“The idea that this broad functioning hub, built over decades, was significantly degraded in the space of a few days by a regional player is unimaginable.

I have fond memories of Bahrain both from past port visits, where it provided much-needed rest and relaxation, decent shopping and fitness options, and from my time as a government trainer when I flew over for shipboard training once every six months. I always felt safe there.

That NSA Bahrain is now virtually uninhabitable, with families left in limbo, as described in recent reporting, is difficult to grasp.”

More here:

https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/2026/08/28/the-devastation-of-nsa-bahrain-is-a-national-security-warning/

I’m a bit of a student of Ship Names, but wasn’t always that way. My first two ships were USS CALIFORNIA and USS TRUXTUN. I lived in California at the time, but other than that, it has no special meaning. I remember knowing that TRUXTUN was an Admiral, noted for his harsh discipline, but not much more. I can’t say the names inspired a strong connection to the namesake.

That changed with my next ship, USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51). With the namesake still alive, I dug into his life, career, and I even got to meet him and his wonderful wife. He called it “my ship” and called us “my crew”; I organized the crew march-on for his funeral at USNA. There was definitely a personal connection; something to strive for. It began to sink in to this young LCDR that ship names really are important.

That feeling deepened with my next ship, USS HARRY S TRUMAN, named for my dad’s favorite President; I had read “Plain Speaking” in high school. Then XO of USS COLE, named for a Marine Medal of Honor recipient. We published his exploits in our Plan of the Day, and I had a copy of his diary in my stateroom. Then on to command USS OSCAR AUSTIN, another Marine, another MOH recipient; I met members of his family, the Marine whose life he saved while giving his, and even the squad leader who wrote up his medal citation.

After that it was USS GHW BUSH, where again I met the namesake as he launched a weight from the catapult. Finally USS SAN JACINTO, where (ironically) my cabin had a photograph of none other than Ensign George H. W. Bush launching his aircraft from the flight deck of - you guessed it - USS SAN JACINTO (CVL 30). Spooky!

So when my friend Keith Green wrote about the JOHN C STENNIS in his book Black Officer White Navy, I jumped in. I found he was one of two Aircraft Carriers named for Senators instead of Presidents, mainly for their support of a strong Navy. Probably just coincidence that their home states - and constituents- were the beneficiaries of most of their shipbuilding operations. But then I learned of a darker past, of two men whose stated goal was the continued subjugation of Black Americans, seeking to maintain a segregated armed forces (against the orders of - here we go again - Harry Truman). They fought against the Civil Rights movement, the Martin Luther King holiday, and one of whom (Stennis) who wrote letters advocating “100% White Units”. They effectively closed off the Naval Academy for Black candidates for decades. We worked hard to get the name changed, even came remarkably close - mentioned by name, along with Mr. Green, in the congressional record. But I had heard first hand what it felt like for a Black Sailor to cross the quarterdeck of a ship whose namesake did not want him there; who told Admiral Zumwalt that “They (Blacks) came down from the trees long after we did!”. Their words: A slap in the face; a gut punch.

Names do have meaning, in a good - and bad - way.

Then I saw the announcement of Doris Miller’s name being assigned to CVN 81. It almost seemed like a counterweight to the STENNIS name staying in place. I read about his life, thinking about my dad as he served aboard the USS CORAL SEA as an enlisted man at about the same time - and the same age. Unlike the Black Sailor who could only serve food, my father became an officer. But he never forgot where he came from. Doris Miller rose to the occasion, earning his place in history.

Side note…

I wasn’t until I started this post that I realized the odd foreshadowing of this letter from Senator Stennis to a constituent:

Stennis would likely not have approved of naming CVN 81 after Doris Miller. You can guess why. He would probably approve of changing the name. That in itself is telling.

Over the years of trying to get CVN 74 renamed, and through my own career experience, I came to realize the importance of the bond between Sailors and their ship namesakes. I conversed with Admiral Sam Cox of the Navy History and Heritage Command. I received letters or notes from SECNAV Del Toro, Modly, and even (Acting) SECNAV Cao. They all spoke of the same goal: for junior Sailors and Officers to walk aboard, see the name, and be inspired. To connect with the heritage of the Navy and its history. That’s the gift that SECNAV Thomas Modly - and by his tacit approval, Donald Trump - gave to the Sailors of CVN 81, on Martin Luther King Day no less. Irony abounds. They say history doesn’t repeat itself, but if you listen closely, it rhymes.

As a plank owner on CVN 75 and 77, I know the pride of donning that ball cap, or the shoulder rocker of the enlisted crew. They deserve the DORIS MILLER name, to look up to, and be inspired. The family deserves to see his name on the stern of CVN 81.

Will there be a CVN named USS DONALD J. TRUMP? Probably. Will it inspire young Sailors? Maybe. But that is a question for another day. The proud Miller Family, the crew of CVN 81, the Navy and the Nation are better served by sticking to the plan.

I look forward to the day a Navy Captain is honored by four bells and the words “Doris Miller, arriving”.

He or She will have a lot to live up to.

Note: Thanks to all the new subscribers while I was on vacation. Over 300 total! I hope you enjoy this special edition.

Next week: NAVADMIN 200/26. Stay Tuned!

I was on a ship today and a young Officer recognized me from somewhere and stuck out his hand - “You’re the Sleep Guy!”

Made my day! In my book “Going Circadian, the Navy’s Slow Road to Change”, (order it here) I talk about three important characteristics to drive change:

Passion, Persistence, and Patience.

I still have the first two but the closer we get to the next fatigue- related collision, the less patience I’m willing to demonstrate.

Hence this article:

https://cimsec.org/toward-a-navy-fatigue-management-program/

I hope you will read it and share it.

This Substack gives a bit of history on my why I wrote the article.

A colleague once called me a Gadfly. “The Navy is the Horse, and you just keep annoying it by biting it in the a** until it decides to move”.

This article (with thanks to CIMSEC for indulging my format) is an attempt at just that.

I (and others) have been pushing the Navy for about a decade to improve sleep for Sailors, with some success. But as I say in the article, there is much to be done.

During my time as a Human Factors Engineer, one of the most compelling tasks that I had was interviewing individuals who had survived brushes with death in major mishaps. Most were junior enlisted personnel who had been inches away from the actual collision point in ships like USS PORTER, USS FITZGERALD , the LCAC collision, and USS TRUMAN. Each of these collision investigations cited fatigue as a major contributing factor. Some examples:

• The eight Sailors in the Parachute Loft on TRUMAN who watched the outboard bulkhead disintegrate 10 feet away.

• The Engineer on an LCAC that collided with another at 80 knots closing speed, 10 feet below his seat.

• The YN2 who was reaching for the door to the smoke break on PORTER when it was crushed inches from her face.

• The OS2 in FITZGERALD in the berthing just above the one that flooded, killing his shipmates.

In each case, these junior personnel had questions like, “How could their leadership let this happen?” - knowing that fatigued watch standers had made poor decisions that led to their brush with death. They also asked me to “Please do everything you can” to not let it happen again.

It is in that spirit that I submitted this article - so that the idea of a Navy Fatigue Management policy doesn’t sit in someone’s inbox where the rest of the world can’t see it. I’m now retired, so the best I can do is hand over an 80% solution - the draft instruction embedded in the article- to whomever will take it and run with it.

The fight for better sleep is worth it, and it matters, especially now. I got this note last week from a Department Head who has just returned from deployment as part of Operation Epic Fury:

“ Sir, as I come off my DH tours as part of Operation Epic Fury, I want you to know your work on circadian rhythm had a deliberate impact on our ship’s performance as we stuck to it all throughout combat operations… evolution and event dependent. But I’m so grateful we took that onboard as a Navy, and we highlighted it in our Post Deployment Brief that it both worked - and was necessary!”

So there is progress, but there is still work to do. It’s frustrating that attempts to leverage the 2024 USS TRUMAN collision and the GETTYSBURG F-18 shootdown (both of which cited fatigue as a contributing factor) as a wake up call (pun intended!) to drive a policy (and funding for research, wearables, etc.) for the entire Navy seem to have been unsuccessful.

Why?

A friend recently opined that,

“It takes people dying to get the Navy’s attention”.

I sincerely hope that’s not the case.

Enjoy the article, and share your fatigue story in the comments!

Mr. Hegseth, as a veteran with 30 years service, I would like to ask you to reverse your position against facial hair in the military, specifically for religious and medical reasons. Bear with me - it would actually be a win-win situation for you and the military. Your often-articulated core values of merit and warrior ethos would seem to lend support, rather than opposition to, beards - at least for those with religious or medical waivers. In June you stated, as justification for rescinding the requirement for influenza vaccinations, that, “We will not force you (to get a flu shot) because your body, your faith and your convictions are not negotiable." That is exactly the argument that you could use to support beards; the reasons for beard waivers are exactly the same - related to individual body characteristics (the medical condition Pseudofolliculitis Barbae or PFB) or religious convictions. If you believe in these values, you are missing a huge opportunity when it comes to facial hair. If you are like I was at your stage in life, you probably don’t have a good understanding of PFB; many do not. This video (click link to view - only 3 minutes and very good!) will help.

A quick primer:

1.        PFB is a chronic skin condition primarily associated with the curved shape of the hair follicle and tightly curled hair structure but can be associated with an additional genetic predisposition. It is triggered by shaving.

2.        There is no “treatment plan” that allows a person with PFB to “return to normal shaving.”  Shaving itself, combined with genetics, is the cause of PFB.

If your concern is safety, please review the research which demonstrated that there is minimal impact on forced air mask effectiveness for individuals with 1/8” to 1/4” facial hair; they achieved a satisfactory seal to OSHA standards in the vast majority of cases. This indicates a very small risk, and one that has been accepted for decades with no recorded injuries due to mask leakage during fires.

Additionally , your stance on beards seems to contradict your own focus on merit. If the best leader, sniper, or intelligence specialist has a minor medical condition that a short beard can remedy, his selection for greater responsibility should be based on merit and performance and not on his appearance. Finally, beards are historically aligned with the Warrior Ethos you desire for the military. Many Navy SEALS have beards, and they are truly badass warriors. Q.E.D.

You said we don’t want a bunch of Nordic Pagans; Mr. Secretary, Thor is the ultimate “warrior” - you should want an army of those!

Most importantly, if you follow through with your plan to separate those servicemen with PFB, you will be ruining lives and careers, and creating gaps in critical skill areas, (many more than those separated during the pandemic for refusing the COVID vaccine). Since the majority of those with PFB are Black, your policy has a disproportionate, if coincidental, racial impact. One additional point that is often misunderstood is that PFB is a chronic condition based on hair and skin type; there is no “treatment plan” to prevent it from happening. The only mitigation is to stop shaving and maintain a short, well-trimmed beard.

By my calculations (just for the Navy) the new policy will impact, and likely separate, between 6000 and 12,000 Sailors each year.

My friend used AI to help visualize this impact:,

This is essential the manning of a Carrier Strike Group, including the CVN and its escorts.

This comes at a time when our warships are engaged in combat operations with already over 10,000 gaps at sea.

Then there is this stunning fact:

Applying the PFB restriction (per the new policy) to new recruits will likely shut the door to Navy service for 50% of Black Americans.

That’s roughly the percentage of Black men with PFB.

Bottom line: your anti-beard policy is undermining military readiness.

But you can change that by allowing those with PFB to continue to serve on a waiver. Beards are historically aligned with warrior ethos, independent of merit, and a historical symbol of strength and religious conviction, which puts them in perfect alignment with your values. Don’t let your actions contradict your words; what you are currently saying is, “We will force you (to shave) because your body, your faith and your convictions are negotiable.” As someone with strong convictions about religion and control over your body, this stance seems contrary to your stated values. You once said, “If you want to grow a beard, join the special forces”, so you have already associated beards with an elite fighting unit; the connection is already there. Go with it!

Note that I am not advocating for “beards for all”. Just allow service members with waivers and short, trimmed beards to continue to serve. They have done so for 40 years. You are also setting the Armed Forces up for a future policy change and lawsuits resulting in reinstatement with back pay. History is a great teacher.

I encourage you to meet with a Dermatologist to discuss the true nature of PFB; then meet with a group of your “bearded warriors” - those with approved waivers - over a cup of coffee. Listen to their stories. Look past the beard at the person behind it; they are proud professionals who just want to serve their country, and exactly the type of people you want leading our Soldiers and Sailors.

Nordic Pagans?

I say “Hell yeah - Bring ‘em on”!

As a friend once told me, “I’m not trying to change your mind; just present you with facts and data in the hopes that you will change it yourself”.

Mr. Secretary, in the name of empathy, lethality, and readiness, and to preserve your legacy, please change your position on beards. You will not regret it!

I was reading Admiral Jim Stavridis’s book The Restless Wave last week and one story reminded me of current events involving (now two) Navy Flag Boards. The protagonist, a young officer on the staff of (then) Commodore Arleigh Burke, is asked by Burke, “What is the difference between a good Officer and a great one?” The young Lieutenant tries all sorts of different responses but the Commodore shakes his head, then explains, “The difference between a good officer and a great one is about 10 seconds.” 

As a USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51alumni, that story has always resonated with me.

In a recent Substack, I wrote about the silence of senior Flag officers, acting and retired, after the unprecedented removal by SECDEF of 9 officers who were selected by the board. I have worked and am friends with many outstanding Flag Officers, some retired, some still on Active duty. Many of them have been mentors, sponsors and advocates for the individuals impacted, many of whom are also friends of mine.

I spoke out against this unfair action, in Military Times and then I held my breath for “10 seconds” - in this case 30 days - to see if any of them would speak up, speak out, or take a stand in support of these officers.

The clock has ticked out. None did.

Today it happened again, this time the 2* list. Again, multiple women and minorities summarily removed for no stated reason.

Will there be resistance this time? Revolt?

The clock just started anew. 10 seconds.

Don’t get me wrong; I have to respect their decision to remain silent. These are all good officers. They have a lot to lose.

But man, here’s hoping for at least one Great one!

https://open.spotify.com/episode/6RBZP6elstYduEMnJvcZV4?si=UMq_nvHWTSaO0rADR615wg&utm_source=copy-link

I recently had an opportunity to be interviewed on VOX’s “Today, Explained” about the recent Navy Flag Board results. I hope you will listen (It’s about 25 minutes long). My main points about the removal of (approximately 9) names from the list of 31 submitted by the Navy were:

1. The Unprecedented nature of this SECDEF intervention. No previous Secretary has done so since WWII (I Verified this with a search of NHHC records and detailed web search/interviews). Why not? Out of  respect for and trust in the established board process.

2. Destroys Faith in board process with service members and the American People.

3. Clear signal to women and minorities - your merit doesn’t matter.

4. Seems to target anyone with past DEI engagement – white men included.

5. Disappointment in lack of public comment/pushback by active and retired Flags.

6. Impact on retention and recruitment of women and minorities (same as Beard policy for Black men - more on that next week) creates an atmosphere of fear and hopelessness.

7. Flag Officer Demographics: White Males make up over 95% of Flag Officers  Data does not support the idea that female and minority were “unfairly advantaged” by past DEI policies. The math doesn’t work.

I also shared quotes from Active Duty folks responding to my Military Times Op Ed (here).

Quotes from Active-Duty individuals who reached out after the Op Ed:

“From my anecdotal, day-to-day interactions with many Active-Duty women: They believe that they will not have any opportunity to make Flag under the current administration or any other that represents the same hostility to high performing women. It no longer matters if your supervisor or CO thinks you are a stellar performer or superior to others because SECWAR will take your name off the list”

Female Officer: “I’m retiring. It’s too dangerous to remain in service at the moment. I’m sure I’ll be back in some capacity in the future. The work is so important. But it’s a good time not to be in the military.”

Senior Female Officer: “I’ve been told there are no more jobs for me at the next level, specifically due to my past DEI engagement (Cordle note - for following then DOD policy). I would add that I have spoken to white men who also have been told they cannot get new jobs because of perceived support of DEI, like support for cultural history month events”

WRT Senior Officers not speaking out: “It’s easy to have courage when courage is rewarded and not punished.”

Friend: “A family member (female O5) is very discouraged. Fortunately, at her current command they treat her with all the respect and care that her hard work and competence earn her.”

Retired Navy Officer (Black): “These removals will do to the Flag community what happened to the Navy officer corps when southern congressional delegations would not nominate Blacks to USNA. We will have leadership cohort gaps that will be detrimental to overall leadership in the Navy.”

“Thank you so much for giving voice to the maelstrom whirling through the selection boards, when so many of us are required to be mute under a watchful eye.”

“I very much appreciate your Military Times article, particularly calling out the false presumption that minorities only promoted due to diversity.”

The result will be a “lost generation” - minimal representation by women and minorities in upper Navy leadership. Impact of 2026 will take a decade to recover”.

And my personal favorite:

“This definition of “Merit” seems based on chromosomes and genes more than experience and accomplishment.”

I end with three thoughts:

1. With recent and upcoming retirements, we are rapidly approaching a 100% White Male Admiralty, at least for the Unrestricted Line, within 2-3 years. Don’t believe me? Start counting, and do the same count in a year. Then we’ll talk.

2. This process is so unnecessary; we can be (and are now) both diverse and lethal.

3. It will take a decade to recover, but the Navy is resilient. The ship will right itself.

For evidence of the impact of an Admiralty that doesn’t reflect (and thus doesn’t understand) the workforce and its unique issues, see the new PFB ADSEP policy.

More on that next week.

Thanks for listening.

Greetings to my Substack subscribers!

As a retiree, freedom of speech is important, even (or especially) on topics of national security, politics, and the military. I exercise it weekly in this forum. I wanted to share an upcoming event in support of Senator Mark Kelly and, on behalf of Carlos Del Toro, invite you to either attend or provide a donation as you see fit.

Please see the below link:

https://secure.ngpvan.com/Z_LWLUMQK0icOlfRD8AmDw2

Thanks, and please share with your friends who might be interested.

First of all, Thanks to my friend Captain Joe Keenan, USN Retired for this photo of USS New Jersey (BB 62) at Camden berthing. My friend Jon Dachos turned it into a painting.

This week’s post is not about politics or the Navy, just a short one to celebrate our Nation’s 250th Birthday. The more I study the history of this country, the more I realize that its foundation, and its survival, from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War to today, depends on one word: “We”.

More specifically, the use of that word to describe all of us as Americans, combined with a concerted avoidance of using the word “They” to describe other Americans. Any time we use “They” to describe other Americans - Black, White, Straight, Gay, Republican, Democrat, Left or Right - we erode the fabric of our Stars and Stripes. This doesn’t mean there no questions or criticisms of process or policy - that too is one of the freedoms that makes us different and unique. But it’s “we” criticizing “us”. That’s how we get better, and stronger.

So this weekend, as we fire up the grill, watch baseball, World Cup soccer, or a patriotic movie, let’s remember those who gave up their lives and fortunes for our freedom - for something bigger that themselves. Remember that this county has survived numerous threats and challenges from within and without, and turbulent times that make today’s issues look boring. Let’s take a moment to embrace those around us, our friends, coworkers, neighbors and colleagues, who are all included in the collective, “We Americans”. United we Stand.

God Bless America.

Happy Independence Day!

They say that actions speak louder than words. But sometimes the words and actions actions are so diametrically opposed that they seem unable to exist in the same universe. Such is the case in two Department of (Still) Defense policies:

Flu Shots and beards.

First, let’s look at the (already disastrous, and it’s not even flu season yet!) decision to stop mandating flu shots. As justification, in his own exact words, the Defense Secretary said the following:

“We will not force you (to get a flu shot) because your body, your faith and your convictions are not negotiable." (Words)

Lofty words, even if they do cut against history, science, and common sense. But the conviction behind them is, in its own odd way, admirable.

Until it is inconvenient. Such is the case with clean shaven faces, despite longstanding waivers for medical and religious reasons, another policy rolled out with no new data or evidence to support a change, but one that literally turns the previous (flu shot) logic inside out, essentially stating:

“We will force you (to shave) because your body, your faith and your convictions are negotiable” (Actions).

The above statements - as justification for policies - simply CANNOT coexist. Or as my parents would say, “You can’t have it both ways!”.

Until you can. Alas, both are policy (terrible policy, but nonetheless…) and both have the hugely ironic effect of forcing Commanders to request an “exception to policy” in order to preserve unit readiness.

Update from an article yesterday: A Navy official confirmed to Task & Purpose that the service now requires the flu vaccine for boot camp:

“Navy recruit training currently includes the Influenza vaccine as an exception to policy approved by the Under Secretary of War,” the official said.

Read that again.

***Commanders must request an “exception to DOD policy” - in order to preserve unit readiness.***

Wow. It’s hard to imagine - but here we are. Same issue with beard waivers:

If the “Face Plant” Emoji didn’t already exist, it would be necessary to invent it.

By my math (more next week) the Beard policy will result in far more separations (and personnel gaps) in the next 12 months than those separated for refusing the COVID vaccine during the entire pandemic. It remains to be seen how many more workdays (and possibly lives) will be lost due to the flu vaccine decision. Stay tuned.

Anyway, it’s only for a while, until the policies are eventually reversed by the next person in the job, but the damage to readiness, retention and health of the force will be done.

Outlawing Beards and the Flu vaccine:

Both are the epitome of a bad decision.

Postscript. My time at sea last week, combined with over a dozen messages - mostly from Active Duty folks whom I have never met - helped me answer the question about continuing to write about things that I see as important, from my perspective, in an effort to educate and inform.

I’ll keep trying.

A sampling:

I wasn’t planning to post a Substack this week because I’m on vacation. This one doesn’t really count, but I thought I would share a couple of quick thoughts. I decided to head out to sea, where the view and quiet calm always helped me focus. When I hit the Maps App on my phone, it came up with a little rotating ball and the word, “Recalibrating”.

It hit me: so am I.

I retired a year ago and started this Substack about 9 months ago with no clear vision or purpose. I wanted to “get stuff out there” and add my voice and experience to discussions about things that matter to me. Leadership. Inclusion. Common Sense. Fairness. I think I’ve done that. But I’ve also been polarizing. A friend shared “you have a large audience, but they all agree with you. You aren’t reaching the ones who don’t. You’re white noise to them”. Hmmmm. He’s probably right. So now what?

As Keith Green said of me in the Forward of my book:

“John seems to have lived his professional life by asking himself the following questions: Is this right? If yes, what can I do to make it better? If not, what can I do to make it right? How much heat am I willing to take to drive the necessary change?”

So I’m recalibrating.

What real change should I be driving at?

Where is my energy best spent?

What is my “why”?

How much heat am I willing to take?

I’ll be out here another week or so, staring at the ocean.

Recalibrating.

Military Times was kind enough to print my Op Ed this week. You can read it here.

https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/2026/06/11/defense-secretarys-navy-flag-board-actions-are-unprecedented-and-deeply-troubling/

Just a bit of elaboration and pontification to add. I think a few points are very important:

1. Lack of Precedent. I think it’s really important to realize how unprecedented this is. I did some pretty extensive research and found no past examples (Tailhook and Fat Leonard were very different).

2. Lack of Transparency. One commenter asked “As a CO, did you share your reasoning with the crew for every decision you made?” My answer: “Yes”. That’s how you build (and show) trust. SECDEF must have a reason - why not share it? (Altogether now - “Hmmmmmmm”)

3. Long Term Impact. My email and PM accounts have exploded today with comments like “Thank you for speaking up for those of us who can’t” from Active Duty of all ranks. Several more junior folks are questioning whether to stay or go where they are not constrained.

As I said in the Op Ed: the Fleet is watching.

Regardless, the makeup of this group of Admirals will shape Navy leadership for decades to come. Many of us see this as a seminal moment for the Navy.

Now for the fun: A thought experiment.

The vast majority of my colleagues seem to agree with the SNL actor Keenan Thompson as a talkshow host where the contestants expect to see social justice:

“Ain’t Nothin Gonna Happen”

This isn’t Hollywood, but if a Hollywood screenwriter were putting this script together, that is certainly the most likely ending. However, as with most films, it seems appropriate to explore some alternate endings. It could play out in a few different ways. Let’s assume, as they say in show business, “A willing suspension of disbelief” and explore some alternate endings:

# 1. Maverick: Revolt of the Admirals. In this version,  every three and four star admiral in the Navy flies to Washington and demands a meeting with the Secretary of Defense. They point out the stellar careers of the nine officers whose names were removed. In one variation this results in the reinstatement of the officers. In another, it results in mass resignations. You pick.

#2. Stand by Me. The 22 officers whose names were on the list decline as a group to accept the promotion without their nine colleagues who were found to be equally qualified by the Navy selection board. This display of loyalty could also end in two ways. The entire list could go in the shredder, along with their careers; or the entire group would be seen in the final scene as they all receive their promotion to one star Admiral.

Note: I am not saying they should do this. Again, it’s just a movie!

#3. Back to the Future. This one entails the cadre of influential Retired flag officers asking for an audience with the Secretary and taking a stand. This option is also fraught with danger for them - due to the fact that most have a position on either an influential board or the defense Contractor. Retribution could be swift - and expensive. But it would be interesting!

As with most potential script writers who are writing about real life, I can’t say what I would do. I can’t even say what I think anyone should do. One thing I can say, though is that as with most dramatic movies:

The audience will not forget the ending.

One final thought: if there is an explanation, hopefully to the Navy but at a minimum to Congress, I hope it is transparent and honest. We may not like it, but it would be nice to understand. Otherwise we will be like the fella in this scene from my favorite movie, “The Outlaw Josey Wales”:

https://youtu.be/PpwJ1n7g1pM?is=kv0CQdKZUjdeAHPT

No Substack post next week due to vacation! Enjoy some time off!

Additional Background if desired (ChatGPT Generated).

The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a major 1949 institutional and strategic clash within the U.S. military. In the aftermath of World War II, President Harry Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson sought to drastically cut defense spending, heavily favoring the Air Force and nuclear strategic bombing over the Navy's fleet and aircraft carriers.

The conflict exploded into public view and led to high-profile congressional hearings, featuring several distinct phases and consequences:

• The Spark: In April 1949, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson abruptly canceled the construction of the Navy's first "supercarrier," the USS United States (CVA-58), just days after its keel was laid.

• The Allegations: Navy leaders, fearful that naval aviation would become obsolete in the atomic age, retaliated by circulating anonymous documents questioning the capability of the Air Force's primary nuclear bomber, the Convair B-36, and alleging procurement corruption.

• The Hearings: The House Armed Services Committee launched investigations into both the B-36 program and national defense strategy. Prominent WWII admirals and naval aviators testified that relying solely on strategic bombing was a dangerous and inflexible military strategy.

• The Outcome: The Air Force ultimately won the political and public relations battle. The committee did not reinstate the carrier program, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis E. Denfeld was fired for failing to uphold service loyalty to the administration's unified command.

The rest of the story:

Despite losing the initial budgetary battle, carrier aviation eventually won the day. The revolt was a tactical loss but a strategic victory.

Food for thought.

The title comes from an excellent book on leadership by my friend and colleague JC Carter.

You can find it here:

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0GZ7T6GV9

But I’m going to apply it to a different situation. The recent revelation that seven names were likely removed from the Navy’s 07 list after the normal process was completed made me think of all the Flag Officers and Navy Secretaries - many of them friends and peers - who have said things like:

“I stand with you”

“If you walk past something and don’t say anything, you just set the new standard”

“If you see something, say something!”

Here’s the problem: if the removal of duly board-selected Flag officers based on race, gender, or past assignments over which they had little or no control is not challenged by:

• Senior Navy Leaders

• Navy Community Leaders

• Congress

• Retired Flag Officers

Then mark my words: We will never see another female flag officer. And very few minorities wearing stars.

I realize that statement is provocative. It’s meant to be. I sincerely hope that it is not prescient and that I am proven wrong. But for now, it is a hypothesis, one that shall be proven, or disproven, over the next two years.

Why do I say this? This year the Navy made 0 of 22 Female 1 Star Admirals. Regardless of the reasons, the implications are huge. From this group will come exactly ZERO 2/3/4 Star Admirals. If the trend continues it could be years before the Navy has another female 2/3/4 Star Admirals.

Unfortunately the combination of “Anti-DEI” efforts over the past 18 months have been overwhelmingly successful, not just in rooting out programs, but people, especially women and minorities. It has been a hugely successful campaign on several coordinated fronts.

The wolves of misogyny and racial bias have been clothed in the sheepskin of “merit” and “standards” and are rapidly culling the herd of qualified candidates while we, the sheepdogs, stand by helpless and watch.

Let’s start at the beginning.

First, there was the systemic removal of every 4 female star Admiral in the Navy and Coast Guard, along with many senior minority officers. This had multiple effects:

1. It signaled: you got there because of DEI, not merit (which most of us who know these officers know is BS.)

2. It deprived all of the 1, 2, and 3 star female Admirals of role models, mentors and advocates - for years to come.

3. It diluted female representation at Flag selection boards. As a past RAND study of Navy Flag Officers found “ducks pick ducks”. The “ducks” in question were already mostly male and white. This will have ripple effects for years.

4. It sent a clear signal to every officer in every paygrade - stand by.

Secondly, there was a purge of articles, artifacts, plaques and displays across the DOD that celebrated women “firsts” or specific accomplishments. This was a classic Orwellian example of erasing and rewriting history. The real impact is not yet felt - it is generational. It will be apparent in today’s 18 year olds who have no idea that others have, so I can. They will look elsewhere.

Thirdly, during the previous 4 years, the vast majority of designated, billeted, or collateral duty DEI Officers were - you guessed it - women or minorities, or both. So when candidates for flag over the next few years are examined by such internet sleuths and “influencers” as the American Accountability Foundation (AAF), who keep a historical website of “DEI Transgressors”. Being designated, as per one speech by the head of the Department, as “DEI Debris” can’t help your selection chances. Thus a DEI purge is a de-facto purge of female and minority officers. By the way, most of these officers were simply executing orders, or assigned collateral duties, to the best of their abilities.

A newly directed study of the effectiveness of women in combat (despite them having been there for decades - even fighting and dying today in Iran) may re-re-re adjudicate the issue and result in further constricted opportunities. The fact that the first study was expanded and extended makes one wonder if it didn’t support the hypothesis that the presence of women may somehow hurt readiness. Also interesting is the lack of transparency in the conduct of the study and what it is actually measuring.

It is worth noting that for the Line Communities, the path to Flag is via Major Command. There are no female Submariners in the queue (There has been one female XO) and no women (to my knowledge) in the CVN CO pipeline (there has been one female CVN CO, and she is now a Flag Officer). As of yet there are no female SEALS. At SURFLANT, only 2 of the approximately 20 Major Commanders are women. This is the “assembly line” that leads to Flag rank, and it is VERY “male”.

Finally, we get to today’s big news. the Office of the Secretary of Defense(War) has demonstrated a willingness to summarily remove individuals from other boards (most recently the Army) for no stated reason or public explanation. Based on the short list of Admirals this year, (only 22 when there are usually more) this appears to have happened again. According to NYT reporting, seven or eight names were removed, including two women and two Black Officers. This stunning development has just hit the news cycle and may get fleshed out as more information becomes available. But the initial indications are pretty clear - the wolves have infiltrated the herd.

All of this is likely to have a chilling effect on those already in the service. A father on a recent post shared that his daughter, a Submarine Officer, left the Navy to pursue a career in the private sector “rather than navigate the tricky waters of a Navy career for a woman” - his words. Many women would have chosen different paths anyway, and not all Officers aspire to be Flag Officers. All of the above leads to my original hypothesis of a future Flag Mess devoid of women.

A commenter posted a reminder that “the primary mission of the military is to pick the best and brightest to win wars, regardless of race or gender”. I agree. That’s exactly what the Navy Flag Board did. And then that work was undone.

I should add that the individuals on the list, many of whom are friends and colleagues, are also fully qualified - they are the best and brightest. But so are those left off the list.

I voiced my hope in a post this week that someone - anyone - would speak up. That they will demand that the individuals be reinstated. That the Navy will prove to be different than the Army in simply accepting this outcome.

To a person my friends said “don’t count on it”.

If that turns out to be the case, I don’t know how much Navy leadership can count on continuing trust from the deckplates. Clearly, they are in a quandary not of their making. But they have the deck and the conn as the ship heads to shoal water. As Epictetus said, “Anyone can hold the rudder when the seas are calm!”

I hope this post resonates with all Naval Officers, past and present, and regardless of political leaning. This crosses a line.

In the end, as Billy Joel says “I May be Wrong, but I May be Right”.

I sincerely hope I’m wrong.

One thing I learned in Command was that the crew is watching you. They want to see if your actions match your words. If not, you have lost their trust which as (Shakespeare?) said, “Like virginity, once lost, is impossible to regain!” Maybe it was somebody else.

You get my point.

Leaders, the Navy is watching.

“Welcome to the least modern Aircraft Carrier in the fleet.”

Those words were spoken by the Captain of the USS GEORGE H W BUSH (CVN 77) at its commissioning. It seemed shocking at the time, but in retrospect was very accurate. During the 7 years between laying the keel and commissioning, the ship was built according to a plan that had already been locked down for 3 years. During that decade, myriad upgrades and improvements had been installed on the CVNs in service - better communications, new weapons, improved Hull, Mechanical and Electrical systems. The Navy’s newest CVN was a decade behind its peers - right out of the gate.

I had experienced something similar in command of USS OSCAR AUSTIN, the first FLT II DDG (adding an embarked helicopter squadron). We joined the TRUMAN Strike Group, but did not have the necessary communications gear to integrate with the rest of the ships - it was developed while we were being built. The Commodore wanted to embark with his team for deployment, but determined the C2 and accommodations were inferior to a 20 year old SPRUANCE DD, so he broke his flag elsewhere.

We are in danger of learning exactly the wrong lesson from the FFG(X) fiasco.

The very behavior change that is being hammered into everyone’s head after the requirements fiasco of FFG(X) will prove the undoing of BBGN: locking down a plan and sticking to it.

Welcome to Martec’s Law.

Martec's Law is the principle that technology changes at an exponential rate, while organizations change at a much slower, logarithmic rate. Coined by marketing technologist Scott Brinker, this disparity creates a widening gap between what technology is capable of doing and how quickly businesses can adapt their people, culture, and processes to leverage. Unless a lot of things change, the TRUMP class is likely to lumber into that gap - and pay the price.

Unfortunately it could be a high one.

The current plan is to “lock in” the design as soon as possible. Even a “willing suspension of disbelief” yields - best case scenario - an approved plan in FY-28. Remember, we haven’t hired a bunch of new people to create the design - we just added it to the plates of a bunch of already busy people. And they are all being reorganized to boot - the PAE structure alone will take a year to shake out. The average build time for the FORD class is looking to be 15 years, double the NIMITZ class, which averages 7 years. So 10 years to build a BBGN is a realistic estimate. We could accelerate, but one need look no further than my favorite Navy film, Down Periscope, for this warning:



There are a few obstacles in the path of building the ship in the first place:

1. Immature technologies. Lasers, Rail Guns and Hypersonic missiles are still evolving. This could induce change in the ship design as they solidify requirements.

2. Drydocks to build it. As one commenter “Mr. Animal” pointed out, there literally isn’t room at the inn, without a major disruption to the CVN building and refit plan. His description was spot on, so I added it in detail at the end.

But back to my point. The correction put in place for the FFG (no design changes - take a USCG Cutter and Paint it Gray) is exactly the WRONG solution for the BBGN. If industry cannot flex to adapt the design over the 10 years it takes to build the shop, it will hit the fleet in 2038 with 2026 technology - and immediately be obsolete.

Building a ship is complicated and it takes time. I know - I’ve been part of two CVN Commissioning crews.

The House seems to feel similarly:

https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/house-pushes-navy-to-nail-down-battleship-design-details/

“The draft legislation includes a section that would prohibit the Navy from inking a contract or other agreement that “includes a scope of work for the construction” of the lead ship until after the Secretary of the Navy proves to lawmakers that the weapons systems the service plans to include on the vessel are “at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level.” 

The lesson isn’t “don’t change the design”; it should be “build flexibility into the design and building process”. To some extent we do this in other areas using Agile design.

Agile performance management adapts the principles of agile methodology, originally from IT and software development, to enhance organizational performance. Unlike traditional performance management approaches, agile performance management prioritizes adaptability, collaboration and continuous improvement. By fostering a culture of flexibility and innovation, agile performance management empowers teams to respond swiftly to challenges and opportunities.

https://www.insperity.com/blog/agile-process/?pid=21862396697&cid=7014x000000QbJvAAK&kw=&utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=M99_AODIG_SRCH_SRCH-PD-GOOG&customer_id=855-678-2386&gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21862396697&gbraid=0AAAAADpcGv_SQZF9aLtNwJh6aBFsjjfss&gclid=Cj0KCQjwz9_QBhD_ARIsADnSCfDLA2LKvEBUlOLrot85v2cS8pnk4AWzsbdwCQJJxLzP21jW7CSn1AMaAtuuEALw_wcB

Will the ship be delivered with dated technology? Can industry adjust along the way to keep up with technology? Will it be built at all? Martec’s law will apply regardless.

Final Thought: For a really scary graph, add a line to Martec’s chart that shows Chinese Offensive Weapons deployment. I’m my mind, it’s above the other two, and hyperbolic. Now move out 12 years and look at the gap between that mine and BBGN.

Hold on folks, it’s gonna be a wild ride!

Postscript on Dock Capacity

by “Mr. Animal”

“In addition to that, the Newport News Shipbuilding, although it possesses three large dry docks (Nos. 12, 11, and 10) and one floating dock, only dry dock No. 12 is capable of building nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the Nimitz-class and Ford-class carriers all originated from this dry dock.

Dry dock No. 11 is primarily used for aircraft carrier overhauls, nuclear refueling, and decommissioning, while dry dock No. 10 is dedicated to nuclear submarines.

Neither of these dry docks could be converted to build nuclear-powered battleships, which brings us to dry dock No. 8 at Norfolk Shipyard and dry dock No. 6 at Puget Sound Shipyard which could also be used for aircraft carrier construction, however, these dry docks are only used for aircraft carrier overhauls.

Even if they were used for shipbuilding, it would disrupt the aircraft carrier overhaul cycle, so the probability of them being converted to build battleships is virtually zero. In other words, the entire shipbuilding industry across the United States has only one dry dock capable of building the 35,000-ton Trump-class battleships, and this dock would be shared with the Ford-class.

Dry Dock 12 would need to accommodate one aircraft carrier and two battleships simultaneously to meet the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Moreover, this schedule cannot be disrupted by any disruptions, such as supply chain interruptions or unforeseen events, otherwise, the entire US Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan would be disrupted.

The Stoics believed that external events, outcomes, and the broader strokes of your life are predetermined by fate. However, your internal responses—your judgments, intentions, and moral choices—are entirely "up to us". William Spears writes about this in his excellent book: https://www.amazon.com/Stoicism-Warrior-Philosophy-Insights-Morality/dp/1636246230

With this in mind, this letter is addressed to those SWO(N) Officers currently in Department Head School - Congratulations! - you are among the small pool of candidates “predetermined” to command the first BBGN in 2036!

Actually, we should probably narrow it down a bit because they’re going to require AEGIS experience, so you are probably headed to a DDG as Weps/CSO.

That’s a pool of about 50-100 people.

So let’s talk about this ship a little bit. This article gives a good summary of the history of nuclear-powered surface ships, and a case for one now.

https://www.twz.com/sea/nuclear-powered-trump-class-battleships-will-reverse-one-of-the-navys-largest-mistakes-navy-boss

A couple of things to note as you prepare for the journey:

                  1.              It is going to be nuclear powered. The BBGN will use a Single reactor similar to the FORD class CVN. This will drive the training pipeline for the Commanding officer and many of the crew.

                  2.              It is about three times the size (displacement) of a DDG. It is about half again as long. Maneuvering it will be interesting!

                  3.              It will probably have a crew about 1000. More on this later!

                  4.              It will have several weapons which are not in the fleet yet - this will likely require a specialized training pipeline.

Just a few things to watch along the way.

                  1.              Manning. While initial estimates are around 800, I suspect the final number will be around 1000. This accounts for Reactor Department, Helicopter Detachment, and the Command Staff. Also, as new weapons and sensors are added, they bring operators and maintainers.

                  2.              Maintenance. The acquisition community often tries to save money in this area, placing a burden on the crew. Watch the maintenance workload closely. Steam plants in particular are maintenance intensive.

                  3.              Watchstandiing. Despite my attempts to get the Navy to use a 4-Section watch rotation, your ship will be built around three sections. There may be an attempt to combine some traditional watch positions or replace them with automation. That often falls short. Combine with a fleet manning average of about 85% Fit/90% Fill, and you will need to watch for fatigue.

                  4.              Deployment Cycle. You probably won’t be tied to the CVN schedule and will probably have your own “Battle Group” – with an Admiral embarked! But plan on long deployments - by 2036 one year will probably be the norm. Port visits may be few and far between due to your size, power requirements and being nuclear powered.

                  5.              Your career path will be challenging but rewarding. Expect to be on sea duty for awhile:

  DDG XO/CO - CVN RO – BBGN CO

This adds up to about 8-10 years total, with a few schools in between. I recommend knock out a Joint tour as a LCDR; there will be no time after that!

In the end, you should be excited. Assuming it gets built, despite the political headwinds and engineering challenges, it really will be the most powerful warship the world has ever seen. You will be in a position of great power, and of great responsibility. Continue to build your tactical and technical proficiency; and be a strong, positive leader. As my Dad said: Don’t forget where you came from! Speaking of which:

I (of course) recommend you get a copy of my book, Letters to Myself, (link here) with chapters on Technical Proficiency, Tactical Expertise, Self-Care, and Servant leadership:

As the Stoics said - this is your destiny.

Your journey starts now – be ready!

Years ago (2010) I was having a cigar on the bridge wing of the Carrier with my Strike Group Commander, an Aviation Admiral. “You SWO’s crack me up. In Aviation we hold two things dear - our accession training and our intermediate maintenance capabilities. Your community crumpled both up (eliminating SIMA and SWOS) and tossed them in the garbage. It’s gonna take five years to realize what a mistake that was, and another decade to rebuild what you had!”

He was correct on all counts. SWOS is back (renamed to the unpronounceable SWCS). But today’s post is about SIMA.

SIMA (Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity) Norfolk merged into the Mid-Atlantic Regional Maintenance Center (MARMC) in 2004.

• Merger: As part of the Navy’s regionalization efforts to streamline maintenance, SIMA Norfolk became part of MARMC in 2004.

• Context: This was part of a wider effort in the early 2000s to consolidate maintenance functions, similar to the consolidation of SWRMC in San Diego in late 2004.

• Significance: This shift marked the end of the traditional SIMA command structure as it had existed previously.

• Recent Developments: CNO has announced that Navy is planning to re-establish SIMA-like repair structures in Norfolk and San Diego as part of a renewed focus on fleet readiness.

Here is my take, based on 30 years of waterfront experience:

YIPPEE!

There are several advantages and opportunities that SIMA can bring back to the fleet.

1. Building Expertise. SIMA allows sailors to build expertise in their specialty while on shore duty. In the past, it was not uncommon for specialist to be assigned to shore duty completely disconnected from their skills. This resulted in poor school results when they headed back to sea, where skills atrophy to the point where it was difficult to bring them back up to speed after several years ashore.

2. Connection and Contribution. Keeping Sailors on the waterfront. By accomplishing more of intermediate maintenance, the burden on shipboard Sailors is reduced. Likewise, those in the SIMA or organization are visiting ships all the time making connections and taking notes about what ship they would like to seek orders to when they’re sure duty is complete. It will likely help retention.

3. Geographic stability. I cannot count how many Sailors told me that they really wanted to stay in their home port, but there were no shore billets available. The stand-up of SIMA should allow to stay where they are, keep their kids in the same school, let their spouse keep their job - and continue their upward mobility while refining their skills.

4. Flexibility. There is also an inherent flexibility in having sailors do some of these intermediate maintenance jobs. I can recall while in Command I was able to convince the Regional Maintenance Center leadership to just give me a fixed amount of welder Man-hours to conduct a few minor repairs. The contract welder who showed up was not used to having any flexibility and had very little initiative to meet the ship halfway. Working with Sailors can be different. A Post Major Command SWO Commanding Officer will bring autonomy and flexibility, as well as increased initiative.

I hope that a potential benefit could be the integration of Reserve Sailors into the SIMA organization. I often found that when an individual went from active duty to reserves, they were forced to convert to an entirely different rating and skill set because there were no billets available in the reserves. If SIMA is aligned to a Reserve unit, then there might be opportunities for continued service in the reserves while not having to relearn a new skill.

More here: https://blog.usni.org/posts/2019/07/30/send-in-the-reserves

Preservation could be a bright spot as well. We discuss this in a recent article:

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/january/give-navy-crews-painted-ships

It includes recommendations would relieve the burden on crews and enhance the material readiness of ships:

•  Reassign the majority of corrosion control maintenance from the organizational level (ship’s crew) to the intermediate level (regional maintenance centers). This aligns well with the new Chief of Naval Operations’ initiative to bring back the ships’ intermediate maintenance activities.

•  Create a focused “painting package” in each homeport using contracted painters from the regional maintenance centers and ships’ intermediate maintenance activities. Employ them on the waterfront during short maintenance periods, after longer underway periods, and just prior to deployments. This model could be built around a fixed number of man-days, a fixed amount of time (such as two weeks), or a fixed cost per ship.

•  Mirror the above effort with shore-based sailors and perhaps reservists. Ensure they get the training and experience necessary to become experts in all aspects of corrosion control and paint application so they can infuse the fleet with this knowledge when they return.

•  Include the CCAT (Corrosion Control Assist Team) to optimize tools and training for the interim periods and while on deployment when contracted resources are not available.

•  Expand the corrosion control van concept by adding support for ships’ additive manufacturing shops to create fasteners and other corrosion-resistant components. Use shore-based sailors to team with ships’ crews to swap out the components.

It is important for the Navy to give crews better technology and training in corrosion control. However, the most valuable currency on board ships is time. Sailors do not have enough of it. Providing them with a properly painted ship as a starting point would buy time to spend on more important tasks that directly relate to their ratings and warfighting, and it would improve recruiting, retention, and lethality.

Training. The other capability that SIMA can bring to the fleet is training. They have much of the gear that is found aboard ships and the test equipment to perform infrequent maintenance. Back in the day I used to send my Sailors over there to shadow the technicians and practice with the experts on the same equipment we had. With today’s modern technology, they could probably leverage this expertise to produce training materials like videos (think YouTube meets HGTV!) to further improve fleet, proficiency, and self-sufficiency. One point of synergy could be the NAMTS program, where sailors, perform maintenance actions the count towards civilian certifications and also increase their own level of knowledge.

More here:

https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/RMC/CNRMC/Our-Programs/NAMTS/

Summary. In the end, in addition to addressing many of the fleet’s near-term challenges in maintenance and preservation, SIMA will act like a pinball machine accelerator, adding energy and momentum to careers of the Sailors who go there - and propelling them back to the fleet with an increased level of proficiency.

It is a HUGE win. BZ, CNO!

“Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle has directed that U.S. naval aviators will no longer be allowed to command amphibious warships—specifically amphibious assault ships, transport docks, and dock landing ships—which will now fall under surface warfare officers only, as part of an effort to improve amphibious‑ship readiness by putting in command officers with deeper, career‑long expertise in ship maintenance, damage control, and complex amphibious operations.

The move breaks a long‑standing tradition of assigning aviators to these vessels to satisfy a “deep‑draft” command requirement for future aircraft‑carrier command eligibility, and the Navy is now studying whether that requirement should be reduced or eliminated for aviators destined for nuclear‑powered carriers. (USNI News)“(Story here).

From what I’ve seen so far, the responses have been mixed about 50-50 positive and negative. The purpose of this post is not to agree or disagree, but to share some perspective from someone who has had two ship command tours and served on two aircraft carriers in senior leadership positions.

Just a quick primer on Major Command in the surface and aviation communities. In the surface community, there is ship command at the 06 level, and a Commodore position. The ships in question could be a cruiser, a large deck amphibious ship, or, more recently, an LPD 17 class or a new or DDG. In the aviation community there are generally two Major Command categories- one is a CAG and the other is a CVN Commanding Officer.

On paper, these positions are peers and equals, in every sense of the word. In general, any Carrier Strike Group fitness report peer group at the 06 level will consist of at least one of each category- ranked against each each other.

But this is where nuance enters the equation.

In the surface community, there is a definite difference between the amphibious community and the CRUDES community. Most officers by the time they reached the 06 level have specialize in one or the other. The same as true of a ship command at that level or a DESRON or PHIBRON. Again, technically equals, but not necessarily. In my career, I have seen superb officers in each of these categories. Although I don’t have statistics, it was always my impression that the most common path to Flag was the CRUDES Community, as a DESRON commander. From what I understand there are parallel community rivalries in Aviation between jet and rotary pilots.

To some extent I would submit that the ranking might depend on who the boss is. At a minimum, an aviation or surface Admiral probably has a better understanding of their own community and its needs than of the other. Most reporting seniors in my experience are very even handed, but there are certainly opportunities for either overt or covert bias.

As one (very) senior officer once told me in a leadership symposium, when talking about decisions like this one, “In the end it’s all about the FITREP - everything revolves around that”. This is where it gets interesting. Of note, the movement of the approximately 32 Amphibious Ship billets work offset the loss of about 27 Ticonderoga Class Cruisers. Mere coincidence I’m sure!

The CNO letter decries the state of amphibious readiness and the fact that it is at a lower level that other (read CRUDES) ships. This is true. He doesn’t specifically reference it, but with all of the data that INSURV collection processes, I suspect that they can tease out which ships had an aviation Commanding Officer during a maintenance period, which ones had a SWO, and how they performed at INSURV; I don’t have the data, but it would not surprise me if that was part of the decision process. Here’s an overall graph - the red line is Surface Ship readiness.

Charts of Surface, Submarine, and CVN performance on the operational demonstrations yields a rather striking comparison (source: INSURV Annual Report)

The challenge is that there are so many other factors at work in that equation. In my experience as the Force Maintenance Officer at a Type Commander staff, the money was generally divided into two buckets, AMPHIB and CRUDES. One thing I noticed was that when funding shortages occurred, it was fairly easy to get money to flow from the AMPHIB bucket into the CRUDES bucket, but almost impossible to get it to flow the other way. Some shipyards to have more experience with one type of ship and some tend to specialize, which can also lead to inconsistent performance over time. Manning levels is another issue that can be a differentiator. This all results in a multifactorial equation, in which the CO is but one of many factors; albeit a critical one. But is it more influential than manning or funding shortfalls? Probably not!

Regardless of the causes, given the 36 months cycle of the Operational Fleet Response Plan, it is likely that any outcomes that could be potentially tied to this decision are at least three to five years away. Any attempt to draw conclusions one way or the other inside that window would be disingenuous at best, probably based on a “one off”

That said, the SWO community took on a major pivot in 2017 following the deadly collisions that killed 17 sailors. They added an incredible amount of rigor to the training pipeline, including mandatory schools, go/no-go check points, observed exams, and an experience tracker. The CVN force did not follow suit. As noted in the investigation report from the collision involving the USS Truman, there is a significant difference in the amount of training and certification of Officers of the Deck who are qualified to drive surface ships versus those qualified to drive aircraft carriers. By the same token, and an aviation officer taking command of an amphibious ship at the 06 level has limited experience in both shiphandling and in managing surface ship maintenance. A friend of mine (aviation 06) who went through the pipeline in that position shared that he got almost 6 months of tactical seminars and training, including shiphandling, weapons employment, and damage control, but only two days on how to conduct a maintenance availability. He then spent two years in a maintenance availability and never got the ship underway. When I was teaching maintenance for the Navy, I found that the average Surface Warfare officer had participated in 3 to 5 maintenance availabilities of at least six months duration during the course of a 20 year career. That number for most aviators is generally zero.

So from an enterprise perspective, looking at ship maintenance, shiphandling, navigation, and overall combat and material readiness, the obvious solution is that which the CNO has now enacted. The potential risk of this decision lies in the aviation officer training path to CVN command.

Let’s talk about that for a little bit.

A while ago, Congress decreed (via Title 10 at the behest a Naval Aviation leadership) that the Commanding Officer of a CVN will be an aviation officer. Since these ships are nuclear powered, that imposes a requirement on anyone who would command them to be nuclear certified via a one year to 18 month certification and training program. The 06 is tossed into a classroom at Nuclear Power School with a bunch of ensigns, has to perform at the same level from a technical standpoint, and then has to complete a higher level school at Naval Reactors in order to be certified. Some don’t make it. The assumption is, they already have the knowledge to manage and operate and carrier air wing and a flight deck; ship driving can be learned, along with operating the nuclear plant.

The questions that is, why could the opposite logic not be applied to a Surface Nuclear Officer with a career similar to mine? Instead of a cruiser or a large deck amphibious ship, which most would say is essentially an aircraft carrier, could not some surface officers move into the CVN pipeline for major command? This would certainly involve another new pipeline where those officers would have to learn flight deck and Carrier Air Wing operations and safety in a relatively short amount of time compared to their aviation peers. Plus it’s the law, so it’s very unlikely to change - fun to talk about though!

Could they do it? Certainly. Are there risks involved? Certainly. Again in referencing the recent collision of the Truman, although it’s impossible to prove a negative, the preponderance of error was in the sweet spot of shiphandling and navigation, as well as fatigue, areas where the surface force has long established policies and procedures that are much more rigorous than the aviation community - even for those who drive the CVNs (of note, this was one of the recommendations from the report). So at the end of the day, when you count the three cards on the table: flight deck operations, ship driving, and nuclear propulsion, whoever you put in charge is going to have two that are strong and one that is weaker. The question is, which risk are you willing to take? I would submit the one that is off the table is nuclear expertise. To put a fine point on it, the increased risk the CNO is (potentially) accepting with this new policy is a slightly increased likelihood of a collision at sea involving an aircraft carrier at some point, but that may be years away; upcoming CVN CO’s for the next few years will have completed a ship command tour. The question will be how to mitigate that risk before the first CVN CO walks aboard without it. There is time to mitigate that risk. And there is a plan. I hope it works. Don’t want to see this again:

So here we are. The decision has been made, studies will commence, opinions will be shared. My personal opinion is that it will all even out in the end. If there is a dramatic increase in the readiness of amphibious ships at a cost of slightly increased risk to ship driving for the CVN force, perhaps that is a fair trade. Perhaps it would make sense to assign an 1110 (SWO) Executive Officer on future CVNs when the Commanding Officer has not held command of a ship before. The letter addresses other mitigations as well in some detail.

One thing I do know for sure. The only way to understand command at sea is to have command at sea.

To help round out the discussion, I’ll share some personal experiences. The following are a few quotations (first person, as accurately as I can recall) were either told to me or written about me during my time as an 06.

“John, the problem with your record is you spent way too much time at sea to make Flag!” (06 Detailer).

“Recommended for major command of a Cruiser but not a DESRON” (that was an actual note in my fitness report after I selected for major command).

After my Cruiser Command tour, I walked up to a leadership conversation between a flag officer (past Commodore) and a DESRON Commander. One put his hand on my shoulder and said “you’re welcome to stick around, but you won’t understand - you haven’t experienced leadership - not like a Commodore does.”

“John, you did a great job in Cruiser Command, but the carrier CO would never survive (ie, make Flag) being ranked anything but number one.” (FITREP Debrief).

(Note: The above are not “sour grapes” - hey, with my Nuke bonus as an 06, my pay was higher than a 2* SWO Admiral). Plus, I got to command a Cruiser - not long before that opportunity no longer exists.

To be clear, the CNO letter lays out a generous timeline for implementation that allows time to capture the potential secondary impacts of this change. Interestingly, the letter also directs the development of a new pipeline for CVN command, and a study of career path vs Flag selection. Chances are, the public will never see the results of these studies - too bad, they will be interesting! In the end, the letter represents a rather bold solution to a longtime issue. CNO could have conducted further research, but apparently this discussion has been going on for awhile and he saw enough to convince him to make the change.

So what comes next? We shall see!

I recently authored a book titled “Letters to Myself” (check it out here) summarizing a full career and have written a few “Letters to the New CNO” for Navy Times and the Center for Maritime Security) over the years (latest here). I have never been SECNAV, but I have one good friend and one USNA Classmate who have, and I read a book by another, (Vectors, by Thomas Modly - check it out here) so I figured “why not.” I also spent 30 years in the Navy, including a wartime ship command. I also spent 5 years with a shipbuilding company and 5 years as a GS. What’s different about this one is it’s in two parts: the first would be applicable to anyone coming into the job, and the second is to the new Acting SECNAV, under the presumption that he will be nominated and confirmed, which I believe may well be the case.

Here goes:

Mr. Secretary, first, CONGRATULATIONS! You have just been placed at the helm of the finest and most lethal Navy on earth. The Greek philosopher, Epictetus, once said that “Anyone can hold the helm when the seas are calm,” but they are certainly stormy now. You know what tasks you have before you, leading a nation at war with Navy and Marine forces front and center. You said it well in your short video:  

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1E3WV1bNzo/?mibextid=wwXIfr

So, here’s my advice after 45 years in the organization.

The Navy primarily consists of two main pillars: Sailors and Ships. I’ll admit to a Surface Warfare Bias, so let’s lump airplanes and submarines under “ships,” if nothing else, for alliteration!

Ships. We build great ones. They are incredibly complex, and the collaboration between the government and shipbuilders is crucial to our success. Never forget that shipbuilding is a business and often it serves two masters: the Navy and its Stockholders. Their efforts usually support both, but not always. From my time in both new construction on Active Duty and at a major shipbuilding company, I would say the biggest challenges are trust and transparency. I saw many examples on both sides where these were both present, and several where they were not. Any investment in U.S. Shipbuilding will eventually pay dividends, but it’s likely to take some time to build both of these traits. News like this is all too normal (link to shipbuilding delay here). Your actions will set the tone for those conversations. Don’t forget that the Government workforce has experienced some major cuts in manpower and churn lately with both DRP/DOGE and a Major Acquisition reorganization that’s still not fully understood by all. Shipbuilders suffer from a shortage of skilled workers, a problem that will be tough to overcome, much less to influence, even with an influx of money. NAVSEA is under a major restructuring; in my experience reorganizations alone rarely fix the core problems facing an industry. Often, they disrupt more than they repair. That’s not politics, it’s reality. I hope you are afforded the time to turn the tide, but it's a marathon, not a sprint. I wish you Fair winds and Following Seas in this effort.

Sailors. They are our greatest resource. They deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. They are are all strong and resilient, and doing an outstanding job in the waters off Iran. Here at home, they deserve a good place to live, shipboard and ashore, and a safe workplace. Their families bear much of the burden of their service, even more so in wartime during record breaking deployments. It’s possible to be both tough and compassionate, to push to the limits, both physical and mental, but still need a respite to rebuild. The VCNO effort on Sailor Wellness (building on four pillars: Exercise, Sleep, Nutrition, and Mental Health) is a great start. So are investments in barracks, public-private housing, and childcare on every base. Suicide prevention efforts built on connection and contribution, such as the Green Ribbon program, are great force multipliers. You Sailors - all of them - male, female, all races and religions (and sexual orientations) deserve consistent positive leadership; you can set that tone.

There is probably a third pillar – Naval Strategy - but you’ll get plenty of advice in that area, so I’ll leave that to the other experts.

Now a few thoughts directed at the incumbent: You have an enviable record as a Naval Officer and a Citizen. Our careers were actually quite similar, but I should acknowledge that as a white male from a middle class military family, my issue was not knocking down or opening doors, but choosing which open door to walk through. You had a very different path with many different obstacles. In fact, I view your career as a great example of a successful (and empathetic) immigration policy, and (you’re not going to like this), a shining example of all that is good about Diversity, Equity and Inclusion. The President even pointed this out in his proclamation on Pan-Asian American Celebration month.

You lived it as a leader, leading a diverse team and fostering inclusion, and ensuring equity of opportunity for all your Sailors. I have seen multiple posts from former shipmates of yours, all praising your passionate deck-plate leadership. I suspect you enjoyed some great meals during various “celebration months” on Active Duty, not thinking to yourself at the time, “Boy, can’t wait to get rid of this program”! I understand that in the current environment, you can’t say “Diversity is our Strength” aloud - but in your heart, I suspect you know it is true. Just substituting the word “multitude” for “diversity” (as in the below graphic from the White House) does not change the message.

As you visit the fleet, if you listen carefully, you will hear that many of your Sailors and Marines today are feeling disenfranchised by some of the political and cultural rhetoric. My two cents: ask them. Listen to them. I applaud your focus on Sailors and Marines, and your aggressive goals on reducing suicides. I hope you will review the 2023 SECNAV study on the impact of facial hair before implementing a potentially discriminatory beard policy - one that will create literally thousands of gaps at sea on an already stressed Naval force - at war - at a time when we can least afford it.

As an aside, I wish you’d back off on the “we don’t need…(leaf eaters, non-“alpha” people)” rhetoric. It’s unnecessary and divisive. You need good, dedicated and honorable people, no matter what they eat. You have them; lead them all - no need to alienate half of them.

Today you stopped being a politician and became a public servant. Think back to your first day at Annapolis and what motivated you then. Build on that. My father (a 30-year Navy EOD Mustang) gave me two pieces of advice when I entered the Naval Academy in 1980, and I’ll pass them on to you now:

1. Figure out what you are expected to do and do it.

2. Don’t forget where you came from.

I believe that you are the right person for the job, at the right time. Bravo. Here is wishing you every success!

John

——————

John Cordle is a retired Navy Captain who commanded two warships, earning the Bronze Star Award for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the U.S. Navy League John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.

What if Pete Hegseth was SECWAR and Elmo Zumwalt were CNO at the same time? Bear with me…

In chaos theory, the “butterfly effect” is the sensitive dependence on initial conditions in which a small change in one state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences in a later state.

The Butterfly Effect (2004) is a science fiction thriller starring Ashton Kutcher as Evan Treborn, a man who discovers he can travel back in time to alter traumatic childhood memories, but each change creates disastrous alternate realities in the present. The film explores the chaos theory concept of the title, showing how small changes can have massive, unforeseen consequences, leading to dark and twisted outcomes. In this example, the time traveler visits the past, steps off the trail and kills a butterfly. When they return to the present, the entire nature of the animal kingdom has changed dramatically. The simple act of killing a butterfly changed the world.

But on to this week’s story….

While attending the 50 year celebration of Women at the Naval Academy this past weekend, I indulged in a bit of “alternate reality” daydreaming. It was prompted by this article.

So come with me on a journey where Admiral Elmo Zumwalt has been CNO for about a year, and through use of the Greg Phillips Time Machine (look it up), Pete Hegseth is teleported from a Waffle House in Georgia to 1972 and is appointed Secretary of War. He fires Zumwalt for being “Woke” and immediately rescinds all Z-Grams. This is the “butterfly” that is killed, and the reforms that Zumwalt spearheaded don’t happen.

SO…..What does the Navy look like in 2026 on board the USS ROBERT E LEE (CVN 72) - (in this version of reality, President Lincoln was too “woke” to have a ship named for him. A real “Libtard”!). So ship names are slightly different. Here goes…

You walk up the brow of the ship and notice the 10 Commandments on a wooden board across from the Flags. You notice something about the watches on the quarterdeck and the crew:

No women (Z-Gran 117)

No beards (Z- Gram 70)

No Black Sailors* (Z-Gram 66)

Filipino Stewards (Z- Gram 66)

Bullying and Demeaning behavior is encouraged (Z-Gram 116)

Only Christian Chaplains (Z-Gram 66)

Full list here.

Other observations:

Lots of Sailors are out with the flu

There’s a video loop of Pulp Fiction Prayer playing on the mess decks

* Per the wishes of Senator John C. Stennis, ships are fully segregated - all Black or All White Crews. More: here.

I interrupt this Substack to report a strange, almost scary parallel between fact and fiction:

Yikes! I gotta call Ashton Kutcher!!

I think I’m going to go get a beer and leave the rest of the story to the reader’s imagination. This is all getting to real for me!

Have a great weekend!

I spent this weekend at a fantastic event, the USNA Women 50th Anniversary Celebration at the Alumni center. More on this great organization here. Over 1000 graduates and supporters gathered to mark this hugely significant milestone. There were panels, speeches, good food, great music (from my generation!) and lots of familiar faces. It was truly a Once in a Lifetime experience (literally!). As a member of the SWMC, (the only one; more here) It filled me with strongly felt emotions on opposite ends of the spectrum. I’d like to address them here.

Pride. I saw - and listened to - a former CNO. Several Admirals, Commanding Officers, Astronauts, and shipmates, all great leaders - who happen to be female. They were proud of their wartime accomplishments, and I was proud to listen to their stories on the Warrior Panel, shown below. These are not “Women Warriors”. They are simply Warriors.

Gratitude. For my friends, classmates and shipmates who showed up to gather, hug, share stories, and support each other. For the pioneers who broke down barriers, opened doors (and minds). For those women doing the nation’s business right now in Iran and around the world.

The Astronaut Panel was the most inspirational hour I’ve spent in years. My favorite comment from Astronaut Suni Williams on why Helicopter Pilots make great Astronauts, “There are no runways on the moon”. Her incredible story here.

Admiral Lisa Franchetti shared her story and leadership philosophy, and a common bond of having a mascot on our ships (You can read about mine here.) She also recognized Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (and the pushback he experienced) for his bold advocacy to drive change for Navy women. More here.

So to those on the panels and those who organized this event (and attended): From the bottom of my Navy heart - thank you 🙏.

But there was one additional emotion (for me):

Disappointment. Missing from this incredibly powerful and motivational event: Midshipmen. Navy Leaders. Active duty (in uniform). Why? Such events (10, 20, 30 and 40 year celebration events), which were previously actively supported by the Naval Academy, are now discouraged because they are labeled “DEI”. The young Midshipmen, just across the street, largely missed out on such an opportunity for advocacy, mentoring and exposure to such examples of success. One Navy officer shared that she had to take personal leave to participate. How profoundly sad. (Correction:?To be fair, I did see a few cMidshipmen but it could have been much better attended if more barriers were removed).

I’ll add a final one - embarrassment.

For SECWAR, SECNAV, CMC, CNO, (Correction from original post: USNA Superintendent did stop by), and other Navy leaders who were notably missing. They could have showed up for these women, like I did - even made a short video - but they chose not to.

As one participant shared with me -

“We don’t need their affirmation; but we deserve it”.

Looking Forward. But as many of the speakers noted, now is not the time to sit on laurels or to be bitter about recent events that might be setbacks. Now is the time, as one panelist said, to “seek out opportunities and take them; if they are not there, make them.”

If I have one overwhelming emotion, even as one of the few men in attendance, it was Belonging. The week was filled with positive energy and if there is a takeaway for junior folks, especially women, it’s that “We belong at every table, in every room.”

Amen.

Thanks to USNA Women for a superb event. You can be proud. Well done!

Just for perspective, I spent 30 years in the Navy of which 21 were on sea duty. I deployed seven times and served on nine different ships; my average deployment was about six months and my longest was 7.5 months in 2010.

Nothing I experienced in my 30 years approaches what the Sailors in the FORD Strike Group (including their Surface Escorts) are doing today. When we talk about breaking records on deployment, it’s more than just a number. We tend to compare the current deployment with the longest deployment ever. We ignore the fact that there’s a reason we haven’t deployed ships for that long in a while.

When the Navy deployed ships for Covid, keeping them at sea in order to preserve readiness, they broke records from the Vietnam era, which had stood for five decades.

As a Human Factors Engineer for the Navy, I studied the impact of stress and OPTEMPO on sailors and families. Don’t get me wrong, sailors are resilient. They generally find ways to cope with the stress of deployment and the separation from families by focusing on the mission. On one level when you get in that zone, as I can recall from experience, it almost doesn’t matter how long you’re out there. You just keep doing the same thing over and over again. You know that it’s important and you know that is what you trained for.

But science and the human brain have other things going on. Short term fatigue becomes long-term fatigue, and it starts to affect performance, memory, mood, and focus. The stress on families of running a household back home increases over time and becomes ever more apparent in emails and letters from home. This can induce a high amount of additional stress - as I experienced when my wife fell and broke both arms while I was on deployment. She tried to keep it from me, but I found out eventually, and the guilt that I felt for leaving her alone at that time was almost overwhelming. I know of at least once Sailor whose newborn baby arrived one week before the recent deployment and will probably be a year old when he sees his baby for the first time. Which of the readers has gone through that?

I see old farts like me saying things like “that’s what they signed up for and “welcome to the military” - but unless they served on a carrier in Vietnam, they probably don’t really know what they’re talking about. Personally, I never subscribed to the, “My life sucked so yours should too “attitude.

To be fair, the Navy has learned from the Covid events and deployed resources to assist these sailors in coping with the stress of deployment. FORD has an Expeditionary Facilities Dog which helps with stress. They have Deployment Resiliency Counselors (DRC) and a “fun boss“ as well as a “fit boss“ to help them relieve both mental and physical stress. Smaller ships, though, have none of these. They do have assigned Chaplains, but there seems to be a movement to reduce their role in counseling and training, which almost everyone I speak to in the service feels is a mistake. But of course they cannot say so, without fear of being retaliated against.

In a case of the FORD, as well as some of their escorts, the length of the deployment was extended by an Atlantic crossing into 4th fleet for counter drug operations. The burning up of resources for a questionable mission was so egregious at the CNO has since issued a statement that “a CVN presence is not required for this mission in the future”. He is trying to avoid future similar deployments, burning readiness unnecessarily as this one did.

In the end, the Sailors will return home to their families, and there are things we can do for them to help with the adjustment. Just as the ship will require additional maintenance than what was originally planned, the same is true for the crew.

Historically, the Sailors had great resilience on deployment, but things tend to deteriorate when they return to the real world. Things that I have seen done in the past and should be considered:

⁃ Adding additional mental health counselors and training on stress management during the period after deployment and in shipyards.

⁃ Expanding the DRC program to include smaller ships or at the Squadron level.

⁃ Extending post deployment leave periods beyond 30 days to allow for more recovery time.

⁃ Ensure all new parents receive full maternity and paternity leave watch their return.

⁃ Provide preferential detailing to those who completed this deployment.

⁃ Look at Sailor Support program such as operation Green Ribbon, very prevalent in the pack northwest area for expansion.

• - Accelerate the CNO vision of a “hedge force” by decoupling the Surface Ship deployment cycle from the CVN to rotate more ships through and sustain presence. I wrote about this here.

I am extremely proud of our sailors on deployment. They have accomplished things that have not been done in a generation. But record-breaking deployments take a toll - and it looks like these will continue for some time. It is important to establish support mechanisms - for both Sailors and Families - for the long game and recognize the uniqueness of the current situation.

To do otherwise would be failing our heroes.