Editor’s Note: In Part 1 of Fragile by Design, Audrey Levisay examined the 2024 IV fluid shortage as a warning of deeper vulnerabilities in America’s medical supply chains. In Part 2, she turns to the structural forces behind the broader injectable drug shortage crisis: manufacturing complexity, geographic concentration, and a market that too often rewards efficiency over resilience. Together, the two articles ask a larger question at the heart of Hale Strategic’s brief: how should the United States protect resources and systems that are economically fragile but nationally essential? What should be doing now to protect critical health resources?

Introduction

In 2024, Hurricane Helene transformed a shortage of essential medical products into a national emergency. In my previous article, I highlighted how flooding at Baxter’s North Cove facility not only left hospitals scrambling, but also exposed the deeper vulnerabilities of the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.

For many Americans, the shortage seemed unprecedented. In reality, it was a highly publicized manifestation of a supply chain crisis that has quietly affected the United States for decades. Long before floodwaters reached North Carolina, a series of accumulating disruptions across the manufacturing chain had made shortages of sterile injectable drugs a familiar problem for hospitals. Although the media often presents them as isolated events, these shortages reflect a broader structural problem that leaves injectable medicines poorly protected against disruption.

​The difference between the IV fluid crisis and the broader injectable drug shortage is not one of cause, but of visibility. Hurricane Helene provided a clear explanation for why saline bags suddenly disappeared. But most sterile injectable shortages occur without a natural disaster at all. They emerge from routine manufacturing interruptions, product discontinuations, quality failures, and a deeply flawed market that discourages redundancy. These shortages have rarely made headlines, but have quietly shaped patient access, complicated medical care, and increased costs throughout the American healthcare system.

For more than a decade, researchers and regulators have identified the same underlying causes behind injectable drug shortages. A 2011 economic analysis commissioned by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found that sterile injectables accounted for nearly three-quarters of all drug shortages.1 Years later, an analysis published in the American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy concluded that the underlying causes had changed little since 2012.2 Manufacturing quality failures continued to halt production, and when only a handful of companies produced a drug, competitors lacked the capacity to replace lost supply. In the case of sole-source manufacturers, no alternatives existed at all. Hospitals were left to ration existing inventories, compound medications when possible, or substitute therapies that were often less effective or carried additional risks.

Recent data suggest that increased awareness of the crisis has not produced sufficient policy action or measurable progress. USP’s annual drug shortage reports illustrate a pattern that has persisted, and in some respects worsened, over the past three years. In 2023, sterile injectables represented 64% of drugs newly in shortage.3 The report identified low prices, manufacturing complexity, geographic concentration, and weak incentives to invest in quality systems as interconnected drivers of recurring shortages. One year later, USP reported 98 active drug shortages, 69% of them sterile injectable medications; 89% had carried over from the previous year.4

The average shortage duration exceeded four years, up from approximately three years the previous year and two years in 2020. The drivers of these shortages, as reported by USP, were nearly identical. By 2025, the total number of shortages had declined modestly to 75, but the average duration had increased again to 5.3 years. Nearly 71% of drugs still in shortage were sterile injectables, and almost all had persisted from the previous year. While the United States may now have fewer drugs in active shortage, the reports indicate that the country has become less effective at resolving persistent shortages or addressing the systemic vulnerabilities that produce them.

This trend raises an important question: why are sterile injectables disproportionately vulnerable?

The Manufacturing Challenge

The first challenge lies in manufacturing itself.

Unlike oral medications, sterile injectable medications are among the most technically demanding pharmaceutical products to manufacture. Production occurs in tightly controlled, sterile environments under rigorous current good manufacturing practice, or CGMP, requirements established by the Food and Drug Administration. Facilities require specialized cleanrooms, validated equipment, dedicated production lines, and extensive regulatory oversight. Different injectable products may require distinct equipment, processes, or production lines to prevent cross-contamination and maintain sterility. Even when facilities manufacture multiple injectable products, shifting production from one medicine to another requires significant time, regulatory review, and operational adjustment.

A pharmaceutical manufacturing plant, in other words, is not a flexible assembly line.

When one facility experiences a quality concern, contamination, equipment failure, or storm damage, another manufacturer cannot simply increase production overnight. Available manufacturing lines typically operate near capacity to maximize profit, produce different classes of medicines, or lack the regulatory approval necessary to manufacture the affected product. The result is a system with remarkably little ability to absorb disruption once it occurs or resolve shortages quickly. USP has found that facilities associated with drugs in shortage are more likely to have received FDA enforcement communications, illustrating how quality problems and manufacturing interruptions can translate directly into supply disruptions.

The Economic Challenge

While manufacturing disruptions are nearly inevitable and explain why production cannot respond quickly, weak economic incentives explain why companies often fail to build reserve capacity in the first place.

Ironically, many of the medications most vulnerable to shortage are also among the least expensive products on the market. In 2023, USP found that the average price of sterile injectables in shortage was $46, less than one-eighth the $392 average for commercially available injectables.5 The disparity widened dramatically in 2024: injectables in shortage averaged $9 per unit, compared with approximately $117 for those remaining commercially available. 6 Among 51 injectable drugs in shortage in 2025, 73% were priced below $15 a unit, and 47% were priced below $5 per unit. 7

USP has repeatedly identified unfavorable pricing dynamics and weak incentives to invest in manufacturing quality as key contributors to product discontinuations. In 2025, discontinuations reached their highest level since 2019, increasing by 60% compared with the previous year.8 As margins shrink, companies face difficult financial decisions about whether maintaining aging production facilities, investing in quality improvements, or expanding manufacturing capacity remain economically worthwhile. Essential drugs can therefore become financially unattractive products, neglected or discontinued not because patients no longer need them, but because the market offers too little return for producing them reliably.

From a market perspective, prioritizing the most profitable products is a predictable and straightforward business decision. Manufacturers have little incentive to maintain unused production capacity that may never generate revenue. Holding excess inventory is costly and risky, as injectable medicines have finite shelf lives. Building duplicate production lines requires significant capital investment, additional regulatory oversight, and highly trained personnel, and those lines may never generate the revenue needed to justify their creation. As a result, facilities are optimized to operate efficiently, not to withstand unexpected disruptions.

The 2024 saline crisis demonstrated how consequential this business model can be for public health. When Baxter’s production halted, there was little reserve capacity elsewhere in the market capable of replacing nearly 60% of the country’s IV fluid supply9. In an economic system that rewards short-term efficiency while offering few incentives to reduce fragility or build redundancy, even a localized disruption can have nationwide consequences.

The pressure to minimize costs extends beyond manufacturing facilities and finished drug products to the chemical building blocks on which those medicines depend. Key starting materials, or KSMs, are chemical inputs used in the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients. Drug manufacturers often import these materials from overseas, searching for the lowest-cost source of chemicals that meet required specifications. While this may again seem intuitive from a business perspective, reliance on a small number of suppliers risks creating single-source points of failure and market concentration.

USP’s 2025 report found that 33 out of 75 drugs in active shortage rely on at least one KSM exclusively manufactured in a single location.10 Rather than investing in qualified backup suppliers and predetermined emergency sourcing arrangements, pharmaceutical companies may be forced to search for alternatives only after a disruption has already occurred. Geographic concentration, whether domestic or international, creates vulnerabilities in the upstream supply chain that can reverberate throughout the entire healthcare system.

Reactive Solutions

Since the shortages of the early 2010s, policymakers have worked to reduce future disruptions to the supply chain and strengthen emergency response mechanisms.

Under Section 506C of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, drug manufacturers must notify the Food and Drug Administration of certain anticipated manufacturing interruptions and permanent discontinuations so that the agency can attempt to mitigate potential shortages before they occur.11 The FDA has further issued guidance encouraging companies to communicate beyond the minimum requirements of the law, increasing transparency about potential threats to public health.12

In the event of a disruption, the FDA can authorize extended expiration dates, permit temporary compounding, authorize emergency importation, and take other steps to minimize harm to patients. In addition, Section 503B of the Drug Quality and Security Act created a category of FDA-registered outsourcing facilities that may compound certain drugs in shortage under defined conditions.13

While mandatory reporting provides an important tool for assessing supply risks, and 503B facilities can provide much-needed manufacturing capacity, these measures are limited and do not resolve the underlying vulnerabilities. Section 506C generally covers drugs considered life-supporting, life-sustaining, or intended for use in preventing or treating debilitating diseases, as well as drugs critical to public health during an emergency. Its scope does not encompass every medication whose shortage could disrupt patient care.14

Certain product categories may also fall outside particular reporting requirements, limiting regulators’ visibility into some biologic and radiopharmaceutical supply chains. Perhaps most concerningly, when six months’ advance notice is not possible, drug companies may in some circumstances report an interruption only shortly before- or even up to 5 days after production has stopped. 15 Such timelines undermine the purpose of advance notification and leave regulators and healthcare systems with little time to prepare.

Beyond this, 503B facilities are not an immediate or universal solution. They generally respond to drugs already identified as being in shortage, and can take five to six weeks to ramp up production. 16 It can be difficult to anticipate which medications are at risk before a disruption occurs, delaying efforts to quickly fill manufacturing gaps. Outsourcing facilities may also lack the equipment, technical capabilities, or scale required to produce certain drugs or satisfy nationwide demand.

Taken together, the measures implemented by the federal government and the Food and Drug Administration reveal a system that remains largely reactive. While the FDA attempts to gain advance notice through reporting, the system can be difficult to enforce and may fail to capture important events. The FDA can encourage reporting and coordinate emergency response initiatives, but it cannot require a company to manufacture a particular drug, maintain reserve production capacity, or operate redundant facilities in multiple geographic locations.

As a result, the American drug shortage strategy remains predominantly reactive, with manufacturers sometimes providing notice only when an interruption is imminent or already underway. Regulators work to expand supply and authorize emergency measures. Hospitals ration existing inventories, identify substitute treatments, and postpone some outpatient or elective procedures. These actions help lessen the burden of active shortages, but they do not reduce the probability of future shortages. Under the current response model, the underlying causes remain largely unchanged.

Conclusion: Designing for Resilience

The evidence spanning decades of American public health points to a clear conclusion. America’s injectable drug shortage problem is not simply the result of unpredictable disasters or isolated failures. Shortages are the product of an economically fragile market that rewards efficiency while providing little incentive to invest in resilience or redundancy.

Manufacturing complexity, geographic concentration, limited production capacity, and aging infrastructure are not separate causes—they reinforce one another, creating multiple points of failure throughout the production chain and leaving hospitals with few alternatives when a shortage occurs. While policy responses help lessen the immediate consequences of medication shortages, they do relatively little to address the conditions that repeatedly produce them. The United States has become increasingly adept at responding to shortages after they begin, but it has not yet built a system capable of consistently preventing them.

Without substantial reform, manufacturers will continue to face incentives to cut costs, operate with minimal excess capacity, and defer investments whose public-health benefits are not reflected in market prices. By rewarding manufacturers for maintaining long-term contracts, redundant infrastructure, reserve manufacturing capacity, geographic diversification, and quality investments, American policymakers could begin to restore reliability to the pharmaceutical supply chain.

Instead of simply mitigating ongoing crises, policy should strengthen markets that are socially essential but economically unsustainable under current conditions. Equally important, manufacturers, regulators, and healthcare systems need to develop contingency plans and qualify backup suppliers before disruptions occur. With better visibility into geographically concentrated suppliers and other manufacturing vulnerabilities, companies and regulators could activate predetermined sourcing and production plans rather than improvising after a shortage begins.

Sterile injectables should not be treated merely as commercial assets, but as critical healthcare infrastructure necessary for the well-being of all Americans.

Hurricane Helene and the IV fluid shortage were not anomalies. They were warnings that brought national visibility to a problem the United States has faced for decades. Future disruptions may be inevitable; whether they become national crises will depend on America’s willingness to reform the structural weaknesses of pharmaceutical manufacturing before the next emergency begins.

About the Author

Audrey Levisay is a rising junior at Colgate University, studying the intersection of cultural anthropology, public health, implementation policy, and the social sciences. Levisay supports both the Simmons Center for Global Chicago and the Hale Strategic Resources Initiative as an undergraduate intern, contributing research on global health, international development, and public policy.

Footnotes

Editor’s Note: We are pleased to publish the first article in a series by Audrey Levisay, HSRI’s Simmons Center intern, on the fragility of America’s medical supply chains. Audrey begins with the 2024 IV fluid shortage, a crisis triggered by Hurricane Helene but rooted in a deeper problem: the lack of redundancy and resilience in the production of essential medical products. This series reflects HSRI’s broader focus on the critical materials, medicines, and technologies that support American economic and national security.

A Warning Hidden in Plain Sight

In the aftermath of Hurricane Helene, hospitals across the United States found themselves facing a new threat. The immediate problem was not a shortage of doctors, hospital beds, or emergency response capacity, but a quieter and more systemic threat: a fragile medical supply chain extending far beyond any coastline. One of the most basic tools of modern medicine, intravenous fluids, became almost impossible to acquire.

Intravenous fluids are an established practice in the medical field, so established that they often fall into the background. Whether it be routine hydration, administering anesthetic drugs, transporting necessary medications, or critical care for life-threatening illness, IV fluids are an essential tool for medical providers. From large hospitals and emergency rooms to outpatient clinics and oncology centers, modern medicine relies on a steady supply of sterile fluids. Disruptions to the supply chain can have catastrophic consequences for Americans of all health backgrounds.

Why IV Fluids Are Hard to Replace

Before an IV can even reach your arm, each unit passes through a series of complex and stringent manufacturing rules. As a sterile injectable, IV fluid is produced in a highly regulated capacity that meets a series of rigorous quality and safety standards implemented by the Food and Drug Administration. Manufacturing facilities require specialized equipment, dedicated production lines, and regulatory oversight. Unlike most commodities, production of IV fluids cannot simply be outsourced overnight when demand or disruption occurs. This manufacturing complexity is compounded by the relatively limited number of manufacturers in the United States. A significant portion of the country’s IV fluids comes from a handful of producers, creating a system in which disruption at a single facility can have national consequences.

When One Plant Becomes a National Vulnerability

The vulnerability of a condensed supply chain and limited contingency planning became tangible in September 2024, when Hurricane Helene devastated parts of North Carolina and the Southeast. Baxter International, responsible for 1.5 million IV bags daily and an estimated 60% of the American IV supply, was caught in the crossfire.1 Baxter’s North Cove manufacturing site, the largest in the United States, was subject to surge flooding on September 27, 2024.2 Baxter responded by shutting down production, coordinating with other manufacturers and the federal government, and implementing protective allocation processes in the market. 3

Despite Baxter’s efforts to stabilize supply, Helene’s impact extended far beyond September, into the following year and even today. 0.9% sodium chloride solution, “the most commonly used crystalloid solution worldwide,” remained in FDA shortage for over 10 months until August 2025, disrupting the supply chain and hospital operations.45

The shortage spread rapidly. Hospitals accustomed to receiving routine shipments of IV fluid found themselves confronting the uncertainty of whether their supplies would even arrive at all. In a Premier survey, 86% of healthcare respondents reported experiencing a shortage of IV fluids essential to daily operations.6 The same survey revealed that 88% of respondents claimed their hospitals received less than half of their typical order quantity, and 54% had less than 10 days of adequate fluid inventory in the hospital.7 Small providers were particularly vulnerable, often finding their orders completely unfulfilled, creating disproportionate impact for Americans living in rural areas.

Without adequate supplies, hospitals were forced to adapt. 78% of Premier respondents considered scheduling changes or completely postponed and canceled elective procedures and surgeries.8 Clinicians implemented conservation strategies, reserving IV fluids for medically emergent cases and shifting medication plans. Providers were forced to extend the use of their supplies, search for alternative products, and leave patients without beneficial hydration and medication strategies in the name of preservation. The shortage further produced secondary effects throughout the healthcare system. Reports emerged of gray-market distributors offering scarce products at significant markups, while providers devoted increasing amounts of time and resources to inventory management.9 What began as a disruption to IV fluid production quickly evolved into an operational challenge affecting nearly every aspect of patient care.

Faced with a growing crisis, regulators intervened. The FDA issued temporary measures designed to expand available supply, including permitting the importation of Baxter’s foreign-manufactured products and extending expiration dates on select IV fluid inventories.10 These actions provided short-term relief, but they also underscored a troubling reality: the healthcare system possessed few built-in safeguards capable of absorbing a disruption of this magnitude. Yet the most striking lesson of the FDA’s response was not what regulators did, but what they had to do. Emergency imports, extended expiration dates, and allocation protocols were never intended to serve as permanent safeguards for the healthcare system. Rather, they were temporary measures designed to compensate for a market suddenly deprived of one of its largest suppliers. The question raised by Helene extends beyond IV fluids alone. If a single storm could disrupt such a fundamental medical product for nearly a year, what does that suggest about the resilience of the broader healthcare supply chain?

A Pattern of Weather-Driven Disruption

Helene, although devastating, was not the first weather event to expose vulnerabilities in pharmaceutical manufacturing. In fact, it was only the latest in a growing series of disruptions affecting the production of critical medical products. What were once prime manufacturing locations with access to water are now plants susceptible to the realities of climate change-related weather events. In 2017, Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico, causing Baxter to lose power in 3 facilities, limiting manufacturing operations and efficiency. 11 That same year, Hurricane Irma wreaked havoc on the production of essential blood-thinning medication on the island, including 13 drugs that are exclusively manufactured in Puerto Rico.12

In 2018, as Hurricane Florence approached the Carolinas, Pfizer temporarily suspended operations at two manufacturing sites in North Carolina, including its sterile injectables facility in Rocky Mount.13 Five years later, that same Rocky Mount facility was struck by a tornado, damaging a site that Pfizer described as producing nearly 25% of the company’s sterile injectables used in US hospitals, equivalent to approximately 8% of total US hospital supply.14 15 The tornado did not create the same kind of prolonged national shortage as the Baxter disruption, but it triggered renewed concern among hospitals, distributors, and policymakers about how much of the sterile injectable supply depends on a limited number of large manufacturing sites.

Viewed together, these events suggest that disruptions once considered isolated incidents are becoming recurring stress tests for pharmaceutical supply resilience, and evidence of how little flexibility the system has to absorb disruption.

For many Americans, the shortage was their first glimpse into the hidden infrastructure that supports modern healthcare. An IV bag is often viewed as a simple medical product. Yet behind every bag sits a network of manufacturers, production facilities, transportation systems, regulators, and suppliers whose operations must function seamlessly every day.

Efficiency Without Resilience

While the prospect of limited medical supplies is harrowing, the true vulnerability revealed by shortages lies in the structure of the supply chain they disrupt. Time and time again, nature, manufacturing errors, regulations, and politics have proven just how easy it is to disrupt the delicately balanced medical supply chain. When a major pharmaceutical facility goes offline, production cannot simply be shifted elsewhere overnight. Sterile manufacturing requires specialized equipment, trained personnel, regulatory oversight, and available production capacity- resources that are often concentrated among only a handful of facilities. In a system with robust redundancy, disruptions would be absorbed through backup suppliers, reserve capacity, or alternative manufacturing sites. Instead, the IV fluid shortage demonstrated how quickly a localized event can become a national crisis when critical products depend on a limited number of manufacturers operating with little room for error.

The IV fluid crisis was not primarily caused by Hurricane Helene. Helene was merely the catalyst that exposed a healthcare supply chain already operating with little redundancy, minimal excess capacity, and heavy dependence on a small number of manufacturers. The resulting shortage highlights an underdeveloped system with limited ability to absorb disruption once it occurs.

From Fragility to Strength

The events of 2024 revealed how fragile the supply network can become when efficiency is prioritized over resilience. More importantly, shortages exposed a grim reality in medical manufacturing that extends far beyond IV fluids, and into a broader category of medicines known as sterile injectables- products that include chemotherapy drugs, anesthetics, antibiotics, emergency medications, and countless other treatments relied upon by hospitals every day.

The shortage of IV fluids in 2024 was a warning, not an isolated event. In Part II, I will examine why shortages of sterile injectable drugs have become a recurring feature of American healthcare, why experts have been raising alarms for more than a decade, and what reforms may be necessary to prevent the next crisis before it begins.

About the Author

Audrey Levisay is a rising junior at Colgate University, studying the intersection of cultural anthropology, public health, implementation policy, and the social sciences. Levisay supports both the Simmons Center for Global Chicago and the Hale Strategic Resources Initiative as an undergraduate intern, contributing research on global health, international development, and public policy.

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Further Reading

CIRSD, “A Biopharmaceutical Superpower? China’s Rise, Its Limits, and What Comes Next.”

Footnotes

In Northwest Indiana, the bargain between heavy industry and local communities has always been complicated. Steel mills brought noise, pollution, land-use conflict, environmental damage, and the daily reality of living beside the machinery of American industrial power. They also brought jobs, tax revenue, municipal borrowing capacity, ports, infrastructure, and a sense that local sacrifice served a larger national purpose, especially during World War II.

The steel corridor along Lake Michigan was not built in that location by accident. Bethlehem Steel purchased thousands of acres in Porter County and built what became the Burns Harbor steel plant, which began operations in 1964, one of the most important integrated steel facilities in the United States. The plant helped anchor the Port of Indiana and the incorporation of the Town of Burns Harbor. Decades later, Burns Harbor’s annexation of part of the steel property gave the town additional tax revenue and borrowing power, allowing it to purchase and share the Bethlehem sewage treatment plant with the mill.[1] The result was a familiar industrial bargain: local communities absorbed the burdens of heavy industry, in return for jobs and lower property taxes along the Indiana lakefront.

Burns Harbor has already confronted this question directly. In August 2024, the town’s Advisory Plan Commission considered a proposed technology district and data center rezoning. The minutes show residents raising concerns about building height, setbacks, noise, water pressure, power demand, fire protection, taxes, proximity to residential neighborhoods, and the Indiana Dunes National Park. One resident summarized the dilemma clearly: “Burns Harbor indeed became a town because of the steel mill, but further industrialization is not the only option before this commission and does not have to be your legacy to your community.”[2]

Data centers are the new steel mills. They are strategic, capital-intensive, power-hungry facilities whose importance extends far beyond the towns in which they are located. But unlike steel mills, they have arrived under the language of clean technology, cloud computing, and digital transformation. Communities have quickly begun to discover that these facilities behave less like office parks and more like industrial infrastructure. The comparison is not exact, but is useful.

Artificial intelligence is often described as weightless, digital, and borderless. It is none of those things. AI’s physical stack rests on electricity, water, land, semiconductors, cooling systems, fiber networks, backup power, transformers, and political permission.

Interconnected Capital’s new US Data Center Moratorium Tracker shows that the next bottleneck in the AI race may not be algorithms or venture capital, but the communities being asked to host the infrastructure of national power.[3]

❝ AI may seem weightless, but it depends on very physical infrastructure: land, electricity, cooling, fiber networks, construction and skilled trades. These are precisely the kinds of systems the Midwest was built to support. By locating AI infrastructure there, America can reconnect innovation with production rather than leaving the future concentrated only on the coasts. — Mark Roeder

The United States cannot win the AI race without building the physical infrastructure of AI. But if data centers are permitted as ordinary commercial real estate rather than strategic industrial infrastructure, the backlash will grow. Communities are not simply being anti-technology. They are asking a legitimate question: if data centers are essential to national competitiveness, why are the costs local and the benefits remote?

Ten Principles for the AI Industrial Compact

1. Data centers are not office parks. They are the factories of the AI age

The first mistake is conceptual. Data centers are often discussed as part of the digital economy, but their footprint is industrial. They are closer to steel mills, chemical plants, ports, rail hubs, and power stations than to suburban office parks.

Like steel mills, data centers require a supply chain. Instead of iron ore, coke, and lake ports, they need chips, servers, rare earths, copper, transformers, cooling systems, backup power, and fiber. Like steel mills, they require enormous fixed investment and they reshape the communities around them.

But the political bargain is weaker. Steel mills employed large numbers of people and created visible industrial ecosystems. Data centers require vast capital investment, but relatively few permanent workers once construction is complete. That does not mean they lack value. They are essential to cloud computing, AI development, cybersecurity, finance, logistics, healthcare, defense systems, and scientific research. But it does mean the local benefit is less obvious.

A town asked to host a steel plant could see the jobs, the port, the rail lines, the tax base, and the industrial identity. A town asked to host a data center may see higher electricity demand, construction traffic, humming equipment, water withdrawals, backup generators, and tax abatements, but not a comparable employment base. That asymmetry is at the heart of the backlash.

2. The data center revolt is a warning signal

Interconnected Capital’s tracker matters because it turns anecdotes and local news reporting into a map. Across the country, local governments are imposing moratoriums, considering restrictions, or rejecting proposed facilities. The tracker records municipal, county, and state-level construction bans and moratoriums affecting data center development, and other state-level analyses have found that local restrictions are gaining traction even as statewide moratorium bills have advanced more slowly.[3][4]

This is not simply a NIMBY problem; it is a legitimacy problem. The AI economy is being built faster than the civic bargain needed to sustain it. The politics are becoming bipartisan because the concerns are local and tangible: electricity bills, water use, land use, noise, grid reliability, tax subsidies, and distrust of large technology companies. A farmer worried about groundwater, a homeowner worried about noise, a retiree worried about electric bills, and a local official worried about emergency services may have very different politics, but they can all converge against a data center project.

Denver’s one-year data center moratorium, approved in May 2026, is a useful example of how quickly this issue has moved from specialized infrastructure policy into ordinary city politics. The stated concerns were not abstract hostility to technology, but water and energy demand, resource conservation, and community impact.[5]

3. The electricity issue is the central bottleneck

Data centers are becoming one of the most important new sources of electricity demand in the United States. The Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report found that US data centers consumed about 4.4% of total US electricity in 2023 and could consume 6.7% to 12% by 2028, depending on growth scenarios. The report also estimated that data center electricity use rose from 58 TWh in 2014 to 176 TWh in 2023 and could reach 325 to 580 TWh by 2028.[6] That is not a marginal load. It is a structural change in US electricity demand.

❝ The central energy challenge for the great AI data center expansion is not whether the US can supply the quantities of electricity needed, and importantly at the velocity needed, because the engineering and resource capabilities are more than sufficient. The central challenge resides in permissions and politics, and in breaking free from the shackles of a no-growth grid mindset. What that means is already in play; the market is overweight in pursuit of America’s astonishing capability to supply natural gas, and the use of every class of machine that can convert those molecules into electrons, from all classes of turbines and big engines to even gas-fired steam boilers.—Mark P Mills

For years, American electricity demand was relatively flat. The AI boom has arrived just as the grid is also being asked to support electrification, reshoring, electric vehicles, heat pumps, advanced manufacturing, and defense-related industrial production. Data centers are therefore competing for capacity in a system that is already under stress.

The political question is not whether data centers should have electricity. The question is: who pays for the generation, transmission, substations, transformers, backup systems, and reliability services needed to serve them?

If the answer is ordinary ratepayers, the backlash will intensify. A household should not be asked to subsidize the grid upgrades required by a hyperscale compute facility. Large-load customers should bring, contract for, or pay for the firm power and grid infrastructure they require. This principle is central to the HSRI policy framework:

4. Nuclear is a promising longer-term solution

The data center boom is already changing the politics of nuclear energy. Microsoft and Constellation signed a 20-year power purchase agreement tied to restarting Three Mile Island Unit 1, now renamed the Crane Clean Energy Center. Constellation has said the project could add approximately 835 MW of carbon-free power to the grid, subject to regulatory approvals.[7]

Google has also signed an agreement with Kairos Power to purchase nuclear energy from multiple small modular reactors, with a path to deploy up to 500 MW of advanced nuclear capacity by 2035.[8]

This is a major shift. For years, nuclear power was discussed largely in terms of climate policy, baseload electricity, and decarbonization. Now it is also being discussed in terms of AI competitiveness.

Data centers need reliable, round-the-clock electricity. Wind and solar can contribute, especially with storage and grid integration, but hyperscale AI loads require firm power. Nuclear, geothermal, hydro, gas with carbon capture, long-duration storage, and advanced grid management will all be part of the discussion.

But nuclear does not solve every problem. A nuclear-supplied data center still needs transmission, cooling, land, security, emergency planning, and public trust. Restarting a nuclear plant or building advanced reactors takes time, regulatory approval, financing, and local acceptance. Nuclear can be part of the answer, especially for firm clean power, but it cannot immediately solve siting, water, cost, and community consent issues.

5. Needed: A bridge over troubled waters

Electricity may be the dominant constraint, but water is often the issue that makes a data center politically toxic. Some data centers use evaporative cooling, which can reduce electricity use but consume significant water. Others use closed-loop, liquid, or air-cooling systems that can reduce water demand but increase power needs or capital cost. The right technology depends on climate, water stress, power availability, and the type of computing load.

The policy principle should be simple: data centers should not use scarce drinking water for private compute in water-stressed regions unless they meet strict standards, use recycled or non-potable water, or adopt water-minimizing cooling systems.

This is not anti-growth, it is basic resource realism. A data center in a water-abundant industrial corridor is different from a data center in a drought-prone region with stressed aquifers. A facility using recycled wastewater is different from one drawing potable water. A facility with transparent reporting is different from one whose water use is hidden behind confidentiality claims.

This is also why the Great Lakes region will become central to the data center debate. Water abundance may be a strategic advantage, but it is not a blank check. Communities that steward one of the world’s most important freshwater systems will expect transparency, conservation, and enforceable limits.[9]

6. Noise and land use turn abstract AI concerns into daily life

Noise may sound like a minor issue compared with electricity and water, but it is often what turns local concern into organized opposition. Cooling systems, fans, transformers, generators, and construction activity can affect nearby residents in a direct and continuous way.

Data centers can also change land-use patterns. A project may be proposed near homes, schools, farms, wetlands, or conservation areas because the site has access to transmission or fiber. The developer sees infrastructure. Residents see disruption.

This is where higher, clearer standards could prevent unnecessary conflict. Setbacks, acoustic design, sound walls, generator-testing limits, real-time monitoring, landscaping, building design, and enforceable penalties should be part of the permitting process.

7. The Midwest should not miss the AI opportunity, but it should not accept a bad bargain

For Hale Strategic, the Midwest angle is essential. The old industrial Midwest already has many of the assets the AI economy needs: power infrastructure, water access in some regions, rail and port corridors, brownfields, engineering talent, manufacturing capacity, universities, and a history of hosting strategic industry.

This creates a major opportunity. Former steel sites, retired coal plants, nuclear-adjacent sites, brownfields, industrial parks, and underused manufacturing corridors could become preferred locations for the infrastructure of the AI age. As Mark Roeder argues, the opportunity is not merely to host data centers, but to build an AI industrial ecosystem around them, linking compute infrastructure to robotics, advanced manufacturing, power equipment, university research, technical training, and skilled trades. Done well, the Midwest would not become another Silicon Valley. It would become the industrial backbone of the AI age.

But this should not mean a race to the bottom. If communities compete by offering tax abatements, cheap power, weak water rules, and minimal disclosure, they may win the project but lose the public. The better Midwest strategy is to offer speed and certainty in exchange for standards and benefits, including jobs and training.

A data center that locates on a brownfield industrial site, pays for its grid upgrades, uses non-potable or recycled water, meets noise standards, contributes to local tax revenue, and supports workforce development should move quickly through permitting. A data center that shifts costs to ratepayers, hides water use, demands abatements, and creates few local benefits including employment should not. A new industrial compact is being formulated in the shadows of closed factories and broken promises.

8. The community benefit model should be rebuilt for strategic infrastructure

The Northwest Indiana example points toward a practical solution. Communities will accept industrial burdens when they believe the benefits are real, local, and lasting. For data centers, that means moving beyond vague promises of innovation and economic development. Host communities should receive a clear bargain.

That bargain should include:

• A local tax floor so data centers do not erase their public benefit through excessive abatements.

• Ratepayer protection so households and small businesses do not pay for hyperscale grid upgrades.

• Water transparency with public reporting of withdrawals, consumption, source, and recycling.

• Noise standards with enforceable limits and independent monitoring.

• Infrastructure contributions for roads, substations, emergency services, water systems, and broadband.

• Workforce commitments tied to local technical colleges, electricians, engineers, cybersecurity programs, and operations jobs.

• Clawbacks if promised investment, tax revenue, or community benefits do not materialize.

• Cybersecurity and resilience standards, especially for facilities supporting critical infrastructure, healthcare, finance, defense, or government functions.

This should not be framed as an industrial penalty but as as a condition of political legitimacy and support.

9. A national law may be necessary, but federal override would be a mistake

The national security argument for data center buildout is real. The United States cannot lead in AI without domestic compute capacity. If local moratoriums continue to spread, the cumulative effect could weaken US competitiveness, slow AI deployment, raise costs, and push infrastructure into less suitable locations.

But a blunt federal override of local authority would likely deepen mistrust. It would confirm the fear that communities are being asked to absorb costs for the benefit of distant technology companies and national-security planners.

A better approach would be a federal-state-local compact. The federal government should set baseline standards for energy transparency, water reporting, cybersecurity, grid-cost allocation, and critical infrastructure resilience. It should support nuclear, geothermal, storage, transmission, transformer production, and advanced cooling technologies. It should also identify preferred strategic infrastructure zones, especially brownfields, retired coal sites, nuclear-adjacent areas, military-adjacent secure compute zones, and industrial corridors.

States should create fast-track permitting for projects that meet these standards. They should prevent indefinite moratoriums from becoming disguised bans, but they should also protect residents from cost-shifting and poor siting.

Local governments should retain meaningful authority over land use, setbacks, noise, emergency planning, community benefits, and design. Local consent should not be performative, it should be structured. The bargain should be: better standards, faster approvals.

While US data center development is increasingly shaped by local moratoriums, zoning disputes, water concerns, and ratepayer politics, China is moving in the opposite direction: treating compute as a national infrastructure priority.

10. Technology is part of the solution, but not the whole solution

Improved technology can reduce the burden. More efficient chips, advanced liquid cooling, waterless systems, heat reuse, battery storage, AI-driven load shifting, modular nuclear, geothermal power, and grid-enhancing technologies can all help.

But technology alone will not solve the political problem. A quieter, more efficient data center can still raise electricity prices if grid costs are socialized. A nuclear-powered facility can still face opposition if it receives tax breaks without local benefits. A water-efficient project can still fail if residents believe the process was opaque.

The United States needs better technology, but it also needs better governance. This is the larger lesson for AI policy. The race is not only about who builds the best model. It is about who can build the physical, institutional, and civic infrastructure to sustainably support the model at scale.

Conclusion: From backlash to bargain

The United States does not lack capital, engineers, or ambition. What it increasingly lacks is a credible process for building strategic infrastructure in places where people actually live. In the Midwest, which is an ideal location from a logistical and resource standpoint, there is also history within living memory of industrial policies and practices that did lasting, quantifiable harm to communities and workers. Local concerns need a social and political, not just economic compact:

The data center backlash is not a rejection of AI. It is a warning that the AI economy is being built faster than the civic bargain needed to sustain it. Northwest Indiana’s steel towns offer a useful lesson. Communities will tolerate industrial burdens when they believe the benefits are real, local, and lasting.

Data centers are the new steel. They are the factories of the AI age. They will shape American competitiveness, defense capacity, scientific research, healthcare systems, financial markets, and the future of work. But they are not weightless. They require power, water, minerals, land, cooling, chips, and trust.

AI sovereignty depends on resource sovereignty. And resource sovereignty depends on whether America can build again without breaking faith with the communities asked to host the future. Especially in the Midwest, the promises of globalization were not kept. Trust was broken, and must be rebuilt as the US competes with China, whose government can build strategic infrastructure without asking for the consent of the communities affected by it. That is not a model to emulate, but it is a competitive reality the United States must answer in its own democratic way.

Footnotes & Sources

[1] Indiana Historical Bureau, Legacy of Steel / Burns Harbor Steel Plant, State of Indiana. The historical marker notes that Bethlehem Steel purchased 3,300 acres in Porter County, began Burns Harbor operations in 1964, helped spur the creation of the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore in 1966, and was key to building the Port of Indiana and incorporating the Town of Burns Harbor in 1967. See also Town of Burns Harbor, Local History, which notes that the town’s 1998 annexation of about 1,000 acres of the Burns Harbor plant increased tax revenue and borrowing power, enabling the purchase of the Bethlehem sewage treatment plant in 2001.
https://www.in.gov/history/state-historical-markers/find-a-marker/find-historical-markers-by-county/indiana-historical-markers-by-county/legacy-of-steel-burns-harbor-steel-plant/
https://www.burnsharbor-in.gov/203/Local-History

[2] Town of Burns Harbor, Advisory Plan Commission Minutes of Monday, August 5, 2024, approved September 9, 2024. The minutes record discussion of a proposed data center/technology district, including concerns over building height, setbacks, noise, water pressure, power demand, fire protection, taxes, proximity to residential neighborhoods, and nearby Indiana Dunes National Park.
https://www.burnsharbor-in.gov/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Minutes/_08052024-906

[3] Interconnected Capital, US Data Center Moratorium Tracker — 2026, accessed May 19, 2026. The tracker maps municipal, county, and state-level construction bans and moratoriums affecting data center development in the United States.
https://www.interconnectedcapital.com/research/data-center-moratoriums

[4] MultiState, State Data Center Moratoriums Stall Despite Local Success, March 13, 2026. MultiState reported that state-level data center moratorium bills had been introduced in 11 states in 2026, while local construction bans were gaining more traction.
https://www.multistate.us/insider/2026/3/13/local-data-center-regulations-gain-ground-as-state-bills-falter

[5] Axios Denver, Denver passes one-year data center moratorium, May 19, 2026. Axios reported that Denver’s City Council approved a one-year moratorium on new data center developments and construction amid concerns over water and energy demand.
https://www.axios.com/local/denver/2026/05/19/denver-data-center-moratorium-approved

[6] Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley Lab Report Evaluates Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, January 15, 2025; see also US Department of Energy, DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, December 20, 2024. The report found that US data centers consumed about 4.4% of total US electricity in 2023 and could consume 6.7% to 12% by 2028.
https://newscenter.lbl.gov/2025/01/15/berkeley-lab-report-evaluates-increase-in-electricity-demand-from-data-centers/
https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-new-report-evaluating-increase-electricity-demand-data-centers

[7] Constellation Energy, Constellation to Launch Crane Clean Energy Center, Restoring Jobs and Carbon-Free Power to The Grid, September 20, 2024. Constellation announced a 20-year power purchase agreement with Microsoft to restart Three Mile Island Unit 1 as the Crane Clean Energy Center, adding approximately 835 MW of carbon-free energy to the grid, subject to regulatory approvals.
https://www.constellationenergy.com/news/2024/Constellation-to-Launch-Crane-Clean-Energy-Center-Restoring-Jobs-and-Carbon-Free-Power-to-The-Grid.html

[8] Google, New nuclear clean energy agreement with Kairos Power, October 14, 2024. Google announced an agreement to purchase nuclear energy from multiple small modular reactors to be developed by Kairos Power, with the first reactor targeted by 2030 and additional deployments through 2035, enabling up to 500 MW of 24/7 carbon-free power.
https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/sustainability/google-kairos-power-nuclear-energy-agreement/

[9] Crain’s Chicago Business Forum: This piece is useful background for the emerging debate over whether the Great Lakes region’s freshwater access could become a strategic advantage for data center development, and why water abundance still requires governance, transparency, and public trust. AI’s Expanding Footprint comes with a big thirst for water

[10] Trivium China, Ding Xuexiang Tours Data Centers to Push Compute Buildout, May 19, 2026. Trivium reported that Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang toured data centers in Beijing, Hebei, and Inner Mongolia to push China’s National Unified Computing Power Network, and that Inner Mongolia plans RMB 731.1 billion in computing infrastructure investment and accounts for roughly 17% of China’s national AI compute capacity.
https://triviumchina.com/2026/05/19/ding-xuexiang-tours-data-centers-to-push-compute-buildout/

If you have an interest in energy security, you will enjoy the discussion that took place on March 19, 2026 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Executive Director Mark P Mills, Executive Director of the National Center for Energy Analytics, discusses the newly launched NCEA U.S. Energy Security Index (ESI) and what it reveals about America’s energy resilience. Mark also serves on the board of the Hale Strategic Resources Initiative.

The key question: is the US is becoming more secure or less exposed in an increasingly volatile global system?

My take: you cannot improve anything you cannot measure, and energy is foundational to everything else. This index is a major contribution to US efforts to create resiliency and security throughout our economy.

Lyric Hughes Hale

Founder & Chair

Australia’s Identified Mineral Resources 2025

Publisher: Geoscience Australia, Australian Government
Portfolio: Department of Industry, Science and Resources
Minister: The Hon. Madeleine King, MP – Minister for Resources & Northern Australia

Full report: https://www.ga.gov.au/aimr2025

Why this report matters

Australia remains one of the most important democratic suppliers of critical minerals and strategic resources in the world. The 2025 edition of Australia’s Identified Mineral Resources (AIMR) provides a comprehensive snapshot of the country’s mineral reserves, production trends, and global ranking across key commodities essential to advanced manufacturing, energy systems, and defense technologies.

As global supply chains reorganize around security and resilience rather than pure efficiency, Australia’s geological endowment and stable regulatory environment position it as a cornerstone supplier for the United States and its allies. Lithium, rare earth elements, tungsten, vanadium, and other strategic materials highlighted in this report are fundamental inputs for batteries, semiconductors, aerospace systems, and next-generation infrastructure.

HSRI is posting this report as part of its developing Strategic Resource Library — a curated reference collection of government and industry materials relevant to critical minerals, industrial policy, and supply-chain resilience.

Selected 2024 Industry Highlights

• Mineral resource exports continue to be dominated by iron ore (41%), coal (28%), and gold (12%)

• Australia ranks number one globally in resources of gold, iron ore, lead, rutile, uranium, vanadium, zinc, zircon and ilmenite

• Tungsten production increased by more than 90% and molybdenum by 59%

• Tantalum production rose 26% and tin 14%

• Lithium production increased 14%, platinum group elements 12%, and rare earth elements 7%

These trends underscore Australia’s expanding role not only as a bulk commodities exporter, but as a primary supplier of the specialized minerals required for electrification, advanced manufacturing, and defense supply chains.

About the Minister

The Hon. Madeleine King serves as Australia’s Minister for Resources and Minister for Northern Australia. A Western Australia MP elected in 2016, she has overseen Australia’s resources portfolio since 2022 and is a leading advocate for strengthening allied supply chains in critical minerals and energy. Her portfolio plays a central role in positioning Australia as a reliable supplier of strategic resources to global partners amid accelerating geopolitical and industrial change.

Filed under:
Strategic Resource Library | Australia | Critical Minerals | Supply Chains

This calendar is not exhaustive. It is strategic, and it is evolving. Please let us know if you have any suggestions for additional event listings.

Overview

January 2026

The year opens with a dense concentration of investment, policy, and technology convenings. Mining and critical minerals discussions are anchored by the Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada Convention in Toronto, alongside the Future Minerals Forum in Riyadh and the SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, DC. Supply chain geopolitics come into focus at the Atlantic Council’s convening on Taiwan’s critical role in global supply chains and the future of U.S.–Taiwan ties.

Technology and compute discussions accelerate with CES in Las Vegas, the AI+ Expo hosted by the Special Competitive Studies Project in Washington, DC, and the SNIA Data Analytics Innovation Summit. Energy and industrial systems feature prominently at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos. Healthcare manufacturing and capital allocation set the tone for the year at the J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference in San Francisco.

February 2026

February emphasizes state-level coordination, security, and industrial resilience. The U.S. Department of State hosts the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, bringing allied governments together around supply chain security. Mining Indaba in Cape Town concentrates global attention on African resource development and investment.

Science and policy converge at the AAAS Annual Meeting, while geopolitical risk and strategic alignment dominate discussions at the Munich Security Conference. Semiconductor manufacturing and AI scale are addressed at SEMICON Korea and the India AI Impact Summit. Energy ministers convene in Paris for the International Energy Agency Ministerial Meeting. Healthcare manufacturing capacity and advanced therapies are highlighted at the Advanced Therapies Congress in London.

March 2026

March centers on capital-intensive systems and infrastructure. Extended programming around PDAC continues in Toronto, while the Mining & Critical Minerals Korea Conference in Seoul reflects Asia’s role in downstream processing and materials security.

Energy and industrial systems take center stage at CERAWeek by S&P Global in Houston. Nuclear policy and deployment are addressed at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Energy Conference in Vienna. Healthcare systems and manufacturing are covered at the HIMSS Global Health Conference in Chicago and INTERPHEX in New York City. Science and institutional coordination continue at the National Academies Science & Technology Forum in Washington, DC.

April 2026

April shifts toward global governance and long-term financing frameworks. The IMF–World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC set the macroeconomic and development finance context. Energy system innovation and constraints are debated at the World Hydrogen Summit in Rotterdam. Semiconductor roadmaps and production risk are outlined at the TSMC Technology Symposium. Vaccine manufacturing and public–private coordination are addressed at the World Vaccine Congress in Washington, DC, alongside science policy discussions at the AAAS Policy Fellowship Forum.

May 2026

May brings a focus on production, logistics, and partnerships. Mining capital markets and Australian resource strategy are highlighted at the Diggers & Dealers Mining Forum in Kalgoorlie. Energy infrastructure and offshore systems dominate the Offshore Technology Conference in Houston. Semiconductor manufacturing ecosystems are addressed at SEMICON Southeast Asia in Singapore. Pharmaceutical manufacturing and global supply chains come together at the BIO International Convention and DCAT Week in New York.

June 2026

June emphasizes materials, energy security, and manufacturing scale. The World Gas Conference underscores the strategic role of gas in global energy systems. Metals markets and physical supply chains converge during LME Asia Week in Hong Kong. Hardware, chips, and system integration are featured at Computex Taipei. Pharmaceutical supply chains and API production are central to CPHI China in Shanghai. Science diplomacy and institutional coordination continue at the AAAS Global Science Policy Forum in Washington, DC.

July 2026

July highlights energy geopolitics, defense technology, and advanced systems. Global energy coordination is discussed at the OPEC International Seminar in Vienna. Defense, AI, and frontier technologies are examined at the DARPA Tech Futures Conference. Nuclear innovation and next-generation reactor systems are addressed at the IAEA Fast Reactors Conference, also in Vienna. The Australian American Leadership Dialogue holds it annual forum in Washington, DC.

August 2026

August bridges macroeconomics, energy, and technology. Critical minerals and the energy transition are discussed at the Critical Minerals & Energy Transition Conference and Exhibition in Sydney. Semiconductor design and performance take center stage at the Hot Chips Conference at Stanford. Broader economic and energy implications are debated at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium.

September 2026

September is defined by global governance and multilateral coordination. Heads of state and ministers convene in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. Climate finance and energy policy discussions intensify during Climate Week NYC. Mining and materials strategy are addressed at the Critical Minerals Conference in Brisbane, hosted by the Australasian Institute of Mining & Metallurgy. Global pharmaceutical manufacturing networks reconvene at CPHI Worldwide in Europe.

October 2026

October concentrates financial governance, energy systems, and industrial infrastructure. The IMF–World Bank Annual Meetings frame global fiscal and monetary conditions. Energy producers and industrial players gather at ADIPEC in Abu Dhabi. Mining and processing leadership converge in Cape Town for African Mining Week and the International Mineral Processing Congress. Nuclear industry stakeholders meet in Paris at the World Nuclear Exhibition. Applied pharmaceutical science and scale-up are addressed at AAPS PharmSci 360, while science policy leaders convene at the National Academies Annual Forum in Washington, DC.

November 2026

November brings together markets, technology governance, and climate negotiations. Commodity flows and mining finance are discussed at the International Commodity Summit in Cape Town, Mining Tech North America in Vancouver, and Mines and Money London. Semiconductor manufacturing and equipment suppliers convene at SEMICON Europa in Munich. AI governance is addressed at the Global AI Safety Summit. Climate diplomacy culminates at COP31, the UN Climate Conference.

December 2026

The year concludes with long-horizon planning and institutional reflection. Energy systems and transition pathways are debated at the World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi. Ethical and governance dimensions of artificial intelligence are examined at the IEEE AI & Ethics Conference. Global coordination on pharmaceutical production and resilience is addressed at the World Health Organization’s Global Forum on Medical Product Supply Chains. Science policy leaders close the year at the AAAS Year-End Science Policy Forum in Washington, DC.

Listing of Events

JANUARY 2026

CES – Consumer Electronics Show
January 6–9, 2026 | Las Vegas, USA
https://www.ces.tech/

J.P. Morgan Healthcare Conference
January 12–15, 2026 | San Francisco, USA
https://www.jpmorgan.com/healthcareconference

World Economic Forum Annual Meeting
January 19–23, 2026 | Davos, Switzerland
https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2026

PDAC – Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada Convention
January 26–29, 2026 | Toronto, Canada
https://www.pdac.ca/convention

SNIA Data Analytics Innovation Summit
January 27–28, 2026 | Phoenix, USA
https://www.snia.org/

Taiwan’s Critical Role in Global Supply Chains and the Future of U.S.–Taiwan Ties (Atlantic Council)
January 28, 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/taiwans-critical-role-in-global-supply-chains-and-the-future-of-us-taiwan-ties/

Future Minerals Forum
January 2026 | Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
https://www.futuremineralsforum.com/

AI+ Expo (Special Competitive Studies Project)
January 2026 | Washington, DC
https://scsp.ai/events/

SelectUSA Investment Summit
January 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.selectusasummit.us/

FEBRUARY 2026

Mining Indaba
February 9–12, 2026 | Cape Town, South Africa
https://www.miningindaba.com/

SEMICON Korea
February 11–13, 2026 | Seoul, South Korea
https://www.semiconkorea.org/

AAAS Annual Meeting
February 12–14, 2026 | Phoenix, USA
https://www.aaas.org/meetings

Critical Minerals Ministerial (U.S. Department of State)
February 4, 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.state.gov/

Munich Security Conference
February 2026 | Munich, Germany
https://securityconference.org/

IEA Ministerial Meeting
February 18–19, 2026 | Paris, France
https://www.iea.org/

India AI Impact Summit
February 2026 | India
https://www.indiaai.gov.in/

Advanced Therapies Congress
February 2026 | London, United Kingdom
https://www.advancedtherapies.com/

MARCH 2026

PDAC – Extended Programming and Investor Week
March 1–4, 2026 | Toronto, Canada
https://www.pdac.ca/convention

CERAWeek by S&P Global
March 9–13, 2026 | Houston, USA
https://www.ceraweek.com/

HIMSS Global Health Conference
March 16–19, 2026 | Chicago, USA
https://www.himss.org/global-conference

INTERPHEX
March 2026 | New York City, USA
https://www.interphex.com/

IAEA Nuclear Energy Conference
March 2026 | Vienna, Austria
https://www.iaea.org/events

Mining & Critical Minerals Korea Conference
March 26, 2026 | Seoul, South Korea
https://www.kotra.or.kr/

National Academies Science & Technology Forum
March 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.nationalacademies.org/events

APRIL 2026

IMF–World Bank Spring Meetings
April 13–19, 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.imf.org/en/Meetings

World Hydrogen Summit
April 20–22, 2026 | Rotterdam, Netherlands
https://www.worldhydrogensummit.com/

TSMC Technology Symposium
April 2026 | Global

https://www.tsmc.com/

World Vaccine Congress Washington
April 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.terrapinn.com/exhibition/world-vaccine-congress-washington/

AAAS Policy Fellowship Forum
April 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.aaas.org/

MAY 2026

Offshore Technology Conference (OTC)
May 4–7, 2026 | Houston, USA
https://www.otcnet.org/

Diggers & Dealers Mining Forum
May 2026 | Kalgoorlie, Australia
https://www.diggersndealers.com.au/

SEMICON Southeast Asia
May 19–21, 2026 | Singapore
https://www.semiconsea.com/

BIO International Convention
May 2026 | USA
https://www.bio.org/events/bio-international-convention

DCAT Week
May 2026 | New York City, USA
https://www.dcat.org/dcat-week

JUNE 2026

Computex Taipei
June 2–6, 2026 | Taipei, Taiwan
https://www.computextaipei.com.tw/

World Gas Conference
June 2026 | TBA
https://www.wgc2026.com/

LME Asia Week
June 2026 | Hong Kong

https://www.lme.com/

CPHI China
June 2026 | Shanghai, China
https://www.cphi.com/asia/

AAAS Global Science Policy Forum
June 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.aaas.org/

JULY 2026

OPEC International Seminar
July 2026 | Vienna, Austria
https://www.opec.org/

DARPA Tech Futures Conference
July 2026 | USA
https://www.darpa.mil/events

IAEA Fast Reactors Conference
July 2026 | Vienna, Austria
https://www.iaea.org/events

The Australian American Leadership Dialogue (Annual Forum)
July 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.aald.org

AUGUST 2026

Critical Minerals & Energy Transition Conference and Exhibition
August 11, 2026 | Sydney, Australia
https://www.australiaminerals.org.au/

Hot Chips Conference
August 23–25, 2026 | Stanford, USA
https://hotchips.org/

Jackson Hole Economic Symposium
August 2026 | Wyoming, USA
https://www.kansascityfed.org/

SEPTEMBER 2026

UN General Assembly (UNGA 81)
September 15–29, 2026 | New York, USA
https://www.un.org/unga

Climate Week NYC
September 21–25, 2026 | New York, USA
https://www.climateweeknyc.org/

Critical Minerals Conference (AusIMM)
September 2026 | Brisbane, Australia
https://www.ausimm.com/

CPHI Worldwide
September 2026 | Europe
https://www.cphi.com/

OCTOBER 2026

IMF–World Bank Annual Meetings
October 12–18, 2026 | TBA
https://www.worldbank.org/en/events

ADIPEC
October 5–8, 2026 | Abu Dhabi, UAE
https://www.adipec.com/

African Mining Week
October 14–16, 2026 | Cape Town, South Africa
https://www.africanminingweek.com/

International Mineral Processing Congress
October 18–22, 2026 | Cape Town, South Africa
https://www.impc2026.org/

World Nuclear Exhibition
October 2026 | Paris, France
https://www.world-nuclear-exhibition.com/

AAPS PharmSci 360
October 2026 | USA
https://www.aaps.org/PharmSci360

National Academies Annual Forum
October 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.nationalacademies.org/events

NOVEMBER 2026

International Commodity Summit
November 2026 | Cape Town, South Africa
https://www.commoditysummit.com/

Mining Tech North America
November 17–18, 2026 | Vancouver, Canada
https://miningtechnorthamerica.com/

Mines and Money London
November 2026 | London, United Kingdom
https://www.minesandmoney.com/

SEMICON Europa
November 17–20, 2026 | Munich, Germany
https://www.semiconeuropa.org/

Global AI Safety Summit
November 2026 | TBA
https://www.gov.uk/

COP31 – UN Climate Conference
November 2026 | TBA
https://unfccc.int/

DECEMBER 2026

World Future Energy Summit
December 2026 | Abu Dhabi, UAE
https://www.worldfutureenergysummit.com/

IEEE AI & Ethics Conference
December 2026 | TBA
https://www.ieee.org/

WHO Global Forum on Medical Product Supply Chains
December 2026 | TBA
https://www.who.int/

AAAS Year-End Science Policy Forum
December 2026 | Washington, DC
https://www.aaas.org/

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February includes nuclear-relevant deliberations alongside the International Energy Agency Ministerial Meeting in Paris, where nuclear power is discussed within broader energy security and decarbonization frameworks.

March centers on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Energy Conference in Vienna, bringing together governments, utilities, and technology providers to discuss advanced reactors, grid integration, and long-term deployment strategies.

July features the IAEA Fast Reactors Conference in Vienna, focused on next-generation reactor technologies, fuel cycles, and safety frameworks.

October includes the World Nuclear Exhibition in Paris, the largest global gathering of the civil nuclear industry, spanning reactor vendors, fuel suppliers, regulators, and industrial partners.

December concludes with nuclear policy discussions continuing within broader energy and science forums, including year-end international energy and technology convenings.

For most of history, sovereignty meant controlling land, borders and armies. In the 21st century, it increasingly means controlling something else: the intelligence that runs your society.

Artificial intelligence is no longer a niche technology. It is rapidly becoming the decision layer of modern life: embedded in healthcare, finance, policing, welfare, logistics, energy systems, education and defence. Within a decade, AI will quietly shape how governments govern, how economies function, and how citizens experience the world.

And yet most countries are handing that power, by default, to foreign corporations operating under foreign laws, trained on foreign data, and optimised for foreign commercial interests.

That is not innovation. That is dependency.

AI as Critical National Infrastructure

Every country should be developing its own sovereign AI capability; not as a nationalist gesture, but as a basic act of self-preservation.

AI is becoming critical national infrastructure, even if governments are reluctant to admit it. No serious state would outsource its power grid, its military command systems, or its central bank to a foreign entity. Yet this is effectively what is happening with AI. The algorithms that increasingly determine who gets a loan, who is flagged for investigation, which information is promoted or suppressed, and how resources are allocated are largely built and controlled elsewhere. AI is becoming infrastructure, but invisible infrastructure, and that makes it more dangerous, not less. If you do not control the intelligence layer of your society, you do not fully control your society.

The Myth of Benign Dependence

There is a comforting illusion that globalisation makes sovereignty obsolete, that interdependence is always benign, and that relying on global tech giants is simply “efficient.” Recent history tells a different story. Energy shocks, supply chain collapses, semiconductor shortages, export controls, sanctions and technology bans have all revealed the same truth: deep dependency creates vulnerability. Think European dependency on Russian gas before the Ukraine war. AI will be no different, except that AI is not just hardware or software. It is cognition. It is decision-making. It is influence. A country that relies entirely on foreign AI exposes itself to service withdrawal in times of political tension, subtle manipulation of information flows, legal exposure through foreign jurisdictions, strategic blindness if systems are restricted, and the steady extraction of value offshore. Cooperation is healthy. Dependency is not. Sovereign AI is about restoring balance.

AI is Not Neutral

Another uncomfortable truth is that AI is not neutral. These systems embed assumptions about what is acceptable, what is harmful, what is normal and what is important. When countries import AI wholesale, they are importing someone else’s values. This matters. Do we really want our legal norms, cultural sensitivities and social boundaries quietly shaped by models trained elsewhere, under different political systems and social contracts? Sovereign AI is not about nationalism. It is about cultural agency. It allows societies to embed their own ethical frameworks, legal standards and democratic values into the systems that increasingly mediate daily life. If governments do not do this deliberately, it will happen accidentally - and not in their favor.

Data Sovereignty is Power Sovereignty

AI runs on data, and data is power. Today, vast volumes of national data - health records, education data, consumer behaviour, government interactions - are flowing into foreign platforms. Once that data leaves a country, so does leverage. It becomes subject to other legal systems, other intelligence regimes and other commercial incentives. Sovereign AI goes hand in hand with data sovereignty: keeping critical data under national law, national security frameworks and national oversight. This is not about closing borders. It is about preventing quiet digital colonisation.

The Economic Stakes

The economic dimension is just as stark. The next wave of productivity, automation and wealth concentration will be AI-driven. Countries that own their AI capability will build high-value industries, retain intellectual property, create domestic tech champions, export specialised AI services and shape global standards. Countries that do not will become permanent consumers. They will supply data, import intelligence, and operate at the low-margin end of the value chain. This is not theoretical. We have seen this pattern before with manufacturing, with platforms, with semiconductors. AI will amplify it. If governments want economic sovereignty - not just growth, but control over growth - they must invest in domestic AI capability now.

Sovereign AI is Not About Scale

Many smaller and mid-sized countries tell themselves they are too small to compete with the United States or China. That is true, and irrelevant. Sovereign AI does not mean building everything from scratch. It means controlling critical layers, hosting sensitive systems domestically, customising global models for local use, building talent pipelines, owning strategic use cases and having fallback capability. Even small nations can do this if they are focused and serious. In fact, smaller nations often have more to lose from dependence, not less.

The Geopolitics of AI Are Already Here

The geopolitics of AI are already here. The United States treats AI as a national security priority. China is pursuing full-stack AI autonomy (i.e. every layer of the AI infrastructure). Europe is building sovereign models. The United Kingdom has created dedicated AI taskforces. South Korea is investing tens of billions into AI independence. These are not tech projects. They are strategic moves. Countries that fail to respond will not remain neutral. They will become exposed.

The Choice Ahead

Every nation now faces a clear choice. Build sovereign AI capability, or accept digital dependence. There is no stable middle ground. You can collaborate. You can partner. You can use global tools. But if you do not have your own capability, your own infrastructure, your own talent base and your own governance framework, you are not sovereign in the AI age. You are a customer. And customers do not set the terms.

Power, Control, and the Future of Statehood

At its core, this is not an AI debate. It is a power debate. Who decides. Who controls. Who benefits. Who is vulnerable. AI will mediate human agency at scale. It will shape behavior, perception, productivity and security. Nations that do not control it will be shaped by it. Nations that do control it will shape others. That is the reality.

The window is closing. The worst time to build sovereign capability is after a crisis, after access is cut, after dependence is entrenched. The best time is now, while there is still room to build, partner, shape and invest.

Sovereign AI is not a luxury. It is not a prestige project. It is not optional. It is becoming the new foundation of statehood.

And the countries that understand this early will quietly secure their futures - while others will one day wonder how they lost control of something so fundamental.

About Mark Roeder

econVue

Mark Roeder

Mark Roeder focuses on the impact of technology—especially artificial intelligence—on human behavior and society. Head of Global Strategy at Hale Strategic, and a Board Member of Hale Strategic Resources Initia…

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2 years ago · 1 like

The idea that the United States can quickly “transition” away from hydrocarbons—the petroleum, natural gas, and coal that today are the dominant fuels for society—to a future dominated by so-called green technologies has become one of the central political divides of our time. It is, fundamentally, a claim that depends on understanding the nature and limits of technology.

Policy Cannot Override Physical Reality

While policymakers can mandate or subsidize favored technologies, neither policy nor political aspiration can make the impossible possible. It’s not just that currently over 80 percent of our energy needs are met directly by burning hydrocarbons—a share that has declined by only a few percentage points over the past several decades; the key fact is that 100 percent of everything in modern society, including the favored “green energy” machines themselves, depends on using hydrocarbons somewhere in the supply chains and systems. The scale of today’s green policy interventions is unprecedented, targeting the fuels that anchor the affordability and availability of everything.

The Costs of Electrification at Scale

Claims that an energy transition is feasible are anchored in proposing to accelerate electrification of end uses, and the collateral and radical expansion in the use of wind and solar electricity to supply the necessary electricity. The core challenge in that idea is that delivering reliable 24–7 electricity using episodic power sources (wind and solar) unavoidably necessitates both significantly over-building generation (to supply extra energy for storage when systems are operating) along with astonishing quantities of energy-storage. The combination of these two requirements leads to a doubling or tripling of delivered energy costs compared with conventional power.

Mining, Materials, and Supply-Chain Constraints

Wind and solar machines, along with the batteries needed, also requires a far greater quantity of metals and minerals needed to build machines compared to the machines that burn hydrocarbons. A seminal paper from the International Energy Agency estimated a fourfold to 40-fold increase in global mining would be needed for a variety of common energy minerals. An analysis from Yale looked at a suite of 15 rare minerals required for “full decarbonization” and reached similar conclusions: the supply of various key minerals would have to increase by factors of 60 to 300. A Platts analysis of copper—the pillar of electrification and green tech, and essential for much else—found that pursing an energy transition would, within a few years, leave the world short of copper, and that shortage would expand to levels in the tens of megatons within the decade. Meeting new minerals demands is constrained by a well-established fact: the 10-to-15-year lead times to find and bring online new mines.

Why China’s Role Matters

The relevance of mining is highlighted by how minerals themselves now constitute more than half the cost of building solar modules and lithium batteries. That means the future costs of such hardware are firmly in the hands of global miners and minerals refiners, a domain in which China holds clear supremacy.

Innovation Has Limits

But the transitionists propose these challenges will induce more innovation to solve the problems. The reality is that there are real-world limits to the velocity of commercialization of all industrial-class technologies, and firm physics boundaries for all hardware. The limitations of economic theory become apparent at the scale of civilizational engineering. Economic incentives cannot alter physical laws that govern technology. The reality is that technologies available today are those that will be deployed in the coming decade, not speculative future inventions.

Energy Is Not Software

Of course, there is much to be optimistic, even excited, about regarding the emergence of new technologies. But the overwhelming majority of history’s innovations have been with energy-using not energy-producing technologies. Put differently: humanity’s imagination is far more fecund when it comes to finding ways to consume energy than to produce it. The options for producing energy are surprisingly limited, and new possibilities await the arrival of new physics.

We often hear about the “accelerating pace” of innovation, referring of course to computers and communications. However, the physics of energy-producing machines are profoundly different than those of energy-using information tech. Indeed, if silicon-based photovoltaics scaled the way silicon-based computing does, then a single solar panel would eventually collapse to the size of a postage-stamp, cost a dime, and power a skyscraper. Similarly, if battery tech scaled like computer tech, we would soon see a shoebox-sized battery, costing next to nothing, that could power a jumbo jet. The point is not only that such outcomes are impossible, with the physics we know, but that invoking computer-tech growth patterns outside of computing itself is a category error.

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Why Replacement is the Wrong Metaphor

In general, the transitionists’ tropes contain a fundamental forecasting error: failure to recognize differences in the inherent utility of different classes of (energy-producing) technologies, and thus their longevity. The transitionists’ favorite analogy—horses replaced by cars, so solar replaces combustion, etc.—is the exception rather than the rule for many technology domains. Airplanes didn’t eliminate seagoing ships; both expanded into different primary utility functions.

What History Actually Shows

The central animating vision of the energy transition is the claim that fossil fuels are “old tech” that will be inevitably replaced, wholesale, by modern “clean tech.” But history shows only a two examples of “old” sources of energy being abandoned. The world did abandon use of whale oil for illumination around 1850 (replaced by kerosene synthesized from coal), and societies transition away from burning dung whenever possible (though it’s still widely practiced in poor countries). For everything else—from water wheels to burning coal and even wood—there are no “transitions.” Globally, burning wood still supplies more than twice the energy of all solar and wind installations combined. The only transition has been in changes in the relative shares of energy sources; wood, for example, is a tiny share of global energy now, but in absolute terms far more wood is burned for energy than at any time in history. Meanwhile the world is seeing both coal and wind/solar expanding because they have different utility functions.

Addition is How Energy Systems Evolve

We’ve witnessed amazing technological transformations over the past half-century, but they have all been in energy-using, not energy-producing domains whether for warfighting, highways, or space travel. Rockets, including those of SpaceX, fly using hydrocarbons. EVs get built using diesel fuel. Solar cells are fabricated using coal. Neodymium magnets for wind turbines are acquired and processed by using coal, oil, and natural gas. Industries consume natural gas to fabricate the myriad polymers and metals needed for society, as well as the fertilizers that help feed the world.

There are, in short, no energy transitions. Instead, there are improvements, and additions. <>

About Mark Mills

Physicist-engineer, investor, and policy analyst focused on energy, technology, and industrial strategy. Founder of the National Center for Energy Analytics, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, Faculty Fellow at Northwestern University, and author of The Cloud Revolution: How the Convergence of New Technologies Will Unleash the Next Economic Boom and a Roaring 2020s and other books. He recently joined the Hale Critical Resources Initiative (HSRI) as a member of the board.

Dear Friends and Supporters:

Although we are just getting started, HSRI has already reached an important milestone. Included with the holiday cards I received on Christmas Eve was a large envelope from the Internal Revenue Service—not exactly what I was hoping for from Santa. However, the letter contained very good news. HSRI’s application to be recognized as a non-profit organization was accepted, and we have now been granted federal tax-exempt status by the IRS. For those supporters who have indicated that they would like to make a year-end tax-deductible donation, this is now possible.

For a new organization, this approval came remarkably quickly. I cannot be sure of this, but I believe that the priority of our mission may have been a factor in this speedy processing, for which we are very grateful. This designation allows us to raise the institutional and philanthropic support necessary to hire staff, assemble the resources we need, and carry out our plans for HSRI’s inaugural year in 2026. I will be sharing more details in early January via our HSRI newsletter here on Substack.

For those of you who have already become newsletter subscribers, thank you. While paid subscriptions to the HSRI newsletter are not tax-deductible, they directly support our publication and outreach efforts, which are central to our public mission. We encourage you to share upcoming monthly editions widely. Our founding subscribers have been critical to providing momentum and support for HSRI’s launch.

So, how can you participate and support our goal of becoming the leading research platform for critical resources and supply chains in the United States?

HSRI is founded on a conviction that the American Midwest will re-emerge as an economic corridor in an era when digital, energy and industrial strategies will converge. As globalization sheds its exoskeleton, it is giving way to a new “alliance economy” defined by trusted partners, shared strategic interests, and stable access to critical resources. This period of transition will be chaotic, but also presents an opportunity to rebuild durable and equitable foundations for long-term economic security.

• We are seeking not only financial support, but also project ideas— such as our proposed Gary feasibility study initiative— content suggestions, partnerships, and expert engagement. We are in the process of creating both an advisory board and senior fellow positions, and we welcome your suggestions. We would especially appreciate introductions to experts you recommend as we build HSRI’s brain trust, as well as information on programs that may be synergistic with our own.

• If you come across a compelling article on resource security or industrial resilience, we would be pleased to consider featuring it in the recommended reading section of our newsletter. We will be building a library of reliable, authoritative material that will be valuable to business, government, and academic researchers.”

• If you are currently a free subscriber to the newsletter and would like to upgrade, you can learn more about our two paid subscription tiers here:

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• Information about tax-deductible donations, whether as an individual or an institutional supporter, in any amount, is available here —or feel free to contact me directly. We are proceeding with all deliberate speed to create a research institute unlike any other, not only in the Midwest, but in the United States.

Thank you for your early confidence, engagement, and encouragement.

With best wishes for the holidays, and a peaceful and prosperous New Year.

Lyric

Lyric Hughes Hale

Founder and Chair, Hale Strategic Resources Initiative

Chicago

Hale Strategic Resources Initiative (HSRI) is a US nonprofit organization recognized as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. HSRI conducts independent research, dialogue, and feasibility-driven analysis focused on critical resources, industrial resilience, and long-term economic security, focused on the American Midwest. Contributions to HSRI are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

Our Mission

Hale Strategic Resources Initiative (HSRI) is a nonprofit organization dedicated to independent research, dialogue, and feasibility-driven analysis focused on critical resources, industrial resilience, and long-term economic security, with an emphasis on the American Midwest and cooperation with allied partners abroad, to strengthen vital supply chains.

Charitable donations support HSRI’s public-interest work and help sustain our research, dialogue, and outreach efforts. Donations do not confer governance or editorial influence.

Donor Opportunities

HSRI welcomes support from individuals, institutions, and corporate partners who wish to advance informed dialogue and rigorous analysis in the public interest. All donors are acknowledged for their support (unless anonymity is requested).

Individual Donor — $500

(or choose your donation amount)

• Invitations to HSRI panels, briefings, and public events

• Advance notice of publications and activities

• Inclusion in HSRI donor communications and acknowledgments (optional)

Institutional Donor — $7,500

• All Individual Donor features

• Invitations for up to five designated participants

• Eligibility to co-host HSRI public forums (subject to mission alignment)

Corporate / Patron Donor — $25,000

• All Institutional Donor features

• Participation in select roundtables and briefings

• Recognition as a supporter of HSRI’s public-interest work

Founding Donor (One-Time Contribution)

• $1,000 (Individual)

• $10,000 (Institutional)

• $50,000 (Corporate)

Early supporters recognized for helping launch HSRI and establishing its public-interest mission.

Payment Details

To make a charitable donation to HSRI, please use the secure payment link below:

Payment link

• If you prefer to discuss institutional or corporate support, or have questions about donor options, please contact us directly.

• HSRI accepts both charitable donations and paid newsletter subscriptions through Stripe. Donations support HSRI’s nonprofit mission and are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law; paid subscriptions support HSRI’s publishing work and are not tax-deductible.

Tax Status

Hale Strategic Resources Initiative (HSRI) is a US non-profit organization recognized as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. EIN: 39-4977555

Contributions to HSRI are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law. No goods or services were provided in exchange for contributions.

Mission and Framework for International Collaboration

November 1, 2025

The Hale Strategic Resources Initiative (HSRI) is a nonprofit research organization that analyzes how access to critical resources—such as minerals, energy, pharmaceuticals, and advanced technologies including AI, shapes global stability, national security, and economic growth. Our mission is to advance informed policy and strategic cooperation by providing rigorous research, actionable insights, and practical solutions for governments, industry, and civil society.

Building on the legacy of economist David Hale (1951–2015) whose research illuminated the connections between commodities, capital, global growth, and national security. SRI examines how the world’s essential materials underpin both prosperity and power.

Our research explores the intersection of markets, policy, and technology, focusing on sustainable strategies for securing critical inputs: from rare earths and energy minerals to semiconductors and data infrastructure.

From metals to molecules, HSRI’s mission is to provide clear, data-driven analysis of the industrial, scientific, and geopolitical foundations of national resilience, and to create blueprints for supply chain security and resilience. We are actively seeking engagement with allied nations around the world.

Our vision is supported by a network of experts, policymakers, and public and private institutions, as well as Track 1.5 organizations such as the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, which connect policymakers, researchers, business leaders, and civil society. Uniquely, HSRI also draws upon a network of real-world practitioners — large-scale developers, legal experts, project managers, engineers, and environmental specialists — who help evaluate the feasibility of the projects we study.

Research Focus

HSRI’s work centers on three interconnected domains of strategic importance:

1. Energy & Industrial Materials — rare earths, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing inputs.

2. Technology & Infrastructure — semiconductors, data systems, and AI-enabled industrial processes.

3. Health & Biotech Supply Chains — pharmaceuticals, reagents, and medical devices are essential elements of national security and public-health preparedness.

Fellows Program

To expand its intellectual reach and build a global network of experts, HSRI will establish a Fellows Program comprising three tiers:

· Senior Fellows — established economists, technologists, and policy experts providing strategic guidance and authoring flagship papers.

· Research Fellows — early and mid-career professionals conducting targeted analyses and/or participating in joint projects.

· Non-Resident Fellows —international contributors collaborating virtually on HSRI initiatives.

Fellows are appointed by the Chair and Board for renewable one-year terms and contribute at least one research output or event participation annually. Participation is voluntary and non-remunerated unless attached to funded projects.

HSRI Fellows’ work will also be featured through econVue, an independent source of global economic news and opinions, enhancing the visibility and public reach of their research. This publication, which includes the Hale Report podcast, is edited by Lyric Hughes Hale and hosted on Substack.

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Building on the legacy of economist David Hale (1951–2015) whose research illuminated the connections between commodities, capital, global growth, and national security. SRI examines how the world’s essential materials underpin both prosperity and power.

Our research explores the intersection of markets, policy, and technology, focusing on sustainable strategies for securing critical inputs: from rare earths and energy minerals to semiconductors and data infrastructure.

From metals to molecules, HSRI’s mission is to provide clear, data-driven analysis of the industrial, scientific, and geopolitical foundations of national resilience, and to create blueprints for supply chain security and resilience. We are actively seeking engagement with allied nations around the world.

Our vision is supported by a network of experts, policymakers, and public and private institutions, as well as Track 1.5 organizations such as the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, which connect policymakers, researchers, business leaders, and civil society. Uniquely, HSRI also draws upon a network of real-world practitioners — large-scale developers, legal experts, project managers, engineers, and environmental specialists — who help evaluate the feasibility of the projects we study.

Research Focus

HSRI’s work centers on three interconnected domains of strategic importance:

1. Energy & Industrial Materials — rare earths, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing inputs.

2. Technology & Infrastructure — semiconductors, data systems, and AI-enabled industrial processes.

3. Health & Biotech Supply Chains — pharmaceuticals, reagents, and medical devices as essential elements of national security and public-health preparedness.

Fellows Program

To expand its intellectual reach and build a global network of experts, HSRI will establish a Fellows Program comprising three tiers:

· Senior Fellows — established economists, technologists, and policy experts providing strategic guidance and authoring flagship papers.

· Research Fellows — early and mid-career professionals conducting targeted analyses and/or participating in joint projects.

· Non-Resident Fellows —international contributors collaborating virtually on HSRI initiatives.

Fellows are appointed by the Chair and Board for renewable one-year terms and contribute at least one research output or event participation annually. Participation is voluntary and non-remunerated unless attached to funded projects.

HSRI Fellows’ work will also be featured through econVue, an independent source of global economic news and opinions, enhancing the visibility and public reach of their research. This publication, which includes the Hale Report podcast, is edited by Lyric Hughes Hale and hosted on Substack.

Governance Overview

HSRI operates under a three-member founding board to ensure compliance, transparency, and strategic direction. The organization maintains a majority of US citizen directors to preserve eligibility for US government and defense-related research funding. Regular board meetings review finances, research progress, and strategic partnerships.

Founding Board of Directors

Lyric Hughes Hale — Director & Chair (Chicago) - Economist, author, and founder of HSRI. Editor-in-Chief of econVue and host of The Hale Report. Consultant to Fortune 200 companies on China. Co-edited What’s Next: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy, Yale University Press).Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, American Economic Association, and board member, the Australian American Leadership Dialogue.

Mark Roeder — Director (Sydney) - Author and strategist specializing in technology, markets, and society. Former executive with UBS, Westpac, and Zurich Financial. Author of The Big Mo: Why Momentum Rules Our World and Unnatural Selection: Why the Geeks Will Inherit the Earth, and an upcoming book on AI.

Mark P. Mills — Director (Washington) - Physicist-engineer, investor, and policy analyst focused on energy, technology, and industrial strategy. Founder of the National Center for Energy Analytics, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, Faculty Fellow at Northwestern University, and author of The Cloud Revolution: How the Convergence of New Technologies Will Unleash the Next Economic Boom and a Roaring 2020s and other books.

Institutional Development Framework

As HSRI evolves from its founding stage into a fully operational research organization, it will establish a structured ecosystem to guide its growth and ensure transparency. The following framework outlines the core organizational pillars, membership opportunities, and fellowship system designed to support HSRI’s mission and expand its global reach.

Five Pillars

1. Supervisory Board — strategic oversight and governance.

2. Management Team — day-to-day operations and program management.

3. Clients — government agencies, corporations, and investors concerned with supply-chain resilience and national security.

4. Partners — fellows, universities, think tanks, and research centers contributing expertise and data.

5. Patrons & Sponsors — financial supporters through donations, grants, or project funding.

6. Advisory Board — policymakers, industry leaders, and key supporters.

Membership & Public Engagement

HSRI will offer membership opportunities for individuals and institutions wishing to engage with its research, participate in events, and support its mission. Membership will be non-voting and participatory. Donations, of any size, are always welcome.

Tiers and Annual Fees (USD)

· Individual Member — $500
Access to HSRI papers, panel invitations, member newsletter, and directory listing.

· Institutional Member — $7,500
All individual benefits plus five seats, co-hosting eligibility.

· Corporate / Patron Member — $25,000
All above benefits plus VIP roundtables, early briefings, and sponsor recognition.

· Founding Member (One-Time) — $1,000 (individual) / $10,000 (institutional) $50,000 (corporate).
Early supporters recognized for launching HSRI.

Hale Strategic Resources Initiative (HSRI) is a U.S. nonprofit organization recognized as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. HSRI conducts independent research, convenings, and feasibility-driven analysis focused on critical resources, industrial resilience, and long-term economic security.

Contributions to HSRI are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

Choose your donation level:

Payment link

HSRI Contacts:

US: Lyric Hughes Hale, lyrichale@halestrategic.com

Australia: Mark Roeder, markroeder@halestrategic.com

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