La semana entrante marca el fin del primer gobierno de izquierda en Colombia ante la posesión del presidente electo Abelardo de la Espriella. La fecha dará un probable inicio al desmantelamiento de varios hitos a favor del trabajador del gobierno de Gustavo Petro, entre ellas una encomiable y trascendental campaña en contra del banco central colombiano (BanRep). BanRep ha consolidado esencialmente a una postura idéntica a aquella de su homólogo brasileño: es decir, una política de extorsión a través de altas tasas de interés con el fin de obligar al gobierno a recortar gastos.

Históricamente, la diferencia entre la tasa de interés y la inflación en Colombia era mínima, como se puede evidenciar en el gráfico de abajo. Esta postura sensata terminó poco después de que Gustavo Petro asumiera la presidencia en el 2022, cuando las tasas de interés se mantuvieron desproporcionadamente por encima de la inflación. Ciertamente, dicho fenómeno se vió en buena parte del mundo tras la inflación pos Covid, la cual fue interpretada como una amenaza excepcional que requería una respuesta más agresiva de lo usual.

Críticos sostuvimos que dicha postura fue contraproducente. La lógica de las altas tasas de interés consistía en reducir la demanda para disminuir los precios. Sin embargo, dado que la inflación posterior a la pandemia fue resultado principalmente de problemas de oferta—y no de demanda como el crecimiento salarial—era poco probable que una política monetaria más agresiva tendría un efecto significativo. Tecnócratas afines, como Robin Brooks de Brookings, y los propios bancos centrales eventualmente reconocieron esto y redujeron las tasas, acercándolas más a la inflación. Brooks incluso ha argumetado en contra de una política restrictiva en respuesta a la crisis energética ocasionada por la guerra en el medio oriente. Tiene razón justamente porque el efecto inflacionário obedece a un choque de oferta y no a factores de demanda (obviamente declararle la guerra a Iran fue, en sí, imbécil).

Social Democracy With Populist Characteristics

The Left Case For Lower Interest Rates [Extended]

Last week, President Donald Trump paid a visit to the Federal Reserve which is currently undergoing renovations. Sporting a hard hat, the president berated a visibly perturbed Fed Chair Jerome Powell for failing to cut interest rates as well as for the renovation’s purported profligacy. Between September and December of last year, the lender of last res…

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a year ago · 10 likes · Juan David Rojas

Hay, por supuesto, dos excepciones a dicha trayectoría monetaria: Brasil y Colombia.

Ambos países tienen actualmente algunas de las tasas de interés más altas del mundo. Tras la victoria de de la Espriella, BanRep elevó su tasa 75 puntos a un ridículo 12%, detrás del aún más absurdo 14,25% de Brasil. ¿Por qué, entonces, los bancos centrales de ambos países se han negado a seguir el ejemplo de sus pares internacionales? Supuestamente, es porque las tasas de inflación tanto de Brasil como Colombia siguen estando elevadas en un 4,5 y 5,5%, respectivamente.

“La inflación no cae más por lo que los comunistas Lula y Petro están gastando demasiado dinero.” Si el gasto disminuye, también lo hará la inflación y, posteriormente, las tasas de interés, o al menos esa es la lógica. En realidad, este planteamiento constituye una amenaza velada: reduzcan el gasto o subiremos las tasas —o nos negaremos a bajarlas— sin importar el comportamiento de la inflación. Peor aún, esto conduce de manera masoquista a un mayor gasto al incrementar los pagos de intereses sobre la deuda. En el caso de Brasil, Lula terminó cediendo, reduciendo el gasto público y nombrando burócratas “promercado” en la junta del banco central, incluido su presidente, Gabriel Galípolo.

Petro, sin embargo, optó por un camino distinto. Nombró tecnócratas heterodoxos con una visión más integral de la política monetaria a la junta de BanRep e impulsó contundentemente su programa de gobierno, para bien y para mal. De no haber sido por un solo nombramiento, habría logrado una mayoría heterodoxa en la junta directiva. Lamentablemente, Olga Lucía Acosta, nombrada por Petro, terminó alineándose con la mayoría fundamentalista de mercado, un error que el mandatario calificó como el peor de su presidencia.

Todo esto culminó en el conflicto de este año, cuando Petro incrementó el salario mínimo en un histórico 23%. Este crimen imperdonable desató indignación por parte de los medios, la oposición, el sector empresarial y la burocracia neoliberal, los cuales imploraron colectivamente al banco central a aumentar las tasas de interés. Por tanto, el banco central elevó unos 100 puntos básicos a una tasa del 11,25%. Petro respondió amenazando con que su Ministro de Hacienda no asistiría a la siguiente reunión monetaria si una mayoría en la junta votase a favor de otro aumento. En Colombia, la junta de BanRep carece de quórum sin la presencia del Ministro de Hacienda de turno. La maniobra funcionó y el banco aceptó mantener estables las tasas de interés hasta después de las elecciones.

Naturalmente, esta discusión ha perdido relevancia, dado que de la Espriella ya ha prometido que sus nombramientos “respetarán la independencia del banco central”. En mi opinión, el tipo de independencia del banco central que defienden Bloomberg y de la Espriella constituye una forma de charlatanería sin sustento en los datos ni en objetivos productivos. Pero, claro, para la tecnocracia colombiana omnisciente, esta no es una postura “respetable”.

Dicho todo esto, es difícil prever cómo evolucionará la política monetaria durante el mandato del narcoabogado. Un resurgimiento del sector de hidrocarburos podría ayudar a reducir la inflación al abaratar los precios de energía, lo que a su vez podría facilitar recortes en las tasas de interés. Por otro lado, cualquier crecimiento económico consecuente probablemente será neutralizado por los recortes masivos que ha prometido el presidente electo. Igualmente, la actual tasa de interés no va a ayudar al crecimiento económico, lo que, a su vez, podría conducir a eventual recortes por parte del banco central.

En cuanto a Brasil, lo que más me entristece es que, si es el caso que Lula logra la reelección, inevitablemente será celebrado por los comentócratas por su “moderación”, es decir, por rehusarse a incomodar al banco central e inversionistas. En cambio, Petro y Cepeda, claro, habrán perdido la presidencia por “radicales”. Esta visión es simplista.

Petro fue radical en un sentido bruto y contraproducente al matricularse con la austeridad climática que —al igual que Trump con la guerra contra Irán— debilitó su postura ante el banco central. A la vez, aumentar el salario mínimo y laburar en contra de que BanRep asfixiara al crecimiento económico fueron objetivos sensatos. Lula, por el contrario, ha hecho bien al aumentar la producción de petróleo y la extracción de recursos. Pero su rotundo fracaso en materia de salario mínimo y su capitulación ante la extorsión del banco central no merecen elogios.

En el mejor de los casos, el octogenario izquierdista tomará otro rumbo si es que logra reelegirse.

Historically, interest rates in Colombia were set at a virtually one-to-one basis with inflation. In general, the difference between the two was minimal is evident in the chart below. This sensible policy ended soon after Gustavo Petro assumed the presidency in 2022 where rates were kept disproportionately higher than inflation. In fairness, this monetary posture was embraced around the world in the wake of post-pandemic inflation which central bankers viewed as a unique threat requiring more aggressive action than usual.

I and others have argued that this view was both wrong and counterproductive. The logic of high rates was to reduce demand in order to lower prices but because post-pandemic inflation resulted mainly from supply shocks–as opposed to wage growth–high rates were unlikely to have a meaningful effect. Most central bankers and related technocrats such as Robin Brooks eventually realized this and brought rates down closer to inflation as economic growth has continued to slow. Brooks has even gone as far as to [correctly] argue against hiking rates due to the Iran War for the same reason that price shocks are due to a supply shock as opposed to demand-related factors (by no means does this detract against the stupidity of the Iran war).

Social Democracy With Populist Characteristics

The Left Case For Lower Interest Rates [Extended]

Last week, President Donald Trump paid a visit to the Federal Reserve which is currently undergoing renovations. Sporting a hard hat, the president berated a visibly perturbed Fed Chair Jerome Powell for failing to cut interest rates as well as for the renovation’s purported profligacy. Between September and December of last year, the lender of last res…

Read more

a year ago · 10 likes · Juan David Rojas

There are, of course, two outliers to these trends: Brazil and Colombia

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Los márgenes de Abelardo tan solo en Bogotá le dieron la victoria. En relación a Rodolfo Hernández en el 2022, de la Espriella obtuvo 300.000 más votos en la ciudad, lo que hizo que la ventaja de Cepeda respecto a Petro se derrumbara de unos 20 a 8 puntos. En total, la diferencia entre ambos candidatos fue de apenas 250.000 votos: 49,66% frente a 48,7%. Petro y Cepeda cometieron muchos errores: excesos progresistas en temas de género, seguridad, el fundamentalismo climático y la propuesta “tal vez sí tal vez no” de una constituyente.

Aun así, con resultados tan cerrados, la triste realidad es que, de haber jugado bien sus cartas, Cepeda hubiese derrotado a su contrincante. Una de dichas cartas fue su rechazo hacia la camisa de la selección. Esta decisión fue tan estúpida que, por sí sola, pudo haberle costado la elección.

A lo largo de la campaña, de la Espriella y sus seguidores, fánatico de las banderas tanto estadounidenses como israelíes, se apropiaron de la camisa de la selección como parte del disfraz patriota del candidato ateo globalista, neocon de Miami. La respuesta lógica de Cepeda pudiese haber sido de ponerse la bendita camisa y atacar a su oponente tri-ciudadano por no haber vivido en Colombia desde el 2016. En cambio, Cepeda al parecer interpretó a la camisa—en plena Copa Mundial—como una amenaza fascista (el primer partido de Colombia contra Uzbekistán tuvo lugar tres días antes de la segunda vuelta).

En efecto, Cepeda cedió el símbolo nacional del país a un activo extranjero; tal cual como ha ocurrido entre el PT y el bolsonarismo en Brasil. ¿Lo peor de todo? Petro usó la camisa durante toda su presidencia, incluyendo durante la campaña. ¿Es esto así de importante? Sí, el fútbol es una religión en Colombia, y los votantes—especialmente los votantes populares—consideran que ponerse la camiseta, dentro y fuera del Mundial, es de lo más sensato del mundo.

El ejemplo mexicano—otra vez

Miren nada más a la Presidenta Científica de México. Claudia Sheinbaum sí se puso la bella camisa azteca de la selección, Mejor aún: explotó al Mundial para un fin político genial. Consciente de los precios exorbitantes de boletos y de la probable asistencia de mexicanos acomodados afines a la oposición, Sheinbaum optó por donar su boleto inaugural y verse el partido en un barrio popular de Ciudad de México.

¡Bien hecho!

La izquierda debe siempre apoderarse de los símbolos nacionales, sobre todo en momentos de orgullo nacional como el Mundial. Por poco que me agrade el darwinismo libertario de Daniel Di Martino, tuvo razón al ridiculizar a los candidatos progresistas de Nueva York, Adriano Espaillat y Darializa Ávila Chevalier, quienes expresaron una preferencia por países distintos a Estados Unidos durante el Mundial.

La oicofobia progresista (el odio hacia la cultura y nación própia) es uno de tantos males occidentales que sigue propagándose entre la izquierda latinoamericana. Al igual que el fundamentalismo climático, todas las facetas del imperialismo progresista han sido catastróficas.

La 4T es el modelo a seguir.

De la Espriella’s gains in Bogotá alone were enough to give him the win. Compared to Rodolfo Hernandez in 2022, de la Espriella won 300,000 more votes in the city, causing Cepeda’s margins relative to Petro to collapse from roughly 20 to 8 points. All told, the overall difference between both candidates was just 250,000 votes–49.66% to 48.7%. Petro and Cepeda made many mistakes: progressive excesses on gender issues, soft-on-crime policies, braindead climate fundamentalism and an extremely dumb will-they-won’t-they promise to rewrite Colombia’s constitution.

Yet, with results that close, the sad truth is that Cepeda genuinely could have defeated his opponent had he played his cards right. One of these squandered cards was his refusal to wear the football jersey of the country’s national team. This decision was so ludicrously stupid, it alone may have cost him the election.

Throughout the campaign, de la Espriella and his US-and-Israeli-flag-waving supporters savvily adopted the jersey as part of their efforts to patriotwash the Miami Neocon president-elect. The logical and actually patriotic response would have been for Cepeda to put on the damn jersey and attack his tri-citizen opponent for not having lived in Colombia since 2016. Instead, Cepeda evidently interpreted wearing the jersey–in the middle of the world cup–as a show of fascist jingoism (Colombia’s first game against Uzbekistan was three days before the run-off).

In effect, Cepeda ceded the country’s foremost national symbol to a foreign asset; a precise mirroring of the same dynamic between the PT and Bolsonarismo in Brazil. The dumbest part? Petro has and actively wears the damn jersey. Does this really matter that much? Yes, futbol is a religion in Colombia and normie voters–especially working class voters–regard wearing the jersey in and outside the World Cup as common sense.

A Better (Mexican) Way–Again

Go figure, President Girlboss Climate Scientist champions wearing Mexico’s awesome Aztec jersey, huh. Not only that, she exploited hosting the World Cup to brilliant domestic ends. Knowing full well the exorbitant ticket prices and consequent opposition attendance at matches, Sheinbaum opted to donate her inaugural ticket and watch the game in a working class neighborhood of Mexico City.

Now that’s some good politics!

Leftists and especially progressives need to become more comfortable with nationalism, particularly during moments of national pride such as the World Cup. As unfond as I am of libertarian Darwinist Daniel Di Martino, he makes a good point in ridiculing progressive NYC candidates’ Adriano Espaillat and Darializa Ávila Chevalier’s support for countries other than the USA at the World Cup. When libertarian globalists like Di Martino and de la Espriella are more patriotic than self-described democratic socialists, you know you have a problem.

Progressive oikophobia (self-hatred of one’s own culture and nation) is one of many Western cancers that continues to spread among the Latin American Left. Like so-called “criminal justice reform” and climate fundamentalism, it must be purged.

The 4T shows the way.

A casi un mes de la segunda vuelta presidencial en el Perú, Keiko Fujimori fue declarada como ganadora de la contienda con el 50.135% del voto frente al 49.965% de su contrincante de izquierda, Roberto Sánchez. La victoria de Fujimori podrá concluir —o prolongar—a la crisis política que ella misma ha agravado en el país desde hace una década. También consolida a una conservadora de candidatos alineados con el gobierno de Donald Trump en las Américas.

Keiko es hija del expresidente y dictador Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), quien aplastó a la guerrilla maoista de Sendero Luminoso a costa de cometer crímenes de guerra contra peruanos indígenas. Su vínculo con su padre la llevó a tres derrotas igualmente reñidas y consecutivas en las elecciones del 2011, 2016 y 2021. Pero a partir del 2016, su partido, Fuerza Popular, obtuvo una mayoría en el Congreso, que después destituyó al presidente de centroderecha Pedro Pablo Kuczynski en el 2018. Desde entonces, ocho presidentes han gobernado al Perú, cinco de los cuales renunciaron o fueron destituidos por el congreso. Fuerza Popular ha sido clave en los cinco los cinco casos, aunque el fracturado Congreso peruano suele funcionar como una organización criminal.

Las repercusiones regionales del escándalo de Odebrecht en Brasil durante la década de los 2010 desató una campaña anticorrupción sorprendentemente rigurosa. Los presidentes Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan García (2006-2011), Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) y Kuczynski fueron condenados por recibir sobornos de Odebrecht; García optó suicidarse en vez de ir a prisión. La propia Keiko fue acusada de recibir más de un millón de dólares en sobornos durante sus campañas del 2011 y 2016, aunque ha logrado eludir una condena determinante.

¿Cómo, entonces, logró finalmente triunfar?

La realidad es que un gobierno Fujimori es probablemente la mejor esperanza del país para restaurar a la estabilidad política. El oponente de Keiko, Sánchez, es aliado del expresidente izquierdista Pedro Castillo—un maestro rural-líder sindical ultacatólico-cum-presidente—quien intentó un autogolpe fallido en respuesta a una inevitable destitución por parte del Congreso. Castillo como no era una amenaza comunista, pero su tremenda ineptitud como gobernante sembró caos durante su breve mandato.

Sánchez hizo campaña prometiendo indultar a Castillo, usando su sombrero chotano en un intento de animar a votantes de la Sierra peruano; también forjó una controvertida alianza con el etnonacionalista indígena Antauro Humala, hermano de Ollanto y que intentó un tomar el poder através de un golpe militar. A diferencia de Castillo, sin embargo, Sánchez es un político bastante convencional y oriundo de Lima. Sus posturas relativamente más progresistas en temas como los derechos LGBT posiblemente contribuyeron a pérdidas en la Sierra.

A pesar de todo esto, la economía peruana se ha desempeñado notablemente bien, salvo por una breve recesión en el 2023. La inflación se estabilizó en un 2 por ciento desde el 2024, con un crescimiento del PIB entre el 3 y el 4 por ciento. En realidad, el poder detrás del trono ha sido el Banco Central, encabezado por Julio Velarde, quien lleva 20 años en el cargo. Velarde y el Banco Central han sido elogiados por su manejo del Sol peruano e independencia frente al Congreso y la presidencia.

De cierto modo, Perú se parece a una utopía neoliberal en la que una tecnocracia insulada ejerce por en cima de los impulsos de votantes y funcionarios electos. Izquierdistas como Sánchez, Castillo y Humala todos se rindieron ante este sistema y abandonaron intentos de nacionalizar al extractivismo y redistribuir la riqueza. El propio Sánchez prometió despedir a Velarde y hacer una constituyente, pero dio marcha atrás tras avanzar a la segunda vuelta contra Fujimori.

No obstante, el milagro neoliberal peruano también tiene un lado oscuro. Un asombroso 72% de la fuerza laboral del país está compuesta por trabajadores informales. De estos, una proporción cada vez mayor participa en la minería ilegal, particularmente la del oro. La nación andina es el segundo mayor exportador minero del hemisferio, con cerca de 50 mil millones de dólares, de los cuales se estima que más de una cuarta parte es ilícita. Para dar una idea, el comercio ilegal de oro en Perú es ahora equivalente en valor a la venta de cocaína en la vecina Colombia. De hecho, es verídicto decir que la minería ilícita ha impulsado gran parte al crecimiento económico de los últimos años.

En torno, los homicidios han aumentado prácticamente cada año desde el 2017, con el incremento más pronunciado en zonas mineras dominadas por mafias. Lo más preocupante es que el Congreso ha facilitado buena parte de esta impunidad. En el 2024, el Legislativo aprobó una ley que prohíbe a fiscales investigar como delitos de crimen organizado a crimenes con penas de seis años o menos, incluyendo la trata de personas y el desfalco. La ley también prohíbe allanamientos de presuntas sedes criminales para recabar evidencia, a menos que el sospechoso y un abogado defensor estén físicamente presentes.

El Congreso también restringió a la capacidad de fiscales para negociar acuerdos de colaboración y prohibió a la policía confiscar explosivos a mineros ilegales. Por último, se debilitó a la extinción de dominio, dificultando la incautación de armas, viviendas y equipos a integrantes del crimen organizado. Prácticamente todos los sectores del espectro político son cómplices de esta legalización de la criminalidad, incluyendo tanto Fujimori como Sánchez. Ahora, Keiko ha prometido seguir los pasos de su padre y restaurar la ley y orden si bien el difunto dictador malversó aproximadamente mil millones de dólares durante su década en el poder.

No obstante, es posible que Keiko se vea obligada a aplicar mano dura, aunque sea solo para reforzar su legitimidad. Tal como están las cosas, su victoria se debe a la diáspora peruana, mientras que Sánchez obtuvo una ligera mayoría dentro del propio Perú. No obstante, no está garantizado que Fujimori complete su mandato. Los partidos de centroizquierda obtuvieron, posiblemente, su mejor resultado legislativo en décadas, incluido Juntos Por Perú, el partido de Sánchez. Por otro lado, es probable que buena parte de los partidos vuelvan a fragmentarse e, ironicamente, terminen extorsionando a la presidenta Fujimori.

La verdad es que el Perú si necesita una constituyente. El actual semipresidencialismo probablemente funcionaría mejor como un sistema presidencial, con umbrales más altos para la destitución de mandatarios. Como mínimo, debe eliminarse la ridícula cláusula de “incapacidad moral”—la cual ha sustentado a todas destituciones de este siglo, incluida la del propio Alberto Fujimori. Quedará por verse qué curso tomará Keiko, incluyendo la posibilidad de que termine recreando a la dictadura de su padre.

Como sus vecinos, el Perú será más otro aliado de la Casa Blanca. Desde el regreso de Trump al poder, Washington se ha visto con malos ojos a la inauguración del megapuerto de Chancay, financiado por China; Pekín pretende conectar al puerto mediante ferrocarril con el puerto de Santos, en Brasil. El actual presidente, José Balcázar, también canceló la compra de 24 aviones de combate F-16 a Estados Unidos, citando irregularidades durante el proceso de adquisición. Es probable que Keiko se muestre más reticente hacia la inversión estadounidense, aunque —al igual que sus vecinos conservadores— continuará profundizando los lazos con China, por la sencilla razón de que Pekín tiene mucho más que ofrecer en relación a Washington.

Por el momento, el único lamento de Keiko, seguramente, es que su padre no haya vivido para ver a su hija en la presidencia.

Nearly a month after Peru’s presidential run-off, Keiko Fujimori was officially declared the country’s next president defeating leftist opponent Roberto Sanchez by 50.135 to 49.865 percent. Fujimori’s victory may well conclude or prolong Peru’s decade-long political crisis–one in large part of her own making. It also cements an ongoing winning streak of Trump-aligned candidates in Latin America.

Keiko is the daughter of former dictator Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who crushed the brutal Shining Path insurgency at the cost of war crimes against indigenous Peruvians. A four-time presidential candidate, Keiko’s association to her father led to similarly narrow, consecutive losses in the 2011, 2016 and 2021 elections. But beginning in 2016, her party, Fuerza Popular–Popular Force–won a majority in the legislature which later ousted center-right president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2018. Since then, eight presidents have governed Peru, five of which resigned or were removed from office by the legislature. Of the five, Popular Force has been key to virtually all of their downfalls though the country’s often fractured congress generally operates like a crime syndicate.

The regional fallout from the 2010s Odebrecht scandal in Brazil birthed a surprisingly thorough anti-corruption drive which tarnished the entirety of Peru’s political class. Presidents Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), Alan Garcia (2006-2011), Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) and Kuzcynski were each convicted of taking bribes from Odebrecht; Garcia opted for suicide over a prison cell. Keiko herself was indicted for accepting over a million dollars in bribes during her 2011 and 2016 campaigns though she has consistently eluded conviction.

How then did the dictator’s daughter finally prevail?

The reality is that a Fujimori presidency is likely the country’s best hope for restoring political stability. Keiko’s opponent, Sanchez, is an ally of former leftist president Pedro Castillo–a tradcath peasant school teacher turned president–who attempted a failed self-coup in response to an inevitable impeachment from Congress. Castillo himself was far from a communist threat but his sheer ineptitude sowed chaos during his admittedly short tenure.

Sanchez campaigned on pardoning Castillo and adopted the former president’s Chotano attire in a bid to appeal to alienated rural voters in the Andean highlands; he also forged a controversial alliance with ethnonationalist indigenous strongman, Antauro Humala. Unlike the Andean Castillo, however, Sanchez is a fairly traditional politician and a native of the country’s notoriously elitist capital. His slightly more progressive positions on issues such as LGBT rights likely contributed to marginal gains and losses in urban and rural areas, respectively. Overall turnout fell to 72 percent from 75 percent in 2021 with the steepest declines in the Andean highlands.

The irony of Peru’s pants-on-head politics is that the country’s economy has performed remarkably well despite a short recession in 2023. Inflation has stabilized at an enviable 2 percent in 2024 with GDP hovering around 3-4 percent. Through it all, the true power behind the throne has been the country’s Central Bank headed by 20-year incumbent Julio Velarde. Velarde and the Central Bank have won rightful praise for their management of the Peruvian Sol and consistent independence from Congress and the presidency.

In many ways, Peru resembles a neoliberal utopia in which an insulated technocracy exerts ultimate influence over voters’ and elected officials’ base impulses. Much to the chagrin of their guerrilla forebearers, leftists like Sanchez, Castillo and Humala have routinely capitulated at efforts to nationalize resource extraction and spread wealth more equally. Sanchez himself initially promised to fire Velarde and overhaul Peru’s constitution yet backtracked following his passage to the run-off against Fujimori.

Yet for all its merits, there is also a dark side to Peru’s neoliberal miracle. An astonishing 72 percent of the country’s workforce is composed of informal workers. Of these, an increasing share is involved in Peru’s deadly and ever-expanding illegal mining sector, particularly in gold. The Andean nation is the second largest mining exporter in the hemisphere, accounting for almost USD$50 billion, more than a quarter of which is thought to be illicit. To give an idea, the illegal gold trade in Peru is now roughly equivalent in value to neighboring Colombia’s cocaine trade. Indeed, it’s fair to say that illicit mining has driven a great deal of recent economic growth.

Accordingly, homicides have climbed virtually every year since 2017 with the steepest increases in mafia-ridden mining areas. Most disturbing, however, is the fact that Congress has enabled much of this lawlessness. In 2024, the legislature passed a law barring prosecutors from investigating crimes carrying prison terms of six years or less, including human trafficking and embezzlement as organized crime offenses. The law likewise forbids raids of suspected criminal headquarters to gather evidence unless the suspect and a defense lawyer are physically present.

Congress also restricted prosecutors’ ability to strike plea deals and barred police from seizing explosives from illegal miners. Finally, asset forfeiture was watered down, making it harder to seize guns, houses and equipment from organized crime. Virtually all sides of the political spectrum are complicit in legalizing criminality, including Fujimori and Sanchez. Now, Keiko has promised to follow in her father’s footsteps and restore law and order. Never mind the fact that the late dictator embezzled roughly USD$1 billion during his decade-long rule.

Nonetheless, it’s conceivable that Keiko may be forced to crack down for no other reason than to boost her legitimacy. As it stands, her likely victory looks set to come thanks to the Peruvian diaspora with Sanchez winning a slim majority inside Peru itself. And yet, it’s by no means a forgone conclusion that Fujimori will finish her term. Left-of-center parties won arguably their best result in the legislature in decades, including Sanchez’s Juntos Por Perú–Together For Peru. On the other hand, it’s likely that parties from across the political spectrum will once again fracture and ironically resort to extorting Keiko over past and future skeletons in her closet.

The truth is that Peru really does need an overhaul of its constitution. The current semi-presidentialism would likely fare better as a standard presidential system with higher thresholds for impeachment and removal from office. At the very least, the ridiculous clause of “moral incapacity”–the premise used for all impeachments this century including ironically against Alberto Fujimori–must be excised. It remains an open question exactly what course Keiko might take, including recreating a version of her father’s autocracy.

However long her presidency lasts, Peru stands to join its right-wing brethren as a staunch ally of the Trump White House. Concern has gripped Washington since the 2024 inauguration of the Chinese-financed Chancay megaport which Beijing aims to link via rail with the port of Santos in Brazil. Current president José Balcázar also canceled the purchase of 24 F-16 fighter planes from the US citing procurement irregularities. Keiko is likely to be more reticent to US investment yet–much like her conservative neighbors–she will continue to deepen ties with China for the simple reason that Beijing has far more to offer relative to Washington.

For the moment, Keiko’s sole lament is likely that her father did not live to see his daughter’s presidency.

Days before Colombia’s run-off in which Abelardo de la Espriella won the presidency, I interviewed “Jhon”, a former soldier and victim of Colombia’s ongoing armed conflict. The 30 minute interview was meant to be published by DropSite news prior to the vote but they opted instead to post short clips on X. Naturally, I wanted to put the whole thing out there given how compelling the content is.

Jhon is exactly the kind of voter I love talking to: humble, patriotic, hardworking who votes with the capital P People in mind. I especially admire his deep love of his country which often isn’t the case from many middle and upper class Colombians beyond futbol (Vamos Colombia 2026).

Those who read my recent coverage of the election which includes a mention of Jhon know that I will be the first to say that Petro made many serious mistakes. His government, however, also did many things right so much so that Cepeda nearly prevailed. The video is in Spanish with subtitles. Below is the English transcript with timestamps.

INTERVIEW

JDR: Good afternoon, Jhon. Thank you for speaking with DropSite. Tell us about yourself and what you do here in Bogotá.

John: Thank you for inviting me. I’ve lived here in Bogotá for 23 years. I currently work as an Uber driver, I also do carpentry and whatever else comes up. Bogotá is a very welcoming city, very good for all of us who come to work here in Bogotá and contribute to the city.

JDR: Great. We actually met, you were my Uber driver a few months ago, in April if I remember correctly. We were chatting and you told me a great deal about your life and upbringing. Colombia, as every Colombian knows very well, has had an extremely agitated, bloody and sad recent history.

For decades there’s been an armed conflict between [leftist] guerrillas, [right-wing] paramilitaries, drug traffickers and state violence. And you yourself are a victim of the conflict. You were displaced. You told me that you are from the corregimiento of Tierradentro in Tolima. Tell us about your life there, your childhood, what you saw, etc.

01:26

Jhon: Well, the truth is that since I was little, we always knew about all the armed groups in the countryside. Out there, you’d wake up and if it wasn’t the army, it was any armed group, like the ELN (National Liberation Army), the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the RP. All of those people. And you get used to that life because you have to. We went to school, and ran into those same people. They would ask you where you were going. If they already knew you were going to school, they would ask anyway. And instead of studies what would happen is that the army arrived.

There was fighting all the time. But as I say, here you got used to living that life and other lives. Because there were no other exits. Of course. And tell us about Tierra Dentro, where it is, you were telling me recently about the landscape, its location. Tierra Dentro is a town located in the mountains of northern Tolima, belonging to the municipality of Ibaratolima. It is located near the Nevado del Ruiz, which has a warm and a very welcoming climate. And it grows all kinds of food, great for growing coffee, bananas, everything you could want.

2:50

JDR: You also mentioned to me that during your childhood several of your friends were recruited by the paramilitaries and guerrillas. And you left Tierradentro around 2004, right?

Jhon: I left while I was still studying. Many [of the armed groups] convinced young men to join them and took them away. They went with them because they were convinced to join. Once they left, by the next day; you could see carrying a gun and in uniform.

And I left Tierradentro. I left in 2004 to serve in the military. Because it seemed like the only way out. I saw the military as a way to get ahead. There were no opportunities, but the military opened up opportunities for people like us, people with limited resources.

JDR: And how did you see that many your peers viewed armed groups? Also as an opportunity to get ahead? Or because of political sympathies, for one side or the other, etc.

Jhon: It was more like the kids were shown a rifle and said: “oh, this is cool. It’s going to be easier for me, there will be work”. Many believed them and went. And once they were in, they couldn’t get out. If they did manage to leave that life behind, they would have to go far away otherwise they’d be killed.

4:28

JDR: If you feel comfortable, tell us about the type of violence you witnessed. You told me that you and your father, were ultimately displaced by the paramilitaries.

Jhon: Yes, it started a while ago, going back when Colombia beat Argentina 5-0 [in 1993]. The paramilitaries came in and created panic in the community. They killed and dismembered people. Everyone was leaving. And then only the town remained, it was like a ghost town, with just us left.

There was an old lady that lived close to our home and she couldn’t leave because she was so old. My dad used to tell us that we would stay because we didn’t owe anything to anyone.

That day, when Colombia, I don’t remember the exact date, Colombia beat Argentina 5-0, The day before, we went down to Feria, Tolima, because my dad did business there, buying goods from local farmers and selling them in a cart in Lérida.

So we went to Lerida the next day, a Saturday, The town was full of paramilitaries. So we sold bananas with my dad, we shopped and we went back home. And when we arrived, all the walls were marked, with the name of the paramilitaries.

JDR: The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Jhon: And that’s how it happened, we were always anxious, because we found out that they were going to kill the guerrillas there. There was combat every day, and sometimes someone would go out into the village whether my dad or I. And fighting would break out; I didn’t know if my dad would catch a stray bullet, or something else. We were in school when soldiers or guerrillas arrived, and there was battle after battle.

06:36

JDR: There’s been a lot of talk about how the government of former President Álvaro Uribe had a lot of connections with paramilitarism, the AUC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. During your childhood, did you perceive any complicity between the State and right-wing groups?

Jhon: They said it themselves, it’s not surprising, they themselves said that the boss (Uribe) needed to win. And when the army went to towns that [the AUC] controlled, the [fighters] hid and only the commanders came out to meet with the army commanders. And when the AUC arrived in a town they kept a list of people’s [government-provided] national ID numbers.

So, what else can one really say or think to justify having all that information?

07:31

JDR: And when you joined the army, you mentioned that you traveled all over the country, saw the best and the worst of Colombia.

Tell us a little about that, and also about those you served with. As well as the view that the armed forces had of the country, for better and for worse.

Jhon: Well, when I did my military service, they were going to send me to Caquetá, Then later a corporal told me no, because I was going to the army. Then they sent me to the police because the quota was already full in the battalion.

So they were going to send me, they sent me to the police academy. We took some courses in counter-insurgency, which consisted of retaking control of police stations that had been taken over by the guerrillas, in Valle [del Cauca], Dolores, all of that.

They were expecting weapons that never arrived, and they sent us to do a jungle commando seminar. Then they assigned us to bases and sent me to Caquetá but the corporal told me that he wasn’t going to let me go because it was too dangerous.

So I told him, well, I’m here to help and they sent me to Tuluá, in Valle del Cauca. And it was more dangerous there than in Caquetá.

JDR: Both of those were historical FARC strongholds.

Jhon: From there, we belonged to the anti-narcotics group; we searched for drugs. And there’s an antinarcotics base in Tuluá, and a police academy and there were 30 or 40 people were killed weekly in Tuluá alone.

So the armed conflict goes way back for many years. After that, we only patrolled looking for drugs. Then they put us out on the streets to help police patrols to carry out operations, to counteract violence, because it was out of control.

And at that time Mr. Uribe was President. That’s why, because the media doesn’t tell the full truth about the country from what it was about 10 or 15 years ago to what it is now. What we are seeing now in 2026, there’s still violence, but it is not the same as it was before.

JDR: Of course. And when did you leave the army?

Jhon: I left in 2004.

JDR: 2004. And then you came here, and settled in Bogotá.

Jhon: Yes, yes, because I couldn’t go back home so I came here to Bogotá to work, to continue my life.

10:35

JDR: Tell us about your life here in Bogotá.

Jhon: I arrived here in Bogotá, I arrived before in Ibagué, and in Ibagué I called an uncle and I saw that he could help me come and work here, and he said yes, so I came to live in the south [of the city] in a neighborhood called Potosí, later my uncle had a fruit and vegetable business there in Paloquemao. And then he told me to find work at a local company. And that’s where I spent a lot of my life. They called me four days later, and that’s where I started working. And that’s how I ended up living in Bogotá. And I’ve done well thanks to God.

JDR: And you also work as a carpenter now, right? How long have you been doing that?

Jhon: Well, I’ve been doing carpentry for three or four years, more or less.

JDR: Oh, really? What kind of things?

Jhon: Doors, closets, everything..

JDR: You also told that around six years ago you returned to Tierradento for the first time in 15 years and that things have changed a lot for the better. Parts of the Colombian countryside are thriving thankfully. Tell us about what’s happening in your town now.

12:11

Jhon: Well, the truth is that our farm was left all alone because my father also had to leave. And it was left all alone because my dad there alone, he could have been killed. So he left. The farm had coffee, it had bananas everywhere, a nice house and all that, and that’s it.

Six years ago, I asked some cousins, since we still have family there. I asked him how he was and they said that things were good. I told my mother, my mom is here in Bogotá with us, I told her I was going to go work on that farm. It was left alone for 15 years.

I went back, with my mother. We arrived at Díaz de Tolima, we had a car. And the roads were completely destroyed, they were practically dirt tracks. And then I arrived at the farm. And I found our little house made of wood. It’s all crooked, we haven’t fixed it because I haven’t had enough money, but we’re getting there. And I already have coffee planted and all that. I’m already picking coffee, bananas, and yucca too. Things have improved quite a bit, that much has been seen.

JDR: Excellent, excellent.

Colombia now has its first left-wing government, the government of Gustavo Petro. We’re in election season, the second round for the presidency is this Sunday. This government has prioritized a rural areas, investments in the countryside, and agrarian reform precisely to restitute lands taken from victims of the armed conflict, like yourself.

You feel that this government has fulfilled its promises to the countryside and to the victims of the conflict?

14:11

Jhon: For me yes, for me yes, because I went back to my farm right before President Petro assumed office. There were no roads, routes, finished highways, health posts, nothing. Right now you go there, and you see festivities, everyone’s goes there and no one fears, being stopped, that they’ll be killed. None of that. People are planting again, there’s a lot of farms, there is a lot of cultivation. Health posts are now up and running where they were destroyed before. They have nurses available 24 hours a day for any emergency. So you don’t have to go to the main hospital in the city. They take care of you there. They have paved a lot of roads.

So yes, it can be done, when a government wants to work with the people, yes, it can be done. But since there are many benefits given to people in this country who act in their own self-interest. That’s why they haven’t done anything [before] for the countryside.

But a majority in the countryside loves this president you very much for that reason. Because he has cared about the countryside and people have liked the way his government has managed things. Healthcare too, before there were the health brigades. Those existed before Uribe became president and they were destroyed.

Now the medical brigades have returned. So that’s useful for one’s grandparents who can no longer go out all the time because of their age. They arrive at your house, examine you, everything. And if possible, depending on how they see it, they might forward you to a hospital with medications. So there’s definitely been a change.

16:06

JDR: It should be said that in much of the countryside, in rural areas, in the country don’t get great healthcare. It’s often necessary to travel to cities for all kinds of procedures, etc. So that’s very important.

And tell us, Jhon, more or less what your family and friends from Tierradentro have told you. When more or less, did it become peaceful? That the armed groups left, some demobilized, others moved to other areas.

Jhon: That’s what my friends have told me since the 2010s. Because that’s when there was a demobilization. Going back to Santos’ peace process. That helped a lot. Some people say it didn’t help, but for example, in that territory, it helped us a lot.

JDR: The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC.

Jhon: Because those people surrendered completely, they all demobilized. Later, when the paramilitaries went through the JEP, some did mobilize, others did not. And those who remained there had to face the same Colombian military so they left since there were very few. More or less since 2010.

JDR: The special jurisdiction for peace (JEP), the court of justice created by the peace agreement to address past crimes from all actors of the conflict.

Jhon: And that’s when things started to improve a lot. It was over, we were at peace in that territory. But there was no government investment. There were many people who had left, people whose families had been killed. And all the inputs for agricultural products are quite expensive. Back then, people weren’t working. Now, as we saw, investment, road repairs, all the products for crops were cheaper. People are cheerful again and are working.

JDR: Excellent. Jhon, there’s a lot of talk that President Petro is a former guerrilla fighter from the M19. During the current election campaign, it’s been said that what’s happening is that the left, Petro and presidential candidate Iván Cepeda, are allies of the guerrillas, of the FARC dissidents, ELN, etc. You have a unique point of view, how do you view past and present guerrillas? Do you them as true ideological actors or more so as criminals? Do you see differences between the political left and the armed left?

Jhon: I always saw guerrillas differently. The truth is I never heard them talk about politics. And the other thing, well, President Petro, although he was part of M19, I hadn’t been born yet. I cannot judge him. And Cepeda, the candidate, well, he...it’s no secret that his father was killed. That’s still unknown, and who killed him.

JDR: Manuel Cepeda, yes.

They are believed to have been state agents, thus allied with paramilitarism in the 90s. He was a very important leader of the Communist Party at the time. The Patriotic Union. Which suffered a genocide. They were devastated.

Jhon: And, for example, here in Colombia, there may be guerrillas, but not as many as they claim. In fact, those who remain, are mostly around borders. Because this government already has approved investment to various departments where the peasants didn’t even have roads, now..many have substituted the cultivation of coca for coffee, bananas, and pancoher. So, the armed groups no longer have coca. There may be cocaine, but it’s much further removed, like at the borders with other countries.

So, that helps to lessen war a little bit. Because we also have many farmers who are tired of the war. And I don’t think that guerrillas are allied with these candidates. The problem we have here is that we have a mirror image like Venezuela or Cuba. They say that the left is the worst, that the left is going to ruin the country, no. For me, the [political] left here in Colombia isn’t a [communist] left, it’s more like the center.

Look at what the country had when President Petro came in; he hasn’t ruined the country. That the country is going to end, no, I would have put 10,000 pesos on it. Right now, the peso has gained value relative to the dollar.

JDR: It has strengthened, yes, yes.

Jhon: That’s good for us, but is bad for the far right. Those who have a great interests in the country. For them everything is bad, if [the dollar] is expensive, if it’s cheap it’s also bad. So we as a people are also allowing ourselves to be very divided.

21:43

JDR: It should also be noted that Petro’s government has fought against several guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents, who chose not to take part in the 2016 peace process, the ELN and several other groups, including the Clan del Golfo. So certainly some of these narratives are simplistic.

Jhon: Yes, and for some, the peace process didn’t work. But the peace process, when one looks at analyzes it thoroughly, it serve the country well because many people demobilized. You go to Caquetá, to a large part of where the demobilized are and those people are working, they are sowing seeds, they are already seeking civilian life, which is the best for the country, the best for all farming families.

Because in violence, you know that in a war, all the peasants are always involved. All the people under little resources, everyday people, as we say here in Colombia. So it’s very easy to start a war, but when it comes to achieving peace, they don’t look for solutions. But from the process of everything that’s being done, the process that the JEP is doing. All of that is good for the country.

JDR: Of course.

Jhon: Because they keep searching for a truth that everyone knows, but here they don’t want to accept it.

JDR: Yes, yes, the right-wing candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella has said that he wants to get rid of the JEP. And that’s a historical promise of Uribismo. The Colombian right claims that the JEP has been politicized although it has investigated the crimes from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

It’s been said that the peace agreement with the FARC opened up a space for the political left that didn’t exist before. Previously, left-wing candidates received a very minimal percentage of votes in national elections and congress. Now, Petro’s party, the Pacto Historico, has grown a lot in Congress and both he and Cepeda also achieved historic vote shares.

You think this is a healthy thing for the country, for pluralism and progress in that regard?

24:22

Jhon: Well, for me, my way of looking at and analyzing things is important because never before have so many people been involved in politics, everyone is talking to him about politics.

JDR: The turnout for the first round of the presidential election was also historic. Like 58% or 57%, which is absurd in Colombia. People are generally indifferent.

Jhon: And that’s good for the country, that everyone is involved in politics. Because that’s what a democracy is about: respecting everyone’s opinions which was something that wasn’t seen before. These days, everywhere you go, everyone talks to you about politics. And for me, it’s very good for the country because it shows that we’re entering into a process of change in the country.

And that’s what Petro’s achieved; it’s the Pacto Historico that has given us that voice to people with limited resources, working people. Jhon, I wanted to ask, in a way you have a profile which should be more right-leaning.

JDR: You are very bootstrapping, you work driving, growing coffee, carpentry etc. The common argument from the right is that the left does not value work and that everything is about giving money away. Welfare, etc. What would you say to that?

25:52

Jhon: We don’t want anything for free. We want [our leaders] to manage the country’s resources well in favor of the people. Not that just because I have power I’m going to steal all that money. And that’s what they want to sell, that the left just gives things away. That the left, that they teach laziness, no.

That’s not what we want, we want to work in peace. That the government helps us with projects, and that all taxes are well managed that we pay for, because that money doesn’t belong to the politicians or whoever is running the country, it is a tax on the people. But they want to sell us this idea that if you’re left-wing, you’re lazy, if you’re right-wing then you’re a hard worker.

JDR: That you’re an entrepreneur, a businessman, etc.

Jhon: Yes and I’ve seen many people who are big fans of Gustavo Petro. They are businessmen, people who have money too. It’s not about whether you like to work. That if you’re left-wing you don’t like to work. There are right-wing like that too...but lately here in our country, all the benefits were always for those who have more. Now the Petro government has worked for everyone.

JDR: Hence the idea of a living wage, raising the minimum wage, precisely so that people can have decent jobs, that they are paid well and can support themselves, to get ahead, without needing state assistance, or be recruited by some gang or whatever.

Jhon: We don’t want handouts, or for people to lack opportunities. And that’s what this government is doing. Giving us opportunities. Right now, the minimum wage, the overtime pay, all of that existed before. But Uribe got rid of it, and now this government has restored it. So, yes, Petro is working for ordinary people. We don’t need them to suddenly take away from those that have the most. Equal opportunities for everyone so that the opportunities are for everyone. That’s what a democracy is about, not just giving to some and not to others.

28:22

JDR: If de la Espriella wins, what do you think the future of the left should be?

Jhon: If a right-wing government tries to undo what this governmet has done Regarding the current government, etc., we’ll have to wait and see what happens. Because it’s very easy to talk, to do. There are many associations that have been working together for a long time. And that’s not what Mr. Abelardo says.

“I’m going in and putting an end to this and that.” No, if he wins, then we’ll have to wait, because that’s not going to happen. They don’t make all the decisions. That’s what the Senate and the House are for. And we the people have the final say. People are no longer willing to be manipulated as they were in the past.

Back in the old days, they used to say things like, “Well, you’re a liberal,” or “You’re a conservative.” So even if the conservatives were stealing, “I’m a conservative, so I vote for them.” No, not anymore, nowadays even the youngest children. They know what politics is.

JDR: At the local level, there’s a lot of talk about political machines. These political machines advocate for governors who buy votes, etc. But the curious thing is that now, at a national level, that is seen less and less. People are truly voting more freely, not simply what they’re told.

30:14

Jhon: Yes, that’s great.

Because then how are we going to change as a country? And we, as a people, started the corruption. So if we don’t sell our votes, well, that’s enough to say, oh well, we’re going to have to change the way we work. what we’re going to do. And most departments already. There are many people who are voting according to their conscience. Not allowing themselves to be manipulated, to be forced to sell their vote, or to be coerced.

The thing is, nowadays, well, the channels that broadcast from this country only talk about the bad things about it. They don’t talk about the good things in the country. In my opinion, if it’s a democratic country, they should talk about everything. The good and the bad. It’s too big a country. And it doesn’t take four years to fix it. That takes many years. For decades, the right wing said they would fix the country. They were there for eight to ten years and what did they do? Nothing.

31:24

JDR: Jhon, this is the last question. Is there anything else you’d like to say? to an international audience, something you think is important for people to know about Colombia, about your own experiences? Regarding past presidents, the future president,

Jhon: what I would say to everyone is...that Colombia is a very beautiful, very good country. Don’t believe all the bad news you hear and choose not to visit because Colombia has so much nature. So much to see, our country is so beautiful. And I extend an invitation to everyone who wants to go to Colombia. That they come to our country and enjoy what we have to offer.

JDR: In Tierradentro.

Jhon: In Tierradentro.

Jhon is exactly the kind of voter I love talking to: humble, patriotic, hardworking who votes with the capital P People in mind. I especially admire his deep love of his country which often isn’t the case from many middle and upper class Colombians beyond futbol (Vamos Colombia 2026).

Those who read my recent coverage of the election which includes a mention of Jhon know that I will be the first to say that Petro made many serious mistakes. His government, however, also did many things so much so that Cepeda nearly prevailed. The video is in Spanish with subtitles. Below is the English transcript with timestamps.

INTERVIEW

JDR: Good afternoon, Jhon. Thank you for speaking with DropSite. Tell us about yourself and what you do here in Bogotá.

John: Thank you for inviting me. I’ve lived here in Bogotá for 23 years. I currently work as an Uber driver, I also do carpentry and whatever else comes up. Bogotá is a very welcoming city, very good for all of us who come to work here in Bogotá and contribute to the city.

JDR: Great. We actually met, you were my Uber driver a few months ago, in April if I remember correctly. We were chatting and you told me a great deal about your life and upbringing. Colombia, as every Colombian knows very well, has had an extremely agitated, bloody and sad recent history.

For decades there’s been an armed conflict between [leftist] guerrillas, [right-wing] paramilitaries, drug traffickers and state violence. And you yourself are a victim of the conflict. You were displaced. You told me that you are from the corregimiento of Tierradentro in Tolima. Tell us about your life there, your childhood, what you saw, etc.

01:26

Jhon: Well, the truth is that since I was little, we always knew about all the armed groups in the countryside. Out there, you’d wake up and if it wasn’t the army, it was any armed group, like the ELN (National Liberation Army), the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the RP. All of those people. And you get used to that life because you have to. We went to school, and ran into those same people. They would ask you where you were going. If they already knew you were going to school, they would ask anyway. And instead of studies what would happen is that the army arrived.

There was fighting all the time. But as I say, here you got used to living that life and other lives. Because there were no other exits. Of course. And tell us about Tierra Dentro, where it is, you were telling me recently about the landscape, its location. Tierra Dentro is a town located in the mountains of northern Tolima, belonging to the municipality of Ibaratolima. It is located near the Nevado del Ruiz, which has a warm and a very welcoming climate. And it grows all kinds of food, great for growing coffee, bananas, everything you could want.

2:50

JDR: You also mentioned to me that during your childhood several of your friends were recruited by the paramilitaries and guerrillas. And you left Tierradentro around 2004, right?

Jhon: I left while I was still studying. Many [of the armed groups] convinced young men to join them and took them away. They went with them because they were convinced to join. Once they left, by the next day; you could see carrying a gun and in uniform.

And I left Tierradentro. I left in 2004 to serve in the military. Because it seemed like the only way out. I saw the military as a way to get ahead. There were no opportunities, but the military opened up opportunities for people like us, people with limited resources.

JDR: And how did you see that many your peers viewed armed groups? Also as an opportunity to get ahead? Or because of political sympathies, for one side or the other, etc.

Jhon: It was more like the kids were shown a rifle and said: “oh, this is cool. It’s going to be easier for me, there will be work”. Many believed them and went. And once they were in, they couldn’t get out. If they did manage to leave that life behind, they would have to go far away otherwise they’d be killed.

4:28

JDR: If you feel comfortable, tell us about the type of violence you witnessed. You told me that you and your father, were ultimately displaced by the paramilitaries.

Jhon: Yes, it started a while ago, going back when Colombia beat Argentina 5-0 [in 1993]. The paramilitaries came in and created panic in the community. They killed and dismembered people. Everyone was leaving. And then only the town remained, it was like a ghost town, with just us left.

There was an old lady that lived close to our home and she couldn’t leave because she was so old. My dad used to tell us that we would stay because we didn’t owe anything to anyone.

That day, when Colombia, I don’t remember the exact date, Colombia beat Argentina 5-0, The day before, we went down to Feria, Tolima, because my dad did business there, buying goods from local farmers and selling them in a cart in Lérida.

So we went to Lerida the next day, a Saturday, The town was full of paramilitaries. So we sold bananas with my dad, we shopped and we went back home. And when we arrived, all the walls were marked, with the name of the paramilitaries.

JDR: The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Jhon: And that’s how it happened, we were always anxious, because we found out that they were going to kill the guerrillas there. There was combat every day, and sometimes someone would go out into the village whether my dad or I. And fighting would break out; I didn’t know if my dad would catch a stray bullet, or something else. We were in school when soldiers or guerrillas arrived, and there was battle after battle.

06:36

JDR: There’s been a lot of talk about how the government of former President Álvaro Uribe had a lot of connections with paramilitarism, the AUC, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. During your childhood, did you perceive any complicity between the State and right-wing groups?

Jhon: They said it themselves, it’s not surprising, they themselves said that the boss (Uribe) needed to win. And when the army went to towns that [the AUC] controlled, the [fighters] hid and only the commanders came out to meet with the army commanders. And when the AUC arrived in a town they kept a list of people’s [government-provided] national ID numbers.

So, what else can one really say or think to justify having all that information?

07:31

JDR: And when you joined the army, you mentioned that you traveled all over the country, saw the best and the worst of Colombia.

Tell us a little about that, and also about those you served with. As well as the view that the armed forces had of the country, for better and for worse.

Jhon: Well, when I did my military service, they were going to send me to Caquetá, Then later a corporal told me no, because I was going to the army. Then they sent me to the police because the quota was already full in the battalion.

So they were going to send me, they sent me to the police academy. We took some courses in counter-insurgency, which consisted of retaking control of police stations that had been taken over by the guerrillas, in Valle [del Cauca], Dolores, all of that.

They were expecting weapons that never arrived, and they sent us to do a jungle commando seminar. Then they assigned us to bases and sent me to Caquetá but the corporal told me that he wasn’t going to let me go because it was too dangerous.

So I told him, well, I’m here to help and they sent me to Tuluá, in Valle del Cauca. And it was more dangerous there than in Caquetá.

JDR: Both of those were historical FARC strongholds.

Jhon: From there, we belonged to the anti-narcotics group; we searched for drugs. And there’s an antinarcotics base in Tuluá, and a police academy and there were 30 or 40 people were killed weekly in Tuluá alone.

So the armed conflict goes way back for many years. After that, we only patrolled looking for drugs. Then they put us out on the streets to help police patrols to carry out operations, to counteract violence, because it was out of control.

And at that time Mr. Uribe was President. That’s why, because the media doesn’t tell the full truth about the country from what it was about 10 or 15 years ago to what it is now. What we are seeing now in 2026, there’s still violence, but it is not the same as it was before.

JDR: Of course. And when did you leave the army?

Jhon: I left in 2004.

JDR: 2004. And then you came here, and settled in Bogotá.

Jhon: Yes, yes, because I couldn’t go back home so I came here to Bogotá to work, to continue my life.

10:35

JDR: Tell us about your life here in Bogotá.

Jhon: I arrived here in Bogotá, I arrived before in Ibagué, and in Ibagué I called an uncle and I saw that he could help me come and work here, and he said yes, so I came to live in the south [of the city] in a neighborhood called Potosí, later my uncle had a fruit and vegetable business there in Paloquemao. And then he told me to find work at a local company. And that’s where I spent a lot of my life. They called me four days later, and that’s where I started working. And that’s how I ended up living in Bogotá. And I’ve done well thanks to God.

JDR: And you also work as a carpenter now, right? How long have you been doing that?

Jhon: Well, I’ve been doing carpentry for three or four years, more or less.

JDR: Oh, really? What kind of things?

Jhon: Doors, closets, everything..

JDR: You also told that around six years ago you returned to Tierradento for the first time in 15 years and that things have changed a lot for the better. Parts of the Colombian countryside are thriving thankfully. Tell us about what’s happening in your town now.

12:11

Jhon: Well, the truth is that our farm was left all alone because my father also had to leave. And it was left all alone because my dad there alone, he could have been killed. So he left. The farm had coffee, it had bananas everywhere, a nice house and all that, and that’s it.

Six years ago, I asked some cousins, since we still have family there. I asked him how he was and they said that things were good. I told my mother, my mom is here in Bogotá with us, I told her I was going to go work on that farm. It was left alone for 15 years.

I went back, with my mother. We arrived at Díaz de Tolima, we had a car. And the roads were completely destroyed, they were practically dirt tracks. And then I arrived at the farm. And I found our little house made of wood. It’s all crooked, we haven’t fixed it because I haven’t had enough money, but we’re getting there. And I already have coffee planted and all that. I’m already picking coffee, bananas, and yucca too. Things have improved quite a bit, that much has been seen.

JDR: Excellent, excellent.

Colombia now has its first left-wing government, the government of Gustavo Petro. We’re in election season, the second round for the presidency is this Sunday. This government has prioritized a rural areas, investments in the countryside, and agrarian reform precisely to restitute lands taken from victims of the armed conflict, like yourself.

You feel that this government has fulfilled its promises to the countryside and to the victims of the conflict?

14:11

Jhon: For me yes, for me yes, because I went back to my farm right before President Petro assumed office. There were no roads, routes, finished highways, health posts, nothing. Right now you go there, and you see festivities, everyone’s goes there and no one fears, being stopped, that they’ll be killed. None of that. People are planting again, there’s a lot of farms, there is a lot of cultivation. Health posts are now up and running where they were destroyed before. They have nurses available 24 hours a day for any emergency. So you don’t have to go to the main hospital in the city. They take care of you there. They have paved a lot of roads.

So yes, it can be done, when a government wants to work with the people, yes, it can be done. But since there are many benefits given to people in this country who act in their own self-interest. That’s why they haven’t done anything [before] for the countryside.

But a majority in the countryside loves this president you very much for that reason. Because he has cared about the countryside and people have liked the way his government has managed things. Healthcare too, before there were the health brigades. Those existed before Uribe became president and they were destroyed.

Now the medical brigades have returned. So that’s useful for one’s grandparents who can no longer go out all the time because of their age. They arrive at your house, examine you, everything. And if possible, depending on how they see it, they might forward you to a hospital with medications. So there’s definitely been a change.

16:06

JDR: It should be said that in much of the countryside, in rural areas, in the country don’t get great healthcare. It’s often necessary to travel to cities for all kinds of procedures, etc. So that’s very important.

And tell us, Jhon, more or less what your family and friends from Tierradentro have told you. When more or less, did it become peaceful? That the armed groups left, some demobilized, others moved to other areas.

Jhon: That’s what my friends have told me since the 2010s. Because that’s when there was a demobilization. Going back to Santos’ peace process. That helped a lot. Some people say it didn’t help, but for example, in that territory, it helped us a lot.

JDR: The 2016 peace agreement with the FARC.

Jhon: Because those people surrendered completely, they all demobilized. Later, when the paramilitaries went through the JEP, some did mobilize, others did not. And those who remained there had to face the same Colombian military so they left since there were very few. More or less since 2010.

JDR: The special jurisdiction for peace (JEP), the court of justice created by the peace agreement to address past crimes from all actors of the conflict.

Jhon: And that’s when things started to improve a lot. It was over, we were at peace in that territory. But there was no government investment. There were many people who had left, people whose families had been killed. And all the inputs for agricultural products are quite expensive. Back then, people weren’t working. Now, as we saw, investment, road repairs, all the products for crops were cheaper. People are cheerful again and are working.

JDR: Excellent. Jhon, there’s a lot of talk that President Petro is a former guerrilla fighter from the M19. During the current election campaign, it’s been said that what’s happening is that the left, Petro and presidential candidate Iván Cepeda, are allies of the guerrillas, of the FARC dissidents, ELN, etc. You have a unique point of view, how do you view past and present guerrillas? Do you them as true ideological actors or more so as criminals? Do you see differences between the political left and the armed left?

Jhon: I always saw guerrillas differently. The truth is I never heard them talk about politics. And the other thing, well, President Petro, although he was part of M19, I hadn’t been born yet. I cannot judge him. And Cepeda, the candidate, well, he...it’s no secret that his father was killed. That’s still unknown, and who killed him.

JDR: Manuel Cepeda, yes.

They are believed to have been state agents, thus allied with paramilitarism in the 90s. He was a very important leader of the Communist Party at the time. The Patriotic Union. Which suffered a genocide. They were devastated.

Jhon: And, for example, here in Colombia, there may be guerrillas, but not as many as they claim. In fact, those who remain, are mostly around borders. Because this government already has approved investment to various departments where the peasants didn’t even have roads, now..many have substituted the cultivation of coca for coffee, bananas, and pancoher. So, the armed groups no longer have coca. There may be cocaine, but it’s much further removed, like at the borders with other countries.

So, that helps to lessen war a little bit. Because we also have many farmers who are tired of the war. And I don’t think that guerrillas are allied with these candidates. The problem we have here is that we have a mirror image like Venezuela or Cuba. They say that the left is the worst, that the left is going to ruin the country, no. For me, the [political] left here in Colombia isn’t a [communist] left, it’s more like the center.

Look at what the country had when President Petro came in; he hasn’t ruined the country. That the country is going to end, no, I would have put 10,000 pesos on it. Right now, the peso has gained value relative to the dollar.

JDR: It has strengthened, yes, yes.

Jhon: That’s good for us, but is bad for the far right. Those who have a great interests in the country. For them everything is bad, if [the dollar] is expensive, if it’s cheap it’s also bad. So we as a people are also allowing ourselves to be very divided.

21:43

JDR: It should also be noted that Petro’s government has fought against several guerrilla groups, FARC dissidents, who chose not to take part in the 2016 peace process, the ELN and several other groups, including the Clan del Golfo. So certainly some of these narratives are simplistic.

Jhon: Yes, and for some, the peace process didn’t work. But the peace process, when one looks at analyzes it thoroughly, it serve the country well because many people demobilized. You go to Caquetá, to a large part of where the demobilized are and those people are working, they are sowing seeds, they are already seeking civilian life, which is the best for the country, the best for all farming families.

Because in violence, you know that in a war, all the peasants are always involved. All the people under little resources, everyday people, as we say here in Colombia. So it’s very easy to start a war, but when it comes to achieving peace, they don’t look for solutions. But from the process of everything that’s being done, the process that the JEP is doing. All of that is good for the country.

JDR: Of course.

Jhon: Because they keep searching for a truth that everyone knows, but here they don’t want to accept it.

JDR: Yes, yes, the right-wing candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella has said that he wants to get rid of the JEP. And that’s a historical promise of Uribismo. The Colombian right claims that the JEP has been politicized although it has investigated the crimes from both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

It’s been said that the peace agreement with the FARC opened up a space for the political left that didn’t exist before. Previously, left-wing candidates received a very minimal percentage of votes in national elections and congress. Now, Petro’s party, the Pacto Historico, has grown a lot in Congress and both he and Cepeda also achieved historic vote shares.

You think this is a healthy thing for the country, for pluralism and progress in that regard?

24:22

Jhon: Well, for me, my way of looking at and analyzing things is important because never before have so many people been involved in politics, everyone is talking to him about politics.

JDR: The turnout for the first round of the presidential election was also historic. Like 58% or 57%, which is absurd in Colombia. People are generally indifferent.

Jhon: And that’s good for the country, that everyone is involved in politics. Because that’s what a democracy is about: respecting everyone’s opinions which was something that wasn’t seen before. These days, everywhere you go, everyone talks to you about politics. And for me, it’s very good for the country because it shows that we’re entering into a process of change in the country.

And that’s what Petro’s achieved; it’s the Pacto Historico that has given us that voice to people with limited resources, working people. Jhon, I wanted to ask, in a way you have a profile which should be more right-leaning.

JDR: You are very bootstrapping, you work driving, growing coffee, carpentry etc. The common argument from the right is that the left does not value work and that everything is about giving money away. Welfare, etc. What would you say to that?

25:52

Jhon: We don’t want anything for free. We want [our leaders] to manage the country’s resources well in favor of the people. Not that just because I have power I’m going to steal all that money. And that’s what they want to sell, that the left just gives things away. That the left, that they teach laziness, no.

That’s not what we want, we want to work in peace. That the government helps us with projects, and that all taxes are well managed that we pay for, because that money doesn’t belong to the politicians or whoever is running the country, it is a tax on the people. But they want to sell us this idea that if you’re left-wing, you’re lazy, if you’re right-wing then you’re a hard worker.

JDR: That you’re an entrepreneur, a businessman, etc.

Jhon: Yes and I’ve seen many people who are big fans of Gustavo Petro. They are businessmen, people who have money too. It’s not about whether you like to work. That if you’re left-wing you don’t like to work. There are right-wing like that too...but lately here in our country, all the benefits were always for those who have more. Now the Petro government has worked for everyone.

JDR: Hence the idea of a living wage, raising the minimum wage, precisely so that people can have decent jobs, that they are paid well and can support themselves, to get ahead, without needing state assistance, or be recruited by some gang or whatever.

Jhon: We don’t want handouts, or for people to lack opportunities. And that’s what this government is doing. Giving us opportunities. Right now, the minimum wage, the overtime pay, all of that existed before. But Uribe got rid of it, and now this government has restored it. So, yes, Petro is working for ordinary people. We don’t need them to suddenly take away from those that have the most. Equal opportunities for everyone so that the opportunities are for everyone. That’s what a democracy is about, not just giving to some and not to others.

28:22

JDR: If de la Espriella wins, what do you think the future of the left should be?

Jhon: If a right-wing government tries to undo what this governmet has done Regarding the current government, etc., we’ll have to wait and see what happens. Because it’s very easy to talk, to do. There are many associations that have been working together for a long time. And that’s not what Mr. Abelardo says.

“I’m going in and putting an end to this and that.” No, if he wins, then we’ll have to wait, because that’s not going to happen. They don’t make all the decisions. That’s what the Senate and the House are for. And we the people have the final say. People are no longer willing to be manipulated as they were in the past.

Back in the old days, they used to say things like, “Well, you’re a liberal,” or “You’re a conservative.” So even if the conservatives were stealing, “I’m a conservative, so I vote for them.” No, not anymore, nowadays even the youngest children. They know what politics is.

JDR: At the local level, there’s a lot of talk about political machines. These political machines advocate for governors who buy votes, etc. But the curious thing is that now, at a national level, that is seen less and less. People are truly voting more freely, not simply what they’re told.

30:14

Jhon: Yes, that’s great.

Because then how are we going to change as a country? And we, as a people, started the corruption. So if we don’t sell our votes, well, that’s enough to say, oh well, we’re going to have to change the way we work. what we’re going to do. And most departments already. There are many people who are voting according to their conscience. Not allowing themselves to be manipulated, to be forced to sell their vote, or to be coerced.

The thing is, nowadays, well, the channels that broadcast from this country only talk about the bad things about it. They don’t talk about the good things in the country. In my opinion, if it’s a democratic country, they should talk about everything. The good and the bad. It’s too big a country. And it doesn’t take four years to fix it. That takes many years. For decades, the right wing said they would fix the country. They were there for eight to ten years and what did they do? Nothing.

31:24

JDR: Jhon, this is the last question. Is there anything else you’d like to say? to an international audience, something you think is important for people to know about Colombia, about your own experiences? Regarding past presidents, the future president,

Jhon: what I would say to everyone is...that Colombia is a very beautiful, very good country. Don’t believe all the bad news you hear and choose not to visit because Colombia has so much nature. So much to see, our country is so beautiful. And I extend an invitation to everyone who wants to go to Colombia. That they come to our country and enjoy what we have to offer.

JDR: In Tierradentro.

Jhon: In Tierradentro.

On May 7th, President Trump held a state visit with his left-wing Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva where the pair discussed issues of bilateral trade, rare earths and regional security. The meeting comes amid an ongoing rapprochement between both leaders following a period of heightened tensions after Trump’s return to office. At a time when the Trump administration has actively antagonized leftist leaders in the Americas, the White House’s about face towards Brazil is a welcome if somewhat perplexing development. For his part, Lula faces a tough reelection in October against Trump stalwart, Flavio Bolsonaro, son of former president and far-right rival Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023). It remains to be seen whether the truce between Washington and Brasilia will hold until election day.

Last August, the Trump administration imposed 50 percent tariffs on a host of Brazilian products on the grounds that the country violated the elder Bolsonaro’s human rights. The former president was barred from office and sentenced to prison by Brazil’s Supreme Court over an attempted coup following his 2022 loss to Lula. The surprise trade war could not have come at a more opportune moment for the Brazilian president who was languishing with record low approval ratings that subsequently recovered to 50 percent. What’s more, the tariff broadside blindsided the Bolsonaros who previously sent Jair’s youngest son, Eduardo, to Washington to lobby for sanctions against the Brazilian government.

Defiant, the Lula government stood its ground and rallied Brazilians against Trump and Bolsonarismo’s haphazard attempts at sabotaging their own country; trade between Brazil and China likewise skyrocketed in a spectacular own goal for Washington. Spurned for his efforts, a leaked WhatsApp chain showed Eduardo Bolsonaro telling his father to “take it up the ass” for his ingratitude. Just three months later, Trump unilaterally dropped most tariffs on Brazil with Lula citing “good chemistry” between the two leaders following a brief encounter at the UN. The independent journalist Glenn Greenwald has claimed that Lula successfully charmed Trump by noting their shared macho bravado in response to legal woes.

Much like the lawfare waged against Trump’s properties and campaign financing in New York, Lula was jailed for over two years on the dubious grounds that he accepted a São Paulo apartment as a bribe. In Lula’s telling, the octogenarian president embraced his imprisonment with resilience in contrast to the younger but sickly Bolsonaro. Without a doubt, Trump has long been susceptible to flattery, particularly from leaders that he finds personally appealing. Following their meeting, the president praised Brazil’s “dynamic president”. Of course, it’s also quite clear that Brazil has much to offer Washington.

In the wake of the White House’s 2025 trade war with China, Beijing successfully culled its Trumpian opponent thanks to a strategic chokehold on the export of rare earths. Many analysts have thereafter observed that Brazil has the second largest reserves of rare earths which could stand to lessen US dependency on the Middle Kingdom. Seeing that its subsequent trade war with Brazil similarly backfired, the Trump administration has since spun the country’s tariff relief as a concession in exchange for rare earths.

Until recently, it seemed that Lula had gotten the better of his American counterpart with no formal agreement signed over rare earths in the 10 months since the White House dropped most of its tariffs. Despite its enormous reserves, Brazil’s current export of rare earths is minimal for the simple reason that the country–unlike China and much like the US–lacks the capacity to extract and refine its deposits. Like AMLO and Sheinbaum in Mexico, Lula has championed a state-owned firm, Terrabras, for extracting rare earths.

Time and again, however, the Brazilian president has shown that his worst ostensible enemies are neither the far right nor jingoistic US presidents but the country’s short-sighted oligarchy. Last month, American mining multinational, USA Rare Earth announced the $2.8 billion purchase of Goias-based Serra Verde Group–at present, the owner of the only rare earths mine in Brazil. Naturally, much of the Brazilian left took to lambasting Goias governor and Bolsonaro ally, Ronaldo Caiado for authorizing the sale. In reality, the president could conceivably annul the purchase if he so chose to do so. As it stands, Brazil would effectively be handing over the entirety of its admittedly minimal rare earth production to a foreign company.

Worse still, in a move to placate Brazil’s Wall Street–known colloquially as Faria Lima–the government seemingly backtracked on its plan to create the state-owned Terrabras. As always, Washington and Faria Lima, it seems, may end up as the greatest beneficiaries of the truce between Lula and Trump. In and of itself, US and any other foreign investment in Brazil not only isn’t malign but eminently desirable for a country like Brazil. The issue, of course, is that the terms of foreign trade and investment ultimately benefit Brazilian workers as opposed to shareholders in São Paulo and New York.

To that end, there is some hope the Lula government could get at least some aspects of the rare earths trade right for workers. Hours before yesterday’s meeting, Brazil’s lower house passed a regulatory framework for rare earth extraction by a near unanimous margin. The legislation includes the creation of a special council with the power to veto foreign acquisitions, including, potentially, the sale of Serra Verde. The bill also provides tax credits and other incentives for companies headquartered and managed in Brazil that undertake domestic processing and refining of minerals; it’s an open question how either provision will function in practice or be diluted in the Senate. Whatever the case, it will take years if not decades before Brazil lives up to its potential as an exporter of rare earths–a fact which may or may not be lost on the White House.

More clear are both nations’ shared interests in reviving oil production in Venezuela. Brazilian firms such as meatpacking oligarch Joesley Batista’s Fluxus has pushed to enter Venezuela’s oil and gas sector following former dictator Nicolás Maduro’s January ouster. A key player across multiple countries, Batista reportedly lobbied Maduro to leave office and was likewise instrumental in organizing the meeting between Lula and Trump. Speaking with the press yesterday afternoon, Lula made a notable admission that he considered Trump’s intervention in Venezuela to have been a success.

Finally, the last item discussed between both leaders regarded regional security, most notably against transnational organized crime. The White House has reportedly contemplated labeling Brazil’s two largest drug trafficking gangs, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) as foreign terrorist organizations. As in Mexico, the prospect has drawn ire from nationalist sectors within Brazil for fears that the US could engage in unilateral strikes against organized crime within the country.

Accordingly, Security minister Wellington Lime e Silva noted in the aforementioned press conference that the drug trade between the two countries is minimal and ironically consists in no small part of trafficking of US synthetic drugs into Brazil. As with the Trump administration’s contrived claims of combating the drug trade in Venezuela, many in Brazil argue that the same pretext could be used to destabilize the country. Indeed, some members of Bolsonarismo have celebrated the idea of Trump bombing Brazil. In turn, Lula told reporters that he invited the Trump administration to join Brazil’s cross border headquarters against organized crime in Manaus.

The irony is that Trump’s rapprochement with Lula appears to have genuinely helped the opposition. Lula’s approval rating has slumped back into the low-to-mid 40s as the public has increasingly punished the president for his capitulations to myriad special interests including the country’s Central Bank, foreign NGOs, Faria Lima, trans totalitarians and degrowth/climate fundamentalists. Ostensible government priorities such as proposed railways and other infrastructure improvements have been derailed by villains such as Environment Minister Marina Silva though the president finally succeeded in overcoming opposition to oil extraction in the Amazon. Worst of all, Brazil’s catastrophic minimum wage has remained stagnant in real terms since Lula returned to office.

Unsurprisingly, polls show the Brazilian leader tied with Flavio Bolsonaro who has promised to dutifully serve his Trumpian master and emulate neighboring Javier Milei’s shock therapy. The Trump administration will ultimately have to weigh whether another intervention in Brazilian politics stands to help or hurt its interests. As for Lula, if he is truly serious about winning reelection, he will need to stand up to more than just Trump and Bolsonarismo.

Whatever its director’s precise intentions, none of these readings are particularly compelling and ironically validate the dead end near future portrayed in the film.

One Battle After Another is a loose adaptation of the 1990 novel, Vineland, by Thomas Pynchon. Both the novel and film recount a convoluted interplay over a course of 16 years between former revolutionaries and agents of a right-wing police state. Many scenes in the film are eerily reminiscent of ICE and CBP enforcement surges in Los Angeles and Minneapolis under the second Trump administration. The fact that One Battle finished filming well before Trump’s 2024 reelection speaks to an almost unintended foresight from the director. Anderson, moreover, previously adapted Pynchon’s Inherent Vice in 2014 and had long expressed interest in bringing some form of Vineland to the big screen.

Unlike the novel–which takes place during the 1980s–the issue of greatest political contention in the film is immigration. Leonardo DiCaprio’s protagonist, Bob Ferguson is initially part of the French 75, a modern-day Weather Underground. It’s telling and painfully appropriate, however, that the group’s stated ideology is purely of the culturally progressive variety. Ferguson’s pursuer and antagonist, Colonel Steven Lockjaw, played by Sean Penn, is an idiosyncratic, nativist executor of mass deportations and repression against insurgent groups like the French 75.

At no point in the film do proponents of revolution or regime partisans advocate for raising wages, making housing more affordable, decoupling from foreign clients’ costly wars or–most notably–punishing employers of illegal labor. Instead, the priorities of the French 75 as described by the militant Jungle Pussy are, “Free bodies, free borders, free choices, and freedom from fucking fear.” The guerrilla’s chief modus operandi consists of robbing banks and freeing illegal immigrants from state detention–a cause certain to rouse working class Americans. Accordingly, the right-wing regime embodied by Lockjaw is hell bent on a performative and selective deportation regime headed by a cabal of oligarchs that shamelessly exploit illegal labor.

The reality depicted in One Battle is disturbingly plausible. After leaving the French 75, Ferguson and his surrogate daughter, Willa (Chase Infiniti) are revealed to have settled in Baktan Cross, a fictional sanctuary city in California. One officer explains to Colonel Lockjaw to expect local sympathy towards targeted terrorist groups when planning a military intervention in Baktan Cross. No mention is made of elected officials or political parties in the film leaving the country’s decade-plus status quo open to the viewer’s imagination.

The most logical interpretation is that progressive enclaves continue to enjoy democratically elected governments while a right-wing regime exercises national hegemony, presumably through some degree of foul play. Clearly, however, the trappings of the country’s constitutional tradition survive to some extent in One Battle. It’s conceivable that the mere existence of the French 75 helped bolster popular support for right-wing rule. In Colombia, decades of terrorism from the FARC cratered support for the political left up until the guerrillas demobilized in 2017. The fact that popular causes such as land reform were discredited in a country as disadvantaged as Colombia speaks to the often counterproductive nature of armed struggle–much less one geared towards open borders.

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Pacto Histórico (PH) - Historic Pact (Left-wing, Ruling Party)

Founded by President Petro, the PH is technically a coalition of multiple left-wing parties ranging from the far-to-center left. In his typical over-the-top grandstanding, Petro said during a debate in 2022, “El Pacto Histórico no es un partido, es una forma de gobernar—the Historic Pact isn’t a party, it’s a method of governing” (Facepalm). In practice, the party runs the gamut from former and possibly still actual communists, social democrats, laborists, climate fundamentalists and identitarians of various stripes.

The former three have redeeming qualities as shown by the administration’s recent turnaround in favor of raising wages, state capitalism and saber-rattling against Washington—the latter two not so much… Conversely, a small number of PH officials such as the recently deceased Piedad Córdoba are overt apologists for left-wing dictatorships. Most such as Petro and PH presidential candidate Iván Cepeda dance around the issue incoherently as is typical of leftist parties in the region.

The PH won at least 25 seats in the Senate and 40 in the House of Representatives. This is the most seats that a single political party has won since 2010, up five in the Senate and 12 in the House of Representatives since 2022. All told, the party secured 4.4 million votes in the Senate.

Alianza Verde (AV) - Green Alliance (Left-of-center, Pro-Government)

Historically, AV has been one of Colombia’s most important parties left-of-center. Most of its elected officials are supportive of the Petro administration with many identifying as Petristas. Some are more centrist and one of its senators, JP Hernández, a finger-in-the-wing populist, is openly anti-Petro; I could see him eventually opposing a President Valencia or De La Espriella. Ironically, Hernandez was the party’s most voted senator thanks to his large following as an influencer prior to his election in 2022. As its name suggests, AV is keen on green politics though there are exceptions. The gamut of its elected officials runs farther to the center and right than PH but it is a mostly progressive party. This time around, the party will have 10 senators and 5 representatives in Congress.

Centro Democrático (CD) - Democratic Center (Right-wing, Opposition)

Founded by controversial former president Álvaro Uribe, CD is effectively a cult of personality around Uribe. The former president is both esteemed and hated for a crackdown against the now defunct FARC and ELN that dramatically improved security at the cost of thousands of extrajudicial killings of civilians. His government had disturbingly close ties to right-wing narcoparamilitaries of United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and he has been plagued with legal issues since leaving the presidency. CD’s adherents form part of Uribismo which promotes the former president’s policies of limited government, hardline security policies and Christian Nationalism. Its presidential candidate is Paloma Valencia who won and secured a surprising number of votes in her respective consulta. CD won 17 senators and 23 representatives.

Salvación Nacional (SN) - National Salvation (Right-wing, Opposition)

SN was originally founded by legacy Conservative, Álvaro Gómez, who was assassinated in 1995 and is now led by Enrique Gómez. Álvaro and Enrique are the son and grandson of Laureano Gómez, a fascistic leader of the Conservative Party who fomented much of the bloodshed of the La Violencia civil war during the 1940s and 1950s. Álvaro was a more moderate but also interesting conservative who later broke with his party. His son, Enrique, has thrown his lot in with Uribismo. SN’s presidential candidate is independent Uribista and right-wing frontrunner Abelardo De La Espriella, who ruled out a primary with Valencia and other right-wing candidates due to his strength in the polls. SN had struggled to make it into congress under Gómez but will now serve as essentially a satellite of CD with it’s four senators and one representative.

The Colombian Centrão: Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador, Partido De La U, Cambio Radical (Amorphous, Clientelistic)

Colombia’s legislative politics are remarkably similar to those of Brazil though there is thankfully a smaller absolute number of parties. In Brazil, there are parties on the left and right with clearly defined ideologies such the PT, PSOL, PSDB and PL. In the middle is the so-called Centrão composed of ‘centrist’ parties, which comprise a majority of congress, and serve largely as crime syndicates hell bent on securing graft from incumbent governments. The same more or less applies in Colombia. Historically, the Liberal and Conservative parties maintained a duopoly over Colombian politics throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Technically, the Partido De La U (PdU) and Cambio Radical (CR) are offshoots of the Liberal Party.

In practice, all three of these parties as well the Conservatives live to extract graft from incumbents as well as maintain local fiefdoms where retain greater influence. At this point, none of these parties are viable for the presidency though they opportunistically back one or another candidate. In 2022, the leadership and most elected officials of all four parties declined to back Petro though that may well change this time around. The leader of the Liberal Party, Cesar Gaviria, for instance, despises Petro but an increasing share of the party’s members in congress back the president such as Maria Eugenia Lopera who was the most voted Liberal senator. The Conservative Party is indeed more to the right than its peers on balance but actually backed Petro during the first year of his term.

Congressional Outlook

Depending on your political orientation, there are glass half empty, half full takeaways from the congressional vote. Both the following are true, the next congress will be more favorable towards Cepeda should he win than the current one is towards Petro. At the same time, Uribismo will be stronger in the next congressional term. If Valencia or De La Espriella win the presidency, they will probably enjoy decent governability but also face stiffer resistance than past right-wing presidents.

Presidential Outlook

In recent years, presidential elections have been held concurrently with interparty consultas whereby voters narrow the field of presidential candidates. As in 2022, there were separate left, center and mostly right-wing interparty votes. However, neither of the two current frontrunners, the left-wing Iván Cepeda nor the right-wing Abelardo De La Espriella participated in the primaries making them almost irrelevant. Colombian media, which loathes both De La Espriella and Cepeda, did its very best to play up the primaries and psychoanalyze the results. In the end, however, both the left-wing and centrist primaries garnered a laughable 600,000 votes.

The right-of-center Gran Consulta Por Colombia, however, secured a substantial 5.8 million votes with Paloma Valencia winning around 3.2 million of the total and centrist, Juan Daniel Oviedo around 1.2 million. These vote shares deserve recognition especially since Oviedo has officially agreed to join Valencia as her VP. Still, it remains to be seen if the ticket will make much of a difference in the broader race. We will have to see whether Valencia displaces De La Espriella as the frontrunner on the Right. Maybe they split the vote but presumably, one will endorse the other in a run-off. Uribistas are probably mulling which of the two candidates is more competitive in the run-off.

Stay tuned.

A pocos días desde la publicación de mi último artículo sobre la reunión entre Donald Trump y Gustavo Petro, el Consejo de Estado de la Corte Suprema colombiana tumbó el decreto del presidente estipulando un incremento histórico al salario mínimo del 23,7% para el 2026. La corte informó un fallo procesal que someterá el aumento a una revisión completa que podría tardar hasta un año. Mientras tanto, el presidente tendrá hasta 30 días para emitir un aumento provisional; el gobierno ha dejado claro que decretará la misma tasa del 23,7%.

El fallo ha beneficiado nuevamente al presidente Petro y el candidato oficialista del Pacto Histórico, Iván Cepeda, quienes han arremetido contra el uso de lawfare en contra del poder adquisitivo del trabajador colombiano. Incluso, miembros de la oposición, incluido el favorito uribista Abelardo De La Espriella, han salido en defensa del aumento a pesar de severas críticas en su contra en semanas anteriores.

El salario mínimo en Colombia se aumenta anualmente mediante un acuerdo tripartito entre los sindicatos, asociaciones empresariales y el gobierno. Tanto los sindicatos colombianos y los empresarios proponen una tasa de aumento que luego es supeditada a una conciliación y aprobada por el poder ejecutivo. El año pasado, las dos primeras partes no lograron llegar a un compromiso después de que cada uno propusiera aumentos del 11% y 17%, respectivamente. Cuando esto ocurre, el presidente puede emitir la tasa final mediante un decreto.

Naturalmente, la administración optó por aprovechar una oportunidad de oro para aumentar el salario mínimo mucho más de lo que incluso los sindicatos habían pedido. Predeciblemente, la élite financiera y los medios de comunicación se escandalizaron. Un coro prácticamente universal de candidatos de centro y de la oposición, incluyendo a De La Espriella—así como su ex cliente y expresidente, Álvaro Uribe—calificaron al aumento como populismo imprudente.

Desde el fallo, aún, ha sucedido algo supremamente notable. Prácticamente todos los candidatos presidenciales han dado un fuerte revés en defensa del aumento salarial “castrochavista”. “no nos hemos opuesto ni nos opondremos al aumento del salario mínimo. Aquello a lo cual nos oponemos es que este país paró la inversión, la violencia, el narcotráfico, la carga de impuestos, el desgreño, la explosión del tamaño del Estado. Eso es lo que hay que corregir. Menos costos en el Estado, menos impuestos para los emprendedores, para los empleadores y buen salario mínimo”, dijo el expresidente Uribe.

El uribismo ha seguido el ejemplo de su Líder Supremo, defendiendo el aumento salarial de Petro a la vez que piden bajar impuestos para las empresas; los candidatos de centro han culpado al gobierno por el fallo procesal pero no al aumento en sí. El cinismo de dichos sujetos es asombroso, pero la realidad económica subyacente para los colombianos es poco complicada. Los salarios en Colombia son tan bajos que ningún político se atrevería a pedir que se despoje a los trabajadores de una ganancia supremamente necesaria. Incluso para el 2026, el salario mínimo colombiano sigue siendo de los más bajos del continente—rondando los 350 dólares al mes a los tipos de cambio actuales.

En México, el expresidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) aumentó el salario mínimo aproximadamente un 20% al año durante su sexenio. Por ende, México ha padecido de hiperinflación y desempleo masivo, ¿verdad? Por el contrario, el desempleo ha caído a un mínimo histórico del 2,4%. La pobreza también ha caído un asombroso 20% y las empresas grandes y pequeñas han visto mayores ganancias como resultado del mayor poder adquisitivo de los trabajadores.

Considere, además, que la inflación en México ha seguido la misma trayectoria pospandémica que Brasil, un país cuyo salario mínimo ha experimentado un crecimiento nulo desde el 2012; la tasa de inflación de México para el 2026 ha sido incluso más baja que la de Brasil con un 3,4%. Claro, Banxico ha mantenido altas tasas de interés–actualmente del 8%. No obstante, dicha tasa sigue siendo más baja que las tasas de Colombia y Brasil–11 y 15, respectivamente–pese al tremendo crecimiento salarial en México. Incluso la informalidad ha disminuído bajo el “régimen narcocomunista” de la 4T. Quienes abogan por un salario mínimo miserable deberían reconocer que muchos trabajadores informales se verán más dispuestos a trabajar en un empleo dado un salario adecuado...

Como argumenté en la última publicación, Cepeda de ninguna manera tiene asegurada una victoria en las elecciones presidenciales. Al parecer, aún, la Corte Suprema le ha dado otro empujón.

Just days after publishing the piece above, Colombia’s Consejo de Estado (Council of State) of the Supreme Court struck down President Gustavo Petro’s decree hiking the minimum wage a historic 23.7% for 2026. In characteristic jargon, the court argued that the decree did not follow proper procedure and would undergo a full judicial review. The process could take up to a year but in the meantime, the president has 30 days to issue a provisional but binding increase; the government has made clear it will decree the same rate of 23.7%.

The naked use of lawfare is yet another boon for Petro and ruling party candidate Iván Cepeda who have railed against the judiciary’s use of lawfare to the detriment of Colombian workers. Remarkably, moreover, members of the opposition, including right-wing frontrunner Aberlardo De La Espriella have subsequently u-turned in defense the hike.

In a remarkably thoughtful process, the minimum wage in Colombia is hiked on an annual basis via a tripartite agreement between organized labor, employer associations and the government. Colombian unions and the business community each propose and comprise on a rate increase that is later approved by the executive branch. Last year, neither employers nor unions reached a compromise after each proposed increases of 11% and 17%, respectively. When this occurs, the president can issue the final rate by executive order. Naturally, the administration opted to exploit this golden opportunity to hike the minimum wage far beyond what even labor had asked for.

Predictably, the business community howled, elite media clutched its pearls, and the opposition lined up to denounce the measure as reckless populism. “Think of our homeowners associations fees!”, said the middle and upper class residents of Colombian gated communities—many HOA dues are tied to the minimum wage and pay for the salaries of working class security guards for apartment buildings. A near universal chorus of centrist and opposition candidates including De La Espriella—as well as his former client and expresident, Álvaro Uribe—cast the hike as fiscally irresponsible and electoral theater.

But since the Supreme Court struck down Petro’s decree, something remarkable has happened. De La Espriella and virtually all other presidential candidates have come out in support of “castrochavismo’s” increase to the minimum wage. “We have not opposed, nor will we oppose, an increase in the minimum wage. What we do oppose is that this country has stagnated investment, experienced violence, drug trafficking, an excessive tax burden, mismanagement, and an inflated government. That is what needs to be corrected. Lower government spending, lower taxes for entrepreneurs and employers, and a decent minimum wage.”, said former president Uribe.

Like clockwork, the opposition has followed in the example of their Supreme Leader, defending Petro’s wage hike while also calling for lower taxes on businesses. Similarly, candidates that spent weeks warning of a Peronist apocalypse suddenly transformed into ardent defenders of the Colombian worker. The cynicism is staggering but the underlying economic reality for Colombians isn’t complicated. Wages in Colombia are so low that no politician would dare call for striping workers of a much needed gain. Even after the hike, Colombia’s minimum wage remains remarkably low in absolute terms — hovering around $350 dollars a month at current exchange rates.

In Mexico, former president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), raised the minimum wage by roughly 20% a year during his six year term. But surely, Mexico must have experienced hyperinflation and mass unemployment, right? Quite the contrary, unemployment has fallen to a record low of 2.4%—among the lowest in OECD. Poverty has likewise fallen an astonishing 20% and businesses large and small have seen greater profits as a result workers’ increased buying power.

Consider, moreover, that inflation in Mexico has followed the same post pandemic trajectory as Brazil, a country with virtually no wage growth since 2012; Mexico’s inflation rate for 2026 has come in even lower than Brazil’s at 3.4%. Sure, Mexico’s central bank has kept high interest rates yet even its current rate of 8% is far lower than Colombia’s 11 and Brazil’s 15% despite far higher wage growth in Mexico. “Narcocommunist” Mexico has even seen a decline in informal labor under AMLO and Claudia Sheinbaum. Critics would do well to note that many informal workers will be more inclined to labor in minimum wage jobs as a result of hikes.

As I argued in the last post, Cepeda is by no means assured to win the presidency. His chances, however, are looking better by the day.

La semana pasada, el presidente estadounidense Donald Trump realizó una visita de Estado con el presidente colombiano, Gustavo Petro. La tregua entre ambos líderes fue, para muchos, un acontecimiento sorpresivo. Evidentemente, la Casa Blanca reconoce que Colombia es un socio clave para el futuro de Venezuela tras el secuestro del exdictador Nicolás Maduro en enero. Petro no tiene derecho a la reelección y terminará su mandato en agosto tras elecciones presidenciales en el verano.

En medio de una ola conservadora en el continente, parecía un hecho que la izquierda colombiana iba a entregarle la presidencia a un derechista pro-gringo. Pero desde que Trump volvió a la Casa Blanca, tanto Petro como el candidato oficialista, Iván Cepeda, han recuperado terreno ante la oposición hasta que el presidente Trump volvió al cargo. Cepeda ha liderado o empatado tanto en primera como segunda vuelta al abogado uribista Abelardo De La Espriella. En mis viajes rutinarios a Bogotá, he percibido un repunte notorio hacia el gobierno Petro entre capitalinos. Al parecer, Trump—y su «Doctrina Donroe»—están favoreciendo al Petrismo.

A pocos días de la segunda inauguración del presidente estadounidense, la Casa Blanca amenazó a Colombia con aranceles de 25% por el rechazo de Petro a la repatriación de sus propios ciudadanos. El líder colombiano cedió y el episodio le sirvió a Trump para sacar pecho. Semanas después, el gobierno eligió televisar una reunión de gabinete repleta de intrigas dignas de telenovela. Fue —como describí hace un año— la culminación de un gobierno impopular, obsesionado con causas simbólicas en un país plagado de pobreza y conflicto armado. Petro, aún, optó por una estrategia poco novedosa para el resto de su gobierno: empezó a antagonizar repetidamente a su homólogo gringo.

Igual que Trump, Petro es un populista recalcitrante y fánatico de redes sociales; en especial X. La semana pasada, el presidente colombiano incendió a las redes al afirmar durante un evento público que Jesús tuvo relaciones íntimas con María Magdalena, «porque un hombre así no podría haber existido sin amor», dijo ante jadeos de los espectadores.

Tras su primer enfrentamiento con Trump, Petro estrechó lazos con Beijing; el comercio entre China y Colombia aumentó a un récord de $7 mil millones en los primeros cuatro meses de 2025. En mayo, Colombia se unió a la Iniciativa Franja y la Ruta del estado chino pese a reproches de Washington. No obstante, la Casa Blanca no ha vuelto a usar aranceles como instrumento de coerción pese a las continuas diatribas del presidente exguerrillero en contra de la política exterior estadounidense.

Para junio, surgieron unas grabaciones del excanciller oficialista, Álvaro Leyva, y otros políticos prominentes sugiriendo un aparente complot para derrocar a Petro con la ayuda del gobierno Trump. Leyva fue suspendido de su cargo en el 2024 por supuestas irregularidades en cuanto al trámite de pasaportes. Al parecer, contactó al Secretario de Estado Marco Rubio, argumentando que Petro no era digno para la presidencia por una plausible adicción a la cocaína; la administración Trump afortunadamente declinó. Al final, el asunto benefició al gobierno ya que figuras de todo el espectro político condenaron el supuesto golpe fallido.

Para esta época, Petro logró finalmente aprobar su reforma laboral. Después de un sin número de negativas en el congreso de la república, la administración amenazó a la legislatura con una consulta popular. Ante el espectro de una movilización popular, el congreso cedió, temiendo que la reelección de varios miembros estaría en peligro. El recargo nocturno del 35 por ciento empezará a partir de las 7pm en lugar de las 9. Además, los fines de semana y festivos tendrán un recargo adicional del 90% a partir del 2026 y el 100% en el 2027.

Luego, en septiembre, empezaron los bombardeos a presuntos narcotraficantes en el Caribe por parte del país de la libertad; la Casa Blanca aún no ha corroborado los criterios utilizados para más de 100 asesinatos extrajudiciales de supuestos “narcoterroristas”. Por lo tanto, Petro ha tomado la bandera de las víctimas colombianos cuyas familias niegan involucramiento en el narcotráfico. A su vez, la oposición se ha encontrado en una posición incómoda al no poder cíticar el asesinato repetido de ciudadanos colombianos; De La Espriella celebró el primer bombardeo pero ha mantenido un silencio estratégico desde entonces.

El mismo mes, la Casa Blanca decertificó a Colombia como socio en la lucha internacional contra las drogas citando la producción récord de cocaína bajo Petro; el líder colombiano también fue sancionado después de instar a los soldados estadounidenses a desobedecer órdenes ilegales durante una visita a la ONU en Nueva York. El aumento de los cultivos de coca es principalmente el resultado de la creciente demanda de cocaína en Europa. Por otro lado, sucesivos gobiernos se han visto dificultados para frenar la oferta desde el 2015 debido a una prohibición constitucional en contra de la fumigación aérea con glifosato. Petro es un proponente de la sustitución de cultivos a través del programa estatal del PNIS. Aunque lenta y costosa, la sustitución de cultivos tiende a ser más efectiva a largo plazo.

Durante su reunión con Trump, el líder colombiano obsequió café y chocolate cultivados por campesinos excocaleros a su homólogo gringo. No obstante, Petro supuestamente está explorando opciones para renovar la fumigación aérea. A pesar de la descertificación, además, Bogotá ha continuado extraditando traficantes a los EEUU y ha incautado cantidades récord de cocaína. En Bogotá, Carlos, un trabajador de mantenimiento y fanático del dictador salvadoreño Nayib Bukele, expresó admiramiento hacia Petro por cuestionar a la hipocresía de Washington hacia el consumo de drogas en Estados Unidos.

Todo esto ha ocurrido a la vez que la estanflación post-pandemia parece haber finalmente concluído. Desde el 2023, el crecimiento del PIB ha aumentado desde un 0.5% al 2.5% en el 2025. Por su parte, la inflación ha caído desde el 11% al 5% durante el mismo período. Aprovechando esta coyuntura, el presidente decretó un aumento histórico del 23% hacia al salario mínimo lo cual ha desatado el rencor del sector financiero. La comentocracia ha argumentado que habrá más desempleo e inflación. La verdad es que lo primero puede representar un riesgo, si los salarios son demasiado altos y las tasas de interés son demasiado bajas.

El salario mínimo colombiano, sin embargo, es de los más bajos del continente y las tasas del Banco Central–alrededor del 10 por ciento—son, igualmente, de las más altas del hemisferio. Cualquier impacto probablemente será insignificante; en enero, la inflación repuntó del 5.1 al 5.35% desde diciembre. Cabe resaltar, aún, que tanto Brasil como Argentina evidenciaron repuntes inflacionarios desde Diciembre pese a aumentos salariales nulos. [Al parecer, el aumento al salario mínimo en Colombia fue tán precipitoso que ahora está generando inflación en el estado distópico libertario argentino; más probable es que los festivos de fin de año influyeron más en los tres países]

En cuanto profesionales de clase media y alta se quejan por el costo añadido para contratar a empleados domésticos, la medida ha impulsado a la izquierda colombiana entre la clase trabajadora, incluso entre integrantes de las fuerzas armadas. La consulta del Pacto Histórico tuvo una votación récord de dos millones de colombianos. Desde el 2024, la aprobación media de Petro ha aumentado desde un 29 por ciento al 44% en el 2026—mucho más que antecesores Duque y Santos a estas alturas de sus mandatos. La mera novedad de las reformas a favor del trabajador en Colombia marcan un contraste con décadas de gobiernos neoliberales. Desde el 2022, el salario mínimo colombiano ha aumentado en un 75% —en términos reales alrededor del 40%—el mayor aumento de las pasadas tres décadas.

Ciertamente, es difícil decir si el timonazo de Petro–como el de Gabriel Boric a mediados de su mandato–logrará compensar por sus incontables deficiencias. El sabotaje climatofundamentalista hacia Ecopetrol y la exploración petrolera probablemente contribuyeron a la estanflación. Petro y Cepeda han citado el ejemplo de AMLO y Claudia Sheinbaum en México como modelos a seguir, convenientemente, aún, omiten que ambos líderes han defendido a los combustibles fósiles a la vez que han invertido en energías renovables durante sus mandatos. La administración ha puesto al sindicato de Ecopetrol en una posición supremamente incómoda de elegir por un lado entre la austeridad climática y sus derechos laborales bajo Cepeda y reanudar a la exploración y fracturación hidráulica bajo De La Espriella.

La tasa de homicidios ha permanecido estancada bajo Petro en una tasa alta, pero baja en relación a décadas pasadas, de 25 por cada 100,000 habitantes. Los secuestros, sin embargo, se han disparado, un resultado probable de la política de Paz Total del gobierno de negociar acuerdos de paz con varios grupos armados simultáneamente. Petro también ha coqueteado con el progresismo judicial penal sin sentido de reducir sentencias para el hampa común fuera del marco del conflicto armado. Curiosamente, De La Espriella ha propuesto que el estado se apropie de parte de los ingresos ilícitos de los traficantes a cambio de sentencias reducidas.

Algunos votantes con los que hablé expresaron apoyo hacia la campaña de bombardeos de Washington, argumentando que las muertes de inocentes son un mal necesario. Muchos colombianos afines al derechismo siguen convencidos de que, en cualquier momento, Petro descenderá del Pico Simón Bolívar con un ejército guerrillero e instalará una variante jippie del régimen venezolano.

La intervención de Trump en Venezuela puede que sea decisiva en las elecciones de Mayo. Petro y Cepeda han intentado equilibrar el desprecio casi universal de los colombianos hacia Maduro junto con una defensa de la soberanía tanto colombiana como venezolana. Así mismo, Petro ha recorrido la gama con su vecino autocrático desde negarse a reconocer la reelección de Maduro en 2024 hasta condenar la agresión estadounidense hacia Venezuela. Es una pregunta abierta si el presidente logrará explotar a los eventos en el vecino país a su favor.

Por el contrario, Venezuela plantea sus propios desafíos para la derecha colombiana. Si la República Bolivariana desciende hacia un colapso estatal debido a la captura de Maduro, es posible que la llegada masiva de aún más venezolanos favorezca a Petro y Cepeda al validar sus críticas hacia la intervención estadounidense. De hecho, ni De La Espriella ni otros candidatos de derecha han hecho campaña en contra de la migración venezolana. Si bien el sentimiento antimigrante se ha disparado en Colombia —igual que en otros países latinoamericanos— al parecer, los profundos lazos tanto históricos como culturales de ambos países han ayudado a apaciguar al nativismo político.

Por su parte, la administración Trump ha mostrado un pragmatismo notable hacia un enemigo antaño. Incluso con menos de seis meses restantes en el mandato de Petro, la cooperación entre Washington, Bogotá y Caracas en contra del ELN e impulsando la producción petrolera en Venezuela podría resultar decisiva para la estabilización del vecino país. Dado que el ELN ha rechazado repetidamente los esfuerzos de paz Petro, la administración ahora se ve más inclinada hacia la represión directa, lo cual, sin duda, complacerá a Washington.

El hecho de que las acciones de Washington hayan ayudado tanto a la izquierda colombiana debería dar una pausa en cuanto a los límites de la llamada Doctrina Donroe. A raíz de su reunión, Petro le pidió a sus seguidores en X que tradujeran un mensaje inscrito por Trump en una copia de su libro, The Art Of The Deal. «Eres Grande», le escribió el presidente gringo. Quedará por verse si las acciones del líder norteamericano seguirán beneficiando a su homólogo exguerrillero.

Last week, US President Donald Trump held a state visit with Colombia’s left-wing president, Gustavo Petro. The meeting was a welcome rapprochement between two leaders that have repeatedly come into conflict. The White House evidently recognizes that Colombia has a role to play in the future of Venezuela following its kidnapping of former dictator Nicolás Maduro. Petro is term limited and will leave office in August after upcoming elections.

At a time when the Latin American Right is increasingly ascendant, the leftist firebrand seemed all but certain to hand over power to a Trump-friendly conservative. That was, until President Trump returned to office. Ruling party candidate Iván Cepeda currently leads most polls though an eventual run-off against conservative lawyer Abelardo De La Espriella will likely be competitive. In my frequent travels to Bogotá, I’ve found a marked turnaround among residents’ attitudes to the incumbent and the Colombian left. Trump—and his “Donroe Doctrine”—it seems, are making Petro great again.

Just days into Trump’s second presidency, the White House threatened to slap Colombia with 25 percent tariffs over Petro’s refusal to accept two repatriation flights of his own citizens. The Colombian leader caved and subsequently held a televised cabinet meeting replete with telenovela-esque intrigues and identitarian virtue signaling. It was–as I described a year ago–the culmination of an unpopular government obsessed with mostly boutique causes in a country plagued by poverty and armed conflict. Petro, however, adopted a novel strategy towards governance: he began doubling down on antagonizing Washington.

Like Trump, Petro abides by a flood-the-zone philosophy of governance, particularly on the X platform where he grandstands on the latest issue of the day. Tune in to Colombian news stations and you’ll hear and see the president’s name incessantly, mostly out of horror. Last week, a possibly inebriated Petro went viral for his conviction that Jesus slept with Mary Magdalene, “because a man like that couldn’t have existed without love”, he said to audible gasps in the deeply Catholic Colombia.

Following his initial spat with Trump, Petro deepened ties with Beijing with trade between China and Colombia rising to a record $7 billion in the first four months of 2025; in May, Colombia joined the Middle Kingdom’s Belt and Road initiative against stark warnings from Washington. Notably, Colombia has since avoided further tariff threats despite its president’s continued diatribes against US foreign policy. One bus driver told me they found it refreshing that the historically subservient Colombia finally had a leader willing to stand up to Washington.

Recordings emerged last June suggesting that Petro’s former minister, Álvaro Leyva and other prominent politicians sought to depose the president with the help of the Trump administration. Leyva was suspended from office in 2024 and reportedly contacted Secretary of State Marco Rubio, arguing that Petro should be removed from office over a plausible cocaine addiction; the Trump administration thankfully demurred. The affair proved to be a boon for Petro as figures from across the political spectrum condemned the alleged plot.

Around this time, Petro finally succeeded in passing a coveted labor reform. Having repeatedly failed to secure majority support from a fractured congress, the administration threatened to mobilize supporters in favor of a referendum. The legislature caved, fearing that the president could jeopardize members’ upcoming congressional campaigns. Workers now receive overtime worth an additional 35 percent of wages after 7pm as opposed to 9pm in addition to 90 percent overtime on weekends and holidays in 2026 and 100 percent in 2027.

Then, in September, the Trump administration began bombing alleged drug runners in the Caribbean, including in Colombian waters; the White House has yet to corroborate the criteria used for over 100 extrajudicial killings of purported “narcoterrorists”. Petro has subsequently taken up the banner of Colombian fishermen whose families deny involvement in the drug trade. In turn, members of the country’s Trump-friendly opposition have struggled to question the repeated murder of their countrymen; De La Espriella initially celebrated the first boat strike but has kept a strategic silence since.

The same month, the White House decertified Colombia as a partner in international counternarcotics citing record cocaine production under Petro; the Colombian leader was likewise sanctioned after urging US soldiers to disobey illegal orders during a UN visit in New York. Soaring coca cultivation is mostly the result of booming demand for cocaine in Europe. On the other hand, successive Colombian administrations have struggled to curb supply since 2015 due to an ongoing prohibition against aerial fumigation of coca crops over health concerns. Petro is a proponent of government-sponsored crop substitution whereby coca farmers voluntarily transition to licit crop.

While slow and costly, crop substitution tends to be more effective in the long term given that farmers are less likely to replant coca crops. During his meeting with Trump, the Colombian leader gifted his counterpart coffee and chocolate grown by former coca farmers. Nonetheless, Petro has reportedly explored renewing aerial fumigation in recent months. Despite decertification, moreover, Bogotá has continued to cooperate with the DEA, extraditing traffickers to the US and seizing record amounts of cocaine. In Bogotá, Carlos, a maintenance worker and fan of Salvadoran dictator Nayib Bukele, told me he respected Petro for questioning Washington’s hypocrisy over addressing domestic drug consumption.

All of this comes as a period of post-pandemic stagflation has finally subsided. In 2025, GDP growth rose to 2.5 percent, up from 0.5 percent in 2023 while inflation has fallen from 11 to 5 percent during the same period. Last month, the populist president further capitalized on gains by hiking the country’s minimum wage for 2026 by a historic 23 percent, stoking outrage from media and corporate elites. The standard groupthink from opponents is that wage hikes will increase unemployment and inflation. The truth is that the former can pose a risk—if wages are too high and interest rates are too low. Colombian wages, however, are so low and the Central bank’s rates so high—north of 10 percent—that any impact is likely to be negligible.

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El 14 de diciembre, los chilenos eligieron al ultraconservador José Antonio Kast como presidente, frente a su rival del Partido Comunista, Jeannette Jara. Un apologista del dictador chileno Augusto Pinochet, la victoria de Kast supone un revés para el actual Gobierno progresista del presidente Gabriel Boric. La profunda impopularidad de su gobierno, a pesar de algunos logros, ofrece una dura lección para el progresismo latinoamericano. Igualmente, es probable que el presidente electo caiga en varias de las mismas trampas de sus homólogos derechistas regionales.

Hasta relativamente poco, Chile fue considerado un éxito económico ejemplar. El modelo neoliberal impuesto constitucionalmente por el general Pinochet y sus «Chicago Boys» ocasionó un periodo de relativa prosperidad apartir de 1990 bajo sucesivos gobiernos democráticos. El legado del dictador sigue siendo un punto álgido de debate. Por un lado el progresismo destaca violaciones de lesa humanidad y el aumento de la precariedad laboral en cuanto derechistas resaltan el aumento en el estándar de vida desde los 90. El propio Kast es hermano menor del Chicago Boy Miguel Kast, quien fue presidente del banco central de Pinochet. El padre Kast fue también un inmigrante alemán y miembro del Partido Nazi, aunque ambos hijos afirman que se unió al partido de forma involuntaria.

Para el 2019, el descontento hacia una série de servicios privatizados, incluyendo pensiones y el sistema de salud desató el tal «Estallido Social». El entonces congresista Boric, antiguo líder estudiantil, intentó cohesionar un movimiento político en torno al estallido y negoció un referéndum a favor de una constituyente constitucional. Y aunque el ahora presidente siempre ha rechazado a la violencia, algunos manifestantes recurrieron a saqueos, lo cual ocasionó represión estatal que dejó 40 muertos y 28 000 detenciones.

Los Chilenos votaron masivamente a favor de una constituyente y Boric fue elegido presidente en el 2021. El mismo año, los votantes eligieron desproporcionadamente a delegados de izquierdas, entre ellos activistas y figuras bizarras de izquierdas para la constituyente. La convención televisada demostró los peores excesos del progresismo contemporaneo. Delegados ambientalistas protestaron desnudos en contra de la «destrucción del planeta», mientras que terroristas indígenas pidieron la devolución de todo el territorio chileno.

En lo que supuso un golpe humillante para el presidente, los chilenos rechazaron ampliamente a la propuesta constitución; una convención posterior, de tendencia derechista, elaboró un documento que los votantes también rechazaron. Boric aparentemente aprendió de la debacle constitucional y destituyó a docenas de activistas identitarios de su gabinete a favor de socialdemócratas tradicionales. La administración dedicó el resto de su mandato a favor de reformas tanto incrementales como sustanciales; algunas de estas, lamentablemente, fueron saboteadas por diversos lobbys progresistas.

Aunque el Gobierno no logró cumplir plenamente sus promesas en materia de salud y pensiones, desde el 2022, el 40 % de los chilenos más pobres ahora tiene derecho a salud medíca gratuita. El Ministerio de Trabajo, dirigido por la candidata perdedora Jeannette Jara, además redujo a la semana laboral de 45 a 40 horas para el 2028, así como una reforma que establece protecciones para los trabajadores de aplicaciones como Uber. El salario mínimo de Chile también aumentará de unos 400 dólares en 2022 a 500 dólares al mes en 2026.

Lamentablemente, estos avances no lograron compensar por un nuevo entorno político que benefició a la derecha chilena. Boric llegó al poder durante el peor momento de la inflación pospandémica, cuando los precios se dispararon un 12 % en el 2022. Cabe también señalar que los recientes aumentos salariales son comparables a los de administraciones anteriores, lo que significa que el poder adquisitivo de los trabajadores ha disminuido en términos relativos.

El crecimiento económico, que depende en gran medida de la exportación de cobre, también se ha ralentizado considerablemente, ya que la producción anual de este producto básico ha estancado. Los precios históricos del cobre apenas han ayudado a la empresa estatal Codelco, ya que sus minas se han ido envejeciendo y su explotación ha encarecido. Los loables esfuerzos por promover el litio y el hidrógeno verde también se han visto frenados por ecologistas decrecimientstas; Kast pretende abrir dichos sectores a la inversión privada.

Al igual que durante el 2020 en Estados Unidos, la reacción en contra de la policía tras el estallido social provocó recortes a la institución. La tasa de homicidios aumentó en un 50% en medio de una reconfiguración del tráfico regional de drogas. Chile sigue siendo uno de los países más seguros de América, pero a los chilenos les consuela poco que sus delincuentes aún no hayan usado drones ucranianos para atacar a la fuerza pública, como ocurrió recientemente en Río de Janeiro. Si bien, Boric aumentó el presupuesto de los Caribineros y creó un ministerio de seguridad pública, muchos votantes —y Kast— lo culparon por la ola de delincuencia; este último ha dicho que pretende consultar al dictador salvadoreño, Nayib Bukele, al respecto.

Por último, la población inmigrante de Chile ha duplicado, superando los 1,6 millones de personas, en su mayoría procedentes de Venezuela, con al menos 300,000 indocumentados, una cifra gigantesca teniendo en cuenta que la población total del país es de poco menos de 20 millones. Alrededor del 80 % de los chilenos desea que se impongan mayores restricciones a la inmigración. El mínimo histórico de deportaciones bajo el mandato de Boric, menos de 4000, provocó la ira de los votantes de clase trabajadora, aunque el Gobierno intentó frenar nuevas llegadas, militarizando la frontera norte del país. Naturalmente, Kast ha prometido deportar a todos los inmigrantes ilegales y construir un «escudo fronterizo» compuesto por muros, zanjas y vallas.

La victoria de Kast es otro recordatorio del vaivén que caracteriza a la política latinoamericana. Del mismo modo que los excesos identitarios de la izquierda chilena, el fundamentalismo medioambiental y el desprecio general por el cumplimiento migratório propiciaron su caída, es igualmente probable que la derecha sufrará al hacer poco o nada ante el alto costo de la vida en el país. La verdad es que el modelo económico chileno padece de sérias falencias. Si bien el crecimiento económico del mandato de Boric ha caído a mínimos históricos, esto omite el hecho de que el crecimiento medio ha caído de forma constante durante todos los gobiernos desde la redemocratización.

Las reformas de Pinochet permitieron a sus sucesores beneficiarse inicialmente de acuerdos comerciales posteriores, pero la precariedad laboral y la desindustrialización consecuente ha traído consigo sus propios inconvenientes. El trabajo temporal representa ahora una parte enorme de la actividad económica, ya que la industria manufacturera pre-Pinochet ha desaparecido casi por completo. No obstante, el presidente electo ha buscado inspiración en su vecino anarcocapitalista y ha prometido aplicar recortes del 4 % del PIB, una medida que sin duda hundiría a la economía.

A la vez, la calidad de la política chilena sugiere que, al igual que su proceso constitucional, es poco probable que el país acepte disrupciones contraproducentes en el largo plazo. A pesar del pasado de Kast y de la nominación de Jara por el partido comunista, ambos candidatos demostraron moderación en sus posturas hacia las instituciones chilenas. El presidente electo ha dado pocas señales de que pretende prolongar su mandato, perseguir a sus oponentes o limitar a la libertad de expresión. En la misma línea, tanto Boric como Jara criticaron abiertamente a los abusos en contra de los derechos humanos cometidos por el régimen venezolano.

La derrota de Jara ofrece lecciones para una izquierda internacional que se encuentra perpetuamente en el desierto, en gran parte gracias a la desmesurada influencia de progresistas adinerados y desconectados de la realidad. Del mismo modo que los decrecimentistas condenaron al «extractivismo verde» de Boric, en Brasil, el mismo grupo ha saboteado infraestructuras críticas en comunidades pobres a a la vez que el presidente climatofundamentalista colombiano Gustavo Petro busca hundir a la empresa estatal, Ecopetrol.

En Estados Unidos, la indignación pública hacia el trato sádico de Trump hacia los migrantes ha reafirmado la convicción progresista de que la deportación es más o menos ilegítimo como política gubernamental. Al igual que Boric, las deportaciones más allá de la frontera entre Estados Unidos y México cayeron a mínimos históricos bajo el mandato de Biden, con millones de inmigrantes ilegales alegando fraudulentamente persecución bajo un régimen de asilo excesivamente generoso. Desde entonces, la opinión general de los progresistas es que pueden tenerlo todo centrándose en cuestiones económicas populares a la vez que eluden, aunque no renuncian explícitamenta a sus compromisos más tóxicos.

En realidad, la estrategia puede que tenga éxito si se da por sentado que lo primero compense contundentemente por lo segundo. Para dar una idea, el partido Morena de México ha duplicado al salario mínimo en términos reales desde 2018. No obstante, su presidenta científica, ha defendido, por el momento, al las energías fósiles a la vez que invierte en renovables. Ambas de estas políticas han contribuido a mitigar a la inflación. Aún así, incluso en México, una encuesta de Bloomberg en noviembre demostró que el 55% de los votantes están a favor de restricciones en contra de la migración.

Por el contrario, centristas como Keir Starmer y Mette Fredrickson no comprenden que limitar a la migración junto con la austeridad neoliberal es una estrategia perdedora. Al final, tanto progresistas como conservadores tendrán que reconocer que el cumplimiento migratorio, la seguridad, el bienestar de los trabajadores y la salud son componentes integrales de la sociedad industrial. Teniendo en cuenta que derecha y izquierda han alternado a la presidencia chilena desde el 2009, es muy probable que la izquierda, e incluso el propio Boric, vuelvan a la presidencia en el 2029.

Por el momento, Kast tiene cuatro años para realizar dicha predicción.

On December 14th, Chileans went to the polls electing the conservative José António Kast to presidency over his Communist Party rival, Jeannette Jara. An apologist of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, Kast’s landslide victory is a rebuke of the incumbent progressive government of President Gabriel Boric. His government’s deep unpopularity in light of post-pandemic inflation, crime and illegal immigration–despite a handful of pro-worker accomplishments–offers stark lessons for progressives throughout the hemisphere. In the same vein, it’s quite likely that the right-wing president-elect will fall victim to many of the same pitfalls of his regional counterparts.

Up until recently, Chile was seen as an economic success story. The constitutionally imposed neoliberal model of General Pinochet and his ‘Chicago Boy’ advisors eventually delivered relative prosperity under successive democratic governments. The dictator’s legacy remains hotly debated with progressives highlighting human rights abuses and increased precarity of workers while right-wingers note steady gains in living standards since the 1990s. Naturally, Boric and Kast represent each faction. Kast himself is the younger brother of Chicago Boy Miguel Kast, who served as president of Pinochet’s central bank. The pair’s father was also a post war German immigrant and Nazi Party member though both claim that he joined the party unwillingly.

By 2019, boiling discontent over privatized services including pensions, universities and healthcare led to a so-called Estallido Social or social breaking point with millions flooding the streets. A former student leader, then congressman Boric attempted to cohere a political movement around the unrest and brokered a referendum on rewriting the country’s dictatorship-era constitution. And while the now president rejected calls for violence, demonstrators demanding radical change rioted across the country with a subsequent crackdown leading to around 40 deaths and 28,000 detentions.

Voters backed the referendum with Boric riding an anti-establishment wave to the presidency in 2021. That year, voters elected left-leaning delegates, including wacky, fringe activists to overhaul the constitution. The televised convention showcased the worst excesses of modern progressivism. Climate delegates protested environmental destruction in the nude while convicted indigenous terrorists called for the return of all Chilean territory.

A humiliating blow for the president, Chileans widely rejected the proposed constitution; a subsequent, right-leaning convention produced a document that voters also turned down. Boric seemingly learned from the constitutional debacle and sacked dozens of inexperienced, identitarian activists from his cabinet in favor of older social democrats. The administration proceeded to dedicate the remainder of its term in favor of both incremental and substantial reforms–some of which, sadly, were nonetheless sabotaged by progressive interest groups.

While the government failed to fully realize its promises on healthcare and pensions, since 2022, the poorest 40 percent of Chileans are now eligible for free public care while employer contributions for notoriously miserly pensions have markedly risen. Most notably, however, the Labor Ministry headed by losing candidate Jeannette Jara oversaw a reduction of the workweek from 45 to 40 by 2028 as well as a labor reform establishing protections for gig workers. Chile’s minimum wage is also set to rise to around USD$500-a-month by 2026 from around USD$400 in 2022.

Unfortunately, these gains have failed to compensate for a shifting political environment that has benefitted the Right. Boric came into office at the height of post pandemic inflation when prices soared 12 percent in 2022. Here it’s worth noting that recent wage hikes are comparable to those of previous administrations, meaning workers’ buying power has fallen in relative terms.

Economic growth—which largely depends on exporting copper—has also slowed to a crawl as annual production of the commodity has stagnated. Historic copper prices, moreover, have barely helped the state-owned copper company Codelco as mines have gotten older and more expensive to operate. Commendable efforts to promote lithium and green hydrogen have also been stalled by degrowth environmentalists; Kast aims to open these sectors to private investment.

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El 13 de noviembre, la Suprema Corte de Justicia méxicana falló en contra del magnate multimillonario Ricardo Salinas Pliego por el pago de casi 3000 millones de dólares en impuestos. El fallo supone una nueva victoria del estado mexicano en contra la evasión fiscal. Salinas fue un férreo promotor de las protestas «Generación Z» y es conocido por su talante libertario antiestado (podríase llamar de una especie de Elon Musk mexicano). Tanto el magnate como sus más de dos millones de seguidores en X le rinden culto al Bitcoin, Milton Friedman y el presidente anarcocapitalista de Argentina, Javier Milei.

El día de las protestas, Salinas escribió lo siguiente: «Lo que México necesita es un gobierno pequeñito, sin tantas regulaciones ni cobro de impuestos absurdos para mantener las vidas de lujo de miles de parásitos gordos y sus hijos corruptos». Queda por verse si dicho mensaje del aspirante presidencial le gane más adeptos. Al igual que su predecesor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Sheinbaum ha mantenido un amplio respaldo por parte del pueblo mexicano. En parte, la popularidad de la 4T se debe precisamente al control que el movimiento le ha hecho a multimillonarios como Salinas. Ciertamente, el contraste incipiente entre la influencia de oligarcas de ambos lados del Rio Bravo es cada vez más notoria.

Protagónico de la élite empresarial mexicana, Salinas heredó el conglomerado minorista y financiero Grupo Elektra de su padre en 1987. Para aquella época, México sufrió una campaña masiva de privatizaciones por parte del Gobierno de Carlos Salinas de Gortari, del régimen del PRI; sin relación a Salinas Pliego. Al igual que en tantas otras privatizaciones posteriores a la Guerra Fría, el magnate mexicano recurrió al amiguismo, aprovechando un préstamo de 29,8 millones de dólares del hermano del jefe de estado para la compra del canal estatal, Imevisión, en 1993. Años después, la adquisición se convirtió en el segundo canal más grande del país, TV Azteca, lo que transformó a Salinas en uno de los primeros multimillonarios de México.

Por más que le guste hablar sobre la «mano invisible» del mercado, Salinas, al igual que Elon Musk, debe buena parte de su éxito empresarial al patrocinio del estado. Si bien su homólogo de Tesla también merece desprecio por sus delirios sociopáticos, sigue siendo de los pocos empresarios del continente cuya fortuna proviene de la innovación en una industria de alto valor agregado, en lugar, meramente, del clientelismo y la ingeniería financiera. Por lo tanto, Salinas fue el beneficiario de favoritismo fiscal por parte de sucesivos gobiernos del PRI y el PAN.

Anterior a la 4T, el Gobierno mexicano le condonó sumas gigantescas de impuestos a las mayores empresas del país. Sobre el papel, empresas como Walmart debían millones al Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT). No obstante, se les permitió evadir pagos mediante una combinación de mandamientos judiciales y un cumplimiento débil. Por ende, Grupo Elektra fue uno de los peores infractores entre las empresas mexicanas, con impuestos vigentes que se remontaban al 2008. Según Salinas, México durante aquella época fue un país grande, antes de la elección de AMLO en el 2018.

Al llegar al poder, López Obrador cumplió con su promesa de acabar con los privilegios de la «mafia del poder» que dominaba México. El gobierno morenista tomó medidas en contra del despilfarro real y percibido, incluyendo en la academia, entes gubernamentales, y el complejo industrial ONG, bajo el lema de la «austeridad republicana». En el 2019, el Congreso tipificó a la evasión fiscal como una amenaza de seguridad nacional comparable al tráfico de drogas, generando pánico en el sector privado. Uno tras otro, los propietarios de las empresas más grandes y poderosas de México se plegaron a la nueva normativa, todos excepto Salinas.

La ironía es que el autodenominado minarquista anticipó los acontecimientos mucho antes de que López Obrador asumiera la presidencia. Tras liderar todas las encuestas y casi ganar las elecciones del 2006 en medio de irregularidades, Salinas vio potencial en el populista de izquierda. Ese año, el magnate concedió a AMLO y a su coalición un programa diario en TV Azteca con un notable descuento. Luego, durante las elecciones de 2018, proporcionó una cobertura favorable hacia Morena. Por supuesto, como tantos otros multimillonarios, el patrocinio de Salinas sirvió como póliza en caso de que AMLO llegase a la presidencia.

Ya como presidente, el triunvirato multimillonario de Carlos Slim, Germán Larrea y Salinas, formó parte del consejo empresariales de Obrador, quienes, junto con otros empresarios, obtuvieron concesiones notables del gobierno. Slim y Larrea recibieron contratos públicos para la construcción de proyectos de infraestructura; también ayudaron al Gobierno en la renacionalización parcial del sector energético. A su vez, el Banco Azteca de Salinas se convirtió en un pilar fundamental de los programas sociales de Morena. Además, tanto AMLO como Sheinbaum se han negado a aumentar los impuestos sobre la renta y eludieron promesas de reducir la semana laboral; por fin, el congreso ya está debatiendo una reducción gradual a 40 horas para el 2030.

Por su parte, la oligarquía del país toleró aumentos históricos del salario mínimo, la codificación de nuevos derechos laborales y aceptó finalmente pagar impuestos pendientes. Mientras que Slim y Larrea liquidaron rápidamente sus deudas con el Estado, incluyendo el pago de deudas retroactivas, Salinas se negó a pagar más de lo que opinaba justo.

Lo que siguió fue una prolongada batalla legal por las considerables deudas del magnate con el Estado, aunque durante años él y AMLO mantuvieron que estaban abiertos a un acuerdo. Con el tiempo, los dos hombres se enemistaron. El Gobierno dejó de lado al Banco Azteca de Salinas en favor de los Bancos de Bienestar, del ejército. El libertario Salinas también se negó a cumplir con las restricciones pandémicas relativamente laxas de México y atacó el supuesto adoctrinamiento marxista de la educación mexicana. En junio, el multimillonario criticó duramente al expresidente: «yo pensé que siendo amigo de López, íbamos a poder llegar a un acuerdo razonable...Mira, todos los impuestos son un robo. No nos hagamos bolas. El gobierno es un grupo de personas que actúan organizadamente y ejercen la violencia en contra del resto de los ciudadanos.».

El magnate se convirtió en un habitual de las mañaneras de AMLO y Sheinbaum. En el 2024, López Obrador ordenó a la Guardia Nacional confiscó uno de los campos de golf de Salinas en Huatulco, Oaxaca. «No es personal», dijo AMLO, explicando que la concesión, otorgada por el expresidente Enrique Peña Nieto sobre tierra pública, había expirado.

Con la llegada de Sheinbaum a la presidencia en octubre del 2024, Salinas albergó la esperanza de que la sucesora de Obrador se mostrara más cooperativa. En cambio, la nueva presidenta y el congreso morenista revocaron las protecciones de Salinas frente al cobro de deudas en Estados Unidos; en octubre, el magnate depositó una fianza de 200 millones de dólares después de que el la Corte Suprema de Nueva York amenazó con arrestarlo por deudas pendientes a AT&T.

Luego, en junio, México celebró unas históricas elecciones judiciales, incluyendo para la suprema corte, lo que supuso para el magnate su pérdida de 3000 millones de dólares en noviembre. Salinas ha cuestionado la legitimidad de la decisión, dado el carácter extraordinario del tribunal. Y aunque yo mismo he criticado graves deficiencias en el método de elección de jueces, es difícil tomar en serio las denuncias de persecución del magnate, teniendo en cuenta la antigüedad y las múltiples jurisdicciones de sus deudas.

Todo esto le ha costado caro a Salinas. A pesar del desprecio de empresarios nacionales e internacionales, las ganancias corporativas y el patrimonio neto de los multimillonarios mexicanos han duplicado bajo los gobiernos de Morena, irónicamente debido al aumento de demanda provocado por los aumentos al salario mínimo. La única excepción ha sido Salinas, debido principalmente a una megainversión que resultó ser una estafa de criptomonedas.

El estimado magnate, que comenzó el mandato de AMLO como el tercer hombre más rico de México, ha perdido desde entonces alrededor de la mitad de su patrimonio neto, cayendo al quinto lugar entre sus pares. En respuesta, Salinas, y TV Azteca, han redoblado sus ataques contra Morena. El multimillonario ahora busca postularse a la presidencia en el 2030, tras haber celebrado un evento de precampaña para su cumpleaños en Octubre.

Sin duda, empresarios como Salinas han sido candidatos competitivos de derecha en todo el continente. Su marca de libertario, aún, es difícil de vender en un momento en que la opinión pública mexicana se ha movido en contra del tipo de privatizaciones que lo hicieron rico en primer lugar. Del mismo modo, la obsesión del magnate por recortes tiene poco de atractivo, dado el bajo déficit presupuestario que ha mantenido el país desde el 2018.

Sin duda, el ítem más fuerte de Salinas es la seguridad, en el que ha criticado duramente al gobierno y prometido emular al presidente salvadoreño, Nayib Bukele. Si bien Sheinbaum ha adoptado una postura más contundente en contra del narcotráfico que su predecesor, es probable que la seguridad siga siendo el punto más débil de su gobierno. Por otro lado, es poco probable que los votantes favorezcan a un radical de derecha bajo la continua amenaza de bombas estadounidenses sobre suelo mexicano. Si bien Salinas ha fomentado estrechos vínculos con el presidente salvadoreño y Milei en Argentina, ha mantenido una distancia prudente con Donald Trump.

El auge y la caída del Elon Musk mexicano ofrece lecciones para aspirantes populistas en Estados Unidos. A pesar de los avances sin precedentes de México bajo Morena, la pobreza sigue siendo significativa y la justicia penal, igualmente, un desastre. La corrupción es también endémica, especialmente entre la policía y las autoridades municipales, en marcado contraste con Estados Unidos. Al mismo tiempo, se puede argumentar que la corrupción de las grandes empresas y políticos nacionales es, para efectos prácticos, indistinguible de ambos lados de la frontera.

En Estados Unidos, el crimen organizado a la escala de los cárteles mexicanos es un recuerdo lejano. A la vez, el lavado de dinero procedente del narcotráfico en el sector bancario e inmobiliario estadounidense es rampante y opera con relativa impunidad. Desde hace décadas, la trata de personas y la explotación masiva de mano de obra indocumenta en Estados Unidos han sido endémicas, particularmente bajo el gobierno Biden; en el segundo mandato de Trump, mientras que la primera ha mejorado notablemente, la segunda persiste. Mientras tanto, el soborno legalizado a través de las sentencias de Citizens United y Snyder bajo Trump han tornado al país en una república bananera con armas nucleares. Grupos de interés ahora le ofrecen donaciones a la Casa Blanca a cambio de exenciones arancelarias e indultos, incluso para narcotraficantes (días después de escribir estas palabras, Trump indultó al expresidente hondureño y capo del narcotráfico Juan Orlando Hernández).

Una futura administración estadounidense podría emular a su vecino y optar por prohibir la compraventa de acciones por congresista, repenalizar el soborno y aumentar el salario mínimo por primera vez desde el 2007. A cambio de preservar las lagunas fiscales y/o mantener tasas impositivas actuales, se podría obligar a empresas a aceptar un sistema nacional y obligatorio de e-verify bajo pena de sanciones severas. Imitando a las mañaneras de la 4T, podría flagelar públicamente a empresas que explotan a trabajadores indocumentados.

Críticos de la 4T pasan por alto que un país devastado por el narcotráfico ha logrado, no obstante, empoderar a sus trabajadores, construir megaproyectos de infrastructura y frenar el abuso de empresarios multimillonarios. En uno de sus últimos discursos antes de dejar a la presidencia, López Obrador arremetió en contra de la «simulación democrática» por parte de sus predecesores neoliberales. Una «oligarquía con fachada de democracia», dijo ante la entonces presidenta electa Sheinbaum. Es una triste ironía que la democracia estadounidense cada vez se parece más al régimen que AMLO y Sheinbaum han tratado reemplazar.

Last month, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled against billionaire magnate Ricardo Salinas Pliego’s claims against almost USD$3 billion in unpaid taxes. The ruling represents yet another victory for leftist President Claudia Sheinbaum and her predecessor AMLO’s crackdown against corporate tax evasion. Having actively promoted the so-called ‘Gen-Z’ protests against Sheinbaum, Salinas has been described as the ‘Mexican Elon Musk’ for his anti-government, libertarian views. His 2.1 million followers on the X social media platform sing to the tune of Bitcoin, Milton Friedman and Argentina’s anarchocapitalist President Javier Milei.

The day of the protests, Salinas–who is reportedly planning a presidential run–said the following on X: “What Mexico needs is a tiny government without so many regulations nor absurd taxes to maintain the lives of government parasites”. Whether this message resonates with voters remains to be seen. Like AMLO, Sheinbaum has received high marks from the Mexican people. Morena’s long overdue check on billionaires like Salinas speaks to the party’s enduring popularity as well as a budding contrast in the influence of oligarchs north and south of the border.

A scion of the Mexican elite, Salinas inherited the retail and financial conglomerate Grupo Elektra from his father in 1987. At the time, Mexico was undergoing a campaign of mass privatizations by the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the one-party PRI regime; no relation to Salinas Pliego. As in so many other post-Cold War privatizations, the Mexican magnate resorted to cronyism, leveraging a USD$29.8 million loan from the president’s brother for the 1993 purchase of state-owned broadcaster, Imevisión. The acquisition later became the country’s second largest channel, TV Azteca, transforming Salinas into one of Mexico’s first billionaires.

For all of his talk of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, Mexico’s Elon Musk–much like the real Elon–owes most of his success to government patronage. While the Tesla billionaire deserves equal scorn for his self-serving and ketamine-induced delusions, he remains one of the few entrepreneurs in the Americas whose fortune derives from innovation in manufacturing as opposed to cronyism and financial engineering. Naturally. Salinas cultivated close ties with consecutive administrations of the centrist PRI and conservative PAN parties, benefitting handsomely from state-sponsored tax evasion.

Before Morena, the Mexican government allowed the country’s largest firms, including foreign multinationals, to accumulate gargantuan sums in unpaid taxes. On paper, companies like Walmart owed millions to Mexico’s internal revenue service (SAT) but were allowed to forgo payments–as well as late fees–via a combination of legal injunctions and weak enforcement over a course of decades. Accordingly, Grupo Elektra proved to be one of the worst offenders among Mexican firms with unpaid taxes going as far back as 2008. In Salinas’ telling, these were the days when Mexico was a great country before AMLO’s election in 2018.

That year, Lopez Obrador won the presidency in a landslide promising to end the privileges of the so-called ‘mafia of power’ that dominated Mexico. AMLO subsequently took an axe to real and perceived waste across a host of institutions including academia, government agencies, public sector salaries and the NGO-industrial complex under the mantra of ‘Republican Austerity’. By 2019, businesses were terrified that they were next on the chopping block after congress codified tax evasion as a national security threat comparable with drug trafficking. One by one, the owners of Mexico’s largest and most powerful companies fell in line–all save for the flamboyant Salinas.

The irony is that the self-described minarchist saw the writing on the wall well before Lopez Obrador assumed the presidency. Having led all polls and nearly won the presidency in 2006 amid irregularities, Salinas saw potential in the cantankerous populist. That year, the Mexican magnate granted AMLO and his coalition a daily show on TV Azteca at a notable discount and in stark contrast to his opponents. Then during the 2018 election, he provided favorable coverage to Morena on TV Azteca. Of course–like so many other billionaires–Salinas’ patronage of figures from across the political spectrum served as an insurance policy in case of their election.

Indeed, a triumvirate of Mexico’s three richest men composed of Carlos Slim, German Larrea and Salinas served on Obrador’s council of business advisors alongside other billionaires and extracted notable concessions from the ostensibly anti-business president. Slim and Larrea received public contracts for the construction of infrastructure projects; they also assisted the government’s partial renationalization of Mexico’s energy sector. In turn, Salinas’ Banco Azteca became a key pillar of Morena’s social programs in poor neighborhoods. Both AMLO and Sheinbaum, moreover, have refused to raise income taxes and shirked promises to reduce Mexico’s worst-in-the-hemisphere 48-hour work week; a gradual reduction to 40 hours by 2030 is finally being debated in Congress as of this month.

In exchange, the country’s oligarchy tolerated historic hikes to the minimum wage, the codification of labor rights and agreed to finally pay longstanding taxes–a vital revenue priority precisely because of the administrations’ commitment not to raise income taxes. While Slim and Larrea quickly settled their debts with the state, including paying for retroactive late fees, Salinas refused to pay more than what he ostensibly originally owed.

What followed was a protracted legal battle over the magnate’s considerable debts to the state though for years he and AMLO maintained they were open to an agreement. Over time, the two men fell out. The government sidelined Salinas’ Banco Azteca in favor of the state-owned–and military built–Bancos de Bienestar. The libertarian Salinas also refused to comply with Mexico’s comparatively lax pandemic restrictions and attacked the purported marxist indoctrination of Mexican education. In June, the billionaire slammed the former president: “ I thought since I was Obrador’s friend, we could come to a reasonable agreement…And let’s be honest, all taxation is theft”.

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Mas o tarifaço do Trump tem sido uma benção para o Presidente brasileiro Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Em julho, Lula fez um discurso televisionado criticando duramente à opisição brasileira, muitos dos quais viajaram para Washington para pedir sanções contra o Brasil, como Eduardo Bolsonaro e Paulo Figueredo. "O fato de esse ataque ter o apoio de alguns políticos brasileiros... Eles não se importam nem um pouco com a economia e o para povo; eles são os verdadeiros traidores da nação", disse o presidente. É um grande resgate para um líder que passou a maior parte de seu mandato capitulando aos piores elementos da elite brasileira, bem como de sua própria coalizão. Em junho, Lula registrou uma aprovação de 39%, a pior de qualquer dos seus mandatos, que desde então se recuperou para cerca do 50%.

Quando governou entre 2003 e 2011, Lula foi elogiado por Barack Obama como "o político mais popular da Terra" com cerca de 80% de apoio ao deixar à presidência. Nascido na pobreza no Nordeste brasileiro, o ex-líder sindical fez um discurso inaugural emocionante no Ano Novo de 2003. Após perder à presidência tres vezes em 1989, 1994 e 1998, o radical de esquerda abraçou a terceira via de seus pares britânicos e norte-americanos, fazendo as pazes com as elites rentistas do Brasil.

Esforços para desfazer a desindustrialização catastrófica e privatizações dos seus antecessores foram limitados, embora o boom de commodities dos anos 2000 tenha ajudado os avanços redistributivos dos programas sociais como a Bolsa Família. Após estagnar por mais de uma década, o PT aumentou o salário mínimo mensal ajustado pela inflação de US$100 para US$506 entre 2003 e 2012; ao menos 20 milhões de pessoas saíram da pobreza durante a presidência de Lula. O governo também reduziu o desmatamento de máximos históricos em 80%, enquanto ainda conseguiu quintuplicar as rendas do agronegócio.

Infelizmente, a sucessora do Lula, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), presidiu um colapso socioeconômico e institucional geracional provocado pelas investigações de corrupção da Lava Jato e a queda das commodities de 2014. A dívida nacional subiu de 58 para 93% do PIB entre 2014 e 2019, enquanto o país entrou em recessão seguido por um período de pouco crescimento. A inflação também subiu para 10% em 2016.

Os sucessores da Dilma, Michel Temer (2016-2019) e depois Bolsonaro, promulgaram um programa de austeridade que limitou ainda mais o crescimento e reverteu os ganhos salariais dos trabalhadores. O gasto sociail foi limitado constitucionalmente, e uma campanha de privatizações visando tudo, desde aeroportos às previdências, espremeu os serviços sociais. A reforma trabalhista de 2017 levou a uma proliferação de condições semelhantes à escravidão atrevés de trabalhos terceirizados. A participação salarial da classe trabalhadora inevitavelmente caiu para mínimos históricos, enquanto os funcionários eleitos se recusaram a aumentar o salário mínimo por medo de alimentar a inflação.

A grande ironia é que durante este período, o PT e a Esquerda brasileira foram submetidos a uma campanha de lawfare e perseguição política comparável à atual cruzada judicial contra o Bolsonarismo. Embora as investigações da Lava Jato tenham prendido políticos de todos os partidos por propinas das empreiteiras, um zelo questionável foi direcionado à esquerda. Fora da presidência, a maioria dos políticos no Brasil são membros de partidos políticos clientelistas conhecidos coletivamente como o Centrão.

Rousseff sofreu o impeachment e foi removida do cargo pelo congresso em 2016 sob a acusação de que deturpou às finanças do país—um crime cometido por todo presidente desde o fim do regime militar. Lula, similarmente, foi sentenciado a doze anos de prisão por supostamente receber um triplex como suborno—uma acusação que os procuradores do caso admitiram de ser duvidosa em privado, considerando que o acusado nunca habitou o triplex.

O descrédito da classe política brasileira abriu caminho para Bolsonaro na eleição de 2018. Na época, os mesmos juízes agora comprometidos em prender o presidente de extrema-direita ratificaram a condenação forjada de Lula, entregando a presidência ao primeiro. A grande ironia é que Rousseff possibilitou tanto sua própria queda política quanto a de Lula ao aprovar a lei Ficha Limpa, bem como a expansão da delação premiada como ferramenta jurídica.

No final do mandato de Bolsonaro, os juízes dos altos tribunais ficaram com medo de que o apologista do regime militar que ajudaram eleger não tinha o respeito pelas normas democráticas que esperavam. Bolsonaro seguiu o precedente estabelecido por Donald Trump, alegando mais de um ano de antemão que a eleição de 2022 seria fraudada contra ele pelo tribunal eleitoral superior do Brasil, o TSE. Naquele ano, Alexandre de Moraes assumiu a presidência do TSE.

Os tribunais começaram a censurar sistematicamente a "desinformação" de Bolsonaristas nas redes sociais, com Moraes prendendo cinco pessoas sem julgamento por postagens de mídia social consideradas ameaçadoras. No papel, a constituição brasileira é decididamente liberal, enumerando mais direitos do que qualquer outra constituição no mundo. Na prática, a latitude desmesurada que o documento concede ao seu judiciário permite que juízes interpretem certos direitos como desejarem, incluindo pisoteando a liberdade de expressão.

Os juízes depois absolveram Lula e restauraram seus direitos políticos na esperança de derrotar o presidente em exercisio. Comicamente, sua defesa inabalável da 'democracia' quase reelegeu Bolsonaro. Em agosto de 2022, dois meses antes do segundo turno, uma série de mensagens de Whatsapp vazados mostrou empresários brasileiros defendendo a ideia de um golpe militar no caso da vitória de Lula. Em resposta, Moraes e o TSE invadiram as casas de oito dos empresários, congelaram suas contas bancárias e eventualmente prenderam os 'perpetradores' em questão. No entanto, Bolsonaro, que criticou os abusos do tribunal, acabou se beneficiando da reação draconiana.

Durante o segundo turno presidencial, Bolsonaro ordenou que a Polícia Rodoviária Federal (PRF) parasse milhares de ônibus transportando eleitores em redutos do PT, principalmente no nordeste do Brasil. No final, no entanto, Lula prevaleceu pela pequena margem de 50,9 a 49,1%. Os apoiadores mais comprometidos de Bolsonaro foram às ruas e acamparam em frente aos quartéis do exército, pedindo uma tomada militar. Muitos permaneceram em seus postos até os eventos de 8 de janeiro de 2023, uma semana depois de Lula ter sido empossado.

Naquele dia, milhares de Bolsonaristas invadiram, saquearam e vandalizaram as sedes dos três poderes na capital brasileira, espelhando os eventos do 6 de janeiro de 2021, em Washington. Os tumultos aconteceram num domingo, quando nem o Congresso nem o Supremo Tribunal estavam em sessão. Em suas próprias palavras, os manifestantes buscavam proclamar um estado de sítio que reinstalaria o ex-presidente através de uma intervenção militar—um objetivo forjado considerando que Lula estava fora da capital na época e Bolsonaro viajou para Orlando, Flórida, dois dias antes de deixar o cargo.

Por mais que se assemelhem os esforços de Trump e Bolsonaro para permanecer noo poder, algumas semelhanças e diferenças valem ressaltar. No Brasil, membros das forças armadas se recusaram desalugar os acampamentos bolsonaristas frente ao quartel-general de Brasília, de onde os ataques de 8 de janeiro foram organizados. Em contraste com o infame, mas isolado, incidente envolvendo a polícia americana do Capitólio no 6 de janeiro, dezenas de policiais e oficiais militares ativos em Brasilia foram observados recebendo manifestantes nas instalações e ajudando-os a se escaparem no dia das invasões.

Nos EUA, o comportamento petulante de Trump frente ao congresso antes de desaparecer por horas para assistir ao tumulto resultante na TV se presta para a seguinte analogia: jogou a pedra e escondeu a mão. Bolsonaro, da mesma forma, alimentou as conspirações de seus apoiadores e se envolveu em atos suspeitos, se até agora inconclusivos, prévio às invasões. No 2 de janeiro, o prefeito de Brasília Ibaneis Rocha renomeou o ministro da segurança de Bolsonaro, Anderson Torres, para seu cargo anterior como secretário de segurança pública da cidade; ao contrário de Washington, DC, Brasília é um reduto de direita. O dia antes dos tumultos, Torres também viajou para Orlando, embora ele alegasse não ter se encontrado com Bolsonaro.

No entanto, os crimes mais convincentes dos dois líderes—como a tentativa de Trump de manipular votas no estado de Geórgia—tiveram pouca relação aos eventos nas capitais das duas nações. No caso de Bolsonaro, os ex-chefes das forças testemunharam em 2024 que o ex-presidente pediu para eles apoiar um golpe após o segundo turno, declarando um estado de exceção e subsequentemente prendendo ou assassinando Lula. Notavelmente, dois dos três chefes se recusaram a apoiar o plano e ameaçaram prender Bolsonaro caso ele insistisse em estender seu mandato pela força.

Textos do secretário pessoal do ex-presidente, Mauro Cid, bem como uma minuta encontrada na casa de Anderson Torres, parecem corroborar o suposto complô. Em suas próprias palavras, Bolsonaro recorreu ao oxímoro de que explorou opções 'constitucionais' para permanecer no poder. Ao contrário de sua contraparte brasileira, Trump, para seu crédito, ainda não cogitou a possibilidade de permanecer no poder por meios militares.

Por mais sérios que os supostos crimes do líder de extrema-direita possam ser, é desonesto postular—como muitos progressistas argumentam—que o judiciário autocrático brasileiro não alimentou as tendências igualmente autoritárias do bolsonarismo. No mesmo sentido, conservadores dentro e fora do Brasil são desonestos ao retratar Bolsonaro como a vítima despretenciosa da tirania legal. Sem mencionar o fato de que a direita brasileira elogiou à justiça na época da condenação de Lula.

É ainda mais decepcionante, portanto, que Lula tenha abraçado uma variante ainda pior do lawfare dos mesmos juízes que elegeram seu rival de direita em primeiro lugar. A censura, particularmente de Bolsonaristas, é ainda abundante nas redes sociais, e até os participantes mais despretenciosos dos eventos de 8 de janeiro receberam sentenças mais severas do que as de assassinos. Em 2023, Bolsonaro foi até indiciado por uma suposta ‘importunação’ a uma baleia enquanto andava de jet ski, embora o caso tenha sido felizmente arquivado em 2024.

Lula 3.0

O terceiro mandato de Lula mostrou alguma promessa inicial, mas com o tempo caiu em muitas das mesmas armadilhas de pares progressistas como Gabriel Boric do Chile e Gustavo Petro da Colômbia. Em seu primeiro ano, o presidente brasileiro conseguiu o feito notável de aumentar sua aprovação polarizada após assumir o cargo. No final do ano, algumas pesquisas registraram apoio de 60%, incluindo de cerca de um quarto dos eleitores de Bolsonaro.

No início, a administração promulgou uma série de medidas populares, como cortar impostos sobre veículos de baixo custo e reprimir agressivamente o trabalho forçado, resgatando mais de 5.000 trabalhadores desde 2023. Brasília também reprimiu o desmatamento e a mineração ilegal, fortalecendo agências ambientais como IBAMA e INCRA, que foram devastadas por Temer e Bolsonaro.

Ao mesmo tempo, Lula expandiu significativamente as concessões de petróleo e mineração e anunciou uma série de iniciativas que enfureceram ambientalistas, como a ferrovia Ferrogrão entre Mato Grosso e Pará, as linhas de transmissão Tucuruí em Roraima, a pavimentação da rodovia BR-319 em Amazonas e a exploração de petróleo perto da foz do Rio Amazonas. O banco central do Brasil (BCB) também finalmente começou a baixos os juros de um máximo pandêmico de 13,75% em conjunto com a queda na inflação.

Depois em janeiro de 2024, o presidente anunciou um plano industrial de US$60 bilhões composto por subsídios, requisitos de conteúdo local e linhas de crédito, que levou Stellantis, Toyota, Hyundai e General Motors a anunciar US$ 14 bilhões em investimentos no Brasil, com um adicional de US$ 30 bilhões de empresas chinesas em 2023.

Tudo isso foi ajudado por um segundo boom de commodities impulsionado pelo fim da pandemia de Covid-19, a guerra na Ucrânia, bem como a guerra comercial global de Trump. Em 2024, o superávit comercial do Brasil subiu para um recorde de US$87 bilhões, com o PIB expandindo 3% em 2023 e 2024. A produção de petróleo subiu similarmente para 4,3 milhões de barris por dia em 2023 antes de cair ligeiramente no ano passado.

Para 2025, no entanto, Lula permitiu—e em alguns casos encorajou—a sacanagem da sua administração por vários interesses especiais. Em qualquer economia capitalista saudável, esforços para aumentar rendas primárias, bem como a promoção do desenvolvimento e a industrialização, seriam elogiados por observadores. Mas em uma colônia de recursos financeirizada como o Brasil, os investidores brasileiros, as ONGs internacionais e os burocratas ambientais vem atacando o governo por tudo, desde a bendita independência do banco central até priorização da produção do petróleo acima do pagamento de dividendos na Petrobras—essa última também sendo uma traição en contra da agenda climática.

Antes da pandemia, o BCB mantinha uma taxa de juros alta mas sensível de 6,5% em resposta a uma taxa de inflação elevada mas estável de 4,5%. Hoje, a inflação estagnou em uma taxa ligeiramente maior de 5% desde 2023. Mas porque Lula ousou criticar o banco central—e inicialmente se recusou a retomar a austeridade pré-Covid de seus antecessores—o BCB resolveu extorquir a administração a cortar gastos através do aumento dos juros. A chantagem monetária funcionou, e Lula cortou bilhões do orçamento social mísero enquanto as taxas subiram de um 'baixo' de 10,5% em 2024 para uns unconscionáveis 15% em 2025.

Dificilmente envolvido em gastos imprudentes, mais de 90% do déficit orçamentário é composto por pagamentos de juros—a implicação paradoxal sendo que o BCB poderia facilmente reduzir o gasto total do estado se cortasse as taxas. O pensamento prevalecente é tão ridículo que até mesmo o banco central reconheceu que os investidores—principalmente investidores brasileiros empanicados—alimentaram a inflação através de vendas de ativos, que enfraquece o Real. Para agregar insulto à injúria, as múltiplas nomeações de Lula para o BCB, incluindo o aliado Gabriel Galípolo como presidente do credor, continuaram as políticas contraproducentes de seus antecessores libertários.

A triste realidade é que Lula enfrenta um cenário perdedor em suas negociações com a Faria Lima. A economia brasileira é tão financeirizada que investidores podem mais ou menos ditar a política fiscal e monetária tanto ao governo quanto ao BCB quebrando a IBOVESPA. Consequentemente, a austeridade desde então forçou Lula a abandonar uma visão mais grandiosa para o desenvolvimento e abraçar políticas destinadas a apaziguar a Faria Lima, como a reforma tributária e expansão dos bets online. O presidente também aparentemente abandonou sua promessa de campanha de renacionalizar a Eletrobras—a empresa elétrica estatal que Bolsonaro privatizou. A administração atual também facilitou a privatização da empresa da Avibras.

Muito do mesmo pode ser dito em relação ao poderoso complexo industrial verde composto por reguladores e ONGs ambientais além da ajuda internacional e fundos estrangeiros—os últimos dos quais financiam partes consideráveis do governo brasileiro. Dos projetos mencionados anteriormente anunciados em 2023, apenas as linhas de Tucuruí foram completada. Por outro lado, o Ferrogrão, BR-319 e exploração de petróleo na foz do Rio Amazonas ainda não receberam aprovação dos reguladores ambientais nem para até começãr construções ou iniciar operações.

Como presidente, Bolsonaro presidiu uma duplicação no desmatamento em meio a um boom do crime ambiental. A mineração ilegal na reserva Yanomami de Roraima levou ao envenenamento de cerca de 1.000 crianças indígenas, enquanto a administração também tolerou a venda ilegal de um lote de terra maior que a cidade de São Paulo para uma empresa madeireira ibérica nos estados do Acre e Amazonas. Para ser justo com o ex-presidente, o desmatamento durante sua presidência ainda ficou muito abaixo das taxas vistas antes do primeiro governo de Lula. No entanto, ao contrário da ditadura militar—que construiu projetos de desenvolvimento destrutivos, mas também vitais, como a Usina de Itaipu—a visão de Bolsonaro poderia ser descrita como destruição pela destruição.

A realidade infeliz é que muitas das ONGs e burocratas ambientais que têm influência no governo Lula, como a ministra do meio ambiente Marina Silva, aderem a uma visão comparativamente perniciosa que vê praticamente qualquer desenvolvimento como uma ameaça inadmisível contra o meio ambiente. No passado governo de Lula, Silva também serviu como ministra do meio ambiente até 2008, quando renunciou devido à sua oposição a supostos crimes imperdoáveis como o uso de usinas hidrelétricas, biocombustíveis e culturas geneticamente modificadas.

Mais de uma década depois, a posição de Silva dentro do complexo industrial climático a tornou tanto um eixo da sinalização de virtude verde da administração quanto um espinho perpétuo em seu lado. Dentro do governo Lula, a oposição à exploração na Amazônia tem sido liderada pela intratável Silva, que vem sofocando boa parte das iniciativas do governo através da burocracia ambiental. Percorra as páginas da mídia internacional, e pode-se encontrar uma aliança perversa entre publicações progressistas e financeiras como The Guardian e Financial Times lionizando Silva e atacando Lula por comprometer o futuro da Terra.

Assim como na política monetária, a administração sucumbiu às pressões dp fundamentalismo climático assinando um acordo entregando a administração de reservas indígenas à empresa multinacional de gestão ambiental, Ambipar. O acordo efetivamente privatiza 1,4 milhão de quilômetros quadrados, representando 14% do território do país.

Assim como os investidores, o fanatismo dos falcões climáticos levou à eliminação deliberada de fatos que contradizem suas narrativas. Fosse o caso de que o governo brasileiro estaja deliberadamente destruindo a Amazônia, como foi o caso antes—e em menor extensão depois—dos governos do PT, um argumento mais acreditável poderia ser feito contra iniciativas como a exploração de petróleo na região. No entanto, o desmatamento novamente caiu para mínimos recordes desde que Lula retornou ao cargo—um fato que deveria oferecer alguma margem de manobra para o desenvolvimento.

Em julho, o Congresso aprovou o que Silva e ativistas apelidaram a PL da 'devastação', reduzindo o escopo dos reguladores ambientais. Tendo passado o congresso com supermaiorias, Lula emitiu um veto alguns itens do projeto, mas notavelmente deixou intocada uma via rápida para exploração de petróleo na Amazônia.

A postura de Lula de se recusar a comprometer a soberania do Brasil enquanto permanece aberto ao diálogo sobre comércio com Washington pagou dividendos eleitorais e geopolíticos, enquanto rivais americanos correram para aceitar exportações que de outra forma teriam ido para os EUA. Trump, além disso, piscou, isentando unilateralmente uma série de bens brasileiros vitais das tarifas, como aeronaves e fertilizantes.

Para todo o auto-ódio dos investidores, além disso, os lucros corporativos dispararam sob Lula, com o desemprego caindo para mínimos recordes. Apesar do flagelo tanto da austeridade quanto das taxas de juros paralisantes, a modesta política industrial do governo ainda assim pagou dividendos; o Brasil está atualmente a caminho de exportar meio milhão de carros em 2025.

Ao mesmo tempo, a mordida tanto das tarifas quanto das taxas de juros parece ter finalmente causado um dano na economia brasileiro. Se espera que o crescimento do PIB vai cair para 2% em 2025—uma razão urgente para expandir ainda mais a produção d petróleo e melhorar a infraestrutura doméstica. Nas próprias palavras do presidente, os eleitores têm razão de estar ‘putos’ com o governo já que o aumento salarial não consegue compensar pela inflação.

Ao contrário de seus mandatos anteriores, Lula falhou em aumentar significativamente o salário mínimo, que subiu por um incremento de apenas 7% em 2025—sendo mais outra capitulação à Faria Lima e seus aliados no Centrão. Mais de dois anos e meio depois do que o PT voltou ao poder, o salário mínimo do ainda é menos da metade de seu pico de 2012 em termos reais e permaneceu efetivamente estagnado desde 2020 em US$251 por mês. Chocantemente, apenas a Argentina de Javier Milei e a Venezuela de Nicolás Maduro têm um salário mínimo menor nas Américas.

Além disso, embora a administração merecesse elogios por sua repressão ao trabalho forçado, é revelador que nenhum esforço tenha sido feito para derrubar a reforma trabalhista de 2017. De fato, o impulso do país em direção à reindustrialização inevitavelmente levará a mais exploração enquanto os incentivos subjacentes não sejam abordados. Muito parecido com o México, há um risco de que a reindustrialização atual no Brasil transformar o país em uma colônia de montagem com pouca indústria indígena de alto valor—uma razão fundamental pela qual Lula impôs tarifas contra VEs chineses.

O líder brasileiro enfrenta uma encruzilhada em seu terceiro mandato. Depois de consistentemente se classificar como o favorito para a eleição presidencial do 2026, as pesquisas feitas antes do tarifaço do Trump mostraram Lula empatando ou perdendo para uma variedade de oponentes, incluindo o inelegível Bolsonaro. Agora, o presidente é novamente o favorito, embora por margens mais estreitas. A maioria dos brasileiros acredita que Trump estava errado ao impor tarifas (72%) e se opõe à interferência dos EUA no julgamento de Bolsonaro (57%). O 55% também acredita que o ex-presidente procurou permanecer no cargo através de um golpe militar.

É possível que Lula possa navegar para a reeleição em 2026 dadas as divisões e a toxicidade da direita brasileira. O Bolsonarismo elogiou universalmente às tarifas de Washington, com alguns chegando ao ponto de elogiar a possibilidade de Trump bombardear o Brasil com o objetivo de combater o PCC. Além disso, Bolsonaro parece poderia apoiar um de seus filhos doidos ou a esposa em 2026 em vez de uma lista mais palatável de governadores atuais, como Tarcísio de Freitas.

Ao mesmo tempo, 39, 35 e 15%, respectivamente, culpam a família Bolsonaro, Lula e Alexandre De Moraes por provocar as tarifas; obrigrados a escolher entre os Bolsonaros e Lula, 55% culpam o primeiro e 46% o segundo. De uma perspectiva puramente eleitoral—bem como de princípio—o presidente se beneficiaria de criticar os excessos do judiciário enquanto mantesse que bolsonaristas acusados de crimes sérios devem ser levados à justiça. Com toda probabilidade, Lula teme perder o favor do judiciário—um medo razoável considerando que juízes como Moraes são semelhantes a co-executivos que coabitam com o presidente em exercísio.

Se Lula gostasse de apostas tipo Pedro Sanchez, ele poderia procurar um acordo com o Congresso quanto com a administração Trump. Um grande acordo removendo tarifas e restaurando os direitos políticos de Bolsonaro poderia ser usado para o benefício da administração, por exemplo, obrigando o congresso a dobrando o salário mínimo. Embora a severidade de uma tentativa de golpe militar justificasse a desqualificação eleitoral, se pode também argumentar que mais outra derrota de Bolsonaro nas urnas fortaleceria o capital político de Lula, bem como a legitimidade da democracia brasileira.

Por mais desprezível que seja Bolsonaro, a poder eleitoral do ex-presidente deveria dar aos progressistas pausa. A verdade é que o ex-presidente é mais próximo aos valores conservadores dos brasileiros do que a alternativa na esquerda. Nas últimas décadas—e particularmente em meio ao caos dos anos 2010—o Brasil viveu um processo de evangelização cristã. Quase um terço dos brasileiros se identificam como evangélicos em 2025 comparado a apenas 9% em 1990. Consequentemente, atitudes conservadoras em relação ao casamento gay, questões trans, aborto e até as armas aumentaram.

Mesmo perdendo para o Lula, o partido de Bolsonaro, o PL, ganhou um recorde de 99 deputados no congresso em 2022. Nas eleições locais de 2024, candidatos de centro-direita dominaram as corridas para prefeito, enquanto a esquerda sofreu perdas. Embora Lula tenha seguido uma linha pragmática em uma variedade de questões sociais e até buscado apoio entre evangélicos, muitos centro-esquerda permanecem irremediavelmente fora de sintonia com os eleitores, importando causas repelentes do progressismo norteamericano. No ano passado, em um evento em São Paulo, Lula e o Guilherme Boulos se apressaram para minimizar o canto do hino nacional do Brasil em português neutro.

Eleitoralmente, o Brasil são dois países com padrões regionais discretos. Nas regiões sul, centro e sudeste do país, eleitores da classe trabalhadora e rurais votaram em Bolsonaro em 2022, enquanto profissionais urbanos votaram em Lula. Por outro lado, no Norte e Nordeste mais, os profissionais da classe alta votaram em Bolsonaro enquato os eleitores rurais e da classe trabalhadora votaram em Lula. O resultado esquisito é que os eleitores do norte e nordeste do presidente são reféns dos caprichos burgueses de seus pares sulistas.

A Esquerda brasileira se beneficiaria de um esquerdismo mais heterodoxo semelhante àquela do AMLO no México. Isso tornaria a coalizão governante mais próxima dos seus eleitores além do brasileiro médio. No mesmo sentido, o exemplo do AMLO de extirpar a influência das ONGs internacionais—bem como o uso do exército para contornar a burocracia—foi fundamental para a construção de projetos de desenvolvimento como o 'ecocida' Trem Maya. O sucesso de seu partido Morena, bem como de sua sucessora, Claudia Sheinbaum, subindo salários lembra aos mandatos anteriores de Lula como presidente.

Embora o ambiente legislativo atual seja mais hostil ao PT do que nos anos 2000, é previso que o governo demonstre uma pressão concentrada sobre o Congresso com o fim subir o salário médio. Como mostrado, a inflação no Brasil é relativamente alta mesmo durante períodos de relativa normalidade; a diferença fundamental entre agora e os mandatos anteriores do PT, no entanto, é que o incremeto salarial superarou signficativamente à taxa da inflação.

A lição do terceiro mandato de Lula é que os eleitores recompensam líderes que confrontam interesses estabelecidos em seu nome, incluindo aqueles favorecidos por progressistas abastados. Se realmente tiver a vontade de ganhar a reeleição e—mais importante—cumprir com o nome de seu partido, o líder brasileiro precisará fazer mais do que simplesmente se opor ao Bolsonarismo e seus aliados em Washington.

Pode começar demitindo sua ministra do meio ambiente e redirecionar o que resta de seu capital político para subir os salários dos trabalhadores brasileiros.

Esse artigo foi publicado originalmente em inglés em The Liberal Patriot no 22 de Agosto.