Marco Rossi’s career stats (per 82 games):
20 G, 28 A, 48 P, -20, 26 PIM, 17:04 TOI, 135 SOG
41 Blks, 53 Hits, 25 TA, 44 GA, 46.6 FO%, 14.7 SH%

2025-26 Advanced Analytics:
55.8 xGF%, 54.39 SCF%, 60.20 HDCF%, 101.4 PDO (17 Games, MIN)
38.99 xGF%, 38.56 SCF%, 35.88 HDCF%, 97.2 PDO (33 Games, VAN)

Most Common Linemates:
Boeser (316:25), Ohgren (177:19, MIN/VAN ), Kaprizov (174:19), O’Connor (134:51)

It’s incredible how underappreciated Marco Rossi was in Minnesota.

Even at 5’9” and 185 pounds, Marco Rossi possessed a bunch of offensive traits that seemed to fit in with what Bill Guerin was looking for. That being hard-nosed, intense players who can convert around the net, and aren’t nervous about attacking opposing defensemen and taking their abuse.

Considering how the Wild’s playoff run went, losing to the Colorado Avalanche in 5 games in the Western Conference Semi-Finals, and having their #1 Center Joel Eriksson Ek out of the lineup due to injury, it would have been nice for Minnesota to be able to fall back on a guy like Rossi to make up for some of the production lost in JEE’s absence. Perhaps if Minnesota could go back, they would have parted with an additional first-round pick in order to retain Rossi in the Quinn Hughes trade.

Well, one team’s mistake creates an opportunity for another.

With Rossi taking more of an offensive role down the stretch for the Canucks, including an 18-point in 21-game run post-trade deadline, can Rossi take that next step and establish himself as a true top-6 center by producing, despite being on the worst team in the league?

One Season, Two Parts

Marco Rossi was hampered by injuries that lasted the entire season. He missed games due to a broken foot and returned when it was still broken.

He also had to adapt to a new system on a new team. It didn’t help that the system happened to be the worst in the NHL, on a team that was also the worst in the NHL.

So I, for one, am not surprised by his lack of 5v5 effectiveness in Vancouver, but it is something we need to talk about. With Minnesota, Rossi produced more points per 60 (1.9 vs 1.6) and shots per 60 (5.8 vs 3.4) at 5v5.
On the power play, Rossi produced 9.8 points per 60 in Minnesota vs 6.00 in Vancouver, although his shots per 60 on the power play increased from 3.9 to 7.3.

The expected goal and scoring chance analytics also suffered immensely in Vancouver. Anywhere from a 15 to 25 percent drop-off in all 3 of the major analytic categories.

His player profile from last season vs 2 seasons ago, courtesy of AllThreeZones, paints an ugly picture as well.

Although in Minnesota we see a whole lot of blue, and in Vancouver we see a whole lot of red, there is a positive that I am able to take out of it, especially from the offensive side of things. That being, even though he saw a decline across the board, his best analytic traits remained his best.

For example, in his Zone Entry category, his Entires w/ Chances per 60 and his Entry w/ Pass % were his 2 best categories in both years, but they just saw a decline across the board.

In the Passing category, his Deflection Assists per 60 and his Center Lane Assists per 60 were his two best analytics in both years as well.

When combined with increased defensive effectiveness, to me that indicates a player who was drowning on a bad team that happened to always be pinned in the defensive zone, and not a player who declined due to a change in playstyle or talent.

It also helps paint us a clear picture of who Rossi is as a player. He is an F3, a two-way center who thrives down low as a secondary offensive play driver. His offence, whether it’s goals or assists, will be produced by generating chances for his teammates and converting chances from the interior of the offensive zone.

With Vancouver’s lack of play driving in their forward core, who can Rossi play with to maximize his potential?

BRÖ, What’s the Plan?

Well, we already know who Rossi should play with on his wings.

Liam Öhgren, Marco Rossi, and Brock Boeser formed what was known as the BRÖ line at the end of the season, and although fans seemed to love the line, their results were pretty bad.

6 Goals For, 10 Goals Against. Outshot 44 to 66. 33.76% xGF%, 39.83 SCF%, and 31.11 HDCF%. The results and underlying numbers point to a line that struggled immensely.

So why keep them together? A combination of necessity and improved coaching.

Marco Rossi is the Canucks #2 Center, and Brock Boeser will be in the Canucks Top 6 on the Right Wing. The question then becomes whether or not the Canucks will either prioritize the development of Öhgren or enhancing the trade value of DeBrusk.

DeBrusk will produce on the Canucks Powerplay. He has done so at a level that is among the league’s best since arriving in Vancouver, and there is no reason to assume that will not continue. His 5v5 scoring, however, needs to rebound.

DeBrusk shot at a putrid 3% at 5v5 last season and scored only 3 5v5 goals, the lowest of his career. If he is going to score, he will need to play with someone who can create zone entries and make high-danger passes. Rossi does have some high-danger passing ability, but creating zone entries is something that DeBrusk and Rossi are not good at. As a result, it will limit DeBrusk’s potential to maximize his 5v5 production.

Öhgren, on the other hand, is kind of like DeBrusk in terms of being a speedy, left-handed winger who excels in North-South systems, and he also struggles with creating zone entries. The difference, however, is the developmental runway that Öhgren has. Öhgren is entering his second full NHL season, and in a healthier environment will have all the chance in the world to develop that skill.

Lord knows that even if Öhgren only tops out as a 3rd line winger, the Canucks will need someone with his speed, size, and on-puck offensive capabilities to be a part of a dominant middle-six in the future. Have you seen what shape Öhgren is in?

This guy is a monster, and his work ethic and the shape he is in will give him the chance to surpass any perceived ceiling that one may put on him. Developing him should be a primary objective for the Canucks this season.

This means the Canucks have to find another source of offensive talent to help make up for some of the offensive inefficiencies that the BRÖ line has.

Repeating History

When you have clearly talented offensive talent upfront, with a few extremely evident holes, one way to patch up those holes is by taking their line and turning it into a 5-man unit.

In 2023-24, the Canucks ran a line of JT Miller, Brock Boeser, and either Phillip Di Giuseppe or Pius Suter. On this line, there were clear roles. JT was the power forward playmaker who offered a unique combination of offensive ability, physicality, and speed. He had an elite transition game. Brock was the finisher and net front presence who kept pucks alive low, won battles along the wall, and extended plays by getting the puck either to Miller on the half wall or to the defenseman up top.

Pius/PDG’s job was determined by circumstance. Either they would act as F1 if they were the first man in, or as F3 if JT was the first man in. Boeser’s lack of speed meant he couldn’t get back quick enough to help the defence, and both Suter and PDG gave the Canucks a good fallback defensive player if Miller was beaten.

With Suter and Boeser being too slow, and PDG possessing offensive talents that were far below NHL average, it meant that no matter the combo, there were gaps that in most cases would have hindered their ability to be an effective trio.

Enter Quinn Hughes.

Hughes is a top-2 defenseman in the NHL, and honestly, is likely the best defenseman in the NHL. His combination of skating, offensive instincts, and puck possessing abilites created the ideal 4th man for JT Miller and Brock Boeser to play off of, and the results speak for themselves.

Hughes was also paired with Filip Hronek, a defenseman who had been acquired from Detroit with the idea that he would be Hughes’ long-term partner on Vancouver’s backend, and the first defence partner that Hughes ever had with above-average offensive capabilities.

The results speak for themselves. In the 362 minutes and 39 seconds where Miller, Boeser, Hughes, and Hronek played together at 5v5 that season, the line produced:

• 55.23 Corsi For %

• 26 Goals For, 17 Goals Against (60.47%)

• 50.61 xGF %

• 53.55 SCF %

They also had an offensive zone faceoff location rate of 66.46%. They were a formidable 4-man unit who were given a ton of offensive ice time, and their high-end talent allowed them to produce results that exceeded their analytics. That’s what high-end playmaking and finishing can do.

Without Hughes, Miller and Boeser produced in 434 minutes and 49 seconds:

• 46.46 Corsi For %

• 25 Goals For, 13 Against (65.79%)

• 47.47 xGF%

• 50.51 SCF%

The lack of secondary puck transition talent that Miller and Boeser had without Hughes meant that they relied on a 1.08 PDO (including a .938 5v5 SV%) in order to remain afloat. Without controlling the shot share, the line was more or less average.

Now, the Canucks have a chance to replicate this idea with Zeev Buium and Filip Hronek, and we already have a small sample size to suggest it may work.

Reminder: the BRÖ line had an xGF% of 33.76%. When those 3 played with Zeev Buium and Filip Hronek (Albeit in only 30 minutes), the line produced the following:

• 58.14 Corsi For %

• 2 Goals For, 2 Goals Against (50%)

• 47.66 xGF%

• 50.00 SCF%

• 75.00 HDCF%

The same formula we saw back in 2023-24 has shown in the short term to be a potential solution to the BRÖ problem. By letting Buium and Hronek provide value in transition, it should make up for the lack of transition talent from Boeser and Öhgren, while also maximizing the traits that allow the entire forward line to be successful in the offensive zone, which is being interior players who excel below the circles, while also opening up the opponent’s defensive zone structure by pulling forwards up top.

And to make things even more intriguing, it should be mentioned that Buium is not as far along in his development as Hughes was, not by a long shot. In a healthier offensive environment, with proper development from Öhgren and Buium, this 5-man unit could become a long-term partnership.

Rossi’s Role

I have zero delusions. Even if the Canucks decided to play the BRÖ Line with Buium and Hronek, I do not expect Rossi to reach the heights that JT Miller reached. He won’t be a 103-point player who happens to possess one of the most unique skill sets in the sport.

However, by using Hronek and Buium to make up for his lack of transition skills, and letting him plant himself around the slot, it should maximize his offensive talents and allow him to create a formidable partnership with Brock Boeser in particular up front.

I would like Rossi to start playing some minutes on the Penalty Kill, especially once Paul Cotter and Drew O’ Connor are traded. As a second-line center, if Rossi is unable to play on the PK, it could prevent teams from spending quality assets in acquiring him, as they would likely be looking for Rossi to be an all-situations center, as most 2Cs are.

Rossi is eligible to be extended on July 1st, 2027; however, I lean more towards trading Rossi than re-signing him before his contract expires in 2028.

His age does not align with a core that will be spearheaded by Buium, Malhotra, Cootes, and other draftees down the line, and extending him means his best years will be spent in a rebuild. It’s much better to trade him in a year after increasing his trade value, especially in a shallow center market.

If Rossi can be a 60-point second-line center, who gets softer minutes than Pettersson (who should be getting softer minutes in his own right), perhaps a 25-goal, 35-assist player, that would be ideal. However, with the lack of talent in Vancouver’s top 6, and without knowing how Buium, Willander, and Öhgren will look to begin the season, I wouldn’t be surprised if Rossi finishes the season with 45 points.

20th Percentile Outcome: 12-15 Goals, 22-25 assists, 16-17 minutes a night.
Plays on the 1st powerplay, no PK time. Shows his obvious offensive talents on the Powerplay, but continues to struggle at 5v5 with middling playmaking and transition metrics.

80th Percentile Outcome: 20-25 Goals, 30 assists, 18 minutes a night.
Plays on the 1st Powerplay Unit, and has the 6th or 7th most PK time among VAN F. Continues developing chemistry with Boeser and finds some of his 5v5 transition and playmaking talents again.

In a league that continues to push out smaller players, Rossi has showcased his ability to play above his size and be a top-6 contributor. In a center market that is shallow, a good season from Rossi can go a long way in not only solidifying Rossi’s status as an NHL top-6 center, but also creating a valuable trade chip for Vancouver down the line.

Thank you for reading!

Paul Cotter’s career stats (per 82 games):
13 G, 10 A, 23 P. -15, 40 PIM, 12:12 TOI, 94 SOG
28 Blks, 237 Hits, 21 TA, 27GA, 50.7 FO%, 13.9 SH%

2025-26 Advanced Analytics:
41.81 xGF%, 39.88 SCF%, 39.86 HDCF%, 94.3 PDO.

Most Common Linemates:
L. Glendening (236:09), C. Brown (177:37), S. Noesen (134:00), M. Tsyplakov (130.41)

2025-26 was a rough season for Paul Cotter. In fact, it was the worst full season of his career. With only 9 goals and 6 assists, Cotter’s lack of production on a Devils team that had been hampered by injuries to their best players and a fracturing locker room (if Brenden Dillon is to be believed) created a snowball that eventually led to the Devils allowing Cotter to walk to Free Agency.

While his production was poor, his analytics painted an extremely ugly picture. When rocking an xGF% below 42%, and SCF/HDCF% under 40%, it is fair to ask whether he even deserved another shot in the NHL.

Way to go, Paul

The fact of the matter, however, is that Paul Cotter has some very desirable traits, and the circumstances surrounding his season should be taken into consideration before judging him.

The eye-opening traits Paul Cotter possesses are his size and skating.
At 6’2” and 213lbs, Cotter has a top speed in the 88th percentile and bursts of 22+ mph and 20-22 mph in the 92nd and 88th percentiles, respectively.

He also happens to use this size + speed combination to maximize his physical presence against his opponents, averaging 237 hits per 82 games.

So, now that we know what Cotter’s best traits are from an eye test POV, how can we overlay these with his analytic profile and create a picture that will demonstrate how the Canucks will best be able to utilize Cotter?

Paul Cotter’s best analytic traits are his Transition talents and his Forechecking Impacts per 60. Below are charts via AllThreeZones in those analytics.

Amongst Canucks last season, Paul Cotter would have ranked:

- 3rd in Zone Entries per 60 with 18.41, between EP40 (19.02) and Evander Kane (18.24).
- 2nd in Zone Exits per 60 with 9.86, only behind Linus Karlsson at 9.88
- 2nd in Forechecking Game Score per 60 with .227, only behind Evander Kane at .256

The good news is that Cotter’s best physical traits line up with his best analytic traits. It’s clear that Cotter recognizes his role on a team and plays in a way that attempts to maximize those outputs.

So why was Cotter unable to produce on the Devils last season?

Looking at his most common linemate, Luke Glendening, we can see a player that, to put it bluntly, is an offensive black hole. Outside of a 10-goal season in which he shot 17.5%, Luke Glendening hasn’t scored 10 goals since 2019-20, and he hasn’t had more than 9 assists since 2018-2019.

Luke Glendening’s role throughout his career has been that of a 4th-line play-stopping center. With a faceoff win percentage above 55% in his career, Luke Glendening has stayed in the NHL by being a reliable man in the dot in close games and on the penalty kill.

Cotter’s role alongside Glendening has been to jump the faceoff in case of a loss and attack the point, and to push defences back with his speed. Once the puck crosses center ice, he will chip or carry it into the offensive zone and either possess it or forecheck until the other 4 players on the ice can make a line change.

We can see how Glendening negatively affects his most common linemates’ impacts

Glendening’s xGF% without Cotter = 30.53%
Glendening’s xGF% without Noesen = 32.80%

Even for average players, they improve immensely without Glendening.

Garnet Hathaway’s xGF% with Glendening is 51.51%.
Without Glendening, Hathaway has a 90.98 xGF%, and Glendening drops to 19.45 xGF% without Hathaway.

Cotter doesn’t possess the offensive capabilities to carry someone who contributes as little as Glendening, and his tendency to lean on his forechecking prowess while providing very little high-danger playmaking means he isn’t a secondary playdriver, either.

The Third Man

So, where does Cotter fit in?

Over his tenure in New Jersey, Cotter’s best analytic impacts came alongside New Jersey’s top forwards. With Jack Hughes, in 167:55 minutes, he had an xGF% of 65.9, with a SCF% of 63.16 and 62.96 HDCF%. Surprise surprise, great players elevate their teammates.

167 minutes and 55 seconds isn’t a massive sample size, but it demonstrates how capable he is as a tertiary player on a top 6 line.

Paul Cotter alongside Jack Hughes acted as an F1 who would act as the line’s primary forechecking threat, disrupting retrieval and breakout attempts from opposing teams.

I have mentioned before that Elias Pettersson’s production seems to improve the more he is involved in the forecheck, as long as one of his linemates is better than him at forechecking.

Elias Pettersson’s forechecking gamescore per 60 over the last 2 seasons has been the 4th worst amongst Canucks forwards, but is still better than Jack Hughes’.

Pettersson’s best offensive analytics have been his Center Lane Assists and his Assists off the Forecheck. While Hughes blows him out of the water in terms of Center Lane assists, they’re very close in terms of Forechecking assists.

What we can take from Pettersson and Hughes’ lack of forechecking gamescore/60, but their elite ability to generate chances off of the forecheck, is that as long as they have a player on their line that can play as F1 and create havoc, both would likely see an increase in chance assists and therefore production as a result of getting more kicks at the can.

If Vancouver added a threat down low on that line, it’s not a stretch to imagine Cotter sees an uptick in Goals and Secondary Assists, while Pettersson’s Primary and Secondary Assists increase.

Cotter’s ability to transition the puck up-ice would provide Pettersson with a quick, secondary puck carrier (kind of like DeBrusk), who possesses elite physical traits and retrieval skills (unlike DeBrusk). His speed would force defenders to back up through the neutral zone and would allow Pettersson to have more space to generate speed and transition the puck from the Defensive Zone and through the Neutral Zone.

Lastly, a good reason to have Cotter with Pettersson is that Cotter’s career faceoff% is above 50% (even though he has never won 100 faceoffs in a season).

Pettersson had the hardest deployment of his career last season in terms of ice time percentage against Elite competition, and it was only compounded by the amount of those shifts that started in the Defensive Zone.

Pettersson’s poor faceoff ability only helped to extend time in the Defensive Zone against Elites, and also prevented Pettersson from taking advantage of tired opponents when he started shifts in the Offensive Zone. If Cotter took a larger role in the faceoff dot on Pettersson’s line, it would allow the Canucks and their #1 Center to spend less time defending and more time attacking.

Who would be the ideal linemate for Cotter and Pettersson? Someone who can hold onto pucks, continue the cycle, extend plays, and has a knack for finding the soft areas of the ice.

Enter Linus Karlsson. Linus Karlsson is extremely slow, but his familiarity in Malhotra’s cycle-heavy system and extremely underrated two-way ability give him an advantage at both ends of the ice.

Cotter struggles from a defensive perspective, and Karlsson + Pettersson have the ability to babysit a 3rd forward. In the offensive zone, Karlsson is currently the best player in terms of Shots off the Forecheck and Cycle/60, Scoring Chance Assists/60, and Scoring Chances per 60.

Karlsson also possesses extremely high-end puck control and stability on his feet. He wins board battles against multiple defenders constantly, and extends plays while facilitating and burying pucks from below the faceoff dots.

It’s not hard to see a world where Cotter acts as F1, Pettersson acts as F2, and Karlsson acts as F3, both in Malhotra’s 1-2-2/2-1-2 OZ Forecheck and 1-1-3 NZ forecheck.

Other linemates that Cotter could excel with are Marco Rossi or Filip Chytil, as long as the other forward on their line possesses similar traits to Karlsson.

Expectations

At the end of the day, I do not expect Cotter to be Kiefer Sherwood 2.0. Cotter typically shoots well above league average, but his lack of playmaking ability will always limit his production.

What he can be from Game 1 until the Trade Deadline is a player who goes on a 20-goal, 15-assist pace. If the Canucks were a contending team, I think it would be a bad idea to have Cotter play top-line 5v5 minutes with your number 1 center.

However, the Canucks are trying to build up Cotter’s value for a trade, and his ability to be a dual-position (LW/C), forechecking machine with size and speed already provides Cotter with a baseline value that would only increase should Cotter demonstrate some consistent goal-scoring ability. He already has nifty hands!

With that in mind, Cotter should get an extended look with Pettersson and Karlsson, as well as some time on the PK. His speed and faceoff prowess should give him a look there on its own, but his poor defensive ability may give the Canucks some pause. It shouldn’t, however, as any special team versatility he can provide will go a long way in making him an attractive bottom-6 option for a contender when the deadline comes around.

20th Percentile Outcome: 9G, 5A, 4th line W/C hybrid who loses Malhotra’s trust due to his lack of defensive ability. Plays only 5v5. Canucks get a medium-late round pick at the deadline.

80th Percentile Outcome: 15G, 12A, Top 6 tertiary forechecking forward who provides the Canucks with value that goes further than his statline suggests.
He plays on the 2nd PK unit and splits 5v5 faceoff duties with Elias Pettersson.
Canucks get a 2nd Round Pick a year or two down the road, or perhaps multiple 3rd and 4th round picks in 2027.

(These stat lines are based on an 84-game pace.)

Here’s to hoping that the Canucks can unlock a little bit more from Cotter and use him to add more draft capital as the Canucks enter season 2 of their rebuild.

Thank you for reading!

Defence is important.

I know that to most of you, this is clear as day. For Adam Foote’s 2025-26 Vancouver Canucks, you could have been fooled into thinking that players were told to make life as hard as possible for the goalie on a nightly basis. High-Danger chances, East-West passes through the slot, deflections and tap-ins without having sticks tied up.

It was rough. Here are some stats to demonstrate how rough it really was:

• 314 Goals Against, 19 more than 2nd-worse (TOR); the only team to allow 300.

• 210 5v5 Goals Against, 4 more than 2nd-worse (TOR)

• 1986 Scoring Chances Allowed 5v5, 3rd-worse (CHI + TOR)

• 877 High-Danger Chances Allowed 5v5, 2nd-worse (CHI)

The Canucks were arguably the most porous defensive teams in the NHL, and adjusting for era, they might be the worst Canucks team in franchise history.

Well now, Adam Foote is out, and Manny Malhotra is in. What changes can we expect?

Old DZ Coverage - The Swarm

Under Adam Foote, the Canucks ran a Swarm defence, where the goal was to have consistent puck pressure to force teams to have to move the puck in order to generate chances.

When the Canucks made the playoffs in 2024, the defence pair of Quinn Hughes and Filip Hronek would utilize a Hybrid-Swarm system, where they would use their elite skating to angle off the offence, double-team the puck carrier, and strip the puck.

For two defenseman that don’t fit the traditional mold what a shutdown pair looks like, that being a duo that lacked any standout physical capabilities, they used a combination of chemistry and skating to make up for their 5’10” and 6’0” statures, respectively, and used the Swarm to have a top 10 xGF% for any Defense Pairs in the NHL, and their true offensive talent allowed them to overperform that number, with an actual GF% of 61.02% (72 GF, 46 GA).

The issue with the 2025-26’ Canucks, however, is that taking a system that only worked for a D-pair that consisted of two offensively-minded top-pair defenseman who happened to skate well, and applying it to an entire team was always going to go poorly.

In a Swarm system, as I’ve mentioned, you need to have good skating so that you can close gaps quickly and react well on your edges to prevent getting beat on cutbacks, as any mental lapse can create enough separation to create a scoring chance.

Let’s look at Marcus Pettersson as an example.

At 6’5”, 174lbs, Marcus has always been an intelligent defenseman who relied on his ability to cover a zone with his reach and positioning his body in ways where he could take away multiple options at once. He could block a shot while still having his stick in a primary passing lane. He can throw a hit, but I wouldn’t say he’s ever been physically imposing at the net front.

In 2025-26, Marcus Pettersson was handed the harshest defensive deployment on the Canucks, facing elite competition for 38.9% of his total ice time. He also happened to be the 6th slowest defenseman in the NHL, and was the 5th slowest defenseman in terms of 20+ mph bursts per mile skated. The eye-test often made him look like nothing more than a #5 defenseman, which is a far cry from his true talent level.

When we look at forwards, the Canucks routinely had Brock Boeser, Linus Karlsson, Teddy Blueger, and Aatu Räty in the lineup, all forwards that, despite evident talent, are extremely slow. Playing guys like Evander Kane, who lack any defensive IQ whatsoever, meant that even Vancouver’s fast players weren’t providing much help.

Here is a play that would commonly occur against Vancouver in the Swarm:

While most teams have some sort of contingency in a Swarm to allow the defence to reset, the Canucks didn’t appear to have one, instead insisting on sending someone at the puck carrier, even if it meant pulling away a defending player from a more dangerous option, like a downhill shot from the circle.

With a below-average skating team, the Canucks would often lose their man, end up on the attacking player’s back or shoulder, and proceed to be beaten to the net for a tap-in.

There were plenty of times in which the opponent would have multiple High-Danger options available on the same play! Pick your poison!

Knowing what is needed to succeed in a Swarm, it makes sense that Elias Pettersson (F), Tom Willander, and Filip Hronek were the only Canucks to play 250 minutes or more against elite competition while posting a 50% GF%. Elias Pettersson (even if he wasn’t as fast as 2022-23) had a rebound in his skating metrics, Willander is an extremely smooth skater, and Hronek has good skating and defensive IQ, while having great offensive IQ to punch back and drive play.

So, what does Manny’s system look like?

New DZ Coverage - Box + 1

So first, I want to explain what the boundaries are.

The Red Box is the “Aggressive” box. This is what Malhotra implements when the team needs to regain possession with more urgency.

The Black Box is the “Contain” box. This is what Malhotra implements when the team is up by multiple goals, or is in survival mode. It also determines the maximum zone for the F3 (usually, but not always the center) regardless of whether the team is in “Aggressive” or “Contain”.

The Green Line and Orange Box indicate how far the weak-side W+D will collapse into the box if the strong-side W+D go towards the red edges.

Additionally, each position has its own zone that ideally would never have 2 defenders occupying the same one, with the exception of F3.

Here is an example of what that looks like on a play that involved multiple side switches by the offence:

The goal from the wingers is to stay parallel to the shooting lane of the defenseman in their “Zone”. This means that in a contained box, and when the opposing d man is at the corner of the box, the box will look more like a Rhombus, especially if the far side defenseman slides into the middle of the point.

F3 will usually occupy the corner of the box wherever the puck is. On a side switch where this isn’t possible, the Box will turn into a diamond where the far side defenseman steps up to block a shot, and F3 takes the net front forward, behaving like the defenseman they are covering.

Weirdly, the goal from the defence is to provide such obvious passing options to the offence that it becomes almost inexcusable for them not to use them, but making these options low danger, and the tight structure makes any attempt to the middle extremely difficult to execute.

The one major weakness of the Box + 1 is a play where the far side defenseman activates, and a pass goes through the box in between the hashmarks.

This takes advantage of the far side players collapsing into that orange box, but even with that obvious weakness, because of how tight the team collapses and having sticks on the inside lanes, this pass has to be perfect, with it being a saucer pass or one along the ice that goes through 2 or 3 sticks.

It can also lead to extended shifts against due to a lack of aggressiveness along the walls, and non-existent double team pressure when using the “Contain” version. There are double team usages in the “Aggressive” version.

Offensively, the tight structure won’t allow much room for quick vertical breakouts up ice, which will limit the team’s ability to counter off of an opponent’s OZ turnover. This is where Manny Malhotra’s breakout system comes into play, which you can read about in my article about Manny Malhotra’s total system set.

This system should work well for players with good hockey IQ, regardless of their skating ability. Players will need to possess an ability to defend while flatfooted, which means they need to have good sticks. Off-Puck, players need to recognize the level of danger from certain passing lanes, as well as prevent anyone from getting behind them in their zone. The predictability and support offered behind each player should give the young players confidence in being aggressive within their zone, and allow for mistakes without too many of them ending up in the back of the net.

1-1-3 Forecheck

The 1-1-3 is a more modern version of the Left Wing Lock. The Left Wing Lock is a defensive system that was created by Czechoslovakian Head Coach Vladimir Kostka as a way to defend against the USSR, who at the time was a Global Powerhouse.
It was then adopted by Scotty Bowman, who utilized it starting in 1994-95 with the Detroit Red Wings.

The idea was simple: The Left Winger drops back to act like a 3rd defenseman, and the team utilizes a 2-3 neutral zone to force teams to the perimeter and away from the guts of the ice.

A few things forced the Left Wing Lock to evolve into the 1-1-3.

First, the elimination of the 2-Line Pass rule meant that the location cues for the LW to drop back changed, diagonal stretch passes would catch the winger flatfooted, and the entire weak side of the ice would be opened up.

Second, teams began to prefer staggered defences with 3 layers opposed to just 2.
In the Left Wing Lock, an attacking team could regroup endlessly due to the lack of back pressure from the defence. A simple pass back and reload would force the defence to come out of the structure, and teams would repeat this until they got a clean break in through a combination of speed, timing, and support from the center.

In the Malhotra 1-1-3, which is similar to the Dallas Stars 1-1-3, the main goal is to cut the ice in half and funnel the breakout to one side using the F1, prevent a pass through the middle using the F2, while F3, D1, and D2 man the blueline. The F3 or D2 will activate towards any puck carrier, and the middle defenseman (D1) will slide into their spot, with the far-side player moving over to the middle while also keeping their momentum in order to retrieve any dumped/rimmed pucks.

Upon a retrieval, Malhotra prefers his teams to send the puck to the far side to open up the ice more. Here’s an example of a 1-1-3 zone entry stop + a quick breakout:

With the breakout, there is a healthy amount of defenseman activation, but it is negated by the constant switchbacks from forwards, and the up-ice options off the retrieval allow for players to maintain their momentum and execute a quick counter.

If a team can’t beat the 3-man line with their skating, but they desire to break the puck in with control, F2 all of a sudden becomes the most important man on the ice, and the far player is forced to activate up-ice. This means that the far side man back has to have a considerable amount of offensive intelligence, as while the dump-in is a more predictable and drawn-out play, failure to activate up-ice on a NZ turnover might kill any counter-attacking opportunity.

The system is boring when executed properly, but it does prevent teams from attacking the guts of the ice, and any NZ turnover that is caused is almost certain to result in an odd-man rush. This system will force players to constantly make the right decisions, but in a rebuilding setting, it will provide the younger Canucks with an environment that lets them develop their play recognition skills at the Pro level.

Wrap-Up

I’m almost certain that from a defensive perspective, the Canucks are going to be in a much healthier place. With their best prospects (at least among those that have NHL jobs) being defensemen, it’s essential to make sure that they develop properly by providing an on-ice environment that allows them to make mistakes, and also gives them a soft landing when they inevitably occur.

From a counter-attacking perspective, I am almost certain that these defensive systems will force the Canucks to be a Cycle-Heavy offense, unless Willander, Buium, and Hronek can send tape-to-tape stretch passes off the counter at a high efficiency.

Willander and Buium need to develop these skills anyway if they are going to be bona fide top-four puck-moving defensemen in the future, so providing them with a system that rewards them offensively for performing well defensively should motivate them to continue to follow the process and know that their chances will come should they do so.

Overall, I’m extremely excited to see these systems come to life.

Thank goodness the Swarm is gone.

When Manny Malhotra was hired as Canucks head coach, I remember breathing a huge sigh of relief. It wasn’t as if I knew Malhotra’s systems inside and out by that point. However, I knew that Malhotra's Offensive Zone Cycle system was perfect for that Abbotsford team and helped them win the Calder Cup the previous season.

Go back and find highlights from the Calder Cup run. When watching, chances are you are going to see some nasty cycle plays. These plays don’t always show off a player's individual talents, but they will demonstrate how important team chemistry is while allowing the team’s offensive intelligence to be the difference between failure and success.

With that said, I wanted to dive more into how the Canucks cycle game will operate under Manny Malhotra.

The Structure

When watching how the Abbotsford Canucks operated on their cycle, we can take a lot of notes by watching the Sedins during their era of dominance.

The idea is simple. By using a combination of puck and off-puck movement, you can create manpower advantages low, attack against the opponent’s momentum, and create lanes into the slot or the backpost. I want to show an example from “The Shift 2.0”, featuring The Sedins and Loui Eriksson.

When Loui Eriksson rims the puck towards Daniel, Johnny Gaudreau is the man closest to him. With an exhausted Flames team on the ice, Gaudreau makes the ill-advised decision to attack Daniel, who has done a good job baiting Gaudreau in by keeping the puck close to his feet.

When Daniel makes the first pass to Henrik, all 5 Flames players are below the circles, and 4 of them are between the hashmarks. This is a very tight, collapsing defence, which makes them susceptible to any plays that get made up high. With Gaudreau attacking, Monahan decides to swing up high towards Edler. If Daniel had rimmed this to Edler, he would have needed to take it on his backhand and walk to the middle for a shot. Monahan’s goal would have been to force a rim-in on Edler’s backhand or an interception.

Instead, Gaudreau’s missed check and Monahan’s up-ice momentum provide the Sedins with their window of opportunity.

Henrik makes a beautiful pass through the triangle of Giordano’s stick to a cutting Daniel, who had kept his momentum from the original pass and let it carry him to the middle. As Henrik’s momentum carries him to the half wall, Eriksson swings out, and Daniel cuts through a triangle of Flames players to the backpost.

Notice how Tanev only activates once Henrik comes up above the goal line? Henrik’s momentum carrying him up the wall gives Tanev the reassurance that should a puck come to him and get past, Henrik will have gone up the wall, and Edler will have gone to the middle of the point. This is fluid cycling, where players rely on one another for cues from the positioning of the puck carrier himself and the other non-puck-carrying players.

When Daniel gets the return feed from Eriksson, there are 4 Canucks below the hashmarks, but there are also 4 Flames players below the hashmarks. It isn’t as if there are 2 Flames forwards waiting to spring a 2-on-1 up ice in case of a turnover.

Even if a large area on the ice doesn’t appear to have a manpower advantage, utilizing a series of back-and-forth passing in small areas creates small area advantages that force defences to break from their structure, which allows for chances to open up in situations that appear to look safe for defences.

If a turnover had been committed before the final pass, it would have been below the dots, which would have allowed Vancouver to have 2 or 3 players ready to set up in their neutral zone forecheck, preventing any potential odd-man rushes. Forcing the defence to collapse into such a tight space also limits the number of options for the opponent up-ice on a turnover, which potentially forces an icing or a turnover.

This is how Malhotra’s system operates. Focus on heavy, possession-style hockey low. Limit the risk if there is a turnover by keeping the puck below the dots and use misdirection and small-area play to create high-danger chances.

Opening the Overload with the 2-3

Thinking about the type of players that will benefit from small-area cycling, I can’t help but think of players like Linus Karlsson and Brock Boeser, and how they’ll benefit from this structure. Both are tremendously strong on the puck and showcase good-to-great offensive instincts that aren’t always able to be demonstrated in more chaotic, dump-and-chase and uncontrolled shot+tip and repeat systems.

We saw numerous times last season where the 4th line that was usually populated by some combination of Max Sasson, Arshdeep Bains, Linus Karlsson, and Nils Hoglander, all players that have either been coached by Malhotra for a long period of time, or play more possession-based hockey, looked as if they were the only line that knew how to cycle the puck into the slot instead of defaulting for a low danger point shot.

However, in this overload system, you can’t work the puck low 100% of the time. The Canucks will have to demonstrate an ability to create offence from high in the offensive zone if they want to create little pockets of space on the overload for one-timers and other slot plays. a 5 man collapsing defence will snuff it out otherwise.

This is where the 2-3 system comes into play.

Play #1 - Overload to 2-3, High Forward Shot + Crash

(In Malhotra’s OZ systems, there is less emphasis on positional play and more of an emphasis on playing a role based on where you are/end up.

So for example, a lot of the time, “F3” will mean the forward closest to the blueline (or highest in the OZ). However, some coaches will institute strict F positional play that F3 will ALWAYS be the Center.

In these examples, 1 = initial puck carrier, 2 = closest support, 3 = highest up or opposite side flank. 4 & 5 = defensemen.)

In this play, the puck carrier is below the goal line, with a linemate in the high slot and another along the half wall.

1. F1 walks up the wall with the puck, and F2 matches his pace. F3 crashes towards the net to force the defence. Without a presence in the middle, the defence can expand. F3 prevents this.

2. F1 makes a pass to F2 and darts towards the crease, forcing the defence to track him man-on-man. F1 and F2 create a double screen. F2 continues to skate up the wall. Both defensemen begin to slide over to provide space to F2 if he comes up to the blueline. Far side defenseman begins activating up to open a cross-ice lane

3. Once F2 reaches the top of the circle, he executes a cross-ice diagonal pass to the far side defenseman, and swings up the middle of the point. The strong side defenseman switches with F2 and begins to activate towards the net. This can also be done with a D-to-D pass, but draws out the play longer, allowing defences to recognize the set play earlier.

4. The far-side defenseman holds until F2 gets to his spot, and then passes it. Once F2 gets the puck, he can either hold and look for a seeing-eye wrist shot or a one-timer. F1 pops out from the crease to be a deflection option either in the low slot or hashmarks. F3 slides in as a screen. Strong side defenseman activates completely.

5. The shot might go clean through, be deflected, or blocked. If a rebound pops out far side, the strong-side defenseman will have activated to the net to deposit it. F1 jams for a rebound, and F3 can either jam or circle up high as a slot option or a defensive support. If F3 swings up high, F2 can reactivate towards the net.

When looking at this play, the goal is to force the defence to switch sides of the ice, moving a 4- or 5-man defensive unit that has collapsed to deal with the overload all the way over to the far side where the defenseman is. When cross-ice passes, especially diagonal ones, are made, defences typically collapse to prevent any return feeds for one-timers, and to compensate for having to turn and move, which slows momentum.

When the far-side defenseman makes the pass to F2, the play then gets switched back a second time, this time to the middle of the point, between the typical 2-winger-high defensive set.

From here, all the F2 needs to make sure is that he beats the opposing low forward with his shot to allow his forwards in front to either deflect the puck or execute a screen to disrupt the goaltender.

If there is a turnover after the rebound, both F2 and the far side defenseman will still be back to stop a counterattack, and F3 will swing up high to become F1 while defending.

By having F2 and the defenseman swing and switch, it also forces either an opposing center or winger to defend against a player that has built momentum on his way towards the net while also paying attention to the change in coverage.

It’s an innovative way of turning a 3-man forward unit into a pseudo-4-man unit, while offering both speed and structure.

Play #2 - 2-3 Funnel (Avalanche Activation)

This play was run by Abbotsford under Malhotra, but is more commonly run by the Colorado Avalanche, specifically when Cale Makar and Devon Toews are on the ice.
(I could see Buium-Hronek/Willander run this against tired defences.)

This play answers the question of “When I have multiple offensively capable defensemen on the ice, how can I incorporate them both?”

1. The forwards first start in overload, and begin to execute a “roll-out” cycle (a roll-out is when the puck continuously gets sent down the half wall, but is brought back up by the next pass recipient, and once making the pass down the wall, they swing into the high slot).

2. This roll-out can be done multiple times if needed. At some point, the puck carrier will move the puck up to the strong-side defenseman instead of sending it back down low. At this point, the two low forwards post up at the crease, creating a double screen. The far side defenseman will move up to the blueline and swing back down to create momentum.

3. The defenseman will take a step or two towards the net and make a pass to the high forward who has swung up to the middle of the point. Once the pass is made, both defensemen will activate towards the net.

4. The high forward will make an immediate tap pass to the strong-side defenseman to keep the opposing team’s attention focused on the puck-side of the ice, allowing the far-side defenseman to sneak in without being impeded.

5. The far-side low forward (in this model, F1) will pop up into the high slot to act as a “bumper” as the formation changes from a 2-3 into a 1-3-1. F3 can either screen the goalie, open up at the crease for a deflection, or take away the net front defenseman’s stick. The far-side defenseman will remain parallel to the strong-side defenseman.

6. The strong-side defenseman either shoots it, goes to the bumper in the middle, looks for a deflection, or they go cross ice to the far-side defenseman for a backdoor tap-in. This is the highest-danger chance, and the most ideal.

In this case, F1 is not only moving back to be a “bumper”, but also to support both defencemen who have activated low. To keep structural fluidity, should the play be unsuccessful and result in a change of possession, both defenseman will keep their momentum and swing behind the net, crossing and skating back towards the defensive zone. Only once the defensemen get above the goal line should their respective covering forward activate on the forecheck.

Like the one above, we see similar plays work across hockey, although most of these start with a 2-1 OZ structure from the forwards and not a 3-man overload.

These kind of plays work really well against teams who play a hybrid defensive system, where the opponents may confuse a situation that is supposed to call for man defence for being one that is a zone defence situation instead, which oftentimes results in opposing wingers either forgetting to track their man down to the net, or a center double-committing defensively with the strong side defenseman, creating a wide open lane through the slot.

But again, it relies on direct passing, misdirection, and movement from almost everyone on the ice, whether they’re the puck carrier or not.

Work it Low - Overload

When thinking of how an Overload should work, it’s easy to think that smaller players can’t succeed in these systems. It is harder for them, certainly, but having the ability to be a high-slot shooting threat while also sliding into the 3-man line at times will give players like Lekkerimaki or Elias Pettersson the chance to showcase some of their more finesse, open-ice offensive talents.

It also allows for single defenseman activations on the far side, which can turn smaller forwards into a one-timer threat high, which helps open up back door chances for their linemates.

Here are some examples:

Play #3 - Half Ice Overload w/ Side Switch

This play includes a defenseman decoy and a cut through the middle by the original high forward, which allows for the high circle to be open for F1.

1. F1 has the puck along the halfwall, near the goal line. He rims it low, and the net-front forward (F2) spins off the goalie and defenseman and supports down low. The rest of the team moves and switches sides.

2. F2 then faces the middle of the ice, while F3 has looped across the slot. F3 then cuts towards the top of the crease, forcing the defence to remain tightly collapsed to prevent a high-danger pass. The strong-side defenseman has come down the wall to act as a second passing support, but is really just a decoy to give F1 time and space to slide into the high circle.

3. As F1 slides into the high circle, the strong-side defenseman loops back up and the far-side defenseman activates inwards a tiny bit to become a passing option, if needed. As F2 makes the pass to F1, F2 cuts towards the crease, and F3 goes to the far post.

4. F1 can either shoot through the moving screen, wait for F3 to pop up into the high slot, or pass it to the far-side defenseman and go to the near post. Should they shoot the puck, they will follow up on the rebound with F2 sliding over to the top of the crease or the back post. Both will look for a rebound.

5. If F1 and F2 are looking for the rebound, F3 can either loop and reactivate as long as 3 or more opponents are in the crease area. If there are only 2 within the puck’s vicinity, F3 will stay up above the opposing 3rd man to prevent an odd-man rush.

This isn’t an exact replica, but this is the idea. Use misdirection and small-area puck play up high to create a shot from the slot for an elite shooter, with traffic in front and secondary options if needed. Again, it requires constant movement. One stationary player is fine, maybe 2 in a double screen + deflection situation. Other than that, there must be constant motion to create lanes, provide support, and produce chances and goals.

Play #4 - Overload + Far Side D Activation

This play is very simple. It starts with a half-ice overload and a high slot pass.

1. F1 has the puck, with F2 as the net front. F3 is in the high slot as a one timer/catch-and-shoot option.

2. F3 slides out to the dots as F1 makes a pass and crashes to the net, with F2 sliding over to provide a double screen.

3. When the pass is made, F3 can either shoot or pass to the far-side defenceman who has activated.

4. The defenceman will attempt to shoot it through the screen, or go backpost for a pass. F3 will slide behind the defenseman to provide support.

This is the simplest play, but with such a young group of players, I believe we’ll see this a lot. There were a ton of moments under Rick Tocchet and Adam Foote where this play would be executed by going up to the point and “around the horn”, D to W to D. This however provides a quicker strike, with a good balance of horizontal and vertical hockey, as opposed to a long, drawn out play that defenses can track, which makes it less effective (even if it limits the chances of a counter attack the other way as a result).

Wrap Up

What is great about Malhotra’s system is he’s always trying to think one step ahead, and recognizes how easy it is for offences to fall into the trap of repeating the same things over and over again. While this system isn’t positionless hockey, it offers a great combination of movement, activation, and structure that will be key for a young Canucks team that is trying to develop into a high-tempo, balanced team. A team that knows how to activate in an intelligent way to provide different looks and manpower advantages while also providing defensive support.

There will be mistakes made under this system, and there will be nights where it feels like the team can’t make a pass or is making too many turnovers in the middle of the ice. However, these learning experiences will be crucial 3-5 years down the line once the Canucks start to emerge from the NHL’s cellar and make their way back to being a contender.

This summer, I’ve spent a lot of time reading the 12th Edition of Canadian Organizational Behaviour, by Steven L. McShane and Melissa Warner.

On the surface, a class called “Organizational Behaviour” seemed very boring to me. I tend to look at my prerequisites and register for them when the time comes without diving deeper until the night before first class, so I assumed the class would be about how organizations behave internally and when interacting with other organizations. To an extent, that is true, but it goes so much deeper than that. I was unaware that Organizational Behaviour (commonly abbreviated as “OB”) was an actual field of study that people could PhD in.

As the summer progressed and we dove into specific concepts and the circumstances that may cause them to arise, or when certain concepts may enable you to have a better understanding of how individuals, groups, and leaders behave within an organization, I couldn’t help but apply these concepts to the Canucks.

In particular, I wanted to write about motivation and power.

Motivation

In OB, there are numerous theories about motivation and how they apply to both employees and leaders.

Motivation = The internal forces affecting the direction (goals), intensity (amount of effort), and persistence (duration of effort) of voluntary behaviour. These are split into “drives” and “needs”.

The Four-Drive Theory identifies four innate drives that are independent of each other.

• Drive to Acquire - The drive to seek, take, and control objects + personal experiences. Includes the desire for status and competition.

• Drive to Bond - The drive to form social relationships and mutual commitments.

• Drive to Comprehend - The inherent curiosity to make sense of our environment and ourselves.

• Drive to Defend - The drive to protect ourselves physically, psychologically, and socially. It’s the only reactive drive, triggered by threat.

When we look at the Canucks, we can actually use Four-Drive Theory to examine how the locker room fell apart.

Drive to Acquire:
In a “normal” state, a locker room will all pull in the same direction to acquire collective rewards. Wins, playoff berths, and, if they’re lucky enough, the Stanley Cup. However, employees (in this case, the players) have to feel confident that their coaches and management are also pulling in the same direction.

When management or coaching lacks transparency, for example, if they trade someone who is liked within a locker room who has contributed to team success, if they fail to address rumours among the team, or perhaps if there is a feeling of unfair playing time allocations, a player (or multiple) will inevitably feel as if the team is being compromised.

Emphasizing the playing-time example further, the moment a player is compromised, the drive to acquire is accompanied by the drive to defend their position on the team. A player might stop playing within a system, opting to play “their game” to maximize results in an attempt to survive.

When looking at the Canucks, we can see how this may have affected Nils Höglander

In Organizational Behaviour, there is a concept called “Expectancy Theory”. It lays out the belief that effort will lead to a specific level of performance, which will lead to a specific outcome. It provides clear guidelines for increasing employee motivation.

In Höglander’s case, he had been consistently shunned by coaches for being defensively irresponsible.

When Tocchet arrived in the back half of 2022-23, he made it clear that every player had to play in a way that was within the team structure and was defensively responsible. He also emphasized effort and how the little things, such as finishing a check or putting in that extra stride on the backcheck, could be the difference in scoring a goal and winning, or surrendering a goal and losing games.

With this in mind, Nils Höglander came into the 2023-24 season on a mission. He was (like always) one of the best-conditioned Canucks, and showed the makings of a new-era power forward. Not a big player, but one with a lot of grit and the ability to hold onto pucks and create plays even through contact.

He was rewarded with a 24-goal, 12-assist campaign. However, despite the increased production, Höglander’s deployment never indicated that there was any level of trust in him when things came down to the wire. He would be given ice time in the first half of games and the back half if the Canucks were either up or down by 2 or more.

His main linemate was Elias Pettersson, but when crunch time came, he was regularly replaced by Teddy Blueger or Elias Lindholm on those lines. When he would make mistakes that seemed inconsequential, he would be benched.

He had 13 games in which he played less than 10 minutes, and 17 in which he played more than 14 minutes. Despite being 4th on the Canucks in goals, he only had 32 seconds of power-play time per game, which was less than Arshdeep Bains.

When bringing this back to expectancy theory, we can see how this would affect Höglander’s motivation to stick to the things that made him successful that season.

Clearly, Tocchet and co. were able to satisfy the first part of Expectancy Theory, as
Höglander clearly believed that his increased effort would directly improve his performance.

However, when it comes to Performance (or P to O), this is where it begins to fall apart. While his performance from a production outcome perspective was likely met (career season, 24 even-strength goals), there is a high likelihood that he didn’t feel as if his performance would actually matter in terms of acquiring more ice time, specifically in offensive situations during crunch time.

A failure to receive an outcome that was promised as the result of good performance will often lead to ambiguity and resentment, and can cause an employee to lose their motivation, which will cause them to fall back into bad habits, or make them go completely off the page as a means of searching for something that will give them the desired outcome.

In Höglander’s case, this was clearly the case as the seasons wore on. His production and thus his ice time began to crater, and he started to play a very safe offensive game that came off as if he had lost confidence in himself, and it snowballed into a season where (when he wasn’t out of the lineup due to injury) he was in-and-out of the press box.

“I feel like every time you get pulled out of the lineup, you know, (you feel like) you’re not good enough and that takes your confidence down, too. And as a player, confidence is everything. You see it with every player. They talk to me; it's details and small things I’ve got to get better at. But then when you go in and out of the lineup like that, it's hard to prove you can earn the trust to do it.” - Nils Höglander, March 26th 2026 talking to SN reporter Iain MacIntyre about his season.

Cliques, The Drive to Bond, and Power.

It’s no secret when I say that for the better part of 5 seasons, the Canucks locker room was full of cliques. In 2023-24, this was mostly ignored by media and fans due to the fact that they were winning. However, the cliques that flooded Vancouver were as big a reason for the team’s fast spiral to mediocrity before crashing into the league’s basement.

The Drive to Bond

The drive to bond is fairly simple to understand. Humans have an innate desire to feel as if they belong and be affiliated with others. Everyone’s self-concept is at the very least partly defined by their association with social groups.

For example, if you tell someone that you’re a Canucks fan, that in and of itself is indicative of your drive to bond.

The drive to bond motivates people to cooperate, which means it’s essential to both organizations and society as a whole.

On a healthy hockey team, the locker room will have a family-like culture of some kind. It’s built on mutual trust, sacrificing yourself for the greater good of the team, and psychological safety (feeling as if you belong in the locker room satisfies this).

When the coaching staff and/or management teams are perceived as playing favourites, talking behind their backs, or if players are unable to trust each other due to a perception that someone (or multiple people) is not putting their best foot forward, this is when a locker room begins to fracture.

Looking at the Canucks, there have been many stories about the cliques that had formed within the locker room. So many that it became hard to keep track of who was with whom, and it was definitely difficult to validate stories.

With that in mind, I often think of the 2024-25 Canucks season and how the Elias Pettersson - JT Miller saga finally came to a head to the point at which JT was actually traded.

It had been reported that Rick Tocchet had instructed JT Miller and Quinn Hughes that they needed to “toughen Elias [Pettersson] up”. This clearly did not work, as Elias proceeded to put up 45 points, 21 points less than the multiple 66-point seasons he had that shared the honour of being his worst production season.

When JT walked away from the team in November, multiple reporters mentioned how loose and happy Pettersson appeared; it made sense considering we knew that JT and Petey never had the greatest relationship. What I never had considered, however, was how JT’s absence may have affected the power dynamic within the locker room outside of JT and Elias directly.

From what has been reported, we know that there was a high likelihood that JT’s “clique” included Quinn Hughes and Conor Garland. The thing about a clique that would include those 3 is that they would have been extremely powerful due to their production and the fact that all of them were adored by Rick Tocchet, both publicly and privately.

Multiple sources of power can affect an individual or a group’s power.
These sources include

• Legitimate - Power held by a formal position

• Reward - You can influence someone else’s rewards

• Coercive - You can influence someone else’s punishment

• Expert - You can influence someone based on expertise/knowledge

• Referent - You hold social status; people want to be associated with you.

However, these sources of power only matter under certain conditions. These are called the contingencies of power. They include

• Nonsubstitutability - If your skill set cannot be replaced within a team, you hold more power than if multiple people on a team could do what you do.

• Centrality - If this person stopped showing up, how many people would be affected, and how severe would it affect the team?

• Visibility - Are others aware of the skills you possess, and the control you have over those skills?

• Discretion - Can you exercise judgement without referring to certain rules or without receiving constant permission from someone above you?

  

While JT was on the Canucks, and around the team, he held incredible amounts of expert power based on his production. He was the Canucks best point-per-game player over his tenure, and his “power-forward” style of play was nonsubstitutable to Rick Tocchet, almost to the point of being overvalued (Rick seemed to think hitting+tenacity+faceoff ability meant that JT was a good defensive center, which he wasn’t).

Rick believed that JT’s “toughness” was something that Elias needed to add to become successful, and Rick’s power as head coach gave JT Miller (and Quinn Hughes) the discretion to behave in a way that would accomplish the goal of turning Elias Pettersson into a tougher player.

With this, anyone who was in JT or Quinn’s clique would have been given discretion to behave similarly, as long as it was within the scope provided by those 2.

However, when JT was put on leave, the power dynamic shifted heavily in favour of Elias Pettersson.

With JT gone, the Canucks suddenly lacked a top-line-calibre center.
With this, all of a sudden Elias became the person who held an immense amount of expert power. His skill set as a power-play, even-strength, and shorthanded contributor was also something that no other Canucks forward provided, which meant he was nonsubstitutable.

Without Elias Pettersson, the Canucks would have been forced to put Pius Suter and Teddy Blueger into top 6 center positions. If Pettersson didn’t show up, the Canucks likely wouldn’t have been able to produce much offence, and as a result wouldn’t have won games, which satisfies the contingency of centrality. Finally, everyone knew up and down the lineup, and in the coaching/management groups, that if the Canucks were to survive the stretch without Miller, Pettersson was key. This gave him visibility.

With Pettersson being instrumental to the team’s success up front, this negated most of the power that Quinn Hughes would have had, due to him being a defenseman, and Conor Garland wouldn’t have had much power because of Quinn’s lack of power and JT’s lack of visibility.

This would have forced the Canucks to cater more to Pettersson, providing a more enjoyable environment, thus increasing his motivation.

In a season where he only had 45 points in 66 games, a 10-game stretch of 15 points is eye-opening, especially when considering how his job would have only gotten harder in JT’s absence.

Even in 2025-26, with Pettersson once again having a tough season production-wise, putting up similar point-per-game numbers, this can be explained by his heavy defensive deployment due to being relied on as the team’s primary shutdown forward. He was also saddled with a variety of linemates, including Conor Garland (part of the JT/Quinn clique) and Evander Kane (not an NHL-caliber player at this point).

Pettersson appears to look healthier and quicker in training footage; however, that needs to be taken with a grain of salt due to it not being in-game action.

Wrap Up.

It makes complete sense to me why Pettersson would have been less motivated last summer compared to this summer, given that Quinn was given an incredible amount of power as they attempted to re-sign him, to the point where Demko, Boeser, and Garland were all given long term contracts that the team would likely want to move on from if they were given the chance (in Garland’s case he was traded).

Looking at Pettersson’s production once Garland was traded, he had 13 points in 15 games through March and an additional 5 in 9 games in April. The March games interest me because those games were against better competition, and it came after multiple players brought up the fact that the locker room was a better and healthier place post-trade deadline.

Could a healthier locker room increase the motivation of Pettersson and the young players in Vancouver, which might enable them to reach their potential and play to their true talent level?

Time will tell, but using what I learned during the summer semester, it’s definitely given me more insight into how the Canucks locker room fell apart, and how the lack of true leadership from the top on down played just as big a part in the core’s collapse as the players themselves.

As Canucks fans, we can only hope that this new regime can bring a more modern approach to player empowerment, motivation, and Organizational Behaviour as a whole to the table.

(Lastly, I wanted to thank Aidan Dumaisnil, my Business 210/220 professor, for being such a welcoming presence for me in my first in-person semester at Camosun.)

The two sports that I primarily watch are Hockey (surprising, I know) and Baseball.
I’m not a fair-weather fan when it comes to Baseball, either.

I got into Baseball back in 2012, when I was about 11 years old, thanks to Ichiro Suzuki and Jose Bautista. Bautista was just coming off a season that would see him set the Toronto Blue Jays record for home runs in a season (54), and Ichiro was coming off the worst season of his career, but the highlights I watched of him led me to feel an attachment to the player.

Ichiro was so cool. A short, stick-like figure who was known to hit .300, primarily with slap-hit singles sprayed to all parts of the field, who just so happened to have the strongest arm in the league and would catch every flyball hit to what became known at Safeco Field (now T-Mobile Park) as “Area 51”.

All that to say, I’m a massive baseball fan. The numbers are fun to examine, and the game is in a healthy spot, at least on the field. With the introduction of the pitch clock and 3-batter minimums, games no longer take 4 and a half hours to complete.

So when Vladimir Guerrero Jr. signed with Toronto and inevitably made his debut against the Oakland Athletics back in 2019, I was extremely excited. The Blue Jays finally had a “Generational” talent.

It just so happened to replicate the feeling I had when I watched Elias Pettersson. While not labelled as a “Generational” talent (he wasn’t even predicted to win the Calder Trophy), he was the first bright spot Canucks fans had in about 3 seasons, and the first elite prospect they had in at least a decade.

I sit here on August 2nd, 2026, and the Canucks are in the beginning stages of a rebuild. The Blue Jays are 52-60 and are likely selling at tomorrow’s MLB Trade Deadline. As I dove into the failures of this season’s Blue Jays team, I started to notice similarities between the two franchises, and more importantly, their “superstar” player.

The Prototype

On October 3rd, 2021, Vladimir Guerrero Jr. hit his 48th home run of the season in a 12-5 win against Baltimore. The grand slam just so happened to give Vladdy an MLB record for the most home runs hit in a single season by a player aged 22 or younger.

The record had long been held by Hall of Fame Third Baseman Eddie Mathews.
In 1953, Mathews hit 47 home runs with the Milwaukee Braves, who had just relocated from Boston. By the age of 21, he had set the National League record for home runs by a rookie (25 in 1952) and followed that up by having the 3rd best single-season home run total of any National League player ever.

For this, Mathews finished 2nd in NL MVP voting, losing out to Dodgers legend Roy Campanella. Modern-day voters would scoff at this result. Mathews had more games played, an OPS (on-base plus slugging) of 1.033, and 1.3 WAR more than Campanella.

However, times were different. Campanella had a historic season when it came to offensive production at the Catcher position, becoming the first to hit 40+ home runs, hit for a better average (.312 vs .302) and played on the better team (Brooklyn won 105 games, Milwaukee won 92).

But Eddie was 21 years old. His career was just beginning! Surely, he would only improve, and that illustrious MVP Trophy would be his someday, right?

Nope. The closest Eddie ever got to being MVP was another 2nd place finish, this time in 1959. This time, he lost to Chicago Cubs Shortstop Ernie Banks, who had now won back-to-back NL MVPs. (Funnily enough, Vlad Jr. was also a former runner-up in an MVP race, and is looking to find a way back into the conversation.)

That’s not to say Eddie was bad; he wasn’t. Between 1954-’62, he averaged (per 162 GP):

• 7.7 WAR (for context, that would rank him as #1 or 2 in NL WAR in every season since the 2020 shortened season).

• 40 Home Runs

• 108 RBI’s

• .283/.390/.543, for a .933 OPS (or 154 OPS+, meaning his OPS was 54% better than the average MLB Player)

He had a down season at age 24 in 1956, and another down season at age 26 in 1958. He was still an All-Star, but he wasn’t even close to being an MVP candidate, and wasn’t even the best Brave. That torch had been passed to Hank Aaron.

At age 30, Mathews tore his shoulder while swinging at a high fastball thrown by Dick Farrell. He was never the same after that injury.

Before the age of 30, Eddie had hit 370 home runs. He was predicted to be the man who would pass Babe Ruth’s infamous mark of 714 career home runs. Instead, from age 30 until his retirement in 1968 at age 36, he would only hit 142 homers, only surpassing 30 in a single season one more time (32 in 1965, at age 33). He would never again have an OPS above .885, which was his career total.

Times were different. Players were expected to play through all types of injuries, whether minor or major. Eddie tore his shoulder at age 30, but still played 152 games that season, which was 3 more than his average between ages 21 and 30.

If Eddie had taken time off after his injury and had received proper treatment, there is a chance that he could have far surpassed his 512 career home run total.

Tendonitis? Never heard of it.

Over the last 2 summers, I think we’ve had our fair share of talk about Elias Pettersson. For those who don’t know, here is a general timeline:

2021-’22: Pettersson struggles early, resurges late in the season.

2022-’23: Pettersson finds instant chemistry with Kuzmenko. He puts up 102 points.

Early 2023-’24: Pettersson puts up 64 points in first 49 games.

Late 2023-’24: Kuzmenko is traded; Pettersson puts up 7 goals + 25 points in his last 33.

Sometime in January, Pettersson started experiencing knee tendonitis.

2024 Playoffs: Pettersson scores 1 goal and 6 points in 13 playoff games.

2024 Offseason: Tocchet and Rutherford deny the knee tendonitis story; Pettersson says he has to “train around” the injury.

2024-2026: Pettersson puts on weight each season. He gets less agile/explosive.
In 2025, Jim Rutherford admits that the knee tendonitis was real the whole time.

His per-82 game pace in those 2 seasons is 18 goals and 57 points. 9 points less than any other season in his career.

Ok, now that is out of the way…

Before the fall-off, Elias Pettersson was a bona fide superstar. Between October 1st, 2022 and February 1st, 2024, Elias Pettersson played in 129 games.
In those games, Elias Pettersson ranked:

• 9th in Goals (66)

• 9th in Assists (100)

• 10th in Plus-Minus (+32, next closest Canuck forward was JT Miller, +14)

• T-3rd in Shorthanded Goals (5)

• 10th in Even Strength Goals (45)

• 6th in Even Strength Points (106)

He was also 7th in Selke Voting for the 2022-’23 season.

From game 1 in his NHL career, Canucks fans saw him as the next great Canuck.

He scored on his first shot, in which he took a Loui Eriksson pass in the neutral zone, looking off Derek Pouliot, and wired a snap shot above the glove of Mike Smith. Later in the evening, Pettersson recorded his first NHL assist, after picking up a loose puck in the slot and sliding a cross-crease pass to Nikolay Goldobin.

Two nights later, Pettersson followed up his debut by recording 2 goals and an assist. It was also the first time we got to see Pettersson’s power-play one-timer.

He scored 10 goals in his first 10 games and was the youngest player in NHL history to accomplish the feat. He was as confident as they came, oftentimes bordering on cocky. Pettersson was a center who had the physical build and high-tempo play that you oftentimes see in elite wingers.

But with an elite transition game that allowed him to produce without sacrificing defensively, he fit the profile of a new-age two-way center.
One that may not have the greatest defensive tools, but the combination of possessing a high-end motor, intelligence, and being able to maintain puck possession for his team allows him to provide defensive value by keeping the puck 200 feet away from his net.

However, like in any sport as it evolves, there will always be people who can’t accept change.

At some point during the Rutherford-Allvin-Tocchet era in Vancouver, the decision was made that Elias Pettersson had to get bigger to truly become a number one center.

We don’t know exactly what happened with Elias Pettersson when it comes to his size since he’s always been private about it, and the team continues to list him at 176lbs. The one time he did talk about it was at the start of 2025-’26 when he was said to have put on 6 kilograms of weight to try and play larger.

In early 2023-’24, Pettersson was still producing like it was 2022-’23. However, he started to do something that surprised people: He started hitting people. In the season opener, he laid out Oilers defenseman Cody Ceci with a hit at the blueline, which was met with heavy applause by the Canucks faithful. Another hit I can recall, and likely the largest in his career, was against 6’4”, 225lb defenseman Mattias Ekholm.

Under Rick Tocchet, the Canucks played a strict zone defensive system, where the center was always the low forward. Under those conditions, I can understand why the team would want their center to be physically capable of boxing out large offensive threats.

However, somewhere along the line, the Canucks (and Elias Pettersson) lost the plot, forgetting that Pettersson’s defensive value didn’t come from his play in the defensive zone, per se, but rather that he could get the puck out of the Defensive Zone, transition it at an elite level, and generate in the offensive zone.

For Pettersson to be an elite transition player, he has to have good acceleration and elite agility. At some point, Pettersson lost those.

It’s not as easy as saying it’s one or the other, but the fact is that Pettersson has always had poor skating technique, which, when combined with improper training and the increased weight that came with it, took away all of his agility and a large chunk of his acceleration. His top speed last season was similar to every other season in his career besides 2022-23’, but his ability to cut and change directions (with or without the puck) and his ability to separate himself from defenders was still atrocious.

If his skating does not improve, and this could be through either distributing more of his muscle mass to his legs, improving his technique (unlikely), or slimming down from ~190 lbs back to 175-180 lbs, then nothing else really matters. We will continue to see Pettersson produce less than expected.
When it comes to his past bouts with Tendonitis, I pray that it hasn’t developed into Tendonosis. That would completely change my perspective on Pettersson’s future.

Even if he stops getting some of the hardest deployment of any 1C in the sport (relative to his team’s + opponent’s strength), he may see a production rebound of some sort. Still, without the skating, this uptick will likely make him a 65-point player rather than a potential 80-point player.

Also, I don’t think Pettersson hates Hockey; I think he hated his workplace environment. At this point, on a human level, I hope he can get past these career and life struggles and go back to being a true #1 center again.

Vlad Jr: Elite Talent, Horrific Technique

This image is from the last game in which Vladimir Guerrero Jr. hit a home run in Canada.

Vladimir Guerrero Jr is an elite hitter who is experiencing the worst season of his career, both from a results perspective and an underlying metrics perspective.

Luckily, unlike the NHL, who have a very primative form of analytics tracking known as “NHL Edge”, the MLB is ahead of the curve with “Baseball Savant”. Using data from the pitch tracking era, the website provides information about things like pitch spin rate, vertical + horizontal break, a hitter’s bat speed, barrel rate, and expected stats based on their batted ball profiles, like expected batting average and slugging (xBA, xSLG). It can also track player tendencies like their attack angle to the ball, positioning in the batter’s box or while fielding, and even their swing path.

This site allows people to better understand the game, spotting inefficiencies, inconsistencies, and sustainability.

What we see with Vlad is a player who can’t barrel up a baseball at an elite level, and his already poor Sweet Spot % has gone from being in the low-medium percentile range to being among the worst in the sport. His hard hit rate is even more startling, going from the 89th, 97th, and 90th percentiles to being 67th, which is hardly acceptable for a player with Vlad’s talent.

Looking at his swing metrics, his struggles become clearer

When looking at Vlad’s swing, we can see how at the three-quarter mark of his swing, he is chopping down at the ball at a very extreme angle compared to 2025. (-24 vs -28 degree attack angle).

His back foot is also further back in the batter’s box, which is affecting his ability to drive the ball due to a change in his center of gravity. Finally, if you look at the triangle in his left arm, you’ll notice how small it is in 2025 vs 2026. Even in 2024, this triangle is much tighter.

This wider triangle is indicative of a player who is looking to hit pitches on the outer part of the plate, as opposed to driving pitches on the inner half for power. He’s looking to prevent strikeouts, not slug. This is a problem for a $500M USD slugger who at one point looked like he could be a consistent 35-40 HR, .900 OPS hitter.

The 2025 Toronto Blue Jays did force defences to work by putting balls in play and passing the bat off to the next guy. However, in an attempt to conform more to the team’s overall style of play, Vlad has gone completely against what has made him successful historically. He is not a speedster, and although he is more of a complete hitter as opposed to a home run hitter, having 0 at Rogers Centre in 2026 and only 6 all season is absurd. The Jays need him to slug. They don’t need him to try and be Luis Arraez.

It’s easy to look at Vlad’s xSLG, xBA, and xWOBA and wonder why he constantly underperforms his expected metrics, and it’s once again due to his swing. His attack angle at the point of contact is usually 1 to 2 degrees, which is basically a flat swing.

In 2024, which was his best season in the swing tracking era, his attack angle also happened to be the steepest, at a staggering 3 degrees, with a 29-degree swing tilt. Even if this is still somewhat flat, it shows that even with minimal adjustments to optimize lift, his home run and slugging percentages explode:

2023:
Attack Angle - 2°
Swing Tilt - 28°
Attack Direction - 6° Pull
Bat Speed - 75mph
BA vs xBA - .264/.295
SLG vs xSLG - .444/.510
wOBA vs xwOBA - .340/.380

2024:
Attack Angle - 3°
Swing Tilt - 29°
Attack Direction - 0°
Bat Speed- 76 mph
BA vs xBA - .323/.317
SLG vs xSLG - .544/.578
wOBA vs xwOBA - .398/.413

2025:
Attack Angle - 1°
Swing Tilt - 27°
Attack Direction - 4° Pull
Bat Speed - 77mph
BA vs xBA - .292/.300
SLG vs xSLG - .467/.506
wOBA vs xwOBA - .366/.384

2026:
Attack Angle - 1°
Swing Tilt - 28°
Attack Direction - 3° Pull
Bat Speed - 76mph
BA vs xBA - .264/.288
SLG vs xSLG - .355/.407
wOBA vs xwOBA - .309/.340

Vlad’s swing path has always caused him to hit line drives and ground balls. By putting balls within reach of defenders and without blazing speed, he puts his results into their hands. He hits the ball so hard that even with a minimal improvement in lift, he can hit balls over the heads of infielders and also split gaps or get balls down the line and to the wall, past the reach of outfielders.

This season, Vlad has the highest ground ball rate he’s had since 2022, which was the last season he had that was a true disappointment. In 2021, when he hit 48 home runs, it just so happened to coincide with the highest flyball rate (36.5%), the highest hard-hit rate (41.7%), and the 2nd-highest medium-hit rate of his career (47.6%).

He’s also swinging at outside pitches at the highest rate in his career (31%) and making contact with those pitches at an 8% higher rate than any other season in his career. (72.1% vs 64% last season). His willingness to expand the zone to prevent strikeouts has also created an environment where he is only seeing 45% of pitches inside the strike zone, which means unless he’s more willing to take borderline pitches on the outside, this problem will continue.

Long story short, Vladimir Guerrero Jr.’s willingness to conform to the Blue Jays overall team identity has robbed him of his own individual identity. Whether or not that was at Vlad's or the team’s discretion is another conversation entirely, but at the end of the day, you can't afford to have your superstars tied to a leash. They have to be themselves, because that’s what made them so special in the first place.

There are rumours that Vladdy has been dealing with a major back issue, which could be contributing to these problems; however, he hasn’t gone on the IL, so it’s hard for me to put much stock into it when analyzing his stats.

If he is injured, he should go on the IL and get back to optimizing his swing. He could take a lesson from Kazuma Okamoto, who leads the team in home runs, being the only Blue Jay with over 15 (he has 24).

In a sea of Ernie Clement, Nathan Lukes, and Andres Gimenez’s, Vlad needs to be the slugger who drives people in. Not the guy who gets driven in.

When we look at the issues surrounding both Elias Pettersson and Vladimir Guerrero Jr, we can look to the past for how injuries affected superstar players, while also looking at their current situations and how getting away from their individual identities to conform to team identities has robbed them of their unique, high-end skill. Both players and their teams have a duty to fix these issues by any means necessary, and without a proper game plan to accomplish this, these problems could continue to snowball and persist for many seasons.

It is oftentimes said that good things come to those who wait. However, for new Abbotsford Canucks Head Coach Ryan Papaioannou, it would have been easy for a normal man to become dejected, and begin to believe that his time was never going to come.

However, judging by the results he provided to Brooks, it’s safe to say that “Papa” is anything but normal.

If anything, there is ample evidence to suggest that he could be the “Next Big Thing”.

The Prologue

When looking at Papaioannou’s coaching resume, obviously one tenure stands out above everything else. That being a 17 year coaching run with the Brooks Bandits of the AJHL and BCHL.

Before Papaioannou’s arrival to Brooks, the Bandits had played in 8 AJHL seasons, recording a 170-277-8 record, along with 28 ties, according to Elite Prospects.
In those seasons, they had only one winning season.

2004-05’ saw the Bandits, led by 2010-11’ ECHL Performer of the Year Brendan Connolly’s 84 points and 210 PIM’s in 58 games, and backed by 2009 Hobey Baker Finalist, NCAA Goalie of the Year, & 192 NHL Game goaltender Chad Johnson, record a 36-26-2 record, only to lose in the South Division Final to the Camrose Kodiak, being swept 4-0 in the process.

It was the first season in which Brooks allowed less than 200 goals.

The Brooks Bandits did record 29 wins and 29 Reg. + OT Losses in 2005-06’, and a second season in which they allowed less than 200 goals (188), but a 56 goal decrease from 230 to 174 was the bigger story.

In 2006-07’, they went 27-26-6, with 1 tie, and scored 185 goals, an 11 goal increase, but it was drowned out allowing 13 additional goals, once again surpassing 200 goals allowed.

Then, in 2007-08’, Brooks went 23-30-8, with 1 tie. They scored 197 goals, and allowed 228. This was the Bandits’ worse finish since 2003-04’, where they failed to make the playoffs. To make things worse, this was the first time in their playoff history in which they failed to win the Preliminary Round, being swept 3-0 by the Drumheller Dragons.

In August of 2008, Brooks hired Ryan Papaioannou as their sole full-time Assistant Coach. In 2007-08’ Papaioannou had been assistant coach of the Lethbridge Hurricanes AAA team in the Alberta Midget Hockey League.

With Papaioannou on their staff, Lethbridge had recorded a 1.58 standing points per game record, which to this day remains as their Regular Season record, just ahead of their 2017-18’ Championship winning 1.54 mark. Once leaving, Lethbridge dropped to 1.09, 0.91, and 0.76 standing points per game in the 3 years following.

In 2008-09’, Brooks had the best Regular Season in franchise history, winning the South Division with 39 wins, 18 losses, 2 OT Losses, and 3 ties. They recorded 215 goals, and allowed 182. This +33 goal differential was 2 above the 2004-05’ mark.

In the playoffs, Brooks reached the Division Finals for the first time in their history, but lost 4-1 against the Grande Prairie Storm, the eventual winners.

With this newfound success, there was still some staff turnover. GM and Head Coach Brian Curran ended up leaving Brooks, taking a job with the Lloydminster Bobcats, also in the AJHL.

This opened up room for Ryan Papaioannou to be named Head Coach (and Interim General Manager) of the Brooks Bandits on October 16th, 2009.

How would the 25-Year Old first-time Head Coach fare?

Beast Brooks Incarnate

It isn’t as if Ryan was dominant right out of the gate.

When talking about player development, he once said on The Coaches Site’s Glass and Out Podcast,

"As much as we want to have a perfect practice... that's not how the game's played. If we're in that pursuit of player development, we have to be okay with mistakes in practice."

In the pursuit of coaching development, he made mistakes. The Bandits were unable to replicate the success that was 2008-09’. In 2009-10’, they had a 28-27-4 record with 1 tie. They scored 218 goals, and allowed 205. They scored 3 more goals but allowed 23 more. They also lost in the Division Quarterfinals.

However, considering the responsibility that was put upon him, being a 25-year old first time Head Coach and GM, it could easily be considered a success. Success isn’t linear, after all.

Little did Brooks know, 2009-10’ would be the last season in which they would fail to win 35 games (besides the 20 game COVID season).

Ryan Papaioannou was about to kickstart an AJHL dynasty.

In 2010-11’, Brooks rebounded with a 35-18-7 record. Their +26 goal differential was more in line with 2008-09’, and although they lost in the Division Quarterfinals again, there was clear momentum.

Then, 2011-12’ came, and Brooks became truly elite.

Between 2011-12’ and 2024-25’, The Bandits recorded a 692-90-39 record. This is a 86.67% points percentage. In those 15 AJHL/BCHL seasons, the Bandits averaged 266 Goals For, and 128 Goals Against per Season.

They recorded 9 AJHL/BCHL Championships out of 12 possible playoffs.
These losses were in 2013-14’ (Semifinals), 2014-15’ (Finals), and 2017-18’ (Division Finals). In 2019-20’ and 2020-21’, the seasons were interrupted and cancelled due to the COVID Pandemic, and in 2023-24’, the Bandits were expelled from the AJHL along with 4 other clubs for signing deals with a newly-independent BCHL.

A desire for more practice time, better competition, and as a result, a better developmental pathway led to the decision to move to the BCHL.

In the AJHL, teams only had about 3 days a month for full practices, which is hardly conductive for development. In the BCHL, teams spend Monday to Thursday practicing and training. When interviewed by Chat News, Papaioannou stated:

I think for every nine people that were really excited about what we were doing, there’s always one that doesn’t understand…
When we had the ability to finally come out and explain to our stakeholders and all the people in our community what it all meant and why we were doing it, I think it’s only been met with positivity….
People are excited to see different teams next year. They’re excited for the way the games have gone since we’ve made the change.”

This quickly came to fruition for the Bandits, as they won back to back BCHL titles under Papaioannou, being the 5th straight season (not including cancelled seasons) in which the Bandits won a championship.

In 2025-26, the Bandits won again, this time under Papaioannou’s 2-year assistant, Dakota Mason. This gave Brooks their 6th straight season with a championship.

Under Papaioannou, the Bandits won:

• 7 AJHL Championships

• 4 RBC/Centennial Cups (National Junior A Titles)

• 1 Western Canada Cup

• 8 South Division Titles, plus 1 as an assistant

• 6 Regular Season Titles

• 2023-24’ BCHL “Rocky Mountain Challenge” (BCHL Alberta Champion)

The Bandits also set the following AJHL records:

• Most Wins (57) & Fewest Losses (3). (in 2018-19’)

• Longest Winning Streak (33, in 2018-19’)

• Longest Season-Opening Winning Streak (22, in 2019-20’)

• Longest Home-Ice Winning Streak in one season (30, in 2018-19’)

He also won AJHL Coach of the Year 3 times (2013, 2019, & 2022).

Moving On Up

On August 14th, 2025, Ryan was named Head Coach of the Wheeling Nailers of the ECHL, affiliate for the Pittsburgh Penguins of the NHL and Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Penguins of the AHL.

“Adding Ryan to the organization as the head coach of the Wheeling Nailers is a pivotal hire for the Penguins and our development system.

Ryan has consistently delivered winning results, including multiple championships during his 16 years as head coach and general manager of the Brooks Bandits. Additionally, he has a long track record of developing elite players, helping them to reach their potential and while contributing to a winning program. In the coming years, the number of young draft picks and free agents we will have entering pro hockey with our organization will be immense. As a result this hire was of tremendous importance to the Penguins and we are thrilled to get to work with Ryan." - Penguins A.GM Jason Spezza on hiring Ryan Papaioannou

Papaioannou’s hiring was a massive reputation builder, even if his resume speaks for itself. Kyle Dubas, for all of the flack he gets in regards to the “Core 4” era in Toronto, where his “We can, and we will [keep the core 4]” quote was constantly brought up as the Leafs failed to break through the 1st Round, is still highly regarded within analytics circles around hockey.

Now in Pittsburgh, Dubas has done a great job managing a roster that still has Sidney Crosby, Evgeni Malkin, and Kris Letang on it.

He has been able to find ways to make the playoffs while also accumulating draft and prospect capital through trades such as moving Tristin Jarry and Sam Poulin to Edmonton for Stuart Skinner, Brett Kulak, and a 2nd Round Pick. Then, he proceeded to flip Brett Kulak to Colorado for Samuel Girard and another 2nd Round Pick.

He could still flip Girard at some point for additional capital, which means he may find a way to ultimately turn Tristian Jarry into three-2nd Round Picks, maybe more.

Other wins from Dubas include acquiring Egor Chinakhov from Columbus for 2nd Round and 3rd Round Picks, and Chinakhov proceeding to put up 36 points in 41 games. Acquiring a 2nd line-quality scoring winger with size and speed for a 2nd and 3rd is quite handy work.

Dubas has usually been ahead of the curve in terms of hiring coaches, as well. Rookie Coach Dan Muse was recently named a Jack Adams Award Finalist, and Sheldon Keefe was hired by Dubas, and won a Calder Cup with the Marlies while also recording the best winning percentage of any head coach in Maple Leafs history at a .665, 0.74 ahead of 2nd place, legendary Head Coach Pat Quinn.

Needless to say, Dubas’ endorsement holds weight.

In Wheeling, Papaioannou led the Nailers to their best Regular Season since 2003-04’, with a 46-20-6 record, winning the Eastern Conference’s North Division, and losing in the Conference Finals to the inevitable Kelly Cup Champions, the Florida Everblades, who have won 4 of the last 5 Kelly Cups. This was also Wheeling’s best playoff finish in a decade, when they lost in the 2016 Kelly Cup Finals.

He has earned the chance to take the next step, even if he’s only been a pro-coach for one season. His resume is elite, and extremely unique.

Philosophies & Wrap Up

AJHL, BCHL, and even ECHL footage is hard to acquire if you aren’t watching live. However, here is what I’ve gathered from the limited footage I’ve watched.

1. When it comes to offense, Papaioannou prioritizes controlled neutral zone play, and high-tempo puck control. He wants his players to make direct passes to players in stride whenever possible, and demands that his players are constantly moving.

2. He gives his players ample amounts of personal freedom to make plays. Part of the reason why he’s been able to develop players who have played in professional leagues all over the world, including the NHL, AHL, SHL, and KHL, as well developing some NCAA players, is because he understands that as long as a play is made with purpose, and is translatable, it’s better for his players to try and hone in those skills as opposed to coaching them out of them. He is trying to create game-breakers, not high-floor, low-ceiling players.

3. The defense will activate all over the ice. He utilizes a 2-3 OZ spread, which means he has 2 players low, and 3 up high. However, because he prioritizes constant motion, over time the 2-3 will become a 1-3-1 as a defenseman pinches and far side forward slides up towards the point. This rotation not only forces the opponent to adjust their structure based on everchanging situations, but it also allows his teams to maintain possession, change the sides of attack, and account for potential turnovers by having his perimeter players constantly moving.

4. Defensively, he prioritizes heavy forechecking, strict defensive positioning, and wall-play. Similar to Malhotra’s system in Abbotsford, Papaioannou wants his team to use hard rims to the weak side in order to open up the opponents’ forecheck, allowing for easier exits. When asked about his defensive rigidity, he said,

“I think buy-in is probably the biggest thing. The game’s hard, and you have to do a lot of hard things to win. You have to be able to get guys excited to block shots and to backcheck and to do the little things for each other. I think that’s probably what’s contributed to most of the success of my teams, and it’s hard. It’s building that environment where guys see themselves as part of something bigger.” - Ryan Papaioannou in The Province

Papaioannou has also gone through extremely rough moments as a head coach, and has been able to lead his teams through adversity. On July 5th, 2011, Brooks Bandit forward Nick Crosby unfortunately passed away in a car accident. The Bandits retired Crosby’s #23, and dedicated their 2011-2012 Championship Season to Nick.

At the time, Papaioannou was a 27 year old Head Coach and GM, and even at such a young age (for a head coach), he was able to manage the emotions of men as young as 16 years old, and channel them into something that they could use to honour Nick, even if it would never make up for the loss of a well-loved teammate. Also, as GM, having to make decisions while separating yourself from your coaching opinions shows an ability to remain objective, and stick to a structure, both on and off the ice.

By all accounts, Ryan is a very good person, who takes pride in developing good players. Why did it take so long for him to make the jump from Junior A to the Professional Level? It’s hard to tell for sure, however rumour has it that he ruffled feathers by constantly advocating for players to go to the NCAA as part of their development, which the Old-Boys Club known as Hockey Canada wasn’t exactly happy with.

Nonetheless, Ryan Papaioannou is a fantastic coach who should have been given an opportunity much sooner. Obviously I am not trying to create any dissent, but judging by the average NHL Head Coach tenure length, there is actually a decent chance that the next Canucks team to make the playoffs will be manned by Papaioannou, and not Malhotra.

That is of course, if a smart team doesn’t poach him from the Canucks first.

Thank you for reading!

Sometimes you have to try and make the best of a bad situation. This is what I aim to achieve with this post.

Over the last few months, my wife’s family cat, Husky, had been slowing down. He wasn’t eating as much as he used to, he didn’t really have the urge to play or hunt as frequently, and he much preferred to just lounge around and snuggle up to my sister-in-law. We knew Husky was older, being ~13-years-old (or so we thought), so slowing down was to be expected. He had lived for the first 4 years of his life as a feral outdoor cat, and had developed arthritis at an early age as a result of all the impact that a combination of hunting and cold weather (he was found up in Northern BC) will tend to help expedite.

However, when my wife woke me up just before midnight on Monday, and told me that Husky was crossing the rainbow bridge on Wednesday the 15th, it shocked us.

We hadn’t seen Husky since early January, as the move from Langley to Vancouver Island and all that came with that (finding jobs, housing, education, medical, moving supplies, etc.) meant we couldn’t spend as much time going to see her family. Last we had saw Husky was when we cat-sitted him for a month, and although he had slowed down, he still looked happy and healthy for his age.

Needless to say, my wife’s birthday (Tuesday) was more-or-less ruined, and I didn’t really pay attention in either of my classes. It was all too sudden, and it hurt a lot.

However, in the days since, I’ve thought about Husky and all the good he did for my wife, her family, and even me. It might seem ridiculous to think that an animal can actually leave a lasting impact on a family beyond its life, but I can assure you that Husky gave me a first hand learning experience in certain ways that I can apply to both my future career, and life in general.

Follow The Leader

This is Lehma (means “Cow” in Estonian, as all of her littermates were named, but in different languages), my wife-and-I’s 9-year-old cat. She was adopted by my wife at 8 weeks of age from an organization called VOKRA. Lehma’s mother was found pregnant, and gave birth to the litter while in the care of a foster family.

Looking back on it, both my wife and I recognize that separating a cat from her mother at that age is likely not ideal for their development. Of course, Lehma is a housecat, so we’re able to make sure her “flaws” don’t result in any harm, but at the end of the day, she didn’t have enough time with her mother or siblings to develop a ton of skills surrounding things like hunting, play, grooming, and other things that even housecats need to develop in order to have happy, satisfying lives.

Enter Husky. Now 4 years old (again, or so we thought), Husky immediately stepped in and played the role of Big Brother for Lehma.

While Lehma was never going to need to learn how to hunt in order to eat like Husky had, he still did his best to teach her how to at least imitate hunting in the form of play, whether it was scaring Lehma from behind, and faking being scared when Lehma would replicate his actions, or whether Husky would actually attempt to hunt in the backyard, with Lehma close by, watching his every move.

When the Canucks signed Jamie Oleksiak on July 1st to a 2 year, $5M AAV contract, it was coming off the back of trading veteran defenseman and known locker room leader Marcus Pettersson to the New York Rangers for a 2030 First Round Pick (Top 10 Protected). Everyone who knows how Oleksiak plays will tell you that he isn’t going to have the same overall combination of defensive ability and mobility that Marcus had.

To be straight forward with it, Marcus Pettersson is a better defenseman than Jamie Oleksiak, and that’s okay to say without it being a slight to Oleksiak. However, Oleksiak did offer something that the Canucks needed, that being a large, imposing presence on the backend that can play in the lineup every night alongside one of their two talented top 4 defenders, Zeev Buium or Tom Willander.

Because of his handedness, chances are Oleksiak will slide into a D-Pair with Willander. And to be completely honest, for a rebuilding Canucks team that is expecting to go through a series of growing pains, I could not think of a better temporary fill-in for the Canucks AND Willander.

For those who don’t know, Willander was a forward until he was ~16 years old. The fact he was able to convert positions and be the 11th overall pick in 2023 is honestly astounding. However, it hasn’t been without it’s struggles.

Whether or not we want to put the entire blame on Adam Foote’s chaotic defensive structure and archaic teachings is a conversation for another day.

However, the microstats show that Willander, even with the best mobility of any Canucks defenseman last season, and while showcasing very great instances of poise, struggled with DZ Retrievals. He would oftentimes be late getting to pucks chipped behind him, and the lack of support around him (combined with some very tough deployment after Myers was moved) created an environment where Willander was being asked to do far too much with the puck.

It wasn’t all bad, however. Although Willander did surrender a ton of zone entry chances, a lot of that can be applied to system-centric issues, as his actual individual numbers regarding denials per 60 and denial % were great for a 20 year old defenseman playing in elevated minutes.

Enter Oleksiak. While not demonstrating the same level of all-around defensive dominance that Marcus Pettersson was able to demonstrate in his first half season in Vancouver, and throughout his tenure in Pittsburgh, Oleksiak should be more than capable of providing a nurturing developmental environment for Willander.

The way you develop kids into capable, driven adults is by giving them the space to try new things, stretch their talent to it’s full capability, and then offering a soft landing in case they fail, while also encouraging them to give it another try.

With athletes, it’s very similar. In this case, Willander’s clear mobility and flashes of puck moving brilliance showcases what he could become when he’s 23/24 years old. However, last season he was being stretched paper-thin, and didn’t have the support needed to have a soft landing. Poor structure, including a system that went completely against what made Marcus Pettersson a successful defender, and a starting goalie with an .875 sv% meant that oftentimes, any mistake would result in a scoring chance that was ending up in the back of the Canucks net.

How does that encourage a young player to keep taking kicks at the can? If every mistake you make results in a goal against, chances are you’re going to attempt to reign things in to prevent these mistakes from ever happening. This results in overcorrection, which in the long run will hinder you from reaching your true ceiling.

Oleksiak is a fantastic secondary puck mover, and can retrieve pucks in the DZ. He can take those responsibilities from Willander to stop any threats, and due to his inability to be a primary puck mover, can still give Willander the bulk of those responsibilities. This way, Willander won’t have to be responsible for the bulk of both stopping opponents at the blueline, and going all the way back for loose pucks.

Oleksiak will also be able to help Willander hone in his talents as a transition-stopping defenseman. His reach and size will be a major plus, but his composure and confidence as a blueline stalwart should rub off on Willander, giving him the confidence to use his own size (6’1”, 195lbs), to the best of his ability, and offer some techniques that perhaps he hadn’t thought off.

Plus, Oleksiak is a fighter, when push comes to shove. He will square up with heavyweight fighters (he has fought Nic Deslauriers 3 times, for example), which should help protect Willander from opponents who aim to take runs at him.

He’s what you want out of a veteran defenseman.

Wisdom Comes With Age

Looking at Luke Schenn and Zeev Buium, you’d be hard pressed to find a way in which they’re similar, both now or even if you looked at Luke Schenn in his prime.

It’s not as if Luke Schenn was ever an elite puck moving defenseman with sky-high offensive talent and agility that is only seen by a handful of the top defensemen in the league. In fact, you could argue that the two of them are polar opposites.

However, Schenn’s story of resilience, and the dedication he displays for the crest he wears, his teammates, and the organization as a whole is something that Buium, the rest of the Canucks young talent, and the organization in general can take note of.

Will Schenn play 82 games in 2026-27’? I hope not. With young defensemen Elias Pettersson and Kirill Kudryavtsev (who can play both sides) knocking at the door, Schenn’s age (turns 37 in November), and declining mobility, he isn’t much more than a culture add.

But for a rebuilding team that is trying to rid itself of the cancerous locker room culture that festered for years, and move towards a more positive environment for staff, veterans, and young talent alike, this is an awesome move.

Remember when Quinn Hughes got his first point as a Canuck against the Kings? While Boeser was celebrating on his butt, and Petey and Hughes were tending to him, Schenn was over in the slot, challenging the Kings to fighting him because one of them had taken a run at Hughes a few seconds earlier.

Did Schenn have to do that? No. It’s easy for players to say “punish them on the scoreboard” and use that as an excuse as to why they didn’t engage. After all, why does it matter if you scored? However, context matters.

The Canucks are going into this season with the expectation that they’re going to lose games, and they’re aiming to develop their players instead. With that in mind, as long as it helps teach the group of young talent how to play and behave like a team, who cares if you take a few too many minor penalties after the whistle?

Of course, you don’t want to venture into undisciplined territory, but showing that you will not let your young teammates get pushed around is one hell of a way to endear yourself to a fanbase and to your teammates.

The Canucks young defensemen have already stated that they couldn’t imagine the support that would come their way if they made the playoffs, considering how much support the fans gave them as the 32nd Ranked team in the NHL. Zeev Buium also made a point to mention how now-Seattle Kraken Curtis Douglas came to him and said that if anyone were to touch Zeev, they’d be a dead man walking.

As a culture guy with ample amount of toughness, resilience, and character, your job is to provide your young teammates with the room to breathe, play confidently, teaching them the ropes and how to be professional, and while helping to fill in the gaps that they might have, allow them to continue to stand out.

Which is exactly what Husky did for Lehma.

Ending

When my wife and I got Penny, she was also a recently feral cat, albeit much younger than Husky. She still had some gaps in her knowledge, and Husky also helped her in the limited time they spent together, which was usually limited to when my wife and I housed Husky during one of my sister-in-laws trips into the BC Interior.

However, the gaps that couldn’t be filled in by Husky were certainty filled in by Lehma. Although Lehma had adapted her own style to teaching Penny the ropes (for example, Lehma would catch pray animals outside but not kill them, instead holding onto them and letting them go, as she much preferred her kibble), she was and continues to be a great big sister to Penny.

Do they share the same relationship that Lehma and Husky had? No. Penny is much higher energy than Husky or Lehma have ever been, and this irritates Lehma to the point where she’ll growl when Penny wants to instigate play one too many times.

Their personalities are different, and that’s okay. However, they still love each other. When one of them is sick, the other goes out of their way to not annoy the other, and my wife and I have even caught them grooming the sick sibling. They’ll nap together, even with their butts touching, which indicates that they trust each other and don’t feel any angst around one another when calm.

At the end of the day, they’re family. They don’t have to necessarily be inseparable, staying within tail’s length at all times. However, they still spend time around each other and enjoy the time they do spend. Their bond has grown.

In hockey, the same applies. Do you have to be best friends with your teammates? No. Do you have to spend every waking moment with them? No.

However, when push comes to shove, you have to be willing to protect them. You have to be willing to fight for them. You need to support them, and when the time comes, you need to become the player and person that passes those teaching and the culture down to the next generation that comes up after you.

They say people die twice. Once when they take their final breath, and another when someone speaks their name for the last time.

For Athletes, you could argue it’s thrice. The two I mentioned above, but their first death comes when they retire. It’s something they fight again until it happens, and sometimes that comes at the expense of younger players. Luke Schenn, Jamie Oleksiak, and even Brendan Gallagher are comfortable in their own skin. They know their roles. They know what they came to Vancouver to accomplish.

And hopefully when the time comes, Zeev Buium, Tom Willander, and others will know when it’s their time to pass the torch. That’s how you build a championship level culture both on and off the ice.

For my wife and I, Husky was our Championship Leader.

We’ll miss you buddy. We Love you Husky.

July 7th, 2022. Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

I was 21 years old, in Montreal playing in the 2022 NHL Gaming World Championship. I lost in the quarter finals to the 2023 winner, Jos x 10 (Joseph Olmstead), and while disappointed that I had lost, I was extremely happy with my overall performance, being top 8 in North America in a tournament that began with 17,291 people.

The disappointment I felt when I lost 5-4 in Game 3 vs Jos was likely nothing compared to the disappointment Shane Wright must have felt when Juraj Slafkovsky was drafted 1st overall by the hosting Montreal Canadiens. That disappointment was amplified when the New Jersey Devils went with defenseman Simon Nemec at 2nd Overall. When the Arizona Coyotes drafted Logan Cooley at 3rd Overall, his disappointment became anger.

I was inside Centre Bell that night, and when Montreal drafted Juraj Slafkovsky, there were boos. When Wright didn’t get drafted 2nd or 3rd, there was audible shock throughout the arena. It’s a core memory of mine that I’ll likely never forget. An entire arena basically wondering “what the hell was happening?”

Eventually being selected 4th Overall by the Seattle Kraken, Shane Wright went up on stage, smiled with Gary Bettman, and as soon as the picture was taken, gave a death stare not seen since Rookie Elias Pettersson (Forward) spoke to Vancouver media.

Shane Wright recently stated that the death stare was not intentional, but that it gave him a massive chip on his shoulder, one that he still has.

With recent reports that Wright has requested a trade from Seattle, and Vancouver being his preferred destination, does it make sense for the Canucks to make a move?

The Beauty of Suffering

Shane Wright at one point was considered to be a surefire #1 Center in the NHL, even before his draft year. Being named associate captain of the OHL’s Kingston Frontenacs at age 15, Wright put up a staggering 39 goals and 66 points in 58 games.

Remember, this was his draft - 2 season. Wright was not legal driving age until a week after being named associate captain. Combine this excellent production in the OHL with 7 points in 5 U17 games for team Canada at the U17 World Hockey Championships, it looked like the sky was the limit for Shane.

Then.. COVID happened. It wiped out an entire season of his development, and this is where things started to get weird for him.

In his draft season, it was assumed he would have some monster season, and to be fair, he still had 94 points in 63 games, with 32 goals, good enough for top 10 in OHL scoring. But when you look at his D-2 season, and see how other players before him developed, a new question began to circulate.

”Has Wright already peaked?”. The question is unfair, of course. Being unable to play for a full season combined with a changing Kingston roster left Wright with a lot of uncertainty when it came to his teammates. However, his teammate Lucas Edmonds, albeit 20 years old, had 113 points in 68 games. What was so different between Edmonds and Wright’s deployment that allowed him to get 19 more points in 5 more games, even when you consider the 2 year age gap?

The fact of the matter is that these questions began to affect Wright’s draft stock, and with Juraj Slafkovsky winning Olympic MVP, becoming the youngest player to ever achieve the honour, combined with his unbelievable combination of size, skating, and hands led him to being the first pick.

His D+1 season was weird, rotating between Seattle, Coachella (AHL), and Windsor (OHL). He had 1 goal, 1 assist in his 8 NHL games, 4 goals and 2 assists in 8 AHL games, and 15 goals and 22 assists in 20 OHL games.

In the playoffs, he put up 3 points in 4 OHL games and 9 points in 24 AHL games.
Yet another funky season for Wright.

His D+2 season seemed to be the beginning for an upwards swing for Wright.
In 8 NHL games he recorded 4 goals and 1 assist, and in 59 AHL games, he recorded 22 goals and 25 assists, adding another 13 points in 12 playoff games.

For a 20 year old, these stats are very impressive. However, because of where Wright was 3/4 seasons prior, this was viewed as a disappointment. Fast forward to 2024-25’, and Wright puts up 19 goals and 25 assists for 44 points in 79 games.

At this point, you have to think he’s arrived, right? Well unfortunately for Shane, last season he only recorded 12 goals and 15 assists in 74 games.

Shane Wright’s development has been downright weird.

Player, or Team?

I don’t feel bad about saying this: Seattle has been one of the most irrelevant franchises in the NHL.

As a Canucks fan, I understand that they have not necessarily been run the greatest over the last decade and a half. However, outside of a first round win against Colorado, what has Seattle really done?

They’re heading into year 6 of the franchise, and it seems like they’re in the same spot now as they were when the franchise kicked off. Except, they seem to believe they can contend in a Pacific Division that albeit weak last season, has juggernauts at the top (Vegas, Edmonton), with potentially 2 more on their way (San Jose, Anaheim).

When Seattle went out and tried to trade for Artemi Panarin and offered 4 x 14M, they were turned down. When they tried to execute a sign-and-trade for Jason Robertson which would have seen Robertson make $15M annually on an 8 year contract, they were also turned down.

Clearly, players don’t see the value in going to Seattle.

When looking at player development, there aren’t a lot of stories to talk about.

Their top center, and first ever draft selection, Matty Beniers, peaked as a rookie, scoring 24 goals and adding 33 assists for 57 points. All 3 of these are still career highs. Since, he has recorded 37, 43, and 50 points, without recording more than 20 goals in any of those seasons. He has great defensive metrics that balance some of the lack of production out, though.

For a 2nd overall pick, you’re hoping to draft a franchise changing player. Not a player that looks to be a 2nd line center. Their 2023 draft looks to have produced next to nothing, with their first round pick Eduard Sale failing to record 0.5 ppg in both of his AHL seasons.

Berkly Catton and Jake O’Brian might be good but it’s too early to tell, and Chase Reid was just drafted.

It could be argued that their best case of development in which a player exceeded expectations is Joey Daccord, and Seattle didn’t even grab him until he was 25, becoming a full-fledged starter at age 27.

In the last two seasons, Wright has ranked 6th in goals and points at 5v5 for Seattle, yet has been 25th in 5v5 ice time per game. Failing to reward your prospects for producing (more goals, assists, and points per 60 than Beniers) is a surefire way to stagnate their development and leave them frustrated.

Simply put, Seattle is not good at player development, and when combined with Wright’s tricky career and development path, it shouldn’t be surprising to see Wright suffer as a result.

The Numbers

When diving into Shane Wright’s analytic profile, it’s easy to look at the sea of red and wonder if it’s even worth the time discussing about acquiring him. However, there are some key stats here that might give us an idea of what Wright is, and could become.

First off, he suffers from some of the things that people bring up when talking about Elias Pettersson.

He makes a ton of passes from the center lane, and is great in transition. In fact, when it comes to creating chances off controlled entries (entries in which the puck is carried instead of dumped/chipped in), you could say that Wright is elite. He sets up a lot of chances, but those chance assists aren’t reciprocated.

When you combine this with his shooting heatmap, it helps contextualize his forechecking and rebound analytics, too. He is usually F1 on the forecheck, and is used in a role where he battles at the net front and bangs in chances, occasionally cycling up high or getting a shot off the rush from just above the dots.

His average shot distance was 24.3 feet, and his average goal distance was 15.2 feet.

Here is a good example of what Shane Wright was doing in Lane Lambert’s system.

He applies pressure to the goalie, and when the puck goes up high he comes up into the high slot and loops back towards the net. When the pass goes from east to west, Wright is at the net front, waiting for an opportunity. Montour takes a shot from outside the dots, and Wright creates enough of a disturbance to prevent a clean cover from the Ottawa netminder, eventually cashing in the rebound. He can do this well, but I do believe he is being limited by Seattle’s system.

In Lane Lambert’s 3 years as head coach in NYI and Seattle, his teams have put up below average offensive numbers in all of those seasons. To be fair, the teams he was given weren’t built to win with offense, but to put up anemic numbers year after year shows a trend that perhaps Wright is in a system that doesn’t benefit his actual talents.

In 2024-25’ (the most recent data I could find), Seattle recorded 33.75 entries per game, a touch above league average. However, when it came to generating chances off the rush, the Kraken were in the bottom 7.

This season, Shane Wright was the best Kraken player at creating chances off of zone entries, with 4.19 per 60. No other Kraken was above 3.66 (Berkly Catton). They were the only 2 players with a rate per 60 above 3.50.

In Lambert’s system, where Entries are used to set up as opposed to create high danger chances, Wright is left in a position where his best offensive asset is being wasted, and when it comes to shooting, he isn’t being set up in high danger areas to score, instead relying on rebounds (like above) to produce.

Since Wright doesn’t have all-world, elite talent in any facete of his offensive game, he needs to be a duel-scoring threat to produce. By playing in a system where his team passes up rush chances and only works off the cycle, this limits Wright’s ability to produce. If he is going to succeed in an NHL top 6, he needs to be in a balanced system that has a emphasis on making controlled rush plays.

Defensively, Wright struggles a lot. He makes late reads on pucks behind him, fails to read pressure and often overestimates the time he has, or overestimates his ability to get away from pressure. Often times, elite player will lure players in only to make a move at the last possible moment in order to ensure that a successful move will provide the maximum amount of separation from their opponent. Wright often waits to long and is stuffed as a result. When he does though, he can exit the zone adequately. However, the fact that he struggles with retrievals as much as he does, combined with fantastic zone entry chance metrics leads me to wonder if he could be a RW/C hybrid.

Ideal Linemates

So, Shane Wright is someone who can create chances off zone entries, and is at minimum a secondary zone entry threat. He struggles in the defensive zone, and has a hard time reading pressure when attempting exits. In the O-Zone, he sets up chances and scores on rebounds, but doesn’t get controlled chances yet having a shot that can score on goalies from the high slot?

This sounds like a job for EP40 and Linus Karlsson.

Over the last few years, Elias Pettersson has used all of his offensive powers in creating chances for his linemates, without seeing chances come his way. It’s one of the main reasons he hasn’t scored 20 goals in either of his last 2 seasons.

Wright could provide both secondary zone entry support, and work at the net front, which is what Pettersson could feed off of to get more assists in front and more goals off the rush.

When working with Linus Karlsson (who I believe should be alongside EP40 as well), they could form a duo down low that excels in small spaces, causing havoc at the net front while also being able to execute low to high passes off of retrievals and forechecks, which should give Pettersson more space in the high slot where he can either release his wrist shot or feed it to the back door for a tap in.

The Canucks should still attempt to develop Wright as a center, but with his defensive deficiencies and poor faceoff ability, it might be one of those cases where you have Pettersson babysit Wright, while also allowing Wright to fill in at center during select times, for example if Pettersson is caught deep in the OZ due to a forecheck or counter attack.

This allows Wright to get valuable center reps in while also giving EP40 the ability to actually attack deep instead of always worrying about the play turning up ice.

Would there be growing pains? Yes. However, this is a rebuild. The pain is only just beginning, and if Vancouver got Wright it would be organizational malpractice to completely forego his center development.

With Buium and Willander on the backend, they could provide enough mobility to help make up for Wright’s struggles on retrievals while also giving them a 4th offensive option on the transition, which should provide Wright with more time and space to distribute off the rush.

Wrap Up

I didn’t want to talk about any personality issues that may or may not be there with Wright. When I heard him described as an “Alpha”, it spooked me, but at the same time we have to remember that the description was used by one person, and depending on what you believe about the word, it doesn’t have to mean toxic.

If it means he can develop into a leader, that is completely different that someone who is demanding to players in a way that makes him uncomfortable to be around.

When it comes to the price of Wright, I am unsure of what it would be.

I think if the Canucks can move DeBrusk for a 2nd + 3rd, they could use one of their three 2nd Round Picks (CBJ, DAL, + DeBrusk Pick) along with someone like Jonathan Lekkerimaki to create the foundation needed to acquire Wright.

I don’t know if Seattle would want a center as well in return, but if so they could take Aatu Raty, who is loved by Canucks faithful, who might be nothing more than a 3C play stopper due to his poor skating.

Would Lekkerimaki, Raty, and a 2nd get the job done? I could see a world where a group of people think it’s too much, and others think it’s not enough. It’s a very weird trade to think about considering where Seattle wants to go versus what the reality of their situation is.

Maybe Drew O Connor could be part of a deal since Seattle loves 3rd line wingers? I genuinely don’t know.

Regardless, if the opportunity presents itself without trading Buium or Willander the Canucks should definitely jump on it. In rebuilds you have to take swings, and the upside on Wright (potential top 6 pivot center or 3rd forward on a top line) far surpasses the ceiling on what you could get from a second round pick.

It’s just a matter of comparing the potential against the prospects you’re giving up. If Vancouver doesn’t see Lekkerimaki as part of their future, move him now while he holds value.

With that said, this is an interesting development in an offseason that has already seen Vancouver make clear rebuilding moves. Could they be swinging high on upside by trading for Wright? We shall see. Thank you for reading!

His Predecessor

Last season was a tumultuous one for the Canucks. A captain traded, multiple top 6 players injured, more locker room turmoil. As a fan, it was a nightmare. For any of the players or staff on the Canucks, I’d imagine it was so much worse.

Adam Foote was put in a situation where he could not win. He was never going to be able to keep Hughes in Vancouver, and he was never going to be the guy to turn the ship around after an extremely disappointing 2024-25’ season. Foote didn’t do much too much to help himself, either.

His system was.. interesting, to say the least.

In the offensive zone, the team prioritized low to high plays, so much in fact that it almost felt like they were purposefully avoiding the middle of the ice. When it came to forechecking, the team would use a 1-2-2, which is common, but with certain alterations they would often end up in a 1-1-1-2 formation, which would allow for easy breakouts and 3 on 2s against on a consistent basis.

In the neutral zone, the team would activate the far side defenseman at every opportunity, but would commonly make the mistake of utilizing high danger cross ice passes to the point where they would become predictable, resulting in turnover chances galore.

Then, we get to the defensive zone. If you look a Canucks fan in the eyes and say “Man defense”, there is a fair chance that they’ll get haunting flashbacks with an effect on their psyche not seen since men returned from the Great War. The amount of times where the Canucks would seem lost, whether it was understanding their check, when to break the system and support, or even something as simple as tying up a stick versus taking a body in front, was staggering.
As a result, the Canucks finished with 314 goals against last season, 19 more than the 31st ranked Toronto Maple Leafs. That is 3.83 goals against per game.

Needless to say, the Adam Foote experiment in Vancouver was a failure all around.

How do Manny Malhotra’s systems differ from Adam Foote’s? How will they help the young players develop, and how will they assist in helping to rebound the production and value of countless Canucks players? Let’s dive into it.

The Forecheck

Diagram Legend:
Black line + Arrow = primary line of attack.
Blue = Assigned Coverage
Checkered Line = Secondary assignment based on play development
Green = Pass

Formation: 1-2-2, with Aggressive & Conservative variations
Aggressive Objective: Cut off the far side half of the ice, force the D up the wall. Force a play up the wall or a covered pass up the middle.
Conservative Objective: Cut off far side half of the ice, taking away up options up ice, forcing him to beat F1 and carry the puck himself through the middle, or make a contested pass.

When breaking down the 1-2-2, it’s important to note that the level of aggressiveness isn’t just determined by the score. It’s also determined by factors such as the opponent’s puck moving ability, the speed of the center, and the aggressiveness of the far side defenseman.

For Malhotra’s version of the 1-2-2, it relies on F1 (ideally the player with the best combination of speed, physicality, and positional IQ, but usually just the forward closest to the puck) being able to cut off half of the ice.

When F1 establishes his target, he will remain close to the hip of the puck-carrying defenseman (Orange #4). This is to force him up the wall, while providing enough of a buffer to prevent either a cutback or reverse play.

Once the defenseman establishes this skating path, F2 has a decision to make. Either he feels like he can close the gap between himself and the defenseman to step up and seal off the half wall, creating a man power advantage along the boards with the intent of stripping the puck. If F2 cannot confidently close the gap, he will either seal off the pass along the half wall, or he will fall back and shadow the opponents center (Orange #3)

F3’s read is to either stick with the opponent’s center (if F2 dives deep), or read and keep a sizable gap between himself an the far side defenseman.

Where the 1-2-2 can break down is when the defenseman is able to beat F1 & 2, whether it’s by carrying the puck or a pass to the center who either beats F3 with his skating, or bumps the puck to an activated far side defenseman (Orange #5).

If this happens, the far side forward (Orange #1) will make a diagonal cut through the middle, and the far side defenseman will accelerate up ice. This will set up a 4 on 3 or a 3 on 2 from the opponent’s blueline through the neutral zone.

This version of 1-2-2, if successful, has the added benefit of allowing the offense to immediately set up a Half-Ice Overload cycle, with a low, high, and middle option depending on who retrieves the puck.

Neutral Zone

Formation: 1-1-3
Objective: Force opponent up one half of the ice. As F1 follows in behind the puck carrier, F2 will cut off the middle to prevent a pass or cutback. Either the strong side defenseman (Blue #4) or far side winger (Blue #3, on the bench side of the ice) will pinch up. Goal is to force a dump-in or a contested pass through the middle.

The 1-1-3 is boring. Very boring, in fact. The idea is to cut off cross-ice passes and entries between the dots. Unlike the 1-3-1, which is meant to create turnovers before the red line that can result in quick-strikes, but is susceptible to fast breakouts that include indirect or diagonal puck movement, the 1-1-3 is designed to force puck movement at some point between the red line and defensive blueline.

This is achieved by a combination of back pressure from F1, Off-Puck Intelligence from F2, and an aggressive step-up + rotation from some combination of F3, D1, and D2 (Blue #3, 4, & 5).

In a successful 1-1-3, F1 will ideally force the breakout up the strong side of the ice. F2 will remain in the middle of the ice, slightly shifted towards the puck, while remaining either in front of or slightly ahead of the opponents nearest passing option.
F3 or D2 will step up to force puck movement, as the other two players rotate in the event of a successful pass.

Assuming the dump-in is forced, typically the far side player (Blue #5) will retrieve the puck, and the strong side player will either retreat and rotate behind them to act either as a decoy, or become a legitimate passing option should the puck be reversed behind the net.

If the opponent is able to make a pass to the center as F2 closes, F1 is able to maintain their momentum and switch as the primary back checker, either to apply back pressure, or is able to shadow the far side defenseman (Orange #5) in the event he activates through the neutral zone and into the high slot.

The 1-1-3 doesn’t require the entire 5-man unit to be fast. It requires smart players who understand what their role is at any given moment, and 1 mobile defenseman who can be dependable on puck retrievals.

1-1-3’s do result in a lack of offense off the counter-attack, and it almost guarantees that your opponent will cross center-ice. However, it does prevent the most dangerous of entries, and ensures that even if the opponent is able to move the puck through F2 and the strong side blue-line player, there is enough back pressure that it forces the opponent to continue moving up-ice as opposed to being patient and opening up the high slot.

To give an example of a Neutral Zone counter, on the play above, once the strong side player on the blueline strips the puck from the opponent, they will look to move the puck to defenseman in the middle of the ice, and then tail the defenseman as they make their read up ice.

F2 will turn and explode up the middle of the ice to push both defensemen back, and hopefully force the opposing far side forward (Orange #3) to hesitate forechecking. The far side player on the blueline will activate, behaving as the far side winger. This is to prevent the counter from only having 2 players providing up ice pressure, as well as giving his defenseman an option to flip the side of the ice in which they’re attacking.

Depending on Orange #3’s lane of attack and Orange #5’s initial read off the counter, there will be an option to either send it to the activated far side player (In this example, Blue #5), or up the middle of the ice to a streaking F2.

F1 will swing up as the third forward into the rush, either to crash the far post, act as a retrieval option on a rimmed puck, or as an option in the high slot should an odd man rush chance develop.

Offensive Zone

Structure: Half-Ice Overload, Triangle. Heavy emphasis on possession

The idea of an overload is to have a healthy presence of high and low support, using a combination of motion and side-switching to create misdirection amongst the defense. It allows the offense to use the constant movement (as well as the net) to create screens and natural, legal picks, which opens up the soft spots of the ice, including both the low and high slots, as well as the back post.

Things the offense can do to further establish advantages are things like exchanges, where two forwards will execute a give in go in small space in an attempt to get two defenders to either run into each other or have the passing forward set a pick.

Another thing they can do is having the forward in the middle (Blue #3) attempt to cut in front of the net front defenseman (Orange #4) to either drive the net for a tip, or give the board side winger an opportunity to walk into the high slot and shoot.

On this play from February 16th 2026, Abbotsford executes a beautiful overload play above the goal line. Bains creates the entry and delays enough to allows the offense to set up.

Bains then cuts back on the wall and feeds Neilsen, who then executes a backhand pass through the Ontario Reign’s triangle to Jonathan Lekkerimaki who snipes the puck into the top corner. Here are a few things to note:

- By cutting up and around the far side winger, Lekkerimaki uses him as a pick to separate himself from the coverage of Joe Hicketts (Ontario #27).

- When Neilsen executes his pass, he doesn’t dart directly to the back post. Instead, he loops around the Ontario triangle. This accomplishes two things. One, it prevents Hicketts from being able to close the gap that has formed between him and Lekkerimaki, and it provides temporary separation between Neilsen and Ontario #45.

- Bains doesn’t activate towards the net until Neilsen has made the pass to Lekkerimaki, this forces Ontario #78 to follow him to the net in case of a rebound or thread pass. Instead, this provides Lekkerimaki more space, and creates a shooting lane.

The reason this works very well with Malhotra’s 1-2-2 forecheck is if they’re able to strip the puck from the puck carrier, this offensive triangle will be formed naturally from the second they gain possession of the puck, allowing the offense to start the cycle quickly, and strike quickly, too.

There are times where the Abbotsford Canucks would bring a winger up high to shoot the puck through traffic or for a deflection, but instead of having a 2-3 formation up top, the far side defenseman will activate towards the back post, looking for a potential rebound or pass. So yes, there still are point shots in this system.

Notice as Lekkerimaki rotates up high, the far side defenseman begins to attack down hill while maintaining an open stance for a potential pass. Once Lekkerimaki dedicates himself to a shot, Woo rotates back in case of a block, and the far side defenseman pushes hard to lose his man, and create a 3v2 manpower advantage at the net front.

The shot does get deflected in, but it should demonstrate that no matter if the puck is low or high in the OZ, Manny Malhotra’s teams are constantly trying to find ways to create manpower advantages around the ice, and thus creating more offense.

Defensive Zone

F1 = Green, F2 = Blue, F3 = Red, D1 = Yellow, D2 = Purple.
Other colours mean there is overlap.

Formation: Strict Zone Low, with potential switches on the high half wall.

Manny Malhotra’s Defensive Zone Structure is similar to Rick Tocchet’s, that being a Box + 1. However, from my viewings of Abbotsford show that there are differences in how it operates. It isn’t a strict positional version of man defense, in which F1 is always the center, F2 is always the LW, etc.

Instead, this zone defense focuses more on who the first forward back is. If the RW is first man back, he will take F1 until there is an appropriate time to switch. For the defense, it depends on who is first back and where they are on the ice. Even if you typically see LHD on the left side and vice versa, it’s more important to get the structure set up as fast as possible.

I will mention also that there are times where the center in particular can deviate from their zone, particularly if the strong side defenseman drives the opponent up the half wall, or if there is a battle along the boards. In the event of D1 + F2 pinching a forward up the wall, the center can either cut off the middle lane or attack up to the strong side defenseman (Orange #4) and have F2’s momentum swing down into F1’s original positioning

F1 and both Defensemen are supposed to execute tie ups in front while maintaining body positioning. F2 and F3 will push up towards the point, to swarm the puck carrier and block any potential D-to-D one timer.

If the strong side defenseman and forward are beat off the wall, The remaining 3 will collapse to the middle in an attempt to fortify the slot and nullify any manpower advantages low. In exchange for this, the far side defenseman is left wide open.

If the puck is tapped over to them, this enables them to walk down hill completely unencumbered, looking for a potential shot, either direct or for a tip, and a potential passing option to the backdoor or strong side flank.

In the event of a rebound to the far wall, the center must come out of their zone and retrieve the puck, while the weak side winger collapses down to take away the board side winger who has moved over into the middle as the opponent rotates to the puck side.

To make things more clear, the zone structure is much more strict low in the Defensive Zone. Up high, and when the puck goes cross ice, there are some rotations and reads that can be made to increase defensive effectiveness, and also jump start a DZ to OZ counter, should the defense retrieve a loose puck or strip it from an opponent.

The objective is to create man power advantages along the wall, and prevent high danger passes. The main counter to this is activating the far side defenseman and executing either 2 short passes or 1 cross ice pass through the sides of the box.

Breakouts

Formation (Retrieval): Reversal, F3 Blast, F1 + F2 Strong Side Slant
Formation (Set): Strong Side F1+2 Double Stack & F3 Blast, + F1 Middle-High Cut

When the puck is recovered by either F1 or the strong side defenseman (Blue #5), the inside defenseman (Blue #4) will activate behind the net, both to act as a passing option and to build speed into the breakout. Either F1 or the Strong Side Defenseman will reverse the puck as soon as possible.

F1 will loop across the slot and under the dots before exploding up the center lane lane, slightly angled towards the strong side. F3 will activate as a potential breakaway options, pushing 1 or both defensemen back. F2 will become the primary outlet option, with the intent of backing up the far side defenseman, and as an added bonus, potentially drawing in the opposing forward in the middle (Orange #2) which can create a lane for F1 to cut more vertically up ice, or for a long stretch pass from the puck carrying D man (Blue #4)

Legend for Diagram below:
Red = Passing Lanes to F3.
Green = Passing Lanes to F2.
Blue = Passing Lanes to F1
Solid Teal = Defensive Coverages, Checkered Teal = Defensive Option.
Solid Black = future movement + option, Checkered Black = previous movement

On a Set breakout, the Abbotsford Canucks liked to execute a Stacked Breakout on the strong side.
F1 will explode up the strong side wall, followed by F2. As F1 (usually the center in this case) cuts through the middle, F2 explodes up the wall.

When this happens, puck carrying defenseman has to make a read depending on the defense’s reaction.

F1’s goal is to get a free lane up the middle, however if the opposing F2 follows, this gives Blue F2 free space up the wall. If they get the puck they will either attempt a chip & chase, attempt to enter the zone with control, or make a pass to F1 if he’s able to get behind the opposing F2.

If Opposing F2 takes the Blue F2, there should be a passing lane for F1. Assuming the strong side defenseman (Orange #4) charges towards the middle to cut off the center lane, Blue F2 will execute an inside-outside deke to open up space along the strong side boards. If this happens, F3 can either attack the far post, or cut across the slot for support. If the far side defenseman (Orange #5) steps up, they will chip the puck to F3 at the far blueline to chase onto.

In the event F2 gets the puck at center ice and cuts across the entirety of the ice to attempt an entry on the far side of the blueline, Blue F3 will straddle the blueline to open up the lane and draw in the far side defenseman (Orange #5).

F3’s primary use on this breakout is to make reads to draw in the opponent, opening up lanes for F2, as well as being an option in case the team needs to start a line change, in which case they will either deflect a pass in deep, or forecheck on a dump & chase to delay the opponents breakout long enough to change the other 4 players.

This breakout requires the defense to mark their coverage early, and be weary of any early step ups, especially in the middle, as it can create odd-man rushes against.

Powerplay

Formation: 1-3-1

On the Powerplay, the Abbotsford Canucks utilized a 1-3-1, and prioritized diagonal puck movement and strong side flank reloads.

In Vancouver, fans are no stranger to this kind of powerplay. It was the powerplay utilized by Rick Tocchet at times (he alternated with an Umbrella set at times) and Travis Green.

F2 + Point Man (Blue #5) create a two-way, interchangeable passing chain. F2 will continue to work the half wall, or make a series of false charges down hill towards the slot. The F2 can look for all 4 teammates depending on the coverage assigned by the PK. Common options include a wrist shot through a screen, a cross ice pass to F4, shot pass to the bumper, shot pass to the back post, starting a low set triangle one timer, etc. They are the primary forward playdriver on the powerplay.
You don’t necessarily need to have your best forward as F2, especially if F4 is phenomenal at one-touch offense (one-timer, tap pass, etc), but they need to be able to make controlled plays and feel comfortable handling the puck for a majority of the time in the OZ.

F3 occupies 3 roles. He is the primary goal line option on the strong side, responsible for reading a play that requires him either on the goal line or back post. (video below)
His second job is to be the main screen/rebound/deflection threat.
His third and final job is to act as a pivot man down low, changing the side of possession by using the net as a pick. He helps keeps plays alive around and below the goal.

F4 (far side flank) will attempt to remain either parallel to, or slightly lower than parallel to F2, cross-ice to act as a one timer threat, and draw the far side penalty killer away from the bumper (Blue #1). If previously communicated, F3 can slide down to the goal line to create an umbrella, or beat his man to the back post on a rebound or quick cross-ice passing play.

F1 is the bumper. He is the player that will usually have the best combination of shot, hockey IQ, and hand eye coordination. Needs to be able to take a lot of abuse. His job is to be enough of a threat that the opposing PK can’t expand their structure and be aggressive to the outside. He can also act as the finisher on any low-set or high-set triangle one timers. (video below)

On the Penalty Kill, Malhotra’s Abbotsford Canucks would usually execute a 1-1-2, commonly known as a Wedge + 1.

The idea is you have 1 forward sweeping across the top of the DZ, against the opposing Flank-Point-Flank triangle of the opposing Power Play. If the +1 was drawn from one side of the triangle all the way to the other, and the puck was then sent back to the other side, instead of the + 1 stopping and accelerating across the ice again (completely inefficient and tiring), the top of the wedge would activate as the +1, and the original +1 would rotate into his spot.

The goal of this is to apply constantly pressure up top while preventing cross seam passes.

If the Opponent switches to a 2-2-1, also known as an umbrella, begins to work near the goal line, and attempts a Flank to Goal Line to Cross Crease play, the + 1 will slide towards the bumper, the strong side defenseman will pressure the flank man, the far side defenseman will move to the strong side goal line, and the top of the wedge will accelerate to the back post in order to takeaway the tap in.

The main concern with this type of Penalty Kill are the amount of rotation reads that are required up high from the forwards, and the 4 man rotation needed low.

For example, assuming the goal line play is unsuccessful, due to the rotation, and depending on the Powerplay’s speed, there can be situations where this causes the +1 or the top of the wedge to be a defenseman, and thus forcing a forward to defend the goal line, leaving them primed to be exploited on passes behind them for diagonal tap ins.

Depending on the side of attack, this can force the bottom 2 players in the wedge to turn their back to the play, as this structure is far more reliant on stick work than body positioning, which forces players to defend at awkward angles depending on previous rotations.

Another weakness of this PK structure, even if used properly, is that the point man will be constantly available for wrist shots and one timers. For a defenseman like Evan Bouchard, for example, this means they can either shoot from the point or use the potential of a shot to open up the far side flank for a one timer from Draisaitl. So the wedge has to be aware of their role within it, and recognize what their job is should the puck be moved from the goal line up to the point directly.

It’s super aggressive, however, which means it has a high ceiling. If young players struggle with it, it’s going to look ugly. On the flip side, if the PK units become great at it, you’re almost guaranteed to be a top Penalty Killing unit in the league.

Wrap Up

Manny Malhotra has spent a decade getting ready for this opportunity. Between Assistant Coach stints in Toronto and Vancouver, as well as being Abbotsford’s Calder Cup Winning Head Coach. He has clearly been influenced by a variety of coaches, including Sheldon Keefe, Rick Tocchet, Newell Brown, Mike Van Ryn, Spencer Carbury, all of which possess some aspect in their system that can be elite.

In order to separate himself from his mentors, he’s created a system that is high-tempo and aggressive, and attached a possession-based cycle game that generates high danger chances while keeping the puck deep.

In the neutral zone, he’s built a 1-1-3 trap that emphasizes patience, intelligence, and quick strikes with manpower advantages attacked to force turnovers.

In the defensive zone, his system is one that prioritizes defending against high danger chances, without surrendering the exterior of the ice.

Overall, it’s a nice blend that has the potential to carry him far. However, the true test for Manny is how he’ll handle a Canucks team that lacks high-end NHL talent, and whether or not it will translate to a team that desperately needs to return to play a more structured, yet balanced, Pro-Style game.

Thank you for reading!

Note: In this article I’ll talk about the players that Vancouver signed to One-Way Contracts.

I’ll be honest, it’s extremely weird to go into July 1st and not feel incredibly anxious.
When looking at the Canucks, it’s obvious that they’re a rebuild team. When listening to talk show radio and podcasts, it’s obvious that this franchise is on a strict budget. We also know through media and from the team themselves that the Franchise’s culture (or lack thereof) has contributed to the reality that not a lot of players look at Vancouver as a primary or even secondary situation.

However, the Canucks couldn’t afford to spend nothing. General Manager Ryan Johnson and Co-POHO’s Daniel & Henrik Sedin desperately want to improve this organization’s culture, from the top on down. With that said, they can’t do everything themselves, and they also couldn’t afford to grab players who can’t play in the lineup.

The Canucks goal was to sign high-character players with exceptional work ethic that will improve the locker room, insulate the youth, while also using them as assets in the future.

Through that lens, did Vancouver succeed?

Luke Schenn - RHD - 1 year, $2.25M

Stats: 50 GP, 1G-6A-7Pts, 35 SOG, 43 PIM, 149 Hits, 7-44 TA-GA, 38.85 xGF%

Luke Schenn is 36 (almost 37) years old. Luke Schenn is slow. He is not offensively inclined, and he likely shouldn’t be in the lineup every night, even for Vancouver.

What Luke Schenn is however, is a leader. He is a fighter, both literally and metaphorically. He loves Vancouver, and has made British Columbia his home.
Most importantly, he loves the Canucks.

The Canucks helped revive Schenn’s career, and in turn Luke Schenn helped keep rookie Quinn Hughes from being abused when he first came to Vancouver. Even when Schenn left and won 2 cups in Tampa Bay, he decided to come back and solidify Vancouver’s bottom pair. The Canucks then traded Schenn and multiple years later, he still came back, even though he’s at the end of his career, and the chances of winning are as close to 0% as you could possible imagine.

What Schenn is as a player shouldn’t surprise anyone who has watched him through any of his stints in Vancouver. He is a large, imposing defensemen who abuses opponents and won’t allow them to abuse him or his teammates. He is also extremely limited offensively, but he will also show flashes of puck moving ability that will allow him to survive if he’s with the proper partner.

Last season, Schenn played for Winnipeg and Buffalo, and with the Sabres he had the highest rate of defensive zone starts in any stint of his entire career (74.3%), and with his most common d-partner being Logan Stanley (49.09% of his 5v5 ice time), resulted in extremely poor underlying numbers.

Ideally, Schenn plays with a combination of Zeev Buium and D-Petey.
You want Buium to be protected, but you also want DPetey to learn how to play a heavier style by playing with Schenn. Also, with Buium likely playing top pair minutes next season, you can’t have Schenn with him all the time anyways.

Schenn should be Vancouver’s #5 or 6 5v5 defender by ice time, & their #1/2 PK defender.

Also, he is the one free agent signing that I will not mind Vancouver keeping past the deadline. With Schenn’s No Move Clause, he has full control over any potential trade destinations, and it would not surprise me if he wants to just stick around. If Schenn does retire, he can move into a scouting, player development or coaching role within the Canucks organization, and as a staff member who has played with players on the current and future Canucks teams, would automatically garner the respect of players and other staff members alike.

Paul Cotter - LW/C - 1year, $2.15M

Stats: 79 GP, 9G-6A-15Pts, 61 SOG, 19 PIM, 192 Hits, 7-27 TA-GA, 41.81 xGF%

Paul Cotter is coming off a down year in New Jersey that saw him play 2 minutes per night less than his previous career low (10:41 TOI/GP), and as a result saw his production fall to a career low 15 points.

When looking at Paul Cotter’s deployment however, it makes sense. He did have a career high Offensive Zone Start rate (60.09%) but that doesn’t tell even half of the story.

His most common linemate was Luke Glendening, who for any Canucks fans who may not be familiar, is basically a smaller David Kampf. He hasn’t had more than 16 points since 2018-19’. He hasn’t had 10 goals or more since 2023-24 where he shot 17.5% with a 10g-1a-11pt stat line. Where Glendening excels however is in the faceoff dot, where he sits at a 55.6% win percentage in his career.

Paul Cotter and Luke Glendening spent 42.6% (236 minutes) of Cotter’s 5v5 ice time together, and had a 62.35% Offensive Zone Start Rate. In that time, Cotter recorded 0 goals, 2 assists. Needless to say, Cotter was put into a role where his primary linemate was an offensive blackhole, and as a result, the lack of offensive production shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone. Defensively, Cotter struggled due to team factors. Glendening doesn’t offer the same transition ability most centers possess, and his goalies also couldn’t make a save, which reflected poorly on him with a .943 PDO, worst of all full time Devils.

At 26 years old, Cotter was one of the youngest UFAs in the class, and as a result likely felt as if taking a 1 year deal on a team with 0 expectations of winning, where the opportunity to earn ice time is plentiful, would give him the best opportunity to cash in next year.

Cotter will likely act as Aatu Räty’s largest competitor at 3rd line center going into training camp, where Cotter has shown an ability to win draws at a 51.9% rate over his tenure in New Jersey. If Räty is able to solidify his spot at 3C, Cotter will likely transition to left wing, playing with a combination of Räty, Rossi, or EP40 (if he isn’t traded).

Cotter is 6’2”, 215lbs, with elite forechecking ability, and the willingness to drive into the offensive zone and towards the net with the puck. With a top skating speed in the 88th percentile, 20-22 mph bursts in the 88th percentile, and 22+ mph bursts in the 92nd percentile, I could actually see him playing alongside Elias Pettersson and Linus Karlsson (or Jonathan Lekkerimaki) next season.

EP40 and DeBrusk haven’t shown the best chemistry together at 5v5, however DeBrusk hasn’t held up his part of the bargain in a lot of ways, too. He had 3 5v5 goals on 12.8 expected, and was a below average forechecker.

Cotter is going to be able to get behind defenses (like DeBrusk), retrieve dump-ins and rimmed pucks, and will take large chunks out of defenseman while doing so, which which allow the Canucks to regain or keep possession, and create temporary man power advantages low and around the net. Hopefully, Cotter won’t deal with the same finishing struggles at 5v5 that DeBrusk had in 2025-26’.

Cotter is a career 12.4% shooter at 5v5, and had 4.06 shots per 60 and a 9.09 shooting percentage at 5v5 last season. If Cotter continues to play at a high pace, lay the body, keep plays alive, and demonstrate defensive competence, there is a possibility he plays 12-13 minutes a night at 5v5 alongside EP40 + Linus Karlsson, both of whom demonstrate great playmaking ability.

Hopefully that combination of factors enables Cotter to get his 5v5 shot rate per 60 up to ~ 6.5, which would rank 3rd in his career.

At 13 minutes a night at 5v5 (1092 in a 84 game season), and averaging 6.5 shots per 60, that would give Cotter 118 shots, and at his career 5v5 shooting percentage, would equal 15 goals. He also shows good ability to score at both 4v4 and 3v3, and if he gets increased PK responsibility, could record a couple goals there as well.

At the end of the day, if Cotter records 10-12 goals in all situations, lays 200+ hits, and showcases elite speed + forechecking ability leading up to the deadline, he is a player that any contender would give up assets for.

If he has a career season, given the increased opportunities, he could even fetch an extremely valuable asset. Vancouver could use his cap hit, size, versatility, and playoff-desired traits to extract a 2nd + 4th Round pick from a playoff team, similar to the Bobby McMann return Toronto got from Seattle last season.

Assuming these assets would be for the 2027 draft, this would give Vancouver Three 2nd Round picks, and Three 4th Round picks in 2027. This would give Vancouver flexibility to move to a spot late into the first round, or early into the second round, which could offer a very good player given how deep the 2027 Draft Class is.

This is a low floor, high ceiling free agent signing that landed in the Canucks lap due to the opportunity they could provide. His size, speed, and scoring potential should give Canucks fans a reason to be happy.

Needless to say, I’m excited to see DJ Cotter don the blue & green.

Jamie Oleksiak - LHD - 2 years, $5M/yr

Stats: 78 GP, 5G-10A-15Pts, 77 SOG, 36 PIM, 112 Hits, 19-71 TA-GA, 46.65 xGF%

Jamie Oleksiak’s importance to a rebuilding Canucks team became extremely evident upon the news of Vancouver trading Defenseman Marcus Pettersson to the New York Rangers for a 2030 Top 10-Protected 1st Round Pick.

Without Oleksiak, Vancouver’s left side of the blueline would be Zeev Buium, D-Petey, and Kirill Kudryavtsev. All project to be full-time NHL’ers, with Buium possessing the highest ceiling, but all three would be 22 or younger, with a combined 179 NHL Games. With Oleksiak in the lineup, this allows he and Schenn to eat a heavy amount of defensive minutes, sheltering the youth, and protecting them from a physical perspective, but they also have flaws.
This is not a negative, as it will force their young defensive partners to play to their strengths in order to make up for the veterans.

Oleksiak is a pure defensive defenseman, who has seen a 67.6% defensive zone start rate in all situations while in Seattle.

When looking at his defensive trait metrics combined with a 6’7”, 252lb frame, it becomes clear that his role is to absorb rushes, and stop plays in their track with a long reach and size that can wipe out any player along the wall.
He will keep plays to the outside as well, which should help a Canucks defense that was by far the worst defensive team in 2025-26’. Historically, he has been a lot better in a secondary puck mover move.

Alongside Ryker Evans, however, he has been forced into a role where he is the primary puck mover on exits, while Ryker is the primary zone entry defenseman. The awkwardness surrounding roles, and either defensemen’s inability to both start and finish a complete transition sequence without passing a responsibility onto each other created a situation where Oleksiak wasn’t used to his strengths, and thus his effectiveness declined.

In Vancouver, I believe Oleksiak will be used alongside Tom Willander. Before Willander was put in a role with Marcus Pettersson that saw him rank 2nd on the Canucks in TOI vs elite competition past the trade deadline, Willander had favourable zone entry metrics, both offensively and defensively. However, after being put with the now departed Pettersson, his metrics tanked. However, his Zone Entry denials were still positive

Assuming Manny Malhotra’s structure is not as chaotic as Adam Foote’s (a safe assumption, to be quite honest), and Tom continues to develop, there is a very high likelihood that Willander operates as a mobile puck moving defenseman whose main responsibility is controlling the transition game. With Oleksiak’s size and reach, and Willander’s mobility, they should form a duo that prevents opponents from crossing the Canucks blueline as easily as it looked on a nightly basis last season.

Oleksiak has also historically been a pretty solid player in terms of chance assists in the OZ. However, last year he suffered a bit of a dip in those metrics

Willander on the other hand, actually shows good ability to find passes into and from high danger areas, which is impressive given his age. It might be explained by the fact he was once a forward, so he is able to understand that side of the game more naturally.

From a trade asset perspective, I believe Vancouver will move him sometime between the 2027 trade deadline and the 2027 entry draft. Ideally, the Canucks would retain 50% of his salary ($5.5M in 2026 and $4.5M in 2027), and juice that return.

Tyler Myers went for a 2027 2nd round pick last offseason with 50% retention that brought him to a 1.5M cap hit. Jamie Oleksiak is a similarly sized defenseman with much better puck moving and defensive qualities. Oleksiak can actually chain a breakout with his teammates, whilst Myers is more likely to carry it out himself, slowing a transition. Oleksiak will actually prevent an entry, whilst Myers has the tendency to give up high-danger chances at an astonishing rate (unless he’s with Quinn Hughes). With retention, Oleksiak maintaining his defensive value and showing an even slight rebound in his transition metrics, should be someone who goes for a 2nd round pick + a B prospect.

This could actually increase if the Deadline market and incoming Free Agency market either dry up, or project for similar players to receive contracts that are 2-3x longer, and 2-2.5x more expensive (again, accounting for retention).

Looking for a recent comparable trade, Logan Stanley and Luke Schenn were traded for Isak Rosen (23 year old former 14th overall pick who looks to be a 3rd liner at most), Jacob Bryson (depth D man), a conditional 4th round pick in 2026, and a 2nd round pick in 2027.

Could Vancouver get even more for a Jamie Oleksiak who through his career has produced points at an extremely similar rate to Logan Stanley in a career year, and has much better defensive metrics? What could you get from a team if you packaged him with either Paul Cotter or Drew O’ Connor? It could give Vancouver some substantial draft capital.

Overall, this is also a fantastic signing.

Wrap Up

Overall, the Canucks stuck to their guns. They added size, character, work ethic, and created healthy internal competition. Each of these players were signed to money that is in line with market value (Cotter) because they were able to leverage the amount of opportunity they could provide, or they slightly overpaid players who will become underpaid with retention.

All 3 players have a high asset value floor due to their innate traits, with high asset value ceilings due to their underlying metrics, cost with retention, or potential production rebounds (Oleksiak, Schenn).

I believe at a minimum, assuming all 3 were to be traded, I could see the Canucks getting a 2nd Round Pick, and multiple 3rd/4th round picks.

At most, there is a possibility the Canucks could get a very late 1st round pick (or a couple 2nd Round Picks), a B prospect or two, and multiple 3rd/4th round picks.

An underrated part of these signings, in my opinion, is the fact that while they may be valuable on an individual basis, none of these players are likely to be good enough to affect Vancouver's tanking efforts next season, which is important given the amount of high-end talent that the 2027 NHL Entry Draft seems to possess.

With the Canucks firmly at the beginning of a rebuild, asset accumulation is the name of the game. With these signings, Ryan Johnson and the Sedins have put themselves in a very good position to continue accumulating draft and prospect capital.

Thank you for reading!

Ryan Johnson and the Sedin twins get to enter the first Free Agency Period under complete authority of the Canucks organization. The trio has continued to preach patience as the Canucks enter unchartered territory: A full-on, complete, rebuild.

When asked what his ideal Canucks player looks like, Ryan Johnson mentioned 5 key traits:

• Size

• Speed

• Character

• High Compete Level

• Professional Habits

The Canucks are not only looking for a complete rebuild of the roster from a talent perspective, but from a cultural perspective as well. We saw this demonstrated yesterday, when the Canucks took their prospects to a Food Bank as a way of staying true to the 3 word motto Henrik & Daniel Sedin spoke during their introductory press conference: Connected, Committed, Purpose. Culture is something that is built from the ground up, but it is also nice to have people come in and fill in the gaps and mentor the current crop of youth. However, this cannot come at the expense of actual talent.

When the market opens at 9 AM, the Canucks are going to be looking for NHL-quality talent that can fulfill multiple roles both on and off the ice, while also keeping in mind the actual purpose of the rebuild, which is asset accumulation, whether it’s draft or prospect capital. They need to do this while also working on a strict budget.

Needless to say, Ryan Johnson and the Sedins have their work cut out for them.

With that being said, let’s take a look at a few Free Agency candidates that can fit the mold of what the new trio wants out of a Vancouver Canuck, while also potentially being valuable on the trade market come Deadline or Draft time.

1. James Van Riemsdyk - W - Detroit

It’s honestly hard for me to believe that James Van Riemsdyk is 37 years old, and heading into his 18th NHL season. The power forward has played for 5 teams across a career that spans 1154 regular season and an additional 82 playoff games. Surely, “JVR” wants to accomplish one last thing before retiring with what will be a 350 goal, 700 point career.

A Stanley Cup.

Well, that’s not going to happen here in Vancouver, but I believe Vancouver can help get there. Last season, James Van Riemsdyk had 15 goals, 16 assists for 31 points. The Red Wings only used him for 11 minutes a game, and less than 10 minutes a game at Even Strength, the lowest of any full time player on Detroit.

Where he did get minutes however, was the powerplay. On a per 60 minute basis, Van Riemsdyk put up 3.16 goals, good enough for 13th in the NHL. Over his career he has over 100 Power Play goals. He was tied for 3rd on Detroit with in PPGs, with 7, despite getting half of the ice time the person he was tied with, Star Forward Lucas Raymond.

When he was in Columbus, he was quoted as saying “I remember coming into the league who rubbed off on me, and it was guys who played a long time – how they approached their craft, how they thought about the game, how they tried to get better every single day. It’s been great; we have some guys, especially some of the younger guys, that are like sponges and are asking questions about different guys I played with or different situations in the game.”. His Head Coach at the time, Dean Evason, also preached how vocal he was on the bench and in the locker room.

At 6’3”, 220lbs, and the likely outcome of Jake DeBrusk (2nd in Power Play Goals per 60) walking out the door, could the Canucks offer a 35+, bonus-laden contract with the promise of trading him to a contender at the deadline? He likely wouldn’t add enough at Even Strength to change the Canucks regular season point totals, but with the size and power play acumen that he possesses, he could be a player that a team gives up a 2nd or 3rd round pick for, assuming he produces as a rate slightly above what he has done in extremely limited ice time for Detroit.

Brandon Duhaime - W - Washington

Size? Yep. He’s 6’2” 210 pounds.
Speed/Pace? Yep. He was in the 92nd percentile for top skating speed last season, and 91st percentile in speed bursts 22 mph or faster.
High Compete Level? He is top 50 amongst NHL Forwards in Hits, will stand up for team mates, and even fights (including 8 last season).

There’s a reason why Vancouver was so interested in Duhaime a few seasons back. He has a rare combination of size and speed that is hard to find for a bottom 6 player, and he does it while still being able to put up 20 points, and eat up minutes with heavy defensive deployment (Over the last 2 seasons only 15.12% and 21.73% of his 5v5 shifts started in the Offensive Zone, respectively) while surviving on the analytical side of things, with a 51.61 and 49.69 xGF% rate at 5v5.

Enforcer/Grit players are seeing healthy paydays in the NHL as of late. We can look at AJ Greer getting 4.25m x 4 years in Anaheim or Beck Malenstyn (perhaps a better example) getting 2.916 x 6 in Buffalo. However, the rise in these players pay also indicates that the market has shifted, and these players are now deemed as being valuable.

Could the Canucks pick up Duhaime on a 2-3 year contract at $3.5M, and after a season or a season and a half of injecting his size, speed, and hilarious locker room demeanor (he is reported to act like a literal dog in the locker room, including eating pieces of the paper in which the lineup is written on), flip him to a contender looking to add speed in their bottom 6, while also having a player that survive in the trenches of war known as NHL Stanley Cup Playoff Hockey?

With the cap ceiling and floor increasing, and a tight budget, there is room for the Canucks to (slightly) front load the deal, and by retaining 50% on his cap over the course of 1 or 2 seasons, may allow the Canucks to retain a decent cap hit while only retaining a modest amount of actual salary owed.

Mats Zuccarello - W - Minnesota

A lot of what I said about James Van Riemsdyk could be applied to Mats Zuccarello, but with a much higher production potential. Alongside Kirill Kaprizov, Zuccarello has continued to demonstrate an ability to put up points, averaging 21 goals and 49 assists for 70 points per 82 games in his age 32-38 seasons, and even over the last 2 seasons he’s still averaged 22 goals and 69 points per 82 games.

Despite his age, he has remained consistent. As a 35+ player, the Canucks could give him a bonus heavy contract that allows them to pay Zuccarello a cheap amount this year, while maintaining the ability to offload future salary commitments related to the bonus to another team, or retain them in order to stay at the cap floor in the future.

If Zuccarello were to accept a contract similar to Toews last season ($2.5M with the potential of $6m in bonuses. I would see if Zuccarello would do $2.5m + $3-4m in bonuses), this would allow a cup contending team to add him to a playoff roster at a very cheap cap hit, while having any potential bonus overages move to the 2027-28’ season, which will see the cap rise by $9.5m to $113.5m.

Another positive to a Zuccarello deal would be that his point production could also help Elias Pettersson’s production. Pettersson while having modest assist totals over the last few seasons (closer to his earlier rookie, sophomore, and year 3 seasons), his goals have tanked into the mid-teens. Part of the reason for this has been the lack of playmakers in the Canucks lineup over the last 2 seasons. DeBrusk, Boeser, Suter, Kane are all players who lean more on the goal scoring side, who happen to get assists due to high ice time, but on a per minute basis none of them can hold a candle to Zuccarello, who could help EP40 get more high-danger, controlled passes in the high slot and the circles, where he excels.

Points aside, despite being 5’8”, 181lbs, he has maintained a 52 block, and 68 hit per 82 game pace over his career, and other than the last 2 seasons, has been an expert puck management player who often had more takeaways than giveaways. He has also been top 30 in Selke voting before. This is the type of vet that can lead by example, both production wise and intangible wise. With retention, the Canucks could very well get a 2nd Round Pick & a B+ Prospect in return for Zuccarello at the trade deadline from a contender in need of a 2nd line supplementary playmaker with powerplay expertise.

He has missed 13 and 23 games the last two seasons, which is not ideal for a contender, but missing games for the Canucks (as long as it doesn’t completely tank his value), will allow young players to fill in for small periods of time in much greater roles, which will give them a sense of job enrichment and the experience needed to understand how to maintain that level of play over a longer stretch of games in the future.

Andrei Kuzmenko or Matias Maccelli

I’ll make it clear off the bat: Both of these players are reclamation projects, are large stretches considering their inconsistent performance and lack of intangibles, and the Canucks would only be able to pick one. These signings would be for the sole purpose of asset accumulation in the future.

In favour of Andrei Kuzmenko is the fact that he was with Elias Pettersson when EP40 produced at a level that placed him firmly into the top 10 of NHL centers, potentially top 5. EP40 over an 18 month stretch was 7th in points in the NHL, and showcased a chemistry with him that we haven’t seen before, or since. Also, he is a locker room personality who keeps things light in the room.

He has had issues in the past with his weight, and despite great playdriving metrics (54.46 xGF%, 57.64 HDCF%), he has never been trusted by coaches on the defensive side of the puck, nor will he throw a body or block shots. Those are negatives, but I believe in the power of friendship. Could the Canucks have Kuzmenko in the room to help Petey return to form both on and off the ice, keep the locker room vibes positive, and in turn, help the Canucks extract value from both Kuzmenko and EP40 if/when they decide to trade them both? I think the opportunity to reunite those two in particular is a very intriguing prospect. I think with the implementation of Manny Malhotra as head coach, as well as the signing of a vet like Ian Cole for example could offset any negatives that may be showcased by Kuzmenko.

With Maccelli, this could be a 2 year reclamation project. Maccelli was recently non-tendered by the Maple Leafs, which shouldn’t be a surprise given how his & the Leafs season went.

A former 57 point scorer, Maccelli has always been an assist heavy player, and even on a horrible Maple Leafs team that saw them place low enough to have the lottery balls fall in their favour and win 1st Overall, Maccelli was Toronto’s best playdriver analytically. He had the best xGF% of any forward (only full time player at or above 50%) and 2nd best HDCF% (beside former Canuck Dakota Joshua).

He will turn 26 in October, so there is runway for Maccelli to rebound and cash in later in his career, perhaps at age 28/29. Would the Canucks be willing to over Maccelli a prominent offensive role in their lineup, enough so that he could help Elias Pettersson find the back of the net more with his elite playmaking, and potentially get flipped to a playoff team in need of a younger, cost controlled rental with the ability to re-sign them at a relatively young age compared to other NHL UFA’s?

I think both Kuzmenko and Maccelli could fetch hefty prices at a trade deadline or during draft week should those respective markets appear barren, especially if they have an extra year or two (in Maccelli’s case) of control.

Ian Cole - LHD - Utah

Ian Cole has been a Canuck before. The last time fans saw him don the Blue & Green, he was struggling in a series with a broken foot against the Edmonton Oilers, where he scored multiple own goals, including Evan Bouchard’s game 2 OT Winner.

What people don’t remember however, was how much of a defensive anchor he was for that group. Playing 2nd pair and heavy PK minutes, often times with Noah Juulsen or Tyler Myers, Cole was such a stabilizing presence for the Canucks blueline. If you look at his expected goals, you’d wonder what I was talking about. With Vancouver he had a 44.1 xGF%. That’s true, but he was also playing against the toughest competition, while often playing with partners that had a tendency to be overtly aggressive, and possessed poor puck management skills.

For 78 games, Ian Cole gave Rick Tocchet and co. the confidence to be able to put him out on the ice in very difficult minutes as a way of making sure Filip Hronek and Quinn Hughes got the heavy offensive deployment needed as they carried the backend offensively to a Division Title, and within one game of a Conference Final.

He is 6’1”, 240lbs. He blocks shots, he hits hard, and he has good secondary puck moving ability. Also, fans may not know this, but it is mentioned somewhat that he was the stabilizing force in that locker room that helped manage the EP40 and JT Miller feud. He left, and it blew up. That’s not just hindsight, that’s just how the chain of events unfolded.

At his age, he will need to play less minutes, whether it’s in the form of playing less games (perhaps so DPetey and Kirill Kudryavtsev can both get into the lineup), or in the form of less minutes per game (of his top 5 seasons ice time wise, 4 have occurred in the last 5 seasons, with 2016 being the outlier in his top 5, when he won a cup with Pittsburgh).

Cole could play alongside Tom Willander and offer him a stable defensive partner, allowing Willander to take more chances offensively, assume a heavy amount of puck moving responsibility, while also learning more of the finer details defensively.

Also, players like Cole will always hold value at a trade deadline. Whether it’s for a 2nd/3rd round pick, maybe even a 2nd with a B-level prospect if the market is bare, teams across the league would kill for an Ian Cole on their D-Core, either as a 2nd pair play stopper, or a 3rd pair luxury.

Luke Schenn - RHD - Buffalo/Winnipeg

Yes, the defensive portion of this list is heavy on former Canucks defensemen, but there is something to say for both Cole and Schenn.

Both love the city, both have fantastic character traits, and offer intangibles that are key to any player in a leadership role.

What Schenn possesses however, is a story of adversity. Luke Schenn was a former 5th overall selection who after 2017-18’ looked to be a draft bust who was on his way out of the NHL. Upon getting waived by Anaheim after only playing 8 games with the Ducks, the Canucks picked him up for the last 18 games of the 2018-19’ season. There, he raised his stock by being Quinn Hughes’ d partner in Quinn’s NHL debut.

Go watch Quinn’s first NHL point. When Boeser scores, whilst everyone in celebrating, what is Luke Schenn doing? He is going after Trevor Lewis for laying Hughes out in the slot moments before. He demonstrated leadership qualities very quickly and endeared himself to the Vancouver faithful.

Then, he left. He went to Tampa Bay, and in a depth role that saw him 63 regular season and 19 playoff games across 2 seasons, won the Stanley Cup in both seasons.

After all of that, he decided to come back to Vancouver, where he proceeded to put up his best and 4th best point production seasons on a per 60 minute basis (.31 and .26) including 21 points in 55 games in 2022-23’, and adding a 117 block and 356 hit per 82 game pace.

At 6’2”, 225lbs, the Canucks wouldn’t be asking Schenn to be anything more than what he is. A leader who can play 3 of every 5 games, maybe less, while punishing opponents during play and after the whistle for even looking at the young players wrong.

Grandpa Schenn will show these kids the ropes, being an example of how to overcome adversity, how to win, and how to be a damn fine teammate.

I think bringing “Schenner” back to Vancouver would be a marvelous way for him to end his career, and perhaps even move into a player development or pro scouting role for the Canucks.

Wrap Up

July 1st isn’t an easy day for GM’s to manage. There is an expectation of players being overpaid, and as Andrew Freeman, President of Baseball Operations for the LA Dodgers said,

"If you're always rational about every free agent, you will finish third on every free agent"

However, the Canucks have the unique combination of being able to offer opportunity for increased ice time or even just staying in the league, potentially retaining money later to open up opportunities for players to move onto contenders later in the season, and allowing players to make a difference for an organization that is desperately trying to turn over a new leaf and create something worth playing for. A team that players want to play for, and a organization that wants everyone to be Connected, Committed, and filled with Purpose.

Thank you for reading!

“Your dreams are like the cement. If you water it with actions, it becomes a hard concrete mass…” - Israelmore Ayivor

The 2026 NHL Draft has concluded, and I’m feeling something that I haven’t felt coming out of one in a long time. I think the word is optimism?

I want to talk about the draft picks, but first I want to talk about Canucks GM Ryan Johnson, Co-POHO’s Daniel and Henrik Sedin, and what felt different between this draft and prior ones.

Canucks New Philosophy

When the Canucks didn’t move up to select Ryan Lin, I was irritated. The feeling of irritation was likely compounded because Mike Grier decided to be the star of the show, moving up to select Lin after already drafting Ivar Stenberg and Keaton Verhoeff at 2nd and 9th Overall, respectively. I even called it “Ryan Johnson’s first strike”.

Ryan Johnson, like Bluejays’ LF’er Davis Schneider, must have recognized how out of the zone my strike call was, and with the 24th Overall Selection, had the strike reversed via ABS challenge when he selected Adam Novotny.

I didn’t expect Novotny to be available at 24th overall, and truthfully as someone who wanted Mathis Preston at #24, picking Novotny here was a no brainer.
I went to sleep happy, and woke up with the expectation that they would draft Preston at #33.

8am comes around, and they select Brooks Rogowski, a 6’7.25”, 234lb center who had a great year in Oshawa. I was a touch disappointed because I viewed Preston as the BPA, but before I had the chance to really process it, they selected Niklas Aaram-Olsen.

Aaram-Olsen is where my thought process changed, and it got me to dive into the picks from a more analytical standpoint.

The following images are analytic profiles from Mitch Brown (4) & Byron Bader (1)
*Mitch Brown did not have a profile for Niklas Aaram-Olsen*

When looking at Brown’s cards, it’s easy to get lost with all of the stats and the bars. Lets keep it simple and look at the 7 stats on the left:
Pace, Passing, Shooting, Handling, Physical, Puck Mgmt., & Translatability

Here are the Canucks top 4 picks (that have M.B. Cards) Big 7 Stats, averaged.
Pace: 97
Passing: 95.5
Shooting: 70.5
Handling: 91.25
Physical: 91.75
Puck Mgmt.: 90.25
Translatability: 97.75

There was a very clear trend here. The Canucks prioritized size and character, but they didn’t do it at the expense of a player’s underlying impacts.

They might not have been committed to drafting a player based on their absolute ceiling, but they went 75-80% of the way in that direction. They weren’t going out of their way to draft players who couldn’t be justified through any lens other than “he’s a culture guy”. Instead, they drafted a group of players that are positive from an analytics point of view, that also fit into the identity that Ryan Johnson wants the Canucks to be built around: Size, Speed, and Character.

Also, I want to point out the importance not only in having leadership at the NHL level, but having hard workers with high draft pedigrees at Prospect Camps can also set an example for the newer prospects who might not have the chance to interact with the NHL or AHL teams.

The Canucks major swing on skill, upside wise was Niklas Aaram-Olsen, who might not have had the best ceiling of players left at 41 (again I believe that was Preston), but it was the highest ceiling player that fit the identity of the Canucks. NAO plays with pace, is 6’1”, 190lbs, has a wicked, NHL ready shot, and would have had to pass the character test for RJ to draft him.

Now, lets dive into the picks more.

3rd Overall:
C Caleb Malhotra

I’ve talked at long lengths about Caleb Malhotra, so I’ll try to keep this somewhat short.

I had Caleb ranked at #4. I was a big believer in Chase Reid, and would have loved to see the Canucks draft him. Clearly however, Vancouver wasn’t the only team to show some level of concern about Reid, or at the very least showed preference of other players over him.

Seattle will likely end up with a Top Pair offensive defenseman, but that is fine. Seattle deserves some love, and I’d like for them and Vancouver to have an actual rivalry one day full of playoff drama and Canuck wins.

Malhotra is fantastic in transition, and other than his tendency to turn pucks over as a result of trying to make high danger passes, is an elite playmaker and blossoming two-way talent.

At Boston University, he will be joined by Niklas Aaram-Olsen, and I hope they get the chance to play together on the same line. They may even get the chance to do so at Development Camp.

If Caleb wants to take that next step, he will need to assert himself as a shooting threat. If he is able to do that it should add more scoring, and some more deception to his game, forcing teams to not take away passing lanes as much as they began to do. If he becomes more of a duel threat, that should limit his turnovers.

Defensively, he needs to do a better job at breaking plays up in open ice, and that should improve as he settles into a more pro-style system and works on his lateral skating.

I have no doubt that he’ll be an all situation 2C at a minimum. He could become a 1C, but he would have to add more deception, become a better lateral skater, and be more a constant shooting threat for this to happen.

He could become Ryan Nugent-Hopkins (minus the 104 point outlier season), or he could become a better playmaking version of Ryan O’Reilly. He has the work ethic and developmental runway (late birthdays matter!) to become a Top 6 Center, it’s just a matter of whether he can reach his true ceiling.

24th Overall:
W Adam Novotny

Like I said earlier, I did not expect Novotny to be available at pick #24, and RJ selecting him made me forget his decision to not move up and draft Lin for a little bit. And looking at his production profile, you would be right in asking if 34 goals and 31 assists in 58 games is enough for a player that many had as being a top 15 selection.

The consensus amongst scouts is that Peterborough’s System is highly structured. This may have helped Novotny develop more pro-style habits, as he is a fantastic forechecker, and despite limited assist totals is good at connecting with teammates, on both sides of the puck. However, Peterborough’s system also limits offensive and neutral zone creativity, and therefore the production of their players (and at times, sacrifices development too).

He led Peterborough in points, and was the only player younger than 20 years old to score 25 or more goals. He had 34. At 6’1” & 205lbs, you can easily see how this kid could develop into a modern day Power Forward. He doesn’t have the same edge most Power Forwards have, but the combination of having a heavy shot, being a stable physical presence both at the net front and along the walls, and finally, being able to extend plays and use your size to create space and manpower advantages for your teammates, gives him one hell of a foundation to build upon. To quote David St. Louis from Elite Prospects: “Adding some muscle and becoming even fiercer in his wall battles could transform him into a kind Zach Hyman-like power forward with scoring skills.”

His ceiling is likely that of a top 6 winger. If he does become a First Line winger, I don’t foresee him being a playdriver, but rather a play extender and fantastic supplementary piece. I do believe he could be a good 2nd line playdriver who excels on the powerplay on the goal line and at the net front.

At his floor, he would likely be a very solid 3rd line playdriving winger with 2nd line powerplay time. Could be a 25 goal, 20 assist player.

This was an example of the Canucks taking what fell to them, while also staying true to their desired identity, and draft philosophy.

C Brooks Rogowski

This pick intrigued me, one because it wasn’t Mathis Preston, and two, because there isn’t much of a track record of players as big as Rogowski becoming great NHL’ers.

The only 6’7” players to ever score 100+ points in their NHL careers are all defensemen. Hedman, Chara, Myers, Zadorov, Gill, and Oleksiak. The reasoning is very simple however. For years, any big player that played an NHL game was likely made a defenseman very early into their development, likely in junior, and told that they needed to be physically dominant due to their gift of being massive.

The game is evolving however. Since 1917-18, there have been 14 NHL forwards who have been listed at 6’7” or taller. The oldest was Steve McKenna, who was born in 1973. He made his debut in 1996. As the years progressed, there is a clear trend of large players being defensemen.
There wasn’t a single 6’7”+ forward who played an NHL game that was born between 1983 (John Scott), and 1998 (Logan Brown). To contrast, in the same timeframe, there were 14 defenseman to play an NHL Game.

The game is getting larger. The largest team last season was the Maple Leafs, who were 6’2”, 209lbs on average. They had 3 top 6 forwards who were 215lbs or heavier (Matthew Knies, Auston Matthews, and John Tavares.
12 years ago, the cup winning LA Kings had 2 (Anze Kopitar & Jeff Carter).
15 years ago, the cup winning Bruins also had 2 (Milan Lucic & Nathan Horton).

Teams have begun understanding the true value of transitioning the puck from the DZ and through the NZ, and part of defending the transition is by implementing an effective forecheck. As the chess battle between Forechecking and Effective Transition has carried on, it shouldn’t be a surprise to see larger forwards emerge in an attempt to punish smaller puck movers physically, while also using their reach to their advantage in regards to puck protection and play disruption.

All this to say: Brooks Rogowski is a very intriguing prospect. He is one of the best players in the OHL at playmaking off of the forecheck, he is fearsome along the wall, and he can transition the puck well, too. He genuinely elevated an Oshawa Generals offense that was anemic at points, and like Novotny, is intelligent with his size, using it to create manpower advantages for himself and his teammates. Also, he finds a way to draw penalties, too.

What he’ll need to work on is his open ice defense. He doesn’t throw the body a lot, and that is something the Canucks will work with him on, but he does show a willingness to instigate contact along the wall and with the puck. In open ice, this can leave him on an island, as his size can only take up so much space, especially off the rush. He will sometimes abandon the slot to pursue an opponent, likely believing his reach will allow him to make up for any large gaps, and this can burn him.

But when it comes to puck protection, puck management, newfound playmaking success, and the pace in which he plays, it’s easy to see why it was too enticing for Vancouver to pass up on.

If Vancouver wants him to hit his ceiling, they will need to work with him to put those playmaking and power forward traits into a more consistent and pro-ready package. If they overemphasize defense during his development, he will be stuck at his floor of being a solid 4th line center.

If they’re willing to put in the work and provide the proper guidance, there is definitely a world where he becomes 3C who plays PP2 and PK1.
At his absolute ceiling, he could even be a Jumbo Pius Suter type, a player who should be a 3C, but with a combination of great intelligence and a few above average offensive tools, would be able to fill in as a 2nd line winger in a pinch, granted he plays with an exceptional playdriver.

The odds of this happening are extremely low, however. If Vancouver ends up with a better version of Elmer Soderblom, in that Rogowski actually dedicates himself defensively, they should be happy.

I think it’s more likely he ends up as a bottom 6 center who kind of fills the same role that Teddy Blueger has the last couple years for Vancouver.
Good defensive instincts, good playmaking ability (for a bottom 6 player), playing with a constant pace and a willingness to take and instigate contact, while having great defensive stickwork and faceoff proficiency.

41st Overall:
W Niklas Aaram-Olsen

This was Vancouver’s swing on high upside, and they did it without diverting from their draft philosophy too much.

Niklas Aaram-Olsen is magnificent to watch. Agile? Yes. Hands? You bet. Shot? I’d argue it’s pro-ready. NAO has modern NHL Winger size as well, measuring in at 6’0.5”, 185 pounds. Having just turned 18 two months ago, he very well may end up at 6’1”, 190-195lbs.

He doesn’t possess top end speed (like Mathis Preston, for example), but what he does possess is skating that allows him to transition the puck and be deceptive enough to either beat defenseman or open up passing lanes to get pucks to his teammates.

The major issue, and the reason why he likely fell to #41, was his lack of “B-Game”. When he isn’t producing, he can oftentimes become a ghost.

However, upon arriving to Norway’s National Men’s team, he began to take his off-puck responsibilities more serious, and according to NHL scouts and executives, via Elite Prospects’ 2026 Draft Guide:

“Rounded out his game with more of a competitive edge and physical presence. A nice complement for his skill set to add in that willingness to throw his weight around.” - NHL Scout, May 2026
and,
“He works hard in practice, practices on his own, that kind of thing.” - Eastern Conference Executive, May 2026

I would assume the Canucks share a similar perspective on NAO as these scouts and executives do, or else he likely wouldn’t have been drafted. The Canucks, in sacrificing absolute ceiling, clearly wanted players who have incredible work ethic, either to maximize the potential they reach their ceiling, or at the very least if they don’t hit their ceiling, are still extremely effective in lesser NHL roles.

Aaram-Olsen has the combination of deception and a shot that can lead to him being a 30 goal scorer, and maybe even a 55 to 60 point player. If he can keep and built upon the off-puck habits that he demonstrated for Norway, it would take him from being a “Boom or Bust” selection, to becoming a “Boom potential” prospect who still possesses a high floor.

With his commitment to Boston University, perhaps he can kindle a friendship, gain chemistry, and compete with and against in games & practices with Caleb Malhotra. This would go a long way for both Caleb and Niklas, as well as the Canucks.

78th OVR (via CBJ):
G Dimitri Ivchenko

Quite frankly, I don’t know enough about goaltending to form my own opinion. What I will say however, is after a lot of Google searching and looking through scouting reports, goalie scouts love his combination of size and poise.

Elite Prospects had him ranked as the 2nd Most Technical Goalie and 4th Smartest Goalie in the Draft, so this seems to track. Also, he has never had a season with a save percentage under .915%.
In the MHL last season he had a .922 sv%, and in Russian u18 he had a .915.
The year prior he had a .940 sv% in Russian u17, and .947 sv% in the MHL (1 GP)

He has a hard time making reads, and apparently struggles to track pucks through traffic (Somewhere, Arturs Silovs shivers). He is under contract to the KHL until 2027/2028, so he will remain oversees for the foreseeable future.

Hopefully during this time, he can play in more games, which might be one of the reasons why his on-ice awareness hasn’t developed as much as other goalies. Since 2023-24, he has played in 86 games, with the most being 34 in 2024-25’ (33 in Russian u17, and 1 in the MHL)

What gives me confidence in this pick is the man who almost certainly had the most say in making it: Ian Clark. I’d trust that man to develop my cat into an NHL quality netminder.

97th Overall:
F Yaroslav Bryzgalov

The Canucks clearly loved selecting size this year. Their first overaged selection of the draft further solidified this trend. Bryzgalov is 6’3.25”, 216 pounds.

I do not believe that he has a future as an NHL center, as his lack of transition defense and entry ability, combined with poor skating will likely prevent him from fitting in as a 200-foot player. What he lacks in skating pace however, he makes up for with his offensive IQ and vision.

Playing in Medicine Hat this season, Bryzgalov was one of the WHL’s best players at the following (watch out, this is a long list):

Cycle Slot Passes, Low Cycle Playmaking, Expected Primary Assists off the Forecheck, Slot Passes off the Forecheck, Cycle to Middle Plays, One Timer Shot Assists, OZ Advantages Created, Created vs Ended Advantages, Advantages Created for Teammates, and Completed vs. Turnover Ratio.

Needless to say, Bryzgalov has the playmaking acumen, and knows how to use his body to create offense. However, out of all the power forwards drafted by Vancouver this weekend, he is the one player that excels in laying the body, as opposed to just using his body to create plays.

Laying all of this out, I want to make it clear that I don’t think this guy is Todd Bertuzzi 2, Electric Boogaloo. He isn’t. He had more time to develop than most other drafted players, and has the IQ to know how to dominate younger players with his size. He also doesn’t possess much of a shot. If there was a Shot-Pass Spectrum, he would be very close to the passing end of it.

Also, unless he demonstrates that his IQ can translate at higher levels, his skating will keep him out of the NHL. But, if he continues to keep playing at a high pace offensively, and his intelligence continues to stand out at the NCAA or even AHL levels, he could become a Bottom 6 Playmaking Power Forward.

However, unlike Rogowski, of whom I believe has an almost certain chance of playing NHL games, Bryzgalov is going to have to overcome a lot of obstacles just to play 1 NHL game. Through work ethic, and proper training, if he somehow finds a way to make it to the NHL with poor skating ability, it’ll be because of High-End intelligence. And the thing about poor skating, high IQ players, is that once they make the NHL, their intelligence allows them extend their careers far beyond what people think is possible.

Mark Stone is an example, being a 6th round pick who is now an elite NHLer. He keeps getting slower, and he keeps sticking around. I’m not saying Bryzgalov is gonna be Mark Stone, but that’s the path in which he will need to follow to carve out an NHL career. Most likely outcome is being a fringe NHL’er who could find better playing time and money oversees, perhaps in Liiga or the KHL.

Late Round Picks

There isn’t a lot of analytics, and not nearly enough of a production profile to form an opinion on these players, so I will go over each one quickly.

129th Overall - Connor Davis - RW - USHL - 6’0”, 190lbs.

Ranked as a C Grade, 4.8/9 level prospect in 2025 by Elite Prospects, the analytic profile while limited paints a pretty picture for Davis. He excels on the forecheck, he throws his body around, and even if he’s outmatched he never gives up on a play. His shot and other offensive tools are limited, but there is clear bottom 6 energy winger upside here. With 55 points in 59 USHL games last season, he will be heading to the University of North Dakota to play alongside the likes of Carson Carels and Keaton Verhoeff. Could this be Vancouver’s attempt to find the next Kiefer Sherwood? Perhaps, but he’ll likely grade out as a top 6 AHL forward.

176th Overall - Lucian Bernat - W - Finland u20 - 6’3.5”, 201lbs.

Bernat has a hard and heavy shot, and is a decent physical presence. However, hockey sense is his biggest issue. He fails to chain plays with teammates and despite having a shot first mindset, struggles to produce consistently due to a more individual on-ice mindset. What likely got him drafted was the fact that he was 17 years old playing in Finland u20, opposed to u18, and the fact he had a good 7 game showing at the u18 WJC, putting up 4 points in 7 games, as well as a 4 game, 3 point Hlinka Gretzky cup performance.
I see the tools, I don’t see the translatability. This is an extremely raw prospect who will likely need all 4 seasons to showcase enough to earn an ELC. Next season, he will be joining the Owen Sound Attack of the OHL. Would be nice to see him pop off production wise, regardless of the way it occurs.
This is a late round swing, and one the Canucks were at the luxury of taking.

184th Overall - Samuel Eriksson - D - 6’6”, 212lbs.

This was Vancouver’s only selection in the 2026 NHL Draft that was a defenseman, and they certainly swung for the fences on this one.
At the U20 level, he played a ton with Leafs 3rd round selection Mads Gudmundsson, a player I was advocating for Vancouver to select as early as round 2. He played a bunch of hockey in many places, ranging from U18 (where he put up 4 assists in 1 game) to the SHL (1 game, no points). Internationally at the U18 level, he had 6 points in 20 games. Where he played the most however was with Färjestad BK U20 of U20 Nationell.
This automatically raises his stock in my eyes, as his defensive ability, which is common sighted as being poised, and physically imposing with a great ability at pinching opponents along the wall, was clearly good enough to where there was confidence in playing him above his age group. Despite being physically imposing, apparently he isn’t imposing enough for a d man of his size, nor does he have the skating to play a defensive game that is reliant on good gap control and stick work in open ice. He would need to get quicker off his base, and add more meanness to his game to become an NHL defenseman, where his ceiling is likely that of a #6 or #7 defenseman. Might become a top 4 AHL defenseman or European league playstopper. I am intrigued by his assist numbers though. Could there be more for him to offer offensively?

Wrap Up

I might come across as biased here, but all but 2 of the players selected in this draft have the potential to play NHL games at some point. I do appreciate that Vancouver stuck to their drafting philosophy and organizational objectives without sacrificing too much on ceiling, as well.

This is the first draft in this rebuild, and while I am happy with this draft (A-, 8.5/10), the Canucks should not go into the following drafts with the exact same mind set. As the prospect base builds, they will need to begin swinging on more prospects with higher upside in an attempt to fill out the top of their lineup.

In 2027, there are multiple high end prospects available that I am intrigued by.

Potentially in the top 5:

• Landon DuPont projects to be a Generational Defenseman.

• Nazar Privalov is an absolute monster, both physically and as a goal scorer.

• Sergei Skvortsov might be the forward with the highest production upside, and purest offensive skill set.

• Jaxon Jacobson projects as a winger who could have Clayton Keller upside.

Top 10 to Late First Round:

• Brock Cripps had a fantastic DY-1, and could be the 2nd best D Man

• Andrei Pustovoy is a large, imposing duel scoring threat

• Bosse Meijer is a small center, but his IQ and Two Way Ability could lead him down the Viggo Bjorck path.

As of now, barring major position changes, the Athletic projects 15 of the first 25 2027 draft picks selected to be Centers, with 4 pure wingers, 5 RH Defenseman, and 1 LH Defenseman.

If Vancouver misses out on DuPont, and picks top 3, while also adding a top 20 pick via trade, and perhaps another late first and 2nd round pick, the 2027 draft could go a long way in solidifying Vancouver’s future Center core, and provide a ton of offensive playdriving in a non-Power Forward type fashion.

I also want to extend gratitude to:
EliteProspects, Mitch L. Brown, Byron Bader, DobberProspects, and PuckPreps
for filling in any gaps of knowledge I may have had, or providing analytics for this article.

Thank you for reading!

3rd Overall

3rd Overall Pick Stats:
65.6% play 500+ NHL Games
54.1% score 300+ NHL Points
31.1% score 500+ NHL Points

At 3rd overall, I project that Gavin McKenna and Ivar Stenberg will be off the board.
When Vancouver makes their selection, they will be choosing between two players:
A Center with a game centered around power, playmaking, and two way impact, or
A Right Handed Defenseman who along with fantastic skating and size, excels in transition, has a wicked offensive tool kit, and an untapped defensive game.

Caleb Malhotra: 6’2”, 185lbs. 29 goals, 55 assists, 84 points, 51 PIMs, and 33 +/-.
Center.

Production Highlights:
Amongst OHL Players, Malhotra ranks 11th in Assists Per Game, 19th in Points Per Game in the OHL, including 3rd and 2nd amongst players 18 or younger. 6 months younger than Reid.

Stylistic/Analytical Highlights:
Extreme proficiency in transition, excels at using his body to create advantages for his teammates both offensively and defensively.

Risks:
Awkward development path, multiple years of early season struggles and late season production growth, and has the tendency to turn the puck over an extreme amount, and shows a reluctancy to shoot the puck.

Chase Reid: 6’2”, 190lbs. 18 goals, 30 assists, 48 points, 30 PIMs, and 27 +/-
Right Handed Defenseman.

Production Highlights:
Amongst OHL Defensemen, Reid ranks 3rd in Points Per Game, 2nd in Goals Per Game, including 1st amongst players 18 or younger. Has plateaued production wise, despite OHL scoring being down by 0.6 goals per game.

Stylistic/Analytical Highlights:
Best OHL defenseman at slot passes per 60, Controlled Entries per 60, and Advantages Created per 60. Extremely deceptive, which drives his well-rounded projection profile.

Risks:
Too anxious to regain puck possession, not physically assertive, pinches too aggressively at times, was cut by his USHL team not long ago, and had late developmental growth as a result.

SAP’s Selection: Chase Reid.
He has a position, production, and analytical profile that is too hard to ignore for a Canucks team that is absent of superstars.

24th Overall

24th Overall Pick Stats:
37.9% play 300+ NHL Games
25.8% play 500+ NHL Games
20.6% score 300+ NHL Points
8.6% score 500+ NHL Points

At 24th overall, there will be a healthy selection of talent for Vancouver to select from. I believe the Canucks should take a run at trying to find a top 6 forward talent, even if it comes with risk.

Mathis Preston: 5’11”, 176lbs. Winger
18 Goals, 26 Assists in 46 WHL Games
2 Goals, 4 Assists in 5 U18 WJC Games.
4 Goals, 3 Assists in 5 Hlinka Gretzky Cup Games.

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Extremely Fast, High Skill Ceiling. Elite Transition Game, Elite Playdriver.

Risks:
Middling production profile, Small winger with Injury Risk, Doesn’t attack the middle enough.

Elton Hermansson: 6’1”, 181lbs. Winger
11 Goals, 10 Assists in 38 HockeyAllsvenskan Games.
3 Goals, 6 Assists in 13 U20 Nationell Games
14 Goals, 19 Assists in 18 International U18 Games.

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Fantastic combination of hands, shot, and creativity. Fantastic production profile to back it up. Drives play offensively.

Risks:
Commonly known to take shifts off, can frustrate coaches with his unwillingness to use his size to his advantage, lacks defensive intensity.

J.P. Hurlbert: 6’0” 183lbs. Winger
42 Goals, 55 Assists in 68 WHL Games
1 Goal, 0 Assists in 3 CHL-USA Prospect Challenge Games

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Has incredible foresight and vision. Uses delays and changes of pace to expose less intelligent players, and can pick apart WHL teams with his deception and ability to thread passes. Elite ability to enter the zone.

Risks:
Lacks intangibles, including an inability to win puck battles. Will turnover the puck too much, even in a developmental context.
Lacks International Games, and Tournament Production against his more talented peers.

SAP’s Selection: Mathis Preston.
Elton Hermansson has more of a Pro-Ready build, which leads me to believe there is a high likelihood of him being off the board when Vancouver makes the 24th selection. Preston, despite being smaller, is 89th percentile in Puck Battles, carries an elite transition and playdriving toolkit, and despite his injury this season, is still blazing fast. This is a boom-or-bust selection for Vancouver, but one they can afford to take considering their options at #3

33rd Overall

2nd Round Pick Facts:
39.9% play 100+ NHL Games
25.1% play 300+ NHL Games
21.4% score 100+ NHL Points
9.6% score 300+ NHL Points

The 33rd Overall Selection will be the first pick in day 2 of the NHL Entry Draft, which is when rounds 2 to 7 will be selected. The Canucks will have first dibs on any potential first round level talent that through a variety of circumstances were not selected on day 1. Here are a couple names that could be available when Vancouver announces the 33rd Overall Pick:

Marcus Nordmark: 6’2”, 187lbs. Winger
14 Goals, 24 Assists in 25 U20 Nationell Games
0 Goals, 1 Assist in 8 SHL Games
19 Goals, 18 Assists in 25 U18 International Games

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Top Producing U18 International player for Sweden. Has an incredible combination of size and offensive tools. His shot will get a lot of the attention due to his ability to shoot in stride, and the deception he brings with it, but his vision allows him to be a better playmaker that believed. Could be a modern day power forward, who is a 2-way threat on the Powerplay along the goal line.

Risks:
Inconsistent compete level, moreso than other players who are labelled as such. Despite his size he will often default to the perimeter, and can make fancy plays when unneeded, leading to turnover chances against. Off the ice, he may be a character risk as well, according to multiple people I’ve talked to that would know

Xavier Villeneuve: 5’11”, 163lbs. Left Handed Defenseman
6 Goals, 32 Assists in 37 QMJHL Games.
1 Goal, 0 Assists in 3 CHL-USA Prospect Challenge Games

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
In Shooting, Shots, xGoals, In.Slot and Out.Slot, he ranks in the 99th or 100th Percentile.
In Playdriving, Puck Touches, Passes, Slot Passes, and Shot Assists, he ranks in the 99th or 100th Percentile.
In Transition, he ranks in the 100th Percentile for Pass Entries, Carry Entries, and Carry Exits, while ranking in the 81st Percentile for Pass Exits.
Despite his size, is 87 in Puck Battle Won Percentile, and 66th Percentile in Takeaways.
Has committed to Boston University for 2026-27’, where he’ll hope to follow a similar development path as Lane Hutson.

Risks:
Small offensive defensive are the ultimate boom-or-bust picks. They typically have 3 outcomes
One: Top Pair Defenseman, Powerplay Quarterback
Two: #6/7 Defenseman, in and out of the lineup with 2nd PP Unit Time
Three: End up in Europe as top defensemen elsewhere.
Will not throw hits or use his body in any way, shape, or form, and despite his intelligence there is genuine concern that his skating will not be able to carry him the same way it has for Lane Hutson, who people will often compare him to when looking at his ceiling.
Plateaued points-wise, and had a major injury.

Jack Hextall: 6’1”, 185lbs. Center
20 Goals, 38 Assists in 59 USHL Games.
2 Goals, 5 Assists in 5 Hlinka Gretzky Cup Games

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Extremely competitive two way center who will go to the “dirty areas” to score. Excelled on the powerplay, with 31 points, and along with his competitiveness, showcases high-end intelligence. With his ability to win faceoffs, win puck battles, forecheck, combined with underrated playmaking ability, there could be the potential of him becoming a player similar to Phillip Danault. Not the best at exiting the zone, but showcase an ability to be an effective zone entry option.

Risks:
His shot, while hard, doesn’t project to result in many goals at the NHL level, which limits his ceiling. His shot quality is good (70th Percentile), but his In.Slot shooting being in the 18th Percentile, and his shots taken being in the 34th Percentile indicates a player with only one projectable offensive tool. His defensive talent is evident, but sometimes his positioning can be questionable. Would like him to take the next step and be an undeniable defensive forward, or else he may not be anything more than a High-End AHL’er or 4th Line Center. His motor and competitiveness is excellent, but he will need to add muscle to truly standout against NHL’ers.

SAP’s Selection: Xavier Villeneuve
I see Villeneuve has being the biggest Boom-Or-Bust prospect in this draft. If he hits his ceiling he will be the best point producing defenseman in the class, and this is something that the Canucks cannot pass up on, especially after their mistake putting Lane Hutson on their “Do Not Draft” List. Also, with this being Vancouver’s first draft since officially announcing their rebuild, they can afford to take more risks, as they have years ahead to make up for any busts as they attempt to start stocking their cupboards with High-End Prospects. Nordmark was an interesting option here, but his character issues combined with my belief that Ottawa will take him if he falls to 32nd, led me to Villeneuve.

41st Overall

Provided the Canucks do go after Preston and Villenueve with the 24th and 33rd Overall Picks, I could see (and understand) the Canucks going with a more NHL Projectable, safe selection at pick 41. Here are some names that could fit that mold:

Jack Hextall: Yes, this is not a typo. His projected range is between #32 and #56. If Vancouver sees Hextall still available at #41, I could definitely see them selecting him.

Rūdolfs Bērzkalns: 6’4”, 203lbs. Center
13 Goals, 12 Assists in 48 USHL Games
4 Goals, 6 Assists in 16 USHL Playoff Games
1 Goal, 0 Assists in 5 World Junior Games for Latvia

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
An extremely raw prospect, Berzkalans mixes size, work ethic, defensive projectability to create an extremely intriguing selection at pick 41. What also intrigues me is his balanced production profile, having a good mix of goals and assists, with an uptick in production on a point per game basis in the USHL Playoffs. He is an extremely balanced player, constantly shutting down plays, hitting extremely hard, and has the ability to win faceoffs, too. Even offensively, he is good playmaker, and has a heavy one timer on the powerplay. At his size and age, he shows a willingness to use his body to create advantages for his team, go to the net, and disrupt opponents. Just an extremely balanced player with work ethic and size to make up for a middling production profile in Regular Season and International play. Has the ability to one day be an all-situations 3C.

Risks:
Lacks production, and there is a worry that not being able to produce at his size against younger players will result in him being nothing more than a bottom 6 playstopping center. His skating needs work, and despite his willingness to go to the net, isn’t a consistent net front presence, even though he has the hands, including deflection ability, and the stability to do so. Boston College has shown the ability to develop larger forwards recently with Dean Letourneau being an example, so perhaps they can help Berzkains unlock his true talent and reach his ceiling of middle 6 NHL forward, with 3C being the most ideal spot in the lineup for him.

Måns Gudmundsson: 6’3”, 185lbs. Right Handed Defenseman
1 Goal, 24 Assists in 35 U20 Nationell Games.
0 Goals, 0 Assists in 1 SHL Game.
2 Goals, 9 Assists in 21 U18 International Games

Production/Stylistic/Analytic Highlights:
Despite the notion that Gudmansson is a pure defensive defenseman, he showcases a great ability to move the puck. His assist totals remain consistent in league and international play, and while he projects to be an average skater, his combination of size, passing, and skating allow him to project as being either an elite bottom pair playstopping defenseman, or even perhaps a 2nd pair playstopper. His defensive ability to evident, and is best when aggressive. He can pinch to keep plays alive, or step up early in the neutral zone to kill plays for the opposition. Good defensive mobility, even against players who have good rush offense capabilities.

Risks:
Is the prototypical defensive defenseman, so if he is unable to become more calculated with his aggression as he progresses to the NHL, he will likely be unable to stick in the league. This should be heavily emphasized, because his skating is only projected to be average, and as a result will be unable to make up for poor pinches and step ups. His assist production is nice, but he doesn’t project to be anything more than a secondary puck mover, who will take no risks with the puck, even in a bottom pair role. As a result, he will need to be paired with a player that can move the puck to prevent him from being hemmed in the defensive zone for long periods of time.
Also, he will need to either need to increase his mobility, or add muscle to better handle aggressive forechecking at the NHL level, especially as forechecking tactics become more advanced, and NHL forwards become bigger and faster than ever before.

SAP’s Selection: Rūdolfs Bērzkalns
While I think Jack Hextall is most likely to be available at this pick, I feel as if Bērzkalns has the best mix of floor, ceiling, and potential to be available in this spot. Hextall has a low chance of reaching that Danault-type ceiling, and projects to be a bottom 6 playstopper.
Gudmansson could be available here, but with San Jose potentially picking Malte Gustafsson at #9, I could see them selecting his U18 D Partner, Gudmansson at pick 27.
Bērzkalns will be an incredible project for Vancouver to take on, and they would need to trust Boston College to develop him properly, but he could be an AHL’er in as little as two seasons, and as a Latvian, will have ample opportunity to showcase his talents against top competition on the international stage, particularly at the World Juniors, and potentially the World Championships next May. His combination of size, intelligence, and tools would be too tempting to pass up at #41.

Thank you for reading my article! My next article will be after the draft concludes on Saturday, and will be released either Saturday night or Sunday afternoon, as I recap the Canucks selections, and potential trades they make, and analyze what Vancouver’s draft philosophy going forward might be.

On Draft or Pass, we've discussed Chase Reid and Keaton Verhoeff.

Two defensemen who offer completely different, yet extremely intriguing skill sets that make them worthy of a potential top 5 selection in Friday's NHL Entry Draft.

One more defenseman that deserves consideration is Carson Carels. In a year where right handed defenseman dominate the field, Carels is a left handed defenseman that offers a unique blend of meat and potatoes, north-south hockey that is highly projectable, along with interesting skating and passing traits that may raise his ceiling from being a dependable 2nd pair, all situations minute muncher, to being a bona fide top pair NHL defenseman. One that offers a combination of skill and bite that is hard to find in defenseman at his age.

I want to say right off the bat - there is no defenseman in the draft that offers a similar combo of potential production and physicality. One could argue that Alberts Smits is the most physically ready defensive prospect in the draft. I tend to agree, but he does not offer the same puck moving potential as Carels, particularly the fact that Carels has puck moving potential in all 3 zones, while I don’t see Smits as being a particularly great offensive zone puck mover once he finishes developing.

Carels, like Smits, is downright mean at times. He has no issues going out of his way to abandon the puck in favour of destroying an opponent.

In the first clip above, you can see where Carels’ defensive intelligence comes into play. It’s clear extremely early that the Saskatoon player is going to be able to cut across Carels’ defensive partner. Normally, double committing below the goal line can spell trouble for a team defense, but in this particular case the momentum of Prince George’s defensive coverage pulls them down below the dots. This gives up the point, but Carels’ intention is to stop this play in it’s tracks.

As the Saskatoon forward bobbles the puck, Carels goes hard into his back, and when the forward gets up, he executes a small yet effective cross check to disrupt the forward further, dislodge the puck, and turn it up ice. A small yet important detail in this play is how Carels’ physical superiority forces Saskatoon to send a second forward in to help support the one who Carels had taken out. This means when Carels comes out with the puck and carries it above the goal line, he has already beaten two forecheckers. With the amount of space he has, the likelihood of F3 diving in is unlikely, and Carels skating allows him to break the puck out.

The second clip is honestly just in there for fun. The hit is late, but it showcases how mean Carels is. He absolutely decimates the Spokane forward, and he’s able to take liberties in this situation because of the lack of support from Spokane, and the plethora of support from Prince George down low. The Cougars were one of only 4 WHL teams to allow less than 200 goals this season, so Carels was regularly able to showcase his mean streak without needing to worry about the support behind him.

In some extreme situations however, this can go to Carels’ head.

Watching the clip above, you’d be forgiven for asking “Where’s Carels? Where’s the mistake?”.

The Penticton forward just outside the blueline is the one with the puck.
Carson Carels is the defenseman on the boards who was completely fooled by their breakout.

By the time Carels separates from his body check, Penticton has already crossed center ice, and Prince George (plus Carels himself) are bailed out on a great defensive play by Bauer Dumanski to disrupt the 2 on 1.

There is a fine line between being aggressive in a way that benefits your team, and being aggressive in a way that puts them at risk. Carels showcases both sides somewhat frequently, and this will need to be an area of focus for Carels if he is going to be an effective minute muncher at the NHL level.

On this play, Carels does a great job in both tracking the Penticton forward who is leaving the D Zone, while also recognizing the potential opportunity that arises with a well timed pinch. He closes off the blueline quickly, picks off the pass, and is able to pass in stride through Penticton’s F3 triangle (For those who may not know, the Triangle is the area between an opponents stick blade and their skates) to a stationary Cougar, who makes a poor pass to give up possession.

Double-Edged Sword

If we go back to the previous video, at about 6 seconds in, Carels makes a baffling decision to back skate despite his check already bypassing him, and also he wasn’t the 2nd man back. He was the third man back with a stationary forward below him attempting to pick off a clearing attempt.
If the Cougar forward picks off the pass, Carels would be in prime position to receive a pass and potentially turn a 4 on 3 manpower advantage into an opportunity, but the risk-reward ratio isn’t good enough to justify this. You’re way more likely to score on a 2 on 1 rush than a 4 on 3 with potential back pressure.

When watching Carels, a common trend emerges, that being the fact that a lot of good in his game is overshadowed by either mental lapses, or the lack of high end offensive talent.

On this play, Carels executes a weird breakout. His skating is good, but his handles aren’t. Even with a pick set against the oncoming forechecker, Carels almost finds a way to give up the puck. He crosses the neutral zone and attacks 2 on 4 against Penticton, with all 4 Vee’s in between Carels and his supporting teammate.
The best thing that Carels could do here, especially with his teammates changing, would be to chip this puck low and chase onto it to allow a full change, or to execute a hard rim play and hope his teammate is able to get to the puck first. Instead, he skates down the half wall and attempts a cutback, which causes him to get pinched and lose possession of the puck. He does a good job with being strong on his opponents stick afterwards to force a chip out, but it’s a needless risk that can’t even be justified within the context of development.

As a North-South player without the best puck handling ability, he can oftentimes be too predictable with his breakouts, or make tiny mistakes the close his window of opportunity, like seen above.

While these don’t result in a ton of turnovers in junior hockey, there is a risk that without steps in development, this will limit his ability to be the primary puck mover on a d pair, which will completely remove him from future Number One defenseman conversations.

Carels’ is offensively limited. He did score 20 goals and have 73 points in 58 WHL games, which ranked 3rd among WHL defenseman in terms of Point Per Game ratio.

However, there were a lot of times where I would watch a Carels point and say to myself “That’s not translatable to the NHL”. His shot is not particularly great, but he is able to find the back of the net through screens. He attempts a lot of passes to the middle, but they rarely connect unless there is a wide open gap and his teammate is somewhat stationary. He makes good passes from the point to the flanks, but he isn’t incredible deceptive. All of these limit his offensive ceiling.

From an analytics perspective, this is a player that struggles in transition relative to his peers when it comes to passing in transition, which will result at higher levels in opposing teams attempting to force Carels to transition the puck himself before closing a gap and forcing a turnover.

From a shooting perspective, it may appear that Carels is an elite shooter, but his lack of deception, particularly in his passing, will result in NHL teams being able to close off these shooting lanes, as he sells his shots extremely early. He also has the tendency to score from very close to the goal mouth, something that isn’t common for NHL defensemen.

His puck handling is his biggest need of improvement offensively and should help him with his deception, as he oftentimes struggles to retrieve passes softly and will rarely change angles in order to execute a pass. If he can combine improved puck handling with his very proactive offensive nature, he could become a defenseman who puts up 35 assists on a fairly consistent basis.

And although I said he struggles in transition, he does excel in working with his d partner to facilitate a breakout.

For example on this play, Carels does a fantastic job executing a shoulder check, and upon recognizing the lack of options on the far side of the ice, is able to find his primary support player, drawing in the forechecker and chipping the puck to him at the last moment, which gives his teammate the time and space to make a play to his forwards to begin the transition up ice, a play that eventually leads to Carels getting the puck back up the wing

On this play, he keeps his feet moving, and upon seeing the puck freed in the corner is able to cut behind the net, accelerate away from the pile and up above the goal line, and execute a nice breakout pass cross ice. Then, he follows up with a step up play that scares Penticton into making a needless chip play up the middle, which is cut off and extends Defensive Zone time for Penticton.

When properly insulated by a predictable system that gives him confidence to take risks, and has enough support to where he doesn’t have to create everything himself, he excels. But again, this limits his ceiling in my mind. It’s a weird battle that teams have to properly evaluate if they want to draft this player. If you are confident in your team’s structure defensively, and don’t need to rely on Carels as your primary transition defenseman, he may be able to flourish. If you’re looking for a #1 puck mover, Carels is likely going to leave you disappointed.

Proactive vs. Reactive

Last thing I wanted to bring up, and it touches on the previous paragraph is Carels as a system-dependent player. When I watch Carels, I see a player with a fabulous defensive base to build off of, and enough skill to where he could be a solid secondary puck mover.

However, a concerning trend with Carels is his tendency to allow the play to come to him defensively. When a player attacks him directly, he is elite. He maintains a good gap, closes it at effective times, and rarely makes a mistake that causes him to look silly.

For example on this rush, he backs up, maintains his gap, and is unfazed by the cross over the Penticton executes at the blueline. He does this while maintain his position between the dots, never chasing to the perimeter to force a turnover, which is common for defenseman his age.

Had he chased, this could have opened up a potential 2 on 1 down low between the center cutting forward and the backdoor man. Instead, the backchecking pressure and Carels poise forces the forward to take a low percentage backhand that rims the glass and allows Prince George to escape a potentially dangerous situation without surrendering a shot on goal.

Throughout the entire sequence, he doesn’t take a single stride, instead using his momentum to maintain his gap. However, this oftentimes bleeds into other defensive situations that end up resulting in turnovers, when simply moving his feet earlier would have prevented the entire breakdown.

For example, on this play against the Royals, he turns to retrieve the puck way too late. I’m not entirely sure if the thought process was perhaps reading if the Royals forechecker would take too much of an inside lane, potentially allowing Carels to cut against his momentum and accelerate past the forechecker, but instead the Royals forward closes the gap extremely fast, and by the time Carels gets behind the net, the forechecker has already pushed him once, separated him of the puck, and when they come together again, Carels gets completely wiped out.

Carels was lucky that Victoria failed to chain together a simple pass and that the Cougars are a great defensive team or else this could have been a dangerous chance as the result of what should have been a nothing play.

On this play against Vancouver, Carels turns too late upon Vancouver’s chip-in, and doesn’t respect the speed of the oncoming Vancouver forechecker. In fact, he never even looks over his shoulder to survey the situation, perhaps assuming the gap that was previously extremely large was too big for the forechecker to make up. This results in Vancouver being able to chip a puck across the Prince George crease, and forces the center to come low and support.

Offensively, and as a support player on the transition, Carels is an extremely proactive player. It’s such a weird difference. He has the skill set to be an elite defensive defenseman, but he isn’t proactive with his skating enough to the point where his mistakes are borderline mind-boggling. He has the proactiveness and IQ to be a great defenseman offensively, but lacks the high danger passing and puck handling ability needed to actually put up points at the NHL level.

There is #1 defenseman potential in Carels, but so much would have to go right, it seems unlikely to me.

Wrap Up

Carels has committed to the NCAA next season, and will be joining Keaton Verhoeff and the University of North Dakota Fighting Hawks next season.

I’m extremely intrigued by this, because from a physical perspective, he should be able to hold his own. He has a ton of confidence in his size and ability to use it with purpose, knocking opponents into next week and separating them of the puck. However, I will be intrigued to see how his offense and transition game translates to the next level.

Will he be able to keep producing at a level that makes sense given the massive jump in competition? Or will his lack of deception and powerful shot reduce his point totals, as he plays against more mature and structured competition.

If I had to guess, Carels is going to be an extremely detailed player, who will struggle out of the gate as he learns how to pick his moments physically. From an offensive perspective, I could see him dropping to a similar amount of goals as Verhoeff, who recorded 6 goals this season, but Carels will likely be able to put up more 5v5 goals in his first NCAA season due to his ability to shoot through traffic, whilst Verhoeff relies on a combination of open space and shot power to score.

His playmaking will likely result in a lack of primary assists, but his ability to work within a structure and execute passes on set plays should enable him to put up secondary assists, while not tanking his primary contributions entirely.

If I had to guess, if he plays 36 games similar to Verhoeff did this season, 5 goals and 12 assists, when accounting for the lack of PP1 time, seems like a good stat line for Carels. If he can achieve this while also being used on the first unit penalty kill and against top competition in the NCHC, this will do him a lot of favours in terms of NHL projectability.

As of now, I see his potential being the following

Ceiling: Jonas Brodin with more assists. A large, physically imposing defensive defenseman with good puck moving ability, whilst not being a playmaking defenseman. Average production stat line: 8 goals, 35 assists. ~ 40 points while being a PP2 and PK 1 guy. A solid if not elite playstopping #2 defenseman

Floor: Prime Marc Staal: A defensive defenseman whose lack of deception and tendency to use his skating ineffectively limits his offensive game to the point where he is forced to adjust into being a pure defensive defenseman, who limits chances against but requires a defensive partner + center combo to handle almost all of the transition responsibility. An effective second pair playstopper, but not the player you want in the top 5.

For what it’s worth, I believe his floor is as equally as unlikely for him to hit as his ceiling. In reality, he will likely be a high end #3 defenseman who offers a physical edge that all playoff teams desire, and will be a 30-35 point defenseman.
Basically an era adjusted version of Dan Hamhuis when he was on the Predators.

Should the Canucks draft Carels? I do not believe so. If the Canucks should draft any defenseman, especially at # 3, it should be Chase Reid. His combination of size, offensive, and transition ability makes him a higher upside pick at #3, and quite frankly gives him a higher likelihood of being a #1 Star defenseman. However, if the Canucks drop down to #5 or 6, I could be convinced.

Thank you for reading my article on Carson Carels, and on Friday at noon, mere hours before the draft I plan on dropping my article about potential draft candidates for the Canucks at #24, 33, and 41!

The 2026 NHL Draft class has been fascinating not because of elite, franchise-altering talent, but due to the lack of consensus around it.

Last season, Keaton Verhoeff recorded 21 goals and 24 assists (45 points) in 63 WHL games for the Victoria Royals, followed by 1 goal and 9 assists (10 points) in 11 playoff games. Before this season, it initially looked like the first overall pick would come down to Gavin McKenna or Keaton Verhoeff.

At 6’4” and 212 pounds, the right-shot defenseman brought a heavy shot and strong production, especially in the playoffs, where he outperformed his already impressive regular season. However, his hype cooled considerably over the 2025-26 season, and opinions on him as a prospect now vary widely.

If you ask around, you’ll hear all kinds of conflicting takes.
Some scouts love his straight-line speed but say his agility needs work. Others point out how much his passing has improved this season, while plenty of people still see him looking lost with the puck and forcing turnovers.

At this point, I’ve come to the conclusion that Verhoeff is hands-down the weirdest top prospect I’ve ever watched. His compete level is rock solid and consistent, but pretty much everything else about his game is up and down.
Night to night, his overall impact and individual skills can swing wildly.

The Jump

This season, Verhoeff made a bold and somewhat unprecedented move, jumping straight to the NCAA with the University of North Dakota instead of staying with the Victoria Royals in the WHL.

Thanks to new rules allowing CHL players to keep their amateur status, we saw a wave of top young talent leave Canadian junior hockey for the NCAA. The chance to play against older, stronger, and more pro-ready competition was simply too good to pass up.

Verhoeff was one of the biggest names to make the leap, and given his size and production profile, many expected this jump to cement his status as the clear top defenseman in the 2026 NHL Draft class...

Instead, Verhoeff spent the season chasing consistency.

Just when one part of his game started to click, something else would fall off. One night he’d look like the most NHL-ready defenseman in the entire draft, and the next he’d play like a guy you might rank somewhere in the 10-15 range without thinking twice about it.

It’s important to remember that the NCAA isn’t a development league. It’s an amateur league full of older, stronger, more physically mature players. These guys have been developing longer and are physically further along.
On top of that, the talent gap between conferences and even between teams inside the same conference is huge. Some nights a better team just beats you outright and makes you look bad. Other nights you dominate and look like a superstar.

It’s probably going to take scouts and fans a while to recalibrate their expectations for underage players in the NCAA, no matter how big or skilled they are. We saw the same thing with Gavin McKenna - he had stretches where the production dried up, but he turned it on later in the year and has now positioned himself to go first overall to the Maple Leafs.

The Good, & The Bad

Verhoeff has clear talent. He has a combination of size and skill that is hard to find in the modern game. He uses this combo, along with above average Hockey IQ to create advantages for teammates and escape pressure.

On this play, Verhoeff shows off part of what makes him so intriguing: His strong puck protection skills, stickhandling ability, and improved passing.

North Dakota is getting pressured hard by a two-man forecheck.
When the first SCSU forward gets on him, Verhoeff fights through stick work, makes a quick cut, and sheds the guy off his hip, leaving him chasing air.

As the second forechecker closes in on a now stationary Verhoeff, he doesn’t panic. He uses a smooth backhand stickhandle to keep the puck away from danger, then makes a nice bank pass to his defensive partner.

When SCSU immediately jumps the partner, Verhoeff reads the situation perfectly. Instead of double-teaming, he sees the clear lane and lets his partner slide the puck into the space behind the net for the center. This keeps him open for a return option while he scans up the ice for the breakout.

Once the puck comes back to him, he delivers a crisp, tight-angled bank pass off the wall to his streaking center, and North Dakota transitions smoothly into the offensive zone.

Of course, because it’s Verhoeff, there are still things you can nitpick. He did shake the first guy, but he also left the puck exposed in open ice for a split second. If he’d lost it, he wouldn’t have been in position to body the forward off.

Also, after the final pass, he gets caught admiring it and takes a big hit into the boards. At 6’4” and 212 pounds, he should be finishing those plays with a reverse hit to make guys pay for coming after him.

Verhoeff isn’t the most explosive skater, but that doesn’t mean he can’t close gaps quickly.

This play against Denver is a great example of how his size and defensive IQ let him multitask effectively off the rush. As Denver crosses center ice, Verhoeff is already tight on the left winger, which creates a big gap between him and his defensive partner. Denver’s #13 tries to exploit it, but Verhoeff uses his long reach and anticipation to close the distance fast, stripping the puck and shutting down a dangerous chance.

The concerning part is that he gets caught puck-watching. He misses his first stick check, gets it on the second try, but then turns his body toward the puck and straightens his legs for a moment instead of staying glued to his check and trusting his backchecking forward. That allows the puck to swing back to #13 for a shot.

The good news is he turned a potential high-danger chance into something much less threatening. Ideally, though, that second opportunity never happens. If he had stayed with his man, he likely would’ve prevented the shot entirely.

Here’s another good example of Verhoeff using his reach, stickhandling, and puck protection in the defensive zone.

While his teammate is tied up in a puck battle down low on the boards, Verhoeff sweeps in, positioning his body between the puck and the opponent while using his stick to disrupt the forechecker along the wall.

When the puck pops loose, he tries to control it but gets bumped, sending it off the net. As a second forward comes at him, he smoothly pushes the puck to his backhand, pulls it back to his forehand, and turns his body to shield it all in one fluid motion.

That sequence is indicative of high-end talent.

A lot of big, less mobile players his age would’ve just rimmed the puck along the boards and taken the icing. He then scans over his right shoulder, sees that his far-side winger doesn’t have a stick, and decides to turn and push the puck up the strong-side wall.
This is where his lack of explosiveness hurts him. He can’t separate from the forechecker, gets angled into the corner, and his attempted bank pass to the winger is picked off by a pinching defenseman, giving the opponent extended zone time.

On one hand, I love that he didn’t panic under pressure and took the extra second to scan and recognize his teammate had no stick.
On the other, he failed to scan the strong side, so he didn’t see the defenseman closing in.
You could argue he was just trying to make a play, but with a temporary manpower disadvantage, the safer option was probably to flip the puck high out and into the neutral zone, or just ice it to get a whistle and regroup.

This is exactly why I’ve emphasized Verhoeff’s inconsistency. He can look shaky on one shift and then turn around and make a play like this that highlights his strong passing and high hockey IQ.

When the puck gets rimmed around the wall, Verhoeff pivots quickly, skates backward, and retrieves it just as two Omaha forwards pinch in on him. Under pressure, he scans the strong side of the ice, and while on his backhand and facing the boards, delivers a beautiful tape to tape pass to his teammate.

Lesser players would’ve just tried to muscle the puck up the wall, but Verhoeff reads the situation perfectly.
He sees the forechecker’s stick positioned along the boards and knows his teammate is left-handed. A pass along the wall would have forced his teammate to handle it on the backhand, slowing him down and likely leading to a turnover with Omaha’s F3 bearing down.

Instead, he threads the puck behind the forechecker, giving his teammate space to control it, scan the ice, and make a safe chip out into the neutral zone for his linemates to chase.

I wanted to showcase this play to demonstrate Verhoeff’s improved playmaking, while also continuing to demonstrate his hockey IQ.

He makes a perfectly timed step up to knock the puck down in mid-air, and while stickhandling in the middle of all 5 SCSU players, is able to thread a nice backhand pass into the high slot for his teammate, who just misses giving North Dakota the lead.

Despite Verhoeff’s clear limitations in his skating and tendency to show a bit too much confidence with the puck, his playmaking has come a long way. In fact, I’d say it’s been the part of his game that has developed the most over the course of the season.

The growth in his playmaking ability has shown itself not only in the eye test, but from an analytical point of view as well, where Verhoeff is 97th percentile in passes, while also being 94th percentile in slot passes.

To put that into context, Carson Carels, another projected top 7 selection in the 2026 NHL Entry Draft, is 90th percentile in passes and 96th percentile in slot passes, while playing in a weaker WHL, against younger competition.

If you’re looking for an NCAA Defenseman to compare him to, we can look at 2025 1st round selection (14th overall, CBJ) Jackson Smith, and see that his passing and slot passing percentiles are in the 89th and 79th percentiles, respectively.

Keep in mind, Jackson Smith plays in the Big Ten Conference, which is considered to be significantly weaker overall than NCHC, the conference Keaton Verhoeff and the North Dakota Fighting Hawks play in.

Verhoeff’s combination of stickhandling and improved passing has also led him to becoming a very good transition player, where his only deficiency is being 42nd percentile in pass exits.

You may look at his 2nd percentile turnover rate and have major concerns, but I view this as a player who dove into the deep end of NCAA hockey as a 17 year old, while recognizing that most of his turnovers are low in the Defensive Zone, and because his team has not yet vacated the zone, allows them to adjust quickly, or low in the Offensive Zone, as the result of attempting a high danger pass to the slot.

When Verhoeff was in the WHL, his shot was one of the things people raved about, and rightfully so, given he scored 21 goals in 63 games. But this season in the NCAA, he didn’t record a single high-danger shot at 5v5.

The reason is pretty straightforward: he lacks the explosiveness and agility to consistently drive into high-danger areas at top speed.

That said, when he does get time and space to walk the puck downhill and unleash his shot, it’s still a weapon. The fact that he scored 6 goals in 36 games without a single 5v5 high-danger shot is actually a bit of an accomplishment.

On the power play, he was a legitimate shooting threat, which allowed him to freeze penalty killers and open up passing lanes. He showed a good (but not elite) ability to take advantage of those opportunities.

Wrap Up

When I watch Keaton Verhoeff, I keep coming back to the same question: Is his inconsistency and these clear limitations a sign that he lacks true top-end talent, or is it just the result of a 17 year old throwing himself into the toughest conference in college hockey before he was physically or mentally ready for that jump? Also, lets not forget that he was a goalie until he was 12 years old! He’s only been a defenseman for 5 years.

On the positive side, he has a very good wrist shot and has improved his playmaking to the point where he doesn’t have to rely on shooting to produce. His transition game is excellent, and the way he combines strong puck protection with a habit of constantly scanning for threats and opportunities is impressive.

On the flip side, he still panics under pressure at times, throws pucks away even when he has space, can often get caught puck watching, or trying to do too much with the puck, and can get walked on the rush by quicker players (as seen below).

The answer for whether the Canucks should Draft or Pass on Keaton Verhoeff is dependent on whether or not they believe their development team is in a position, both in terms of staff and analytics (research & development) to properly handle such a massive, high-stakes project like Verhoeff.

His size, decent mobility, shot, playmaking, and habits give him a tremendous skill set to build upon, but if the Canucks fail to recognize, understand, and develop a plan to hammer out the kinks in his game, fans will be looking at the Canucks using a 3rd overall pick on a 2nd pair, puck moving (but not offensive) defensive defenseman, and asking ourselves “What if they picked someone else?”.

Considering what we’ve heard about the Canucks lack of analytics (they’re still building up a proper department), and how the Canucks have failed to develop a 300+ game defenseman since Quinn Hughes (who is generational), I do not have confidence in this organization’s ability to properly develop Keaton Verhoeff.

Perhaps that can be mitigated by keeping him at North Dakota for another 2 seasons, but it’s not a risk that I would feel comfortable taking, personally.

There are quite a few franchises that I believe could develop him into the Top Pair, Right-Handed NHL Defenseman that every team dreams of, however.

When it comes to projectability, I see him as having the ceiling of being low end #1 d man, and a fantastic second pair play stopper as his floor.

If you want player comparables, he could range from being:

Ceiling: A slightly better Aaron Ekblad. 15-18 goals per 82 games, with 30-35 assists. Threat in all three zones, being able to shoot, distribute, and transition the puck, while also being able to use his size and mobility to prevent opposing defenses from being able to enter the zone and set up.

Floor: Adam Larsson, 5-10 goals a season, 15-20 assists per season, and makes a career out of being a large right handed defenseman who has to change his playstyle from being a potential two way threat to being a defenseman that relies on his size and decent mobility to kill plays, while also having the ability to exit the zone safely.

Next post, I'll be writing about Carson Carels! I hope to have that article out on Wednesday. Thank you for reading!

Defense is currently a position that is undergoing a remarkable evolution. What was once thought of as a position where the objective was solely (outside of a few historical exceptions) to keep pucks out of the net with defensive actions has changed.

With the introduction and evolution of analytics within the sport over the last 20 years, and how readily available they’ve become to the public, a couple things have become abundantly clear:

• The best Defense is Puck Possession

• The most important zone is the Neutral Zone

• Rush Chances are more dangerous than Cycle Chances, and as a result,

• The ability to create and defend against zone entries is extremely important

The new age playdriving, #1 Defenseman not only has to defend well, but also has to be able to possess the puck and create chances through their own possession.
In this day and age, top defensemen are practically second centers on the ice.

It’s very similar to how the Rover position used to operate in the PCHA back in the 1910’s.

When we look at the best offensive defensemen in the NHL, who comes to mind?
Cale Makar, Quinn Hughes, Zach Werenski, Evan Bouchard? All 4 of those defensemen possess an incredible ability to possess the puck, create zone exits and entries, and when in the offensive zone, create high danger chances for themselves and their teammates.

Their Offensive IQ enables them to join the offense as either the primary puck carrier, or fill in as a temporary F2 or F3, allowing them to become a potential catch and shoot option off the rush.

They also make use of their defensive IQ to make aggressive (yet calculated) pinches to extend possession time, and unlike most defensemen, have no problem handling the puck below the circles and joining the cycle, allowing their teams to create man power advantages all around the Offensive Zone.

With that in mind, there is only one defenseman in the 2026 NHL Entry Draft that possesses the traits needed to be a top offensive defenseman, while also having the size needed to survive in the modern game. His name is Chase Reid.

Chase-ing Greatness

“Big, mobile defensemen who can play a lot of minutes and score like Reid are the foundational pieces of a championship roster.” – Corey Pronman, from The Athletic

In the 2024-25′ season, Chase Reid put up 7 goals and 33 assists for 40 points in 39 OHL games, which is remarkable for a defenseman in the D-1 season. Not only did he lead all Soo Greyhound defensemen in points, but he did so by a remarkable margin.
The next best point producing defenseman for the Greyhounds was 20-year old Caeden Carlisle who had 1 goal and 18 assists in 65 games.

Reid was tied for 20th in defenseman scoring, with Oliver Bonk, recent 1st round pick of the Philadelphia Flyers.

On a per-game basis, Reid was 6th in points per game, behind top prospects Zayne Parekh and Sam Dickinson, both in their D+1 seasons, Matthew Schaefer in his Draft Year, Henry Mews who most recently had 9 points in 10 games for the Uni. of Michigan before suffering a season ending injury, and Luca Marrelli in his D+1 season, who despite being a 3rd round selection in 2024 put up a respectable 16 points in 32 AHL games this past season.

What many people don’t know though, is before signing with the Greyhounds, who had drafted him in Round 7, 125th overall in the 2023 OHL Priority Selection Draft, Reid was a middling prospect struggling to produce and find playing time for the Bismarck Bobcats of the NAHL.

In 2023-24′, Reid played 10 games for the USHL’s Waterloo Black Hawks, putting up 0 points and recording a +1. Not what you want to see out of a prospect in their Draft – 2 Season. To compare, lets look at Keaton Verhoeff, another Top Prospect in the 2026 draft and see what his D-2 season production was.

2 points in 12 WHL games, and 27 points in 22 CSSHL U18 Games. Reid had 62 points in 68 16U AAA games. So not only was Verhoeff playing against older competition, but he was putting up better than point per game numbers while doing so. Meanwhile, Reid was ranked 18th in 16U with 0.91 points per game.

According to Michigan State University Associate Coach Jared DeMichiel, Chase Reid “was like the No. 4 on his NAHL team”

So to say this turnaround has been magnificent is an understatement. A lot of players would have been mentally destroyed by this kind of development path. Despite already being committed to MSU, his draft stock was dropping rapidly.

Through all of that, his confidence never waivered. This allowed him to not only jump to the OHL, but find his footing almost immediately. However, despite this confidence, he didn’t rest on it, and dedicated himself to the craft

“Reid’s development was aided by Greyhound’s defensive coach Brendan Taylor, with whom he worked closely. The rookie often asked for extra video sessions, eager to sharpen his game and expand his responsibilities.” – CHL.ca article by Breanna McNeill

Needless to say, this kid is hungry, driven, dedicated, and resilient. These are all innate traits that will carry him far, not only in Hockey, but life in general.

And we haven’t even gotten to his on-ice play yet.

Reid-y. Set. Go!

Let me make this clear off the bat:
There is still a level of rawness to Reid’s game. This is to be expected. Most elite offensive defensemen are smaller framed, which gives them a lower center of gravity, this letting them be more fluid in their skating and tighter on their edges.

Chase Reid however, is 6’2″ (6 foot 2.25 inches to be exact), and 195 pounds. This makes him 4 inches taller than Quinn Hughes, and 2.25 inches taller than Cale Makar. He is not going to be same type of skater as either of them.

However, for his size, his skating is great, and he uses it along with his innate ability to anticipate the game to excel in transition.

Let’s take a look at an example:

This play might seem a bit mundane, but it actually showcases Reid’s elite ability to anticipate while remaining committed to his defensive responsibilities.

When London throws the puck around the boards, Reid doesn’t feel compelled to follow the puck into the opposite corner, instead remaining in the slot, ready to defend against a potential attack by London, should they come out with the puck.
However, he doesn’t plant himself in the slot. He makes sure to keep some of his momentum, in case he needs to accelerate. He does this while staying true to his defensive responsibilities by cutting along the circle and back towards the far circle, and pushing back off towards the puck side.

At ~7 seconds in, he recognizes that #27 is going to come out with the puck. In order to give him an option, he uses the momentum he kept to accelerate below the goal line and behind the net, while also having his body faced towards where he wants to skate, rather than facing the pass. This gives #27 an option that is not only open, but has speed, which will allow Reid to accelerate away from pressure, which allows the Greyhounds to breakout much easier than if Reid had been flatfooted.

This momentum also plays a big part in evading the forechecker. Upon getting the puck, Reid begins to skate up the ice, keeping his head up to scan for any potential options up ice. However, the strong side winger and the center are both in between two separate layers of 2 London players. Any play to these two risks a turnover, with the best case scenario being a chip in.

With London #6 closing in on him, the momentum Reid built up on defense allows him to keep his distance. If Reid had been flatfooted, London #6 would have had a much easier time closing the gap, which may have allowed London to recover the puck before it exited.

With London backing up in their 1-2-2 structure, Reid finds his defensive partner, #6, who has pinched up to act as F3, with a direct, horizontal pass. His teammate then shoots the puck in deep.

Even though this isn’t a play that leads to any offensive scoring chance, it showcases how intelligent Reid is. He knows he can’t hit a homerun on this play, but he knows that he could force a low percentage play that doesn’t allow his team to make a full change, or worse, a turnover that results in a chance or goal against. He instead makes sure to get the puck to someone who can get the puck deep.

These are the types of plays that allows a team to transition effectively, which is a key component in preventing goals and chances against. Not only does it keep the puck out of the DZ, but it allows his team to line change, ensuring that his team doesn’t surrender goals as the result of being stuck on the ice for extended periods of time.

Let’s take a look at Reid’s breakouts:

On the first breakout pass, I’m equally as impressed with Reid’s ability to handle the slap by his defensive partner, while being amused by the contrast in how both of them decided to handle the play.

Reid upon receiving the puck, only has a short window in which he’s able to thread this pass. Not only does he time it perfectly, but he has the wherewithal to take a step up ice before releasing it. This allows him to ensure that his pass will be accurate, while also giving it a bit of extra velocity on its way to the receiver.

On the second play, he uses his Hockey IQ and backskating ability to allow the play up-ice to develop while short handed, while also drawing in a forechecker.

Erie is executing a 2-1-2 press in an attempt to recover the puck with the man advantage.

Because of Erie’s aggressiveness in wanting to recover the puck on the powerplay, this also leads the entire Otter Power Play unit to be drawn up ice, which allows Reid to fire a pass towards his two forwards up-ice, against Erie’s momentum.

When the Camera cuts back to the 2 on 1, you can see that the two backchecking Otter players were unable to turn against their momentum and accelerate back into the D Zone in time, allowing the Greyhound PK forwards to execute a beautiful 2 on 1 for a shorthanded goal.

In the Offensive Zone, Reid uses his combination of Skating and IQ to unleash his shot, a weapon in it’s own right.

The video below features 3 plays. Lets go over them one by one.

Play 1:
Reid displays exceptional offensive instincts, keeping his body open for a potential pass from the defenseman while building momentum and attacking the open space down his flank and towards the net, anticipating a potential man power advantage at the slot.
The rebound comes to Reid, who is being assisted by a Greyhound forward tying up his check in front, and releases a beautiful toe drag (to change the angle) wrist shot 5 hole.

Play 2:
Reid walks down his strong side flank and wires a wrist shot, that bounces wide.
While his linemate picks up the puck in the corner, Reid reloads up top, keeping his momentum instead of standing still.
Because of his momentum towards the net, and the shooting threat he is, this forces the Oshawa PK unit to back up in an attempt to give themselves more time to get into a shooting lane. Reid takes advantage of this by immediately wiring a cross ice pass to a linemate, who fumbles the pass. The teammate gives it to the high point man, who taps it over to Reid, who once again keeps his momentum by reloading up high.
Oshawa, due to the fact they’ve now had to switch their side of coverage twice in the span of 10 seconds, and that Reid has presented himself as a Shooting and Passing threat, collapse in an attempt to conserve energy and attempt to take away both options. Reid however is pretty set on shooting this puck. He takes two hard strides into and with the puck, and before the Oshawa PK’er can close the gap, wire a shot above the glove of the Oshawa goaltender.

Play 3:
This play displays Reid’s vision and IQ. In previous plays, we’ve seen Reid use his momentum as a threat to force defenses to commit to taking away one option. However, initially on this play, Reid is somewhat still. This is intentional.
Had Reid attacked down his flank, the pass he makes to the goal line through Flint’s Defensive Zone coverage would not have been available.
While his teammate fumbles this pass, Reid recognizes that Flint now has to collapse to defend against the goal line player. When Reid gets the puck back, he takes advantage of the space that has opened up in the high slot that has opened up, skates into the pass and wires a shot into the back of the net.

Reid’s shot demands the respect of defending teams, which allows other plays to open up for him, and he takes full advantage of that.

Here’s another play:

Reid’s ability to shoot draws in wingers and gets opposing defensemen to get caught puck watching in an attempt to block a shot or get out of the way of their goaltender’s line of sight. This lets his teammates to often bypass their checks for deflections like the one above.

Reid’s teammate fails to redirect the puck in, but this is a very high danger scoring chance that NHL teams attempt, especially in tight games. Scoring in those types of games requires a level of deception and creativity that Reid clearly possesses.

He’s not done, however. Upon getting the puck back, he keeps his hips open towards the middle of the ice and skates slowly down the wall. If his hips were closed, the opposing defense would be much more inclined to try and angle him off the puck and force a turnover. However, with his hips open, he is able to side step potential checks, scan the ice, and present himself as a potential threat. No defending player wants to be drawn to the perimeter only to get beaten, so they give Reid his space. This gives his teammate on the far side time to beat his check, and one clearly open, Reid fires a direct pass cross ice, and it ends up in the back of the net.

Reid is like a Field General Quarterback. Constantly scanning the ice, willing to take small yardage to survive, and because of that, he freezes opposing defenses to the point where he can make the long range, high danger pass.

NHL Ready? No.

With that said, Reid does have flaws that are eye popping, but I believe these are merely the consequences of a late (yet rapid) development, and the fact he plays in a development league.

If you recall my article on Caleb Malhotra, you might remember how I said that while Malhotra turned the puck over a lot, especially on the inside lane, that it was understandable, as he was trying to see how far he could stretch things. He wanted to see what his limit was, and in a developmental sense this is a good thing. I rather see a player try and reach his full potential rather than being terrified of making mistakes and keeping it safe.

On this play, Reid makes a solid play initially, taking the puck in stride, and entering the zone with enough speed to back off the London defense. However, he attempts to make a low percentage pass through both London defensemen, and when that is blocked, instead of rimming it low for the Greyhound forward in an attempt to maintain possession, he instead chips it cross ice and deep, where no one is. This is better than a turnover, but it’s a sign of a player who might still have some level of panic in his game when his initial idea doesn’t work.

On this play, Reid takes the puck behind the net and instead of chipping it up the half wall, he instead stops to try and side step the forechecker. This is easily snuffed out, which results in an attempted pass to the slot by London and an extended possession. This play may have been caused by his d partner cutting too far in towards the middle of the ice as opposed to being closer to the wall, but it’s once again evidence of a player that might struggle to adjust when things don’t develop as he anticipated.

Reid is also prone to making pinches that test the limits of his abilities. While I wouldn’t characterize any of his missed pinches as being egregious, I would say that in the NHL even the smallest opening can be exploited. On this play, when Reid pinches, he is not even within a stick’s length of the Niagara IceDogs player, and even with a puck fumble, is able to move the puck past Reid and to the middle of the ice.
While this results in an icing that brings the puck back, against a better, more structured team this could have resulted in a 2-on-2, or 3-on-2, with one of the Greyhound players back being a forward.

On this play, Reid foregoes the safe, possession extending play of chipping it low into space for his teammate in favour of attempting to side-step the winger and attack down the flank. Normally, Reid is able to create a chance out of a play like this. However, he failed to recognize that the Niagara winger had built momentum up towards the point by swinging up high when the initial low to high pass was executed. When Reid gets the puck, he has some momentum built, but far less than what the defending winger has built. Reid no longer has an advantage, yet tries to create a high danger chance.

When he loses the puck, he also falls, resulting in a delayed backcheck.

Once Reid is back in the defensive zone, he actually positions himself well. He’s a good defender on his side of center ice. He knows how plays are going to develop, and uses his gap control and general hockey IQ to win puck battles and shutdown plays. He was voted as the OHL’s 2nd best defensive defenseman for a reason. However, when he does get in trouble defensively, it’s because of his eagerness to create offensively or regain the puck for his team.

I would like to see him use his body more to actually wipe out players along the wall, but as it currently stands he uses his large frame to angle players off on the forecheck and zone entry, and has magnificent stick work and gap control. He needs to gain more confidence in his size in order to maximize his potential physically.

Wrap Up

“Everyone has a dream, just reach for the stars.” -Chase Reid.

Chase Reid possesses a combination of size, skating, shot, and hockey IQ that is hard to find in the NHL.

When reading reactions to potential draft picks, it stuns me that people fail to recognize the difference between leagues that prioritize development versus winning.

Stenberg in the SHL, plus McKenna and Verhoeff in the NCAA are prime examples. The SHL is a pro league. The NCAA is an amateur league, and are a developmental pipeline for the NHL, but they do not consider themselves to be a developmental league. Club teams have two objectives: Win, and make money.

That’s why it’s important to recognize the context of a player’s development within their respective environment. Does Reid make bad pinches, and is a bit too creative with the puck at times? Yes.

However, the OHL is the environment where that should be prioritized. When a player makes mistakes in the SHL or NCAA, the implications are completely different.
Is the player themselves still developing? Yes. However, their failures act against the overall clubs interests in achieving their primary objectives set by the league. That’s why I am less (not by a lot, but a little) considerate of someone like Verhoeff’s struggles as I would be if he was making these mistakes on the Victoria Royals, even though he is playing against men. This however, means that their successes deserve an equal adjustment in terms of the praise they receive when they succeed.

When Reid goes to Michigan State University, he is going to have a fantastic base skill set. He is going to be given ample opportunity, and although his mistakes will be less forgiving, as a player he will learn how to reign in his pinches, and become more of an all around threat who can rely on his teammates, rather than a player who feels the need to possess the puck for 27 minutes a night, and supply 60% of the teams transition and offensive output when he’s in the lineup.

I do think he’ll take two more seasons to come into his own fully.
If he does play in the 2027-28′ NHL season, I would expect some early growing pains.

To me, Reid is a top 3 talent in this draft. In my rankings, I had him ahead of Stenberg, but in a Pyramid Format, McKenna would be tier 1, but Reid and Stenberg would be tier 2.

If Reid is available at #3, with McKenna and Stenberg off the board, he would be my selection, personally. His IQ gives him a baseline that to me is that of a #3 defenseman, with the potential of being a #1 defenseman. I don’t think he’d be the type to win Norris Trophies, but he could definitely become a top 10 defenseman in the NHL, and his size will allow him to eventually play in all situations, especially if he becomes more confident in his physical abilities.

I believe he’ll be a constant 15 goal, 55-65 point defenseman. He reminds me a lot of Sergei Gonchar from an overall impact point of view.

I planned on putting this article out on Monday, but moved it up to today because truthfully, I’m having a lot of fun with this.

So Monday, or perhaps sooner, expect an article about Keaton Verhoeff.

My two articles after that will be about Carson Carels, and finally about who the Canucks should select at 24th, 33rd, and 41st overall.

Thanks for reading!

Everything’s bigger in Texas the NHL

It’s funny what one inch can do for your reputation and draft stock.

According to Elite Prospects, Stenberg is 6’0″, 181 pounds.
According to the NHL Combine, Stenberg is 5’11”, 183 pounds.

According to me? I don’t care, and neither should you.

3 nights ago, the Carolina Hurricanes won the Stanley Cup for the second time in franchise history. Their team, coached by Rod Brind’Amour, has found a masterful balance between shot frequency and quality, while maximizing puck possession.

In the regular season at 5v5, the Hurricanes ranked:

• 1st in Corsi For (4621)

• 1st in Corsi % (59.78%)

• 2nd in Shots For (2070)

• 1st in Shots For % (57.66%)

• 1st in Scoring Chances (2205)

• 1st in Scoring Chance % (57.57%)

• 1st in High Danger Scoring Chances (889)

• 4th in High Danger Scoring Chance % (55.15%)

These trends remained true in the playoffs, and it was a great showing of how modern hockey is played. Using your speed efficiently, extending possession by any means necessary, and once you lose possession, forecheck the tired defense, force a turnover, and strike on the counter.

Why am I bringing this up? It’s because despite the fact that they forecheck hard up and down the lineup, and maintain possession of the puck better than any team in hockey, they lack size.

4 Hurricanes players produced more than 10 5v5 points these playoffs. Jackson Blake (5’11”, 185lbs), Taylor Hall (6’1″, 210lbs), Logan Stankoven (5’8″, 165lbs), and Nikolaj Ehlers (6’0″, 168lbs).

Other than Hall, the Hurricanes top producers were smaller than average players. This isn’t to say that size isn’t important. There are analytics to backup that size on the backend matters, and traditionally you want your centers to be a bit larger (whether it’s in height or weight) to help low in the D Zone, whether it’s with their body or stick.

But to look at Ivar Stenberg and say “He’s 5’11”, 181 pounds, he might not be big enough to be a star in the NHL” is completely ridiculous.

Ivar The Great

“The game is won or lost in the neutral zone” – Scotty Bowman

The neutral zone is extremely underappreciated by the average hockey fan, and that’s understandable. Goals don’t occur from the neutral zone, and big, open ice hits rarely occur anymore.

In reality however, a team’s ability to successfully enter the zone, or stop entries against is often a great indicator of team performance.

52.9% of goals originate off of the cycle/forecheck. This stat might seem to counter my previous statement, however by stopping your opponent before they enter the zone, you prevent a team from being able to cycle effectively.

Here are some other stats about rush vs. cycle offense

• On the Rush/Forecheck, shooting percentage is 8.6%. Take away rebounds and this drops to 7.7%

• Off the Rush, Shooting percentage is 9.9%

• On the Forecheck, cross slot passes accounted for 3.8% of all shots, with a 15.8% shooting percentage

• Off the Rush, cross slot passes accounted for 5.6% of all shots, with a 22.5% shooting percentage.

• On the Cycle, Low-to-High passes make up 18.5% of all passes. The shooting percentage from these passes are 2.7%. If you include point shot deflections, this increases to 4.2%

• Rushes that start from Defensive Zone Counters have a 17.5% shooting percentage, and make up 17.4% of all rushes.

• Rushes that start from Neutral Zone turnovers have an 11.1% shooting percentage and make up 13.1% of all rushes.

• Rushes that start from a DZ retrieval/exit have an 8.1% shooting percentage but make up 32.6% of all rushes

So, how does this affect Stenberg?

This play between Canucks 5v5 scoring leader Linus Karlsson, NHL 2026 Top Prospect Viggo Björck, and Stenberg is a great example of Stenberg’s ability.

If we look back at the beginning of this section, we will see that Stenberg had a transition score of 4.38 in the SHL. 4 is elite. 4.38 is off the charts elite.

The SHL is not just some random men’s league, either. It is often ranked 2nd in the world in terms of talent (yes, even higher than the KHL). Stenberg put up a historic 18 year-old campaign, only trailing Henrik and Daniel Sedin in terms of points in a single season all time, and tying Henrik for most assists in a season by a player aged 18.

Plays like the one above are reasons why he found that level of success.

When Czechia turns the puck over right outside their blueline, Ivar carries the puck west to east. This pulls all 3 Czech players in the DZ over towards the middle of the ice, with the far side man making an aggressive move on Stenberg, in an attempt to force a turnover or forcing the other 2 Swedish forwards offside.

Stenberg slams on the breaks and makes a hard cut towards the inside lane. This gets him away from the attacker, but it also stops his momentum dead in it’s tracks. This gives one of the other 2 Czech DZ players confidence to attack, believing Stenberg has no way of getting around him.

Instead of chipping the puck in, Ivar stickhandles to his backhand to lure the defender in even more, and chips the puck against the defender’s momentum, to his left side (important to note as the defender is right handed, allowing him to avoid the stick) and behind him to a streaking Linus Karlsson. This creates a 2-on-1, which Karlsson is able to take advantage of, dishing a perfect pass to Björck, who buries the pass.

When Stenberg makes his pass, he is in the middle of a Czech triangle at the blueline, with a 4th defender caught puck watching.

The situational awareness to know where his wingers are, chipping it away from the Czech player’s stick, and not panicking with all of the pressure being placed on him at the blueline paints a picture of a player wise beyond his years.
He doesn’t make a selfish play, but he also makes sure to not kill the chance. He attacks the middle lane and creates a high danger scoring opportunity for his linemates.

This is what stars do.

Let’s look at another example.

When Ivar picks up the puck, he is basically at top speed, against a defenseman who just turned to skate backwards. The entry is the easy part here.

What is difficult however, is finding a way to beat the defender while managing to avoid any back pressure being applied, especially since Stenberg is alone on this rush.

He crosses the blueline, and on his backhand attacks the middle. The Slovak defenseman clearly believes that Stenberg’s objective is to cut in and across on his backhand in an attempt to get between him and the oncoming backcheck, perhaps hoping to pass the defender and use him as a pick against the backchecker.

Stenberg in making this move to his backhand early, gives himself time to scan the ice and make a decision.

1. He either cuts across the ice on his backhand and either takes a shot or attempts to power to the net. or

2. He holds the puck on his backhand as long as possible to bait the defenseman into attempting to pinch him between himself and the backchecker, and cuts away from the pressure.

This choice is made depending on the commitment of the defenseman. If he relaxes in an attempt to take away the cutback, he will accelerate and attempt to pass the d man before the backchecker arrives. Instead, the defenseman dedicates himself to cutting off the lane on Stenberg’s backhand.

Stenberg slams on the breaks, cuts to his forehand (and in the process, breaking the Czech d man’s ankles), and without any additional stick handles, rifles a shot into the top corner.

There are moments where you want a player to meet pressure with pressure. Attacking into traffic as a way of getting to the middle in order to force the defense to make a play. However, there are also times where you want a player to avert from pressure as a means of maintaining possession and allowing reinforcements to arrive into the OZ.

With this play, Stenberg used the threat of meeting pressure with pressure as a way of both averting from it, and creating a high danger chance that just so happened to end with a beautiful goal.

Again, this is what stars do.

Size of the Fight In The Dog

When you look at Stenberg’s size, you have to ask whether or not a lot of his best traits will translate against the worlds best and biggest defensemen. However, like I mentioned with the Carolina Hurricanes top playoff scorers this season, size doesn’t matter if you can fight upwards.

Not only can Stenberg fight upwards, it’s what he’s trained himself to do.

Stenberg has exceptional lower body strength, and uses this to his advantage to create space for himself and teammates. He consistently rolls off checks, and displays great proficiency at protecting the puck with one hand. He also pops off of checks while maintaining possession, allowing him to extend plays and draw in additional defensemen that attempt to double team Stenberg along the wall.

This, combined with his ability to delay plays as long as possible to create the most advantageous situations possible gives Stenberg a highly projectable skill set once he makes the leap to the NHL. I would argue his skill set is more projectable than even Gavin McKenna’s, although McKenna has far higher top end skill, and thus a higher offensive ceiling.

Ivar The Terrible

There aren’t many flaws in Stenberg’s game, however the few he has can potentially limit his ceiling as an offensive player and two-way winger.

His skating is good. He creates speed in his crossovers, and displays a fantastic combo of balance and agility. Where he lacks is in his explosiveness and top speed.

As his skating currently stands, it’s easy to see a world where he dominants against middle and bottom pair defensemen. However, the lack of explosiveness will make it a struggle to beat high end defenseman, those of which typically have high end IQ and great skating, regardless of size.

By working on these, he will be able to produce regardless of who he is out on the ice against.

From a defensive standpoint, Stenberg is also beyond his years. He is a fantastic forechecker, and shows an ability to work along the walls. However, he’s still a winger, and young wingers will often show a level of passiveness in some area of their defensive game that can cause holes in their team’s defense.

With Stenberg, his main defensive deficiency is his passiveness off the backcheck. He will often float up high in the DZ in an attempt to pick off a pass rather than attacking a player in an attempt to force a turnover. You will also often find that his passive nature will result in opposing offenses being able to create chances that would not have occurred otherwise.

The skating is a bigger issue to me than his defensive game, however.
His hockey IQ and work ethic are extremely high, so with proper development and coaching, his defensive game should come around.

If his defensive game was as bad as other young SHL’ers, he wouldn’t have gotten as much ice time as he did. The SHL is not a development league. Teams are there to win, and countries like Sweden and Finland are often reluctant to give young players ice time over established veterans.

Wrap Up

“You want to go as high you can, but No. 1 has been nothing I think about. I start laughing when I think about going No. 1.” – Ivar Stenberg

Ivar Stenberg is going to be an elite winger in the NHL. I project his ceiling as being an 85 point winger, with the potential of a couple 90-95 point seasons in the perfect environment.

He isn’t the type of winger that will get Selke Trophy votes, but he will be an all situations winger, with Top PP unit and 2nd/3rd PK unit time.
His work ethic, forecheck, and transition game will make him a nightmare for opposing defenses, both offensively and defensively.

From a player comparable standpoint, he reminds me of Henrik Zetterberg, who while primarily a center, did frequently play wing in his NHL career. His combination of puck protection, playmaking and two way play is too difficult for me to ignore.

If Stenberg is available at #3 for the Canucks, he borders on being an automatic selection in my eyes. However if Stenberg is available at 3, that means the player I’ll be writing about on Monday was likely selected by the San Jose Sharks.

On Monday, I write about Soo Greyhound’s defenseman Chase Reid.

Thank you for reading!

“”He continues to make an impressive showing for a first-year player even after Jake O’Brien (Seattle Kraken) and Marek Vanacker (Chicago Blackhawks) came back from NHL camps. He still has gotten his spot in the lineup, his place on the power play. That’s pretty telling for a 17-year-old to maintain that position when you’ve got all these high-end drafted players returning to the lineup”
– Dan Marr, NHL Central Scouting Director

If you look at Caleb Malhotra’s bio, and add his production on top of it, you can see why there would be hype around this player.
6 foot 2, 185 pound center with 29 goals, 55 assists, for 84 points in 67 Games.
He followed it up in the playoffs with 13 goals and 13 assists for 26 points in 15 Games.

So, why are so many Canucks fans so down on Malhotra? Lets dive into a few things that might be able to explain some of the angst out there.

1. He’s a Late Riser

On November 13, 2025, Caleb Malhotra’s draft stock was significantly lower than it is today.
At that time
Craig Button of TSN had him ranked at 17th.
Daily Faceoff had him at 27th,
Sam Cosentino of Sportsnet ranked him 28th, and
Elite Prospects’ Consolidated Ranking had him at 35th.

With the Vancouver Canucks drafting 33rd overall, a handful of scouts believed the team might have had a chance to select him in the second round if the draft had been held in November.

Malhotra had just completed a mediocre D-1 season with the Chilliwack Chiefs of the BCHL, recording 8 goals and 18 assists in 44 games. He ranked 12th on the team in goals and 10th in points. However, like this past season in Brantford, he elevated his game in the playoffs. In 21 playoff games, he posted 5 goals and 12 assists. He finished third on the team in scoring, well ahead of the next-youngest scorer on the roster.

As a 16-year-old, Malhotra stood out while playing alongside 19- and 20-year-olds, which was an impressive feat. In the 2023-24 season with the Vaughan Kings of the GTHL, he recorded 19 points in 21 regular season games and 12 points in 12 playoff games, elevating his production to a point per game in the postseason.

The conversation becomes more interesting when considering age. Malhotra was born on June 2, 2008. By comparison, Gavin McKenna was born on December 12, 2007, Ivar Stenberg on September 29, 2007, and Chase Reid on December 29, 2007. This makes Malhotra six to nine months younger than those three players who could be selected ahead of him. Combined with his pattern of strong second halves and playoff surges, it raises the question of whether his slower starts are simply a result of being younger. His body and mind may still be catching up developmentally, especially when adjusting to stronger competition in new leagues.

As a result, some believe he has more developmental runway left. By the time he reaches 20 to 22 years old, he could close the gap that currently exists between him and the top players in this draft class.

2. Organizational Need

2016 was a rough year for the Vancouver Canucks, much like 2026. They finished third-last in the NHL and dropped two spots in the draft order.

The Toronto Maple Leafs selected Auston Matthews first overall. At second overall, the Winnipeg Jets took Patrik Laine. At third, the Columbus Blue Jackets reached on a 6’2″ center (now listed at 6’3″), Pierre-Luc Dubois. Dubois was ranked between fourth and eighth by most major scouting outlets but had risen sharply throughout the season. That pick briefly gave Canucks fans hope. At fourth overall, the Edmonton Oilers selected Jesse Puljujärvi.

Canucks fans across the province began to celebrate, believing that London Knights star forward and future Stanley Cup champion Matthew Tkachuk had fallen to them at fifth overall.

Then Jim Benning stepped to the podium and announced:
“With the fifth selection, Vancouver selects from the London Knights… Olli Juolevi.”

As Benning made the pick, Sportsnet cut to a shot of the Canucks draft party inside Rogers Arena. The audible deflation from the crowd was immediate when Juolevi’s name was called. Sportsnet had several seconds of dead air before the broadcast noted, “And a second ripple through First Niagara Center as Matthew Tkachuk is passed over for Olli Juolevi.”

Canucks nation is no stranger to costly mistakes at the draft table. Examples include:

• Jake Virtanen selected sixth overall in 2014 instead of Nik Ehlers or William Nylander.

• Jared McCann also selected in 2014 over David Pastrnak.

• Olli Juolevi in 2016 passed over in favor of Matthew Tkachuk or Clayton Keller.

• Vasili Podkolzin taken 10th overall in 2019 instead of Matthew Boldy or Cole Caufield.

Even in more recent drafts under the Rutherford and Allvin regime, many fans preferred Zach Benson over Tom Willander in 2023, and Victor Eklund or Kashawn Aitcheson over Braeden Cootes. While it is still too early to judge those picks definitively, there is a widespread belief that the Canucks tend to prioritize a player’s floor and certainty over high-upside potential, or make selections based heavily on positional need.

In Caleb Malhotra’s case, many fans believe selecting him would check both boxes. His perceived floor is a second-line center, and he is the highest-ranked center available in the draft. The Canucks need centers, particularly if they plan to move Elias Pettersson at some point in the next three years.

Stenberg may be smaller and a pure winger, but his offensive ceiling is viewed as much higher than Malhotra’s.
Reid has some clear weaknesses, especially his pinches and defending the rush, but if he improves his decision-making, he could develop into the best player in the draft.

Malhotra does not possess any standout elite individual traits. For some fans, this is concerning because it makes it harder to see how he can outperform players who show more skill in specific areas of the game.

This is also why fans get uneasy when they hear descriptors such as “he is a good human being” or “he has the drive to get better.” Leadership and work ethic are difficult to quantify, and it is even harder to project exactly how they will translate into on-ice production compared to rawer skill.

Defense is also harder to measure than offense, which leads many fans to assume that players labeled as ‘two-way forwards’ automatically have lower offensive ceilings.

“He’s a franchise No. 1 center… He’s a 200-foot player, but he also has the grit and edge – borderline meanness. He’s built for the heavy hockey you play in the playoffs”
– Anonymous NHL Scout, via The Hockey News

3. Production Profile vs. Analytics

Caleb Malhotra’s production profile is very assist-heavy. Only 34.5% of his points come from goals. Unless a junior forward is a major outlier in total points, it is traditionally better to see a closer to 50-50 split between goals and assists.

Seeing that Malhotra “only” scored 29 goals in 67 games has led many to question how he could ever become a 30-goal scorer in the NHL when he couldn’t even reach that mark in the OHL.

This is where analytics help paint a clearer picture. Under the hood, Malhotra profiles as a very good playmaking two-way center. His inside play is genuinely elite in areas such as zone entries, exits, cycle play, and transition plays through the middle of the ice. He excels at moving the puck from the perimeter into high-danger areas and generates positive outcomes in defensive zone retrievals, slot protection, rush and wall breakups, and board battles.

On the shooting side, his z-score (on a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, where 0 is the 50th percentile) shows xGoals at +1.0, which is 70th percentile. However, his shot frequency sits at roughly -0.30, or 44th percentile. This suggests his lower goal total is the result of prioritizing shot efficiency and quality over volume. His first instinct is usually to find a teammate in a better scoring position rather than shooting himself.

This is further supported by his puck management metrics. He ranks off the charts in completed plays, multi-touch sequences, and advantages created for himself, while sitting elite in puck touches, advantages created for teammates, created versus ended advantages, and completed play versus turnover rates.

However, his turnover rates, especially inside lane turnovers, are also extremely high, and his advantages-ended numbers are poor.

This profile makes sense for a developing player who views himself as a two-way play-driver rather than a pure goal scorer. He has been deliberately trying to push the limits of his playmaking, even if it leads to turnovers. While some see this as a flaw, in a developmental context it is actually a positive. He is experimenting and trying to add more deception to his game to create even higher-quality chances and tap-ins.

When Malhotra heads to Boston University in the fall, he will already have a strong understanding of how to create plays for others. The next step in his development is learning when to take advantage of those opportunities himself. If he can convert some of those inside-lane turnovers into shots, he should be able to maintain most of his assist production while meaningfully increasing his shot rate and goal output.

Wrap Up

“I made my mark, made a name for myself. I still got a ways to go, but I did exactly what I wanted.” – Caleb Malhotra, via TSN.

Simply put, Caleb Malhotra is a special player. Personally, I have him ranked fourth on my draft board, first amongst all centers (Although, I will say that I believe prospect pyramid formats are better than straight 1-through-32 rankings), and he is not as far behind Ivar Stenberg and Chase Reid (my second and third ranked players) as most people seem to think.

Should the Canucks draft him at third overall? I do not believe so. If Vancouver is set on Malhotra and has a good read on what Chicago, the New York Rangers, and Calgary want, they should explore trading down. This would allow them to acquire additional assets while still landing the center they covet.

Here are a few example trades using the PuckPedia Perri Pick Value Calculator that could make sense for the Canucks:

• To Chicago: 3rd overall
  To Vancouver: 4th overall + 37th overall (TOR)
  Result: Vancouver gets 63.56 value, Chicago gets 62.07 value
  

• To New York Rangers: 3rd overall
  To Vancouver: 5th overall + 26th overall (DAL)
  Result: Vancouver gets 63.89 value, New York gets 62.07 value
  

• To Calgary: 3rd overall + 78th overall (via CBJ)
  To Vancouver: 6th overall + 30th overall (VGK) + 36th overall + 65th overall (VAN)
  Result: Vancouver gets 69.1 value, Calgary gets 64.15 value

These are not perfect offers, and Vancouver would ideally leverage the third overall pick to gain more value than the calculator suggests. They serve as useful templates for the type of return the Canucks could target by moving down.

At the end of the day, the Canucks are going to get a good player whether they select Malhotra, Reid, or Stenberg. Making the pick itself is the easy part. Finding a way to maximize assets while still getting the player they want is much harder, and it is exactly what Ryan Johnson and the Sedins will need to do if they are going to rebuild this team into a championship contender five to seven years from now.

See you on draft day!