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That balanced, values-driven perspective is the heart of my writing and my work at J Street: building a new consensus in the Democratic Party and Jewish community that reflects what so many American Jews believe.

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By Jeremy Ben-Ami

First, there is a sharp disconnect between the Israeli government’s position on Gaza and the rest of the world’s – coupled with a complete lack of understanding of how profoundly this policy is damaging Israel’s standing internationally.

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Second, I saw firsthand how Smotrich and Ben Gvir are using the levers of power to shape Israeli policy in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the dangerous impact of their actions.

None of this changes the conclusions I drew on my previous trip in May: that a reckoning has already begun within Israeli society in response to the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza – one that could eventually open the door to a better path forward. But in the near term, as long as this government remains in power, likely for the next year, the outlook is grim.

The Israeli Government Doubling Down on a Failed Gaza Policy

Before my trip to Israel, it felt like there was a fundamental shift underway in the U.S. and internationally regarding the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. One by one, close Israeli partners are committing to recognizing a Palestinian state. Germany, perhaps Israel’s closest European ally, recently announced it would stop selling weapons to Israel that could be used in Gaza. 27 Senators—more than half of the Democratic Caucus—voted to block one or two arms sales to Israel. Debates about whether Israel is committing genocide becoming part of mainstream discourse in the American Jewish community. Only 8% of Democrats and 25% of Independents support Israel’s policies in Gaza. Israel is as isolated internationally as it has ever been.

Yet you wouldn’t know this from talking to the Israeli government or the IDF. During our visit, the Netanyahu government doubled down on plans to occupy nearly all of Gaza. IDF briefings insisted Israel must continue attacking Hamas: “We’ve eliminated 95% of Hamas’s fighting capability, which gives us an A, but we must get to an A+.” On the other hand, a different official claimed there are still 20,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza—roughly the same number we heard a year ago when I was still in government. That doesn’t sound like an “A.” So, which is it? Briefings on the humanitarian situation only mentioned how many tons of aid had been delivered over the past two years—numbers without context on what’s actually needed to feed 2.2 million people. And the images coming out of Gaza and the reporting on the ground seem to indicate that whatever the numbers are, the aid getting in is totally inadequate. As for an endgame, nearly two years into the war Israeli officials could only articulate a vague hope for a new governing entity in Gaza that’s neither Hamas nor the PA.

The killing of Al Jazeera journalist Anas al-Sharif this week is a stark example of how the Israeli government has lost the plot. Israel alleges he was a Hamas operative – an unproven claim that demands more evidence. Even if, for the sake of argument, one accepts the allegation, Israeli leaders had to know the international backlash such a strike would provoke. How could they possibly weigh the costs and benefits and conclude that killing an alleged mid-level Hamas figure, on tenuous evidence, was worth the diplomatic damage? Only a government utterly mired in its own political and ideological blinders could make such a calculation.

The good news is that the Israeli public seems to get it. The overwhelming majority now supports ending the war. Opposition leaders like Yair Lapid and Yair Golan and analysts such as former national security advisor to Naftali Bennet Eyal Hulata understand that this war is doing more harm than good. They believe Israel should declare victory and negotiate to bring the hostages home, instead of holding out for unrealistic terms like a Hamas surrender. But realistically, those voices are unlikely to lead the government for at least a year, with elections probably coming in the first half of 2026. In the meantime, the Israeli government is likely to continue digging itself deeper.

Ben Gvir and Smotrich Use the Tools of Government to Further Their Extremist Agenda

The second major development I saw on this trip was clear evidence of just how much Ben Gvir and Smotrich are turning the IDF and the police into tools that further their annexationist and extremist agenda. Even as a veteran observer of these issues some of these events were stunning.

On the Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif (TM/HAS) I witnessed clear violations of the long-standing status quo, enabled by Israeli police under the authority of Ben Gvir as Minister of National Security. The TM/HAS – the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest in Islam – has always been the most sensitive point in the conflict, where territory, religion, and nationalism collide. In 2000, a visit by Ariel Sharon helped spark the Second Intifada; in 2021, tensions there contributed to the outbreak of a short war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

Since 1967, Israeli policy to keep the peace has been to maintain a status quo: Muslims and non-Muslims may visit, but only Muslims may pray on the TM/HAS, while Jews pray at the Western Wall. This also aligned with most Orthodox Jewish teachings, which prohibit Jews from entering the site lest they inadvertently step on the “Holy of Holies” – the most sacred space in Judaism, once entered only by the High Priest on certain holy days.

Over the past decade, extremist nationalists have begun visiting and secretly praying, pretending to be talking to someone or speaking on the phone. In the past, Israeli police would stop this, aware of how provocative it was and how Muslims might view it as an attempt to take over their prayer space.

On this visit, I saw something entirely different. Within thirty minutes, I witnessed three separate groups – from a few individuals to about twenty – openly praying on the Temple Mount. The Israeli police did not intervene. In fact, they provided armed escorts. Netanyahu insists the status quo remains in place, but this is pure gaslighting – and a recipe for a dangerous spark.

A picture of Jewish worshipers on the Temple Mount/Haram Al Sharif being escorted to prayers by Israeli police

We also visited the Palestinian village of Um al Khair, where activist Awdah Hathaleen had been killed just days earlier. Video and other compelling evidence strongly indicated that the killer was Yinon Levy – a violent extremist settler previously sanctioned by the Biden Administration.

Levy lives on a farm that is an illegal outpost. From a distance, it appears fully connected to the West Bank’s power grid and water system. He is not a misguided teenager wandering the hills; he owns a construction company and, along with his associates, has carried out violent attacks and issued threats to Palestinians, with the goal of driving them from their land.

In this case, Levy and his accomplices spent the day working farmland near Um al Khair, then deliberately drove a bulldozer across village land, causing damage. When villagers tried to stop him, a confrontation ensued. Levy pulled a gun and fired, killing Hathaleen.

The Israeli government and IDF response was telling: within a day, Levy was released to house arrest, free to continue his activities. Hathaleen’s body was held for over a week as authorities tried to pressure the family into accepting a small, overnight funeral. Meanwhile, Palestinians accused of throwing rocks were arrested the next day, and some remained in detention ten days later, when we visited.

We also visited one of the small villages from which Levy’s supporters had expelled residents before destroying it. A court order had been issued to bar Israelis from the site, in an effort to protect Palestinians from repeated settler incursions. During our visit, the IDF and police arrived and ordered us – international visitors there at the invitation of Palestinian residents – to leave, citing the court order. On our way out, we saw what appeared to be one of Levy’s associates watching us. It seemed likely he had tipped off the IDF about our presence.

Being a liberal Zionist also means advocating for Israel to uphold Jewish and liberal values—especially in its treatment of Palestinians. I’ve never hesitated to criticize Israeli government policies or push the U.S.—as Israel’s closest ally—not to blindly back those policies in international forums when they conflict with those values and, in my view, Israel’s long-term interests.

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But I was never comfortable supporting legislation to block arms sales to Israel. I didn’t believe it would change Israeli behavior, that it was credible, or that it served U.S. or Israeli security interests—especially given the close cooperation between our countries. I spent much of my career, including at the Pentagon, strengthening the U.S.-Israel security relationship. To me, that relationship was sacrosanct.

Even when I considered joining J Street after serving as Jewish Outreach Director on the 2024 campaign, this was a sticking point. J Street’s position—that Israel, like all recipients of U.S. weapons, should meet basic legal standards around humanitarian aid and use of force—is entirely reasonable. In November 2024, after years of supporting every single arms sale that the United States made to Israel, J Street supported blocking an arms sale because it believed Israel no longer met those standards. That made me uneasy.

Now, my view has changed. And I suspect many of the 27 Democratic Senators (28 if you count Senator Slotkin) who voted last week to block one or two arms sales feel similarly.

The situation in Gaza is catastrophic. Starvation is spreading. Images of suffering children are unbearable. Israel has a legal and moral obligation to allow humanitarian aid in. While there have been some improvements recently, it was vital for the Senate to send a clear message: this cannot continue. If it does, it threatens the U.S.-Israel relationship itself.

This message is even more urgent after six months of the Trump administration giving Israel a green light to pursue policies that have worsened the crisis. While I have written in the past about some of the mistakes that were made in the Biden administration, it consistently pressed Israel to allow more aid into Gaza. There never would have been a two-month blockade under Biden, nor approval for the disastrous Gaza Humanitarian Foundation plan, which only made things worse. As we are seeing now, pressing Israel to allow aid in isn’t just the right thing morally—it’s the pro-Israel thing to do. It could have helped Israel avoid the international backlash it now faces and the resulting Senate votes on arms sales.

It also matters which arms we’re talking about. The first blocked sale involved rifles that the Biden administration held up for over a year because they were slated for the Israeli National Police under Itamar Ben Gvir. Some were reportedly going to civilians, including violent settlers. Just in the past two weeks, two Palestinians—one a Palestinian American—were killed by extremists in the West Bank, including one by Yinon Levi, previously sanctioned by Biden but unsanctioned by Trump. We should not be arming people like this.

The second sale involved 1,000-pound bombs that could be used in Gaza. Israeli military officials themselves have questioned the strategic value of continuing the campaign there, and it is just not clear that anything is being accomplished at this point. Meanwhile there are reports now that Netanyahu is planning on giving the order to occupy all of Gaza despite IDF concerns. So why send more bombs?

To be clear: I would never support blocking missile defense systems like Iron Dome, Arrow, or David’s Sling, which save Israeli lives. And these blocked sales, at a time when Israel has sufficient stockpiles and has already dealt major blows to Hezbollah and Iran, do not materially affect its security.

The goal is to send a message—to the Israeli government and the Israeli people. The current path in Gaza and the West Bank is dangerous. It undermines U.S. and Israeli interests. It violates Jewish values. And it risks one of the pillars of Israel’s long-term security: the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Given the stakes, that’s a message worth sending.

She took to paper just today on the man-made starvation of Gaza, which we talked about at length at the start of our time together. We also discussed the palpable shift this week, as more and more communal and political leaders speak out against the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and what this could mean for progress in alleviating the suffering.

I hope you enjoy today’s call with Jen. and I will be back next week at our regular time (4pm Eastern on Wednesdays)!

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1. The Israeli government has done all it can in ceasefire/hostage negotiations and the problem lies exclusively with Hamas;

2. The humanitarian crisis is primarily due to Hamas diversion of aid and UN refusal to deliver aid; and

3. Military operations must continue in order to defeat Hamas.

All three of these claims range from half truths to total falsehoods. There is much more Israel can do to get the hostages out and get aid into Gaza. And the reality is that at this point the only pathway to defeating Hamas is through political and security mechanisms that can replace it – not more military force. Let’s break these myths down in detail.

Myth: The Israeli government has done all it can to get the hostages out and the problem lies exclusively with Hamas.

Reality: The Netanyahu government has refused to make a direct, simple offer of all the hostages for the end of the war, despite overwhelming support from the Israeli public and the hostage families for such an offer.

It is true that Hamas is a terrible terrorist organization that committed horrific atrocities on October 7 and continues to repress the people of Gaza. Hamas should return all of the hostages tomorrow.

It is also true that nearly two years into the war, the Netanyahu government has still refused to make a very simple and direct offer – all of the hostages for an end to the war. This is despite the fact that in the latest polls, 74 percent of the Israeli public supports such a deal while only 8 percent support Netanyahu’s approach of partial hostage deals for temporary ceasefires. 12 percent of Israelis want to continue the war no matter what, but unfortunately those 12 percent include Itamar Ben-Gvir and Betzalel Smotrich who could bring down Netanyahu’s coalition if he ended the war.

Hamas’ position has long been that it wants a guaranteed end to the war as part of a hostage deal. Even if Netanyahu were to make such an offer there would still be difficult negotiations involved and Hamas’ position may change. They have certainly not negotiated in good faith throughout this process. But until an Israeli government makes this offer, it is false to claim that the war is being dragged on only by Hamas’ obstinance.

It’s worth taking a moment to understand the history. After an initial ceasefire in November 2023 during which 105 hostages were released, the issue of ending the war became a major hang up. Hamas wanted an end to the war as part of any deal. Israel was not willing to offer that, and the Israeli public was not supportive of such an offer. In May 2024, Israel offered a multi-step framework whereby there would be an initial hostage deal and ceasefire – during that time the parties would negotiate on the terms of ending the war and getting all of the remaining hostages out. President Biden publicly embraced this plan and Hamas accepted the overall framework in July 2024. It took another six months to get to a ceasefire in January of 2025.

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Unfortunately, during the ceasefire Netanyahu refused to ever seriously engage on the second part of the agreement, which would have ended the war in exchange for all of the hostages. Israel ultimately chose to unilaterally restart the war in mid-March with more than 50 hostages still remaining in Gaza. The Trump Administration simply returned to the old formula: temporary hostage deal during which discussions could continue on an end to the war. Unsurprisingly, having been burned once, Hamas has refused to take this deal a second time.

What’s even more important is the political context has fundamentally changed. The Israeli public gets it. They realize the war is not doing Israel any good anymore. People are sick of having their loved ones called up again and again for reserve duty and being sent to Gaza, when it is so crystal clear that there is no endgame or strategy for actually getting rid of Hamas. Netanyahu has all the political space he needs to make an offer to end the war – except for the fact that it will bring down his ruling coalition. So, he continues to make these partial offers that he knows are likely to fail and then he, the Trump Administration, and all of their supporters can just blame Hamas while the suffering in Gaza continues and the hostages languish.

Myth: The humanitarian crisis is due to Hamas and the United Nations.

Reality: Israel has significant control and can do much more to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

Starting in May, the Israeli government implemented a new system for the distribution of aid, run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation in collaboration with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). It replaced the UN system of many distribution sites in Gaza with only four locations. The rationale was that this would prevent aid from being siphoned off by Hamas, but from the beginning this proposal was bound to be a disaster. A system of only four sites to feed millions of people, far away from population centers, requiring people to walk through combat zones, into a militarized environment that included IDF soldiers, American contractors, other Gaza gangs and elements of Hamas nearby was an obvious recipe for disaster that many of us warned about.

Moreover, as the New York Times has reported, there is very little evidence of actual diversion of aid by Hamas. I’m skeptical that the answer is that zero aid is being diverted for Hamas’ benefit. But even if some is, the question is how you weigh that concern versus the importance of feeding Gaza’s population. For me, feeding the 2.2 million people and roughly 1 million children who live in Gaza is so much more important than addressing the comparatively minor issue of aid diversion. Unfortunately, the Israeli government doesn’t see it that way.

The second claim is that the UN on its own could send all of its trucks into Gaza and feed the population. It is true that the relationship between the UN and international aid organizations on the one side and the IDF on the other is toxic. There is fault here on both sides and international aid providers and the people of Gaza would be better served if they could engage more constructively with the IDF. However, to claim that the UN could just magically get this food into Gaza without Israeli cooperation is ridiculous. The IDF needs to work with the UN on de-confliction routes so that UN aid providers don’t end up getting killed trying to get aid in. The Israeli military also needs to provide access to roads that don’t go through the heart of Palestinian population centers. If the UN is forced to drive through the heart of population centers with large convoys, that just leads to looting by a combination of desperate people, but also precisely the actors that are diverting aid. Israel also has very specific restrictions on how aid can and cannot go in and the type of truck aid can go in on. From my understanding, none of that cooperation was happening once the GHF system was set up making it impossible for the UN to get food in. Hopefully, that now begins to change with the welcome announcement by Israel that it will create humanitarian corridors and have temporary ceasefires.

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Finally, there is the question of what actually is the most effective way to prevent food diversion and the answer from previous conflicts is that the best solution is the opposite of what GHF is doing. Israel should flood the zone with a lot of aid – not restrict it. The guys with the guns in a conflict zone are always going to get enough food as they’ll just take it by force from others. The question is whether they can control the food distribution system and then use the black market to make a lot of money off the food and use that money to buy other things they need more and to wield power. The best answer is to actually flood the market with food, cause prices to crash and ruin the business model. It’s not only the moral thing to do, but it’s also the best way to counter Hamas. It also has the added benefit of giving Israel the moral high ground instead of causing it to be internationally isolated, while Hamas cynically takes advantage of the anger the international community is directing towards Israel.

Myth: Israel must continue the war in order to defeat Hamas.

Reality: Only a political and security plan for the ‘day after’ that creates a real alternative to Hamas has any chance of success. Continued Israeli military operations in Gaza at this point are doing little to defeat Hamas.

I’ve written about this a number of times, but there is no strictly military solution to defeat Hamas. The only way to replace Hamas is with a credible alternative that can hold territory and govern Gaza. As Americans have learned the hard way in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, if you don’t develop an alternative, you just end up in a game of whack-a-mole – going back again and again to the same territory, as the enemy hides or moves and then comes back. That is exactly what has been happening in Gaza for nearly two years now and the Israeli public has grown weary of it.

It was precisely these lessons that led to efforts by the Biden Administration early in the war to develop a strategy to actually have an alternative for the day after. We quickly concluded that the most viable option was a temporary Arab-led force with Palestinian participation from the start, spearheaded by Egypt, that would eventually be handed over time back to the Palestinian Authority (PA). This was an imperfect solution – they always are in these situations. There are real questions about what the Arab states are willing to do and the PA is a deeply flawed institution in much need of reform. But still, these were the best options. However, Netanyahu refused to ever seriously engage on these ideas because having Palestinians rule Gaza in the aftermath was anathema to Smotrich and Ben-Gvir who have an agenda of ethnically cleansing Gaza and settling it with Israelis. So this plan would have brought down the Israeli coalition.

Sadly, chances of this working now have probably dropped significantly. But still, this remains the best option for Israel, instead of continuing a war that is making no difference at this point in removing Hamas, causing increased suffering for Palestinians, failing to bring the hostages home, undermining Israeli legitimacy abroad, and wearing down Israeli society and the IDF as they continue with one deployment after another.

There has been a lot of hype over the past week that in the aftermath of the war with Iran, now is the moment to end the war in Gaza and cut multiple regional deals that convert the military progress Israel has made over the past 21 months into political victory. Ending the war in Gaza is certainly the best option for Israeli society, which suffered another terrible incident yesterday with five more soldiers killed and fourteen wounded. Israelis are feeling triumphant after the successful military campaign against Iran, but also exhausted after two very intense weeks spent in shelters absorbing ballistic missile attacks and coming after what has been a grueling 21 months in the aftermath of October 7th. Ending the war is obviously what is also best for Palestinian civilians who are still suffering very high casualties from the combination of daily strikes and incidents at the chaotic and dysfunctional food distribution sites set up by the poorly named Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.

So is this visit a key milestone on the way to wrapping up the war? Or just another play by Netanyahu to kick the can down the road? It could end up being both. We just don’t know yet.

To understand where things may go, let's try to get inside Netanyahu’s and Trump’s heads and understand how they are approaching the current moment. Two things to remember about Netanyahu. First, he always leaves himself multiple options and pathways not making up his mind until he absolutely has to. Second, his greatest skill and first priority has always been to keep his governing coalition together, unless he thinks the time is right to go for elections on the strongest leg possible. And so what we can assume is that Bibi is certainly keeping open the possibility of ending the war and consolidating regional gains, especially if he can do it in a way that is politically advantageous. But that’s not his only option right now.

As for Trump. He wants a deal to end the war in Gaza and has been talking about deals in the Middle East since he came back into office. But he is also impatient, distractible, and doesn’t bother with the details. So while he likely pushed Netanyahu on ending the war, nobody knows precisely where he will be next week let alone in two months. When these two men last met in April, Trump publicly declared he’d pursue diplomacy with Iran, only to be relatively easily convinced two months later to join a military attack on Iran’s nuclear program.

Step 1: A Partial Deal

It is clear that Netanyahu will not offer an immediate big bold move to end the war in exchange for all of the hostages. It’s against his nature of leaving himself options and putting off decisions and it’s too risky politically. Netanyahu got a bit of a political boost from the Iran war, but not as much as he had hoped, and if Israel were to have elections today his coalition would still be quite far behind in the polls. The risk of cutting a deal to end the war, which would trigger Ben Gvir and Smotrich leaving the government and lead to new elections, is too high for him.

But what is also clear is that Trump is hyper-focused in the aftermath of the war with Iran on getting deals. So Bibi needs to offer something. It appears that Netanyahu has convinced Trump and Witkoff that another temporary ceasefire is the best way to move forward and has avoided having Trump put intense pressure on him for the moment to immediately end the war as part of a comprehensive agreement.

So, we are back to partial deals in this case a proposed 60 day truce where Israel receives ten living hostages and eighteen deceased in exchange for a surge in humanitarian assistance into Gaza, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and a commitment to negotiate on an end to the war. It is unclear if this will be enough for Hamas to accept. The fact that Witkoff is on his way back to Qatar for negotiations is a good sign. But for Hamas ending the war is the most important criteria of any deal, and they continue to reject this notion of negotiating a sustainable end to the fighting during the ceasefire and want guarantees now. It doesn’t help that the last time we had a hostage deal back in January, part of the deal was a commitment by Israel to engage in serious negotiations on ending the war during the pause. Netanyahu never followed through on that part of the agreement and so Hamas might be unwilling to make the same deal again and spend down the one piece of negotiating leverage it has by releasing more of the hostages.

And so for Bibi at this point there are two outcomes. Maybe Hamas takes the deal under renewed pressure in which case he gets hostages out without ending the war and still leaves himself options. Or, if Hamas does not take the deal, Bibi convinces Trump that it is Hamas’s fault and the war just continues. Either way, Netanyahu remains in power.

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Step 2: Ending the War

If we get a 60 day ceasefire what happens next? Again, Netanyahu will look to leave himself options and try to put himself in the best possible political position. Israel will have to go to elections at some point before November 2026, and so he might calculate that getting a popular deal that brings all of the hostages home in exchange for an end to the war is the best way to pivot from his current strategy of holding together his far right wing coalition, to instead going to elections with the broadest possible support in the country. This would be very similar to a moment in US politics when Presidential candidates pivot from winning a primary to contesting a general election. If Netanyahu decides to go in this direction, he will spend the 60 day ceasefire attempting to consolidate as many diplomatic and political victories as possible as part of a deal. Deals he might try for include on the positive end:

• A non-aggression pact with Syria that becomes the first step to an eventual peace and keeps the Golan Heights under Israeli control;

• Normalization agreements with some Arab or Muslim states. The most significant would be Saudi Arabia, but if that is not on the table there are also other potential lesser options; and

• An Iran nuclear agreement that meets Israeli terms for no domestic uranium enrichment (Feels like a major stretch).

On the negative side of the ledger, he may seek U.S. support for annexation of some parts of the West Bank as part of a deal to end the war in Gaza. Such a move would be popular with Netanyahu’s base and could even allow him to hold his far right coalition together while ending the war. However, it would not only be a catastrophic move against Palestinian rights and Israel’s standing in the world, but would be very hard to pull off while also pushing for normalization with Gulf States.

For Netanyahu, the beauty of this play is that he does not need to cut all of these deals. Even one or two may be enough. And if it works he goes to elections on the strongest footing possible. If it doesn’t work, then he’s bought himself 60 days. During that time the Knesset will be out of session on summer recess dramatically reducing the chance the government will fall. Meanwhile 60 days is forever for Trump, who may grow impatient and bored and move on to other things. And so in 60 days, if none of this has worked, Netanyahu can just revert to form, restart the war and keep looking for more options while maintaining his hold on power.

It feels incredibly lonely, exhausting, and overwhelming to be a liberal American Jew right now. This isn’t just how I feel, but what I’ve heard from so many friends and colleagues over the past few weeks. It’s obviously scary. The attacks on Governor Shapiro’s residence, the AJC event in Washington, and the march for the hostages in Boulder makes Jew fear for their safety. But it’s more than just that. It’s also because so many of the institutions that Jews have traditionally counted on as sources of strength and leadership in moments of crisis are not as reliable as they used to be and are sometimes a big part of the problem. That just makes everything exhausting and more confusing.

The Institutions that are Failing Us

Start with the U.S. government. In the past, the President’s role especially in moments of tragedy was to act as comforter in chief. And Jews could expect that the government would be pursuing good faith efforts to keep them safe without politics interfering. That is not what is happening with the Trump administration. There is of course the appropriate and necessary condemnation of antisemitism, but then almost immediately a pivot to attacks on immigrants and higher education in the name of fighting antisemitism. Attacks that most Jews oppose.

Just look at the two Congressional resolutions that passed in response to the recent spate of antisemitic attacks. There was thankfully a bipartisan resolution that passed with unanimous support condemning the attacks. But then we had a second resolution focused on the attacker’s immigration status and framed entirely as an anti-immigration resolution that thanked ICE. This even though ICE was not one of the agencies responding on the day of the shooting. It was the FBI and Colorado police, neither of whom received a specific word of thanks in the resolution. An initial draft of this second resolution even included a statement saying “Free Palestine” was an antisemitic phrase before that language was struck. At the end the resolution passed with unanimous Republican support and a split Democratic caucus. It would be helpful to be able to actually take a moment to process the grief and horror of what is happening without having to immediately jump into fighting against others using our community’s pain to pursue their own agenda.

The second major failure is from the Israeli government, which has in the past in moments of crisis been a beacon for Jews around the world, but is now basically the opposite. The worldview and policies being promoted by Itmar Ben Gvir, Belzal Smotrich, and Benjamin Netanyahu are anathema to most American Jews. The biggest problem at this point is of course perpetuating the war in Gaza and deplorable humanitarian conditions instead of taking a deal that ends the war in exchange for the hostages. Let’s be clear that Hamas started this war by committing the horrible atrocities of October 7th and has been an incredibly difficult negotiating partner ever since. But it is also clear that, at this point, Hamas’s demand that Israel end the war in exchange for the hostages is a concession that 70% of the Israeli public is willing to make. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is speaking out stating that Israel is committing war crimes as former right wing Israeli Defense Minister Bougie Yaalon accuses Israel of ethnic cleansing. And avid anti-Israel activists such as (check notes) NY Times columnist Tom Friedman and 550 retired senior Israeli security officials are warning of the impact of the Israeli government’s actions on Jews all over the world.

To be crystal clear: Blaming American Jews for what is happening in Gaza and attacking them for the behavior of the Israeli government is antisemitism – end stop. However, let's also be real. As long as the war goes on and horrific images keep coming out of Gaza, American Jews and Jews across the world will be exposed to a higher level of risk to antisemitic attacks.

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The third failure is from our allies on the Left in the United States who we are used to having in our corner. As Sheila Katz laid out in the NY Times, there have been too many instances since October 7th where progressives have failed to see Jewish pain. Whether it’s the initial hesitancy by women’s organizations to speak out about the sexual violence that occurred on October 7th or exclusion of “Zionists” from traditional progressive spaces like LGBTQ events or events on preserving the environment. Or use of language in protests that sometimes crosses over from concern for Palestinian lives and freedom, into the type of language that is seen by the extreme fringes of the left as a call to violence (e.g. “by any means necessary” or “globalize the intifada.”)

Another example I saw just a couple of weeks ago, was a series of social media posts with almost 100K likes that singles out a direct link between IDF and ICE exchange programs and what is happening right now in Los Angeles. ICE has these types of relationships with many U.S. partners around the world. Yet somehow we need to draw a direct link to the IDF and explicitly blame Israel and implicitly blame Jews for the Trump Administration’s decision to send the National Guard into Los Angeles.

The most recent instance of this challenge comes from the New York mayoral race and the controversy surrounding Zohran Mamdani. I could write a whole piece about that, but for the moment since this was a post I wrote two weeks ago and don’t want to entirely rewrite, I’ll instead refer you to Jeremy Ben-Ami’s post and our conversation on our substack live last week.

These various examples are all very different, and I’ve written in greater detail about how at least I distinguish between what I see as clearly antisemitic behavior and what are examples of unconscious bias or ignorance. But all of it is disappointing and hard to deal with.

The final failure comes from American Jewish organizations, and here maybe the biggest disappointment is the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The ADL is a vital organization with an important history. At this moment with what American Jews are facing, it should be THE leading entity countering antisemitism in the United States and yet in too many instances it seems to be coming up short. The latest example is Jonathan Greenblatt’s offensive statements at a conference to Republican Attorney Generals. I tend to agree with the ADL (and maybe not some of my progressive friends) that anti-masking laws are a good idea. They were initially enacted to counter the KKK. But that doesn’t justify Greenblatt saying “You have people hiding their faces behind scarves and keffiyehs like they’re in ISIS, storming libraries, vandalizing buildings and literally – I’m not exaggerating – terrorizing their classmates.” I have my deep skepticism, anger, and frustration about some of the ways protestors have conducted themselves since October 7th. But that does not justify Greenblatt saying “the founding fathers didn’t want al-Qaida right running rampant on our streets.” Al Qaeda murdered nearly 3,000 Americans on September 11th and ISIS beheaded Americans and burned prisoners alive while broadcasting the events around the world. Lumping student protesters, which include many Muslim and Arab Americans, with Al Qaeda and ISIS, perpetuates anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate. And it gives Donald Trump cover to further hijack the fight against antisemitism for his anti-democratic agenda. These are the types of statements you might excuse or ignore at a family gathering from a relative you don’t really agree with. Coming from the leader of the preeminent American Jewish organization charged with fighting antisemitism and “secur[ing] justice and fair treatment to all.” It’s a major problem.

By Ted Eytan - National Menorah Washington DC

How we Respond

So what are liberal American Jews to do with this situation where the U.S. government, Israeli government, some progressive allies, and some mainstream Jewish organizations are all coming up short in different ways? The good news is that there is a lot to do and many good options for how to do it.

Standing up to the U.S. government is straightforward. Keep speaking out for the things we care about and believe in as a community and make clear that when the Trump administration cuts billions in education funding or deports visa holders without any due process all in the name of countering antisemitism, they do not speak for us.

When it comes to the Israeli government, we also need to be expressing our concern especially over what is happening in Gaza. Here I’ll just quote from the letter of 550 retired security officials:

We categorically reject the notion that Jews in the diaspora must remain silent on matters concerning Israel. Israel was founded as the homeland of the entire Jewish people, and its Declaration of Independence recognizes the essential role of diaspora Jewry in shaping our collective destiny. Whereas Israeli decisions will be made exclusively by Israelis who live here, the views of our partners in this historic Jewish joint venture should inform those decisions. To those who fear that public criticism undermines Israel, we say that open, honest dialogue only reinforces our democracy and our security. As we learned repeatedly, in security, suppressing criticism or demanding silence is outright dangerous. In interJewish dialogue, it risks eroding the very foundations upon which Israel was built.

The good news is that there are many Israelis who agree with this point and disagree with their current government, including most of the hostage families. Building alliances between liberal U.S. Jews and this Israeli opposition is essential. And J Street is the vital organization that is giving American Jews a political voice in expressing this concern to our leaders in the United States. And so if this is something you want to do, please do get involved.

As for engaging with progressives… Again, there are many allies out there including the 60 civil rights organizations that signed on to join a letter condemning the recent attacks. The key is for Jews to be engaging with progressive allies, and for them to be supporting Jews and calling out antisemitism when they see it on the left. The other key here is that oftentimes, what Jews are dealing with on the left is unconscious bias or ignorance. There the best solution is to be present in progressive spaces and have those awkward hard conversations that educate or point these things out.

Finally, when it comes to Jewish organizations, the good news is that there are many that are getting things right at this moment. Obviously I’m partial to J Street. But there are also many others, including the ten Jewish organizations that represent a large swath of American Jewry - including three of the four denominations – and signed onto a statement rejecting the false choice between Jewish safety and democracy.

And so the bottom line is that at this moment, things are scary, complicated, and exhausting. It’s disappointing that this is so hard and the supports aren’t stronger. However, there are many tools, resources and organizations that liberal American Jews can use to stand up, be heard, and fight back.

I have very strong feelings and worries for friends and colleagues who are in Israel right now and wishing them nothing but the best. I also have friends and colleagues with family and friends in Iran, and am thinking of them too.

But in this very long post I’m just going to focus on walking you through what I am watching at the moment and how this all might play out.

Strong early start for Israel but did the timing make sense? There is no doubt that the initial Israeli strike was incredibly impressive. They have killed a large number of Iran’s senior military leadership and nuclear scientists, established air superiority over Iran, taken out a meaningful amount of Iran’s missile capability, and put Israel in a very strong military position in this conflict. However, I have to ultimately associate myself with Ned Price’s view that there was a serious diplomatic alternative that should have been given more time. We don’t really know how this will end, and there are huge risks for Israel with this operation. War should always be a last resort because of the suffering and stress it is already bringing to civilians in both Iran and Israel. And the reality is that Israel didn’t treat war as a last resort in this case. It acted while other options that could have yielded the same or a better outcome were still available. But we are where we are. So it is more useful to talk about where things go from here.

Who holds the advantage in the missile battle? Let's start with the defense of Israel. We’ll talk plenty about the impacts on Iran in a moment. In the near-term, the biggest question is how many missiles Iran has and how many interceptors Israel has available to shoot them down. If one side has a clear advantage that might make all the difference in how bad this gets in Israel. Israel tried to take out as much of Iran’s missile capability with its initial attack on Thursday, and it appears to have done significant damage but the question is how much? We have seen since that Iran has the capacity to muster multiple rounds of missile and drone strikes on Israel. It also appears that Israel is shooting most of the stuff down. What we are seeing is very different from the events in April and October 2024 - one time salvos that were slowly generated and where Iran focused on military targets that Israel could largely anticipate. Now Iran is throwing the kitchen sink at Israel, firing all it can quickly and at what appear to be civilian targets across the country. The end result has been 23 Israelis killed and hundreds injured in the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas and their suburbs. How long will this go on for? How many interceptors does Israel have? How many missiles does Iran have left? (According to press reports Israeli intelligence believes Iran still has 2,000 missiles left). How much additional support can the U.S. provide in shooting these down? How quickly can the U.S. get more assets into the region? This equipment takes some time to move. Will Iran be able to manufacture more or get any resupply from Russia given how much it sold to the Russians for their war in Ukraine?

Bottom line: if Iran runs out first and is unable to inflict massive damage than Israel can conduct its operations relatively quickly and end the fight on its own terms. If Iranian strikes cause repeated mass casualty events and things get much worse because Israel runs out of interceptors, it’s an entirely different situation and you can expect more comprehensive strikes by Israel for weeks and increased pressure for the U.S. to enter the fight more directly beyond just defense of Israel.

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How badly has Iran’s nuclear program been damaged? In the long-term, the question is whether or not this now pushes Iran towards pursuing a nuclear weapon and whether and how quickly, with its remaining nuclear infrastructure, it can build a bomb and what can be done to stop that. There are two components to this question. The first is having the nuclear material to build the bomb. Before the strike Iran had enough enriched uranium that it could convert to weapons grade uranium in a matter of days, and it likely still has that. The second is the process of build a device that could use the material to trigger a nuclear reaction. Estimates for how long it would take to go through that second part vary from a year to a few months depending on the type of device. The early reports are that Israel has done significant damage to a lot of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. This includes taking out much of Iran’s main facility at Natanz, and a lot of infrastructure at another important facility at Esfahan. It has also claimed credit for killing 10 nuclear scientists. However, it’s all still unclear precisely how much this sets the Iranians back.

The real confounding issue is whether any meaningful damage has been done to the Fordow facility, which is buried deep underground in a mountain near the city of Qom. According to the latest IAEA report, which was issued just weeks ago, Iran has enough enriched uranium at Fordow to get to nine nuclear weapons worth and can produce material for an initial bomb in a matter of days. According to reports we are seeing in the press and even commentary from Israeli officials, they can’t do real damage to Fordow - only the U.S. can with its Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Still, it would be mind boggling to launch a strike on Iran’s nuclear program with no ability to do damage on its most important facility. So I see three Israeli theories here for what they were thinking:

1. The Israelis have a creative plan for destroying Fordow. They are very good operationally. We should not underestimate them. However, the longer this goes without damage at Fordow the less likely this is to be true.

2. Israel has established air superiority and with drones and planes will be monitoring everything that goes in and out of Fordow and make it impossible for Iranian scientists and military to access it. Plausible. Hard to sustain over time.

3. The Israelis are hoping and banking on the fact that the dynamics of the war eventually cause the U.S. to enter and finish the job at Fordow. Really hoping this is not the Israeli plan over time.

Even if Iran suffers significant damage in the short-term, the long-term outcome here is still dicey. Iran will almost certainly be convinced that its only real deterrent is a nuclear weapons arsenal. The program will go deeper underground. Iran has already announced that it is going to cease cooperation with IAEA inspectors, because the information it provides makes the nuclear program vulnerable to attack. Bottom line: It’s unclear precisely how much the nuclear program has been set back. Fordow is the real wild card and we really have to hope that the crux of the Israeli plan there was not to draw the U.S. into taking it out. And in the long-term, Iran is almost certainly going for a nuclear weapon and you’ll need consistent repeated military action to try and stop it, unless the outcome of this was to convince the Iranians that the nuclear program is not worth pursuing. But that seems exceedingly unlikely.

How does this end? Right now I see three scenarios: (1) diplomatic deal with significant nuclear concessions; (2) drawn out conflict; (3) ceasefire without nuclear concessions; (4) regime collapse.

1. Diplomatic deal with significant nuclear concessions: This is the best outcome and the one the Israelis say they are driving towards. They want Iran to essentially give up and have Israel dictate terms by which Iran’s nuclear program no longer exists. That is a massive stretch goal at this point. Even though the Iranian leadership is under tremendous pressure right now, Iran is a proud nation and this type of total surrender is unlikely even if things get much worse. Still, this is where the U.S. can step in and negotiate what could be a really good deal. Probably better than the JCPOA. Along the lines of what the Trump administration was trying to do before the war started, where Iran would agree to phase out all of its enrichment over time in exchange for a regional enrichment consortium not on Iranian soil that could provide nuclear fuel, but in a form that cannot be turned into weapons. Diving into diplomacy and trying to get this deal or at least the initial framework to end the war should be the first priority.

2. Drawn out conflict: Probably the most likely outcome at this point as with all wars is that it just drags on (see Gaza and Ukraine for example). Israel will continue to attack Iranian military infrastructure, regime targets, and perhaps further expand into taking out its oil infrastructure. We will also see many more Iranian civilians dying - the current estimate stands at 224. Meanwhile, Israeli civilians will continue to deal with Iranian missile strikes and runs to bomb shelters, and levels of destruction and death from missiles that they haven’t seen since the invention of Iron Dome. Both countries will suffer terribly economically. It’s an awful outcome for everyone. It’s also a world where over time the Iranians try to reconstitute their nuclear program, which will put a great deal of pressure on the U.S. on whether it should get involved and try to take out the Fordow facility.

3. Regime collapse: A bit more of a wildcard scenario is the possibility of Iranian regime collapse. After all, a significant part of the leadership has been eliminated and Iran is in a very weak position right now. However, history has shown us that regimes being overturned by air-bombing alone is an incredibly unlikely outcome without military opposition on the ground. There is no strong organized opposition that can rise up and take the country and neither the U.S. nor Israel are about to pursue a land invasion of Iran. If there were to be a regime collapse, as we saw during the Arab spring, it would most likely lead to chaos or civil war not necessarily democracy. And it’s still possible that whatever comes next would also be very hostile to Israel and the U.S. Though at least it would mean that Iran is incredibly divided internally and weak and unlikely to be able to threaten Israel in the same way. But the bottom line is that regime change is still so unlikely that it cannot be the basis for any strategy.

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What is the U.S. role? The U.S. has three roles at this point. First, it will and should do everything it can to help defend Israel against Iranian missiles. That part is obvious.

The second, is that the United States still has a central role to play as a mediator or negotiator. Only the United States can apply the necessary pressure on Israel to stop, which means even though Iran doesn’t trust the U.S. at all, its leadership probably knows that it needs to deal with the Americans and with Trump to try to get a deal that ends the war.

The third role for the U.S. is as a combatant, especially since it is only the United States that has the capacity to take out the Fordow facility. There is a case to be made for doing that as a world in which this conflict ends and Iran still has the capacity to pursue a nuclear weapon with Fordow intact is a world in which Iran could very quickly have nuclear weapons. However, the second we do that, the U.S. is in the fight. That means Iran potentially responds with missile strikes on U.S. bases in the Gulf and begins targeting our forces and facilities around the globe. It also potentially draws us into a long-term commitment to this war - something that is completely the opposite of what Trump campaigned on and also could be a major distraction where the priority in the long run is still competition with China. Moreover, the second the U.S. strikes Iran it also cuts off diplomacy and any possibility of a deal in the immediate, since we are no longer mediating but instead in the fight itself.

At this point by far the best role for the U.S. is to continue to defend Israel and try to get a deal that ends the war and gets the necessary nuclear concessions from Iran. Unless there are strong indicators of Iran dashing to a nuclear weapon at Fordow, there is still time to pursue that option later if it becomes necessary.

How long will the rally around the flag effect last in Israel? Before the war started last Thursday, Netanyahu was deeply unpopular in Israel with most polls showing the Israeli public would vote him and his coalition out by a wide margin in the next election. The public was disenchanted with the dead-end in Gaza and 70% had come around to the view that they would support ending the war in exchange for the hostages. The public mood has now totally flipped. The Israeli public seems to be entirely behind the decision to go to war though I haven’t seen any public polling yet. Even opposition figures like Yair Golan and Yair Lapid have been supportive. The question is how long will this support last? If this becomes a prolonged conflict with no clear end game in sight and Israelis dealing with daily missile strikes from Iran, will the public turn against it? Will that even matter to Netanyahu given how he has approached Gaza? Still, as a democracy Israel’s ability to sustain this war will certainly be linked to public opinion, which cannot be guaranteed in perpetuity.

The region is mostly unhappy right now. I have seen some outdated notions in the U.S. press that other Middle Eastern countries are secretly happy this is happening. There might be some who feel that way. There is no love for the Iranian regime, and in the past some of these countries had urged U.S. military action. But none of the Middle Eastern states want thousands of missiles flying over their territory. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have traditionally been the most hawkish about Iran, have in recent years come around to the view that reorienting their economics away from oil and becoming some of the most important global financial and technology global players is their first priority, and a regional war just undermines that. They are I’m sure pleased that things are going badly for Iran even as publicly they condemn Israel. But given the number of U.S. troops and bases on their territory, they are quite concerned that if we get involved you could see missile strikes targeting our bases or even their own civilian infrastructure. This is not what they wanted.

The greatest threat and challenge to Israel is still the Palestinian issue. It is also important to remember that even as the world’s focus shifts to Iran, we cannot forget that the greatest threat to Israel’s security and democratic and Jewish nature is the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians. There are millions of Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Iran is thousands of miles away. Even as Israel shows remarkable ingenuity and technical prowess in knocking down missiles and conducting air strikes thousands of miles away, it is the much more low tech challenge on their own border that is still the greatest issue facing the country. Yes. Iran supports Hamas, but it was not the catalyst behind October 7th and the weapons and money it provided were an add on, but not the real source of Hamas’s power, which is fundamentally Palestinian. In one day, Hamas using guns, bulldozers, and gliders managed to cause more horror, damage, and trauma to Israeli society than Iran has ever caused or is likely to cause in this war. Israeli hostages are still being held in Gaza. 2.2 million people are still living under horrific humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Forces are still bogged down in Gaza with wave after wave of reserve call ups. Israel’s international standing and legitimacy are still being eroded because of what is happening in Gaza.

The most important thing that Israel can do for its long term security is come to an agreement that ends the war in Gaza, gets the hostages out, and gets humanitarian aid in. It can then work with the Arab world on a real political, security, and reconstruction plan for the day after that ensures Hamas no longer governs Gaza. And it can use that effort as a springboard for an eventual “23 state solution” – a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of the Arab states with the creation of a new demilitarized Palestinian state. That is such a more affirmative and better future for Israel than what we are looking at right now.

The first thing that struck me is how different this J Street trip was then one I participated in six years ago (I’ve been to Israel and the West Bank many times since in different capacities). A key purpose of the trip is to expose participants to both sides of the conflict and the multiple narratives. In 2019, the ultimate message from Israeli society and leadership was – “sure we’d like peace. But we have no partner on the other side and we can basically just manage the conflict and not worry about what is happening just miles away in the West Bank or Gaza.” We also heard from a vocal Israeli minority who warned that continuing to muddle along was unsustainable – a position that J Street wholly endorsed. In the second half of the trip we went to the West Bank, learned from Palestinians about the challenges of living under occupation, saw the expansion of the settlements, and where the occupation was really at its worst in Hebron. The dichotomy of one side suffering while the other kept moving along and thriving was jarring, but it was the reality of the conflict.

Tragically this dynamic no longer exists. Those who were warning about the unsustainability of the previous status quo were right. We spoke with hostage families at hostage square in Tel Aviv, visited one of the communities on the border that suffered horribly from the Hamas attacks on October 7th and paid tribute to the victims at the site of the Nova music festival. We heard about the privations of the occupation from Palestinians, and now they also spoke of loved ones lost in Gaza or just trying to survive, and about an extremist Israeli government that had embraced previously problematic behavior and put it on steroids. I had a chance to visit the northern West Bank, and the pace of growth of illegal farming outposts and the associated land grabs enabled by this Israeli government are stunning. And we didn’t even visit Gaza - a whole other layer of pain and horror that is ongoing. The bottom line is that now when you go on a J Street trip now, you see two societies living in trauma, which is the new reality of the conflict.

At the Nova music festival site, which has become a memorial to the victims.

Something else that I found on this visit was an Israeli society that was at the beginning of a deep reckoning, with conflicting and contradictory views. On two things Israeli society is clear. First, they don’t like Netanyahu and this government and poll after poll shows it. Second, 70% of the population supports ending the war. They believe that this is the best way to get the hostages out, and that for them is the first priority, which was evident by the pictures of the hostages that we saw everywhere. They are also deeply skeptical of Netanyahu’s pronouncements that total victory is right around the corner, having heard that for more than a year, and then watching their loved ones who serve in the reserves going back to war again and again and again and fighting again and again in the same Gaza neighborhoods, which were supposedly cleared months ago.

However, when you start to talk about what needs to happen after the war ends and the hostages come home things get much more confusing. I saw some polling that showed that 60% of Israelis were willing to pursue a strategy that included a proposal by President Trump to end the war, get the hostages out, get a deal with the Arab states that includes integration into the region with Saudi Arabia and others, and as part of that support a demilitarized Palestinian state. That seemed too good to be true. Separately, a poll released while I was in Israel found that 82% of Israelis support expelling Palestinians from Gaza. That seemed too bad to be true. But really what it shows is how fluid the moment is in Israeli society and how people are so undecided about where to go that asking the question a certain way can lead to such wildly different results.

There was also an increasing awareness of the suffering in Gaza, though this was still only a very small part of the news and conversation. But leading voices are starting to speak out and the debate in Israel is changing. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert writing about his belief that Israel is committing war crimes. Former Defense Minister in a Netanyahu government Boogie Yaalon raising concerns that Israel is conducting ethnic cleansing. Former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan, the head of the Democrats party and one of the heroes of October 7th who got up that day and drove south as a civilian to save Israeli civilians, raising the alarm about the terrible civilian death toll.

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Meanwhile, you would also hear from Israelis that they were disillusioned and deeply distrusting of Palestinians. A long time believer in peace told me that he was questioning things not because of the Hamas attacks on October 7th, but because of the wave of Palestinian civilians that came after the Hamas fighters to loot and pillage. He said that broke his belief that while the leadership on both sides was rotten the people were ready. But he also acknowledged that just trudging along with the status quo also didn’t make sense either.

The debate in Israel reminded me of where we were in the U.S. in 2006 with the war in Iraq and the aftermath of 9/11. But in Israel the whole process is happening faster because everything is so much closer. And because as opposed to the U.S. where only a tiny portion of the population serves in the military, in Israel it’s almost everyone who is feeling it. The country is turning against the war. The rally around the flag effect is over. A real reckoning is coming in Israeli society. But the ruling government is still all in on the war and the society feels trapped by their government, which will continue to cling to the strategy of perpetuating the war until it is voted out of power.

And so despite the fact that things may be as bad as they’ve ever been, I come away from this trip with some optimism precisely because everything right now feels so fluid and unclear. We talked a lot during the trip about key pivot moments in the conflict, and how out of horrible events often came some good. The Yom Kippur war caused a reassessment of Israeli strategy and society that ultimately led to the Camp David Accords. The First Intifada led to the Oslo Accords. The Second Intifada and Gaza Disengagement led to the 15 year period of apathy and conflict management that was ultimately punctured on October 7th. Now Israelis are unmoored. They are reevaluating. They are all over the place. It is a moment that could lead to a deep hardening of views, which only makes the conflict more intractable. But it is also a moment that could lead to a real shift in a more positive direction.

In these critical pivot moments, what is most necessary is leadership. It was true with Camp David and Begin and Sadat, and Oslo would have never happened without Rabin’s leadership. And while Israelis are currently stuck with this current government, help is on the way even if elections may be 12 to 18 months away though hopefully much sooner. And in conversations with opposition officials and leaders I found a group of people who learned a lot from the one year of power that they had in 2021-22 and the mistakes they made in not being ready. That won’t happen again. They are planning seriously and thoughtfully for their moment - their own Project 2026 - but in a good way. The primary effort will be around protecting Israeli democracy and democratic institutions, but there is also a lot of thinking about how to end the war, get the hostages out, and use that moment to begin serious efforts to start Israel down a better path in the Middle East and with the Palestinians. When that moment does come and this government is finally gone, there is a real opportunity to put Israeli society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a much better trajectory.

To be clear, there is also plenty of antisemitism on the American far right, and it has a longer history of resulting in terrible violence directed at Jews – most notably the killing of eleven people at the Tree of Life Synagogue in 2018. It is also true that Donald Trump has fed these fires by legitimizing antisemitic right wing extremists. And he is likely to generate further antisemitic backlash on the left by using his supposed fight against antisemitism to launch attacks on academia that are really about his own vendetta against elite research institutions.

All of that is true, but that is not what this post is about and that is not what the events of the past week were about. This post is about the challenges that American Jews face from the left both in the form of violent and extreme antisemitism, but also much more complicated and subtle prejudice and insensitivity that we have dealt with since the October 7th attacks and the start of the war in Gaza, and what we can do about it.

Extremism and Violence

We have seen a series of obviously violent antisemitic incidents in recent months. Start with the attack on Sarah and Yaron, and we need to be clear that was not just an “anti-Israel” attack it was clearly antisemitic. The shooter went to an event hosted by the American Jewish Committee at the Jewish Museum in Washington DC to target and kill people. The notion that this was strictly an “anti-Israel” incident, and that he could specifically pick out and discern that Yaron and Sarah were employees of the Israeli embassy, is incredibly unlikely. From all that we can tell, the man was coming to the event to kill Jews because he somehow felt this was justified because of a terrible war in Gaza. That’s antisemitism. Pretty simple. And support and glorification of this act in its aftermath, which we have seen in some social media circles is also antisemitism.

This is only the latest in a string of violent events targeting Jews. On the evening after Seder an assailant conducted an arson attack on the home of Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro – arguably the highest profile Jewish politician in the United States. Shapiro’s public position on Israel and the war in Gaza, is probably more supportive of the Israeli government than mine is, but absolutely not exceptional amongst mainstream Democratic Party discourse. Why did the assailant single out Shapiro instead of many of the other politicians in this country who have expressed similar views? The answer seems obvious. It’s because he is Jewish.

How do we deal with this kind of violence and threat? I’d first commend to you the Biden Administration’s National Antisemitism Strategy, which included more than 100 actions in the areas of education, physical security, countering online hate, and putting in place legal mechanisms to counter antisemitism. The strategy was developed before October 7th and has obviously required updating and increased resources, but it still serves as a useful document even if the Trump Administration has basically shelved large chunks of it. Of particular importance is fully funding the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP), which provides a significant boost in funding to defend synagogues, Jewish schools, and other Jewish facilities and after October 7th was funded at record levels. The Trump Administration temporarily froze these funds when it first came into office, and while they have started to be released it’s vital that this program continue to be fully funded and funded at higher levels if necessary.

Second, now is a moment of self reflection for leaders in the Pro-Palestine movement, the overwhelming majority of whom absolutely deplore this attack. What is happening in Gaza is horrific. I do not deny that. Raising awareness about the tragedy there and trying to stop it is just and right and I’m doing it in my work every day. But language matters. Using provocative language that implies or direct calls for armed resistance across the globe, does not help the Palestinian cause or raise awareness. It does however put Jews in danger. You need to consider how some of this language sounds to the most extreme fringes of your movement and the kind of consequences that come with it.

Finally, we have to also recognize that what happens in Israel and in Gaza does not stay in Israel and Gaza. The reality at this point is that we are 18 months into a terrible war - a war that was triggered by a horrific terrorist act by Hamas - and one in which there has been great human suffering in Gaza caused both by the Israeli government and Hamas. It is a war that at this point 70% of the Israeli public opposes. Israelis want a deal to bring the remaining hostages home and end the fighting. That deal is imminently doable. But instead, as long as the current extreme Israeli government continues to prioritize prosecuting the war, the risk of unjustified antisemitic attacks against Jews around the world will remain elevated.

Alienation, Lack of Sensitivity, Prejudice

Beyond the obvious and blatant antisemitism we saw in Washington last week, there is a second category of experiences that many American Jews have felt since October 7th that I’ve long wanted to write about. But honestly I’ve been hesitant because it is much harder to define and grapple with. It is the feeling of loneliness and lack of support that many American Jews have felt in progressive spaces since October 7th.

A few weeks ago I was on a college campus speaking to a group of J Street U students. They hold an important space in the middle on college campuses. They are supportive of the state of Israel and its importance as a Jewish and democratic state, and at the same time are critical of Israeli government policy towards the Palestinians, especially the war in Gaza. In many respects this puts them not too far away from 70% of the Israeli public and the majority of American Jews at this point. But on college campuses, this can sometimes be a lonely place to hold.

I asked them if they had experienced antisemitism since October 7th on their campus and to my surprise there was universal agreement from them that they had not. What they had experienced was loneliness due to lack of empathy and sympathy for Jewish suffering after October 7th after many of their classmates quickly pivoted to the horrors in Gaza without acknowledging the atrocities that had begun the war. They said they also experienced alienation in certain clubs and organizations focused on progressive causes such as LGBTQ rights and protecting the environment that were suddenly expressing extreme positions on the conflict that they did not agree with. I asked them if they didn’t define these experiences as maybe being based on antisemitism and if not how would you define it? Their view was that it was insensitivity, a microaggression, ignorance, but they did not call it antisemitism.

One student talked about how a year earlier during the peak of campus protests and encampments, he gave a tour to an accepted Jewish student and his family. By the end of the tour, the mother of the prospective student was so upset she wanted to call the police and file a complaint. The current student found this to be incredibly strange, as he knew some of the people at the encampment and even though he disagreed with them, he had been able to have reasonable debate and never felt threatened. Again all very hard to define and wrestle with.

Indeed, I had my own similar experience during the Presidential campaign last fall. A couple of weeks after joining the campaign in August, we began working to set up events in Jewish communities in swing states. We had the support from leaders at the campaign headquarters in Wilmington and were lining up high profile Jewish speakers, who were all excited to do this. When we first reached out to our local teams in the states, some were immediately supportive. In other cases, the initial response back was “how about a private breakfast for 10 Jewish community leaders instead of a rally for 200-300.” When we tried to probe about this posture, the response came back that there was concern about protests and that “we didn’t want to make other people mad.” To me this was infuriating. All kinds of other minority groups get to express their political support for the Democratic candidate with big Get Out the Vote events, but not Jews because “it might make people mad?”

Still, the answer to this challenge was to get on a call with the people who were expressing resistance. Once we explained to them that the purpose of this event was not to spend an hour talking about October 7th and the war in Gaza while waving Israeli flags, but instead to get American Jews, a core constituency of the Democratic base to have a positive and joyful event expressing their support for the Democratic nominee, all concerns went away. We did events all over the country and they were successful.

I don’t think the right word for what I was dealing with or what these students are dealing with is necessarily antisemitism. Putting it in the same category as the attack this past week only confuses things. Perhaps the right word is unconscious bias. Whatever we call it, it is a phenomenon that American Jews have experienced on the left since October 7th and one we have to wrestle with.

The key to overcoming this problem is for Jews to be engaging in progressive spaces, breaking down stereotypes and building bridges as we did in response to the problem on the campaign and as J Street U students are doing every day. A lot of people in these spaces don’t understand Jews and have preconceived notions about what they prioritize politically and their views on Israel. The key for me on the campaign was being able to explain to these political operatives on the ground in these states what I was trying to do. That conversation was vital.

In the age of Trump, Jews have an opportunity to rebuild some of these bridges on the left, precisely because most share such a strong common objection with progressives to Trump’s agenda. This is particularly true of the Trump administration’s use of “fighting antisemitism” as a pretext for defunding higher education and disappearing and deporting international students (even if we fundamentally disagree with these students’ positions on Israel). This moment is an opportunity to be out there loud and proud in progressive spaces opposing Trump. And there is also a danger that if we aren’t out there aligning with other organizations on the left and making clear our concerns, then many on the left might just assume we support these Trump policies. Such assumptions will only lead to further backlash and antisemitism against the Jewish community.

That’s why the work J Street has been doing in these spaces in recent months is so vital. Not only because it is the absolute right thing to do. But because now is an essential moment to prevent and fix the rift that has been growing between the Jewish community and progressives since October 7th, by reminding traditional allies on the Left that American Jews continue to share the same values and together fight the same fights.

If you couldn’t make it and find yourself with some free time this weekend, I hope you’ll watch and maybe share the recording with folks in your circles.

Jeremy and I covered a wide range of topics.

We discussed the horrific situation on the ground in Gaza and Netanyahu's announcement that the Israeli military would be moving to re-occupy Gaza. We talked a bit about the humanitarian catastrophe and what must be done immediately to bring relief to Palestinian families and the hostages home from captivity.

Coming back to America, we chatted about how Washington is responding, including in a flurry of Congressional letters pressing the Israeli government to end its 68-day blockade on all aid into Gaza. You can learn more about how J Street is responding to the crisis here.

Bridging the two regions is none other than President Trump, who heads to the Middle East on Monday. We chat about his trip, Congressional activity and more.

Watched the recording or joined us live? I’d deeply appreciate your feedback in the comments below.

How can we make these chats more engaging? What would you like to hear about? And most importantly, we’d love your suggestions for what to call these programs? Watch to see what Jeremy proposed.

Stay tuned for more info on future live discussions. We hope to finalize a standing hour each week to host these calls. Have a great weekend, all.

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The first story is the call up of thousands of Israeli reserves yet again and the approval of a scaled up offensive in Gaza. Though the plan will not be executed for at least a couple of weeks after President Trump’s visit to the region. There are varying reports on what this operation would look like, but the bottom line is that the IDF would reoccupy at least certain areas of Gaza if not all of it, and this time stay much longer, exercising full control in an effort to ensure Hamas does not melt away only to come back. This time the IDF will more seriously take on the task of counterinsurgency not only clearing territory, but holding it afterwards to ensure Hamas cannot come back. However, as I’ve written about previously, this plan will likely result in a new and horrific wave of humanitarian suffering in Gaza. Moreover, whatever force you expect to hold territory for the long-term in a counterinsurgency needs to have some legitimacy with the local population. The IDF has none with the population in Gaza. The Israeli government has refused to entertain any plans that involve Palestinian forces eventually controlling Gaza. Without that, not only is it impossible to build a long-term legitimate force to ensure security, but it also becomes impossible to generate any momentum for some kind of transitional international or Arab force. No foreign actor will go in unless there is a clear pathway for them to handover to Palestinians. And so the most likely outcome of this latest effort is greater political, social, and economic pressure on Israeli society and IDF fatalities as thousands of reservists are once again called up to service; greater suffering for Palestinian civilians from new fighting; and lack of progress in getting the hostages out.

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The second development this weekend was reporting that Israel is planning on a new method for distributing aid in Gaza in an effort to try to prevent Hamas from syphoning it off. Again, it would not go into effect until after Trump’s visit. Unfortunately, early indicators are that this plan is likely to be highly impractical and not address the civilian needs of the population. According to reports, there would be four to ten distribution sites set up in Southern Gaza with outside contractors providing security and humanitarian aid workers distributing food. Individuals would have to make their way to these sites to receive a 44 pound parcel of primarily food and some medical supplies and then get that back to their families. Each package would be intended to last for one to two weeks. All recipients would be biometrically scanned to ensure Hamas members would not receive aid. The plan relies on bringing in 60 trucks of supplies a day into Gaza as opposed to the hundreds that have historically been necessary to feed the population.

Humanitarian organizations are already expressing grave alarm. They believe the plan could cause another mass displacement as Gazans move to position themselves near the hubs in the south. Moreover, four to ten distribution centers are not nearly enough for a population of more than 2 million as the previous system had 100 distribution centers. There is also a question of how people – many of whom are malnourished – are supposed to carry these heavy parcels of food back to their families, perhaps far away. And depending on the precise rhythm of distribution (whether once a week or every two weeks), one parcel would be enough for roughly half a meal to one meal per person per day for a family of 5.5, which is the average size in Gaza. On top of that, it’s unclear how this plan keeps people from having their food stolen by Hamas after they leave the distribution location. And you are replacing a system by which all needy people receive food, with a system where political decisions with imperfect information are being made about how aid gets in, which is in violation of basic humanitarian principles. I’ll admit that I am not briefed on all the details, and perhaps all of these issues have been addressed, but with the track record of facilitating the delivery of aid in Gaza over the past 18 months, there is little reason to be optimistic.

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Finally, the third story is the missile attack by the Houthis on Sunday that penetrated Israeli and American missile defenses and hit near Ben Gurion airport injuring six. International carriers have temporarily cancelled most flights, which is inconvenient for many Israelis and economically costly. Hopefully, this pause in air traffic is short-lived, but the pain for Israel is real.

These actions by the Houthis are deplorable and I support continuing to conduct air strikes, which take out Hothi missile capabilities before they are launched either at Israel or at international shipping in the Red Sea. But we also have to be realistic about what is happening here and what might shape Houthi behavior. The Houthis see these strikes as major propaganda victories as they continue to present themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. Only one thing has so far stopped these attacks over the past 18 months, and that has been ceasefires in Gaza. Just a few years ago, the Houthis fought a horrific civil war in Yemen that included regular intensive daily bombing from a coalition of Gulf States, and this was not enough to change Houthi calculus or behavior. It seems doubtful to me at this point, that using only a fraction of that fire power from the air, the U.S., Israel, and its allies are likely to cause the Houthis to change their calculus. The only thing that stops these unjustified attacks by the Houthis is a massive escalation of the military campaign in Yemen by the United States, which is not happening and simply not worth the cost for the United States, or a ceasefire in Gaza.

What do all three of these developments say about where Israel currently stands in the war? It feels eerily similar to where the United States was during the middle years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is broad recognition both amongst the public and security experts that the initial assumptions about what could be accomplished and how quickly were way too optimistic. Many also understand that dramatic mistakes were made early in the conflict. However, there is still a fundamental disagreement between two camps. The first believes Israel has no choice but to keep going and try new strategies to achieve “victory” such as this new offensive and aid distribution mechanism. They are similar to Americans who supported trying multiple strategic shifts such as the 2007 surge in Iraq or Obama’s decision in 2009 to significantly increase troop levels in Afghanistan. The other school believes that the costs have grown too high and the best option is to cut a deal to end a war and get the hostages out.

If U.S. history is any judge, Israel is better off at this point cutting the best deal it can to end the war. Fighting these types of prolonged insurgencies with dwindling domestic support is unworkable in democracies - even if you achieve some tactical success. Given that Israelis do live in such a tough neighborhood and have a long history of dealing with conflict, their societal pain tolerance is higher than it is in the United States. However, there are two factors in the Israeli case, which will make support harder to sustain than in the U.S and are likely to accelerate an end to the conflict in Gaza. First, in the United States the brunt of the war was felt by a small all-volunteer-force with the majority of the American population shielded from the impact. In Israel, reservist mobilizations affect all of society. Second, for the U.S. ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan meant acknowledging defeat. For Israel, agreeing to end the war means a deal that gets all of the hostages out, which for the majority of the Israeli public, is the most important victory of all.

The Double Standard

In the campaign, I dealt with constant concerns from members of the Jewish community that Kamala Harris had not said enough about her commitment to Israel’s security or sufficiently condemned Hamas for the attacks of October 7th. This despite the fact that I could point them to many many many examples where she had done exactly that.

Meanwhile Donald Trump could say the most outrageous things from calling Hamas and Hezbollah smart and mocking Israel days after October 7th, to calling some of the neo-Nazis who marched at Charlottesville “very fine people,” to having his own Vice President vote against the National Security Supplemental that included billions in support for Israel in the aftermath of October 7. (The one thing that did stick to him was when he said if he lost, the Jews would “have a lot to do with it.” This was because it was so outrageous and put a target on Jews back, but also because we worked really hard to make sure everyone knew about it).

In the last couple of weeks we’ve had two more very stark examples of this double standard. First, last week the NY Times reported that Israeli officials had briefed Trump’s senior team on military plans for Iran and ultimately Trump had decided on negotiations. This is obviously big news in and of itself (and I think trying to pursue a deal with Iran makes sense), but what really shocked me was the level of disclosure in the story. That Israel had plans to strike nuclear sites in May. That the plans required U.S. support not just to defend Israel, but to ensure the attack was successful. That the plan originally included commando operations and even described tactics for how the commando operation would be conducted. That they ultimately moved on to an extended bombing campaign option that would require U.S. assistance again describing in some detail the sequencing of the types of strikes that would need to be conducted, the rough time line under which they would occur, and how long they expected the operation to last.

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This is a shocking level of disclosure for the NY Times, and the story is largely sourced to American officials. It shows the same lax casual approach to secrecy that we’ve seen in Mike Waltz and Pete Hegseth signal chats. And yet, there has been no public outrage. Nothing from Israeli officials. Nothing from the organized Jewish community. Nothing.

Imagine what the response would have been if instead this had happened under Joe Biden’s presidency. Actually, you don’t have to imagine, because in October 2024 an American intelligence assessment of what an Israeli strike might look like leaked to the press. That leak was a U.S. intelligence product - meaning it was based on the American best estimate/speculation of what an Israeli strike would look like. So it was likely much less damaging than leaking conversations and consultation with Israelis. And it did not come from political appointees but seemed clear from early on that it was coming from someone lower level inside the intelligence community as opposed to the information in the Times story, which feels like it came from high ranking American officials who would have been in these very sensitive small meetings. And yet in October 2024, this incident led to my inbox filling up with notes from concerned supporters saying it was flipping Jewish voters to Trump, and there were social media conspiracy theories being launched against Biden Administration appointees with no evidence, accusing them of leaking. It turned out later that the leaker was not a Biden political appointee but an intelligence analyst.

Another recent example - the attack on Governor Shapiro. Imagine if we had a Democratic President and there was an attack on arguably the most prominent Jewish politician in the country. If someone had broken into his house the evening after Seder and thrown Molotov cocktails in his home and then called the police and said the attack was because of his position on Gaza – even though the politician’s positions on Gaza are very much inside the Democratic mainstream and no different than many other governors and politicians who aren’t Jewish. Now imagine if the Democratic President had said nothing about it or just offhandedly referred to the assassin as a “whack job” without mentioning antisemitism, and if it had taken that President a week to call the victim of the attack. I can tell you that if I was working in a Jewish outreach role for that President, my phone would have been ringing off the hook. But when Trump responds this way nothing happens.

The Sources of the Double Standard and What to Do About It

So, why this ridiculous double standard? First, is the obvious Trump fatigue that applies to so many issues. There are just so many crazy things going on that no one can focus on any one issue.

More important though is that Trump appeals to Israelis - especially right wing Israelis - on a very base cultural level. He moved the embassy to Jerusalem and says nasty things about Palestinians and protesters on college campuses. So it doesn’t matter if he does real harm to Israel by giving away its attack plans on Iran, burning important intel sources in Syria, or neglecting to stand up against an antisemitic attack against a Jewish governor. And it doesn’t matter that Joe Biden is the one who actually sent aircraft carriers to the Middle East to protect Israel and deter Iran after October 7th, or helped defend Israel from multiple Iranian missile attacks.

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In many ways, appealing to Israelis on cultural issues, while actually harming their national interests is pretty similar to his ability to appeal to working class voters even as he pursues policies that line the pockets of his billionaire cronies.

Trump’s popularity with the Israeli right also means Netanyahu never criticizes Trump publicly and looks for ways to avoid daylight (as opposed to seeking daylight like he did with Biden). And all of that bounces back into the American Jewish community - especially to conservative Jews but also a segment of the Jewish population who votes for Democrats but remains conservative on Israel issues.

There is also a challenge of the social media environment that drives so much of this. Conservatives have invested more than liberals in this space. I felt it during the campaign, in the Jewish community where disinformation was and remains prevalent (At some point I’ll write a piece just about that. It was genuinely disturbing). Every day there was another tweet, Instagram post, or tik tok video full of lies calling Kamala Harris antisemitic or anti-Israel, and these items got remarkable traction and made their way through various chat groups throughout the Jewish community. It was so bad that I had to set up a specific line of effort with our volunteers and experts just to knock all this crazy stuff down.

So what do we do to respond? First, we have to keep telling the truth and pointing out the hypocrisy because some of our messaging really does work to knock down these myths, and some of our counter-messaging like Trump’s antisemitic remarks about blaming Jews for a potential loss really do break through.

Second, Democrats and liberals need to make a major investment in the social media ecosystem to build up a counter to Republicans. That is going to take a lot of money and a lot of time, but it’s much bigger than just the Jewish community and my sense is Democrats get it and that will be happening over the next few years. But part of that effort needs to be targeted at Jewish specific content. We as a community are not immune to this problem as I can testify firsthand.

Finally, it’s important to remember that despite this frustrating double standard, 70% of Jews still voted for Kamala Harris in 2024. That is largely because most American Jews are liberal and their values are much more consistent with the Democratic Party. But we also worked very hard to keep those voters by fighting the disinfo and the double standard and that is something we are going to have to continue to do.

U.S—Iran relations are consistently in one of three modes:

1. Working on or implementing a deal such as around the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the early years of the Biden administration;

2. Teetering on war such as in 2020 after the killing of Qassem Soleimani or in late 2011 or early 2012 where the possibility of an Israeli strike was quite high; or

3. Muddling through with the U.S. applying economic and military pressure, and Iran responding with actions from its proxies, which is basically the default position.

In most moments the chance that we’ll muddle through is probably 80% with 10% each for a war or a deal. But right now, I would put muddling through at 40% with each of the other two scenarios at 30%. Let’s look at why.

Why we might get a deal

The first reason why we may have a deal is that President Trump keeps saying he wants one. He has made it clear time again most recently in his press conference with Netanyahu when he said “I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious. And the obvious is not something that I want to be involved with…” The desire for a deal, isn’t in and of itself enough to get one, but as we’ve seen with the tariffs and with other issues, when Trump insists he wants to do something he should be taken seriously and usually it means there is a strong chance he will try to find a way to do it. As he considers his options, Trump is likely to hear from at least some of his advisors – most notably those less inclined to direct military intervention such as Vice President JD Vance and some of the senior officials at the Pentagon – that the options when it comes to setting back Iran’s nuclear program are not very good. Some of the key facilities are deeply buried and any military option is likely to only temporarily set back the program and could lead Iran to double down in its determination to get a bomb while retaliating with strikes against U.S. bases in the Gulf, and creating a very unstable scenario where the U.S. and Israel need to repeatedly “mow the lawn” with new strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities every few months.

Second, Iran is as weak as it has been in a long time and may really need a deal. In the past few months, it has suffered a series of major setbacks in the region. The war last fall between Israel and Hezbollah went much better for Israel than anyone – including both Israeli and American officials – anticipated. Hezbollah – Iran’s strongest and most important non-state proxy in the Middle East – was decapitated and suffered serious setbacks on the ground. Add to that the collapse of the Assad regime – Iran’s closest Arab ally and a key conduit for rearming Hezbollah – and Iran’s position in the Levant and its ability to use it to pressure Israel militarily has been dramatically set back. Meanwhile, working together the United States and Israel successfully defeated two Iranian ballistic missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024 and the Israeli response, which decimated Iran’s air defenses only further weakened Iran’s position. And in recent weeks the Trump Administration seems to be making moves to add military pressure on Iran to change its calculus – most notably sending a second carrier strike group to the Middle East and B-2s to the Indian Ocean base on Diego Garcia from where they can operate more easily in the Middle East. Add to that, that it has now been 7 years since Trump’s departure from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the reapplication of sanctions, which were maintained during the Biden administration, and the cumulative economic effect on Iran has been profound.

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A third reason we could see a deal is that there is a ticking clock that will put pressure on all of the parties to try to come to an arrangement by the fall. One of the key provisions of the JCPOA was that in October 2025, UN Security Council Sanctions on Iran would be lifted and Iran would no longer be on the agenda of the Security Council. However, there is also a mechanism where if Iran is in violation of the agreement, the other parties to the JCPOA can snapback UN sanctions. Since the U.S. left the deal in 2018, it no longer has the option to snapback. But given how out of compliance Iran is with the agreement at this point, and the advances it has made in its nuclear program since Trump collapsed the JCPOA in 2018, the three European parties to the deal – the UK, France, and Germany – are very likely to snapback sanctions this summer or early fall if no deal is reached. Iranian officials have stated that they would leave the non-proliferation regime (NPT) potentially in response, resulting in the removal of nearly all nuclear inspection mechanisms in Iran and leaving no international visibility into a program on the precipice of a bomb. Neither side wants to see this highly escalatory scenario, which creates a ticking clock to get a deal over the next few months – something that is always useful in a negotiation.

Another one of the big differences from when the JCPOA was negotiated in 2015 is the position of the Gulf States – especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Back then, they were much more open and even in some cases willing to support a military strike or encourage greater U.S. confrontation. But their position has changed. Their strong preference now is to avoid a war, which would threaten their number one priority of building up their economies and diversifying away from oil. This shift from confrontation to rapprochement with Iran will matter to Trump who is highly focused on major Gulf investment in the U.S and on a desire to get an Israel-Saudi normalization deal. Indeed, his first foreign trip will be to the Gulf next month – an indicator of how important these countries’ views may be in determining his policies.

As for PM Netanyahu, the most likely instigator of a military confrontation with Iran, he has a long track record of being risk averse when it comes to the use of military force. And, Trump has tremendous leverage over him given Trump’s popularity in Israel – especially with Bibi’s right-wing base. It is hard to imagine Netanyahu will openly and directly defy Trump if Trump tell him not to do it.

Why we might get a war

Despite, the rosy picture I just painted a number of the factors laid out above could also mean that in the next few months Israel - perhaps on its own or perhaps with direct intervention from the United States – strikes Iran’s nuclear program triggering a significant escalation in the region. First, while Trump really wants a deal, most of the decisionmakers in the administration have traditionally been much more hawkish on Iran including Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz, Pete Hegseth, and many of the political appointees who work for them. They and Netanyahu may convince Trump to pursue unrealistic terms such as the complete dismantlement of the nuclear program, which could lead to the collapse in negotiations. Indeed, in his press conference with Netanyahu Trump specifically mentioned the Libya model, whereby in the early 2000s Moammar Qaddafi agreed to complete dismantlement. What is left unsaid is that only years later during the Arab Spring, Qhadaffi’s lack of a nuclear deterrent likely played a role in the U.S. decision to support a revolution that ultimately toppled him. The lesson for Iran’s regime? Don’t totally give up your nuclear capability if you want to stay in power. If Trump keeps these absolutist demands a deal is unlikely.

Moreover, an effective nuclear agreement with Iran requires deep technical analysis and a team of scientists and sanctions experts, deeply versed in the nitty gritty of the Iran nuclear issue. Those people exist in the U.S. government, but the Trump administration has still not put that team together and it’s unclear if they have the will and capacity to do so or would even listen to the experts you need to make something like this happen.

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Another factor is Trump’s very brash style and threats he regularly issues towards Iran. The Iranians are a proud nation that is more likely to respond to constant threats by getting their backs up. Trump’s very public threats against Iran could go over quite badly and reduce the chance of a deal. His inability to keep anything quiet in a delicate negotiation, such as his inaccurate statements earlier this week that the U.S and Iran would begin direct talks, were a case in point, causing Iran to come out and strongly deny that direct negotiations were under way.

On top of that, Iran’s historic weakness in the region, which I described above not only increases the likelihood of a deal but also increases the likelihood of conflict. Israel may calculate that this moment of Iranian weakness is the ideal time to strike the nuclear program because of Iran’s inability to effectively respond with so many of its proxies unable to fight back meaningfully, its missile capabilities less effective than expected, and its air defenses dramatically degraded. As risk averse as Netanyahu has been over the years about the use of military force, in the past six months he has seen real successes against Iran that could certainly lead him to conclude that now is the time to strike. And who knows, he might be right that at this moment of Iranian weakness it will be restrained in retaliating. But that is a significant risk to take and just one Iranian missile getting through and causing a mass casualty event in Israel, the Gulf, or an American military base could send us off to the races.

Iran’s weakness combined with how close it is to getting a bomb, might also trigger an Iranian decision to dash for a nuclear weapon if it concludes that it is so vulnerable now that it needs a bomb for deterrence. This could also cause a U.S. or Israeli military strike as we seek to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Finally, the same ticking clock of impending sanctions snapback and potential Iranian NPT withdrawal that might create the pressure for a deal, could also generate the conditions for a significant escalation. It does not currently appear that either side is in a rush to make a deal, and especially if the negotiations in Oman remain indirect, they will be painfully slow and inefficient. The U.S. and Iran might not want a war, but If time expires and the Europeans snapback, and the Iranians feel compelled to follow through on their threat to leave the NPT, the U.S. and Iran may inadvertently stumble into a war that neither wants.

Muddling Through is Still Most Likely

Despite all the reasons for either a war or a deal muddling through without either is still most likely. It is highly plausible that for all reasons outlined above, it will be too hard to get a new nuclear agreement. Trump won’t want a risky war and the Gulf, the Europeans, Russia, and China will all push for restraint. Netanyahu’s risk aversion and unwillingness to go directly against President Trump will keep him from striking. Iran’s weakened position in the region will mean it is not spoiling for a fight, so even in the event of snapback it will find a way to avoid the most provocative of actions such as leaving the NPT or kicking out inspectors. Perhaps the P5+1 and Iran will even find a way to kick the can down the road on snapback.

And so, the bottom line is this. Muddling through is still, as it almost always is, most likely. But the chances of a nuclear agreement or a war are both much higher in 2025 then they’ve been in a while.

First, it’s important to note that this military plan has not been approved by Israel’s political leadership. There is a reasonable chance that it is a bluff, being used as a tool of leverage to get a better deal out of Hamas. Let's hope so. Because this is a terrible idea. Let's walk through why.

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Counterinsurgency 101 - Why the Plan Won’t Work

First, if Israel’s priority is to get the hostages home - something 70% of the Israeli public agrees with - this is not the way to do it. Of the 147 hostages that have been released alive so far, only eight have been freed as a result of military operations, and a number have also been killed as a result of Israeli military operations. All of the others have been released as a result of negotiations and diplomatic agreements. A prolonged, new violent phase of the war is unlikely to lead to the release of the remaining estimated 24 living and 35 deceased hostages.

At the strategic level, the plan is likely to fail because there is no “hold force” that has any legitimacy with the local population. The basic tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine are that to displace an insurgent force like Hamas, you need to “clear, hold, and build.” First, you clear the area of insurgents through active military operations. Israel did this the first time it spent a year in Gaza. Then you hold the territory and demonstrate to the local population that you – not the insurgent force – can provide for their security. This is key, because if the local population believes that you are just going to leave and the insurgents will come back, they will never move over to your side and will just continue to support the insurgency providing it with the ability to hide amongst the population. If the population believes that the counterinsurgency force is there for good and will be the ultimate arbiters of their physical security, they will stop providing the insurgents with help (e.g. hiding weapons in their homes) and some may turn on the insurgents and provide intelligence on them. Meanwhile, some insurgent fighters will give up, put down their arms, and melt into the population. Israel didn’t bother to try holding any of Gaza last time. The IDF conducted clearance operations and then left, allowing Hamas to come back. A long term occupation is an effort by the IDF to correct that mistake.

However, what the IDF plan is missing is that a key element of the hold phase of a counterinsurgency campaign is that the hold force must have some legitimacy with the local population. The local population has to not only believe that the force is sticking around to provide for their security, but also needs to trust the force to cooperate with it. The problem with the IDF plan is that the IDF cannot be the hold force because it has no legitimacy with Palestinians. In what world is the IDF going to build trust with the local Gazan population after conducting a second intensive military campaign, which further decimates the Strip? There is way too much history between Israelis and Palestinians for that to be a reality. Without that legitimacy, the local population will never trust the IDF, and so Hamas will be able to continue to recruit, hide amongst the population, and fight a prolonged and costly insurgency for Israel. This problem dooms the current plan.

This challenge of finding a legitimate hold force is not new. The only way to address it is to find local fighters with some legitimacy with the population and get them to take the lead in holding, governing, and rebuilding. This is what the US did during the counter-ISIS campaign. Working with the Syrian Democratic Forces, it over time helped build a Kurdish-Arab force that still governs Northeast Syria today. And in Iraq, it worked with Iraqi Security Forces to enable them to retake, hold, and rebuild in ISIS-held territory. In other cases, including the surge in Iraq in 2006-2008, the war in Afghanistan, and the Vietnam War, the US failed either because it was unable to create a legitimate local security force (Afghanistan), or because it stumbled into a proper counterinsurgency strategy too late in the war and the American public no longer had the patience to support such a costly approach that would take years of investment (Iraq/Vietnam).

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This is why for the 15 months that the Biden Administration was in office after October 7th, we pushed for an interim international Arab-led force in Gaza that would ultimately hand over control to Palestinian Security Forces. It is the only option we could develop that actually has a chance of having some support on the ground, which is so necessary to defeating Hamas. But from the beginning, Netanyahu refused to pursue this strategy because it involved ultimate Palestinian control of Gaza, which would be opposed by Ben Gvir and Smotrich, and bring down the Israeli governing coalition. It is also why Netanyahu refused to ever seriously engage in Phase II negotiations on the ceasefire, which would require agreeing to end the war with Palestinian control of Gaza and has instead restarted the war.

How the Plan Threatens Israel

The plan will likely be incredibly costly and entirely unsustainable. The reporting right now suggests that the IDF estimates it would take up to five divisions (50,000-75,000 troops) and four to five months to reoccupy all of Gaza, which would then be followed by a prolonged occupation. Let’s get real, a year ago Netanyahu said that the war was almost wrapped up and all that was necessary was finishing Rafah. That obviously didn’t happen and neither will this. Our own experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam also point to the reality that any counterinsurgency fight goes way longer than anyone expects and oftentimes those wars are lost because the public loses patience or the costs become too high. If Israel pursues this approach, it will put itself on a similar trajectory. Already, reservists are raising objections and reservist reporting rates have dropped significantly from the start of the war. Meanwhile, leaving forces mobilized for what could be years would come at a huge cost to the Israeli economy. The public is already turning on this strategy with 70% preferring an approach that gets the hostages out and ends the war. That support will only drop as this fight continues and drags on. The end result will be the eventual election of a new government and eventual political pressure to withdraw, only after much greater costs to Israelis and Palestinians, and with less hostages surviving.

Finally, it is important to contemplate the one scenario under which this current plan would “work,” because in many ways that approach may present the greatest threat to Israel. If instead of using the approach that democracies and liberal states have used to fight insurgency, the Israeli government decides to remove all restraints associated with the laws of war, it could potentially crush the insurgency. There have been cases like this in the past. Bashar al-Assad used this approach in Syria and it worked for ten years even as he killed 500,000 people, leveled half the country, committed numerous war crimes, and in the long run failed to save himself. Vladamir Putin used the same approach in Chechnya in the early 2000s. Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed a revolt by the Shia population in southern Iraq after the First Gulf War. Hafaz al-Assad used it to suppress a revolt in Hama in the 1980s. And there are numerous other brutal examples of this type of repressive scorched earth campaigns throughout history against insurgents.

If this is the pathway the Israeli military wants to take and is approved by the political echelon, then it might be able to bring Hamas to its knees. However, the civilian cost to Palestinians, who have, according to the Hamas controlled health ministry, already suffered 50,000 deaths – more than 25,000 of them civilians – would be horrific. Israel would likely find itself internationally isolated and being mentioned in the same sentence as some of the most brutal regimes and human rights violators in the world, with genuinely profound consequences for how it engages with the rest of the world going forward. And such a horrific campaign would rip Israeli society apart, while separating it in perhaps permanent ways from the Jewish diaspora. It would be a horrific cost for Israel to bear and a pyrrhic victory over Hamas.

Coming off of the Presidential campaign in the fall, I concluded that the Democratic Party, American Jews, and Progressives had a lot of work to do to reunify around a common set of beliefs and values as it pertains to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering antisemitism, and protecting our democracy. In the aftermath of October 7th some of the loudest voices in the Jewish community tilted hard right associating support for Israel with support for the extremist government of Benjamin Netanyahu. Some of the loudest voices on the Left began supporting anti-Zionism, which sometimes crossed into antisemitism, violence, and support for terrorist organizations. The result of this fracture was that even as American Jews voted for Kamala Harris with over 70% support because they agree with the Democratic party on so many domestic issues, there is a danger of a real schism on Israel where Jews become increasingly alienated from their natural liberal political home in the United States.

But what I also found and still find was that when I talked to most American Jews and Democratic voters, they were on neither side of the two extreme poles. The overwhelming majority believe that given the history of the Jewish people Israel should exist as a secure, democratic, Jewish state. They believe that Palestinians deserve their rights to freedom, security, and self-determination. They believe that the terrorist organization Hamas started the war in Gaza with the horrific attacks of October 7th and that all of the hostages should be returned now. They are deeply worried about Palestinian civilians and suffering in Gaza and put that responsibility on both Hamas and on this far right wing Israeli government. They believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship based on common interests and common values. They recognize that Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu represent a fundamental threat to this relationship and to American and Israeli democracy. They are deeply concerned about the rise of antisemitism in the United States from both the right and the left and believe that universities did not do enough after October 7th to protect Jewish students. They oppose actions being taken by the Trump Administration in the name of fighting antisemitism that threaten higher education and civil rights.

The key now is to elevate voices, which support these values and ideas, but are being drowned out by the extremes. We need to build the center inside the base of the Democratic party and in the American Jewish community. We also need to strengthen relationships with progressives and like-minded Israelis and Palestinians. J Street is an absolutely essential organization for doing this work, which is why I am going there.

Now, as I was considering taking this role I asked many friends what they thought. Most expressed support, but I also heard some surprising things from people I deeply respect and admire. That J Street supports the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. It does not. I would never work at an organization that supported BDS, and I don’t believe an organization that supports BDS would be taking members of Congress to Israel over the past year and a half and visiting communities in the South that were attacked on October 7th. I heard that J Street is accusing Israel of genocide. Again no, that has never been J Street’s position.

If you want to understand what J Street actually stands for, I’d read their recently released policy memos on J Street’s agenda in the Trump era and on the way forward in Gaza (Full disclosure. I was the lead drafter on both of these). I’d also look at their recently released booklet on J Street’s definition on what it means to be pro-Israel. The point is that what J Street’s pro-Israel, pro-peace, pro-democracy agenda represents is a strand of liberal Zionism that is largely aligned with where many of the protestors out on the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem stand; where many of the hostage families stand; and where the majority of the Jewish community and the Democratic party stand. You won’t agree with everything, but we need a big tent to fight the threat that both Trump and Netanyahu represent, and to rebuild a consensus for a policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that we can support going forward. And if you’ve been enjoying my newsletter, I think you’ll like where much of J Street’s policies are going (especially since I’ll have a significant hand in developing them).

Beyond policy, the other reason I am joining J Street is that at this crisis moment with American, Israeli, and Palestinian rights under attack from both Trump and Netanyahu, I feel the need to DO SOMETHING. J Street has an incredible platform and is unafraid to stand up and fight on all these fronts at a time where it is desperately needed and where many others are pulling their punches. And even during the Biden-Harris administration in which I served, J Street was unafraid to push us on important issues whether it meant pressuring the administration to be more aggressive in pressing Israel to change policies that restricted aid from getting aid into Gaza, pushing for more measures to keep civilians in Gaza safe, or encouraging sanctions against far right extremists like Ben Gvir and Smotrich.

J Street endorsees now comprise 75% of Senate Democrats and 55% of House Democrats. It was the largest Jewish institutional funding source for Kamala Harris in 2024, and it has experienced a 50% growth in budget over the past four years while doubling the size of its core leadership and membership. And it has an incredible network around the country. This is especially true on college campuses where J Street U is a vital convener of nuanced, hard conversations about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that young people need to have, at a time where the atmosphere on campus in particular has become so polarized.

Finally, my hope is that in addition to my policy expertise and years of experience on the conflict, I can also bring my reputation and experience as a bridge builder to J Street. This is a skill I have always prided myself on whether it was at the Center for a New American Security, where I was able to work across the political divide with Republicans, or on the Harris-Walz campaign where I needed to connect with every flavor of Jewish voter from across the community. J Street is already uniquely positioned with its reach both into Jewish and progressive circles. But I hope to help build on that by helping grow coalitions that can fight to bring all the hostages home and end the war in Gaza; prevent annexation and reverse the negative trends of settlements and violence in the West Bank; support progress towards a regional peace that leads to Israel’s integration into the Middle East and the creation of a Palestinian state; prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon while avoiding an unnecessary military conflict; counter antisemitism; and fight for American and Israeli democracy.

I’m incredibly excited about this next chapter. And in the meantime you’ll still be able to read my thoughts on this substack, though as I start my new role, maybe a little less often at first as I take on more responsibilities.