Against Forest’s 3-4-3/5-4-1 system, Liverpool set up nominally in 4-2-3-1. However, in the defensive phase Liverpool actually adapted their shape to match up with that of Forest.

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City had a high possession share in this game, partially because Palace proved unable to establish themselves in their high pressing phases. This was in large part due to their inability to adapt to City’s overload in midfield.

Palace wanted to get their front three engaged against City’s backline and goalkeeper in the press. However, the follow-up behaviour from the midfielders was unclear. In some early scenes, such as above, Anderson was simply left free in the number six position, with the central midfielders not jumping forward.

This behaviour from the central midfielders was likely due to the presence of the likes of Cherki and O’Reilly in midfield. However, in a back three as Palace used here, the normal solution would be for a centre-back to also jump in order to liberate the central midfielders to go into the press, since they already had three centre-backs versus Haaland. As it was, Palace’s passivity in the midfield and defensive units made it easier for City to play out.

On the above occasion, where Palace did manage to get their midfield engaged higher, they also faced problems in the wide areas with Gvardiol moving back out into the left back zone. He was able to receive without initial pressure as Palace’s right wing-back was deeper with Semenyo.

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Chelsea set up in a 3-4-3 system as favoured by Alonso at Leverkusen, while Fulham were in a nominal 4-2-3-1 shape which ended up being quite fluid in possession.

The away side were able to go ahead in the first minute through Joao Pedro’s goal which came from a second ball won after a long kick from the Fulham goalkeeper.

As seen above, Fulham’s possession shape was very open at times, with the centre-backs splitting very wide and Berge being left as the lone number six. This ultimately cost them in this case as the left centre-back Cuenca was left isolated when Lacroix’s defensive header back into the Fulham half bypassed their midfield line.

When Chelsea pressed, Palmer and Rogers could attack the wide-splitting centre-backs of Fulham, while Pedro remained central to block the passes into Berge. Castagne would often indent into the right halfspace (marked by Lavia in the case above), while King could also drop to receive.

In the shot above, a feature of Alonso’s pressing system is seen, whereby the side centre-backs Acheampong and Colwill would jump into midfield to ensure that James and Lavia were not overloaded or getting exposed down the sides of the midfield unit. In the above example, it is Colwill jumping with King.

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United lined up nominally in a 4-2-3-1 shape, although with Cunha essentially acting as a false nine, 4-2-4-0 may be more accurate. Hull meanwhile set up in a 5-4-1 shape without the ball, moving into a 3-4-3 with the ball in which they sought to be direct and play quickly over the wings where possible.

In United’s central midfield, Santos would often be the deepest, acting as the number six in front of the centre-backs, while Tielemans was able to vary his positioning by playing alongside Santos or moving higher, as in the shot above.

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Both sides lined up initially in 4-2-3-1 shapes but often switched to back three or similar structures on the ball. For Arsenal, this was through White, who tended to indent, meaning they would form a 3-2-5 or 2-3-5 depending on if White stayed in the first line or the second.

City were pressing against this in their 4-2-3-1 in which they would try to get their wingers engaged narrow against Arsenal’s centre-backs and White. They had issues creating pressure on the ball from this though, and Arsenal were able to bounce out with third-man combinations to the wide option, as seen below.

Key to this was the fact that Arsenal timed the dropping movements from their midfielders well, especially Guimaraes. This manoeuvre is harder to carry out with static play, but when dropping towards the ball dynamically, it’s hard for City’s midfielders to prevent the bounce pass out wide.

Elsewhere in Arsenal’s structure, Calafiori often indented into the left halfspace while Tzolis stretched the width, while Odegaard continued to play the more deep-dropping possession role he was eased into last season. He started in the right halfspace between the lines but could drop and rotate with the forward bursts of Guimaraes.

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Another issue for City was in their low block defending. They attempted to hold a defensive line on the edge of the eighteen-yard box to prevent getting pushed back, but they were punished twice for this by Arsenal overloading and running off the back of Khusanov.

In the first goal (above), they find the gate between Khusanov and Dias with a lovely reverse pass from Lewis-Skelly. Note that Tzolis is also available on the outside which doubtless distracted Khusanov at least partly from Calafiori’s run.

In the second goal (above), the same zone is targeted again and this time the ball does reach Tzolis’ run on the outside of Khusanov - his blindside. Havertz was close by to receive the nod across goal from Tzolis and the ball eventually found its way past Donnarumma.

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Arsenal were ahead from the first minute, which put the emphasis on City to break down Arteta’s organised defensive scheme - an unenviable task for anyone.

The basic shapes of the teams in City’s possession phase are shown above. City moved into a 3-1-3-3 shape with O’Reilly indenting into midfield while Anderson drifts into the right halfspace, leaving Kovacic as number six and Foden as number ten.

Aside from occasional 3-2-4-1 variations with Anderson dropping a little deeper and O’Reilly a little higher, City were somewhat rigid in this structure and struggled to generate fruitful rotations or dynamic play.

Arsenal meanwhile started from their typical zonal 4-4-2 mid block, from which they would try to lock on man to man when the right pressing triggers were fulfilled.

The animation above (made with DrawTactics) shows an example of Arsenal jumping and going man-to-man from their mid block. Tzolis would be the one to jump against his nominal direct opponent Khusanov, which was the trigger for the rest of the midfield to follow.

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A key aspect is illustrated at the end of the animation. With Madueke jumping, O’Reilly was often left in space on the left side, but City were unable to exploit this for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, Madueke tended to use his cover shadow diligently to cut off the direct pass from Gvardiol to O’Reilly. Secondly, City lacked the well-timed dropping movements Arsenal had shown, which would’ve let them reach O’Reilly indirectly. Thirdly, Arsenal would also sometimes shift their defensive chain, pushing White a little further forward to close O’Reilly’s space, with Mosquera ready to slide over towards Doku.

In one scene, shown above, Doku was actually able to solve this for City by dropping into the left halfspace. Mosquera was hesitant to jump so far, meaning Doku was able to get turned and dribble forward, breaking through the Arsenal midfield.

Another small success for City (above) was that through their three attacking midfielders in the 3-1-3-3, they were sometimes able to stretch the gap between Guimaraes and Lewis-Skelly enough to thread the central pass to Foden.

This was rare though, and the overall story was that City’s possession game was too slow and not dynamic enough to threaten Arsenal.

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This continued into the second half, where City did not seriously threaten to mount a comeback. They were 3-0 down shortly after half time thanks to Odegaard’s goal (below), where City’s defending around the edge of the box was exposed again, this time leaving the cutback zone open for the arrival of Arsenal’s captain.

Aside from their defensive game, Arsenal were also quite stable with the ball in the second half. Rice came on for Guimaraes at half time and would often drop in to form the back three when Arsenal had the ball, with White pushing higher.

Odegaard would form the double pivot in a 3-2 buildup structure alongside Lewis-Skelly, and they were often able to overload City’s number ten area. On the left, Tzolis indented more frequently in the second half, while the left back (first Calafiori, then Hincapie) would play wide.

In the end, this was not a particularly difficult 3-0 win for Arsenal. The second half drifted by somewhat with plenty of subs as coaches continue to nurse players at varying levels of preparedness towards match fitness. The key questions are around City, and whether Maresca can improve on the aspects that were exposed in this game in order to fill the considerable shoes of his predecessor.

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When PSG had the ball, they often formed a back three, with Mendes staying deeper in the left back position while Hakimi pushed forward on the right. It was also possible for PSG to rotate their left-sided players so that Neves or Vitinha (below) could also end up in the left centre-back or left back position, while Mendes pushed higher.

This back three structure was used to try and play in through the corners of Villa’s block (especially the gap between McGinn and the nearest striker (see below)). The line of three also offered stability to prevent Villa’s front two from being able to jump two-versus-two against PSG’s centre-backs.

Villa’s approach was relatively zonal, although McGinn did often play a bit higher than Hemmings due to Mendes’ lower starting position. PSG’s approach was focused on getting around the outside of Villa’s block and switching the play quickly.

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It was often the case that while the ball was on their left side, starting the buildup with Mendes, they would still have double wing occupation on the right side, so that if they were able to switch the play, they could try to create a quick two-versus-one against Villa’s left back.

The focus on triangle and diamond rotational structures on the wings was clear in PSG’s play, as it was last season. Akliouche would supplement this from the false nine role, drifting to either side to help create overloads or pin defenders.

The same was true of Dembele when he came on in the second half. In the above shot, Dembele pins Lindelof, meaning that PSG create a superiority in the left halfspace with the deeper Vitinha and more advanced Neves either side of Villa’s Kamara, who cannot cover both passing lanes at once. Again, the gate between McGinn and the nearest striker (playing into the ‘corners’ of the formation) is used.

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In Villa’s possession phase, PSG unsurprisingly went with an aggressive man-marking approach, trusting their defenders to defend without an overload and with large spaces to cover.

PSG then essentially had a 3-1-4-2 defensive shape, with Marquinhos having the task of pushing out of the defensive line to take up the marking of Villa number ten Buendia, as the nominal PSG midfielders would push into advanced positions for their marking assignments (Emery and Neves usually had the Villa fullbacks).

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This created a tension for Marquinhos who needed to cover a bit of distance to get out to Buendia. At the same time, if he moved too early and too quickly, it might simplify Villa’s decision too much to just play long into Madjo and let him duel against Pacho.

In both the defensive phase and the defensive transition (above) phase then, PSG’s defensive midfield space (or Villa’s number ten space) became a problem for PSG. Buendia was frequently able to find timings in which he could receive the ball before Marquinhos could jump to get sufficient pressure.

Ironically, it was from an attacking transition where Villa actually conceded their first goal (above), whereby they won the first ball after a clearance, but then dwelt on it too long and lost possession to the backwards pressing of Neves.

Other Villa players could also make use of the space created by PSG’s loose defensive coverage of their number six area. For example in the shot above, McGinn is able to time his movement to receive the pass through the lines.

As mentioned, when Marquinhos pushed out to Buendia, this left PSG three-versus-three in the backline. In PSG’s high pressing phase, this led to plenty of back-to-goal duels for the likes of McGinn and Hemmings against PSG’s fullbacks as Villa tried to play vertical passes up the line to generate third-man play.

Even in lower defending though, Marquinhos had a responsibility to jump out, which meant that Madjo became a key part of the Villa attack with his duel against Pacho. The young Villa striker was difficult to deal with, showing movement to get into good positions on multiple occasions in the first half, both from moves constructed centrally and from crosses. It was no surprise that he was the one who eventually equalised for Villa.

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Eventually, the game hinged on one botched offside trap for Villa (below). Right back Cash was the one who played Doue onside in the end, but it was interesting to observe his scanning behaviour in the seconds leading up to it (impossible to show properly in a screenshot unfortunately).

Cash makes a quick scan towards Kvaratskhelia (left wing) while Dembele is on the ball. At that exact moment, his teammates begin the movement to step up to play the offside trap. By the time Cash has reoriented his gaze towards the ball and his teammates, he’s already on his heels and takes a split second to realise that he needs to step up.

It proves a good example of how decisive a split second can be at this level. Cliche, but true.

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As one might expect from a Mourinho team in a final, this was a game in which Inter were happy to play on the counter-attack. When they did have possession, their attacks were direct and to-the-point.

A common pattern was the indenting of Pandev into the left halfspace from the left of midfield, where Inter were able to connect with him on a couple of occasions. Pandev’s movement could be met by Milito drifting out to the left side into the vacated space. This left channel was a space favoured by Milito, who sought to run on the outside of a less mobile van Buyten throughout the game.

Chivu as left back played in a conservative manner, staying as part of the rest defence (below) instead of joining the attack. The same can be said of Zanetti and Cambiasso, who generally stayed as a flat defensive midfield pairing when Inter had the ball, while Sneijder roamed between the lines.

On the right side, the main attacking feature was the bursts from deep by Maicon. Eto’o had a great 2009/10 season, but was less prominent in this game. His key involvement in this particular pattern was that by holding a wide position, he helped create space inside for Maicon to play one-twos and accelerate past his marker on the blindside, attacking the space from outside (below).

Inter also played plenty of long balls up to Milito. This was what eventually led to their goal (below). It was an extremely simple attack in the end - a long ball up from goalkeeper Julio Cesar was flicked on by Milito to Sneijder, with the Argentinian striker then spinning in behind Demichelis to latch onto Sneijder’s return pass.

With Inter’s strategic counter-attacking style, plus the fact that the Italians went ahead in the first half, Bayern’s main task in this game was trying to break down Inter’s organised mid-low block.

Inter’s approach was relatively man-oriented, although they were flexible enough to drop off in a more zonal fashion when needed. Against Bayern’s 4-2-3-1 shape, this meant that Zanetti often wanted to step up towards Schweinsteiger who often played deep in the left halfspace for Bayern. Sneijder would then try to disrupt van Bommel, while Cambiasso stayed deeper as the number six with Muller, giving Inter a temporary 4-1-4-1 shape.

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This Spain side arrived along with the era of Guardiola’s Barcelona side, who were known for their positional approach. Although Spain were also keen on having a high possession share, their approach was somewhat less positional in nature - at least in the orthodox sense of what is meant by positional play.

The focus was more on stability for Spain, and less on a positional structure which rationally occupies the pitch. Sometimes, as in the shot above, Spain would have their three midfielders dropping deep while the fullbacks were also not overly advanced.

This left Spain with a sparse occupation of the spaces inside the opposition shape. Their approach was to try and find quick combinations from this stable foundation though, ultimately aiming to play in Villa who was constantly on the shoulder of the last defender.

Spain’s approach meant that they did not generate the suffocating possession with which the current national team is often able to dominate territory, bombarding the opponent’s area. Instead, their attacks came mostly from middle third phases and ended with attempted throughballs.

The main occupation inside the opponent’s block came from Pedro and Iniesta indenting from the touchline. Again Spain eschewed the positional principle of width that Guardiola’s Barcelona were demonstrating at the time.

Instead, the focus was on the timing of the arrival of Pedro and Iniesta into the spaces between the lines. As explained, once they threaded the ball between the lines, they would try to finalise attacks quickly through Villa.

In many ways, Spain’s approach in possession was more reminiscent of Zidane’s Madrid (especially 2016/17 and 2017/18 where Isco was prominent). The focus was on stable possession, followed by quick, depth-focused attacking thrusts (albeit Madrid were more focused on wing-play) through the improvisation and instinct of their attackers to arrive in the right spaces.

In the early scenes, it had seemed that the Netherlands wanted to take a man-oriented approach to Spain’s midfield. However, the distances that Spain’s midfield three moved from their nominal positions (either outside the Netherlands shape or rotating within the midfield slots) made this difficult.

It was a similar story for the Holland fullbacks van der Wiel and van Bronckhorst. There was a desire to follow Pedro and Iniesta into the midfield areas, but also a hesitancy to move unusually far from their nominal position, which resulted in some inconsistent defensive behaviour and overall forced the Netherlands to become more passive.

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I hope you enjoyed the tactical analyses over the course of the World Cup and are excited as I am for the new season ahead. I’m extremely grateful for your support and I will continue to work hard to give you the best tactical breakdowns I can, week in, week out.

This newsletter will continue to be active over pre-season with retro analyses and other content. These weekly articles will be exclusive to paid subscribers. As the new season begins, publishing volume will increase again.

For paid subscribers who have not yet redeemed their free DrawTactics subscription, please contact me if you wish to do so! Before the start of the season, my Fundamentals of Football Analysis guide and analysis notebook template will also be released exclusively for paid subscribers.

Thanks for reading,

JM

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Scaloni made the slightly surprising move of including Nicolas Gonzalez in the starting lineup over Paredes, meaning Enzo and Mac Allister partnered in central midfield. This was an area of the pitch that was firmly under Spanish control though. Against the ball, Spain’s midfield were able to play on the front foot, as were their defence, aided by the lack of depth threat possessed by Argentina.

Thanks to the intensity of Spain’s 4-4-2 against the ball, they were able to easily neutralise Argentina who largely played with a slow tempo and tried to break the game up as much as possible.

Spain also succeeded in isolating Argentina in wide areas. Again the lack of threat in width and depth for Argentina became clear in these phases. Although Argentina have been able to do without such traditional principles in many matches, their improvised possession approach proved unsuitable to deal with Spain’s proactive defensive approach.

On the ball, Spain started from a 4-3-3 shape against Argentina’s 4-4-2. Alvarez would initially try to get close to Rodri. When trying to jump into a press, Alvarez would jump to Cubarsi and Mac Allister would then follow to get close to Rodri, while Lisandro Martinez would be responsible for pushing up towards Olmo who played behind Argentina’s midfield line.

Spain’s midfield positioning was flexible though. As seen in the above shot, Olmo has drifted to the left, allowing Oyarzabal to drop in the right halfspace. This attracts Mac Allister, meaning Rodri is free and Spain can find him with the third man combination, allowing him to carry the ball into space.

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The game started in a physical manner with plenty of fouls, but England tried to play in a positive manner and impose themselves on the game in their wing-focused 4-3-3 system.

As in the shot below, England were often happy to have a weaker occupation of the centre in order to prioritise their wing play. This was accentuated by Anderson sometimes dropping out of the Argentina block, between his own centre-backs.

One pattern which is also visible in both the above and below shots was the attempt to exploit the space between Argentina’s fullbacks and centre-backs with penetrative runs from Rice and Bellingham through the halfspaces when the Argentina fullbacks were drawn wide.

With Rice and Bellingham’s athleticism, this seemed a logical way to try to break the Argentina defence. However, it failed to yield much in the first half - part of a wider trend in the game, as both sides had very little goalmouth action.

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Two other key aspects of England’s attacking game were the deep dropping of Kane, more so than pretty much any other game this tournament, plus the involvement of the fullbacks in the aforementioned wide attacks too, which was partially facilitated by Anderson’s dropping into the backline.

Kane’s own forays into midfield finally paid off for England’s goal (below). In the buildup, he helped overload the Argentina midfield while they were pressing high, receiving from James before hitting a pass into depth for Rogers, which the Argentina defence failed to deal with adequately, eventually resulting in Gordon’s goal.

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Without the ball, England initially took a strategic gamble in the early stages of the game. There was a focus on getting Rogers and Gordon engaged in the press against the Argentina centre-backs, while Kane and Bellingham would try to screen the Argentina number six area to limit the short passing options.

The narrow positioning of England’s wingers left Argentina’s fullbacks in plenty of space, which is something that Tuchel would have already understood when undertaking this approach. One can only assume that this was a strategic gamble from Tuchel, choosing to try and limit Argentina’s central combinations which are a key part of their game, under the assumption that Argentina’s fullbacks carried less threat.

In some sense, it was correct that Argentina’s fullbacks are among their least threatening players on the ball. However, the issue for England was more of an indirect one.

Although Argentina’s easy access to Molina and Tagliafico did not directly lead to England’s defence being penetrated, it allowed Argentina to dissolve England’s pressure with these outlets always available, leading to an increasing possession share and more control of the game for Argentina.

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Of course, the tactical choice for which this game will always be remembered is that of Tuchel after England had gone ahead. After the first goal, England had already sunk quite deep into their low block (4-4-2 or 4-1-4-1 shape depending on Bellingham’s positioning), and were starting to face threats from Argentina deliveries into the box.

It was after the second half advertising hydration break that Tuchel decided to make the switch to a back five. After the game, he explained that his intention was to reduce the gaps in the backline for Argentina to exploit.

However, the gaps in the backline were not actually England's problem. The issue was that they were conceding far too much space around the box due to being very deep and having a lack of pressure on the ball. This allowed Argentina’s technical players to get on the ball close to England’s goal and start whipping in crosses and long shots.

After the switch to a 5-3-2 (above), the problem was amplified due to the narrow three-man midfield line for England being unable to cover the full width of the penalty box. The likes of Messi and De Paul on the right along with Mac Allister and Alvarez on the left were able to reach the corners of England’s penalty box with far too little pressure.

Tuchel at least recognised this and widened the midfield’s stance by switching to a 5-4-1 with the addition of O’Reilly for Rice. However, just moments later, Argentina’s equaliser came from a corner in which England again displayed their defensive passivity.

In the shot above, Messi is about to assist Enzo on the edge of the box. Some have blamed Anderson for getting drawn towards Messi, but his inclination to double up on the Argentina captain was a natural one.

The bigger issue was that England were so passive in their own box that there was no one alongside Anderson to control the large spaces at the edge of the box. England were seeking to minimise risk by staying deep, but actually exposed themselves to more risk by doing so.

Even after the equaliser, England were completely unable to readjust their mentality and get up the pitch. They continued to defend deep in a 5-4-1. With the wider England midfield line controlling the halfspaces better, Messi started moving wider to the right wing to find room to receive. It was from here that he eventually assisted Lautaro’s winner.

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One more thing that was striking in the final few minutes was the contrast in Argentina’s approach to defending a lead compared with that of England. As in the shot below, Argentina tried to maintain pressure on the ball to prevent England driving them back into their own box where crosses could be dangerous.

Of course, the context was slightly different since Argentina had far less time to survive compared to England. However, the way in which Argentina decided to cut off any potential England attacking momentum at source by pressuring the ball aggressively (accepting the risk of being in equal-number or overloaded situations at the back) while they were preparing their attacks showed that there is not just one way to defend a lead in a big game.

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Starting with Spain’s out of possession game, it was, of course, important for them to limit France’s threatening attack. Spain were able to defend well in low block, mid block, and high pressing situations.

In low and mid blocks, their 4-4-2 shape was compact and conducted with good intensity. France usually had Tchouameni dropping deeper between the centre-backs in possession while the other central midfielder Rabiot or later Kone would remain slightly higher.

As in the shot above, France’s structure could become a bit disconnected centrally with Tchouameni dropping out of the shape and both fullbacks playing wide. The thing that Spain needed to control would be the dropping of the likes of Olise into the spaces opened in the centre.

Rodri had an outstanding game in terms of his control of the spaces in front of the defensive line. He was able to screen passing lanes expertly as well as consistently winning duels.

Although France were quite disappointing in possession, especially in the second half, they did actually have a couple of decent moments against the Spanish high press in the first half where they were able to beat the midfield line and run at the defence.

In the above example, they get the chipped pass out to Digne who flicks on, and they then try to find Mbappe running in behind. In such situations, France never quite got the execution right, nor did they recycle the ball in order to have longer possession phases.

Spain were usually in a diamond shape when pressing high, as Ruiz jumped forward onto Tchouameni while Olmo led the press alongside Oyarzabal, usually trying to curve his run to cut access to the left centre-back of France. On occasions such as the one above, Spain’s high press did also have a little bit of success, despite being beaten a few times in the first half.

In possession, Spain had clear tactical advantages through midfield and particularly when attacking down the left side. France’s defensive scheme was inadequately intense, nor were they appropriately positioned to prevent Spain from dominating.

Paid subscribers can read the rest of this article, detailing how Spain’s positional play broke France’s defensive scheme, as well as access all of my other articles past and future.

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Scaloni went with a diamond shape in this game for Argentina in order to try and fit all four of his midfield generals into the side, with Enzo as the most advanced.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this game from the start was Switzerland’s pressing approach. They had a clear intention to try and reduce Lisandro Martinez’s influence in Argentina’s buildup game by directing the play away from him.

Embolo would stand close to left centre-back Martinez when Argentina were building from the back, and pressing movements that he made towards the ball were curved in order to keep Martinez in his cover shadow.

At the same time, Xhaka would try to jump forward from the Swiss midfield to get close to Paredes, while Rieder was preparing to jump to Romero. The wide midfielders for Switzerland then remained quite narrow, while Freuler would be man-oriented against Mac Allister or the nearest player.

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England dominated possession in the first half of this game. It was a relatively low-tempo affair, perhaps due to heat and humidity. Tuchel’s side stuck with their 4-3-3 with wing rotations, which usually ended up in 2-3-5 or 3-2-5 structures against Norway’s 4-1-4-1 low block.

Konsa usually stayed lower on the right side, allowing Bellingham to be higher in the right halfspace and Madueke to hold the width. On the left, O’Reilly often ventured forward, either wide or in the halfspace depending on Gordon’s actions. Anderson usually stayed deeper alongside Rice, but with license to run from deep.

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The emphasis for England was on stable circulation followed by attacking down the wings or switches of play to try and change the tempo. The intent to get isolation situations for Madueke down the right via long diagonals was clear in the opening stages.

The positioning of Bellingham and O’Reilly/Gordon in either halfspace was an important method of creating more space on the outside for the wide player by drawing the fullback into a narrow position (see both above and below shots). This is a key theme in formations that use a positional front line of five arranged across the vertical lanes.

Neither team created many chances in this game. In Norway’s possession, the tempo was also relatively low, plus their structural focus on stability saw them often lacking the occupation of more advanced zones to play forward.

In the example above, both Odegaard and Berge have dropped outside the England block, allowing England to control the centre of the pitch. Norway were also unable to prepare the switches of play in as cohesive a manner as England were, and therefore had fewer lines of attack.

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Despite this, Norway were able to take the lead through a transition situation, to which England replied with their own transition goal thanks to Bellingham seizing the moment with a burst forward from midfield.

This set up a second half in which England actually struggled to retain control of possession as they had in the first half. Tuchel also made a change, removing Rice and Madueke for Eze and Saka. This restructured the midfield and the control of this area of the pitch was never quite right for the rest of the game from Tuchel’s point of view.

Odegaard became more influential, with his free roaming across the midfield zones helping Norway to circulate the ball against an England midfield that looked more open as they tried to take a man-oriented approach against players that were moving away from their nominal zones.

Midfield tinkering would continue throughout the half for England, as James eventually came on for Gordon to try to restore some stability to the three-man midfield. As the game drifted towards extra time with neither team really taking it by the scruff of the neck, James eventually moved to right back to make way for Rogers in midfield who added some extra energy and drive.

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The later substitutes for England were quite effective after the half time ones had seen a degradation in England’s performance. Spence played well from left back and provided some good attacking moments, while Rogers’ shot eventually led to the rebound that Bellingham put in the net to win the game for England.

Tuchel switched to a 5-4-1 in extra time to see out the lead, as he often prefers to do. Burn added extra height as a third centre-back to repel Norway crosses, which were weakened anyway by the fact that Haaland had left the pitch by this point. Overall, England were not at their best, but were able to prevail over a Norway side who also struggled to create.

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Belgium actually attempted to press Spain high in the first half. De Bruyne and De Ketelaere would push up to Spain’s centre-backs, while Raskin and Vanaken would mark Rodri and Ruiz. Left centre-back Mechele would then jump out of the backline to mark Olmo in Spain’s right halfspace.

From the start, Spain showed a classic 4-3-3 theme to outplay the Belgian high press (below). With the opposition central midfielders split over a large distance due to their marking assignments, vertical passing lanes can be opened for Spain to reach their striker, Oyarzabal, who drops with the right timing to receive and spread the ball out wide to Baena.

Looking for the vertical pass to the most advanced player is often a principled way to face man-marking, since it facilitates third man combinations and forces the midfield of the pressing team to reorient themselves as the ball bypasses them, which creates opportunities for blindside actions from the midfield of the attacking team.

Oyarzabal’s dropping also created opportunities for opposite movements (seen below) with his midfielders, especially Olmo who was relentless with his movements between the lines and into depth.

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When Morocco had the ball, their initial focus was on stability. Central midfielder El Aynaoui would drop between or alongside the centre-backs to form a back three, while left back Salah-Eddine would indent alongside Bouaddi. This gave Morocco a 3-2 base for their possession phase.

Hakimi had a lot of freedom to attack on the right, while Talbi held the width on the left. Ounahi would often drop into deeper or wider areas to support ball circulation or bring himself into group-tactical combinations in wide areas.

As can be seen in the shot above, France’s response to Salah-Eddine’s indenting from left back was for his nominal direct opponent Dembele to also indent into a higher and narrower position.

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Belgium set up in a 4-2-3-1 shape here and mostly defended from a mid block initially. The key aspects of the USA’s attacking game in this tournament have been the left-sided combinations and overloads and the runs into depth. It was these aspects, then, that Belgium needed to counter effectively with their defensive gameplan.

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The first half of this game centred around Canada’s 4-4-2 mid-high block against the buildup game of Morocco. The North African side were building up with an asymmetric back four as Hakimi would push high on the right side and Mazraoui would stay lower on the left, or sometimes indent into midfield.

With Hakimi pushing higher, Diaz would often move into the right halfspace, while Ounahi and Saibari (Rahimi when he came on too) would share the centre and left halfspace (or as in the case above, the pocket between Canada’s right central and right midfielders).

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Ancelotti’s switch to a diamond shape during the group stages with Brazil was one of the more interesting tactical stories of the World Cup so far. However, with the injury to Raphinha and the introduction of Rayan to the side, the defensive shape has actually shifted slightly again towards more of a 4-4-2 with Rayan dropping off to a right midfield role as he has done with Bournemouth.

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The primary tactical battle of interest coming into this game was the issue of how Argentina would try to overcome the pressing of Rangnick’s side, who started in his trademark 4-2-2-2 shape.

During Argentina’s buildup phases, Mac Allister often dropped between the centre-backs to provide extra stability against Austria’s forward pairing. In order to retain access to Argentina’s circulation along the backline, Austria would jump up on their left side, with Sabitzer pressuring Romero, and Laimer pushing forward from left back to close Molina down as the ball reached his feet.

In the early minutes though, Argentina quickly demonstrated that their highly flexible system had ways to outplay this pressure through the roaming of their midfielders into the spaces that opened in Austria’s shape.

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