On August 15, 2026, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire stepped to the podium with an unusually stark warning about Somalia’s economic and political trajectory. He argued that economic growth, household purchasing power and business profitability were deteriorating amid worsening unemployment, poverty and displacement. His intervention came amid an escalating political confrontation and roughly three months after what Khaire describes as the expiration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s mandate.

Khaire’s speech can be debated politically. But its timing is difficult to dismiss: he delivered his warning just as Somalia’s latest fiscal and financial data began revealing multiple signs of stress at once.

The political argument will continue. The economic numbers are harder to argue with.

Somalia is not in economic collapse today. Markets operate, banks function, and household remittances remain remarkably resilient. But beneath that surface, the financial architecture supporting the Somali state and institutional economy is showing multiple signs of stress simultaneously.

That is what makes the current moment dangerous.

Mogadishu Has Almost No Fiscal Cushion

Federal domestic revenue declined from approximately $118.4 million in Q4 2025 to $100.6 million in Q1 2026.

That represents a:

15% quarter-on-quarter decline

One quarter should not automatically be interpreted as a trend. Q1 revenue remained higher than Q1 2025, and seasonal fluctuations matter. But the real warning is not simply the decline. It is what sits underneath the $100.6 million.

Employee compensation was approximately $86.7 million

The equivalent of roughly 86% of domestic revenue was therefore needed merely to match employee compensation. And payroll does not run a country.

Somalia still has to finance security operations, fuel, ministries, courts, diplomatic missions, procurement, transfers, maintenance, and infrastructure.

Yet capital expenditure was only approximately $7 million

That should be setting off alarms. Fiscal crises rarely begin with the government suddenly announcing that it is bankrupt.

Investment usually dies first.

Projects disappear. Infrastructure is postponed. Procurement contracts. Maintenance deteriorates. Suppliers wait. Governments protect salaries and essential political and security functions while sacrificing development.

Paying salaries while investment approaches the floor is therefore not necessarily evidence of resilience.

It can be evidence of fiscal triage. The official fiscal and economic publications underlying these figures are available through the Central Bank of Somalia publications portal.

The External Lifelines Are Weakening Too

This would be less alarming if foreign financing were strengthening.

It isn’t. External grants declined from roughly $65 million in Q1 2025 to $53 million in Q1 2026, approximately 18% year-on-year.

Bilateral grants fell to $0

Meanwhile, the Central Bank’s inward-transfer statistics show another troubling shift.

Source: Central Bank of Somalia, Q1 2026 statistics and calculations from CBS data. See CBS Publications.

The message inside this table is severe.

Somali households are holding up better than Somali institutions.

Business transfers fell by approximately $126 million in a year.

NGO transfers lost another $47 million.

Individual remittances increased by approximately $73 million, cushioning the deterioration.

But diaspora families cannot become Somalia’s permanent lender of last resort.

They cannot simultaneously replace business investment, NGO expenditure, donor projects, institutional employment and government grants.

An economy increasingly sustained by household transfers while institutional financing retreats is not becoming economically independent.

It is concentrating its dependence on its last reliable external shock absorber.

Then Comes the $2.13 Billion Hole

Somalia’s trade position makes this deterioration considerably more dangerous.

During Q1 2026, merchandise imports reached approximately:

$2.479 billion. Merchandise exports were only $345 million.

The difference:

$2.134 BILLION IN THREE MONTHS

For every $100 of merchandise Somalia imported, exports generated only about $14.

That imbalance can persist while sufficient foreign money continues entering through remittances, aid, businesses, NGOs, investment and other channels.

But now look at those channels. Grants are down. Business transfers are down.

NGO transfers are down. Total inward transfers are down. Only individual remittances remain strongly positive.

Source: Central Bank of Somalia Q1 2026 fiscal, trade and inward-transfer statistics. Official reports are available through CBS Publications.

One weak indicator can be temporary. Two can be coincidence.

When almost every institutional indicator begins flashing red simultaneously, policymakers should stop treating them as isolated statistical curiosities.

The World Bank and IMF Face Their Real Test

Somalia has received years of international institution-building assistance, debt relief and public-financial-management reform. Those achievements matter, but they now face the test that ultimately matters:

Can the Somali state finance itself when foreign money retreats?

If years of reform still leave Mogadishu only several bad quarters away from domestic revenue being insufficient to meet employee compensation, international partners must ask whether they created genuine fiscal resilience—or merely a better-administered form of external dependence.

The question becomes more uncomfortable alongside controversy surrounding public assets. A 2025 Africa Report investigation documented disputes over public-land sales and leases and forced evictions in Mogadishu. It reported that Deputy Information Minister Abdurahman Yusuf defended selling or leasing public land partly on the grounds that proceeds financed helicopters, military equipment and government and military salaries.

When monetizing public assets is defended partly as a means of financing recurrent expenditure while capital investment sits around $7 million, something is fundamentally wrong with the fiscal picture.

Khaire’s Brink: What Happens If the Decline Continues?

This is where Khaire’s warning becomes measurable.

Consider a deliberately severe stress test: external grants fall to zero beginning Q2 2026 while domestic revenue continues declining at the 15% quarterly rate observed between Q4 2025 and Q1 2026.

This is not a forecast. It asks a simpler question: how much room does Somalia have if the deterioration does not reverse?

Source: Author’s stress-test calculations using the CBS Q1 2026 baseline. This is not a CBS, IMF or World Bank forecast. Assumptions: zero grants beginning Q2 2026; domestic revenue falls 15% sequentially each quarter. Baseline data: Central Bank of Somalia Publications.

The graph makes the danger brutally simple. Available resources fall from $153.9 million in Q1 to $85.5 million in Q2, immediately below the approximately $86.7 million quarterly employee-compensation bill. By Q3, the compensation deficit reaches approximately $14 million. By Q4, only $61.8 million would be available against $86.7 million in compensation—a $24.9 million hole before paying for security operations, ministries, fuel, courts, procurement, infrastructure or development.

That is not routine austerity. That is the economic brink Khaire is warning about.

The state would not suddenly disappear. Development spending would likely be gutted further, suppliers would accumulate arrears, civilian institutions would be squeezed, security spending prioritized and emergency financing sought.

Then the fiscal crisis starts contaminating the economy itself. Government cuts mean fewer contracts; falling NGO expenditure means fewer jobs and purchases; declining business financing weakens investment and commerce; informal traders lose customers; consumption weakens; and customs and tax collections fall again.

Less external money → weaker commerce → lower government revenue → deeper spending cuts → weaker commerce again.

From Khaire’s Brink to the “Kabul Effect”

The timing makes this more than an economic problem.

UN reporting has described AUSSOM’s financial position as “dire,” while the subsequent UN/UNSOS review reported an $11.1 million outstanding balance from the 2025 AUSSOM pledge round. Meanwhile, UNTMIS is scheduled to close by the end of October 2026.

Somalia could therefore enter Q4 with its fiscal capacity deteriorating while international political and security guardrails are simultaneously under pressure.

This is where the “Kabul effect” matters. Afghanistan’s lesson was not merely that the Taliban eventually captured Kabul. It was how rapidly state authority unraveled once soldiers, officials, businesses and local political actors began doubting whether the government could continue paying, supplying and protecting them. Expectations of collapse helped accelerate collapse.

Somalia is not Afghanistan, and Al-Shabaab is not the Taliban. But the mechanism is relevant:

Al-Shabaab does not necessarily need to defeat every government formation if financial exhaustion, political paralysis and collapsing confidence begin hollowing the state out from within.

Fiscal crisis → weaker state capacity → falling confidence → fragmentation → security deterioration → insurgent opportunity.

That is the Kabul effect Washington and Brussels should be trying to prevent before it starts.

Washington & Brussels Cannot Keep Watching

Another diplomatic communiqué urging dialogue is not a strategy.

Washington and Brussels should use the leverage they still possess to demand an inclusive political settlement while insisting on much greater transparency over government finances and public assets.

Where credible investigations establish corruption, diversion of public assets or other conduct meeting applicable legal thresholds, surgical sanctions should be considered: asset freezes, visa restrictions and financial scrutiny directed against responsible officials and connected commercial networks—not ordinary Somalis.

That standard should reach Villa Somalia. If credible evidence concerning President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud satisfies applicable sanctions thresholds, the presidency should provide no immunity from targeted measures.

Washington and European governments should also be prepared to withdraw political recognition from Hassan Sheikh’s administration if the constitutional crisis remains unresolved—not as an invitation to institutional collapse, but as leverage to force an agreed political transition. The objective would be to compel Hassan Sheikh to resign, accept a negotiated exit, or be politically sidelined in favor of a consensual transitional arrangement. Somalia has a precedent for externally pressured political transition: President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed resigned in December 2008 after losing domestic and international political support, allowing a new political process to proceed. The lesson is that preserving the Somali state does not require indefinitely preserving the political position of one president. If Washington and Brussels conclude that the incumbent leadership has become an obstacle to settlement, their priority should be preserving the institutions while facilitating an orderly change at the top—not continuing recognition until political paralysis becomes state failure.

Somalia has not economically collapsed. Mogadishu has not become Kabul. Al-Shabaab has not defeated the Somali state yet.

That is precisely why this is the moment to act.

Khaire is warning while Somalia still has guardrails: functioning banks, resilient household remittances, government revenue, AUSSOM, international financial institutions and the possibility of political compromise.

The danger is allowing those guardrails to fail together.

After billions in assistance, historic debt relief and two decades of international security intervention, Washington, Brussels, the World Bank and IMF should not wait for unpaid security forces, collapsing institutions or territorial losses before deciding that Somalia has crossed the brink.

Washington should not wait for helicopters over Mogadishu to discover that Somalia’s “Kabul effect” began months earlier—in a shrinking treasury, a political settlement that never came, and an Al-Shabaab insurgency waiting for the guardrails to fail.

In April 2026, U.S. authorities arrested 44-year-old Iranian businesswoman Shamim Mafi in Los Angeles, alleging that she operated on behalf of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) through a sophisticated procurement and money-laundering network designed to evade U.S. sanctions. According to the FBI affidavit supporting the U.S. criminal complaint, Mafi and her associates allegedly used front companies, third-country intermediaries, informal money-transfer channels, and concealed financial transactions to procure sensitive military technology for Iran while disguising the true beneficiaries of those transactions. Prosecutors further allege that the network brokered defense-related procurement for Sudan, including the proposed sale of Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed drones, OJAN-500 aerial bombs, AM-A-25 aircraft bomb fuses, AK-47 rifles, and hundreds of millions of rounds of ammunition, with transactions allegedly routed through commercial channels involving Oman, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as part of the sanctions-evasion and money-laundering scheme.

Yet one allegation in the complaint has received comparatively little public attention.

Beyond the alleged defense-procurement scheme, prosecutors also allege that Mafi established a U.S.-based partnership to supply medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and medicines to African countries through Oman, with plans to engage directly with African ministries of health. According to the complaint, this proposed commercial venture was intended to expand into African healthcare markets while Mafi simultaneously possessed detailed knowledge of the financial channels allegedly used to bypass international sanctions.

Although the criminal complaint does not identify Somalia or any Somali officials, the alleged use of front companies and commercial intermediaries to penetrate African healthcare markets is noteworthy when viewed alongside developments in Somalia. The country’s Health Minister has previously faced allegations of ties to Al-Shabaab, which he has denied. He also oversees medical-equipment procurement, pharmaceutical regulation, licensing, and donor-supported health programs, while separately facing allegations of corruption, procurement irregularities, and mismanagement involving World Bank-financed and other donor-funded healthcare initiatives.

At the same time, Somalia’s healthcare economy has expanded dramatically. Central Bank data show imports of medical products increased by nearly 700% between 2021 and 2025. During the same period, the UN Monitoring Team documented Al-Shabaab’s growing investments in medical equipment and pharmaceutical businesses, while international donors, including the World Bank, significantly increased healthcare financing.

Together, these developments raise important governance, financial-integrity, and national-security questions. They also underscore the need for stronger procurement transparency, beneficial-ownership verification, and sanctions screening to guard against trade-based money laundering, procurement fraud, terrorist-linked commercial infiltration, and corruption in one of Somalia’s fastest-growing economic sectors, particularly following the country’s renewed diplomatic relations with Iran.

Iran Returns as Somalia’s Healthcare Economy Explodes

Somalia’s renewed engagement with Iran unfolded alongside a broader expansion of its ties with Iraq. In July 2024, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre traveled to Baghdad with a senior delegation that included Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and the head of Somalia’s intelligence agency. Official reporting said Barre met Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani to discuss economic and security cooperation. Separately, Horn Observer, citing unnamed sources, reported ahead of the visit that Barre’s mission was expected to include engagement with figures connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). That latter claim has not been independently confirmed. (African Portal)

Just one month later, in August 2024, Somalia moved to restore diplomatic relations with Iran. Then-Foreign Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi met Iran’s acting foreign minister, Ali Bagheri Kani, with Tehran publicly welcoming Somalia’s initiative to restore bilateral relations and expressing interest in expanding ties with African countries. (iranpress.com)

The Iraq connection soon extended directly into healthcare. In December 2024, Somalia’s Health Minister Dr. Ali Haji Adam traveled to Baghdad for the 61st Arab Health Ministers’ Conference. During the visit, he also met Iraqi Health Minister Saleh Mahdi Al-Hasnawi, with the two governments discussing expanded health cooperation, medical training, exchanges of expertise, and support for Somali doctors. (SONNA)

These diplomatic and healthcare engagements occurred as Somalia’s medical economy was undergoing an extraordinary transformation. According to Central Bank of Somalia data, medical-product imports increased from US$181.6 million in 2021 to approximately US$1.44 billion in 2025—a 695% increase in only four years.

The timing does not establish a connection between Somalia’s medical-import growth and its relationships with Iran or Iraq. But it creates an important backdrop for examining the Mafi case: Somalia was simultaneously rebuilding relations with Iran, deepening political and healthcare engagement with Iraq, and experiencing one of the fastest expansions of medical imports in its recent economic history.

The Mafi Question: Somalia’s Health Minister, World Bank Funds, and the Unconfirmed Backchannel

The Shamim Mafi case becomes particularly relevant to Somalia because U.S. prosecutors allege that her activities extended beyond sanctions evasion and sensitive-technology procurement into African healthcare markets. According to the criminal complaint, Mafi established a U.S.-based partnership intended to supply medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and medicines through Oman and planned to engage African ministries of health. The complaint does not publicly identify those ministries.

That allegation deserves examination against controversies already surrounding Somalia’s Ministry of Health. Minister Dr. Ali Haji Adam has faced public allegations of previous involvement or association with Al-Shabaab, which he has denied. Separately, his ministry has faced allegations involving corruption, mismanagement, procurement irregularities, and donor-supported healthcare programs.

Horn Observer: Health Minister corruption and mismanagement allegations

The World Bank Money

At the same time, Somalia’s healthcare sector became a major recipient of international financing. The World Bank’s Damal Caafimaad project expanded to approximately US$152.25 million, supporting health services and broader health-sector reforms.

World Bank: Damal Caafimaad US$152.25 million financing document

World Bank: Damal Caafimaad project and additional financing

World Bank documentation has continued to identify High fiduciary and governance risks and internal-control weaknesses requiring corrective action. These institutional warnings are particularly relevant when considered alongside separate allegations of fraud, corruption, misuse of donor resources, and procurement irregularities involving Somalia’s health sector. They do not establish that Damal Caafimaad money was stolen or diverted, but they strengthen the case for examining who received contracts and payments and who ultimately owned the suppliers.

World Bank: Damal Caafimaad project documents

There is also an important historical counterterrorism context. U.S. government reporting, including USAID oversight, has documented longstanding risks of humanitarian assistance and internationally financed activity being exploited or taxed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia. That history makes the UN’s more recent finding that Al-Shabaab was increasing investments in medical equipment and pharmaceutical businesses especially important.

It does not establish that Al-Shabaab front companies received World Bank health contracts. That is precisely the question requiring investigation: did any companies participating in World Bank-financed or other donor-supported healthcare projects overlap with Al-Shabaab-linked businesses, intermediaries, or beneficial owners—and could such revenues have contributed to the group’s expanding healthcare investment portfolio?

The Trafficking Allegations and Their Timing

Another controversy involves reported human-trafficking allegations connected to official Health Ministry travel. In September 2024, Horn Observer reported allegations involving the disappearance of the minister’s aide and two wives following official trips to Geneva and New York. These remain allegations rather than established judicial findings.

Horn Observer: Health Minister aide and wives trafficking allegations

The timing matters because another international health gathering followed shortly afterward.

Baghdad and the Unconfirmed Iranian Backchannel

In December 2024, Adam traveled to Baghdad for a regional Arab health-minister gathering. According to an intelligence source in Mogadishu, Iranian commercial representatives were allegedly seeking meetings with African health-sector delegations through what the source described as an Iraq-based backchannel around the gathering.

That intelligence remains unconfirmed, and there is no public evidence that Adam met Mafi, her associates, or anyone acting on her behalf.

Nevertheless, U.S. prosecutors separately allege that Mafi intended to establish commercial relationships with African ministries of health. That creates a specific investigative question: Was Somalia’s Ministry of Health among the African ministries Mafi or associated Iranian commercial interests intended to approach?

The wider timeline makes the question more significant. Somalia restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2024; its Health Ministry faced separate Al-Shabaab, corruption, trafficking and donor-management allegations; medical imports surged toward US$1.44 billion; and UN reporting documented Al-Shabaab increasing investment in medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. The later Mafi prosecution adds another dimension. U.S. authorities allege that she participated in an international Iranian procurement operation involving drones, bombs, bomb fuses and millions of rounds of ammunition destined for Sudan, alongside substantial financial transactions.

U.S. case summary: Shamim Mafi arrest and Iranian weapons allegations

None of these developments proves they belonged to a single network. But they make the underlying records important: Who received World Bank and other donor-funded health contracts? Who beneficially owned those suppliers? Were sanctions and terrorism-financing checks conducted on subcontractors and intermediaries? Did any recipients overlap with companies connected to Al-Shabaab’s expanding healthcare investments? And was Somalia among the African health ministries Mafi’s network intended to approach?

Those are questions that World Bank payment and procurement records, Ministry contracts, corporate ownership records, customs declarations, banking transactions, and Baghdad meeting records should be capable of answering.

The Al-Shabaab Angle: Why the Medical Boom Matters

The Al-Shabaab angle does not depend on establishing a connection between Mafi and Somalia. It rests on a separate development: as Somalia’s medical market expanded rapidly, UN reporting documented Al-Shabaab increasing investment in medical equipment and pharmaceutical businesses.

In Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc., my research argued that Al-Shabaab had evolved beyond taxation and extortion by recycling revenues into commercial enterprises, including medical imports, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare services. The later UN finding matters because it suggests the group was not merely present in healthcare—it was increasing its investment in a sector already experiencing extraordinary growth.

Somalia’s medical-product imports rose from US$181.6 million in 2021 to approximately US$1.44 billion in 2025—a 695% increase in four years. That provides a clear economic backdrop for why more capital may have moved into the sector.

Following the Investment Model

Figure 1. Al-Shabaab Revenue Allocation and Commercial Reinvestment Model

Source: Author’s analysis, Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc. — illustrative estimates.

Figure 1 estimates 60% of revenue is reinvested commercially and 40% supports operations. While this is the author’s model, UN and FATF reporting independently estimates a 30% investment / 70% operations allocation, confirming that Al-Shabaab systematically directs a significant share of its revenues into commercial investments.

Figure 2. Estimated Al-Shabaab Commercial Investment Exposure by Sector

Source: Author’s analysis, Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc. — illustrative estimates.

Figure 2 estimates that about 11% of commercial investment capital is allocated to medical imports, with another 3% directed toward healthcare services.

Together, the two figures explain the US$66 million starting point used in Table 2:

US$1 billion × 60% reinvestment × 11% medical allocation = US$66 million

The US$66 million is a modeled allocation, not a documented transaction.

Why Double Down on Medical Investment?

Table 2 helps explain the investment logic behind the UN’s observation that Al-Shabaab was increasing investment in medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

In the illustrative scenarios, medical investments yield potential returns of 120–160%, roughly 1.5-2 times the UN-documented upper-end return on investment of 80% for Al-Shabaab’s legitimate-business investments. Significantly, the UN separately confirmed in 2025 that Al-Shabaab had increased investment in medical equipment.

That does not prove Al-Shabaab actually earned those returns. It does provide a plausible economic explanation for why the group would double down on healthcare: if medical equipment and pharmaceuticals were expected to outperform the broader portfolio, shifting more capital into the sector would make commercial sense.

Somalia’s 695% medical-import boom reinforces that hypothesis. Rapid growth can support higher sales volumes, faster inventory turnover, stronger distribution networks, and repeated reinvestment of profits.

FATF’s terrorist-financing analysis adds another layer. FATF has warned that terrorist organizations can place illicit proceeds into legitimate businesses through front companies, intermediaries, and concealed ownership structures. Somalia’s medical supply chain—importers, wholesalers, pharmacies, clinics, procurement agencies, financial institutions, and donor-supported programs—therefore makes beneficial ownership and source-of-funds transparency especially important.

There is also a regional question. If the market-influence estimates in Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc. are broadly accurate, Somalia’s unusually large medical-import volume raises the possibility that some products may be moving beyond domestic consumption into regional distribution or re-export markets elsewhere in Africa. That remains a hypothesis requiring customs and trade data.

The core questions are straightforward: Who imported the US$1.44 billion in medical products? Where did they originate? Who financed and beneficially owned the importing companies? How much was consumed domestically versus re-exported? And what portion, if any, intersected with businesses in which Al-Shabaab had invested?

The Questions That Need Answers

The evidence does not establish that Mafi’s alleged network operated in Somalia, that Iran coordinated with Al-Shabaab, or that World Bank health funding benefited terrorist-linked businesses. But investigators should ask:

• Who supplied and beneficially owned companies behind Somalia’s US$1.44 billion medical-import market?

• Did any donor-funded suppliers overlap with Al-Shabaab-linked businesses?

• What triggered the Damal Caafimaad fraud-and-corruption complaint referred to the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency?

• Were medical products being re-exported to other African markets?

• Most importantly, which African health ministries was Mafi allegedly targeting—and was Somalia one of them?

The Real Red Flag

No single fact proves a network. But the convergence—Mafi’s alleged IRGC procurement and money-laundering operation, Somalia’s renewed Iran ties, a 695% medical-import boom, UN-documented Al-Shabaab healthcare investment, and a US$152.25 million World Bank health program facing an integrity complaint—warrants following the money.

The question is simple: Who financed and profited from Somalia’s medical boom, did those networks intersect with Al-Shabaab’s healthcare investments, and was Somalia among the African health ministries Mafi allegedly intended to approach?

Too much of the public discussion focuses on attacks and ideology, while far less attention is given to the financial networks, taxation systems, commercial influence, and business structures that sustain the group over time. Understanding those economic foundations is essential for designing better counterterrorism policy.

Despite zero marketing and just one Amazon review, the book reached #2 in Amazon’s Terrorism New Releases in 2025 and remained there for nearly a month. That told me there is a real appetite among researchers, journalists, intelligence professionals, and policymakers for deeper analysis of terrorist financing.

Today, I’m making the book available as a free download.

The publishing world is changing rapidly. AI systems increasingly learn from publicly available books, articles, and research. Rather than allowing knowledge to become inaccessible or fragmented, I believe important research should be available to the people who can use it to inform policy, improve reporting, and advance scholarship.

If this book helps a journalist uncover a story, assists an intelligence analyst in connecting financial networks, supports a policymaker in developing more effective strategies, or inspires a researcher to build on its findings, then it has achieved its purpose.

Knowledge creates the greatest impact when it is shared.

Download it. Read it. Challenge it. Cite it. Share it.

If it contributes to a better understanding of the economics of terrorism and encourages more research into this overlooked field, then making it free will have been worth it.

Download it using this link! Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc Book or This Link just in case Download Option Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc

On July 17, I posted on X that, based on interviews with Somali insiders—government, military, intelligence, and diplomats involved with Mogadishu’s engagement with US and European partners—I assessed that influential actors are preparing Somalia for political reconciliation with Al-Shabaab. I promised to share more later. Many dismissed this as speculation, citing lack of evidence that Washington was reconsidering its nearly two-decade counterterrorism policy in Somalia. However, my assessment was based on intelligence and policy discussions from multiple independent sources.

Less than a week later, I found what I consider the public receipt. Buried inside the FY2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was one of the broadest congressional reviews of U.S. Somalia policy in nearly two decades. For the first time, Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct a comprehensive assessment of U.S. strategy in Somalia, including whether current objectives remain achievable, the effectiveness of nearly twenty years of policy, sanctions, force posture, and security assistance. Most notably, the legislation directs the review to examine “whether direct or indirect communications or engagements have occurred between the United States Government and al-Shabaab” and requires consultation with outside experts and think tanks before recommendations are submitted to Congress.

To be clear, the NDAA does not direct negotiations with Al-Shabaab or endorse political accommodation. But that is not what makes this language remarkable. For the first time, questions that had largely been confined to private diplomatic conversations, think-tank reports, and academic debates have entered a congressionally mandated strategic review. The NDAA did not create this debate—it publicly confirmed that it had already begun. The question is no longer whether influential policymakers are exploring alternatives to the current strategy. They clearly are. The real question is whether the Trump administration will learn the lessons of Afghanistan before opening the door to a Somalia version of Doha.

We Have Seen This Movie Before

Washington has followed this intellectual path before.

During President Trump’s first administration, many analysts argued that the Taliban could not be defeated militarily. Afghanistan, they contended, had reached what political scientist I. William Zartman described as a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate.” Negotiations were increasingly portrayed as the only practical alternative to an endless war.

The result was the Doha Agreement. The Taliban did not dismantle its military organization. It did not surrender its command structure, abandon its shadow administration, or transform itself into an ordinary political party operating under Afghanistan’s constitutional order.

Instead, it negotiated while preserving every meaningful instrument of coercion. Following the U.S. withdrawal, the Taliban did not become one political actor among many. It became the state.

The lesson is not that negotiations always fail. The lesson is that political legitimacy granted before armed power is dismantled can fundamentally alter the balance of power. The Trump administration now has an opportunity to avoid repeating that mistake in Somalia.

The Taliban, Hezbollah, and the Houthis Preserved Their Power

The Taliban never disarmed. Hezbollah never disarmed. The Houthis never disarmed.

Yet all three gained political legitimacy while retaining their independent military structures and coercive power. In Afghanistan, the consequences have become increasingly evident. Rather than fully honoring the counterterrorism commitments made under the 2020 Doha Agreement, the Taliban continue to provide a permissive operating environment for terrorist organizations. According to the May 2026 Lead Inspector General (Operation Enduring Sentinel) report to Congress, the Taliban continue to allow al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate from Afghanistan, while the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated that the Taliban continue to demonstrate “bad faith” regarding their Doha counterterrorism commitments.

Hezbollah followed a similar model in Lebanon, entering the political system without surrendering its armed wing, external sponsorship, or independent command structure. Likewise, the Houthis benefited from the 2018 Stockholm Agreement and the 2022 UN-mediated truce without giving up their missiles, drones, territorial control, or Iranian support. Those agreements reduced large-scale fighting but left the Houthis’ military capabilities intact. They later used that leverage to attack Yemen’s oil-export infrastructure, depriving the internationally recognized government of its principal source of revenue and deepening its dependence on foreign financial support.

These cases demonstrate a consistent lesson: peace agreements that reduce violence without dismantling an armed group’s military, intelligence, and financial infrastructure often postpone conflict rather than resolve it. They can provide time, legitimacy, and strategic space for such organizations to consolidate power. That is not durable peace—it is leverage.

The Al-Qaeda Dimension Cannot Be Ignored

Unlike the IRA, ETA, or even the principal FARC movement, Al-Shabaab is not simply an insurgency pursuing domestic political objectives. It is an al-Qaeda affiliate that has repeatedly reaffirmed its allegiance to al-Qaeda’s global jihadist movement.

That distinction fundamentally changes the negotiation debate.

A political settlement with Al-Shabaab would not simply involve reconciling a domestic armed movement with the Somali state. It would involve an organization whose ideology, legitimacy, and strategic identity remain linked to al-Qaeda.

United Nations monitoring reports have documented continuing cooperation between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab, including training, logistical support, and strategic coordination. More significantly, AQAP reportedly encouraged Al-Shabaab to repeat in Somalia what the Taliban achieved in Afghanistan.

That warning deserves serious attention.

The Taliban’s return to power is not merely a comparison made by critics of negotiations. It is reportedly viewed within the broader al-Qaeda network as a successful model for other jihadist movements.

If al-Qaeda itself views Afghanistan as a blueprint for Somalia, policymakers should carefully consider whether premature political engagement would undermine that strategy—or inadvertently reinforce it.

Why Ripeness Theory Does Not Fit Al-Shabaab

Supporters of negotiations frequently invoke Zartman’s Ripeness Theory, which argues that conflicts become negotiable when both sides conclude that continued fighting has become more costly than compromise.

The theory has helped explain several successful peace processes.

But Al-Shabaab presents a fundamentally different challenge.

As documented in Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc., Al-Shabaab has evolved into a hybrid terrorist-mafia enterprise sustained by extortion, illegal taxation, commercial investments, procurement networks, logistics, money laundering, and protection rackets. Its military operations protect its financial system, while its financial system finances its military and intelligence apparatus.

Conflict is not merely Al-Shabaab’s strategy.

Conflict is part of its business model.

Instability creates opportunities for extortion. Violence protects investments. Territorial influence secures taxation. Weak institutions facilitate money laundering. Political fragmentation expands the market for coercive protection.

The relevant question is therefore not whether Somalia has reached a mutually hurting stalemate.

The relevant question is whether Al-Shabaab has any incentive to dismantle the criminal economy that makes continued conflict profitable.

There is little evidence that it does.

Trump Has an Opportunity to Avoid Another Doha

The FY2027 NDAA does not establish negotiations with Al-Shabaab as U.S. policy. It does, however, confirm that Washington is reopening questions many believed had already been settled.

That debate deserves careful scrutiny.

Al-Shabaab is not the IRA. It is not ETA. It is not even the principal FARC movement.

It is an al-Qaeda affiliate with a parallel administration, an intelligence apparatus, an entrenched criminal economy, and a military structure that benefits from continued instability.

My research in Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc. estimates that Al-Shabaab generated approximately US$2.2 billion in 2022 and US$1.65 billion in 2023 through extortion, illicit commerce, taxation, investment, and money laundering. Negotiating with Al-Shabaab would therefore require far more than persuading an insurgency to lay down its arms. It would require dismantling an economic empire that has become inseparable from its military power.

Before the United States contemplates any Somali version of Doha, one question should guide policy:

Why should Somalia expect a different outcome from Afghanistan when al-Qaeda itself reportedly encourages Al-Shabaab to follow the Taliban’s path to power?

If the Trump administration wishes to avoid a Somalia Doha Version 2.0, any future political process must begin—not end—with verifiable dismantlement of Al-Shabaab’s military, intelligence, financial, and criminal infrastructure, along with a complete break from al-Qaeda.

Without those conditions, dialogue is unlikely to produce lasting peace.

It risks legitimizing an organization whose greatest incentive is not to end the conflict—but to preserve the system that allows it to thrive.

For the past two years, I have challenged one of the most repeated narratives promoted by Somalia’s Federal Government under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose term ended on 15 May 2026: “Mogadishu is more secure than ever.”

Each time I questioned that claim, the response was predictable. Government officials and supporters pointed to fewer mass-casualty bombings, declining civilian fatalities, the rollout of CCTV surveillance, expanding security checkpoints, Turkish-trained security forces, and a growing security presence across the capital as evidence that Al-Shabaab had been strategically defeated.

I never disputed that these security measures existed or that they had reduced visible violence. I questioned what those improvements actually meant.

In April 2026, I published Mahad Karate: The Whitey Bulger of Al-Shabaab – Intelligence Capture, Shadow Power, and the Failure of Counterterrorism in Somalia, arguing that security should not be measured solely by the number of explosions or civilian casualties. Instead, I concluded that a city can become quieter without becoming strategically secure. I warned that declining civilian casualties risked creating a misleading appearance of stabilization, while Al-Shabaab adapted by shifting from indiscriminate violence toward intelligence penetration, economic coercion, selective intimidation, targeted attacks against security forces, and the preservation of its financial and taxation networks inside Mogadishu.

One of the central conclusions of that investigation stated:

“Violence is redistributed, not reduced. The decline in civilian exposure coincides with sustained extortion pressure and increased targeting of security forces and state infrastructure, indicating that Al-Shabaab has adapted to operate in a way that lowers visible civilian harm while maintaining control and operational flexibility.”

Months later, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) reached a strikingly similar assessment through its own independent methodology.

The EUAA reports that Benadir recorded relatively low levels of violence—354 security incidents and 225 fatalities between April 2025 and March 2026—and concludes that Al-Shabaab increasingly targeted military and government forces rather than civilians. At the same time, however, the report finds that the group maintained extensive intelligence and taxation networks inside Mogadishu, advanced to within approximately 50 kilometers of the capital during its 2025 offensive, and continued exerting influence through extortion, intimidation, and attacks against state institutions.

Although the EUAA neither cites my work nor endorses every conclusion presented in my investigation, its findings independently reinforce my central analytical thesis:

Al-Shabaab has evolved from an organization seeking maximum casualties into one seeking maximum control.

The Illusion of Security

The Somali government’s strongest argument comes directly from the EUAA report.

Between April 2025 and March 2026, Benadir recorded 354 security incidents and 225 fatalities. Of the 156 incidents attributed to Al-Shabaab, 129 targeted security forces, while only 22 targeted civilians. At first glance, those numbers appear to validate the government’s claim that Mogadishu is more secure than ever.

But these numbers support a different conclusion.

My April 2026 investigation argued that lower civilian casualties do not necessarily indicate a weaker insurgency. They may instead indicate a more disciplined one. Rather than maximizing civilian casualties, Al-Shabaab increasingly appears to maximize strategic influence by concentrating on intelligence collection, coercive taxation, selective assassinations, infiltration of state institutions, and attacks against security forces. In other words, violence has not disappeared. It has become more selective. The question is no longer how many people are killed, but who is being targeted and why.

Violence Was Redistributed—Not Removed

The strongest confirmation of my analysis is found not inside Mogadishu, but across Somalia. While the capital appeared calmer, the wider conflict deteriorated dramatically.

Nationally, the EUAA recorded 4,676 security incidents and 8,753 fatalities, the highest levels in its four-year dataset. At the same time, Al-Shabaab advanced across Middle Shabelle and Hiraan, reportedly moving to within 50 kilometers of Mogadishu while maintaining extensive intelligence and taxation networks inside the capital.

This apparent contradiction is the core of my analytical model. Violence was not eliminated. It was redistributed geographically and operationally. The organization reduced indiscriminate attacks against civilians while increasing pressure on security forces, state institutions, and the economic infrastructure that sustains government authority. That is not strategic defeat. It is strategic adaptation.

Control Without Occupation

The most important finding shared by both my April 2026 investigation and the latest EUAA assessment is that lower levels of visible violence should not be mistaken for the dismantling of Al-Shabaab’s influence. The EUAA describes a capital protected by an extraordinary concentration of Somali security forces, AUSSOM personnel, intelligence services, surveillance systems, checkpoints, and Turkish-trained units. These measures have contributed to reducing indiscriminate violence and improving day-to-day security for many residents.

At the same time, however, the report concludes that Al-Shabaab continues to maintain intelligence networks, taxation systems, and extortion capabilities inside Mogadishu while increasingly directing attacks against security institutions rather than civilians. These findings are not contradictory. They describe two realities that exist simultaneously. One reflects the state’s ability to contain violence. The other reflects Al-Shabaab’s ability to preserve influence despite that containment.

Figure takeaway: Despite recording only 354 security incidents and 225 fatalities, the EUAA documents 156 Al-Shabaab incidents, of which 129 targeted security forces and 22 targeted civilians. The report also concludes that Al-Shabaab maintained intelligence and taxation networks inside Mogadishu. Together, these findings suggest a shift toward protecting insurgent capabilities while reducing indiscriminate civilian violence, rather than the disappearance of insurgent influence.

This challenges one of the most common assumptions in counterinsurgency: that control is measured only by territorial occupation. Modern insurgencies increasingly operate differently. They do not necessarily need to govern a city openly if they can collect intelligence, finance themselves through taxation and extortion, intimidate businesses, recruit informants, and selectively attack the state when required.

In my April 2026 investigation, I described this phenomenon as dual compliance. Businesses comply with government regulations because the state controls checkpoints, CCTV, and licensing, while simultaneously complying with Al-Shabaab because the terrorist controls the consequences of non-compliance. This represents a form of influence that is less visible than territorial occupation but can be equally effective in sustaining an insurgency over time.

The Kabul Shadow-Control Lesson

The comparison with Kabul is frequently misunderstood. The lesson is not how Kabul fell in August 2021. The lesson is how the Taliban exercised shadow control over Kabul long before the city collapsed.

Years before August 2021, the Afghan government still controlled ministries, military bases, police stations, checkpoints, airports, and received extensive international military and financial support. To most observers, Kabul appeared firmly under government control. Yet beneath that visible security architecture, the Taliban had already built intelligence networks, extortion systems, taxation mechanisms, informant networks, shadow courts, and the capability to selectively assassinate government officials and security personnel.

The Taliban did not need to control every neighborhood. It needed to preserve the underground systems that allowed it to gather intelligence, finance its operations, intimidate opponents, and patiently erode state authority while waiting for political conditions to shift in its favor. That is why Kabul remains relevant to Mogadishu.

The latest EUAA assessment concludes that Al-Shabaab continues to maintain intelligence and taxation networks inside Mogadishu while concentrating attacks on security institutions rather than civilians. My April 2026 investigation reached the same broader conclusion months earlier: Al-Shabaab has increasingly optimized for control rather than casualties.

This comparison should not be interpreted as a prediction that Mogadishu will inevitably experience a Kabul-style collapse. Somalia’s political institutions, clan dynamics, and security architecture differ significantly from Afghanistan’s.

However, the Afghan experience demonstrates an enduring principle of modern insurgency:

An insurgency can establish shadow control over a capital long before it establishes political control over it.

Whether those underground networks ever translate into political power depends less on military operations than on political developments. A prolonged constitutional crisis, disputed elections, elite fragmentation, weakening international support, or an inability to sustain and pay the security sector could create opportunities that insurgent organizations are prepared to exploit.

The central question, therefore, is not whether Mogadishu resembles Kabul in August 2021. It is whether Mogadishu today exhibits some of the shadow-control characteristics that Kabul displayed before its collapse. That is the comparison policymakers should be examining—not because history repeats itself exactly, but because insurgencies often succeed by preserving influence long before they seek to seize power.

Current situation: In less than 11 days, pirates hijacked 3 vessels-including the oil tanker Honour 25, cargo ship Sward, and the tanker MT EUREKA-off Puntland’s coast, a pattern echoing the early stages of the 2008 piracy crisis. The attacks are concentrated around the Garacad–Hafun corridor and are occurring as naval forces are distracted by Red Sea and Gulf tensions, creating a security gap that local networks are exploiting.

This resurgence is unlikely to be driven directly by Houthis or Al-Shabaab. Instead, it points to Puntland-based pirate networks operating through clan structures and coastal logistics. A key reference comes from a November 2023 EUNAVFOR ATALANTA presentation shared via the DCOC framework, which documented that the hijacked Iranian dhow AL ASHKAAN was linked to the same ownership network as ALMERAJ1, and noted that the owner supported President Deni’s election system while the pirate crews were tied to an opposing clan. This highlights a clear intersection between piracy, business actors, and local political divisions.

Given Puntland’s current economic crisis and rising political opposition to Deni, it is plausible that the same clan-business networks identified in the November 2023 EUNAVFOR/DCOC intelligence are re-emerging. A further risk scenario is that these actors could now be working with Iranian-linked networks to destabilize the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, especially as maritime enforcement weakens. There is no confirmed proof of direct coordination, but the convergence of piracy, politics, and external actors makes this a credible and concerning possibility.

The United Arab Emirates breaking from OPEC is not just an energy market story—it is a geopolitical inflection point. At its core, this is about power: who controls supply, who shapes markets, and ultimately, who influences political outcomes across regions stretching from the Gulf to Africa.

For decades, OPEC has operated as a cartel designed to stabilize oil prices through coordinated production quotas. But for a country like the UAE—one of the world’s lowest-cost producers—those quotas are increasingly a constraint rather than a benefit. Leaving OPEC, or even behaving independently within it, signals a shift away from price control toward something more aggressive: market share, influence, and strategic leverage.

At the center of this transformation lies a simple economic reality: cost advantage.

The UAE maintains one of the lowest fiscal break-even oil prices among major producers, often around $50–$60 per barrel. In contrast, Saudi Arabia typically requires closer to $90, Iraq around $85, Kuwait near $80, and Iran well above $100 to balance their budgets. This gap is not just economic—it is strategic.

It means that in a lower-price environment, the UAE can continue producing profitably while others face fiscal pressure. In a price war scenario, Abu Dhabi can endure longer. And outside OPEC constraints, it can choose to expand production, capture market share, and reshape supply relationships globally.

This is where geo-transactional politics comes into play.

Unlike traditional diplomacy, which relies on alliances and long-term ideological alignment, geo-transactional politics treats statecraft as a series of negotiated exchanges. Energy, infrastructure, investment, and security cooperation become bargaining chips.

For the UAE, this means oil is no longer just a commodity—it becomes part of a broader package: discounted energy supply, port development via DP World, logistics corridors, sovereign investment flows, and security partnerships.

These bundled deals are already visible across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Ports in Berbera, infrastructure investments, and logistics corridors connecting Ethiopia to the coast are not isolated projects—they are components of a wider strategy.

Within this framework, Somaliland emerges as a critical node.

While formal international recognition of Somaliland remains limited, the UAE’s approach could shift the landscape—not through direct “oil-for-recognition” transactions, but through layered influence. By deepening economic integration with countries like Ethiopia and expanding its footprint across African energy and trade networks, Abu Dhabi can create conditions where engagement with Somaliland becomes normalized.

Over time, normalization can evolve into political acceptance.

Countries such as Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, or even Morocco are unlikely to make recognition decisions based solely on oil incentives. Their calculations are shaped by internal stability concerns, African Union norms, and regional dynamics. However, when energy access, infrastructure financing, and strategic partnerships are aligned, political positions can shift.

This is the essence of geo-transactional leverage: not coercion, but structured dependency.

In a post-OPEC or weakened-OPEC environment, the UAE’s ability to operate independently enhances this model. It can offer flexible supply terms, tailor bilateral agreements, and integrate energy into broader geopolitical deals. This stands in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s model, which relies more heavily on maintaining higher oil prices to sustain domestic fiscal requirements.

The result is an emerging divergence within the Gulf itself.

Saudi Arabia represents a system built on price discipline and centralized control. The UAE, by contrast, is moving toward a model based on flexibility, diversification, and networked influence. If fully realized, this shift could redefine not only energy markets but also the political geography of regions where energy, trade, and security intersect.

Somaliland sits at that intersection.

Its strategic location along key maritime routes, combined with growing infrastructure development, positions it as more than a peripheral actor. In a world where energy is increasingly tied to logistics and supply chains, control of ports and corridors becomes as important as control of oil fields.

The UAE appears to understand this—and is acting accordingly.

The real question is not whether the UAE leaves OPEC. It is whether it succeeds in transforming oil from a price-driven commodity into a multi-dimensional instrument of geopolitical influence.

If it does, the implications will extend far beyond the Gulf—reaching into Africa, reshaping alliances, and potentially altering the long-standing impasse over Somaliland’s place in the international system.

A UAE unconstrained by OPEC is not just an energy story—it is a structural power shift. In that shift, oil becomes leverage, infrastructure becomes influence, and recognition itself can become part of a wider geopolitical transaction. Within this framework, Somaliland’s recognition could emerge as a parallel domino factor—not as a standalone decision, but as part of layered alignment driven by energy, trade, and security incentives. It also serves as a hedge: in a post-Iran war environment where the Strait of Hormuz becomes more volatile or politically constrained, alternative corridors and partners gain strategic value—and recognition decisions may follow those new realities.

Executive Summary

This investigation finds that Al-Shabaab has not declined—it has adapted and embedded itself within Somalia’s state and economic systems. By mid-2025, the group maintained stable finances, intact leadership, and an estimated 10,000–18,000 fighters, while expanding influence inside Mogadishu through extortion and coercive governance. At the center of this shift is Mahad Warsame “Karate,” who has consolidated influence across both intelligence (Amniyat) and financial networks, emerging as a de facto shadow leader. Evidence drawn from UN reporting, ACLED data, Critical Threats Project analysis, financial intelligence, and military intelligence interviews indicates that systemic vulnerabilities within NISA—particularly under Fahad Yasin and Mahad Salad—enabled the manipulation of intelligence flows and selective targeting of internal rivals.

The study introduces a novel analytical approach combining statistical modeling with investigative reporting, demonstrating that recent counterterrorism operations have not dismantled Al-Shabaab’s core systems, but instead coincided with targeted weakening of specific factions, facilitating internal consolidation. This dynamic mirrors the Whitey Bulger–John Connolly case, where compromised intelligence relationships enabled criminal dominance. The key policy implication is clear: counterterrorism strategies operating within compromised intelligence environments risk reinforcing, rather than degrading, terrorist networks

Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods design integrating qualitative reporting, interview-based intelligence assessment, and structured quantitative analysis. The evidentiary base includes United Nations Panel of Experts reports (Somalia; ISIL/Al-Qaida), ACLED conflict event data, EUAA and UK Home Office CPIN/Landinfo reporting, Somalia Financial Reporting Center (FRC) analysis, Critical Threats Project and GI-TOC reporting, media investigations, and semi-structured interviews with former NISA and military intelligence officials. A clear analytical distinction is maintained between documented evidence, corroborated open-source reporting, interview-based assessments, and authorial inference.

The quantitative component applies time-series analysis and descriptive statistical methods to examine trends in defection/DDR patterns, extortion pressure, violence lethality (fatalities-to-incidents ratios), civilian-to-combatant fatality ratios, and finance-network targeting. Given the incomplete and uneven nature of conflict and illicit economy data, the study employs an interval-based estimation approach, bounding observed values between confirmed incidents and plausible upper estimates to generate conservative central estimates. Event data are cross-validated across sources, de-duplicated, and aggregated into monthly and annual intervals, with normalization procedures applied to mitigate reporting bias.

To analyze intra-organizational dynamics, the study incorporates a structured driver-based model of purge intensity—capturing external pressure, leadership shock, factional competition, and financial stress—and the Al-Shabaab Purge Intensity Index (APII), defined as the ratio of internal executions to operational pressure. These statistical tools are used to identify temporal shifts in the relative balance between internal repression and external conflict dynamics, rather than to infer causal relationships.

Where visualizations draw on prior reference materials, figures are reconstructed using primary datasets (UN, ACLED, EUAA) and supplemented with author-compiled data to ensure consistency with the analytical framework.

Methodological caution. Several claims in the study are investigative or inferential rather than judicially established. Interview-derived insights and certain financial or intelligence-related assertions cannot be independently verified and are therefore presented as indicative. Findings should be interpreted as identifying patterns, correlations, and plausible mechanisms, rather than establishing definitive causation.

Introduction: When Intelligence Becomes a Weapon

In the history of organized crime and counterterrorism, the most dangerous transformations occur when the boundary between state intelligence and violent networks begins to erode. Few cases illustrate this more clearly than James “Whitey” Bulger, the Boston crime boss and leader of the Winter Hill Gang—an Irish mob network who did not merely evade law enforcement, but embedded himself within it. Through his relationship with FBI handler John Connolly, Bulger neutralized rivals—particularly the Angiulo faction of the Italian Mafia—while expanding his own criminal enterprise under the protection of the very institution tasked with dismantling it. The result was not disorder, but a reordering of power in which intelligence became a weapon serving criminal consolidation. This article argues that a structurally similar dynamic has emerged within Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc. in Somalia through the rise of Mahad Warsame “Karate.” The comparison is not one of direct equivalence, but of operational logic. Between 2017 and 2025, Karate’s ascent reflects a pattern in which proximity to intelligence networks—rather than isolation from them—became the decisive factor in reshaping internal power. Like Bulger, he appears to have operated within overlapping systems of enforcement and information, leveraging access to expose rivals, manage pressure, and convert external counterterrorism efforts into instruments of internal control.

From the command posts in Jilib, southern Somalia, to the intelligence corridors of Mogadishu, Karate’s trajectory illustrates how insurgent leadership can evolve through infiltration instead of confrontation. Emerging from Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat, the organization’s most feared intelligence apparatus, he moved beyond the role of enforcer to become an architect of influence. Through linkages that connected Amniyat operatives with elements inside Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), alongside political intermediaries such as Fahad Yasin and Mahad Salad, a shadow network took shape. Within this system, the distinction between state and insurgent blurred, allowing intelligence flows to be repurposed in ways that selectively advantaged certain actors within Al-Shabaab.

These dynamics intensified during the period of organizational strain that followed sustained military pressure between 2022 and 2023. Revenue collection systems were disrupted, internal mistrust deepened, and mid-level operatives were eliminated amid accusations of corruption and espionage. Yet rather than producing collapse, these pressures accelerated adaptation. Financial networks were reorganized, intelligence channels became more centralized, and authority increasingly shifted toward actors capable of navigating both insurgent and state-linked environments. In this context, violence, information, and finance were no longer separate domains—they became mutually reinforcing tools of consolidation.

For observers, the implication is significant: insurgent resilience is not solely a function of ideology or battlefield strength, but of institutional permeability. When intelligence systems are compromised or selectively manipulated, counterterrorism pressure can produce unintended outcomes—strengthening the very actors it seeks to weaken by enabling them to eliminate rivals and reorganize internally.

While the UN Panel of Experts on ISIL and Al-Qaida (July 2025) assessed that Al-Shabaab’s leadership remained unchanged under Ahmed Diiriye, subsequent reporting from the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (November 2025) documents Mahad Karate’s expanding oversight of both Amniyat (intelligence) and financial (zakat) systems. This convergence of intelligence and revenue control mirrors the Whitey Bulger model of power—where dominance is not derived from formal title but from control of information and cash flow—positioning Karate as a de facto power center within Al-Shabaab, operating beyond the constraints of formal hierarchy. Karate’s rise can be traced back to his strategic relationships with key handlers, notably Fahad Yasin and Mahad Salad, which have allowed him to integrate Al-Shabaab and state institutions to an unprecedented extent.

The Handlers: Mahad Salad and Fahad Yasin

From 2017 onward, Somalia’s intelligence service evolved into a contested arena of political maneuvering, clandestine networks, and competing agendas. At the center of this system were two successive directors of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA): Fahad Yasin and Mahad Salad.

Fahad Yasin—a former Al Jazeera journalist who rose to become NISA chief and a close ally of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo”—cultivated covert channels with former jihadist intermediaries, publicly framing these contacts as efforts to “recruit sources” within Al-Shabaab. Yet these engagements blurred the boundary between penetration and accommodation. Parallel reporting indicates that networks under his tenure were also involved in the recruitment and external training of thousands of Somali youths, embedding opaque and highly sensitive linkages between state intelligence structures and militant ecosystems. This system did not develop in isolation. It unfolded against a backdrop of international ambivalence. Leaked U.S. diplomatic reporting and Western press accounts—most notably cited in The New York Times—indicate that Washington itself was divided over how to respond to Fahad’s growing influence. Some American officials reportedly pushed for sanctions, citing obstruction of security and governance reforms. However, the proposal stalled after opposition from the CIA, which argued that preserving operational access within Somalia’s intelligence ecosystem served broader counterterrorism priorities.

The result was a contradictory posture: while parts of the U.S. government viewed Fahad as a liability, others treated him as a necessary conduit. To Somali political actors and militant networks alike, this signaled strategic inconsistency—Washington’s approach appeared fragmented, with its “mouth and body doing two different things.” Crucially, this ambiguity reduced the likelihood of any decisive disruption to the intelligence networks that had taken shape under Fahad Yasin.

When Fahad was eventually removed, and Mahad Salad assumed the directorship, the leadership changed—but the system did not reset. Instead, the absence of external pressure or internal dismantling mechanisms allowed those networks to survive the transition intact. Mahad Salad not only inherited this architecture but also moved to sustain and institutionalize it. Reporting from the period shows that he promoted Fahad Yasin’s close associates into senior NISA roles, including individuals tied to finance, intelligence coordination, and prior recruitment pipelines. In doing so, Mahad Salad effectively preserved and advanced elements of the intelligence ecosystem that had intersected with Al-Shabaab-linked recruitment structures during Fahad’s tenure. What might have been a moment of institutional rupture instead became one of continuity and consolidation.

It was within this permissive and ambiguous environment that Al-Shabaab’s internal intelligence wing, the Amniyat—under Mahad Karate—found opportunity. In such conditions, intelligence flows were not neutral; they could be shaped, filtered, and redirected. Analysts and defectors have long described how Amniyat selectively fed intelligence into Somali and international counterterrorism channels, while simultaneously framing certain rival commanders as irreconcilable extremists. In effect, NISA’s cooperation—whether deliberate or inadvertent—created conditions that allowed Mahad Karate to weaponize counterterrorism against his internal rivals. Those individuals—often drawn from non-Hawiye constituencies—were subsequently exposed to drone strikes, arrests, or internal purges. Between 2022 and 2025, figures reportedly caught in this pattern included Maalim Ayman, Jaafar Gurey (Xamud), and Abdullahi Nadir—senior commanders widely identified with Al-Shabaab’s core leadership aligned with Ahmed Diriye.

The mechanism reflects a broader and historically recognizable pattern: access to compromised intelligence channels can be leveraged to reshape violent hierarchies from within. In Boston, James “Whitey” Bulger used his relationship with FBI handlers to systematically weaken the Angiulo faction of the Italian Mafia. In Somalia, while the context differs, the underlying dynamic is strikingly similar—intelligence relationships, once distorted, can become instruments through which one actor quietly reorganizes the battlefield in his favor.

Mahad Karate’s Relationship with Fahad Yasin

During Fahad Yasin’s tenure at NISA, as documented by the UN and other organizations, the agency was transformed into a political weapon against civil and political opposition. For the first time, former NISA officials and military intelligence interviewed for this investigation acknowledged that Al-Shabaab’s infiltration into NISA initially occurred due to weakened policies that lacked oversight and monitoring of Al-Shabaab fighters and high-ranking defectors. This ad hoc defector policy was based on amnesty declarations made by successive presidents, from Abdullahi Yusuf in 2009 to the current president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, rather than on a legitimate national amnesty law.

The most effective amnesty efforts—implemented by both the Federal Government and Federal Member States—occurred between 2013 and 2015, leading to the defection of several senior Al-Shabaab figures. These included Hassan Dahir Aweys (Hizbul Islam leader), Zakaria Ismail Hersi (secretary of Al-Shabaab’s finance department), and Mohamed Said Atom (Puntland commander, June 2014). Mukhtar Robow (deputy leader) later defected in 2017. According to the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) report, Abdullahi Abdi Haji, a member since 2006, was arrested in August 2015 and released under a general amnesty granted by Puntland President Abdiweli “Gaas.”

Despite the policy's clumsiness and lack of clarity, defectors were generally not allowed to join the government directly or to integrate into security apparatuses. Typically, defectors, whether received through informal channels such as tribal elders or directly (which is extremely rare), went through a process where some fighters were used as informants for counterintelligence. Others were placed under house arrest, particularly high-ranking Al-Shabaab commanders, while some were enrolled in rehabilitation and reintegration programs—90% of which were funded by Somali donor agencies. In most cases, foot soldiers and their families were assisted, while Zakariya Ismail consistently acted as an informant for NISA (per former NISA officer interview), aiding the Somali government and its allies in the elimination of Ahmed Godane. He even received amnesty from the US government, which offered rewards for information leading to his capture—something the US government declined to comment on, as expected. However, when Farmaajo was elected and Fahad Yasin became his chief of staff, they made unconstitutional and illegal arrangements with Al-Shabaab defectors, including Zakariye, whom Yasin promised to appoint to a high position within NISA as soon as he assumed the role of deputy director in early 2018—an unprecedented move in the Somali government. Major defectors were allowed to join the agency in high positions, while the foot soldiers were mostly controlled and utilized as informants. Nevertheless, during Fahad Yasin’s leadership, NISA became an open door for Al-Shabaab recruitment, particularly for their Amniyat unit, overseen by Mahad Karate.

Interviews with former NISA intelligence officers and senior military personnel reveal that Al-Shabaab’s infiltration within Somalia’s security and government structures not only persisted but significantly worsened after 2018. Before 2018, infiltration was estimated to be around 5 percent, mainly involving informants and clan-based access. However, by 2022, this figure reportedly increased to approximately 20 percent due to weakened vetting, politicized reshuffles, and factionalism, indicating deeper embedded access rather than just external intrusion. This assessment aligns with the escalation in tone and warning from the United Nations Monitoring Group, which stated that the National Intelligence and Security Agency was “beset by infighting and allegations and counter-allegations of the leadership’s affiliation with Al-Shabaab” and warned that “at worst, extensive infiltration of the Agency by Al-Shabaab represents a significant threat to regional peace and security.” While the UN does not quantify infiltration in numeric terms, the use of “extensive infiltration” marks a clear recognition of systemic institutional vulnerability rather than isolated compromise.

Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, based on UN and EU-compiled DDR data (2012–2022), a dramatic collapse in Al-Shabaab defections following Fahad Yasin’s appointment as NISA Deputy Director in 2018.

Between 2012 and 2017, estimated annual defections averaged approximately 330–350 per year, totaling roughly 2,000 DDR participants during that period (EUAA COI, February 2023). Immediately after 2018, defections dropped to near zero. The UN Panel of Experts documented only 29 confirmed defections between October 2021 and August 2022, indicating that annual defections during much of the 2018–2021 period fell to fewer than ten per year. The speed and magnitude of this decline suggest a structural shift rather than normal fluctuation. One plausible analytical explanation is that potential defectors were discouraged by the perception — or reality — of Al-Shabaab infiltration within state security institutions. If insurgent operatives had visibility inside NISA or other government structures, surrendering would no longer guarantee safety. Instead, defection could expose individuals to retaliation, identification, or targeted elimination. Under such conditions, the incentive structure collapses, and fear replaces exit.

The collapse in defections coincided with a period in which Al-Shabaab maintained and expanded its economic penetration of Mogadishu. Rather than being territorially dominant, the group embedded itself into the capital’s taxation, coercion, and shadow governance systems. This period marked a shift from overt insurgent warfare to deep economic and political influence within Somalia’s commercial hub. The environment created strategic leverage for state actors willing to tolerate or manipulate this embedded presence.

During this same period, Mahad Karate consolidated control over Al-Shabaab’s intelligence and internal security apparatus, the Amniyat. Control of Amniyat meant authority over internal discipline, counter-intelligence, assassinations, and financial enforcement. Because Amniyat oversees both vetting and internal punishment, consolidation of this unit effectively centralizes power inside the organization. This concentration of authority strengthened Karate’s internal dominance and enhanced his influence over financial flows, contributing to perceptions of him functioning as a de facto “shadow emir” within the movement.

Further reinforcing this trajectory, Somalia’s Financial Reporting (FRC) Center has documented that Al-Shabaab maintains penetration across economic and governance structures, noting that “AS (Al-Shabaab) has its claws in every sphere of the country’s economic system, including the judicial system and the country’s intelligence services. This penetration has allowed AS to exercise its powers to generate revenue and maintain such control.” This finding is not isolated—it reflects a broader shift from earlier, more constrained infiltration toward a post-2018 environment characterized by expanded institutional exposure. In practical terms, this points to increased access within state security organs, elevating counterintelligence risk and weakening institutional resilience.

This shift coincides with financial indicators highlighted in the 2020 National Risk Assessment published by FRC, which documents that Al-Shabaab surpassed government revenue collection, stating that “AS (Al-Shabaab) is competing in generating more revenue than the government of Somalia… [and] has succeeded in surpassing the government in raising revenues.” With Somali federal domestic revenue at approximately $211 million in 2020, conservative scaling suggests Al-Shabaab’s annual revenue plausibly operated in the $200–250+ million range.

Within this context, Figures 2 and 3 together illustrate a coherent transition toward coercion-driven revenue extraction. Figure 2 (Integrated Coercion Architecture: Markets, Mogadishu Port, and Stacked Taxation) shows that across key commercial nodes, coercive enforcement increasingly outweighs overt violence—particularly in primary hubs such as Bakara, where the coercion-to-violence ratio rises notably after 2018 and accelerates after 2019. This shift is not solely market-driven but reflects a structural transformation following Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of the Mogadishu port. As a result, coercion evolves from localized extortion into a layered system combining market taxation (Bakara, Suuq Bacaad) with port-based taxation of imports, forming a stacked taxation system operating across interconnected commercial flows.

Figure 3 (Overt Violence vs Coercion and Revenue) reinforces this pattern by demonstrating that while overt violence (bomb/IED proxy) stabilizes or declines, coercion continues to rise and aligns closely with the upward trajectory of Al-Shabaab’s estimated revenue. The divergence between declining visible violence and expanding coercion highlights a transition from kinetic operations to embedded fiscal control—suggesting adaptation and consolidation rather than operational decline.

Academic reporting has also pointed to persistent allegations of ambiguous interactions between Mahad Karate and Somali intelligence structures. Professor Bacon observed that “he (Mahad) sometimes refrains from enforcing death penalties of government officials, and there are pervasive rumors about him dealing with Somali intelligence chief.” While such accounts describe patterns rather than verified coordination—and the Financial Reporting Center does not establish direct links between specific individuals—the consistency of these observations aligns with broader counterintelligence concerns.

The structural patterns in the data suggest that significant outcomes can occur without direct coordination. For example, Mahad Karate, involved in Amniyat enforcement and financial oversight, wouldn’t sustain expanded coercion and revenue extraction without reduced enforcement pressure and greater movement freedom in key economic areas. The evidence of revenue growth, institutional penetration, and coercive dominance indicates that gaps and vulnerabilities within security institutions, especially NISA, create a permissive environment. Thus, the lack of proven direct coordination does not undermine the analysis; instead, it highlights a pattern of systemic vulnerability that has bolstered Al-Shabaab’s operational and financial strength during the Fahad Yasin period.

Methodological Validation

Figure 2 and Figure 3 are constructed using an interval-based estimation approach suited for incomplete conflict and illicit economic data. For each year, observable indicators (bombings, targeted killings, extortion) are bounded between confirmed events (UN, ACLED, media) and an upper estimate accounting for underreporting. The central estimate is:

Where Et is the estimated annual level, Lt is the lower bound (confirmed incidents), and Ut is the upper bound (plausible maximum including underreporting). Figure 2 applies this method to commercial coercion in Bakara and Suuq Bacaad, with a structural adjustment after 2019 to incorporate UN-documented Mogadishu port infiltration and systemic import taxation, consistent with GI-TOC reporting on layered extraction across markets and supply chains. This produces a stacked taxation system combining market coercion and port-based revenue extraction. Figure 3 applies the same framework to overt violence and coercion trends, aligned with revenue indicators (NRA 2020). The resulting divergence—declining overt violence alongside rising coercion and revenue—is consistent across both figures and reflects a shift toward embedded economic control rather than event-driven violence. While not proving direct coordination, this convergence supports a finding of systemic institutional corruption and enforcement gaps, enabling Al-Shabaab to exploit or manipulate formal economic and regulatory processes.

Against that structural backdrop, on February 3, 2020, Somalia’s NISA announced that Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Diiriye had ousted Mahad Karate and Bashir Qorgab for opposing bombings in Mogadishu, revealing internal divisions within the group’s control. Independent reports indicate that Karate and Qorgab were removed due to financial disputes and inter-clan tensions within Al-Shabaab. Karate, head of finances and intelligence, was central to their revenue operations. Allegations of resource hoarding and clan friction have surfaced, particularly involving the predominantly Hawiye-controlled Mogadishu, a hub for Al-Shabaab’s taxation and attacks. Shortly after their reported expulsion, Qorgab was killed in a U.S. airstrike, which reduced internal conflict but did not remove Karate’s influence.

Shortly thereafter, the sequence expanded beyond internal factional struggle. In May 2020, Italian aid worker Silvia Romano was released after Al-Shabaab publicly acknowledged receiving payment for her freedom, widely reported at approximately $4.3 million. The ransom episode intensified scrutiny over insurgent financing channels and mediation efforts. Former NISA director Abdullahi Mohamed Ali (Sanbalolshe) alleged that Qatar facilitated funding flows and that the then-NISA chief, Fahad Yasin, acted as a “middleman” between Doha and Al-Shabaab. These allegations were denied and never adjudicated. Nonetheless, the overlap between ransom inflows, internal financial disputes, and leadership expulsions deepened political controversy at a time when Al-Shabaab’s revenue apparatus was already under strain from internal friction. Interviews suggest possible informal revenue-sharing between Al-Shabaab and political actors in Mogadishu, potentially around $10 million annually. These unverified claims lack evidence and confirmation from any authority but would require inquiry if substantiated.

The central analytical question is therefore not whether revenue-sharing has been proven — it has not — but whether the timing of events reflects strategic intent within a broader environment of infiltration, exposure, and revenue competition. Was the NISA tweet exposing Al-Shabaab’s infighting over money and bombings an attempt to weaken Mahad Karate’s leverage over the group’s finances and intelligence apparatus? Did publicizing the dispute — followed by the killing of Qorgab and the reported removal of Karate from the executive council — function to narrow internal rivals while leaving the core financial node intact? And in the broader context of the $4.3 million ransom controversy, was the exposure of factional fracture designed to shape who controlled future revenue streams? The questions clearly reveal a pattern of structural vulnerability: macro-level threats, internal financial disputes, state exposure, the swift elimination of a faction, and ransom controversies. This sequence—ranging from infiltration risks and revenue disputes to state exposure, drone strikes, and ransom fallout—directly highlights the ongoing struggle for control over Al-Shabaab’s financial and intelligence framework amid evident systemic instability.

As a result of mistrust between two factions loyal to Mahad Karate and Ahmed Diiriye, internal clashes within Al-Shabaab erupted. These conflicts peaked in early 2020 and diminished by 2021 (see Figure 4 and Figure 12) as Somalia entered an election period. This led to unprecedented election-related violence. During this time, Mahad Karate began to lose his connections with Fahad Yasin and NISA. Consequently, he started prosecuting NISA informants within Al-Shabaab who were directly working with Fahad Yasin. According to UN data from January, following the killing of Qorgab, Al-Shabaab prosecuted more than 27 of its fighters and mid-level commanders, accusing them of spying for the Somali government.

As Fahad Yasin had already initiated covert outreach to Al-Shabaab in 2020 and 2021 through NISA to explore negotiation channels, his loss of influence among Al-Shabaab insiders—and the approaching election year—coincided with renewed discussions around a potential “Doha version 2.0.” During late 2020, specifically around October 2020, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller traveled to Doha to pursue a proposal—developed with the awareness and support of senior U.S. officials, including Kash Patel—to explore whether Qatar could help buy off or otherwise marginalize a subset of senior Al-Shabaab leaders, particularly those aligned with Al-Qaeda. Despite this, the effort faced significant internal challenges. U.S. officials struggled with fundamental questions, including who within Al-Shabaab could be engaged, given the group’s fragmented and internally violent leadership structure, and the broader risks of negotiating with Al-Qaeda-linked figures. The initiative was further complicated by the U.S. election transition and lack of interagency alignment. Ultimately, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo intervened, viewing the proposal as insufficiently developed, and moved to halt the effort before it could advance further

Interviews with former NISA officers and military intelligence officials reveal that tensions between Fahad Yasin and Mahad Karate escalated in early 2020. In February 2021, the UN Security Council added Karate to its sanctions list, citing his role in Al-Shabaab’s Amniyat intelligence wing. While some sources claimed that Ahmed Diriye temporarily stepped back from leadership due to health issues, former intelligence officials contested this, stating there was no verified evidence of incapacitation. They argued that the push for sanctions against Karate stemmed more from the conflict between Yasin and Karate than from any legitimate succession threat.

The strained relations between Fahad Yasin and Mahad Karate coincided with Somalia’s electoral impasse and the decline of its intelligence sector. A notable incident was the June 2021 abduction of Ikran Tahlil Farah, a NISA cyber officer, near headquarters, where CCTV captured her entering a vehicle resembling a NISA jeep. On September 2, NISA stated she was handed over to Al-Shabaab and killed, which Al-Shabaab denied. Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble suspended Fahad Yasin for failing to provide a credible report, although this decision was later contested. Former NISA Director-General Abdullahi Ali Sanbalolshe publicly suggested that Ikran may have been targeted due to her possession of sensitive information, including details about the covert deployment of Somali recruits to Eritrea, possible links to the Tigray conflict, and knowledge related to the assassination of former Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahman Yarisow.

During the same political cycle, the assassination of MP Amina Mohamed Abdi exposed the operational depth and resilience of Al-Shabaab’s network, centered around Engineer Ismail—the group’s senior bomb-maker responsible for mass-casualty attacks, including the 2017 Mogadishu bombing that killed over 587 people. Ismail was not a peripheral operative but a central figure within the organization’s command architecture, serving as a close ally and adviser to Emir Ahmed Diiriye. His trajectory—from media technician under Fahad Yasin at Al Jazeera to chief explosives expert and senior adviser within Al-Shabaab—illustrates the permeability between media, intelligence, and Al-Shabaab’s terrorist infrastructure, further reinforced by the broader Qatari-aligned networks associated with both Fahad Yasin and Ismail.

From a policy perspective, the CIA may have underestimated the risks associated with Fahad Yasin’s proximity to individuals linked to Al-Shabaab, particularly Engineer Ismail—a senior bomb-maker connected to the group’s leadership during a period of internal contestation. While publicly available information remains limited, multiple reporting streams have pointed to overlapping networks between political, intelligence, and militant actors. This posture contrasts with earlier U.S. engagement in 2015, when the CIA station chief in Mogadishu actively pushed for the removal of NISA director Abdirahman Turyare, citing concerns over corruption and mismanagement. This intervention occurred despite Turyare’s tenure being associated with relatively strong counterterrorism outcomes, including higher rates of high-value target (HVT) operations and disruption of Al-Shabaab networks. The dispute—centered in part on control of the CIA-trained Gaashaan unit—ultimately resulted in his removal, reflecting a more proactive approach toward perceived institutional risk.

By comparison, later periods appear to show a more permissive approach toward Fahad Yasin, even as concerns persisted regarding his proximity to key figures such as Engineer Ismail—a high-value target with a multi-million-dollar U.S. bounty following the killing of CIA paramilitary officer and former SEAL Team 6 member Michael Goodboe. This raises a broader structural issue in intelligence practice: the trade-off between maintaining access to local intermediaries and mitigating the risk of compromised relationships. Historical parallels—such as the FBI’s handling of informants in the Whitey Bulger case—are instructive. In that case, FBI agent John Connolly maintained a close relationship with Bulger, prioritizing intelligence access over enforcement, which enabled Bulger’s network to operate while targeting rivals and undermining broader law enforcement efforts. In this context, Fahad Yasin can be viewed as occupying a functionally similar intermediary position—where reliance on a politically embedded actor may have constrained more decisive counterterrorism action.

A more assertive approach—potentially including greater scrutiny of key intermediaries, consideration of targeted sanctions, and prioritizing the capture or confirmed neutralization of high-value operatives such as Engineer Ismail—may have increased pressure on critical nodes within Al-Shabaab’s network. Instead, prioritizing continuity of engagement appears to have limited the ability to fully disrupt key operational elements, contributing to the group’s continued resilience during this period.

Mahad Karate’s Relationship with Mahad Salad

Mahad Salad was appointed as the director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in May 2022, despite lacking experience in intelligence or military operations. His appointment was perceived as a continuation of a previous regime that also lacked relevant experience, raising concerns about President Hassan Sheikh’s control over intelligence matters. Salad lived in Egypt from 2004 to 2012 and is alleged to have ties to Egyptian intelligence. Additionally, he is a member of Somalia’s ruling JSP party, which further fueled skepticism about his qualifications.

During his first tenure from May 2022 to April 2024, he promoted Fahad Yasin and recruited former Al-Shabaab intelligence officers, leading to the hiring of inexperienced personnel from his tribe for top positions with high salaries. This undermined morale among dedicated NISA agents and strained the security budget, contributing to a deterioration of security in Mogadishu and its surroundings.

Within less than a year of his appointment, NISA reported the apprehension of 10 Al-Shabaab moles, while two agents promoted by Mahad Salad himself became fugitives: Abdisatar and Ayanle. For instance, Abdisatar was appointed by Mahad Salad to lead the new NISA unit, Duufaan unit, before he fled.

To complicate the situation further, Mahad Salad has reportedly faced allegations—raised by diplomatic and intelligence sources in Mogadishu—of interfering in investigations related to terrorism financing and money laundering. These concerns are linked to cases involving detained Al-Shabaab operatives allegedly associated with Mahad Karate, a senior figure with whom Salad is reported to have familial ties. According to these accounts, some of these individuals were subsequently released without formal charges. In addition, reporting indicates that Salad has engaged in multiple meetings with Mahad Karate without formal authorization from Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. These developments have reportedly drawn concern from U.S. officials, with the Biden administration exerting pressure on the Somali leadership to reconsider Salad’s position. However, President Hassan Sheikh is said to have been slow to act on these concerns.

Nonetheless, avoiding past mistakes associated with Fahad Yasin, the Biden administration invited Mahad Salad to a meeting in Washington, D.C. with the FBI and CIA to clear the air and work towards implementing tangible reforms within NISA and the government regarding addressing Al-Shabaab’s money laundering, as reported by a former NISA and military intelligence official interviewed for this investigation. Following his return from the United States, Mahad Salad oversaw measures targeting Hormuud Telecom framed as enforcement of customer data-sharing requirements, which resulted in the harassment and arrest of Hormuud Telecom staff. During the same period, NISA enforced CCTV camera regulations, compelling businesses to invest in the infrastructure and store data permanently at their own cost. This period coincided with a series of Al-Shabaab attacks on Hormuud Telecom 13 times, reportedly resulting in the deaths of over six staff members. These actions may have been intended to demonstrate to external partners, including the Biden administration, that anti-money laundering measures and efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab financing were being actively enforced. However, extortion targeting businesses in Mogadishu has continued to escalate during his tenure.

Taken together, these developments raise concerns about the effectiveness of these measures in disrupting militant financial networks and suggest the possibility of unintended consequences, including increased exposure of private sector actors to risk. Some analytical interpretations further point to the potential for manipulation by actors such as Mahad Karate, whereby state-led enforcement and data collection efforts could be indirectly leveraged to map financial activity in Mogadishu’s private sector, enabling the persistence of extortion networks while maintaining an outward appearance of compliance with international counterterrorism expectations.

To validate and substantiate the above reporting with qualitative data, we employed statistical analysis on existing data from the Mahad Salad period spanning May 2022 to April 2024. This analysis focused on several variables, including violence fatalities in Mogadishu, extortion pressure from Al-Shabaab, the lethality index- utilizing data extracted from ACLED, Critical Threat Project, as well as reports from media and UK government sources. Using ACLED Explorer–derived monthly fatality data for Mogadishu (Banadir), as reflected in the UK Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN), shows that between May 2022 and April 2024, during Mahad Salad’s tenure as Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), fatalities fluctuated month-to-month but remained broadly stable. With the exception of a single spike in late 2022, most months recorded approximately 35–55 fatalities, with no sustained upward trend through 2023 or early 2024. While ACLED data itself cannot confirm such an arrangement, the fatality pattern shown in the ACLED/CPIN data is consistent with a period of compressed violence rather than escalation.

Following Mahad Salad’s departure in April 2024, the pattern shifts. Monthly fatalities move into a higher band of roughly 60–95 deaths, with greater volatility and a higher baseline of violence. In ACLED analytical terms, this reflects a clear escalation in the lethality and intensity of political violence in Mogadishu, see Figure 5.

Examining patterns of violence in Mogadishu during Mahad Salad’s first (May 2022–April 2024) and second tenures (June 2025–present) reveals a shift in fatality distribution that challenges official claims of sustained stabilization. Using triangulated data from ACLED Explorer (Banadir/Mogadishu, as cited in UK CPIN), Land info/ACLED tables, UN Panel of Experts reporting, and corroborating media reports, the civilian-to-combatant fatality ratio (see Figure 6) tracks how violence is distributed. For example, a ratio of 0.67 indicates that for every 1 combatant killed, approximately 0.67 civilians are killed.

Applied monthly (May 2022–October 2025), the data shows a coercive phase (mid-2023–early 2024) during Mahad Salad’s first tenure, where the ratio peaks near 0.90, indicating near parity between civilian and combatant deaths. This aligns with intensified urban coercion and extortion enforcement, where violence disproportionately affected economic actors and public spaces, consistent with UN monitoring findings and media-documented incidents. However, during Mahad Salad’s second tenure (June 2025 onward), the ratio drops to approximately 0.60–0.65, indicating a shift back to combatant-heavy targeting.

This transition complicates the narrative of stabilization. The reduction in civilian casualties during the second tenure coincides not with the dismantling of insurgent capability, but with a reconfiguration of violence—from civilian-facing coercion in the first tenure to more targeted attacks on security actors in the second. This raises a critical question: does this shift reflect effective state policy under Mahad Salad’s return, or an adaptive recalibration by Al-Shabaab after consolidating its economic control in Mogadishu?

In this context, claims of stabilization risk are structurally flawed. The evidence suggests not the elimination of insurgent influence, but its optimization: a transition from coercive enforcement against civilians during the first tenure to a more calibrated, lower-visibility conflict posture during the second. Importantly, the data reflected in the first graph indicates that Al-Shabaab has shifted its targeting pattern—reducing visible civilian casualties while increasing attacks on combatants and high-value state targets. This shift is reinforced by UN reporting (2025), which documents a series of high-profile attacks inside Mogadishu, including operations targeting multiple military compounds—among them facilities linked to NISA, such as the Godka Jilicow detention center—as well as a reported attempt to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud through an IED attack on his convoy. Additional person-borne IED attacks against military facilities in districts such as Hodan further demonstrate sustained operational capability within the capital.

The result is an environment where security appears improved on the surface, but where Al-Shabaab remains embedded and adaptive—raising serious questions about the durability and depth of the state’s control over Mogadishu. These developments directly challenge claims that Mogadishu is “more secure than ever,” as the persistence of complex, high-impact attacks in 2025 indicates otherwise.

This creates a misleading appearance of stabilization. Reduced civilian casualties—particularly in Mahad Salad’s second tenure—can be interpreted as improved security outcomes, yet the underlying data shows that insurgent capability has not been dismantled. Instead, violence is redistributed, not reduced. The decline in civilian exposure coincides with sustained extortion pressure and increased targeting of security forces and state infrastructure, indicating that Al-Shabaab has adapted to operate in a way that lowers visible civilian harm while maintaining control and operational flexibility.

For further illustration, Figure 7 compares the Extortion Pressure Index and Violence Lethality Index (VLI) in Mogadishu from May 2022 to December 2025, with the dashed line marking the CCTV rollout in November 2023. VLI is calculated as (fatalities ÷ incidents) × 100, showing how deadly attacks are relative to frequency. Together, the indicators reveal a three-phase shift during Mahad Salad’s tenure and into 2025, alongside the emergence of a stability-without-resolution equilibrium.

First (mid-2022–early 2023), extortion pressure declines while lethality spikes sharply, reflecting disruption and insurgent attempts to compensate with high-impact attacks under financial stress. Second (mid-2023), extortion pressure recovers while lethality stabilizes at lower levels, indicating insurgent adaptation and restoration of revenue systems with reduced reliance on mass-casualty violence. Third (post-November 2023 through 2025), extortion continues rising while lethality remains compressed, signaling a shift toward selective intimidation tied to taxation enforcement rather than spectacular attacks.

This pattern reflects a stable but unresolved system. The state expands surveillance through CCTV, increasing visible control but not dismantling extortion networks. As noted in the UN Panel of Experts (2025), businesses in Mogadishu were required to install CCTV systems to monitor Al-Shabaab activity; however, those same businesses were subsequently targeted by Al-Shabaab through improvised explosive devices and shootings, with multiple attacks recorded in late 2024 alone. This underscores the limited effectiveness of surveillance measures in disrupting underlying financial networks. Traders therefore absorb the cost of dual compliance—meeting state-imposed CCTV requirements while continuing to pay Al-Shabaab extortion to avoid retaliation—effectively purchasing stability. UN reporting further confirms that Al-Shabaab continues to extort businesses even in areas outside its direct territorial control, particularly in Mogadishu’s key commercial hubs such as Bakara Market, Suuq Bacaad, and Xamar Weyne, which remain central revenue generators for the group. The business community is consequently placed in a structurally constrained position between state enforcement and insurgent coercion. At the same time, Al-Shabaab adapts by allowing CCTV compliance to proceed while selectively targeting compliant businesses, avoiding direct confrontation with surveillance infrastructure while sustaining its revenue base through calibrated intimidation.

Although Figure 7 does not demonstrate direct coordination between Mahad Salad and Mahad Karate, the sustained divergence—rising extortion alongside suppressed lethality—indicates a strong correlation between insurgent adaptation and the NISA security environment. Whether driven by policy limitations, institutional gaps, or unintended consequences of a surveillance-focused strategy, the outcome remains consistent: the underlying coercive economy persists. Instead, Al-Shabaab appears to have transitioned toward a lower-visibility but economically entrenched model of coercive governance, where violence is used selectively to enforce compliance rather than maximize casualties—undermining claims that Mogadishu’s security environment has been fundamentally stabilized.

Mahad Salad’s Second Tenure, June 2025-To date (as of April 2026)

The spike in the targeting of Al-Shabaab finance leaders since mid-2025—coinciding with Mahad Salad’s second tenure as Director of NISA—occurs alongside UN reporting that Mahad Karate has expanded his authority across both Amniyat and the group’s financial networks. Historically, these functions were separated to prevent excessive concentration of power, but recent reporting suggests increasing centralization. In this context, the observed shift represents a statistically significant deviation and an observed exceedance over baseline variance, rather than routine fluctuation (see Table 1 and Figure 8).

Against this backdrop, the data demonstrates a clear departure from prior baseline patterns. During the baseline period—May 2022 through February 2025—finance and zakat targeting remained limited and sporadic, with only isolated cases observed (see Table 1). In contrast, the period March 2025–February 2026 records five finance-network leaders killed, including a concentrated cluster within less than six months (June 2025–January 2026). This represents an unprecedented density of targeting activity over a compressed timeframe, as visualized in Figure 8. The individuals targeted—including Moalim Adan Qaddiid, Abdullahi Mohamed “Arab,” Abdullahi Abukar Ali, Abdullahi Wadaad Cosoble, and Ahmed Dhubad Xidig—held roles within zakat and financial networks that function as structured extortion systems. Available reporting further indicates that approximately 80% of these individuals were aligned with networks associated with Ahmed Diriye.

To assess whether this pattern reflects random variation, a baseline comparison is applied using the period structure outlined in Table 2, covering May 2022 through February 2025. This baseline yields a mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of approximately 0.71, while the post-2025 period records an observed value of five. This produces a z-score of:

z = (5 − 1.5) / 0.71 ≈ 4.95

The z-score measures how far an observation deviates from the baseline average (mean), scaled by the typical variation (standard deviation)—that is, how unusual the spike is relative to prior patterns. A value of 4.95 places the observation far outside expected variance, confirming a highly statistically significant deviation (see Table 2).

Because the targets were finance and zakat actors rather than battlefield commanders, the pattern suggests that operations during Mahad Salad’s second tenure may be influencing the internal configuration of Al-Shabaab’s financial system rather than dismantling it. The concentration of targeting within specific financial networks, combined with the reported expansion of Mahad Karate’s authority, points toward a potential consolidation of control within the group’s leadership structure. In this interpretation, the targeting pattern reflects a reorganization of financial governance within Al-Shabaab, while the broader revenue system—particularly extortion-based zakat collection—continues to function.

The pattern shown in the Figures 9 to 11 is reinforced by NISA’s own public communications (See Figures 9 to 11), which repeatedly highlighted operations against individuals identified as Al-Shabaab finance figures or close associates of Emir Ahmed Diriye. For instance, NISA announced the capture of Muxudiin Daqare, described as a senior commander and close aide to Diriye, and later issued wanted notices for Xasan Afgooye and Cabdullahi Wadaad, both portrayed in NISA messaging as individuals connected to Al-Shabaab financial networks or leadership structures. These announcements coincide with the cluster of finance-network removals after mid-2025, indicating that those targeted were not random operatives but individuals tied to revenue collection or the emir’s inner circle. When considered alongside UN reporting that Mahad Karate has expanded his influence over both Amniyat and aspects of Al-Shabaab’s financial system, the pattern suggests that intelligence operations may have selectively removed certain finance leaders while leaving the broader zakat and extortion infrastructure largely intact.

Within this context, the timing of these operations during Mahad Salad’s second tenure as head of NISA raises a critical question: why was Mahad Karate himself never publicly identified or highlighted as a priority target? If operations disproportionately focused on financial and operational figures linked to Ahmed Diriye’s network—while the individual, reportedly consolidating control over both intelligence (Amniyat) and financial systems, remained absent from targeting—this pattern suggests that these actions may have, whether intentionally or inadvertently, enabled the concentration of power under Mahad Karate. Rather than degrading the group’s core financial architecture, such targeting appears consistent with a selective disruption that weakens one faction while leaving the broader revenue system intact and increasingly centralized.

Further scrutiny reinforces this concern. In March 2026, NISA publicly announced the elimination of 14 senior Al-Shabaab commanders as a major operational success. Excluding Engineer Ismail—confirmed alive by military intelligence sources—leaves 13 confirmed cases, of which approximately 9 were aligned with Ahmed Diriye’s network (~69%) and 4 with Mahad Karate’s faction (~31%), according to military intelligence assessments of factional alignment. This concentration suggests a clear targeting imbalance, raising the possibility that NISA operations disproportionately weakened Diriye’s network while enabling Mahad Karate’s consolidation of authority within an increasingly fragmented Al-Shabaab leadership structure.

This dynamic presents a striking comparison to the Whitey Bulger case in Boston organized crime. Bulger, leader of the Winter Hill Gang, operated for years as an FBI informant handled by agent John Connolly, providing intelligence that helped authorities dismantle rival criminal networks, particularly factions of the Patriarca Mafia and the Angiulo organization. As those competing groups were weakened or removed, Bulger’s network expanded its control over gambling operations, loansharking, and extortion rackets—core revenue streams in Boston’s criminal economy—generating tens of millions of dollars annually and consolidating dominance within a single network. In a similar way, the emerging pattern suggests that Mahad Karate functioned as the dominant insider within Al-Shabaab’s financial and intelligence structures—effectively acting as a shadow leader—analogous to Bulger, while Mahad Salad’s NISA operations, intentionally or not, played a role similar to Connolly’s. From a policy perspective, this raises the possibility that external counterterrorism engagement—particularly by the CIA and AFRICOM—may have inadvertently reinforced internal dynamics. As in the Bulger case, selective disruption aligned with rivalries between Ahmed Diriye and Mahad Karate factions can enable consolidation rather than fragmentation. In this context, intelligence flows through NISA under Mahad Salad may have intersected with these rivalries, potentially strengthening Mahad Karate’s position while leaving the broader insurgent financial system intact

Mahad Karate’s Rise to Shadow Leader of Al-Shabaab

Since Mahad Karate lost the Al-Shabaab leadership contest to Ahmed Diiriye following the tenure of Ahmed Godane, tensions have escalated between the two. Despite being appointed as deputy leader and head of Al-Shabaab’s intelligence unit, Mahad’s growing disagreements and distrust of Diiriye led him to pursue a power grab. This resulted in several clashes between the two leaders, leading to internal purges and conflicts within Al-Shabaab as early as 2018 through late November 2023, a situation that has continued to escalate, as documented by ACLED, UN, and the media.

Internal purge executions in Al-Shabaab typically occur when the leadership perceives infiltration or operational compromise. These triggers include precision drone strikes on senior figures, arrests following internal meetings, or disruptions to financial networks that signal intelligence leaks. In such contexts, Amniyat—under Mahad Karate—conducts internal investigations and executes individuals accused of collaborating with Somali intelligence (NISA) or foreign actors. While Al-Shabaab frames the internal purge and executions as punishment for “spies,” these purges also function as a mechanism for eliminating rivals and consolidating power. For example, UN reporting indicates major purge cycles in 2020–2021 with roughly 27–29 executions (See Figure 12), coinciding with heightened suspicion after Mahad Karate’s reported removal from the Shura in 2020, the drone killing of commander Qorgab during Fahad Yasin’s NISA tenure, and Karate’s addition to the UN sanctions list, all of which intensified fears of infiltration. A comparable pattern is documented in Boston’s Winter Hill Gang under James “Whitey” Bulger, where internal killings were frequently justified as counter-informant measures but often functioned to eliminate perceived threats to leadership control. Notable cases include the execution of Brian Halloran (1982), the murder of Deborah Hussey (1981), and the disappearance of multiple associates amid escalating internal suspicion and rivalry. These cases demonstrate how accusations of betrayal can be operationalized as tools of internal discipline and power consolidation—closely mirroring the logic of Amniyat-led purges under Mahad Karate, particularly following the post-2020 Qorgab neutralization.

To systematically analyze these dynamics, the dataset used in this study is derived primarily from existing ACLED event data, UN Panel of Experts reporting, and media, and has been manually modified and expanded using verified media reports to capture underreported events—particularly in the post–Phase I period (2024–2026), where formal datasets show lower visibility. This hybrid dataset enables a clear distinction between internal purge executions and internal fighting, which are treated as separate but structurally linked phenomena.

Building on this dataset and conceptual framing, the analysis applies the following Purge Intensity model, which captures how internal violence emerges from the combined influence of key drivers:

Purge Intensity_t​=α_t​+β_t​+γ_t​+δ_t​

where α = external pressure, β = leadership shock, γ = factional competition, and δ = financial stress. Each component is operationalized as a standardized contribution level (0–1 scale), allowing comparison across time. In this formulation, purge intensity is not treated as a purely additive mechanical output, but as a composite index of relative influence, where higher combined values—and especially dominance of specific components—indicate the conditions under which internal violence is most likely to manifest as purges rather than open conflict.

In parallel, the analysis also uses the Al-Shabaab Purge Intensity Index (APII) to capture the balance between internal repression and external operational pressure:

APIIₜ = Executionsₜ / Operational Pressureₜ

Together, these formulations distinguish between when purges occur (APII) and why they occur (driver contribution model).

Before presenting the figures, it is important to clarify the statistical approach. The analysis applies a structured event aggregation method, where incidents are coded across sources, time-aligned, and normalized to peak or mid-period placement to reduce reporting bias. These events are aggregated into annual values to produce consistent time-series patterns (Figures 12 and 13). The driver contributions in Figure 14 are then mapped onto these time periods to explain observed shifts in internal violence.

The figures are organized for clarity:

• Figure 12 = internal purge executions

• Figure 13 = internal fighting (clashes + deaths with event markers and Phase I shading)

• Figure 14 = drivers explaining transitions between the two

Figure 12 shows that internal purge executions peak sharply in 2020–2021, reaching approximately 27–29 executions, immediately following leadership shocks—most notably Mahad Karate’s removal from the Shura (February 2020) and the Qoor Gaab killing (March 2020). This period reflects a breakdown of trust between Ahmed Diriye and Mahad Karate, producing heightened paranoia over infiltration. As a result, Amniyat-led purges were intensified, targeting both suspected NISA informants and selectively removing rivals aligned with Diriye. The concentration of executions indicates coercive internal consolidation driven by leadership shock (β) rather than battlefield conditions.

High APII values during 2020–2021 confirm that internal repression was disproportionately high relative to external pressure, establishing this period as a leadership shock–driven purge phase.

The shift away from purges is captured in Figure 13, which shows internal fighting trends alongside leadership and external shock markers, with the Phase I war period (Aug 2022 – Late 2023) clearly shaded. During mid-2022 to late 2023, internal violence transitions into open clashes, peaking in 2023 at approximately 13 clashes and ~80 deaths. This escalation occurs within the shaded Phase I period and reflects a structural shift: external pressure (α) and financial stress (δ) become the dominant drivers. Under these conditions, Al-Shabaab prioritizes battlefield survival, and internal tensions are expressed through overt conflict over operations, finances, and territorial control, rather than covert purges.

The underlying drivers of this transition are shown in Figure 14, where contribution levels indicate how influence shifts over time. In 2020–2021, β (leadership shock) reaches near-dominant levels (~0.9), while α and γ remain moderate and δ low, confirming that internal violence is driven primarily by leadership instability and mistrust. In 2022–late 2023, α (~0.8–0.9) and δ (~0.6) rise to dominant levels, while β and γ decline, showing that external military pressure and financial disruption override internal purge dynamics and push violence outward into open conflict. By 2025, contribution levels rebalance, with β and γ both rising to moderate-high levels (~0.6) while α declines, indicating that leadership insecurity and factional competition again become the primary drivers, now expressed through selective purges rather than large-scale clashes.

This distinction is critical. In 2025, Figure 13 shows relatively low levels of open clashes, yet Figure 12 shows a renewed rise in purge executions. This indicates that factional competition has shifted form, from open confrontation to coercive internal targeting. At this stage, Ahmed Diriye faces increasing internal pressure following the loss of key finance-linked actors, while Mahad Karate consolidates influence over Amniyat, financial networks, and the Shura. Leadership shock generates instability, and factional competition determines how that instability is resolved through purges. A third pattern emerges in late 2025, where internal fighting remains low (Fig. 13), but purge executions rise again (Fig. 12). This reflects a return to internally driven control dynamics, where coercive enforcement is used to manage leadership instability and factional competition rather than respond to external pressure.

The epicenter of clashes within Al-Shabaab is driven by two core grievances shaping Mahad Karate and the Hawiye faction, which are reflected in the transition patterns observed across Figures 12–14. First, Hawiye business and clan leaders believe the overwhelming burden of terrorism and extortion falls on southern Somalia—particularly Hawiye communities—while the operational backbone of the group (intelligence, taxation, and attacks) is largely run by Hawiye figures such as Mahad Karate, Ali Dhere, and others. Despite this, ultimate leadership remains with Ahmed Diriye of the Dir clan, reinforcing a perception of exclusion from top decision-making. This structural imbalance helps explain why factional competition (γ) remains persistent in Figure 14, even during periods of low open conflict (Figure 13), as Karate’s support base expands through clan-aligned networks within the movement.

Second, Karate’s faction views Diriye’s leadership as strategically biased and dismissive of these grievances. They argue that Al-Shabaab continues to concentrate violence and extortion in southern Somalia while avoiding operations in Somaliland, even as Diriye expands recruitment and influence linked to Somaliland networks—particularly within Isaaq clan structures, including sub-clans such as Nageeye, Gama’did, and Adan Sunne—seen as an attempt to consolidate his power base outside the traditional southern operational zones. These tensions intensified under external pressure and financial disruption during the Phase I war period (Figure 13), where α and δ dominate in Figure 3, forcing internal disagreements over strategy, resource allocation, and territorial focus to surface as open clashes.

As these pressures evolved, Mahad Karate moved to consolidate control over intelligence, security, and financial networks, while actively undermining Diriye’s support within the leadership—including localized clashes in Jilib captured in Figure 13. This trend is reinforced by the UN Panel of Experts report on Somalia published in November 2025, which documents that Mahad Karate has expanded control over both intelligence (Amniyat) and financial systems, while consolidating influence within the Shura council, where approximately 18 out of 29 members (≈62%) are Hawiye-aligned. Karate has effectively built a majority power base within the council. This consolidation aligns with the rise of β and γ in Figure 14 during 2025 and the renewed purge activity in Figure 12, indicating a shift in internal power. As a result, Ahmed Diriye is increasingly relegated to a symbolic leadership role, while Mahad Karate emerges as the de facto or shadow leader within Al-Shabaab amid deepening internal divisions.

Consequences and Outlook

By mid-2025, Al-Shabaab had reversed earlier territorial losses, reasserting control in multiple regions and tightening its operational presence around Mogadishu. The UN estimated its manpower at 10,000 to 18,000 fighters, its finances stable, and its leadership “largely intact.” But this stability is deceptive. Beneath it, a quiet power shift has taken place: Karate is consolidating control under the guise of continuity. His trajectory goes beyond jihadist doctrine. Analysts increasingly see a strategy geared toward eventual negotiations—potentially mediated by Qatar and Turkey—in a model reminiscent of the Taliban’s Doha process. The systematic removal of dissenting commanders, especially those aligned with Ahmed Diriye, ensures a simple outcome: when talks begin, the “Al-Shabaab delegation” will, in reality, be Karate’s delegation. This direction aligns with the UN Panel of Experts' report (July 2025), which notes Al-Qaida guidance encouraging Al-Shabaab to adopt a Taliban-style governance model.

The comparison to Whitey Bulger is not rhetorical—it is structural. Both men moved from informant-linked environments to positions of dominance, turning counterterrorism relationships into strategic protection. Bulger’s handler went to prison. In Somalia, the trajectory looks different. Fahad Yasin is relaunching a political PAC and remains free after the CIA blocked sanctions against him, despite longstanding concerns and his proximity to networks linked to Engineer Ismail—the Al-Shabaab explosives operative tied to the operation that killed CIA officer Michael Goodboe. Mahad Salad remains in power, continues engagement with the CIA, and promotes reform narratives—even as UN reporting indicates Maalim Ayman remains alive and military intelligence in Mogadishu assesses that Engineer Ismail is also still alive, despite NISA claims of their neutralization.

The pattern is familiar. In Boston, John Connolly protected a crime boss, targeted rivals, and compromised his own institution. In this context, Mahad Salad’s tenure reflects a similar dynamic: not the dismantling of Al-Shabaab, but the selective weakening of rivals—while enabling Mahad Karate to consolidate power.

Between 2017 and 2025, Mahad Karate mastered the politics of contradiction—simultaneously Al-Qaida’s loyalist and NISA’s invisible partner, terrorist and tactician. Like Bulger, he manipulated state structures to insulate his empire, using intelligence as currency and clan loyalties as leverage. Each assassination or defection inside Al-Shabaab tightened his control, while external actors mistook his faction’s survival for organizational stability. In the end, Karate’s story is not just about extremism; it is about the corruption of intelligence itself. When informants become strategists and handlers become accomplices, terrorism mutates into governance—and accountability dies behind the language of “national security.” If history is any guide, as the Bulger case proved, the system that protects a manipulator eventually inherits his crimes. For Somalia, that reckoning is already overdue.

Notes

1. United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia, latest report on Al-Shabaab leadership and finance structures, February 2026.

2. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia, February 2023.

3. United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia, S/2022/754, reported 29 confirmed defections between October 2021 and August 2022.

4. Somalia Financial Reporting Center, National Risk Assessment, 2020.

5. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Somalia event data, various years.

6. UK Home Office, Country Policy and Information Note: Somalia security situation, referenced in the publication draft.

7. Critical Threats Project, Somalia analytical reporting, various years.

8. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, reporting on Al-Shabaab taxation and coercive governance in Mogadishu.

9. The New York Times, reporting on U.S. policy debates surrounding Fahad Yasin and sanctions discussions.

10. Jamestown Foundation, reporting on internal Al-Shabaab disputes, finance conflicts, and clan-linked tensions.

11. Interviews cited by the author with former NISA officials and military intelligence officers; not independently verified in open source.

Bibliography

ACLED. Somalia Data. Various years.

Critical Threats Project. Somalia analytical reporting. Various years.

EUAA. Country of Origin Information Report: Somalia. February 2023.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Reporting on Al-Shabaab coercion, taxation, and shadow governance. Various years.

Jamestown Foundation. Reporting on Al-Shabaab internal leadership and finance disputes. Various years.

Somalia Financial Reporting Center. National Risk Assessment. Mogadishu, 2020.

United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia. Reports to the Security Council. Various years, including S/2022/754 and the February 2026 report.

UK Home Office. Country Policy and Information Note: Somalia security situation. Various editions.

The New York Times. Reporting on Somalia intelligence politics and U.S. sanctions debates. Various dates.

Executive Summary

The destruction of a World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse inside Mogadishu Port in January 2026 was not a bureaucratic mishap, a misunderstanding, or an unintended byproduct of infrastructure development. It was a deliberate administrative act, executed by port authorities under ministerial authority and later exposed only because donor governments intervened. As Reuters confirmed, the warehouse was formally ordered to vacate by Somalia’s Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport and subsequently demolished by port authorities, while U.S. officials alleged that donor-funded food aid was seized, prompting Washington to suspend assistance.

The incident revealed more than a single humanitarian violation. It exposed a port governance system optimized for extraction, where commercial concessions, state authority, and Al-Shabaab taxation coexist, and reinforce one another. At the center of this system sits the Turkish concessionaire Albayrak, operating under a long-term, opaque concession that concentrates control over port operations, construction, security, and revenue collection while evading independent audit. Somalia’s Auditor General has formally confirmed that Albayrak failed to submit independently audited financial accounts, rendering large portions of port revenue unverifiable and the state’s contractual entitlement unenforceable. In parallel, UN sanctions reporting documents Al-Shabaab’s sustained taxation of cargo moving through Mogadishu Port, establishing the port as a parallel taxation marketplace despite nominal government control.

Within this environment, the WFP warehouse became a sacrificial asset—not because it lacked legal standing or humanitarian protection, but because it occupied high-value container-yard land inside a concession regime that rewards repurposing, cost recovery, and upstream revenue capture. IMF data show rising import volumes through the port; trader surveys confirm hundreds of millions of dollars in annual container-related payments; yet audited state revenue reflects only a fraction of that activity. The demolition of protected humanitarian infrastructure was thus not aberrational—it was economically rational within a system that monetizes space, externalizes humanitarian cost, and shields decision-makers from accountability.

This investigation demonstrates, for the first time with quantifiable evidence, that Mogadishu Port’s container economy systematically finances corruption Al-Shabaab extortion, and humanitarian harm. The facts establish a clear chain of authority, benefit, and omission that meets the threshold for command responsibility and material facilitation. They warrant urgent, targeted sanctions, donor enforcement actions, and further investigation under UN mechanisms concerned with diversion of humanitarian aid and illicit revenue extraction.

Mogadishu Port is not merely infrastructure. It is a crime scene with a balance sheet.

Albayrak’s impunity to demolish and siphon revenue concessions

It is critical to understand the legal impunity and operational authority that enabled the demolition. When the United States suspended assistance, Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to deflect responsibility through vague references to “port expansion works” and inter-agency confusion (Reuters). But the issue was never coordination failure. The decisive question is who exercised authority over construction, demolition, and security inside Mogadishu Port—and why that authority was used against a protected humanitarian asset.

As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, operational control inside the port is concentrated within the concession system overseen by the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport and implemented by the Turkish State Owned Enterprise (SOE) concessionaire, Mogadishu Alport Corporation (Albayrak–Somalia), which publicly identifies itself as the operator of Mogadishu Port under long-term agreements with Somali authorities (Albayrak Group – Mogadishu Alport). In practice, this mandate extends beyond cargo handling to include infrastructure development, site control, and internal coordination across secured port zones, placing demolition decisions firmly within the concession-managed perimeter illustrated in the figures.

The same framework used to justify security upgrades and expansion works-also reflected in Figures 1 and 2—contains no enforceable humanitarian safeguards. It grants broad authority for “repurposing” without defining protected zones, exclusions, or donor consent requirements for donor-funded facilities. As a result, a humanitarian warehouse can be reclassified and removed as ordinary infrastructure. The contract further suppresses accountability by assigning no clear liability for third-party asset damage, limiting donor oversight through confidentiality, and allowing expansion costs to be recovered before revenue sharing—ensuring the commercial gains of demolition accrue upstream while humanitarian and fiscal costs are externalized. The WFP warehouse was therefore not an anomaly, but a foreseeable casualty of a concession regime designed to prioritize extraction over protection.

Figure-1

Figure-2

Compounding these flaws is the design of the security wall and guard towers contract, signed in 2021, which was drafted as an instrument that can be reopened and extended beyond realistic timelines. The agreement specifies a 180-day completion period and is associated with a limited scope, approximately 514 meters of reinforced concrete wall and three guard towers (Figure-3). Under reasonable engineering benchmarks, such works could be completed within the stated timeframe and at a cost unlikely to exceed USD 2 million, even allowing for security premiums. Yet the contract structure-through expandable variations, remeasurement flexibility, and weak enforceability-can operate in practice as an open-ended vehicle for prolonged “works” and recurring cost recovery.

Fugure-3

In practice, this structure functions as an open-ended cheque for Albayrak. By allowing expansion and security costs to be recovered before revenue sharing, the concession turns prolonged “works” into deductible expenses that steadily erode Somalia’s port revenues. The demolition of the WFP warehouse shows how this operates: a narrow security rationale is reclassified as “repurposing,” triggering additional works, continued cost recovery, and no effective oversight. Rather than protecting state or humanitarian interests, the framework enables finite projects to generate infinite charges, undermining Somalia’s sovereign revenues through contractually sanctioned opacity.

Port container economic governance and revenue-sharing parties

This concession regime has been repeatedly flagged for systemic opacity. Somalia’s Auditor General, in the 2024 Audited Annual Financial Statements (dated 30 June 2025), confirmed that Mogadishu Alport Corporation (Albayrak–Somalia) failed to submit independently audited financial accounts as required by its concession, rendering significant port revenues unverifiable and depriving the Somali state of confirmed income (Office of the Auditor General – Audited Annual Financial Statements 2024 (PDF)). This is not an allegation; it is a formal qualified audit opinion issued by the Federal Republic of Somalia.

At the same time, UN sanctions reporting has for years documented Somalia’s exposure to revenue leakage and parallel taxation networks, including Al-Shabaab’s coercive extraction across trade corridors and commercial flows (UN Security Council – Panel/Monitoring Group reports portal). The coexistence of formal concession control and Al-Shabaab taxation is not accidental-it is structural.

The Port as an Extortion Marketplace (Al-Shabaab)

United Nations monitoring has repeatedly established that Mogadishu Port functions as an extortion marketplace operating under a system of parallel taxation, where Al-Shabaab extracts revenue from cargo moving through a port it does not formally control. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia documents that the group systematically taxes imports arriving through government-controlled ports and along associated transport corridors, enforcing payments through intimidation of traders and transporters and maintaining parallel fiscal authority alongside the state (UNSC S/2019/858).

Building on this framework, IMF high-frequency indicators show that Mogadishu Port handles approximately 120,000–200,000 metric tons of imports per month, underscoring the scale of the taxable trade base moving through this parallel system (IMF staff estimates based on PortWatch and UN Global Platform data). The UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (2021) further quantified this extortion by reporting that Al-Shabaab levies a tax of approximately USD $4 per metric ton on commercial cargo transported through areas under its influence, including port-linked supply chains (UNSC S/2021/849). Applied to IMF-reported import volumes, this implies baseline Al-Shabaab revenue of roughly USD $5.8–9.6 million per year derived from Mogadishu Port imports alone.

UN monitoring makes clear that this figure represents only a minimum floor. The same reports document that taxation is frequently layered across multiple checkpoints and corridors, with additional shipment-based and route-specific payments imposed as cargo moves inland, resulting in higher cumulative extraction across the full supply chain (UNSC S/2019/858; S/2021/849). In practice, this parallel tax regime allows Al-Shabaab to monetize Mogadishu Port as a durable revenue hub despite the presence of state authorities and foreign operators.

Official Port Revenue: Somalia–Albayrak Concession

Carrier-published tariffs confirm that official terminal handling charges exist and are routinely invoiced to shippers. Maersk’s published terminal-handling service updates illustrate the structure of handling-related charges and how they appear in customer billing (Maersk – Terminal Handling Service update). Yet Somalia’s 2024 audited accounts record only USD 28.2 million under “Port Fees – Albayrak,” ( see Table 1) while simultaneously confirming the absence of independently audited concessionaire financial statements required under the concession, meaning gross collections cannot be independently verified, and the state’s contractual entitlement cannot be confirmed (OAG – Audited Annual Financial Statements 2024 (PDF)). This is not an academic dispute; it is a formal audit finding by the Federal Republic of Somalia.

What Traders Actually Pay vs. What the State Records

While Al-Shabaab taxation captures one layer of extraction, the true cost borne by traders moving goods through Mogadishu Port is substantially higher once all line items are included—terminal charges, documentation, port dues, security charges, facilitation costs, and informal payments. Carrier tariff publications show only a subset of the cost structure that appears in real-world billing (Maersk – Terminal Handling Service update). This section captures the real container economy-what traders pay to move goods, not what appears in government accounts.

Table 2 combines IMF high-frequency import indicators-showing Mogadishu Port handles 120,000–200,000 metric tons of imports per month (IMF staff estimates based on PortWatch and UN Global Platform data)—with independently reported trader cost surveys. Annual container volumes are derived by converting IMF-reported tonnage into container equivalents using conservative, industry-standard loading ranges for mixed consumer cargo, yielding approximately 170,000–240,000 containers (TEU) per year. Actual per-container costs are taken from GSM Business Solutions survey data, as reported by Horn Observer, which documents total trader-paid charges of USD $1,080–$1,210 per container once formal and informal port costs are included. Multiplying these verified volumes by observed trader costs produces an estimated actual port economy of USD $183.6–$290.4 million in 2024, reflecting what traders pay in practice rather than what appears in official accounts.

The Structural Siphoning of Container Revenues (2024 Snapshot)

The demolition of the World Food Programme warehouse inside Mogadishu Port was not a neutral infrastructure decision but the predictable outcome of an unaccountable concession regime, as reflected in the revenue patterns quantified in Table 3. For years, Albayrak—the Turkish, state-linked operator—has exercised near-total control over Somalia’s primary trade gateway, enabled by political corruption and contractual opacity. Operating as an effectively unauditable entity, Albayrak controls terminal operations, billing, yard access, and expense reporting with minimal state oversight, reducing port land to a revenue-maximization asset where humanitarian infrastructure becomes expendable.

Table 3 is derived from actual trade volumes and trader-paid costs, not contractual assumptions. Using IMF high-frequency indicators, Mogadishu Port is estimated to handle 120,000–200,000 metric tons of imports per month, which converts—using conservative industry loading standards—into approximately 170,000–240,000 containers (TEU) per year. GSM Business Solutions survey data, reported by Horn Observer, show that traders pay USD $1,080–$1,210 per container once terminal charges, documentation, security fees, facilitation costs, and informal payments are included. As shown in Table 3, this yields an actual container economy of USD $183.6–$290.4 million in 2024—what traders pay in practice, not what appears in official government or concessionaire accounts.

What distinguishes Mogadishu Port, therefore, is not weak revenue generation but the collapse of Somalia’s contractual revenue share once trade enters the Albayrak-operated system, as quantified in Table 3. Although the concession entitles the Somali Treasury to 62.8 percent of port revenues, audited accounts show that in 2024 Somalia recorded only USD 28.2 million, translating to an effective state share of just 9.7–15.4 percent and a loss of USD 87–154 million relative to its contractual entitlement. This outcome was explicitly warned about in advance by the UN Monitoring Group, Somalia’s Financial Governance Committee, and the 2021 Middle East Institute report Far from a Benefactor. By 2024, the result was measurable: USD 25.5–72.0 million was extracted by Al-Shabaab through port-linked taxation, while USD 113–173 million in additional revenue never reached public accounts. When combined with Albayrak’s reported official revenue (~USD 17 million), the operator’s effective capture rises to 71–78 percent of the entire port economy, more than double its contractual share—the first time this siphoning has been fully quantified.

Minister of Marine Transport's record of looting of humanitarian and donor aid

The demolition of the World Food Programme’s Blue Warehouse at Mogadishu Port was preceded by a deliberate administrative act that now functions as its legal pretext: a formal “Notice to Vacate” issued on November 1, 2025, by the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, signed under the authority of Minister Abdulqadir Mohamed Nur. The letter ordered WFP to vacate the facility within sixty (60) days, setting a final deadline of December 31, 2025, on the grounds that the site would be repurposed as part of port modernization and expansion-timelines and justification reported by Reuters in its account of the dispute and the U.S. response (Reuters). This establishes sequencing: weeks before the warehouse was destroyed, the Ministry formally reclassified a donor-funded humanitarian facility as expendable in service of commercial port use.

That notice did not stand alone; it relied on the permissive architecture of concession governance and related construction arrangements that enable broadly defined “repurposing” inside concession-controlled space, without donor consent requirements, protected humanitarian zoning, or clear third-party liability triggers. By collapsing oversight into self-authorization and shielding planning documentation, the Notice to Vacate effectively converted protected aid infrastructure into a lawful obstacle to be cleared. The demolition that followed was therefore not a breakdown of governance; it was the execution of an administrative decision enabled by contract design—revealed only after donor action forced the issue into public view (Reuters; AP).

A Pattern, Not an Isolated Incident

The demolition of the World Food Programme warehouse occurred under the authority of the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport, headed by Abdulqadir Mohamed Nur, and it was not his first encounter with compromised donor-funded food assets. As Minister of Defense, Nur oversaw a system in which U.S.-funded food and fuel intended for the elite Danab forces were illegally diverted and sold, as documented by Reuters, prompting the United States to suspend assistance after Somali institutions failed to account for the aid (Reuters, 2023). Although investigations were announced, no meaningful prosecutions followed. Nur was esacked from defense under U.S. pressure—but reassigned, not sidelined, and placed in charge of the country’s most sensitive commercial gateway (Mustaqbal Media).

Under his authority at the ports ministry, another donor-funded food asset—the WFP warehouse inside Mogadishu Port—was ordered to vacate and subsequently demolished, as confirmed by Reuters reporting on the aid dispute between Somalia and its international partners (Reuters, 2024). Command responsibility does not require proof of personal orders; it requires authority, knowledge, and failure to prevent or remedy abuse. In both defense and ports, life-saving food assets were compromised under systems Nur led, reinforcing donor conclusions that this was a repeat governance failure, not isolated mismanagement.

Public reporting and biographical records explain why donors view this episode with heightened concern. Open-source biographical accounts, including Wikitia, alongside verifiable information from Somali government officials and national intelligence sources, document that Nur entered government after the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union era, following prior involvement with Islamist and Al-Shabaab–linked structures before his transition into formal politics in late 2009 (Wikitia – Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, see Figures 3a and 3b). Since then, across multiple ministerial portfolios, aid diversion, donor disputes, and accountability failures have repeatedly followed his tenure. Seen together, the WFP demolition is not an anomaly—it is the latest expression of a persistent pattern of impunity affecting donor-funded food assets.

Figure-3a Mr Abdukar Nur when he was with Al-Shabaab ( photo from Left)

Figure-3b Minister Abdulkadir Nur visiting Turkey

The Warehouse: Why WFP Became the Sacrificial Asset

The removal of the World Food Programme’s Blue Warehouse occurred as Mogadishu Port faced rising commercial pressure driven by higher import throughput and a growing premium on container-yard space. What makes the case especially grave is that the warehouse was not informal or temporary: it was built by WFP in 2011 as secure in-port humanitarian storage, deliberately placed inside the port’s controlled perimeter to protect life-saving assistance from diversion and insecurity.

By 2023–2025, that humanitarian footprint collided with monetization incentives. Figure 4a shows the WFP Blue Warehouse and adjacent storage area in January 2023, before the demolition of three smaller WFP storage buildings. Satellite measurement confirms that the primary Blue Warehouse alone covered 40,436 square feet. The three auxiliary WFP storage structures removed earlier together accounted for approximately ~18,000 square feet, bringing the total WFP in-port storage footprint to roughly 58,000–59,000 square feet prior to successive demolitions. Figure 4b shows the same site in October 2023, after the removal of the three auxiliary structures, leaving the Blue Warehouse as the last major humanitarian facility in that zone.

Using conservative yard-utilization assumptions, the monetization incentive becomes explicit. A 40,436-sq-ft footprint supports roughly ~175–180 ground TEU slots after accounting for operational lanes and stacking geometry (≈70% efficiency). With stacking up to six containers high—well within a practical yard height below ~60 feet—and average dwell times of 5–7 days, this footprint can cycle approximately ~9,200 to ~12,900 container moves per year. Applying GSM Business Solutions survey data, reported by Horn Observer, which show traders paying USD $1,080–$1,210 per container once all formal and informal port costs are included, the reclaimed WFP site represents USD $10.0–$15.6 million per year in trader-paid container economics tied to that yard capacity.

Figure 4a WFP Facility January 2023 before the 3 storages demoliation.

Figure 4b WFP facilaity Octobrer, 2023, after demolation of 3 storage facilities.

The figures make the incentive clear. As shown in Figures 4a and 4b, the demolition sequence progressively converted protected humanitarian space into premium container-yard land inside a concession system where collections are opaque and independently audited concessionaire accounts are missing. In such an environment, the WFP warehouse became a sacrificial asset—not by accident, but because humanitarian infrastructure occupied land that could be monetized under a container economy optimized for extraction rather than accountability.

Conclusion: A Crime Scene Demanding Accountability

Mogadishu Port functions as a contested revenue battlefield, where Al-Shabaab, public officials, and concession operators extract income from the same container flows while the Somali state loses legitimacy and donor confidence. The destruction and looting of the World Food Programme warehouse was not an administrative error-it was a serious humanitarian violation and the predictable result of a port system structured for extraction rather than accountability, a conclusion underscored when the United States paused assistance in response to the incident (Reuters; AP).

Responsibility lies with identifiable actors. The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport exercised authority over the eviction and demolition process. The Mogadishu Port Authority executed the actions within the protected port perimeter. And the Turkish concessionaire Albayrak, operating under an opaque concession repeatedly flagged for the absence of independently audited accounts, benefited directly from the monetization of cleared humanitarian land. This chain of authority and benefit meets the threshold for command responsibility and material facilitation, irrespective of whether individual orders are documented.

This investigation establishes, for the first time with quantifiable evidence, that Mogadishu Port’s extraction model is both measurable and structurally linked to humanitarian harm. The facts warrant urgent, targeted sanctions, donor enforcement actions, and further UN investigation into aid diversion and parallel taxation. Without forensic audits and enforceable accountability, every container unloaded in Mogadishu will continue to finance corruption, Al-Shabaab, and impunity.

Mogadishu Port is not merely infrastructure-it is a crime scene with cranes run by a Turkish state-owned enterprise. Humanitarian aid is demolished, state revenue is siphoned, and terrorist extortion thrives, all while Albayrak operates the cranes under a World Bank–linked port rating that conferred unearned legitimacy. What was branded as development became a permissions structure for looting-burning U.S. taxpayer dollars, entrenching corrupt officials and concessionaires, and sacrificing civilians already devastated by the war against Al-Shabaab.

In my research on the illicit activities between the Houthis and state actors, I have uncovered significant evidence regarding the tracking of bulk carriers and chemical and LNG tankers involved in the trafficking of oil and fuel from Sudanese ports to Houthi-controlled ports between August and October of 2025. These operations frequently employed tactics such as GPS spoofing and disabling automatic ship identification systems. Additionally, the crude oil transfer methods utilized were consistent with standard practices associated with illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers. This evidence effectively addresses the long-standing debate about Sudan’s support for the Houthis. The Sudanese government appears to be receiving backing from the Houthis, alongside Iranian supplies of illegal oil and weaponry. Evidence of Sudan ports providing fuel and oil to Houthis in Yemen. Watch the 2 and half minute clip.

Ethiopia’s October 2025 press release on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) claimed an average daily release of 154.7 million m³/day in August and 472 million m³/day in September—figures touted as evidence of “equitable regulation” and “steady flow to downstream countries.”
At face value, these numbers look reassuring; in hydrological reality, they expose the same contradictions long highlighted by technical experts and early warnings issued in 2024.

The August–September outflow totals nearly 19 BCM, but that is simply the flood pulse. Converting those peak flows to annualized numbers creates an illusion of constant release. Once the rains end, daily discharge typically drops below 40 million m³/day—a reminder that GERD is operating seasonally, not steadily.

2️⃣ The Probability Problem—Q50 vs Q90

The dam’s operation rests on hydrological probability, not fixed quotas.

• Q50 (50 % exceedance) represents an average year: roughly 49 BCM of inflow at the dam site.

• Q90 (90 % exceedance) represents a dry-year guarantee: only ≈ 40 BCM available.

Most large dams are designed to deliver reliable power at Q90 to ensure consistency through droughts. GERD, however, was optimized for Q50, meaning its design assumes median-flow years half the time. Consequently, the often-repeated 6 GW capacity is a theoretical peak, achievable only during about three high-flow months.
Outside the wet season, production falls to 2–3 GW, and in drought years it could decline to 1.5–2 GW.

3️⃣ Transparency: The Missing Five Years

Since 2020, Ethiopia has released no continuous inflow-outflow or power-generation data. The 2025 statement provided only two monthly averages. Without multi-year records, downstream states and independent analysts cannot verify the dam’s reliability or forecast drought-season releases.
This opacity validates the warnings of the 2013 International Panel of Experts (IPoE), which criticized the absence of verified modeling and reliable production estimates. Five years of withheld data protect Addis Ababa’s political narrative but undermine regional trust and technical credibility.

4️⃣ Shifting Narrative—From Powerhouse to Flood Regulator

Ethiopia’s newest rhetoric focuses on flood mitigation for Sudan rather than electricity exports—an implicit admission of performance limits. By emphasizing regulation instead of generation, Addis Ababa has reframed GERD from an energy revolution into a regional public-goods project, sidestepping uncomfortable questions about its under-realized 6 GW promise.

5️⃣ The GERD Energy–Water Trade-off

While Ethiopia’s GERD boasts an installed capacity of 6,000 MW, the IPoE explicitly warned that such levels “will not be generated under 90 % hydrological reliability.” With mean annual flow around 49 BCM (Q50), output is inherently variable. Unlike most global dams, GERD lacks the storage margin or hydrological buffer to guarantee full generation in dry years.

This creates a structural energy–water dilemma:

• Prioritizing energy means retaining water, reducing downstream flow and aggravating Egypt’s water scarcity.

• Prioritizing water releases means sacrificing power output, slashing domestic electrification and export ambitions.

In 2020, the U.S.-brokered proposal under the Trump administration required Ethiopia to release 37 BCM annually during droughts. Had Addis Ababa accepted, only a few BCM would remain for turbines—cutting generation below 1 GW. Rejecting that formula protected Ethiopia’s sovereignty but also postponed a transparent reckoning with its own hydrological constraints.

The GERD thus embodies the classic development paradox: a project designed to symbolize independence now entangles Ethiopia in the physics of a river it cannot fully control.

6️⃣ Toward Science-Based Diplomacy

Recognizing and publishing real hydrological data would strengthen, not weaken, Ethiopia’s credibility. Transparency could de-politicize negotiations and enable a science-driven framework balancing power generation and downstream security. Such an approach could support a pragmatic, “geo-transactional” settlement linking measured water guarantees for Egypt to economic or trade incentives for Ethiopia—turning confrontation into interdependence.

Where do we go from here?

Ethiopia’s October 2025 statement was meant to project success; instead, it confirmed what hydrologists and analysts have long argued:

• The 6 GW claim is hydrologically overstated.

• The real operation is seasonal and probabilistic.

• Transparency remains absent.

• The energy–water trade-off is the unspoken truth behind every press release.

Until Ethiopia embraces open data and realistic hydrological accounting, the GERD will remain less a triumph of engineering than a hydropolitical experiment—powerful in symbolism, constrained by water, and defined by secrecy.

For years, Djibouti has enjoyed the protection of its geostrategic location on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, hosting U.S., French, and Chinese bases while presenting itself as a neutral, indispensable partner. Yet behind the façade of stability, its financial system was repeatedly flagged as a channel for illicit finance — from laundering Somali pirate ransoms to facilitating the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Iran’s IRGC.

In 2024, that façade began to crack. My investigation revealed how Djibouti’s banking and shipping networks were exploited to launder Houthi revenues, enable Chinese sanction-busting trade, and disguise Iranian and Hezbollah-linked shipping under the cover of legitimate commerce. I recommended FATF action at the time, warning: “Djibouti’s financial institutions must be placed under increased monitoring.”

Last November, FATF confirmed those concerns, formally placing Djibouti in pre-grey list status — what FATF calls “increased monitoring.” In its statement:

“Djibouti will work with MENAFATF to address strategic AML/CFT deficiencies under increased monitoring.”

What FATF Found

The Djibouti Mutual Evaluation Report 2024 is damning. It shows systemic failures in the very areas FATF considers non-negotiable:

• Terrorist Financing (R.5): Partially Compliant
  No convictions, no alternative disruption tools, and no frozen assets despite clear links to Houthis and Hezbollah.

• Targeted Financial Sanctions (R.6 & R.7): LC/PC
  Djibouti failed to implement UN terrorism and proliferation sanctions “without delay” — no designations, no freezes.

• Non-Profit Sector (R.8): Partially Compliant
  Charities remain vulnerable to terrorist abuse; no oversight or risk assessment in place.

• Customer Due Diligence (R.10): Partially Compliant
  Weak KYC, gaps in identifying beneficial owners, and no exclusion of simplified due diligence in high-risk cases.

• Beneficial Ownership (R.24 & R.25): Partially Compliant
  Shell companies and legal arrangements can obscure true ownership, creating a perfect cover for sanctions evasion.

• Financial Intelligence Unit (R.29): LC
  Limited capacity, little independence, and weak cooperation.

The FATF evaluation was blunt: Djibouti’s understanding of ML/TF risks is still at an “embryonic stage.” Confiscation of criminal proceeds is “underdeveloped and not considered a priority.”

Why This Matters

Djibouti’s role is not abstract. The country has been repeatedly named in UN and U.S. reports for facilitating illicit finance:

• Somali piracy ransoms laundered through Djibouti banks.

• Houthi-linked cargo flows exploding by 427% in 2023–2024, with safe passage granted to Chinese shipping.

• Hezbollah front companies using Djibouti shipping firms for laundering drugs, oil, and weapons profits.

• IRGC-linked arms smuggling, including detonators and chemicals transiting Djibouti.

By ignoring FATF’s core standards, Djibouti effectively became a financial hub for groups undermining Red Sea security.

Policy Implications

Djibouti’s placement under FATF “increased monitoring” is more than symbolic. It signals to international banks, insurers, and investors that Djibouti is a high-risk jurisdiction. For policymakers, this creates leverage:

1. Condition financial aid and debt relief on measurable AML/CFT reforms.

2. Increase scrutiny of Djibouti shipping & banking networks for sanctions evasion benefiting Iran, Houthis, and Hezbollah.

3. Press for transparency on beneficial ownership to choke off shell companies enabling illicit trade.

4. Support regional alternatives — such as Somaliland’s Berbera port — to reduce reliance on Djibouti’s compromised hub.

The Lesson for Djibouti

The FATF decision is a warning shot. Djibouti can no longer rely on geography and foreign bases as a shield. If it wants to preserve its role as a regional logistics hub, it must demonstrate that it is not a conduit for Houthis, al-Qaeda affiliates, Hezbollah, and the IRGC.

Bab el-Mandeb carries 20% of global trade and trillions in daily financial transactions through undersea cables. Djibouti’s credibility — and the stability of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa — now depends on real reforms.

In March 2024, the U.S. Treasury Department launched one of the most consequential sanctions campaigns in its history against Al-Shabaab. This was not the usual OFAC action targeting a handful of individuals or shell entities. Instead, Washington went after the Haleel Group — a sprawling financial and business empire tied directly to Hormuud Telecom, Somalia’s largest mobile money provider. The goal was clear: cut Al-Shabaab off from the global financial system.

The scale of the sanctions was unprecedented. For the first time, Al-Shabaab wasn’t treated as a loose terrorist network but as what it truly is — a mafia-style enterprise embedded in the formal economy. OFAC’s statement was blunt: “The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 16 entities and individuals who compose an expansive business network spanning the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Cyprus that raises and launders funds for Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qa’ida.”

Treasury did not reveal the exact value of assets frozen, but during field research for my book Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc., Somali bankers and traders quietly told me the impact was devastating. They estimated that roughly $650 million in Al-Shabaab-linked assets and capital were suddenly locked out of the system because the sanctions severed access to SWIFT transfers. One Mogadishu banker told me bluntly: “We lost the ability to move hundreds of millions. Overnight.”

Here is how I documented it then in Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc.: “Through interviews with bank managers, traders, and intelligence sources, it has been revealed that a staggering $650 million, comprising capital and assets belonging to Al-Shabaab and affiliates, has been frozen. This unprecedented move has forced Al-Shabaab to resort to using only cash and hawala, a significant challenge in financing their terrorist operations and extorting funds.”

But here is where the story takes a darker turn. When the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) finally published its 2024 Annual Report in July 2025, the numbers told a very different story — a story wrapped in bureaucratic doublespeak. Instead of acknowledging the collapse of formal banking transfers caused by U.S. sanctions, CBS blamed it all on a harmless technical adjustment. The report explained away the billion-dollar drop as a simple “reclassification of previously uncategorized inflows into more specific channels.” (Figure 1).

Figure-1

This is not accounting precision. This is a cover-up.

Reclassification cannot plausibly explain the collapse of over a billion dollars in SWIFT-linked transfers in a single year. The reality is clear: U.S. Treasury sanctions hit hard, but CBS moved quickly to provide political and financial cover. On paper, the drop was re-labeled as a technical fix. In reality, the money was rerouted out of the traceable SWIFT system and funneled into opaque hawala networks within weeks.

As I’ve long argued, Al-Shabaab is not just a militant group — it is a mafia enterprise. It thrives by embedding itself inside financial institutions, exploiting regulatory blind spots, and adapting to every shock. The events of 2024 prove it. Washington disrupted the formal flows. CBS rebranded the disruption as “reclassification.” And Al-Shabaab, once again, found a way to keep its billion-dollar economy alive in the shadows.

Why This Is a Cover-Up

The timing alone reveals the truth. The sudden collapse of SWIFT flows and surge in hawala occurred immediately after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Haleel Group, a network long tied to Al-Shabaab. These sanctions disrupted Somalia’s access to correspondent banking — yet the Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) never acknowledged this context. Instead, it presented the shift as if it were a technical fix.

What actually happened was a downgrade in transparency. SWIFT transfers leave behind a detailed trail: sender, receiver, purpose codes, and amounts logged in correspondent banks abroad. Hawala transfers, by contrast, are bulk settlements, often recorded only in internal ledgers without customer-level detail. By reclassifying flows from SWIFT into hawala, CBS effectively pushed them out of sight, removing them from the reach of international regulators.

This maneuver also shielded Somali banks and hawaladars from external scrutiny. No longer exposed to the compliance checks of foreign correspondents, banks could continue moving funds under a less regulated banner. Hawaladars gained even more freedom, absorbing large inflows without generating the kinds of compliance records that sanctions rely upon.

Perhaps most damaging was the story CBS told the outside world. By framing the reclassification as a step toward regulatory “improvement,” it reassured donors, the IMF, and the World Bank that Somalia was moving toward greater accountability. In reality, the opposite was true. The system became less transparent, not more, and Al-Shabaab and its associates were given new room to maneuver under the cover of bureaucratic language.

A Sudden Collapse in SWIFT Transfers

The numbers tell a story of disappearance and disguise. In 2023, Somalia’s Central Bank reported $1.33 billion flowing in through “Other SWIFT Transfers,” formal bank-to-bank wires routed via correspondent banks in Dubai, Turkey, or Nairobi. That same year, “Business Transfers” — the Central Bank’s polite term for hawala money transfer businesses (MTBs) — totaled just over $1 billion.

By 2024, the picture had flipped upside down. SWIFT inflows collapsed to a mere $188.5 million, an 85% crash in a single year. Meanwhile, hawala transfers exploded, more than doubling to $2.31 billion. For a fragile country dependent on aid, mired in conflict, and facing U.S. sanctions against Haleel Group, such a dramatic rerouting was not the product of economic growth — it was the product of engineering. (See Figure-2).

Figure-2

What the Quarterly Data Reveals

The quarterly breakdown makes the sleight of hand even clearer. Until early 2024, business transfers hovered steadily around $250 million per quarter. But immediately after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Haleel Group, those flows doubled to $550 million per quarter, where they remained through the rest of the year.

SWIFT flows show the mirror image. They climbed slowly from $110 million per quarter in 2022 to $342 million by Q4 2023, only to collapse in early 2024 to an average of $40–50 million per quarter. In other words, the money didn’t stop — it simply switched columns, moving from “SWIFT Transfers” to “Business Transfers” on the Central Bank’s books. (See Figure-3).

This was not an accounting quirk. It was a cover-up. Somali banks tied to Haleel — itself linked to Al-Shabaab — had found a way to sidestep U.S. Treasury sanctions. And the Central Bank of Somalia gave them bureaucratic cover by calling it “reclassification.”

Figure-3

How the Haleel Cover-Up Worked

First, the normal system. Before sanctions, Haleel ran its operations through the SWIFT network. Every transaction was logged: sender, receiver, amount, purpose. These inflows appeared under “Other SWIFT Transfers.” Regulators abroad could follow every trail. High visibility. High risk of exposure.

Then came the trick. After sanctions, Haleel and its partner banks reclassified inflows. Instead of reporting them as SWIFT Transfers, they shifted them into “Business Transfers.” On paper, the money had simply jumped from one ledger to another. CBS accepted the change, publishing delayed reports that framed it as a “technical adjustment.”

Behind the paperwork, the trail went dark. Once reclassified, the money no longer ran through correspondent accounts. Instead, Haleel relied on hawala-style settlements: mispriced trade invoices, cross-border cash couriers, and netting through weakly regulated regional banks. What had once been visible line by line became bulk settlements between hawaladars, with no names, no details.

Finally, Haleel delivered back to Al-Shabaab — with profit. By rerouting flows into hawala, Haleel not only avoided sanctions but also skimmed fees and leveraged the liquidity. When the cycle closed, it returned the funds to Al-Shabaab, turning frozen capital into recycled investment. What looked like routine “Business Transfers” in CBS’s reports was in fact terror finance disguised as commerce.

Impact: Instead of weakening under U.S. sanctions, Al-Shabaab came out richer and more resilient — thanks to Haleel’s laundering machine and the Central Bank’s willingness to play along.

CBS’s Record of Cover-Ups

The Central Bank of Somalia (CBS) insists that its 2024 “reclassification” of financial flows was a technical fix. But the record suggests otherwise. Far from being an isolated case, the maneuver fits into a pattern: a regulator that shields powerful financial institutions, undermines donor requirements, and applies sanctions selectively — often in ways that appear to serve political or clan interests rather than impartial law.

Protecting Financial Institutions from Scrutiny

In 2021, despite having no formal authority outside Mogadishu, CBS intervened in Puntland on behalf of several mobile money operators and hawala firms. Six major operators — including Dahabshiil, Amal Express, Iftin Express, and Taaj (a Hormuud subsidiary) — had been flagged by a Global Initiative report for money laundering and terrorism financing. The report alleged links to UN-sanctioned individuals such as Abdi Mohamed Omar (“Dhofaye”), who was implicated in illicit flows to the Houthis and Al-Qaida in Yemen. Instead of reinforcing international standards, CBS effectively absolved these companies.

That same reflex appeared again in March 2024, when CBS issued a directive ordering Somali firms to sever ties with Haleel Group, the Hormuud-linked network sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury. The order bore all the hallmarks of a face-saving gesture: no supporting investigative report, signed only by the Deputy Governor, and quietly scrubbed from the CBS website soon after publication. Such actions create the impression that CBS is more interested in insulating favored institutions than enforcing anti–money laundering rules (see Figure-4).

Figure-4

Undermining World Bank and IMF Standards

CBS has also shown a pattern of resistance to donor-imposed reforms. A World Bank report in June 2023 found that Somalia had failed to meet basic transparency obligations in its mobile money operators (MMO). Despite being given a two-year grace period, only one of the four licensed operators complied with requirements to disclose transaction data. Rather than enforcing compliance, CBS defended the non-reporting firms by invoking “data confidentiality.” (see Figure-5)

Figure-5

This explanation directly undercuts the very principles of transparency and accountability demanded by the World Bank and IMF. In an economy where even rudimentary Know Your Customer (KYC) and due diligence systems are absent, CBS’s permissiveness leaves ample space for illicit finance — space that Al-Shabaab and its affiliates have long exploited.

Undermining U.S. Sanctions Enforcement

The contradiction becomes sharper when CBS’s actions are measured against sanctions enforcement. In 2024, CBS quickly issued a directive against Haleel following U.S. Treasury designations. Yet the Bank failed to take any comparable action against nine individuals and entities in

Puntland sanctioned in 2022 and 2023 for smuggling weapons to ISIS and Houthi networks in Yemen.

By acting swiftly in one case while ignoring others, CBS has undermined the credibility of sanctions enforcement in Somalia. The selective application suggests that decisions are not guided by impartial regulation, but by political expediency and clan calculations. The net effect is damaging: CBS projects an image of compliance to international donors while providing cover for networks that facilitate terrorism finance.

The Key Takeaway

The sanctions were meant to choke Haleel and starve Al-Shabaab of its financial lifeblood. Instead, Somali banks and the Central Bank of Somalia quietly changed the labels. SWIFT transfers were reborn as “hawala transfers,” and the money continued to flow unseen. Haleel returned it to Al-Shabaab not diminished, but multiplied — transformed into profit.

The scale of that profit is no longer speculative. The United Nations has reported that Al-Shabaab has established an investment committee, channeling its laundered funds into legitimate businesses that generate returns of 50 to 80 percent. In Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc., my own research validated this reality, estimating Al-Shabaab’s average return on investment at 112 percent. Far from starving, the group has weaponized profit itself, turning sanctions into an opportunity to entrench its financial empire.

As I documented, Al-Shabaab is not a rebel movement but a mafia enterprise: one that thrives by embedding itself in financial institutions, exploiting loopholes, and adapting faster than regulators can react. The events of 2024 were a case study in this logic. Washington disrupted formal banking channels; CBS supplied political cover through “reclassification”; and within weeks, Al-Shabaab had rerouted billions into hawala streams that fed its war machine.

Napoleon reminded us that “an army marches on its stomach.” The U.S. Treasury sought to cut off that stomach, to starve Al-Shabaab into weakness and perhaps defeat. Instead, CBS reopened the supply lines, ensuring that hunger never set in. What should have been a breaking point became a moment of resurgence. In shielding the group’s finances, CBS did more than manipulate ledgers — it preserved the very lifeblood of a movement now standing once again at Mogadishu’s gates.

It is therefore incumbent on the U.S. Treasury to investigate the Central Bank of Somalia directly, demand new audits and reconciliation reports, and expose the banks and hawaladars that reclassified Al-Shabaab’s funds in the wake of sanctions. Those actors — including CBS directors, Somali government officials, and even the World Bank and IMF staff who signed off on Somalia’s reports — must be held accountable. Anything less makes U.S. policy incoherent: wiping billions in Somali debt, pumping billions more in aid to fight Al-Shabaab, while Somalia’s own financial institutions shield the very networks those dollars are meant to defeat. That contradiction is not just unsustainable — it is unacceptable.

Iran has learned valuable lessons from the sectarian conflicts in Iraq, which united Sunnis in their effor

ts to oust Al-Qaeda and stabilize the country. However, this shift allowed Iran to stray from its anti-Sunni policy, leading to collaborations with various Sunni state and non-state actors through acquisitions and mergers.

Notably, Iran initially linked the Houthis and Al-Shabaab through strategic geography in the age of the sharing economy, where Al-Shabaab facilitated Iranian weapons fuel smuggling for the Houthis into Somalia — a practice that has persisted since the piracy era. Over the years, Al-Shabaab has waned in power, but with its substantial cash reserves, it sought the Houthis’ expertise in weaponry, receiving light arms in return. However, this support proved insufficient in the aftermath of the Red Sea crisis and the Gaza conflict.

To bolster their position economically and strategically, the Houthis began providing advanced weaponry to Al-Shabaab, who in exchange offered access to new gold mining and rare earth mineral assets, as well as utilizing pirates to geolocate target ships and improve their ransom operations. At this stage, Iran remained passive regarding this collaboration.

As the Gaza conflict intensified and the Houthis gained global support — including partnerships with Russia — Iran recognized a significant opportunity. By fostering a new Sunni militant front akin to Hezbollah in the Indian Ocean, Iran could gain geo-economic and geopolitical leverage, not only in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf but also in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean — an ambition once dreamed of by the Ottoman and Persian empires. This culminated in the birth of the merger between Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

Houthis, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab Partnerships

In a revealing interview conducted by the author with military intelligence sources in Somalia, it was disclosed that since early June 2024, Iran has been working to forge an alliance between Al-Shabaab and ISIS. This clandestine meeting took place in Kunyo Barrow, located in the Middle Jubba Region of Somalia, where Al-Shabaab’s commander, Hussein Fidow (of the Mursade subclan, Hawiye), and ISIS’s Kuwaiti commander, Yahya Ashmari, convened. The gathering was initiated by ISIS, aiming to unite with Al-Shabaab through a collaborative venture. The primary goal was to set aside their differences and consolidate their efforts as a unified Islamist front, seeking military and economic assistance from Iran.

Iran’s overarching ambition is to cultivate a cohesive Sunni Islamist front in the Horn of Africa, utilizing Somalia as its operational base, an initiative referred to as the منظمة التحرير والاعادة المسلمين or “Muslim Liberation and Reconstruction Organization.” Following this pivotal meeting, the partnership was solidified in October 2024, with plans for the collaboration to officially commence in January 2025. With Iran’s backing, this new alliance is poised to receive an annual budget exceeding $500 million, funded through the illicit sale of commodities and smuggling activities encompassing oil, gold, drugs, and weaponry. Their immediate objective is to seize control of all of Southern Somalia, including the Southwest State and Jubaland, by May 2025. To further cement this intell insight, as reported by Lloylods List “According to an intelligence report published by Seahawk Maritime Intelligence, the Houthis are extending financial, logistical and military support to both al-Shabaab and Daesh factions operating within Somalia”

The endgame for Houthis and Iran for this coalition is to morph both Al-Shabaab and ISIS into a formidable hybrid entity akin to Hizbullah. This would thereby lay the groundwork for future negotiations with the Somali government, which Qatar and Norway are currently mediating, pushing what is being termed “Doha Version 2.0.”

Moreover, Iran is keen on rekindling diplomatic relations with the current Muslim Brotherhood government in Somalia, led by Hassan Sheikh. His Foreign Minister, Ahmed Fiqi, who has alleged ties to Al-Shabaab according to UN reports, recently met with Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Executive Committee summit in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. During their meeting, Amir-Abdollahian emphasized Iran’s strategic interest in Africa, asserting, “We believe Islamic nations must unite to protect shared interests and resist external threats.”

This strategic maneuver by Iran is poised to extend its influence beyond Somalia, potentially securing a significant foothold in the Indian Ocean and gaining control over the Gulf of Aden through existing alliances with Al-Shabaab and the Houthis. Should this nascent coalition evolve into a Hizbullah or Houthi-like entity, it could represent a burgeoning threat to maritime commerce in the Indian Ocean within the next two to five years.

Iran and Houthi's Growing Influence in Somalia

In early June 2024, the Houthis dispatched over three engineers to Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia with the mission of constructing advanced medium- and short-range missiles, as well as sophisticated drones. A UN report revealed that the Houthis forged a partnership with Al-Shabaab and local pirates from the Puntland region to facilitate the hijacking and geo-location of commercial vessels. This opportunistic alliance has enabled the Houthis to rake in nearly $2.2 billion in ransom from seized ships in 2024, with an 11% share going to the pirates and Al-Shabaab pocketing 30% of the pirate’s cut.

Meanwhile, Iran has capitalized on the situation in Puntland, which has issued 52 illegal fishing licenses that have become conduits for transporting illicit weapons and arms, generating an estimated $650 million annually. Furthermore, in 2024, Iranian-backed illegal fishing traders and arms smugglers financed Puntland President Deni, as noted in an assessment by EU Naval Force
Operation ATALANTA regarding Iran’s footprint in Somalia.

Enablers of Iran’s application of proxy integration (API)

Iran’s application of proxy integration (API) has unveiled a digital wallet potentially exceeding $2 billion annually. Since 2012, it has reportedly invested $16 billion in proxies across Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, alongside a staggering $30 billion supporting the Assad regime in Syria since 2011. With losses in Syria and Lebanon, Iran is now eyeing investments in the Houthis in Yemen, Al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia, and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

This complex web of proxy warfare against the West is underpinned by a fast-moving network of malign state and non-state actors, which Iran employs to facilitate money laundering, weapon smuggling, drug trafficking, and illicit gold trading. Notably, Turkey under Erdoğan has played a role by facilitating oil-for-gold transactions. China contributes by selling arms to Houthis and purchasing sanctioned oil from Iran. Djibouti facilitates Houthis illicit activities and allows Iranian spy vessels that share geolocations with the Houthis, to aid in attacks on commercial and U.S. ally ships while smuggling weapons — including missiles — into Houthi hands.

Countering Iran in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean

The Trump administration is poised to take a hard stance against Iran and the Houthis, while simultaneously considering the withdrawal of U.S. special forces from Somalia. This move could counteract efforts to deter Iran’s growing influence in the region and diminish the effectiveness of combating the Houthis and Iran’s proxies. However, Trump has the opportunity to reform the Biden administration’s weak and faltering policies by transitioning from a “partner-led, U.S.-enabled” approach to a more robust “U.S.-led, partner-enabled” strategy. This would involve holding regional partners accountable while maintaining U.S. special forces in Somalia.

An effective dual-track policy could be implemented that includes collaborating with tribal militias like the Macawisleey, which have successfully disrupted Al-Shabaab’s finances and military operations through an autonomous drone program supported by the Danab special forces trained by the U.S. Furthermore, expediting the establishment of five military bases agreed upon with the Somali government would enhance the U.S. regional posture against Iranian and Chinese influence. Increasing sanctions against political spoilers, as well as ISIS and Al-Shabaab money laundering operations and weapons smuggling, is also crucial — potentially even reconsidering Somalia’s status under the UN arms embargo. Moreover, if the U.S. does not recognize Somaliland, it should consider establishing alternative military and naval bases there for AFRICOM, treating it with a special status similar to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

In Yemen, the Trump administration would need to reinvest in supporting the Yemeni government to finish off the Houthis, leveraging assistance from Saudi Arabia — something that was nearly achieved before the Biden administration intervened. This renewed support for Yemen, along with the dual-track policy for Somalia, requires a reinforcement of sanctions to cut off the Houthis from the Central Bank of Yemen, alongside strict measures against those facilitating their money laundering, shipping companies that violate sanctions, and weapons smugglers. A comprehensive strategy like this could yield tangible results, disrupting and defeating the Houthis while weakening Iran’s influence in the region.

Lastly, it is crucial for the Trump administration to counter Iran’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the potential upheaval in the Indian Ocean. This can be achieved by dismantling the Biden administration’s policy of backing the UN-mediated truce in Yemen, which has inadvertently strengthened the Houthis, a group that was nearly defeated by the Yemeni government. As a result, the Houthis have stockpiled more weapons from Iran, threatening to disrupt global shipping routes in the Red Sea.

To restore free navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the U.S. may ultimately need to declare war on the Houthis through Congress and impose a stringent blockade on Hudaydah Port. This bold move would echo the actions of Thomas Jefferson, who famously took a stand against Algerian pirates by refusing to pay tribute to Tripoli’s ruler, Yusuf Karamanli, during the early 1800s. This conflict, known as the Barbary War, serves as a historical parallel to the current situation.

January 23, 2025

Guled Ahmed MEI Scholar

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