Innovision PEPS led the way in this new polling landscape; its successor, Doppler, has now released its first approval rating survey, offering the clearest picture yet of what the public actually makes of the new government.

The survey is a national one, covering 3,443 adults, weighted to the census, with respondents asked a common set of questions in the same interview -- allowing favourable, unfavourable, and “no opinion” responses to be compared cleanly across questions.

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The headline results, shown in Figure 1, are unambiguous: Two-thirds rate the Prime Minister well, against a fifth unfavourable; the government fares less well but still comfortably positive, at over half well versus a third badly; and almost half say the country is going in the right direction, over a third who say it is going the wrong way.

Figure 1: Approval Ratings

Source: Doppler Approval Rating Survey 2026. National sample of 3,443 adults, weighted to the census.

Pollsters should not interpret their own results -- that is not their job. Analysts, however, should, and there is more than one plausible reading of these numbers.

One possible interpretation, of many, is this: six months into the new government, people are reserving judgment. They see problems mounting on almost every front. But they also understand, correctly, that the government did not create most of these problems.

They are prepared to give it time to fix things. And, for now at least, they like what they see in the Prime Minister. Put differently: People accept that things are tough, but they are not yet blaming the government for it.

They do not expect this government to fix everything -- or, realistically, very much at all, very quickly. What they want is to see the ministers trying. The evidence for this reading comes into sharper focus in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Problems

Source: Doppler Approval Rating Survey 2026.

The two marks come from two different questions, so the distance between them is not a percentage difference. The pattern here is telling. The government is rated worst -- by a wide margin -- on precisely the two problems that people name most often.

Three out of every five respondents name electricity and fuel as one of the country’s biggest problems, and nine out of ten say the government is handling it badly.

Prices of essentials are also named by three out of five, with over two-thirds saying the response is poor.

Education sits at the bottom of both lists: Named by only about one in every ten as a top problem, with just one out of every five rating the government’s handling badly -- the best rating in the set, attached to the least-cited issue.

Straying further into interpretation: What should the government take from this?

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Start with education. Bangladesh’s problems here are well known by experts, and structural -- weak PISA-comparable learning outcomes, underpaid and underqualified teachers, and a widening urban-rural and class divide in the quality of schooling, to name a few.

None of this will be fixed overnight, and everyone knows it. Yet the Education Minister’s singular focus on cracking down on exam malpractice -- nokol ar hobe na, no more cheating -- and on tightening up examinations, was trolled online as a narrow, almost cosmetic intervention.

The polling suggests the public disagreed with the online mockery. People understood that the grade inflation under the fallen regime signified something rotten in the system, and the Minister’s crackdown was appreciated precisely because it signalled that the ministry was actually tackling at least one problem, visibly and without excuses.

Will Bangladesh’s education system be fixed as a result? Definitely not. But that’s not the point.

The point is, the poll might be telling us that the public would like to see the Ministers try to tackle something, or at least tell us that they are doing something.

The exact opposite is true of electricity and fuel.

The proximate story is straightforward. Fuel shortages first bit when the Iran war disrupted global energy markets; problems in the gas supply chain; rolling load-shedding as domestic gas supply has failed to keep pace with demand.

Beneath that lies a more familiar set of causes: years of underinvestment in domestic gas exploration, heavy and growing reliance on costlier imported and spot-market LNG, ageing power-generation and transmission infrastructure inherited from the Hasina years, and a foreign exchange position too constrained to comfortably absorb a sustained spike in import costs.

Perhaps none of this is the government’s fault. But none of it was truly unforeseeable either -- these were known knowns.

Even the Iran war shock became a known known very quickly once it hit. And none of it has an easy or quick fix. So why did the government not take the country into its confidence much sooner about what was coming?

To be clear, optics will not matter in the long run. Whether the economy sinks or keeps this government afloat will ultimately be decided by outcomes, not messaging -- optics will not tip that balance one way or the other.

But right now, in this window of reserved judgment, people want to see the government trying, and being seen to try. Silence in the face of a foreseeable crisis reads as drift, not prudence. And that brings us to the economy.

Figure 3: Misery and Hope

Source: Doppler Approval Rating Survey 2026. National sample of 3,443 adults, weighted to the census.

Here the public mood is genuinely double-edged. Asked to compare their household finances with a year ago, less than a fifth say they are better off, against almost half who say they are worse off -- a bleak retrospective judgment that tracks the inflation people have lived through.

Yet asked to look forward twelve months, the picture flips: Nearly two-fifths expect to be better off, against just a quarter who expect to be worse off.

People are struggling, in other words, but they have not given up hope. The government has begun rolling out its signature election commitments against this backdrop -- family cards and similar targeted-support schemes, so far on a pilot basis, aimed at cushioning exactly the households registering the sharpest sense of hardship.

It has also set out its longer-term vision through the Five-Year Strategic Framework for Reform and Development, a national plan built around a phased “recovery, restoration, reconstruction” sequence intended to move the country from post-Hasina fragility toward durable, broad-based prosperity.

But right now, the economy is mired in a stagflationary rut, and no amount of long-term vision changes the current miasma.

Growth was just 2.2 % in the year to March quarter, with the industrial sector actually contracting; given the ongoing energy crisis, growth in the year to current quarter may well be slower still, and could turn negative.

Inflation stands at 8.3 %, and people feel every point of it at their pocket. A loose monetary policy stance, applied into a supply-constrained economy, risks fuelling that inflation further and could yet trigger a fresh exchange-rate problem on top of it.

The budget, as things stand, is not seen as credible. What the government needs to announce, urgently, is a credible energy plan and a credible banking-sector plan.

There is one recent, genuinely encouraging sign. The Finance Minister has begun offering a frank, unvarnished assessment of the country’s economic difficulties, rather than the reflexive optimism that so often substitutes for candour in government communication.

That bitter truth-telling is likely to build confidence, not undermine it, because it signals that the government is actually in touch with reality on the ground -- precisely the quality the public seems to be probing for in these polling numbers.

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If the government is tempted to feel anxious about facing this economic storm head-on, the polling suggests it need not be -- because, right now, the numbers offer the opposition very little to work with either.

Figure 4: Divided Opposition

Source: Doppler Approval Rating Survey 2026, weighted, 3,443 respondents.

Negative ratings only; the balance of each group is positive or holds no view. In every party-supporter group, the Prime Minister draws the smallest share of negative ratings, and in five of the six groups, the country’s overall direction draws the largest negative -- worse, in most people’s minds, than either the Prime Minister or the government specifically.

Only Awami League supporters register the slimmest of majority -- barely over half -- saying the country is going the wrong way; even there, only a third rate the Prime Minister badly.

Among BNP supporters, tellingly, about a fifth rate the government and the direction negatively -- a reminder that even sympathetic voters are watching delivery closely, not just personality.

Awami League and Jamaat-e-Islami or NCP supporters, of course, likely hold very different ideas of what the country’s “right direction” even means -- and that divergence alone hands the government a measure of political breathing space it might not otherwise enjoy. This will not last forever.

At some point, political realignment will sharpen these divisions into something more coherent and more threatening. But that point lies in distant future.

For now, the lesson from this survey is a simple one. The government should spend this window of reserved judgment governing -- tackling the known knowns of energy and banking with the same visible urgency the Education Minister brought to examinations -- and communicating clearly to the public that it is doing so.

The public has made its patience conditional on visible actions, reserving judgment on results. It will not last indefinitely, and it should not be mistaken for endorsement.

Further reading

• Khaleda Zia and the Hardest Revolution of All

  Mirza R Ahmed, 23 Oct 2025

• The Long Road Home : Tarique Rahman Returns

  Ashraf Ud Doula, 22 Dec 2025

• Is Honesty Alone What We Want in a Leader?

  Asif Shahan, 26 Jan 2026

• The Changing of the Guard

  Ehteshamul Haque, 1 Feb 2026

• Why Jamaat Wins When Others Stay Home

  Navine Murshid, 11 Feb 2026

• 10 Takeaways from the Election

  Zafar Sobhan, 13 Feb 2026

• Where the Anti-India Current Runs Strong

Jannatul Naym Pieal, 15 Feb 2026

• Jamaat Didn’t Miss Its Moment. It Rewrote Its Political Future

  Nakibur Rahman, 17 Feb 2026

• Are Women Voters behind Jamaat’s Electoral Success?

  Rushad Faridi, 25 Feb 2026

• Dhaka Will See You Now, Mr Prime Minister

  Apurba Jahangir, 1 April 2026

• Why India wants Bangladesh’s Tarique Rahman in Delhi

  Anbarasan Ethirajan, 28 Aug 2026

• The Khalil and Kobir show

  Faisal Mahmud, 28 Aug 2026

We covered:

• Current inflation and growth conjunctures
• Expansionary monetary policy versus inflation control
• Possible effects of policy rate cut by the central bank
• Monetary Policy Trilemma and what it means for Bangladesh
• How much might the taka depreciate
• The risk of reserve depletion to maintain exchange rate stability
• Remittance through formal and informal channel
• Bangladesh Bank’s role in the foreign exchange market
• Banking sector and the credit growth crisis
• Energy and infrastructure constraints against investment recovery
• Monetary policy ineffectiveness to boost growth in a supply constrained economy
• Importance of forward guidance and policy communication
• The crisis of confidence in Bangladesh economy

My slides are below.

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I talked with Musa Miah of Dhaka Stream on 28 July regarding the current state of the economy, high inflation, banking sector reforms, budget implementation, the economic measures taken by the interim and current governments, and the challenges and future roadmap for Bangladesh's economy within the altered global context following the July uprising.

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Further reading

• Weather is again determining economic outcomes

  The Economist, 24 Nov 2022

• Taking Greening Bangladesh Seriously

  Faysal Kabir Shuvo, 23 Oct 2025

• Why is Dhaka debating Bangladesh’s LDC graduation?

  Md Rubaiyath Sarwar, 9 Dec 2025

• Professor Yunus Leaves on a High Note

  Munir Quddus, 19 Feb 2026

• Democracy Without Teeth

  Asif Shahan, 31 Mar 2026

• Rethinking Dhaka’s China policy in a changing world

  Mostak Ahamed Galib and Bulbul Siddiqi, 12 May 2026

• Well-Designed Regulatory and Institutional Reforms Can Boost Economic Growth

  Nicolas Fernandez-Arias, Marwa Ibrahim, Colombe Ladreit, 25 Aug 2026

I would meet Mr Alamgir several more times over the years. Most of those meetings would be under very trying political circumstances. How soon is now, we would wonder, as all our hopes would gradually evaporate. But not his.

And he probably thought this message of hope and positivity would resonate with other people like me — Anglophone, urban, affluent.

I have a theory.

I wrote on 36 July that our parents’ generation felt guilty about their cowardice around 15 August 1975. And Hasina exploited that guilt to the hilt.

Well, our generation too have a moment of guilt — around the stolen election of December 2018. The political theory underpinning the opposition’s participation in that election was that as the regime rigged it blatantly, the urban classes would come out in protest.

People like us didn’t. They, we, were cowards. They, we, clicked and liked Mr Alamgir’s video, and, well, that’s all we did.

The Monsoon Revolution gave us a chance to repent. And here we are!

I met Mr Alamgir several times since. I certainly wish that we collectively listened to him and held an election at the soonest after Hasina fled — certainly nothing happened after February 2025 that was worth delaying the election by a year!

I did a long video interview of Mr Alamgir in the autumn of 2024, but sadly the internet gods have swallowed it! He did promise me the chance to do profile essay for Weekly Counterpoint, but that was before the presidential business.

The democratic journey of Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, and Bangladesh, continues.

Meanwhile, over the fold, what I wrote in the lead up to the stolen 2018 election, when this stuff would not be printed in Bangladesh.

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A few old men

A corrupt, selfish elite rules over you, an elite in cahoots with foreigners, to whom the nation’s assets and future is being sold; and the lying media and rootless intellectuals stop you from seeing the truth; and yet, you sense the truth, that’s why you flock to the leader; even as the enemies of the people demonise him for not echoing their sophistry, you feel he tells it as it is — that he will kick the elite out, drain the swamp, lock the corrupt up, kill the criminals, and fix what ails the country; and make no mistake, it’s not hard to fix things, it’s just the knavery and perfidy of corrupt elite that need to be rooted out, and the leader will do just that; and he has proved it, hasn’t he, in his remarkable career as (business tycoon or mayor or army officer or whatever); he will make the country great, because he is truly of the country, like you are, and unlike those footloose elite who will flee the land with their ill gotten wealth if things get tough.

In recent years, variations of the above have reverberated from Washington DC to New Delhi, Warsaw to Brasilia, and Istanbul to Manila. And politics around the world has been shaken. There appears to be one exception — there doesn’t appear to be a Bangladeshi strongman on the scene.

There might have been. After all, charges of corruption and ‘selling the country to foreigners’ can be laid quite easily against the current regime in Dhaka. And historically, Bangladeshis have proved as susceptible to the cult of the leader as any other people. So there might well have been a would be strongman leading the opposition.

Curiously, as Sherlock Holmes might have said, strongman in Bangladeshi politics is a dog that didn’t bark.

Leaders of the Jatiya Oikya Front are, in fact, as unlike a strongman demagogue as one could imagine. Take Dr Kamal Hossain — a scholarly lawyer who appears to be unfailingly polite with the prime minister during the dialogues last month. The same could be said about Moudud Ahmed — another scholarly lawyer who served in various non-Awami League governments over the years. Of course, the two lawyers were allies in the 1960s London, working towards the freedom of the then East Pakistan. Four decades ago, the two young men — both were barely in their 30s! — stood behind Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as that fire breathing leader stared down the mighty Ayub regime. Now the two old men are allies again, working to bring down the dictatorship of Mujib’s daughter.

Scholarly, lawyerly types Kamal Hossain and Moudud Ahmed are. Fire breathing populist demagogue — they most definitely are not.

Nor is Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir a tub thumping, rable rousing cult figure. He has the air of high school or college teacher. Indeed, he did start his working life as a teacher, and might easily have gone on to earn a PhD and settle into a comfortable suburban life in the west. Of course, he chose politics. And he did it the hard way. Scion of a political family, he could have entered parliament on his family name. Instead, leaving his family in Dhaka, he joined local politics in Thakurgaon, and worked his way up BNP’s organisation. An indefatigable, eternal optimist, Alamgir is the antithesis of a Trump / Erdogan / Modi / Putin / Duterte.

Why is there no strongman demagogue figure in the opposition platform?

A friend noted ironically that perhaps three decades of matriarch rule has inculcated us Bangladeshis against the dangers of unleashing an alpha male. Perhaps. Perhaps there is some sociological study to be done here. After all, the cult of the mother has deep heritage in Bengal, and survives today in the form of the country’s national anthem to late Ayub Bacchu’s greatest hit.

Or perhaps we have been experiencing the cult of the populist leader for the past decade, and in a few old men we seek salvation precisely because they look to be what the current prime minister is not.

Also curiously absent from these old men’s promises is any red meat rhetoric about 1971, Islam, India, and the history wars. Instead, they promise tangible, practical stuff. And most importantly, they seek to bring politics back by stressing, by virtue of their action, two important aspect of the hard work that is politics: they want to govern, not just shout holier-than-thou slogans; and they want to build consensus, synthesis if you like.

Interestingly, not everyone welcomes these old men. No, I am not talking about the Awami Leaguers. Of course, they don’t like the Jatiya Oikya Front. That the regime is afraid of the opposition is evidenced by the blatantly partisan shenanigans of its hand picked Election Commission. More curious are the likes of Sirajul Islam Chowdhury, Farhad Mazhar, and Sohrab Hossain — whether they are naive or knave I leave it to the reader to judge.

It’s not easy to be optimistic about liberal values anywhere in the world these days. Bangladesh is an exception. Yes, the regime is likely to brutally and thuggishly steal the election. Yes, the opposition might not be able to defy the might of the regime. Yes, these old men — whose moderate approach gives Mrs Wajed the safest passage to exit the scene gracefully — might yet be replaced by a populist demagogue.

All of the above may well happen. But right now, men like Kamal Hossain and Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir give hope to the cause of liberty.

That is something.

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Further reading

• Who Can Afford to be a Politician Today

HM Nazmul Alam, 13 Jan 2026

• Ali Riaz’s Big Bet

Naomi Hossain, 19 Jan 2026

• Beyond Fault Lines: Bangladesh’s Intolerance Problem

Zunaid Kazi, 19 Jan 2026

• The Changing of the Guard

Ehteshamul Haque, 1 Feb 2026

• Bangladesh Has Woken Up to a New Reality

Owen Lippert, 14 Feb 2026

• What It Means to Be Bangladeshi Today

Muhaimen Siddiquee, 14 Feb 2026

• Against All Odds

Yasin Shafi, 11 Mar 2026

• Why are Critical Ordinances not being Passed into Law?

Sharif Bhuiyan, 5 April 2026

• The Future of Reform

Asif Shahan, 11 April 2026

• Back, again, to the cycle of broken promises?

Altaf Parvez, 19 April 2026

• The Machete and the Matchstick

Zakir Kibria, 20 April 2026

• The Rise and Fall of Anti-Establishment Populism

Syed Hasibuddin Hussain, 21 Apr 2026

অভ্যুত্থানের দুই বছর পূর্ণ হলো। সামগ্রিকভাবে আপনি এই সময়কে কীভাবে মূল্যায়ন করবেন?

জ্যোতি রহমান: মাও সে–তুং যেমন বলেছিলেন, ‘শত ফুল ফুটতে দাও’, আমার পর্যবেক্ষণে অভ্যুত্থানের মাধ্যমে এই দুই বছরে ভালো-মন্দ মিলিয়ে বহু উদ্যোগ ও নতুন চিন্তার উন্মেষ ও বিকাশ ঘটেছে। এই শত ফুল ফোটার ও শত চিন্তার বিকাশের প্রক্রিয়াটি সার্বিকভাবে ইতিবাচক।

এ অঞ্চলের ইতিহাসে বিদ্রোহ অস্বাভাবিক ঘটনা নয়। সম্রাট আকবরের দরবারের লেখক শেখ আবুল ফজল আল্লামি এই অঞ্চলের বর্ণনায় মন্তব্য করেছিলেন, এখানকার বাতাসেও বিদ্রোহের উপস্থিতি ছিল। তবে শেখ হাসিনার শাসনব্যবস্থা এতটাই ব্যক্তিকেন্দ্রিক একনায়কতন্ত্রের ওপর দাঁড়িয়ে ছিল যে সরকারের পতনের পর কী হবে, তা নিয়ে আমার মধ্যে সব সময় উদ্বেগ ছিল।

আন্দোলনের মাধ্যমে ক্ষমতার পরিবর্তনের সময়ও রাষ্ট্রকাঠামোর একটি প্রাতিষ্ঠানিক ধারাবাহিকতা বজায় থাকতে দেখা যায়। কিন্তু জুলাইয়ে রাষ্ট্রীয় সহিংসতা ও আগ্রাসনের মাত্রা ছিল অভাবনীয়। এবারই প্রথম কোনো আন্দোলনে সরকারপ্রধানের সঙ্গে রাষ্ট্রের প্রধান প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলোর শীর্ষ ব্যক্তিরা একযোগে পালিয়েছেন। ফলে তিন দিন দেশে কার্যত কোনো সরকারই ছিল না।

অথচ লক্ষ করুন, এক ভয়ানক রক্তাক্ত অভ্যুত্থানের টাটকা স্মৃতি এবং সীমান্ত ও অভ্যন্তরীণ বিভিন্ন গোষ্ঠীগত ও সাম্প্রদায়িক উসকানি সত্ত্বেও আমাদের সমাজ অবিশ্বাস্য একতাবদ্ধতা দেখিয়েছে। যদিও এই ঐকতান ধরে রাখা যায়নি, কিছুটা অন্তর্বর্তীকালীন সরকারের ব্যর্থতায়, কিছুটা রাজনৈতিক শক্তিগুলোর অপরিণামদর্শিতায়। তবু আমাদের সমাজ স্ব-উদ্যোগে বহু বিশৃঙ্খলা সামাল দিয়েছে। এটা আশাজাগানিয়া।

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প্রথম আলো:

আওয়ামী লীগ আমলের ব্যাংকিং খাতের লুটপাট নিয়ে অনেক আলোচনা হলেও পরবর্তী সময়ে ব্যাংকিং খাতের সংস্কার নিয়ে পৃথক কোনো কমিশন হলো না। এই পরিস্থিতি নিয়ে আপনার মূল্যায়ন কী?

জ্যোতি রহমান: আওয়ামী লীগ আমলের অর্থনৈতিক মডেলকে আমি বলি ‘হাসিনোমিকস’। এর অন্যতম মূল বৈশিষ্ট্যই ছিল নিজ গোষ্ঠীভুক্ত ব্যক্তি ও পছন্দের অলিগার্কদের লাইসেন্স দেওয়া অথবা অবৈধ পন্থায় ব্যাংকের দখল করা। এরপর আইনি ও রেগুলেটরি কাঠামোকে কলুষিত করে ও অবৈধ পন্থায় ব্যাংক খাত থেকে অতিমূল্যায়িত মেগা প্রকল্প বা অস্তিত্বহীন ব্যবসায় ঋণপ্রবাহ, যা অর্থ পাচারকে এমন বিশাল রূপ দিয়েছিল।

হাসিনা সরকার যত দিন নিজেদের ক্ষমতাকে নিরবচ্ছিন্ন ভেবেছিল, তত দিন অর্থনীতিতে একধরনের প্রবাহ ও ‘ট্রিকল-ডাউন ইফেক্ট’ ছিল। কিন্তু করোনা ও আন্তর্জাতিক বিধিনিষেধের ক্ষেত্র তৈরি হওয়ার পর ব্যাংক খাত থেকে বেনামি ঋণের নামে অর্থ পাচারের গতি মারাত্মকভাবে বেড়ে যায়, যা ব্যাংকিং খাতকে দেউলিয়া পরিস্থিতির মুখে ঠেলে দেয়।

রূঢ় বাস্তবতা হলো, আমাদের দেশের ৬১টি ব্যাংকের মধ্যে কোনোভাবেই ১০-১২টির বেশি ব্যাংক কার্যকরভাবে টিকে থাকার মতো সক্ষম না। কিন্তু হুট করে তো এত ব্যাংক বন্ধও করা যায় না। তাই ব্যাংকগুলোকে একীভূত করা বা রাষ্ট্রীয় ভর্তুকি দিয়ে ধাপে ধাপে কমানোর মতো কঠিন পদক্ষেপ দরকার।

সবচেয়ে জরুরি বিষয় হলো, আমানতকারীদের আস্থার সংকট দেখা দিলে পুরো ব্যাংকিং খাতেই এর প্রভাব পড়বে। এ ছাড়া দুর্বল ব্যাংকগুলোকে টিকিয়ে রাখতে বা বারবার মূলধন জোগাতে করদাতাদের অর্থই ব্যবহার করতে হয়। এটা সরকারের জন্য অত্যন্ত ব্যয়বহুল। বিদেশে চলে যাওয়া বিপুল পরিমাণ অর্থ দেশে ফেরানোও দুঃসাধ্য প্রক্রিয়া।

ফলে ব্যাংকিং খাতের সংস্কার শুধুই অর্থনৈতিক জ্ঞানের বিষয় নয়, এটা একটা রাজনৈতিক সিদ্ধান্তও বটে। অন্তর্বর্তীকালীন সরকার সরাসরি না বললেও স্পষ্টই বোঝা গেছে, অর্থনৈতিক ক্ষেত্রে তারা কোনো কাঠামোগত রূপান্তর প্রক্রিয়া শুরু করবে না, তারা শুধুই জরুরি সংকটাবস্থা সামাল দেবে। সে হিসেবে অন্তর্বর্তী সরকার তাদের সংক্ষিপ্ত মেয়াদে মোটামুটি গ্রহণযোগ্যভাবেই ‘সামাল’ দেওয়ার কাজটি করেছে। তারা জরুরি সংকটাবস্থা সামাল দেওয়া সম্পন্ন করে প্রকৃত অর্থে ‘অন্তর্বর্তীকালীন’ দায়িত্ব পালন করেছে এবং সংস্কার বা কাঠামোগত রূপান্তরের দায়িত্ব নির্বাচিত সরকারের ওপর ছেড়ে দিয়েছে।

প্রথম আলো:

বিএনপি সরকারের আমলে এই খাতের সংস্কার কি সম্ভব হবে?

জ্যোতি রহমান: বর্তমান সরকারকে আসলে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ রাজনৈতিক সিদ্ধান্তটিই নিতে হবে: তারা কি তাৎক্ষণিক কঠিন সিদ্ধান্ত নিয়ে দ্রুত অর্থনৈতিক পুনরুদ্ধার চায়, নাকি কয়েক বছর ধরে ধীরগতির ব্যবস্থাপনায় ক্রমে সংস্কারের পথে চলবে? এ দুটো পথের যেটাই নেওয়া হোক না কেন, ব্যাংকিং খাতের কাঠামোগত সংস্কারের কোনো বিকল্প নেই।

এ দেশে কিন্তু ব্যাংকিং খাতের সংস্কারের উদাহরণ আছে। আশি ও নব্বইয়ের দশকে ব্যাংক সংস্কার নিয়ে কাজ হয়েছিল, যেখান বাস্তবায়নযোগ্য ও তাৎপর্যপূর্ণ দিকনির্দেশনাও ছিল। ফলে ব্যাংক খাতের এই সংস্কারের রাজনৈতিক রূপরেখা গ্রহণই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ। অবশ্য বর্তমান সরকারকে এখন পর্যন্ত দোদুল্যমান বলে মনে হচ্ছে।

প্রথম আলো:

সম্প্রতি আইএমএফ পূর্বাভাস দিয়েছে যে প্রয়োজনীয় সংস্কার না করলে মধ্য মেয়াদে জিডিপি প্রবৃদ্ধির হার আরও কমে ৩ শতাংশের নিচেও নেমে যেতে পারে। আপনি কীভাবে এটাকে ব্যাখ্যা করেন?

জ্যোতি রহমান: সরকারের অনুরোধে সম্ভাব্য নতুন ঋণ কর্মসূচি নিয়ে প্রাথমিক আলোচনা এবং বাংলাদেশের সাম্প্রতিক অর্থনৈতিক পরিস্থিতি নিয়ে পর্যালোচনা করার মিশন শেষে আইএমএফ এটা জানিয়েছে। ব্যাংকিং ও রাজস্ব খাতে প্রয়োজনীয় সংস্কার বিষয়ে আন্তর্জাতিক অংশীজনদের আগ্রহ স্পষ্টভাবেই দৃশ্যমান।

আইএমএফের ভূমিকা অর্থনীতিতে অনেকটা চিকিৎসকের মতো। একটি দেশ সাধারণত তখনই আইএমএফের কাছে যায়, যখন সে অর্থনৈতিক সংকটে থাকে কিংবা সম্ভাব্য সংকট মোকাবিলায় আগাম প্রস্তুতি বা ‘ভ্যাকসিন’ নিতে চায়। কোনো দেশ যখন আইএমএফের দ্বারস্থ হয়, তখন আন্তর্জাতিক ঋণমান নির্ধারণকারী সংস্থা (রেটিং এজেন্সি), বিশ্বের আর্থিক বাজার, দ্বিপক্ষীয় উন্নয়ন অংশীদার এমনকি দেশীয় পুঁজিবাজার তা তীক্ষ্ণভাবে পর্যবেক্ষণ করে। এই পরিস্থিতিতে আইএমএফের কাছে গিয়ে তাদের দেওয়া শর্ত পালনে অনীহা দেখালে আন্তর্জাতিক ও দেশীয় অংশীজনদের কাছে একটি নেতিবাচক বার্তা যায়।

তাই যেকোনো সরকারেরই আইএমএফের কাছে যাওয়ার আগেই হিসাব করা উচিত তারা ঠিক কী চায়। কেবল সরাসরি ঋণের অর্থ পাওয়ার জন্য নয়, অনেক সময় অন্যান্য আন্তর্জাতিক উন্নয়ন সহযোগীদের কাছ থেকে বড় অঙ্কের অর্থায়ন পাওয়ার জন্য আইএমএফের ‘গুড ক্যারেক্টার সার্টিফিকেট’ জরুরি হিসেবে দেখা হয়।

আইএমএফ যখন ব্যাংকিং ও রাজস্ব খাতে সংস্কারের শর্ত দেয়, তখন কেবল সাময়িক জনতুষ্টিতার কথা ভেবে পিছিয়ে আসা ঠিক হবে না। কারণ, আন্তর্জাতিক বাজার তখন মনে করবে, দেশের সার্বিক অর্থনৈতিক সক্ষমতা বা রাজনৈতিক সাহস একেবারেই নির্ভরযোগ্য নয়।

প্রথম আলো:

এই ধরনের সংস্কার কি বর্তমান নির্বাচিত বিএনপি সরকারের রাজনৈতিক কর্মসূচির সঙ্গে সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ণ বলে মনে করেন?

জ্যোতি রহমান: আইএমএফ সাধারণত ১৫-২০ বছর ধরে যে সংস্কারগুলোর কথা বলছে, তার একটি বড় অংশের সঙ্গে দেশীয় অর্থনীতির কাঠামোগত চাহিদার যৌক্তিক মিল রয়েছে। এ ক্ষেত্রে প্রধান দ্বিমতগুলো তৈরি হয় বাস্তবায়ন কৌশলে। আমাদের দেশের প্রধান রাজনৈতিক-অর্থনৈতিক সমস্যা হলো রাষ্ট্রের সঙ্গে আমাদের অভিজাত ও সুবিধাভোগী (প্রিভিলেজড) শ্রেণির রাজস্ব ও রাজনৈতিক সম্পর্ক অত্যন্ত দুর্বল।

এই শ্রেণি তাদের শিক্ষা, স্বাস্থ্য, পরিবহন বা ভ্রমণের মতো মৌলিক নাগরিক সেবার জন্য রাষ্ট্রীয় ব্যবস্থার ওপর নির্ভরশীল নয়। একমাত্র আইনশৃঙ্খলা রক্ষাকারী বাহিনী ছাড়া রাষ্ট্রের আর কোনো সেবাতেই তাদের প্রত্যক্ষ নির্ভরতা নেই। ফলে তারা রাষ্ট্রের প্রতি কর প্রদানে কোনো সামাজিক বা নৈতিক দায়বদ্ধতা অনুভব করে না।

যখন রাষ্ট্র কর-জিডিপি অনুপাত কম বলে রাজস্ব বাড়াতে চায়, তখন এই শ্রেণি উল্টো অভিযোগ করে যে রাষ্ট্র টাকা অপচয় করে। তবে প্রকৃত চিত্র হলো, আমাদের রাষ্ট্রকাঠামোর প্রশাসনিক ও প্রাতিষ্ঠানিক সক্ষমতা এতটাই কম যে বড় অঙ্কের টাকা পরিকল্পিতভাবে ব্যবহার করার মতো সক্ষমতাও বস্তুত তাদের নেই।

অতএব, আইএমএফ যখন কর-জিডিপি অনুপাত বাড়ানো কিংবা শিক্ষা ও স্বাস্থ্য খাতে ব্যয় বাড়ানোর কথা বলে, সেগুলোর সঙ্গে সরকারের নিজস্ব লক্ষ্যমাত্রার কোনো মৌলিক বিরোধ থাকার কথা নয়। মতপার্থক্য তৈরি হতে পারে কেবল বিস্তারিত শর্তাবলি ও দর–কষাকষির সুনির্দিষ্ট কৌশল নিয়ে। এখন ব্যাংকিং খাত বা এনবিআরের সংস্কার কীভাবে করা হবে, তা সরকারকে ঠিক করতে হবে।

আপনি কি ৫-১০টি দুর্বল ব্যাংককে একীভূত করে জাতীয়করণ করবেন, নাকি একীভূত করে বেসরকারি বা বিদেশি খাতে বিক্রি করে দেবেন, নাকি সরাসরি লিকুইডেট (বিলুপ্ত) করে দেবেন? এসবই টেকনিক্যাল বিষয়। কিন্তু মূল সিদ্ধান্তটা রাজনৈতিক। তবে রাজনৈতিক সুবিধাভোগীদের তুষ্ট রাখা ও ব্যবসায়ীদের জন্য ‘ঠেকা দেওয়া প্রণোদনার’ সমাধানের পথে হাঁটলে রাজনৈতিক আত্মহননের পথকেই ত্বরান্বিত করবে।

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প্রথম আলো:

সরকার দায়িত্ব নেওয়ার পর ফ্যামিলি কার্ড, কৃষক কার্ড, হেলথ কার্ডের মতো সামাজিক সুরক্ষা কর্মসূচি হাতে নিয়েছে। এর অর্থায়ন বিষয়ে আপনার কী মত?

জ্যোতি রহমান: প্রশ্নটি অত্যন্ত গুরুত্বপূর্ণ এবং এ নিয়ে আরও বিস্তারিত গবেষণা ও আলোচনা হওয়া দরকার। সরকার যে ‘বটম অব দ্য পিরামিডের’ কাছে সরাসরি নগদ সহায়তা পৌঁছাতে চায়, তা স্পষ্ট। আমাদের মতো দুর্বল রাষ্ট্রীয় সক্ষমতার দেশে আমলাতান্ত্রিক জটিলতায় প্রস্তাবটি যাতে ফাইলচাপা পড়ে আটকে না যায়, সে জন্য হয়তো সরকার চিন্তা করেছে, আগে মাঠে নামিয়ে দেওয়া যাক, শুরু হয়ে গেলে আর পেছনে ফেরার সুযোগ থাকবে না, তখন পরিস্থিতি দেখে পরীক্ষা-নিরীক্ষা ও সংশোধন করা যাবে। এই চিন্তাধারাটি ভুল নাকি ঠিক, তা সাদা বা কালো ভঙ্গিতে বলার সুযোগ নেই।

আগে সামাজিক সুরক্ষায় যে বিপুল অপচয়, লিকেজ (চুরি) বা ডাবল কাউন্টিং হতো, নতুন এই ব্যবস্থার মাধ্যমে যদি তা বন্ধ করা যায়, তবে অতিরিক্ত কোনো অর্থায়নের প্রয়োজন হয়তো হবে না। পুরোনো অপচয় থেকে বেঁচে যাওয়া অর্থ দিয়েই এই নতুন নগদ প্রদান চালানো সম্ভব। যদি সঠিক মানুষের কাছে টাকাটা পৌঁছায়, তবে তা সামগ্রিক অর্থনীতিতে ইতিবাচক প্রভাব ফেলবে।

এ ছাড়া আর্থিক লেনদেনে ডিজিটালাইজেশনের এই ভরা জোয়ারের যুগে একাধিক কার্ড স্কিম চালু না করে একটি ইউনিফর্ম কার্ডের মাধ্যমে ব্যাংক ও এমএফএস (মোবাইল ফাইন্যান্সিয়াল সার্ভিসেস) খাতের মাধ্যমেই সব সামাজিক সুরক্ষার নগদ সহায়তা দেওয়ার ব্যবস্থা করাটা বিশ্বজুড়েই একটি প্রমাণিত মডেল। তবে উল্টোটাও হতে পারে, যদি আগের অপচয় বন্ধ না করে নতুনভাবে অনির্দিষ্ট খরচ যুক্ত করা হয়, তবে তা অর্থনীতির জন্য বোঝা হয়ে দাঁড়াবে।

প্রথম আলো:

সামাজিক সুরক্ষা খাতের এই নতুন ও বড় খরচ কি সামষ্টিক অর্থনীতিতে বড় কোনো চাপ ফেলবে?

জ্যোতি রহমান: এই মুহূর্তে (২০২৬-২৭ অর্থবছরে) খুব বড় চাপ সম্ভবত ফেলবে না। কারণ, এখন পর্যন্ত এ সংখ্যা বা পরিধি পুরো অর্থনীতির তুলনায় খুব বড় নয়। তবে গুরুত্বপূর্ণ বিষয় হলো, এই পাইলট প্রজেক্টগুলো থেকে সরকার কী শিখছে এবং কীভাবে তাদের শেখার প্রক্রিয়াকে কাজে লাগিয়ে সংশোধন করছে।

অপচয়, দুর্নীতি ও সিস্টেম লসকে যথাসম্ভব ন্যূনতম পর্যায়ে রেখে সামাজিক সুরক্ষা কর্মসূচির প্রসারই এ ধরনের উদ্যোগের সাফল্যের একমাত্র পথ। তবে ব্যাংক খাতে আস্থা না থাকলে নগদ অর্থ স্থানান্তরে মধ্যস্বত্বভোগীদের দৌরাত্ম্য বাড়বে, যা এই উদ্যোগের মূল উদ্দেশ্যকেই ব্যাহত করবে; তাই ব্যাংক খাতের সংস্কার এখানেও অত্যন্ত গুরুত্বপূর্ণ।

প্রথম আলো:

ইরান-যুক্তরাষ্ট্র যুদ্ধের কারণে সৃষ্ট মধ্যপ্রাচ্য সংকট সরকারের ওপর কী ধরনের অর্থনৈতিক চাপ ফেলছে। সরকারের করণীয় কী?

জ্যোতি রহমান: যুদ্ধ পরিস্থিতির কারণে আমাদের অর্থনীতিতে ইতিমধ্যেই বেশ বড় চাপ তৈরি হয়েছে। সরকার কিছু ক্ষেত্রে তাৎক্ষণিক ও বিলম্বিত, উভয় ধরনের ব্যবস্থা নিয়েছে। বিশ্ববাজারে তেলের দাম বাড়ার সঙ্গে সঙ্গে দেশের জ্বালানি খাতের ওপর সরাসরি আর্থিক চাপ তৈরি হয়েছে।

এ অবস্থায় সরকারের সামনে দুটি বিকল্প থাকে: বিশ্ববাজারের ধাক্কা সামলাতে ভর্তুকি বাড়িয়ে ভোক্তা পর্যায়ে দাম অপরিবর্তিত রাখা; অথবা ভর্তুকি কমিয়ে তেলের দাম বাড়িয়ে দেওয়া। এটি একটি অত্যন্ত কঠিন রাজনৈতিক পরিস্থিতি। সরকার শুরুতে তাড়াহুড়া করে ভর্তুকি প্রত্যাহার করেনি, তারা সময় নিয়েছে। শেষ পর্যন্ত দাম কিছুটা সমন্বয় করতেই হয়েছে। সামনে দেশের সামষ্টিক অর্থনীতির মূল ঝুঁকিটাই আসবে আন্তর্জাতিক বাজারে জ্বালানির দাম এবং তা অভ্যন্তরীণ মূল্যস্ফীতিতে কীভাবে প্রভাব ফেলছে, সেটি সামলানোর মধ্য দিয়ে।

উল্লেখ্য, এখন পর্যন্ত আমাদের বৈদেশিক মুদ্রার বাজারে টাকা-ডলারের বিনিময় হার খুব একটা অস্থিতিশীল না থাকলেও তা কত দিন থাকবে, সেটা এই মুহূর্তে বলাটা মুশকিল। কারণ, দেশে রেমিট্যান্সের প্রবাহ এখনো বেশ ভালো। যত দিন এই রেমিট্যান্সের প্রবাহ বজায় থাকবে, তত দিন টাকার বিনিময় হারে একধরনের প্রাক্কলনযোগ্যতা থাকবে। তবে বিশ্বসংকটের কারণে কোনোভাবে যদি টাকার অবমূল্যায়ন শুরু হয়, তবে সেটি জ্বালানিসংকটের পাশাপাশি অর্থনীতিতে নতুন ও বড় ধরনের জটিলতা তৈরি করবে।

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প্রথম আলো:

নির্বাচনের আগে যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের সঙ্গে বাণিজ্যচুক্তি, প্রধানমন্ত্রীর চীন সফর এবং ভারতের সঙ্গে টানাপোড়েন—এই ত্রিমুখী ভূরাজনৈতিক সমীকরণ বাংলাদেশের অর্থনীতি ও কূটনীতিতে কী ধরনের সুযোগ বা চ্যালেঞ্জ তৈরি করছে?

জ্যোতি রহমান: আশির দশকের শেষে সোভিয়েত ইউনিয়নের ভাঙনের পর এবারই সম্ভবত বিশ্বব্যবস্থায় বড় ধরনের পরিবর্তনের ক্ষেত্র প্রস্তুত হয়েছে। ফলে এই পরিস্থিতি বাংলাদেশের জন্য সম্পূর্ণ একটি নতুন অভিজ্ঞতা।

বর্তমান বিশ্ব এখন বহুমুখী বা মাল্টিপোলার বিশ্ব। এমনকি যুক্তরাষ্ট্র নিজেও এখন আর ওই ডব্লিউটিও, আইএমএফ, বিশ্বব্যাংকের মতো প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলোর মাধ্যমে বৈশ্বিক নিয়ন্ত্রণ ধরে রাখায় বিশ্বাস করে না। এখন চীন উদীয়মান ও শক্তিশালী ভূমিকা নিয়ে এগোচ্ছে। ফলে পুরোনো দৃষ্টিভঙ্গি দিয়ে এখনকার অর্থনৈতিক সুযোগ খোঁজাটা হবে বেশ অপরিপক্বতা।

বর্তমান প্রেক্ষাপটে বাংলাদেশের সামনে একটি নতুন ও স্বাধীন অবস্থান তৈরি করার সুযোগ এসেছে। কূটনীতিকে কেবল যুক্তরাষ্ট্র, চীন ও ভারতের চশমায় সীমাবদ্ধ না রেখে আমাদের বিস্তৃত বিকল্প ভাবা উচিত। বাংলাদেশ এখন উদীয়মান আঞ্চলিক শক্তিগুলোর যেমন তুরস্ক, জাপান বা দক্ষিণ-পূর্ব এশিয়ার দেশগুলোর সঙ্গে সরাসরি সম্পর্ক গড়ে তুলতে পারে।

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প্রথম আলো:

বিএনপি নির্বাচনের আগে মেগা প্রকল্প না নেওয়ার কথা জানিয়েছিল। তবে সম্প্রতি কিছু বড় প্রকল্পের নতুন আলোচনার খবর আসছে। এটাকে কীভাবে মূল্যায়ন করবেন?

জ্যোতি রহমান: সঠিক ব্যবস্থাপনা ও বাস্তবায়ন থাকলে মেগা প্রকল্প কখনোই সমস্যা নয়। বিগত হাসিনা সরকারের মূল সমস্যা ছিল জবাবদিহিহীন অতিমূল্যায়িত বাজেট এবং প্রকল্পকেন্দ্রিক দুর্নীতি। অতীতের ইতিহাস বলে, আমলাতন্ত্রের অদক্ষতার চেয়ে বরং তৎকালীন রাজনৈতিক শাসকগোষ্ঠীর ‘রেন্ট-সিকিং’ বা দুর্নীতির কারণেই ১০ টাকার প্রকল্পের বাজেট ২৫ টাকা করা হতো।

তাই আসল বিষয় হলো রাজনৈতিক সদিচ্ছা—বর্তমান সরকার যদি ১০ টাকার কাজ ১০ টাকায় করার সদিচ্ছা দেখায়, তবে এই আমলাতন্ত্রকে দিয়েই যথাযথ খরচে প্রকল্প বাস্তবায়ন সম্ভব।

প্রথম আলো:

বিদেশি বিনিয়োগকারী ও অংশীজনদের আস্থা পুনরুদ্ধারে সরকারের কী পদক্ষেপ নেওয়া দরকার বলে মনে করেন?

জ্যোতি রহমান: এই মুহূর্তে বিনিয়োগকারী ও বৈশ্বিক অংশীজনদের আস্থার অভাবই আমাদের জন্য সবচেয়ে বড় অর্থনৈতিক চ্যালেঞ্জ। বিনিয়োগকারী ও বৈশ্বিক অংশীজনদের মধ্যে বাংলাদেশ বিষয়ে একধরনের ‘সতর্ক প্রত্যাশা’ দেখা যাচ্ছে; কিন্তু বর্তমান সরকার তাদের জন্য নির্ভরযোগ্য কি না, সে বিষয়ে তারা এখনো ভরসা করতে পারছে না। এর মূল কারণ হচ্ছে সামষ্টিক অর্থনীতি ও আর্থিক খাতের নীতিমালায় স্পষ্টতার অভাব এবং পরস্পরবিরোধী অবস্থান। উদাহরণস্বরূপ, বাংলাদেশ ব্যাংক একদিকে মূল্যস্ফীতি কমাতে কঠোর মুদ্রানীতির কথা বলছে, আবার অন্যদিকে এমন সার্কুলার দিচ্ছে, যা সেই নীতির পরিপন্থী।

তাই আস্থা ফেরানোর জন্য একটি গুরুত্বপূর্ণ পদক্ষেপ হতে পারে একটি স্বাধীন ও ক্ষমতায়িত ‘ব্যাংক সংস্কার কমিশন’ গঠন করা। অন্তত পরবর্তী ১০ বছরের জন্য একটি পরিপূর্ণ সংস্কারের রোডম্যাপ পেতে সেই কমিশনের প্রতি সরকারের পূর্ণ রাজনৈতিক সমর্থন থাকতে হবে।

প্রথম আলো:

আপনাকে ধন্যবাদ।

জ্যোতি রহমান: আপনাকেও ধন্যবাদ।

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সাক্ষাৎকার নিয়েছেন সহুল আহমদ, প্রকাশ: ০২ আগস্ট ২০২৬

Further reading

• Childhood’s End

  Shafiqur Rahman, 30 May 2025

• The July Uprising and Its Aftermath

  Asif Shahan, 14 Nov 2025

• Neither Competent nor Prudent

  Niaz Alam, 15 Jan 2026

• Why Bangladesh needs rule-based trade monitoring

  Tashzid Reza, 18 Jan 2026

• বিএনপি, জামায়াত, এনসিপি, সিপিবি, ইসলামী আন্দোলন নীতিগত প্রশ্নে যা বলছে

  আলতাফ পারভেজ, 5 Feb 2026

• What Should Be the Foreign Policy Priorities of the Next Government

  Nazmus Sakib and Muhib Rahman, 8 Feb 2026

• What the Interim Government Gave Bangladesh

  Farhana Sultana, 13 Feb 2026

• Hormuz is not the only weak spot for global trade

  The Economist, 26 March 2026

• Why a 4% Cap is a Bad Idea

  Asif Khan, 21 July 2026

• Bangladesh’s FDI puzzle: Why human capital, not red tape, is the real constraint

  MQ Quibria, 14 Aug 2026

Anchored by Asif Iqbal, Asif Khan and I discussed:

• whether the Budget is really impractical or unrealistically ambitious?

• how the Budget compares with the now defunct IMF program

• the medium-term projections for revenue, expenditure, deficit, and financing

• the risks to the domestic and external financing

• why interest costs may be the most significant challenge in coming years

• why fiscal and monetary policy co-ordination is important for the economy

• how can public sector efficiency, transparency, and accountability be enhanced

In this episode, we tried to move beyond the conventional budget reviews that take place in Bangladesh, and attempted to explore the macroeconomy, government policymaking, and medium-term economic strategy from a comparative and data-driven perspective.

One wishes this time was different. After many years, we have an accountable Finance Minister placing the budget before an elected parliament. And the macroeconomic context is fundamentally challenging, with economic growth languishing below 4% (Chart 1) and inflation stubbornly around 9% (Chart 2).

Macroeconomic management is difficult under these circumstances. There aren’t any good policy options. There are, however, many bad policy choices a government can make. And a better policy discourse can help avoid worse mistakes. When it comes to our policy discourse, there is still a lot of room for improvement.

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An Ambitious Budget, in Context

Every new budget invites the same question: Is it credible, or is it wishful thinking dressed up in tables? This one was no different. One could have randomly chosen commentaries about any budget from the past quarter century, and they would probably apply to this one as well. Plus, there were a few interesting ones.

My favourites were along the lines of Amir Khasru Mahmud Chowdhury’s first budget being big on emotions and feelings -- from the heart -- but perhaps not very well grounded on cold hard numbers. You see, the Finance Minister is reputed to be a man of culture, and perhaps the cut and thrust of public finances are not for him, or something like that.

Well, no one would accuse the IMF of being a bunch of bleeding heart softies. Let us compare the FY26 budget targets against those of the now defunct IMF program. In Chart 3, the solid lines represent the budget whereas the dotted lines represent the IMF program. Compared with the budget, the recently terminated IMF program asked for more revenue and more expenditure.

Under the IMF program, primary deficit would have widened by 1.9% of GDP between 2025-26 to 2027-28, compared with 0.8% of GDP projected by the budget. And it’s important to note that the IMF figures are from January, before the Iran War.

Somehow, one doesn’t hear much commentary about the "unrealistically ambitious IMF program."

Fiscal Expansion

One way to think about the government’s fiscal policy (as opposed to budget allocation on this or that sector) is to compare a set of fiscal aggregates over the three latest budgets, and try to understand possible macroeconomic impacts.

In Charts 4 to 7, the thick lines represent the budget that was just announced, the thin line represents the budget announced by the Interim Government in June 2025, and the dotted line represents the last budget of the fallen regime.

The current government has embarked on a modest fiscal expansion, reflected by the widening of the primary deficit over the coming years (Chart 4). As is well reported, the government has an ambitious revenue target.

The fiscal expansion therefore reflects the expenditure side of the ledger, particularly the non-development expenditure, with development expenditure projected to return to what previous budgets targeted (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 7 shows that the government plans to achieve all this while keeping a lid on debt.

Is the fiscal expansion appropriate?

From a macroeconomic policy perspective, in a stagflationary environment such as the current economic conjuncture, it is possible to argue that targeted fiscal measures to cash starved households or firms may help, provided they are affordable and that monetary policy remains geared towards broader macroeconomic stabilization.

Let us consider each caveat.

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Fiscal Risks

Of course, there is a reason for our “traditional pattern.” Bangladesh’s budget history is one of revenue shortfalls met, in-year, with expenditure cuts rather than financing adjustments -- a pattern that, if repeated, would mean the ambitious figures in these charts are more aspirational ceiling than realistic floor.

Then there is the composition of spending: while the clichéd commentaries are about the wastage in public servants’ pays and procurement, it is really the transfer payments and subsidies that really need scrutiny on targeting, since untargeted transfers are exactly the kind of spending that is politically hard to cut when revenue disappoints.

Third, and most consequential, is financing. Even if the “old pattern” of shortfall-then-cut reasserts itself as it has before: this is not the 2010s anymore. Global liquidity conditions, the after-effects of the Iran war shock, and a domestic financing landscape that looks nothing like the pre-pandemic decade all mean that the safety valve Bangladesh has relied on before may not open as easily this time.

Monetary Policy isn’t Helping

Fiscal policy is easier when it is supported by well monetary policy that is anchored in a transparent and credible framework. When that is not the case, however, even well-intentioned monetary policy actions tend to backfire and complicate things in unforeseen and unintended manner.

Let us consider Bangladesh Bank’s policy stance -- the stated and the actual.

In its latest Monetary Policy Statement, published in the last week of June 2026, the central bank stated that:

Under these conditions, BB will sustain its contractionary monetary policy stance through the first half of FY27 (H1FY27) to rein in headline inflation and anchor long-term inflation expectations. Accordingly, the policy rate will remain unchanged at 10.0 percent. The Standing Lending Facility (SLF) rate will remain at 11.5 percent and the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) rate will be 7.5 percent, respectively.

Almost immediately, the central bank circumvented its own stance by a circular that capped the spread banks may charge between their lending and deposit rates.

The point here is not to argue whether the contractionary policy stance is a good idea or not -- at least it’s something sensible, but one can debate whether it is desirable. Nor is it to argue whether the spread cap is a good idea -- it is not, market interventions like that are rarely good ideas.

Rather, the point is much more fundamental, and far more serious. The point is that the monetary policy lacks credibility.

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Credibility is the Constraint

The Monetary Policy Statement was announced in the last week of June, and was almost immediately hemmed in by the circular announcing the spread cap -- a sequencing that signals incoherence between the central bank’s stated stance and the tools to enforce it.

And that incoherence matters more than whether monetary policy should be expansionary or contractionary. Macroeconomic policy cannot be effective in supporting growth or curbing inflation unless it is credible.

The central bank could have made an intellectually defensible argument that tight monetary policy was bringing inflation down, the recent reversal was because of extra-monetary factors, and monetary policy is going to switch to support growth going forward, presaging a modest cut in policy rate. But the central bank chose a different route.

Bangladesh Bank needs to establish policy credibility. It needs to return to textbook macroeconomics and avoid gimmicky policy interventions that, however well-intentioned they may be, will only take us down a road to economic perdition.

Without credible monetary policy, macroeconomic stability is put at risk. And without macroeconomic stability, the government’s broader economic visions have no realistic path to being realized.

First published in the Weekly Counterpoint on 21 July. Since then, latest national accounts show that economic growth has slowed to 2.2 percent in the year to March 2026, while Bangladesh Bank has cut policy rate by 50 basis points.

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Further reading

• Let’s Get Real on Taxes

  Mohammed A Rab, 13 July 2026

• What Bangladesh Bank’s rate cut really signals

Asif Khan, 3 Aug 2026

We discussed: the macroeconomic backdrop to the MPS; what the central bank is trying to achieve; likely consequence of the current monetary stance; links between interest rate, economic growth and inflation; likely impact of the 4 percentage points spread cap between lending and deposit rates; winners and losers of the current policy stance; impacts on the SMEs, banks, and private sector credit; alternative policy options for the Bangladesh Bank; and the critical importance of policy credibility and monetary policy transmission mechanisms.

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Since the recording of this episode, Bangladesh Bank has cut the policy rate by 50 basis points and will move to quarterly MPS.

Further reading

• The Iran war is roiling commodities far beyond oil

The Economist, 16 March 2026

• The tumbling rupee could be a big problem for Narendra Modi

The Economist, 5 April 2026

• Warsh would be wise to listen to Fed dissenters

Lael Brainard, 7 May 2026

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Further reading

• Pelé went from poverty to football superstardom

The Economist, 30 Dec 2022

• Football as freedom: From colonial Bengal to Bangladesh

Sahidul Hasan and Md. Hasaibur Rahman, 17 July 2026

From the nation's founding and constitutional vision to Hamilton's influence on politics, economics, and state-building, the conversation reflects on how America's founding debates continue to resonate 250 years later.

Ehteshamul Haque joined me on 10 July in a thought-provoking discussion on history, nation-building, and the enduring power of ideas.

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Further reading

• Why slave-owners never willingly emancipated their slaves?

  Branko Milanovic, 15 Aug 2023

• The Weaponization of History

  MK Aaref, 1 Jun 2025

• Decoding the DC-Dhaka Dance

  Michael Kugelman, 9 Nov 2025

• The decline and fall of the Roman currency empire

  The Economist, 26 March 2026

• It’s been centuries since Haiti’s revolution. It’s still paying for it.

Lurent Dubois, 28 Apr 2026

• How Americans see their country’s past, present and future

The Economist, 29 June 2026

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Further reading

• Islington Corinthians FC: The amateur football club that toured the world

  Dhrubo Alam, 15 July 2018

• Football and nationalisms in Bengal

  Mirza Hassan, 22 July 2018

• Own-goal football

  The Generalist Academy, 7 Jun 2022

• Pelé, king of the beautiful game

  The Economist, 29 Dec 2022

• We need a plan to revive Canary Wharf

  Stuart Lipton, 3 Oct 2024

• Can countries grow richer by exporting people, not goods?

  The Economist, 30 April 2026

• Counterpoint with Zafar Sobhan and Thomas Dooley, 22 June 2026

• The forgotten history of football in Bangladesh

  Dhrubo Alam, 3 July 2026

• How Mohammedan Sporting Club shaped Muslim identity in colonial Bengal

  Ystiaque Ahmed, 8 July 2026

• When we win

  Ed West, 10 July 2026

This time they arrived at a place where, on every side, there were small and large hills of limestone and granite, and on the flank of every hill were caves of various shapes and sizes. The natural scenery of the place was somewhat different from the usual look of the Richtersveld. Here the forest was not as dense, but there were very large trees all around, and hills and caves everywhere.

They pitched their tent atop a granite hill shaped like a high mound. Ever since arriving here, Shankar had felt that the place was not good. Some kind of unease, some sense of impending danger stirred in his mind — something he could neither fully understand himself nor properly explain to Alvarez.

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One day Alvarez said — It’s all a mirage, Shankar. We’re still wandering in the same forest. Today I saw that tree again, the one with DA carved on it. Yet you remember, we’ve kept as far west as possible for the last fifteen days now. How can we have come back to that same tree?

Shankar said — Then what’s to be done now?

There is one way. Tonight I’ll climb to the top of a tall tree and find our direction by the stars. You stay in the tent.

This was one thing Shankar couldn’t understand. If they were moving in a circle, how had they come to this land of hillocks and caves? It seemed they had never come this way before. Alvarez answered that after seeing his name carved on the tree, he had never tried going east of it again. If they had gone just two miles east, they would have reached this very spot.

That night Shankar sat alone in the tent reading Bankimchandra’s Rajsingha. It was the only Bangla book he had brought with him from home, and even though he had read it many times, he read it again whenever he found the time.

How far away was India — and within it, Chittor, Mewar, the conflict of Mughals and Rajputs! Sitting in the midst of this alien continent’s vast unchartered forest, it all seemed almost unreal.

Suddenly, outside, there seemed to be the sound of footsteps.

At first Shankar thought Alvarez was probably coming down from the tree and returning — but the next moment he realized this was not the natural sound of a human’s footsteps; it sounded more like someone dragging their feet along the ground, limping, as if the feet were wrapped in sacks. Alvarez’s Winchester repeater was close at hand, and Shankar picked it up, aiming it toward the tent’s entrance. Outside, the footfall paused once — then came again, moving from the tent’s south side to the left. Then came the sound of some large creature’s heavy, repeated breathing — exactly as had happened one night while crossing the mountains, exactly like that. Shankar, gripped by a moment of fear, lost his composure and fired the rifle. Once... twice—

Almost immediately, about two minutes later, from the top of a distant tree came an answering sound — two revolver shots. Alvarez had thought some danger had come upon Shankar; otherwise why would he fire a gun needlessly at night? He was probably climbing down in haste.

Meanwhile, the gunfire from all directions seemed to have frightened the creature away, and there was no more sound of it. Shankar lit his torch and came out of the tent, thinking he would signal Alvarez not to come down from the tree — when, at that very moment, from somewhere in the forest, two more pistol shots rang out suddenly, along with a faint scream.

Shankar ran toward the sound of the pistol shots. A little way off, he saw Alvarez lying beneath a large tree in the forest. Seeing him in the torchlight, Shankar shuddered in fear and horror — his whole body was covered in blood, his head bent at an unnatural angle to the rest of his body; his jacket was torn to shreds.

Shankar hurried to his side and sat down, lifting Alvarez’s head into his own lap. He called out — Alvarez! Alvarez!

There was no response from Alvarez. His lips seemed to move once, as if trying to say something; he was staring at Shankar, and yet there seemed to be no sight in his eyes — or rather, a strange, indifferent, distant gaze.

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Shankar carried him back to the tent. He poured water on his face, and then, trying to remove his jacket, saw that some of the flesh below the neck, toward the shoulder, had been torn away by something. The whole of his back was in the same state. Some extraordinarily powerful creature had torn the back to shreds with sharp claws or fangs.

Nearby, in the soft earth, were the footprints of some creature —

Only three toes on that foot were imprinted.

The whole night passed like this — Alvarez showed no response, no consciousness. With the coming of morning, his lucidity suddenly seemed to return. He looked at Shankar with a gaze of astonishment and non-recognition, as though he had never seen Shankar before. Then he closed his eyes again. Sometime after noon, he most likely began muttering something in his own native tongue — Shankar could not understand a single word of it. Closer to the evening, he suddenly turned to look at Shankar. The instant he looked, Shankar felt that Alvarez had recognized him. This time he spoke in English — Shankar! Still sitting there? Pack up the tent — let’s go —

Then, in the manner of someone not in his right mind, he raised his hand in an aimless gesture and said — The king’s treasure lies hidden in the caves of this mountain — you cannot see it, I can see it. Come, let’s go — pack up the tent — don’t delay.

These were Alvarez’s last words.

After that, Shankar sat still and silent for a long time. The evening came, and little by little the whole forest sank into deep darkness.

Then Shankar started to come out of his daze. He got up quickly and first lit a fire, then loaded both rifles with cartridges, and, aiming the gun barrels toward the tent’s entrance, sat down on a mat beside Alvarez’s dead body.

Then that night, once again, the rain came pouring again. Water seeped through the tent’s cloth and soaked everything inside. But by then Shankar had become completely indifferent to his surroundings. In these past few months, he had truly come to love Alvarez — his fearlessness, his unshakeable resolve, his extraordinary capacity for hard work, his courage — all of it had captivated Shankar. He had loved Alvarez like his own father. And Alvarez, too, had looked upon him with similar affection.

But more than all of this, what struck Shankar most was that Alvarez had, in the end, died at the hands of that same unknown creature — exactly like Jim Carter.

As the night deepened, his mind gradually filled with fear. Before him lay a terrible, strange messenger of death — a deeply mysterious existence. When it would come, when it would leave, no one could say. Without letting sleep overtake him, Shankar stayed awake through sheer force of will, through the whole night.

Oh, what a terrible night that was! As long as he lived, he would never forget that night. Tree after tree, branch after branch, the sound of rain falling in a thousand streams, and the ceaseless roar of the storm, drowned out every other sound of the nocturnal forest. Atop the hill, great trees came crashing down with a groaning crack. On such a dreadful night, he was alone in this terrible forest! The dark tree trunks looked like phantoms; even in that heavy rain, swarms of fireflies still glowed. Before him lay his friend’s dead body. He could not afford to give in to fear. He had to summon courage in his heart, or else fear alone would kill him. In his desperate effort to gather courage, he fixed his attention on the two rifles. One was a Winchester, the other a Mannlicher — both magazines full of cartridges. There was no creature with a body that could withstand these two powerful, terrifying weapons and enter the tent unharmed tonight.

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Fear and danger make people brave. Shankar kept watch, alert, the whole night. The next morning, he buried Alvarez’s body beneath a large tree, and bound two tree branches together with sturdy vine into the shape of a cross, planting it atop the grave.

Among Alvarez’s papers was a diploma in his name from the School of Mines at Oporto. He had passed his final examination with honors. From the way he sometimes spoke, Shankar had often suspected that he was no mere fool, fortune-hunter, or vagabond.

Far from any human settlement, in this uninhabited, deep forest, weary Alvarez’s search for treasure had come to an end. Men like him were not truly greedy for wealth — wandering from place to place, intoxicated by danger, was the greatest joy of their lives; even Kubera’s treasure would not have kept him tied down in one place forever.

What a fitting grave for a wanderer. The forest’s shadows will fall upon the grave. Lions, gorillas, hyenas will keep their watchful vigils, and above them all, towering over everything, the vast Richtersveld mountain range will stand nearby, its head raised into the clouds, keeping eternal, upright guard through the ages.

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This is the tenth chapter of Shankar’s adventure that I started recounting a few years ago. I planned to post one chapter for each Sunday I was at the continent, but had to suspend because of more pressing matters. Now that politics has receded from the front of our mind, time to go back to the yarn.

In the first chapter, we learn about Shankar. In the second chapter, he encounters a man-eating lion in East Africa. In the third, he escapes death from a snake bite. In the fourth, he saves an old man’s life. In the fifth we hear about Alvarez’s adventures. In the sixth, Shankar and Alvarez start their journey. In the seveth, Alvarez talks about the strange beasts that might still be undiscovered. In the eighth, they are lost in the unmapped jungles of Africa. In the ninth, they witness a volcano.

Further reading

• Chimpanzee and Human Risk Preferences Show Key Similarities

Lou M Haux et al, 3 Jan 2023

• The Best African Novels

recommended by Blessing Musariri

• The Best Comics on African History

recommended by Trevor Getz, 29 Jul 2023

• Jaws turns 50: reading Peter Benchley’s novel, you barely mind if its self‑loathing characters are eaten by a ‘genius’ shark

Ari Mattes, 3 Jan 2024

• The Best Cli-Fi Books

  recommended by Dan Bloom, 5 May 2024

• Chimpanzees stayed in an ‘invisible cage’ after zoo enclosure was enlarged – South African study

Luke Mangaliso Duncan, 21 Mar 2024

• Science Fiction Classics

recommended by Adam Roberts, 13 Jul 2025

• Why Japan is much better than Hollywood at making Godzilla movies

Shadique Mahbub Islam, 3 May 2024

• Million-year-old skull rewrites human evolution, scientists claim

Pallab Ghosh, 25 Sep 2025

• ‘You must not give up’: the last testament of Jane Goodall

Joseph Akel, 2 Oct 2025

• The Sci-Fi Thriller Action Epic That Ended An Iconic Actor’s Career

Jeffery Rapaport, 4 Jan 2026

• How to save the Safari

The Economist, 3 May 2026

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We examine Nigeria's ongoing economic and governance challenges and ask what lessons Bangladesh, and others, can draw from them.

From fiscal pressures and currency instability to energy dependence, inflation, and the management of natural resources, the discussion explores how policy choices can shape a country's long-term trajectory. Using Nigeria as a case study, the conversation considers the risks of economic mismanagement, the challenges of reform, and the importance of building resilient institutions.

As Bangladesh navigates its own economic and development challenges, this episode offers a timely reflection on the warning signs policymakers should heed—and the opportunities they should seize.

Further reading (and listening)

• A young person’s guide to escaping Nigeria

  Ore Ogunbiyi, 24 Feb 2023

• On why I remain bullish on Nigeria

  Ken Opalo, 16 March 2023

• Nigeria’s Hollow Democracy

  Chimamanda Adichie, 6 April 2023

• Nigeria’s currency crisis is decades in the making

The Economist, 7 March 2024

• Can better urbanization policies unlock faster economic growth and development in Nigeria?

  Ken Opalo, 23 Sep 2024

• From chalkboards to chatbots: Transforming learning in Nigeria, one prompt at a time

  Martín E. De Simone et al, 9 Jan 2025

• Nigeria’s economy may be back from the brink

  The Economist, 29 Jan 2026

• Is the staple meal in Nigeria and Ghana becoming a luxury?

  The Economist, 18 June 2026

These are, almost without exception, the wrong conversations to be having.

Economic policies should not be judged on a single number. They should be grounded within a framework -- a set of interlocking institutions, instruments, and commitments that, when they work together, translate a government’s ambitions into actual outcomes for real people.

Understanding that framework is what separates serious economic analysis from noise. And right now, Bangladesh needs more of the former.

Bangladesh economy is currently stuck in a rut. Three major economic policy statements are expected in the coming weeks. These statements will tell us how the government expects to shift the country out of current economic malaise.

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From Stagflation to Sustainable Acceleration

The economy has been hit by a series of supply side shocks since the beginning of this decade, which were mostly mishandled by the Hasina regime. Political uncertainty and transitional difficulties -- to put things charitably -- have compounded the problem since the Long July.

The result is that the economy is growing at an anaemic pace of sub-4%, while inflation remains sticky at nearly 9%. These stagflationary conditions are expected to persist into the next fiscal year, as shown in Charts 1 and 2.

More importantly, according to the IMF analysis, the past several years have scarred the economy so much that only a slow and gruelling recovery is likely. Consequently, they forecast economic growth to recover to barely a 6% pace in 2031 (Chart 3).

Even that, of course, will require a strong recovery in private investment. If this investment recovery is not matched by a similarly strong recovery in household savings, then the current account will swing into deficit, which is exactly what the IMF forecasts (Chart 4).

That is, the macroeconomic tasks are two-fold: In the near-term, come out of stagflation; and in the medium-term, accelerate the recovery without blowing out the current account deficit.

It is against that background the government is going to be announcing a set of economic statements in the coming days and weeks.

Tomorrow (June 11), the Finance Minister will be presenting the Budget in the Parliament. The Bangladesh Bank will be releasing the Monetary Policy Statement by the end of the month. And the Five-Year Strategic Framework for Reform and Development will be released in early July.

A Strategic Framework

International best practice would suggest that macroeconomic policies in the next few years be grounded in the Five-Year Strategic Framework. The Framework should provide a clear outline of the government’s aspirations for the economy.

Unlike traditional five-year plans, however, the Framework should have a strong focus on how to realise these aspirations, and link them to macroeconomic (and indeed, microeconomic and sectoral) policies.

Further, the Strategic Framework should also have a strong emphasis on monitoring, evaluation, learning and risk management.

For example, if the Framework aspires to achieve faster economic growth by the end of the decade than the IMF’s forecasts, then presumably it would involve either more investment or stronger productivity boost from the same investment. If the former, then what will happen to the current account?

If the latter, then what will drive it? Not only should the Framework have a coherent narrative around these, but the specific policy implications should also be spelt out.

The Strategy should have built in scenario contingencies for an evolving economy.

Specifically, the Strategic Framework should give the Bangladesh Bank a clear task for monetary policy, while grounding the medium-term fiscal and budgetary framework that will (have) be(en) announced on June 11.

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The Monetary Trilemma

The Monetary Policy Statement is expected later this month, and will tell us how the central bank is reading the economy. Conceptually, central banking operates under a fundamental constraint known as the impossible trinity: A country cannot simultaneously maintain free capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate, and independent monetary policy.

It can only pick two of the three. Bangladesh Bank, like any central bank, must operate within this reality.

In practice, Bangladesh Bank right now faces a conundrum. Interest rate has been high, aggregate demand is weak, and yet inflation (particularly non-food inflation) persists.

Meanwhile, the currency is facing appreciation pressures which the central bank is managing by mopping up US dollars from the market and building a reserve a buffer. Is this the right policy mix?

A war chest of reserves will be important to manage a future current account deficit (such as what the IMF forecasts, for example). But an appreciating taka right now might help with inflation. Is that not a more important priority?

A significantly appreciating taka against dollar is not something we have a living memory of --what might the confidence effect of that be on the economy? We simply don’t know. But we do know that many exporters will not like it. The Monetary Policy Statement should give us an idea about how the central bank is weighing up these issues.

The Fiscal Trilemma

On the fiscal side, governments often face their own three-way bind. Bangladesh, like many developing economies, simultaneously faces higher spending requirements, pressure to contain public debt at sustainable levels, and a genuine difficulty in raising tax revenues. The Finance Minister cannot fully satisfy all three at once.

This is not a counsel of despair. It is an argument for honesty. A government that acknowledges its fiscal trilemma can make deliberate choices and explain them. A government that pretends the constraint doesn’t exist will eventually be confronted by it anyway -- usually not at a moment of its own choosing.

Perhaps the most important feature of economic governance is whether the government’s stated vision actually connects to how it raises and spends money.

The logic is straightforward. The Strategic Framework should set the political vision -- a trillion-dollar economy by 2035, investment-led growth, human welfare, regional development. From that vision should flow a medium-term fiscal and budget framework: multi-year macroeconomic forecasts, fiscal targets, expenditure ceilings, and spending allocations. From that framework should flow the annual development program and departmental budget allocations. And undergirding all of it should be robust monitoring and implementation mechanisms.

This is a cascade from political decisions to professional implementation. When it works, budget line items reflect genuine national priorities. When it doesn’t -- when the annual budget bears little relationship to the medium-term framework, or when the medium-term framework bears little relationship to the strategic plan -- the numbers become, at best, aspirational fiction.

How to Judge the Plans?

So, how should we judge the coming economic statements?

Here is a short guide.

Don’t obsess over forecasts. Macroeconomic forecasts are educated guesses. Treating them as the main event is a distraction. Instead, look at the narrative and the details. Is the story coherent?

If the assumptions underlying a projection come true, will the promised results actually follow? Are the elasticities and ratios used to produce these results transparent and evidence-based, or are they black boxes?

Ask whether the plans are consistent with each other. If the strategic framework promises investment-led growth, is that reflected in the medium-term budget framework? Is the Annual Development Program actually funded to deliver the priorities the framework names? Is monetary policy consistent with the government’s fiscal stance, or are the two working at cross-purposes?

Ask what the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are. What happens when targets are missed? Is there a risk management framework? Who is accountable, and to whom?

And note the big factor that should be present (and could well be missing) in all these statements --the crisis engulfing the banking sector.

The quality of Bangladesh’s economic future will be determined not by any single budget figure, but by whether the institutions connecting vision to implementation are built and maintained with the seriousness they deserve. That is the conversation worth having.

Hold the government to account for the answers to these questions. But hold the pundits to account too. Commentary that ignores institutional coherence in favour of number-chasing is not analysis -- it is theatre.

Speaking of theatre, as a suave Anglophile patron of the creative economy, surely the Finance Minister is familiar with many adventures where the hero has to shift the gear and manage the brake-clutch-accelerator footwork while the Aston Martin swerves in a foggy, narrow mountainside road while dangers lurk at every corner. Those stories always end happily for the hero.

May that be the case for the Finance Minister as well.

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Further reading

• অভিজাত প্রশাসন ক্যাডারকে জনবান্ধব ও পেশাদার করতে পারবে কি বিএনপি?

  শেখ তৌফিকুর রহমান, 15 Feb 2025

• Bangladesh’s Next Budget

  Mohammed A Rab, 5 May 2025

• An Open Letter to the Hon’ble Foreign Minister

  Zakir Kibria, 11 May 2026

• পদ্মা (গঙ্গা) ব্যারাজ কি সমস্যার সমাধান দেবে

  নজরুল ইসলাম, 19 May 2026

• How Dhaka’s Gig Workers are Getting Squeezed

Suborna Akther Laboni & Jahid Hossain, 19 May 2026

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Further reading

• A Budget for Bangladesh in Fragile Times

• Suvojit Chattopadhyay, 17 April 2026

• Bangladesh’s Next Budget

  Mohammad A Rab, 5 May 2026

• Can Bangladesh Build a People-Centric Bureaucracy?

• HM Nazmul Alam, 5 May 2026

• The beauty of tautologies

Scott Sumner, 6 May 2026

• Responding to the Energy and Food Price Shock: Getting the Policy Details Right

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Borja Gracia, Delphine Prady, Rodrigo Valdés

May 20, 2026

Drawing on classic political thrillers, African revolutionary history, and Bangladesh's own turbulent past, the conversation examines how coups, assassinations, and struggles for power have inspired some of the most compelling works of fiction. From Frederick Forsyth's tales of mercenaries and regime change to narratives surrounding Thomas Sankara and the dramatic events following the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, the discussion reveals how history can often be stranger—and more gripping—than fiction.

The episode also reflects on the importance of revisiting Bangladesh's formative years through both literature and serious scholarship. As new political realities open space for debate, how should we engage with complex historical figures and contested national narratives? And what can novels and thrillers teach us about the forces that shape nations?

Ehteshamul Haque join me in a wide-ranging conversation on political fiction, historical memory, coups, revolution, and the stories we tell about power.

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During the nearly two decades that we have known each other, Ehtesham and I often talked about the books to read and movies to watch when ‘this was all over’. Well, now that Bangladesh has a democratically elected parliament, perhaps the time has come to redeem our pledge, perhaps not fully or in whole measure, nor even substantially — far too many things to read and watch — but at least somewhat, through the Cultural Bourgeoisie podcast where we discuss and dissect popular culture from home and abroad, contemporary and from times of yore.

Further reading

• It feels like no one cares about Sudan

  Mohamed Bashir, 18 Nov 2024

• DR Congo’s failed gamble on Romanian mercenaries

  DR Wafula, 31 Jan 2025

• Friends with benefits? The country still in thrall to the Wagner Group

  Tom Gardner, 11 Apr 2025

• Frederick Forsyth’s bestsellers drew on his work as a spy

  The Economist, 11 Jun 2025

• The mercenary business is on the brink of another boom

  The Economist, 21 Oct 2025

Economists are infamous for their physics envy, whereby they try to model social phenomena involving human interactions with precise mathematical rigour. Scholars of politics or sociology, in turn, are said to suffer from economics envy in their desire to paint a grand narrative and prognosticate.

Of course, it is very important for commentators and analysts to step back from the daily din every now and then, and to take a big picture view of the political landscape.

Well into the fourth month of the fourth BNP government is a good time to take such a big picture stock. While resisting the temptations to make any grand statement, such a big picture view suggests that history may well beckon for the Prime Minister.

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The Politics of Synthesis OG

That the BNP was going to win the election of February 12 was perhaps never really in serious doubt. Whether the actual result -- seemingly a record for the party in terms of seats won, and arguably a record for any party in a free and fair election -- was what might have been expected or an underperformance -- the party did lose a large number of urban seats -- in a relatively low turnout election ought to be further debated and analysed.

Also, up for inclusion in the ‘should be further analysed’ file are the roles of minority and formerly Awami League voters -- how many of them switched to BNP, and how much did they matter?

Such analysis notwithstanding, in a very big picture way, BNP’s electoral dominance might be explained by the fact that it sits well within the ‘invisible triangle of Bangladeshi politics’ posited by Faham Abdus Salam -- that no political party in Bangladesh is electorally viable if it can be portrayed as against the Liberation War, or subservient to Indian hegemony, or is insensitive to Muslim values. It is very difficult to convincingly paint BNP as an anti-1971 or a pro-Indian or an anti-Muslim party.

Indeed, Ziaur Rahman’s articulation of Bangladeshi nationalism alluded to these very elements, and more, when he used the terms ‘absorption power’ and ‘elbow room’ to accommodate multiple threads of our identity.

Zia’s politics of synthesis -- a term that was very much in wide circulation in his time, but seems to have fallen out of fashion since -- envisaged a civic nationalism that subsumes cultural identities and identity politics.

Further, being propelled into power through the macabre maelstrom that shook the very fabric of the society in the early 1970s Bangladesh (see the seminal work of Professor Naomi Hossain, for example), Zia wanted politics to be about solving problems than identity and culture. Whether it is pragmatic developmentalism in economic policy, cautious (and ultimately failed) attempt at military withdrawal from politics, or a pro-active foreign policy -- Zia’s politics of synthesis favoured problem solving and experimentation over ideology and rhetoric.

It is not a surprise that the Ershad regime of the 1980s, Sheikh Hasina trying to revamp the Awami League in the 1990s, the 1/11 regime of the 2000s, and the peddlers of the so-called “notun bondobosto” after the July uprising have all tried to repackage a variation of the same synthesis.

As the heir to the original politics of synthesis, one might expect BNP to enjoy a degree of electoral advantage. But such advantage can easily disappear during an electoral cycle, particularly in the face of an anti-incumbency wave. And that is exactly what happened in 2008. That election might not have been as free and fair as the three preceding it -- in the sense that playing field under the 1/11 regime was definitely not level -- but there is also no denying that BNP was suffering from a massive anti-incumbency backlash which would have seen them suffer a heavy defeat.

The Path Chosen

In the wake of that December 2008 election debacle, against the backdrop of changing relationship with India, rising income inequality and social dislocation, emergence of political Islam, and global geopolitical developments, the BNP found itself in a distinct fork in the road. As I wrote in Forum in January 2009, the party faced two plausible paths -- populist and liberal nationalisms.

The standard bearer for the former strand might have been Mahmudur Rahman. Consider his credentials as of the early 2010s -- a product of the country’s two most prestigious educational institutions, top-most salaried corporate executive, a minister-ranked technocrat in the last BNP government, and then a firebrand editor against the 1/11 regime. All of that before he was jailed by the Hasina regime for being the first one to report about Sajeeb Wajed’s corruption.

Upon being released from jail, in a very theatrical manner, Mr M Rahman raised his fist and shouted Allahu Akbar, not Bangladesh Zindabad. The symbolism was pointed. This was the path of populist nationalism.

The logic of dynastic politics meant that it was always going to be a different Mr Rahman -- one exiled in London under a cloud of allegations and terrible image problems at that time -- who would be the front runner for BNP leadership after Begum Khaleda Zia. And Tarique Rahman might also have easily chosen the populist path. But crucially, he didn’t.

Under his leadership, and supported by the Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and other senior leaders, BNP has consciously, deliberately rejected populist nationalism. Instead, painstakingly, and perhaps not-very-convincingly, but decisively, the party has, over the past decade, been trying its hand at liberal nationalism -- one that emphasises positive personal images of its iconic leaders and candidates, political tranquillity and opposition in parliament, courts, and media rather than streets, reducing inequality through growth that generates employment, an open arms foreign and trade policy that avoids being entangled with other people’s conflicts, and a social policy that is pluralist if not secular (that’s how I described it in 2009).

That is, BNP’s apparent repositioning in Bangladeshi politics as seemingly the less stridently anti-Indian party, or its staunch defence of the ethos and memories of the Liberation War, its evocation of Rabindranath Tagore as a liberal icon just as Hindutva wins a thumping victory across the border, or its manifold development programs are not just election season opportunistic gimmicks.

These represent conscious decisions by the party leadership to return to the politics of synthesis upon which the party was founded back in the 1970s. Populism may be the way of the future in many other parts of the world, but BNP leadership has consciously eschewed populist politics at a meta level.

Many typical analyses of our current political conjuncture fail to grasp this major factor.

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The Anti-Populist

Another factor that is often missed by many political analysts is the very persona of the current prime minister that can best be described as a very model of a modern anti-populist politician. Indeed, I myself made a very wrong call by missing this over a decade ago.

Our political tradition has always favoured larger than life figures and cults of personalities who relied heavily on the gift of the gab. AK Fazlul Huq, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were populist demagogues par excellence. HS Suhrawardy, Fazlul Quader Chowdhury, Moudud Ahmed and many others were not exactly populist figures, but were excellent parliamentary orators and rhetoricians.

Lacking any of these characteristics, Sheikh Hasina built an elaborate cult of personality around her father, and relied on heavily ritualistic (and by the end of her despotic rule, vulgar) performance of victimhood.

The Prime Minister’s parents were exceptions. But his father was a decorated war hero who literally walked the length of the country upon assuming the responsibility of government, and his mother personified resistance, courage and dignity.

Given that background, I urged in January 2015 (published in the Dhaka Tribune, just before he was effectively banned from the media), as it became clear that the unelected Hasina regime was set to continue in power, that Tarique Rahman should return to Bangladesh and follow the path of every major politician before him in our history.

Implicitly, I was urging him to go down the path of building his own cult of personality.

In the event, he had done nothing of the sort. Instead, he had chosen to communicate directly with his party rank and file during his years in exile, while trusting the party senior leaders in Dhaka to run the daily activities.

In doing so, of course, Tarique Rahman was physically absent from the momentous events of the Long July. Uncomfortable parallels with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1971 were made -- publicly by Mahmudur Rahman in fact in one of Tarique Rahman’s first meetings in Dhaka. And Mr T Rahman responded in a very calm, collected, and ultimately persuasive manner that while it was true that he was absent physically, it is probably not the case that he was completely out-of-touch, and nonetheless, he welcomed engagement with the full spectrum of politics and beyond.

His speeches are at best anodyne if not soporific. Rather, in public meetings as well as in official or closer format ones, he prefers to listen closely and carefully. He has shown an ability to connect with ordinary citizens at an individual level. He eschews playing the victim, a sharp contrast with the fallen despot. He does not surround himself with elaborate security protocol. In fact, his penchant for holding his wife’s hand in public, catching a movie with his adult daughter, or fun time with the family cat, showcases an everyman persona that we have not seen among any of our leaders.

Slowly and steadily, Tarique Rahman -- indeed, note the very name, and deliberate absence of his father’s first name-- is establishing himself as his own man, not his parent’s son. Not the dashing war hero in ray ban aviator or debonair suits, nor glamourous like his mother, but in simple monochromatic shirt or polo, often untucked, without a tie, a simple prescription pair of glasses -- he could be the middle-class professional uncle next door. It’s not easy growing up under the shadows of great parents, and the image contrast alone can sometimes be quite Shakespearean in the latent family drama!

After the trauma of the Hasina years and the turbulence of July and aftermath, Tarique Rahman maybe the anti-populist the country needed.

In an era of populist demagogues, in a country where such figures always thrived, Tarique Rahman is very much against the mould. If he is successful in government, he may well become a case study on how to beat the populist wave elsewhere.

The Song Remains the Same

Of course, it will be years before we can pass a judgment on whether the Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has succeeded or failed. And what does being successful even mean?

The government has inherited an economic mess. Is an economic recovery the metric of success? Or is avoiding a catastrophe sufficient? Sheikh Hasina and other perpetrators of the previous regime’s manifold crimes remain at large. Will a failure to punish them be considered a failure? Or a general improvement in the law and order be success enough? What if the law and order situation improves, but is accomplished through draconian means like extrajudicial killings?

Bangladesh does not face the existential crises that Ziaur Rahman inherited in November 1975. But Tarique Rahman is grappling with the same mundane governance problems that his father was facing when he visited Chittagong that fateful day 45 years ago last week.

Ironically, the late president was visiting the port city to mediate between powerful factions of his own party. And it is BNP’s factions that may give us a clue about how the government of Tarique Rahman will evolve over the coming years.

We have already noted that as a party, BNP has decided at a very high level that it will eschew populist politics and have embraced liberal nationalism. In practice, and at grassroots level, BNP is perhaps better understood through a different prism. Using the work of Professor Mushtaq Khan, one might think of BNP as a transactional party that caters to the constituency through patron-client relationship.

One way to judge the government, and arguably this is how the voters will ultimately judge it, will be its ability to deliver upon these patron-client promises. And manifold and complex factions complicate the picture at local level.

There are also philosophical differences at the very highest level of party leadership that create a dialectic tension that needs to be synthesized by the Prime Minister. There are those for whom the path to development is primarily through deregulation and unleashing of entrepreneurship, and government’s redistributive impulses might be a distraction at this moment.

And there might be those for whom the human welfare and redistribution is the very essence of politics. Then there are those who are far more pragmatic, want a stronger bureaucracy, and would prefer to reach accommodations with oligarchs. What will the synthesis of these thesis and antithesis look like?

And finally, there are the pillars of the establishment that have been the de facto bastions of power since the modern Bangladesh was effectively established by the Zia regime -- civil-military bureaucracy, the business sector, and the international partners. In the 1990s democratic era, the establishment was agnostic between the two main parties and people voted freely. In the 2010s, the establishment swung heavily behind the Hasina regime and elections stopped happening.

How will the coming decade be?

This Time is Different

In one simple way, Tarique Rahman stands to be more successful than either of his parents. Neither of them could successfully, peacefully, finish their term and hand over power to the next government. Ziaur Rahman was gunned down by rogue officers. Khaleda Zia faced an implacable foe who made good on her promise of not allowing the former prime minister a moment of peace.

Well, our army is not the rag tag force where every other major dreamt of emulating Zia himself by going on radio to make another iconic speech. And contrary to the more excitable commentators, the political constellation aligns for a completion for parliamentary term because no one has any incentive to hit the streets any sooner.

Jamaat-e-Islami, the official opposition, is grappling with far too many inexperienced MPs, and an existential question about how to transition from a Leninist organisation to a mass political party. At the very least, these first time Jamaat MPs want to consolidate their grip over the local electorate over the full five-year term. They have no reason to seek an early election.

Biding its time to build its strength might be the best strategy for the NCP as well, which would mean recruiting local politicians, contesting local elections, and building parliamentary profiles of its young leaders, while waiting for the anti-incumbency to take its toll.

Meanwhile, there is no incentive for the government to allow the Awami League to return to politics under its old leadership. This is not to say that Awami leaning political figures wouldn’t make statements here and there, nor to say that local politicians might not run as independents or for any of the existing or new parties. But the relevant point is, Awami League as a political force has long ceased to matter.

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The Centre Will (probably) Hold

That is, considering all the various factors, it is more than likely that the Prime Minister will see out a rather peaceful few years to the end of the decade. If he takes the country to a free and fair election, he will already have achieved more than his illustrious parents.

To be sure, the country will face a surfeit of shocks from abroad -- economic and geopolitical. And the Prime Minister’s ability to synthesize various philosophical strands and clientelist factions within the party remains to be seen. Perhaps these things will become too hard to manage. Perhaps the Prime Minister will start learning bad habits of his predecessors, with a new cult gradually emerging, and new oligarchs making new sweetheart deals that prove far too costly for the public.

If the opposition parties can resolve their problems and put together a slate of candidates and their own anti-populist everyman, they may win on an anti-incumbency wave in 2031.

But none of that is a certainty. No one expected much from Tarique Rahman, so he is already ahead of the curve. Perhaps a plodding economic recovery and a general improvement in the law and order situation without gross human rights abuse will see the humane, empathetic Prime Minister re-elected in a free and fair election.

Time will tell.

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First published at the weekly Counterpoint.

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Further reading

• Banning the opposition is no way to revive Bangladesh’s democracy

The Economist, 26 June 2025

• বিএনপি-জামায়াতের চার যুগের বন্ধুত্বের কী হলো

  সালেহ উদ্দিন আহমদ, 19 Sep 2025

• The Long Road Home : Tarique Rahman Returns

  Ashraf Ud Doula, 22 Dec 2025

• Why the Nation Owes Tarique

  Rumi Ahmed, 26 Dec 2025

• The rebranding of Islamist politics in Bangladesh

  Shakeel Anwar, 30 Jan 2026

• Bangladesh’s drift to the right before its historic election

  Cyrus Nanji, 10 Feb 2026

• After 17 years in exile, dynastic heir looks to lead Bangladesh

  Andres Schipani, 11 Feb 2026

• নির্বাচনে গণতন্ত্র ফিরুক, ‘অনুদার গণতন্ত্র’ নয়

  জাহেদ উর রহমান, 12 Feb 2026

• What Bangladesh must learn about political transitions

  Sarzah Yeasmin, 12 Feb 2026

• জামায়াত সমর্থনে জোয়ার বা হাইপ, ’৯১-এর পুনরাবৃত্তির আলাপ ও বাস্তবতা

  রাফসান গালিব, 12 Feb 2026

• ঐতিহ্যগত অবস্থান থেকে সরে এসেছে জামায়াত

  এ কে এম ওয়ারেসুল করিম interviewed, 12 Feb 2026

• জামায়াত আসলে জিতেছে, না হেরেছে

  আসিফ বিন আলী, 14 Feb 2026

• The Long Road to the Prime Minister’s Office

  Ehteshamul Haque, 23 Feb 2026

The first episode explores the capers of the great Bengali sleuth Feluda (and his posse) in the deserts of Rajasthan in the book and movie Shonar Kella. The episode also covers broader works of Satyajit Ray.

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Also to read

In this episode, we examine the widening gap between political promises and economic realities. From fiscal pressures and subsidy burdens to inflation and public expectations, the discussion explores how governments balance electoral commitments with the constraints of economic management. The issues remain relevant, not just in Bangladesh but across the Global South.

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Work takes me to developing and emerging economies in different continents. I focus mainly on macroeconomic issues. Md Rubaiyath Sarwar, nicknamed Jyoti, travels to similar places, but works on microeconomic issues. Two Jyotis working globally on economic development, albeit from macro and micro perspectives — a podcast was just a matter of time.

Keep an eye on the Weekly Counterpoint social media for future live chats.

Further reading

• Governments are not going to stop getting bigger

The Economist, 20 Nov 2021

• Remembering Martin Ravallion

Gaurav Datt, 20 Jan 2023

• Africa needs malaria vaccines as soon as possible

Ben Krauss, 2 Jun 2024

• Would you pass the world’s toughest exam?

Harriet Shawcross and Dipanjan Sinha, 24 Jul 2025

• এবারের নির্বাচনী ইশতেহারও কি ফাঁকা বুলিই থেকে যাবে

বুলবুল সিদ্দিকী, 1 Oct 2025

• Sendhil Mullainathan: The AI Economist

Bob Simison, 1 Dec 2025

• Reallocating resources, revitalising economies: How central transfers affect local economies

Leonardo Sanchez-Aragon, Gonzalo E Sanchez, Wladimir Zanoni, 19 Dec 2025

• ঐতিহ্যগত অবস্থান থেকে সরে এসেছে জামায়াত

ওয়ারেসুল করিম interviewed, 12 Feb 2026

• A new dawn interrupted by an old shadow

Zahid Hussain, 21 Feb 2026

• When Cities Outrun the State

Alice Evans, 10 April 2026

In this episode, we take a hard look at why long-term challenges are no longer distant concerns—but immediate pressures shaping today’s policy choices.

From mounting fiscal constraints and structural budget deficits to the ongoing fuel crisis and volatility in global oil pricing, the conversation unpacks how interconnected risks are tightening the space for economic maneuver. We furthr explore why delaying difficult decisions only compounds the cost—and why forward-looking policy is essential in navigating an increasingly uncertain world.

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Further reading

• The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race

  Jared Diamond, 1 May 1999

• Nick Farmer knows dozens of languages, so he invented one for The Expanse

  Annalee Newitz and Cyrus Farivar, 23 Dec 2019

• Can Science Fiction Wake Us Up to Our Climate Reality?

  Joshua Rothman, 24 Jan 2022

• The Read: Brad DeLong, Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century

  Timothy Burke, 22 Oct 2022

• A Controversial Technology Is Creating an Unprecedented Rift Among Climate Scientists

  Alejandro de la Garza, 18 Mar 2023

• What It Will Take to Transform Development Finance

  Mia Amor Mottley and Werner Hoyer, 21 Jun 2023

• Lawrence F. Katz: The Inequality Economist

  Bob Simison, 1 Dec 2023

• Moving to Complexity

  Harold James, 1 June 2024

• Where is it actually cheaper to drive an electric car?

  The Economist, 21 Nov 2024

• Anne Case: The Longevity Economist

  Garry Seidman, 1 Dec 2024

• Brad De Long interviewed, 3 Mar 2025

• Multilateralism Can Survive the Loss of Consensus

  Danny Quah, 1 Sep 2025