I suspect that after reading this article, most of you will be left asking why select Western Nations (e.g., Canada, UK, Australia) continue to double down on policies aimed at transitioning their economies to a dependence on Chinese dominated so-called Clean Tech supply chains based on the argument that human CO₂ emissions are the control-knob of Climate Change.

Of course, the assumption is always that Climate Change since the Little Ice Age or Industrial Revolution, is equivalent to an Extinction Level Event.

The sciencey sounding mechanism declares that CO₂ absorbs outgoing long wavelength radiation (OLR) and redirects half of this radiation back to the surface, resulting in either enhanced surface warming as tropospheric CO₂ concentrations continue to rise or in a reduction in broadband OLR out the top of the atmosphere.

I will argue that while this mechanism may occur, the data shown in the cover image time series demonstrates the complete irrelevance of human CO₂ emissions in modulating the Earth’s broadband OLR.

For clarity, the cover image compares broadband OLR radiation measured through the top of the atmosphere using the CERES multi-satellite instrument series versus the 21st century record for human CO₂ emissions.

It is clear that CERES OLR data shows that there are two distinct regimes of behavior over the 21^st century record.

CO₂ emissions rise in a near monotonic manner in both 11 to 12 year periods, but decadal response of broadband OLR differs wildly between The Great Hiatus (2000 - 2012) and during the 2013 to 2024 regime that I purposefully call Global Brightening.

What follows is a break-down of the statistical metrics that are embedded alongside each regime in the cover image - understanding these numbers is the crux of how I am able to build my case.

The slope (m) of the linear regression equation (i.e., y = mx +b) tells you the direction (+/-) and size of the relationship, the R² tells you how much of the variation one variable explains in the other, and the p‑value tells you whether the relationship is statistically real or just something that could easily happen by chance.

The most commonly used threshold for a statistical p-value is p < 0.05.

A p-value < 0.05 implies that there is less than a 5% probability that the observed relationship (or a stronger one) would occur by random chance if no real relationship existed. Researchers typically treat a p-value below 0.05 as evidence of a statistically significant relationship.

Note that “E” in the cover image is Microsoft Excel’s equivalent for base-ten (10^x) scientific notation (e.g., E+3 = 1000 = 10³).

Regime 1. The Great Hiatus (2000 - 2012)

Summary Statistical Interpretation

Slope: ~0 (−4×10⁻¹²)
R²: 0.0045
p‑value: 0.85

Interpretation: During the Hiatus, the decadal regression slope is essentially zero, the R² indicates no explanatory power, and the p‑value shows the slope is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p » 0.05).

Problem: Feldmen et al measured downwelling IR radiation from rising CO₂ to be increasing by 0.2 Watts per square meter per decade in the 21st century. This represents a serious problem for CO₂ emissions as the control knob, a the regression line slope is essentially 0 with respect to CO₂ emissions AND surface temperatures during The Great Hiatus were found to be statistically stable. If surface temperatures rose during Regime 1 in proportion to this 0.2 Watts decadal forcing, then it could be argued that this higher temperature could explain the ~ 0 regression line slope. The R² and p-value put the final nails in the control knob coffin argument for the first decade of the 21st century.

Regime 2. Global Brightening (2013 - 2024)

Summary Statistical Interpretation

Slope: positive (≈ +2×10⁻¹⁰)
R²: 0.45
p‑value: 0.0004

Interpretation: Over the 11 years of Regime 2, the decadal regression line slope increased by 50x relative to Regime 1 and is found to be a positive value. Furthermore, the R² indicates moderate explanatory power, and the p‑value shows the relationship is statistically robust (p « 0.05). OLR increases by 1 Watt / m² / decade as CO₂ emissions rose by 3 billion tonnes per annum (tpa) between 2013 to 2024.

Problem: The existential problem here is both the sign and magnitude of the regression line slope. If CO₂ is indeed to control knob on OLR, the regression line slope should be negative to zero, but not a 50x larger positive number than measured in Regime 1. The R² and p-value suggest a probable relationship exists, but the direction is opposite to Feldmen et al’s measured decadal radiative forcing and is over 5x too large to have been produced by any radiative surface warming caused by rising CO₂ (35 to 38 billion tpa).

Figure 1 shows the corresponding CO₂ emission data, where I broke up the time series into matching intervals to regimes 1 and 2. During Regime 1, the average annual emission rate grew by 800 million tonnes -year-over-year, which dropped to 300 million tonnes over Regime 2.

Figure 1. Our World in Data annual average global CO₂ emission rate.

Thus, Figure 1 provides another level of criticism of the control knob hypothesis.

Even though human CO₂ emissions increase by 3x higher rates in Regime 1 than in Regime 2, it shows no statistical relationship between OLR and CO₂ emission exists.

Then when CO₂ emission growth rates drop by a factor of 3x, the regression line’s slope between OLR and annual CO₂ emission rate explodes in the opposite direction the CO₂ control knob hypothesis predicts.

Don’t worry, I am not about to propose that human CO₂ emissions and a minute downward radiative forcing of 0.2 Watts / m² / decade is giving rise to an OLR ventilation growth rate of 1 Watts / m² / decade.

That would defy the Law of Conservation of Energy.

My purposeful use of the phrase Global Brightening indicates that the Cloud Greenhouse Effect is mechanism behind Regime 2.

Before moving onto the next phase of this discussion, I must acknowledge the high R² values for both regimes in Figure 1.

When we replot annual averaged OLR versus regimes 1 & 2 as shown in Figure 2, the near equivalence of CO₂ emission rates with time becomes visually apparent. As in the cover image plot, I have included the linear regression and p - value statistics for both regimes to aid in comparison.

Likewise, we better visualize how interannual features are closely associated with the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO).

Figure 2. Annual average OLR plotted using Regime 1 & 2 time scales (top) and the interannual changes in OLR with (red) & without (blue) CO₂ radiative forcing adjustment.

This near equivalence between time and CO₂ emission rates must be factored into our rationalization of the statistical characterizations for both regimes, particularly as there is no plausible mechanism by which CO₂ emission rates can be responsible for an OLR growth rate of +1 Watts / m² / decade seen in Regime 2.

When we factor in the linear regression and p-value hypothesis testing on both temporal regimes (i.e., The Great Hiatus, Global Brightening) conducted on the OLR vs. Time data-set in Figure 2 and compare these against the same in the cover image (i.e., OLR vs. CO₂ Emissions) we find evidence confirming that human CO₂ emissions are a lower quality proxy for Time as a correlating variable.

Specifically we see that the R² and p-values are nearly identical.

Table 1. Comparisons of linear regression R² and p-value hypothesis testing from statistical analysis of two equivalent periods (The Great Hiatus / Global Brightening) in two related plots - OLR vs. CO₂ Emissions (Cover Image) and OLR vs. Time (Figure 2).

To further help visualize just how irrelevant our CO₂ emission rates are on OLR over both a decadal and interannual basis, I have taken annual Scripps Oceanography CO₂ concentration data and calculated the interannual radiative forcing (25 to 35 mW / m² / year) and positively adjusted the interannual OLR change (red).

This minute positive adjustment barely registers on the interannual OLR difference time series simply because of the shear magnitude contrast between both sets of numbers.

Specifically, interannual max to min differences in unadjusted annual OLR that can be larger than 1 Watt / m², while interannual CO₂ related radiative forcings are merely 25 to 35 mW / m² / year.

Figure 3 replots these time dependent interannual (+/- ∆) values against each other (i.e., Regime 1 vs. 2), as in the decadal comparison in the cover image, reveals another layer of confirmation of the lack of merit to a statistical significance of human CO₂ emission rate data.

Here is a summary of my interpretations of the data in Figure 3:

1. While linear regression slopes in both decadal regimes are aligned (negative) with the CO₂ control knob mechanism on a trajectory basis, the low R² and high p-values (» 0.05) are not.

2. Decadal differences between Regime 1 & 2 disappear.

3. Number of points in Quadrant 1 > Quadrant 4 as OLR peaks during El Nino events are higher than troughs are deep during La Nina events (Figure 2).

4. Again, the low R² and high p-values (» 0.05) discredit the utility of human CO₂ emissions in the interpretation and attribution estimation of interannual (+/- ∆) OLR values in relation to ENSO.

Figure 3. Scatter-plot of the interannual changes (+/- ∆) in the annual averaged human CO₂ emission rates and CERES measured OLR data points - 21^st century.

In closing to this phase of analysis, the key take away points are:

1. The p‑value analysis (aka hypothesis testing) of human CO₂ emission rates vs global annual averaged OLR across both decadal and interannual time scales, as part of null‑hypothesis significance testing (NHST), reveals no basis to the CO₂ control knob hypothesis.

2. Regression line and p‑value analysis of human CO₂ emission rates vs global annual averaged OLR across decadal time scales yield nearly equivalent results to the same analysis of global averaged annual OLR versus Time.

3. In view of the outcome of CO₂ control knob hypothesis testing, it is argued that Time is a more physically relevant variable than is human CO₂ emissions.

CONCLUSIONS

The CERES record does not behave like a system whose outgoing longwave radiation is throttled by the annual rise in human CO₂. Emissions climb in both halves of the twenty-first century.

Broadband OLR does not.

From 2000 to 2012 the regression of OLR on emissions is flat, R² is near zero, and the p-value cannot reject a slope of nothing. That is the same decade in which surface temperature stalled.

A 0.2 W m⁻² per decade downwelling increment from CO₂ cannot be the control knob if the planet’s measured heat leak to space does not move with emissions and the surface does not warm in proportion.

From 2013 to 2024 the relationship flips the wrong way. OLR rises about 1 W m⁻² per decade while emission growth slows. The slope is positive, statistically robust, and several times larger than any CO₂ forcing of the surface could close in the energy budget.

Conservation of energy forbids treating that ventilation as a CO₂ greenhouse increment.

The timing matches a weaker cloud greenhouse—Global Brightening—not a stronger CO₂ lid.

Interannual scatter adds nothing for the control-knob case. Year-to-year OLR swings of a watt dwarf the 25–35 mW m⁻² from the Keeling increment. Points cluster with ENSO, not with emission steps.

OLR versus time yields the same R² and p-values as OLR versus emissions, because emissions are a smooth clock. Time, clouds, and the tropical Pacific organize the signal. Human CO₂ emissions do not.If Western energy policy rests on CO₂ as the knob on Earth’s heat loss, this record does not support the claim.

A Subscriber, who I admire and appreciate as a Friend, wrote me after my last Substack article and encouraged me to write on the topic of “Wildfires and Climate Change.”

We can hardly spend 5 minutes on social media or read mainstream media news over the past few summers, without hearing the repeated narrative that “rising temperatures cause forest fires” and of course, what is implied is that “warming is caused by human CO₂ emissions.”

To me, the strategy is obvious and brilliant.

INTRODUCTION

In this article, I will focus on the following topics and by doing so, I hope you will come away with a greater understanding of this complex topic that is plagued with failed policies, disinformation and yes, complicated by Climate Change.

1. Climate Change is not evidence of Human Causation; it is largely of natural origination and humans are a minor perturbation to the Earth’s radiative balance.

2. The Plant Kingdom is rapidly expanding in area and density, driven by more optimal climatic conditions and atmospheric composition (e.g., CO₂, NOx, H₂O).

3. The Boreal Forest ecosystem requires reqular, low intensity fire to germinate and to recycle nutrients and older coniferous forests are lower biodiversity and lower overall productivity ecosystems.

4. On a global basis, both the per annum rate an total area burned by wildfires has been declining, driven largely by reductions across grassland, savana, brushlands and agricultural landscapes, while Boreal Forest fires appear to be on the rise.

5. Canada is an anomaly by showing a growth in total area burned as forest fire frequency has declined.

Now let us begin.

1.0 CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT EVIDENCE OF HUMAN CAUSATION

I open with this one-liner, because of the open perversion of climate science with this popular narrative that Climate Change = Anthropogenic Global Warming.

Routinely, I argue that evidence of environmental change is hardly evidence of human causation. A new set of data that I have derived in an attempt to demonstrate these false claims are without merit is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 compares the Undetrended Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) in sea surface temperature (SST) versus the global ocean sensible plus latent heat flux anomalies and includes their linear regression plot and R-squared value. The following describes the steps I used in creating the global heat flux anomaly and the citations for the data source is embedded in Figure 1:

1. The global average ocean heat content (0 - 2000 meter depth) anomaly was converted to an equivalent sensible heat flux by dividing each year value by the area of the planet and the number of seconds in a year.

2. The global average precipitation anomaly was converted to an equivalent latent heat flux by converting inches to mass and multiplying by the heat of vaporization of water, followed by dividing each year by the area of the planet and the number of seconds in a year.

3. Summing both heat flux time series over 1955 to 2018.

Figure 1. Global ocean sensible + latent heat flux anomaly versus the undetrended Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) and its regression line.

The regression line and its R-squared value of 0.7 obtained from the scatter plot of both of these data products shows that my global sensible + latent heat flux exhibits a comparable time dependence to the famous AMO time series.

This plot is not introduced to imply the AMO is causative of these globally estimated changes in ocean heat content and precipitation. Rather, it is used here to show that the rate of change of these two separate but related physical properties, follows a multidecadal cycle analogous to the AMO with a periodicity of 60 - 80 years.

Furthermore, the difference between 1970 and 2010 shows an approximate slope of 3.5 Watts per square meter per decade.

This later point is extremely important, for it represents the magnitude or rate by which the Hydrological Cycle accelerated over three decades - an effect.

When we examine the literature for estimates of the magnitude or slope of the CO₂ downwelling IR radiation curve, produced by rising CO₂, we find that this value increased by a mere 0.2 Watts per square meter per decade - a theoretical cause or force.

Figure 2. Measured rate of increase in CO₂ downwelling IR radiation over the early 21st century.

So the trillion dollar question is how can a decadally increasing force of magnitue 0.2 give rise to an effect of magnitue 3.5?

That is well over an order of magnitude descrepancy and it represents a complete failure of logic in that is defies basic energy conservation principles.

Therefore, if we assume the tropospheric CO₂ growth rate is entirely due to human influence, clearly Climate Change does not equal Anthropogenic Global Warming. I have written extensively on this topic and have argued that insufficient evidence to suggest we are responsible for rising tropospheric CO₂ concentrations and that this measured trend is of natural origination.

2.0 THE PLANT KINGDOM IS RAPIDLY EXPANDING

The literature is extremely clear on the fact that the Plant Kingdom is rapidly expanding across every continent. The reasons for this trend are numerous and they include rising tropospheric CO₂ concentrations, higher global average precipitation rates, warmer temperatures and elevated rates of NOx deposition.

Figure 3 shows the classical representation of the dependence of net photosynthetic rates on leaf - ambient temperature and tropospheric CO₂ concentration.

This illustration by Bruce Dunn, from the University of Oklahoma, is commonly used to explain by CO₂ injection into commercial greenhouses gives rise to higher yields and growth rates. The upper curve represents the net photosynthetic rate commonly observed at higher CO₂ concentrations and it shows that the optimal photosynthetic state moves to higher temperatures.

Figure 3. Relationship between leaf temperature and net photosynthetic rate at ambient and CO₂ elevated condition in Populas grandidentata (Jurik et al., 1984). Redrawn by Vince Giannotti

Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates why the Plant Kingdom is able to increasingly thrive under more arid conditions as tropospheric CO₂ concentrations rise and why satellite measurements show many deserts are receding in the face of advancing plantlife.

Dan Zhu et al (2025) in their Nature Reviews publication argues that global mean vegetation greenness reached a record high in the year 2025, extending the multi-decadal upward trend. A total of 68.2% of vegetated land surfaces experienced greening, particularly in grasslands and croplands in the Southern Hemisphere and in northern mid-latitudes. Herbaceous ecosystems dominated the 2025 greening signal, with 72.1% of grasslands and 77.6% of croplands exhibiting greening. Greening hotspots observed in southern Africa, southern South America, northern Australia, Europe, central North America and northern China align with precipitation increases.

As discussed in my recent Substack article titled Hadley Cell Expansion and the Re-Greening of Africa, I show that numerous arid regions are experiencing expanding plantlife, where increases in both temperatures and precipitation are positively correlated.

This highlights that CO₂ fertilization is not acting alone and in fact, as required by mass action laws applicable to photosynthesis, H₂O is required in CO₂ sequestration in plant matter.

Of course, any increase in atmospheric total water content and precipitation, will require an acceleration in the Hydrological Cycle, which is in essence what Figure 1 represents. Coincidently, Figure 4 illustrates this multidecadal change in the global ecosystem water-use efficiency anomaly (WUE), where WUE is the ratio of carbon gained by photosynthesis (gross primary production) to H₂O lost through evapotranspiration.

C_a / VPD (red curve) anomaly is the ratio of the tropospheric CO₂ concentration divided by vapor-pressure deficit, which captures the competing effects of rising CO₂ (which tends to raise WUE) versus rising atmospheric dryness (VPD, which tends to lower WUE).

Figure 4. Changes in global photosynthetic water use efficiency and vapor pressure deficiency versus multidecadal changes in global sunshine intensity.

By juxtaposing Martin Wild’s 2012 data against Fei Li et al’s global photosynthetic water use efficiency and vapor pressure deficiency anomaly, I am arguing that it is changes in sunshine intensity or cloud cover - type that ultimately is driving the multidecadal changes in the Hydrological Cycle required to mass balance CO₂ uptake through Global Greening.

Comparing Figure 1 and 4 reveals complementary periods of globally coherent steep changes (1980 to 2000) in sunshine intensity and global photosynthetic water use efficiency and vapor pressure deficiency, which level off in the first 10 to 15 years of the 21st century.

Much like the AMO, which is increasingly viewed as a proxy of the multidecadal changes in the North African and Indian Summer Monsoon.

Now we move away from global generalizations and switch gears to focus on the World’s largest terrestrial ecosystem - the Northern Hemisphere Boreal Forest that covers 11 % to 14 % of the Eath’s terrestrial surface.

Figure 5 shows a recent publication by Min Feng et al that makes extensive use of satellite remote sensing data to extrapolate the northward shift of the Boreal - Arctic Tundra interface over the period of 1985 to 2020. I will leave the details on their methods for you to explore.

What caught my attention from this study, was not just its hemispheric scale, but the fact that it like other studies, shows that the Boreal Forest is expanding northward by approximately 10 to 15 km per year over the 35 years of data examined.

Figure 5. Spatial and temporal distribution of boreal tree cover change from 1985 to 2020. Map: significant net gains (green-blue) and losses (orange-red) of tree cover over the boreal biome. Bar chart (top-right): linear regression slope of tree cover over time, stratified by latitude. Time series (bottom): northward migration of the distribution of mean and median latitude of tree cover.

Note that the greatest expansion in tree cover in this study is found between 63N to 68N and that there is a stagnation - contraction along 49N to 52N.

The second example of a northward migration of the interface between the Boreal Forest and Tundra ecosystems is shown in Figure 6. This earlier study by Giona Matasci et al used similar remote sensing techniques to those by Min Feng et al and it too, shows an abrupt growth in younger above ground biomass and an expansion of canopy cover along the polar extent of the Canadian Boreal region over the time frame of 1984 - 2016.

Figure 6. Difference (2016–1984) maps of forest structure attributes (a) canopy cover (cover_2m), (b) canopy height (elev_p95), (c) total aboveground biomass (ag_biomass), and (d) Lorey’s height (loreys_height) using Lansat time series and Lidar plots.

Equally important is the distribution of lighter colors along lower latitudes relative to the darker colored northern expansion. This suggests that this lighter colored zone is not experiencing the same net growth as regions further north over this time frame.

This lower net growth zone is due to a complex pattern of logging, changing climatic conditions and to increased frequency of forest fires.

Starting first with the most important climate indicator - total precipitation records.

To answer this question, I introduce a full century total annual precipitation record from Fort McMurray, Alberta, which is located in the very bullseye of Canada’s Boreal Forest (57N x 111W).

Note the following:

1. 21st century total precipitation levels mirror the levels seen in the early 20th century - a natural cycle.

2. Monthly precipitation records show that +75% of total precipitation comes in the form of rain during the non-winter months.

3. There is a 3x fold difference between maximum (1970s) and minimum precipitation levels.

Figure 7. Fort McMurray, Alberta, total precipitation records, together with a model of the multidecadal migration pattern of the polar jet stream and its storm track.

At this point in my intensive research, I am invoking a hypothesis that argues that the polar jet stream over North America, together with its storm track, have undergone a multidecadal pattern longitudinally over the past century.

1. The Arctic Polar Cell and its polar jet stream has contracted poleward twice over the past century and its areal extent southward reached a maximum during the 1970s.

2. As the polar jet stream migrated southward (northward), Fort McMurray at 57N received more (less) precipitation.

3. As such, total precipitation is proxy for the Arctic Oscillation Index, which is the Northern Hemisphere analog to the longer studied Southern Annular Mode (SAM) of the Southern Hemisphere - same atmospheric physics applies.

4. The early 20th century poleward expansion of the North American polar jet stream coincided with the concurrent positive phases of the North Atlantic - Pacific sea surface temperature cycles.

To test the later literature claim, I plotted the inverse total precipitation record at Fort McMurray versus the undetrended AMO and as shown in Figure 8, it is clear that a negative correlation exists, which appears to get stronger in the latter half of the 20th century.

Note, Figure 8 is not an argument for an AMO influence on Boreal Forest precipitation trends - it is simply my way of showing two effects, with similar temporal dynamics.

Figure 8. Inverse total annual precipitation records from Fort McMurray, Alberta (57N x 111W) versus the undetrended AMO time series.

By emphasizing long term precipitation data, specific to Canadian’s Boreal Forest region, we set the stage to show that the 21st century has been droughty for this region relative to the middle of the 20th century.

Note that the lowest total precipitation in a century in Fort McMurray (2011) coincided with the second largest forest fire since 1950 in Alberta.

The Alberta Athabasca region’s 2011 Richardson Fire burned over 700,000 acres of Boreal Forest - I lived in Fort McMurray during that fire and it was epic.

It is crucial point out that the multidecadal rise in precipitation shown in Figure 7 from the early to middle 20th century was not unique to Fort McMurray - it was part of Canada wide phenomenon.

I am presently embarking on an expanded research project that examines centennnial scale precipitation and air temperature data, extending from Canada, to Greenland and Europe. Careful attention will be made to both latitude x longitude, in an effort to expand further on the idea that multidecadal trends are phase locked with changes in the mean zonal position of the Northern Hemisphere’s polar jet stream or AMO.

In conclusion to this section, I will simply state that on a global average basis, the biosphere has been rapidly accumulating biomass, since the natural climate tipping point of the late 1970s, where sunshine, the Hydrological Cycle and tropospheric CO₂ concentrations entered a multidecadal phase of collaboration.

In essence, this means wildfire fuel has been stockpiling.

The Boreal Forest’s poleward migration since the late 20th century, coincides in parallel with the northward displacement of the polar jet stream and its associated storm track. This trend is giving rise to droughty conditions along lower latitudes over which the majority of the Boreal Forest is concentrated.

The conditions for enhanced Boreal Forest fires is therefore increasing.

3.0 BOREAL FOREST ECOSYSTEMS, WILDFIRES AND ECOSYSTEM VITALITY

While the previous sections were global in their generalizations, this section focuses on the boreal forest ecosystem. The Boreal Forest ecosystem is unique to the extratropical Northern Hemisphere and is the largest zonally coherent forest system on the planet (11% - 14% land surface area).

The Boreal Forest is a disturbance‑adapted biome whose long‑term stability depends on recurring, low‑to‑moderate intensity wildfire.

Far from being an episodic catastrophe, fire is the central ecological process governing regeneration, nutrient cycling, species composition, and productivity across northern coniferous landscapes. The structural and functional characteristics of the boreal forest cannot be understood without recognizing the evolutionary role of fire and the consequences of its absence.

A defining feature of many dominant boreal species is serotiny — an adaptation in which cones remain closed until exposed to the heat of fire.

Jack pine, lodgepole pine, and portions of black spruce populations exhibit this trait, ensuring that seed release coincides with conditions favorable for establishment:

• Fire exposed mineral soil

• Reduced competition for newly emergent sapplings

• A pulse of nutrients liberated from combusted organic matter.

Johnson’s comprehensive analysis of boreal fire regimes demonstrates that these species evolved under fire return intervals typically ranging from 50 to 150 years, and that their reproductive strategies are tightly coupled to this disturbance frequency.

Weber and Stocks show that fire acts as a nutrient reset mechanism, increasing the availability of nitrogen, phosphorus, and base cations, thereby enhancing early‑successional productivity relative to older stands. This nutrient pulse is essential for maintaining long‑term forest productivity in a biome otherwise constrained by cold temperatures and short growing seasons.

The biodiversity consequences of fire exclusion are equally significant. Older coniferous stands tend toward structural homogeneity: closed canopies, sparse understories, and limited habitat heterogeneity.

Figure 9. Late stage successional low diversity state of the Boreal Forest before a fire.

These conditions support fewer species and restrict ecological niches.

In contrast, fire creates a shifting mosaic of stand ages and compositions, generating the spatial heterogeneity required by many boreal birds, mammals, and understory plants. Bergeron and colleagues demonstrate that recurring fire maintains landscape‑level biodiversity by preventing late‑successional dominance and promoting mixedwood development, which supports higher species richness and functional diversity.

Figure 10. Early stage open structure and diverse state of the Boreal Forest after a fire.

Taken together, these dynamics illustrate a fundamental principle: the Boreal Forest is not a climax ecosystem but a disturbance‑regulated system. In classical ecology, a climax ecosystem is the end‑point of succession:

• Stable

• Self‑maintaining

• Dominated by long‑lived species

• Capable of persisting indefinitely without major disturbance.

Temperate hardwood forests in the eastern U.S. or old‑growth coastal rainforests in British Columbia fit this model reasonably well. If left alone, they tend toward a predictable, mature state.

The Boreal Forest cannot reach — and is not designed to reach — a stable, disturbance‑free climax condition. Its dominant species (jack pine, lodgepole pine, black spruce) are fire‑adapted, fire‑dependent, and in many cases fire‑obligate.

Their reproductive strategies assume that fire will occur on a predictable cycle.

This means:

• The boreal forest requires disturbance to maintain its structure and function.

• Fire is not an interruption of the ecosystem; it is the primary organizing force of the ecosystem.

• Without fire, the forest does not progress toward a stable climax state — it declines.

These principles, while well known among Indigenous peoples, have largely been forgotten by metropolitan policy architects - much to our detriment.

4.0 GLOBAL FIRE STATISTICS

Now that we have established a foundation based on fundamentals, it is time to switch gears to statistics. Figure 11 shows Copernicus data specific to 21st century yearly burned aera and the annual number of fires by ecosystem type - croplands, forest, shrubs/grasslands, savannas and other.

Pay close attention to total yearly burned areas, together with ecosystem type and yearly number of fires.

Africa, Asia and European Union stand out by showing strong declining trends for both over the two decades of data listened at the Copernicus website, driven predominately by reductions in fires over shrublands / grasslands and croplands.

North America, South American and Oceania shows limited evidence of any trend on a total area burned basis and other than Oceania, show a shallow reduction in annual total fire count.

Missing is the Russian Confederation.

Figure 11. 21st century yearly burned area and annual fire rates by region - Copernicus data.

Now, when I have shown this data to people on social media, when debating whether forest fires are increasing, I am regularly reminded that this data is dominated by statistics from other ecosystem types.

I remind people that ecosystems such grasslands, shrubs and savannas are uniquely fire prone by virtue of the fact that they are low precipitation landscapes, while forested ecosystems are less so.

Forests only exist where sufficient rainfall exists to support their higher evaportranspiration load.

Now lets dive into the statistics specific to forest ecosystems.

The World Resources Institute (WRI) provides a useful frame of reference, with numerous recent publication references, which shows the active research into quantifying how 21st century forest fires are changing.

Figure 12 is an extract from a WRI literature review article, which quantifies select literature estimates on annual tree cover loss by fire from 2001 to 2025, as a function of forest ecosystem type.

Note that the Boreal Forest fires are the dominant signal.

Figure 12. 21st century forest fire statistics by forest ecosystem type - WRI.

A closer examination of the Boreal Forest specific statistics shows that Russia is the dominant source of the signal. Figure 13 compares annual Boreal Forest cover loss for both Canada and Russia, shows that the latter has exhibited a positively trending area burned, while the former has been relatively constant until the last three years prior to 2025.

Clearly Russian fires are dominating the signal.

Figure 13. Canadian versus Russian Boreal Forest annual forest cover loss to fire - WRI.

The fact that the middle latitude Boreal Forests are the primary signal source for global forest fires in the 21st century is an important fact to bear in mind.

At this point, I suspect it is because the tropics are benefiting from rising precipitation, while the middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere is experiencing low precipitation as per the ideas expressed in the previous section.

Indeed, the poleward migration of the polar jet stream and its precipitating storm track, is indeed evidence of Climate Change. However, as this discussion started, there is no physical basis with any merit to argue that modern Climate Change is due to rising CO₂ concentrations.

In conclusion to this section, I will summarize global total area burn stats that simply shows the opposite of the common narrative - total being all ecosystem area types - not just forests (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Total global annual burn area from Our World in Data - all ecosystem types.

5.0 CANADIAN FOREST FIRE STATS

This article ends with a focus on Canada and the central reason is because the longer term record shows larger forest fires have been increasing since the 1950s, while total forest fire count has been decreasing since the 1980s.

First, I will begin by showing a figure by Chelene C. Hanes et al that I have modified with green highlighting. In Figure 15, Chelene C. Hanes et al shows the distribution of major fires across Canada by decade from 1959 to 2024.

I added the green band to show the approximate area of newer Boreal Forest that has developed since the 1980s - note that I added this green band because of the absence of fires identified in this study along this younger forested zone - in line with Figure 6.

Figure 15. Spatial distribution of burned areas over the last 66 years in Canada across ecozone boundaries.

The key figure from Chelene C. Hanes et al that I want to emphasize is shown in Figure 16, which shows the time series for fire size class in both area and percentage of total area burned between 1959 to 2024. The take-away point is that irrespective of size class, forest fires in Canada are increasing in size per event.

Figure 16. National annual area burned (left panel a to (e)) and percent annual area burned (right panel f to j) by size classes 1959–2024. Solid trend lines p < 0.05 and dashed lines are not significant.

Now for the linchpin dataset.

Figure 17 displays the segmented trend in the annual number of fires of all sizes across Canada from 1959 to 2024. It shows a statistically significant increase in fire frequency from 1959 until a peak around 1988, followed by a sustained decline thereafter. This pattern, together with Figure 16, underpins the paper’s central finding that, while total fire numbers have fallen since the late 1980s (largely due to improved detection, prevention, and suppression), the remaining fires have grown larger and more destructive.

This is a concerning long term trend and it signals an unsustainable ecological trajectory.

Figure 17. Segmented trend in all Canadian fires since 1959 - Chelene C. Hanes et al.

As we approach the end point in this deep dive, I want to show the sum total of all size class fires versus the annual number of fires from the Canadian National Fire Database (CNFDB). Figure 18 helps bring perspective on the scale of the recent highs in 2023 - 2025 relative to the annual area burned from 1970 to 2025.

Figure 18. Canada - Wildland Fire Summary Stats.

Is it just me or do the last few years appear as an outlier?

If Climate Change is by norm defined by a longer term trend (e.g., Figure 16), what Figure 18 shows over the past few years is hardly consistent relative to the decadal trend.

It the last few years due to a sudden drought intensification? How about arson?

In conclusion, I will leave you with a photo I found just this evening as I am wrapping up this multi-day research and writing endeavor. A British Columbia Forester posted to LinkedIn the photo shown in Figure 19, apparently taken from a location in the southwestern region of the province at an elevation of 1200 - 1400 meters above sea level.

The Forester was alarmed by the successive mortality that is occurring.

When I look at this forest, I am reminded of the same level of successive mortality and fuel loading accumulation that I witnessed while living in Fort McMurray prior to the Richardson Fire of 2011.

Figure 19. Photo taken in late stage conifer forest in British Columbia in 2026.

Let me conclude this final section by saying that:

1. Long term fire suppression.

2. Optimal climatic conditions from the 1950s to the late 20th century.

3. Declining logging over the past few decades.

Each of these factors have collectively given rise to a near perfect condition where fuel loading in older Boreal Forest zones in Canada have reached unsustainable levels.

These factors, have reached a tipping point over the past decade with persistent droughty conditions as part of a natural cycle in precipitation. All that is required is an ignition source to set in motion a rise in very large intense forest fires in Canada.

Climate, economics and policy - a complex mix of factors.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence examined throughout this article demonstrates that the dominant public narrative linking wildfires primarily to human-caused warming via CO₂ is both incomplete and misleading. Climate change itself is real and ongoing, yet it is largely an expression of natural multidecadal and longer-term oscillations in ocean–atmosphere systems, sunshine intensity, and the hydrological cycle—processes that dwarf the radiative contribution of rising CO₂.

Concurrently, the global plant kingdom has expanded vigorously under higher CO₂, increased precipitation in many regions, and warmer conditions, accumulating substantial biomass and, in the boreal zone, creating dense fuel loads.

Within the Boreal Forest—the planet’s largest terrestrial ecosystem—fire is not an aberration but an essential ecological process that resets nutrients, enables serotinous regeneration, and sustains biodiversity. Long-term fire suppression, favorable mid-to-late twentieth-century climate, and reduced logging have allowed fuel to accumulate to critical levels, particularly in older stands.

Canadian data illustrate the resulting paradox: total fire frequency has declined since the late 1980s while individual fires have grown larger and more intense, especially under recent drought. Globally, overall burned area continues to fall, driven mainly by reductions outside forest ecosystems.

Policy that treats every large fire as proof of catastrophic anthropogenic warming risks perpetuating failed suppression strategies while ignoring the natural role of fire and the complex interplay of climate, vegetation, and human management. A more honest approach recognizes natural climate variability, the ecological necessity of fire, and the need for adaptive, landscape-scale management rather than simplistic attribution.

Only then can we move beyond disinformation toward resilient forests and informed public discourse.

This article is written to address the all too common narrative the natural gas or liquified natural gas is a bridge to a Net Zero global economy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

North American LNG export capacity is expanding rapidly, approaching 127 MTPA of operational capacity as of mid-2026 and on trajectory to reach approximately 190 MTPA by the end of the decade [1]. Asia, led by China and India, consumes coal at a scale that dwarfs any single energy substitution in recorded history. China alone consumes an estimated 4.5–4.8 billion tonnes of coal annually, a quantity roughly ten times the total volume of all LNG traded globally in 2024 [2]. India crossed one billion tonnes of annual domestic coal production for the first time in FY 2024–25 [3]. Against this backdrop, the central question examined in this paper is whether North American LNG can structurally penetrate and displace meaningful volumes of Asian domestic coal consumption or whether the economics, infrastructure, and sovereign policy architecture of Asian coal markets represent a ceiling that LNG cannot breach at current and foreseeable price levels.

The analysis is organized around five structural factors:

(1) The scale and trajectory of North American LNG supply;

(2) The scale and production economics of Asian coal;

(3) The coal sovereignty doctrines that anchor domestic coal in both China and India;

(4) The effect of the 2026 Strait of Hormuz blockade on Asian energy market dynamics;

(5) A sector-by-sector examination of where LNG and coal genuinely compete.

The conclusion is that LNG displacement of Asian coal is real but structurally bounded, occurring at the margin in industrial processing, fertilizer feedstocks, and isolated island power markets, while coal’s position in utility-scale power generation and state-owned heavy industry is deeply entrenched by both economics and sovereign policy. North American LNG’s most durable addressable market in Asia remains Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and gas-dependent Southeast Asian economies, not the two nations that consume the most coal.

SECTION 1: NORTH AMERICAN LNG EXPORT CAPACITY

The United States emerged as the world’s largest LNG exporter beginning in 2023, surpassing Qatar and Australia on a rolling twelve-month basis, a position driven by a decade of permitting, construction, and capital investment concentrated along the Gulf Coast of Texas and Louisiana [4]. The US export infrastructure build-out, anchored by Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi terminals, was subsequently joined by Dominion Energy’s Cove Point facility (2018), Freeport LNG (2019), Cameron LNG (2019), and Venture Global’s Calcasieu Pass (2022) [5,6]. The commissioning of Venture Global’s Plaquemines LNG terminal in 2025 added a further 20 MTPA of Gulf Coast capacity, while Cheniere’s Train 6 expansion at Sabine Pass contributed an incremental 6 MTPA.

Canada entered the Pacific-facing LNG export market in 2025 with the commissioning of LNG Canada Phase 1 in Kitimat, British Columbia, a Shell-led joint venture delivering 14 MTPA of capacity directly oriented toward northeast and southeast Asian buyers [7]. Combined operational capacity as of mid-2026 approaches 127 MTPA [8,9]. The construction and advanced development pipeline adds substantially to this base, with six major projects at various stages of completion expected to contribute an additional 65 MTPA by 2029.

The combined construction pipeline positions North America’s total export capacity at roughly 190 MTPA by decade’s end, surpassing Qatar’s pre-Hormuz blockade LNG output of approximately 110 MTPA and Australia’s approximately 80 MTPA [10,11].

The supply side, in other words, is not the constraint.

North American producers command access to feedstock gas often trading at $1.00–3.50/MMBtu in 2025–2026, providing a cost-competitive liquefaction input relative to global alternatives [12]. The limiting question is not production capacity but market structure: whether Asian coal-consuming economies are economically and structurally open to displacement at scale.

SECTION 2: THE SCALE OF ASIAN COAL — THE MARKET LNG MUST COMPETE AGAINST

The core analytical challenge in assessing LNG-for-coal displacement in Asia is one of relative scale. Asian coal consumption, dominated by China and India, is not comparable in magnitude to any energy market LNG has previously disrupted. It represents a structural baseline against which LNG’s growth, however rapid, must be measured in single-digit percentage terms.

China

China is the world’s largest coal producer and consumer by a decisive and widening margin. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2025 Country Analysis Brief, coal accounted for approximately 62% of China’s primary energy consumption in 2023, with domestic production reaching approximately 4.7 billion tonnes, a record at the time of publication [13]. Production has remained elevated through 2024, with output expansion concentrated in Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi provinces [14].

Raw coal consumption grew 1.7% year-on-year in 2024 according to China Energy Transition Programme data [15]. For reference, total global LNG trade in 2024 was approximately 410–420 million tonnes in volume equivalent across all origins and destinations [16]. China’s coal consumption alone was roughly ten times that figure.

China’s LNG imports reached approximately 78 million tonnes in 2024, a 9% increase year-on-year, according to Kpler trade data cited by IEEFA [17.18]. Supply was sourced primarily from Australia (approximately 34%), Qatar (approximately 24%), Malaysia (approximately 10%), Russia (approximately 9%), and the United States (approximately 6%).

US LNG’s 6% share, approximately 4.7 MTPA, is volumetrically dwarfed by China’s domestic coal output, which exceeds US LNG imports by a factor exceeding 1,000 on a raw tonne basis.

The cost differential explains the asymmetry: large Chinese coal producers operate at full-cycle costs of approximately $65 per tonne in 2024–2025, having moderated from the $75/tonne range seen in 2021–2023 [19]. At a thermal conversion rate of approximately 25 MMBtu per tonne of coal equivalent, this translates to a mine-mouth energy cost of approximately $2.6/MMBtu for large Chinese operators, which is highly competitive with long-term delivered LNG at $10–14/MMBtu, and even more so than JKM spot prices of $17+ /MMBtu as of May 2026 [20].

These numbers must be framed in light of the fact that China’s coal mining capacity is slated to expand by an additional 25% by 2030.

India

India crossed a historic production milestone in FY 2024–25, extracting over one billion tonnes of coal for the first time, specifically 1,047 million tonnes, representing a 5% year-on-year increase, according to India’s Press Information Bureau and Ministry of Coal [21,22].

India is now the world’s second-largest coal producer by volume.

Coal accounts for 55–60% of India’s total primary energy mix and powers over 74% of total electricity generation; structural ratios that reflect both the scale of India’s power generation fleet and the economics of domestic extraction relative to imported alternatives [23,24].

Notably, India’s coal imports declined 8.4% in the April–December 2024 period, generating an estimated $5.43 billion in foreign exchange savings; an outcome explicitly framed by the Ministry of Coal as a measure of energy security policy success, not a market outcome [25].

The competitive reality established by this data is clear: LNG must displace a fuel that China produces domestically at approximately $65/tonne for large-scale operators, with smaller marginal producers at $100–130/tonne, as identified by Wood Mackenzie’s supply cost curves [26].

India operates its domestic coal base at substantially lower extraction costs, given shallower seam geology in many producing states, with Coal India Limited reporting average production costs well below those of Chinese peers [27]. At JKM spot pricing of $17/MMBtu as of May 2026, LNG carries a large premium over Chinese domestic coal on an energy-equivalent delivered basis, a premium that utility-scale coal consumers are structurally unable to absorb within their operating economics.

SECTION 3: COAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINES — THE STRUCTURAL ANCHOR

Beyond market economics, the displacement question must be assessed through the lens of what this analysis terms coal sovereignty doctrine, which is the explicit, codified state decision to maintain domestic coal production at strategically significant levels regardless of short-term import economics. This is distinct from a conventional market subsidy or regulatory preference. It represents a deliberate strategic posture in which governments treat domestic coal capacity as a hedge against import dependency, external price volatility, and geopolitical supply disruption.

China

China’s coal sovereignty is institutionally embedded. The 14th Five-Year Plan for Energy (2021–2025), promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), explicitly mandates the maintenance and expansion of domestic coal production capacity as a primary instrument of energy security [28].

This directive is not rhetorical: it has been operationalized through production quota expansions, emergency mine authorization, and administrative pressure on provincial governments to maintain output levels during periods of external supply volatility.

Chinese policymakers explicitly frame coal as the sea-calming divine needle or ballast stone (定海神针) of national energy security [29]. The phrase is drawn from the classic 16th-century novel Journey to the West (西游记), in which the 定海神针 is a pillar of immense magical mass used by the Dragon King to stabilize the seas; Sun Wukong later wields it as an all-powerful weapon.

In invoking this image, Chinese policymakers cast coal not merely as a fuel but as the singular stabilizing force upon which the entire energy order rests and as an asset whose removal would invite chaos. The rhetorical parallel is King Arthur’s Excalibur: just as Excalibur was inseparable from the legitimacy and power of the sovereign, coal in the Chinese framing is inseparable from the legitimacy of the state’s energy security guarantee.

The response to global LNG and coal price spikes in 2021–2022 is instructive.

When international LNG prices surged following supply tightening in Europe, China’s administrative response was not to accelerate LNG import contracting, it was to authorize emergency coal production increases, reopen idled mines, and expand output quotas across the Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Shaanxi coal basins [30]. The result was record domestic coal output in 2022 and 2023, sustained into 2024.

The state’s revealed preference, when faced with a choice between import price exposure and domestic production expansion, has been consistent and unambiguous.

The pipeline gas dimension reinforces this picture. Russia’s Power of Siberia 1 pipeline currently supplies approximately 22 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/yr) to China’s northeast, providing a pipeline gas alternative to LNG that is structurally insulated from JKM pricing. The planned Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, projected at 50 bcm/yr by the early 2030s pending final commercial agreement, would add a further tranche of non-LNG gas supply, acting to reduce the addressable ceiling for LNG market share even in scenarios where coal displacement occurs at the margin [31].

India

India’s coal sovereignty doctrine is less formally articulated in a single planning document but is equally structural in practice. The Indian government’s ownership of Coal India Limited (CIL), which produces approximately 80% of India’s domestic coal supply, means that coal output is a matter of state industrial and employment policy, not merely market economics [32]. CIL’s production decisions are effectively instruments of sovereign energy strategy, buffered from commodity price signals that would otherwise induce supply rationalization.

India’s Ministry of Coal has publicly established a target of 1.5 billion tonnes of annual production by 2030, supported by continued capital investment in new mine development, rail evacuation infrastructure, and domestic processing capacity. The 8.4% decline in coal imports recorded in the April–December 2024 period, cited explicitly as a $5.43 billion foreign exchange saving and an energy security milestone, is the operational expression of this doctrine.

Declining import dependency is the stated objective; market signals to the contrary are not treated as authoritative inputs into procurement decision-making at state-owned utilities.

The practical consequence for LNG market penetration is material: coal sovereignty doctrines establish an effective price floor below which domestic coal supply is maintained by state action independent of market economics. LNG cannot reliably displace coal in sectors where state-owned utilities and state-directed heavy industry are the primary consumers, because purchasing decisions in those sectors do not optimize against spot commodity price in the manner that private industrial buyers do.

The addressable LNG market in China and India is therefore structurally bounded to the private industrial and commercial sectors and even there, it faces the cost arithmetic documented in Section 2.

SECTION 4: THE 2026 STRAIT OF HORMUZ BLOCKADE — STRESS TEST AND PARADOX

The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20–25% of global LNG trade transited prior to the current crisis, has been effectively closed since early 2026 under an ongoing naval blockade. As of June 2026, tanker traffic through the Strait is down more than 95% against pre-crisis averages, with an estimated 800-plus vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf awaiting clearance. Qatar, whose pre-crisis LNG exports totaled approximately 77 MTPA, representing roughly 18–20% of total global LNG supply, has had its export fleet largely immobilized at the Ras Laffan terminal complex. The JKM spot price assessment as of May 18, 2026, stands at approximately $17.15/MMBtu, reflecting the acute tightening of non-Hormuz supply available to spot-market buyers in Asia [33].

Effect on Non-China Asian Buyers

For Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and several Southeast Asian importing economies, the Hormuz crisis has precipitated an acute supply emergency. These nations hold minimal domestic energy reserves of strategic consequence and have constructed their energy systems around LNG import dependency by deliberate policy design [34].

The blockade has accelerated long-term Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) negotiations with US Gulf Coast and Canadian West Coast suppliers, including reported advanced discussions involving JERA (Japan’s largest power generator), KOGAS (Korea Gas Corporation), and several European counterparties seeking supply diversification [35].

The crisis has validated, in commercial terms, the argument that geographically diversified LNG supply, specifically, Atlantic Basin and Pacific Coast sources not exposed to the Hormuz chokepoint, constitutes a structural supply-security necessity. LNG Canada Phase 1’s loading at Kitimat, British Columbia, and US Gulf Coast terminals routing via the Panama Canal are both categorically outside Hormuz exposure.

North American LNG’s geographic position is a concrete and quantifiable commercial advantage in this environment, and it is translating into contract formation that will establish durable long-term volume commitments [36].

Effect on China — The Paradox

The dynamic in China inverts sharply relative to the allied importer group. The Hormuz blockade has functioned as a domestic communications asset reinforcing Beijing’s coal sovereignty position. Chinese state media coverage of European and Japanese LNG price spikes, now exceeding $17/MMBtu on the spot market, has been framed explicitly as empirical evidence that LNG import dependency represents a strategic vulnerability.

This is precisely the argument that underpins the NDRC’s domestic coal expansion mandate.

Beijing’s operational response to the supply disruption has not been to accelerate LNG import contracting from alternative non-Hormuz sources. It has been to increase utilization rates at existing coal-fired generating capacity and authorize additional domestic coal production.

Power of Siberia 1 pipeline offtake has also been maximized. This paradox, whereby the crisis that created urgent LNG demand among allied importing nations simultaneously hardened China’s institutional resistance to LNG import dependency, is among the most structurally important findings of this analysis.

The crisis has not opened the door to coal displacement in China; it has reinforced the rationale for keeping that door closed.

Effect on India

India’s response to the Hormuz disruption has been more pragmatic and commercially opportunistic, consistent with its historical pattern of price-sensitive spot LNG purchasing behaviour. As a price-sensitive but increasingly large industrial LNG importer, principally for fertilizer feedstocks and petrochemical inputs, India has selectively increased spot LNG purchases from non-Hormuz origins where prices remain within its economic ceiling, while simultaneously accelerating domestic coal production expansion.

The Hormuz crisis has not fundamentally altered India’s energy mix trajectory. Coal production expansion continues at record pace, LNG remains a supplementary industrial input rather than a system-level energy source, and the fertilizer sector remains the primary legitimate demand engine for LNG volumes in the Indian market.

Net Assessment for North American LNG

The Hormuz blockade has created a near-term demand surge for non-Hormuz LNG supply, and North American terminals are among the primary beneficiaries of this structural reorientation. Long-term contract formation in Japan, South Korea, and parts of Europe has been materially accelerated.

However, the crisis has had either a neutral or counterproductive effect on LNG market penetration into the two largest Asian coal-consuming economies.

China’s response has been coal consolidation; India’s response has been coal expansion combined with selective, economics-driven LNG opportunism at volumes that do not alter the structural picture. The 2026 Hormuz shock has clarified, rather than altered, the structural limits of LNG’s role in Asian coal displacement.

SECTION 5: INDUSTRIAL-SECTOR COMPETITION — WHERE LNG AND COAL ACTUALLY COMPETE

Stepping back from the utility-scale power sector, where coal’s economic and sovereign entrenchment is strongest, reveals a more differentiated picture at the industrial and commercial level. Several specific sectors present genuine LNG-versus-coal competition in which substitution is already occurring, and in which the economics are materially closer to parity than in the power generation context.

Steel

Coking coal (metallurgical coal) used in blast furnace ironmaking is not substitutable by LNG or any gaseous fuel through conventional processing routes. However, direct-reduced iron (DRI) production using natural gas as a reductant represents a genuinely competing process route.

Gas-based DRI facilities have been commissioned in India and several Southeast Asian markets where natural gas pipeline infrastructure exists [37]. LNG-fed DRI is technically feasible, but at JKM pricing of $17/MMBtu, gas-based DRI steel production in India is uncompetitive against blast furnace steel produced using domestic coal at $30–50/tonne equivalent.

This competitive gap narrows as LNG spot prices fall below approximately $10–11/MMBtu, a level seen in 2020 and in certain shoulder periods of 2023, but not representative of the current post-Hormuz pricing environment.

Cement

Coal is the dominant kiln fuel in Asian cement production. LNG substitution in cement kilns has occurred in niche industrial clusters along China’s coastal provinces, where gas distribution network infrastructure reaches established industrial parks and where industrial tariff structures have historically been more favourable to gas.

However, the cost differential at current prices remains decisive.

At approximately $65/tonne for domestic Chinese coal versus $17/MMBtu for JKM-priced LNG, coal retains a commanding cost advantage for rotary kiln applications. Structural displacement in cement is not occurring at scale under current market conditions and is not projected to occur under most pricing scenarios presented in analyst forward curve analysis through 2030 [38].

Chemicals and Fertilizers

The fertilizer and petrochemical sectors represent the most commercially viable arena of genuine LNG-versus-coal competition in Asia, and the sector where North American LNG’s displacement case is strongest. Natural gas is the preferred feedstock for ammonia and urea production via steam methane reforming (SMR), and SMR-based plants are operationally distinct from coal gasification-based fertilizer routes in ways that make switching costs real but not prohibitive over medium-term planning horizons [39].

India’s fertilizer sector, subject to government procurement pricing and feedstock subsidy arrangements, represents the largest legitimate industrial LNG demand engine that is both price-sensitive and partially insulated from direct coal competition by process chemistry requirements.

Indian fertilizer plants that cannot access piped natural gas have adopted LNG as a regasified feedstock input, a practice growing across the sector. The aggregate demand scale remains manageable, approximately 5–8 MTPA India-wide in current market conditions, but this represents the clearest existing displacement vector with demonstrated commercial momentum.

LNG Bunkering

International maritime shipping represents a structurally growing LNG demand sector that operates independently of the coal competition dynamic. IMO vessel efficiency and sulphur content regulations are driving LNG-powered newbuild orders across the container and bulk carrier segments, with significant order books at South Korean and Chinese shipyards [40].

LNG bunker demand in Asian ports is projected at 30–35 MTPA by 2030 in consensus analyst estimates [41].

This is not a coal displacement market, it is primarily an HFO (heavy fuel oil) displacement market, but it constitutes a structurally expanding demand vector for North American LNG volumes at Asian bunkering hubs and does not require coal-competitive pricing to be economically viable.

Small-Scale and Island Power Markets

In electricity-isolated markets, Philippine island grids, Indonesian outer islands, Vietnamese industrial zones not connected to national transmission networks, LNG delivered via FSRU (floating storage and regasification units) and small-scale import terminals competes directly against diesel generation and, in some cases, against imported coal for dedicated island power plants [42].

These markets are smaller in aggregate volume (approximately 2–5 MTPA at present across the Southeast Asian archipelago) but represent the highest-probability coal displacement vector identified in this analysis, because they lack entrenched domestic coal supply infrastructure, face high delivered coal costs (due to logistics complexity), and have utility-scale buyers who respond to commercial economics rather than sovereign procurement mandates.

FSRU-based LNG supply to Philippine and Indonesian island grids has demonstrated commercially viable displacement economics at LNG delivered costs below approximately $14/MMBtu, achievable for US Gulf Coast LNG under long-term contracts in normal (non-Hormuz disruption) pricing environments [43].

SECTION 6: ASSESSMENT — THE DISPLACEMENT VERDICT

Synthesizing the five analytical dimensions above produces a structured, evidence-grounded verdict on the central question: Can North American LNG realistically displace Asian domestic coal production and consumption?

Where Displacement Is Occurring

LNG is displacing some coal volumes in Chinese coastal industrial clusters (cement, glass, and chemical production in gas-networked zones), Indian fertilizer feedstocks (SMR-route ammonia and urea production), Southeast Asian island electricity markets (FSRU-delivered power generation displacing coal or diesel), and in the growing LNG marine bunkering sector serving Asian ports.

These represent real, commercially grounded, and incrementally growing substitution volumes. Collectively, they are estimated on the order of 5–20 MTPA in current Asian markets, with growth potential to perhaps 30–40 MTPA across the regional industrial sector by 2030 under pricing conditions more favourable than the current Hormuz-elevated environment.

Where Displacement Is Structurally Blocked

In utility-scale coal power generation, which accounts for approximately 60–63% of electricity in China and approximately 74% in India, LNG cannot displace coal at current and projected delivered prices under any pricing scenario presented by major analyst houses through 2030 [44].

Chinese domestic coal costs of approximately $65/tonne ($12/MMBtu equivalent) for large producers, combined with the state-directed procurement structures governing utility coal supply chains, mean that economic substitution does not occur even when LNG long-term contract prices decline to the $10–12/MMBtu delivered range.

State-owned utilities are not making fuel switching decisions based on marginal commodity economics; they are executing procurement mandates within sovereign energy policy frameworks. India’s one-billion-tonne domestic production base, expanding state coal infrastructure, declining import dependency trajectory, and Coal India Limited’s institutional scale tell the same structural story through a different institutional mechanism.

The Hormuz Variable

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz blockade has created a short-term demand spike for non-Hormuz LNG supply and accelerated long-term contract formation in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and parts of Europe, all of which are translating into durable volume commitments for North American LNG producers [45]. For these markets, North American LNG is performing a genuine supply-security function with quantifiable commercial value.

However, China’s and India’s responses to the crisis have been coal expansion and domestic production consolidation respectively. The Hormuz shock has not altered the coal sovereignty calculus in either nation; in China’s case, it has reinforced the institutional and communications rationale for continuing that posture.

Bottom Line

North American LNG is expanding into a global market that wants more of it, but the markets that want it most are not the markets that consume coal most. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and gas-constrained Southeast Asian economies constitute the real addressable long-term market for North American LNG volumes, and the Hormuz crisis has accelerated and deepened that commercial relationship.

China and India, which together account for roughly 70% of Asian coal consumption, present structural barriers compounded of sovereign policy doctrine, domestic production economics, and state-directed procurement that LNG cost economics alone cannot overcome at current and foreseeable price levels. Displacement at the margin is real and commercially growing. Displacement at scale, in utility power generation and state-owned heavy industry, is not supported by the evidence base examined in this analysis.

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An artistic reconstruction of what North Africa may have looked like during the Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM) or also called the Holocene Climate Optimum (9,000 to 5,000 years ago).

This article is the next iteration on the themes developed in my last article titled Solar-Driven Hadley Cell Expansion: How the SAM Index Explains Global Brightening Since the Little Ice Age. In this article, I will invoke some of the same ideas generated in this June 28th article, to propose a new hypothesis that links modern day observations from the African continent to the paleorecord that shows a radically different regional landscape than present.

A central objective of this article is to propose that the structure of the atmosphere, which made possible the African Humid Period during the Holocene Climate Optimum (HCO) was radically different then the structure of the atmosphere that emerged following the Great Aridity Event some 4,200 years ago. In essence, I propose that the middle latitude Ferrel Cells in either hemisphere, came into existence at the onset of the current neoglacial sub-epoch of the Holocene Interglacial Period, which is commonly called the Great Aridity Event.

Note that this idea will also be expanded upon in further articles.

Figure 1 is a cross section of the Northern Hemisphere, showing the three great atmospheric circulation zones called the Hadley, Ferrel and Polar cells. Note how the Hadley cells straddle the near equatorial latitude(s), which is the zone of maximum global precipitation and upwelling low pressure cyclonic air masses - also referred to as the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ).

Likewise, note that both the Ferrel and Hadley Cells converge and downwell as anticyclonic air masses along the 30th parallel (on average). These anticyclonic air masses are low in specific humidity as they begin to descend from the tropical tropopause and as they approach the lower troposphere they begin to compress and increase in temperature. These descending hot dry air masses act to maintain the global deserts that align with the 30th parallel (on average) and are commonly called the Horse Latitudes.

The Horse Latitudes today are characterized by an evaporation potential that greatly exceeds total precipitation and it is the combined subsiding masses of both counter rotating cells that acts to maintain the great global deserts, such as the African Sahara (north) and Kalahari (south).

Figure 1. Current structure of atmospheric circulation, where the Ferrel and Hadley Cells converge and subside along the 30th parallel (approximately).

As described in my last Substack, George Tselioudis et al and numerous other recent publications, have identified that on average, the Hadley Cells and their Horse Latitudes have been migrating poleward by 80 to 200 kilometers per decade since the late 1970s. Satellite surveillance of zonal cloud formations show that low level clouds within the Hadley Cells are declining, while the Ferrel Cells are contracting as the Horse Latitudes expand poleward.

At this pace of change, the Horse Latitudes will be fully displaced from the African continent by the end of the 21st century.

These modern trends establishes a plausible mechanism explaining how Africa was virtually void of deserts during the Holocene Climate Optimum. Figure 2 represents this end point, which I argue may have defined the structural state of the atmosphere pre-Great Aridity Event.

Figure 2. Hypothetical structural state of the atmosphere during the Holocene Climate Optimum.

Of course, this would imply that the Horse Latitudes are advancing northward into southern Europe and that as they do, Europe would experience warmer temperatures and reduced cloud cover. This is indeed what we are observing in this climate regime, but that is for another article and another day.

Now that I have introduced the hypothetical model for atmospheric restructuring in the context of the African Humidity Period (AHP), it is time to dive into the evidence behind this well known body of paleoclimatological data.

The Holocene Climate Optimum (HCO) and the African Humidity Period (AHP)

First, let me emphasize that there have been over 230 African Humid Periods (AHP) over the past 8 million years. Such conditions are defined in large part by an absence of the Sahara Desert in the north, the Kalahari Desert in the south and an overall expansion of the tropics poleward. Furthermore, the AHP includes a mega Lake Chad extending northward from the Sahel region up into today’s Sahara region. This massive body of fresh water is estimated to have been upwards of 400,000 square kilometers during the HCO versus the 1,500 to 2,000 square kilometers today.

As indicated in the cover image, today’s Sahara Desert was littered with many large bodies of water and an entirely different ecosystem during the HCO.

For longer term perspective, the landscape evolution of the African continent over a full interglacial period is represented in Figure 3. Pay close attention to the expansion of the tropics, together with the retreat and adance of deserts / grasslands along the north and south middle latitudes.

Figure 3. Landscape evolution across Africa over a full interglacial cycle.

Figure 4 is an illustration by Francesco S.R. Pausata et al, which shows estimated precipitation levels across North Africa during the last AHP. Note that the lowest precipitation levels corresponding to grassland ecosystems in the far north are on par with those seen here in southern Alberta and that woodland ecosystems covered half of today’s Sahara Desert.

Figure 4. Vegetation and estimated precipitation countors across Africa during the African Humid Period (AHP).

While mainstream models largely invoke orbital mechanics, such as changes in the Earth’s orbital precession, eccentricity and obliquity, to explain the changes observed in northern Africa over the Holocene, one of the shortcomings is the failure of these orbital centric models to describe the mirror image changes developing in the southern continent over the same time scales.

These symetrical changes in ecosystem evolution occurring along either middle latitude in Africa are best characterized using modern surveillance methods.

Modern Oscillations in African Humidity

Over the Satellite Era, ecosystem changes over Africa have been characterized through spectroscopic changes in outgoing reflected shortwave and longwave length radiation. In this article, we will limit discussion to Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) data.

NDVI is a satellite-derived metric that quantifies vegetation health and density by measuring the difference between near-infrared and red light reflected by plants. It is widely used to monitor changes in ecosystem structure, such as greening or browning trends, desertification, deforestation, or agricultural expansion. By analyzing long-term NDVI time series from satellites like MODIS or Landsat, researchers can detect shifts in vegetation cover, productivity, and phenology across large spatial scales. This makes NDVI an essential tool for tracking climatic changes, land use, and disturbances on terrestrial ecosystems.

In other words, NDVI data is a measure of landscape greenness.

The first NDVI data I will share is shown in Figure 5, where Rasmus Fensholt et al examine changes in greenness across global arid ecosystems, using satellite data obtained over the span of 1981 to 2007.

The two correlation plots are built from GIMMS NDVI, which stands for Global Inventory Modeling and Mapping Studies Normalized Difference Vegetation Index, a long‑term satellite‑derived measure of vegetation greenness generated from AVHRR sensors aboard NOAA satellites. The precipitation data come from GPCP, the Global Precipitation Climatology Project, which blends satellite microwave/infrared retrievals with surface gauge observations to produce globally gridded annual rainfall totals.

The first map is created by statistically correlating annual integrated NDVI with annual summed GPCP precipitation at each grid cell to determine whether vegetation greenness responds positively or negatively to rainfall variability.

The second map uses multiple regression, combining GPCP precipitation and annual mean air temperature to quantify how much of NDVI variability can be explained by these climate drivers, expressed through adjusted r² values.

Figure 5. Satellite‑derived GIMMS NDVI correlations with GPCP precipitation (top) and multiple‑regression climate controls on NDVI using GPCP precipitation and air temperature (bottom).

These difference correlation plots effectively demonstrate the increased greenness along the African Horse Latitudes is accompanied by increased precipitation and temperature.

The second select body of evidence that I have chosen to illustrate the multidecadal growth in African greenness is the 2018 study by Z. S. Venter et al, which is shown in Figures 6a and 6b.

Examine closely the embedded caption in Figure 6a. The right hand (b) woody cover change (%) map shows that the expansion of brush and trees along the southern Horse Latitudes since 1986 to 2016 is just as intensive as that found along the northern middle latitudes. Many regions along the limits of the continental Hadley Cells are showing a 25% expansion in woody cover in a mere 30 years.

This means the Sahel region is expanding northward and the Kalahari Desert is being over run by high precipitation requiring brush and trees.

Figure 6a. Satellite‑derived maps show mean woody plant cover and its 30‑year rate of change across sub‑Saharan Africa, highlighting widespread woody encroachment outside masked forest, cropland, wetland, and urban areas.

Figure 6b strengthens the argument that African climate is trending toward conditions reminiscent of the AHP by showing that multiple continental‑scale drivers are shifting in directions that collectively favor increased woody vegetation and higher biological productivities. The steady rise in woody cover over three decades mirrors the northward drift of the tropical rain belt associated with Hadley Cell expansion, which historically helped sustain greener landscapes during past humid phases.

Rising atmospheric CO₂ enhances plant water‑use efficiency (aka CO₂ fertilization), allowing woody species to thrive even under marginal moisture conditions, a dynamic also believed to have amplified vegetation during the mid‑Holocene.

Concurrent increases in herbivore density and reduced fire frequency highlight rising landscape productivities and increased wildfire resilience. The continentally averaged positive rainfall trend (+3% per decade) aligns with a gradual strengthening of moisture availability in semi‑arid zones, echoing the hydrological shifts that characterized the AHP. Taken together, these synchronized trends suggest that modern climate forcing is nudging African ecosystems toward a greener, more wooded state analogous to earlier humid epochs.

Figure 6b. Time‑series trends of woody cover (%), atmospheric CO₂, herbivore density, rainfall, fire frequency, and air temperature across Africa from 1985–2015.

Changing Cloud Morphologies and Precipitation Efficiencies within the African Hadley Cells

To start this final section, it is crucial to first identify that generalized climate models (GCM), using CO₂ as the sole external forcing, do not replicate the observed pace of expansion of the Hadley Cells. Johanson & Fu (2009) conclude that observed Hadley Cell widening since 1979 far exceeds what climate models simulate. Observations show a 2°–5° poleward expansion of the Hadley circulation over the last two decades of the 20th century, while CMIP3 GCMs produce only ~0.2°–0.6° of widening over comparable periods, meaning models underestimate the trend by a factor of 5–10. Observations show strong, rapid Hadley Cell expansion; models show weak, slow expansion over the past 50 years.

The discrepancy is large, robust across datasets, and unresolved - one fundamental reason is GCMs do not effectively represent reproduce cloud dynamics.

Across Africa and the subtropics, satellite records reveal a decisive shift in cloud‑type composition, with METEOSAT showing a multi‑decadal decline in large, short‑lived deep convective systems and a rise in smaller, longer‑lived systems that increasingly dominate the monsoon and equatorial cloud belts.

This reorganization occurs even though the deep‑cloud fraction has remained essentially constant, demonstrating that the climate signal lies in changing cloud morphology rather than cloud quantity.

These evolving cloud types exhibit longer lifetimes and more persistent organization, traits that enhance precipitation efficiency and help explain the observed increases in heavy‑rainfall indices across West Africa, East Africa, and parts of southern Africa. Intense‑precipitation trends show that many equatorial and mid‑latitude regions have experienced rising multi‑day rainfall totals and more frequent very‑wet days, consistent with a convective regime that is becoming more productive.

The Atlantic Niño further reinforces these changes, with the eastern Atlantic Niño strengthening West African monsoon rainfall by intensifying zonal moisture convergence into the Gulf of Guinea. In contrast, the central Atlantic Niño shifts rainfall patterns zonally but does not produce the same magnitude of wetting over West Africa, underscoring the sensitivity of regional precipitation to cloud‑type and sea surface tempearture pattern differences.

Together, these observational records show that Africa’s rising precipitation and expanding greenness are tightly linked to structural changes in convective organization rather than simple increases in cloud cover. General circulation models fail to reproduce these cloud‑type transitions, highlighting the need for observational constraints to improve simulations of African hydroclimate.

In other words, we must measure more and model less.

Attributions of Modern African Hadley Cell Modulation

First, it is important to emphasize that attribution research into the topic of migrating tropical and polar jet streams and their associated convecting cells is in its pioneering stages (IMO). While mainstream news and human centric climate change pundints arbitrarily lay claim to this body of evidence as a smoking gun of human influence, as stated already, GCMs largely under estimate the expansion phase of the past 50 years.

As it is generally accepted that Hadley Cell expansion can only occur under an external forcing, the million dollar question is what natural mechanism(s) can produce said external forcing?

In my previous Substack article titled Solar-Driven Hadley Cell Expansion: How the SAM Index Explains Global Brightening Since the Little Ice Age, I argued that this external forcing is solar activity modulated tropospheric - stratospheric coupling via the Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV).

The SPV acts like a tornado, which when it strengthens, acts to pull the lower troposphere poleward - resulting in whole scale restructuring of zonal cloud fields and giving rise to Global Brightening - the reverse would be called Global Dimming.

The basic idea here is that any change in the magnetic field structure of the near Earth environment that gives rise to an increased stratospheric thermal gradient between the equatorial and polar latitudes, will act to enhance the vorticity of the SPV tornado.

Enhanced vorticity of the SPV results in the following tropospheric changes:

1. Hadley Cells expand poleward and marine stratiform over the Atlantic - Pacific oceans decline, resulting in greater sunshine absorption.

2. Both the tropical and polar jet streams migrate poleward, resulting in heightened anticyclonic air masses and reduced storm clouds along the middle latitudes as the Ferrel Cells contract in response to Hadley Cell expansion.

3. Increasing precipitation within the Hadley Cell latitudes and a reduction in precipitation along middle latitudes.

New data that I will introduce in this evolving expose on solar mediated external forcing is framed in the context of African environmental changes over the 20th to 21st centuries with special attention given to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).

To frame this discussion, I introduce Figure 7, which a plot of the global Total Precipitable Water (TPW) versus the AMO time series. I maintain that this multidecadal bimodal TPW time series is evidence that the global Hydrological Cycle has experienced a multidecadally varying external forcing over this time frame.

Note that TPW is a measure of the total moisture loading per square meter and approximately 50–60% of the absorbed shortwave radiation (ASR) at the Earth’s surface is consumed by the evaporation of water (latent heat flux).

Thus, while I propose that the AMO is a proxy of this multidecadal external forcing of the global hydrological cycle, I am not arguing that the AMO is the driver of this multidecadal TPW cycle.

TPW and the AMO are both effects.

Figure 7. NCEP Reanalysis derived global Total Precipitable Water (TPW) versus the detrended Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).

Bear in mind that the AMO climate signal is typically extracted from sea surface temperatures in the North Atlantic over the following approximate region:

• Latitude: 0° to 70°N.

• Longitude: 0° to 80°W.

Thus, it would be logical that the Hadley Cells (0° - 30°) would show a physical - temporal linkage to the AMO.

Now it is time to bring in the African continental context.

Figure 8 shows that rainfall over the Sahel region, together with meridional winds over the southern hemisphere Hadley Cell, increase (decrease) as the AMO enters a positive warming (negative cooling) phase. Rong Zhang et al likewise argues that the rainfall intensity of both the Indian Monsoon and the Sahel region, are phase locked to the AMO over the 20th century.

Figure 8. Sahel region precipitation, hemispheric lower troposphere temperature gradient and southern hemisphere’s meridional wind speed versus the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).

Additional African focused relevant data is shown in Figure 9, which compares the reconstruction of the proxy sea surface temperature of eastern Africa’s Agulhas current near Madagascar versus the reconstruction of the Southern Annular Mode (SAM) over the past three centuries. Recall from the last Substack article in this series, SAM is a measure of the north - south migration of the Southern Hemisphere’s Horse Latitudes and that a positively trending SAM indicates the tropical jet stream and its anticyclonic air mass is moving poleward.

The fact that eastern African coastal waters warms as the Horse Latitude advances poleward, shows that the Ferrel Cell’s lower tropospheric storm track is contracting and resulting in higher absorption of sunshine along this zone.

Figure 9. SAM Index versus reconstructed sea surface temperature record of the Agulhas Current along the southeastern African coast.

Finally, I introduce Figure 10, which compares the SAM Index versus the undetrended AMO time series. Horst-Joachim Lüdecke et al 2021 have likewise made similar arguments in their paper titled Decadal and multidecadal natural variability of African rainfall, where they maintain that such correlations are coupled through a mutal dependence on long term changes in solar activity.

Figure 10. Comparisons of the multidecadal variability of the SAM and AMO indexes.

Collectively, Figures 7 and 10 suggests that what we have measured by satellite surveillance since the late 1970s is part of a longer term process of environmental change across Africa and globally.

To summarize, this is what we can propose:

1. The multidecadal variability in Sahel (Indian Summer Monsoon) precipitation suggests that both the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the Hadley Cells, modulate in a phase locked manner with the AMO.

2. The global Hydrological Cycle and the AMO are being driven by a multidecadally variable external forcing.

3. The SAM and AMO indexes positively correlate and reflect the poleward contraction of both the Ferrel Cells and the expansion of the Hadley Cell Horse Latitudes.

In my next Substack article, I will focus on a body of evidence that further illustrates these atmospheric fundamentals are at play over the modern era and I will leave you with a 2023 study by Kyong-Hwan Seo et al titled What controls the interannual variation of Hadley cell extent in the Northern Hemisphere: physical mechanism and empirical model for edge variation. In this study, the authors argue that the El Nino Southern Oscillation and the Arctic Oscillation are directly responsible for over 60% over the northward displacement of the Northern Hemisphere’s Horse Latitude over the satellite era.

This next Substack will focus on the Arctic Oscillation, which will be introduced in a European centric narrative, as the Northern Hemispheric equivalent of the SAM Index - both reflect long term changes in the SPV residing in the polar atmospheres.

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this article strongly supports the hypothesis that the atmospheric circulation structure during the Holocene Thermal Maximum was fundamentally different from today’s three-cell model. The expansion of the Hadley Cells and the corresponding contraction of the Ferrel Cells provide a coherent mechanism for the African Humid Period, when the Sahara and Kalahari were largely absent and Mega-Chad reached enormous proportions.

Modern satellite observations — NDVI greening trends, poleward shifts in cloud patterns, and changing precipitation efficiencies — mirror these paleoconditions and are occurring at a pace that far exceeds what current GCMs can simulate under CO₂ forcing alone.

The strong correlations between the TWP, AMO, SAM, Sahel rainfall, and meridional wind changes suggest a multidecadal external forcing, most plausibly linked to solar-modulated stratospheric-tropospheric coupling via the polar vortex. This solar-driven mechanism offers a natural explanation for both the ancient humid periods and the ongoing poleward migration of the Horse Latitudes.

As the Hadley Cells continue their expansion, Africa is once again transitioning toward a greener, more tropical state.

The implications are profound: what we are witnessing is not merely “climate change” in the narrow anthropogenic sense, but a return to a circulation regime last seen during the Holocene Climatic Optimum. Understanding this restructuring is essential for accurate climate projection and for recognizing that Africa’s future may look far more like its humid past than its arid present.

This article is dedicated to my subscribers who have graciously purchased subscriptions in support of my efforts to educate. Thank you all!

In my latest lecture on the Tom Nelson podcast (June 15th), I expanded on the themes introducted in my January 4th, 2026 article titled Beyond Milankovitch: Solar-Driven Atmospheric Dynamics in Neoglacial Evolution. The link to this podcast is included at the end of this article.

Here in this end of June article, I will include elements from my June 15th presentation and specifically will focus on the idea that changes in solar activity indirectly acts on the lower troposphere through a coupling with the Stratospheric Polar Vortext (SPV). The select body of evidence that I will present begins with the zonal mean cloud cover time series for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans shown above.

The take home messages from this George Tselioudis et al study are:

1. The tropical Hadley Cells on either side of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) are expanding poleward.

2. The middle latitudes along which the Hadley Cells subsize (aka Horse Latitudes) are moving poleward as the Hadley Cells expand and as they do, marine stratiform cloud cover is declining. Remember, the Horse Latitudes are where the global deserts reside and the causative atmospheric factor is subsiding (anticyclonic) air masses along the higher latitude branches of the tropical Hadley Cells.

3. The deeply convective clouds (aka Trade Cumulus clouds) within the ITCZ are contracting.

4. The middle latitude Ferrel Cells are narrowing.

I have included in Figure 1, a cross section illustration of a single Hadley Cell bordering the ITCZ (left-hand side), to better visualize how cloud types vary within the low pressure upwelling zone of the ITCZ to the high pressure downwelling zone along the Horselatitude (right-hand side). This illustration conveys the basics of how atmospheric - oceanic circulation are coupled within the Hadley Zone and work to create two wildly different cloud types (i.e., Trade Cumulus vs Stratiform / Marine Boundary Layer clouds).

Figure 1. Cloud cover type variance within a cross section of tropical Hadley Cell.

With this model in mind, it is clear that the ITCZ latitudes are more efficiently ventilating LWR as deeply convective clouds contract, while the sub-tropical / middle latitudes are reflecting less in-coming SWR as marine stratiform cloud cover decreases. In other words, the Cloud Greenhouse Effect within the tropics is decreasing and as this occurs, the ocean is absorbing more sunshine.

The role of Walker Circulation dynamics in modulating the Trade Cumulus clouds and LWR flux out the top of the atmosphere was the topic of the recent article titled Clouds 850% Stronger Than CO₂: Unmasking the True Driver of Changes in Global Average Air Temperatures, where I showed that interannual variabilities of the Pacific Trade Winds is the control knob on heat flux out the top of the atmosphere.

This article will expand on the idea that marine stratiform clouds are declining as the Hadley Cells expand poleward and will argue that the famous Southern Annular Mode (SAM) serves as a proxy for this dynamic process. Specifically, I propose that a positively trending SAM Index implies that the Horse Latitudes in the Southern Hemisphere are migrating poleward and conversely that a negatively trending SAM Index is indicative of the migration of the Horse Latitudes towards the equatorial zone.

Keep in mind that while the ITCZ corresponds to the zone of maximum precipitation, the Horse Latitudes are the zones of minimum precipitation. Thus, why in the neoglacial sub-epoch of the Holocene Interglacial (last 4,200 years), the global deserts reside along the Horse Latitudes.

Once this proxy relationship has been established, we will be in a position to approximate how the Hadley Cell expansion - contraction may be evolved since the Medieval Warm Period (MWP) to present.

Finally, I will emphasize the role of changing solar activity in its influence on the Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV), together with the coupling between the SPV and SAM migrations, to introduce a plausible mechanism behind Global Brightening (Warming) versus Global Dimming (Cooling) within the Holocene Neoglacial sub-epoch.

Southern Annular Mode (SAM) Index

The Southern Annular Mode (SAM) index is calculated as the difference in zonal mean sea level pressure (SLP) between 40°S and 65°S.

What a Positive SAM Means:

• •Strengthening of the circumpolar westerly winds (the Roaring 40s, Furious 50s, and Screaming 60s).

• •Poleward shift of the westerlies.

• •More zonal flow — the winds become more west-to-east (zonal) with reduced meridional (north-south) waviness.

• •A deepening (strengthening) of the stratospheric thermal gradient between low latitudes (warmer) and high latitudes (colder) is a well-established causative mechanism for a positive trend in the SAM Index.

• A negative SAM Index implies a reversal of these meteorological effects.

People living in Australia, are well acquainted with the utility of the SAM Index in making sense of climate variability within the southern half of the continent. As shown in Figure 2, when the winter season SAM is positive, the southern coast is droughty, while during a negative winter SAM gives rise to a shift in drought prone regions to the middle eastern coastlines.

Note the zonal shift occurs as a function of the proximity of the westerlies to the southern region of the continent.

The mechanism at play the Southern Hemisphere’s Horse Latitude is migrating in concert with the displacement of the Roaring 40s / Screaming 60s.

Figure 2. Representations of the Southern Annular Mode (SAM) Index and zonal migrations of the Roaring 40s / Screaming 60s.

The left-hand image in Figure 2 is included to help visualize the relationship between the higher pressure and lower pressure zones that exist along the latitudes (40S & 65S) over which the SAM Index is quantified. The red band is the high pressure zone and the blue is the lower pressure field.

I include Figure 3 to further build the mental picture of the cross sectional structure and dynamics of tropospheric circulation over the latitudes that the SAM Index quantifies.

• The left-hand diagram shows the anticyclonic circulation and low cloud cover associated with the high pressure zone that is characteristic of the condition over the 40th parallel when SAM is in a positive state.

• The left-hand diagram likewise shows that the 65th parallel is defined by a prevailing cyclonic-low pressure - higher cloud state.

• The right-hand illustration shows the latitudinal band over which the SAM Index is measured, together with the classical representation of the the Hadley, Ferrel and Polar cells that exist in either hemisphere extending poleward from the equatorial zone.

Thus, Figure 3 helps in understanding what a positive SAM Index equates to in terms of structural changes in tropospheric circulation. As the cover image shows, the poleward migration of the Horse Latitudes, means this higher pressure - lower cloud - anticyclonic state is increasingly advancing towards the 40th parallel at which the SAM Index characterizing.

Figure 3. Cross sectional representation of the anticyclonic (40th parallel) and cyclonic (65th parallel) tropospheric circulation patterns that exist across the SAM Index zone.

Figure 4 shows the modern instrumental Marshall SAM index from 1979 to 2018 and Figure 5 shows the 1,000 year reconstruction of the SAM Index by Abram et al. (2014).

Abram et al used a Composite Plus Scale (CPS) with nesting, a widely used paleoclimate reconstruction technique based on James Ross Island (JRI - 64th parallel) ice core deuterium isotope record (temperature proxy from the Antarctic Peninsula) normalized to the calibration period (1957–1995), which overlaps with and weighted by the instrumental Marshall SAM index.

Figure 4. Modern Marshall SAM Index from 1979 to 2018.

The JRI lies off the northeastern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula in the Weddell Sea, Antarctica. This places it near the Antarctic Circle (66.5°S), in a region known for its relatively mild Antarctic climate and significant glacial and paleontological research.

Likewise included in Figure 5 are proxy surface air temperature reconstructions, using geochemical samples taken from selection locations from JRI and South America. These land based temperature reconstructions coincide with the 40th and 65th parallel latitudes over which SAM characterizes changes in mean sea level pressure.

Figure 5. Abram et al 2014 reconstruction of the Southern Annular Mode since the Medieval Warm Period.

I took the liberty of adding supporting text to Abram’s 1,000 year SAM reconstruction, such as Little Ice Age, Dalton Minimum, Natural and Un-natural. While Abram et al maintains that the 20th century trend is a function of human CO2 emissions (i.e., Un-natural), I simply point to the rest of the time series as evidence that such a suggestion lacks merit.

The clear deeply negative state of SAM between 1400 and 1600 (Little Ice Age), together with the abrupt peak with subsequent decline around the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century are features seen in the South American, JRI and SAM reconstructions.

The fact this tipping point coincides with the Dalton Minimum (1780 to 1830) in solar activity, deserves acknowledgement.

The fact that the most negative state of SAM over the 1,000 years is found to coincide with the Little Ice Age, stands in complete mockery of those who argue that the Little Ice Age was not truly global, but rather a regional climate state in the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere.

We maintain that the Little Ice Age is due to the Maunder Minimum in solar activity.

This article would be deficient if I did not show that sea surface temperatures are likewise governed by the same environmental fundamentals that determine changes in the SAM Index. Figure 6 shows a sea coral reconstruction of near surface proxy temperatures within the Indian Ocean’s Agulhus Current. The Agulhas Current exists primarily between approximately 27°S and 40°S latitude alongside the African east coast, places it in the subtropical to subantarctic transition zone in the southwest Indian Ocean.

Note the remarkable correlation with the Abram et al SAM Index reconstruction across a full three century record.

Figure 6. Madagascar Coral based sea surface proxy temperature versus Abram et al SAM Index reconstructions.

Similarly, we find a marked temporal coherence between the SAM Index and the North Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) in sea surface temperature (Figure 7). Two middle latitude sensitive climate measurements, located in either hemisphere, both showing a coherent multi-decadal pattern of change. \

Figure 7. Comparing the Abram et al SAM Index to the Kaplan undetrended Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO) sea surface temperature time series.

In view of the data and fundamentals shown in this article, this should not seem surprising. What is true for the SAM Index is likewise true for the Northern Annular Mode (NAM) Index. However, as NAM is less studied, it is often the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) Index that we find in the literature.

In summary, we have now established that a positively increasing SAM Index means:

1. Marine stratiform clouds are declining in coverage and the tropical oceans are absorbing more sunshine, while the deeply convective cloud greenhouse effect over the ITCZ is declining and more effectively ventilating heat flux through the top of the atmosphere.

2. The Horse Latitude(s) is (are) migrating poleward as the Hadley Cells expand, effectively cannibalizing the Ferrel Cell(s).

3. Air and sea surface temperatures across the tropical to polar environment are increasing.

The Stratospheric Polar Vortex, Solar Activity and Middle Latitude Zonal / Meridional Flow

Moving onto the final mile of this marathon, I must begin this last section by reinforcing the idea that a positive SAM or NAM coincides with more zonal (west to east) westerlies, while a negative SAM or NAM implies the westerlies are more meridional (north to south) or undulating.

A more zonal westerly, also means its average velocity is higher in magnitude. Of course, meridional westerlies means they are slower moving and undulating between blocking high and low pressure modes along the middle latitudes.

Figure 8 is introduced to aid the mind’s eye.

Figure 8. Middle latitude westerlies moving in zonal versus meridional modes.

Now that we have that basic definition covered, it is now time to establish the underlying physics that links these modes of middle latitude circulation with the Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV) and the ever changing activity of our G-type Main Sequence star.

While we do, keep in mind that we have established that the Hadley Cells and their culumnus / marine stratiform clouds are changing in coverage across the tropics as the middle latitude position, strength and zonal (meridional) characteristics of the Westerlies vary over time.

Figure 9 represents a demographic of studies, which argue that the Little Ice Age that argue that iceberge calving rates in the North Atlantic and glacial advance records from this climate regime correspond with low states of solar activity and enhanced meridional flow of the middle latitude westerlies. Shindell et al maintained that the defining characteristic of the Little Ice Age was the emergence of higly resilient low pressure troughs and low pressure ridges (meridional flow) across the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere.

High resilience implies they slowly move eastward.

A highly resilient winter low pressure (Arctic) system was deadly during the Little Ice Age, as dispatchable natural gas heating and electricity were non-existent.

Figure 9. Literature example arguging the Little Ice Age was driven by solar activity modulated changes in the Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV).

The mechanism commonly invoked is the well known coupling between the SPV and the lower troposphere middle latitude westerlies.

Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV) - Tropospheric Coupling

The first and most important principle to understand is that any top-down solar perturbation of the stratosphere that results in a steeper equator-to-pole temperature gradient in the stratosphere gives rise to an increase in the thermal wind shear / velocity of the circumpolar westerly winds (aka SPV) in the stratosphere.

This strengthened SPV then propagates downward into the troposphere (stratosphere-troposphere coupling), resulting in:

• Stronger, more zonal, and more poleward-shifted tropospheric westerlies (e.g., Roaring 40s / Screaming 60s).

• Higher sea level pressure along mid-latitudes and lower pressure over Antarctica → positive SAM index.

A rudimentary analogy is the SPV is akin to a stratospheric tornado and as the energy of the tornado increases, its bottom reaches down to the lower troposphere and draws in the troposphere and specifically the Hadley Cells, towards higher latitudes.

Figure 10 attempts to convey some of these basic ideas with specific application to understanding the relationship between the SPV and the SAM Index. The idea that a strong SPV gives rise to more zonal westerlies and a weaker SPV produces a negative more waving (meridional) westerly field, is shown, together with the time lag between cause and effect.

Figure 10. Illustration conveying the underlying physics specific to Stratospheric - Tropospheric Coupling in the Southern Hemisphere.

One of the first two most common factors at play in modulating the stratospheric equator to pole thermal gradient is the solar activity modulated UV / EUV intensity influence on the exothermic Chapman Cycle (O + O2 - > O3). During periods of high solar activity or sunspot numbers (SSN), UV / EUV intensities can increase by upwards of 50%.

As the equatorial latitudes receive more UV / EUV radiation than polar latitudes, the SPV strengthens and the stratospheric thermal gradient increases as SSN peaks. Figure 11 conveys these ideas and acts to reinforce how solar activity ultimately gives rise to changes in tropospheric circulation in the Southern Hemisphere.

Figure 11. Illustration conveying the role of solar activity modulated changes in EV intensity incident on the stratosphere and thus influencing both the SPV and SAM Index.

The second known mechanism that links changes in solar activity to increased SPV strength is known as Energic Particle Precipitation (EPP). EPP is closely linked to the Aurora Borealis (Northern Lights) and Aurora Australis (Southern Lights).

EPP is in essence the capture and transport of charged particles (e.g., electrons, protons) in the solar winds ejected from the Sun’s surface during high activity storms, which become trapped in the Earth’s geomagnetic fields emanating from its polar regions. As these charged particles drop down into the stratosphere they increase the stratospheric equatorial to polar region temperature gradient by quenching the exothermic Chapman Cycle within the eye of the SPV.

Figure 12 conveys these basic ideas and highlight the relvance of the Earth’s geomagnetic field and Sun’s solar storm activity in modulating the SPV strength.

Figure 12. Illustration highlighting the known relationships between solar activity and solar winds modulated rates of energetic particle precipitation (EPP) and the strength of the Stratospheric Polar Vortex.

Conclusion

The evidence presented throughout this article converges on a single, coherent framework: solar variability modulates the stratospheric polar vortex, which in turn governs the Southern (Northern) Annular Mode and the migration of the Horse Latitudes. A positive SAM reflects a strengthened SPV and more zonal westerlies, driving the subtropical high‑pressure belt poleward and reducing tropical marine stratiform cloud cover over the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

This dynamic enhances oceanic absorption of shortwave radiation by the oceans and accelerates global brightening. Conversely, a negative SAM corresponds to weakened solar forcing, a slackened SPV, and more meridional flow—conditions that favor persistent troughs, expanded cloud fields, and global dimming.

Across millennial reconstructions, from the Medieval Warm Period through the Little Ice Age to the present, the SAM Index mirrors solar‑driven oscillations in atmospheric circulation and oceanic heat flux. These findings underscore that the interplay between solar activity, stratospheric dynamics, and tropospheric structure is not peripheral—it is central to understanding Holocene’s neoglacial sub-epoch’s climate evolution. The SAM thus stands as a powerful proxy for tracing the rhythm of solar‑atmospheric coupling that defines the waxing and waning of Earth’s thermal equilibrium.

Longer version Tom Nelson link:

Special acknowledgement to Dr. Henri Masson, University of Antwerp, Belgium, for his assistance with the extensive data analytics presented in this article.

This study is published at a critical moment to counter the widespread pseudoscientific alarmism surrounding the anticipated 2026/27 El Niño event. While media outlets and many social commentators warn of an “unprecedented” super El Niño triggering global mega-droughts, this analysis of six decades of NCEP Reanalysis data demonstrates a far more orderly and predictable physical sequence.

Using first-derivative (rate-of-change) analysis, the paper reveals a consistent ENSO “heartbeat” of the Pacific Trade Wind deceleration that leads tropical sea surface warming by ~3 months, which in turn drives increases in global specific humidity.

This single, robust observation directly contradicts claims of impending global drought.

Rather than drying the atmosphere, El Niño events make the global troposphere measurably moister.

By quantifying the timing and causal chain of ENSO teleconnections, this paper provides an evidence-based counter to sensationalist narratives and reminds readers that El Niño is a well-understood, repeating physical process — not an existential climate catastrophe.

ABSTRACT

The global tropics experience a recurring, quasi-periodic disruption to their normal seasonal energy state. These disruptions — best known as El Niño and La Niña (ENSO) — are set in motion by oscillations in the speed of the Pacific Trade Winds (PTWS) and the complex feedback responses they trigger. When Trade Winds slow, a domino effect unfolds: global tropical sea surfaces warm, the atmosphere spins faster, moisture rises, and temperatures across the planet respond in sequence. This study measures and quantifies the average time delays — the lags — between each step in that chain. Using cross-correlation statistics applied to first-derivative (rate-of-change) time series, we show that: global tropical sea surface temperature (GTSST) peaks about 3 months after Trade Wind deceleration; global atmospheric angular momentum (GAAM) peaks 3 months after GTSST; global specific humidity (GSH) at 700 mb peaks 3 months after GAAM; and global lower tropospheric air temperature (GAT) peaks 9 months after the initial Trade Wind slowdown. The methods employed — 12-month rolling averages combined with month-over-month differencing — strip away the seasonal cycle and reveal the underlying ENSO heartbeat.

1. Introduction

After the seasonal cycle of the sun, the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is the single most powerful driver of year-to-year climate variability on Earth (Pavlakis et al., 2008). While ENSO is born in the tropical Pacific, its effects ripple across every ocean basin and every continent. When headlines in 2026 describe a coming El Niño as “unprecedented,” they are invoking a phenomenon with deep scientific roots — one that can be tracked, timed, and understood through the physics of ocean-atmosphere interaction.

ENSO’s signature is felt through a chain of interconnected changes. The Pacific easterlies slow, warm water piled up again Indonesia spreads across the equatorial Pacific towards Latin Ameriaca, and sea surface temperatures (SST) rise across the Indian and Atlantic tropics as well through a process called teleconnections and eventually the whole global atmosphere responds. The reverse is true during La Niña: Trade Winds strengthen, cold water upwells, the tropics cool, and the atmosphere contracts.

Scientists track this continuum of states using a six-variable tool called the Multivariate ENSO Index (MEI), developed by Wolter and Timlin (2011). The MEI captures sea level pressure, SST, surface air temperature, cloudiness, and wind components to provide a single number summarising the state of the tropical Pacific at any given moment — making it one of the most comprehensive single-number summaries of ENSO available.

The physics behind ENSO’s global reach comes down to energy transport.

The tropics and sub-tropics receive more solar energy than they can radiate back to space — they run an energy surplus.

Higher latitudes do the opposite, radiating more than they receive. The atmosphere and ocean are the transport systems that move this excess heat poleward. When ENSO disrupts the tropical energy state, it alters the efficiency of that transport and the effects cascade outward with measurable time lags (Trenberth et al., 2002).

While previous studies have used anomalies or index values to track ENSO, this study takes a different approach: treating the first derivative (month-over-month rate of change) of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed (PTWS) as the key signal.

This highlights the transitions — the accelerations and decelerations — rather than the absolute state, and applies cross-correlation statistics to pin down the timing of each downstream response like a branching domino chain. The result is a sharper picture of the ENSO domino sequence from first cause to final atmospheric response.

Section 2 describes the datasets and methods. Section 3 presents results across five pairs of variables. Section 4 discusses the findings in the context of prior literature and draws conclusions relevant to the ongoing debate about ENSO predictability and the 2026/27 outlook.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1 Data Sources and Selection Criteria

Much of the primary data come from NCEP Reanalysis, which is one of the most widely used, long-running atmospheric datasets in climate science, covering 1948 to the present. The following time series were extracted:

● Regional and global tropical sea surface temperatures (SST): latitudes 5°N to 5°S for tropical Pacific; 90°N to 90°S for global parameters

● Pacific Trade Wind Speed (PTWS) at 850 mb: longitudes 240°W to 90°W, latitudes 5°N to 5°S

● Global Specific Humidity (GSH) at 700 mb: full globe (360°W to 0°W, 90°N to 90°S)

● Global Atmospheric Angular Momentum (GAAM): sourced from NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL)

● Global lower tropospheric air temperature: Remote Sensing Systems (RSS) TLT (Temperature of the Lower Troposphere) and University of Alabama Huntsville (UAH) TLT satellite records

2.2 Data Processing

The processing chain is straightforward and applied identically to every variable:

1. Step 1 — Seasonal detrending: Apply a 12-month rolling average to remove the seasonal cycle. This acts as a low-pass filter, leaving only the interannual and longer-period signals.

2. Step 2 — First derivative: Take the month-over-month rate of change of the smoothed series. This converts the anomaly time series into a rate-of-change time series, highlighting transitions and peaks rather than absolute levels.

3. Step 3 — Cross-correlation: Apply cross-correlation statistics between paired variables to identify the time lag (Tau) at which correlation is maximised. Cross-correlation calculates the correlation coefficient between two time series at progressively shifted time offsets and identifies the shift that produces the strongest match.

3. Results

The results are presented in five subsections, each examining a specific pair of variables. The goal in each case is the same: determine how many months one variable leads or lags the other, and how tightly they are coupled.

3.1 Global Tropical Sea Surface Temperatures versus the Pacific Trade Wind Speed

The tropical oceans are connected. What happens in the Pacific doesn’t stay in the Pacific. ENSO-like warming and cooling patterns develop simultaneously in the Indian Ocean and the tropical Atlantic — a phenomenon called teleconnection — and these three ocean basins warm and cool in rough synchrony during ENSO events (Alexander et al., 2002; Wang, 2004; 2006). Figures 1a and 1b compare the tropical Indian Ocean sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies to those in the Easter Pacific and Atlantic regions.

Note the clear temporal coherence in changes in SST - see a recent article I wrote that highlights the atmospheric circulation dynamics behind this tropical teleconnection.

Figures 1a and 1b Comparisons of the seasonally detrended (12 month average) anomalies (1950 – 1980 baseline) of the Indian versus the eastern Pacific (1a) and the Atlantic (1b) tropical (5N – 5S) sea surface temperatures (SST) from NCEP Reanalysis from 1950 to 2013.

When we look at what drives these changes, the zonal Pacific Trade Wind Speed (PTWS) emerges as the initiating signal. Figures 2a and 2b show that decelerations of the Trade Winds — the winds slowing down (i.e., positively trending anomaly) — precede growth in global tropical sea surface temperature (GTSST) by approximately 3 months. Here, GTSST is the average of SSTs in full circumference along 5N to 5S.

The decelerating Trade Winds is the trigger; warming tropical seas are the first response.

Figures 2a and 2b Comparisons of the seasonally detrended (12 month average) anomalies of the tropical Pacific Trade Wind Speed (240W – 90W x 5N – 5S, 850 mb) versus the global average tropical sea surface temperature (5N – 5S) from NCEP Reanalysis (2a), and their associated monthly rates of change (first derivatives) time series (2b) from 1950 to 2013.

Figure 2c Cross correlation statistics of the average lag between the peak monthly rates of change of the global tropical sea surface temperature versus the Pacific Trade Wind Speed (Figure 2b) over the period 1950 to 2013. The cross-correlation shows that the peak in dGTSST/dt lags the peak in dPTWS/dt by approximately 3 months.

3.2 Global Tropical Sea Surface Temperatures versus Global Specific Humidity

▶ Key Finding — Challenging the Drought Narrative

Here is where media narratives about El Niño-driven drought deserve serious scrutiny. When El Niño events develop — driven by warming tropical sea surfaces — global average specific humidity at 700 mb (the base of the free troposphere, roughly 3 kilometres altitude) rises measurably.

This means the atmosphere as a whole becomes more moist during El Niño events, not drier.

The widespread alarm about tropical drought during El Niños reflects regional redistributions of rainfall — some areas do dry out — but the global atmospheric moisture budget moves in the opposite direction to what the drought narrative implies. Global moisture at 700 mb tracks GTSST with an approximate 3-month lag, and the relationship is robust across the full 1948–2013 record.

Figures 3a and 3b The seasonally detrended (12 month average) global average specific humidity (360W – 0W x 90N – 90S, 700 mb) and the comparison of the monthly rates of change of the of the global average tropical sea surface temperature (NCEP Reanalysis) versus the global average specific humidity at 700 mb from 1948 to 2013.

Figure 3c Cross correlation statistics of the average lag between the peak monthly rates of change of the global tropical sea surface temperature versus the 700 mb global average specific humidity (Figure 3b) over the period 1948 to 2013. The cross-correlation shows that the peak in dGSH/dt lags the peak in dGTSST/dt by approximately 3 months.

3.3 Global Specific Humidity versus Global Lower Tropospheric Air Temperature

The moisture signal leads the temperature signal by approximately 1 month. The largest pathway by which heat moves from the tropics to higher latitudes is meridional (south to north) atmospheric circulation via convective overturning of the Hadley and Ferrel cells (Trenberth et al., 2002).

As humid, warm air rises over the tropics and is transported poleward, it releases latent heat in the middle and upper troposphere, warming the lower troposphere at higher latitudes.

▶ Key Finding — Bjerknes Feedback and the Rise of Westerlies

Bjerknes Feedback — the positive reinforcing loop between weakened Trade Winds, reduced cold upwelling, warmer SSTs, and further Trade Wind weakening — amplifies this process during El Niño events.

The critical consequence is a strengthening of the westerlies at middle-to-higher latitudes, driven by accelerated Hadley Cell circulation and the Coriolis Effect. The result is measurably warmer lower tropospheric air temperatures globally, lagging the global average humidity peak by just one month.

I have seen no precedent for such a lag between specific humidity and the global tropospheric air temperature anomaly in the literature. Either this is an error or it may suggest the pulse of moisture emerging from the tropics precipitates out along lower latitudes than does the subsequent pulse in global tropospheric air temperature.

Figures 4a and 4b The seasonally detrended (12 month average) anomaly of the global average lower tropospheric air temperature (RSS TLT) and the comparison of its associated monthly rate of change versus the monthly rate of change of the global average 700 mb specific humidity (NCEP Reanalysis) from 1987 to 2013.

Figure 4c Cross correlation statistics of the average lag between the peak monthly rates of change of the global average 700 mb specific humidity (NCEP Reanalysis) versus the global average lower tropospheric air temperature (RSS TLT) from 1987 to 2013. The cross-correlation shows that the peak in dGAT/dt lags the peak in dGSH/dt by approximately 1 month.

3.4 Pacific Trade Wind Speed versus Global Tropical SST and Lower Tropospheric Air Temperature

Bringing the chain together: Trade Wind deceleration is the first domino. It leads global tropical SST (GTSST) by 3 months, and GTSST in turn leads the tropical (20N to 20S) lower tropospheric air temperature (TAT) by 3 months and the global lower tropospheric air temperature (GAT) by 6 months. The difference in lag factors is indicative of the time for warm - moist air masses to propogate poleward through Bjerknes Feedback, following the emergence of an El Nino State.

The changes in Walker Circulation and Bjerknes Feedback explain why the tropical atmosphere (TAT) warms before the global (GAT) atmosphere — tropics first, then poleward via a strengthened Hadley Cell and rising westerlies at mid-to-higher latitudes.

Figure 5a compares the TAT versus GAT anomaly, as measured using microwave sounding from orbiting satellites and 5b shows their first derivatives versus the first derivative of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed.

The peaking Trade Wind deceleration (blue) is clearly seen to lead the max rates of change of the TAT (tan) and GAT (brown) anomalies.

Figure 5c contrasts the cross correlations of the rates of change of the Trade Winds versus the GTSST (3-month), the TAT (6-month) and GAT (9-month) anomalies.

Figures 5a and 5b The average lower tropospheric air temperature anomalies for the tropics (20N – 20S) and the globe (UAH TLT) and the comparison of their associated monthly rates of change relative to the monthly rate of change of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed from 1979 to 2013.

Figure 5c Cross correlation statistics of the average lag between the peak monthly rates of change of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed (NCEP Reanalysis) versus the average global tropical sea surface temperature and the lower tropospheric air temperature anomalies for the tropics (TAT) and globe (GAT) from UAH TLT from 1979 to 2013.

3.5 Pacific Trade Wind Speed versus Global Atmospheric Angular Momentum

As Trade Winds decelerate, the atmosphere spins up. Global Atmospheric Angular Momentum (GAAM) — a measure of the rotation rate of the entire atmosphere — rises during El Niño events because the weakening of the equatorial easterlies reduces the drag that normally slows the atmosphere’s rotation and the strengthening of the middle latitude westerlies.

Bjerknes (1969) and subsequent studies identified this as a signature of accelerated tropical lattude Hadley Cell circulation, which strengthens the westerlies at mid-latitudes. The cross-correlation shows that the rate of change of the Pacific Trade Winds leads the rate of change of the global atmospheric angular momentum by approximately 3 months — the same lag as for GTSST — consistent with a single initiating mechanism driving both ocean and atmospheric responses simultaneously.

Figures 6a and 6b The seasonally detrended anomalies of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed (NCEP Reanalysis) and the global average atmospheric angular momentum (NOAA ESRL) and their associated monthly rates of change from 1959 to 2014.

Figure 6c Cross correlation statistics of the average lag between the peak monthly rates of change of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed (NCEP Reanalysis) versus the global average atmospheric angular momentum (NOAA ESRL) from 1959 to 2014. The cross-correlation shows that the peak in dGAAM/dt lags the peak in dPTWS/dt by approximately 3 months.

3.5 The Pacific Trade Wind Speed as a Leading Climate Indicator

Figure 7 summarises the full domino sequence. Reading from left to right, it shows the average lag (Tau, in months) of each climatic variable relative to the peak deceleration of the Pacific Trade Winds. The 1-month gap between the global specific humidity (GSH) peak and the global air temperature (GAT) anomaly peak reflects the latent heat release pathway: moisture rises, condenses, releases heat, and warms the lower troposphere. Tropics warm first; then the signal travels poleward via changing atmospheric circulation and rising westerlies.

Figure 7. Comparisons of the average lag (Tau in months) between the peak monthly rates of change of the global tropical sea surface temperature, the global atmospheric angular momentum, the global specific humidity at 700 mb, the tropical air temperature (20N – 20S, UAH TLT) and the global air temperature (UAH TLT), relative to the peak monthly rate of change of the Pacific Trade Wind Speed from NCEP Reanalysis.

4. Discussion and Summary

The results of this study tell a coherent story. Every major interannual climate variable examined — tropical SST, atmospheric angular momentum, specific humidity, and lower tropospheric air temperature — responds to changes in the Pacific Trade Winds in sequence, with predictable time lags that have remained consistent across more than six decades of data. This is not a new discovery — Bjerknes (1969) described the feedback loop bearing his name over fifty years ago — but this study provides a quantified, multi-variable, derivative-based empirical framework that places the Trade Wind deceleration as the measurable starting gun of the entire ENSO sequence.

When commentators describe the potential 2026/27 El Niño as “unprecedented,” the physically meaningful question is whether the initiating Trade Wind deceleration and its downstream lags are behaving differently from prior events. The evidence from this study suggests that the ENSO sequence itself — from Trade Wind slowdown to global temperature response — is a stable, repeatable physical process governed by Walker Circulation and Bjerknes Feedback dynamics. What varies between events is the amplitude of the Trade Wind anomaly, not the underlying mechanism. An event can be large without being structurally novel.

The specific humidity finding (Section 3.2) is particularly important in the current media environment. Global atmospheric moisture at 700 mb rises during El Niño — the atmosphere gets wetter globally, even as regional drought conditions develop in specific locations (e.g., tropical terrestrial environments). The conflation of regional drought signals with a global drying narrative is not supported by the 700 mb humidity data spanning 1948 to 2013.

Readers who follow ENSO news closely should treat with scepticism any claim that El Niño is making the world drier in aggregate: the tropospheric moisture budget says otherwise.

Equally important is what drives the tropospheric temperature response.

The warming of the lower troposphere during El Niño events is primarily a result of changed atmospheric circulation — altered Walker Circulation in the tropics feeds an accelerated Hadley Cell, strengthening the westerlies at middle-to-higher latitudes through Bjerknes Feedback. This poleward transport of heat and moisture is the dominant mechanism.

Understanding this helps explain both the timing lags and the spatial pattern of the global temperature response.

Finally, this study acknowledges that Trade Wind decelerations are themselves triggered by higher-frequency intra-annual atmospheric and oceanic westerly equatorial waves. At a quasi-decadal level, numerous publications have shown that up to 50% of El Niño events between 1900 and 2005 arise through non-linear phase locking with the 11-year solar cycle (White, 2003; 2008, Wang, 2004).

ENSO is not random — it is a structured sub-harmonic of the Earth’s seasonal cycle, amplitude-modulated by solar forcing and ocean memory (Jin et al, 1996; Stueck et al, 2013; Douglas, 2011). Understanding its mechanics is the most reliable antidote to the recurring media temptation to call every new event “unprecedented.”

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This article is dedicated to Mitch Sylvestre, CEO of Stay Free Alberta (SFA) / Alberta Prosperity Project (APP), who has been steadfast in his defiance of Ottawa’s climate fraud and its insane allegiance to Net Zero.

After the May 13th, 2026 ruling by Justice Shaina Leonard of the Alberta Court of King’s Bench ruled against the SFA petition on the grounds that the Alberta Government failed to consult Albertans living on reserves, regarding the Citizen’s Initiated Petition on the question of Alberta Independence, I felt it timely to once again set the record straight on the underlying philosophy of the Net Zero ideology.

I argue that the single greatest reason for Alberta’s present day Independence movement is Ottawa’s insistence that the production of food and energy represents an existential threat to Confederation and to Humanity.

For subscribers who are not Albertan, I encourage you to read The West Wants Out: How Ottawa’s Climate Fraud, Censorship Crusade, and Cultural Betrayal Are Driving Alberta Toward Independence to gain a deeper understanding of this complex and pressing topic.

In a recent article titled The Pasture Is Not a Methane Factory—It Is the Original Solar Panel, I argued that the Net Zero view of modern agriculture is akin to a mental disorder.

Likewise, in 2026 I wrote a two part series titled From Lambing Fields to Deep Oceans and Plate Tectonics: A New Take on CO2 and Climate Reality and Pacific Upwelling, Not Fossil Fuels: The Dominant Driver of Tropospheric CO₂ Growth where I challenged the claim that Humans are responsible for the 20th century growth in tropospheric CO₂ concentrations.

In place of the Human centric model of the global CO₂ cycle, I proposed the Meridional Overturning Mediated Carbon Cycle (MOMCC), which emphasizes the following:

1. Modern changes in tropospheric tropospheric CO₂ concentration, also called the Tropospheric Growth Rate (TGR), reflect changes in the natural flux of CO₂ from the Cold Tongue region of the tropical eastern Pacific.

2. The interannual changes in the TGR are indicative of the rate by which carbonic acid enriched deep water upwells and offgases, like opening a can of beer, and the natural process at work is Walker Circulation Dynamics.

3. Said deep water is enriched in carbonic acid through both the accumulation of subsiding - decaying lifeforms along the ocean’s surface and from geochemical exchange with the Earth’s Crust over the +2,300 year journey of the global thermohaline circulation (cover image) starting in the sub-polar North Atlantic and ending in the tropical eastern Pacific.

Figure 1. The Meridional Overturning Mediated Carbon Cycle (MOMCC) showing CO₂ absorption along polar latitudes, CO₂ offgasing along tropical latitudes and geochemical exchange between deep water and the Earth’s Crust.

For a deeper dive into the framework of the MOMCC, I encourage you to take the time to review the data and literature I shared in my 2026 two part series.

Here in this article, I will expand further on the MOMCC by emphasizing two main arguments.

Number One

Even though the majority of human CO₂ emissions occur within the Northern Hemisphere, and there is extremely limited inter-hemispheric gas exchange within the lower atmosphere, the first derivative of the seasonally detrended CO₂ concentration measured in either hemisphere, is almost perfectly matched on a month-over-month basis. This suggests that dominant CO₂ emissions in both hemispheres arise from a common area source (i.e., Cold Tongue region) that is located along the latitudes where they collide and repell each other (aka Hadley Cell Convergence Zone).

Number Two

Comparing CO₂ concentration time series obtained from Antarctic ice core samples to best estimates of global CO₂ emissions from the 18th century to present, shows that Tropospheric CO₂ concentrations began to rise 200 years prior to the Industrial Revolution.

1st Argument - Hadley Cell Convergence Zone (HCCZ) vs Tropospheric CO₂ Concentrations

To begin this discussion, I must first help build a mental picture for why in the 1st argument, I suggest that there is extremely limited inter-hemispheric gas exchange wtihin the Troposphere. Figure 2 has been selected as it effectively demonstrates why this limited inter-hemispheric gas exchange exists.

The Hadley Cells, are the two largest counter-rotating air masses on the planet.

Note how both cells collide and convect along the equatorial latitude(s).

Further note how the Hadley Cell Convergence Zone (HCCG) migrates towards whichever hemisphere that is experiencing summer. This migration of the HCCG towards whichever hemisphere is warming relative to the other, is a consistent trend that is found across all time scales (e.g., Seasonal to Millennial).

Figure 2. Structure and dynamics of the Hadley Cell Convergence Zone over the Seasonal Cycle.

Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we see that the HCCG is both the zone of maximum precipitation and CO₂ offgasing.

Likewise, both figures show that the HCCG is the zone where both deep water and the lower troposphere experience the greatest convective upwelling. While the mechanics of deep water upwelling differ from HCCG upwelling, ultimately both are driven by the absorption of solar energy and thus are examples of convective overturning.

I will reiterate that the extremely limited inter-hermispheric gas exchange across the HCCG is a consequence of the counter-rotating structure of both Hadley Cells.

This is classical atmospheric physics.

Now that we have this first step laid out, it is time to highlight the long standing fact that the majority of Human CO₂ emissions are located on the Northern Hemisphere side of the HCCG.

Figure 3 shows a classic representation of the latitudinal distribution of Human “carbon” emissions over the last half of the 20th century. This estimate shows that the vast majority of Human CO₂ emissions are located between 30N and 50N.

Figure 3. Oak Ridge National Laboratory estimation for historical “carbon emissions” by decade and by latitude.

This is extremely importnt to bear in mind when we move onto examine Tropospheric CO₂ concentration data at surface stations in either hemisphere, such as Mauna Loa in Hawaii and at the South Pole.

Figure 4 shows CO₂ concentration time series data from both Mauna Loa in Hawaii and the South Pole from 1958 to 2023. The most important feature that I want to draw your attention to is the fact that the monthly average values on either side of the HCCG are out of phase in how they change over the course of the Seasonal Cycle.

Specifically, Figure 4 shows that when CO₂ concentrations near Mauna Loa are decreasing, they are increasing at the South Pole.

Figure 4. CO₂ concentration time series data from both Mauna Loa in Hawaii and the South Pole from 1958 to 2023.

The reason behind the anti-correlation shown in Figure 4 is simply the fact that when it is winter in one hemisphere, it is summer in the other. Figure 5 shows a great 3-D plot for both CO₂ and CH₄ concentration versus latitude and time.

Note the biological attribution applied to changes in both gases (i.e., respiration vs photosynthesis).

During the summer months, photosynthetic uptake prevails over organic material respiration (decomposition) and both gases decrease in concentration, while during winter months respiration (decomposition) dominates and both gases increase in concentration.

The significant hemispheric difference in the seasonal amplitude is often argued to be due to the difference in land versus ocean coverage between the North and South.

Collectively, these observations are proof of the extremely limited inter-hemispheric gas exchange across the HCCG.

Figure 5. Tropospheric CO₂ and CH₄ concentration versus latitude and time

To examine the month-over-month change in Tropospheric CO₂ concentration at a subharmonic level to the Season Cycle, we simply apply as 12-month rolling average low pass filter to both time series in Figure 4.

The application of a 12-month rolling average acts to filter out the Seasonal Cycle and this technique is often referred to as Seasonal Detrending.

Given the topic is emission rates, we then apply a month-over-month difference (first derivative) to the seasonally detrended data from Figure 4, which is then replotted in Figure 5. This technique reveals an entirely different relationship is shared between stations in either hemisphere that would not be apparent otherwise.

Figure 5 shows the Tropospheric CO₂ Growth Rate (TGR) as measured at both South Pole and at Mauna Loa.

Note that both time series are now almost perfectly correlated.

Likewise, take note of how the TGR peaks during La Ninas and reaches a local minimum during El Ninos. See part I & II to gain a deeper understanding for why the TGR emulates Walker Circulation Dynamics.

Finally, take stock of the fact that the TGR went negative or approached zero multiple times between 1960 and 1993. This is a particularly damning feature, when we consider the mainstream claim that the growth in tropospheric CO₂ concentration since the Industrial Revolution is entirely due to Human activity.

Figure 5. Tropospheric CO₂ Growth Rate (TGR) as measured at stations in either hemisphere.

I argue here that the reason the TGR at both the Mauna Loa and at the South Pole surface stations are highly correlated is because they share a common area source. In atmospheric sciences, an example of an area source would be a lagoon, while a point source would be a smoke stack.

This area source is the tropical eastern Pacific Cold Tongue.

The Cold Tongue region gets its name from the simple fact that the carbonic acid enriched deep water that upwells in this climate zone is cold, as it last came in contact with the warm atmosphere some +2,300 years prior when it subsided to ocean bottom in the sub-polar North Atlantic.

Figure 6 is a great representation of the Cold Tongue, together with its little siblings along Africa’s tropical west coast and the northwestern Indian Ocean.

Figure 6. Global ocean surface water pH map, showing eastern tropical Pacific Cold Tongue climate regime and its smaller analogs along the tropical west coast of Africa and northwestern Indian Ocean.

Please note that the actual rate by which carbonic acid enriched deep water upwells in the Cold Tongue region is highly uncertain. Case in point is a 2025 study titled How Fast is the Mean Upwelling in the Equatorial Pacific Ocean? This publication produced new data and analysis suggesting that the actually deep water upwelling rate in the Cold Tongue zone is an order of a magnitude higher in actuality than has been estimated or assumed in climate models.

This of course implies that CO₂ offgasing rates from this area source are also 10x higher than historically assumed.

In conclusion to this argument, I propose that the fact that the seasonally detrended TGR measured in either hemisphere is found to be almost perfectly correlated, while the Seasonal Cycle shows tropospheric CO₂ concentrations in either hemisphere to be anti-correlated, is evidence that the common area source is the HCCG.

In otherwords, Human CO₂ emissions, which are largely constrained to the Northern Hemisphere, have a lower order influence than rising CO₂ emissions arising from deep water upwelling from the eastern tropical Pacific.

2nd Argument - The Industrial Revolution vs Growth in Tropospheric CO₂ Concentration

This next and final data set is introduced to add further merit to the claim that the growth in Tropospheric CO₂ concentration is natural. The data I share is publically available, but ignored.

Figure 7 plots the change in Tropospher CO₂ concentration reported in the famous Antarctic Law Dome ice core samples versus the gold standard record (aka CDIAC) on human CO₂ emissions during the 18th and 19th centuries.

Note that a 1 ppm rise in Tropospheric CO₂ concentration is equivalent to 7.8 billion tonnes.

This plot clearly shows that Human CO₂ emissions during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution came too late to the game and were over two orders of a magnitude smaller than the rise in Tropospheric CO₂ .

To be exact, ice cores show the atmosphere gained 117 billion tonnes from 1625 to 1850, but by 1850, Human emissions had contributed a mere 0.6 billion tonnes.

Figure 7. Comparison of the growth in Tropospheric CO₂ from Anarctic ice core samples versus records of the early growth in Human CO₂ emissions during the 18th and 19th centuries.

The challenge that remains for those who adhere to the strict Human centric view of “the Industrial Revolution was bad” should be rather apparent.

When the likes of the IPCC, CSIRO and Copernicus argue that 25% to 30% of today’s approximately 40 billion tonnes per year of CO₂ emissions are absorbed by the oceans, how is it that our puny 19th century emissions were able to radically alter the natural carbon balance?

Were oceans fundamentally different back in the 18th and 19th centuries?

If the Human centric model is indeed correct, pre-Industrial oceans should have easily absorbed over 10 billion tonnes per year.

Considering that the World today is warmer and colder oceans absorb more CO₂, how do we reconcile this argument with reality?

Conclusion

To Mitch Sylvestre and every Albertan who refuses to bow to this climate ideology: your courage is inspiring.

The push for Alberta independence is not rooted in rebellion for its own sake — it is a rational, necessary response to a federal government that has declared war on the very industries that sustain Canada.

Alberta must chart its own course.

And the future of our province demands that we reject Ottawa’s Net Zero fantasy and reclaim control over our resources, our economy, and our destiny.

The pasture is not a methane factory.

The Cold Tongue is not a smokestack.

Alberta will not be sacrificed on the altar of a failed ideology.

Abstract

The 2026 closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed a fundamental truth: energy security and food security are inseparable. As LNG and oil flows from the Middle East were disrupted, Asia’s fertilizer industry, reliant on continuous hydrocarbon feedstock, faced immediate crisis. This event starkly reveals the geopolitical reality that hydrocarbons remain the irreplaceable foundation of modern civilization.

The Haber-Bosch process, which converts hydrogen (derived overwhelmingly from coal and natural gas) into ammonia for nitrogen fertilizer, sustains roughly half of humanity’s caloric intake. Coal, in particular, functions as a strategic “food” for industrial agriculture across China, India, and Southeast Asia through coal-to-chemicals and coal-to-urea pathways.The crisis has laid bare the ideological madness of the Net Zero movement.

Those advocating rapid hydrocarbon divestment in favor of solar panels and wind power ignore two critical facts: China dominates global “clean tech” supply chains, and those supply chains themselves depend on the rapidly militarizing South China Sea, another rapidly emerging vulnerable maritime chokepoint. In a fracturing world of contested sea lanes, pursuing energy sovereignty through domestic coal and natural gas is not climate denial, it is strategic realism. The events of 2026 demonstrate that nations ignoring the chemical reality of feeding billions do so at their peril.

1. The Middle East Crisis and the Return of Energy Realism

The effective shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, triggered by escalating conflict, Iranian drone and ballistic missile strikes, and the militarization of the Persian Gulf, has delivered the most severe shock to global energy flows since the 1970s. More than 80% of LNG passing through Hormuz is destined for Asian markets, and its disruption has sent fertilizer producers across Asia into crisis mode. Tankers are rerouting around Africa, spot prices have surged, and delivery windows have become unpredictable.

For Asia’s major economies, Japan, South Korea, India, China, and the ASEAN (Association of 10 Southeast Asian Nations) bloc, this is not merely an energy crisis.

It is a food security crisis.

Fertilizer plants cannot operate on uncertain feedstock. Ammonia synthesis requires continuous hydrogen supply, and hydrogen, despite decades of aspirational rhetoric, still comes overwhelmingly from hydrocarbons. The Middle East crisis has exposed a structural vulnerability: Asia’s food systems are hostage to maritime chokepoints.

The Red Sea, Hormuz, Malacca, and the South China Sea are no longer stable trade corridors. They are contested spaces. The assumption that global shipping lanes would remain permanently safe, an assumption that underpinned the 1990–2015 era of hyper‑globalization, has collapsed.

As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned, globalism has made the world “dangerously naïve.” Asian policymakers did not need the reminder. They have been preparing for this moment for years.

2. The Chemical Foundation of Civilization: Hydrocarbons → Hydrogen → Ammonia → Food

The world’s food system rests on a single industrial process: Haber–Bosch, the 20th century’s most important invention. By synthesizing ammonia (NH₃) from hydrogen and nitrogen, Haber–Bosch enabled the mass production of nitrogen fertilizers that now sustain more than 4 billion people.

The chain is simple:

• Hydrocarbons produce hydrogen via steam methane reforming (SMR) or coal gasification

• Hydrogen + nitrogen produce ammonia

• Ammonia produces urea and other nitrogen fertilizers

• Nitrogen fertilizers produce half of global food

Remove hydrocarbons and the chain collapses.

Electrolytic hydrogen or hydrogen produced through the electrolysis of water, is often marketed as “green” when powered by solar panels.

This mode of hydrogen production cannot replace hydrocarbon‑derived hydrogen. One fundamental reason for this is its energy-return-on-energy-invested (EROEI) is below one when powered by intermittent power sources such as solar or wind. On a lifecycle basis, it consumes more energy than it delivers. It requires massive overbuild of solar/wind capacity, expensive buffering, and high‑cost electricity. Even optimistic projections place green hydrogen at $4 – 6 / kg ($28 – 42 / GJ) by 2030, far above coal or LNG pathways.

Ultimately, a dependence on green hydrogen is a dependence on the Chinese Communist Party, which controls most of the material (manufacturing) supply chain. Furthermore, for Asia and the Indo-Pacific region at large, electrolytic hydrogen represent similar geopolitical risks, as it simply substitutes one maritime chokepoint for another: Strait of Hormuz for the South China Sea.

Hydrocarbons are not optional. They are the chemical foundation of modern civilization.

This is why 80 – 90% of global nitrogen fertilizer is produced from hydrocarbon‑derived hydrogen, and why coal and natural gas remain indispensable to global food security.

3. Coal Gasification and Natural Gas Reforming: Asia’s Strategic Lifelines

Asia’s fertilizer production is shaped by geology, demography, and geopolitics. The region is not uniformly endowed with natural gas. Japan and South Korea have none. India has too little. Southeast Asia’s reserves are declining. China has gas, but not enough to meet its enormous agricultural demand.

Coal, however, is abundant.

This is why China produces ~79% of its ammonia from coal gasification, why India is expanding coal‑to‑urea production through the Talcher plant, and why Indonesia is rapidly building coal‑based fertilizer capacity.

Coal gasification is not a relic. It is a strategic industrial technology that converts domestic coal into synthesis gas (CO + H₂) through oxygen‑steam‑blown gasifiers operating at 1,200–1,600°C. These systems are capital‑intensive but robust, scalable, and most importantly, domestically controlled.

Hydrogen Cost Reality (with HHV conversion)

• Coal gasification:
  $0.90–1.46 / kg H₂ → ($6.34 – $10.28 / GJ)

• SMR (LNG):
  $1.50–3.00 / kg H₂ → ($10.56 – $21.13 / GJ)
  (can exceed $4 / kg = $28.17 / GJ during crises)

NEW: Alberta AECO Comparison

To help readers grasp the magnitude of Asia’s energy‑cost disadvantage:

• AECO natural gas in Alberta often trades at $1.50 – $3.00 / GJ

• This is 3–10× cheaper than LNG delivered to Asia

• And 2–7× cheaper than hydrogen-equivalent energy in Asia

This single comparison explains why fertilizer production is far more economical in Canada than in LNG‑dependent Asian nations. Coal’s cost advantage is structural. Domestic coal in China, India, and Indonesia costs $2 – 4 / GJ, while imported LNG ranges from $10 – 25 / GJ, with spikes above $50 / GJ during crises.

Strategic Reality

Coal is:

• Abundant

• Cheap

• Domestically controlled

• Geopolitically insulated

• Technically compatible with large‑scale hydrogen production

For coal‑rich nations, coal is not a climate liability: it is a national security asset.

4. The Geopolitical Logic: Why LNG Dependence Is Now a Strategic Liability

The post‑2020 world has revealed the fragility of global supply chains. Four maritime chokepoints define Asia’s energy security:

• The Red Sea / Bab el‑Mandeb

• The Strait of Hormuz

• The Strait of Malacca

• The South China Sea

Each is now a theatre of escalating military tension.

Japan and South Korea: The Most Exposed

• 90%+ of Japan’s LNG passes through Malacca and the South China Sea.

• South Korea faces similar dependence.

• Both nations have minimal domestic fertilizer production.

A single maritime disruption can shut down their ammonia plants and threaten national food security.

China, India, Indonesia: The Most Insulated

These nations have:

• Large coal reserves

• Expanding coal‑to‑fertilizer capacity

• Policies that cap LNG imports

• Strategic doctrines emphasizing energy self‑reliance

Their food systems are far more resilient.

ASEAN’s Strategic Shift

Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have explicitly identified LNG dependence as a national vulnerability. Their energy plans increasingly prioritize:

• Domestic coal allocation

• Coal‑to‑chemicals

• Coal‑to‑urea

• Reduced LNG exposure

This is not climate backsliding: it is risk management.

5. Economics, Emissions, and the Hard Arithmetic of Feeding Billions

Coal gasification emits more CO₂ per tonne of ammonia than SMR. But this is only half the story.

However:

• Coal‑based plants often integrate CO₂ capture for urea synthesis.

• LNG supply chains include methane leakage, increasing lifecycle emissions.

• Fertilizer affordability directly affects crop yields.

• Food security outweighs marginal CO₂ differences in developing economies.

For nations where hundreds of millions depend on affordable fertilizer, the priority is clear:

Feed people first and to focus on national security.

This is the logic behind China’s 14th Five‑Year Plan, India’s coal‑to‑urea expansion, and Indonesia’s Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) for coal.

The Food Security Equation

Hydrocarbons → Hydrogen → Ammonia → Fertilizer → Food → Stability

Break any link in this chain and the system collapses.

6. Conclusion: The World Cannot Feed Itself Without Hydrocarbons

The Middle East crisis has forced the world to confront a truth that Asia has understood for decades: energy security is food security, and hydrocarbons remain the irreplaceable foundation of both.

Coal and natural gas are not optional. They are the chemical pillars that sustain half of humanity. In a world where global supply chains are fracturing, maritime chokepoints are militarizing, and LNG markets are convulsing, coal gasification and natural‑gas‑based hydrogen are not relics, they are lifelines.

Asia’s investment in coal‑to‑fertilizer production is not climate backsliding. It is strategic foresight.

The West may not like this conclusion, but ignoring it will not make it go away.

Hydrocarbons feed the world. Coal and natural gas are the quiet, indispensable guarantors of global food security. And in the 21st century, as in the 20th, the nations that control their hydrogen supply will control their destiny.

Don’t worry, I wasn’t converted by the woke mind virus - the focus on this conference was on Climate Realism - not Climate Alarmism.

One of the keynote speakers was Nobel Laurete John Clauser.

John Francis Clauser (born December 1, 1942) is an American theoretical and experimental physicist who won the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physics, who shocked the Scientific Establishment in a high-profile talk at Quantum Korea 2023, where he declared there is no climate crisis, criticized climate models, called the IPCC “one of the worst sources of dangerous misinformation,” and argued that clouds (not CO₂) are the dominant factor in climate.

In his keynote speech, Dr. Clauser stated that throughout his career, he routinely spoke with God’s creation in his pioneering work in quantum information science.

This comment really resonated with me.

Another famous climate skeptic that has left a positive mark on my approach to discovering the nature of the forces at work in modern climate change was Dr. Tim Ball, former Senior Fellow with the Frontier Center for Public Policy - a role that I now am honored to fill within the Frontier Family.

In one of few conversations that I had with Dr. Tim Ball before his passing, he expressed his keen interest in my focus on atmospheric circulation patterns such as the Pacific easterlies (Trade Winds) or Walker Circulation dynamics. He argued that atmospheric circulation patterns undergo long term evolutions over time and that alarmists have largely overlooked this topic.

Dr. Tim Ball argued that the God Father of modern day climatology, H. H. Lamb who founded the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia in 1972, placed a lot of weight on zonal and meridional wind speed records in his climate research.

As a southern Albertan rancher, I am keenly aware of the powerful moderating effect that changes in the relative strength of westerlies versus northerlies, have in determining whether a winter season will be bone crushingly cold or warm enough to wear tee-shirts outside in January.

We call these anomalously warm winter events Chinooks and they are characterized by strong westerlies, robust southerlies and elevated sunshine intensity (hours).

Arguably, it is my interest in Chinooks that inspired me to learn more about atmospheric circulation physics and indeed, I too view my studies on this topic as if I am attempting to communicate with God’s creation.

In this article, I will highlight evidence suggesting that Canada’s winter climate trajectory is defined by Pacific tropical climate trends, while Canada’s summer climate change is heavily modulated by the same forces as work in the North Atlantic.

1.0 Introduction

In this article, I will introduce you to a seasonal climate index that I have developed that foundationally, acknowledges that seasonal, interannual and decadal changes in near surface air temperature are all too often governed by or accompanied by changes in atmospheric circulation.

Before we dive into the methodology behind creating and interpreting these seasonal climate indexes, I will begin by building your general knowledge and appreciation for the fact that wind speed analysis is indeed pivotal in understanding the broader topic of climate science.

To start, I introduce Figure 1, which compares anomalies of the Pacific Trade Winds versus the Global average Westerlies. Note the deceleration and acceleration labels applied to both vertical axis and the fact that they are inverse to each other.

As I have discussed numerous times over the past year, a deceleration of the Pacific Trade Winds gives rise to what we know as an El Nino state in the Pacific tropics. This in turn is known to give rise to an acceleration in the global Westerlies through a mechanism called Bjerknes Feedback in atmospheric physics.

Bjerknes Feedback is simply the response of the subtropical to mid-latitude atmospheres to the release of stored thermal energy and rise in absorbed solar radiation in the Pacific tropics, as tropical clouds restructure during the collapse and reversal of Walker Circulation or Trade Winds during El Nino events.

This feedback gives to rise elevated rates of heat transport out of the Pacific tropics and into higher latitudes, where said heat is more readily able to escape through the top of the atmosphere along middle to polar latitudes.

Thus, when we see Westerlies anomalously rising as the Pacific Trade Winds anomalous decline, this signifies the simple fact that the entire planet is attempt to ventilate the pulse of excess energy released and generated in the Pacific tropics during El Nino events.

Conversely, the opposite is true during La Nina events and Pacific Trade Winds accelerate.

Figure 1. Pacific Trade Winds versus Global Westerlies.

It is the rise of the Westerlies during El Ninos, which force the development of Chinooks in southern Alberta along the eastern foothills of the Rocky Mountains. These air masses, originating in the west, effectively block winds from the north (Northerlies) from migrating to lower latitudes during the winter season.

I introduce Figure 2 to illustrate how the Earth’s rotation and the resulting Coriolis Force cause tropical air masses exiting the tropics, to be deflected towards the east as they move into middle to polar latitudes. Note how the purples arrows point towards the west along the equatorial latitude and how the green arrows point towards the east along the middle to polar latitudes.

Figure 2 also highlights classical nomenclature regarding the structure of counter rotating air masses called the Hadley, Ferrel and Polar Cells.

Note that during an El Nino event and the Trade Winds decelerate along the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), the Hadley Cell expands towards higher latitudes and its rate of convection accelerates, pushing tropical air masses up into higher latitudes or into the Ferrel Cell.

It is in the Ferrel Cells where we see the strongest Westerly wind streams and thus the global average Westerlies is statistically biased towards the middle latitudes in either hemisphere.

Figure 2. Classical model for global atmospheric circulation structures.

The next concept that I wish to emphasize is the idea that the Westerlies are at an annual maximum during the winter season when the surface temperature gradient between the oceans and land is at a maximum.

Figure 3 illustrates this characteristic by contrasting zonal (aka Westerly & Easterly) wind speeds by winter (Nov - Feb), spring (Mar - June) and summer (Jul - Oct) using 5-year averaging specific to the Northern Hemisphere. By using 5-year averaging, one is better able to visualize the long term or decadal trends in zonal winds by season.

Figure 3 clearly demonstrates that zonal winds are at a maximum during the Northern Hemisphere winter season and a minimum during the summer season.

As zonal winds are vector quantities, by convention Easterlies (i.e., Trade Winds) are asigned a negative sign and Westerlies are asigned a positive sign.

Thus, when Figure 1 shows the globally averaged Westerlies (Black) and we see a rapid spike towards positive values, this indicates that the Easterlies (Green) are decelerating.

The baseline used for the Easterlies (1950 - 1980) = -4.56 m/s and as the Easterly anomaly equation is:

Easterly anomaly = Monthly Average - Baseline = Monthly Average +4.56 m/s.

Therefore, a positively trending Easterly anomaly means the Monthly Average is collapsing to zero.

Figure 3. 5-year averaged zonal wind speeds for the Northern Hemisphere by season.

Building further the foundation of knowledge required to appreciate my climate index concept, I introduce the monthly average meridional wind speeds for the Northern Hemisphere.

Note that meridional means along longitudinal lines or north-to-south.

Southerlies and Northerlies are meridional winds.

Figure 4 shows that in the Northern Hemisphere, Southerlies (positive vector) statistically dominate from March to November and Northerlies (negative vector) from December to February.

Figure 4. Monthly average meridional wind speeds for the Northern Hemisphere.

2.0 Methodology

We are now in a position to introduce three seasonal climate indexes, which in this analysis are defined by the following seasonal intervals:

Winter Climate Index - November to February.

Spring Climate Index - March to June.

Summer Climate Index - July to October.

Yes, I have redefined reality, by suggesting there are only three seasons. This is an arbitrary asignment - I could have used 3 month blocks, but I didn’t.

I have used NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Reanalysis product to extract meridional and zonal wind speeds, together with lower tropospheric air temperature over Canada (140W - 50W x 70 N - 50N) at 700 mb, which is often referred to as the bottom of the free troposphere.

This monthly averaged data (e.g., meridional wind speed) was processed according to the following methodology:

1. Monthly averaged data was averaged into four month seasonal blocks (e.g., Nov - Feb) for each year over 1948 to 2025.

2. Each yearly seasonal block was asigned a baseline average over 1970 to 2000 and for which a standard deviation was quantified.

3. Each parameter (e.g., zonal wind speed) was then converted to an anomaly by subtracting the baseline from the yearly seasonal block value.

4. Each parameter (e.g., lower tropospheric air temperature) was then converted to an index by by dividing its anomaly by the baseline’s standard deviation.

5. Each parameter index was then converted into a 5-year rolling averaged time series to emphasize decadal (climatic) trends.

6. A seasonal climate index was then produced by averaging the seasonal block index for each of the three parameters into a single composite index.

When you think of the Winter Climate Index, think of wind chill.

By averaging each of the three parameter indexes, a statistical facsimile of atmospheric circulation is constructed.

By dividing each parameter anomaly by its standard deviation prior to averaging into a composite index, a positive bias is established for the parameter anomaly (e.g., lower tropospheric air temperature) with the smallest standard deviation.

3.0 Canadian Winter Climate Index

As a Southern Albertan sheep rancher, who lambs during the months of October to January, I am keenly biased to understand and prepare for anomalous winter season trends. During these months, I am extremely grateful for those weeks where prevailing winds are from the West and Southwest, while I dread those periods when when Westerlies decline and in their place the Northerlies bring in those monster Arctic airmasses with bone-breaking wind chills.

You know wind chills are deadly, when with even a balaklava face covering, your eyelids struggle to not freeze shut when facing into the northerly winds.

Figure 5 shows each of the three parameter indexes, together with the composite Winter Climate Index. The negative regions indicate that yearly seasonal block values are more negative or smaller in magnitude than the baseline value used in the construction of each of the parameter anomalies.

Note the prominent negative excursions shown in the Winter Climate Index, prior to 1976. During these intervals (e.g., 1966 to 1976), we find that the winter season block was defined by strong Northerlies, weak Westerlies and anomalously low air temperatures.

In fact, the most intense winter storm in Canadian history occurred in 1967 - a Southern Alberta claim to fame!

The intense decadal rise in Winter Climate Index from 1976 to the mid-1990s, was defined by a sudden growth in the strength of the Westerlies and Southerlies, together with an anomalous rise in lower tropospheric air temperatures.

Then suddenly, the mid-1990 peak Winter Climate Index gave way to a reversal of these positive trends and for the next 20 years, intensified negatively to a minimum around 2013, followed by a partial rebound into slightly positive territory between 2017 to 2025.

Figure 5. Canadian Winter Climate Index based on the average of the winter season meridional, zonal and lower tropospheric air temperature indexes.

The first steps that I took to determine if this Winter Climate Index was but a statistical construct, was to begin comparing to other classical atmospheric circulation indexes such as the Winter Arctic Oscillation (AO) and the Winter Pacific North American (PNA) Indexes (Figure 6).

The Winter AO is a large-scale atmospheric pressure pattern over the Northern Hemisphere. In its positive phase, low pressure over the Arctic strengthens the polar jet stream, keeping cold air north and bringing milder winters to mid-latitudes (North America/Europe). The negative phase weakens the jet, allowing cold Arctic outbreaks southward.

The Winter PNA Index describes a wave-like pressure pattern from the North Pacific to North America. Positive PNA features a deepened Aleutian Low, ridge over western North America, and trough in the east — typically warmer/drier in the west, cooler/wetter in the southeast U.S. in winter. A negative PNA pattern features a weakened Aleutian Low, a trough (lower pressure) over western North America, and a ridge (higher pressure) over the eastern United States, typically resulting in cooler and wetter conditions in the west and warmer, drier weather in the east during winter.

Both the AO and PNA strongly influence North American winter weather.

Figure 6. Comparisons of the Canadian Winter Climate Index to the Arctic Oscillation and Pacific North American Index.

While there are positively correlating intervals of time between both comparisons in Figure 6, I pressed on in my search as I was not entirely impressed with the temporal coincidence between the Winter Climate Index and the AO or PNA.

As I am obsessed with Pacific ocean - atmospheric processes, I turned to my old friend the Pacific Easterlies, which is of course the famous proxy for Walker Circulation within the World’s largest descrete climate regime, the Pacific Ocean.

The fact that we see this winter season correlation should likewise not be surprising, since we have already established that the Westerlies are the strongest during the winter season.

Figure 7 compares the 5-year averaged Pacific Easterlies versus the Canadian Winter Climate Index. I have added red stars to mark distinct periods where the positive correlation between the two time series breaks down.

These two intervals are 1960 to 1970 and again from 2020 to 2025.

Otherwise, Figure 7 shows a marked improvement in the temporal correlation between the Pacific Easterlies and the Canadian Winter Climate Index.

Figure 7. Canadian Winter Climate Index versus the Pacific Easterlies.

This stronger correlation with the Pacific Easterlies should not be a surprise, given what we have already established regarding the role of the Pacific Easterlies in dictating the the strength of the global Westerlies (zonal winds) and the blocking effect these winds have on winter season Northerlies.

The green stars coincide with two winter climate extremes from Canadian history.

The late 1960s green star coincides with the interval which saw the most intense winter storm in Canadian history (1967), while the 2013 green star coincides with the infamous Calgary regional food.

Both of these winter extreme were characterized by much the same atmospheric trends, which include deeply negative winter air temperatures, a late arrival of spring and highly persistent Northerlies over Westerlies.

Finally, the red star over 2025 is to aid the eye in visualizing the recent disconnect between the Winter Climate Index and the Pacific Easterlies. Canadians should be immensely grateful that the Winter Climate Index did not track the Pacific Easterlies into deeply negative territories during the recent three year La Nina (2020 - 2023).

Had this recent divergence not occurred, Canada would have experienced winter extremes not seen since the 1950s to 1970s.

We dodged a speeding bullet.

However, a downside to this divergence, has been the low snow packed reported across Canada over the past few years, resulting in reduced hydroelectric power generation and electricity imports from United States to cover the short fall.

This section concludes with an acknowledgement that Canada’s winter climate is strongly influenced by climatic changes occuring within the Pacific Ocean’s Walker Circulation zone.

4.0 Spring Climate Index

Figure 8 shows the Canadian Spring Climate Index, together with its parameter indexes. Note the differences in the magnitude of the vertical scale for the three parameters - they are relatively the same and thus contribute similarly to the scale and structure of the Spring Climate Index.

The deeply negative conditions of the 1950s to 1970s, is reminiscent of the Winter Climate Index. However, the Spring Climate Index underwent a near step change to more neutral conditions in the 1970s to 2000 and does not exhibit the mid-1990s peak positive conditions of the Winter Climate Index.

Figure 8. Canadian Spring Climate Index based on the average of the spring season meridional, zonal and lower tropospheric air temperature indexes.

Furthermore, around 2000 and continuing to 2025, the Spring Climate Index progressed into an increasing positive state, characterized by strengthening Southerlies since 2008, a step-change to more intense Westerlies around 2015 and a gradual warming of the lower troposphere from 2000 to 2017.

These changes in Canada’s Spring Climate are reminiscent of changes in sunshine intensity during the spring as reported by the Global Energy Balance Archive (GEBA) shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Change in sunshine intensity from 47 different European surface stations.

Likewise, the large positive growth in the Spring Climate Index is further reminscent of the progression of the Length of the Growing Season for Montana and Western United States from the 1950s to 2020, as shown in Figure 10. Since the 1950s, the North American interior has witnessed an expansion of the growing season by approximately three weeks.

Figure 10. Increase in length of growing season over the 20th and 21st centuries in Montana and Western United States.

These collective changes are likewise analogous to the spring season’s snowcover extent, as reported by Ronan Connolly et al for the entire Northern Hemisphere (Figure 11). This adds credence to the idea that the growth in the Canadian Spring Index from the 11950s to 2025, was part of a hemispheric pattern of climate change, involving broad scale changes in atmospheric circulation, cloud cover, air temperatures and snowpack accumulation at higher elevations.

Figure 11. Northern Hemispheric spring season’s snowcover area anomaly.

This broad scale temporal association is extremely important to emphasize. All too often, alarmist voices point to changes in lower tropospheric air temperatures and snowcover as evidence of anthropogenic causation, while ignoring the context of atmospheric circulation and sunshine intensity changes occuring on the same time scales.

My opinion is that atmospheric circulation and sunshine intensity changes are causative, while changes in growing season length, snowcoverage and air temperature are their effects.

Like a domino chain - what mechanism drives these changes in atmospheric circulation and cloud coverage was alluded to in a recent article titled Beyond Milankovitch: Solar-Driven Atmospheric Dynamics in Neoglacial Evolution.

The prevailing mechanism within the current neoglacial phase of the Holocene Interglacial is climatic changes in the solar system.

Environment Canada should be ashamed, of how it has failed to collect sunshine data from its historical stations. I am confident that if it had been more responsible, it would have shown similar trends that European stations have over the same time interval.

5.0 Summer Climate Index

The next and final composite index is the Canadian Summer Climate Index, which Figure 12 shows to be characterized as rapidly falling from a peak in the 1940s, followed by a deep multi-decadal decline to the early 1960s, when a sudden natural tipping point to a multi-decadal positive phase emerged and that continues to 2025.

This sudden decrease in Summer Climate Index up the mid-1960s, is clearly seen in both the Zonal and lower tropospheric Air Temperature Index time series.

In this section, I have obstained from specifically calling Zonal winds, Westerlies, as there is a distinct possibility that Easterlies (negative vector) out of the North Atlantic climate zone likely rose following 2000. The intrusion of North Atlantic Easterlies over Central and Atlantic Canada since 2000, may be why we see the Zonal wind speed index moving towards zero in Figure 12 (i.e., averaging of a positive and a negative → 0).

The large sudden rise in Summer Climate Index around 1965, it largely due to a rapid increase in the zonal wind speeds from 1960 to 1970, followed by a gradual episodic rise in lower tropospheric air temperature starting around 1976.

On the otherhand, meridional winds show no clear trend from 1952 to 2000.

Come 2000, meridional winds transitioned to a prevailing Northerly direction, which is surprising given lower tropospheric air temperature made a significant positive advancement around the same time.

Figure 12. Canadian Summer Climate Index based on the average of the summwe season meridional, zonal and lower tropospheric air temperature indexes.

Given Central and Atlantic Canada border the North Atlantic, it is justified to see if the Canadian Summer Climate Index shows similar patterns of change with respect to the familiar Atlantic Multidecedal Oscillation (AMO) in sea surface temperatures.

The AMO is one of the most powerful natural climate regulators on Earth.

Figure 13 compares the Kaplan AMO time series to the Canadian Summer Climate Index, which shows that aside from the amplified negative correlation between both time series around 1960 to 1965, both time series show a consistent positive correlation from 1952 to 2025.

Figure 13. Comparing the Canadian Summer Climate Index with the Kaplan Atlantic Multi-decedal Oscillation (AMO) time series.

The idea that the Canadian Summer Climate Index is heavily influenced by the same forces shaping the multi-decedal changes in sea surface temperature in the North Atlantic should be no surprise. Figure 14 shows that it is during the Northern Hemisphere’s summer when the North Atlantic thermohaline (Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation or AMOC) reaches its annual maximum value.

This maximum annual value is of course a function of peak solar intensity and sunshine driven evaporation of surface water across the North Atlantic, which in turn gives rise to peak rates of deep water formation in the sub-polar North Atlantic Ocean.

Note that the AMO time shown in Figure 13 lacks the annual signal clearly visible in Figure 14, as it has been seasonally detrended using a 12-month rolling average.

Figure 14. Early 21st century estimate of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation rate (AMOC).

Beyond the annual cycle and examining North Atlantic trends on a decadal basis, we see evidence of the same multi-decedal forces at work. Figure 15 shows recent literature suggesting that North Atlantic thermohaline heat transport (THC) sea surface temperatures and European sunshine duration (SD or hours) per year all show similar temporal trends to the Canadian Summer Climate Index (Figure 13).

Oh, did I mention that these multi-decedal patterns in the North Atlantic are well known to be caused by changes in regional atmospheric circulation?

Indeed.

We call this pattern of atmospheric climate change the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) - for another article.

6.0 Conclusions

This analysis demonstrates that Canada’s seasonal climate variability is fundamentally governed by dynamic changes in atmospheric-oceanic circulation rather than trace greenhouse gases. By integrating zonal and meridional wind anomalies with lower tropospheric temperatures into composite seasonal indexes, a clearer picture emerges of natural climatic drivers at work since the end of WWII.

1. The Winter Climate Index reveals strong ties to Pacific Trade Wind (Walker Circulation) fluctuations, explaining historical extremes like the 1967 superstorm and the relatively mild recent winters despite La Niña conditions.

2. Spring Climate Index aligns with hemispheric trends in sunshine duration, snowcover retreat, and growing season extension—changes rooted in strengthened westerlies and southerlies, not solely CO₂.

3. Summer Climate Index track the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation and North Atlantic thermohaline strength, underscoring ocean-atmosphere coupling driven by solar intensity and evaporation cycles.

These indexes validate the insights of H.H. Lamb: clouds, circulation cells (Hadley, Ferrel, Polar), and Bjerknes Feedback dominate energy redistribution far more than model-projected CO₂ sensitivity.

Alarmist narratives overlook these mechanisms, misattributing circulation-driven warming and reduced snowpack to human causation while ignoring decadal wind cycles or natural tipping points.

As a southern Albertan rancher, I experience these realities directly through Chinooks, Arctic outbreaks, and lambing-season risks. Studying atmospheric physics feels like listening to God’s creation—humble observation over hubristic control.

Policymakers and agencies like Environment Canada should prioritize high-quality sunshine and wind data over simplistic temperature narratives. True climate realism demands we embrace natural variability, refine predictive tools around circulation physics, and reject fear-based agendas that ignore empirical evidence from Earth’s dynamic systems.

Changxing Island shipyard — the beating heart of China’s naval expansion. Multiple warships under simultaneous construction reflect a shipbuilding pace not seen since the Second World War.

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China is building a blue-water navy at a pace the world has not witnessed since the United States mobilized its shipyards during the Second World War. The scale is not a matter of speculation; it is a matter of public record. In March 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a landmark report revealing that the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) — a single state-owned enterprise — produced 14 million gross tonnes of vessels in 2024. That figure is more than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has produced in the eight decades since the end of the war, combined [21]. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is already the world’s largest navy by ship count, with over 370 ships and submarines in active service, and is projected to field a fleet of 425 vessels by 2030 — against the U.S. Navy’s roughly 300 [21].

These numbers command attention, and they should. But fixating on warship hulls alone is a strategic error. The real foundation of China’s military posture is not steel on the water — it is the resource that makes the steel, powers the shipyards, and fuels the entire industrial edifice that converts raw materials into sovereign power. That resource is coal.

Chinese policymakers do not speak of coal in the language of energy transition or environmental compromise. They call it 定海神针 (dìng hǎi shén zhēn) — a term that translates literally as “the divine needle that calms the sea.” The reference is not obscure. It is drawn from one of the most celebrated texts in Chinese literature: the 16th-century novel Journey to the West (西游记), in which the mythical hero Sun Wukong — the Monkey King — wields a magical iron pillar that commands the ocean itself. The 定海神针 is not a metaphor for stability. It is a weapon of sovereign power — an instrument that confers mastery over the elements and bends the natural world to the will of the one who holds it. The parallel to Excalibur in Western mythology is deliberate: just as Arthur’s sword conferred sovereign legitimacy and martial supremacy upon the king who drew it from the stone, the ballast stone confers upon the PRC the sovereign capacity to anchor its industrial and military power independently of foreign supply chains. When Beijing calls coal the 定海神针, it is declaring coal a weapon of state — one that stabilizes the entire edifice of national power [6,12].

This article synthesizes two bodies of analysis — an operational assessment of China’s coal expansion and a broader strategic white paper on the geopolitical implications — to advance a single thesis: all available evidence — the coal expansion, the naval buildup, the synthetic fuel investments, the narrowing reserve horizon — collectively suggests that the PRC is preparing for regional conflict and coercive resource acquisition. The pieces fit together too precisely to be coincidental. And the clock is ticking.

I. The Scale of the Surge

Begin with the raw numbers, because the raw numbers are staggering. China holds recoverable coal reserves estimated at 140–150 billion tonnes under the Energy Institute classification, ranking behind only the United States globally [2,4]. It is simultaneously the world’s largest coal producer and the world’s largest coal consumer, accounting for 52–55 percent of total global coal use. In 2023, global coal demand stood at approximately 8.5–8.6 billion tonnes per annum; China alone consumed roughly 4.5–4.7 billion tonnes of that total — more than half the planet’s output passing through a single economy [2,5].

The 21st-century trajectory tells the story of a nation that tried restraint and abandoned it. Chinese coal production tripled between 2000 and 2013, plateaued briefly from 2014 to 2016 during a period of supply-side reform, resumed growth from 2017 to 2019, and then surged again after 2020 in what can only be described as a security-driven expansion. Output hit record levels above 4.6 billion tonnes per annum, and the expansion shows no sign of decelerating [2,5].

Mechanized coal extraction in one of China’s major producing provinces. The consolidation of mining operations into large-scale, state-controlled facilities is a deliberate strategic choice.

The pipeline of future capacity is equally revealing. Global Energy Monitor data shows 1.35 billion tonnes per annum of new coal mining capacity in development as of 2024, including approximately 233 million tonnes per annum approved between 2022 and 2024 and roughly 635 million tonnes per annum in the planning pipeline for 2026–2030. If fully built and utilized, this new capacity would increase China’s coal output by roughly 25 percent over 2024 levels by the end of the decade [1]. The geography of this expansion is concentrated and deliberate: large, mechanized operations consolidated into Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Xinjiang — the deep interior of the country, connected by rail to the industrial coast and insulated from maritime disruption [1,10]. This is not the pattern of a nation winding down a legacy fuel. It is the pattern of a nation loading ammunition.

II. A Sovereign Weapon, Not a Transitional Fuel

Western analysts have spent the better part of two decades expecting China to “transition away” from coal. The expectation is not merely wrong — it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how Beijing conceives of coal within its strategic architecture. The language of the 14th Five-Year Plan is unambiguous: coal is to serve as “the mainstay of the energy system” [6]. The 2020 Energy Security White Paper goes further, declaring that China must “hold the energy rice bowl in its own hands” — a formulation that explicitly frames energy sovereignty as a precondition for national survival [12]. These are not the words of a government managing an orderly decline.

They are the words of a state fortifying a strategic asset.

Return to the 定海神针 — the ballast stone, the divine needle that calms the sea.

When Chinese policymakers reach for this metaphor, they are not speaking in the register of energy economics. They are speaking in the register of sovereign weaponry. The 定海神针 in Journey to the West is not a tool of convenience; it is an iron pillar of cosmic power that only the worthy can wield.

It is Excalibur.

It is Mjölnir.

It is the instrument that transforms a mortal into a sovereign. Coal plays exactly this role in the PRC’s strategic calculus: it is the resource that converts raw industrial capacity into autonomous national power, independent of any foreign chokepoint [6,12].

The operational data confirms the mythology. Coal-fired power generation accounts for 55–60 percent of total coal consumption, with installed thermal capacity exceeding 1,100 gigawatts — roughly seven times the entire electrical generating capacity of Canada.

Coal provides 61 percent of China’s electricity, versus 32 percent for wind, solar PV and hydroelectric [5,9,20]. And the trend is accelerating, not decelerating: post-2020 thermal power expansion has been extraordinary, with per annum generation from coal expanding by 23 percent relative to 2019 — an increase of over 1,000 terawatt-hours [9].

Beyond electricity, coal is the indispensable feedstock for heavy industry.

China produces more than half of the world’s crude steel, overwhelmingly via the blast furnace–basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) route, which consumes over 30 percent of the nation’s coal output [7].

And then there is the most strategically revealing use of all: coal-to-liquids (CTL) and coal-to-chemicals, which account for 8–10 percent of coal consumption and are growing rapidly.

China Energy’s $24 billion Hami Fischer-Tropsch CTL facility expanded regional synthetic fuel capacity by 24 percent to 11 million tonnes in 2023 [8,18].

Fischer-Tropsch CTL fuels emit over twice the CO₂ per unit of energy compared to conventional oil-derived fuels on a well-to-wheel basis [19] — a cost Beijing is willing to bear because the strategic logic is overwhelming. This is precisely the path taken by Apartheid-era South Africa under sanctions and by Nazi Germany under wartime blockade: when a state invests billions in synthetic fuels despite their economic and environmental costs, it is preparing for a world in which conventional oil supplies cannot be guaranteed [8,18,19].

This brings us to the Malacca dilemma.

Approximately 80 percent of China’s oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca — a narrow chokepoint that could be interdicted by hostile naval forces in a conflict scenario. Coal, by contrast, travels by rail and inland waterway from China’s interior provinces to its coastal industrial centers, entirely insulated from maritime interdiction [12,15]. Every tonne of synthetic fuel produced from domestic coal is a tonne of liquid energy that no foreign navy can deny.

The 定海神针, indeed.

III. How the West’s Coal Retreat Supercharged China

There is a bitter irony at the heart of the global coal market, and Western policymakers have been remarkably slow to recognize it. Over the past decade, the OECD world has systematically dismantled its coal industry in the name of climate policy. The number of new coal mine proposals across OECD nations fell from over 140 in 2015 to a handful by 2024; no new thermal coal mines have been under construction in Europe or the Middle East since 2019 [1,3]. Governments in Ottawa, Canberra, London, and Brussels have competed to announce phase-out dates, export restrictions, and financing prohibitions with the explicit goal of rendering coal economically unviable.

The policy succeeded — but the beneficiary was not The Climate.

It was Beijing.

Reduced OECD demand pushed seaborne thermal coal prices downward from their 2013 peak, shifting the market’s center of gravity decisively to Asia. China and India became the primary price-setters in a market that Western producers had voluntarily vacated [5,14]. The legislative phaseout handed China a suite of concrete advantages: lower import costs for supplementary coal purchases, ceded long-term supply influence to producers aligned with Asian demand curves, and vacated market space for Chinese state-owned enterprises to consolidate control over global coal trade networks [14].

The irony deepens when one examines the financial architecture.

China’s clean energy sectors — solar photovoltaics, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles — contributed a record 10 percent of China’s GDP in 2024, approximately $1.9 trillion, with exports of these products reaching $177 billion. These are industries built, in substantial part, on coal-fired electricity, coal-derived steel and CTL petrochemicals.

Without the clean energy export windfall, China’s GDP growth would have been far weaker — a fact that transforms the West’s green procurement into an indirect subsidy for China’s coal-powered industrial base.

Meanwhile, Beijing has positioned itself as a leading voice demanding over $1.3 trillion annually in climate reparations from developed nations — while simultaneously expanding coal mining at record pace since 2019.

The optics are devastating and the strategic logic is elegant: CCP leadership reaps trillions from the West’s rejection of coal through clean energy exports while doubling down on coal domestically as a geopolitical hedge. The West pays twice — once for the solar panels and batteries, and once for the climate reparations — while China builds the industrial base for regional hegemony on the back of the very fuel the West has forsworn.

IV. The Clock Is Ticking — Reserve Depletion and the 2050 Horizon

If coal is the ballast stone — the 定海神针 upon which China’s entire strategic posture rests — then the critical question is how long the stone can hold. The answer is more alarming than most Western analysts have recognized, and it requires working through the arithmetic carefully.

At current production rates, the static reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio is straightforward: 140–150 billion tonnes of Energy Institute–classified recoverable reserves divided by approximately 4.6 billion tonnes per annum of current production yields a reserve life of roughly 30–33 years [2,4,5].

That alone is sobering — decades, not centuries.

But the calculation must incorporate the expansion pipeline. If the 1.35 billion tonnes per annum of new coal mining capacity currently in development is fully built and utilized by 2030, annual production rises to approximately 5.75 billion tonnes per annum [1]. Under this expanded production scenario, the arithmetic shifts dramatically: 143 billion tonnes (the midpoint of reserve estimates) divided by 5.75 billion tonnes per annum yields a reserve life of approximately 24.9 years from 2024.

This means China’s Energy Institute–defined coal reserves effectively run out around 2049–2050 under expanded production, absent major new discoveries or reserve reclassifications.

Ironically, 2050 is also the globalist 2050 Net Zero milestone.

Key Finding: The 2050 Reserve Horizon

Under expanded production of 5.75 Btpa, China’s recoverable coal reserves are exhausted by approximately 2049–2050. This is not a distant, theoretical constraint — it is a strategic deadline within the planning horizon of leaders in power today. The window is narrowing with every tonne extracted.

Could new technologies extend the timeline?

Underground coal gasification (UCG) could theoretically expand usable reserves by accessing deposits too deep or thin for conventional mining. But UCG remains severely limited by environmental risks — groundwater contamination, land subsidence — as well as technical challenges and regulatory uncertainty.

UCG is a supplementary option at best, not a central pillar capable of fundamentally altering the reserve calculus [13].

The strategic implications of this timeline deserve to be stated plainly.

A narrowing reserve horizon creates a powerful incentive for the PRC to secure external coal and mineral resources through coercion or conquest before domestic reserves dwindle to critical levels. A state facing long-term resource exhaustion around mid-century — while simultaneously building the world’s largest navy at a pace not seen since the 1940s — is not a state merely hedging against uncertainty.

It is a state preparing for contingencies that extend well beyond self-defense.

The correlation between the reserve depletion curve and the naval expansion curve is difficult to dismiss as coincidence. The 定海神针 is being consumed, and the fleet being built to replace it with something more durable: control over the resources of others.

V. Policy Recommendations: Coal as Security Policy

Beijing’s coal strategy is not an anachronistic attachment to a dirty fuel. It is a geopolitical adaptation to a ruptured rules-based order — a calculated bet that sovereign energy independence will matter more than carbon commitments when the international system comes under maximum stress. The 14th Five-Year Plan’s insistence on coal as “the mainstay” and the 2020 Energy Security White Paper’s injunction to “hold the energy rice bowl in its own hands” are not rhetorical flourishes.

They are strategic directives from a government that sees the world clearly and is preparing accordingly [6,12].

North American policymakers must respond with equal clarity.

Four recommendations follow.

First, Canada and the United States must abandon the assumption that LNG exports will meaningfully displace coal in the PRC. This assumption — which underpins much of the current North American energy export strategy — fundamentally misreads Beijing’s threat calculus. The PRC views LNG dependence as a structural vulnerability, not an opportunity. Liquefied natural gas arrives by sea, through chokepoints that hostile navies could interdict. It is the Malacca dilemma in gaseous form. Coal’s strategic appeal is precisely that it is domestic, rail-based, and sovereign. No volume of competitively priced LNG will persuade Beijing to trade one maritime vulnerability for another. North American energy strategy must be built on this reality, not on the fantasy of LNG-for-coal substitution [12,15].

Second, North American policymakers must recognize the existential dimension of accelerating reserve depletion. The R/P analysis presented in this article — showing reserves exhausted by approximately 2050 under expanded production — intersects with the most rapid naval expansion since the U.S. wartime shipbuilding surge of the 1940s. CSSC alone produced 14 million gross tonnes of vessels in 2024 [21]. A state simultaneously exhausting its foundational energy resource and building a navy at wartime speed is a state preparing for a future in which it must secure resources beyond its borders by force. The policy implication is stark: the most dangerous period for Indo-Pacific stability is not some abstract future — it is the next two decades.

Third, Canada and the United States should adopt a coal strategy that is actively stabilizing, not merely defensive. Expanding thermal and metallurgical coal shipments to Asia would deliver four strategic benefits simultaneously:

● Increase North American leverage in a market where China is consolidating price-setting power, restoring competitive balance and preventing Beijing from dictating terms to global producers [14].

● Reduce Beijing’s incentive for coercive resource acquisition by easing near-term supply pressures — lowering the temperature on a strategic calculus that currently points toward confrontation.

● Strengthen Indo-Pacific partners — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India — who are hedging against LNG volatility and need reliable, diversified coal supply from allied producers.

● Provide a geopolitical safety valve during what may prove to be the most dangerous decade for regional stability since 1945, buying time for deterrence architectures to mature.

Fourth, coal policy must be integrated into a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. This means coordinating export infrastructure development across federal and provincial or state jurisdictions, harmonizing permitting timelines to eliminate bureaucratic bottlenecks that currently delay projects by years, and embedding coal supply security into defense-industrial planning alongside semiconductors, critical minerals, and shipbuilding capacity. Coal is not a sideshow to the strategic competition with the PRC. It is central to the industrial base that will determine the outcome.

Coal policy is now security policy. North American legislators must treat it as such.

Conclusion

Return to where we began: the shipyards. In 2024, CSSC alone produced 14 million gross tonnes of vessels — more than the entire American shipbuilding industry has managed in eight decades [21]. The PLAN fleet is projected to reach 425 ships by 2030, dwarfing the U.S. Navy’s 300. These are not theoretical projections. They are observed trajectories, built on steel forged in coal-fired furnaces, in shipyards powered by coal-fired electricity, by a nation that has explicitly declared coal to be the 定海神针 — the divine needle that calms the sea, the ballast stone of sovereign power.

China is expanding coal mining capacity by 25 percent in a single decade. It is investing billions in Fischer-Tropsch synthetic fuel facilities that mirror the wartime economies of Nazi Germany and Apartheid-era South Africa. Its recoverable coal reserves, under expanded production, are exhausted by approximately 2050 — within the career span of officers currently graduating from PLA military academies. It is building the world’s largest navy at a speed not seen since the United State’s existential mobilization of the 1940s. And it has structured its entire energy architecture to be insulated from the maritime interdiction that would be the West’s primary tool in any conflict scenario.

Taken together, this evidence does not describe a nation merely hedging against uncertainty. It describes a state systematically preparing for regional war and coercive resource acquisition — building the industrial base, the energy reserves, the synthetic fuel capacity, and the naval power to secure new coal and mineral resources by force if necessary, before domestic reserves are exhausted. The 定海神针 is being consumed. The fleet is being built. And the strategic window is closing.

Coal is the ballast stone. The navy is the sword. And the clock is ticking toward 2050.

Endnotes

[1] Global Energy Monitor, “Global Coal Mine Tracker,” July 2024 update. Data on proposed, approved, and under-construction coal mining capacity worldwide.

[2] Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy 2024, 73rd edition, June 2024. Global coal reserves, production, and consumption data.

[3] International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Investment 2024, June 2024. OECD coal investment trends and decline in new mine proposals.

[4] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “International Energy Statistics — Coal Reserves,” accessed 2024. Comparative national reserve estimates.

[5] IEA, Coal 2024: Analysis and Forecast to 2027, December 2024. Global coal demand, production, trade, and pricing trends.

[6] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, March 2021. Energy policy directives including coal’s role as “mainstay.”

[7] World Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2024. China’s share of global crude steel production and BF-BOF route dominance.

[8] China Energy Investment Corporation, “Hami Coal-to-Liquids Project Update,” press release, September 2023. Fischer-Tropsch CTL capacity expansion data.

[9] Ember, “Global Electricity Review 2024,” April 2024. China’s coal-fired power generation growth post-2020, installed capacity, and share of electricity mix.

[10] National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2023. Provincial coal production data and regional consolidation trends.

[11] National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Notice on Strengthening Coal Mine Production Capacity Management,” various circulars 2022–2024. Regulatory framework for capacity approvals.

[12] State Council Information Office of the PRC, Energy in China’s New Era (white paper), December 2020. “Hold the energy rice bowl in its own hands” and energy security doctrine.

[13] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Underground Coal Gasification: Status, Challenges, and Opportunities,” technical review, 2023. UCG feasibility, environmental risks, and limitations.

[14] International Energy Agency, Coal Market Update, July 2024. Seaborne thermal coal price trends and the shift of market gravity to Asia.

[15] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 2024. Malacca dilemma, PLAN force structure, and energy supply vulnerability analysis.

[16] Reuters, “China approves largest batch of new coal mines in years,” 12 March 2023. Coverage of post-2020 coal mine approvals.

[17] Carbon Brief, “Analysis: China’s coal power capacity hits new high in 2024,” January 2025. Tracking of coal-fired power plant construction and commissioning.

[18] Gasification and Syngas Technologies Council, “China CTL and Coal-to-Chemicals: 2024 Project Tracker.” Comprehensive database of Fischer-Tropsch and methanol-to-olefins projects.

[19] Jaramillo, P., Griffin, W.M., and Matthews, H.S., “Comparative Life-Cycle Air Emissions of Coal, Domestic Natural Gas, LNG, and SNG for Electricity Generation,” Environmental Science & Technology, Vol. 41, No. 17, 2007. Well-to-wheel CO₂ emissions comparison for CTL fuels versus conventional petroleum.

[20] China Electricity Council, Annual Report on China’s Power Sector Development 2024. Installed capacity breakdown, coal share of generation, and renewable capacity data.

[21] Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Murky Waters: Navigating the Risks of China’s Dual-Use Shipyards,” March 2025.

Today is both the first anniversary of my first Substack article and is also an April Fools joke on our most successful - productive Canadians, who will enjoy an increase of 60 % in the price they pay for natural gas (relative to Alberta AECO pricing), all in the name of saving the climate.

I started this journey on Substack in 2025, following a month long shutdown of my LinkedIn account over allegations of who-knows-what. A shout-out to my many Followers who bombarded the LinkedIn Help-Desk with regular demands that they reinstate my account!

In this year-end-beginning article, I will not be kind to nor mince words about those who lie to us and routinely conduct gentle psychological operations on us in the name of saving the climate.

My parents taught me that the end rarely justifies the means.

Unfortunately today, many who knowingly lie to us, do so because they sincerely believe that they are smarter than us and that if they can convince us to swallow hook-line-and-sinker their narrative and the promised utopia that would arise would justify the lie shoved down our throats.

Repetition does not transform a lie into a truth - Franklin D. Roosevelt

The specific repeated lie that inspires this article is the unprecedented rise in the Earth’s Energy Imbalance (EEI), as reported with much fan fare by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in their annual State of the Climate report.

This same message was parroted by the United Nations.

I am sure that many of you, who frequent social media, similarly noted that the past week has seen an “unprecedented rise” in alarmism about energy imbalances, climate tipping points and a decade of unparalleled growth in air temperatures.

AI bots, graduate students, ESG specialists and solar panel salesmen, together with their AI generated memes, pumped up the hype as everyone worked collectively to fan the flames of paranoia generated by the WMO State of the Climate year-end report.

So what is the Earth Energy Imbalance (EEI) and why is both the UN and the WMO focusing on this particular parameter in their 2025 State of the Climate report?

First, I will state that the reason for the alarmist enthusiasm is simply because many environmental indexes show a clear warming signal, especially over the past decade. Figure 1 is a plot from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research that shows that since 2010, we have seen a step change increase in the global average air temperature anomaly - also called global warming among purveyors of what I call routinely call climate porn.

Figure 1. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research rate of global average air temperature warming (C per decade).

While the WMO and United Nations declare with no uncertainty that the attribution in the large rapid rise in the rate of warming after 2010 is eating beef and taking our children to soccer practice, I will show the following:

1. Global Warming over the past +decade is more correctly called Global Brightening.

2. The Earth Energy Imbalance (EEI) is driven by large rapid growth in sunshine.

3. The global average air temperature anomaly is not a function of the EEI.

First, let us defined the Earth Energy Imbalance.

EEI = Absorbed Solar Radiation (ASR) - Outgoing longwavelength Radiation (OLR)

Absorbed Solar Radiation (ASR) - is the fraction of incoming solar radiation from space that is NOT reflected by clouds back into space and is itself, quantified by changes in reflected incoming solar radiation off the tops of clouds.

Outgoing longwavelength Radiation (OLR) - is the result of surface & atmospheric emissivity or the heat flux released from the Earth and into space.

Note that both of these parameters are measured relative to the top of the atmosphere and have units of Watts per square meter.

Now that we have established these basic definitions, let us examine satellite data for ourselves using public available information from NASA’s Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES).

The starting point that I so often prefer in my studies of Earth Science, begins with examining a value’s monthly average trend over the Orbital (Seasonal) Cycle. This approach establishes context on the magnitude of natural variability (aka climate change) and aids in understanding the most relevant physics at play as the Earth transits its orbital path and as summer gives way to winter in either hemisphere.

Figure 2 shows how the Earth Energy Imbalance varies over the Orbital (Seasonal) Cycle.

Note the following features in this plot:

1. Peak +EEI coincides with the Fall Equinox.

2. Peak -EEI coincides with the Spring Equinox.

3. The EEI is only briefly balanced (ASR = OLR) as summer migrates between hemispheres.

4. The annual amplitude varies by ~ 20 Watts per square meter.

Figure 2. CERES derived Earth Energy Imbalance (EEI) as a function of the Orbital Cycle (2014 to 2024).

Recall that the two equinox events in Earth’s orbital cycle occurs when the Sun is directly above the equator or where the Sun’s declination is 0° — it lies directly in line with Earth’s equatorial plane - and neither pole is tilted toward or away from the Sun.

This is the geometric definition of equinox events in Earth’s orbital cycle.

Equinox events are the opposite of Solstice events.

Now let’s examine the WMO and United Nation’s argument that the global air temperature is a function of the Earth Energy Imbalance.

When we examine the monthly average global air temperature, as shown in Figure 3 using NCEP reanalysis, versus the extra-tropical (ET) northern and southern hemisphere air temperatures, we find most peculiar story that is rarely if ever told.

Notice how, just as expected, the peak near surface air temperatures in either ET zone, occurs shortly following the respective summer solstice event - January in the ET southern hemisphere and July in the ET northern hemisphere.

Now, look at the month wherein the global average achieves it peak value - in July.

Something very fundamental is causing the global average to be dominated by the ET northern hemisphere’s summer and winter solstice events.

It is as if, the tropical equinox events and ET southern hemisphere’s seasonal variation is muted by the ET northern hemisphere when constructing the global average air temperature - a statistical construct.

Figure 3. NCEP reanalysis showing the monthly global average air temperature versus the average air temperatures in either extra-tropical (ET) hemisphere over the Orbital Cycle.

Comparing Figures 2 and 3 shows us that global average air temperature peaks after the summer solstice in the ET northern hemisphere (June 2st), while the positive peak EEI occurs around the fall equinox (September 23rd).

Furthermore, EEI is negative while the ET southern hemisphere is experiencing its non-winter season and temperatures are the warmest over the Seasonal Cycle.

Nowhere in these relationships do we find a basis to argue that a positively growing EEI is causative of an increasing global average air temperature.

Now that we have examined the fundamentals of both the EEI and the statistical construct that we call the global average air temperature, it is time to examine them in their seasonally detrended format, which shows the underlying interannual variability (i.e., year-over-year variance).

To seasonally detrend a monthly average time series, one need simply apply a 12-month rolling average.

Figure 4 shows the seasonally detrended ASR and OLR time series relative to January 2000 - making them both difference plots, relative to the start of the 21st century. As discussed in my recent article titled Clouds 850% Stronger Than CO₂: Unmasking the True Driver of Changes in Global Average Air Temperatures, seasonal detrending allows one to examine patterns of variability occurring naturally according to the pace of the El Nino Southern Oscillation or Walker Circulation dynamics.

Figure 4. Seasonally detrended difference plots of the global absorbed solar radiation (ASR) and outgoing longwavelength radiation (OLR) over the 21st century - satellite measures relative to the top of the atmosphere.

Remember, as the Earth Energy Imbalance (EEI) is simply the difference between ASR and OLR, Figure 4 aids the mind’s eye by showing us that during The Great Hiatus, there were numerous years where OLR exceeded ASR or both were in fairly balanced state.

Likewise, since 2014, we have witnessed the emergence of a state that rightfully can be called a decade plus of Global Brightening, where ASR is has been consistently larger than OLR.

Thus, when we convert Figure 4 into an EEI plot (Figure 5) and compare against the University of Alabama at Huntsville (UAH) satellite measured lower tropospheric global air temperature anomaly, we find a most damning lack of statistical correlation.

In fact, the R-square value in Figure 5 is shown to be a mere 0.01 - meaning there is no statistical (physical) correlation.

Figure 5. Comparison plot of the Earth Energy Imbalance versus the satellite measured lower tropospheric global air temperature.

Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that indeed the EEI went negative between 2001 to 2003 and again during 2009 to 2011 - if indeed human CO₂ emissions are solely responsible for a positive EEI state, these multi-year events during The Great Hiatus should not have been able to enter negative imbalance territory.

Of course, in view of the amplitude of EEI variability over the Orbital Cycle (+/- 20 Watts per square meter), these near zero values are likely statistically insignificant.

The reason EEI is able to achieve significantly positive values during the last decade plus of Global Brightening, without seeing a strongly correlated rise in lower tropospheric global air temperatures is simply due to the fact that said sunshine (ASR) is being absorbed by deeper ocean water and not the atmosphere.

This absorption of sunshine by deeper ocean water is why OLR does not rise in lock-step-fashion with increasing ASR shown in Figure 4.

Even the WMO and the United Nations argue that 90% of sunshine is absorbed by the oceans.

However, neither the WMO or United Nations acknowledges that visible light, because of its minimal absorption by liquid water, is able to penetrate well over 100 meters into deep water, while IR radiation is only able to directly penetrate a mere micron or two.

That is the physical chemistry of liquid water - electromagnetic radiation interactions.

Instead, the WMO and other alarmist agencies like Potsdam, rely on heavily smoothed ocean heat content (OHC) data to argue that the near linear rise in the global average OHC over the past few decades is correlated with a similar rise in our use of hydrocarbons and emitted CO₂.

The mechanism they suggest is that back-reflected IR radiation from slowly rising tropospheric CO₂ is responsible for the near linear growth in OHC (Figure 6).

I will dive deeper into these arguments in a latter article, but for now, I will simply argue that these claims ignore observation.

Figure 6. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) generated global average ocean heat content (OHC) since 1960.

The lowest hanging fruit to draw from in demonstrating why the WMO and United Nations are wrong in their human centric causation narrative is that this claim crumbles the moment we examine the geographic basis of OHC variability.

Figure 7 shows an example of a study published in 2015, where the authors quantify both the rate of change in the global average OHC and the OHC as a function of oceanic basin (e.g., Atlantic, Pacific) over two distinct periods (i.e, 1971 - 2000 vs. 2003 - 2012).

Note from the embedded table that the late 20th century rate of change in the global average OHC was estimated at 2.8x10^22 Joules per decade and 2.9x10^22 Joules per decade during the first decade of the 21st century.

However, the authors also show that while 3 out of 4 oceans experienced increasing OHC pre-2000, only 2 out of 4 showed increasing OHC during The Great Hiatus.

The authors attribute the sudden change the rate of change in OHC in both the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans around the turn of the century to a very large intensification of Walker Circulation in the Pacific tropics, which pushed great volumes of hot surface water out of the Western Pacific Warm Pool and into the Indian and Southern Oceans.

Nothing to do with human use of hydrocarbons.

In fact, in the 1990s, alarmist climate scientists were arguing that Walker Circulation was expected to continue to decelerate well into the early 21st century - yet the opposite occurred - a topic for another article.

This yet again highlights the inherent flaw and danger in an over-reliance on global averages, as it can hide relevant facts that can have a marked influence on the merit of a hypothesis.

Figure 7. Evidence showing major flaw in arguing human attribution for changes in the rate of ocean heat content.

While this brief criticism of the WMO and United Nations claim that the growth in the global average OHC is the smoking gun proof of human causation, is hardly comprehensive, this critique definitely shows that recent growth in OHC is hardly coherent on a global scale

While IR back-reflection from tropospheric CO₂ is largely coherent in terms of geographic extent and is increasing at approximately 0.2 Watts per square meter per decade, we have observed vast expanses of the World’s greatest oceans (e.g., Pacific) switch between warming at depth to cooling.

If our CO₂ emissions are indeed first order in driving the growth in OHC (EEI), then surely the largest ocean on planet Earth wouldn’t suddenly switch to a declining OHC simply because the Trade Winds experienced a sustained period of acceleration relative to their sluggish pace during the late 20th century.

A natural mechanism is perfectly capable of explaining this natural tipping point

Thus, the claim that a rising OHC is indicative of human CO₂ emissions is of extremely low merit.

However, this claim is not nearly as erroneous as framing a positive EEI in purely anthropocentric terms, while ignoring the obvious role of Global Brightening and the absolute lack of a statistical correlation between a +EEI and the global air temperature anomaly (R² = 0.01).

Conclusion

One year into this Substack journey, launched amid LinkedIn censorship and sustained by loyal readers who refused to stay silent, the pattern remains unmistakable: climate alarmism thrives not on robust evidence, but on deliberate repetition of convenient narratives and outright lies.

Today’s 60% effective increase in natural gas costs for Canada’s most productive citizens — disguised as climate salvation — perfectly embodies this disconnect.

While hardworking Canadians face higher energy bills from policies like the industrial carbon tax, institutions like the WMO and UN trumpet an “unprecedented” rise in Earth’s Energy Imbalance (EEI) as proof of human catastrophe.

The near-zero correlation (R² = 0.01) between EEI and satellite-measured lower tropospheric temperatures further undermines any anthropocentric causation claims. Likewise, ocean heat content changes, far from being a smoking gun of a globally coherent CO₂ emissions, show basin-specific shifts driven by natural circulation patterns like intensified Walker Circulation during The Great Hiatus.

Repetition does not transform a lie into truth, as Roosevelt warned.

My parents were right: the end rarely justifies the means.

Canadians deserve honest science and transparent policy, not psychological operations that punish productivity in the name of a narrative increasingly detached from satellite observations and physical reality. The climate debate must return to rigorous metrology and causal evidence — not hype, rent-seeking, or April Fools jokes played on the productive backbone of the nation.

The following was published behind a paywall with Epoch Times - I am making a special version of it available to my subscribers today.

Canadians and the World are watching the world-wind tour of Prime Minister Mark Carney. Endless photo-ops and innumerable promises of new trade opportunities, but no contracts - all blitz and little substance.

My take on this folks is quite simple.

Canada does not need more trade agreements, as we already have over 50 free trade agreements and have had them for the better part of a decade or more. The combined GDP of these countries is equivalent to 60% of global GDP.

What Canada needs is a productivity renaissance.

Before diving into the Op-Ed, I want to remind people of what economic productivity means.

Economic productivity is the measure of how efficiently inputs (e.g., labor, capital, materials, energy, and technology) are converted into outputs (goods and services) in an economy, sector, or firm.

In simple terms: it answers the question, “How much valuable stuff are we producing per unit of effort or resource used?”

The most common ways to express it are:

• Labor productivity — output per worker or per hour worked (e.g., GDP per hour worked, or tons of wheat per farm worker). This is the most widely quoted version because labor is the most visible and measurable input for most people.

• Total factor productivity (TFP) — output per unit of combined inputs (labor + capital + other factors like land and intermediate goods). TFP captures the “efficiency bonus” from better technology, organization, skills, and innovation—everything that isn’t just adding more workers or machines.

Key characteristics of a tight definition:

• It is a ratio: Output ÷ Input.

• Higher productivity means more output from the same (or fewer) inputs, or the same output from fewer inputs.

• It drives real economic growth, higher living standards, and the ability to support more non-productive activities (education, healthcare, arts, leisure, defense, etc.) without proportional increases in work or resource use.

• It is not the same as total output (GDP) — you can grow GDP by simply adding more workers or machines, but that doesn’t necessarily improve productivity.

Example: If one farmer with a modern tractor produces 100 tons of grain where four farmers with horses once produced 10 tons total, the tractor farmer has dramatically higher economic productivity—even if total grain output is the same or lower.

In short: Economic productivity = efficiency in turning scarce resources into valuable things.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate metrics that highlight changes in Canada’s national productivity, unit labor costs and investment in industrial machinery relative to our largest trade partner.

Figure 1. Productivity (left) and unit labor cost (right) index for Canada versus United States.

Figure 2. Industrial machinery investment index for Canada versus United States.

Now for my take on this data and on how the Liberal infatuation with the Industrial Carbon (Energy) Tax is a tax on productivity.

Canada is facing a productivity crisis that can no longer be waved away as a statistical quirk or an academic concern. The Bank of Canada has warned repeatedly that our economic output per worker is falling behind our peers, and the consequences are already visible: stagnant wages, declining investment, and a shrinking capacity to compete in global markets.

Yet at the very moment when the country needs to unleash its most productive industries, the federal government continues to tax them more heavily than any other advanced economy.

The Industrial Carbon Tax is a direct tax on productivity itself.

Imagine a worker who generates five days’ worth of revenue for their employer while only working four. That is what high productivity looks like: more value created per hour, more prosperity per unit of effort.

Now imagine forcing that same worker to perform the same job while carrying a backpack full of rocks. They may still get the work done, but they will do it more slowly, at greater cost, and with less competitive edge.

This is precisely what Ottawa’s Industrial Carbon Tax is doing to Canada’s most productive sectors.

The Industrial Carbon Tax will ultimately add roughly $8 to $9 dollars per gigajoule to natural gas, while the fuel itself costs only about $1 to $2 per gigajoule in Alberta.

The tax will increase by many multiples the cost of the energy it is supposedly pricing.

No industrial economy can thrive under a regime where the tax on energy dwarfs the cost of the energy itself. And no government that claims to care about productivity can justify a policy that forces factories, mills, refineries, and food processors to pay five times more for industrial heat than their competitors across the border.

This is not an abstract concern.

It is already showing up in grocery bills.

Canadians are bracing for what many economists warn will be a second wave of food inflation. The first wave was triggered by the global supply-chain rupture during the 2020–2022 lockdowns.

The second wave is being manufactured domestically.

A large industrial bakery or food processor in Alberta or Saskatchewan will have to pay four to five times more to fire its ovens and driers than a similar plant in the United States, where recent regulatory changes have removed federal climate policy constraints on industrial energy use.

When a Canadian plant pays 4 to 8 times more for heat than a competitor in North Dakota, the outcome is inevitable: higher prices, lower investment, and a growing incentive to shift production south.

This is the quiet part of the productivity crisis that few in Ottawa seem willing to acknowledge.

Canada’s highest productivity industries are also its most energy intensive.

Mining, refining, petrochemicals, steelmaking, fertilizer production, and advanced manufacturing all rely on large volumes of affordable, reliable energy. These sectors routinely generate labour productivity far above the national average and pay wages that support families, communities, and regional economies.

They are the backbone of the country’s export capacity and the anchor of its industrial base.

Yet these are the very industries being punished most severely by the Industrial Carbon Tax.

When the cost of energy rises by many multiples, companies do not simply absorb the difference.

They cut investment, delay expansion, automate more slowly, reduce hiring, offer smaller wage increases or close facilities entirely.

A tax that was sold as a tool to reduce emissions has become a tool that reduces productivity, competitiveness, and national resilience.

The timing could not be worse.

Since 2020, Canadians are leaving Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal in record numbers, seeking affordability, stability, and the higher wage blue collar jobs that anchor rural and mid-sized communities. This internal migration is one of the most significant demographic shifts in modern Canadian history.

It represents a quiet but powerful rebalancing of the national economy, as workers and families move toward regions where housing is affordable and industrial jobs still offer a path to the middle class.

But the Industrial Carbon Tax is choking off the very industries that make this rural revival possible. Blue collar jobs in mining, energy, construction, and manufacturing are the frontline of Canada’s productivity recovery.

They are also the sectors most exposed to global competition.

When Ottawa forces these industries to pay five times more for energy than their American counterparts, it is effectively asking Canadian workers to run a marathon while breathing through a straw.

If Canada truly wants to grow export markets beyond the United States, it must confront a basic reality: exporting goods overseas requires greater energy expenditure.

More distance means more fuel.

Taxing the energy required to transport Canadian goods to global markets guarantees that the United States will remain our dominant trading partner, not because of geography, but because Ottawa has made every other market prohibitively expensive to reach.

Canada cannot tax its way to higher productivity.

And it cannot pretend that punishing its most productive industries will somehow lead to national prosperity.

The Industrial Carbon Tax must end.

Canadians should demand a credible plan from Ottawa to attract investment into the sectors that actually generate wealth - mining, refining, petrochemicals, manufacturing, and energy. These industries built the country once.

They can do it again, if government gets out of their way.

The path to higher productivity is not complicated. It begins with removing the backpack of rocks on Canadian workers and industry.

Foreword

I have heard from numerous Albertans over the past year, who claim to be pro-Alberta sovereignty, but have stated that they can not support the citizen’s initiated petition to secure a referendum ballot question on Alberta Independence, simply because of their dislike of Jeffrey Rath (legal counsel and co-founder/organizer) of the Alberta Prosperity Project (APP).

When I remind people that King Ralph Klein (former beloved Alberta Premier) was also known to be even more subtle or brash as Jeffrey Rath, I am reminded that Alberta’s culture has changed since the Klein Era.

The Klein Era of Shoot, Shovel and Shut-up or the Peter Lougheed Era (former beloved Alberta Premier) of Let those Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark, mark a period of Alberta culture where Albertans valued speaking truth to power in politics over political correctness.

I agree that Alberta culture has changed over the past 20 years.

As such, I also agree that there is a basis to the concerns over the idea that Jeffrey Rath could be representing Alberta’s interests if a referendum vote achieves greater than 51% YES.

Note that while this question of Jeffry Rath’s future role in the APP inspired this article, answering this question is not my intention.

Rather, I am writing this article for those who are hung up over political correctness and have yet to embrace evidence of irreconcilable differences between Canada and the rest of Canada. This article should be viewed as analogous to as supporting content to a Statement of Claim of Divorce and not as a blue print for an Independent Alberta.

This vision of an Independent Alberta will be a future article.

For the rest of my subscribers, I trust that you will come away with a greater appreciation for why the Alberta Independence Movement has gained so much traction.

Executive Summary

Alberta’s sovereignty debate has entered a decisive new phase. The October 19th 2026 vote on autonomy measures and the citizen‑driven push for a formal independence referendum, reflects a province no longer content to plead for fairness within a federation that consistently sidelines its interests. For many Albertans, independence is not a reaction to a single policy or grievance. It is the culmination of a long‑standing realization: Alberta is a distinct society whose values, culture, and political instincts diverge sharply from those of Laurentian Canada.

This divide is not new. Laurentian Canada was shaped by British Loyalist and a deep suspicion of American‑style individualism. Alberta, by contrast, was built by waves of American and European settlers who carried a frontier ethos of self‑reliance, personal responsibility, and a belief that individual rights are God given and precede government. These cultural foundation still largely define Alberta today, even as federal policy increasingly reflects the priorities of a more populous, urban, and bureaucratic East.

Economic conflict over pipelines has merely exposed the deeper rift. From the National Policy to the National Energy Program to today’s carbon‑pricing regime (effectively a 500% tax on Alberta’s industrial natural gas use), Ottawa has repeatedly used federal power to reshape Alberta’s economy without its consent. Equalization compounds the imbalance, transferring billions from Alberta to provinces that refuse to develop their own resources.

But the independence movement is about more than being landlocked by regulation or drained by fiscal policy. It is about identity and values. Like Quebec, Alberta recognizes itself as culturally distinct: tougher on crime, firmer on victim rights, more committed to traditional family structures, and more aligned with the historic Canadian values of hard work, duty, community and faith. Many Albertans believe these values have been abandoned under a decade of Laurentian liberalism that argued Canada was a post nationalist state.

The question now is not whether Alberta is frustrated. It is whether a province with such a strong and distinct cultural identity can continue to thrive within a Confederation that increasingly views traditional values as precursors to ideological extremism.

Table of Contents

As this is a substantial article, I felt it helpful to outline how it is structured:

1. Introduction

2. Loyalists in the East, Yankees in the West: The 1776 Revolutionary Roots of Canada’s Divide

3. The Polluter Must Pay Myth: How Climate Pretext Fuels Alberta’s Push for Sovereignty

4. Alberta’s Quiet Rebellion: From Woke Lockdowns to Addition Recovery and Individual Rights

5. Ottawa’s Permissive Stance: From Undefined Foreign Interference to Banking Blind Spots and Foreign Mercenaries

6. Reconciliation Without Truth or Justice? British Columbia’s UNDRIP Path Amid Rising Land-Title Uncertainty

7. Ottawa’s Climate Policies: Legalized Fraud Masquerading as Virtue

8. Bill C-9: Ottawa’s Latest Assault on Religious Freedom Under the Guise of Combatting Hate

9. A Challenge to undecided Albertans

1.0 Introduction

As an Albertan voter, I am pro-Independence because I view statehood as an opportunity to rebuild a system of governance where Albertan votes actually matter and that closer aligns with traditional values.

As such, the recently announced October 19th vote on a range of Alberta sovereignty related issues, is arguably but a placeholder for the yet to be formalized referendum question on Independence. For my subscribers who are not Albertan, there is presently a citizen’s initiated petition underway to gain a minimum of 177,000 signatures required by law to achieve a specific ballot question on the following:

“Do you agree that the Province of Alberta should cease to be a part of Canada to become an independent state?”

Note that the Clarity Act is Canada’s constitutional framework for such a hypothetical succession, which received royal assent June 29, 2000 and was formalized in response to Quebec’s longer term contentions with Canadian Confederation and a reoccurring positive sentiment towards independence.

Bear in mind that the Oath of Allegiance of Canadian provincial (excluding Quebec in some variations) and federal politicians is as follows:

“I, [full name], do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King Charles the Third.”

Canada is a constitutional monarchy.

In 1987, the Provinces came together under the Meech Lake Accord, in an attempt to address the grievances of Quebecers, who were highly disenfranchised over the 1982 Constitution Act, which it felt had eroded its distinct society status within Confederation.

At this 11th hour, there is zero appetite for a Meech Lake Accord equivalent for Alberta. In fact, many who oppose this referendum, vehemently suggest that should the vote fail, Independence supporters should leave Canada outright.

After Meech Lake, Jacques Parizeau, the Premier of Quebec (1994 to 1996) and leader of the Parti Québécois, traveled to France in January 1995 to seek pledges of support and early recognition of Quebec as an independent state in the event of a successful sovereignty referendum later that year.

During his four-day official visit to Paris (starting January 23, 1995), Parizeau:

• Addressed the French National Assembly.

• Appealed directly to the French government and leaders to “quickly recognize” an independent Quebec if voters chose sovereignty.

• Emphasized that France should play a leading role in international recognition, quoting French Senate reports and framing non-recognition as a potential “second abandonment” of Quebec.

• Received treatment typically reserved for heads of sovereign states, including pomp and symbolic honors from French officials (e.g., supportive comments from Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac at the time).

This trip was part of Parizeau’s strategy to secure international legitimacy and diplomatic backing, particularly from France as a key Francophone ally, for Quebec statehood ahead of the October 30, 1995 referendum (which ultimately failed narrowly, 50.58% No to 49.42% Yes).

However, when founding members of the Alberta Prosperity Project (APP) traveled to Washington, D.C., to seek assurances of U.S. recognition of Alberta as an independent state in the event of a successful “YES” vote in a referendum, they were met with open calls of treason by British Columbia Premier David Eby.

Bear in mind that 90% of Alberta’s exports are destined for American markets and historically, a large portion of original Albertan settlers were from the US Midwest. The Ringland family on my biological Father’s side, immigrated to Alberta from North Dakota at the turn of the 20th century.

2.0 Loyalists in the East, Yankees in the West: The 1776 Revolutionary Roots of Canada’s Divide

In my opinion, the origins of the cultural divide between Laurentian Canadians and Western Canadians began with the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783). It is estimated that between 40,000 to 50,000 British Loyalists (also known as United Empire Loyalists or “Tories”) fled to Canada from the southern colonies during this interval of time. Bear in mind that the population of the British Colonies in Nova Scotia and Quebec, were between 100,000 and 130,000 prior to this mass immigration event.

You can imagine how disruptive this period of time was, especially for the predominately French speaking Quebecers, who had only become a British Colony in 1763.

I am sure the sentiment among French speaking Quebecers was nothing short of disgust and fear.

From being annexed by Britain following war between France and Britain just 20 years earlier, to being forced to accommodate a massive immigration wave of British Loyalists from the Thirteen Colonies, the seeds of distrust of English speaking colonialists and a deep anti-American sentiment took hold.

Note that the newly formed American government formally extended an invitation to Quebec and surrounding British Colonies to their north in July 1776 to join the newly formed Confederation of United States (Article XI).

The text of Article XI states:

“Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States.”

The Continental Congress had already made diplomatic overtures, sending letters to the inhabitants of Quebec in 1774 and 1775 inviting them to send delegates to the Congress and join the resistance. When these peaceful efforts failed to produce results, the Congress shifted to military action.

The close proximity of British forces along the northern border was deemed an unacceptable risk.

On June 27, 1775, U.S. Congress authorized Major General Philip Schuyler to invade if conditions were favourable and if it was “not disagreeable to the Canadians.” George Washington, in his address to the Canadians, emphasized that the troops were sent “not to plunder, but to protect you.”

The campaign involved two prongs:

• One force under Richard Montgomery captured Montreal in November 1775.

• A second under Benedict Arnold endured a grueling march through Maine to join up near Quebec City.

The combined forces besieged Quebec City but suffered a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Quebec on December 31, 1775, where Montgomery was killed and Arnold wounded. The Americans held parts of the province briefly but were forced to retreat in the spring of 1776 after British reinforcements arrived

Needless to say, between the mass immigration of British Loyalists and the invasion by the American Revolutionary Forces, the conditions were set for both long term distrust of Quebecers to English speaking British Loyalists and deeply rooted anti-American sentiment within Quebec.

The last tit-for-tat between British (Canadian) forces and the Americans was in 1812 / 1813, when British forces invaded and burned the Presidential Palace in Washington and American forces destroyed Fort York, the capital of present day Ontario.

Fast forward to the middle of the 19th century, Canadians watched with growing anxiety as American expansionism acquired vast tracts of territory between 1812 / 1813 and 1867 and increasingly viewed these events as a threat to what it viewed as its western territories.

In 1867, the Dominion of Canada was created through Confederation and by the decision to build a transcontinental railway in Canada was made in 1871 when British Columbia joined Confederation on July 20, 1871.

In fact, transcontinental railway being built was a condition of British Columbia’s agreement to join the Confederation.

Sir John A. Macdonald viewed the transcontinental railway as a vital strategic instrument for asserting Canadian sovereignty over the western territories, effectively “planting the flag” of the Dominion across the continent, and for countering the serious risk of American annexation.

While the first Dominion of Canada census conducted following British Columbia’s admission into Confederation on July 20, 1871, was not until 1881, there was not yet data collected on country of origin for new immigrants in Western Canada.

However, historical records suggests that 10s of thousands of Americans immigrated into Western Canada during the Gold Rush Era of 1850 to 1900.

The major individual gold rushes in British Columbia and the Yukon during the late 19th and early 20th centuries were the Queen Charlotte Islands Gold Rush (1850–1851), Fraser River Gold Rush (1858–1860), Cariboo Gold Rush (1861–1867), Rock Creek and Wild Horse Creek) rushes (1864–1865), Forty-mile rush (1886), and the Klondike Gold Rush (1896–1899).

While many of these American immigrants returned to United States as the gold rush subsided, untold thousands took of permanent residence.

Historical records documenting the influx of American immigrants into Alberta from the mid-19th century through the 1930s show a gradual increase, accelerating significantly in the late 1890s and early 20th century.

In the 1870s–1880s, the region (then part of the Northwest Territories) had a sparse population with limited American presence, mainly traders, ranchers, and cattlemen crossing from the U.S. Plains, as noted in Hudson’s Bay Company post journals, North-West Mounted Police reports), and early homestead files under the Dominion Lands Act (1872).

The 1881 and 1891 Dominion censuses recorded small numbers of U.S.-born individuals in trading posts and southern ranching areas.

American settlement grew markedly after 1896 under aggressive immigration policies (promoted by Clifford Sifton - cover image) such as the Dominion Land Act, with many experienced farmers from the U.S. Midwest bringing machinery and expertise.

Between 1898 and 1914, over 600,000 Americans moved north into the Prairies (including Alberta); they arrived individually or in groups, contributing to rapid population growth.

These Americans who immigrated into Western Canada between 1850 to the Great Depression, were nothing like the British Loyalists who immigrated in mass into Central and Atlantic Canada during the Revolutionary War of Independence. Like oil-in-water, these American Melting Pot immigrants, who fundamentally believed that individual rights are God Given, added to the evolving cultural mix in Alberta and Western Canada.

By the time of Clifford Sifton, we see clear evidence of how Laurentian Canadians, especially in Ottawa, viewed the role of Western Canadians within Confederation.

This role of course was indebted servitude to Central Canada and to fuel the industrialization of Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada.

One of the first examples of this sentiment was Sir John A. MacDonald’s National Policy, implemented in 1879, which imposed protective tariffs (20%) on American-manufactured goods, including essential agricultural machinery, which Prairie farmers in Manitoba and the future provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta relied upon heavily.

These duties significantly raised the cost of farm implements for Western settlers, who often had no local manufacturing alternatives and faced higher prices compared to their American counterparts, while simultaneously protecting central Canadian industrial interests.

This economic imbalance fostered deep resentment among Prairie farmers, who felt they were subsidizing eastern manufacturers through inflated input costs without receiving equivalent protection or benefits for their wheat exports.

The resulting sense of exploitation, exacerbated by the lack of political representation before provincial status in 1905 and the perception that federal policy favoured the East, became a foundational grievance in early Western Canadian alienation. These policies fueled demands for tariff reform, greater regional autonomy, and the rise of protest movements such as the United Farmers of Alberta and the Progressive Party in the early 20th century.

3.0 The Polluter Must Pay Myth: How Climate Pretext Fuels Alberta’s Push for Sovereignty

After a lost century of failed attempts to create Fire Walls of protection for Alberta against jurisdictional intrusion by Ottawa and ignored pleas to treated as equals in Confederation, Alberta is currently experiencing an unprecedented level of support for Independence.

While Albertans rallied within Confederation under the political slogan of the West Wants In, during the late 1980s under Preston Manning, leader of the former Reform Party, it is fair to say that for many Albertans in 2026, it would be more fitting to say the West Wants Out.

While the West Wants In was a rallying cry following the destructive National Energy Program (NEP) of Pierre Eliot Trudeau, the West Wants Out or WEXIT was the instinctual response to his Son’s NEP 2.0.

Conversely and from the Laurentian Canadian perspective, while the NEP 1.0 was sold under the banner of consumer equality and energy affordability for Eastern Canadians, the NEP 2.0 was pushed through the Supreme Court of Canada and embraced at eastern voting booths under the pretense that the Pollute Must Pay.

Of course, the burden of both largely fell on the shoulders of Albertans and Eastern Canadians largely felt justified in penalizing their polluting cousins out west.

While the the NEP 1.0 was borne out of economic nationalism after the 1970s Oil Crisis and the Iranian Revolution, which saw massive inflation and extreme volatility in the price of oil that disproportionately benefited oil producing jurisdictions like Alberta, the NEP 2.0 was created under the pretense of a Climate Crisis.

Without going into all aspects of Trudeau Senior’s NEP 1.0, it is sufficient here to acknowledge some of its key Federal revenue generating features:

1. Western Canadian crude flowing east was be priced at 50% of international valuations and Ottawa took the difference;

2. Export taxes were imposed on crude flowing to United States;

3. Imposed production taxes on Western Canadian natural gas, natural gas liquids and petroleum production, where collectively these were the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) and the Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT). The PGRT was 8% of net before provincial royalties and the NGGLT varied between 15 to 30% on gross natural gas sales; and

4. These new revenues to subsidize oil consumption in Eastern Canada and to fund the growth of the newly formed Petro-Canada oil & gas crown corporation.

Needless to say, the NEP 1.0 was devastating for Western Canada (e.g., unemployment rising from ~3.7% to over 12% in the early 1980s) and Alberta in particular.

Fast forwarding to 1985 and after an estimated $100 billion earned by the Federal Government through these price controls and wealth redistribution schemes, the NEP 1.0 was put to rest following the election of Brian Mulroney.

While the NEP 1.0’s PGRT and NGGLT were crippling taxes, they pale in comparison to the NEP 2.0’s slatted ultimate target of $170 per tonne of emitted CO₂. For a climate polluter like Alberta, which is heavily dependent on natural gas for both residential and industrial heating and power generation, a $170 per tonne CO₂ tax on natural gas is equivalent to $9 per GJ.

Bear in mind that current AECO pricing for natural gas in Alberta has varied between $1 and $2 per GJ over the past few years.

Thus, the NEP 2.0 represents an unheard of 500% tax on Alberta’s heavy industrial consumption of natural gas.

Figure 1 is introduced to illustrate just how reliant Alberta’s grid is on both heavy industry and on natural gas to power its provincial grid.

Note that since the Alberta NDP accelerated the phase out of 5,800 MW of coal power generation ten years ago, there has been a rapid transition to a reliance on waste heat recovery (cogeneration) to produce electricity through steam turbine power generation.

Heavy industrial cogeneration has become Alberta’s baseload power.

Industrial facilities like steam injection bitumen production in the oil sands, to heavy crude oil upgrading and refining, as well as petrochemical plants, have become extremely well integrated into the provincial grid and are all heavily dependent on affordable natural gas.

The NEP 1.0 under Mark Carney’s Industrial Carbon Tax stands to increase the cost of natural gas for these industries by a 5x factor relative to AECO pricing.

Note that a 5x increase on natural gas costs for an average bitumen producing steam injection plant in Alberta would increase the energy cost from $4 per barrel (@ $2 per GJ) to $22 per barrel (@$9 per GJ tax + $2 per GJ gas price). Bear in mind that at current prices for Western Canadian crude, a bitumen producer earns $35 to $45 per barrel.

Likewise note that the higher the operating cost for these steam injection plants, the lower the royalty rate the Province receives per barrel from the Producer.

Figure 1. Power pool mix in Alberta as of February 16th, 2026.

What is equally astounding is the fact that not once over the past decade of weak protest by Alberta and Canadian Conservatives, have I ever heard anyone point out the 5x inflationary effect that $170 per tonne CO₂ tax is going to have on Canadian heavy industry by 2030.

As far as I know, I am the only Canadian energy scientist who have looked past the gaslighting associated with listing this consumption tax in emission intensity units, to quantify its true inflationary impact on natural gas prices.

Given the premise of the NEP 2.0 legislation is the Polluter Must Pay and that human CO₂ emissions are the cause of the claims of a present Climate Emergency, most engineers and scientists in Canada look the other way when this consumption taxes' obvious inflation impact is eluded to by the likes of Pierre Poilievre.

I recommend that all energy prices (e.g., gasoline, electricity) be listed in $ per GJ, instead of the different units for gasoline ($ per L) versus electricity ($ per kWh) versus natural gas ($ per GJ) versus coal ($ per tonne).

If energy was priced in $ CDN per GJ for these types of energy, this is what Canadians would be well acquainted with:

1. $0.17 per kWh electricity (average 2025 Canadian retail price) = $47 per GJ

2. $1 per L gasoline (Edmonton rack price) = $31 per GJ

3. $180 per tonne thermal coal = $7 per GJ

4. AECO natural gas $1 to $2 per GJ

On a pre-tax $ per GJ basis, electricity is on average 25 to 50 times more expensive than natural gas.

The question all Albertans and Canadians must ask is why does Ottawa remain so steadfast in its insistence that the NEP 2.0 path to Net Zero 2050 is to electrify the economy and to use every regulatory measure within its power to restrict access to the most affordable forms of energy (i.e., natural gas and coal)?

Oh right, because there is a Climate Emergency.

Here is the thing folks, when the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled in 2021 on the Federal Government’s Constitutional right to regulate national CO₂ emissions, there was never any debate on the validity of the claim that modern measurements of subtle changes in climate was due to human use of hydrocarbons.

In fact, the Provinces all bent the knee to the alarmist claims of the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

You know, the same organization that recently declared that a new Era of Global Boiling had began, when in fact it was simply the large 2023 / 24 El Nino event occurring at the same time the natural sea surface temperature state of the Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO) was peaking.

In my recent Substack video presentation titled There is not one Greenhouse Effect, there are two, I show peer reviewed research showing that this Global Boiling Event was defined by an anomalously low cloud cover state that emerged in both the Pacific Tropics and across the Tropical to North Atlantic regions.

In other words, it was not human CO₂ emissions, but Global Brightening driven by elevated sunshine that drove global temperatures to anomalously high values in 2023 / 24.

Of course, there is no such language allowed in Canadian politics or in academia.

In the 2021 Supreme Court ruling on Federal jurisdiction, of the 15 to 20 non-governmental intervenors present over the two day hearings (September 22–23, 2020), there was not a single intervenor present who challenged the Liberal Government’s claims on human causation.

These intervenors included:

1. Environmental groups (e.g., Environmental Defence Canada, David Suzuki Foundation, Canadian Environmental Law Association)

2. Public health organizations (e.g., Canadian Public Health Association)

3. Indigenous groups (e.g., Assembly of First Nations, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation)

4. Women’s rights advocates (e.g., National Association of Women and the Law)

5. Canadian Taxpayers Federation (opposing the Act).

The only intervenors who contended, did so solely on the basis of Constitutional jurisdiction.

Blacklock’s Reporter revealed in January 2025 that the federal Court Challenges Program (CCP) funded non-governmental intervenors who supported the government’s position in the 2021 Supreme Court case Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (2021 SCC 11), where the carbon tax was upheld.

The articles Feds Paid Carbon Tax Friends (January 22, 2025) and Carbon Tax A ‘Human Right (January 23, 2025) disclosed that the CCP subsidized advocacy groups to argue in favour of the tax’s constitutionality, framing it as advancing “human rights,” but refused to name recipients or disclose specific amounts for that case, citing litigation privilege and other reasons.

Separately, a Blacklock’s report from October 2024 noted that the CCP had spent $24.9 million in total since its revival in 2017 on various Charter-related test cases and interventions.

In other words, tax payers were funding the appearance of a grassroots support for unprecedented levels of taxation on energy use in a country defined by its massive geography and extremely cold winters.

All in the name of human rights and climate justice.

I seriously doubt a single intervenor pointed out that the $170 per tonne CO₂ penalty on natural gas use would empower the Federal Government to tax consumption 500% above the value of the gas.

Since 2021 SCC 11, the Federal Government has doubled down on its newly minted dystopian powers to characterize Canadian agricultural CO₂ and CH₄ emissions as being as being as large a climate polluter as Alberta’s oil sands sector.

As I discussed in a recent Substack article titled Methane Rules Today, Farmers Tomorrow, Ottawa leverages IPCC reports to characterize gases from crop residue decomposition, domestic animal respiration and digestion, as equivalent to industrial pollution.

As a scientist and rancher, I am so enraged over this pseudo-scientific illogic that I have begun to openly state that this outlook on ranching and farming is akin to a mental disorder.

When I hear Ottawa et al speak about our agricultural sector, it makes me ask does the NEP 2.0 Net Zero vision regard Homo Sapiens as a natural outcome of four billion years of evolution, self aware stardust that learned to tend the Garden (aka ranching, farming), or does it see us as a plague that must be cured by returning the world to a state that existed before our ancestors ever stood upright?

Arguably, this illogic is the most profound metropolitan delusion in human history.

It’s the belief that eight billion people can be gently nudged back into a pre-industrial state by bureaucrats who have never heard a rooster crow at dawn and this would be called progress.

Yet this is the ideology that Ottawa and its multi-billion dollar consultant apparatus pushes on the Confederation, all the while ignoring the fact that a single modern Canadian farmer is so productive, their annual blood, sweat and tears effectively produces enough food to support the dietary requirements of hundreds if not thousands.

For every agrarian worker removed from the fields, since the Industrial Revolution, a barrel of oil has been required to fill the gap and to power the ever increasing mechanization that defines modern agricultural practices.

Likewise, the public relations apparatus that advances Ottawa’s NEP 2.0 Net Zero insanity, refuses to acknowledge that Alberta’s oil & gas sector produces upwards of 25% of the provinces GDP and public sector revenue, while employing only 4 to 5% of the provincial work force.

If Alberta were an independent country and the federal corporate income tax of its oil & gas sector were diverted to Edmonton instead of Ottawa, upwards of 35% of public sector revenue would come from its energy industry.

Instead of saluting such excellence in productivity, Ottawa argues that the Polluter Must Pay.

Remember, it is Alberta’s oil & gas industry that allows the province to have the lowest corporate income tax (CIT) in the Confederation and is leading reason for why Alberta continues to lead the country in job creation and GDP growth. Provincial + Federal CIT for businesses with over $500,000 revenue per year are 8% + 15% and 2% + 9%, respectively, for those with revenues lower than this threshold.

To conclude this section, I will briefly touch on the long standing imbalance within Confederation that is made possible through Federal Equalization.

Historically, Canada’s federal equalization program is a formula-based transfer system established in 1957 and constitutionally entrenched in 1982 (Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982), whereby the federal government provides unconditional payments to provinces with below-average fiscal capacity.

The program’s stated intent is to enable provincial governments to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, regardless of their ability to raise revenue.

It measures each province’s fiscal capacity, which is the revenue it could theoretically generate by applying national average tax rates to its tax bases, including personal income, corporate income, sales taxes, property taxes, and 50% of non-renewable resource revenues, against a national average standard.

Provinces falling below receive payments to bring them closer to that average, funded from general federal revenues.

Alberta’s primary contention is that the formula creates profound fiscal inequality and unfairness, despite contributing disproportionately to federal revenues (often 14–17% despite having ~12% of the population).

Alberta receives no equalization payments (as a “have” province) while indirectly subsidizing recipient provinces (primarily Quebec, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island) through its net outflows, estimated at $15–$27 billion annually in recent years.

The biggest bone that Alberta has is with Quebec, who like Atlantic Canada, sits on a massive hydrocarbon resource base that it has made illegal to even explore to characterize its full extent.

If Quebec and Atlantic Canada begins to develop its hydrocarbon resources, this will reduce equalization payments.

Easy money is addicting.

Furthermore, Eastern Canadian provinces have imported upwards of $150 billion of oil and gas products over the past decade from international markets, after the Federal Liberal Government made it all but possible for the 1 million barrel per day Energy East pipeline to be built.

Energy East would have ended Eastern Canada’s dependence on foreign oil and would have given Canada the ability to export crude oil to Europe.

Figure 2. Fiscal outflow from Western Canada and in particular from Alberta under the Federal Equalization program.

However, the Liberal Government stated that the proponent of the Energy East pipeline project (legacy TransCanada Corporation) must account for the increase in CO₂ emissions from exporting Alberta heavy crude and this regulatory requirement, among other factors, resulted in the cancellation of the regulatory application.

This regulatory requirement is a first for any major pipeline regulatory review application processes and demonstrated Ottawa’s underlying desire to see the project application cancelled.

We know this, because Ottawa does not apply its climate policies against foreign oil imports into Eastern Canada.

Following this announcement, TransCanada Energy changed its name (rebranding) to TC Energy and shifted its investment focus to United States.

Ultimately, I believe that Ottawa refuses to allow Eastern Canada to become more dependent on Alberta for the oil & gas it imports from international markets, because it does not want Alberta to gain leverage within Confederation.

Even though Western Canadian crude oil is discounted relative to international markets (e.g., Brent) and Eastern Canadians would benefit from lower prices at the pump, Ottawa learned from NEP 1.0 that Albertans will use trade dependencies to fight for greater reciprocity, when push comes to shove.

In October 2021, Albertans voted overwhelmingly in favor of removing the principle of equalization payments from Canada’s Constitution, with 62% supporting the measure in a non-binding referendum held alongside municipal elections. Five years later, there has been zero indications from Ottawa or other provinces that there is a willingness to revisit Equalization.

4.0 Alberta’s Quiet Rebellion: From Woke Lockdowns to Addition Recovery and Individual Rights

This next section is extremely important and it clearly demonstrates that Alberta is truly a distinct culture within Canadian Confederation (like oil-in-water).

Too many people outside of Alberta have come to the overly simplified conclusion that the primary basis of discontent within the Independence movement is the lack of progress on pipelines to markets outside of United States. While this is indeed a wallet-book level contention, it has increasingly had to share air time with a much more deeply rooted emotional beef that Albertans have with both Ottawa and the Rest of Canada (RoC).

Over the past few years, the Alberta United Conservative Party (UCP) government has adopted positions on crime and gender identity that frequently diverge from broader Canadian trends and federal or other provincial approaches.

On gender identity, Alberta introduced restrictive policies in 2024 (e.g., Education Amendment Act and Health Statutes Amendment Act), requiring parental consent for students under 16 to use preferred names/pronouns at school, banning puberty blockers and hormone therapy for minors under 16, and limiting transgender girls’ participation in female sports, measures more stringent than in most provinces and often criticized as anti-trans, prompting legal challenges and notwithstanding clause use to shield them from Charter scrutiny.

On crime, the UCP has emphasized self-defense rights, reinforcing homeowners’ ability to use reasonable force against intruders, invoking “castle doctrine” principles absent in federal law.

As well, the UCP has pushed for tougher approaches to child sexual crimes (e.g., calls for mandatory minimums).

One of the most noteworthy departures in Alberta policy from the RoC was the abrupt shift with drug addiction treatment toward a recovery-oriented model prioritizing abstinence and treatment over harm reduction. Figure 3 shows the explosion in drug related over-dose fatalities shortly after the Liberal Government came to power in late 2015.

Examples include closing supervised consumption sites, opposing safe supply, and focusing on involuntary care in some cases, contrasting with federal and many provincial emphases on harm reduction and decriminalization pilots.

Figure 3. Explosive growth in drug overdose fatalities in Canada following the introduction of Liberal legislation relating to narcotics.

Evidence from recent years suggests Alberta’s recovery-oriented addiction treatment model, may be contributing to positive outcomes.

Official provincial data showing a nearly 40% reduction in opioid-related deaths in 2024 compared to 2023, which was more than double the national average decline of 17% in some analyses. Continued decreases in early 2025, followed by over 10,000 additional publicly funded treatment spaces (a 55% capacity increase), and full coverage for medications like Sublocade.

Several other provinces have begun adopting or exploring elements of Alberta’s approach, with Saskatchewan and Ontario signing memoranda of understanding in 2024–2025 to collaborate on recovery-oriented care.

Saskatchewan is advancing its own five-year plan, and even NDP-led British Columbia and Manitoba implementing aspects such as new involuntary care facilities.

In response to a 2025 Supreme Court ruling striking down mandatory minimum sentences for child pornography possession/access as cruel and unusual in some cases, Premier Danielle Smith and the UCP called for Ottawa to use the notwithstanding clause to restore stricter penalties, though no provincial override was applied directly in Alberta.

Additionally, the UCP introduced updates to the Alberta Bill of Rights (2024–2025), expanding protections for property rights, firearms ownership, and the right to refuse medical treatments, explicitly referencing opposition to COVID-era lockdowns, mandates, and restrictions.

Albertans insisted on these structural changes following the illegally invoked Emergency Act against protesting Canadians who dared to demand an end to COVID lawlessness.

No other Province in Confederation implemented such safe guards other than Alberta.

The Bill of Rights updates stands out as more libertarian and critical of pandemic policies than most other jurisdictions, which generally upheld or enforced similar measures without such explicit legislative pushback. These positions reflect a consistent UCP emphasis on parental rights, law-and-order priorities, recovery-focused social policy, and resistance to perceived federal or progressive overreach.

Most of these legislation changes in Alberta are a direct result of a decade increasing lawlessness and moral decay in Canada (Figure 4), which are perceived by Albertans as a direct result of the Liberal Government soft on crime (Woke) legislation over the past 10 plus years.

As Ottawa dictates much of the criminal code and Alberta’s superior courts (i.e., Court of King’s Bench and Court of Appeal) are governed by Federally appointed judges, this is yet another point of contention that is rapidly emerging.

Figure 4. The rise of lawlessness within Canada over the Lost Liberal Decade.

The Alberta UCP, has aggressively challenged Ottawa’s exclusive authority to appoint federal judges to Alberta’s superior courts, by demanding greater provincial input in the selection process.

In a January 23, 2026 letter to Prime Minister Mark Carney, Premier Danielle Smith threatened to withhold provincial funding for new judicial positions, essential for supporting court operations, unless Ottawa reforms the advisory committees to include more Alberta-nominated members and reflects Alberta’s distinct legal traditions.

She argued the current federal process is politicized, citing perceived Liberal donor ties among appointees. This standoff escalated into a referendum issue: in February 2026, Smith announced Albertans will vote in October 2026 on amending the Constitution to give provinces control over appointing superior court judges within their borders.

The question (one of nine referendum items) reflects broader UCP grievances over federal overreach and judicial independence, positioning the vote as a test of provincial sovereignty and a potential step toward reducing Ottawa’s discretion in Alberta’s justice system.

The move has drawn criticism from the Canadian Bar Association and others for risking politicization of the judiciary, but it underscores Alberta’s push for more autonomy amid ongoing federal-provincial tensions.

These summary stories are but a few that I believe, reinforce the claim that Alberta’s culture is distinct within Canada and is one that has a much stricter sense of personal accountability and a stronger valuation of victim rights than does the RoC.

I must point out the obvious, which is that it is mind blowing that a state of emergency has not been declared in Canada over the tens of thousands of excess deaths caused by opiates, fentanyl and other narcotics over the past decade.

Note that the Trump Administration declared in early 2025, fentanyl to be a Weapon of Mass Destruction and labelled the Mexican Cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

Arguably, Ottawa should have and still can invoke the Not Withstanding Clause and remove due process for both Mexican Cartels and Chinese Triads known to be operating within Canada and implement similar measures to destroy these organizations.

Before moving onto the next section, I want to leave you with a question, which is why does Ottawa’s Liberals, often called Canada’s natural ruling party, persist on being soft on crime?

5.0 Ottawa’s Permissive Stance: From Undefined Foreign Interference to Banking Blind Spots and Foreign Mercenaries

This section may provide you with some ideas as to why Ottawa’s Liberal Government remains so soft on criminals and the hypothesis that I offer is that the answer may simply be that it suits their invested interests.

I will now outline what we know about Ottawa’s refusal to effectively define through legislation, what defines Foreign Interference.

Further, I will highlight the near absence of any formal acknowledgement from Ottawa that Canadian banking institutions are actively engaged in large scale laundering activities for Mexican cartels and Chinese triads.

Finally, I will will discuss the latest in Ottawa’s plans to enlist foreign mercenaries to fill the ranks of the Canadian Armed Forces and will ask if this new immigration framework is part of Ottawa’s new alignment with the CCP as part of the New World Order?

Foreign Interference - Foreign interference in Canadian politics refers to covert or clandestine efforts by foreign states to influence, manipulate, or undermine Canada’s democratic processes, institutions, and decision-making to advance their own interests. This includes disinformation campaigns, proxy agents, illicit funding, intimidation of diaspora communities, and interference in elections or nominations.

The threat has grown in scale and sophistication due to globalization, technology, and geopolitical tensions, as noted in multiple Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reports over the past decade-plus. CSIS has consistently warned Ottawa of escalating foreign interference.

In its 2020 public report, it described 2020 as seeing the highest levels of espionage and interference since the Cold War.

Subsequent reports, including the 2021 and 2024 editions, highlighted persistent threats from state actors, with China (PRC/CCP) identified as the most active and pervasive perpetrator.

CSIS has repeatedly emphasized that foreign interference targets democratic institutions, diaspora groups, and elections.

Formal reviews, such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Special Report on Foreign Interference (June 2024), assessed threats from 2018–2024 and concluded that Canada remains a permissive environment for such activities, with the PRC as the greatest threat.

The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, with its initial report in 2024 and final report in January 2025, found interference attempts stained electoral integrity.

A key limitation identified across these reviews is the absence of clear, comprehensive legislation defining and criminalizing foreign interference threats effectively, hindering detection, response, and prosecution.

This gap has prompted updates like Bill C-70 (Countering Foreign Interference Act, 2024), which modernized the CSIS Act and introduced transparency measures.

Other federal bodies, including the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), have reviewed intelligence dissemination on PRC interference (2018–2023). Private sector and think-tank analyses, such as those from the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, echo these concerns.

Clear examples include PRC efforts in the 2019 and 2021 elections: clandestine support for preferred candidates, disinformation to undermine critics, and targeting MPs like Michael Chong.

Front and center, Mark Carney (2025), explicitly stated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) / China represents Canada’s greatest geopolitical threat, citing foreign interference.

Canadian Money Laundering - On October 2024, TD Bank (Toronto-Dominion Bank), one of Canada’s largest financial institutions, pleaded guilty in the United States to conspiracy to commit money laundering and violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The bank agreed to pay approximately $3 billion in penalties, the largest ever under U.S. anti-money laundering laws, including a record $1.3 billion fine from FinCEN and over $1.8 billion to the Department of Justice.

U.S. authorities found that TD’s lax oversight allowed criminal networks to launder hundreds of millions, including over $670 million through three major schemes.

One prominent case involved a Chinese money launderer, Da Ying Sze, who funneled more than $470 million in narcotics proceeds (linked to fentanyl trafficking) through TD accounts, with some staff accepting bribes like gift cards.

Investigations traced these funds to Mexican drug cartels (e.g., Sinaloa-linked operations) and Chinese organized crime groups, where drug cash from U.S. sales flowed back to suppliers in Mexico and China.

This U.S. ruling exposed systemic failures in TD’s monitoring of trillions in transactions, creating an “easy target” for international traffickers.

Evidence from broader Canadian contexts, such as the Cullen Commission (British Columbia’s inquiry into money laundering) and FINTRAC reports, highlights similar vulnerabilities.

In B.C., the “Vancouver Model” involved Canada-based Chinese Triad-linked underground banking (e.g., Silver International) laundering cartel drug proceeds through casinos, real estate, and banks, with estimates of billions annually.

Reports from the Department of Finance Canada and experts note transnational organized crime, including Mexican cartels and Asian Triads, exploiting Canadian financial sectors for drug trafficking proceeds, often via trade-based laundering or professional networks.

Despite these revelations, including FINTRAC alerts on synthetic opioid laundering and U.S. pressure on fentanyl-linked flows, Albertans should be asking why has Ottawa launched no formal, comprehensive public investigation into alleged corruption or systemic complicity within Canada’s banking system?

Foreign Solider Enlistment - On February 18, 2026, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Minister Lena Metlege Diab announced updates to Canada’s Express Entry system, introducing priority categories for 2026 to address critical labour shortages, including a groundbreaking stream exclusively for skilled military recruits from foreign armed forces.

This new category targets highly experienced personnel actively serving or recently released from recognized foreign militaries, with a strict requirement of at least 10 years of continuous service.

Figure 5. Ottawa’s new immigration strategy aimed at enlisting foreigners with 10 plus years experience in foreign armed forces.

Applicants must secure a full-time job offer from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) for at least three years in high-demand roles, while meeting standard Express Entry criteria (e.g., under Federal Skilled Worker or related programs), holding relevant post-secondary credentials, and passing intensive security, medical, and military vetting.

Successful candidates receive invitations for permanent residence, often at lower Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) scores than general draws, accelerating their path to citizenship.

The government positions this as essential for bolstering national defense, sovereignty, and security amid the CAF’s reported shortfall of around 16,000 personnel and evolving global threats.

What sets this apart is its unprecedented focus.

Unlike historical models (e.g., Roman auxiliaries or the French Foreign Legion) that recruit foreign volunteers or non-citizens directly into service, this program explicitly prioritizes individuals with mid-to-late career military experience from other nations’ standing forces.

The 10-year threshold means recruits are typically not fresh enlistees but seasoned professionals, often in their 30s or even 40s, who would literally discontinue (or have recently discontinued) active duty in a foreign military to transition to the CAF.

This raises unique questions about loyalty screening, integration of mid-career foreign officers, and reliance on external militaries for Canada’s defense capabilities.

I find this policy simply astounding.

First, it shows a complete inability to acknowledge that woke ideologies of the Liberal Government of the past decade, the Department of Defense order in 2023, to install tampons / pads in men’s washrooms on all bases contributed to low enlistment rates over the past few years (<2025).

Second, enlistment rates in 2025 surged to a 10-year high, so why implement such an unprecedent enlistment strategy?

I can not ignore the fact that this announcement came just one month after Mark Carney’s January 16, 2026 visit to Beijing, where he famously stated that the agreements on trade and security sets us up well for the World Order.

With so many unanswered questions regarding electoral interference in favor of Liberal candidates and Chinese police stations operating in Canada that have allegedly been targeting Chinese Canadians and new immigrants, trust in handling of the Liberal-China file as being in the National Interest is at an all time low.

Ultimately, Canadians should be extremely concerned that this new immigration strategy does not include officers who have served with the People’s Liberation Army or any other dictatorial country.

At this point in history, where multiple higher courts have declared the Liberal Party of Canada to be guilty of illegally invoking the Emergency Act (former War Measures Act) to end the lockdown protests in 2022, the optics of this foreign soldiers enlistment strategy are deeply unsettling.

Canadians can be certain that the Americans are watching this with special interest, as Canada has been increasingly viewed as an emerging national security threat.

Albertans must ask themselves whether they want to be a part of this China - Canada New World Order or if they wish to chart their own course.

6.0 Reconciliation Without Truth or Justice? British Columbia’s UNDRIP Path Amid Rising Land-Title Uncertainty

On May 27, 2021, the Tk’emlúps te Secwépemc First Nation announced that ground-penetrating radar had detected 215 potential unmarked graves at the former Kamloops Indian Residential School site. The news dominated headlines and radio waves for weeks, sparking national grief, outrage over historical residential school abuses, and renewed calls for reconciliation.

A new national statutory holiday was created on September 30th, called National Day for Truth and Reconciliation.

NDP MP Leah Gazan (representing Winnipeg Centre) pushed for legislation to criminalize or treat as hate speech what she terms residential school denialism, which includes questioning or denying aspects of the residential school system, such as the existence or implications of “mass graves” in the context of the 2021 Kamloops announcement and similar sites.

Gazan also previously tabled a successful unanimous motion in October 2022 recognizing residential schools as genocide.

In the weeks and months that followed, a wave of church arsons, vandalism, and desecrations erupted across Canada—primarily targeting Catholic and other Christian churches.

Conservative tracking sources (Juno News, True North) documented over 100 incidents in total (arsons plus vandalism/desecration), with clusters in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and beyond. CBC News later confirmed 33 churches fully burned down between May 2021 and December 2023, 24 of which were ruled arsons.

Statistics Canada data showed a statistically significant spike: arsons at religious institutions nearly doubled relative to baseline levels (2011–2017), rising sharply in western provinces post-announcement.

Figure 6. Map showing distribution of Church desecrations across Canada in 2021.

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s Scorched Earth report (April 2025, updated December 2025) quantified the surge—90 arsons in 2021 alone—and found over 96% of cases unsolved, with fewer than 4% resulting in charges or arrests.

Clearance rates stayed extremely low: only nine of the 24 confirmed church arsons identified by CBC led to arrests, and most motives remain undetermined. Many fires occurred on or near First Nations lands, yet few perpetrators have been brought to justice.

Despite millions of taxpayer dollars spent on archaeological surveillance, ground-penetrating radar follow-ups, and related investigations at Kamloops and similar sites, no human remains or mass graves have been exhumed or definitively confirmed to date.

The final Kamloops report, funded publicly, remains sealed from public view for 15 years under confidentiality rules.

Canadians must now ask the following questions:

1. Why, after years of public funding, intense national attention and declarations of a genocide verdict without evidence, has the Kamloops report been sealed for 15 years?

2. Why has there been so little justice for the thousands of Canadians whose communities were violated when their churches were burned and desecrated?

There can be no reconciliation without truth or justice.

We can not ignore the fact that British Columbia is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has signed onto the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

Furthermore, that British Columbia continues to be at the center of increasing questions over property rights violations in the courts, as recent as late February 2026, when the federal government (Crown-Indigenous Relations) signed three agreements with the Musqueam Indian Band recognizing their Aboriginal rights and title over a large area in Metro Vancouver (including waterways and parts of the Lower Mainland).

For many Canadians, this file has many classical underpinnings of state sponsored gaslighting. UNDRIP, as with Ottawa’s obsession with United Nations climate policies, is viewed as a loss of Canadian sovereignty, which in turn is fueling Alberta’s push for Independence from Ottawa.

7.0 Ottawa’s Climate Policies: Legalized Fraud Masquerading as Virtue

Canada’s relentless pursuit of United Nations-inspired climate policies—championed by successive Liberal governments and justified by IPCC targets—has become a textbook case of legalized fraud.

Taxpayers foot the bill for grandiose promises that deliver little environmental benefit while enriching insiders and burdening ordinary Canadians.

A landmark 2024 Oxford-led study in Science, Climate policies that achieved major emission reductions: Global evidence from two decades, analyzed 1,500 policies across 41 countries over 25 years. The verdict was stark: only 63 interventions produced significant CO₂ cuts (0.6–1.8 billion tonnes total), often through rare, well-designed policy mixes.

Standalone measures like subsidies or regulations rarely succeeded.

Figure 7. Since time immemorial, there have always been an elite class who enrich themselves while demanding our self sacrifice to save us from inconvenient weather.

Globally, aggressive policies yield marginal results; in Canada, they are even less effective given our massive geography, cold winters and rapidly growing population, yet Ottawa doubles down.

Retired energy economist Robert Lyman, writing for Friends of Science, has repeatedly exposed the staggering costs to tax payers. In his May 2024 report What Are Climate Policies Costing Canada?, Lyman cites third-party estimates including the Carbon Policy Tracker’s tally of $476 billion in total federal and provincial expenditures on climate measures from 2020 to 2030, equating to roughly $11,900 per resident or $2,800 annually.

This covers direct spending and tax expenditures announced to date, with five more fiscal years potentially adding more.

He notes carbon pricing revenues alone could exceed $80 billion over the decade (per Finance Canada projections), with the rate rising to at least $170 per tonne by 2030.

However, the worst thing about these policies is not that they cost tax payers so much for so little in return, is they enable outright fraud within our political institutions.

The Green Slush Fund scandal, centered on the now defunct Sustainable Development Technology Canada (SDTC), saw hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars funneled to ineligible projects, with conflicts of interest, political favoritism, and minimal oversight.

In other words, the SDTC became a criminal enterprise under the Liberals.

RCMP investigations and parliamentary probes revealed systemic abuse, yet accountability remains elusive and no charges have been laid. This is not mere mismanagement; it is a cartel-like scheme where public funds are diverted under the guise of green virtue.

A glaring example of ethical sleight-of-hand is the shift from Consumer Carbon Tax 1.0 to 2.0, now called the Clean Fuel Regulations (CFR). The original tax, rising to $170/tonne by 2030, added roughly 17 cents per litre to gasoline, offset by rebates for many households.

The CFR or Carbon Tax 2.0, imposes comparable or higher costs (estimates of 11–17 cents per litre by 2030) through mandates on fuel producers, passed directly to consumers at the pump.

Unlike the old tax, there is no rebate mechanism.

Both systems extract similar revenue per litre, but the Carbon Tax 2.0 hides the burden behind “clean fuel” rhetoric, evading political backlash while maintaining the tax load.

Figure 8. A vibrant yellow Chinese BYD electric vehicle crossover.

The same strategy was applied to Mark Carney’s switch between his predecessor’s electric vehicle mandate, with his emissions standard regulations and rebates. While the emission standard is touted as technology neutral, its stringency is such that in the long run, only battery electric vehicles will meet the emission intensity targets.

Of course, the rebates for this latest $2.3 billion subsidy program, will be disproportionately be borne by Albertans, who will be forced to fund the program, while being denied the option to use their province’s immense hydrocarbon resource for transportation.

How long will this new subsidy program last, before it too goes belly up?

Bear in mind, American and European automotive manufacturers have spent over $10 billion in trying to force fit electric vehicle supply into a market that simply does not demand this technology concept. Many jurisdictions are dropping their mandates, simply because the demand is too low and because subsidies run out.

Meanwhile, investment capital in modern conventional automotive manufacturing plants will continue to head south of the border, where electric vehicle subsidy programs have altogether vanished.

Ultimately, these policies are not about science or the environment; they are about control, revenue extraction, and insider enrichment. The perennial subsidies should tell you everything you need to know about the sustainability of this reinvented program.

When Oxford research shows most climate measures fail to deliver major cuts, when third-party estimates peg pre-2030 costs at hundreds of billions (with trillions looming), when scandals like the Green Slush Fund expose corruption, and when taxes are rebranded without relief, Canadians face legalized fraud by all levels of government.

True accountability demands an end to this charade, not more UN-inspired mandates.

Albertans must ask themselves if they wish to be the principle demographic within the Canadian Confederation that funds fraudulent climate policies that perpetuates the idea Albertans must pay for their “climate transgressions”?

8.0 Bill C-9: Ottawa’s Latest Assault on Religious Freedom Under the Guise of Combatting Hate

Introduced by Liberal Justice Minister Sean Fraser on September 19, 2025, Bill C-9, titled the “Combatting Hate Act,” amends the Criminal Code to address hate propaganda, hate crimes, and access to religious or cultural places. Ostensibly aimed at curbing rising antisemitism and online harms, the bill creates new offenses for hate-motivated intimidation and interference with institutions like places of worship.

However, controversy erupted when Liberal MPs on the House Justice Committee voted on December 10, 2025, to approve a Bloc Québécois amendment removing the religious exemption in Section 319(3)(b).

This clause previously shielded individuals from hate speech charges if they expressed good-faith opinions based on religious texts or subjects.

Figure 9. Traditional Canadian definition of freedom.

The amendment means quoting or arguing from sacred scriptures—like passages in the Bible condemning homosexuality, or similar verses in the Koran or Torah—could now be prosecutable as promoting hatred, without the prior defense.

Critics, including Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre, warn this could criminalize sections of these holy books, stifling religious expression. As of March 2026, the bill remains in committee, but Liberal support signals intent to pass it, aligning with broader efforts to redefine “hate speech” in ways that target traditional beliefs.

This mirrors a July 2025 CBC News interview, where RCMP Staff Sgt. Camille Habel stated that a sudden shift toward “traditional values” from previously held beliefs in equal gender rights could be an indicator of potential extremism or radicalization.

This bill exemplifies the Liberal Party’s pattern of censoring speech it hates, particularly Christianity.

Liberals don’t just disagree; they weaponize policy to silence dissent.

A case in point is the 2018 Canada Summer Jobs program attestation, which forced applicants, including Christian-managed student work programs, to affirm respect for “reproductive rights,” effectively requiring them to denounce long-held pro-life positions that life begins at conception.

Funding was denied to those refusing, demonstrating Ottawa’s desire to coerce and censor Christians. This wasn’t neutrality; it was ideological litmus testing, prioritizing Liberal abortion policies over religious freedoms.

Bill C-9 extends this intolerance, potentially labeling ancient scriptures as hate conveyors.

Why target religious texts now?

It’s not about safety—it’s about control.

By equating faith-based views with hatred, Liberals marginalize Christianity, the faith most at odds with their progressive agenda. Canadians must recognize this as systemic bias: Ottawa censors what it despises, eroding freedoms under “inclusivity” rhetoric. True democracy protects diverse voices, not just those aligned with the ruling elite.

Albertans must ask themselves why:

1. Why traditional definitions of freedom are under increasing attack by Ottawa and Quebec; and

2. Can they further gamble with their children’s future in view of Eastern Canada’s proclivity towards regressive ideologies that target religious expression?

9.0 A Challenge to Undecided Albertans

A famous old English proverb that applies to many Albertans who remain on the fence on the question of Independence and that is Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t know. Many I talk to who are ardent conservative voters, with deep traditional values and who express their reservations of advancing at this juncture in history to full Independence, ignore many of the facts that I shared in this article.

Some of my farmer neighbors, seem more concerned about how their precious grain will get to market in an Independent Alberta, than they about blatant climate fraud or double standards for the East versus the West or legislation aimed at labelling the Bible or Torah hate speech.

I liken this cognitive dissonance to the Stockholm Syndrome, which applies to people who fall in love with their captors.

This Ottawa Syndrome is a condition where Canadians, who know the system is rigged and rotten to the core, yet remain loyal to the idea of Confederation.

To these skeptics, I will remind them of the fact that our forefathers and foremothers (aka Pioneers) came in mass to Alberta and the Prairie region with no assurances, other than the promise of owning their own property under the Dominion Act. The brave souls created community and commerce out of shear determination.

Many of these same immigrants were cut from the same cloth as those brave souls who instigated the Boston Tea Party.

These immigrants understood that:

1. Government is a necessary evil.

2. Legislation must always be crafted in such a way that the powers of government are limited at every juncture.

3. Because of their deep Judeo-Christian values, understood that power corrupts and that all men are corruptible.

Today, Albertans are faced with a choice. The choice to accept a 500% climate tax on our most important source of primary energy as the price of being Canada’s greatest Climate Polluter.

At least that is the narrative being spun at the highest levels between Edmonton and Ottawa.

The same people argue that Alberta’s agricultural sector is as great a Climate Polluter as is its Oil Sands Industry.

The sin here is that these aristocrats ignore the fact that Alberta’s greatness is built on its energy and agricultural sectors and the amazing hard working citizens who feed and energize the Province, the Country and the World.

We can not continue down this path of lawlessness.

We must not allow our children to be financialized further into indebted servitude to central banksters.

The truth is, the Confederation is a house divided against itself.

The cultural psyche of Quebec and Eastern Canada are immiscible with the West and Alberta in particular. No wishful thinking at this late hour can change the hearts and minds of generations of Eastern Canadians who have been taught to believe that Albertans are backward, regressive and are indebted to servitude to their quality of life.

It has been this way for well over a century and has only gotten worse in the past decade.

In closing, I challenge Independence skeptical Albertans to remember the Pioneers and their ability to create community out of thin air and determination.

Yes, there are so few solutions in life, most trade-offs.

I for one, have more faith in my fellow Albertan and place a higher valuation on my vote here in Alberta, than I have faith in Eastern Canadians where my vote is meaningless.

For those of my subscribers who have followed me on LinkedIn for the past couple of years, they know that my writing is has been a path of personal discovery. Those of you have experience teaching, you can attest to the idea that the process of learning a subject sufficiently to teach others, is ultimately the best way to learn.

I hope this presentation helps further consolidate what I have been writing about on a reoccurring and evolving basis for the past nine months that I have been on Substack.

Please forgive me for the less than perfect presentation formatting. I gave this presentation towards the tail end of a 3 week lambing cycle, where the longest unbroken sleep I had was 3 hours.

The following article, is the condensed version of a larger 30 page policy paper that I just submitted to the Frontier Center for Public Policy and that is now under peer review, together with elements from my recent Epoch Times Op-Ed that was published two weeks ago.

This Substack version is arguably a window into my soul and speaks to what I pray more Albertans and Canadians quickly realize as the path forward for our culture at this critical juncture in history.

In many respects, this article reflects the journey that my family and I have taken over the past decade. From down-town Calgary oil & gas executive career track to rural rancher and writer. Our life story has inspired this Rural Renaissance policy paper, which I will make available once it makes it way through final peer review.

I. A Country at the Crossroads

Canada stands at a pivotal moment—one that will define whether the next generation inherits a sovereign, productive nation or a fragile, urban‑centric economy unable to withstand global shocks. As I wrote in my white paper, “Canada stands at a pivotal crossroads… What appears as quiet migration is, in truth, the leading edge of national renewal.”

That renewal is not guaranteed. It must be chosen.

The last decade exposed the structural weaknesses of a country that concentrated too much of its economic life in a handful of metropolitan regions—Toronto, Vancouver, Montréal, Calgary, and Edmonton. These cities became engines of growth, but also engines of vulnerability: hyper‑dense, import‑dependent, and increasingly unaffordable.

The pandemic inspired lockdowns and global supply chain ruptures that followed, shattered the illusion that globalization would always deliver. In fact, we now see its inherently dangerous naivety in that dependence erodes sovereignty and bleeds productivity.

When the virus escaped Wuhan “under a shroud of censorship” and China hoarded global PPE supplies, Canadians discovered how deeply we had outsourced our industrial base. Pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and basic manufacturing inputs became chokepoints. A nation that cannot produce essential goods cannot protect its people.

At the same time, a quiet demographic revolution began. Between 2019 and 2023, Canada’s major census metropolitan areas (CMA) lost nearly 274,000 domestic residents to smaller cities, towns, and rural regions—a 350‑fold increase over the negligible outflows of the previous decade.

As the op‑ed notes, “This was not a trickle. It was a 350‑fold increase.”

This is the Great Unwinding. And it is the beginning of something far more important: a much needed Rural Renaissance.

II. The Great Unwinding: Why Canadians Are Leaving the Big Cities

The drivers of deurbanization are not fads. They are structural:

• Housing costs in Toronto and Vancouver soared to more than seven times median household income.

• Remote work exploded from 4% pre‑pandemic to 40% in 2020, stabilizing at 20% by 2023.

• Urban disorder—homelessness, crime, and congestion—eroded quality of life.

• A search for meaning pushed younger Canadians toward land, space, and tangible work.

As my white paper states:

“This Great Unwinding is no mere lifestyle fad… It stems from intertwined forces: supply‑chain fragility, housing unaffordability, remote work, and the vulnerabilities of hyper‑dense urban cores.”

The result is a demographic rebalancing that mirrors the economic one. Canadians are rediscovering the advantages of dispersed geography: affordable land, cleaner air, and communities where families can build a future.

III. AI and the Great Inversion: When White‑Collar Work Becomes the Most Automatable

For 40 years, Canada pushed its youth toward white‑collar careers—coding, finance, consulting, administration—while trades were treated as relics of a by-gone era.

AI has flipped that script.

Generative AI automates the very tasks that define office work: pattern recognition, drafting, summarizing, coding, and analysis.

As the white paper notes:

“Generative AI… is turning the entire automation story upside down. For decades factory robots took away repetitive physical jobs, but today’s AI masters the very thinking tasks that define white‑collar work.”

Meanwhile, trades remain resilient and provide exceptional geographic mobility and career advancement:

• Welding

• Pipefitting

• Heavy equipment operation

• Power engineering

• Construction

• Electrical work

These require dexterity, spatial judgment, and real‑world problem solving—domains where AI cannot compete.

The op‑ed captured this succinctly: “The future of Canadian sovereignty will not be written in boardrooms. It will be built by tradespeople.”

This is the Great Inversion: AI eats the office first, while blue‑collar work becomes the backbone of national resilience.

IV. Geopolitics and the Return of Industrial Sovereignty

The Indo‑Pacific is now the world’s most volatile region. China’s militarization of the South China Sea, its near‑total dominance of critical minerals refining, and its ambitions toward Taiwan threaten global semiconductor micro-electronics supply chains.

As the white paper states:

“What began as a public health catastrophe rapidly exposed lethal vulnerabilities in pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, rare earths, and basic manufacturing inputs.”

North America is responding with re‑shoring:

• The U.S. CHIPS Act

• Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy

• New battery, steel, and semiconductor investments

• A continental push for energy security

But here is the truth Canadians must confront:

Heavy industry cannot be rebuilt inside expensive, congested CMAs.

It must be rebuilt in rural Canada—where land is abundant, electricity is affordable, and skilled tradespeople can still buy homes.

This is not lifestyle. It is strategy.

V. The Industrial Carbon Tax as a Tax on Productivity

Here is where Canada in its current Productivity Emergency faces a stark choice.

The federal industrial carbon tax—set to reach $170 per tonne—is not a climate policy. It is a tax on industrial productivity, imposed on the very sectors that generate the highest economic output per worker.

Let’s be clear:

A $170/tonne carbon tax on natural gas is equivalent to an $8–$9 per GJ surcharge.

Meanwhile, AECO natural gas prices sit around $1.70 per GJ.

That means Ottawa is imposing a tax 4 to 5 times the commodity cost of the fuel itself.

This is not environmental stewardship.

This is economic sabotage.

Canada’s most productive industries—mining, steel, cement, fertilizer, petrochemicals, forestry, and manufacturing—are also its most energy‑intensive. As the white paper notes:

“Canada’s most productive industries are those that have the highest energy use intensity.”

Raising their fuel costs by 400–500% is a recipe for accelerated deindustrialization.

It ensures that:

• factories close

• investment flees

• tradespeople leave

• reshoring fails

• sovereignty erodes

If Canada wants to rebuild industrial capacity, the industrial carbon tax must be withdrawn. No nation has ever taxed its way to productivity.

VI. The Rural Advantage: Why Heavy Industry Belongs Outside the CMAs

Rural Canada offers natural advantages that cities cannot match:

• Vast airsheds that safely dilute emissions

• Lower land costs

• Lower regulatory burdens

• Access to skilled trades

• Room for expansion

• Cleaner air and lower stress for workers

As the white paper explains:

“Venting a tonne of SO₂ in the open skies over Red Deer might raise local levels by mere micrograms per cubic meter… whereas the same tonne in Calgary could cause ground‑level exceedances for an entire afternoon.”

This is why the U.S. EPA, European regulators, and Canadian provinces all encourage rural siting for energy‑intensive industries.

If Canada wants to reindustrialize, the path runs through the countryside.

VII. The Cultural Shift: How Urban Mindsets Change When People Move to the Exurbs

One of the most hopeful findings in my white paper is the rapid cultural equilibration that occurs when urban Canadians move to rural regions.

“Former city dwellers who once viewed extraction and agriculture with suspicion develop direct, daily exposure to these sectors, replacing abstract fear with lived understanding.”

This is the antidote to the polarized, metropolitan mindset that sees farmers as climate villains and resource workers as obstacles to progress.

When people live near:

• farms

• ranches

• mines

• mills

• refineries

• forestry operations

…they see the truth:

• These industries are technologically advanced.

• They are environmentally progressive.

• They are the backbone of national prosperity.

• They provide stable, high‑wage jobs.

• They sustain communities.

The “my brother‑in‑law works on that site” effect is real. Proximity dissolves ideology.

VIII. The Mental Health Dividend of Rural Life

The neuroscience is unequivocal:

• Lower density reduces amygdala activation and severe mental health disorders.

• Cleaner air reduces depression by 15–20%.

• Stronger social capital and community engagement reduces loneliness.

• Outdoor play improves executive function in children.

As the white paper states:

“Lower-density living brings neurological calm, reduced chronic stress, cleaner air-linked mood improvements, and denser social capital that combats loneliness.”

This is not nostalgia. It is biology.

IX. The Path Forward: Soil, Space, and Sovereignty

Canada now faces a choice.

We can cling to an urban‑centric model that no longer serves us—one built on fragile global supply chains, unaffordable housing, and a service economy vulnerable to AI.

Or we can embrace the dispersed, resilient, productive future already taking shape across rural Canada.

A future where:

• heavy industry is re‑shored

• trades are socially elevated

• families can afford homes

• communities thrive

• mental health improves

• agriculture is respected

• sovereignty is restored

As my Epoch Times op‑ed concluded:

“The opportunity is immense. And the road to national renewal runs through the countryside.”

The Rural Renaissance is not a retreat from modernity.

It is a return to the foundations of national strength.

It is Canada rediscovering itself.

And it is the path toward a sovereign, productive, hopeful future—rooted in soil, space, and the enduring spirit of the True North.

Cover Image - Column integrated heating plot represents the net heating rate applied to the entire atmospheric column from the surface to the top of the atmosphere.

In this article, I will throw another grenade into the rapidly crumbling house of cards that is the Davos and United Nations controlled narrative that is your use of hydrocarbons and modern industry is creating a climate emergency.

I purposefully call this a narrative, as these increasingly irrelevant multilateral institutions have pumped the pseudo-scientific storyline that there is but one so-called greenhouse effect and that our CO2 emissions are amplifying this natural heat trapping mechanism to reduce the amount of measurable heat flux out the top of the atmosphere to decrease.

To call this a story or a narrative is being too kind

In my 2025 article titled YOUR CO2 EMISSIONS ARE NOT DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE BY TRAPPING HEAT I showed that the broader scientific literature is abundantly clear that there is a much larger greenhouse effect created by middle to higher elevation clouds. Specifically I showed that Ramanathan et al.’s seminal 1989 paper titled Cloud-Radiative Forcing and Climate: Results from the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment showed that greenhouse effect from these higher elevation or more deeply convecting clouds is a full 850% larger than that created by tropospheric CO2.

Why would so many public institutions of higher learning stand by and allow such a misrepresentation of these two distinctly different natural heat flux attenuation mechanisms?

For now, I will leave this question for you to ponder.

In this article I will show that there is no evidence supporting the claim that global air temperatures are rising due to a greenhouse effect caused by rising CO2 concentrations that act to trap outgoing long-wavelength radiation (OLR).

Note, OLR is the more technical term for heat flux out the top of the atmosphere.

Instead, I will introduce satellite data that not only shows that OLR out the top of the atmosphere has been rapidly increasing over the past decade, but that this increasing heat flux LEADS the growth in the global average air temperature (GAT) anomaly.

This does not mean that OLR does not interact with IR active molecules on their way out through the top of the atmosphere, for it most certainly does.

Rather, it simply suggests that the greenhouse effect from CO2 takes a back-seat to larger atmospheric - oceanographic processes.

The Global Column Integrated Heating (GCIH) map show in the cover image, is introduced to illustrate evidence of these larger natural processes at play across the Global Heat Engine, which I maintain is the Pacific Tropical Climate Regime.

In order to understand why the global OLR increase LEADS the growth in the GAT anomaly, we must first dive into the high level atmospheric physics at play in the massive GCIH gradient seen in the cover image and across the Pacific tropics.

Figure 1 compares prevailing equatorial circulation patterns from the Pacific to the Atlantic under La Nina and ENSO neutral conditions (top) to those found during El Nino conditions (bottom). Pay close attention to the changes in deeply convective cloud formations over Indonesia, Africa and South America.

During El Nino (bottom) states, the restructuring of convective clouds give rise to notable reductions in precipitation over land. The most notable change in deeply convective cloud formations are seen over the Western Pacific Warm Pool (WPWP), which as Figure 1 shows, migrate towards the central Pacific region during El Nino events.

See how during El Ninos, the direction of winds reverse from an easterly to a westerly. This growth in westerly winds are the driving force behind the migration of deeply convective clouds from the western Pacific to the central Pacific.

Figure 1. Changes in tropical atmospheric circulation and deeply convective clouds over the terrestrial tropics between La Nina / neutral ENSO (top) and El Nino (bottom) conditions.

These changes are highly relevant in this discussion, as highly convective clouds are 850% more effective in blocking or attenuating OLR than is tropospheric CO2.

This is especially true over the WPWP.

Thus, it should not be surprising to learn that regions, such as the WPWP, not only more effectively ventilate heat as OLR out the top of the atmosphere, during El Ninos, but also experience enhanced rates of surface heating as sunshine intensity increases with declining convective cloud cover.

Now that the stage has been set and the mechanism has been spelled out, we are ready for the data!

Figure 2 is introduced to illustrate this relationship between enhanced OLR flux and the subsequent growth in the GAT anomaly during El Nino events. The OLR data shown is global in context and is from NASA’s CERES (Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System) program. The GAT anomaly is produced using satellite based microwave soundings of the lower troposphere and is available at the University of Alabama at Huntsville.

Note how the interannual changes in both OLR and GAT during first 12 - 15 years of the 21st century were without a decadal trend. This period of stability is commonly called The Great Hiatus. However, the last 10 plus years have seen a series of intense El Nino states in the Pacific tropics and net warming from the 2008/09 and 2011/12 La Nina lows.

A simple linear regression of both time series, reveals that 83% (R² = 0.83) of the variance in the GAT anomaly coincides with these changes in global OLR relative to 2000.

Figure 2. University of Alabama at Huntsville (UAH) global lower tropospheric air temperature (GAT) anomaly versus Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) satellite measurements of global outgoing long-wavelength radiation (OLR) relative to the top of the atmosphere and 2000.

Take special note of how the peak global OLR flux leads the development of a peak in the GAT anomaly at the 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2024 El Nino states in the Pacific tropics.

This subtle temporal lead-lag relationship has its basis in the migration of deeply convective clouds over the WPWP towards the central Pacific during the earliest onset of an El Nino state (e.g., Figure 1).

To confirm that the changes in cloud coverage across the Pacific tropics during El Nino events are caused by interannual decelerations in the near equatorial easterlies (i.e., Figure 1), I introduce Figure 3, which contrasts the anomaly plot of the Pacific easterlies versus the global OLR flux. The NOAA Physical Science Laboratory data used is specific to the easterlies between 5N - 5S and 240W to 80W and relative to 850 mb for those who wish to explore this data series for themselves.

Note that a positive anomaly for the Pacific easterlies coincides with a deceleration of this wind vector quantity.

This relationship between the Pacific easterlies and the global OLR flux is evidence of the migration of the deeply convective clouds across the WPWP, towards the central Pacific during El Ninos and westward towards Indonesia during La Ninas.

Figure 3. Comparing the anomaly plot of the 850 mb Pacific easterlies versus the global OLR flux.

The fact that near surface wind speeds along a mere 4% (19,780,000 km²) of the Earth’s surface is observed to exert such a profound global influence has been a deep fascination of mine for the past decade.

I believe that the answer to this riddle begins to come into focus when we first acknowledge that Pacific easterlies act to charge the equivalent of a massive thermal capacitor.

This capacitor is the WPWP’s thermohaline.

During El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) neutral and La Nina states, the WPWP capacitor charges and during El Nino events, it discharges.

The Global Column Integrated Heating (GCIH) map, show in the cover image, represents the magnitude (distribution) of this massive thermal capacitor over the WPWP, as well as the circuit (aka Pacific easterlies) that carries the thermal current that feeds this great body of hot water and its thermocline buried beneath its surface.

Figure 4 is an alternative representation of the WPWP, plus the Indian Ocean extension, as a sea surface temperature isopleth map. By definition, its size is defined by surface temperatures above 28 C and on average, its present area exceeds 30 million square kilometers.

Figure 4. Western Pacific Warm Pool (WPWP) surface temperature isopleth map.

When we examine the historical record on the areal variability of the WPWP (east of Indonesia) over much of the 20th century (Figure 5), we find that the largest expansion and contraction occurred during the 1940s. Note that over this decade, the WPWP area oscillated from +60% to -60%, relative to its 20th century average size of 12 million square kilometers.

Bear in mind that Canada’s land mass (excluding water) is approximately 9 million square kilometers.

Likewise, see the corresponding sea surface temperature anomaly plot, which indicates that the annual average temperatures varied by approximately 1.5 C from max to min over the 1940s.

What is missing in Figure 5 is the deviation from average speed of the Pacific easterlies. It stands to reason that such wild changes in WPWP area and annual average temperatures, would see a corresponding change in the pace by which how surface water is pushed westward into the WPWP.

As shown, the climatic variability that followed this decade of extremes, pales in comparison to that seen in the 1940s.

Figure 5. 20th century anomaly plots for both area and sea surface temperature for the Western Pacific Warm Pool.

I will now provide further evidence that adds credence to the idea that the sudden anomalous growth in OLR that peaks before the peak GAT anomaly (Figure 2) is due to an El Nino triggered eastward migration of the deeply convective cloud greenhouse effect over the WPWP towards the central Pacific.

The next layer of evidence is the well known dynamics of the WPWP thermohaline as it relates to ENSO variability.

The time series shown in Figure 6 from Jin et al compares the near surface warm water volume (WWV) anomaly plot for the thermohaline of the WPWP versus the change in sea surface temperature (SST) within the central Pacific (Nino3) region. The false color imagery is complimentary in how it shows the eastward discharge of the WPWP thermohaline as the leading mechanism giving rise to a central Pacific El Nino condition.

Note how the WWV anomaly grows and peaks ahead of the peak SST of the Nino3 region of the central Pacific.

Likewise note how the peak SST of the Nino3 region of the central Pacific coincides closely with the emergences of a negative WWV anomaly within the WPWP. A negative value implies the WWV is dropping below average.

This lead-lag relationship is indicative of the time it takes for shallow warm water within the WPWP to pulse eastward into the Nino3 region (central Pacific) when the easterlies collapse during the initial stages of El Nino states. Unfortunately, Figure 6 does not show the eastward velocity of the higher SST as the WPWP discharges its WWV.

Figure 6. Warm Water Volume (WWV), sea surface temperatures (SST) in the central Pacific (Nino3) and Western Pacific Warm Pool (WPWP) dynamics as a function of the El Nino Southern Oscillation.

The fundamental reason for these lead-lag relationships can be traced back to the simple fact that during extended ENSO neutral or La Nina states, the average sea elevation within the WPWP is higher than during El Nino conditions.

Figure 7 represents the mean sea level anomaly (SLA) for the Western equatorial Pacific, which is a segment of the WPWP. The vertical axis is in meters, and negative quantities simply mean the SLA is dropping below average. The large rapid decline in SLA around 1998, 2010 and 2015, coincide with major El Nino events.

Note furthermore, how the SLA immediately tracks to higher elevations immediately following these El Nino events.

The reason for these variable changes in SLA in the Western equatorial Pacific is the dynamically changing velocity of the tropical easterlies or Trade Winds. During periods of higher sustained eastly winds, the surface shear forces act to push water up against Indonesia and other land masses in the western Pacific region. When these shear forces subside during El Ninos, the easterly downhill flow of this warm surface water towards the central Pacific region is simply discharging gravitational potential energy.

Figure 7. Equatorial western Pacific sea level anomaly time series.

Conclusions

This article highlights clear evidence that the monthly averaged global heat flux (OLR) out the top of the Earth’s atmosphere is dominated by the massive convective cloud formations over the Western Pacific Warm Pool (WPWP).

Contrary to popular superstition, the reduction in the powerful greenhouse effect produced by these cloud formations prior to and during major El Nino events, give rise to a subsequent increase in the global average air temperature (GAT) anomaly.

Further amplifying this inverse relationship between the WPWP’s greenhouse effect and the global air temperature anomaly is the corresponding rise in sunshine in this climate zone during El Ninos and the massive discharge of stored solar radiation in the regional thermohaline.

In other words, when the WPWP discharges is stored solar energy and begins to cool, the GAT anomaly is found to rise. Likewise, when the greenhouse effect from convective clouds return to the WPWP and solar energy is once again begins to recharge the regional thermohaline, the GAT anomaly decreases or the Earth begins to cool.

For years, Westerners have been told that the only responsible response to climate change is a rapid transition to so-called renewable energy. Solar panels, wind turbines, EVs, and battery storage are presented as the moral antidote to fossil fuels, the so-called “clean” technologies that will save the planet from human‑caused warming. This narrative is repeated so often that it has become dogma: if you care about the climate, you must support Net Zero, and if you support Net Zero, you must support the renewable technologies that make it possible.

But this story leaves out the most important geopolitical fact of our time: every major clean‑tech supply chain is dominated, if not monopolized, by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
And the CCP has not been shy about its intentions.

To understand the stakes, we must step back and examine the geopolitical architecture that predates the climate debate entirely.

The Pivot to Asia Was Never About Climate — It Was About China’s Rise

In 2011, the Obama administration formally launched the Pivot to Asia foreign policy, a strategic reorientation of US naval power, acknowledging that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was preparing to challenge U.S. dominance in the Indo‑Pacific¹. But the intellectual roots of this shift stretch back to the 1999 Cox Report, a bipartisan congressional investigation documenting the PRC’s systematic efforts to acquire U.S. military and commercial technology².

Figure 1. Deng Xiaoping’s 1997 “16-Character Policy”, which governs the PRC’s economic, technological and geopolitical strategy.

The Cox Report was not speculative. It was a response to something the CCP had already codified in Deng Xiaoping’s 1997 “16‑Character Policy.” This policy, shown in Figure 1 is not a slogan. It is a formal declaration of a militarized economy³.

Its four pillars are explicit:

• Fuse military and civilian sectors

• Integrate peacetime and wartime production

• Prioritize military output

• Mobilize civilian industry for military aims

This is the CCP telling the world, in plain language, that its economy exists to serve the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)d and its wartime readiness.

Under this doctrine, every major Chinese corporation, especially in strategic sectors, is an extension of the CCP and the PLA. The State Council, through the State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), oversees a vast network of state‑owned enterprises that blur the line between commercial production and military modernization.

These include:

• China Aerospace Corporation (CASC)

• China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

• China North Industries Group (NORINCO)

• Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC)

• China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)

These are not “companies” in the Western sense. They are instruments of state power and wartime preparedness.

And under Xi Jinping, the fusion of party, state, and industry has only intensified. As of 2023, 80 billionaires occupy senior CCP, PNC, and State Council positions, with a combined net worth exceeding $800 billion CAD⁴. Nearly half of all private enterprises now host embedded CCP political officers⁵.

This is the context in which Western climate policy must be understood.

Clean Tech Is Not Clean — It Is Mineral‑Intensive, Industrial, and Geopolitically Captured

The Western climate narrative insists that renewable energy is the path to decarbonization. But renewables are not ethereal, post‑material technologies. They are mineral‑hungry industrial products, dependent on vast quantities of:

• Rare earth elements

• Lithium

• Cobalt

• Nickel

• Graphite

• Gallium

• Germanium

• High‑purity silicon

• Copper

• Manganese

Figure 2 illustrates this clearly: every major “Net Zero” technology — solar PV, wind turbines, EVs, grid batteries, is built atop a foundation of critical minerals.

Figure 2. Qualitative importance of critical elements in common Net Zero technologies.

And who controls these minerals?

The PRC.

China is not merely a large player. It is the OPEC of critical minerals, with near‑total dominance across the entire supply chain⁶:

• 98% of global gallium and gallium‑nitride semiconductors⁷

• 100% of high‑performance EV magnet production

• 70% of global rare‑earth mining

• 90%+ of rare‑earth refining

• 80% of global solar manufacturing

• 60% of global lithium refining

• 75% of global battery cell production

This is not a market accident. It is the result of deliberate industrial strategy.

The near total monopoly that the PRC has attained over the rare earth elements (REE) space is a prime example.

REEs are a group of 17 elements found in the periodic table, including well-known names like neodymium, dysprosium, and lanthanum. Despite their name, these metals are not rare in terms of abundance but are challenging and costly to extract and refine due to their dispersion in ores and high environmental impacts.

These elements possess unique magnetic, optical, and electronic properties that make them indispensable in a plethora of modern technologies.

For instance:

· Neodymium and Dysprosium are critical for making high-performance magnets used in electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and advanced electronics.

· Lanthanum plays a vital role in hybrid car batteries and camera lenses.

· Yttrium, Europium, and Terbium are essential in creating vibrant colors for LED screens.

Moreover, the defense industry heavily relies on REEs for advanced applications, such as missile guidance systems, advanced radar systems, jet engines, and satellite communications.

This makes them a strategic resource with massive implications for national security.

The geopolitical implications of fact that the PRC has 100% control over high performance EV magnets, or the fact that the PRC maintains nearly 98% control over all gallium and gallium nitride semiconductors used in the radar systems of fifth generation stealth fighters like the US F-35 Lightning and the F-22 Raptor or in ship-borne anti-ballistic missile capable Western naval vessels, are indeed profound.

Figure 3 shows how the PRC has redirected capital away from non‑clean‑tech sectors and into clean‑tech manufacturing, reaching nearly 2% of GDP in 2023. Clean tech accounted for half of China’s total GDP growth that year, generating $1.6 trillion USD in revenue⁸.

Figure 3. Chinese dependence on the West’s obsession over Net Zero.

This is the engine of China’s economic expansion and Western climate policy is the fuel.

Tariffs, Export Bans, and the CCP’s Weaponization of Supply Chains

When Western nations began imposing tariffs on Chinese solar panels, EVs, and batteries, Beijing responded exactly as a geopolitical strategist would expect: it weaponized its chokehold on critical minerals.

China has now banned or restricted exports of:

• Gallium

• Germanium

• Graphite

• Rare‑earth processing technologies

These are not trivial materials. They are essential inputs for:

• EV motors

• Wind turbines

• Solar inverters

• Radar systems

• Missile guidance

• Stealth aircraft

• Naval vessels

The PRC’s dominance over gallium and gallium‑nitride semiconductors is especially alarming. These materials power the radar systems of the United State’s F‑35, F‑22 stealth fighter technologies and advanced Western naval platforms⁹.

In other words: the West’s clean‑tech transition is structurally dependent on the same regime that supplies the materials for its military deterrence.

This is not just a contradiction. It is a national‑security crisis.

The PLA Is Preparing for Regional Conquest — And the World Pretends Not to Notice

While Western governments lecture their citizens about recycling and heat pumps, the PRC is building the largest naval fleet since World War II.

Satellite imagery shows Chinese shipyards producing guided‑missile destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers at a pace unmatched since the U.S. wartime mobilization of the 1940s¹⁰. By 2035, the PLA Navy will match the U.S. Navy in both tonnage and number of major surface combatants.

In aerospace, the PLA has moved from fifth‑generation to sixth‑generation fighter prototypes in 12 years, while the U.S. has yet to field a sixth‑generation aircraft after more than two decades¹¹.

But the most brazen act of all is China’s illegal seizure of the South China Sea.

The PRC has:

• Built seven militarized artificial‑island bases.

• Installed runways, missile batteries, radar systems, and deep‑water ports.

• Claimed 3.2 million square kilometers of maritime territory; nearly the entire South China Sea.

This is a direct violation of the Rules‑Based International Order and the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling.

Yet Western governments, the same governments that demand Net Zero compliance from their citizens, remain silent.

Why?

Because the same regime that is militarizing the South China Sea also controls the supply chains required for Western climate policy and national defense.

The West Cannot Mine Its Way Out — Not Fast Enough

Some argue that the solution is simple: build domestic mines.

But the timelines tell a different story.

The average mine‑development timeline in North America is:

• 18 years at the optimistic end¹²

• 29 years at the realistic end¹³

Even a wartime‑level mobilization cannot compress these timelines enough to counter the PRC’s entrenched dominance.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of War has begun funding critical‑mineral projects in both the U.S. and Canada, which is a tacit admission that the supply chain is now a national‑security priority.

But the gap is enormous and time is short.

The Trojan Horse Question

In retrospect, the former US President Bill Clinton’s advocacy for the PRC to be admitted into the World Trade Organization in 2001 was under the premise that this would lead to the long term liberalization of the CCP and its economy.

History appears to be showing that this was extremely naive.

While Clinton may have forgotten that the US Democrat Party had financed, provided military aid and intelligence support to the Chinese National Army in their civil war with Mao Zedong’s Chinese Red Army, you can be sure that the PRC did not when it disingenuously signed onto the WTO’s admission conditions in 2001.

So we return to the central question: Are clean technologies and critical minerals the Trojan Horse of the Chinese Communist Party?

The answer depends on whether Western nations recognize the trap before it closes.

If the West continues to pursue climate policy without acknowledging the geopolitical architecture beneath it, the CCP wins.

If the West continues to mandate technologies it does not control, the CCP wins.

If the West continues to transfer wealth, industrial capacity, and strategic leverage to Beijing, the CCP wins.

And if the West continues to ignore the fusion of civilian and military power in the PRC, the CCP wins.

The climate debate is not just about carbon, it is about sovereignty, security, and the future of the global order.

The last time the world underestimated an authoritarian regime’s industrial ambitions, the consequences were catastrophic.

We must not make that mistake again.

Endnotes

1. https://www.cfr.org/project/us-pivot-asia-and-american-grand-strategy (cfr.org in Bing)

2. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-04/cox-report-selected-text-and-commentaries (armscontrol.org in Bing)

3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may99/coxreport/chapter1.htm (washingtonpost.com in Bing)

4. https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1746362/china-latest-communist-party-billionaires-spt (express.co.uk in Bing)

5. https://eastasiaforum.org/2023/08/11/ccp-branches-out-into-private-businesses/ (eastasiaforum.org in Bing)

6. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/the-raw-materials-challenge-how-the-metals-and-mining-sector-will-be-at-the-core-of-enabling-the-energy-transition (mckinsey.com in Bing)

7. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-gallium.pdf (pubs.usgs.gov in Bing)

8. https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-clean-energy-was-top-driver-of-chinas-economic-growth-in-2023 (carbonbrief.org in Bing)

9. https://ssbcrackexams.com/most-advanced-radars-in-the-world/ (ssbcrackexams.com in Bing)

10. https://www.asiafinancial.com/shipyard-image-exposes-chinas-massive-naval-build-up (asiafinancial.com in Bing)

11. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinas-groundbreaking-6th-gen-stealth-fighter-takes-flight-how-it-could-be-a-super-weapon-that-could-alter-global-power-dynamics/articleshow/116709494.cms (economictimes.indiatimes.com in Bing)

12. https://impossiblemetals.com/blog/new-mine-average-lead-time-grows-41/ (impossiblemetals.com in Bing)

13. https://thedeepdive.ca/us-canada-among-the-slowest-in-mine-development-timelines-new-report-shows/

The following is a condensed version of a white paper that I wrote in support of Alberta’s hopeful return of its metallurgical coal industry. Over the next coming months, I will be writing a series of such articles and ultimately a book.

Introduction

History is written not in parchment or pixels, but in metal. Civilizations rise when they master new ways of transforming earth into engineered strength. The Stone Age didn’t end for lack of stones; it ended because humans learned to smelt copper and tin. Bronze forged cities, writing, and long‑distance trade.

When tin supplies faltered, the Iron Age emerged around 1200 BCE, democratizing metallurgy because iron ore is nearly everywhere. From the crucible steels of ancient India to Henry Bessemer’s 1856 converter that slashed steel prices by more than 80 percent, every major leap in human prosperity has rested on cheaper, stronger, more abundant iron and steel.

Today, steel is the skeleton of modernity. It holds up our bridges, towers, hospitals, ships, wind turbines, and the rebar inside every concrete structure—including the one you’re sitting in right now. And at the heart of this global system sits the blast furnace: a 170‑year‑old industrial organism that produces roughly 1.9 billion tonnes of iron per year using a narrow, high‑performance subset of the world’s coal deposits known as metallurgical coal.

The blast furnace is not a relic. It is the apex predator of metallurgy—thermodynamically elegant, brutally efficient, and unmatched in scale. It dominates because physics, mineralogy, and economics all point in the same direction.

And yet, in the political imagination of 2026, the blast furnace has become a villain. The new gospel is “green steel”: iron ore reduced not by carbon monoxide from coke, but by hydrogen produced via electrolysis powered by wind and solar. Governments from Brussels to Sacramento have declared this transition inevitable. Subsidies, mandates, and carbon border taxes are being erected to force the shift.

But the numbers tell a very different story.

The Physics Problem No One Wants to Talk About

The blast furnace works because the chemistry is exothermic. Carbon monoxide strips oxygen from iron ore, producing molten iron and CO₂ while releasing heat. That heat is not a nuisance—it is the engine of the process. It drives the reduction reactions, melts the iron, and even powers steam cogeneration systems that feed electricity back into the plant.

Hydrogen‑based direct reduction (H₂‑DRI) flips this logic on its head. The core reaction:

Fe2O3+3H2→2Fe+3H2O

is endothermic. It consumes heat. A lot of it—roughly 900 MJ per tonne of iron. That energy must be supplied externally, usually by electricity. The blast furnace is a self‑heating chemical engine; H₂‑DRI is a chemical refrigerator that must be force‑fed energy.

This is not a minor detail. It is the thermodynamic foundation of the entire debate.

The Energy Arithmetic Is Brutal

Replacing today’s blast‑furnace steel with pure green hydrogen would require 8,000 TWh of dedicated electricity every year—almost equal to China’s entire 2024 consumption. This is not a rounding error. It is a civilization‑scale energy demand.

A modern green steel plant producing 2–5 million tonnes per year needs true 24/7 baseload power. Not “when the wind blows” power. Not “when the sun shines” power. Continuous, stable, high‑quality electricity.

Electrolysis alone consumes 50–60 kWh per kilogram of hydrogen. Producing one tonne of iron requires roughly 55 kg of hydrogen. Add the electric arc furnace (EAF) melting step, and you’re looking at 4 MWh of electricity per tonne of steel.

Multiply that by 2 billion tonnes of global production and you arrive at the 8,000 TWh figure—an amount of clean electricity that simply does not exist.

Meanwhile, many of the loudest advocates for green steel live in jurisdictions where electricity supply has flat‑lined. Canada has added almost no new generation in a decade, yet policymakers insist we can electrify transport, heating, data centers, and now heavy industry—all on intermittent renewables.

This is magical thinking dressed up as industrial strategy.

ERoEI: The Metric That Should End the Debate

One of the most important—and least discussed—metrics in energy systems is Energy Return on Energy Invested (ERoEI). It measures how much useful energy a system delivers over its lifetime relative to the energy required to build and maintain it.

The numbers are devastating:

A green hydrogen steel system barely breaks even. It consumes almost as much energy in its infrastructure as it produces in useful output. This is not an engineering problem. It is a physics problem. Wind and solar are diffuse, intermittent energy sources that require enormous quantities of steel, concrete, copper, and rare minerals to harvest. Their ERoEI is inherently low.

A civilization cannot run on energy systems with ERoEI ratios below 3:1 without triggering structural energy inflation. Green steel, at scale, would be an energy sink.

The Mineral Reality: A New Dependency on China and Russia

Metallurgical coal is geologically rare but geopolitically diverse. Australia, Canada, the U.S., and parts of Africa all have significant reserves.

Green steel, by contrast, requires:

• Nickel (Russia supplies ~20% of high‑purity Class‑1 nickel)

• Iridium and platinum‑group metals (80–90% refined in China)

• Rare‑earth‑doped ceramics (China dominates)

• Electrolyzers (China controls >85% of global manufacturing)

• Solar PV (China controls ~70% of global production)

• Wind turbine components (China controls ~80%)

In other words: the green steel supply chain is a Chinese industrial policy dream.

Why is dependence condemned when it involves Australian or Canadian coal, yet celebrated when it involves Chinese electrolyzers and Russian nickel?

Hydrogen Leakage: The Hidden Climate Problem

Hydrogen is often marketed as a perfect fuel because it produces only water when burned. But hydrogen itself is an indirect greenhouse gas. It reacts with atmospheric hydroxyl radicals, reducing the atmosphere’s ability to break down methane and other sources of atmospheric pollution (e.g., SO2).

Recent studies show:

• 1–3% leakage during steady‑state electrolyzer operation

• 5–10% leakage during ramping cycles (inevitable with renewables)

Hydrogen’s global warming potential (GWP):

• 11–12 over 100 years

• 33–40 over 20 years

At realistic leakage rates, a green steel plant operating on grid‑connected electricity can have a higher short‑term warming impact than a modern blast furnace.

This is the part of the story no one wants to touch.

Scrap Steel: The Ceiling No One Can Raise

Electric arc furnaces (EAFs) are fantastic machines. They recycle scrap steel with low emissions. But the global scrap pool is finite. In 2025, scrap availability is capped at 600–650 million tonnes—only one‑third of global demand.

High‑quality flat steel for cars and appliances requires low residual elements. Scrap alone cannot meet that standard. Virgin iron units are still required.

No amount of wishful thinking changes the metallurgical math.

Real‑World Projects Are Quietly Failing

The green steel narrative is strongest in PowerPoint decks and weakest in the real world.

HYBRIT (Sweden)

The poster child of green steel delivered its first sample in 2021. But the commercial 2.5 Mt/year plant has been delayed repeatedly. Construction was paused in 2024 and halted in 2025 after the Swedish government withdrew funding.

Nucor (United States)

America’s largest steelmaker announced a $1.7B green H₂‑DRI plant in West Virginia. By 2025 it was mired in litigation, cost overruns, and permitting delays. Nucor now plans to start with natural‑gas‑based syngas, not green hydrogen. Their own filings admit pure green operation is uneconomic without the full $3/kg U.S. tax credit.

China Baowu

The world’s largest steelmaker is pursuing a hybrid approach: hydrogen injection into blast furnaces and DRI‑EAF lines—but the hydrogen comes from coal‑derived gases, not electrolysis.

The pattern is unmistakable: green steel works in pilot plants, not in the real world.

The Blast Furnace Endures Because It Works

The blast furnace is not a symbol of the past. It is a symbol of what happens when human ingenuity aligns with the laws of thermodynamics. It is the most energy‑dense, capital‑efficient method ever devised for turning rocks into civilization.

It dominates because:

• It uses an exothermic reaction that supplies its own heat

• It relies on a reductant (coke) with unmatched energy density

• Its supply chain is diversified and geopolitically stable

• Its ERoEI is extraordinarily high

• It produces steel at a cost the world can afford

Until a primary iron‑making technology emerges that is cheaper, more energy‑efficient, and scalable without Chinese minerals or trillion‑dollar subsidies, the world will continue to make most of its steel with coke and coal.

This is not nostalgia. It is realism.

Civilizations That Forget Their Foundations Rarely Build Better Futures

Steel forged in coal‑fired furnaces lifted billions out of poverty. It remains the irreplaceable foundation of prosperity. Pretending otherwise is not ambition; it is historical amnesia dressed up as virtue.

The road to tomorrow still runs through the blast furnace—at least until someone invents a replacement that does not require rewriting the laws of thermodynamics or surrendering industrial sovereignty.

Green steel, in its current form, is not the destination. It is a cautionary tale about what happens when ideological enthusiasm outruns material reality.

Red Rebel Brigade - a performance art climate activist troupe closely associated with Extinction Rebellion (XR).

The recent Memorandum of Understanding between Alberta and the federal government commits the province to aligning with Ottawa’s evolving methane emissions reduction agenda, with a headline target of a 75% cut in methane emissions from 2014 levels by 2035.

Framed as essential for Canada’s climate strategy, this deal raises a deeper concern for Albertans and Canadians: Will these methane rules stop at oil and gas, or will they soon target the agricultural sector?

Ottawa has already laid the groundwork for expansion.

Federal accounting attributes roughly 10% of national greenhouse gas emissions to agriculture—primarily from natural biological processes like cattle digestion, manure decomposition, and soil activity.

This places agriculture on par with emissions from Alberta’s oil sands in official narratives. If the oil sands justify recent demands to decarbonize oil production, it is logical to fear similar restrictions on farmers and ranchers.

The path is already visible.

Ottawa’s Agricultural Methane Reduction Challenge funds voluntary research into feed additives and other interventions to curb livestock methane. Meanwhile, a voluntary target aims to reduce nitrous oxide emissions from nitrogen fertilizer use by 30% below 2020 levels by 2030.

History shows voluntary programs often precede mandatory rules, as seen with the oil and gas sector’s new methane regulations finalized on December 16, 2025. These tighten leak detection, ban routine venting and flaring, and add monitoring, with federal estimates projecting 304 million tonnes of CO₂e reductions between 2028 and 2040 at a cost of roughly $14 billion to industry, costs ultimately passed to consumers.

If agriculture faces similar mandates, Canadians should look to international precedents for alarm. In Europe, the EU mandated Bovaer, a methane-inhibiting feed additive for cattle, backed by over 150 studies claiming safety and efficacy.

Within a month of rollout in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, farmers reported reduced feed intake, digestive issues, fertility problems, and even collapsing cows. Several countries quickly paused or dropped the mandate, highlighting the risks of imposing unproven interventions on real-world farming.

The question Canadians should be asking is simple: If a product backed by extensive scientific literature can fail so dramatically in real world conditions, how confidently can we “trust the science” when regulations mandate its use?

More troubling are growing calls for direct intervention in meat consumption. Globally and in Canada, advocates increasingly push for taxes on red meat to discourage consumption, framing it as a tool to address climate and health goals. Recent analyses (including in Nature Food 2025) explore varying tax rates on meat and dairy while subsidizing fruits and vegetables to drive dietary shifts.

Such proposals align with broader efforts to reduce animal protein intake.

This ties directly to the EAT-Lancet Commission’s Planetary Health Diet (updated in 2025), which promotes a plant-rich model emphasizing whole grains, legumes, fruits, vegetables, and nuts while sharply limiting red meat and other animal proteins. The Commission claims widespread adoption could prevent up to 15 million premature deaths annually and halve food-system GHG emissions.

While presented as voluntary and evidence-based, critics warn it serves as a blueprint for policy pushes toward mandatory or incentivized shifts, replacing animal protein with plant-based alternatives on a global scale.

In Canada, where food prices are already rising sharply (with beef up significantly in 2025 per Canada’s Food Price Report 2026), such policies could exacerbate affordability challenges for families already debt-financing groceries.

Ireland provides a stark cautionary example.

In 2023, government documents proposed culling up to 200,000 dairy cows (potentially through voluntary exit schemes with compensation) to meet EU-aligned agricultural emissions targets by 2025–2030. Though framed as voluntary, the plan drew fierce backlash from farmers and politicians as a threat to the sector, with critics labeling it scapegoating agriculture for national climate goals.

The idea resurfaced in discussions as recently as 2025 amid nitrates derogation pressures, underscoring how climate policy can lead to herd reductions and production cuts.

These international trends, cow culls in Ireland, mandated feed additives in Europe, red meat taxes, and planetary diet models, signal where Canada’s methane agenda could head next.

When a T-bone steak already exceeds $30 amid rising living costs, should farmers face penalties for emissions inherent to food production? Should regulations target livestock biology while sidelining far larger natural methane fluxes from Canada’s boreal wetlands?

Field studies by Professor Maria Strack at the University of Waterloo, using flux chambers in Alberta’s northern wetlands, show methane fluxes that, when combined with geographic data from the Alberta Biodiversity Monitoring Institute and extrapolated across Canada’s vast boreal region, suggest natural methane emissions could be at least five times higher than the combined methane emissions from Canada’s oil and gas and agricultural sectors.

Canada’s boreal forest, contains one of the largest wetland ecosystems on Earth, and as such, is a massive natural emitter of methane. Bogs, swamps, and fens release methane continuously through natural biological processes.

Ironically, elevated methane emissions from wetlands are indicative of carbon sequestration or humus materials formation. You know, that rich black organic material one finds along marshes and bogs.

Yet federal inventories focus overwhelmingly on human caused emissions, while natural emissions are estimated with wide uncertainty ranges and extremely limited field data.

If agricultural and oil and gas methane emissions are truly as large as Ottawa suggests, where are the reams of evidence showing they exceed natural emissions by an order of magnitude?

The answer is straightforward: accurately measuring natural methane emissions is extremely expensive, and governments have shown little appetite to fund such research. Grants overwhelmingly target human related emissions because those are the emissions policymakers intend to regulate.

Before expanding methane rules into agriculture, Canadians deserve a transparent, full accounting of all methane sources, natural and human. Anything less risks imposing economic pain on farmers and consumers without meaningful climate benefit, all while ignoring the continent’s vast natural emissions.

The cover illustration - a Glacial Atmospheric Dipole (aka North Atlantic low / Beringian high) that defined the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM).

In a recent article, I introduced the idea that the transition from the thermal maximum of the Holocene Interglacial that defined the Northgrippian sub-epoch, to the on-set of present Meghalayan (neoglacial) sub-epoch, some 4,200 years ago, was found to coincide with both a sudden multi-centennial increase in iceberg calving rates into the North Atlantic and with an increase in the environmental concentrations of beryllium‑10 (¹⁰Be) and carbon‑14 (¹⁴C) isotopes.

Said isotopes are said to be cosmically generated (aka cosmogenic isotopes) and thus they provide a window into past solar - terrestrial interactions.

Here in this article, I will expand on this theme and introduce a framework of ideas that I believe help explain why the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) was defined by the extreme lack of coherence in glacial ice (cover image) extending along the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere latitudes. The literature that I will emphasize in this review, shows that solar weather (activity) has a profound influence on higher latitude atmospheric circulation and precipitation patterns.

As this is a long and in-depth story, I wanted to provide a shortened teaser that summarizes what you will discover with me, as I have attempted to produce a hypothesis on the how this mechanism unfolds.

Abstract

The conventional Milankovitch paradigm explains late-Holocene cooling after the Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM) chiefly through declining high-latitude summer insolation due to reduced Earth obliquity, fostering gradual global cooling and lower atmospheric CO2 as oceans enhance carbon uptake.

Yet this model inadequately accounts for the pronounced hemispheric asymmetry in ice sheet distribution during the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM), with extensive Laurentide and Fennoscandian ice sheets along North Atlantic margins contrasted with an expansive ice-free Beringian corridor from the Urals to the Mackenzie Valley. Nor does it explain the episodic, irregular iceberg-rafted debris (IRD) pulses in North Atlantic sediments since the Meghalayan neoglacial onset ~4.2 ka BP, which strongly correlate with elevated cosmogenic isotope (¹⁰Be, ¹⁴C) concentrations.

This synthesis argues that solar activity variations, modulating atmospheric dynamics atop the Milankovitch backdrop, ultimately generates a persistent glacial-atmospheric dipole responsible for these patterns achieved at the LGM.

Low solar output diminishes stratospheric ozone via reduced UV/EUV flux and alters energetic particle precipitation, weakening the stratospheric polar vortex and favoring negative Arctic Oscillation/North Atlantic Oscillation (AO/NAO) regimes. Resulting meridional, wavy jet streams promote cold-air advection, enhanced storm tracks, and snowfall over Atlantic-sector continents while inducing high-pressure ridging, subsidence, and suppressed precipitation over Beringia, explaining its aridity despite cold conditions.

Paleoclimate proxies substantiate this through Bond Events: ~1,000–1,500-year cooling stadials featuring IRD surges, cosmogenic isotope peaks, meridional circulation shifts, and thermohaline deceleration, even within the HTM.

Inversely, Bond Optimals, which are warm intervals like the Minoan, Roman, Medieval, and Current Warm Periods, coincide with high solar activity, low cosmogenic isotope levels, zonal westerlies, reduced IRD, and glacial retreat, as evidenced by Gulf Stream intensification and ecological proxies.

Supporting mechanisms draw from heliospheric shielding of galactic cosmic rays, spallation-produced isotopes as solar proxies, and modeling (e.g., Shindell et al., 2001) linking Maunder Minimum forcing to amplified regional cooling via top-down stratospheric-tropospheric coupling. Modern analogs confirm daily-to-decadal solar-geomagnetic influences on AO/NAO.

As ice sheets mature, internal feedbacks (e.g., albedo, topography, wave amplification) lock in the dipole, shifting dominance from external solar forcing in the neoglacial phase to internal oscillations toward the next glacial maximum. Importantly, Earth’s current neoglacial state retains heightened solar sensitivity, framing the Current Warm Period as a Bond Optimum mirroring the Medieval Warm Period, flanking Bond Event 0 (Little Ice Age).

1.0 Introduction

The standard model of the Milankovitch Cycle argues that the millennial march, post Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM), towards a deeply perennial glacial state, is largely dependent on changing tilt of Earth (aka Obliquity) that results in declining summer solar insolation along higher latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. As the tilt towards the Sun decreases gradually post-HTM, the Earth slowly cools and tropospheric CO2 decreases as the oceans become a stronger sink as they decrease in temperature.

While this is correct, it does not explain why the North Atlantic margins (i.e., Laurentide (North America) and Fennoscandian (Europe) ice fields) are where we find primary glacial accumulation in the Northern Hemisphere. Likewise, the standard model does not describe why there was little to no glaciation across the vast geographic region called Beringia, extending east from the Ural Mountain Range to the Canadian Mackenzie River Valley.

Equally important, the standard model does not explain why iceberg rafting (IRD) rates (Figure 1), which is a proxy for glacial expansion, into the North Atlantic has been highly irregular during the current neoglacial trend as it has advanced towards the LGM since the onset of the Meghalayan sub-epoch.

Nor does the standard model explain why iceberg rafting debris rates positively correlate with increases in cosmogenic isotope concentrations found within the geological record.

Figure 1. Illustrating the process of ice-rafted debris (IRD)carried south by calving glaciers during neoglacial Bond Events - ocean sediment stratification indicates IRD rates.

While this list is far from being all encompassing, it does form the basis or motivation for this review article. Clearly, there is much more involved with the Milankovitch Cycle than simply changes in planetary orbital configuration and tropospheric CO2 concentrations.

Before we push forward into new the territory that attempts to link changes in solar activity with changes in atmospheric circulation and precipitation across the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere, it is important to include in this introduction, some basics from atmospheric physics and paleoclimatology.

1.1 Zonal (Latitudinal) versus Meridional (Meridian) Atmospheric Flow

To understand how low solar activity gives rise to the strong Glacial Atmospheric Dipole shown in the cover image, we must first define some basic terminologies and concepts from meteorology. As we are focusing on the extra-tropics, this pedagogical exercise is limited to nomenclature specific to the middle to polar latitudes of either hemisphere.

First, it is important to emphasize that the prevailing direction of winds across the extra-tropical latitudes is from the west to the east (aka zonal). Extra‑tropical winds blow west‑to‑east because Earth’s rotation creates a strong Coriolis effect, deflecting poleward air eastward. Combined with the equator‑to‑pole temperature gradients and the resulting jet‑stream dynamics, this produces dominant westerlies in the mid‑latitudes.

They peak in winter because the equator‑to‑pole temperature gradient is strongest, intensifying the jet stream. A stronger jet enhances west‑to‑east momentum, producing faster, more continuous westerlies.

Here at the latitudes of southwestern Alberta, this temperature gradient is the strongest during winter season El Nino events in the eastern-central Pacific, which in turn give rise to more intense zonal wind fields and Chinooks along the south-eastern Rocky Mountain foothills. In other regions, where the westerlies impact large mountain ranges at right angles, these down stream wind fields are generically called Foehn Winds (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Diagram illustrating the meteorological changes developing as Foehn Winds cross mountain ranges at right angles.

During Chinooks, the westerlies achieve sufficient momentum that they manage to ski-jump the Rocky Mountains, and in so doing are able to hold back winter time Arctic air masses from moving southward. Thus, regional air masses are drier-warmer, have elevated sunshine, diminished precipitation and snowpack recedes through sublimation.

All these factors go into reverse during intense La Nina events and during the winter season, the westerlies assume a more meridional or wavy track.

Figure 3 contrasts these two conditions as states wherein the westerlies exhibit more zonal (El Nino / Chinook) versus more meridional (La Nina / Anti-Chinook). Note how the more zonal wind field closely tracks latitudinal lines and that it migrates towards the polar latitudes. Likewise, note how the westerly wind field more closely tracks meridional lines and that it moves away from the pole.

Of course, in either condition, the Arctic air mass resides on the polar side of each blue line. Thus, when the thermal gradient between the equator - poles are the greatest, Arctic air masses are constrained to more polar regions.

Conversely with conditions where the thermal gradient is reduced.

Figure 3. Middle latitude zonal westerlies represent a warming World, while meridional winds a cooling World - especially true relative to the winter season.

Meteorologists favor using hemispheric pressure patterns that drive wind intensity, rather than relying on raw wind‑speed trends alone. These pressures can be at sea level or at higher geopotential heights within the atmosphere and they can be defined relative to the entire Northern Hemisphere or relative to a distinct region.

The most common middle latitude pressure index that is specific to the North Atlantic climate regime is the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), which is calculated from the pressure difference between the Icelandic Low and Azores High. Note that the NAO index is a unitless time series, which as the name implies, oscillates between positive and negative values.

Figure 4 illustrates the complex regional atmospheric restructuring that takes place under associated a positive NAO versus a negative NAO in the modern era. It is conventional to quantify the NAO by season (e.g., winter NAO), although annual average NAO values are also used.

Figure 4. Changes in zonal versus meridional flow of the middle latitude jet stream over the North Atlantic - positive versus negative oscillation.

Table 1 summarizes the complex changes across the North Atlantic climate regime and its margins, which develops as the NAO transitions between positive and negative states, both on an interannual to decadal basis. Note that this summary table does not address the changes in cloud coverage or type, sunshine hours or most importantly the climatic forcing mechanism at play beyond this broad basin wide changes in atmospheric circulation and precipitation.

The underlying forcing mechanism is the ultimate objective of this pedagogical exercise.

Table 1. Changes in regional atmospheric circulation and precipitation that occur as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) transitions between positive and negative states.

Figure 5 shows a representation of the annual averaged NAO time series, extending from 1860 to 2020. Note that there is no linear detrending applied in the derivation of the NOA time series, as there is commonly done in common indexes such as the Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO). While I can appreciate how this time series may seem akin to tea leaf reading, I also know that to the trained eye, a multi-decadal variable pattern is apparent.

Figure 5. Historical annual average North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) index displayed from 1865 to 2020 as computed by Hurrell et al. (2003). Study years are highlighted as the most negative (2010 in blue) and most positive (2015 in red) phases of NAO index reported in recent decades.

To establish the relevance of the NAO index in rationalizing regional modern climate change, I include Figure 6. In the 1995–2009 period studied, Hofer et al. attribute Greenland Ice Sheet mass loss primarily to decreasing summer cloud cover, driven by a state shift in the summer (JJA) North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) toward a more negative phase. This promotes persistent anti-cyclonic (high-pressure) conditions over Greenland, reducing clouds and enhancing shortwave radiation on the low-albedo ablation zone.

In other words, sunshine hours increased and glaciers retreated.

This supports Figure 4 above, which shows that southwestern Greenland warms during a negative NAO state and that the underlying mechanism is altered atmospheric circulation and increased summer season sunshine.

Figure 6. Decreasing cloud coverage over Greenland, driven by a decade of increasing sunshine arising from a negative summer NAO or a regional anti-cyclonic atmospheric circulation pattern.

Note that the NAO, is just one of many atmospheric indexes (e.g., Arctic Oscillation (AO) or Southern Annular Mode (SAM)) and in all cases, a positive index value implies more intense zonal wind fields and a poleward migration (expansion) is underway. Likewise, a negative index value implies more intense meridional wind field strength and a migration towards the equatorial zone (contraction).

Finally, Figure 7 is included to illustrate both the inverse relationship between zonal versus meridional wind speeds, as well as the multi-decadal variability at work across the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere since the end of the 19th century.

These atmospheric circulation indices (ACI) derive from the classification of elementary circulation mechanisms developed at the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) in St. Petersburg. The classification analyzes daily synoptic patterns across the entire Northern Hemisphere, aggregating the frequency and duration of zonal versus meridional circulation forms from 1891 onward.

Figure 7. Extra-tropical zonal and meridional atmospheric circulation indexes.

This section concludes with AAIR’s comparison of the linearly detrended global air temperature (GAT) anomaly versus the extra-tropical zonal ACI (Figure 8), which highlights a leading relationship by approximately 4 years between the latter versus the former. Both plots together, demonstrate that warming follows an increase in the strength of the westerlies and that cooling follows an increase in meridional winds or more specifically, northerlies associated with intruding Arctic fronts.

Figure 8. Linearly detrended global air temperature (GAT) anomaly versus the extra-tropical Northern Hemisphere’s zonal (Westerlies) atmospheric circulation index (ACI).

Now that we have established one of the fundamentals at work between modern climate change and how atmospheric circulation changes in response to multi-decadal forcing, it is now time to move onto the next piece of the puzzle.

1.2 Bond Stadials vs. Bond Optimals: Evidence from IRD and Glacier Records

This next section lays the ground work for the bigger picture, which relative to the Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM), shows us that what goes up, eventually comes down. One of the visuals that I have ever come across, which demonstrates this paleo-fact is shown below in Figure 9 from Javier Vinos’ Climate of the Past, Present and Future in his representation of the complex harmonics at work as the Earth transitions away from the HTM, through the current neoglacial sub-epoch and ultimately arriving at the depths of the next glacial maximum (NGM).

Dr. Vinos will have to forgive me for making minor modifications to the imagery to aid and align with this discussion.

Figure 9. Javier Vinos’ Climate of the Past, Present and Future generalized representation of a transition from a thermal maximum to a next glacial maximum (NGM).

These complex climate harmonics go by many names (e.g., Bond, Heinrich, Dansgaard-Oeschger) in the palaeoclimatological literature and as is common in the practice of science, we honor those pioneers who discovered a fundamental process by naming them after the scientist(s) responsible for their being brought into the light of day.

Note from Figure 9, where each name corresponds with warming (aka Interstadial) or cooling (aka Stadial) intervals over the HTM to NGM transition.

The Bond and Bond Optimal events will be the focus from here to the end of the article, as at this point in history, they are considered to be forced externally by changes in solar activity, while Heinrich and Dansgaard-Oeschger events are said to be internally forced (topic for another day) as there is no clear cosmogenic isotope signature associated with them.

As implied in Figure 9, Bond Events are classified as a type of Stadial and Bond Optimal Events are Interstadials.

Now for a deeper dive into Bond and Bond Optimal events.

A defining characteristic of Bond Events is an intense positive temporal correlation between iceberg rafting debris (IRD) found in North Atlantic sediment (Figure 10) and increasing cosmogenic isotope levels in environmental samples across the Northern Hemisphere (e.g., Alaska - North Atlantic - Middle East - West Africa - Caribbean).

This broad hemispheric correlation is the basis by which Bond et al came to postulate that the external forcing, operating on an approximate frequency of 1,500 years, was a sudden decline in solar activity, which in turn gives rise to an increase glacial growth, iceberg calving rates and a spike in cosmogenic isotopes (¹⁰Be and¹⁴C).

Bond et al hypothesized in their 2001 publication titled Persistent Solar Influence on the North Atlantic Climate during the Holocene that the mechanism invoked a large centennial scale (200 to 500 year) zonal to meridional perturbation of the Arctic Oscillation (AO) - North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and a sustained reduction in the pace of deep water formation in the sub-polar North Atlantic (aka thermohaline deceleration).

Note that this hypothesis remains without a detailed explanation of what is meant by solar activity or how a reduction in solar activity can cause such a cascade in physical changes in the near surface environment.

That level of understanding is coming, so hang in there.

Figure 10. Location of bottom sediment cores analyzed and principal surface currents in the North Atlantic and Nordic Seas - Bond et al 1997.

The drift ice index in the plotted Figure 11 represents the percentage of IRD, specifically the stacked record of petrologic tracers (e.g., hematite-stained grains (HSG), Icelandic volcanic glass, detrital carbonates) in North Atlantic deep-sea sediment cores.

Scientists express the index as a percentage, because it measures the relative abundance of specific coarse lithic grains (>250 μm, identifiable petrologic tracers diagnostic of distant ice-rafted sources) relative to total lithic grains (or sometimes total grains >63 μm) in the sediment sample.

Higher percentages indicate greater influx of drift ice carrying debris from sources like eastern Greenland, Svalbard, or Iceland, as these tracers are rare in local background sedimentation (e.g., hemipelagic muds). The stacked record from multiple cores normalizes and averages these percentages to create a regional signal, with values typically ranging from ~0–20% over the Holocene.

Thus, it is the area under an IRD pulse curve and not the height, which is indicative of the extent of iceberg calving during Bond Events.

The arrows and text are my own additions to add the eye in understanding the broader palaeoclimatological context. Note that the Minoan, Roman and Medieval Warm Periods coincide to low points in IRD; suggesting that conditions favorable to glacial advance are not conducive to optimal civilization states.

Figure 11. Holocene North Atlantic iceberg rafting debris (IRD) index - Bond Event numbers extends back in time from “0” (aka Little Ice Age).

Greenland’s northern ice fields began accumulating glacial mass again during the mid‑Northgrippian, following the end of the HTM. Therefore, Bond Event 4 (7 – 5 ka BP) likely represents calving rates from this extended period of early glacial inception prior to the onset of the Meghalayan (neoglacial) sub-epoch.

These results surprised me, by forcing me to consider the idea that even at the peak warmth of the Milankovitch Cycle (aka HTM), a centennial scale quieting of the Sun is seen to give rise to a relatively short period (200 to 500 years) of glacial growth.

Bond Events 4, 5 and 6 occur within the window of the HTM.

The question I asked was, where were these calving glaciers located during the HTM?

Figure 12 shows that lower latitude glaciers did not begin to form and discharge into the North Atlantic until the transition to the Meghalayan sub-epoch. Specifically, Figure 12 shows that significant glacial advance and associated terminal moraine formation in the forelands of Smørstabbreen’s, Folgefonna’s and Jostedalsbreen’s outlet glaciers in south Norway did not begin until around the 4.2 ka BP transition into the Neoglacial period.

Thus, the change in the IRD pulse height over time in Figure 11 may reflect subtle changes in geology - geochemistry (e.g., less hematite) of new glacial calving sites along lower latitude coastal regions as the Northgrippian gave way to the Meghalayan sub-epoch (dashed vertical orange-line in Figure 11).

Figure 12. Glacial advance and terminal moraine development in south Norwegian glaciers over the Holocene.

Bond et al’s 2003 publication titled Cyclic Variation and Solar Forcing of Holocene Climate in the Alaskan Subarctic conducted high-resolution analyses of lake sediment from southwestern Alaska reveal cyclic variations in climate and ecosystems during the Holocene. These variations occurred with periodicities similar to those of solar activity and appear to be coherent with time series of the cosmogenic nuclides as well as North Atlantic drift ice.

The two figures from Bond et al. (2003) shown in Figure 13 illustrate a compelling link between solar variability and Holocene climate cycles. The left panel compares biogenic silica (BSi) from Arolik Lake in Alaska with hematite-stained grains (%HSG), ¹⁴C production, and ¹⁰Be flux. Peaks in cosmogenic isotope production, indicating reduced solar activity, align with elevated IRD (%HSG) and reduced BSi, suggesting cooler conditions and diminished biological productivity coincide.

BSi reflects the sedimentary abundance of diatoms, which are single-celled algae that commonly dominate lake primary productivity. Note that the y-axis of the BSi time series is inverted to achieve temporal coherence with the IRD (%HSG) time series.

Bond et al. did not generate new ¹⁴C or ¹⁰Be measurements, rather they imported and composited existing, independently produced cosmogenic‑isotope records, specifically the INTCAL radiocarbon calibration curve (Δ¹⁴C) and Greenland/Antarctic ¹⁰Be ice‑core flux records. They then band‑pass filtered and normalized them to extract the millennial‑scale solar‑modulation signal they compared with drift‑ice cycles.

Figure 13. Left hand panel compares biogenic silica (BSi) from Arolik Lake in Alaska with hematite-stained grains (%HSG) from IRD, ¹⁴C production, and ¹⁰Be flux. Right hand panel reflects the FT power spectrum of the BSi data.

The right panel shows Fourier Transform (FT) spectral analysis of the BSi record, revealing significant periodicities near 1,500 years (*), consistent with the timing of Bond Events.

Together, these figures demonstrate that high cosmogenic flux rates coincide with both increased iceberg discharge in the North Atlantic and ecological downturns in the Alaskan subarctic, reinforcing the hypothesis that Bond Events are solar-modulated and globally coherent.

Likewise, the inverse ecological response to conditions favorable to glacial advance, reinforces the naming of anti-Bond events or low points in IRD (%HSG) in the North Atlantic, Bond Optimals.

While Javier Vinos did not coin this Bond Optimal terminology in his recent literature review, it does seem fitting in view of the fact that in classical climatology, the HTM is synonymous with the Holocene Climate Optimum.

In other words, millennial and centennial scale warming events in the Holocene are optimal climatic - environmental states.

According to this rational, the Minoan Warm Period, Roman Warm Period, Medieval Warm Period and the Current Warm Period are all examples of Bond Optimals.

Table 2 compares and contrasts Bond and Bond Optimal Events on the basis of prevailing climatic conditions that sets one state apart from the other. Note how low solar activity coincides with a more meridional westerly flow and a wavier jet stream, while a high solar activity condition produces a more zonal westerly flow and a more stable jet stream.

This relationship between atmospheric circulation and solar activity will continue to be a topic to be expanded upon as we advance to the conclusion.

Table 2. Comparison of Bond and Bond Optimal Events on the basis of prevailing climatic conditions.

Before advancing to the topic of solar activity, cosmogenic isotopes and atmospheric circulation, I wanted to end this section with an illustration that demonstrates the connection between glacial advance and heat transport from lower to higher latitudes. This topic shows up multiple times in Table 2 and thus it is relevant to Bond versus Bond Optimal states.

Figure 14 shows an illustration by D. Larsen from his geological doctoral thesis titled Holocene Climate Evolution and Glacier Fluctuations Inferred from Proglacial Lake Sediments at Hvítárvatn, Central Iceland. The Gulf Stream is a part of the global thermohaline and is integral in transporting heat from the Atlantic tropics to the sub-polar North Atlantic.

Note how the Gulf Stream transport rate (Sv) is shown to decline as Iceland’s Aletsch and Gomer glaciers increase in extent from the Medieval Warm Period (1000 AD). This centennial trend coincides with Bond Event “0” or the Little Ice Age.

Note that 1 Sv equals 1 million cubic meters per second.

Likewise note that the Gulf Stream is shown to increase approximately 20 years before both of these glacials began to rapidly retreat shortly after the Dalton Minimum (1790 - 1830) and continued on this trend throughout the Current Warm Period (CWP).

The vertical blue band in Figure 14 corresponds to the Sporer and Maunder Minimums, which are the quietest periods of solar activity within the late Holocene interglacial. The fact that the Gulf Stream begins to intensify and Iceland glaciers began to rapidly recede following the end of this low solar phase, is noteworthy.

Examining closely the y-axis of the Gulf Stream flow rate in Figure 14 shows that the poleward heat transport rate of the Gulf Stream increased by almost 10% (3 Sv) between Bond Event 0 and the CWP (Bond Optimum 0). In context, this is approximately the equivalent difference between peak summer (1.4 to 1.6 PW) and minimum winter (0.9 to 1.1 PW) poleward heat transport or approximately 0.5 PW (500 TW).

Note that the global power generation capacity is approximately 10 TW.

Figure 14. Iceland glacial advance and retreat versus Gulf Stream’s poleward flow rate since the Medieval Warm Period to present.

If the CWP is indeed a Bond Optimum Event, the last remaining classification box to tick will be evidence showing cosmogenic isotope levels declining in the environment since the end of Bond Event 0 (Little Ice Age).

1.3 Cosmogenic Isotopes and Solar Forcing: From Heliospheric Shielding to Atmospheric Circulation Impacts

There are two magnetospheres that are relevant to the broad topic of solar - Earth surface climate modulation. The first of course, is the geomagnetic field surrounding the Earth, which as shown in Figure 15, is anything but simple in structure and function. As indicated, its shape is a strong function of the dynamically varying impact forces (i.e., Bow Shock) associated with solar winds, coronal mass ejections (CME) and the interplanetary magnetic field (IMF) formed between charged particles ejecting from the Sun and the Earth’s geomagnetic field.

Figure 15. Illustration of the Earth’s geomagnetic field subjected to solar winds and their interplanetary magnetic field (IMF).

Earth’s geomagnetic field does not strengthen or weaken globally as solar activity varies; instead, the disturbance level of the field varies. During solar maximum, enhanced solar wind speed, stronger IMF, and more CMEs drive irregular magnetospheric and ionospheric currents, producing larger geomagnetic disturbances.

These are quantified by the Kp index, a 3‑hour global measure of magnetic variability, and the Ap index, its daily linearized counterpart.

During solar minimum, reduced solar wind–magnetosphere coupling lowers Kp and Ap. These indices are essential proxies for solar energy input into Earth’s system and for studying atmospheric responses.

Because Kp and Ap quantify how much solar wind energy enters Earth’s system, they are used to study:

• energetic particle precipitation (EPP)

• ionization changes in the polar atmosphere

• NOx/HOx production and ozone chemistry

• stratospheric temperature changes

• polar vortex modulation

• AO/NAO variability

They are not climate variables themselves, but are diagnostics of solar forcing on Earth’s upper atmosphere.

The second, but most important dynamically changing magnetosphere, is that our of Sun. The Sun’s magnetosphere is more precisely termed the heliosphere, is a vast region of space dominated by the solar wind and the Sun’s geomagnetic field, protecting the solar system from much of the interstellar medium.

Figure 16. Solar system heliosphere passing through the galactic medium - verified by the Voyageur probe.

Figure 16 shows that the heliosphere is asymmetrical and comet-like (or teardrop-shaped), with a blunt “nose” in the direction of the Sun’s motion through the local interstellar medium and an extended heliotail trailing behind. While the distance between the Sun and its blunt nose, is on average upwards of 120 AUs (AU = distance between Sun and Earth), the distance between the Sun and its diffuse tail is possibly on the order of 1,000s of AUs.

The solar wind, which is a continuous supersonic outflow of charged particles (mostly protons and electrons), provides the dynamic pressure that inflates a vast bubble, pushing against the interstellar medium and defining the heliosphere’s boundaries.

Embedded within this plasma is the heliospheric magnetic field (HMF), which originates from the Sun’s internal dynamo and surface magnetic activity.

The solar wind drags these field lines outward, creating a spiraled magnetic structure (Parker spiral) that gives the heliosphere coherence and shielding properties.

The solar wind supplies the “push” to maintain the bubble’s size and shape, while the HMF provides the “structure” that deflects galactic cosmic rays and organizes the plasma flow. Both are essential; variations in solar activity modulate their strength over the 11-year cycle, causing the heliosphere to “breathe” slightly, but it remains intact and functional throughout.

While Figure 17 indicates that the HMF due to the Sun’s internal dynamo goes through a brief period of near zero field strength over the 11-year Schwabe Cycle, because Sun Spot Numbers (SSN) are at a maximum, the Sun’s surface magnetic field and IMF act to maintain the total HMF well above zero during this geomagnetic field reversal.

Figure 17. Sun’s geomagnetic field reversal over the 11-year Schwabe Cycle.

“Solar maximum” is defined by the peak in SSN, not the peak in the HMF due to the changing geomagnetic dynamo. The geomagnetic HMF usually peaks later, during the declining SSN phase.

SSN controls variable UV/EUV output from the Sun and the Earth’s stratospheric chemistry, while HMF controls the Earth’s geomagnetic activity and energetic particle precipitation (EPP) into the interior polar vortex at either pole.

EPP occurs when solar originating high‑energy electrons and protons enter the polar atmosphere along the Earth’s magnetic field lines (e.g., Aurora Borealis) and produce NOx and HOx radicals through ionization of nitrogen, oxygen and water vapor. These reactive species destroy ozone, especially during polar winter when they descend into the stratosphere inside the polar vortex. The resulting ozone loss cools the upper stratosphere’s polar vortex interior, which strengthens the SPV by enhancing the equator‑to‑pole stratospheric temperature gradient.

EPP is therefore a key pathway through which solar wind variability affects stratospheric chemistry and dynamics.

In parallel, the higher UV/EUV intensity during solar maximum, acts to further enhance the equator-to-polar stratospheric temperature gradient by preferentially heating the lower latitudes through accelerated ozone production (O + O2 - > O3 is exothermic).

These two processes in turn influences hemispheric circulation patterns such as the AO/NAO, which are strongly influenced by the equator-to-polar stratospheric temperature gradient.

In summary and specific to the solar maximum phase (i.e., highest SSN) of the Schwabe Cycle:

☀️ Solar Maximum → High Kp/Ap+ Strong UV/Ozone Coupling

• ↑ UV intensity (≈ +6–8% in the 200–300 nm band)

• ↑ Extreme‑UV (EUV) intensity (≈ +30–50%)

• ↑ Ozone production in upper stratosphere (via O₂ photolysis)

• ↑ Stratospheric heating (ozone absorbs UV)

• ↑ Equator‑to‑pole temperature gradient

• → Stronger, colder, more stable Stratospheric Polar Vortex (SPV)

Solar wind / geomagnetic side:

• more CMEs

• stronger IMF

• faster solar wind streams

• stronger magnetospheric currents

• more geomagnetic storms

Atmospheric outcome:

• Strong SPV that resists planetary‑wave intrusion

• AO/NAO tends to be positive

• Jet stream more zonal

• Winters milder in mid‑latitudes

The very opposite is commonly true to the solar minimum, which again by definition, coincides with the minimum in SSN.

Now we are in a position to understand the relationship between Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR) flux and the Schwabe Cycle.

Figure 18 contrasts SSN variance of the 11-year cycle versus GCR flux counts between 1979 to 2020, which clearly shows an inverse relationship between these two parameters. Specifically, it shows that when SSN is at a maximum, GCRs are at a minimum.

The reason for this is, the HMF generated by the intense surface magnetism of sunspots, acts as a shield that deflects high energy protons associated with GCR flux, away from the inner solar system (e.g., Figure 16).

The fact that GCR flux is at a minimum at the same time the Sun’s geomagnetic dipole is also at a minimum, should impress you with the leading role played by the interplanetary magnetic field (IMF) produced by high energy solar winds and that are at a maximum state when SSN peaks.

It is common to find that the HMF produced by stronger, more turbulent solar winds, is upwards of 2x stronger than the total HMF of the Sun during SSN minimum.

Comparing the peaks and troughs shown in both Figures 17 and 18, should impression you further with the fact that this solar cycle is rarely symmetric.

Figure 18. Galactic Cosmic Radiation (GCR) counts versus Sun Spot Number (SSN) over the 11-year Schwabe Cycle.

This lack of reversibility from one SSN cycle to the next, is at the heart of the relationship between solar activity and cosmogenic isotope (¹⁴C or ¹⁰Be) levels found in the environment.

Cosmogenic isotope generation occurs through GCR initiated reactions called spallation chemistry.

Spallation is in essence a nuclear reaction, where the relativistic energy of GCR is sufficiently high to overcome the strong nuclear force holding together the nucleus of the atmospheric atom (molecule) being impacted.

An example of the direct production of ¹⁰Be from nitrogen-14 (¹⁴N) via a high energy GCR proton (p) is as follows:

p + ¹⁴N → ¹⁰Be + multiple particles (e.g., 3p+n+α)

Where n and α represent neutrons and alpha (helium-3) particles, respectively.

Newly formed ¹⁰Be atoms quickly oxidize to BeO or Be(OH)₂. These highly reactive species attach almost immediately to sub-micron aerosols (sulfate particles, dust, etc.), with residence time in the atmosphere of ~1–2 years (stratosphere longer, troposphere ~weeks).

Because of its strong particle affinity and short atmospheric lifetime, ¹⁰Be faithfully records production rate variations (driven by HMF strength) with minimal lateral transport or redistribution after deposition. This makes it an excellent proxy in ice cores and marine sediments (Figure 19).

Production of ¹⁴C from oxygen-16 (¹⁶O) via a high energy GCR proton is as follows and is shown in Figure X, together with the subsequent steps of environmental incorporation:

p+¹⁶O →¹⁴C+p+2n

Figure 19. Carbon-14 (¹⁴C) and Berylium-10 (¹⁰Be) generation by GCR initiated nuclear spallation reactions in the atmosphere and their subsequent environmental sequestration.

Bringing these factoids into focus in terms of the paleorecord relevance.

Figure 20 shows two plots; one for ¹⁰Be and the other for ¹⁴C. Note how the ¹⁰Be versus SSN time series comparison has the ¹⁰Be concentration inverted. This inverse relationship is commonly interpreted as evidence that the increasing HMF strength associated with rising SSN activity in the Sun, since the Little Ice Age or Bond Event 0, has acted to reduce the production and assimilation of ¹⁰Be within the surface environment.

Additionally, the inverted ¹⁴C time series shows a long term and matching millennial trajectory to the ¹⁰Be paleorecord. The Medieval and Current Warm Periods are delineated as low points in¹⁴C concentration, while higher concentrations are commonly referred to as the Sporer, Maunder and Dalton (solar) Minimums.

These two cosmogenic time series are part of the vast paleorecord, which forms the basis for inferring that high ¹⁰Be and¹⁴C levels are indicative of low points in HMF strength associated with declining SSN activity of the Sun.

While conversely, the Medieval Warm Period (MWP) and the Modern Maximum or Current Warm Period (CWP) are associated with lower ¹⁰Be and¹⁴C levels and higher SSN activities.

Figure 20. Carbon-14 (¹⁴C) and Berylium-10 (¹⁰Be) versus Sun Spot Number (SSN) records.

This effectively ticks the remaining box, which shows that the both the MWP and CWP qualify as Bond Optimum events, by virtue of the fact that both coincide with minimum points in cosmogenic isotope levels as well as reduced iceberg rafting rates (Figure 11).

To show that ¹⁰Be and¹⁴C concentrations are commonly used to elucidate a proxy temperature anomaly time series, I introduce Ludecke et al 2017 titled Harmonic Analysis of Worldwide Temperature Proxies for 2000 Years. Figure 21 includes a key illustration from this study and the abstract is included to aid the eye.

Note that Ludecke et al uses ¹⁰Be and¹⁴C concentrations and reverse Fourier Transforms to construct a global temperature reconstruction by averaging a large set of worldwide temperature proxy records, supplemented with direct instrumental measurements after 1850. Each proxy series was normalized to anomalies relative to the 1950 reference period before computing the composite mean.

The blue curve represents the 30-year running average of temperature proxies (grey), highlighting longer-term trends. The red curve shows the superposition (sum) of three dominant sinusoidal cycles (~1000-, ~460-, and ~190-year periods) extracted through Fourier analysis, demonstrating strong correlation with observed temperature variations.

Again, note the peaks associated with the Roman Warm Period (0 AD), the MWP (1000 AD) and the CWP (1850 to Present), together with the troughs associated with the Late Antiquity Ice Age (350 to 750 AD) and the Little Ice Age (1400 to 1800 AD).

Figure 21. Ludecke et al. 2017 study that used cosmogenic ¹⁰Be and¹⁴C concentrations and reverse Fourier Transforms to construct a 2,000 year global temperature reconstruction.

The longer term harmonics (e.g., 1,000, 460, 190 years) used in Ludecke et al demonstrate that the SSN and solar wind HMF associated with the Schwabe Cycle undergo long term variations in magnitude over time.

Note that there remains significant debate on whether Bond Events occur on an approximate 1500 year basis and increasingly it is believed that the frequency is best approximated closer to 1000 years.

While Ludecke et al did not focus on the dynamic atmospheric response to these longer term harmonics of reduced solar activity, I include a 2001 study by Shindell et al (Figure 22) titled Solar forcing of regional climate change during the Maunder Minimum that did exactly that specific to the Little Ice Age.

Interesting to note that both Michael Mann and Adam Schmidt were co-authors.

Figure 22. Estimated surface air temperature changes and their geographic distribution during the Little Ice Age.

In this 2001 study Shindell et al used a general circulation model (incorporating stratospheric dynamics and ozone chemistry) along with empirical temperature reconstructions to investigate the climatic impacts of reduced solar irradiance during the late 17th-century Maunder Minimum compared to the late 18th century.

The proposed mechanism centered on dynamical atmospheric responses rather than direct radiative forcing alone. Reduced solar irradiance, especially in ultraviolet wavelengths, leads to decreased stratospheric ozone production. This cools the stratosphere, altering the equator-to-polar temperature gradient and strengthening planetary Rossby waves.

These changes propagate downward from the stratosphere and into the troposphere, forcing a shift toward more frequent and intensely negative AO/NAO states.

In this negative phase, weakened westerly winds allow colder Arctic air to spill southward over continental regions, reducing advection of warm, moist Atlantic air into Europe and enhancing winter cooling across the Northern Hemisphere.

The study emphasizes that including stratospheric ozone feedback and full atmospheric coupling is crucial for reproducing these amplified regional effects, which direct forcing alone underestimates.

This mechanism provides a physical explanation for how relatively small solar variations can drive significant regional climate shifts during the Little Ice Age portion associated with the Maunder Minimum.

While the out-put from the generalized circulation model is but a guesstimate, I include it because of the fact that this formal study invoked stratospheric ozone chemistry dynamics and the subsequent changes in zonal versus meridional westerly atmospheric circulation. Likewise, the predicted existence of solar activity induced large resilient low pressure zones over North America and Eurasia is relevant to the topic of the glacier - atmospheric dipole that forms across the Northern Hemisphere during LGM states (cover image).

In conclusion to this subsection, I wanted to include reference to a 2022 study by Jone Vencloviene et al titled Statistical Associations Between Geomagnetic Activity, Solar Wind, Solar Proton Events, and Winter NAO and AO Indices as evidence the solar - atmospheric connections discussed in the context of long term Bond - Bond Optimum events and in the 11-year Schwabe Cycle, is likewise observed even on a day-to-day basis.

This study investigated how space‑weather variability, including geomagnetic disturbances, solar wind parameters, and solar proton events, affects the winter North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and Arctic Oscillation (AO) from 1950–2020. Using an autoregressive model with additional predictors, the authors analyze day‑to‑day atmospheric responses, a major advance over earlier studies that relied on monthly or seasonal averages. Their results show that short‑term changes in geomagnetic activity and solar wind conditions produce statistically significant shifts in the NAO and AO, even after controlling for seasonal cycles and long‑term trends.

The strongest associations occur in winter, when the stratospheric polar vortex (SPV) is dynamically active and most sensitive to external forcing. The study highlights that solar proton events and enhanced geomagnetic activity can perturb the upper atmosphere, altering the chemical and thermal structure of the polar stratosphere. These perturbations propagate downward, modulating the NAO/AO patterns that govern mid‑latitude weather. The authors conclude that space weather is a measurable driver of hemispheric winter circulation, not merely a background influence.

2.0 Conclusions

This article was inspired by my desire to seek a deeper understanding of how glacial - atmospheric circulation patterns have evolved from the Holocene Thermal Maximum (HTM) to present and ultimately by the hemispheric scale glacial - atmospheric dipole (cover image) that defined the Last Glacial Maximum (LGM).

I will now conclude this journey of discovery by summarizing what I have learned about the inner workings of this 4,000 year long neoglacial transition in which planet Earth now exists.

The transition from the Holocene neoglacial period into the Next Glacial Maximum (NGM) represents a profound shift in the balance of climate forcings governing the Northern Hemisphere. While the neoglacial climate remains highly sensitive to solar variability, the eventual emergence of massive ice sheets and high‑albedo surfaces will eventually shift the climate system toward one dominated by internal cryospheric–atmospheric feedbacks. Beneath these higher‑frequency solar processes lies the slow, persistent influence of Milankovitch orbital forcing, which sets the boundary conditions for glacial inception and determines the broad pacing of ice‑age cycles. Understanding how these layers of forcing interact is essential for explaining the highly heterogeneous distribution of ice by the time the NGM is reached.

Milankovitch forcing (i.e., variations in orbital eccentricity, obliquity, and precession), provides the lowest‑frequency, structural backdrop for glacial–interglacial transitions. During the late Holocene and into the neoglacial, declining summer insolation at high northern latitudes favored the gradual accumulation of perennial snow and the expansion of early ice masses.

This orbital configuration did not directly “cause” the LGM, but it tilted the energy balance toward conditions in which smaller, higher‑frequency forcings (solar variability, volcanic activity, ocean–atmosphere feedbacks) could exert disproportionate influence.

Orbital forcing therefore acts as the slow metronome of the climate system, setting the stage upon which solar‑driven and internally generated variability operate.

Within this orbital backdrop, the neoglacial climate remains highly responsive to changes in solar activity.

Variations in ultraviolet radiation modulated stratospheric ozone production, while energetic particle precipitation altered polar stratospheric chemistry and the strength of the stratospheric polar vortex (SPV). These processes influenced the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and Arctic Oscillation (AO), especially during winter when the stratosphere is most dynamically sensitive.

This sensitivity is reflected in the timing of Bond Events and Bond Optimal Events, which appear to represent intensive solar‑paced reorganizations of North Atlantic circulation (ocean & atmosphere) superimposed on the slowly cooling orbital trend. During this stage, the climate system functions as a solar‑modulated amplifier, where relatively small changes in solar output could reorganize hemispheric (global) circulation.

As orbital forcing continues to depress summer insolation, ice sheets expand across North America and northern Europe. Their growth introduces powerful internal feedbacks that increasingly overshadow external solar forcing:

• Surface albedo amplification, reflecting more solar radiation and reinforcing cooling.

• Topographic forcing, as rising ice sheets altered planetary wave propagation and jet‑stream structure.

• Moisture redistribution, with expanding ice sheets modifying storm tracks and precipitation patterns.

These feedbacks produce a persistent negative‑NAO‑like circulation over the North Atlantic, characterized by weakening subpolar lows and enhanced blocking over glaciated regions. This circulation pattern was no longer a transient response to solar variability, but a structural feature of the maturing glacial climate.

The expansion of Northern Hemisphere ice sheets creates a hemispheric dipole between the North Atlantic glacial complex and the ice‑free, arid Beringian interior. While the Atlantic sector becomes dominated by cold, high‑albedo surfaces and persistent blocking, Beringia remains comparatively dry and continental, supporting a positive‑AO‑like regime in the Arctic Pacific sector.

This dipole was not simply a modern NAO/AO pattern with reversed signs; it was a fundamentally different atmospheric base state shaped by ice‑sheet geometry and altered planetary wave dynamics.

By the time the NGM is reached, the climate system has fully transitioned from externally sensitive to internally driven.

Solar variability continues to modulate atmospheric circulation, but its influence was now superimposed on a rigid glacial background state. Large internal oscillations, such as Heinrich Events (cooling) and Dansgaard–Oeschger (warming) cycles, become the dominant modes of variability, reflecting the internal instability of the ice–ocean–atmosphere system.

The NGM thus represents the culmination of a long transition: from a solar‑responsive neoglacial climate operating within an orbital cooling trend, to a self‑sustaining glacial regime governed by ice‑albedo feedbacks and internal dynamical oscillations.