Iran has enriched uranium to 60 percent and developed nuclear capabilities that are increasingly difficult to destroy through conventional military force. Some of these facilities are located deep underground, creating a situation in which conventional bombing may no longer provide a reliable means of eliminating Iran’s nuclear potential.

The issue is therefore not simply whether Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Iran is approaching the nuclear threshold: it possesses much of the technological capability required to produce a weapon, while remaining formally outside the nuclear-armed states.

If the United States concludes that Iran’s nuclear capabilities must be destroyed regardless of the consequences, the question becomes whether conventional weapons are sufficient. If they are not, nuclear weapons could enter the calculations. This would fundamentally change the international system.

Russia and China could not simply accept the successful use of nuclear weapons to destroy another major state’s strategic capabilities. They would have to respond in order to prevent a fundamental shift in the nuclear balance. A military operation against Iran could therefore produce consequences extending far beyond the Middle East.

Russia and Ukraine

The situation in Ukraine has also demonstrated how rapidly a conventional conflict can approach the nuclear threshold. The most dangerous period came during the escalation in 2024, when Russia faced increasingly direct involvement by NATO countries. Russia was prepared to negotiate a settlement, but its willingness to negotiate was interpreted by NATO as a sign of weakness. The attacks on Russia’s nuclear deterrent and early warning systems were unthinkable during the Cold War, yet it was met with hardly any scepticism in the Western media.

The danger of nuclear war came extremely close during NATO’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk region. This was not simply a Ukrainian military operation: NATO planned, prepared and supported the offensive, providing the training, intelligence, equipment and other capabilities required to carry it out. For Russia, the invasion of the Kursk region therefore represented a direct attack by NATO against Russian territory. The significance of this cannot be overstated. Russia is a nuclear power, and NATO is a nuclear alliance. When NATO forces and capabilities were used to invade Russian territory, the conflict moved into a fundamentally different and far more dangerous phase. Had the Kursk operation succeeded in inflicting a major military defeat on Russia, Moscow could have faced an existential strategic crisis. The danger was that Russia might conclude that conventional means were no longer sufficient to defend itself and that escalation to nuclear weapons was necessary. We came extraordinarily close to nuclear war because the West underestimated how Russia would respond to a NATO-backed invasion of its territory. The failure of the Kursk offensive ultimately prevented the situation from developing further, but it demonstrated how quickly the Ukraine conflict could become a direct war between NATO and Russia—and therefore a nuclear war.

The failure of that offensive fundamentally changed Russia’s calculations. Russia now has greater confidence in its military position and believes that the war is moving towards a Russian victory. This reduces the immediate likelihood that Russia would resort to nuclear weapons in Europe.

The greater danger is that European states are increasingly discussing how to confront Russia more directly and how to raise the nuclear threshold. This risks creating exactly the type of escalation that nuclear deterrence was supposed to prevent.

The Greatest Danger Is in Asia

The most serious nuclear danger is now in Asia. The potential confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan could produce circumstances in which conventional American military power is unable to achieve its objectives.

If China were to attack or blockade Taiwan, Washington could face a difficult choice: accept a major strategic defeat or escalate. Because China is a nuclear power, escalation would carry fundamentally different risks from a conventional war against a non-nuclear state.

North Korea creates a similar problem. Any major conflict on the Korean Peninsula would involve a nuclear-armed state from the beginning. The possibility of escalation cannot therefore be treated as a theoretical concern.

The lesson is straightforward: nuclear war cannot be safely limited. Military exercises have repeatedly demonstrated how quickly the use of tactical nuclear weapons can escalate into a broader nuclear exchange.

The only sustainable way to reduce these dangers is to rebuild arms control, restore communication between nuclear powers and reduce reliance on nuclear weapons as instruments of conventional military strategy. Nuclear weapons are ultimately not weapons that can be safely used; they are weapons whose primary purpose must remain preventing nuclear war.

Peter Kuznick argues that the world has entered an exceptionally dangerous period in which the possibility of nuclear war must again become a central political concern. He advocates an emergency international summit involving the principal nuclear powers, particularly the United States, Russia and China, with Pope Leo XIV using his moral authority to encourage such a meeting.

For Kuznick, the danger has grown because political and military leaders increasingly discuss nuclear war as something that might be fought and won. A new school of nuclear planners, he argues, believes advances in artificial intelligence, surveillance, sonar and missile technology could make it possible to destroy an opponent’s nuclear forces in a first strike. Kuznick considers this profoundly dangerous because even the belief that such a war could be won would encourage leaders to take greater risks.

The disappearance of nuclear guardrails

Kuznick sees the erosion of arms-control agreements as another major source of danger. The United States and Russia once developed treaties, communication mechanisms and other arrangements intended to reduce the possibility of accidental escalation. According to him, many of these safeguards have now disappeared, leaving the two countries without the strategic stability framework that helped prevent catastrophe during the Cold War.

He points to the Cuban Missile Crisis as an important historical lesson. Both John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev eventually recognized that events had moved beyond their control and sought a peaceful resolution. Kuznick believes the lesson is that nuclear powers must create mechanisms for diplomacy before crises become uncontrollable. He also highlights Pope John XXIII’s intervention during the crisis, arguing that the Pope’s appeal helped provide Khrushchev with political space to step back.

Challenging the logic of escalation

Kuznick argues that military solutions are increasingly failing in major international conflicts. He points to the difficulties faced by the United States in Iran and by Russia in Ukraine as evidence that even powerful states cannot simply impose political outcomes through force.

For him, this creates an opportunity to reconsider the assumption that military pressure is the primary means of resolving disputes. Russia, China, the United States and other major powers all have an interest in avoiding a conflict that could escalate into nuclear war. Kuznick therefore calls for diplomacy rather than further militarization, arguing that the enormous resources being devoted to military preparations could instead support development, healthcare, education and environmental protection.

He also argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine should not automatically be interpreted through the historical analogy of Nazi Germany and the Munich settlement. In his view, portraying every major adversary as a new Hitler creates the assumption that negotiation is equivalent to appeasement and that military confrontation is therefore unavoidable. He rejects the idea that Russia intends to launch a war against NATO, arguing that such a conflict would carry enormous risks for Russia itself.

A different vision of international development

Kuznick advocates a broader shift toward peaceful economic development. He points to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its expansion of green energy and infrastructure as examples of the kind of development he believes should receive greater attention. Rather than organizing international relations primarily around military competition, he argues that states should focus on shared interests and common challenges.

This perspective also shapes his view of nuclear weapons. They are not simply another category of military technology but a planetary existential threat. Even a comparatively limited nuclear conflict, he argues, could produce catastrophic consequences through destruction, famine and climatic effects.

Personal responsibility

Kuznick ultimately places responsibility not only on governments but on ordinary people. Citizens, he argues, must pressure political leaders to pursue diplomacy, oppose nuclear escalation and reconsider the direction of international politics.

For him, there is still time to change course. Nuclear abolition, an end to the wars in Ukraine and Iran, peaceful development in Asia and renewed diplomacy are possible if people actively demand them. The alternative is continuing along a path in which military escalation eventually escapes political control.

(Article that summarises the transcript has been created with the assistance of AI)

Professor Richard Wolff argues that the central argument is that the United States is experiencing an accelerating decline of its imperial position, increasingly visible across economic, political and military affairs. The modern world economy has become so interconnected that attempts to solve one crisis can generate new vulnerabilities elsewhere. Trade, currencies, financial markets, debt and commodity prices are linked, meaning disruption in one major economy can quickly spread around the world.

The difficulties surrounding Iran and the Strait of Hormuz illustrate this dynamic. Higher oil prices and disrupted energy supplies have placed pressure on Asian economies such as Japan and South Korea. Japan’s weakening yen has made imported oil even more expensive, while efforts to stabilize the currency have contributed to the sale of U.S. Treasury bonds. Falling Treasury prices raise long-term American interest rates, threatening the housing market. The result is a cycle in which policymakers solve one problem while creating another.

The Burden of American Power

The argument is not that the United States lacks resources. It remains exceptionally wealthy and powerful. Rather, its enormous accumulated wealth has become a source of vulnerability because it encourages political leaders to believe that almost any problem can be overcome through sufficient resources.

The postwar American position was built partly on the collapse of European and Japanese empires. As European powers withdrew from Asia and Africa, the United States expanded into the political and economic space they had occupied. It inherited many advantages of the old imperial system while presenting itself as an ally of newly independent nations and a champion of democracy.

This produced an extraordinary concentration of American economic and political power during the second half of the twentieth century. But the system also depended on the rest of the world remaining integrated around American leadership.

Iran and the End of an Era

Iran is presented as a powerful symbol of this historical reversal. The United States helped overthrow Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 and supported the Shah until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iran subsequently became one of the most important states resisting American influence in the region.

Its ability to withstand American pressure demonstrates, in this argument, the limits of American power. Other countries, including both friends and adversaries, are increasingly seeking ways to reduce their vulnerability to American sanctions, military pressure and financial influence.

This is contributing to the dissolution of the world economy organized around the United States. Tariffs and sanctions therefore become not only instruments of American power but also symptoms of a declining system attempting to preserve itself.

From Neoliberalism to Nationalism

Another major transformation is the shift from neoliberalism toward economic nationalism. The previous emphasis on free markets and globalization is being replaced by direct government intervention in corporations, currencies, trade and financial markets.

At the same time, domestic disaffection is growing. Younger Americans are increasingly dissatisfied with capitalism and with both major political parties, even though this does not necessarily represent a conscious rejection of capitalism itself. Progressive movements have gained support partly because they are seen as offering some possibility of addressing economic problems, while the political establishment increasingly appears exhausted.

Europe and a Changing World Order

Europe may eventually face a decisive choice. European countries tied their fortunes to the United States after World War II, becoming junior partners within the American-led system. As that system weakens, the costs of maintaining the relationship are becoming harder to sustain.

Germany could become particularly important. A political shift toward restoring cheap Russian energy and ending support for the war in Ukraine would offer German voters immediate economic benefits through lower energy costs and reduced military expenditures. Such a shift could encourage broader European realignment toward Russia and China.

The broader conclusion is that the conditions supporting American imperial dominance have matured to the point where its dissolution is increasingly difficult to prevent. The world is moving toward a more fragmented economic and political order, while the United States is struggling to adapt to the loss of the extraordinary position it acquired during the twentieth century.

(Article that summarises the transcript has been created with the assistance of AI)

The war against Iran has had immediate economic consequences. Oil prices have risen sharply, while disruptions to production and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz threaten higher prices for fuel, electricity, agriculture and fertilizers. Sachs argues that the costs will extend across the global economy. The direct financial costs to the United States, he says, could reach hundreds of billions of dollars.

But Sachs considers the mentality behind these wars even more consequential. He argues that Western policy remains rooted in the assumption that the United States and its European allies have the right to determine how the rest of the world behaves. Russia, Iran and China, in his view, are treated as unwanted challengers to this presumed Western dominance.

Europe’s Strategic Mistake

Sachs believes Europe is making an especially serious strategic error by continuing to follow Washington. Europe, he argues, has interests fundamentally different from those of the United States. It shares the Eurasian landmass with Russia and China and previously benefited substantially from economic relations with Russia.

He maintains that European leaders understood these realities more clearly in the past. Germany, France and other European governments once recognized that expanding NATO toward Russia could produce conflict and that European prosperity depended partly on maintaining economic connections with Russia. Sachs argues that this understanding has largely disappeared, leaving Europe with weak and incoherent leadership.

He also believes Europe should recognize the importance of its relationship with China rather than adopting an increasingly confrontational position toward Beijing. From his perspective, China’s resurgence represents a return to an historically important position after more than a century of foreign domination, rather than simply the emergence of an illegitimate challenger to Western power.

Iran and the Collapse of Diplomacy

Sachs makes a similar argument regarding Iran. He recalls that European governments supported the nuclear agreement with Iran because they believed diplomacy could resolve the dispute. He argues that Iran complied with the agreement and that the United States’ withdrawal from it in 2018 represented the decisive breakdown.

In his view, European governments should have defended the agreement and continued pursuing diplomacy. Instead, they accepted Washington’s subsequent policy of economic pressure and military confrontation. Sachs argues that the result has been an avoidable escalation threatening both regional stability and the wider international system.

America’s Financial Vulnerability

Sachs also sees major weaknesses inside the U.S. economy. He describes an economy divided between a highly valued technology sector and a broader economy struggling with manufacturing, infrastructure, living costs and employment. At the same time, decades of tax cuts and persistent deficits have pushed federal debt to roughly $40 trillion.

He argues that foreign countries are increasingly diversifying away from the dollar, while high interest rates are increasing the cost of servicing U.S. debt. Meanwhile, he considers the extraordinary valuation of the U.S. stock market, driven partly by enthusiasm over artificial intelligence, a major financial bubble.

China, Sachs argues, is increasingly challenging the technological dominance assumed by American companies, including through open-source and lower-cost artificial-intelligence systems. He therefore expects a substantial financial revaluation in the United States, potentially involving a prolonged stock-market decline or a crash.

A Multipolar Alternative

Sachs sees several possible futures. One is catastrophic escalation toward a wider war. Another is that European leaders eventually recognize that continued confrontation with Russia is contrary to Europe’s interests and pursue a settlement based on Ukrainian neutrality.

His preferred outcome is a broader transition toward multipolarity, in which Europe and the United States abandon the pursuit of global hegemony and accept a world in which China, Russia, India, Brazil, Iran and other countries play major independent roles. He argues that much of the developing world may continue advancing even if the West becomes trapped in economic stagnation.

For Sachs, the central choice is therefore between continued confrontation and an adjustment to a multipolar international system based on diplomacy, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

(Article that summarises the transcript has been created with the assistance of AI)

In Wilkerson’s account, the objective was not simply to persuade European governments on individual issues. It was to cultivate a political class that would reliably support the United States and its geopolitical interests. He portrays this as a long-term project reaching deeply into European political and social institutions.

As he puts it, the Americans did not merely influence politicians through conventional diplomacy. “They bought newspaper editors. They bought labor-union heads. They bought parliamentarians.” He argues that these networks of influence helped create a political environment in which policies favorable to Washington could become embedded within European institutions.

Wilkerson extends the argument beyond individual politicians. “They bought whole countries in terms of their political apparatus.” His point is that American influence, as he describes it, operated at the level of political systems rather than being limited to isolated individuals.

Stoltenberg as an Example

Wilkerson presents Jens Stoltenberg as one of the clearest examples of this process. He argues that Stoltenberg was cultivated within the transatlantic political system and eventually became NATO secretary general, giving him a central role in determining the alliance’s political direction.

For Wilkerson, Stoltenberg’s rise demonstrates how Washington could identify European politicians who were compatible with American strategic objectives and subsequently help elevate them within institutions of importance to U.S. foreign policy.

He characterizes this relationship particularly bluntly: “They bought two NATO Secretaries General: Jens Stoltenberg and Mark Rutte.”

The significance of Stoltenberg, in Wilkerson’s argument, is therefore not simply his individual political outlook. His appointment to NATO represented the culmination of a broader process through which Washington cultivated European leaders who could be relied upon to preserve the alliance’s strategic orientation.

Mark Rutte and the Continuation of the System

Wilkerson places Mark Rutte in the same pattern. Rutte’s rise to NATO secretary general, he argues, should be understood as part of the continuity of this American-created political class.

The central requirement, in Wilkerson’s account, was political reliability: European leaders who wanted to rise within the transatlantic system needed to understand Washington’s priorities and demonstrate that they could be trusted to advance them.

Rutte therefore represents, for Wilkerson, another example of how European political leadership is connected to the wider American strategic establishment. His selection as NATO secretary general did not fundamentally change the direction of the alliance but continued the same pattern.

A Political Apparatus Shaped From Outside

Wilkerson’s broader argument is that American influence in Europe became so extensive that it helped determine who could successfully rise through European political institutions.

The process he describes involved newspapers, labor organizations, parliamentarians and national political structures. By cultivating these different parts of European society, Washington could shape the political environment in which leaders emerged and operated.

The result, in Wilkerson’s view, was a European political class whose careers and institutions were deeply intertwined with American power. This is why he places Stoltenberg and Rutte alongside the broader network of editors, union leaders and parliamentarians he says were bought or cultivated.

His argument ultimately goes beyond NATO. The United States, he maintains, did not simply persuade European governments; it helped construct the political apparatus through which European governments were governed. The elevation of Stoltenberg and Rutte to the leadership of NATO is presented as one of the clearest manifestations of that longer process.

(The article has been written with the assistance of AI)

The rivalry extends beyond Syria. Turkey is a formidable military power whose interests touch virtually every major issue in the region, from Iran and Iraq to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, the Balkans and NATO. It therefore cannot be treated as a peripheral actor. Israel’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Turkey risks turning a powerful regional state into a determined adversary.

A New Regional Independence

A broader transformation is underway. Regional governments are increasingly basing foreign policy on national interests rather than religious or ideological divisions. The traditional Sunni-Shia divide has consequently become less decisive. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Syria and potentially Iran can pursue cooperation despite major religious and political differences when their national interests overlap.

The emerging Pakistani-Saudi-Turkish entente is an important expression of this change. It represents not simply a security arrangement but a declaration that major regional powers no longer regard American protection as sufficiently reliable. They are seeking greater self-reliance, diversifying their international relationships and developing mechanisms for consultation on regional security.

Syria could potentially join this framework, while Pakistan could help facilitate a rapprochement between Syria and Iran. Iran itself might not become a formal member but could develop a consultative or dialogue-partner relationship with the three countries. Such arrangements would reflect the growing ability of regional states to overcome theological differences in pursuit of common interests.

Russia’s Continuing Diplomatic Role

Russia remains relevant to these developments despite the loss of its previous position in Syria. Its continued presence and diplomatic relationships give it capabilities that Western countries have increasingly lost. Russia can potentially mediate between Turkey and Israel or between Syria and Iran because it has maintained dialogue with the principal actors.

The broader regional trend is toward independence from Washington. Turkey, like Russia, has moved away from a long-standing orientation toward Europe and is increasingly positioning itself across several regions simultaneously. Turkey’s importance as a “fulcrum” makes it an actor whose relationships can influence developments far beyond its immediate borders.

Israel’s Strategic Vulnerability

The central danger is that Israel is making an enemy of Turkey at a time when Israel itself faces significant military, political and diplomatic pressures. Israel does not possess the capacity to dominate Turkey militarily, and much of the current confrontation is therefore being conducted indirectly through struggles in Syria and Kurdistan.

Israel’s military reputation has also suffered substantially. The prolonged conflicts in Gaza and elsewhere have placed severe pressures on the armed forces, while the country faces growing international opposition. The previous perception of overwhelming Israeli military superiority has weakened, while the assumption that the United States will indefinitely underwrite Israeli power is becoming less secure.

The internal situation is also increasingly divided. Secular Israelis, nationalists and ultra-Orthodox Jews have different conceptions of the state and its future. Zionism itself has become increasingly detached from Judaism, while some religious Jews reject the political premises of the Israeli state. Emigration among some of Israel’s most highly educated citizens has added to concerns about its long-term cohesion.

The United States and Iran

The changing regional balance is also exposing the limits of American strategy. The close U.S.-Israeli relationship has increasingly become a liability rather than an asset, drawing Washington into conflicts that weaken its broader position. At the same time, European and regional allies are becoming less willing to follow Washington automatically.

The confrontation with Iran illustrates this problem. Military action cannot provide a decisive solution: Iran cannot defeat the United States, but it can inflict serious damage, while American military strikes cannot resolve the underlying conflict. Economic warfare and secondary sanctions risk uniting Russia, China and other countries against Washington rather than compelling Iran to surrender.

The result is a Middle East in which regional powers are increasingly acting independently, religious divisions are becoming less important than national interests, and the rivalry between Turkey and Israel has become one of the most consequential and potentially dangerous expressions of this transformation.

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Tangen identifies the 1985 Plaza Accord as a crucial turning point. By making the yen more expensive relative to the dollar, the agreement weakened the competitiveness of Japanese exports. Japanese companies responded by moving factories abroad, including to the United States and other regions. While this protected their competitiveness, Tangen argues that it hollowed out Japan’s domestic economy by moving production and employment overseas. He maintains that Japan’s economy, measured in real dollar terms, is now worth less than it was in 1986.

A Competitiveness Trap

The consequences, he argues, are visible in stagnant wages, rising living costs and declining economic opportunities. The traditional Japanese employment system, in which graduates could expect stable careers with major corporations, has largely disappeared. Outside major cities, homes stand empty as populations decline and younger people leave.

Japan is also caught between the advantages and disadvantages of a strong currency. A stronger yen would make imported food and energy cheaper, which is particularly important because Japan imports much of both. But it would also make Japanese exports more expensive. A weaker yen would support exporters while making essential imports more costly.

Tangen therefore argues that Japan does not primarily suffer from a shortage of financing. Its deeper problem is competitiveness. Simply injecting money into the economy cannot solve the structural weaknesses that have developed over decades.

Rearmament and China

Tangen connects Japan’s economic difficulties with its political transformation. He argues that political forces associated with Shinzo Abe and Takaichi have sought to “normalize” Japan by revising its pacifist constitution and creating a more conventional military power.

China is central to this strategy, but Japan remains deeply economically connected to China through trade, manufacturing and access to its enormous market. Tangen argues that severing these links would be extremely costly and could make Japanese goods less competitive.

He also maintains that memories of Japan’s wartime conduct continue to shape relations with China. In his view, Japan never fully confronted its wartime history, while Chinese society continues to remember the enormous suffering caused by the Japanese occupation.

Japan and the U.S. Debt Problem

Tangen sees Japan’s financial position as closely connected to America’s debt problem. Japanese companies were able to borrow cheaply in yen and purchase higher-yielding U.S. Treasury securities through the carry trade. This helped finance American debt but did little to stimulate productive investment within Japan.

As Japanese interest rates rise and currency conditions change, unwinding these positions becomes increasingly difficult. At the same time, the United States depends on foreign buyers for its Treasury debt. Tangen therefore sees Washington’s concern about Japanese Treasury sales as a financial necessity rather than simply an act of friendship toward an ally.

He argues that U.S. efforts to reindustrialize through tariffs have also failed to resolve underlying competitiveness problems, while enormous government borrowing has increased financial pressures.

China’s Alternative

Tangen believes China has been preparing for a possible weakening of the dollar-centered financial system. China has developed alternative cross-border payment mechanisms, including CIPS, while expanding the use of the yuan in trade with countries such as Russia and Iran.

He argues that China does not seek to reproduce the dollar’s role exactly. Instead, it wants to facilitate international trade while protecting its domestic economy from destabilizing speculative capital flows. China is also developing mechanisms that allow holders of Chinese bonds to borrow against them without selling the bonds.

Tangen sees gold as another part of this preparation, pointing to Chinese efforts to establish overseas gold-storage facilities. In his view, substantial gold reserves could strengthen confidence in the yuan if the dollar weakened sharply.

A Long-Term Transition

Tangen argues that Japan, the United States and other advanced economies face problems that cannot be solved through short-term political measures. Debt, demographic pressures, stagnation and declining competitiveness require long-term planning and stable governance.

He believes China is preparing for possible disruption of the existing financial order through alternative payment systems, trade relationships, infrastructure investment and greater use of the yuan. For Tangen, the central issue is not simply whether one country replaces another, but whether economies can build a more stable system capable of sustaining productive growth over the long term.

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Professor Michael Hudson argues that the current Western financial crisis can only be understood through the long history of debt and banking. His central claim is that economies become unstable when debt grows faster than the ability to repay it. Over time, this concentrates wealth and power among creditors while pushing debtors toward impoverishment and dependency.

Hudson argues that this problem was recognized across ancient West Asia and China. Rulers understood that excessive debt could destroy social stability, so they periodically canceled agrarian debts, freed people pledged to creditors and restored land lost through indebtedness. These measures, he argues, prevented the emergence of a permanent financial oligarchy.

He contrasts this with the West, where creditor power became increasingly entrenched. Political systems could formally permit voting while concentrating effective power among landowners and creditors. For Hudson, this debt polarization contributed to the decline of classical societies and remains central to the present crisis.

Financialization and Western Decline

Hudson sees today’s Western economies as repeating this pattern. Since the Second World War, debt has steadily accumulated, while financial institutions have increasingly directed credit toward purchasing existing assets rather than expanding productive capacity. Lending for real estate, stocks and bonds can raise asset prices and create financial wealth without generating corresponding increases in factories, infrastructure or living standards.

He argues that this process has produced greater inequality. Financial wealth has become concentrated among the wealthiest sections of society, while ordinary households face rising mortgages, automobile loans and credit-card debt. As debt servicing consumes more household income, consumers have less money available to purchase goods and services. Hudson therefore connects financialization directly to deindustrialization.

China, in his account, represents a contrasting model because money and credit creation remain substantially under government control. He argues that China’s financial system has been directed more toward infrastructure, industrial development and tangible investment, avoiding the independent financial oligarchy he sees in Western economies.

Banking, War and Political Power

Hudson also traces modern international banking to medieval Europe. He argues that the Roman Church helped establish international banking to finance political and military campaigns. Banks increasingly lent to kings and governments to finance warfare rather than primarily lending to ordinary people or productive enterprises.

Over time, European states became increasingly dependent on creditors. City-states such as Florence, Venice and Genoa developed fiscal systems capable of taxing their populations and using those revenues to guarantee government debts. Hudson sees this as an important stage in the emergence of modern fiscal states, where financial obligations became deeply embedded in government policy.

Restoring Productive Finance

For Hudson, the solution is not simply greater reliance on elections. Political democracy must prevent financial wealth from becoming political power. He argues that contemporary political systems have allowed wealthy financial, technological, energy and monopolistic interests to influence legislation in ways that protect their economic position.

He advocates restoring government oversight of money and credit and directing financial resources toward tangible investment, infrastructure and basic public needs. Healthcare, education, transportation and communications should be made affordable through public provision or subsidies, reducing costs for workers and productive businesses.

Ultimately, Hudson argues that the fundamental choice is between an economy organized around financial claims and one organized around production. The West, he maintains, has moved toward finance capitalism, while China has retained important elements of the classical industrial model.

The Debt Crisis Ahead

Hudson argues that if debts cannot be paid without impoverishing the wider economy, they must eventually be written down. Otherwise, banks increasingly lend borrowers money simply to service existing debts, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of indebtedness.

He also argues that the international position of the U.S. dollar is becoming harder to sustain as countries diversify their reserves into gold and other currencies. In his view, disputes over trade, energy and military costs are increasingly connected to the underlying debt problem. The broader crisis therefore concerns not only finance, but the political and international order built around it.

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Macgregor believes Moscow is increasingly asking how long it should tolerate attacks supported by Britain and other European states before striking the infrastructure where those attacks originate. He argues that Russian forces are now positioned for a more decisive offensive and that the replacement of General Valery Gerasimov as chief of the General Staff could reveal whether Moscow intends to accelerate its military campaign.

Ukraine’s Strategic Position

Macgregor argues that Ukraine is increasingly dependent on external support and suffering from severe manpower and logistical problems. He argues that Russian advances toward Zaporizhzhia and pressure on Odessa are threatening Ukraine’s remaining strategic lifelines.

He also sees Poland as crucial. In his assessment, Warsaw is increasingly frustrated with Ukraine and unwilling to become a base for a direct war with Russia. Without Poland, he argues, a major European military intervention would be extremely difficult. He compares Poland’s importance to Britain’s role in the Allied invasion of Normandy, maintaining that European military plans cannot realistically succeed without Polish support.

For Macgregor, this makes NATO entering the war increasingly unlikely. He argues that European armed forces lack the capacity for a major confrontation with Russia, while the United States is already overstretched by its military commitments in the Middle East.

A More Decisive Russian Strategy

Macgregor believes Russia has substantial forces in reserve and is training additional personnel while maintaining equipment that could be used if NATO intervened. He argues that Moscow is no longer primarily concerned about Ukrainian military capabilities but about the possibility of European escalation.

He expects the Russians to become more decisive as their confidence grows. Odessa, in particular, is presented as a major objective because of its strategic importance and Russian-speaking population. Macgregor argues that Moscow does not necessarily want to govern all of Ukraine. Rather, he believes Russia wants a political order in the territories bordering it that is not hostile to Russia or functioning as a NATO platform.

The Collapse of Trust in Diplomacy

A central part of Macgregor’s argument is that Russia has lost faith in Western diplomacy. He believes Russian leaders increasingly regard negotiations as an opportunity for Western governments to buy time, rearm Ukraine and prepare for another phase of conflict.

From this perspective, Moscow can agree to talks while continuing military operations. Macgregor argues that Russian patience has been exhausted by what it regards as repeated Western betrayals, particularly the abandonment of the potential 2022 settlement.

He contends that Russia’s original willingness to accept a neutral Ukraine has disappeared. After years of fighting and enormous casualties, he believes Moscow is now likely to demand much more, including the removal of the current Ukrainian political order and guarantees that Ukraine cannot become a military platform directed against Russia.

Iran and a Changing Order

Macgregor draws a parallel between Russia and Iran, arguing that both increasingly view Western diplomacy with deep suspicion. He believes Iran has endured repeated disappointments and now wants the United States out of the region rather than another negotiated arrangement.

More broadly, he argues that countries such as Russia, Iran and China are increasingly rejecting American financial and military dominance. He sees de-dollarization as difficult, perhaps impossible, to reverse, and believes Washington underestimates the extent to which other powers want an end to American interference.

His overall conclusion is that the existing geopolitical order is weakening. Russia, he argues, has become less willing to compromise, Iran is increasingly unwilling to trust negotiations, and European states may ultimately discover that their ability to wage war depends heavily on continued American support.

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Professor Marandi argues that Iran is entering a more assertive phase of the conflict, driven partly by the appointment of Major General Mohsen Rezaei as chair of the Supreme National Security Council. The change does not necessarily represent a major transformation in Iran’s military leadership, since the commanders now publicly identified had already been directing the armed forces. Rather, their disclosure is seen as evidence of greater confidence about Iran’s internal security.

Rezaei’s appointment is significant because of his extensive experience. He previously led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for many years and helped transform it from a relatively lightly armed organization into a major military force. He also has experience in economic and political affairs, giving him a broad understanding of the issues involved in national security.

His approach is expected to be more proactive. Iran previously responded to American attacks while attempting to control escalation. The emerging strategy is different: if the United States increases military or economic pressure, Iran may respond more decisively and inflict greater costs on the coalition opposing it.

Preparing for a Long War

Iran is preparing for several possible scenarios, including a prolonged conflict. It has expanded its missile and drone programs, developed new weapons, enlarged underground missile and drone facilities, and strengthened command-and-control infrastructure.

The preparations also extend to the economy. Iran is shifting toward a wartime economy and preparing for a conflict that could potentially last until the end of the U.S. presidency. This does not mean such a war is inevitable, but Tehran wants to be capable of sustaining one if necessary.

The Strait of Hormuz remains central to this strategy. Iran continues to allow some ships to pass through arrangements coordinated with Tehran, including vessels from friendly countries and through agreements involving Oman. However, further economic escalation could lead Iran to close the strait completely, potentially disrupting regional energy exports and pipelines.

A Wider Regional Conflict

The conflict is increasingly regional, with Yemen and other Iranian allies playing a larger role. Yemen’s attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, shipping and Saudi-aligned forces demonstrate, in this view, that Riyadh seriously underestimated Yemeni military capabilities.

The same pattern is said to have occurred with Iran. Western intelligence agencies and Saudi Arabia allegedly underestimated Iran’s missile stockpiles, underground facilities, drone capabilities, manufacturing capacity and military research. Iran’s experience in the conflict has subsequently increased its ability to strike with greater precision and effectiveness.

This creates a growing dilemma for the Gulf monarchies hosting U.S. forces. Iran could respond to escalation by targeting American military assets as well as facilities and states supporting the U.S. military presence.

Iran’s Changing International Position

Despite substantial economic damage, Iran’s regional and international position is presented as strengthening. Its relationships with China and Russia have deepened, while prolonged conflicts have weakened the United States and Europe.

American actions are also viewed as damaging U.S. soft power. Threats against Iran’s sovereignty, combined with the continuing violence in Gaza and Lebanon, are seen as reinforcing perceptions of American coercion.

From this perspective, the war has imposed serious costs on Iran but has simultaneously strengthened national cohesion, expanded its strategic partnerships and increased its capacity to resist further pressure.

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In the immediate future, he expects continued fighting and further escalation. Ukraine has increased its ability to conduct long-range strikes deep into Russian territory, prompting Russia to respond with increasingly extensive attacks on critical infrastructure. Neither side, he argues, currently sees a convincing path toward compromise.

He considers Ukraine’s strategy understandable from Kyiv’s perspective: its leadership has an interest in sustaining Western support for as long as possible. He is more puzzled by the European commitment to prolonging the conflict.

Europe and the Russian Threat

He argues that confrontation with Russia has become central to the emerging European political identity. European unity, he suggests, is increasingly organized around the perception of Russia as an immediate security threat. This resembles the Cold War model, when the Soviet threat helped provide a powerful impetus for European integration.

Yet he sees a contradiction in the contemporary presentation of Russia. Russia is simultaneously portrayed as a declining power unable to defeat Ukraine and as a potentially imminent threat to the rest of Europe. In his view, this tension illustrates how the Russian threat has become politically useful within Europe.

There is also a broader geopolitical calculation. Europe’s relative international importance is declining, he argues, as the global distribution of economic and political power changes. Confrontation with Russia provides Europeans with an opportunity to demonstrate international relevance. However, he doubts that this can restore Europe’s former central position in world affairs, because the conflict is fundamentally regional rather than the defining global confrontation Europeans sometimes portray it as.

Russia’s Position in a Global Reshuffle

He argues that Russia’s strategic situation must be understood beyond the European theatre. If the war simply ended with the current battlefield and geopolitical configuration frozen, he believes it would represent a failure for Russia, since Europe’s security landscape has shifted substantially against Moscow since 2021. NATO has been revitalized, additional countries have joined, and Ukraine has become closely integrated with the alliance even without formal membership.

From this perspective, the conflict is part of a much larger restructuring of the international system. Ukraine, Iran and potential conflicts in East Asia are different in their origins, but they can be understood as manifestations of a broader struggle over the future distribution of global power.

Russia’s objective, therefore, is not simply to defeat Ukraine or Europe. It is to strengthen Russia’s position in the international system. The essential requirements are resilience and strength, because the present struggle concerns Russia’s future position in a rapidly changing global order.

Iran and the Lessons of Resistance

The war involving Iran has an important lesson for Russia and other major powers. Iran is considerably weaker militarily than the United States and Israel, yet it has demonstrated that a smaller state can resist a much stronger opponent and inflict significant damage when it is prepared to respond immediately.

The broader lesson is that overwhelming military superiority does not automatically guarantee victory. Modern forms of warfare can favor smaller states, particularly when they are committed to resistance. He believes this will influence how countries prepare for future conflicts and pressure from stronger powers.

For Russia, an Iranian survival that leaves Tehran strengthened in Middle Eastern geopolitics could also create an opportunity to rebuild some of Moscow’s regional influence. Russia’s close relationship with Iran is important, although he distinguishes partnership from alliance, noting that Iran pursues its own interests and does not necessarily share Russia’s priorities.

The Collapse of the Existing Order

He sees little prospect of rebuilding the post-Cold War European security framework. The hostility between Russia and Europe has become too deep, and the conditions that produced the earlier system were historically unique and cannot simply be recreated.

More broadly, he believes the existing international institutions are losing their ability to provide a foundation for the future. The problem is no longer merely that procedures within institutions such as the United Nations need reform. The deeper question is whether their underlying principles can serve as the basis of the next international order.

A new framework may eventually emerge, but he expects it to be global rather than centered on Europe. The present period, in his assessment, is therefore not merely a crisis within the existing order. It is a prolonged transition toward a fundamentally different international constellation.

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For the United States, the vital regions have historically been the Western Hemisphere, Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf. The Western Hemisphere is America’s natural sphere of dominance. Europe and East Asia became important because they contained other great powers, while the Persian Gulf mattered because of its oil. The rise of China has changed these priorities: East Asia is now the most important region outside the Western Hemisphere because China has become a peer competitor to the United States.

Four Strategic Choices

There are four broad grand strategies available to Washington: isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement and global hegemony.

Isolationism holds that no region outside the United States is important enough to justify fighting and dying. America’s geography, protected by two oceans and nuclear weapons, makes this a potentially viable strategy.

Offshore balancing argues that the United States should intervene when another power threatens to dominate an important region, but otherwise avoid permanent military commitments. After the Soviet Union collapsed, this approach would have favored withdrawing American forces from Europe because no country threatened to dominate the continent.

Selective engagement instead maintains that regions such as Europe remain sufficiently important to justify an American military presence, partly because American forces can act as a stabilizing force.

Global hegemony is the opposite extreme: it treats virtually every region as important and seeks to maintain military capabilities against threats everywhere. The absence of a powerful rival after the Cold War encouraged this strategy, giving Washington fewer incentives to prioritize among its interests.

Russia and the European Security Order

Russia’s position after the Cold War was initially oriented toward integration into a European security structure. The American presence in Europe could even serve Russian interests by providing stability and helping manage the question of reunified Germany.

NATO expansion subsequently transformed the strategic environment. Although Russia was not initially regarded by Washington as a serious threat, continued expansion created a situation that eventually became impossible to manage peacefully.

Russia’s current strategy is therefore heavily shaped by confrontation with the United States and Europe. It has strong incentives to deepen relations with China, Iran and North Korea, while weakening European cohesion and preventing Ukraine from becoming a viable threat to Russian security.

China and the Changing Balance

The conflict involving Iran has temporarily benefited China and Russia by diverting American military resources away from East Asia and Europe. The strain on American forces has weakened conventional deterrence in East Asia.

Yet the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful country. Its underlying capabilities have not been fundamentally reduced. What has suffered is its ability to project power effectively and maintain diplomatic influence and alliances.

The changing balance nevertheless creates serious risks. If American security guarantees become less credible, countries such as Japan could reconsider their military and nuclear options. The broader strategic environment is therefore becoming more dangerous, with rival powers strengthening their relationships while American commitments become increasingly difficult to sustain. The central challenge is to recognize limits, establish priorities and avoid commitments that exceed available means.

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He believes Iran is pursuing a strategy of endurance: tolerating the pressure placed on Iran while imposing as much economic pressure as possible on its opponents. Gulf states, he argues, are particularly vulnerable because their economies depend heavily on continuous revenue and consumption, unlike Iran, which has endured sanctions and economic pressure for decades.

The Failure of U.S. Military Power

Marandi considers the recent war a major failure for the United States. He argues that Iran’s most important military infrastructure remained protected because it was built underground, including missile, drone, naval, air-defense and command-and-control facilities. Iran was therefore able to preserve its key capabilities while attacking exposed U.S. and allied assets.

For Marandi, this demonstrates a fundamental difference between the two approaches to warfare. Iran prepared for a modern conflict in which critical capabilities are concealed and protected, while the United States relied heavily on exposed assets and large quantities of military hardware.

He also argues that Iran’s resistance has contributed to a broader weakening of American power. Iranian support for resistance movements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen helped push the United States out of Afghanistan and Iraq after enormous expenditures. Iran’s support for Russia, meanwhile, was motivated partly by concerns about NATO expansion and, in Marandi’s view, helped weaken NATO militarily and economically.

The Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan Defence Pact

Marandi does not regard the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan defence agreement as a major threat to Iran. He argues that its main concern is Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s weakened position rather than confronting Iran directly.

Saudi Arabia, he maintains, is considerably weaker than when it launched its war against Yemen. Yemen has survived years of bombardment and blockade while developing greater military capabilities. Marandi therefore doubts that Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can prevent Yemen from attacking Saudi ships, refineries or oil installations.

He also sees economic motivations behind the agreement, with Pakistan having financial interests and Turkey benefiting from military sales. He consequently does not expect it to significantly alter Iran’s strategic position.

The Near-Complete Iran-Oman Agreement

Marandi says negotiations between Iran and Oman are almost complete and may effectively already have been concluded. He believes the agreement could establish arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz, including fees, but Iran is withholding final approval because it links the issue to the broader memorandum of understanding with the United States.

Iran, he argues, wants Washington to fulfil its commitments rather than selectively implementing them. These include ending the blockade, returning Iranian assets, addressing compensation, and contributing to an end to fighting affecting Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank.

Marandi stresses that Iran does not seek an endless war. Tehran accepted the memorandum partly to demonstrate that it was prepared to reach an agreement, while simultaneously preparing for the possibility that the United States would violate it.

A Changing Regional Balance

Marandi ultimately sees the struggle over Hormuz as decisive. Together with developments in the Red Sea, he believes Iran and Yemen have demonstrated that American military power cannot simply impose its preferred outcome on the region. Iran, he argues, is now determined to preserve the gains it believes it achieved and will not accept those gains being eroded through negotiations.

Whether the confrontation ends within weeks, months, or remains unresolved, Marandi maintains that Iran believes the balance of power in West Asia has fundamentally changed, with the United States and its regional partners facing growing economic, military and political pressure.

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The central argument is that the war in Ukraine cannot be understood simply as a bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It is also part of a much broader geopolitical dispute between Russia and the West over the foundations of European security and Russia’s role in Europe.

From this perspective, even a Russian military victory in Ukraine would not resolve Moscow’s larger security concerns. Russia would still face an expanded NATO, a rearming Europe and a Western security architecture that it regards as hostile. The key question is therefore not only how to settle territorial disputes in Ukraine, but how to create a European security order that also addresses Russian security concerns.

This is why escalation may not produce the desired diplomatic result. If Russia sees the war as a broader conflict with the West, increasing military pressure could reinforce rather than weaken its perception of an existential threat, producing further escalation instead of compromise.

Indivisible Security

The proposed solution is to enlarge the peace process by directly addressing European security. Russia has repeatedly called for discussions on this issue, including through proposed security treaties. A potential foundation is the principle of “indivisibility of security,” associated with the Helsinki Final Act and later reaffirmed in the Paris Charter.

The basic idea is that one country cannot improve its own security in ways that fundamentally undermine the security of another. Western and Russian security therefore have to be considered together.

This does not mean abandoning principles such as territorial integrity, sovereignty or the right of states to choose their alliances. Rather, these principles can conflict with one another. Territorial integrity can come into tension with self-determination, while the freedom to choose alliances can conflict with another state’s security concerns. Diplomacy should therefore seek practical balances between competing principles rather than treating any one principle as absolute.

European security also cannot simply be NATO-centric. NATO can remain intact, but Russia needs a meaningful voice in European security that is not merely consultative. One possibility would be a relatively small European equivalent of the UN Security Council, providing a permanent forum in which Russia and other major powers could discuss and balance their security interests.

Beyond the Post-Cold War Order

The argument is not that Europe should simply return to the 1990s, but that it should return to enduring principles of international relations and diplomacy. The post-Cold War effort to organize European security around American and NATO dominance has failed to produce an order Russia is willing to accept. Russia has demonstrated that it will use force rather than passively accept such an arrangement.

The international environment has also changed. The United States no longer operates in a unipolar world and now faces China as a major rival, alongside other increasingly independent powers. Continuing policies that push Russia closer to China and Iran is therefore seen as strategically counterproductive.

The United States has an interest in preventing a closer strategic partnership between Russia, China and Iran. Addressing Russia’s security concerns in Europe could be an important starting point.

A Different Approach to Iran

The same logic can be applied to Iran. From the Iranian perspective, attacks on its territory and leadership represent an existential security threat. Rather than treating Iran solely as an adversary, the United States could pursue diplomatic normalization, ease economic sanctions and restore normal relations.

Such an opening could alter Iran’s internal political dynamics. Removing the United States as a permanent external enemy would deprive the Iranian political system of an important source of legitimacy while potentially raising expectations among the Iranian population. It could also create a different context for addressing regional issues, including the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The broader approach is to move from security arrangements directed against Russia and Iran toward arrangements that include them. Existing Middle Eastern alliances are already under strain, while U.S. military bases have increasingly become sources of vulnerability for regional partners.

The proposed strategy is therefore to address the larger geopolitical conflicts behind individual crises, rather than attempting to resolve each crisis in isolation.

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Karen Kwiatkowski argues that the central problem in U.S. foreign policy is not a lack of intelligence, but how political leaders use it. Drawing on her experience working with intelligence at the Pentagon, she says policymakers often select information that supports decisions they have already made while disregarding assessments that contradict their objectives.

She points to the run-up to the Iraq War as an example, arguing that intelligence was used to provide legitimacy for a predetermined policy. Ideology, alliances, political relationships and financial interests, she says, frequently matter more than intelligence when decisions about war are made.

She sees the same pattern in U.S. policy toward Iran, where she argues that decades of military planning had repeatedly demonstrated the difficulty of defeating or transforming the country.

Iran Has Exposed U.S. Military Weaknesses

Kwiatkowski argues that the conflict with Iran has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the American military. Iran, she says, is a much more formidable opponent than the weaker countries against which the United States has previously fought.

Decades of military exercises and planning failed to produce a convincing strategy for defeating Iran, yet political leaders proceeded regardless. In her view, the resulting conflict has revealed problems with logistics, planning and the use of weapons.

She particularly emphasizes the imbalance between expensive American weapons and cheaper Iranian missiles and drones. The United States, she argues, frequently uses extremely costly interceptors against relatively inexpensive weapons, creating an unfavorable economic exchange.

She links this to the military-industrial system, arguing that procurement rewards expensive, high-value weapons because they generate large contracts. Cheap, reliable and easily replaceable equipment is less profitable for major defense companies.

The Costs of Empire Are Becoming Unsustainable

Kwiatkowski connects military weakness to America’s broader financial position. She argues that enormous debt, rising interest costs and continued military spending are increasingly incompatible with maintaining a global military presence.

In her view, the United States cannot indefinitely sustain a global empire while accumulating debt and expanding military commitments. She warns that a loss of confidence in U.S. debt could produce a much broader crisis, particularly because Americans are poorly prepared for major economic disruption.

Russia, Ukraine and NATO Expansion

Kwiatkowski applies a similar argument to Russia and Ukraine. She maintains that NATO expansion was driven partly by strategic ambitions and partly by the large market it created for Western weapons.

She argues that Western governments underestimated Russia because they assumed it would remain weak after the Soviet collapse. As Russia rebuilt its economy and military capabilities, however, pressure from the West increasingly produced resistance rather than submission.

Regarding Ukraine, Kwiatkowski argues that Western support encouraged a conflict Ukraine could not realistically win against Russia. She emphasizes the destruction of Ukraine’s population, territory and infrastructure and questions why Ukrainian leaders would have believed that fighting Russia with Western assistance could produce victory.

A Controlled Retreat Is Necessary

Kwiatkowski ultimately argues that the United States needs to reconsider what national defense means. Washington, she says, has become accustomed to assuming global military dominance while failing to recognize the limits of its finances, industrial capacity and military capabilities.

She believes the country’s growing debt, military weaknesses and declining public trust are interconnected. As confidence in government declines, she sees parallels with the late Soviet period, when cynicism toward the state became increasingly widespread.

Her conclusion is that the American system cannot continue indefinitely on its present course. The United States must either reduce its global commitments in an orderly manner or risk having financial, military and political pressures force a far more disruptive change.

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