John F. Kennedy did not make this mistake during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Faced with both the build-up of nuclear capable missiles in Cuba and the Soviet Union’s denial of supplying offensive weaponry, Kennedy took to the airwaves. “The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged ultimately leads to war…It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union... Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed--including in particular the brave people of West Berlin--will be met by whatever action is needed.” No acceptance of plausible deniability, no waiting for evidence that could be submitted to a court of law—Kennedy took a decisive stand and laid the blame directly on Moscow’s doorstep.

How things have changed in a half century. Since 2014 the national security community has been bombarded with references to gray zone operations, aka hybrid warfare. These military actions supposedly fall short of war. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and used its “little green men” to conquer Crimea, Vladimir Putin denied they were Russian soldiers. When Russia surged regular army troops into Ukraine in 2015 to stop Kyiv’s advances on the Donbas, the Kremlin denied the troops were there. In both cases, the denials were enough to make Western countries pause: what if the Russians were telling the truth? In fact, however, these denials were false. Western countries chose to ignore the evidence in front of their eyes.

Today, Europe is under a gray zone siege. European authorities have accused Russia of hiring local agents over Telegram and other social-media platforms to conduct sabotage, espionage and vandalism meant to stoke divisions. Estonia is investigating whether Russia-linked sabotage was behind the arson attack this month on a local defense company, Milrem Robotics, while recent explosions and fires at munitions facilities in Italy, Bulgaria and Finland have drawn suspicion of Russian involvement, even though authorities haven’t said they see evidence of that. The tempo of documented Russia-backed incidents has increased from a maximum of around 10 in many months since 2024 to around 15 a month since April, according to Ukraine’s Sahaidachnyi Security Center, which tracks Russian gray zone activities in Europe. Sahaidachnyi analysts say trends can be difficult to discern because many incidents suspected of being linked to Russia aren’t included in their data.

In the most recent incident, Germany has seen two sabotage attempts on parts of its electricity grid within 24 hours — one in the eastern state of Brandenburg, near Berlin, the other in the city of Bergheim, west of Cologne. One case has triggered a terror probe, while investigators are examining whether the incidents are connected and who may be responsible. In a previous incident, the explosives laden drone found at Leipzig Airport, Germany publicly blamed Russia.

Despite the finding, however, German response is muted. The price Russia will have to pay is relatively small. The Russian House cultural institute in Berlin is being shut down amid suspicions that it is serving as a cover for espionage. The Russian Consulate General in Bonn is also being closed. What’s more, entry requirements for Russian citizens are set to be tightened, and Germany also plans to take tougher action against the Russian “shadow fleet” — the network of ships ​accused of circumventing fuel sanctions. Exactly how and when remains unclear.

The reason for the limited response: blame it on gray zone operations. “We are not at war, but we are the daily target of hybrid warfare,” said Interior Minister Dobrindt, after he blamed Russia for the failed attack. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul told German public broadcaster ARD that Germany is not at war but is a Russian “war target.”

The Soufan Center reports that a key tenet of Russian hybrid warfare has been plausible deniability — denying responsibility for operations to European audiences and governments, and, occasionally, domestic audiences. Former Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Andrei Federov suggested that UK drone manufacturers could face targeting by “unknown sources.” Fedorov said he could not exclude “semi-military” operations targeting the UK in response to its support to Kyiv.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that incidents such as last month’s Russian drone sabotage in Germany had become the “new normal”, marking a further escalation of Russian activity on European Union soil. Von der Leyen said Europe must prepare for a “new era of European security” after Russia was blamed for the drone incident. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the Alliance must have the capabilities to address such threats.

Still unwilling to challenge the “plausible deniability” conundrum, Europe is responding with an age-old political dodge: they are establishing a committee to study the problem. Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the initiative at an informal meeting of defense ministers in Ireland, saying it would help design a new approach to European defense. “The aim is to have some of the brightest minds on security and defense come together and really provide out-of-the-box solutions on how we can be faster in fulfilling these gaps and how we can be more effective, especially now that the security situation in Europe is so much more real,” Kallas told reporters.

By basically ignoring Russian actions in Europe, Russia is emboldened to continue its strikes. The Wall Street Journal quotes a senior NATO official, “What we see is that, even as the Russians are facing very substantial resistance from Ukraine, they are stepping up hybrid acts in Europe—and their risk appetite is going up.”.

The notion that Russia must hit military and logistics targets in European nations to win the Ukraine “special military operation” is gaining currency in Moscow, said Hanna Notte, Eurasia director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and author of a recent book on Russia’s foreign and security policy, “We Shall Outlast Them.” “There are hawks on the Russian side who have been saying for a long time that Russia is fighting with one hand behind its back. These voices are becoming louder and will become louder,” she said. “How far will Russia go?”

To conclude, this is neither a call for Western countries to escalate nor to deescalate in the face of Russian activities. Rather, it is a call for governments to stop trying to kid themselves. They can only make rational decisions as to how to respond to Russian activities after they accept reality. Half measures because of “plausible deniability” have not worked in the past, and they will not work in the future.

The Intelligence Community had similar findings about the 2020 election. It found Russian President Putin authorized, and a range of Russian government organizations conducted, influence operations aimed at denigrating President Biden’s candidacy and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US. A key element of Moscow’s strategy was its use of proxies linked to Russian intelligence to push influence narratives-including misleading or unsubstantiated allegations against President Biden-to US media organizations, US officials, and prominent US individuals, including some close to former President Trump and his administration. Interestingly, Iran’s interference may have cancelled out the effectiveness of the Kremlin’s work. The same report noted Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut former President Trump’s reelection prospects-though without directly promoting his rivals-undermine public confidence in the electoral process and US institutions, and sow division and exacerbate societal tensions in the US.

The 2024 presidential election was no different. Russia used intermediaries to hire American right-wing influencers to spread Kremlin talking points. It created networks of websites that resembled trusted U.S. news outlets, along with fictitious sites, to spread polarizing content. China sought to sway down-ballot races by posting negative content about congressional candidates it deemed anti-China. Hackers tied to Iran successfully got documents from the campaign of President-elect Donald Trump and tried to leak them to U.S. news outlets. The DOJ also alleged that Iran tried to assassinate Trump. On Election Day itself, hoax bomb threats were sent to polling locations in various states. The FBI said that many of the bomb threats appeared to originate from Russian email domains.

Russia does not limit its activities to the United States. France has presidential elections in 2027 and prosecutors in Paris have begun investigating Russian interference. Prosecutors are probing deepfakes and fake video reports posted on social media targeting two main centrist candidates, former prime ministers Edouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal. It had already opened a probe into a disinformation campaign against center-left politician Raphaël Glucksmann, who has yet to formally declare his candidacy but is widely expected to stand. The fabricated content appeared on X in posts impersonating legitimate French media outlets and falsely claimed that Attal had Parkinson’s disease and that Philippe had contracted an illness. Glucksmann, meanwhile, was targeted through false information about his partner, news anchor Léa Salamé who presents the main evening news program on the television channel France 2. It appears that two social media networks were used: Storm-1,516 is reportedly linked to Russian military intelligence, and Matryoshka is a separate network of fake accounts.

In Germany, foreign interference is more kinetic. Continuing a long line of drone sightings from throughout Europe, two drones were spotted over a German military base site in Mechernich, in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia. In a separate incident a drone loaded ‌with explosives was discovered at the Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany. Security authorities uncovered a cache of handguns in a forest near the capital, Berlin, last year, which they believe was intended to be used to carry out assassinations on behalf of Russia. One suspect was reportedly arrested in Romania. The stash contained two pistols, which had signs that they had been placed there on behalf of Russia’s intelligence services, the German news agency DPA reported. The stash also contained ammunition. Police disabled the two handguns but left them intact at the site before placing the location under surveillance. Officers watched the stash for months after discovering it, but no one was seen approaching it. It is presumed the alleged perpetrators were aware that police had uncovered the weapons and avoided the site.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt commented, “We’re not at war, but we are the daily target of hybrid warfare. Espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, or covert operations by foreign powers aimed at destabilizing Germany or inflicting direct harm are a constant reality.” Dobrindt did not name Russia as the foreign power, but some German lawmakers have pointed the finger at the Kremlin because of Germany’s support to Ukraine.

Elsewhere in Europe Russia has launched a wave of attacks on European armaments factories under the guise of plausible deniability, according to Western intelligence sources. They allege the Kremlin is recruiting local gang members to sabotage defense manufacturers to test NATO’s resolve. The attacks appear carefully calculated to fall just short of triggering Article 5. Latvia detained three of its own nationals on suspicion of an arson attack against a drone manufacturer in neighboring Estonia.

There also have been explosions at major arms manufacturers in Italy and Bulgaria this month alone. Earlier this year, a fire almost destroyed a Czech plant making drones and thermal optics for Ukraine. Four suspects were detained as part of the investigation into Russian involvement. Lithuania also charged six people over an attempt to burn down a factory supplying radio-wave scanners to Kyiv.

With each attack that goes unpunished, the Russians are gathering their own useful intelligence on just how far they can push Nato’s boundaries. Russia seems to be able to attempt electoral interference with impunity, launch cyber attacks against its perceived enemies, and turn to kinetic “gray zone” warfare where necessary. Russia denies its involvement in any of the events discussed in this post, but Russian security services do not usually sign their names on their operations.

In January 2026 Russian forces began leaving the base near Al-Qamishli International Airport in northeastern Syria, near the Turkish border. Russian forces had used the airfield since 2019 as a logistics hub and observation post for monitoring the situation in Kurdish areas. Some personnel and equipment were transferred to Hmeimim, while others were sent to Russia aboard Il-76 military transport aircraft. By the end of January, the base had effectively come under the control of Syrian forces, including General Security Directorate units during the transitional period.

Despite the significant reduction in its presence, a limited Russian contingent of several hundred to around 1,000 troops remained at the two main bases, Hmeimim and Tartus. Now, however, after 18 months of negotiations with the new government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Russians have found a way to keep their toehold on the Mediterranean.

Under the new agreement between Damascus and Moscow, Syria will take control of the Hmeimem air base and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Syria’s General Authority for Ports and Customs also announced the commercial ​sites previously operated ​by Russia ⁠at Tartus port includes Pier No. 4 and its associated warehouses and facilities. Pier No. 4 is a restricted area outside of the Tartus naval base that Russia wanted to keep as a commercial hub.

As for the military facilities, the Syrian Foreign Ministry said they will be repurposed as joint training and ​qualification centers “under new arrangements preserving the interests of both sides,” with the transition to be completed within three months. The new arrangements represent a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast, the ministry said.

According to the Syrian Arab News Agency, the agreement goes beyond arrangements governing Russia’s presence on the Syrian coast. It represents a broader effort by Damascus to reshape a relationship that for years was closely tied to the political and military circumstances of the former regime and establish new terms that place Syrian sovereignty and national interests at the center of bilateral ties.

In the negotiations, Russia stressed its support for Syrian sovereignty multiple times. In July 2025 President Vladimir Putin told President al-Sharaa Russia opposed Israeli intervention or attempts to divide Syria and expressed Moscow’s commitment to supporting reconstruction and stability. Ahead of al-Sharaa’s first visit to Moscow in mid-October 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Putin had repeatedly made clear that Russia would not remain in Syria if the Syrian leadership opposed its presence. These appeals to Syrian unity worked.

Russia has yet to comment on the new agreement, and the nature of the Russian presence at the Joint Training Centers has yet to be determined. It could range from the joint training bases run by the Russian Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) in several African countries, to eventually becoming like Gyumri in Armenia which holds 5,000 Russian troops.

For the West, the new agreement signifies Syria is maintaining its neutrality in Russia’s tensions with NATO countries. It also means that Russia will be able to circumvent Turkey’s current Bosphorus closure to Russian warships. Russia will not need to surge from the Black Sea to have a Mediterranean presence; it will already be there.

When one wants to buy a house, they have two strategies. If they like the house, they offer the seller’s full price—sometimes even making an offer that is over the seller’s advertised price. If the house is acceptable but not the house of their dreams, a buyer might try to low-ball their offer in the hope that the seller will lower the price and meet them halfway. Unfortunately, diplomacy is not that easy because the interests of the nation are complex and at stake.

Both of these strategies have been tried over the years, and failed. Diplomacy usually does not look for a “win-win” situation, but for a “lose-lose” situation where both sides acknowledge they are not getting what they wanted but are willing to accept the terms of the ensuing agreement. In early 2025, the Kushner-Witkoff team visited Moscow, learned Moscow’s terms for ending the conflict in Ukraine, and then proposed those terms as America’s own. This was the equivalent of offering the seller the full price for the house. The ploy failed, as neither Ukraine nor the United States Congress were willing to agree. It was a negotiating ploy, but it was not diplomacy that could lead to an agreement to which all sides could agree.

To take another example from the same conflict, Ukraine has consistently offered to negotiate with the Russians but is unwilling to accept Russia’s territorial demands. This is the equivalent of offering a low-ball offer for the house, but the seller refuses to budge from his original selling price. This negotiating ploy has also resulted in failure, as Russia has not shown a willingness to compromise from its original position.

There are two other pitfalls in negotiations that do not represent diplomacy. The first is a reliance on ambiguity to achieve consensus; the second is making agreements on behalf of third parties.

Ambiguity—the classic example of this is UN Security Resolution 242 that brought a halt to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It achieved the short-term goal of stopping the fighting, but sacrificed the long-term goal of ending the conflict. The terms were so nebulous that everyone could agree to them. As an example, the resolution guaranteed that all states in the region could live in peace. For Israel and its supporters, this meant that the state of Israel would finally have peaceful relations with its neighbors. To the Arab countries, however, the conflict could continue because they had never recognized Israel as a state and were therefore not granting it a guarantee of peace.

Another example: at the UN, both English and French are official languages with equal validity. In English, the resolution said that Israel would withdraw from the territories it had recently captured—making the Arabs happy because Israel was obligated to give back everything it had seized. In French, however, because of a French language convention, it read that Israel would withdraw from “des territoires” which could be interpreted as some of the territories. Israel was happy that it didn’t need to give up land for peace until it was good and ready. Fighting stopped, but for the next several decades everyone said Res 242 was the basis for peace negotiations. How could it be, since it had opposite meanings for the opposing sides?

In the 14-point memo that had been the basis of a shaky ceasefire in the 2026 US-Iran conflict, there was a paragraph that said Iran would guarantee the free and safe passage of vessels through the Straits of Hormoz for 60 days. The US interpretation was Iran would not attempt to collect tolls; the Iranian interpretation was that the memo acknowledged their sovereignty over the waterway since the document gave them the responsibility of guaranteeing safe passage. Vagueness brought short-term agreement, but no long-term solution. A hint: whenever one reads that “details will be worked out in future negotiations”, it means no diplomacy has actually taken place.

Third parties. One would think that in a world of sovereign nation-states that this would not be a problem. In fact, it happens all the time. Since 2008 the Europeans have been meeting periodically with the government of Georgia to discuss how to end the frozen conflict in the Republic of Georgia. They make all kinds of proposals. Russia says they will not participate in these discussions or be bound by their conclusions as they are not a party to the conflict; Georgia needs to include the states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgians, not wanting to include the separatist regions for fear of giving them a type of de facto recognition, refuse to allow the separatist leaders to participate. They, in turn, will not be held to anything the Europeans and Georgians decide as they were not party to the discussions. Result: no diplomacy and the conflict continues.

Turning to the 14-point memo, we see the same mistake. The United States committed Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. Almost immediately, the Israeli Minister of Defense announced that Israel would not withdraw, and since they were not party to the discussion or the memorandum, would not be bound by any of its conditions.

Real diplomacy is the search for that “lose-lose” solution where both sides give up their maximalist demands in return for a document all can live with. It is limited to the parties that sign the agreement, and it is specific enough that it provides a roadmap for implementation. Think of the Good Friday Accords that ended the fighting in Northern Ireland. The place to find people who spend a lifetime practicing diplomacy is the Department of State, and not in real estate offices.

The ends, what the United States wanted to obtain by launching this war of choice, changed almost daily.

Regime Change: On the night the first attack was launched, President Trump called for the people of Iran to overthrow its government. “To the great proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand. …Take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations. For many years, you have asked for America’s help…Now you have a president who is giving you what you want. So let’s see how you respond…Now is the time to seize control of your destiny, and to unleash the prosperous and glorious future that is close within your reach. This is the moment for action. Do not let it pass.”

There were massive anti-government demonstrations in Iran in January 2026, but the regime took the initiative to kill or arrest those who opposed it. By the time President Trump made his stirring call to action, it was already too late.

The President abandoned regime change almost immediately, stating he was willing to talk with the government of Iran. “I don’t believe in regime change. And I’ve watched regime changes for years. They never work. It has to just happen [naturally],” he said. Despite his abandoning regime change as a goal, he tried to take credit for having achieved it: “I guess you have regime change because you know better than anybody, the first group, they’re all dead. The second group, they’re dead. A part of the third group is gone. And we’re dealing with people that I think are very rational people. They were nice to deal with. They were strong people, smart people. I think actually they’re smarter than the first and second group, but they’re not radicalized and they’re, you know, looking to help their country.”

Result: the Islamic Republic of Iran is still ruled by a Supreme Leader, supported by the Revolutionary Guard. That Supreme Leader is Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the former Supreme Leader who was killed in the Israeli decapitation strike. The regime appears to be more radical than ever.

Eliminating threats from the Iranian regime. A second end that the President announced was that he wanted to stop Iranian threats to the United States and Israel. “Its menacing activities directly endanger the United States, our troops, our bases overseas, and our allies throughout the world.” Trump listed a long litany of attacks by Iran or its proxies, starting with the taking of the American Embassy in 1979 and ending with Hamas’ attack on Israel in October 2023. At the conclusion of hostilities, Hamas continues to regain control over the parts of the Gaza strip that is not under direct Israeli occupation.

He also reiterated that this attack was designed to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. “This terrorist regime can never have a nuclear weapon. I’ll say it again, they can never have a nuclear weapon. That is why in Operation Midnight Hammer last June, we obliterated the regime’s nuclear program at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan…They’ve rejected every opportunity to renounce their nuclear ambitions, and we can’t take it anymore. Instead, they attempted to rebuild their nuclear program and to continue developing the long-range missiles that can now threaten our very good friends and allies in Europe, our troops stationed overseas, and could soon reach the American homeland.”

There are a number of problems with this. First, as the President himself claimed, Midnight Hammer “obliterated” the regime’s nuclear program, so it is difficult to understand what threat was posed by an obliterated program. Additionally, Iran has stated repeatedly that it has no interest in developing a nuclear program. They stopped enrichment at 60 percent, below the threshold needed for a bomb. The US intelligence community reported with high confidence that Iran had ceased its nuclear program over 20 years ago, by 2003. Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei had issued a fatwa (religious ruling) forbidding the production, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons as un-Islamic. (On this last point, there are some disagreements: Khamenei never produced a copy of the fatwa, he had the ability to issue a new fatwa at any time, and now that he is dead the old fatwa no longer holds. It still points out, however, that Iranian policy at the start of the war was to not build nuclear weapons).

As for Iranian missiles, they have the ability to reach America’s allies in the Middle East, and American military bases in those countries, as was proven in the conflict. Missiles given to Hizballah can reach Israel. Iran does not have missiles, however, that can reach the American homeland.

Result: Despite Administration claims that 90 percent of Iran’s missiles were destroyed, US intelligence says 30 to 33 missile launchers are still functional along the Strait of Hormoz. Media reports claim Iran retained about 70 percent of its pre-war missile and launcher stocks. In late May, US media cited informed sources as saying that Iran’s military was reconstituting much faster than anticipated, and that some drone production had already restarted. Brigadier General Alireza Sheikh, deputy commander of the army for executive affairs, said in mid-April that drone production since the 12-day war with Israel had “increased tenfold”, without elaborating further. Iranian commanders have said they are now more battle-prepared after experiences from two wars with the military superpowers, which are also helping improve remaining air defense systems.

It is unclear how many fighter jets remain operational, but air force commanders are reportedly conducting early negotiations with Russian and Chinese counterparts to purchase military aircraft. Despite the sinking of bigger warships and a number of mine-laying vessels, the IRGC has been able to use smaller vessels and fast boats, along with its projectiles, to heavily disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, squeezing global markets. Parts of the strait are still believed to be laden with mines.

Ways: Initially, the President believed that Iran would agree to America’s nuclear demands without a shot being fired. After sending two aircraft carrier groups to the Gulf, the President expressed bewilderment that Iran had not accepted US terms. The president continued to believe diplomacy remained possible almost until the operation began.

As the administration became convinced that Iran was stalling in the nuclear talks, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stepped in. Netanyahu argued Iran was unusually vulnerable and that the opportunity to strike might not last. He presented President Trump with a four-part plan: eliminate Iran’s senior leadership, dismantle its military, topple the Islamic Republic and pave the way for a successor government. He also identified figures he believed could help lead a new government, including Iranian exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi. Trump appeared persuaded that the first two objectives were achievable, but he remained less convinced the latter stages would materialize. Trump then listened to a divided group of advisors giving competing views on potential hostilities, before the President personally gave the order to proceed.

The Israelis launched the decapitation strike that initiated hostilities and removed the top echelons of the Iranian government. The United States then launched an air war against Iran. Ever since BG Billy Mitchell, proponents of air power have claimed that armies are obsolete. In reality, no conflict in history has been won without the introduction of ground forces. The sole exception to this is the 79 day bombing campaign over Kosovo, but even that required the threat of boots on the ground to bring Slobodan Milosevic to surrender. Just as Milosevic refused to surrender without the threat of ground troops, Iran decided to wait out the aerial bombardment.

Means: Israel and the United States used bombers and missiles in a failed attempt to convince the Iranian regime to surrender. When Iran blockaded the Straits of Hormoz, the United States retaliated with a blockade of its own. This led to a naval standoff.

Conclusion: The war never had fully outlined ends, the ends were confusing, and they contradicted each other. Much of the rationale was contrived, since Iran had no intention of developing nuclear weapons or the ability to deliver attacks against the American homeland. The war was fought in a manner that guaranteed the Iranian regime could survive, in that the President insisted that air power was sufficient to win the war.

The Peace: In the end, the United States did not achieve any of the ends it had outlined as reasons for going to war. They were all abandoned once Iran closed the Straits of Hormoz, depriving the world of 40 percent of its fuel. The American administration decided to sacrifice all its goals to the one goal of reopening the Straits. This was an unenforced error: the Pentagon had been predicting for forty years that the first move Iran would make in a war with the US was to close the strait. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine warned President Donald Trump before the war that Iran might attempt to block the critical shipping lane using naval mines, drones and missiles if conflict erupted. Trump reportedly acknowledged the risk but told advisers he believed Tehran would likely capitulate before taking such a step, and that the US military would be capable of reopening the waterway if necessary.

The result is the cease fire with Iran that is in place today. In the Islamabad memorandum, the US recognized Iranian sovereignty, pledged to stop Israel’s fighting in Lebanon (ignoring Israeli sovereignty), agreed to lift its naval blockade, help create a $300 billion development fund for Iran, release frozen Iranian funds, and lift the blockade on the sale of Iranian oil. There is no mention of regime change, missiles, halting of support to Hamas or Hizballah, etc. In return, Iran stated it would not pursue the development of nuclear weapons (their stated policy before the war), and agreed to keep the strait open to commercial shipping without charge for 60 days only.

The costs are staggering. According to CNN, 13 American service members lost their lives along with more than 7,500 civilians in the region. The conflict cost the Department of Defense about $40 billion, according to preliminary numbers from an upcoming analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The figure includes cost of munitions, destroyed equipment and damage to bases, but does not incorporate operational costs that were already factored into the department’s more than $1 trillion fiscal year 2026 budget, Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at CSIS, told CNN.

Munitions were the largest expenditure, Cancian said, adding that there was a “high use” of weapons that were long-range, highly sophisticated and expensive. For example, a Tomahawk missile costs around $2.5 million, and the US used about a thousand of them, according to Cancian. Experts and officials tell CNN that the military used significant portions of key missile inventory.

While the Defense Department bore the brunt of the expenses, the conflict cost other agencies, such as Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs, $1 billion, according to CSIS’ preliminary numbers. Approximately $165 million of that was related to “higher fuel prices,” Cancian said. The war drove the price of gas up, rising from an average of less than $3 per gallon around the country to well more than $4 during much of the war. According to an energy cost tracker from Brown University, American households have spent more than $253 more than what they would have paid if there was no war.

Annual inflation was over 4% for the first time in three years, driven by those energy prices, according to recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. That’s double what the Federal Reserve generally wants to see before it lowers interest rates. The persistently high inflation helps explain why the Fed declined to cut rates despite now being led by Chairman Kevin Warsh.

To be clear, the goals of halting Iranian support of terrorist groups and keeping nuclear weapons out of their hands are goals on which most Americans can agree. The results of this war, however, are meager at best.

Labor’s majority after the 2024 election was large. The party returned to power after 14 years in the political wilderness with a 174-seat margin of victory – 411 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons. but its support was not deep. Things began to go array almost immediately. As outlined by Patrick Kidd of The Telegraph, having made a virtue out of his party’s higher ethics, within weeks it was discovered that the prime minister, his deputy and the chancellor had all been accepting generous gifts of clothes, glasses and concert tickets from donors.

Economic arguments broke out from the beginning. Starmer’s Chancellor announced early on that she would be removing winter-fuel payments for 10 million pensioners. More than 50 Labor MPs refused to vote for the measure, forcing the Chancellor to recant. MPs complained about rude and high-handed treatment from Downing Street, and a tendency to lecture rather than lead. Further uproar came with the news of a deal to hand the Chagos Islands – including Diego Garcia, a joint UK-US military base – to Mauritius. The honeymoon was over.

About-turns came regularly. He had second thoughts about a compulsory digital ID system four months after announcing it; he cut the foreign aid budget despite a manifesto pledge to raise it; he made reversals on business rates for pubs and inheritance tax on farmers. He promised a significant fall in immigration by curbing judges’ powers to block deportations, but pulled back when the opposition accused him of using ultra-nationalist rhetoric. He lost significant support within his own party when he proposed cutting disability benefits to welfare recipients.

A September reset was drowned out by the news that the Deputy Prime Minister had underpaid tax on a house purchase. Then came the news that Starmer had appointed Peter Mandelson to be Ambassador to the United States, despite the knowledge that Mandelson had failed the security clearance process because of his connections with convicted pedophile Jeffry Epstein. Mandelson’s resignation and subsequent email revelations kept the news in the headlines for months. Emails made public in January 2026 suggested Mandelson had passed sensitive, and potentially market-moving, government information to Epstein in 2009, when he was a Labor Cabinet minister. (Mandelson has been arrested and questioned by police on suspicion of misconduct in public office, but he has not been charged and does not face any allegation of sexual misconduct.)

As a result of dozens of overseas trips Starmer earned the nickname of “Never Here Keir.” He then proposed a defense investment plan that prompted the resignation of his highly regarded defense ministers over concerns that funding was nowhere near sufficient to protect Britain from its adversaries.

Last month’s local election results – effectively a mass revolt against Labor and its leadership – proved fatal. Countless Labor candidates said that voters railed against Starmer in doorstep conversations during the campaign. This convinced a Labor MP to resign, allowing a by-election to bring the mayor of Manchester, Andy Burnham, back to Parliament—and thereby eligible to run against Starmer for the leadership of the Labor Party. Burnham won with 55 percent of the vote, defeating his closest opponent with 35 percent.

Burnham previously served in the House of Commons from 2001 to 2017. While in government he held a number of positions, including Secretary of State for Health; Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport; Chief Secretary to the Treasury; Minister of State for Delivery and Quality of the Department of Health; and Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Home Office.

In his resignation statement, the Prime Minister accepted the inevitable. “The question my party is asking now is whether I am best placed to lead us into the next general election,” he said. “I have heard the answer of my parliamentary party to that question and I accept that answer with good grace.”

Burnham is the front runner for the job, but it is significant that Starmer did not mention him in his resignation speech. While pledging support to whoever his party named as leader, he left the door open for a full leadership contest.

A poll by JL Partners shows that if Andy Burnham becomes Labor leader, 31 per cent think he would win the next election, with 29 per cent thinking Reform UK’s Nigel Farage would triumph. An ally of Andy Burnham has said he could call an early election if he becomes prime minister. An anonymous source in the Labor party suggested such comments should be taken with “an ocean of salt”, but added an early general election shouldn’t be discounted. “Don’t assume he’ll go for the full two to three years,” they said. “He needs [a] mandate to make the changes to the economy and constitution he’ll want to make.”

If Burnham ultimately succeeds Starmer, his previous comments about President Donald Trump could raise questions about the future of the U.K.-U.S. relationship. Speaking on 13 June during the final days of his campaign, Burnham warned Britain against moving toward a more polarized style of politics. “The path we’re on, if we are not careful, is a path towards the politics of the United States of America,” he said. “A polarized, poisonous politics where people in communities don’t work together anymore.” While not mentioning Trump in the speech, he was more explicit a year earlier when discussing the implications of Trump’s reelection and the rise of the populist Right. He told the London Economic that President Trump was bringing instability to the U.S. and the world. While his comments do not necessarily mean a break between his potential government and the United States, it is worth noting that the American president has a long memory for people who have criticized him.

Armenia’s pro-Western, governing Civil Contract party won an election this week, despite what international election observers called blatant interference ‌and pressure by Russia. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s party won 49.8% of votes with all polling stations counted, enough to secure a parliamentary majority under Armenia’s electoral system, the Central Election Commission (CEC) said on Monday.

A pro-Russian opposition alliance has asked the CEC to annul the results of the election. The petition was submitted by the Strong Armenia party, with party member Aram Vardevanyan telling reporters, that the alliance was challenging the outcome over alleged voting irregularities.

While there may have been problems with how Pashinyan ran the election, they pale compared to Russia’s blatant interference. Russia followed its election interference playbook, despite its failure earlier this year to defeat the president of Moldova. In October, the Kremlin established a department known as the Directorate for Strategic Cooperation and Partnership which reportedly oversaw influence operations in Armenia. Moscow warned that Armenia risked forfeiting cheap natural gas supplies if it continued in Pashinyan’s Western direction. “The Russian Embassy has officially ​forwarded a letter...stating that if the process of accession to the EU continues, the Russian side will suspend or unilaterally terminate the Agreement ​on Cooperation in the Supply of Natural Gas, Petroleum Products and Rough Diamonds,” Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, told ⁠the RIA news agency. Russia’s agricultural safety agency Rosselkhoznadzor said it would introduce additional temporary bans on Armenian tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, leafy vegetables and strawberries. The restrictions ⁠announced on Thursday follow similar temporary bans introduced by Russia this week against Armenian flowers, mineral water and brandy.

Certain representatives of the Armenian community in Russia took active steps to influence political developments inside Armenia. Allegedly, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) coordinated a campaign to recruit voters living in Russia who hold Armenian citizenship to travel to Armenia to cast their ballots (absentee ballots from expatriates were not allowed.) The information was published by the fact-checking platform FIP.am. A journalist from the Fact-Checking Platform called the heads of several regional branches of the Union of Armenians of Russia (UAR) and, posing as an FSB officer, inquired about the recruitment of Armenians in Russia. Convinced they were speaking with their “curator,” the UAR representatives revealed details of interference in the Armenian elections. One of the representatives acknowledged that community members had received clear instructions to vote for the “Russian team.”

A video posted on the social media platform X May 22 features what appears to be a news update from Euronews, claiming Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has aggressive cancer with two to three years to live. It also purports that Pashinyan assaulted his press secretary’s personal assistant. Although the video was eventually debunked as AI-generated, it generated 223,000 views. Fact checkers determined the fraudulent item, and others like it either targeting Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party or promoting the pro-Russian “Strong Armenia” Alliance, is the handiwork of Kremlin propagandists.

As reported by Eurasianet.org, various social media pages posing as news outlets have emerged in support of the Russian-Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan, the front man for the Strong Armenia Alliance. A May report from NewsGuard, a nonpartisan information reliability organization, tracked 31 fake news, pro-Kremlin reports in just one week, bolstering the main opposition candidate. False Russian claims targeting Armenia have generated 45 million views across 11 social media platforms and in eight languages between April and November 2025, according to a separate NewsGuard report.

Armenia has been targeted by Russia’s Storm-1516 – its most impactful information operation – more times than any other country between April 2025 and April 2026, according to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. The British government has described Storm-1516 as a “a malign influence network which produces content that seeks to undermine European unity and create support for Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.” Armenia also ranks third, behind Ukraine and France, in targets by Operation Overload, a Russian-aligned information operation also known as Matryoshka or Storm-1679. More reports have since emerged showing ties between Karapetyan and the Kremlin.

A lot of the disinformation draws on real fears and polarizing narratives about the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and future relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Sossi Tatikyan, director of the Yerevan Center of Foreign and Security Policy, described opposition and Kremlin-backed talking points as echoing Azerbaijani narratives. “The tactics of the opposition are so explicitly manipulative that I would be surprised if they are efficient,” she said.

Russian military forces are losing ground in Ukraine, as troops continue to face 1,000 casualties per day. This has kept Russia from keeping its commitments to the governments of Armenia, Syria, Venezuela, etc. With these recent developments in both Moldova and Armenia, it is clear that its non-military efforts to extend its influence are also faltering. To paraphrase the American president, Moscow no longer holds all the cards.

Specifically, The U.S. aims to ‌provide ⁠only half the previous number of strategic bombers, the number of U.S. fighter jets is set to fall by a third, fewer ​destroyers will be available to NATO, ​and the U.S. ⁠no longer intends to provide any submarines to the alliance. Europe will be forced to provide its own reconnaissance drones, ​while the U.S. plans to significantly scale back the provision of ​armed models. The ⁠U.S. will provide further details at a force generation conference in early June, the Spiegel report said.

The decision to reduce America’s support of NATO follows on President Donald J. Trump’s pique at the perceived lack of support to the Israeli-American war on Iran. Hopefully, the force generation conference will provide details on any strategy behind the cuts.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, troop numbers have fluctuated over the decades, reaching a high of roughly 475,000 active-duty personnel in the late 1950s, when the US military served as a bulwark against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces at the height of the Cold War. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 those numbers dropped to the tens of thousands. As of April 2025, the United States had roughly eighty thousand US service members stationed in Europe. The total amount varies due to planned exercises and regular rotations. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some twenty thousand additional US soldiers were deployed to states neighboring Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Over the course of the war, the total number has ranged from approximately 75,000 to 105,000.

In the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress stipulated that US troop levels could not be reduced below seventy-six thousand for more than forty-five days without NATO consultation. Congress passed this restriction to stop the Trump administration from making drastic drawdowns.

When Israel and the United States launched their attacks against Iran, NATO allies had not been consulted prior to the attack. The President stated he did not need NATO because the United States had sufficient power to win the war without him. He then reversed course and demanded NATO provide troops in support of the American war effort. This was met with considerable opposition from the Europeans. As an example, Italy and Spain declined to offer base access to US planes involved in the Iran war. This led President Trump to threaten to pull troops from those countries.

Then on 25 April 2026 German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told a group of students that the Trump administration was being outwitted at the negotiating table. He added that “an entire nation” (the United States) was being humiliated by the Iranian leadership, especially by the Revolutionary Guard. The President reacted with a snap decision to withdraw 5000 troops, one seventh of the 38,000 troops, assigned to Germany to show his displeasure. The move caught NATO by surprise, but the president doubled down. “We’re going to cut way down,” he told reporters. “And we’re cutting a lot further than 5,000.”

As if to emphasize the remark, the following week Secretary of Defense/War Pete Hegseth announced that he was cancelling the deployment of 4,000 troops to Poland. The 4,000 Texas-based troops were preparing to leave on a long-planned nine-month rotation that included training with NATO allies when the order to halt came through. The cancellation of this routine mission was especially unusual since the unit’s equipment had already arrived on the continent. Hegseth’s last-minute decision to cancel the deployment caught Pentagon staff and European allies by surprise — the latest example of an abrupt personnel move from the Defense secretary that blindsided both sides of the Atlantic. It wasn’t clear exactly why Hegseth issued the order, according to three defense officials interviewed by Politico.

It was equally surprising, then, when President Trump announced on his social media site that he was sending an additional 5,000 troops to the same country from which Hegseth had cancelled the deployment the week earlier. U.S. defense officials expressed confusion about Trump’s new announcement. ‘’We just spent the better part of two weeks reacting to the first announcement, We don’t know what this means either,’‘ said one official quoted by NPR.

The Pentagon has not confirmed whether Trump’s newly announced 5,000 troops are the same soldiers whose deployment was cancelled earlier this month, or whether they will be redeployed from elsewhere in Europe, such as from Germany. According to The Wall Street Journal, Trump later questioned Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth about why the deployment had been cancelled, telling him the US should not “treat Poland poorly” given its close ties to Washington. US media suggest the announcement may actually amount to a reversal of the earlier Pentagon decision.

Analysts say the decision over Poland reflects President Trump’s increasingly transactional approach to alliances – punishing governments he sees as hostile or unhelpful while rewarding leaders and countries more closely aligned with his brand of right-wing politics. But the confusion surrounding the announcement has also highlighted a broader uncertainty hanging over Washington’s Europe policy, with allies still trying to determine whether the administration is reducing its commitment to NATO overall, or simply reshaping it around governments Trump sees as more loyal.

Putin praised his close ties with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and said their countries are partners in trade and international affairs. Xi stressed the “political mutual trust and strategic cooperation” between the countries, according to Chinese state media. At one point Xi described Putin as his “best and most intimate friend.” This was a far cry from the Chinese president stoic silence in the face of professions of friendship from the American president.

According to the Brookings Institution’s foreign policy fellow Patricia Kim, “Xi does appear to hold the stronger position relative to both Putin and Trump. Both leaders are grappling with conflicts of their own making that have proven far more difficult to resolve than initially anticipated. Xi, meanwhile, has been able to focus more squarely on strengthening China internally while projecting an image of a stable and confident great power on the global stage.”

Russia and China agreed to extend a friendship treaty first signed in 2001. The major thrust of the meeting, however, was strengthening the economic ties between the two countries, especially in the field of energy. China became Russia’s top trading partner after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Beijing has said it is neutral in the conflict while maintaining trade ties with the Kremlin despite economic and financial sanctions by the U.S. and Europe. China is the top customer for Russian oil and gas supplies, and Moscow expects the war in Iran to increase the demand.

“The message is clearly one that China maintains friendship and strategic partnership with whichever power it likes, and the USA is just one of them,” said Steve Tang, director of the SOAS China Institute at the University of London. Following on this analysis, senior China fellow at the Jamestown Foundation Willy Lam added that Putin “needs to tell his countrymen and the world that Russia has China’s support in terms of buying its oil and gas and other tangible and intangible financial support,” Lam said. Like the famous quote from US Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, all politics is local.

The two leaders spoke in unison on global security issues. China and Russia condemned the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense shield plans and Washington’s “irresponsible” nuclear ​policy. Xi took the opportunity to highlight that he

fundamentally disagrees with the American president on key issues where China’s position is closely aligned with Russia’s. “The world today is far from peaceful, with unilateralism and hegemonism posing profound dangers,” said Xi. “The world faces the risk of regressing to the law of the jungle.”

Despite the continuing close economic and security ties, the two leaders failed to reach a breakthrough that Moscow has long been seeking - ⁠a contract to construct the Power of Siberia 2 that would enable it to more than double the amount of natural gas it sells to China. This is not a surprise: negotiations over the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline took over twenty years and only concluded when Russia capitulated on Chinese pricing demands after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. “What is notable,” said Daniel Sleat, Senior Policy Advisor at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “is that even amid heightened Chinese concern about energy security, Beijing still appears cautious about deepening long-term dependence on Russian pipeline gas.”

In the end, it appears that the week of summitry achieved no results. Xi did not meet the American demands for action on Iran or major trade deals, nor did he meet the Russian demands for the Power of Siberia 2. By both traveling to China, however, the two superpowers appeared to have checkmated each other’s overtures to the Chinese leader.

Sources: Reporting from NPR and Reuters

The proposal would cap the permanent resident population at 10 million before 2050. If the population exceeds 9.5 million before then, the government would have to take measures to curb immigration, including tightening rules for asylum and permanent residence. Crossing that threshold would also force the government to “renegotiate international agreements that drive population growth,” according to the proposal.

And if the population hits 10 million, Switzerland would likely have to abandon a free-movement agreement with the E.U. that has been in place for more than two decades. The agreement allows citizens of E.U. member states and Switzerland to live, work, and purchase property in each other’s countries.

Switzerland already has quotas for immigration of nationals from countries outside the E.U. The quotas are set each year by the Swiss government. In 2024, the quota was 8,500 for non-E.U. citizens and 3,500 for U.K. citizens. Those quotas are consistently underfilled. Switzerland’s population has grown about five times faster than the average in surrounding EU member states over the past decade, as its economic success has attracted both low-skilled workers and highly paid corporate expats. About 27% of Swiss residents are not citizens, according to government figures. The SVP, the country’s largest political party, says the “population explosion” is inflating rents and straining public infrastructure and services to breaking point.

The initiative was rejected by the government last March. But it is gaining popularity among the public: over half of Swiss respondents said they’re in favor of the proposal, according to a new opinion poll. The survey of 16,176 respondents on April 22 and 23 showed that 52% were in favor of the proposal while 46% were against it. The remaining 2% of respondents were undecided.

In December, both chambers of the Swiss Parliament formally recommended a “no” vote to the initiative. “To permanently restrict immigration,” the country’s governing Federal Council said last March, “Switzerland would have to take measures that would be detrimental to its prosperity and incompatible with Switzerland’s international obligations.” According to the Federal Council, “If the permanent resident population exceeds 9.5 million before 2050, the Federal Council and Parliament will need to take measures, particularly in the areas of asylum and family reunification. The Federal Council would also need to invoke or negotiate exemptions and safeguard clauses in international agreements that contribute to population growth. If the 10-million threshold is exceeded, Switzerland would have to terminate these agreements, including the one with the EU on the free movement of persons after two years. This would also render the other agreements under Bilateral Agreements I null and void. Switzerland’s participation in the EU’s Schengen and Dublin agreements would also be called into question, thereby jeopardizing close cooperation in the areas of security and asylum.”

Other opponents, include multinationals such as Roche, UBS and Nestlé. Economiesuisse, a leading business lobby, has described it as the “chaos initiative.” As Switzerland’s largest business federation, it has objected to the proposal, warning that limiting immigration could lead to labor shortages especially for healthcare, research and service industries that depend on foreign labor. Switzerland’s aging population and falling birth rate will only exacerbate those shortages, the Swiss business lobby said.

By capping the country’s population at 10 million led to some questions. “It is quite peculiar in the European demographic and political context,” said Marianna Griffini, assistant professor in international relations and anthropology on Northeastern University’s London campus. “I haven’t heard about specific numbers to cap the population,” Griffini said. “I’m quite baffled by the reasoning behind it and the fact that I think it could have quite serious economic consequences.”

Northeastern economist Mindy Marks agreed. “It’s a weird way to go about anti-immigration policy,” said Marks, an associate professor of economics. “There are legitimate reasons societies might want to think about who they grant citizenship to, none of which are being addressed by this proposal.” “I have no idea what Switzerland’s going to look like in 2050,” Marks said. “To try to pass something now that binds you to do things in 20 years time in a totally different world, it just seems like a bad strategy.”

Caine also told senators that Vladimir Putin has aided Iran’s war effort, something the Kremlin has previously denied to the White House. He declined to go into details, citing the public nature of the hearing, but said:”There’s definitely some action there.” Republican senator Roger Wicker, agreed. “There’s no question that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is taking serious action to undermine our efforts for success in Iran,” Wicker said.

Despite the signs that Russia is cooperating with the Tehran regime, the American administration has taken steps that strengthens Russia’s hands in its fight with Ukraine. Contradicting Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent’s remarks that a Washington would not be renewing the general license on the sale of Russian oil, the White House approved a second waiver that allowed the purchase of Russian crude to alleviate the worldwide shortage.

The White House’s more favorable view of the Kremlin is further demonstrated by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner failure visit Kyiv. The hesitation comes despite months of internal discussions about a possible trip that would mark their first visit to Ukraine, even as both envoys have already traveled repeatedly to Moscow for meetings with Vladimir Putin. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has openly criticized the envoys’ approach, framing their repeated visits to Russia without a corresponding trip to Ukraine as a sign of disregard. “It’s disrespectful to come to Moscow and not Kyiv, it’s just disrespectful,” he said.

Russian actions are not limited to Ukraine and Iran, however. Using Gray Zone tactics, Russia is also in active combat with the United States and Europe. Russia’s recent gray zone activities in Europe have consisted primarily of disinformation campaigns intended to undermine political institutions, according to US Army Major Ryan Burkholder. They also include deception, espionage, destabilization, and sabotage. The end state of each effort is to bolster the image of the Russian government, tarnish the reputation of a foreign government, or sow discord among the populace of an adversary or between nations. A previous column on this substack has outlined Russia’s use of drones to disrupt commercial air operations in Europe.

Given Russia’s implacable opposition to the United States, recent announcements of troop withdrawals from Europe are counterproductive. In October 2025, the U.S. confirmed that it would reduce its troop presence on NATO’s borders with Ukraine. The move to cut 1,500-3,000 troops came on short notice and unsettled NATO ally Romania, where the military organization runs an air base. The Romanian defense ministry said the U.S. decision will “stop the rotation in Europe of a brigade that had elements in several NATO countries,” including at a base in Romania.

This has been followed by the 1 May 2026 announcement that the United States will withdraw about 5,000 troops from Germany in the next six to 12 months, fulfilling President Donald Trump’s threat as he clashes with the German leader over the US war in Iran. Trump had threatened to withdraw some troops from the NATO ally earlier this week after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said the U.S. was being “humiliated” by the Iranian leadership and criticized Washington’s lack of strategy in the war. The number of troops leaving Germany would be 14% of the 36,000 American service members stationed there. The withdrawal “suggests American commitments to our allies are dependent on the president’s mood,” said Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. “The president should immediately cease this reckless action before he causes irreversible consequences for our alliances and long-term national security,” Reed said.

A weaker American presence in Europe limits America’s ability to project power worldwide. The recent bombing campaign in Iran relied heavily on British air bases, and drone attacks were directed from Ramstein Air Base in Germany. Withdrawing troops from a theater of operations in the middle of military operations send the wrong signal.

There are a number of impediments that hinder mutual understanding. After a 47-year estrangement, it is difficult to find people who have had many dealings with the other country. This leaves the negotiators unable to understand what the other is saying. As an example, it is almost impossible to find Persian speakers in the US government. Certainly, lead negotiators Vance/Kushner/Witkoff lack the skill. While there are Iranians who speak English there is a dearth of Iranians who can understand Trump-speak, the mixture of hyperbole and negotiating strategy used by the White House.

A week ago, President Trump announced the Iranians had accepted all demands, while the Iranians eventually said they had agreed to nothing. I suspect the culprit leading to these diametrically opposite positions is the Persian tradition of taarof. This is the Iranian means of avoiding conflict in personal encounters: Iranians don’t want to say no if it offends the other party; they look for ways to signal their negative thoughts while uttering polite phrases that real estate developers from New York might interpret as acceptance. When the taarof is misunderstood, Iranians fall back on the concept that it was others – people over whom they have no control – who negated the agreement (which never really existed).

Persians, on the other hand, have a hard time in believing that they can rely on anything the negotiators say or promise. The United States attacked Iran twice in the midst of negotiations. The second attack, on 28 February, occurred at the time the lead Iranian negotiator announced to the press that a full agreement on the nuclear issue was at hand. Clearly, the Americans had agreed to some Iranian terms for such an announcement to take place; whatever the promises were, they were negated by the falling bombs.

The United States and Iran also see each other through distorted lenses. In the American case, everything is tainted by memories of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis. These original sins were compounded by Iranian support for Hamas, Hizbollah, and Iraqi militias responsible for the deaths of American servicemen. The chant of “Death to America” rings loudly in America’s ears.

Iranians have their own issues. They believe they have not had control over their own country since at least the 1890s. In their eyes, the Iranian revolution of 1979 shook off the American yoke of servitude placed upon them during the 1953 anti-Mossadeq countercoup. America proved its unending hostility by providing intelligence support to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The two attacks in three months while negotiations were taking place only cemented the regime’s belief that America is the “Great Satan.”

Where do we go from here? The United States believes it is only a matter of time before Iran capitulates since they were defeated militarily. Iran believes the United States wants to end the war quickly because of America’s changing war goals, the President’s temperament, and the stranglehold they have over the world’s energy supplies. The United States needs to accept that Iran is not going to surrender; Iran has to accept that an “America First” White House is less concerned about the Straits of Hormoz than China. It is only when some understanding begins that real negotiations have a chance of success.

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Many in Europe wonder if they are even allies anymore. The January crisis over Trump’s attempt to seize the Danish possession of Greenland became a key turning point for European leaders. “This will never be forgotten,” the Wall Street Journal quoted retired French Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff. “Psychologically, Trump talking about taking Greenland was the equivalent of a father talking, jokingly, of raping one of his daughters. Obviously, it’s a new world in the family after that.”

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s annual report shows that Europe is taking seriously the idea that they might have to stand alone. It identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to European security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. He added that Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, now in its fifth year, was backed by China, North Korea, Iran and Belarus. Left unsaid was the United States’ cessation of aid to Ukraine since January 2025.

To meet the threat, and to protect Alliance members in general, allied leaders at the NATO Summit in The Hague in June 2025 agreed to invest 5% of GDP annually in defense by 2035. All Allies have now met or gone beyond the 2% target first set in 2014, with many making steep increases in spending, and three Allies already meeting the new 3.5% objective in 2025.

Rutte separates out the United States from the rest of the alliance, and reiterates Europe and Canada are doing their fair share. Between 2014 and 2025, NATO Europe and Canada more than doubled their annual defense expenditure, with a real-term increase of 106%. In 2025 alone, NATO Allies in Europe and Canada invested a total of USD 574 billion in defense, a 20% increase in real terms compared to 2024.

Despite the increased spending, questions remain as to whether Europe could face Russia alone. The Geopolitical Monitor reports Europe’s vulnerability is represented by its lack of interoperability and centralized command structure. Without coordination among the 27 EU member states (28 if counting the UK), an effective and cohesive defense strategy remains elusive. European armed forces operate a fragmented arsenal comprising 178 different types of weapon systems, compared to just 30 in the United States. The contrast is equally significant in air power, with Europe fielding 20 different types of fighter aircraft, while the U.S. relies on only six.

The Cato Institute believes Europe needs a defensive doctrine. To implement this, European countries should increase their defense spending beyond their 5 percent pledge. Adhering to simplistic defense spending-to-GDP percentages actually limits Europe’s defense spending, as it shifts focus from achieving genuine security needs to meeting arbitrary spending targets. NATO needs to focus on goals that tangibly secure Europe against a Russian incursion.

Allied European nations should improve their military’s ability to mobilize and deploy quickly in the event of a Russian attack. This means improving their infrastructure to transport equipment and personnel eastward, train more troops, and improve command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

European NATO members should deploy light defenses to the Baltic, states with little room for heavy armored units and weapons to be stationed in the region. Light defenses would slow down Russia’s advancing attack through urban warfare. While not ideal for the Baltics, it is the best option given the region’s geographic situation.

Finally, partnered European nations should deploy heavier military capabilities—tanks, armored infantry vehicles, armored and mechanized brigades, aircraft, and medium- and long-range air defenses—throughout Germany and Poland. These weapons and military units would accomplish two goals: prevent a deep Russian penetration from Belarus into Poland, and serve as operational reserves should Russia attack the Baltic states.

It began over a year ago, in the tiny Eastern European country of Moldova. Approximately twenty percent of this country is occupied by Russian troops and their proxies in the breakaway Transnistria. In the runup to the October 2024 presidential election, Moldovan authorities uncovered a plot by the Moldovan-Israeli oligarch Ilhan Shor to launder $15 million in Russian funds and distributing the money to over 130,000 voters with instructions on how to vote against closer ties with the West. Prosecutors later said the money had grown to $39 million. There were further accusations of illegal busing of voters, voter intimidation, death threats, and bomb threats to voting stations abroad.

The United States, United Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement outlining Russian interference in the election:

“Russia is currently supporting candidates for Moldova’s presidency and is exacerbating societal tensions. These Russian actors are actively using disinformation and propaganda online, on the air, and on the streets to further their objectives.

“They are agitating criticism of the incumbent Moldovan president’s government and political party, in order to incite protests.

“Part of these operations would include spreading lies about the incumbent president’s character and intentions, and about supposed electoral irregularities…

“Russia’s political interference in Moldova in the lead-up to the October election goes back years. For example, personnel of state-funded media outlet RT have been involved in providing direct support to fugitive Moldovan Ilan Shor for several years with Russian government assent.”

Despite Russian blandishments, the pro-Western incumbent Maia Sandu won reelection against her Russian-friendly opponent. By a slim majority, voters also endorsed a referendum calling for Moldova to join the European Union. A year later, in September 2025 the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a majority in parliamentary elections, with 50.2 percent of the vote compared with 24.2 percent for the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP). This election also had accusations of blatant and widespread Russian interference.

In Italy, a 54 percent majority rejected a constitutional amendment for which Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had campaigned. The proposed amendment aimed to enhance the relationship between judges and prosecutors, as both have traditionally been part of the same professional order of magistrates. If the referendum had been accepted, the High Council of the Judiciary would have been split into two separate councils—one for judges and one for prosecutors. A significant aspect of this change would have been the method of selection for council members. Rather than being elected through competitive elections, many members would be chosen from eligible pools. Opponents argued that these measures could have resulted in significant political pressure on jurists. The vote was widely seen as a test of Meloni’s leadership ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.

Since her 2022 election Meloni has moved from being an admirer of Vladimir Putin to someone trying to steer a middle course for Italy – often agreeing with US President Donald Trump. But her government includes partners with historical ties to Moscow, such as Matteo Salvini’s League party, which has criticized Western sanctions against Russia. This coalition is now in trouble going into 2027 parliamentary elections.

France has also maintained its left-of-center credentials. In recent municipal elections, despite a belief that the far-right National Rally (RN) would make significant gains, the RN failed to win control of any major city, ​giving hope to embattled mainstream parties ahead of next year’s presidential election. Marine Le Pen’s nationalist Eurosceptic party lost out in big target ‌cities including Marseille and Toulon, although an allied party won in Nice, France’s fifth-largest city. Like many Euroskeptics, Le Pen has close ties to Vladimir Putin. She has spoken admiringly of the Russian president and his nationalist rhetoric. Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and despite Russian incursions into Georgia, Crimea and the Donbas – she laughed off suggestions that he posed a threat to Europe.

In 2023 after a six-month inquiry and more than 50 hearings, a cross-party parliamentary inquiry found that the RN had served as a “communication channel” for Russian power. The report pointed to a “long-standing” link between Russia and the far-right party co-founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, then known as the National Front. The report further noted that the “strategy of political and ideological rapprochement” with Moscow had “accelerated” since Le Pen’s daughter Marine became leader of the party in 2011. The report detailed frequent contacts between party representatives and Russian officials, culminating in the warm welcome Le Pen received at the Kremlin ahead of France’s 2017 presidential election, complete with a photo op with Putin.

French President Emmanuel Macron has blasted Le Pen in the past. “When you speak to Russia, you are not speaking to any foreign leader, you are talking to your banker,” Macron told Le Pen, arguing that a loan her party had received from a Russian bank with links to the Kremlin made her “dependent on Vladimir Putin” and incapable of “defending French interests”. (Le Pen has repeatedly argued that she had no choice but to seek creditors abroad because French banks are reluctant to deal with her party – some on ideological grounds, others due to the party’s chronically unstable finances.)

Finally, there is the upcoming 12 April vote in Hungary where incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orban is seeking reelection. According to a recent poll, the center-right opposition Tisza party has widened its lead over Orban’s Fidesz. The poll, taken by the pollster Median, showed Tisza ​gaining ground while Fidesz’s support was stagnating. Tisza was only ​launched in 2024, but has the support of 58% of decided voters, up from 55% a month ​ago. Fidesz was supported by 35%, unchanged from February. When looking at the entire population, ​Tisza was supported by 46%, while Fidesz was backed by 30%, according to the survey conducted ‌between March ⁠17 and 20.

Orban’s defeat would be a major setback for Russia. His government has long been considered the Kremlin’s stalking horse within the European Union, holding up aid to Ukraine and taking other measures to weaken alliance resolve. In the most recent example, Hungary’s foreign minister has for years informed Moscow of confidential information discussed at European Union meetings, according to an investigation by the Washington Post citing a European official. The minister would call his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov during breaks at EU meetings to brief the Russian foreign minister on what’s been discussed among EU leaders, the report said, suggesting possible courses of action for Russian authorities. According to the newspaper’s unnamed security source, “every single EU meeting for years has basically had Moscow behind the table”. The Washington Post also reported that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service worked to stage a sham assassination attempt against Orbán, an operation called “gamechanger,” in a bid to boost his chances at winning the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Tizla’s candidate for prime minister, Peter Magyar, may not have much room to maneuver away from the Kremlin as the country is a landlocked nation dependent on Moscow for its oil and gas. Orban’s defeat would still be a major slap in the face of Russia’s efforts to subvert the European Union.

Russia has consistently denied its involvement in European elections, yet the evidence appears to be overwhelming. European voters have equally consistently rejected pro-Kremlin political parties and amendments. It appears that Europe prefers its own cuisine to borscht.

A preemptive strike relied on the concept that one does not have to wait and absorb the first blow if an individual knows beyond doubt that he is about to be the victim of an assault. If one is in a dark alley and someone approaches with a loaded gun that he cocks and aims at one’s head, you don’t have to wait for him to fire before defending yourself. You can fire your gun first. A preventive strike, by contrast, is if an individual only suspects he is about to be the victim of an assault. If one is in the same dark alley and an individual approaches you who may or may not have a gun, and who may or may not want to shoot, then to pull out your own gun and firing it would be murder—or at least manslaughter if one has a good attorney.

The same concept applies in international law. At the time, the debate was whether Saddam was planning on launching an attack against the United States (necessitating a preemptive strike) or if he had a capability to attack the United States that he may or may not have planned to use (meaning an attack would be preventive).

A quarter century later, we are faced with a similar debate over President Donald Trump’s launching an attack against Iran. Without taking sides, whether it was authorized under international law rests on the same distinction as the war in Iraq. Using the administration’s own words, the President originally said that Iran was an imminent threat to the United States. If that is true, then a preemptive attack is justified. The President also said, however, that he previously had obliterated Iran’s nuclear capability, and its missiles could someday reach the United States. If this is true, the threat was not imminent and the strike was not legal.

Secretary of State Rubio then said that Israel was about to attack Iran and we knew that the United States’ equities abroad would be targeted in retaliation. Again, this would mean an attack was imminent and legal. The President then contradicted his Secretary, stating that Israel was following his lead and not the other way around. He “felt” that Iran was preparing an attack. No imminency, no legality.

Domestic law is equally murky. Article One of the Constitution states that Congress has the power to declare war. Article Two, however, says the President is the Commander in Chief. During the war in Vietnam, Congress tried to square this circle by passing the War Powers Act. This law has several provisions in it, including the requirement “The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” If the situation required the President to deploy troops without a Congressional declaration of war, then “The president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth-- (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.” Once notification has been given, the clock starts ticking. The president must withdraw all forces within 60 days (there is the possibility of a 30-day extension) unless the Congress concurs in the use of force.

Seems pretty straight forward except that, since its passage in 1973, every President has claimed they are not bound by the War Powers Act, because the act infringes on the Article 2 powers of the Commander in Chief. As the law has never been officially challenged in court, there is no Supreme Court ruling to decide the question.

And so, the questions remain on which justification for war the United States is relying upon: imminent threat, or might be a threat someday. The legitimacy of America’s actions in the eyes of the international community depends on the answer.

“They use this old Soviet type of negotiation tactics,” said Kallas. “First, demand the maximum, demand something that has never belonged to you. Then second, present ultimatums. And third: [They] do not give one inch in the negotiations, because there will always be people in the West who will negotiate and give you something that you didn’t have before.”

In response to these tactics, Kallas has distributed a paper among EU member states that spells out concessions she believes Russia should make in ongoing diplomatic talks with Ukraine, which the United States is mediating. The demands include a reduction of Russian troops levels and their withdrawal from neighboring countries, reparation payments, and the need to democratize its society.

The discussion paper, titled “European Core Interests in Ensuring a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace and Continent’s Security,” insists that there can be no peace or security “without the EU at the negotiating table and without taking into account [the] EU’s core interests.” As one EU diplomat put it, “Getting to peace isn’t all about Ukraine conceding. We also have to talk about what Russia must do, ahead of sending any envoy there.”

The paper outlines a series of ultimatums that Russia would never accept, but puts forth maximalist demands to match Russian intransience. The paper stipulates no nuclear weapons in Belarus and a “ban of Russian military presence and deployments in Belarus, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia.” Russian troops have for decades been stationed in Russian-controlled breakaway regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transniester, as well as bases in Armenia and Belarus. The text also notes that “Russia must compensate and contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction, for damages to European states and European companies, and for ecological damages it has caused.”

Just as Russia is demanding changes in the Ukrainian government, the paper calls for free and fair elections in Russia with international monitoring, a release of all political prisoners, a return of deported civilians and children, media freedom, a repeal of the foreign agent law, ceasing “historical falsification and other laws that criminalize dissent and delegitimize independent media and civil society” and full cooperation in investigations of the killings of the Russian opposition leaders Aleksei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov.

Kallas is an original thinker, whose world view is based on growing up under Soviet occupation. Her mother, grandmother and great-grandmother spent time in Siberia as political prisoners. She makes an important contribution to the discussion over how the West should deal with Russia.

Secretary Rubio recognized the continent and America have common roots. “For the United States and Europe, we belong together. America was founded 250 years ago, but the roots began here on this continent long before...We are part of one civilization – Western civilization. We are bound to one another by the deepest bonds that nations could share, forged by centuries of shared history, Christian faith, culture, heritage, language, ancestry, and the sacrifices our forefathers made together for the common civilization to which we have fallen heir…We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally. We want Europe to be strong. We believe that Europe must survive, because the two great wars of the last century serve for us as history’s constant reminder that ultimately, our destiny is and will always be intertwined with yours, because we know – (applause) – because we know that the fate of Europe will never be irrelevant to our own.”

Rubio asked the same question as the Vice-President: what are we defending? Unlike Mr. Vance, however, Rubio provided an answer. “Armies fight for a way of life. And that is what we are defending: a great civilization that has every reason to be proud of its history, confident of its future, and aims to always be the master of its own economic and political destiny.”

The Secretary did not blame the Europeans for having lost their moral compass, but celebrated the glories of the continent. “It was here in Europe where the ideas that planted the seeds of liberty that changed the world were born. It was here in Europe where the world – which gave the world the rule of law, the universities, and the scientific revolution. It was this continent that produced the genius of Mozart and Beethoven, of Dante and Shakespeare, of Michelangelo and Da Vinci, of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones. And this is the place where the vaulted ceilings of the Sistine Chapel and the towering spires of the great cathedral in Cologne, they testify not just to the greatness of our past or to a faith in God that inspired these marvels. They foreshadow the wonders that await us in our future.”

The secretary praised the international institutions created after the Second World War, but insisted they needed to be reformed. He was particularly scornful of the United Nations for being unable to stop conflicts such as in Ukraine. He then attacked international law as being ineffective. “We cannot continue to allow those who blatantly and openly threaten our citizens and endanger our global stability to shield themselves behind abstractions of international law which they themselves routinely violate. This is the path that President Trump and the United States has embarked upon.”

Rubio concluded his remarks by asking Europe to reinvigorate itself so that the United States and Europe could continue to thrive together. His actions, however, did not match his words. In December 2025 he skipped a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, just as Secretary Pete Hegseth missed a February 2026 meeting of NATO defense ministers. Rubio pulled out of a high level meeting on Ukraine (citing a scheduling conflict—he did meet separately with Ukrainian President Zelensky). Instead, he traveled to Hungary to endorse the prime ministerial candidacy of Putin ally Viktor Orban. “It’s an ‘eff you’ to the EU,” said Theresa Fallon, the director of the Brussels-based Centre for Russia, Europe, Asia Studies. “It was really clear.”

As a United States senator, Rubio was considered an internationalist. Now, in a more nationalistic administration, as secretary of state he has to walk a tight rope. What remains to be seen is whether Rubio or Vance is the voice of U.S. foreign policy—or if there is a difference between them other than in tone.

Faced with all these anti-European measures, European countries have taken the initial steps towards independence from its post-World War II reliance on America. Probably the biggest step was the signing of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement which is bringing two of the world’s largest economies closer together. Covering nearly two billion people and almost a quarter of global economic output, the deal marks the biggest bilateral trade pact either side has ever signed. India will eliminate or reduce duties on 96.6% of EU goods exports, while the EU will liberalize 99.5% of its tariff lines on goods imported from India over seven years. With India’s economy growing at over 6% annually, and a young population of 1.45 billion, the agreement provides the EU with a strategic partner in a region increasingly seen as central to global economic power. The European Commission expects the deal to double EU goods exports to India by 2032, supporting jobs across manufacturing, agriculture, and services.

The United States is not a part of this deal and will not benefit from the tariff reductions contained therein. The US did, however, sign a separate agreement with India reducing tariffs on Indian goods from 50 percent to 18 percent in return for India announcing it would no longer buy Russian oil. Paul Donovan, chief economist at UBS Global Wealth Management, commented that the deal would have little effect on U.S. citizens as India only represents 3 percent of U.S. imports. He also noted that price increases caused by raised tariffs are usually passed to the consumer, but benefits from decreased tariffs usually are not.

The EU has also signed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. This marks the culmination of more than a quarter-century of negotiations. Like the agreement with India, when fully implemented the pact will create one of the world’s largest free trade zones, encompassing more than 700 million people. Mercosur eliminates duties on 91% of EU exports, including tariffs as high as 35% on cars and spirits, while the EU will phase out tariffs on 92% of Mercosur exports. For EU exporters alone, removing these barriers is expected to save more than $4.6 billion per year in duties. Implementation may take some time, however, as the European Parliament voted to send the agreement to the Court of Justice for a legal opinion, a process that may take up to two years.

Europeans have begun to turn to China as an alternative to the United States. A flurry of visits that began late last year with travel to Beijing by the Spanish king and French president has continued with leaders of Britain, Ireland and Finland, with Germany’s chancellor to follow next month.

The back-to-back visits, which Brussels insists are coordinated, highlight one fundamental trait that has long characterized EU-China relations: disunity. Since the 27 member states cannot agree on a common policy to handle the Asian giant, they each conduct diplomacy with it on a bilateral basis to pursue interests that at times diverge. These divergences hinder strategic discussions and blur long-term thinking at the European end. EU leaders have effectively stopped addressing China as a singular item when they meet in person for high-level summits, and foreign ministers do so only occasionally.

It is a difficult balancing act for the Europeans. On the one hand, the 27-member bloc is desperate for new markets to compensate for the 15% duty agreed in a lopsided deal with Trump. China, as the world’s second-largest economy with a growing middle class, is on paper an enticing business partner. But on the other hand, the EU is struggling more than ever to contain a ballooning trade deficit with China, as the country turns to low-cost exports to offset a stubborn real estate crisis and sluggish consumer demand. In addition to the financial imbalance, Europeans were aghast at seeing Xi Jinping reaffirm his “no limits” partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin and sustain his war economy. Soon, the circumvention of Western sanctions through Chinese territory became a major irritant.

European governments and corporations are also racing to reduce their exposure to U.S. technology, military hardware and energy resources. The decoupling drive is still in its infancy and it will take years for the bloc to wean itself off American tech and military support, according to Jean-Luc Demarty, formerly in charge of the European Commission’s trade department. Conservative European leaders including German Chancellor Frederich Merz said it was time to beef up the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual defense clause, as Europe’s governments have started to doubt whether the U.S. really would honor NATO’s Article V. The leaders embraced the EU’s new role as a security actor, tasking two leaders to turn the EU clause from words to an ironclad security guarantee. A 150 billion Euros EU program to help countries boost their defense investments, finalized in May of last year, states that no more than 35 percent of the components in a given purchase, by cost, should originate from outside the EU and partner states like Norway and Ukraine. The U.S. is not considered a partner country under the scheme.

Europe is even taking steps to come out from the American nuclear umbrella. Despite treaty commitments not to pursue nuclear weapons, Berlin is considering developing its own atomic weapons to bolster Europe’s nuclear umbrella. Chancellor Merz said the country is in talks with its partner nations on the possibility of extending Europe’s nuclear arm, which currently involves Britain and France as the sole nations in the continent with atomic weapons. The German initiative comes after the UK and France agreed last summer to form a nuclear deterrence pact to fend off “extreme” threats to the continent in the face of Russian aggression and fears that the US may pull its military support. Britain has around 225 nuclear warheads, a little less than the 290 France is believed to have, according to the Arms Control Association, which monitors nations’ atomic stockpiles.

President Trump has long advocated Europe separating from the United States, and the moves outlined above seem to fit into president’s long-term vision. They also seem to be in accord with President George Washington’s sentiments as stated in his Farewell Address: “Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.” In observing these sentiments, however, the current administration needs to remember the rest of Washington’s sentiments: “Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest.”

The documents outline a world vastly different than that created by Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall at the end of World War II, in which the United States assumed the primary role for the defense of freedom worldwide. “Previous administrations squandered our military advantages and the lives, goodwill, and resources of our people in grandiose nation-building projects and self-congratulatory pledges to uphold cloud-castle abstractions like the rules-based international order.” (NDS)

Instead, it returns the country to its pre-1941 position: preeminent in the Western Hemisphere and offshore balancer in the rest of the world. “The (Defense aka War) Department will prioritize strengthening incentives for allies and partners to take primary responsibility for their own defense in Europe, the Middle East, and on the Korean Peninsula, with critical but limited support from U.S. forces… We will therefore prioritize cooperation and engagements with model allies—those who are spending as they need to and visibly doing more against threats in their regions, with critical but limited U.S. support.” (NDS)

The result is a world divided into spheres of influence with which the United States does not wish to meddle. “We will maintain favorable balances of power in each of the world’s key regions…As U.S. forces focus on Homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific, our allies and partners elsewhere will take primary responsibility for their own defense with critical but more limited support from American forces.” (NDS)

If other countries recognize and respect America’s interests, the administration believes the possibility of conflict will be greatly reduced. “Our goal is peace… This peace is compatible with the interests of our potential opponents, if they keep their demands reasonable and cabined… We demand only that they respect our reasonably conceived interests and those of our allies and partners who stand stoutly with us. If we all can acknowledge this, we can achieve a flexible and sustainable balance of power among us, and peace.” (NDS)

At first, Europe receives considerable scorn. The administration believes the continent is in danger of losing itself, and thereby losing its ability to be a valuable ally. “Continental Europe has been losing share of global GDP—down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today—partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness. But this economic decline is eclipsed by the real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure… Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.” (NSS)

“Should present trends continue, the continent will be unrecognizable in 20 years or less. As such, it is far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies…We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.” (NSS)

According to the Trump administration, Europe’s problems with Russia require American diplomatic intervention to establish a balance of power. “European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons. As a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply attenuated, and many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat. Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states. It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia, as well as to enable the post-hostilities reconstruction of Ukraine to enable its survival as a viable state.” (NSS)

Despite all these problems, Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. “Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of American prosperity. European sectors from manufacturing to technology to energy remain among the world’s most robust. Europe is home to cutting-edge scientific research and world-leading cultural institutions. Not only can we not afford to write Europe off—doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy aims to achieve.” (NSS)

The NDS speaks approvingly of NATO’s decision to increase defense spending to 5 percent of members’ GDP (3.5 percent on core military spending and 1.5 percent on security-related expenditures.) It notes the United States will now ask all its allies to follow Europe’s example and meet the same goals. It notes that Russia remains a threat to NATO’s eastern members but, given Europe’s decreasing economic power the United States will reduce the continent within its defense priorities.

This gives Europe an opportunity to carve out its place in the new, spheres of influence, world order. “Fortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia—it is not even close. Germany’s economy alone dwarfs that of Russia…Our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine’s defense. As President Trump has said, the war in Ukraine must end. As he has also emphasized, however, this is Europe’s responsibility first and foremost. Securing and sustaining peace will therefore require leadership and commitment from our NATO allies.” (NDS)

Probably the one note of dissidence between the two documents is their description of Europe. Whereas the White House-generated NSS heaps scorn on the European Union and insults European leaders as being non-democratic, the Pentagon-authored NDS discusses how Europe can assume a leadership role in Eurasia. How this contradiction is resolved will determine America’s relationship with Europe over the next three years.