So why is it in your feed?

The case isn’t rare. That’s the whole point.

Unfortunately, this happens. Regularly. What doesn't happen regularly is a case reaching global attention the way this one has. And once you can name why, you can't unsee it in any other headline — including ones that have nothing to do with true crime.

The 1+1 formula

Two ingredients drive reach. Only two.

The first is a fear everybody feels, no matter their politics — I call it an identity-neutral fear hook. Money, safety, aging, disaster. You don’t need a party affiliation to be scared of losing your job or your kid.

The second is a wedge tied to identity — who you are, who your group is, who’s to blame. Immigration. Gender conflict. Institutional distrust. Culture war. This ingredient doesn’t have to convince anyone of anything new. It just has to strike a nerve that’s already raw.

Put those two together, and researchers describe the result plainly: content capable of “population-scale attitude disruption through exploitation of societal division and polarizing issues” (Defence Horizon Journal, “Defining Cognitive Warfare,” 2025) [3]. That’s not a marketing phrase. That’s a security phrase.

Clancy, broken down

The fear hook: child mortality, parental dread. You don’t need a political identity to feel that one — it’s about as universal as fear gets.

Layered on top: at least two wedges. One is accountability versus illness — is she guilty, or was she failed by a mental health system before she ever reached that morning? The other is gender conflict — an online campaign wrongly went after her husband, despite zero evidence tying him to the crime.

I’m not saying the Clancy case was built this way on purpose. I’m saying it happened to contain every ingredient a platform algorithm is designed to reward.

Why the algorithm doesn’t care why you clicked

Recommendation systems learn from behavior — what you watch, like, comment on, search for. So a woman who’s engaged with postpartum health, parenting, or true crime gets shown Clancy content because it overlaps with her interests. A man who engages loudly and angrily with gender-conflict content gets shown the exact same story — for a completely different reason.

Two people. Two motivations. One algorithm that doesn’t care about the difference. Watch time is watch time. Comments are comments. Reach is reach.

And reach is the actual currency NATO’s own doctrine cares about — it defines cognitive warfare as anything that affects attitudes and behavior “by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual, group, or population level cognition, to gain an advantage over an adversary.” Reach lets a small actor do what used to require an army’s worth of resources.

What to watch for

Here’s where it gets uncomfortable. Most techniques for manufacturing fake reach — bot farms, coordinated engagement pods, seeded early comments, cross-posting the same content everywhere to fake a “trend” — carry a cost and a detection risk that grows the longer they run.

The fear-hook-plus-wedge recipe skips all of that. Build the content right, and you only need a small, brief nudge to cross the algorithm’s early threshold. After that, real people do the amplifying — for free, voluntarily, and with no fingerprints left behind. The content isn’t fooling the algorithm. It’s fooling the audience, and the audience’s genuine reaction fools the algorithm on the operator’s behalf.

This isn’t just a Clancy story

Watch for this structure and you’ll find it in the news cycle this week, on three different continents.

Australia — financial security tied to immigration. Reuters reported on August 30, 2026, that a minor right-wing party, One Nation, picked up a further seat in a Western Australian state election, with coverage linking its anti-immigration message to public anger over housing costs (”Australia’s Far-Right Party Makes Further Gains,” Reuters, 2026) [4]. Financial fear is the universal hook. Immigration becomes the identity-charged explanation.

Worth being fair here — a real ABC Australia analysis from August 17 walked through the genuine economic relationship between migration, construction, and housing affordability, no political spin attached (”How Migration and Construction Reform Created a Housing Crisis,” ABC News, 2026) [5]. A wedge doesn’t have to be a lie to work. It just has to be simplified and emotionally framed.

The United States — public safety tied to institutional mistrust. An autopsy contradicted the official account of a shooting involving a federal anti-crime task force in Memphis: authorities said a 20-year-old man turned toward National Guard troops with a gun, but the autopsy showed he was shot in the back (”Autopsy Contradicts Account of Memphis Task-Force Shooting,” Associated Press, 2026) [6]. Separately, Reuters found National Guard troops deployed to Washington, D.C., under President Donald Trump appeared in only about 1.3 percent of criminal cases reviewed (”Trump Put Thousands of Soldiers on Washington’s Streets. They Seldom Stop Crime,” Reuters, 2026) [7]. Notice the pattern: a safety question, in under a headline’s worth of time, becomes a question about whether you can trust what you’re being told.

Ghana and the Pentagon — family tied to religion and culture war. In June, Reuters covered an African Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Family Values in Ghana, where “pro-family” lawmakers explicitly tied protection of the family to opposition to LGBT rights, abortion, and sex education (”African Lawmakers Back Push for Tougher Anti-LGBT Laws After Ghana Conference,” Reuters, 2026) [8]. In August, the Pentagon introduced a course on Western civilization and Christianity into military-family schools — and the debate over what children should be taught became, almost instantly, a debate about national identity (”Military Base Schools Put New Emphasis on Western Civilization and Christianity,” Associated Press, 2026) [9].

None of these stories are fake. That’s what makes the pattern worth naming — real events, structured in a way that guarantees they travel further and provoke harder than a story without a wedge attached.

Why this is a national security issue, not a media curiosity

None of this needed a foreign government. No bot farm, no funded influence campaign, no coordinated network anyone could trace. That’s exactly the problem. NATO’s own doctrine defines the goal of cognitive warfare as reach — attitudes and behavior disrupted at population scale. The Clancy case hit that mark using nothing but ordinary human psychology and a platform’s own reward system.

Which means the entire security toolkit built to catch this — built to find foreign coordination, funded bots, traceable networks — is aimed at the wrong layer. There’s no attacker to unmask here. Just content engineered so people amplify it themselves.

Glossary

Cognitive warfare – A military and security doctrine, formally adopted by NATO in 2020, describing coordinated efforts to influence, protect, or disrupt the attitudes and decisions of a population to gain an advantage over an adversary.

Fear hook – A widely relatable fear, such as financial insecurity or safety, that requires no particular political identity to feel, guaranteeing a broad, baseline audience.

Filicide – The killing of a child by a parent, stepparent, or other parental figure.

Rage wedge – An identity-charged topic, such as immigration or gender conflict, layered onto a fear hook to convert attention into argument and sharing.

Trait-matching – A recommendation-system technique that serves content to a user based on their previously demonstrated interests or behavior.

Sources and further reading

1. American SPCC. “Child Maltreatment & Neglect Statistics.” American Society for the Positive Care of Children, 2025. https://americanspcc.org/child-maltreatment-statistics/.

2. Mariano, Timothy Y., Heng Choon (Oliver) Chan, and Wade C. Myers. “Toward a More Holistic Understanding of Filicide: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of 32 Years of U.S. Arrest Data.” Forensic Science International, 2014. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0379073813005422.

3. “Defining Cognitive Warfare: Maximalist versus Minimalist Approaches.” The Defence Horizon Journal, December 4, 2025. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/defining-cognitive-warfare/.

4. Reuters. “Australia’s Far-Right Party Makes Further Gains, Taking Seat in Western State.” Reuters, August 30, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australias-far-right-party-makes-further-gains-taking-seat-western-state-2026-08-30/.

5. ABC News Australia. “How Migration and Construction Reform Created a Housing Crisis.” ABC News, August 17, 2026. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-17/housing-affordability-migration-construction-building-regulation/107040504.

6. Associated Press. “Autopsy Contradicts Account of Memphis Task-Force Shooting.” AP News, August 28, 2026. https://apnews.com/article/8959297a99c362d65aa2517a9d5f1984.

7. Reuters. “Trump Put Thousands of Soldiers on Washington’s Streets. They Seldom Stop Crime.” Reuters, August 19, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-put-thousands-soldiers-washingtons-streets-they-seldom-stop-crime-2026-08-19/.

8. Reuters. “African Lawmakers Back Push for Tougher Anti-LGBT Laws After Ghana Conference.” Reuters, June 19, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/african-lawmakers-back-push-tougher-anti-lgbt-laws-after-ghana-conference-2026-06-19/.

9. Associated Press. “Military Base Schools Put New Emphasis on Western Civilization and Christianity.” AP News, August 14, 2026. https://apnews.com/article/c29537087c0dbf3271cf293a9b17053f.

The appointment comes at a politically sensitive moment.

Fedorov was dismissed as Ukraine’s defence minister in July 2026 after only six months in the job. He has since publicly criticised the Ukrainian government’s management of the war, alleged systemic corruption and called for the restoration of elections. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has rejected Fedorov’s criticism of his government and argued that holding elections during the continuing Russian invasion could destabilise the country. (“Ukraine Needs Changes to Avoid Losing War, Ousted Defence Minister Says,” Reuters, 2026) [1]

Meanwhile, a Temporary Investigative Commission of Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, has summoned Fedorov to appear on 31 August. The commission says it wants “explanations and testimony” connected with information emerging from Operation Midas, a major Ukrainian anti-corruption investigation. (“Verkhovna Rada Summons Fedorov Over ‘Midas’ Corruption Probe,” Kyiv Post, 2026) [2]

On 28 August, Fedorov also confirmed that he had accepted Crosetto’s invitation to advise the Italian defence ministry on military technology and innovation. (“Italy Appoints Ukraine’s Ex-Defense Minister Fedorov as Adviser on Drones, Defense Innovation,” Kyiv Post, 2026) [3]

These developments naturally raise a legal question: if Fedorov were eventually accused of a crime in Ukraine and were living or working in Italy, could Ukraine demand his return?

The short answer is yes, Ukraine could request his extradition from Italy.

But almost everything after that becomes more complicated.

At present, there is no publicly established basis for describing Fedorov as a fugitive, a criminal suspect or someone facing extradition. A parliamentary summons is not an arrest warrant. An investigation is not a conviction. And accepting a position with an Italian minister does not establish that Fedorov is moving permanently to Italy.

To be clear:

Fedorov is being questioned, not extradited

A parliamentary inquiry is an investigation conducted by legislators to establish facts, examine government activity or identify possible wrongdoing. It is not itself a criminal prosecution.

The Ukrainian commission says it is investigating possible violations involving defence, anti-corruption legislation and human rights during martial law. Its chairman, opposition MP Oleksii Honcharenko, has said the commission has “many questions” for Fedorov. (“Parliamentary Commission Summons Former Defense Minister Fedorov over Operation Midas,” NV, 2026) [4]

That does not establish that Fedorov committed an offence.

Operation Midas was made public in 2025 by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau, known as NABU, and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, or SAPO. The investigation concerned an alleged kickback scheme worth about $100 million involving Ukraine’s atomic-energy sector and figures including businessman Tymur Mindich, a former business associate of President Zelenskyy. (“Verkhovna Rada Summons Fedorov Over ‘Midas’ Corruption Probe,” Kyiv Post, 2026) [2]

Public reporting so far does not establish that Fedorov participated in the alleged scheme. There are several possible reasons a parliamentary commission might want testimony from a former defence minister, including information he obtained while in office or his own recent public allegations about corruption.

The legal situation would have to change substantially before extradition became relevant.

A possible sequence would look something like this:

Parliamentary investigation → criminal investigation → evidence against an individual → formal criminal proceedings → arrest warrant → presence abroad → international extradition request.

Several of those stages have not occurred publicly in Fedorov’s case.

Why Italy matters

Italy and Ukraine are both parties to the European Convention on Extradition, a 1957 Council of Europe treaty establishing rules under which participating states can request the surrender of people wanted for prosecution or to serve criminal sentences. Ukraine ratified the convention in 1998. (“European Convention on Extradition: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications,” Council of Europe, 2026) [5]

Extradition means the formal legal process by which one country asks another country to surrender a person for criminal prosecution or punishment.

Ukraine’s relationship with Italy is therefore different from Italy’s relationship with another European Union member state.

EU countries use the European Arrest Warrant, or EAW, a simplified system under which a judicial authority in one EU state can request the arrest and surrender of a person located in another EU state. (“European Arrest Warrant,” European e-Justice Portal, 2026) [6]

Ukraine is not currently an EU member state. It therefore does not have access to the EAW system as an EU member.

A Ukrainian request to Italy would instead go through extradition procedures governed by international agreements and Italian law.

That distinction gives Italian authorities and courts an important role.

Ukraine could request extradition. It could not simply order Italy to return someone.

The same principle broadly applies across the EU

The broad position is similar in many European countries because Ukraine and most EU states participate in the Council of Europe extradition framework.

But that does not mean every Ukrainian extradition request would receive the same answer everywhere in Europe.

Individual countries have their own constitutions, criminal procedures, human-rights obligations and reservations to international treaties.

Italy, for example, has formally declared that it will not grant extradition for an offence punishable by death in the requesting country. (“Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 024: Italy,” Council of Europe, 2026) [7]

Ukraine, for its part, has made its own declarations and reservations under the convention, including a declaration that it will not extradite Ukrainian citizens to another state. (“Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 024: Ukraine,” Council of Europe, 2026) [8]

This produces an important asymmetry: a European state may sometimes be asked to extradite a Ukrainian citizen to Ukraine even though Ukraine itself generally refuses to extradite its own citizens abroad.

None of this determines what would happen in a hypothetical Fedorov case. It simply shows why an extradition request is a judicial process rather than an automatic diplomatic transaction.

The remarkable precedent of Andrea Rocchelli

Italy and Ukraine have already experienced a highly sensitive criminal case involving a Ukrainian serviceman and events during the war.

The comparison is useful precisely because the legal circumstances were very different.

Italian photojournalist Andrea “Andy” Rocchelli was working near Sloviansk in eastern Ukraine on 24 May 2014 during the early phase of the war in Donbas. He was killed along with Russian journalist and human-rights activist Andrei Mironov. French photographer William Roguelon was wounded. (“Italian Police Arrest Ukrainian Man Accused of Killing Photojournalist,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017) [9]

Italian prosecutors later investigated Rocchelli’s death.

Their attention focused on Vitalii Markiv, a Ukrainian National Guard soldier who also held Italian citizenship.

But Ukraine did not extradite Markiv.

That point is crucial.

On 30 June 2017, Markiv travelled from Ukraine to Italy. Italian police arrested him at Bologna airport. (“Italian Police Arrest Ukrainian Man Accused of Killing Photojournalist,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017) [9]

Italy was therefore exercising its own criminal jurisdiction — the legal authority of a state and its courts to investigate and prosecute an alleged crime.

This was not Ukraine asking Italy to enforce a Ukrainian criminal case. It was Italy prosecuting a case connected to the death of an Italian citizen abroad.

Convicted — and then acquitted

The Markiv case became extremely controversial.

In July 2019, a court in Pavia convicted Markiv and sentenced him to 24 years in prison.

Ukraine strongly defended him. The prosecution and defence presented sharply different accounts of what had happened near Sloviansk and what role, if any, Markiv had played.

Then the case changed dramatically.

In November 2020, the Milan Court of Appeal acquitted Markiv on the basis that he had not committed the offence and ordered his release. (“Rocchelli: Markiv Acquitted and Released on Appeal,” ANSA, 2020) [10]

Markiv had spent more than three years in Italian custody.

The prosecution and civil parties challenged the acquittal, but in December 2021 Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation rejected those appeals. The acquittal therefore became final. (“Caso Rocchelli: la Cassazione conferma l’assoluzione per Markiv,” Rai News, 2021) [11]

The final outcome is important when discussing the case. Markiv was not simply “the Ukrainian soldier who killed an Italian journalist.” He was accused and initially convicted, but ultimately acquitted by the Italian judicial system.

That distinction is fundamental to accurate reporting.

Why the Markiv comparison matters — and where it fails

The Markiv and Fedorov situations involve Italy, Ukraine and politically sensitive questions connected to war.

Beyond that, they are legally very different.

Markiv entered Italy when Italian authorities already had their own criminal investigation. He was arrested under Italian jurisdiction and prosecuted in an Italian court.

A hypothetical future Fedorov case would probably begin in the opposite direction.

Ukraine would investigate an alleged offence committed within its jurisdiction. If Ukrainian judicial authorities eventually issued the necessary warrant and Fedorov were physically present in Italy, Kyiv could potentially ask Rome to surrender him.

Italy would then have to consider that request according to the applicable extradition rules.

The Markiv case therefore does not establish that Italy would extradite Fedorov.

What it demonstrates is something more basic: Italian courts can become major independent actors when politically sensitive Ukrainian cases enter Italian jurisdiction.

Politics would inevitably surround the legal process

Fedorov’s new relationship with the Italian government adds another unusual dimension.

Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, serving in Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, first publicly offered Fedorov an advisory position shortly after his dismissal in Ukraine. Crosetto praised Fedorov’s role in battlefield innovation. (“Italian Defense Minister Offers Advisory Role to Mykhailo Fedorov,” Kyiv Post, 2026) [12]

Italy is simultaneously increasing its focus on defence investment. This week, Meloni’s government requested €8 billion from the European Union’s SAFE defence-financing programme, while Crosetto has supported greater investment despite political disagreement within Italy’s governing coalition. (“Italy Asks EU for €8 Billion in SAFE Defence Funds,” Reuters, 2026) [13]

Fedorov’s expertise therefore has practical value for Rome independent of Ukrainian domestic politics.

Fedorov spent years as Ukraine’s digital transformation minister before becoming defence minister in January 2026 and was closely associated with Ukraine’s rapid development of drones and military technology.

His dismissal in July was followed by an increasingly public conflict with the Ukrainian leadership.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s wartime president, has criticised Fedorov’s calls for elections and said some of his decisions as defence minister contributed to serious problems. Fedorov, meanwhile, argues that Ukraine requires major institutional reform, technological change and stronger action against corruption to avoid gradually losing the war. (“Zelenskyy Details Rift with Ukraine’s Dismissed Defense Minister Fedorov,” Associated Press, 2026) [14]

These are political disputes, not findings of criminal responsibility.

That distinction would become especially important if a criminal investigation ever developed.

Could Fedorov claim that a prosecution was political?

International extradition law has long recognised that criminal proceedings and political conflicts can sometimes overlap.

A political-offence exception is a rule allowing extradition to be refused in certain circumstances when the alleged offence or prosecution is fundamentally political rather than an ordinary criminal matter.

That does not mean a politician can avoid prosecution merely by claiming political persecution.

Corruption, fraud and ordinary financial crimes do not automatically become political offences simply because the accused person is a politician.

Nor does Fedorov’s disagreement with Zelenskyy demonstrate that any future investigation would be politically motivated.

There is a competing interpretation that deserves equal attention: Ukrainian institutions have been conducting major anti-corruption investigations during wartime, including investigations involving powerful officials and people connected to the political establishment. Asking a former minister to testify about information he possesses could therefore represent institutional oversight rather than political retaliation.

At present, there is insufficient public evidence to choose between those interpretations because there is not yet a publicly established criminal case against Fedorov to evaluate.

What to watch next

The most significant immediate event is the parliamentary commission meeting scheduled for 31 August.

As of 28 August, commission chairman Honcharenko said Fedorov had not responded to the invitation and warned that failure to attend could have consequences under Ukrainian law. (“Fedorov Warned of Consequences if He Skips Parliamentary Commission Meeting,” NV, 2026) [15]

Whether Fedorov attends — physically, remotely or at all — will therefore matter politically.

More important legally will be what happens afterwards.

The key distinction is Fedorov’s status.

A witness is someone asked to provide information relevant to an investigation. A suspect is someone authorities have reason to believe may have committed an offence.

Moving from the first category to the second would significantly change the story.

An arrest warrant or formal international request would change it again.

Until then, describing Fedorov’s Italian appointment as protection against extradition goes beyond the available evidence.

The established facts are more limited but still noteworthy: a recently dismissed Ukrainian defence minister has become an adviser to the Italian defence minister while openly challenging parts of Kyiv’s wartime leadership, and Ukraine’s parliament simultaneously wants to question him in connection with a major anti-corruption inquiry.

The 2014 Rocchelli case shows why Italy could eventually matter if those political and legal tracks converge.

It also provides a warning against drawing conclusions too quickly. Markiv was arrested, imprisoned and convicted in Italy in an intensely political case — and then acquitted through the same Italian judicial system.

For now, Fedorov’s story remains primarily one of politics, parliamentary scrutiny and an unusual international appointment.

Extradition is a possible future legal question, not the present reality.

Glossary

Criminal jurisdiction – The legal authority of a country and its courts to investigate and prosecute an alleged crime.

European Arrest Warrant (EAW) – A simplified system allowing judicial authorities in one EU member state to request the arrest and surrender of a person in another EU member state.

European Convention on Extradition – A Council of Europe treaty setting rules for extradition between participating countries.

Extradition – The formal legal process through which one country asks another to surrender a person for criminal prosecution or punishment.

Kickback – An illegal payment made in return for favourable treatment, often involving a contract or official decision.

Parliamentary inquiry – An investigation conducted by legislators to establish facts, examine government activity or identify possible wrongdoing.

Political-offence exception – A rule allowing extradition to be refused in certain circumstances when an offence or prosecution is fundamentally political.

Suspect – A person whom authorities have reason to believe may have committed an offence.

Witness – A person asked to provide information relevant to an investigation or legal proceeding.

Sources and further reading

1. Reuters. “Ukraine Needs Changes to Avoid Losing War, Ousted Defence Minister Says.” Reuters, August 25, 2026. Reuters article⁠

2. Kyiv Post. “Verkhovna Rada Summons Fedorov Over ‘Midas’ Corruption Probe.” Kyiv Post, August 25, 2026. Kyiv Post article⁠

3. Kyiv Post. “Italy Appoints Ukraine’s Ex-Defense Minister Fedorov as Adviser on Drones, Defense Innovation.” Kyiv Post, August 28, 2026. Kyiv Post article⁠

4. NV. “Parliamentary Commission Summons Former Defense Minister Fedorov over Operation Midas.” The New Voice of Ukraine, August 25, 2026. NV article⁠

5. Council of Europe. “European Convention on Extradition: Chart of Signatures and Ratifications.” Council of Europe Treaty Office, updated August 2026. Council of Europe treaty status⁠

6. European Commission. “European Arrest Warrant.” European e-Justice Portal, 2026. European e-Justice Portal⁠

7. Council of Europe. “Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 024: Italy.” Council of Europe Treaty Office, 2026. Italy’s declarations under the Extradition Convention⁠

8. Council of Europe. “Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 024: Ukraine.” Council of Europe Treaty Office, 2026. Ukraine’s declarations under the Extradition Convention⁠

9. Committee to Protect Journalists. “Italian Police Arrest Ukrainian Man Accused of Killing Photojournalist.” Committee to Protect Journalists, July 6, 2017. Committee to Protect Journalists report⁠

10. ANSA. “Rocchelli: Markiv Acquitted and Released on Appeal.” ANSA, November 3, 2020. ANSA report⁠

11. Rai News. “Caso Rocchelli: la Cassazione conferma l’assoluzione per Markiv.” Rai News, December 9, 2021. Rai News report⁠

12. Kyiv Post. “Italian Defense Minister Offers Advisory Role to Mykhailo Fedorov.” Kyiv Post, July 25, 2026. Kyiv Post report⁠

13. Reuters. “Italy Asks EU for €8 Billion in SAFE Defence Funds.” Reuters, August 26, 2026. Reuters report⁠

14. Associated Press. “Zelenskyy Details Rift with Ukraine’s Dismissed Defense Minister Fedorov.” Associated Press, August 2026. Associated Press report⁠

15. NV. “Fedorov Warned of Consequences if He Skips Parliamentary Commission Meeting.” The New Voice of Ukraine, August 28, 2026. NV report⁠

US Senator Lindsey Graham died on the evening of 11 July 2026, less than two days after completing his tenth visit to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion. His office said the 71-year-old Republican died following a “brief and sudden illness.” Emergency services reportedly responded to a cardiac-arrest call at his Washington home, but no official medical cause has yet been released. (Reuters)

South Carolina Republican Senator Tim Scott said the death appeared to have resulted from a heart attack, but that remains a political colleague’s account rather than a medical examiner’s conclusion. United States President Donald Trump said Graham had telephoned him after returning from Ukraine and had sounded tired but otherwise normal. Graham had been scheduled to appear on NBC’s Meet the Press on 12 July. (AP News)

The political consequence is clearer than the medical explanation. Graham’s death removes the leading Republican broker behind a long-delayed sanctions effort at the moment when he believed it was finally ready to advance.

The votes remain, but the political driver is gone

On 10 July, Graham met Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv. Zelenskyy, who continues to seek stronger air defences and additional pressure on Russia, discussed both issues with the senator.

After the meeting, Graham announced that senators had reached an agreement with the Trump administration on revised Russia sanctions legislation. The joint announcement came from Graham, Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker and Senate Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Jeanne Shaheen. (Reuters)

Their official statement said the updated legislation would be released “very soon.” It did not publish the revised wording or explain what concessions had been made to secure administration support. (blumenthal.senate.gov)

That distinction matters. The earlier version had around 85 co-sponsors in the 100-seat Senate. A co-sponsor is a legislator who formally adds their name in support of a proposed bill, but is not legally committed to vote for every later version.

The number therefore shows deep bipartisan interest, but not 85 guaranteed votes for revised language that had not yet been made public. Graham was nevertheless confident. He told reporters that White House support meant the bill would become law. That was a political prediction, not a completed legislative act.

What must happen before the bill becomes law

The United States Senate does not automatically vote on a proposal because it has many supporters. The process still involves several political and procedural decisions.

First, senators must publish and formally present the revised language. Changes involving presidential waivers, exemptions, tariff levels or the conditions that trigger sanctions could cause some original supporters to reconsider.

Second, United States Senate Majority Leader John Thune controls much of the chamber’s agenda. The majority leader works with committee leaders to decide which bills are brought to the floor and when they will be debated. (U.S. Senate)

Third, senators may attempt to delay or block a vote through a filibuster, meaning the use of Senate procedures to prolong debate and prevent final action. Ending that debate normally requires cloture, a formal vote to limit further discussion. For most legislation, cloture requires 60 senators.(U.S. Senate)

Eighty-five reliable votes would easily clear that threshold. The uncertainty is whether all 85 senators will support the final text and whether leadership gives them an opportunity to vote.

The House of Representatives must then approve the same wording. A bill becomes law only after the House and Senate pass an identical version and the president signs it.

The bill therefore has strong Senate mathematics but an unfinished political journey.

Why Graham was difficult to replace

Graham had served in Congress for more than three decades, including more than 23 years in the Senate. A former US Air Force lawyer, he built his reputation around national security, military power and an active American role abroad.(AP News)

He was once one of Trump’s fiercest Republican critics. After Trump took control of the Republican Party, Graham became a close ally and frequent adviser.

That relationship gave Graham an unusual function. He could translate traditional Republican foreign policy into Trump’s language of leverage, strength and tariffs. Supporting Ukraine was not presented only as assistance to another country. It was presented as a way to pressure Russia’s customers, strengthen Trump’s negotiating position and force Russia’s President Vladimir Putin towards talks.

Graham told reporters in Kyiv that the coming months offered a possible diplomatic window. His proposed strategy combined stronger Ukrainian military capabilities, economic pressure on Russia’s customers and negotiations. (Reuters)

That helps explain why his death matters even though several senior senators remain involved. Wicker can provide leadership on defence. Blumenthal can preserve the bill’s bipartisan character. Shaheen can use her position on the Foreign Relations Committee. Committee Chairman Jim Risch has formal authority over foreign-policy legislation, while Thune controls the Senate timetable.

None of them individually has Graham’s precise combination of long experience, bipartisan relationships, media visibility and direct access to Trump.

Election-year politics may now become more important

Thirty-five of the Senate’s 100 seats are being contested in the November 2026 midterm elections. (Reuters) Republicans are defending 20 of the 33 regular Class II seats, in addition to two special-election seats already held by the party. (U.S. Senate)

Many of these seats are considered politically safe. Even so, Republican senators must consider primary voters, campaign donors and Trump’s position on the final bill.

Graham gave them some political protection. He could argue that the legislation was not a challenge to Trump but a new tool for the president. Without Graham making that case privately and publicly, some senators may find it safer to remain co-sponsors while avoiding pressure for an immediate vote.

This is the difference between general support and political commitment. Adding a name to a bill carries limited risk. Demanding floor time, defending the economic consequences and challenging sceptical members of one’s own party require more political capital.

Anti-Ukraine rhetoric may also increase as the elections approach. Candidates may frame the debate around the cost of overseas commitments, the risk of escalation or an “America First” preference for domestic spending.

That does not mean every delay would prove hidden opposition to Ukraine. Legislators could have legitimate concerns about the revised wording, presidential authority or effects on global energy prices. A prolonged delay after an announced White House agreement, however, would suggest that Graham’s personal leadership had been more important than the headline number of co-sponsors indicated.

What the sanctions are designed to do

The legislation aims to reduce Russian war revenue by targeting countries that continue purchasing Russian oil and gas.

It relies on secondary sanctions, which punish outside countries, companies or banks for conducting certain business with the main target. Instead of focusing only on Russian organisations, Washington would threaten consequences for foreign buyers that help Russia continue earning energy revenue.

The proposal has also included tariffs of up to 500 percent. A tariff is a tax placed on imported goods. In practice, such a high rate could make many exports from an affected country too expensive to compete in the American market.

The threat is meant to force governments and companies to choose between discounted Russian energy and access to the US economy.

The economic target is significant. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimated that Russia earned approximately €734 million per day from fossil-fuel exports in June 2026, even though total revenue had fallen slightly from May. It estimated that China, India and Türkiye remained central markets for Russian crude and petroleum products. (Energy and Clean Air)

India’s imports of Russian oil reached an estimated 2.7 million barrels per day in June, accounting for more than half of the country’s crude imports as Middle Eastern supplies were disrupted. (Reuters)

These figures show why the bill could hurt Russia. If major buyers reduce purchases, Moscow may have to sell less oil or offer much larger discounts. They also show why implementation would be difficult. India and other importers depend on affordable energy. A sudden reduction in Russian supply could raise oil, diesel, transport and food prices far beyond the countries directly involved.

The energy picture is changing quickly

The relationship between the Iran conflict, Russian exports and Asian demand is more complicated than a simple replacement story.

At points during the Middle Eastern disruption, Asian buyers increased Russian purchases because other supplies were harder to obtain. India’s June import figures provide clear evidence of that shift. (Reuters)

China also remains Russia’s largest overall fossil-fuel customer. However, Chinese refiners use several suppliers and respond quickly to prices, sanctions, shipping risks and domestic demand.

By early July, discounts on Russian Urals crude delivered to India had widened beyond $10 per barrel as some Middle Eastern supplies returned and Asian demand for Russian cargoes weakened. (Reuters)

Russia is therefore not always the fixed or automatic replacement for Iranian oil. Its importance rises and falls with the availability and price of other supplies. This uncertainty affects the sanctions bill. Economic pressure is easier to impose when the world has enough alternative oil. It becomes politically harder when governments fear shortages and inflation.

Sanctions can work, but enforcement determines how much

Sanctions do not need to stop every Russian sale to have an effect. They can reduce revenue by forcing Russia to offer discounts, use more expensive shipping routes or pay intermediaries to hide transactions.

Russia has also developed a shadow fleet, a group of ageing or secretly owned tankers used to transport oil while avoiding normal Western insurance, ownership and regulatory systems.

The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimated that 54 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil in June was transported by sanctioned shadow tankers. (Energy and Clean Air)

This creates a central trade-off. Strong enforcement could reduce Russian income, but removing large volumes from the market too quickly could raise world prices. Higher prices might allow Russia to earn more from the oil it continues selling.

The bill’s effectiveness would therefore depend on its timing, enforcement, exemptions and coordination with other producers. The final text will matter more than the maximum tariff quoted in public debate.

Why conspiracy theories appeared so quickly

The timing of Graham’s death will naturally produce suspicion. He had just returned from Kyiv, strongly criticised Russia, supported legislation aimed at damaging Russian energy revenue and died suddenly before a planned television interview. Russia also has a documented history that makes poisoning claims emotionally plausible to many audiences.

A British public inquiry concluded that the 2006 operation to poison former Russian intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko in London was probably approved by Russia’s security leadership and President Putin. (GOV.UK)

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed that Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny was exposed to a toxic chemical acting as a cholinesterase inhibitor in 2020. (OPCW) The same organisation independently confirmed the identity of the toxic chemical used in the 2018 Salisbury attack on former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter. “(OPCW)

The United Kingdom has attributed these attacks to Russian state-linked actors. Russia has consistently denied involvement and described the accusations as politically motivated. (Reuters)

This history explains why poisoning is being discussed. It does not provide evidence that Graham was poisoned. No official statement has reported suspicious toxicology, evidence of foreign involvement or a criminal investigation. A cardiac-arrest emergency call describes what happened to the heart; it does not by itself establish what caused the arrest.

Poisoning a sitting US senator inside Washington would also represent a major escalation. It would amount to a direct attack on an American constitutional institution and could trigger severe diplomatic, intelligence and military consequences.

Moscow might have reasons to oppose Graham’s work. Whether it would accept the enormous risks of such an operation is a separate question that cannot be answered from timing alone.

The more evidence-based concern is information warfare

The more immediate area to watch is not an unproven assassination theory but the way Graham’s death may be used in the political information space.

Disinformation is false or misleading material deliberately created or spread to influence an audience.

US intelligence and law-enforcement agencies have previously documented Russian operations that manufactured false videos, amplified divisive narratives and attempted to weaken confidence in American elections. (DNI)

There is currently no public evidence of a specific Russian campaign linked to Graham’s death. Past behaviour nevertheless provides a basis for monitoring whether foreign or domestic networks amplify unsupported claims, deepen distrust or encourage anti-Ukraine divisions during the midterm campaign.

The most politically useful influence operation would not necessarily convince Americans that Moscow killed Graham. It could simply make the sanctions debate more confused, more polarised and more costly for senators seeking re-election.

What happens next

Five developments will determine whether Graham’s final sanctions effort survives:

The first is the publication of the revised bill. The second is a clear and continuing endorsement from President Trump. The third is whether Majority Leader Thune schedules floor action. The fourth is whether Graham’s Republican colleagues defend the measure during an election campaign. The fifth is whether the House accepts the same language.

Official information about Graham’s cause of death must be assessed separately from the legislative debate.

The bill has enough support on paper to pass. Graham’s death will show whether that support belongs to a durable institution or depended on one unusually influential political relationship.

Glossary

Cloture – A Senate procedure used to limit debate and move a proposal towards a final vote.

Co-sponsor – A legislator who formally adds their name in support of a bill introduced by another member.

Conspiracy theory – An explanation claiming that powerful actors secretly caused an event without sufficient supporting evidence.

Disinformation – False or misleading material deliberately created or spread to influence an audience.

Filibuster – The use of Senate debate or procedure to delay or prevent a final vote.

Secondary sanctions – Penalties placed on outside countries, companies or banks for doing specified business with a sanctioned target.

Shadow fleet – Tankers with hidden, complex or weakly regulated ownership used to move sanctioned oil outside normal Western shipping systems.

Tariff – A tax placed on goods imported from another country.

Sources and further reading

1. Khushi, Akanksha, Thomas Derpinghaus, and Tim Reid. “Lindsey Graham, US Republican Senator and Trump Ally, Dies at 71.” Reuters, July 12, 2026.

2. Kim, Seung Min, Mary Clare Jalonick, and Meg Kinnard. “Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Close Trump Ally and Foreign Policy Hawk, Dies After a Brief Illness.” Associated Press, July 12, 2026.

3. Psaledakis, Daphne, and Olena Harmash. “US Senators Say Agreement Reached With Trump on Russia Sanctions Bill.” Reuters, July 10, 2026.

4. Blumenthal, Richard, Lindsey Graham, Jeanne Shaheen, and Roger Wicker. “Blumenthal, Graham, Shaheen, & Wicker Announce Agreement on Legislation to Hold Purchasers of Russian Oil Accountable.” United States Senate, July 10, 2026.

5. United States Senate. “About Parties and Leadership: Majority and Minority Leaders.” United States Senate, 2025.

6. United States Senate. “About Filibusters and Cloture.” United States Senate, 2025.

7. United States Senate. “Laws and Acts.” United States Senate, 2019.

8. Harmash, Olena. “China Can Help End Ukraine War by Pressuring Russia, U.S. Senator Graham Says.” Reuters, July 10, 2026.

9. Reuters. “Eight US Senate Races to Watch in the 2026 Midterm Elections.” Reuters, March 4, 2026.

10. United States Senate. “Class II—Senators Whose Terms of Service Expire in 2027.” United States Senate, 2026.

11. Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. “June 2026—Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions.” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, July 10, 2026.

12. Verma, Nidhi, and Mohi Narayan. “India’s Russian Oil Imports to Hit Record High in June, Data Shows.” Reuters, June 30, 2026.

13. Reuters. “Discounts for Russian Urals Crude Widen to More Than $10 per Barrel in India, Sources Say.” Reuters, July 7, 2026.

14. Owen, Robert. “The Litvinenko Inquiry.” United Kingdom Government, January 2016.

15. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. “OPCW Issues Report on Technical Assistance Requested by Germany.” OPCW, October 6, 2020.

16. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. “Incident in Salisbury.” OPCW, 2018.

17. Tabahriti, Sam, and Muvija M. “UK Sanctions Russians It Says Developed Chemical Weapons Used to Kill Navalny.” Reuters, July 6, 2026.

18. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. “Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA Statement.” ODNI, October 25, 2024.

By Kari Odermann | June 7, 2026

The Deterrence Breakdown: When Ally Status Becomes Target Status

The fundamental assumption governing Middle Eastern security for three decades is collapsing: the belief that hosting U.S. military bases guarantees American protection. Since February 28, 2026, every Gulf state that hosts U.S. forces—Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain—has been targeted by Iranian strikes, even though none of these countries participated in attacks on Iran. Iran’s deliberate message is clear: if you host U.S. infrastructure, you share the liability.[11]

This shift represents more than a military escalation; it is a stress test for the entire post-Cold War international order. Gulf states are now likely to demand consultation rights with enforcement mechanisms, meaning they could veto strikes planned from their territory—not merely receive diplomatic notifications.[12]

The first wave of Iranian strikes on February 28 followed expected wartime logic: Iran was hit by a joint U.S.-Israel attack, and Iran retaliated. However, the second wave occurred during an active ceasefire announced in April, revealing a different strategic calculation. These countries are not caught in crossfire; they are being used as pressure valves. Every time Tehran is unhappy at the negotiating table, the Gulf pays the price.[13][11]

The Atlantic Alliance Cracks: Merz’s Criticism and Trump’s Response

The deterrence breakdown extends beyond the Gulf, straining NATO alliances. In late April 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly criticized the United States for entering the Iran war “without any strategy,” warning that the lack of planning complicates prospects for resolving the situation. Merz noted that Iran’s capabilities are stronger than previously anticipated, creating significant obstacles to ending the conflict.[1]

Trump responded by scolding Merz for his criticism, calling the war “necessary” and saying the German chancellor “doesn’t know what he’s talking about”. In May 2026, the Pentagon unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops from military bases in Germany—though Merz maintained there was “no connection” between the troop withdrawal and disagreements over the Iran war.[4][14][15]

Merz did not retract his criticism, instead expressing his admiration for the United States while maintaining his position. He later said he would not advise his children to pursue education or employment in the U.S. amid the “deeply polarising” social climate. This exchange demonstrates that hosting American military forces now comes with a “condition of silence” regarding U.S. operations—a change in how American military power functions globally.[7][4]

Iran’s Strategy: Internationalizing Conflict Costs

Iran’s targeting of Kuwait and Bahrain signals a deliberate strategy to internationalize the cost of conflict beyond the direct U.S.-Iran confrontation. The calculation is straightforward: Iran cannot match U.S. military power directly, so Tehran has made the war economically costly for Gulf states and their allies, creating pressure points that force broader intervention.

Iran’s targeting strategy deliberately focused on economic pressure points beyond military sites: oil refineries, desalination plants, and airport infrastructure. These targets are designed to hurt global energy markets, disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and force Gulf governments to question whether the cost of their U.S. alliance is worth it. This is not retaliation; it is leverage—a sophisticated form of coercive logic.[16]

The Strait of Hormuz: Choke Point and European Independence

The United States brings overwhelming naval firepower: 27 war ships, two aircraft carriers, and a blockade costing Iran half a billion dollars daily. But raw naval power is not the same as a sustainable framework.[16]

European powers finalized advance planning for a postwar mine-clearing mission in the Hormuz region, led by the UK and France. U.S. Forces from Central Command began clearing mines in the Strait of Hormuz on April 11, 2026, as two Navy destroyers conducted operations.[2][5]

Crucially, Europe built this framework not entirely with the United States, but alongside it. The same allies Trump criticized and threatened built the framework independently, demonstrating that some things are too important to wait for American leadership.[2]

The Ceasefire Pause and Mediation “Success”

In March 2026, Trump announced a five-day pause on planned U.S. strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure following “very good and productive” talks between Washington and Tehran. Trump stated on Truth Social: “I have instructed the Department of War to postpone any and all military strikes against Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure for a five-day period”.[3][9]

Later, Trump extended the deadline by 10 days to April 6, 2026, at 8 P.M. Eastern Time, citing an Iranian government request. This mediation success demonstrates that third-party diplomats can produce tangible results even when direct communication is limited.[6]

Legal Precedent: Self-Defense Claims During Ceasefires

The U.S. framing of its Qeshm Island strikes on May 7, 2026, as “self-defense” under Article 51 of the UN Charter creates a new precedent for unilateral action during active ceasefires. Article 51 is the emergency clause allowing nations to use military force in self-defense without Security Council approval when under imminent attack.[13]

The key issue is why invoke international law if you don’t respect it? International law is most useful to great powers like the U.S. not when they follow it, but when they cite it. This gives allies political cover—the UK, France, and Germany need to justify support for U.S. operations to their own publics and parliaments.[13]

However, a power that openly abandons legal frameworks loses the ability to invoke them defensively when needed. Russia cited self-defense in Ukraine, and China cites it in the South China Sea, using the exact same playbook. The most jarring fact for many in the West is that the U.S. is using the same techniques that authoritarian governments have employed, damaging its moral authority.[13]

The definition of “imminent” is contested: during a ceasefire declared April 8, does Iranian naval positioning near the Strait constitute an imminent threat justifying pre-emptive strikes? The U.S. argues yes—this is genuinely new: ceasefires do not constrain pre-emptive self-defense against posturing, not just incoming fire. Russia has claimed self-defense for every escalatory step in Ukraine since February 2022. Every actor with a territorial grievance and a lawyer now has a new template.[13]

Air Defense Burden: Institutional Failure Exposed

The drone and missile interceptions over Kuwait expose genuine institutional failure across the Gulf. Since summer 2022, Russian forces were confirmed using Iranian-designed Shahed drones at scale in Ukraine. Gulf states watched this but did not restructure their defense architecture, assuming Iran would not directly attack states it was diplomatically engaging.[17]

The dual-track assumption has now collapsed. On one track, diplomatic engagement with Iran was supposed to reduce targeting likelihood—the 2023 Saudi-Iranian normalization deal brokered by China was the centerpiece, while Qatar maintained open channels with Tehran and the UAE quietly rebuilt economic ties. On the other track, hosting U.S. military infrastructure was supposed to deter Iranian aggression. The strikes have proven these tracks incompatible: diplomatic engagement did not prevent targeting, and U.S. presence did not deter it.[17]

Every dollar Iran spends on drone strikes, the UAE spends an estimated 15 to 35 dollars defending against them, according to reports. This is not a military problem; it is an economic attrition strategy. Iran doesn’t need to penetrate Gulf air defenses; it just needs Gulf states to keep spending until their magazines are empty and treasuries are strained.[17]

Pathways to Regional War Without Israel

If the ceasefire collapses, three pathways to broader regional war exist that don’t involve Israel as the primary front. Israel and Iran have managed their confrontation for decades with mutually understood thresholds. Gulf states are newcomers to direct exposure, with far less established red lines, far more economic vulnerability, and governments that never agreed to be part of this war.[12]

Pathway one: If the ceasefire breaks down, Iran escalates against Gulf energy infrastructure.[12]

Pathway two: Gulf states enter directly—the point where entering the conflict becomes cheaper than absorbing it.[12]

Pathway three: Revolutionary Guard splinter action—the IRGC doesn’t need a directive; it needs an opportunity.[12]

Glossary

Deterrence – A security strategy where one country prevents attack by making the cost of aggression too high for the opponent.

Article 51 of the UN Charter – An emergency clause allowing nations to use military force in self-defense without Security Council approval when under imminent attack.

IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) – Iran’s elite parallel military force, distinct from the regular army, with significant political influence inside Iran.

Economic attrition strategy – A tactic where one side forces the opponent to spend so much on defense that their treasury becomes strained over time.

Choke point – A narrow geographic passage (like the Strait of Hormuz) that can be blocked or controlled to disrupt shipping and trade.

Backchannel diplomacy – Informal, unofficial communication between countries designed to prepare ground for formal negotiations.

Ceasefire – A temporary pause in fighting between conflicting parties, not a permanent end to conflict.

Shahed drone – Iranian-designed unmanned aerial vehicle used extensively by Russian forces in Ukraine since 2022.

About the Author:

Kari Odermann, is a political analyst and communication specialist with over 20 years of experience across security, development, and technical assistance in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. She advises on and develops strategies for government programmes and projects worldwide, including work with the German Parliament, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), UNDP, and international implementation organisations, and serves as a consultant to public, private, and non-profit actors.

To advise clients effectively, Dr. Odermann is also a hands-on content creator with a global community of close to 400,000 followers and an annual reach of approximately 10 million, demonstrating how complex political and security issues can be made accessible in evidence-based formats for audiences who might not otherwise engage with the content.

She holds a Dr. rer. phil. from the Freie Universität Berlin and has been awarded both a Fulbright Scholarship and a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship. She has also held political mandates in the United States and Germany.

Dr. Odermann develops strategies and conducts trainings and workshops on communication in sensitive environments and the effective use of technology.

Sources and further reading

1. Al Jazeera. “Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation.” Al Jazeera, February 28, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/multiple-gulf-arab-states-that-host-us-assets-targeted-in-iran-retaliation

2. Middle East Institute. “Iran considers its response to potential renewed US-Israeli strikes.” MEI, February 19, 2026. https://mei.edu/publication/iran-considers-its-response-to-potential-renewed-us-israeli-strikes/

3. Arise News. “US-Iran strike exchange reshaping deterrence calculus for Gulf states.” Arise News, June 6, 2026.

4. PBS. “U.S. ‘is being humiliated’ by the Iranian leadership, Germany’s Merz says.” PBS, April 27, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-is-being-humiliated-by-the-iranian-leadership-germanys-merz-says

5. ANKASAM. “The Collapse of Strategic Deterrence in the Middle East and Asymmetric.” ANKASAM, March 6, 2026. https://www.ankasam.org/anka-analizler/the-collapse-of-strategic-deterrence-in-the-middle-east-and-asymmetric/?lang=en

6. Al Jazeera. “Trump scolds Germany’s Merz for criticism of Iran war.” Al Jazeera, April 28, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/28/trump-scolds-germanys-merz-for-criticism-of-iran-war

7. DW. “Merz ‘not giving up’ on Germany’s relationship with US.” DW, May 3, 2026. https://www.dw.com/en/merz-not-giving-up-on-germanys-relationship-with-us/a-77026062

8. New York Times. “Europe Tries a Trumpian Tactic With Trump: No Apologies.” New York Times, May 13, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/13/world/europe/trump-merz-no-apology.html

9. The Guardian. “German leader Merz says he ‘would not advise my children to go’ to US.” The Guardian, May 15, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/15/friedrich-merz-germany-children-study-work-us-politics

10. Al-Monitor. “Trump announces five-day pause on Iran energy strikes after productive talks.” Al-Monitor, March 22, 2026. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/trump-announces-five-day-pause-iran-energy-strikes-after-productive-talks

11. Scripps News. “Trump calls for five-day pause in strikes on Iranian power plants, energy sites.” Scripps News, March 22, 2026. https://www.scrippsnews.com/us-news/iran-war/trump-calls-for-five-day-pause-in-strikes-on-iranian-power-plants-energy-sites

12. YouTube. “Trump pauses Iran energy strikes for 10 days.” YouTube, March 26, 2026.

13. U.S. Department of War. “U.S. Forces Start Mine Clearance Mission in Strait of Hormuz.” War.gov, April 12, 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4457440/us-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/

14. GCaptain. “UK and France Finalize Postwar Hormuz Mine-Clearing Mission.” GCaptain, June 3, 2026. https://gcaptain.com/uk-and-france-finalize-postwar-hormuz-mine-clearing-mission/

Sources

[1] U.S. ‘is being humiliated’ by the Iranian leadership, Germany’s Merz ... https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-is-being-humiliated-by-the-iranian-leadership-germanys-merz-says

[2] UK and France Finalize Postwar Hormuz Mine-Clearing Mission https://gcaptain.com/uk-and-france-finalize-postwar-hormuz-mine-clearing-mission/

[3] Trump announces five-day pause on Iran energy strikes ... - Al-Monitor https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/03/trump-announces-five-day-pause-iran-energy-strikes-after-productive-talks

[4] Europe Tries a Trumpian Tactic With Trump: No Apologies https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/13/world/europe/trump-merz-no-apology.html

[5] U.S. Forces Start Mine Clearance Mission in Strait of Hormuz https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4457440/us-forces-start-mine-clearance-mission-in-strait-of-hormuz/

[6] Trump pauses Iran energy strikes for 10 days - YouTube

[7] German leader Merz says he ‘would not advise my children to go’ to US https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/15/friedrich-merz-germany-children-study-work-us-politics

[8] Clearing mines laid at sea can be an ‘extremely challenging and ... https://www.facebook.com/UN.News.Centre/posts/clearing-mines-laid-at-sea-can-be-an-extremely-challenging-and-very-dangerous-un/1363576589141273/

[9] Trump calls for five-day pause in strikes on Iranian power plants ... https://www.scrippsnews.com/us-news/iran-war/trump-calls-for-five-day-pause-in-strikes-on-iranian-power-plants-energy-sites

[10] Friedrich Merz said the US was ‘being humiliated’ by Iran, as the German ... https://www.facebook.com/financialtimes/posts/friedrich-merz-said-the-us-was-being-humiliated-by-iran-as-the-german-chancellor/1370307851809255/

[11] Multiple Arab states that host US assets targeted in Iran retaliation https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/multiple-gulf-arab-states-that-host-us-assets-targeted-in-iran-retaliation

[12] The U.S.-Israel war against Iran, and Tehran’s subsequent missile ...

[13] Iran considers its response to potential renewed US-Israeli strikes https://mei.edu/publication/iran-considers-its-response-to-potential-renewed-us-israeli-strikes/

[14] Trump scolds Germany’s Merz for criticism of Iran war - Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/28/trump-scolds-germanys-merz-for-criticism-of-iran-war

[15] Merz ‘not giving up’ on Germany’s relationship with US - DW https://www.dw.com/en/merz-not-giving-up-on-germanys-relationship-with-us/a-77026062

[16] Iran’s high-risk war strategy seems to centre on endurance ... - BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93jj3gz8x0o

A project would be designed, funded, and implemented. Communication would arrive later to explain the results, produce reports, create visibility for donors, and share success stories.

In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, “The End of Foreign Aid Is Not the End of Development,” Mark Suzman, CEO of the Gates Foundation, argues that the current crisis in global aid should not simply be viewed as a funding problem. Instead, it should be seen as an opportunity to rethink how development works.

His central argument is straightforward: development should be designed to reduce dependence on aid, not perpetuate it.

Countries should become increasingly capable of funding, managing, and sustaining their own systems. External support should focus on helping build that capacity rather than maintaining permanent dependence.

The article focuses primarily on financing, institutions, and development policy.

What it does not explore in detail is the role communication plays in making that transition possible.

That omission is understandable.l, as mentioned, communication is often treated as a support function.

In reality, it may be one of the most important factors determining whether this new model succeeds.

The Old Communication Model

For much of the modern aid era, communication often followed a relatively simple logic:

Donor → Project → Beneficiary

Communication existed to explain what the project had achieved.

Reports documented outputs.

Campaigns raised awareness.

Stories highlighted beneficiaries.

Donors demonstrated accountability.

These activities remain important. Public money should be transparent.

But if development is moving toward local ownership, communication can no longer focus primarily on documenting what happened.

It must help create the conditions that allow change to continue after a project ends.

Communication as Development Infrastructure

Many development challenges are not primarily technical problems.

The technology already exists.

The expertise already exists.

The financing may even exist.

The challenge is often adoption.

People must trust institutions.

Communities must understand reforms.

Businesses must invest.

Citizens must participate.

Governments must maintain public support during periods of change.

None of these outcomes can be achieved through technical solutions alone.

They require communication.

Not communication as publicity.

Communication as infrastructure.

The ability of societies to share information, explain decisions, build trust, manage disagreement, and sustain collective action may increasingly determine whether development succeeds.

The Shift From Visibility to Ownership

The traditional question in development communication has often been:

“What did the project achieve?”

The question is:

“Who will sustain these outcomes when the project is gone?”

That shift changes everything.

Success is no longer measured solely by reach, impressions, publications, or media coverage.

Instead, communication must help answer deeper questions:

• Do citizens understand the change?

• Do communities support it?

• Do local institutions have credibility?

• Do stakeholders trust one another?

• Can the public distinguish evidence from misinformation?

• Is there a coalition willing to continue the work?

These questions sit at the heart of long-term development.

They are also communication questions.

The Information Environment Matters

Development practitioners often speak about financial capital, human capital, and physical infrastructure.

Increasingly, societies must also think about informational infrastructure.

The ability to communicate effectively is becoming a strategic capability.

This is particularly true in an era characterised by:

• Information overload

• Declining trust in institutions

• Algorithm-driven media environments

• Political polarisation

• Disinformation campaigns

• Fragmented audiences

A technically sound policy can fail if people do not understand it.

A necessary reform can collapse if opponents define it before supporters explain it.

An institution can lose public confidence even when its performance improves.

Development does not happen in a vacuum.

It happens inside information environments.

Communication Is No Longer the Final Slide

Many organisations still treat communication as the final slide in a project presentation.

A deliverable.

A dissemination activity.

A visibility requirement.

That mindset reflects an older development model.

In the emerging model, communication is not something that happens after development.

It is one of the mechanisms through which development happens.

The challenge is no longer simply communicating projects.

The challenge is helping societies navigate change.

And if the future of development is greater local ownership, stronger institutions, and reduced dependence on external assistance, then communication is no longer a supporting activity.

It becomes part of the foundation itself.

Reference

Suzman, Mark. “The End of Foreign Aid Is Not the End of Development.” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2026. Available at: https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2026/06/01/the-end-of-foreign-aid-is-not-the-end-of-development/content.html

Taiwan has openly recognized that algorithmic manipulation—the use of automated recommendation systems to shape what content users see on social media platforms—poses a national security threat. The island’s 2025 National Defense Report integrates cognitive warfare, defined as efforts to manipulate public perception and decision-making through information operations, into its civil preparedness framework. The government’s civil defense handbook also instructs citizens that any message claiming Taiwan has surrendered should be treated as false during heightened tensions with China.[5][1]

Yet despite this recognition, Taiwan has not built the regulatory infrastructure needed to counter algorithmic manipulation at its source. Unlike the European Union’s Digital Services Act, which requires very large online platforms and search engines to assess systemic risks, disclose the main parameters of recommender systems, and submit to independent audits, Taiwan has no framework to compel platforms to reveal how their algorithms rank and amplify content. That gap is not merely technical; it is a mismatch between the threat Taiwan faces and the defenses it has built.[2][3][4][6]

Two Types of Manipulation

Content-based manipulation involves creating and distributing false or misleading material through fake accounts, bot networks, coordinated inauthentic behavior, and high-engagement tactics designed to game platform algorithms. Manipulators often use outrage, repetition, hashtag flooding, coordinated likes and shares, and misleading headlines to signal relevance to recommendation systems, which can cause false or manipulated content to be amplified as if it were organic public interest. This approach requires continuous effort, leaves detectable traces in posting patterns and account behavior, and can be countered through account removal, fact-checking, and user education.

Even so, people often remain confident that they can spot fake content, even when experiments show otherwise. A Cambridge test using more than 8,000 participants found that adult Americans correctly classified only about 65% of real and fake headlines, while younger adults and people who spent more time online recreationally performed worse. Separate research also shows that overconfidence is common in news judgments: people may feel certain about what is true or false even when their accuracy is limited, and false confidence can increase the chances of sharing misinformation. Public opinion data echo that gap between confidence and capability, with a substantial share of Americans expressing little trust in social media companies’ ability to identify false information, while still believing algorithms are shaping what gets seen and removed.

Algorithmic manipulation operates at the infrastructure level. It involves influencing the recommendation systems that determine which content is amplified, suppressed, or never shown to users at all. This approach is persistent, hard to detect from the outside, and can turn a platform’s authentic users and content into delivery vehicles for influence operations.[8]

The distinction is critical. Content manipulation is a tactic that requires ongoing resources. Algorithmic manipulation is an architectural advantage that, once established, can operate continuously without additional effort.

The Scale of Taiwan’s Exposure

The scope of Taiwan’s vulnerability becomes clearer when looking at usage patterns among the population most likely to be mobilized in a crisis. According to research published by Small Wars Journal in June 2025, more than 42% of Taiwanese voters under age 30 rely exclusively on algorithmic platforms such as TikTok for political information. TikTok, owned by Chinese company ByteDance, operates under Chinese law, which requires companies to cooperate with state intelligence activities when requested.[9][1]

Research by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in October 2025 found that TikTok users in Taiwan hold perceptions about cross-strait relations that contradict established facts. Specifically, 38.9% of active TikTok users blamed Taiwan or the United States for rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, compared with 51.8% of non-users who correctly attributed primary responsibility to China. The study suggested that these perceptions may have been shaped by platform dynamics that distort the documented record of Chinese military exercises and diplomatic pressure.[10]

This pattern is not accidental. Chinese People’s Liberation Army doctrine explicitly describes social media platforms as “the main battlefield” of cognitive warfare. Military writings recommend using algorithmic recommendations to push information to target audiences with desired biases, a strategy described as “invisible manipulation”.[11]

Taiwan’s Response

Taiwan has implemented several defensive measures against information manipulation. The Ministry of Digital Affairs created an SMS authentication system in which official government text messages are delivered from a unique “111” phone code, making it easier for citizens to identify authentic government communications during emergencies. The ministry has also established protocols requiring online platforms to remove fraudulent advertisements within 24 hours of notification.[12]

The government has banned TikTok and Douyin from devices used by public sector employees, classifying them as products that “endanger national information and communication security”. Officials have also discussed blocking TikTok access on school Wi-Fi networks.[13][14]

Civil society organizations such as Kuma Academy provide training in media literacy and civil defense preparedness, including instruction on recognizing disinformation. Fact-checking initiatives work to identify and debunk false narratives circulating on social media platforms.[15]

These measures address content-level threats. They help citizens distinguish authentic government messages from fake ones, remove specific pieces of fraudulent content, and strengthen critical thinking. But they do not address the algorithmic infrastructure that determines which messages, authentic or fraudulent, reach users’ screens in the first place.

As one analysis noted, Taiwan’s response remains “piecemeal,” with “no national doctrine” that integrates civil, cyber, and cognitive defense into a unified framework.[1]

The EU’s Regulatory Model

The European Union offers the clearest democratic counterexample. Through the Digital Services Act (DSA), it treats platform risk as a governance problem rather than only a content moderation problem. The law imposes its strongest obligations on very large online platforms and search engines, requiring them to assess systemic risks, mitigate those risks, and provide more transparency around recommender systems.[3][4][2][1]

The DSA also requires independent audits for these platforms and gives regulators and researchers more visibility into how recommender systems operate. That is important because the law is explicitly concerned with risks to civic discourse, elections, and democratic processes, not merely with removing illegal content after the fact. In that sense, the EU has gone further than Taiwan and the United States in treating algorithmic systems as part of the democratic infrastructure.[4][2][3]

Even so, the DSA is not a complete solution. Early assessments have criticized platform risk reports as vague and overly reliant on self-reporting, while researchers still face limits in obtaining data needed for robust independent scrutiny. So the EU model is more advanced, but it still leaves important gaps.[16][17]

The Crisis Scenario

A central strategic question remains unresolved: in a crisis scenario involving blockade or military action, would China shut down Taiwan’s internet infrastructure or maintain connectivity to exploit algorithmic control?

If connectivity is maintained, platforms like TikTok could function as distribution channels for false evacuation instructions, fabricated surrender announcements, or manipulated footage—amplified through trusted local voices to maximize credibility. Taiwan’s SMS authentication system addresses one vector of false official communications, but it cannot prevent the suppression of authentic preparedness information that contradicts adversary narratives.[18]

This is not a hypothetical concern. During military exercises around Taiwan in December 2024, Chinese state media conducted coordinated information operations using social media platforms, including TikTok and YouTube, to amplify content from Taiwanese political figures that aligned with Chinese Communist Party messaging.[19]

Digital Services Act

The United States’ Different Gap

The United States has taken a more aggressive approach to foreign control of social media platforms, but it has still arrived at a solution that does not fully address algorithmic vulnerability.

In January 2026, TikTok finalized an agreement that transferred operational control of its U.S. operations to a new joint venture with 80.1% American ownership. Under the agreement, the joint venture operates under safeguards covering data protections, algorithm security, content moderation, and software assurances.[20]

However, the structure contains a major flaw: ByteDance continues to own the underlying algorithm, which the U.S. entity licenses and will “retrain, test and update”. National security experts have argued that the core issue is not just where data is stored, but what the algorithm emphasizes or suppresses in its recommendations. Those decisions can shape public perceptions even without overtly false content.[2]

Senator Ed Markey said in January 2026 that “the White House has provided virtually no details about this agreement, including whether TikTok’s algorithm is truly free of Chinese influence”. The deal illustrates a broader pattern in U.S. policy: addressing ownership and data storage while leaving algorithmic transparency unresolved.[20]

Legislative Efforts

The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2025 was introduced in both the Senate and the House and would require the FTC to mandate impact assessments for automated decision systems used in consequential areas such as housing, employment, and education. As of May 2026, the bills remain in committee with little movement.[21][3]

A separate bill, the Algorithm Accountability Act, focuses specifically on social media platforms and requires them to “exercise reasonable care” in algorithm design to prevent bodily injury or death. But that proposal is aimed at youth safety concerns such as self-harm or eating-disorder content, not the national security implications of foreign algorithmic manipulation.[4]

The Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, has prioritized AI competitiveness over regulation. In July 2025, the White House released “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan,” which recommended reconsidering regulations viewed as constraints on innovation.[22]

Ownership Without Transparency

Both Taiwan and the United States have focused regulatory attention on ownership structures, data storage locations, and content moderation practices. The U.S. approach includes:

- CFIUS reviews of foreign acquisitions and investments in technology companies, with expanded authority to block transactions in sensitive sectors.[16]

- Department of Justice rules restricting cross-border flows of Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data to China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela.[23]

- Outbound investment controls, codified in the COINS Act of December 2025, that restrict U.S. investment in Chinese artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing.[24]

These measures address who owns platforms and where data is stored. They do not address how algorithms function once those ownership and data requirements are satisfied.

As a result, both democracies have built defenses that target symptoms rather than architecture. The TikTok agreement changed the ownership structure, mandated U.S. data storage, and established a U.S.-based content moderation team, but it did not require full algorithmic transparency, independent auditing with meaningful public disclosure, or enforcement mechanisms to verify that recommendation systems are not shaped by foreign influence.[2][20]

Counterarguments

Several arguments suggest that concerns about algorithmic manipulation may be overstated or that existing approaches are sufficient.

First, some analysts contend that platform algorithms primarily optimize for engagement rather than political outcomes, and that political effects are incidental byproducts of that design. This view suggests that concerns about manipulation may overstate intentionality.[25]

Second, Taiwan’s civil society, independent media sector, and high digital literacy may provide natural resilience even without formal regulation. Those strengths matter, especially in a population that has repeatedly experienced external pressure.[26][27]

Third, the technical complexity of auditing proprietary algorithms raises questions about whether regulatory frameworks can effectively verify neutrality even if transparency rules are adopted. Algorithms also change over time, which makes one-time audits imperfect.[17]

Finally, some observers warn that overly restrictive algorithmic regulations could reduce platform functionality, create barriers to entry for smaller firms, or empower government oversight mechanisms that could be misused in less democratic settings. Those concerns are real, but they do not remove the underlying problem.[28]

Sovereignty and Infrastructure

The algorithmic vulnerability facing Taiwan and the United States is not primarily a technology problem. It is a sovereignty problem.

Both democracies have identified algorithmic manipulation as a threat. Both have implemented defensive measures focused on content moderation, ownership structures, and data flows. Neither has fully built the regulatory infrastructure needed to compel algorithmic transparency, verify system behavior, or audit the infrastructure that determines what information reaches citizens during normal times, much less during crises.

Taiwan faces the more immediate threat because of its geopolitical position and the concentration of young users’ political information on platforms vulnerable to Chinese influence. The United States, despite more aggressive action on platform ownership, has settled on a TikTok arrangement that changes ownership without fully resolving the question of algorithmic control.[10][1][20][2]

Whether that gap becomes a catastrophic vulnerability or a manageable risk remains an open question. What is clear is that answering it will require moving beyond content-focused defenses and confronting the algorithmic infrastructure itself.

Glossary

Algorithmic manipulation – The use of automated recommendation systems to shape what content users see on digital platforms in order to influence behavior or perception.

CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) – An interagency committee that reviews foreign investments in U.S. companies to assess national security risks.

Cognitive warfare – Military or intelligence operations designed to manipulate public perception, decision-making, and willingness to resist through information and psychological tactics.

Content-based manipulation– Information operations that involve creating and distributing false or misleading content through fake accounts, bots, or coordinated networks.

– European Union legislation requiring large online platforms to assess systemic risks, provide transparency around recommender systems, and submit to independent audits.[3][1][4][2]

TID (Technology, Infrastructure, and Data) U.S. business – A category used by CFIUS to identify U.S. companies that maintain or collect sensitive data or develop critical technologies, subjecting them to enhanced foreign investment scrutiny.

Kari Odermann is a political analyst and communication specialist. She is also a hands-on content creator with a global community of nearly 400,000 followers and an annual reach of approximately 5 million, demonstrating how complex political and security issues can be translated into evidence-based formats for broad audiences. She holds a Dr. rer. phil. from Freie Universität Berlin and has received both a Fulbright Scholarship and a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship. She has also held political mandates in the United States and Germany.

Sources

[1] The Digital Services Act | Shaping Europe’s digital future https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act

[2] DSA: Very large online platforms and search engines https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops

[3] The impact of the Digital Services Act on digital platforms https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-impact-platforms

[4] How to define platforms’ systemic risks to democracy https://algorithmwatch.org/en/making-sense-of-the-digital-services-act/

[5] What is DSA: The Digital Services Act Explained https://edaa.eu/digital-services-act/

[6] A guide to the Digital Services Act, the EU’s law to rein in ... https://algorithmwatch.org/en/dsa-explained/

[7] The Digital Services Act: Practical Implications for Online ... https://www.lw.com/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/Digital-Services-Act-Practical-Implications-for-Online-Services-and-Platforms.pdf

[8] Digital Services Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Services_Act

[9] Mostly False: The Digital Service Act is intended to prevent ... https://eufactcheck.eu/factcheck/mostly-false-the-digital-service-act-is-intended-to-prevent-the-sharing-of-unorthodox-and-creative-ideas/

[10] Countering cognitive warfare: Lessons for the EU from Taiwan https://www.9dashline.com/article/countering-cognitive-warfare-lessons-for-the-eu-from-taiwan

[11] Unpacking the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) https://adfinternational.org/article/digital-services-act-unpacked

[12] The Digital Services Act and the EU as the Global ... https://cjil.uchicago.edu/print-archive/digital-services-act-and-eu-global-regulator-internet

[13] The Digital Services Act and the Brussels Effect on Platform ... https://cjil.uchicago.edu/print-archive/digital-services-act-and-brussels-effect-platform-content-moderation

[14] The Digital Service Act: Overview and Key Obligations https://www.williamfry.com/knowledge/the-digital-service-act-overview-and-key-obligations/

[15] Putting the Digital Services Act (DSA) to the test https://baldon-avocats.com/putting-the-digital-services-act-dsa-to-the-test-can-the-eus-counter-the-deregulation-push-from-big-social-media-platforms/

[16] A Critical Look at the DSA’s First Risk Assessments https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/dsa-initial-analysis/45345

[17] Systemic Risk Assessment under the Digital Services Act https://kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and-commentary/systemic-risk-assessment-under-the-digital-services-act/

[18] Digital Services Act (DSA) | Updates, Compliance, Training https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com

[19] The EU’s Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act https://www.gmfus.org/news/eus-digital-markets-act-and-digital-services-act

[20] The preliminary findings under the Digital Services Act ... https://www.facebook.com/rapplerdotcom/posts/the-preliminary-findings-under-the-digital-services-act-which-requires-big-tech-/1502897415205655/

[21] Learn About DSA Obligations for Very Large Online Platforms https://edaa.eu/digital-services-act/obligations-for-very-large-online-platforms/

[22] EU AI Act: implications for VLOPs and Digital Services Act https://legalbriefs.deloitte.com/post/102ierr/eu-ai-act-implications-for-vlops-and-digital-services-act

[23] Regulating high-reach AI: On transparency directions in the ... https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulating-high-reach-ai

[24] Making Systemic Risk Assessments Work: How the DSA ... https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/making-systemic-risk-assessments-work-how-the-dsa-creates-a-virtuous-loop-to-address-the-societal-harms-of-content-moderation/17DD3903564630E8DBB8D6CAE93855A7

[25] The Regulation of Recommender Systems Under the DSA https://dsa-observatory.eu/2024/11/22/the-regulation-of-recommender-systems-under-the-dsa-a-transition-from-default-to-multiple-and-dynamic-controls/

[26] Systemic Risk Reporting: A System in Crisis? https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/01/systemic-risk-reporting-system-crisis

[27] Analyzing Recommender System Audits under the DSA https://kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and-commentary/dsa-ambiguity-to-accountability/

[28] How the Digital Services Act enhances transparency online https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-brings-transparency

[29] Citation styles with numbers in brackets [Updated 2025] https://www.bibguru.com/blog/citation-styles-numbers-in-brackets/

[30] How do I fold/collapse/hide sections of code in Visual ... https://stackoverflow.com/questions/30067767/how-do-i-fold-collapse-hide-sections-of-code-in-visual-studio-code

[31] JMP 18 Help https://www.jmp.com/support/help/en/18.0/

[32] Studying User Income through Language, Behaviour and ... https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0138717

[33] Effect of Antibiotics on Gut Microbiota, Gut Hormones ... - PMC https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4643023/

[34] 3.2 Oracle Hardware and Software Products Used In ... https://docs.oracle.com/en/engineered-systems/private-cloud-appliance/2.4/licensing/pcalicensing-thirdparty-oraclestack.html

The Problem: When Algorithms Become Weapons

Taiwan has openly acknowledged that algorithmic manipulation—the use of automated recommendation systems to shape what content users see on social media platforms—represents a national security threat [1]. The island’s 2025 National Defense Report explicitly integrates cognitive warfare, defined as efforts to manipulate public perception and decision-making through information operations, into its civil preparedness framework [2]. The government’s civil defense handbook now instructs citizens that any message claiming Taiwan has surrendered should be considered false during heightened tensions with China [2].

Yet despite this recognition, Taiwan has not built the regulatory infrastructure necessary to counter algorithmic manipulation at its source. Unlike the European Union’s Digital Services Act, which requires very large online platforms to submit to independent algorithmic audits and demonstrate transparency in how their recommendation systems work, Taiwan has no framework to compel platforms to disclose how their algorithms weight content, verify algorithmic neutrality, or submit to independent oversight [3].

This gap is not merely a technical oversight. It represents a fundamental mismatch between the threat Taiwan faces and the defenses it has constructed.

Two Types of Manipulation: Content vs. Infrastructure

To understand why this matters, it is essential to distinguish between two categories of information manipulation.

Content-based manipulation involves the creation and distribution of false or misleading material through fake accounts, bot networks, and coordinated inauthentic behavior. This approach requires continuous effort, leaves detectable traces in posting patterns and account behavior, and can be countered through account removal, fact-checking, and user education [4].

Algorithmic manipulation, by contrast, operates at the infrastructure level. It involves controlling the recommendation systems that determine which content is amplified, suppressed, or never shown to users at all. This approach is persistent, nearly invisible to outside observers, and turns a platform’s genuine users and their authentic content into the weapon by determining what reaches audiences and what does not [5].

The distinction is critical. Content manipulation is a tactic that requires ongoing resources. Algorithmic manipulation is an architectural advantage that, once established, operates continuously without additional effort.

The Scale of Taiwan’s Exposure

The scope of Taiwan’s vulnerability becomes clear when examining usage patterns among the population most likely to be mobilized in a crisis. According to research published by Small Wars Journal in June 2025, more than 42% of Taiwanese voters under age 30 rely exclusively on algorithmic platforms such as TikTok for political information [1]. TikTok, owned by Chinese company ByteDance, operates under Chinese law, which requires companies to cooperate with state intelligence activities when requested [6].

Research by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in October 2025 found that TikTok users in Taiwan hold perceptions about cross-strait relations that contradict established facts [7]. Specifically, 38.9% of active TikTok users blamed Taiwan or the United States for rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, compared to 51.8% of non-users who correctly attributed primary responsibility to China [7]. The study noted that these perceptions appeared to have been shaped in ways that contradict the documented record of Chinese military exercises and diplomatic pressure campaigns.

This pattern is not accidental. Chinese People’s Liberation Army doctrine explicitly describes social media platforms as “the main battlefield” of cognitive warfare [8]. Military writings recommend using algorithmic recommendations to push information to target audiences with desired biases, a strategy described as “invisible manipulation” [8].

Taiwan’s Response: Necessary but Insufficient

Taiwan has implemented several defensive measures against information manipulation. The Ministry of Digital Affairs created an SMS authentication system in which all official government text messages are delivered from a unique “111” phone code, making it easier for citizens to identify authentic government communications during emergencies [9]. The ministry has also established protocols requiring online platforms to remove fraudulent advertisements within 24 hours of notification [9].

The government has banned TikTok and Douyin (TikTok’s Chinese domestic version) from devices used by public sector employees, classifying these applications as products that “endanger national information and communication security” [10]. Officials have discussed blocking TikTok access on school Wi-Fi networks [11].

Civil society organizations such as Kuma Academy provide training in media literacy and civil defense preparedness, including instruction on recognizing disinformation [12]. Fact-checking initiatives work to identify and debunk false narratives circulating on social media platforms.

These measures address content-level threats. They help citizens distinguish authentic government messages from fake ones, remove specific pieces of fraudulent content, and build critical thinking skills. However, they do not address the underlying algorithmic infrastructure that determines which messages—authentic or fraudulent—reach users’ screens in the first place.

As one analysis noted, Taiwan’s response remains “piecemeal,” with “no national doctrine” that integrates civil, cyber, and cognitive defense into a unified framework [1].

The Crisis Scenario: Internet as Weapon or Vulnerability

A central strategic question remains unresolved: In a crisis scenario involving blockade or military action, would China shut down Taiwan’s internet infrastructure or maintain connectivity to exploit algorithmic control?

If connectivity is maintained, platforms like TikTok could function as distribution channels for false evacuation instructions, fabricated surrender announcements, or manipulated footage—all algorithmically amplified through trusted local voices to maximize credibility [13]. The Taiwan government’s SMS authentication system addresses one vector of false official communications, but it cannot prevent the algorithmic suppression of authentic preparedness information that contradicts adversary narratives.

This is not a hypothetical concern. During military exercises around Taiwan in December 2024, Chinese state media conducted coordinated information operations using social media platforms, including TikTok and YouTube, to amplify content from Taiwanese political figures that aligned with Chinese Communist Party messaging [14].

The United States: A Different Problem, Similar Gap

The United States has taken a more aggressive approach to addressing foreign control of social media platforms, yet it has arrived at a solution that fails to address the core algorithmic vulnerability.

In January 2026, TikTok finalized an agreement that transferred operational control of its U.S. operations to a new joint venture with 80.1% American ownership [15]. Under the agreement, the joint venture operates under what TikTok described as “defined safeguards that protect national security through comprehensive data protections, algorithm security, content moderation, and software assurances” [15].

However, the structure contains a critical flaw: ByteDance continues to own the underlying algorithm, which the U.S. entity licenses and will “retrain, test and update” [16]. National security experts have pointed out that the fundamental concern is not the data used for training, but rather what the algorithm emphasizes or censors in its recommendations—decisions that ultimately remain under ByteDance’s control [16].

Senator Ed Markey (D-Massachusetts), a member of the Senate Commerce Committee, stated in January 2026 that “the White House has provided virtually no details about this agreement, including whether TikTok’s algorithm is truly free of Chinese influence” [15].

The TikTok agreement illustrates a broader pattern in U.S. policy: addressing ownership and data storage while leaving algorithmic transparency unaddressed.

Legislative Efforts and Their Limitations

The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2025 was introduced in both the Senate (S.2164) in June 2025 and the House of Representatives (H.R.5511) in September 2025 [17]. The legislation would require the Federal Trade Commission to mandate impact assessments for automated decision systems used in consequential areas such as housing, employment, and education [17].

As of May 2026, the bills remain in committee with minimal movement. Analysis by GovTrack estimates a 3% chance of the legislation advancing past committee and a 1% chance of enactment [18].

A separate bill, the Algorithm Accountability Act (H.R.6266), focuses specifically on social media platforms, requiring them to “exercise reasonable care” in algorithm design to prevent bodily injury or death [19]. However, this legislation targets youth safety concerns—such as content promoting self-harm or eating disorders—rather than national security implications of foreign algorithmic manipulation.

The Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, has prioritized artificial intelligence competitiveness over regulation. In July 2025, the White House released “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan,” which recommended reconsidering existing regulations viewed as constraints on AI innovation [20].

The Structural Gap: Ownership Without Transparency

Both Taiwan and the United States have focused regulatory attention on ownership structures, data storage locations, and content moderation practices. The U.S. approach includes:

• CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) reviews of foreign acquisitions and investments in technology companies, with expanded authority to block transactions in sensitive sectors [21]

• Department of Justice rules restricting cross-border flows of Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data to China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela [22]

• Outbound investment controls, codified in the COINS Act of December 2025, that restrict U.S. investment in Chinese artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing [23]

These measures address who owns platforms and where data is stored. They do not address how algorithms function once those ownership and data requirements are satisfied.

As a result, both democracies have constructed defenses that target symptoms rather than architecture. The TikTok agreement changed the ownership structure, mandated U.S. data storage, and established a U.S.-based content moderation team, but it did not require algorithmic transparency, mandate independent algorithmic audits, or establish enforcement mechanisms to verify that the algorithm is not biased toward narratives preferred by the Chinese Communist Party [15][16].

Counterarguments and Limitations

Several arguments suggest that concerns about algorithmic manipulation may be overstated or that existing approaches are sufficient.

First, some analysts contend that platform algorithms primarily optimize for user engagement rather than political outcomes, and that any political effects are incidental byproducts of engagement-driven design [24]. This view suggests that algorithmic manipulation concerns attribute intentional design to what may be unintended consequences.

Second, Taiwan’s vibrant civil society, independent media sector, and high digital literacy rates may provide natural resilience against algorithmic manipulation even without formal regulatory frameworks [25]. Taiwan ranks among the world’s most free countries in press freedom and internet freedom indices [26].

Third, the technical complexity of auditing proprietary algorithms raises questions about whether regulatory frameworks can effectively verify algorithmic neutrality even if transparency requirements are established. Algorithms are not static; they are continuously updated based on user behavior data, making point-in-time audits potentially inadequate [27].

Finally, some observers note that overly restrictive algorithmic regulations could create unintended consequences, including reducing platform functionality, creating barriers to entry for new platforms, or establishing government oversight mechanisms that could themselves be misused in less democratic contexts [28].

These counterarguments highlight legitimate complexities. However, they do not eliminate the core concern: that algorithmic recommendation systems represent infrastructure-level influence over information environments, and that democracies currently lack tools to verify whether that infrastructure is neutral or manipulated.

Conclusion: The Sovereignty Dimension

The algorithmic vulnerability facing Taiwan and the United States is not primarily a technology problem. It is a sovereignty problem.

Both democracies have identified algorithmic manipulation as a threat. Both have implemented defensive measures focused on content moderation, ownership structures, and data flows. Neither has constructed the regulatory infrastructure necessary to compel algorithmic transparency, verify algorithmic neutrality, or audit the systems that determine what information reaches citizens during normal times—much less during crises.

Taiwan faces the more immediate threat, given its geopolitical circumstances and the concentration of young voters’ information consumption on platforms potentially subject to Chinese state influence. The United States, despite more aggressive action on platform ownership, has reached a compromise on TikTok that addresses ownership while preserving the algorithmic architecture that generates the underlying concern.

Whether the gap between threat recognition and institutional response represents a catastrophic vulnerability or a manageable risk remains an open question. What is clear is that answering that question will require moving beyond content-focused defenses to confront the algorithmic infrastructure itself.

Glossary

Algorithmic manipulation – The use of automated recommendation systems to shape what content users see on digital platforms in order to influence behavior or perception.

CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) – An interagency committee that reviews foreign investments in U.S. companies to assess national security risks.

Cognitive warfare – Military or intelligence operations designed to manipulate public perception, decision-making, and willingness to resist through information and psychological tactics.

Content-based manipulation – Information operations that involve creating and distributing false or misleading content through fake accounts, bots, or coordinated networks.

Digital Services Act – European Union legislation requiring large online platforms to provide transparency about algorithmic systems and submit to independent audits.

TID (Technology, Infrastructure, and Data) U.S. business – A category used by CFIUS to identify U.S. companies that maintain or collect sensitive data or develop critical technologies, subjecting them to enhanced foreign investment scrutiny.

Sources and Further Reading

[1] “Digital Propaganda: How China Uses Short-Form Videos to Target Taiwan’s Youth.” Small Wars Journal, June 16, 2025. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/07/digital-propaganda-how-china-uses-short-form-videos-to-target-taiwans-youth/

[2] Kerg, Brian. “Resistance is Victory: Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report and Resisting Cognitive Coercion.” Irregular Warfare Initiative, November 20, 2025. https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/resistance-is-victory-taiwans-2025-national-defense-report-and-resisting-cognitive-coercion/

[3] “Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability of Digital Services.” European Audiovisual Observatory, December 15, 2025. https://www.obs.coe.int/en/web/observatoire/-/algorithmic-transparency-and-accountability-of-digital-services

[4] “China Uses Social Media to Amplify Taiwanese Voices in Information Warfare: Reuters Report.” Vision Times, April 20, 2026. https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/04/20/china-uses-social-media-to-amplify-taiwanese-voices-in-information-warfare-reuters-report.html

[5] “China’s Social-Media Attacks Are Part of a Larger ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Campaign.” Defense One, October 17, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/10/chinas-social-media-attacks-are-part-larger-cognitive-warfare-campaign/391255/

[6] “TikTok Banned Countries List [Updated 2026 Data].” DemandSage, March 26, 2026. https://www.demandsage.com/tiktok-banned-countries/

[7] “Assessing China’s Cognitive Warfare against Taiwan on TikTok.” Sasakawa Peace Foundation China Observer, October 8, 2025. https://www.spf.org/spf-china-observer/en/document-detail064.html

[8] “China’s Social-Media Attacks Are Part of a Larger ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Campaign.” Defense One, October 17, 2023. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/10/chinas-social-media-attacks-are-part-larger-cognitive-warfare-campaign/391255/

[9] “Competing in the Cognitive Domain: Lessons from Taiwan’s Anti-Fraud Initiative.” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 27, 2026. https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus_articles/competing-in-the-cognitive-domain-lessons-from-taiwans-anti-fraud-initiative/

[10] “Taiwan Bans TikTok from Public Sector Devices.” Taiwan News, December 6, 2022. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4741706

[11] “MODA Plans to Block TikTok on School Wi-Fi Networks: Minister.” Focus Taiwan, October 15, 2025. https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202510150017

[12] Chen, Yu-Chen. “The Challenges Taiwan Faces in Cognitive Warfare and Its Impact on US–Taiwan Relations.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2025. https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/01/2003702343/-1/-1/1/VIEW%20-%20CHEN%20DISCLAIMER.PDF

[13] “Soft Power by Design: China’s United Front Strategy for Taiwan’s Civil Society.” Modern Diplomacy, July 15, 2025. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/15/soft-power-by-design-chinas-united-front-strategy-for-taiwans-civil-society/

[14] “China Uses Social Media to Amplify Taiwanese Voices in Information Warfare: Reuters Report.” Vision Times, April 20, 2026. https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/04/20/china-uses-social-media-to-amplify-taiwanese-voices-in-information-warfare-reuters-report.html

[15] Lybrand, Holmes. “The Deal to Secure TikTok’s Future in the US Has Finally Closed.” CNN Business, January 23, 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/22/tech/tiktok-us-deal-closes

[16] “National Security Experts Argue U.S. TikTok Deal Falls Short.” PBS News, January 24, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/national-security-experts-argue-u-s-tiktok-deal-falls-short

[17] “Text - S.2164 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2025.” Congress.gov, June 25, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2164/text

[18] “Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2025 (S. 2164).” GovTrack.us, June 25, 2025. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/119/s2164

[19] “Text - H.R.6266 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Algorithm Accountability Act.” Congress.gov, November 21, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/6266/text

[20] “Don’t Believe the Hype: Government Regulation of AI Continues to Advance.” Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, January 13, 2026. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/2026-insights/sector-spotlights/dont-believe-the-hype

[21] “2025 Year in Review: National Security.” Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, January 23, 2026. https://www.paulweiss.com/insights/client-memos/2025-year-in-review-national-security

[22] “Trade Controls, Foreign Investment and National Security: New Regimes and Continuing Changes for 2026.” Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, January 7, 2026. https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/trade-controls-foreign-investment-and-national-security-new-regimes-and-continuing-changes-for-2026

[23] “US Treasury’s ‘Reverse CFIUS’ Authority Is Codified and Some Restrictions Are Clarified.” Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, January 8, 2026. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2026/01/us-treasurys-reverse-cfius-authority

[24] “Beyond the Checkbox: Strengthening DSA Compliance Through Social Media Algorithmic Auditing.” arXiv, January 2026. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2601.18405

[25] “Taiwan’s 2025 Civil Defense Handbook and the Challenges of Whole-of-Society Resilience.” Prospect Foundation, 2025. https://www.pf.org.tw/en/pfen/33-11651.html

[26] “Digital Propaganda: How China Uses Short-Form Videos to Target Taiwan’s Youth.” Small Wars Journal, June 16, 2025. https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/07/digital-propaganda-how-china-uses-short-form-videos-to-target-taiwans-youth/

[27] “Enhancing Algorithmic Transparency.” Center for News, Technology & Innovation, October 6, 2025. https://cnti.org/article/enhancing-algorithmic-transparency/

[28] “Five Takeaways from the TikTok Deal.” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, January 26, 2026. https://itif.org/publications/2026/01/26/five-takeaways-from-the-tiktok-deal/

Many headlines now talk about “Gulf War Three.”

The phrase suggests a clear, new war, like the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet what is happening today in the Gulf does not look like a single, declared conflict. It looks more like a continuous background war that almost never switches off.

Instead of a formal start date, the public sees a constant stream of events: drone strikes, missile interceptions, cyberattacks, explosions at sea, and tit‑for‑tat hits on bases and infrastructure.

Each incident is announced as “another strike,” “another retaliation,” or “another escalation,” but rarely as part of a clearly defined war with agreed goals.

For governments, this is politically easier.

They can avoid massive troop deployments, a dramatic vote in parliament or Congress, or a primetime speech announcing a major campaign. Operations are often described as “limited,” “surgical,” or “self‑defense,” making them easier to justify at home and abroad.

However, this pattern is strategically more dangerous.

If leaders never clearly say when a war starts, they also never have to say when it ends. There is no fixed objective that the public can judge, no obvious moment to declare success or failure, and very little built‑in pressure to stop using force.

For people living in the Gulf region, that means their countries can be both launchpads and targets at the same time. Bases, ports, and oil infrastructure live under the shadow of a conflict that few governments fully admit is a war at all.

To understand why this matters, it helps to compare today’s background war with the earlier Gulf wars that set many of the expectations the world still uses.

https://youtube.com/shorts/nNrnE1iaFsc?si=epTU5b10O6GpHylr

From Clear Wars to Background War

1991: A War With a Clear Mandate

The 1991 Gulf War followed a classic script of interstate war.

Iraq, under President Saddam Hussein, invaded and occupied Kuwait in August 1990, triggering a strong international response. The United Nations Security Council passed resolutions demanding withdrawal and authorizing the use of force after diplomacy failed. [1]

The United States, supported by a large coalition of states including many Arab countries, announced a specific mission: expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore Kuwait’s sovereignty.[2]

There was a clear “Day One” when the air campaign began in January 1991, and another clear date when the ceasefire was declared after Iraqi forces were pushed out.

In this model, several elements were obvious to the public:

- A clear act of aggression (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait). [1]

- A formal UN mandate defining the legal basis for force.

- Open debates in many national parliaments, followed by explicit votes.

- A visible end point, marked by ceasefire terms and, in some countries, victory parades.

This does not mean it was simple or cost‑free, especially for Iraqis and Kuwaitis, but it did fit a familiar pattern of interstate war that most governments and publics could recognize.

2003: The Iraq War and a Collapse of Trust

The 2003 invasion of Iraq looked similar on the surface, at least at first.

The administration of President George W. Bush in the United States asked Congress for authorization, named the Iraqi regime as the enemy, and claimed it had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that threatened global security.[3]

A “coalition of the willing” formed around Washington, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and several other states, even though the UN Security Council did not pass a new resolution clearly authorizing the invasion. [4]

There was still a “Day One” when US and allied forces crossed into Iraq in March 2003.

But key parts of the story quickly broke down.

The claimed WMD stockpiles never appeared, and investigations later confirmed that the intelligence used to justify war was deeply flawed or misrepresented. [5]

The occupation turned violent and long, with high human and financial costs and no quick, clean exit.

For many people in the Middle East and wider Global South, Iraq in 2003 became proof that international rules were being applied selectively. Analysts argue that this was a turning point in the way the US was perceived: as a power willing to bend or ignore global norms when it suited its interests. [6][5]

https://youtube.com/shorts/bMI0D1Jwiec?si=hBWsC4TX9E2DBNUS

Today: War Without a Name

Today’s Gulf conflict is different again.

Rather than a single, visible invasion, the region lives with overlapping confrontations involving the United States, Iran, Israel, and a range of state and non‑state actors. These range from attacks on shipping in the Gulf, to strikes on militia groups linked to Iran, to cyber operations against energy and financial infrastructure. [“U.S. Relations With Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2026][7]

There is no new, widely agreed war authorization from the UN Security Council. There is no clearly announced “Gulf War III,” and no agreed list of goals that, once achieved, would mean the conflict is over. Instead, the war runs in the background, managed through legal and political workarounds.

This shift from “big war” to background war reshapes not only the battlefield but also alliances, domestic politics, and global legitimacy.

A “Coalition of the Dependent,” Not the Willing

From Survival to Deep Security Ties

In 1991, many Arab states joined the coalition against Iraq for reasons that combined survival and principle.

Kuwait needed its territory back. Saudi Arabia and others feared that allowing borders to be changed by force would undermine their own security. The coalition role also led to long‑term US security guarantees and the establishment of bases in the region. [2]

Hosting US troops and equipment was framed as a protective shield.

In exchange, Gulf states received security backing, closer diplomatic ties, and, over time, greater access to advanced weapons and training.

Today that shield has grown into a dense ecosystem.

Gulf states host bases, participate in missile defense, sign arms‑co‑production deals, deepen cyber cooperation, and conclude energy and investment agreements linked to their security partnerships. [“U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: The Strategic Costs and Gains,” Modern Diplomacy, 2025]

Some are also exploring more formal defense pacts that would tie their security even more tightly to the United States.

The upside is significant: access to advanced weapons and technology, political backing in a world defined by US–China rivalry, and leverage in regional disputes. [“The Trump Administration’s Middle East Policy,” CSIS, 2025][8]

https://youtube.com/shorts/6Sv9_l2b76w?si=hx-3_xDBpNqOOqR7

The Costs of Dependence

The downside has grown as well.

US bases, ports, and oil facilities are prime targets for missiles and drones from Iran or groups linked to it. [“U.S. Relations With Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2026][7]

Every time the United States or Israel strikes an Iranian‑aligned target, Gulf leaders must calculate whether the response might fall on their own territory—on ports, refineries, or cities.

Public opinion adds another layer of pressure.

Polling and qualitative research show that in many Arab societies, the United States is now viewed negatively on issues such as respect for international law, human rights, and regional stability, especially after wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza. [“Middle East Public Opinion on the American Dream After Afghanistan,” Washington Institute, 2022][“US standing plummets across the Arab World after Gaza and Iran wars,” Ahram English, 2025][9][8]

People are more connected, more online, and follow events in places like Gaza in real time, which shapes how they judge their own governments’ cooperation with Washington.

As a result, Gulf governments hedge.

They sign agreements and quietly cooperate with US forces, yet at the same time hold dialogue with Iran, expand economic ties with China, and present themselves as champions of de‑escalation. [“In a fractured world order, where does the global south fit in?” The Conversation, 2024]

This hedging allows them to keep one foot in the US security system while trying not to stand directly in the line of fire.

Analysts argue that the coalition today is less about enthusiasm for a clearly legitimate mission and more about deep dependence combined with real fear: fear of Iran’s capabilities, fear of abandonment by the United States, and fear of domestic backlash if the background war suddenly becomes more visible and destructive. [“U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: The Strategic Costs and Gains,” Modern Diplomacy, 2025][“The Impact of US Interference in the Middle East on Regional Stability,” JDSS, 2023][10]

This nervous, tightly bound coalition shapes what Washington can realistically do. When allies are this cautious and publics this skeptical, it narrows the political space for large‑scale operations and encourages a pattern of limited strikes and deniable activities.

US Domestic Politics: Less Permission, More Evasion

Classic Consent in the Early 1990s

In the early 1990s, the United States followed a relatively traditional model of democratic consent for major wars.

President George H. W. Bush asked Congress for authorization to use force against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. There was a serious debate on Capitol Hill, and a bipartisan majority voted in favor. [“Gulf War,” Wikipedia, 2025][1]

One can disagree with the decision, but the process was recognizable.

There was a clear request, a visible public argument, and a defined political act giving the executive a green light.

Iraq 2003 and the “Never Again” Moment

The Iraq invasion in 2003 damaged that trust.

Congress approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Iraq based heavily on WMD claims that later proved false. [“The US invasion of Iraq: failings and consequences,” E‑International Relations, 2011][5]

The war became long, costly, and controversial, with thousands of American and many more Iraqi lives lost and vast sums spent. [“Western armed interventions: legitimate and efficient?” Clingendael, 2019][6]

For many Americans, this was the moment they resolved not to take official assurances about major Middle East wars at face value again. Surveys and commentary over the following years documented growing war fatigue and skepticism toward new large‑scale deployments. [“Middle East Public Opinion on the American Dream After Afghanistan,” Washington Institute, 2022][8]

Governing by Workaround

In this environment, any US president asking Congress for a brand‑new, large‑scale war authorization focused on the Gulf knows the risks.

Voters are tired, parties are polarized, and there is little appetite for another open‑ended, expensive campaign.

Instead, leaders rely on workarounds:

- Reusing old authorizations from the post‑9/11 era, such as the 2001 AUMF, to justify operations against a broad range of actors. [“Stuck on a hostile path? US policy towards Iran since the revolution,” City, 2023][3]

- Labeling strikes as “self‑defense,” “force protection,” or “counter‑terrorism,” rather than as parts of a new war. [“Without planning, consultation or legitimacy, the US needs a lot of luck in Iran,” ASPI Strategist, 2025]

- Keeping military footprints smaller, relying more on drones, missiles, special forces, and local partners.

On paper, this can look like restraint.

In practice, it allows the United States to wage a long‑term, low‑level conflict in the Gulf without triggering a broad national debate, and without giving the public a clear moment to say yes or no to the risks involved. [“Western armed interventions: legitimate and efficient?” Clingendael, 2019][6]

Analysts warn that this pattern weakens democratic oversight and blurs accountability. If there is no clearly defined war, it becomes hard to measure whether policy is working, how much it costs, or who exactly is paying the price. [“Without planning, consultation or legitimacy, the US needs a lot of luck in Iran,” ASPI Strategist, 2025]

Global Legitimacy After the Break, Not Before It

Trust Already Broken in Much of the World

When Washington uses force in the Gulf today, it is not operating in a neutral international environment.

Large parts of the Global South—countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—already see the United States as an untrusted, selective referee. [“Mistrust of West defines Global South attitudes to Palestine,” Electronic Intifada, 2024][“The West’s perceived double standards in Gaza widen the gap with the Global South,” El País, 2023][5][7]

In 1991, many governments accepted the idea that the US‑led coalition was enforcing international law by reversing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. [

By 2003, the Iraq war had shattered much of that image. No new UN Security Council authorization, false WMD claims, and a chaotic occupation convinced many observers that international rules were being cited when convenient and set aside when they conflicted with US goals. [“The US invasion of Iraq: failings and consequences,” E‑International Relations, 2011][“Western armed interventions: legitimate and efficient?” Clingendael, 2019][5][6]

Research on attitudes in the Global South shows a structural decline in trust toward Western powers, especially over issues such as Palestine, Gaza, and broader human rights concerns. [“Mistrust of West defines Global South attitudes to Palestine,” Electronic Intifada, 2024][“The West Is Losing the Global South Over Gaza,” Time, 2023][11][5]

In UN votes and public commentary, many governments criticize what they view as double standards in how international law is applied. [“The Global South, Gaza and the rise of Active Non-Alignment,” Oxford, 2024][12]

https://youtube.com/shorts/u9XJ2JW2D0Q?si=h7AYS64zMpMOPyyT

Competing Narratives and Active Non‑Alignment

This is the backdrop against which current Gulf strikes are interpreted.

When US officials talk about “Iranian aggression” or “protecting freedom of navigation,” many capitals do not hear a neutral referee enforcing consistent rules. They hear a powerful actor applying different standards to friends and adversaries. [“Why the Global South Is Accusing America of Hypocrisy,” Foreign Policy, 2023][13]

As a result, more countries pursue what analysts call “active non‑alignment”—a strategy of balancing among major powers like the United States, China, and Russia rather than firmly lining up behind one camp. [“The Global South, Gaza and the rise of Active Non-Alignment,” Oxford, 2024][“In a fractured world order, where does the global south fit in?” The Conversation, 2024][12]

They may criticize specific actions, vote differently in UN forums, or deepen economic ties with non‑Western partners while still cooperating with Washington where it suits their interests.

This does not mean that other powers, such as Russia or China, are universally trusted or seen as moral alternatives.

What it does mean is that the United States can no longer assume that its narrative about law, order, and security will be accepted automatically.

Fighting Tactical Fights, Losing the Bigger Argument

In this context, the key question is not only whether US strikes in the Gulf achieve specific military goals.

It is also whether they further erode or help repair the deeper debate about who sets the rules and how fairly they are applied.

Commentators argue that, at present, each new use of force by the United States in the region lands on top of an existing narrative of hypocrisy—especially in the Arab world and wider Global South—that says: “we have seen this before, and we know whose lives and borders really count.” [“The West’s perceived double standards in Gaza widen the gap with the Global South,” El País, 2023][“America’s Reckoning with Gaza at Home and the Great Rupture in International Relations,” Global Policy Journal, 2024][7][12]

In that world, the United States remains capable of destroying targets, closing strategic waterways, and punishing enemies. But the more it relies on force without rebuilding trust, the more it risks winning short‑term tactical engagements while continuing to lose a broader argument about legitimacy. [“Hypocrisy and Double Standards Deepen the Divide Between the West and the Global South,” Countercurrents, 2026][“The West Is Losing the Global South Over Gaza,” Time, 2023][11]

Who Carries the Costs of a Permanent Background War?

Putting these pieces together—the background war structure, the coalition of the dependent, the domestic workarounds, and the global legitimacy crisis—raises a series of hard questions.

- For Gulf societies, the cost includes living under constant risk that bases, ports, and cities may be pulled into retaliation cycles they did not choose. [“U.S. Relations With Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2026][7]

- For allies, dependence on US security brings advanced weapons and political backing but also deeper vulnerability if Washington’s conflicts with Iran or others escalate. [“U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: The Strategic Costs and Gains,” Modern Diplomacy, 2025]

- For the United States, avoiding big formal wars lowers the immediate political price at home but can weaken democratic oversight and make long‑term engagement harder to adjust or end. [“Western armed interventions: legitimate and efficient?” Clingendael, 2019][6]

- For the wider international system, repeated selective uses of force deepen mistrust and encourage more states to hedge between power centers, making consensus on global rules harder to achieve. [“The Global South, Gaza and the rise of Active Non-Alignment,” Oxford, 2024][“In a fractured world order, where does the global south fit in?” The Conversation, 2024][12]

None of these outcomes is predetermined, and there is active debate among policymakers, analysts, and publics about what should change. Some argue for stricter legal limits on the use of force and renewed diplomacy with Iran. Others prioritize deterrence and pressure, warning that backing away could invite more aggression. [“Assessing US policy toward Iran,” Atlantic Council, 2019][“Without planning, consultation or legitimacy, the US needs a lot of luck in Iran,” ASPI Strategist, 2025][11]

What is clear is that the language of “Gulf War Three” risks hiding more than it reveals.

The reality is not a single, time‑limited war, but an open‑ended background conflict that touches domestic politics, alliances, and global legitimacy at the same time.

How willing publics and leaders are—whether in Washington, Gulf capitals, or across the Global South—to keep that background war running will shape not only the region’s security, but also the future of the international order that claims to govern it.

Glossary

Active non‑alignment – A foreign policy approach where states avoid joining any single power bloc and instead balance ties among multiple major powers.

Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) – A legal measure passed by the US Congress that gives the president permission to use military force under certain conditions.

Background war – A low‑level, ongoing conflict with frequent military actions but no clear start or end date and no formal declaration of war.

Coalition of the willing – A group of states that choose to join a military operation without a broad, formal international mandate, often led by a major power.

Cyber operation– An action carried out in or through computer networks, such as hacking or disabling systems, often for military or political purposes.

Deterrence – A strategy aimed at discouraging an opponent from taking certain actions by convincing them the costs will be too high.

Global South – A broad term used to describe countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East that have often been marginalized in global power structures.

International law – The set of rules and principles that govern relations and conduct between states and other actors on the international stage.

Missile defense – Systems designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming missiles before they reach their targets.

Rules‑based order – A way of describing a world system where states are expected to follow agreed rules and norms, often linked to international law and institutions.

Self‑defense (in international law) – The right of a state to use force to repel an armed attack or prevent an imminent one, as recognized in the UN Charter.

Tit‑for‑tat – A pattern of action and reaction where one side responds to an opponent’s move with a similar move of its own.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – Weapons such as nuclear, chemical, or biological arms that can kill or injure large numbers of people or cause massive damage.

Kari Odermann is a Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a member of the International Advisory Board of the Alliance for Global Security (AGS). She is a political analyst and communications specialist who advises governments and organisations on strategy, democratic resilience, and countering disinformation by occupying space on social media with clear, evidence‑based content.

Her hands on advice is based on content that reaches around 5 million people each year across platforms and formats. Before Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, she worked as a journalist in Kyiv, covering politics and society from the ground. A Fulbright scholar, Odermann holds a PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin.

She is also connected to B4Ukraine, a civil society coalition working to block the economic and financial resources behind Russian aggression.

Sources and further reading

1. “Gulf War.” Wikipedia, last modified 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War

2. Ainger, Peter, et al. “The West’s perceived double standards in Gaza widen the gap with the Global South.” El País, November 29, 2023. https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-11-29/the-wests-perceived-double-standards-in-gaza-widen-the-gap-with-the-global-south.html

3. Acharya, Arabinda. “Why the Global South Is Accusing America of Hypocrisy.” Foreign Policy, November 2, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/02/israel-palestine-hamas-gaza-war-russia-ukraine-occupation-west-hypocrisy

4. “US standing plummets across the Arab World after Gaza and Iran wars.” Ahram Online, April 21, 2025. https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/565432.aspx

5. “The West Is Losing the Global South Over Gaza.” Time Magazine, November 2023. https://time.com/6330746/global-south-ukraine-israel-gaza

6. Ghimire, Sushant. “America’s Reckoning with Gaza at Home and the Great Rupture in International Relations.” Global Policy Journal, July 10, 2024. https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/10/07/2024/americas-reckoning-gaza-home-and-great-rupture-international-relations

7. “Member states / Coalition of the Gulf War.” Wikiwand, accessed 2025. https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/Coalition_of_the_Gulf_War

8. “Western armed interventions: legitimate and efficient?” Clingendael Spectator, 2019. https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/western-armed-interventions-legitimate-and-efficient

9. “Iraq War: Unpacking The Coalition Of The Willing.” Inteligencia y Monitoreo, 2023. https://inteligenciaymonitoreo.com/blog/iraq-war-unpacking-the-coalition

10. “Coalition of the willing (Iraq War).” Wikipedia, last modified 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coalition_of_the_willing_(Iraq_War)

11. Parker, Tom. “The US invasion of Iraq: failings and consequences.” E‑International Relations, August 1, 2011. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/01/why-did-the-united-states-invade-iraq-in-2003-and-what-went-wrong-with-the-subsequent-occupation-what-impact-has-the-war-had-on-us-foreign-policy

12. “Middle East Public Opinion on the American Dream After Afghanistan.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/middle-east-public-opinion-american-dream-after-afghanistan

13. “Stuck on a hostile path? US policy towards Iran since the revolution.” City, University of London, 2023. https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/31445

14. Abunimah, Ali. “Mistrust of West defines Global South attitudes to Palestine.” Electronic Intifada, February 2, 2024. https://electronicintifada.net/content/mistrust-west-defines-global-south-attitudes-palestine/40771

15. “U.S. Relations With Iran.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 1, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-relations-iran

16. “The Impact of US Interference in the Middle East on Regional Stability.” Journal of Development and Social Sciences, 2023. https://ojs.jdss.org.pk/journal/article/download/647/562

17. “U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: The Strategic Costs and Gains.” Modern Diplomacy, June 30, 2025. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/06/30/u-s-intervention-in-the-middle-east-the-strategic-costs-and-gains

18. “How the Global South is reacting to events in Israel and Gaza today.” Responsible Statecraft, October 8, 2023. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/hamas-israel-global-south

19. “The Global South, Gaza and the rise of Active Non-Alignment.” Changing Global Orders (University of Oxford), 2024. https://changingglobalorders.web.ox.ac.uk/article/global-south-gaza-and-rise-active-non-alignment

20. Steindl, Andreas. “Without planning, consultation or legitimacy, the US needs a lot of luck in Iran.” The Strategist (ASPI), May 5, 2025. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/without-planning-consultation-or-legitimacy-the-us-needs-a-lot-of-luck-in-iran

21. Chacko, Priya. “In a fractured world order, where does the global south fit in?” The Conversation, January 15, 2024. https://theconversation.com/in-a-fractured-world-order-where-does-the-global-south-fit-in-278410

What kind of follow‑up would be most useful for you: a tighter 60‑second script version of this article for video, a more data‑driven piece with charts and polling, or a spin‑off focusing only on Gulf public opinion?

Other Sources

[1] The Art of Disruption: How Trump’s Foreign Policy is Impacting MENA https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/the-trump-factor-unraveling-the-impact-of-u-s-foreign-policy-on-mena/

[2] US-Iran Relations: A Complex History of Conflict and Change https://www.amu.apus.edu/area-of-study/legal-studies/resources/us-iran-relations/

[3] [PDF] Stuck on a hostile path? US policy towards Iran since the revolution https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/31445/1/Stuck%20on%20a%20hostile%20path%20%20US%20policy%20towards%20Iran%20since%20the%20revolution.pdf

[4] How to Write a News Article: A Complete Guide - Grammarly https://www.grammarly.com/blog/writing-tips/news-article/

[5] Mistrust of West defines Global South attitudes to Palestine https://electronicintifada.net/content/mistrust-west-defines-global-south-attitudes-palestine/40771

[6] How the Global South is reacting to events in Israel and Gaza today https://responsiblestatecraft.org/hamas-israel-global-south/

[7] U.S. Relations With Iran - Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-relations-iran

[8] The Trump Administration’s Middle East Policy: Shaping an ... - CSIS https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-administrations-middle-east-policy-shaping-emerging-regional-order

[9] Iran - United States Department of State https://2017-2021.state.gov/countries-areas/iran/

[10] US Policies in MENA Under Trump: Key Shifts, Enduring ... - YouTube

[11] Assessing US policy toward Iran - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/assessing-us-policy-toward-iran/

[12] The Global South, Gaza and the rise of Active Non-Alignment https://changingglobalorders.web.ox.ac.uk/article/global-south-gaza-and-rise-active-non-alignment

[13] America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence | Brookings https://www.brookings.edu/articles/america-and-iran-from-containment-to-coexistence/

In April 2026, an episode of a German‑language podcast featuring Austrian Olympic snowboard champion Benjamin Karl was taken down after a wave of backlash to his comments about marriage and his wife’s expected role in their relationship.[“Wintersport: Olympiasieger löst mit Aussagen über seine Ehe Irritation aus,” 2026][“ÖSV‑Star Karl kassiert Shitstorm nach Skandal‑Aussagen,” 2026][“‘Mindgames’ löscht Podcast mit Benny Karl,” 2026] Sources Below

Karl, who is sponsored by Red Bull, described a model of marriage in which his wife should “step back” to fit around his schedule and lifestyle, sparking a “shitstorm” in Austrian and German media and online.[1][2][3][4][5]

The controversy has drawn attention not only to gender roles in elite sports and public life, but also to Red Bull’s ongoing business in Russia, a country where the government has decriminalised some forms of domestic violence and elevated “traditional family values” and “motherhood” in its constitution while restricting women’s rights. At the same time, Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, funded in part by state tax revenues from companies that still operate in the country, including Red Bull.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]

This article unpacks how a seemingly local argument about a sports star’s marriage connects to broader questions: what “family values” really mean in today’s Russia, how global brands navigate war and authoritarianism, and why corporate decisions in distant markets matter to consumers everywhere.

From podcast “shitstorm” to global debate

What Benjamin Karl said, and why it matters

Benjamin Karl is a multiple Olympic medalist in snowboarding from Austria, widely known in the German‑speaking world as a successful and disciplined elite athlete. In early April 2026, he appeared on the German‑language podcast “Mindgames,” produced with support from Red Bull, to talk about his life, career, and family.[2][3][4][1]

During the conversation, Karl described his expectations for his wife, suggesting that in their marriage, his professional schedule and needs take priority and that she should “step back” from some of her own preferences to support his lifestyle. Reports in Austrian and German media highlighted how he spoke about not wanting to change his way of life and appearing largely unconcerned with what his wife might want for herself, which many listeners interpreted as dismissive of her autonomy and equality within the relationship.[4][5][1][2]

The reaction was swift. Major outlets reported on the comments, social media users criticised him for promoting outdated gender roles, and the show’s producers removed the episode from the podcast platforms after the backlash. The term “shitstorm” — a colloquial expression in German for a very intense online backlash — appeared frequently in coverage, signalling that this was not just a minor disagreement but a broader cultural moment about gender, marriage, and public responsibility.[3][5][1][2][4]

Why a personal marriage model becomes political

On one level, Karl’s comments describe a private arrangement between two adults. But when an Olympic champion, supported by a powerful global sponsor, presents a model of marriage where a wife is expected to adapt her life to her husband’s career, it becomes a public message about what is considered normal or desirable in a relationship.[1][2][4]

Analysts argue that such statements matter because high‑profile athletes are role models, especially in youth‑oriented sports, and their views can influence broader attitudes about gender equality and expectations in families. When those views align with political narratives that emphasise “traditional” roles for women, they can reinforce trends already visible in some governments’ policies and rhetoric.[8][6]

Russia’s “traditional values”: laws, women, and the state

Decriminalising domestic violence

In 2017, Russia changed its criminal law to decriminalise certain forms of domestic violence. Under these amendments, a first offence of “battery” against a family member that does not cause serious injury is treated as an administrative offense rather than a criminal one. That means that unless the violence causes significant harm (such as broken bones or a concussion) or is repeated within a year, the abuser faces fines, short administrative detention, or community service instead of criminal prosecution.[12][15]

Human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, warned that this change lowers legal protection for women and children and sends a signal that domestic abuse inside the family is less serious than other forms of violence. They argue that this legal framework makes it harder for victims to seek justice and may strengthen social norms that tolerate violence in the home.[7][15][8][12]

In simple terms, decriminalisation in this context means that the state has decided that some forms of family violence are no longer treated as crimes by default, but as minor administrative violations, which can reduce both deterrence and accountability.

“Traditional family values” in the constitution

Russia under President Vladimir Putin (Russia, president 2000–2008 and 2012–present, with a constitutional change in 2020 allowing him to extend his time in office) has increasingly presented itself as a defender of “traditional family values,” often in contrast to what the Kremlin calls Western liberal or “decadent” norms. In 2020, constitutional amendments added language that explicitly protects “marriage as a union of a man and a woman” and emphasises “parenthood” and “family values.”[9][6][8]

Legal scholars note that while the constitution now highlights family and motherhood as protected institutions, it does not provide equivalent explicit protections for women’s individual autonomy, bodily integrity, or reproductive freedom. Critics argue that this creates a hierarchy in which women are primarily valued as mothers and caregivers within traditional families, rather than as individuals with their own rights and choices.[6][8][9]

This framing has practical consequences. Reports describe how Russian authorities have tightened access to abortion and reproductive healthcare in the name of improving “demography” — a policy focus on raising the birth rate — and producing future soldiers and workers. Analysts note that this links women’s bodies directly to state interests, especially in a time of war, and can limit their ability to decide if and when to have children.[8][9]

How war changes women’s lives

Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has also influenced the position of women in Russian society. Journalistic and research reports describe a situation in which women face both increased economic pressure and a political narrative that praises sacrifice, motherhood, and loyalty to the state’s wartime goals.[9]

Some reporting suggests that as men are mobilised or killed in the conflict, the burden of caregiving and economic survival falls more heavily on women, who may also face growing social pressure to embody the ideal of the patriotic mother. Critics argue that this reinforces traditional gender roles and makes it harder for women to claim independence or challenge abuse, especially in a legal environment where some domestic violence has been decriminalised.[7][8][9]

Red Bull’s business in Russia

What Red Bull says it has done

Red Bull, the Austrian‑based energy drink company, is known worldwide for marketing that associates its brand with freedom, risk‑taking, extreme sports, and an image of individual independence. After Russia launched its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many international companies pulled out of the Russian market altogether or significantly reduced their operations.[10][11][13][14]

Red Bull did not fully withdraw from Russia. In a public statement in April 2022, the company announced that it had suspended all marketing activities and new investments in Russia, but it did not stop selling its products there. In effect, Red Bull chose a partial adjustment: it reduced its public profile while allowing its Russian subsidiary to continue business operations and keep cans of Red Bull on store shelves.[11][13][14][10]

Campaign groups, including the Ukraine Solidarity Project and B4Ukraine, an international civil society coalition focused on blocking corporate financial flows that enable Russia’s aggression, together with monitoring initiatives such as the Yale School of Management’s corporate Russia tracker, have criticised this approach. They argue that companies that continue to trade in Russia pay taxes to the Russian state and thus indirectly contribute to the budget that funds the war against Ukraine.[14][10][11] B4Ukraine and the KSE Institute have further argued that companies remaining in Russia continue to generate taxable revenue that helps sustain Russia’s military budget.

Growth in Red Bull’s Russian business

Public business databases that compile company financial filings indicate that Red Bull’s Russian subsidiary, Red Bull Rus OOO, remained active and grew after 2022. According to data for 2024, the company’s net sales revenue in Russia increased by around 39 percent compared to the previous year, and its profit margin also rose, suggesting the Russian market remains commercially attractive. Analysts point out that this means Russia is not a symbolic or “token” market for Red Bull, but a profitable one.[13][12][14]

Some early commentary suggested that net profit might have nearly doubled in that period, but open‑source data provide a clearer picture of trends in revenue and margins rather than a precise, verified profit‑percentage figure. For that reason, cautious analysis focuses on the confirmed direction and scale of growth rather than potentially overstated numbers.[12]

The key point is that as long as Red Bull continues to operate through its Moscow‑based subsidiary, any profits generated in Russia create taxable revenue, which flows into the state budget. Analysts note that roughly half of Russia’s federal spending is linked to defence, security, and law‑enforcement structures, meaning tax income indirectly supports the war and the domestic security apparatus.[11][13][14]

When branding, gender norms, and war intersect

Lifestyle marketing and political realities

Red Bull’s global image sells excitement, personal freedom, and independence: “it gives you wings.” At the same time, its sponsorship choices and market decisions place it inside political systems with specific laws and values, including Russia’s current framework on women’s rights and domestic violence.[10][6][7][8][9][11]

Analysts argue that there is a tension between a brand that promotes individual freedom in its advertising and its willingness to stay active in a country where the state has weakened protections against domestic violence and restricted women’s reproductive choices. This tension becomes more visible when an athlete closely associated with that brand expresses views of marriage that many consider to fit a traditional model in which a wife’s role is to adjust her life to her husband’s career.[13][14][6][7][8][9][11]

The connection is not that Red Bull or its athlete directly support domestic abuse or war, but that their decisions sit within a larger ecosystem in which certain gender roles and state policies reinforce each other. Critics see an alignment between:

- a public message that a wife should “step back” around a male breadwinner’s schedule, and

- a political system that emphasises women’s role as mothers and caregivers while limiting their legal protection and autonomy.[2][4][1][6][7][8][9]

Corporate responsibility in war

Companies working in countries that wage wars or violate human rights often face difficult choices: whether to leave and sacrifice a market, or stay and accept that their taxes support the state’s actions. After the invasion of Ukraine, hundreds of firms reduced or ended their Russian operations, but others, including Red Bull, chose a partial exit or continued business with limited changes.[14][10][11][13]

Campaigners argue that pausing marketing while continuing to sell products is a “lowest‑cost” strategy: it reduces reputational risk in some markets without giving up revenue in Russia. They claim that as long as profits keep flowing, so do taxes, and those taxes help finance the Kremlin’s war. Supporters of more cautious approaches sometimes counter that maintaining some operations can protect local employees or preserve supply chains for a future peace, but this view is contested and depends on each company’s choices and transparency.[10][11][13][14]

In Red Bull’s case, critics argue that the combination of its branding, its sponsorship of an athlete facing criticism for traditionalist views on marriage, and its continued profitable presence in Russia sends a message that “freedom” in the marketing material stops at the point where significant commercial interests begin.[11][12][13][14][10]

Historical and global comparisons

“Traditional values” as a political tool

Russia is not the first state to use “family values” language in its politics. In many countries, from parts of Eastern Europe to Latin America and the United States, political leaders have appealed to “traditional family values” to mobilise voters, often linking such values to opposition to feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, or reproductive freedom.[6][8][9]

The Russian case is distinctive in several ways. The reference to “motherhood” and “family” is written directly into the constitution, combined with a legal weakening of protections against domestic violence and a wartime narrative that explicitly connects women’s reproductive roles to national strength and the supply of future soldiers. Unlike some democracies where courts or civil society can push back against such measures, Russia’s current political system offers limited avenues for independent opposition, especially since the invasion of Ukraine.[8][9][6]

This comparison matters because it shows both similarities and differences. Like elsewhere, appeals to “traditional values” in Russia frame women’s equality as a threat to social order. Unlike in more pluralistic systems, this framing is closely embedded in constitutional language, law enforcement, and wartime propaganda, giving it a stronger institutional weight.[9][6][8]

Corporate behaviour in authoritarian states

Historically, companies have often continued to operate in authoritarian countries or wartime economies as long as international law and sanctions regimes allowed it. Examples include businesses that stayed in apartheid‑era South Africa, or firms that maintained operations in Myanmar or Saudi Arabia despite well‑known human rights concerns.[13][14][11]

Over time, public pressure and activism led many companies to reconsider, especially when consumers and investors demanded higher ethical standards. The current debates over business in Russia after 2022 fit into this pattern. Monitoring projects list which companies have significantly reduced their presence and which have not, and use grades or rankings to highlight those still earning profits in Russia.[14][10][11][13]

Red Bull’s decision to pause marketing but continue sales in Russia places it among those companies that have made limited adjustments without a full exit. For consumers, this creates a choice: whether to view the brand simply as a source of energy drinks and extreme sports content, or as a global actor whose business decisions are part of a broader geopolitical and human rights landscape.[10][11][13][14]

What is contested, and what is clear

On some points, the facts are relatively clear:

- Russia has decriminalised some first‑time domestic violence offences.[15][12]

- The Russian constitution now explicitly protects “family” and “motherhood” while critics argue that women’s individual rights are insufficiently safeguarded.[6][8]

- Access to abortion and reproductive healthcare has been tightened in the name of improving demographic indicators.[8][9]

- Red Bull has suspended marketing and new investments in Russia but continues to sell products there through its Russian subsidiary.[11][13][10]

- Public data show that Red Bull’s Russian business remained profitable and grew in 2024, with net sales revenue up by around 39 percent and higher margins.[12]

On other points, there is debate:

- Some argue that individual comments by an athlete about his marriage should not be linked to state policies or war; others see them as part of a shared culture that prioritises male careers and women’s caregiving roles.[4][1][2][6][8]

- Corporate defenders sometimes claim that staying in Russia can protect local workers or maintain minimal operations without endorsing the war, while critics respond that taxes are fungible and ultimately support the state’s budget, including military spending.[13][14][10][11]

- There is disagreement over how much responsibility consumers carry when choosing products from companies that remain in Russia; some view boycotts as powerful tools, while others see them as symbolic gestures with limited direct impact.

What is not contested is that the intersection of gender norms, constitutional language, domestic violence laws, and corporate choices in Russia shapes the environment in which women live and in which companies profit.[15][7][9][12][14][6][8][10][11][13]

Glossary

Administrative offense – A legal violation that is punished with fines, short detention, or other penalties but is not treated as a full criminal offense.

Authoritarian state – A political system where power is concentrated in the hands of a leader or small group, with limited political competition and restricted civil liberties.

Constitutional amendment – A formal change or addition to a country’s constitution, usually approved through a special legal process.

Decriminalisation (of domestic violence) – A legal change that removes certain violent acts within the family from the category of crimes and treats them instead as lesser administrative violations.

Demography – The study of populations, including birth rates, death rates, and age structures; often used in policy debates about how many people a country has and how that might change.

Domestic violence – Physical, emotional, or other abuse committed by a partner or family member within the home or family setting.

Mobilisation (military) – The process by which a state calls up and prepares soldiers and resources for war or large‑scale military operations.

Profit margin – A measure of how much profit a company makes compared to its revenue, usually expressed as a percentage.

Reproductive healthcare – Medical services related to contraception, pregnancy, childbirth, abortion, and other aspects of sexual and reproductive health.

Traditional family values – A political and cultural concept that promotes a specific model of family life, usually with a married heterosexual couple, clear gender roles, and an emphasis on child‑raising and obedience to established norms.

Kari Odermann is a Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a member of the International Advisory Board of the Alliance for Global Security. She is a political analyst and communications specialist advising governments and organisations on strategy, democratic resilience, and countering disinformation by occupying space on social media with clear, evidence-based content.

Her work reaches around 5 million people annually. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she worked as a journalist in Kyiv. A Fulbright scholar, Odermann holds a PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin.

She is also connected to B4Ukraine, a civil society coalition working to block the economic and financial resources behind Russian aggression. In 2025, Russia designated B4Ukraine an “undesirable organisation” after its work exposing companies whose continued business in Russia contributes to the Kremlin’s war economy.

Sources and further reading

[1] “Wintersport: Olympiasieger löst mit Aussagen über seine Ehe Irritation aus.” Sport1, April 2026. https://www.sport1.de/news/wintersport/2026/04/olympiasieger-tritt-heikle-ehe-debatte-los-und-kassiert-shitstorm

[2] “ÖSV-Star Karl kassiert Shitstorm nach Skandal-Aussagen.” Heute, April 2026. https://www.heute.at/s/oesv-star-karl-kassiert-shitstorm-nach-skandal-aussagen-120187866

[3] “‘Mindgames’ löscht Podcast mit Benny Karl.” Osttiroler Bote, April 2026. https://osttirolerbote.at/aktuelles/osttirol-aktuell/mindgames-loescht-podcast-mit-benny-karl

[4] “Benjamin Karl erzürnt das Netz mit seiner Vorstellung von Ehe.” Kleine Zeitung, April 2026. https://www.kleinezeitung.at/artikel/20837475/olympiasieger-benjamin-karl-polarisiert-mit-seiner-vorstellung-von-ehe

[5] “‘Da muss sie schon zurückstecken’: Olympiasieger empört mit Ehe-Aussagen.” GMX, April 2026. https://www.gmx.at/magazine/sport/wintersport/zurueckstecken-olympiasieger-empoert-aussagen-42200860

[6] Baeva, Maria. “Women’s Rights and the Russian Constitution.” Verfassungsblog, July 2020. https://verfassungsblog.de/womens-rights-and-the-russian-constitution/

[7] “Russia: Domestic Violence Law Puts Women at Greater Risk.” Amnesty International, February 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2017/02/russia-domestic-violence-law-puts-women-at-greater-risk/

[8] Human Rights Watch. “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Russia.” Human Rights Watch, July 3, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/03/submission-committee-elimination-discrimination-against-women-russia

[9] Sokolova, Anastasia. “‘Women’s Rights in Russia Are in a Catastrophic State.’ How War Changes the Lives of Women in Russia.” The Barents Observer, 2023. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/womens-rights-in-russia-are-in-a-catastrophic-state-how-war-changes-the-lives-of-women-in-russia/127888

[10] Red Bull GmbH. “Red Bull and Russia.” Red Bull, April 2022. https://www.redbull.com/int-en/energydrink/info/red-bull-and-russia

[11] “Red Bull Headquarters Hit by Ukraine Protest.” Pressat, November 24, 2022. https://pressat.co.uk/releases/red-bull-headquarters-hit-by-ukraine-protest-729631a195c1a9b22e52ec29972878d0/

[12] EMIS. “Red Bull Rus OOO (Ред Булл Рус ООО) (Russia).” EMIS, 2024. https://www.emis.com/php/company-profile/RU/Red_Bull_Rus_OOO___en_2387350.html

[13] “Red Bull Is Pausing New Investments in Russia.” LeaveRussia.org, April 8, 2022. https://leave-russia.org/red-bull

[14] “Red Bull – Companies That Have Not Left Russia.” Who-Support-Rus-War.com, 2024. https://who-support-rus-war.com/en/companies/red-bull/

[15] U.S. Law Library of Congress. “Russian Federation: Decriminalization of Domestic Violence.” June 14, 2017. https://stuff.coffeecode.net/www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-violence/russia-decriminalization-domestic-violence.pdf

More Sources

[2] Carl Benjamin: “England Belongs To The ENGLISH”

[3] This Will Cost MAGA the Midterms

[4] 2NiFf7pGB4pqkvbrnS1b9X

[5] These are the right-wing extremists we’re watching out for in 2026 https://forward.com/culture/796030/extremists-to-watch-in-2026-right-wing-antisemitism/

[6] Decriminalization of Domestic Violence in Russia in Respect of ... https://www.hse.ru/en/edu/vkr/360109969

[7] Red Bull https://tadviser.com/index.php/Company:Red_Bull

[8] The Podcast of the Lotus Eaters https://www.youtube.com/@ThePodcastoftheLotusEaters

[9] Domestic violence is never OK. So why did Russia just decriminalize ... https://www.weforum.org/stories/2017/02/domestic-violence-is-never-ok-so-why-did-russia-just-decriminalize-it/

[10] RED BULL HEADQUARTERS HIT BY UKRAINE PROTEST https://pressat.co.uk/releases/red-bull-headquarters-hit-by-ukraine-protest-729631a195c1a9b22e52ec29972878d0/

[11] https://www.facebook.com/john.morton.90281/videos/carl-benjamin-akkad-daily-foreigners-should-not-hold-power-over-usthis-is-not-co/1168871858183309/

[12] Russia: Bill to Decriminalize Domestic Violence - Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/23/russia-bill-decriminalize-domestic-violence

[13] Red Bull is Pausing New Investments in Russia - LeaveRussia https://leave-russia.org/red-bull

[14] Carl Benjamin chats to Andrew Gold. https://pallavidawson.substack.com/p/carl-benjamin-chats-to-andrew-gold

[15] [PDF] Russian Federation: Decriminalization of Domestic Violence https://stuff.coffeecode.net/www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-violence/russia-decriminalization-domestic-violence.pdf

If the whole modern era is considered, most presidents face zero such attacks during their time in office or while running for president; a few experience one. [1]

Against that background, Donald Trump now stands out. By April 2026, he has already been the target of three serious incidents involving armed attackers or clear intent to kill, including the April 25 security incident around the White House Correspondents’ Dinner in Washington, DC.[1]

Purely as a number, this puts Trump at the extreme end for leaders in stable democracies. Most heads of government in the G7 states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) will never face even one direct armed attack over their careers. [1]

This pattern raises an important question: what do repeated attempts on a leader’s life actually say about the political system around them?

Assassination attempts and regime type: democracies vs autocracies

Researchers who study assassinations often separate political systems into broad categories: consolidated democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes, and full autocracies. These categories matter because they shape both the risk of assassination attempts and their political effects. [Jones and Olken, 2009][2]

- In consolidated democracies, there are regular, credible elections, strong courts, free media, and real alternation of power.

- Competitive authoritarian regimes hold elections, but power is heavily tilted toward the ruling party or leader, and opposition space is constrained.

- Full autocracies centralise power in one person or small group and severely limit meaningful opposition or media freedom.

A large cross‑national study by economists Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken compiled data on assassination attempts against all world leaders from 1875 to 2004. They found that autocrats are more likely to be targeted than democratic leaders, and, crucially, that killing an autocrat has very different consequences from killing a democratic leader. [3][4][2]

Other work on political violence and regime characteristics supports a broad pattern:

- Where power is centralised and accountability is weak assassination attempts and political killings are more common.

- Where institutions are strong and there are peaceful channels for changing leaders, attempts are rarer. [“The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations,” 2015][5]

In that sense, repeated attempts on a leader in an advanced democracy such as the United States are abnormal. In hard authoritarian or revolutionary regimes, by contrast, repeated attempts can almost become a structural feature of politics, especially where rulers stay in office for many years and face no legal way to be removed. [5]

Why peaceful handover of power matters

A peaceful handover of power means that leadership changes hands through elections or constitutional procedures rather than through coups, violence, or emergency measures.

Analysts and democracy indices treat peaceful alternation in office as a key sign of a healthy democracy, because it shows that:

- Leaders can lose without the system collapsing.

- Citizens and elites accept electoral results as the legitimate way to choose leaders.

- Political competition does not depend on violence. [“State of the world 2024: 25 years of autocratization – democracy trumped?”, 2025][6]

In authoritarian contexts, where leaders rarely step down voluntarily, assassination or coups may become one of the few ways to force political change at the top. That is one reason why attempts are more frequent in such systems. [5]

Jones and Olken’s study shows that when an autocrat is successfully assassinated, the country becomes about 13 percentage points more likely to move toward democracy in the following year than in cases where an assassination attempt fails. [NBER, “Do Assassinations Change History?”, 2008] About ten years after such an assassination, that gap rises to roughly 19 percentage points. [Jones and Olken, 2009][7][2]

For democratic leaders, the same pattern does not hold. Assassinating a democratic head of government generally does not lead to systemic regime change; institutions are more robust, and succession rules usually work. [7]

This contrast helps explain why repeated attempts on autocrats and single, rare attempts on democrats sit in very different political contexts.

Trump, guns, and U.S. political violence

Recent years have seen a wider rise in political violence in the United States, including threats and attacks on officials, activists, and media figures. A PBS overview notes that violence has become a more frequent feature of U.S. political life over the past decade, with hundreds of documented incidents and easier access to firearms playing a major role. [1]

The United States has one of the highest rates of civilian gun ownership in the world. Access to high‑powered weapons and weak gun regulations in many states lower the barrier for individuals who decide to act on political grievances. Analysts argue that this “gun environment” makes both assassination attempts and their potential lethality more likely, compared with otherwise similar democracies that have strict gun control.[1]

Even when this context is taken into account, three serious attempts or security incidents involving armed attackers still put Trump on the high end for a democratic leader.

How democratic leaders and autocrats react: different playbooks

The reaction to an assassination attempt often tells as much about a political system as the attempt itself.

Autocratic reactions: repression and myth‑building

In many authoritarian regimes, leaders respond to attempts on their lives by moving toward a harder line. Analysts of autocratic politics describe several common elements: [“The Resurgence of Assassination as A Political Tool,” 2024][8]

- Using survival as proof of destiny or strength

Leaders portray their survival as evidence that they are chosen, invincible, or protected. This narrative strengthens a **cult of personality**, in which the leader is treated as larger than the state itself.

- Blurring critics and assassins

Regimes often erase distinctions between peaceful critics, opposition politicians, journalists, and violent attackers. All are placed in a broad “enemy camp” and described as part of the same threat. [“The Resurgence of Assassination as A Political Tool,” 2024][8]

- Crackdowns and emergency laws

Failed attempts become a justification for mass arrests, new emergency regulations, restrictions on media, and expanded powers for security services. The message is that harsher repression is necessary for survival of the state.

Research on failed coups and violent challenges to dictators shows that when such attempts fail, leaders often use the moment to purge rivals, centralise command, and increase “personalism” – the degree to which the regime depends on a single individual rather than a party or institution. [Timoneda et al., “How Dictators Concentrate Power After a Failed Coup,” 2024][9]

Democratic reactions: unity and institutional continuity

In consolidated democracies, expectations are different.

After attempts on U.S. presidents, public speeches typically:

- Condemn political violence in general.

- Emphasise national unity and shared democratic norms.

- Stress that institutions and the constitution will continue to function. [1]

The “hard” response tends to be technical and largely invisible to the public:

- Internal reviews by the U.S. Secret Service.

- Changes to security perimeters, venues, and procedures.

- Adjustments in intelligence collection and threat monitoring.

The core narrative is that the office and the constitutional order are bigger than any individual leader, and that rules – rather than emergency measures against domestic enemies – will guide the response.

This does not mean democratic leaders never use an attempt to their political advantage. It does mean there are stronger institutional and cultural constraints on turning an attack into a broad mandate for crackdowns.

Do leaders “benefit” from assassination attempts?

Assassination attempts can have short‑term effects on public opinion, but the pattern is more limited than some might expect.

Sympathy bumps in democracies

Analyses of U.S. presidential approval suggest that assassination attempts usually lead to a small, temporary rise in popularity – often just a few percentage points. Ronald Reagan (United States, president 1981–1989) saw a notable approval increase after he was shot and wounded in 1981, but that effect faded as normal political issues returned. [“Do presidents’ popularity increase after assassination attempts?,” 2024][10]

After the July 2024 attempt on Trump’s life at a campaign rally, an ABC News/Ipsos poll found his favourability rose to about 40 percent, among his highest ratings in several years, though the overall race against his opponent remained competitive. [ABC News/Ipsos, “Trump favorability rises following shooting…,” 2024] A Reuters/Ipsos poll also found that roughly one‑third of Americans believed Trump survived by “divine providence,” suggesting a deepening quasi‑messianic view among part of his base. [Reuters/Ipsos via Ipsos release, 2024][11]

Overall, historical data indicates that assassination attempts in democracies can create a sympathy effect and a brief “rally‑round‑the‑flag” moment, but they rarely transform the broader political landscape on their own. [10]

Strengthening regimes in autocracies

In autocracies, there are usually no trustworthy public opinion polls. Instead, the impact of attempts is seen in regime behaviour:

- Increased purges of elites and security officials.

- New laws restricting opposition and media.

- Higher levels of fear among potential challengers.

Jones and Olken’s work shows that successful assassinations of autocrats are associated with higher chances of democratisation. The flip side is that failed attempts leave the ruler in place, often with more information about enemies and a stronger justification to centralise power. [[4][2][3]

In that sense, a failed attempt can “lock in” an autocrat’s power, even if that outcome is never measured in formal approval ratings.

Trump, image, and political branding

Trump operates in a democratic system, but his personal political style has often borrowed elements from strongman politics.

Analysts have noted that his public response to the 2024 rally shooting – returning quickly to the campaign trail, emphasising visible defiance, and portraying himself as a fighter standing in for his supporters – fits a pattern in which What assassination attempts r for a leader’s political brand.

In this framing, surviving an attempt is used to underline strength, resilience, and the idea that opponents are not just wrong but dangerous. However, Trump remains constrained by U.S. institutions, political competition, and media scrutiny in a way that classic autocrats are not.

A comparison with Vladimir Putin is revealing. Putin rules in a personalist autocracy a system where the leader’s physical survival is closely tied to regime survival. Analysts argue that his emphasis on dramatic shows of force, and on punishing perceived enemies at home and abroad, reflects both his regime type and his concern with maintaining an image of control.

The difference is not only about personal style but about underlying institutions. In Russia, there are few credible mechanisms for changing leaders without major upheaval. In the United States, contested elections and strong courts still function as the primary channels for political change, even amid rising violence.

What assassination attempts reveal about political systems

Assassination attempts are dramatic and highly personal events, but the deeper story is structural.

Research and recent experience support several broad conclusions:

- Frequency and regime type: Attempts and assassinations are more common where power is centralised, accountability is weak, and opposition has few legal channels. They are rarer where institutions are strong and leaders can be replaced peacefully. [5]

- Consequences differ: Killing an autocrat is more likely to change a country’s regime type than killing a democratic leader. Democracies are better able to absorb the loss of one person without changing their basic rules. [2][7]

- Reactions matter: In democracies, leaders are expected to respond by condemning violence, emphasising unity, and making technical security changes. In autocracies, leaders often respond by tightening repression and expanding their personal power.

For observers trying to understand what recent attempts on Trump’s life mean for American democracy, the key is not only how many times he has been targeted, but how the system responds. Counting incidents is important for tracking risk, but the deeper signal comes from the reaction:

- Does the leader use the attack to blur all opponents into one enemy camp and justify crackdowns?

- Or does the response push toward unity and reinforce institutional rules?

The answer to those questions will reveal more about the future of American democracy than the raw number of attempts alone.

Glossary

Autocracy – A political system in which power is concentrated in one person or a small group, with limited or no meaningful opposition or independent media.

Authoritarian regime – A system of government where leaders are not chosen in free and fair elections, political competition is restricted, and civil liberties are limited.

Cult of personality – A form of political culture where a leader is portrayed as infallible or heroic, often above the state or institutions.

Democracy (consolidated) – A political system with regular, competitive elections, strong rule of law, separation of powers, and protection of civil liberties over a sustained period.

Peaceful handover of power – A change of leadership that occurs through elections or constitutional procedures, without violence or coups.

Personalist autocracy – An authoritarian regime in which power is heavily concentrated in a single leader rather than in a party, military, or collective body.

Sympathy bump – A temporary increase in public support or approval for a leader after a shocking or traumatic event, such as an assassination attempt.

Sources and further reading

1. “The Causes and Impact of Political Assassinations.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 19, 2015. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-causes-and-impact-of-political-assassinations/.

2. Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War.” *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1, no. 2 (July 2009). https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.1.2.55.

3. Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War.” NBER Working Paper No. 13102, February 2007. https://www.nber.org/papers/w13102.

4. Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. “Hit or Miss?: The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War.” Kellogg School of Management, 2008. https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/academics-research/research/detail/2009/hit-or-miss-the-effect-of-assassinations-on-institutions-and-war.

5. National Bureau of Economic Research. “Do Assassinations Change History?” *NBER Digest*, March 2008. https://www.nber.org/digest/mar08/do-assassinations-change-history.

6. Habtoor Research Centre. “The Resurgence of Assassination as A Political Tool.” July 21, 2024. https://www.habtoorresearch.com/programmes/the-resurgence-of-assassination-as-a-political-tool/.

7. Timoneda, Joan, et al. “How Dictators Concentrate Power After a Failed Coup.” Working paper, 2024. https://joantimoneda.netlify.app/files/Timoneda_al_Personalism_Failed_Coups.pdf.

8. Lührmann, Anna, et al. “State of the World 2024: 25 Years of Autocratization – Democracy Trumped?” *Democratization*, May 18, 2025. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2487825.

9. “How Recent Political Violence in the U.S. Fits into ‘a Long, Dark History’.” PBS NewsHour, September 12, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-recent-political-violence-in-the-u-s-fits-into-a-long-dark-history.

10. RawStory. “Do Presidents’ Popularity Increase After Assassination Attempts? History Has an Answer.” July 16, 2024. https://www.rawstory.com/raw-investigates/polls-after-assassination-attempt/.

11. Stevens, Anthony, and Gary Langer. “Trump Favorability Rises Following Shooting, Majority of Americans Want Biden to End Campaign: Poll.” ABC News/Ipsos, July 21, 2024. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-favorability-rises-shooting-majority-americans-biden-end/story?id=112112043.

12. Ipsos. “The Race for the Presidency Remains Unchanged in the Wake of the Assassination Attempt on Trump.” Reuters/Ipsos Poll Release, July 16, 2024. https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/race-presidency-remains-unchanged-wake-assassination-attempt-trump.

13. The Conversation. “Trump’s Promotion of an Image of Strength After Assassination Attempt Borrows from Authoritarian Playbook.” July 25, 2024. https://theconversation.com/trumps-promotion-of-an-image-of-strength-after-assassination-attempt-borrows-from-authoritarian-playbook-234657.

Hit or Miss?: The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/academics-research/research/detail/2009/hit-or-miss-the-effect-of-assassinations-on-institutions/

Do Assassinations Change History? - NBER https://www.nber.org/digest/mar08/do-assassinations-change-history

Nation on edge: Experts warn of ‘vicious spiral’ in political violence ... https://www.reuters.com/world/us/nation-edge-experts-warn-vicious-spiral-political-violence-after-kirk-killing-2025-09-11/

Trump’s favorability rises after shooting while many Americans want Biden to drop out: Poll https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/4784183-trumps-favorability-rises-after-shooting-while-many-americans-want-biden-to-drop-out-poll/

Counterfactuals and the Role of Assassinations in History http://thecounterfactualhistoryreview.blogspot.com/2015/04/counterfactuals-and-role-of.html

Kirk assassination is a national tragedy in a polarized America - CNN https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/10/politics/charlie-kirk-assassination-utah-political-violence-analysis

The race for the presidency remains unchanged in the wake ... - Ipsos https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/race-presidency-remains-unchanged-wake-assassination-attempt-trump

Researchers warn of rising ‘assassination culture’ after murders of ... https://www.foxnews.com/us/researchers-warn-rising-assassination-culture-after-murders-charlie-kirk-brian-thompson

How recent political violence in the U.S. fits into ‘a long, dark history’ https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-recent-political-violence-in-the-u-s-fits-into-a-long-dark-history

The core story: Iran, a UN committee, and a silent room

In April 2026, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) elected Iran to the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC), the main UN body that helps plan priorities and allocate parts of the UN budget, including areas linked to human rights, gender equality, disarmament, and counterterrorism. Iran’s representative, Ali Hajilari, was appointed one of the committee’s vice‑chairs for a term running through 2028.

Only one country objected: the United States, which currently contributes about 22% of the UN’s regular budget. Iran still won the seat. The vote took place by consensus among all 54 ECOSOC members. That means 53 governments—among them major democracies such as Germany , the United Kingdom, France , and Canada —either actively agreed or chose not to object.

For critics, one screenshot tells the whole story:

“Iran – accused of massacring thousands of protesters – elected to a UN body that sets priorities and budgets for women’s rights and human rights.”

Even if that framing is simplified, it spreads quickly and sticks. It feeds a wider narrative: that the UN rewards abusive governments, that democracies quietly enable it, and that global institutions are out of touch with the people who fund them.

This is not only about policy design. It is about political communication—how institutions explain themselves in a world where most people now get their political news from short, emotional content on phones rather than long speeches in conference rooms.

What the CPC actually does – and why it matters

The Committee for Programme and Coordination is a 34‑member body that supports the UN General Assembly in planning and evaluating UN programmes. In simple terms, it looks at:

• Which issues the UN should prioritize (for example, climate, human rights, gender equality, disarmament, counterterrorism).

• How to organize and align different UN programmes with those priorities.

• How to make sure programmes match the budgets approved by member states.

The CPC does not directly write human rights treaties or decide which government is violating women’s rights. But it helps shape the architecture: which areas get more attention, which initiatives get more money, and which reports are prioritised.

This matters because global agendas—on women’s rights, climate, development, and security—often start as UN programme priorities and then move into funding decisions by agencies and donors. If a significant share of the committee is made up of governments accused of serious rights abuses, critics argue that the body risks protecting process over principle.

Independent monitoring groups estimate that at least 21–37% of CPC members are states accused of serious human rights violations, depending on how “serious” is defined and which sources are used. This group includes not only Iran but also Russia and China, which face regular criticism from UN human rights mechanisms and civil society.

How Iran got the seat: the “clean slate” system

The election was not a surprise. The way regional representation works at the UN made it almost automatic.

ECOSOC seats, and many committee positions, are distributed by regional groups:

1. African States

2. Asia-Pacific States

3. Eastern European States

4. Latin American and Caribbean States

5. Western European and Others Group

Each group is allocated a set number of seats and is expected to agree internally on candidates. In this election, the Asia–Pacific group nominated exactly five candidates—India, Iran, Israel, Japan, and Pakistan—for five available CPC seats. This is called a clean slate. the number of nominees equals the number of seats. There is no competition.

In clean slate elections:

• Regional groups trade support and avoid open fights.

• States agree not to challenge each other’s nominees in public.

• ECOSOC then “approves by consensus,” often without a recorded vote.

In practice, the decisive bargaining happens behind closed doors in regional group rooms, not in the open chamber. By the time the nomination reaches ECOSOC, many diplomats treat it as a done deal that should not be reopened.

From an insider’s perspective, this looks “normal”: the Asia–Pacific group filled its quota; everyone else respects the unwritten deal. From an outsider’s perspective, it looks like this:

“Every ECOSOC member either supported or stayed silent as Iran gained influence over UN planning for rights and gender equality.”

Both descriptions are technically true. Only one of them goes viral.

A communications system built for communiqués, not screenshots

The UN’s communications culture is still built around **formal communiqués**, negotiated statements, and reports that take months to write and are read mainly by specialists.

This made sense in a media environment where a few large newspapers and broadcasters decided which stories to tell. It makes far less sense in 2026, when:

• A majority of citizens in many top UN funder states—including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany—say they get most of their news from social media. Surveys suggest that for younger people, short‑form video platforms and messaging apps are now primary political information sources.[14]

• Single images or headlines, such as “Iran elected to UN women’s rights committee,” can reach millions of viewers with no additional context.

• Narratives of “hypocrisy,” “corruption,” and “double standards” are central to populist rhetoric in countries such as the United States, France, Italy, and Germany.

In that environment, silence is not neutral. It is content. When the UN, or member states, do not immediately frame a controversial decision, critics frame it for them.

Some organisations have adapted to this faster than others. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), for example, shifted its communication strategy after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. It began declassifying intelligence in near real time, holding regular briefings, creating visual explainers, and assuming that everything would be screenshotted and shared.

The UN, by contrast, often still behaves as if “if we do not talk about it, it will not become a story.” The new reality is closer to the opposite: “if we do not frame it, someone else will—and their framing will stick.”

The wider crisis: credibility, funding, and populist backlash

The Iran–CPC story hits the UN at a bad time. Trust in global institutions has been under pressure for years.

On the funding side:

The UN’s regular budget for 2025 was around 3.7 billion USD. The United States is assessed at about 22% of that total. China is the second‑largest contributor, followed by Japan , Germany, and the United Kingdom.

When domestic politics turn against “globalism,” funding can change quickly. The United States has previously delayed payments or withdrawn from UN‑linked organisations when Congress, especially under Republican control, refused to back them.

- One study in The Lancet projected that defunding the US Agency for International Development (USAID) could lead to around 14 million additional deaths globally by 2030 if development and health programmes are not replaced.

On the political side, populist movements in many G7 countries argue that international institutions are unaccountable, wasteful, and hypocritical. “America First,” “France First,” “Germany First,” and similar slogans across Europe express not only nationalism but also distrust in multilateral institutions.

The Iran–CPC decision fits easily into this narrative. A simple line—“We are not abandoning multilateralism; we are refusing to fund institutional corruption”—is likely to appear in domestic campaigns, especially in the 2026 US midterms under President Donald Trump (United States, 2017–2021 and 2025–present), whose administration has previously criticised and withdrawn from international bodies.[17]

This leads to a vicious cycle:

1. Diplomats and UN officials dismiss public criticism as uninformed or “just social media.”

2. They repeat behaviour that reinforces those criticisms (for example, clean slate deals involving abusive governments).

3. The public loses more trust in institutions.

4. Institutions weaken—politically and financially.

5. Populist leaders gain influence and further attack multilateralism.

6. Key treaties and agreements on climate, human rights, and trade become easier to ignore or abandon.

The Iran committee episode is one more turn of that wheel.

Why democracies stayed quiet

One of the most striking aspects of the ECOSOC decision is not that Iran secured a seat, but that only the United States spoke up publicly. Other major democracies did not break the consensus.

Several overlapping reasons explain this:

1. Vote‑trading and access: Diplomats often rely on mutual support to win seats for their own countries or allies on other bodies. Challenging Iran in a public forum could make it harder to gain support later for unrelated votes. In many cases, governments prioritise “access” and influence inside the system over publicly defending principles in one vote.

2. Institutional logic vs public logic: Inside the UN, regional balance and procedural continuity are treated as essential to protect smaller and less powerful states. Many diplomats worry that if regional groups lose control over candidate lists, big powers will dominate committee seats. To them, clean slates are a lesser evil. From outside, this looks like elite self‑protection.

3. Media calculations: Because mainstream international media have given little attention to these committee elections, many governments assume they will not pay a political price at home for going along. Monitoring by NGOs such as UN Watch or specialised think tanks rarely breaks into mass media.

4. No clear reform path: Even diplomats who privately dislike outcomes like Iran’s election often have no realistic, detailed plan for reform that would protect both regional representation and basic human rights standards. Without a plan, many prefer to avoid a public fight.

The result is a gap between the moral expectations of citizens (especially in donor countries) and the procedural logic of UN insiders. That gap is exactly where anti‑institutional narratives grow.

Not just Iran: a pattern of contested appointments

The Iran case is part of a wider pattern. Over the past decade, states with poor rights records have been elected to bodies that, on paper, oversee or promote human rights and gender equality. Critics often highlight examples such as:

- Saudi Arabia (under de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 2017–present) winning a seat on the UN Commission on the Status of Women, despite global concern over women’s rights and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.

- Governments accused of systematic torture or political repression sitting on the UN Human Rights Council or its subsidiary committees.

Supporters of the current system respond that:

- The UN is a political body of states, not a club of democracies; it must include governments with bad records if it wants them to change.

- Excluding such countries entirely might push them further away from international norms.

- Regional balance and broad membership are core to the UN Charter and cannot simply be ignored when a government behaves badly.

Critics argue that there is a difference between allowing a state into the room and giving it leadership roles on bodies that set priorities for the very rights it violates. These are contested issues, not settled questions. But they are questions that are now being debated in public, not just in diplomatic circles.

What a more honest communication response could look like

One way forward would not require changing the UN Charter or regional quotas—but it would require changing communication habits. For example:

• When controversial appointments happen, the UN and key member states could immediately acknowledge the concerns and explain, in plain language, what the committee does, how the election process works, and what checks and balances exist.

• A senior official or the UN’s Department of Global Communications could share a short, public statement like:

1. What the CPC can and cannot do.

2. How regional slates work.

3. Why reform is hard (for example, risk of big‑power dominance) but still necessary.
   Clear, timely explanations would not erase criticism. But they might prevent the narrative from being shaped entirely by those who want to weaken multilateral institutions.

At present, the common pattern is silence, followed by technical clarification only if the story becomes politically uncomfortable. By then, the screenshot has already travelled.

Why this matters beyond the UN

The deeper issue is not only whether Iran should sit on a UN planning committee. It is whether global institutions can maintain legitimacy in a world where information is fast, fragmented, and often hostile.

Legitimacy, in this context, means a basic level of public belief that institutions are trying to act fairly and according to their stated principles. Without it:

• Public support for funding international bodies falls.

• Governments find it easier to ignore or exit treaties on climate, human rights, refugees, and trade.

• Narratives of “we are on our own” gain strength, making coordinated responses to global problems much harder.

The Iran–CPC decision is one small piece of a larger picture. The decision itself came out of long‑standing rules on regional representation and quiet diplomatic trade‑offs. But the way it looks on a phone screen in 2026 is very different from how it looked in an ECOSOC conference room.

Institutions that do not adapt to that reality risk being broken not only by their enemies, but by their own communication failures.

The author, Kari Odermann, is a political analyst and communication specialist with over 20 years of experience across security, development, and technical assistance in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. She advises on and develops strategies for government programmes and projects worldwide, including work with the German Parliament, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), UNDP, and international implementation organisations, and serves as a consultant to public, private, and non-profit actors.

To advise clients effectively, Dr. Odermann is also a hands-on content creator with a global community of close to 400,000 followers and an annual reach of approximately 5 million, demonstrating how complex political and security issues can be made accessible in evidence-based formats for audiences who might not otherwise engage with the content.

She holds a Dr. rer. phil. from the Freie Universität Berlin and has been awarded both a Fulbright Scholarship and a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship. She has also held political mandates in the United States and Germany.

Dr. Odermann develops strategies and conducts trainings and workshops on communication in sensitive environments and the effective use of technology.

Glossary

Clean slate – An election in which the number of candidates equals the number of available seats, meaning there is no competition and nominees are almost guaranteed to win.

Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) – A 34‑member UN committee that helps plan, coordinate, and evaluate UN programmes and priorities, including areas such as human rights and gender equality.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – One of the UN’s main organs, with 54 member states, responsible for coordinating economic, social, and related work, and for electing states to many UN committees.

Legitimacy (institutional) – The level of public and political belief that an institution acts fairly and according to its stated rules and principles.

Multilateralism – A system in which multiple countries cooperate through shared institutions and agreements to address common problems.

Political communication – The way information about politics, policies, and institutions is created, framed, and shared with the public across media and platforms.

Populism – A political style or movement that claims to represent “the people” against corrupt or distant elites, often criticising institutions such as parliaments, courts, and international organisations.

Regional group (UN) – A bloc of countries grouped mainly by geography (such as Africa or Asia-Pacific) that coordinates positions and shares seats on UN bodies.

Regular budget (UN) – The main, assessed budget of the United Nations, paid by member states according to an agreed formula, and used to fund core activities such as diplomacy, peace and security, and global communications.

Social media – Online platforms and apps where users create, share, and comment on content, now a primary source of political information for many people.

Sources and further reading

1. Better World Campaign. “UN Budget and Reform, Explained.” Better World Campaign, March 17, 2025. https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-explained-budget.

2. United Nations. “Press Release ECOSOC/7225: Economic and Social Council Elects Members to Programme and Coordination Committee.” United Nations, April 10, 2026. https://press.un.org/en/2026/ecosoc7225.doc.htm.

3. United Nations. “Proposed Programme Budget for 2026: Part 7, Global Communications.” United Nations Digital Library, April 8, 2025. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4079259.

4. Financing the UN. “UN Expenses by Function.” UN Financing Report, 2024. https://financingun.report/un-financing/un-allocations/un-expenses-by-function.

5. Ryan, Mick. “The Learning Curve: Ukraine’s Attrition Campaign and Strategic Communication.” Substack, April 11, 2026.

6. International Institute for Sustainable Development. “Member States Approve UN Budget for 2025.” IISD SDG Knowledge Hub, January 14, 2025. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/member-states-approve-usd-372-billion-un-budget-for-2025.

7. National Public Radio. “United States Exits International Organizations: United Nations Funding Debates.” NPR, January 7, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/01/07/g-s1-104999/united-states-exits-international-organizations-united-nations.

8. Cavalcanti, D., Ferreira de Sales, L., et al. “Evaluating the Comprehensive Impact of Two Decades of USAID Interventions and Forecasting the Effects of Defunding on Mortality up to 2030.” *The Lancet*, June 2025.

9. UN Watch. “Democracies Enable Human Rights Abusers at UN Committees.” UN Watch Briefing, April 2026.

10. Neuer, Hillel. “Saudi Arabia Elected to UN Women’s Rights Commission.” UN Watch, June 2018.

Sources

[1] UN Chief Proposes $577 Mn Budget Cut for 2026 - YouTube

[2] JIU/REP/81/2 https://www.unjiu.org/sites/www.unjiu.org/files/jiu_document_files/products/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_1981_2_English.pdf

[3] UN Budget and Reform, Explained - Better World Campaign https://betterworldcampaign.org/un-explained-budget

[4] UN chief proposes slashing 2026 budget by $577 million, cutting 18 ... https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-proposes-slashing-2026-budget-by-577-million-cutting-18-jobs-2025-12-01/

[5] UN expenses by function - financingun.reportfinancingun.report › un-financing › un-allocations › un-expenses-by-funct... https://financingun.report/un-financing/un-allocations/un-expenses-by-function

[6] How Much Does the UN Really Cost? | United Nations Explainer

[7] [PDF] Programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027 United Nations https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2025_08E.pdf

[8] Secretary General’s address to the Fifth Committee https://archive.globalpolicy.org/finance/docs/2003/1028secgento5thcom.htm

[9] [PDF] A/79/6 (Sect. 28) - General Assembly - the United Nations https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/6(Sect.28)

[10] Proposed programme budget for 2026. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4079259

[11] Chokepoint: How the War with Iran Threatens Global Food ... https://www.csis.org/analysis/chokepoint-how-war-iran-threatens-global-food-security

[12] How the Iran War Is Disrupting the Food Supply Chain

[13] Global | Implications of Iran conflict for food security - Dow Jones https://www.dowjones.com/business-intelligence/blog/global-implications-of-iran-conflict-for-food-security/

[14] Not just energy: How the Iran war could trigger a global food crisis https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/3/18/not-just-energy-how-the-iran-war-could-trigger-a-global-food-crisis

[15] How the Iran war threatens global food supply https://www.npr.org/2026/03/20/nx-s1-5750812/how-the-iran-war-threatens-global-food-supply

[16] War in Iran threatens fresh food-price shock across developing world https://finance.yahoo.com/news/war-iran-threatens-fresh-food-070507520.html

[17] Iran war could push global food insecurity to record levels, leaving ... https://www.livescience.com/health/iran-war-could-push-global-food-insecurity-to-record-levels-leaving-363-million-people-hungry

[18] How Iran War Is Disrupting the Food Supply Chain https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-19/how-iran-war-is-disrupting-farming-fertilizer-production-food-industry

[19] Iran, Fertilizer, and Food Security: Risks, Impacts, and Policy ... - CSIS https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-fertilizer-and-food-security-risks-impacts-and-policy-responses

[20] The Iran war: Potential food security impacts https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/node/3805

Human rights organisations that specialise in Iran—such as Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRA) and regional monitors like Hengaw (links to souces below)—have tried to document deaths since the start of the latest US–Israeli air campaign, known in Washington as Operation Epic Fury and in Israel as Operation Roaring Lion, which began on 28 February 2026. Their most conservative recent assessments suggest:

• At least 1,400–1,500 civilians killed in Iran in the first four weeks of bombing.

• Hundreds of children included in that figure.

• More than 1,000 additional civilians killed across Lebanon and the wider region, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

For comparison, humanitarian groups such as Oxfam estimate that at the peak of Israel’s war in Gaza, around 250 Palestinians were killed per day, which they describe as the highest daily death rate in any major conflict in the 21st century. The current daily rate in Iran, based on conservative figures, but similar to or higher than the rates seen in Iraq, Yemen, and Ukraine over extended periods.

These numbers are still evolving and are contested in detail, but they demonstrate that the war in Iran is not “low intensity” for civilians. It is a mass-casualty conflict.

Despite this, mainstream coverage in the US and Europe has consistently prioritised other angles. Understanding why requires looking at how media systems work.

Reason 1: “Our side” is doing the bombing

In Ukraine, Western media can clearly frame Russia as the aggressor, and civilian casualties can be linked directly to decisions by the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin (Russia, president 2000–2008, 2012–present). In Gaza, coverage is more contested, but many outlets still distinguish between the Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel, prime minister 1996–1999, 2009–2021, 2022–present) and Palestinian civilians under bombardment.

Iran is different because the key external military actors are the United States and Israel—governments that are formally allies or partners of many Western states and whose narratives have strong political support among parts of their domestic audiences. Focusing heavily on Iranian civilian casualties means:

• Questioning the legality of the operation under international law.

• Raising moral questions about the conduct of “our side.”

• Potentially challenging national security narratives used by governments.

Editors and producers operate in environments where political elites, major advertisers, and segments of the audience are sensitive to coverage that appears to criticise “their own” militaries. Research on past conflicts shows that when Western states are leading a campaign, civilian deaths on the other side often receive less visual and emotional treatment, and coverage may rely heavily on official briefings.

This does not mean a conspiracy exists in every newsroom. It does mean there are structural pressures—political, professional, and commercial—that make full, graphic attention to Iranian casualties more “awkward” than reporting on Russian or Syrian attacks, for example.

Reason 2: Iran is framed as a “regime,” not a people

For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has often been presented in Western coverage mainly through the lens of its government: the “regime,” the nuclear programme, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), regional proxy groups, and terrorism designations. This “security first” narrative has several results:

• Ordinary Iranians appear less often as individuals with names, jobs, and families.

• The country is described as a strategic problem rather than a society.

• Civilians who are killed can be subconsciously grouped with “the regime.”

Media studies researchers have shown similar patterns in coverage of other states repeatedly framed as security threats, such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein or Afghanistan under the Taliban in earlier periods. In those situations, audiences are more likely to hear about “targets,” “facilities,” and “infrastructure” than about daily life in affected communities.

This does not mean there has been no human-focused reporting on Iran. Journalists and documentary makers have produced work on Iranian artists, students, women’s rights activists, and political prisoners. However, this material is often separate from day-to-day security coverage. When war breaks out, the long-standing habit of thinking of Iran as “the regime” shapes which stories are told first.

The effect is that Iranian civilians killed by foreign airstrikes can become “collateral damage” in the public imagination—mentioned in numbers but rarely shown as central characters in the narrative of the conflict.

Reason 3: Information blockades and fear

There is also a practical reason civilian deaths in Iran appear less often on screens: getting reliable images and testimonies from inside the country is extremely difficult.

Iran tightly restricts foreign journalists. Many international reporters cannot enter at all; those who do often face strict movement controls, monitored interviews, and the risk of expulsion if they push boundaries. Local journalists and citizen reporters face even greater danger. Human rights groups have documented arrests, torture, and long prison sentences for people who shared images of protests or security-force abuses in recent years.

During the large-scale protests and subsequent crackdown in late 2025 and January 2026, activists and rights organisations estimated that at least 6,000 people were killed across Iran in a matter of weeks. Iranian officials disputed those figures and accused foreign media of amplifying “enemy propaganda.” Independent verification was extremely hard because of internet shutdowns, intimidation, and the blocking of outside observers.

In this context:

• Rights groups such as HRA, Hengaw, and others try to document deaths using local networks and digital evidence, but their access is uneven and often region-specific.

• Major Western news organisations are cautious about relying too heavily on them, especially when figures are politically sensitive and governments openly challenge them.

• The result is that even when casualty numbers are high, they may be presented as “claims” or “allegations,” with fewer images and personal stories than from more accessible war zones like Ukraine or Gaza.

Information blockades therefore interact with editorial caution. This does not erase the deaths, but it keeps them at the level of anonymous numbers.

Reason 4: Economics crowd out human stories

When journalists and editors in the US and Europe look at the Iran war, they see not only a military conflict but also an economic shock. Iran sits near major oil and gas routes, and the Strait of Hormuz is a key chokepoint for global energy exports. Disruption there affects fuel prices worldwide.

This creates a strong incentive to frame the story primarily as:

• A risk to oil and gas supply.

• A driver of inflation.

• A threat to shipping and global trade.

For domestic audiences, those angles can be presented as “what this means for your gas bill” or “what this means for European inflation.” These are important stories. However, when newsrooms are under commercial pressure and have limited airtime or page space, economic framing can squeeze out human-centred coverage of civilians in Iran.

Researchers have found similar patterns in earlier wars where Western economic interests were involved. For example, coverage of conflict in the Gulf has often emphasised oil prices, defence markets, and refugee flows rather than civilian experiences. Once this frame takes hold, each additional paragraph about Iranian casualties competes with graphics on fuel prices or expert commentary on central bank policy.

This does not mean editors do not care about human suffering. It does mean they must constantly choose which angles they believe will keep audiences engaged and advertisers satisfied. Under those conditions, abstract economic trends often win over distant human tragedies.

Press freedom and self-censorship in the United States

The internal environment of US journalism also matters. Legal protections for press freedom in the United States remain strong on paper, but several indicators suggest growing pressure on independent reporting.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF), which produces the World Press Freedom Index, notes that the US score has fallen over the past decade—from around 81.8 in 2013 to about 65.5 in 2025, the lowest US score in the series; in this index, lower scores mean less freedom. During the same period, the country’s global ranking has slipped into what RSF describes as a “problematic” zone.

Several factors contribute to this trend:

• Economic pressure: hedge-fund takeovers, local newsroom closures, and the creation of “news deserts” where communities have no local reporting.

• Physical and legal pressure: spikes in arrests and detentions of journalists covering protests, including protests related to Gaza, police violence, and other contentious issues.

• Political hostility: partisan attacks on the media, including from elected officials, which can increase threats and harassment.

These pressures do not amount to formal censorship. However, they encourage risk-avoidance and self-censorship—especially on topics that might anger powerful political actors or key segments of the audience. Intensive coverage of Iranian civilians killed by US and Israeli forces fits that category.

In this sense, the lack of attention to Iranian deaths is not only about foreign policy. It is also about the changing conditions under which US journalists work.

The information war that started before the bombing

The official start of the current US–Israeli air campaign is 28 February 2026. However, the informational part of the conflict began earlier.

In early January 2026, President Donald Trump used his social media accounts and public remarks to address Iranians directly. He urged them to “KEEP PROTESTING,” suggested that “help is on its way,” and promised that the United States had strong options ready. These messages came while large protests were under way and while Iranian security forces were carrying out a violent crackdown.

Activist groups and some Iranian commentators argue that this messaging encouraged people to stay in the streets, gave parts of the security establishment a pretext to claim the protests were foreign-driven, and contributed indirectly to the high death toll in January. Others respond that domestic grievances were already deep and that protesters acted primarily because of local conditions, not foreign encouragement.

From a conflict-analysis perspective, Trump’s statements fit many definitions of psychological warfare: they were targeted at a foreign population in crisis, aimed at shaping expectations and behaviour ahead of possible military action. Whether they directly “caused” additional civilian deaths is harder to prove. What is clearer is that they blurred the line between domestic political messaging and strategic communication toward a rival state.

Understanding this (pre-)war information phase helps explain why many Iranians feel their suffering is instrumentalised twice: first by their own government, then by foreign leaders and media narratives that treat them as symbols rather than as individuals.

Contested issues and alternative views

1. Casualty figures.
   Iranian officials, rights groups, and international media sometimes present different numbers for civilians killed. Governments in Tehran, Washington, and Jerusalem contest each other’s claims, and independent verification remains difficult. Analysts generally treat rights-group numbers as more credible than official battlefield announcements but still regard them as estimates rather than exact counts.

2. Media intent.
   Some editors and journalists reject the idea that they downplay Iranian casualties for political reasons. They argue that limited access, verification challenges, and audience attention are the main constraints, not a desire to protect “our side.” Critics respond that these structural factors themselves are shaped by political and economic choices.

3. Comparisons with Gaza and Ukraine.
   Oxfam’s conclusion that Gaza’s daily death rate was higher than any other major 21st-century conflict has been widely cited. Some researchers, however, argue that comparisons between conflicts must consider duration, intensity, and data quality, and caution against using a single comparative ranking to summarise complex wars. Despite these debates, there is broad agreement that both Gaza and Iran have seen extremely high civilian death rates.

Recognising these disagreements does not erase the patterns discussed earlier. Instead, it underlines the need for transparent sourcing, clear definitions, and careful language when describing mass violence.

Why this matters

The way wars are covered shapes public understanding, policy choices, and ultimately lives. When certain civilian populations—such as Ukrainians or Israelis—receive extensive, humanising coverage and others—such as Iranians—are largely reduced to numbers, it sends a message about whose suffering is considered visible and whose is not.

This is not only an ethical problem. It also has strategic consequences. Selective empathy can fuel resentment, support extremist narratives, and make diplomatic solutions harder to achieve. When audiences in Iran, the wider Middle East, or the Global South see their casualties treated as secondary to Western economic concerns, they are more likely to view Western claims about “human rights” and “rules-based orders” as inconsistent.

Improving coverage does not require taking sides in the war. It involves applying the same basic journalistic standards—verification, context, and humanisation—to all civilians, regardless of which state is responsible for the bombs.

About the Author

Dr. Kari Odermann is a political analyst, communication specialist, and adviser on risk-aware communication in sensitive political environments. She works with governments, international organisations, and other actors to design communication that protects legitimacy, preserves operational space, and makes complex work understandable to the public. She is a Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and serves on the International Advisory Board of the Alliance for Global Security. Alongside this work, she brings practical platform expertise as a digital creator reaching millions of viewers, where they are already getting their news.

Glossary

Collateral damage – A military term used to describe unintended damage or deaths of civilians and civilian objects during an attack on a military target.

Daily death rate – The average number of people killed per day in a conflict over a given period.

Economic frame – A way of presenting news that focuses on economic impacts, such as prices or markets, rather than human or political aspects.

Islamic Republic of Iran – The official name of Iran since the 1979 revolution, referring to its system of government that combines republican institutions with Islamic rule.

Media framing – The process by which media outlets select certain aspects of a story to emphasise, shaping how audiences understand events.

Operation Epic Fury – The name used by the United States government for its large-scale military campaign against Iran that began on 28 February 2026.

Press Freedom Index – An annual ranking by Reporters Without Borders that scores countries on the level of freedom journalists have to report the news.

Psychological warfare – The use of information, messages, and symbols to influence the emotions, beliefs, and behaviour of an opponent’s population or forces.

Regime – A term used to describe a country’s ruling system or government; in many contexts it carries a negative or authoritarian implication.

Selective empathy – A pattern in which people or institutions show strong concern for some victims of violence but much less for others, often based on political or cultural bias.

Sources and further reading

Human Rights Activists in Iran. “Civilian Harm in Iran after One Month of War.” HRA, March 27, 2026. (PDF, organisation website).

“Iran War Timeline: Civilians Bear Brunt of US and Israel’s Month-Long Campaign.” The Guardian, March 22, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/22/iran-war-timeline-civilians-bear-brunt-of-us-and-israels-month-long-campaign.

Oxfam. “Daily Death Rate in Gaza Higher than Any Other Major 21st Century Conflict.” Oxfam, February 20, 2024. https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/daily-death-rate-gaza-higher-any-other-major-21st-century-conflict-oxfam.

Honderich, Holly. “Iran Protesters Divided over Trump’s Promise that ‘Help Is on the Way’.” Time, January 18, 2026. https://time.com/7347090/iran-protesters-trump-help/.

“Ukraine and the War with Russia: Timeline and Civilian Toll.” BBC News, updated 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news.

“The Sharp Contrast: How Israeli and Western Media Cover the War on Gaza.” Al Jazeera Media Institute, March 4, 2025. https://institute.aljazeera.net/en/ajr/article/3081.

“The West’s Selective Empathy.” Al-Ahram Weekly, July 14, 2025. https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/50/548563/AlAhram-Weekly/The-West%E2%80%99s-selective-empathy.aspx.

Anzalone, Christopher. “Window of Opportunity on the Iran Nuclear File.” Royal United Services Institute, June 20, 2025. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/window-opportunity-iran-nuclear-file.

“Iranians Feel Trapped by War and Regime.” CBC News, March 5, 2026. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/iranians-feel-trapped-by-war-and-regime-9.7143682.

“Western Media Coverage of Ukraine vs Gaza Wars: Bias or Professionalism?” University of El Oued, August 2, 2025. (Research archive).

“Immediate Ceasefire Needed as Attacks on Civilians Intensify.” Center for Human Rights in Iran, June 2025. https://iranhumanrights.org/2025/06/immediate-ceasefire-needed-as-attacks-on-civilians-intensify/.

“Activists Say at Least 6,126 People Killed in Iran’s Crackdown on Protests.” Politico, January 26, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/26/iranian-deaths-protests-00748753.

“War in the Middle East: What Implications for the EU and the World?” EU Institute for Security Studies, March 1, 2026. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/war-middle-east-what-implications-eu-and-world.

“National Gas Price Average Jumps One Dollar in One Month.” AAA, March 2022. https://gasprices.aaa.com/national-gas-average-jumps-one-dollar-in-one-month/.

Reporters Without Borders. “United States.” RSF World Press Freedom Index, 2025 edition. https://rsf.org/en/country/united-states.

Hansaj, Ekalavya. “The State of Press Freedom in 2025 and 2026.” Ekalavya Hansaj, February 18, 2026. https://hansajekalavya.com/state-of-press-freedom/.

Freedom of the Press Foundation. “Journalist Arrests Spike in 2024.” Freedom of the Press Foundation, December 12, 2024. https://freedom.press/issues/journalist-arrests-spike-in-2024/.

“Iran’s Information Warfare During the December 2025–January 2026 Protests.” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, February 3, 2026. https://ict.org.il/irans-information-warfare-during-the-december-2025-january-2026-protests/.

Over a year before the 21 March 2026 Budapest CPAC meeting, Trump’s Vice President, JD Vance, delivered a speech, in person, at another large event, the 2025 Munich Security Conference. Vance’s speech is now often cited as the symbolic rupture or turning point in the post-war U.S.–Europe relationship. In it, he argued that the biggest danger Europe faced did not come from Russia or China, but from the erosion of democratic norms — specifically censorship, suppression of dissent, and the exclusion of populist voices. Vance specifically defended Romania’s right to hold its late-2024 annulled election, saying: “If your democracy can be destroyed with a few hundred thousand dollars of digital advertising from a foreign country, then it wasn’t very strong to begin with.”

Most conference attendees sat speechless. The ideas presented by Vance signalled that Washington’s problem with Europe was not the familiar burden-sharing issue around defence spending, but that part of the Trump camp saw Europe not just as a difficult ally, but as an ideological opponent — especially on democracy, speech regulation, migration, and the far right.

Bucharest to Budapest

In 2024, Călin Georgescu, considered a Romanian political outsider, surged from roughly 3 to 5 per cent in the polls to about 23 per cent in the first round after becoming a TikTok sensation, stunning the political establishment and helping fuel the case for the eventual annulment of the election. Georgescu, one of Vance’s key examples in Munich, along with the exclusion of the German far-right AfD from the conference that year, was presented as the victim of European elites using the language of democratic defence to override an unwanted result.

In Europe, many saw Romania’s 2024 first-round presidential election as a warning about election interference. Observers saw, in real time, how an algorithm driven platform could shape a European election if social media companies did not face meaningful transparency obligations. Declassified Romanian intelligence later suggested that parts of the network pushing Georgescu, and in turn activating the TikTok algorithm, relied on accounts created years earlier, some as far back as 2016, left dormant until they were activated in the weeks before the Romanian vote.

Romania showed that online manipulation does not have to begin during a campaign. It can be prepared years in advance, with sleeper networks built quietly and activated at the most politically useful moment, suggesting a level of foresight, coordination, and likely awareness by more actors than those ultimately exposed.

From that angle, Vance’s accusations about Europe trying to control free speech and shape political outcomes look less like a failure to understand the danger of algorithm-driven influence, and more like frustration not only about a self-proclaimed pro-Trump candidate being barred from an election, but about Europe taking away a political tool the right had learned to use to its advantage.

Why the Feed Favours the Far Right

Parts of the American right had already shown, years earlier, that they understood the electoral value of digital influence. The Cambridge Analytica case, also in 2016, revealed how Republican-linked actors used behavioural data, profiling, and targeted messaging in an effort to shape voter behaviour at scale. Steve Bannon’s association with Cambridge Analytica linked this approach not just to campaign technique, but to a wider political project that treated social media as a battleground for narrative control. By the time Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, the optics made that evolution even clearer: at his inauguration, major tech billionaires including Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, and Sundar Pichai were given front-row seats, turning the ceremony into a visual statement about the proximity between political power, platform power, and the infrastructure that shapes what people see.

What Cambridge Analytica foreshadowed, and the inauguration optics later made visible, was a convergence between right-wing politics and the attention economy.

The right and far-right often perform better on social media because platform systems reward the very things they are especially good at producing: conflict, clarity, repetition, identity, and emotional intensity. A growing body of research supports what reporting and simple observation have already suggested: these are not isolated advantages, but recurring structural ones.

6 Reasons the Right Was Ready for the Algorithm

Platforms reward emotion, conflict, outrage, and identity-based content. Recommendation systems are built to maximise attention and engagement, and content that triggers anger, fear, moral certainty, or in-group versus out-group reactions tends to travel well. Brookings notes that negativity and moral outrage foster virality, while engagement-based ranking can amplify hostile out-group content.

Some platforms and feeds have shown a measurable rightward tilt in outcomes, even without users consciously seeking it out. A 2026 Nature study found that switching from a chronological feed to X’s algorithmic feed increased engagement and shifted political opinions in a more conservative direction on several issues. Reuters Institute’s 2025 Digital News Report also highlighted evidence that X’s influential algorithm was pushing more right-leaning perspectives.

The right and far right often communicate in simpler, more repeatable formats. They tend to use sharp hooks, strong villains, clear emotional cues, and short moral narratives that are easy to clip, remix, and repeat. That does not mean the left or centre cannot do this, but far-right actors are often more disciplined about message repetition and visual identity online. Oxford Internet Institute commentary on the 2024 European elections explicitly linked radical-right online success to digital politics and to the wider normalisation of far-right forces in the platform environment.

They invested early in alternative media ecosystems and influencer-style politics. Pew found that large numbers of Americans, especially younger adults, now get news from social media news influencers, creating an environment where personality-led political communication can outperform slower institutional messaging. That kind of ecosystem tends to favour actors who are provocative, highly online, and less constrained by traditional editorial norms.

The far right is often less institutionally restrained. Mainstream parties usually have more internal checks, legal caution, coalition sensitivities, and reputational risks. More extreme actors can be faster, more transgressive, and more willing to test platform boundaries. Research from Oxford on “computational propaganda” has for years documented organised social media manipulation, including coordinated networks and political opinion shaping across countries.

And finally, pseudo-media formats help them blur politics, entertainment, grievance, and identity. Recent academic work described far-right pseudo-media as effective partly because it fuses journalism, populism, and disinformation in ways that fit platform logic. That makes the content feel more intimate, authentic, and emotionally satisfying than formal party communication.

These dynamics are not limited to the United States. Recent examples from Europe show how far-right actors have often been particularly effective at adapting their politics to the incentives of platformed communication.

Three more recent examples from Europe support this broader pattern:

Germany: In Germany, the AfD’s digital strength did not only come from official party accounts. Reporting and research pointed to a wider online ecosystem in which AfD-linked and sympathetic networks used Telegram, alternative media, meme culture, and influencer-style communication to expand reach beyond traditional party structures. Reuters also reported Russian-linked disinformation efforts targeting the 2025 German election, underscoring how easily platform systems can be used to reinforce far-right narratives in Germany’s information space.

Italy: In Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s online style is often cited as a model for how the radical right can adapt to platform culture. Analyses of her TikTok presence describe a mix of humour, direct address, informality, and personal branding that helped soften ideology, widen appeal, and make hard-line politics feel more intimate and accessible.

France: In France, recent analysis around the 2026 municipal elections found that X and TikTok were amplifying far-right content more strongly than more moderate political material, reinforcing the argument that platform design itself can advantage extremist actors. Separate French investigations into X have also focused on concerns about algorithmic bias, reduced diversity of voices, and possible foreign interference in French politics.

US Freedom of Speech vs
EU Freedom to Reach

Vance’s Munich speech, together with the U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s 2026 report The Foreign Censorship Threat, Part II: Europe’s Decade-Long Campaign to Control Online Speech, showed how differently parts of the American right and European policymakers understand platform regulation. But the core disagreement is less about abstract free speech than about transparency, accountability, and who gets to shape the conditions under which political speech is amplified.

The central democratic concern is not that platforms should be regulated because the far right performs well on them. It is that opaque recommender systems, manipulation, and engagement-driven incentives can distort public debate regardless of who benefits at any given time. This is dangerous because platforms do not merely reflect public debate; they actively reshape it, rewarding the most inflammatory and manipulable content, manufacturing false momentum, and undermining the conditions citizens need to make informed democratic choices.

Once the problem is understood as structural distortion rather than partisan advantage, attention shifts from ideology to incentives. That difference also reveals where real power often lies.

The Digital Services Act (DSA), the European Union’s main law for regulating digital platforms, especially very large online platforms and search engines, with fines of up to 6 per cent of global annual turnover and the ability to impose corrective measures, has shown that platforms can act when the cost of inaction becomes high enough. This suggests that the problem has not always been a lack of computational capacity or technical expertise, but a willingness to tolerate risk, manipulation, and unsafe design where those features remained profitable.

That argument is reinforced by two further points:

• Internal Meta material and later reporting have shown how commercially valuable younger users were treated within platform strategy, underscoring that child safety and business incentives were often in tension.

• UK regulators have made clear that platforms already use, or can use, profiling to infer users’ ages and to distinguish between adults and children online. In other words, the technical capacity to identify underage users and create safer, age-appropriate environments is not wholly absent.

In the United States, broad legal protection under Section 230 has long shielded platforms while leaving more room for engagement-driven business models to dominate — the same models on which far-right messaging has often proved especially effective. To be clear, no major platform, as far as public evidence shows, is formally designed to favour one ideology. Yet systems built to maximise attention can still systematically reward the styles of communication that the far right often uses especially well. Seen from that perspective, conservative defences of Section 230 can look less like a neutral defence of free expression in the abstract and more like a defence of the platform conditions under which right-wing and far-right content has often travelled especially well. Section 230 gives platforms broad protection from liability for third-party content and for some moderation decisions, which has helped sustain the large-scale engagement systems on which those dynamics operate.

While the United States continues to rely heavily on Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act, the European Union has approached platform regulation through a combination of transparency duties, systemic-risk obligations, and credible financial penalties, creating stronger incentives for platforms to change their behaviour. Section 230 broadly shields online services from being treated as the publisher of most user-generated content and also protects many good-faith moderation decisions, helping platforms scale with relatively limited liability for what users post. This approach began to diverge more clearly with the adoption of the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2022.

Leading up to the DSA’s drafting, the broader EU policy environment was already shaped by growing concerns about disinformation, foreign interference, and the democratic risks posed by large platforms. The Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal was an important part of that shift, prompting direct calls in the European Parliament for stronger safeguards against data misuse and election meddling.

Brexit, while not a single direct cause of the DSA, formed part of the wider post-2016 political context in which hard-to-scrutinise digital campaigning and targeted influence operations came to be seen as democratic vulnerabilities requiring stronger regulation. Brexit illustrated that digitally mediated political disruption was not only a national problem: it could also weaken the EU strategically by fracturing membership, reducing unity, and exposing the bloc to internal political shocks.

That concern was not limited to legislation. In February 2023, EU institutions had already begun banning TikTok from official devices, reflecting wider security and data-governance fears around major platforms. Against that backdrop, the DSA became fully applicable in February 2024 and showed its enforcement power in December 2025, when Elon Musk’s X became the first platform fined under the law, receiving a €120 million penalty after an EU investigation found breaches of its transparency and content-governance obligations.

A further layer followed with the EU’s political advertising rules, which began applying to platforms on 10 October 2025, while some cross-border provisions had already been brought into force for the 2024 European Parliament elections. These rules require political advertisements to be clearly labelled, identify who paid for them, and disclose targeting information. The aim is not to prohibit persuasion, but to make it visible, a major shift in a political environment where influence often hides in content that appears organic, local, or part of ordinary community discussion.

That leaves a significant gap. While the EU moved towards making digital influence more visible, the United States still lacks a comprehensive federal transparency framework for online political advertising. Advocacy groups continue to argue that key loopholes remain, including the no law requiring platforms to publish full information about online political ad spending, and the Honest Ads Act has still not become law.

In the United States political influence can be woven into meme culture, creator content, and influencer-style commentary in ways that appear organic even to platform savvy audiences. Under the EU’s newer political advertising rules, paid political persuasion of this kind would face much stricter requirements for labelling, sponsor disclosure, and transparency around targeting.

1. Bloomberg’s paid meme campaign in 2020
   Michael Bloomberg’s presidential campaign paid popular Instagram meme accounts to post campaign messages in the style of ordinary jokes and creator content. That was precisely the point: the material looked native to the platform rather than like a traditional political advert. Facebook responded by adding sponsored-content tracking for this kind of political material. In the EU’s newer framework, content of that kind aimed at influencing voters would need much clearer labelling, sponsor identification, and transparency around payment.

2. The 2024 Tenet Media / RT case
   The U.S. Justice Department alleged that RT employees covertly funnelled about $10 million to a Tennessee-based media company to distribute politically divisive content through American online personalities, while hiding the Russian state role behind shell structures and false identities. Reuters reported that much of this content remained online and unlabeled even after the case became public. This is exactly the type of covert political influence operation the EU’s transparency logic is trying to make harder: persuasive political content masquerading as ordinary commentary rather than clearly disclosed political communication.

3. Paid creator-style campaign activity that looks “organic”
   In the U.S., campaigns increasingly work through creators and influencer ecosystems in ways that blur the line between campaign communication, fandom, commentary, and advertising. Reuters’ 2024 reporting on the Harris–Trump debate described how campaigns and aligned social-media actors fought a parallel battle through short-form platform content rather than only through classic paid ads. Not every post like this is unlawful or undisclosed, but the wider U.S. environment is more permissive of political persuasion appearing in creator-native formats that do not look like conventional advertising. The EU model is stricter precisely because it tries to make that persuasion visible when money, sponsorship, or targeting are involved.

The Far Right’s Next Playbook

If the EU’s newer platform and political advertising rules have made parts of the far-right digital playbook harder to use, CPAC Hungary shows how quickly the right adapts by turning politics itself into shareable content: spectacle, endorsement, imagery, and transnational validation. In Hungary, Orbán’s party, Fidesz, had long benefited from paid posters and political advertising online disguised as other kinds of content. With some of those tools becoming harder to use in the same way, Orbán, in power since 2010 and widely seen as an important Trump ally in Europe, needed a domestic political boost.

Although CPAC is an American political product, the effort to position Orbán at its centre suggests that the far right is willing to work across borders with notable discipline, perhaps already recognising the new legal environment and the growing political value of imagery, symbolism, and tightly managed media moments. The event was not designed only for the people in the room. It was built for recirculation: speeches, endorsements, clips, and symbolic images could travel internationally through aligned media and social platforms, then loop back into Hungary as apparent proof of Orbán’s international stature, ideological centrality, and political momentum. That makes CPAC Hungary less a conference than a mechanism for feeding international attention back into domestic politics — and perhaps a new case study in how the far right keeps winning, this time by turning media systems themselves into tools of political leverage.

Looking back at Vance’s 2025 criticism of European democracy and the supposed damage done to free expression, one distinction matters: freedom of expression is not the same as freedom to manipulate. A recorded presidential endorsement played on a jumbotron at a partisan event, weeks before an election, is not the same thing as an abstract expression of opinion. At CPAC Hungary 2026, Orbán was not simply hosting a meeting of like-minded conservatives. He appeared on a tightly controlled stage alongside, or with the explicit backing of, other international far-right and nationalist allies presented as part of a broader patriotic front.

Election integrity is no longer just about cash, ballot access, or campaign finance law. It is also about platform architecture, algorithmic amplification, and the ability to shape political reality before voters ever reach the polling booth. Nor is a political ecosystem neutral when one side benefits from platform design while denouncing efforts to make those same systems more transparent.

About the Author

Dr. Kari Odermann is a political analyst, communication specialist, and adviser on risk-aware communication in sensitive political environments. She works with governments, international organisations, and other actors to design communication that protects legitimacy, preserves operational space, and makes complex work understandable to the public. She is a Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and serves on the International Advisory Board of the Alliance for Global Security. Alongside this work, she brings practical platform expertise as a digital creator whose analysis reaches millions of viewers.

Glossary

Platform algorithm – The system a social media company uses to decide which posts appear to users first.

Political ad – Paid content meant to influence votes, public opinion, or attitudes toward a political issue or figure.

Prime minister – The head of government in many parliamentary systems.

Section 230 – A U.S. law that broadly protects online platforms from being treated as the publisher of most user content.

Social media targeting – The practice of showing political messages to specific groups based on data such as age, interests, or location.

Transparency notice – A disclosure that explains who paid for a political ad, how much was spent, and what it concerns.

Sources and further reading

1. Reuters. “Trump endorses Hungary’s Orban for re-election ahead of April poll.” Reuters, February 5, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-endorses-hungarys-orban-re-election-ahead-april-poll-2026-02-05/

2. European Commission. “Transparency and targeting of political advertising.” European Commission, 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eu-citizenship-anti-corruptio/transparency-and-targeting-political-advertising_en

3. Reuters. “Orban tells CPAC conservatives in Europe, U.S. must align troops.” Reuters, May 19, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/orban-tells-cpac-conservatives-europe-u-s-must-align-troops-2022-05-19/

4. Hungarian Conservative. “PM Orbán at CPAC Hungary: ‘We are fighting for the soul of…’” Hungarian Conservative, March 20, 2026. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/culture_society/cpac-hungary-2026-orban/

5. Euronews. “Romanian authorities ask EU Commission to investigate TikTok role in election.” Euronews, November 27, 2024. https://www.euronews.com/2024/11/27/romanian-authorities-ask-eu-commission-to-investigate-tiktok-role-in-election

6. CNN. “Europe opens probe into TikTok over election interference following Romanian election.” CNN, December 17, 2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/17/tech/eu-tiktok-investigation-romanian-election-intl

7. Matheson. “Transparency of Political Advertising Rules Now in Force.” Matheson, November 12, 2025. https://www.matheson.com/insights/transparency-of-political-advertising-rules-now-in-force/

8. Adform. “Political Ads in the EU - Company Update - September 2025.” Adform, September 29, 2025. https://site.adform.com/resources/newsroom/political-ads-in-the-eu-company-update-september-2025/

9. Associated Press. “Conference of U.S. conservatives opens in Orban’s Hungary.” AP News, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/politics-united-states-hungary-migration-budapest-956d0b3c89dda8b09a8d813042807cbe

10. Reuters. “In Munich, Vance accuses European politicians of censoring free speech.” Reuters, February 14, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/vance-uses-munich-speech-criticize-europe-censoring-free-speech-2025-02-14/

There is more than one conflict happening right now. The war involving Iran, the United States, Israel, and regional actors is not only being fought with missiles and drones. It is also being fought through news coverage, viral videos, and political messaging.

In the United States, two sharply different storylines are already forming around the Iran war. In one version, Donald Trump, the current president of the United States, is a decisive commander-in-chief who is stopping Iran, securing energy chokepoints, protecting Israel, and restoring American strength. In the other, he is the author of another costly, open-ended Middle East war that pushes up fuel prices, worries allies in Europe and the region, and risks spiralling beyond anyone’s control.

These are not just different opinions about the same facts. They are different frames. Framing means choosing which parts of reality to highlight and which to ignore, in order to tell a particular kind of story. When audiences are offered strong, simple frames before reliable facts are fully known, they are pushed to choose between storylines instead of being guided by evidence.

This matters far beyond the United States. Because U.S. news outlets and U.S.-based social media platforms still play a dominant role in global information flows, American political narratives about the Iran war travel into feeds and timelines around the world. That makes the way this war is reported—and the way it is framed—a global issue, not just a domestic debate.

How U.S. politics divides the Iran war story

Inside the United States, understanding of the Iran war is already split along party lines. Research on U.S. news consumption has long shown that Republicans and Democrats often rely on different media ecosystems, including different television channels and online sources. Conservative audiences tend to watch outlets such as Fox News and Newsmax, while liberal and centrist audiences more often turn to CNN, MSNBC, NPR, or public media.

This division is not limited to television. It is layered on top of a broader shift in how Americans get their news. A recent fact sheet from the Pew Research Center found that about half of U.S. adults say they at least sometimes get news from social media platforms. Another Pew study found that around one in five U.S. adults regularly get news from social media “influencers” rather than from traditional news organizations.

These trends create a powerful mix:

- Highly polarized television and talk radio content.

- Algorithm-driven feeds that amplify emotional and partisan material.

- Influencers with large audiences who are not bound by traditional newsroom norms.

Analysts argue that this environment makes it easier for political actors to push ready-made storylines, such as “strong leader in a dangerous world” versus “reckless president risking American lives and wallets,” long before the full facts of the conflict are known.

At the same time, the war itself is politically sensitive. Trump campaigned on ending “forever wars,” yet now oversees a major conflict involving Iran, a regional power with significant asymmetric capabilities.This tension increases pressure on the White House and on media coverage. U.S. officials have publicly criticised journalists and broadcasters they view as too negative about the war, and media regulators have hinted at possible license pressures, raising concerns about political interference in coverage. Those developments are still unfolding and highly contested.

Why U.S. narratives dominate global feeds

The way this conflict is seen outside the U.S. is also shaped by technology. Social media and video platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, and X (formerly Twitter) use algorithmic recommendation systems—software that decides which posts to show to which users based on past behaviour, language, and engagement.

Several structural factors make U.S. narratives highly visible in these systems:

- English is the dominant language of many platforms, especially for news and political content.

- The United States is often the single largest national user base on these platforms, even when Americans are a minority of total global users.

- Advertising markets in the U.S. and other wealthy English-speaking countries are especially profitable, so platforms have strong incentives to optimize for these audiences.

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Platforms did not necessarily set out to privilege U.S. content on purpose. But they trained their machine-learning systems where the data and money were thickest—heavily in English and heavily on U.S. news, culture, and user behaviour. In practice, this creates what some scholars describe as a “default setting” where U.S. politics and culture are more likely to appear in global feeds, even for users in other regions.

That means that when American media and influencers frame the Iran war primarily as a U.S. domestic political issue—focusing on Trump’s leadership, election implications, and partisan conflict—those frames are exported globally along with the news itself. For audiences in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the result is a stream of Iran war coverage that often centres U.S. interests, U.S. fears, and U.S. political divisions, sometimes at the expense of local perspectives.

Evidence in Ukraine vs. speculation around Iran

One key difference between coverage of the Ukraine war and coverage of the Iran war is the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT). OSINT refers to information gathered from publicly available sources—such as satellite images, social media posts, commercial flight data, or public government releases—that can be analysed to verify events and locations.

From the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, OSINT communities helped journalists map troop movements, confirm strikes, and challenge false claims by governments. Researchers found that open-source information often gave more precise and reliable answers about battlefield damage and military positions than official statements. This pushed many newsrooms towards a more evidence-based norm:

- Maps showing the front lines based on geolocated footage.

- Charts estimating equipment losses with clear sourcing.

- Visual verification of videos using satellite imagery and landmark analysis.

Although OSINT also introduced new risks—such as misinterpretation or deceptive “fake OSINT” content—research suggests that, overall, it improved the ability of journalists and audiences to check claims in near real time. Audiences became used to seeing numbers and assessments that could be traced back to visible evidence, not just anonymous officials or government briefings.

The information environment around Iran is different. Iran’s government maintains tight control over domestic media and restricts access for foreign journalists. There are fewer independent OSINT projects focused on the country, in part because of the difficulty and risks of gathering public data there. At the same time, operational secrecy from both U.S. and Israeli forces is high, given the sensitivity of intelligence sources and regional alliances.

When there is less verifiable data, media coverage often falls back on something else: projections and scenario-building. Analysts and commentators talk about how high oil prices could go, how many people might be displaced if certain cities are hit, or how long fighting might last under different conditions. These questions are important. Energy markets, displacement, and escalation risks all matter.

But when speculative questions dominate reporting, audiences are no longer being grounded primarily in what is known. They are being pulled into what might happen. Analysts argue that, compared with Ukraine, the Iran war is more vulnerable to “projection-heavy” narratives—neat stories about worst-case scenarios that spread quickly, even when the underlying facts are still uncertain.

Fear, virality, and the business of war coverage

War coverage has always contained fear and drama. However, the modern social media ecosystem rewards content that triggers strong emotions such as anger, fear, or excitement. Recommendation algorithms often boost posts that generate high engagement, including shares, comments, and watch time, regardless of whether the content is careful or accurate.

Fact-checkers and researchers examining the Iran war have already documented AI-generated videos, recycled footage from earlier conflicts, video-game clips, and mislabelled images being presented as real-time war scenes. Some of this material appears to come from state-linked accounts or organized campaigns, but much of it spreads because it is visually striking and easy to share.

The most viral content is often not coherent political messaging. It is spectacle: dramatic strike clips, “insane footage,” and impressive explosions that convey a sense of power and urgency. Even when these videos are not designed to support a particular government or leader, they still shape how people feel about the war. They can create an impression of constant escalation, overwhelming threat, or unstoppable military strength.

This environment can blur lines between information and entertainment. Analysts warn that when audiences mainly see dramatic visuals without context—who launched the strike, what was hit, what the legal or humanitarian consequences are—they are more likely to respond with anxiety than with informed understanding. Fear still sells, and war footage is easy to clip and repackage for clicks and views.

The missing piece: basic facts from the region

Another problem in Iran war coverage is the frequent lack of basic geographic and political understanding of the wider region, especially the Gulf states. The Gulf states generally refers to countries along the Arabian Gulf, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman.

During recent Iranian strikes and U.S.-Israeli responses, some Western reports have suggested that Gulf states were close to running out of missile-defense capacity or were unable to sustain their air-defense operations. These claims were sometimes presented without basic questions being asked: What is Iran’s actual capacity to maintain high-intensity salvos over time? How are Gulf defense systems supplied and resupplied? What do official sources in those countries report?

In some cases, official data has been available but underused. For example, on March 14, the UAE Ministry of Defence reported intercepting 9 ballistic missiles and 33 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from Iran, compared with more than 300 missiles and 300 drones reported in attacks on March 1. The UAE published these figures in public updates, including on social media platforms such as Instagram.

This kind of data does not automatically answer every question. It does not explain classified defense capabilities or the long-term sustainability of operations. But it shows that, as in Ukraine, better information sometimes exists than the loudest narratives suggest. Journalists and audiences need both the habit and the skills to look for direct, verifiable sources, including from regional governments, local media, and independent analysts.

Lessons from Ukraine—and their limits

The Ukraine war is often described as one of the first large-scale conflicts where digital platforms and OSINT played a central role in public understanding. There are important similarities and differences with the Iran war.

Similarities include:

- Heavy use of social media to share battlefield footage and personal experiences.

- Attempts by state and non-state actors to flood the information space with propaganda.

- The rise of independent analysts and “amateur” investigators who track events in real time.

Differences include:

- Geography and access: Ukraine allowed a relatively high number of foreign journalists and observers, especially in the early months, and had strong local media traditions. Iran has tighter access controls and more restrictions on independent reporting.

- Media strategy: Ukraine’s government coordinated national television programming in the form of a joint “Telemarathon,” while also using Russian-language channels to reach audiences inside Russia and occupied territories. Iran’s media landscape remains more centralized and less open to outside collaboration.

- OSINT ecosystems: Ukraine became a focus for global OSINT communities, think tanks, and academic researchers, building new verification tools and methods. Iran has not attracted the same scale of independent verification infrastructure, partly because of legal and security risks.

These differences matter. They help explain why evidence-based coverage has been more common in the Ukraine context and why speculation and scenario-building are more visible in much of the Iran war coverage. However, analysts caution against assuming that Ukraine is a perfect model. OSINT also created new vulnerabilities there, including the spread of misleading “BULLSHINT”—material that looks like open-source analysis but is deliberately deceptive.

The key lesson is not that one war is “transparent” and another is “opaque,” but that the information tools available—and the incentives facing media, governments, and platforms—strongly shape what kind of coverage becomes dominant.

Contested issues: control, bias, and responsibility

Debates about the Iran war information environment raise several contested questions.

One debate concerns how much control the U.S. government still has over global information systems. Critics argue that U.S. power remains central because many of the largest technology firms, advertising networks, and media brands are based in the United States and operate under U.S. law.[Pew Research Center, 2025][Atlantic Council, 2026] They point to the global spread of U.S.-centric narratives, the dominance of English content, and the use of U.S. financial and regulatory tools against foreign media outlets.

Others push back, noting that platforms face strong commercial incentives and political pressures from many governments, not only Washington. They argue that while U.S. actors remain influential, the information space is increasingly multipolar, with significant roles for European regulators, Chinese platforms, Gulf-based media, and transnational influencers. From this perspective, bias in Iran war coverage is not simply the result of U.S. “control” but also a product of fragmented regulation and competing narratives.

A second debate focuses on the responsibility of platforms and newsrooms. Some analysts argue that recommendation algorithms should be redesigned to reward verified, contextual reporting and downgrade unverified war footage and sensational claims. Others worry that stronger platform interventions could unintentionally suppress documentation of human rights abuses or give governments more tools to hide misconduct.

These disagreements are not yet settled. What is widely accepted, however, is that audiences now operate in an information environment where:

- U.S. political narratives travel globally through platform design.

- Evidence and speculation are often mixed together in war coverage.

- Viral, low-verification content can shape perceptions more quickly than careful reporting.

Why framing matters now

The Iran war shows that how conflicts are packaged and circulated is almost as important as what happens on the ground. The combination of duelling U.S. political narratives, global dominance of U.S.-centred content, algorithm-driven feeds, and a flood of low-verification videos makes it harder for people in any country to know what to trust.

This is not only a technical problem. It is also political. When voters—and broader global audiences—are mainly exposed to simplified storylines about strong leaders or reckless presidents, they may make decisions based more on identity and emotion than on updated facts about the conflict. The danger is that citizens end up choosing between narratives rather than evaluating information.

At the same time, the Ukraine experience shows that better information is sometimes available than dominant narratives suggest. Public ministry reports from Gulf states, satellite imagery, local journalism, and credible OSINT work can all help ground coverage in verifiable data. But people need the habit—and the time—to look beyond the first viral clip or the loudest commentator.

For global audiences trying to follow the Iran war, one practical implication is to treat frames as starting points, not endpoints. The stories that appear in feeds and broadcasts are shaped by political competition, commercial incentives, and algorithm design. Understanding that does not solve the access problem or remove bias. It does, however, make it easier to see why the same war can look so different, depending on where—and through whom—you watch it.

Glossary

Algorithmic recommendation system – Software that automatically selects and orders content for users based on their past behavior, language, and other signals, rather than showing all content in simple time order.

Asymmetric capabilities – Military tools or tactics that allow a weaker actor to challenge a stronger one in unexpected ways, such as using drones, cyberattacks, or proxy groups instead of direct conventional battles.

Evidence-based norm – A shared expectation in journalism or analysis that claims should be backed by verifiable data, such as documents, images, or confirmed eyewitness accounts.

Framing – The process of highlighting certain aspects of an issue while downplaying others in order to create a particular story or interpretation of events.

Gulf states – Countries along the Arabian Gulf, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, which share economic and security interests but have distinct political systems.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) – Information about events, people, or places that is collected from publicly available sources, such as satellite images, social media posts, and official statements, and then analyzed to draw conclusions.

Projection-heavy narrative – A storyline that focuses more on what might happen in the future, using scenarios and forecasts, than on what has been firmly established by current evidence.

Scenario-building – The practice of outlining different possible futures based on certain assumptions, often used by analysts and journalists to explore how a conflict or crisis could evolve.

Spectacle – Visually striking or emotionally intense content that is designed to grab attention, often emphasizing drama and excitement more than context or explanation.

Sources and further reading

1. PressWatchers. “The US News Media Is Failing the Public in Its Coverage of a Possible War Against Iran.” PressWatchers.org, February 18, 2026. https://presswatchers.org/2026/02/the-news-media-is-failing-the-public-in-its-coverage-of-a-possible-war-against-iran/

2. Associated Press. “Live Updates: Top Iranian Security Official Ali Larijani Killed.” AP News, March 17, 2026. https://apnews.com/live/iran-war-israel-trump-03-17-2026

3. Egypt Independent. “Trump and His Officials Pressure the News Media in Unison as Iran War Scrutiny Intensifies.” Egypt Independent, March 15, 2026. https://www.egyptindependent.com/trump-and-his-officials-pressure-the-news-media-in-unison-as-iran-war-scrutiny-intensifies/

4. Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). “Open-Source Intelligence and the War in Ukraine.” INSS Insight No. 1678, January 4, 2023. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/No.-1678.pdf

5. Pew Research Center. “Social Media and News Fact Sheet.” Pew Research Center, December 8, 2025. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/

6. Pew Research Center. “About 20% of Americans Get Their News from Social Media Influencers, Report Finds.” Pew Research Center, November 18, 2024. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/about-20-of-americans-get-their-news-from-social-media-influencers-report-finds

7. NBC News. “1 in 5 U.S. Adults Get Their News from Social Media Influencers, Pew Report Finds.” NBC News, November 18, 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/news-influencers-social-media-pew-report-rcna179786

8. Democracy Now!. “Headlines for March 16, 2026.” Democracy Now!, March 16, 2026. https://www.democracynow.org/2026/3/16/headlines

9. Peisakhin, Leonid, et al. “OSINT – or BULLSHINT? Exploring Open-Source Intelligence and Deceptive Misinformation in the Russo-Ukrainian War.” arXiv, January 29, 2025. https://arxiv.org/html/2508.03599v1

10. Atlantic Council. “Experts React: How the World Is Responding to the US-Israeli War with Iran.” Atlantic Council, March 3, 2026. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/experts-react-how-the-world-is-responding-to-the-us-israeli-war-with-iran/

11. Kulyk, Volodymyr, et al. “Digital and Mass Media Coverage of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” International Communication Gazette, July 14, 2025. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/17480485251357866

12. Swedish Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS). “Between Freedom and Censorship: Ukraine’s Mass Media in Times of Full-Scale War.” SCEEUS Report, June 18, 2025. https://sceeus.se/publikationer/between-freedom-and-censorship-ukraines-mass-media-in-times-of-full-scale-war/

Let’s take a look at what this means for the UK, what international law actually says about the war in Iran, and why the real long-term risk for Washington may lie not on the battlefield, but in the quieter world of finance, trade, and technology.

A war that tests the rules

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes against targets inside Iran, including missile sites, command facilities, and parts of its nuclear and air-defence infrastructure. The operation, branded “Operation Epic Fury” in Washington, marked a clear shift from years of covert action and proxy clashes into open, interstate war.

Under the United Nations Charter, states are not allowed to use force against another state except in two narrow cases: when the UN Security Council authorises it, or when a state acts in self-defence after an armed attack. Many international-law experts argue that the 2026 strikes do not clearly fit either exception, and instead look like the start of a preventive or pre-emptive war against Iran.

The United States helped design this legal order after 1945 and has often presented itself as its main defender. Today, it is at the centre of accusations that it has committed a “manifest violation” of the ban on aggression, the core rule that is supposed to prevent states from starting wars of choice (sources below).

This is not only a legal debate. It is also about power. When powerful states weaken international law, they do not create a free space. They create a world in which pressure and coercion move into other systems that they may not fully control.

What international law actually says

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter sets out a broad rule: states must not threaten or use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Any cross‑border military strike is, on its face, a breach of that rule, unless it falls under a recognised exception.

There are two main exceptions. The first is explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, usually after a finding that there is a threat to international peace and security. The second is the right of self‑defence after an “armed attack,” as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter and interpreted over time by international courts.

In the 2026 US–Iran war, there was no Security Council resolution authorising the initial strikes against Iran. The legal debate therefore turns on self‑defence. The US government argues that Iran’s missile and drone activities in the region, including attacks on US forces and partners, amount to armed attacks that justify a defensive response. Critics respond that the February strikes were neither limited nor clearly tied to stopping an immediate attack, and thus look more like an offensive effort to destroy Iran’s wider military capacity and pressure its government.

These are not abstract disagreements. The classification of an operation as self‑defence or aggression has direct implications for whether political leaders can be accused of committing the “crime of aggression” under international law, and for how future conflicts will be judged.

The UK, Starmer, and the “defensive” label

The United Kingdom has been pulled into this conflict not by sending combat troops, but by opening its territory to US forces. After the war began, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom (in office since 2024) approved American use of key British bases, including RAF Fairford on UK soil and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, for what London describes as “defensive” operations aimed at Iranian missile capabilities.

This decision came under intense time pressure. Reports suggest that even the US Congress was not briefed in detail before President Donald Trump of the United States (in office 2017–2021 and again since January 2025) ordered the strikes, leaving allies with limited time to seek full legal advice or political cover. Within 48 hours of the initial attacks, Starmer had moved from caution to cooperation, at a moment when Iran was signalling that it could target multiple Gulf states where hundreds of thousands of British citizens live and work.

Former and current US partners have not all followed this path. Spain, for example, reportedly refused US use of certain jointly operated bases, and politicians in Germany have raised open doubts about the legality and wisdom of the campaign. That pattern underscores that this is not a simple case of all allies lining up behind Washington. Instead, there is a growing divide over how far to stretch international law to accommodate US and Israeli strategy.

The United Kingdom’s legal justification relies on the idea that strikes launched from its territory are part of collective self‑defence against Iranian attacks on regional states and Western-linked targets. However, many legal scholars note that the wider campaign—especially if it moves beyond missile defence and into efforts to weaken the Iranian state—blurs the line between defence and a broader, possibly regime‑change‑oriented war.

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When helping an ally becomes complicity

International law does not only look at the state dropping the bombs. It also asks whether other states are facilitating unlawful uses of force. Allowing one’s territory to be used by another state to carry out acts of aggression can itself be treated as a form of wrongful assistance.

That principle has been widely discussed in relation to Russia’s use of Belarusian territory for its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, where Belarus was often described as an enabler of aggression even though Russian forces did most of the fighting. A similar question now arises for the UK. If the broader US–Israeli campaign is eventually judged unlawful, Britain’s role in providing base access may be seen as a form of complicity, even if the UK frames its contribution as strictly defensive.[4]

This is not only a legal question but also one of sovereignty. A state is sovereign when it has real control over what happens on its territory and can meaningfully say yes or no to foreign military requests. When London agrees to US access under crisis conditions, with limited visibility on how missions may evolve during flight, critics argue that British sovereignty becomes more symbolic than real.

Comparable questions have been raised in other contexts. In late 2025, US weapons were reportedly used with Nigerian consent against targets in Sokoto, northern Nigeria. Analysts asked how meaningful that consent was, given the power imbalance between Washington and Abuja, and whether Nigeria could genuinely have refused or later withdrawn its approval. The same doubt now hangs over the UK: in strict terms, Britain can revoke access to its bases, but in political reality, would it ever do so in the middle of a US‑led war?

The blurry line between defensive and offensive war

The UK government insists that it is allowing only “defensive” operations from its territory. In principle, that means missions focused on intercepting incoming missiles or neutralising immediate launch threats. In modern air campaigns, however, the line between defence and offence is thin and constantly shifting.

A single mission can start with a clear defensive mandate—to stop missiles targeting civilians or bases—and then change mid‑flight as new intelligence arrives or as commanders widen the operation’s goals. Strikes on missile launchers can quickly merge into broader attacks on command centres, radar networks, and other parts of a country’s military infrastructure. By the time bombs fall, the mission may no longer be limited to preventing a specific attack, but instead be part of a wider campaign to degrade a state’s overall capabilities.

Because of this fluid reality, Britain cannot fully monitor or control the intent behind each sortie launched from its bases. The more realistic test is political: if London concluded that US actions had crossed from narrow defence into an unlawful offensive war, would it actually suspend or close base access? So far, there is no sign that any such red line has been drawn or enforced.

This reinforces a broader lesson. Once exceptions in international law are stretched, it becomes easier to reinterpret almost any sustained use of force as a form of defence. That makes the original prohibition in Article 2(4) look weaker, and it increases the pressure on courts, scholars, and smaller states to push back or build alternative standards.

Domestic law and political accountability in the US

The legality debate is not only external. Within the United States, there are also constitutional questions about how the war was launched. Under the US Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war, while the president serves as commander‑in‑chief of the armed forces. In practice, many major conflicts—including Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq—have proceeded without formal war declarations, relying instead on authorisations for the use of military force or on the president’s claimed emergency powers.

The 2026 strikes on Iran fit this pattern of ambiguity. Legal analysts argue that the scale and duration of the operations go far beyond the short‑term, defensive actions that the president can justify under existing authorisations and the War Powers Resolution, and that Congress has been sidelined in decisions that amount to entering a new war. That weakens democratic oversight and further blurs the distinction between limited military actions and full‑scale war.

President Trump’s own language has added to the confusion. In public statements, he has alternated between describing the campaign as a “major military operation” aimed at eliminating imminent threats and speaking more freely of “war” and of a mission to reshape Iran’s government. The more the rhetoric moves towards regime change and open-ended conflict, the harder it becomes to maintain a narrow legal justification based on immediate self‑defence.

Allies, reputation, and the cost of rule‑bending

The US–UK security relationship is often described as the “special relationship.” It is deep and is unlikely to collapse over a single episode, however serious. But there can still be lasting costs. If British bases are used for strikes later judged unlawful, London will face sustained criticism from domestic opposition parties, civil society, and international partners.

Already, officials in several European states, including Switzerland and Spain, have publicly questioned the legal basis of the campaign and signalled that they do not see it as a model for future operations. These positions matter because they shape how international norms develop over time. When close allies decline to support a use of force, or do so only with strong reservations, they help draw a line that future leaders will have to take into account.

At the same time, the pattern of behaviour—powerful states pushing the edges of the law, and allies offering partial support while insisting the rules remain intact—adds to a sense that international law is fragile and selectively applied. That perception itself has consequences. If many governments and societies conclude that the legal framework is not worth defending, they will start to invest more in other tools that can constrain power without needing court judgments or Security Council resolutions.

From courts to choke points: weaponised interdependence

When the authority of international law erodes, enforcement does not disappear. Instead, it shifts into other systems. Increasingly, those systems are not military but economic and technological.

One concept that helps explain this shift is weaponised interdependence: a term used by international-relations scholars Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman to describe how states can use their control over key network “hubs” in finance, data, and trade to pressure others. In this world, access to markets, payment systems, technology, shipping routes, and supply chains becomes a tool of coercion. cutting a state off from those networks can be as damaging as traditional sanctions, and in some cases more effective than limited airstrikes.

The United States has already used its central role in the global financial system to impose wide-ranging sanctions on countries such as Iran and Russia, often by restricting access to the dollar system and to the SWIFT banking network. But it no longer dominates every lane.

- In trade and regulation, the European Union wields major leverage through the size of its market and its ability to set global standards for companies that want access.

- In manufacturing and supply chains, China’s position as the world’s largest exporter and a central node in key technologies gives it growing influence.

- In finance, Japan remains one of the largest foreign holders of US government debt, giving it a quiet but important role in global financial stability.

As the 2026 war unfolds, markets have already reacted. Analysts report that Iran’s attacks and the wider conflict have damaged US military infrastructure, including radar systems at major regional bases, and that the economic fallout has helped drive oil prices up by around 30 percent while contributing to one of the worst weeks of the year for the S&P 500 index. These shocks illustrate how quickly military decisions can ripple into the economic realm, where other actors have leverage.

If international law continues to weaken, future disputes may be fought less in courtrooms and more through these forms of economic and technological pressure. In that environment, the United States is still powerful, but it is not uniquely dominant. That is the deeper strategic risk: by undermining the legal system it once championed, Washington may be encouraging a world in which it faces stronger constraints from other centres of power.

Why this matters beyond Iran

The debate over the 2026 US–Iran war is about more than one conflict or one set of leaders. It raises questions that will shape future crises:

• Are powerful states bound by the same rules as others when they decide to use force?

• How far can the idea of “self‑defence” be stretched before it loses its meaning?

• When law fails to constrain power, which other systems step in—and who controls them?

International law after 1945 was designed to make wars of choice less likely, by creating a strong presumption against the use of force and limiting exceptions to clear cases of defence or Security Council approval. The current war in Iran, and the choices of allies such as the United Kingdom, show how fragile that system can be when a major power is determined to act and others are reluctant to stand in its way.

Undermining international law does not end coercion. It moves it into domains where legal protections are weaker and where different actors—regulators, central banks, tech companies, and logistics hubs—hold more of the keys. For the United States, that may prove to be a long‑term strategic cost that far outweighs any short‑term military gain.

Glossary

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – The core rule in the United Nations Charter that prohibits states from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state.[1]

Article 51 of the UN Charter – The provision that recognises a state’s inherent right to self‑defence if an armed attack occurs, until the UN Security Council takes measures to maintain peace.[1]

Crime of aggression – An international crime involving the planning, preparation, or execution of the use of armed force by a state in violation of the UN Charter, often described as waging a war of aggression.[7][5]

Pre‑emptive war – The use of military force to stop an attack that is claimed to be imminent but has not yet occurred, often based on intelligence assessments rather than clear ongoing hostilities.[6]

Self‑defence (international law)– The right of a state to use force to repel or respond to an armed attack, within strict limits of necessity and proportionality.[5][1]

Sovereignty – The principle that a state has supreme authority over its territory and domestic affairs, including the right to control foreign military activities on its soil.[1]

UN Security Council authorisation – A decision by the UN Security Council that permits states to take certain collective actions, including the use of force, in response to threats to international peace and security.[8][1]

Weaponised interdependence – A situation where states use their control over key economic and technological networks, such as finance or data, to pressure or coerce other actors.[11][12][13]

Sources and further reading

1. “USA–Iran War and the Use of Force under International Law.” Diplomacy & Law, March 1, 2026. https://www.diplomacyandlaw.com/post/usa-iran-war-and-the-use-of-force-under-international-law.

2. “Are US–Israeli Attacks Against Iran Legal Under International Law?” Al Jazeera, March 3, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/are-us-israeli-attacks-against-iran-legal-under-international-law.

3. “International Reactions to Military Strikes on Iran.” Just Security, March 2026. https://www.justsecurity.org/132773/us-iran-war-international-reactions/.

4. “Neither Preemptive Nor Legal, US‑Israeli Strikes on Iran Have Blown Up International Law.” The Conversation, January 29, 2026. https://theconversation.com/neither-preemptive-nor-legal-us-israeli-strikes-on-iran-have-blown-up-international-law-277173.

5. “Iran Strikes Could Trigger Wider Conflict in Middle East, Secretary‑General Warns, as Security Council Speakers Call for Urgent Restraint.” United Nations, February 27, 2026. https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16307.doc.htm.

6. “Trump Tells Iranians the ‘Hour of Your Freedom Is at Hand’ as US, Israel Launch Strikes Against Iran.” Fox News, February 27, 2026. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-tells-iranians-hour-your-freedom-hand-us-israel-launch-strikes-against-iran.

7. “Fact‑Checking Statements Made by Trump to Justify U.S. Strikes on Iran.” PBS NewsHour, February 28, 2026. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/fact-checking-statements-made-by-trump-to-justify-u-s-strikes-on-iran.

8. “2026 U.S.–Israel Strikes on Iran: Crime of Aggression Under UN Charter?” YouTube, March 3, 2026.

9. “ICCNC Statement on the US and Israel Bombing Attack on Iran.” Interfaith Council for Peace and Justice (ICCN), June 22, 2025. https://iccnc.org/news/2025/6/23/iccnc-statement-on-the-us-bombing-attack-on-iran-a5wgm.

10. “Weaponized Interdependence.” Wikipedia, October 14, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weaponized_interdependence.

11. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman. “Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman: Weaponized Interdependence.” University College Oxford, February 2021. https://uc.web.ox.ac.uk/article/henry-farrel-and-abraham-newman-weaponized-interdependence.

12. Daniel W. Drezner, Henry Farrell, and Abraham L. Newman, eds. “The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence.” Brookings Institution Press, 2021. Reviewed in Lawfare, January 17, 2023. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/new-network-literature.

Since late 2025, Iran has faced some of its largest protests in years, with thousands reportedly killed in a harsh crackdown and a nationwide internet blackout imposed from early January 2026. During this period, United States President Donald Trump repeatedly used social media and public statements to urge Iranians to “keep protesting” and promised that “help is on its way.”

Internet shutdowns are seen as a way to stop images of violence from reaching the outside world, but the blackout also limits how much information and encouragement from foreign leaders, diaspora voices and outside media can reach people inside Iran. At the same time, Iran plays an important role in Russia’s war economy by supplying Shahed drones and helping move sanctioned oil, shaping how Western governments see the stakes of any political change in Tehran.

Here are three linked issues: Iran’s protests and the human cost, the use of social media and information to encourage or shape dissent from outside, and the role of Iran’s internet shutdowns in both hiding abuses and blocking foreign influence.

Iran’s recent protests and the scale of the crackdown

Large anti-government protests broke out across Iran in late December 2025 and continued into early 2026, driven by severe economic hardship, anger at political repression and long‑standing grievances against the Islamic Republic’s leadership. According to the US‑based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), at least around 2,500 people were killed in the first weeks of the crackdown, including protesters, bystanders and some security personnel. Iranian officials quoted by international media have acknowledged death tolls in the same general range, although they label many protesters as “terrorists”.

Human rights groups such as Amnesty International describe the response as involving unlawful use of force, firearms and mass arbitrary arrests across numerous cities. Amnesty International and other organisations argue that these tactics violate international human rights law, which sets basic rules for how states are supposed to treat their own citizens even during unrest. Iranian authorities deny systematic abuses and say they are acting to maintain order and protect the state.

The protests have been described by analysts as the largest challenge to Iran’s clerical leadership since the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, although the triggers and slogans are not identical. Some demonstrators have openly called for an end to the Islamic Republic and chanted in support of exiled opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah, which the authorities view as a direct threat to the system.

Trump’s public encouragement and “remote courage”

Against this backdrop, President Trump used his Truth Social platform and public remarks to address Iranians directly. He posted messages urging them to “KEEP PROTESTING” and to “TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS”, saying that those responsible for killing protesters would “pay a big price” and promising that “HELP IS ON ITS WAY.” In interviews, he suggested that military action was among the options under consideration, although he did not give details.

Supporters argue that such statements offer moral encouragement to people risking their lives against an authoritarian government and signal that the United States will not ignore their struggle. Critics, including some inside Iran, counter that calls to “keep protesting” from abroad amount to what some analysts call “remote courage”: encouraging others to take risks that the speaker does not personally share.

Reports from activists and human rights monitors indicate that many of those killed or injured in the protests were ordinary citizens, including children, who faced live ammunition, beatings and detentions in conditions of almost complete information blackout. From this perspective, the gap between the low cost of posting supportive messages from Washington and the very high cost borne by people on the streets in Tehran, Mashhad or Isfahan becomes a central ethical concern, even when the goal—greater freedom and accountability—is widely shared.

Iran’s internet blackout: keeping information in, and out

On 8 January 2026, Iranian authorities imposed a nationwide internet shutdown and cut many phone lines, just as protests intensified across multiple cities. Monitoring groups and news outlets reported that fixed and mobile internet services were severely disrupted or completely cut in major urban centres, and that even Iran’s internal National Information Network was affected.

Iranian officials have used such shutdowns before, and they typically justify them as necessary for national security or to combat “foreign plots”. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International argue that these blackouts are designed primarily to hide human rights violations and prevent images of repression from circulating internationally. Amnesty International calls the January 2026 shutdown a “serious human rights violation” in its own right, because it prevents people from seeking help, documenting abuses or communicating safely.

There is also a second effect that receives less attention: shutdowns reduce the flow of information into the country. When the internet is cut, it becomes much harder for Iranians to see statements by foreign leaders, follow diaspora media, access independent news sites, or use social platforms to coordinate protests based on outside reporting and analysis. Researchers studying digital repression note that this inward‑facing aspect can be just as important for regimes that fear external influence on domestic politics.

During the 2025–2026 protests, the blackout limited the reach of Trump’s messages and other foreign commentary inside Iran, even as those same messages were widely discussed in international media. Some Iranians with access to satellite internet services such as Starlink reportedly managed to bypass restrictions, but these tools remain limited to small segments of the population.

In this sense, internet shutdowns can serve two purposes at once: hiding what the state is doing to its own citizens and weakening the ability of outside actors to influence events through digital channels.

Iran in Russia’s war economy

At the same time that protests and shutdowns have been unfolding at home, Iran has deepened its role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Since 2022, Iran has supplied large numbers of Shahed‑type drones to Russia, some of which are now manufactured at a facility in Russia’s Tatarstan region based on Iranian designs. These drones, known as Shahed‑136 or Geran‑2, are used in frequent attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, carrying significant explosive payloads over long distances.

Reports by investigative organisations such as C4ADS and policy institutes describe how Iran and Russia have built complex networks to evade Western sanctions, including “shadow fleets” of tankers that move oil covertly, payment schemes that rely on gold or intermediaries, and the use of permissive jurisdictions to obscure ownership and control of companies. Iranian state media has even framed this cooperation as part of an “emerging economic‑political bloc” that also includes the People’s Republic of China.

For Western governments, this means that Iran is not simply a domestic human rights concern; it is also a key node in Russia’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine and to undermine the effectiveness of sanctions. Analysts in think tanks and government agencies therefore see Iran’s internal stability, its leadership choices and its foreign policy orientation as directly connected to European and transatlantic security.

Reports of an “escape plan” and the politics of humiliation

Amid the early‑2026 unrest, some media outlets and commentators reported that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Iran, supreme leader), and his inner circle might have an emergency plan to flee to Russia if security forces lost control of the streets. These claims have not been publicly confirmed by Iranian officials, and details remain contested. However, the possibility of such a plan is politically significant in itself.

If widely believed inside Iran, the idea that the country’s top leadership had prepared a “runaway” scenario could damage the regime’s image as stable, powerful and rooted in the nation. For Russia, being seen as the destination of a fleeing ally would link Moscow symbolically to a failing, embattled ruler, which could feed narratives about Russia backing unpopular authoritarian regimes.

For Western policymakers in Washington and European capitals, a scenario in which Iran experiences regime change that brings a more moderate, outward‑looking government to power could appear strategically attractive. Analysts argue that such a shift might reduce drone supplies to Russia, weaken sanctions‑evasion networks, and potentially ease tensions across the Middle East.

Still, there is an important distinction between seeing such an outcome as beneficial and actively trying to engineer it. When media stories about leadership escape plans are linked, rightly or wrongly, to Western intelligence sources, this raises questions about information operations—deliberate efforts by states to influence perceptions and behaviour in another country. These efforts can shape protest dynamics and the wider narrative, even if there are no troops on the ground.

Information operations and the ethics of regime change

Information operations are actions by states or other actors that use information—true, false or selective—to influence what people think and do. In Iran’s case, outside messages range from moral support for protesters to leaks about elite behaviour, reports of potential defections, and coverage of military movements such as US air refuelling tankers and transport aircraft heading east.

When people inside a country see signs that a regime is losing control or that powerful foreign actors might intervene, they may be more likely to join protests because they believe change is actually possible. Researchers who study revolutions and mass movements note that perceptions of momentum and elite splits are often crucial to whether people decide to take risks.

However, when regime change appears to strongly benefit outside powers, governments like Russia often respond by framing uprisings as foreign‑engineered “colour revolutions”. This happened after Ukraine’s 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity, which Russian officials have repeatedly described as a Western‑backed coup, and similar claims are being made about protests in Georgia. These narratives are contested and rejected by many protesters and Western governments, but they resonate in parts of the world where memories of past foreign interventions are strong.

In Iran’s case, the history of foreign influence—including the 1953 coup supported by the United States and the United Kingdom against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh—means that any foreign role in present‑day unrest is likely to be scrutinised closely. Analysts argue that this context makes the ethics of “remote influence” especially sensitive: when outside actors cheer on or shape protests via social media and information campaigns, they need to consider not only short‑term gains but also how their involvement will be remembered and framed later.

Iran’s shutdown in a wider global pattern

Iran is not the only state using internet shutdowns during periods of unrest. Governments in countries such as Myanmar, Ethiopia, India and others have also cut or throttled internet access in response to protests or conflict. Research by digital rights organisations shows that these shutdowns can disrupt economic activity, harm emergency services and make it harder for citizens to access basic information.

At the same time, some governments argue that shutdowns are needed to combat disinformation, prevent coordination of riots or terrorism, or protect national security. This debate reflects a broader global struggle over who controls information flows and under what conditions. In many systems, the most powerful actors—states and large technology companies—still have significant ability to switch off, shape or amplify communication, even as social media gives ordinary users more tools to speak and organise.

Iran’s 2026 blackout shows how these levers can be used in highly contested political situations: the same technical act that hides video of a crackdown can also block outside encouragement; the same social media post that offers solidarity can be used by a regime to claim foreign interference; and the same protest that demands domestic change can alter the balance in distant conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.

The unrest in Iran since late 2025, the heavy death toll and the nationwide internet blackout have created a complex information environment that links domestic protest, international conflict and digital technology. President Trump’s public encouragement of Iranian protesters illustrates how leaders outside a country can use social media to influence events with relatively little personal risk, while protesters inside Iran face severe consequences.

Iran’s role in Russia’s war economy means that any political change in Tehran could have ripple effects for Ukraine, European security and global sanctions enforcement. Reports about possible escape plans for Iran’s leadership, and the broader use of information campaigns, highlight how narratives about weakness or collapse can shape both domestic morale and international perceptions.

Glossary

Digital repression – The use of digital tools, such as surveillance, censorship or shutdowns, by authorities to monitor, control or limit people’s online activities.

Human rights – Basic rights and freedoms that all people are entitled to, such as the right to life, free expression and fair treatment by the state.

Information operations – Coordinated actions that use information, including true or false content, to shape what people think and how they behave, often for political or military goals.

Internet blackout / internet shutdown – A deliberate disruption of internet and telecommunications services by authorities, usually nationwide or in specific regions.

Regime change – The replacement of a country’s ruling government or leadership, either through protests, elections, coups or foreign intervention.

Sanctions – Economic or political measures, such as trade bans or asset freezes, used by one or more countries to pressure another state, group or individual to change behaviour.

Shadow fleet – A group of ships that operate under complex ownership structures, false flags or limited tracking to secretly transport goods such as sanctioned oil.

Shahed drones – A family of Iranian‑designed unmanned aerial vehicles, some of which are used by Russia in attacks on Ukraine.

Social media – Online platforms that allow users to create, share and interact with content, such as posts, videos and messages, in real time.

Sources and further reading

1. “More than 2,000 people reported killed at Iran protests as Trump says ‘help is on its way’.” BBC News, January 14, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr57vmznmd9o.

2. “At least 2,571 killed in Iran’s protests, US-based rights group HRANA says.” Reuters, January 14, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/least-2571-killed-irans-protests-us-based-rights-group-hrana-says-2026-01-14/.

3. “Around 2,500 reportedly killed in protests as Donald Trump tells Iranians ‘help is on its way’.” ABC News (Australia), January 13, 2026. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-01-14/iran-protests-death-toll-official-says-2500-killed/106226744.

4. “Trump Tells Iranian Protesters ‘Help Is On Its Way’ As Death Toll Rises Over 2,000 | 10 News.” 10 News Australia, January 14, 2026.

1. .

2. “Trump and Iran trade new threats on social media.” NPR, January 2, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/g-s1-104265/trump-iran-protests.

3. “Iran’s leader calls Trump a ‘criminal’ for backing protests and blames demonstrators for deaths.” The Washington Post, January 17, 2026. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/17/iran-protests-trump-khamenei/.

4. “2026 Internet blackout in Iran.” Wikipedia, accessed March 1, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Internet_blackout_in_Iran.

5. “2025–2026 Iranian protests.” Wikipedia, accessed March 1, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests.

6. “Iran is cut off from the internet as protests intensify.” The New York Times, January 8, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-protests.html.

7. “Iran internet shutdown hides violations in escalating protests.” Amnesty International, February 5, 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/internet-shutdown-in-iran-hides-violations-in-escalating-protests/.

8. “Iran-Russia Drone Alliance: A Sanctions-Evading Partnership Fueling War in Ukraine.” Iran News Update, May 29, 2025. https://irannewsupdate.com/news/terrorism/iran-russia-drone-alliance-a-sanctions-evading-partnership-fueling-war-in-ukraine/.

9. “Iran Update, January 2, 2026.” Critical Threats Project, January 1, 2026. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-2-2026.

10. “The U.S. Sanctions on the Russian-Iranian Shadow Fleet: Strategic Implications and Challenges.” Lansing Institute, July 30, 2025. https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/07/31/the-u-s-sanctions-on-the-russian-iranian-shadow-fleet-strategic-implications-and-challenges/.

11. “Social Media in Iran’s Protests: A New Public Sphere?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 5, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/social-media-irans-protests-new-public-sphere.

12. “How Social Media is Channeling Popular Discontent in Iran’s Latest Uprising.” Informed Comment, January 11, 2026. https://www.juancole.com/2026/01/channeling-discontent-uprising.html.

13. Spasojevic, Jelena. “Social Media as a Tool for Political Change: The Case of the Arab Spring.” Master’s thesis, Harvard University, 2017. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33826164/SPASOJEVIC-DOCUMENT-2017.pdf.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022 and has continued for nearly four years, much longer than many governments, experts, and likely the Kremlin itself initially expected. By early 2026, the current phase of the war is approaching the length of World War I.

Long wars bring enormous human suffering, political stress, and military adaptation.
However, they also generate something else that is less visible but increasingly important: data—measurable information about what is happening over time.

In Ukraine, this data now covers a wide range of areas:

• estimated military and civilian casualties

• maps of territorial control

• defense and social spending in national budgets

• the economic impact of sanctions on Russia and on global markets

• public opinion trends and market reactions

This growing record allows observers to move from daily speculation toward longer-term trend analysis, even as the war itself remains unpredictable.
Yet numbers alone rarely change minds; people often interpret information through the lens of beliefs they already hold. [“First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias,” 1999]

How this war compares to earlier conflicts

World War I, often called “the Great War,” lasted a little more than four years and involved most of Europe as well as major powers around the world. Comparisons with World War I and Russia’s war in Ukraine have been common, with the battlefield trenches, and miserable conditions on the front lines. These comparisons matters for two reasons.
First, it highlights that modern wars between states can be prolonged, even when many actors initially expect a short campaign.
Second, it shows that long conflicts accumulate not only casualties and damage but also extensive documentation, from battlefield reports to economic and social statistics.

In the current war, the full-scale invasion followed earlier stages of conflict that began in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and supported armed groups in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
Russian President Vladimir Putin justified the operation as a “special military operation” aimed at “demilitarising and denazifying” Ukraine, claims widely rejected.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by declaring martial law and a general mobilisation, anchoring Ukraine’s resistance and shaping how the conflict is narrated both domestically and internationally.

These decisions set in motion not just military operations but also a long-term information environment in which governments, think tanks, journalists, and citizens all compete to interpret and frame data about the war.

What kind of data long wars produce

Over time, a war of this length produces a dense set of measurable indicators.
Some frequently cited examples in the Ukraine conflict include:

• Casualty estimates. Research by policy institutes and media outlets suggests that combined Russian and Ukrainian military casualties—killed, wounded, or missing—are approaching two million, with Russian forces likely bearing the larger share of losses, though exact figures remain contested. [“Troop Casualties in Ukraine War Near 2 Million, Study Finds,” 2026]

• Civilian harm. United Nations monitoring missions and humanitarian organisations track confirmed civilian deaths and injuries, while also stressing that the real figures are probably higher due to under-reporting in areas close to the front line.

• Territorial control. Mapping projects, often combining satellite imagery and open-source intelligence, show which areas are held by Ukrainian forces, Russian troops, or remain heavily contested at different points in time. [“War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker,” 2026]

• Budget reallocations. The share of national budgets devoted to defense, social support for veterans, reconstruction, or security services has increased sharply in both Ukraine and Russia, reshaping domestic priorities. [“Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy,” 2025]

• Sanctions impact. International financial institutions and research centres monitor how sanctions affect Russia’s economic output, inflation, trade patterns, and financial stability, showing both serious pressure and areas of adaptation. [“Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy,” 2025]

• Freedom and governance scores. Global indices measuring political rights, civil liberties, and media freedom track how the war has affected democratic institutions in Ukraine, Russia, and neighbouring states. [“War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker,” 2026]

• Market reactions. Energy prices, grain exports, and investment flows respond to battlefield developments, peace talks, or new sanctions packages, illustrating how a regional war can generate global economic ripple effects. [“War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker,” 2026]

Each of these indicators uses a mix of official statistics, satellite data, expert estimates, and sometimes classified information that later becomes public.
Analysts note that the longer the war continues, the more these indicators reveal not only isolated events but longer-term trends, such as which side is adapting faster or how sanctions reshape economic structures over several years.

From daily headlines to trend analysis

In the early weeks of the full-scale invasion, attention focused on dramatic events: the rapid advance on Kyiv, the defence of major cities, and the first large waves of sanctions. Media coverage often centered on immediate developments, such as a newly destroyed bridge or a high-profile political statement.

Over time, as frontline movements slowed and the war shifted toward attrition and positional fighting, daily changes became less visible but no less significant. [“Russia-Ukraine War,” 2026]
This is when trend analysis becomes more important. Trend analysis means examining data over months or years rather than reacting to single events.
For example, instead of focusing on one offensive, analysts can look at whether one side consistently gains or loses small amounts of territory over time, how casualty rates evolve, or how sanctions gradually alter industrial output.

The war now offers enough longitudinal data—information collected repeatedly over a long period—to assess patterns such as:

• whether Russia’s defence industry can sustain current levels of ammunition production

• how Ukraine’s economy adjusts to war conditions and external financial support

• how public support for continued fighting changes in both countries and among their allies

These assessments are not final, because the conflict is ongoing and the data can be incomplete or politically influenced. However, they allow analysts to move beyond isolated anecdotes and to test claims against measurable evidence.

Ukraine’s innovation and the data it leaves behind

Ukraine’s battlefield innovation is one of the most discussed aspects of the war.
Ukrainian forces have used small drones, satellite communications, and locally adapted technologies to offset some of Russia’s advantages in manpower and equipment.

Military analysts focus on how Ukraine’s approach will influence future military practice with the extensive digital records that have been created: geolocated videos, satellite images, and battlefield data that is and can later be studied by militaries worldwide.
The same is true on the Russian side, where large-scale artillery use, mobilisation policies, and adaptation to sanctions create a separate set of data.

But numbers alone do not end debates. Experts disagree about the sustainability of Ukraine’s tactics without continued foreign assistance, or about how quickly Russia can adapt to new technologies and forms of warfare.

Why numbers do not automatically change minds

The phrase “numbers don’t lie” suggests that data speaks for itself.
However, research on confirmatory bias—the tendency to interpret new information in ways that support existing beliefs—shows that people frequently read the same numbers and reach opposite conclusions.

Studies show that when individuals see evidence on polarising topics, such as nuclear energy or capital punishment, they often judge confirming information as reliable and dismiss conflicting evidence as biased or irrelevant. This leads to “belief polarisation,” where exposure to the same information actually pushes different groups further apart.

In the Ukraine war, this dynamic appears in how different audiences react to casualty estimates, sanctions data, or maps of the front line. Supporters of Kyiv may view high Russian losses as confirmation that Moscow’s strategy is failing, while pro-Kremlin commentators may frame the same figures as proof of Russian resilience or willingness to bear costs.

Metric-based content—charts, graphs, and statistics—often does the opposite of its intent, it triggers strong emotional reactions online. People feel that their identity is challenged when confronted with data that conflict with their expectations or preferred narratives.

Data in wartime does not operate in a neutral environment. It becomes part of the crowded information space where governments, media outlets, and social media users all compete to frame what the numbers mean.

The power of first impressions

Research in psychology and economics suggests that early information has a strong and often lasting influence on how later data is interpreted. This is sometimes called an “anchoring” effect: the first number or narrative people encounter becomes a reference point for future judgments.

In the context of the Ukraine war, early statements by political leaders, initial news coverage, and the first widely shared maps or videos all helped set expectations about how the conflict might develop.

Those initial impressions can shape reactions to later data, even when the situation on the ground changes.

For example, observers who expected a quick Russian victory may interpret ongoing fighting as temporary setbacks, while those who believed from the start that Ukraine could resist may see the same developments as evidence of long-term resilience.
The underlying data—front-line movement, casualties, economic indicators—might be similar, but the mental framework for interpreting it is different.

This dynamic helps explain why presenting verifiable metrics early in a conflict matters. When audiences are first exposed to clear, evidence-based information, those initial data points can form a more realistic anchor for later interpretation.

Emotion, attention, and the role of evidence

Wars are emotional events.
Images of destroyed homes, displaced families, and fallen soldiers produce strong reactions that can mobilise support or opposition far more quickly than a statistical chart.

Communication research suggests that emotional content is more likely to capture immediate attention—especially in social media feeds designed to prioritise engagement.
However, emotional reactions can fade or shift over time, while consistent, evidence-based communication has the potential to build a more stable understanding of what is happening.

The challenge for media, policymakers, and civil society is not to remove emotion from war reporting—it cannot be separated from human suffering—but to combine the storytelling with verifiable metrics. This might mean pairing testimonies from affected civilians with data on displacement, or linking a specific battle to broader trends in territorial control or casualty rates.

There is disagreement about how well this balance is being struck.
Some argue that coverage still focuses too much on dramatic moments and not enough on long-term trends, while others worry that heavy use of graphs and numbers can obscure individual experiences on the ground.

What is clearer is that as the Ukraine war continues, the amount of data will only grow.
How that data is presented, interpreted, and challenged will play a significant role in shaping global understanding of the conflict.

Contested data and competing narratives

Many of the most sensitive metrics in the Ukraine war are contested.
Governments restrict information for security reasons, while propaganda and disinformation campaigns seek to manipulate both domestic and foreign audiences.

Casualty figures are a prominent example. Independent estimates draw on satellite images, intercepted communications, and reports from hospitals and local authorities, but they often differ from official numbers released by Kyiv or Moscow. [“Troop Casualties in Ukraine War Near 2 Million, Study Finds,” 2026]
Ukraine understates its losses to sustain morale, according to some, while others suggest that Russia significantly understates its casualties to avoid public backlash.

Sanctions data is another contested field with Western governments pointing to reduced access to high-tech components and long-term constraints on Russian growth as evidence that sanctions are working. Russian officials and some commentators emphasise short-term growth figures and new trade patterns with non-Western partners to argue that the economy is adapting.

These disagreements do not mean that data is useless. Instead, they underline the importance of transparency, methodology, and clear communication about uncertainty—explaining where numbers come from and what they can and cannot show.

Why consistent, evidence-based communication still matters

Despite the challenges of bias, emotion, and contested data, consistent use of verifiable metrics can still shape understanding over time. When audiences are repeatedly exposed to clear, sourced information, they are more likely to recognise patterns and to distinguish between short-term shocks and long-term trends.

In the case of Ukraine, this might mean tracking:

• the gradual shift of Russia’s economy toward a war footing

• the cumulative impact of infrastructure damage on Ukraine’s energy grid

• the long-term demographic effects of displacement and mobilisation

Such information does not end debates about policy choices, responsibility, or future strategy.
However, it provides a common factual baseline that can make those debates more informed, even when they remain politically and morally difficult.

As the war continues, the central question is not whether numbers will exist—they already do—but how societies choose to use them: as tools for clearer understanding, or as instruments in ongoing battles over narrative and perception.

Glossary

Anchoring effect – A mental shortcut where the first information people receive about a topic strongly influences how they interpret later information.

Attrition – A type of warfare in which each side tries to wear down the other through continuous losses in personnel and material rather than rapid manoeuvre.

Casualty – A military or civilian person who is killed, wounded, or goes missing in a conflict.

Confirmatory bias – The tendency to favour information that supports existing beliefs and to dismiss or downplay information that challenges them.

Longitudinal data – Information collected repeatedly over a long period to track changes and trends over time.

Sanctions – Economic or political measures, such as trade restrictions or asset freezes, used by one or more countries to pressure another government or organisation to change its behaviour.

Territorial control – The degree to which a military force holds and administers specific geographic areas in a conflict.

Trend analysis – The study of data over time to identify patterns, directions of change, and possible future developments.

Sources and further reading

1. “Timeline of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Wikipedia, September 23, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.

2. “Russo-Ukrainian War.” Wikipedia, February 28, 2014. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_war.

3. Center for Preventive Action. “War in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine.

4. “World War I.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, February 7, 2026. https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I.

5. Barnes, Julian E., and Helene Cooper. “Troop Casualties in Ukraine War Near 2 Million, Study Finds.” The New York Times, January 27, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/27/us/politics/russia-ukraine-casualties.html.

6. Rabin, Matthew, and Joel L. Schrag. “First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1999. http://www.communicationcache.com/uploads/1/0/8/8/10887248/first_impressions_matter-_a_model_of_confirmatory_bias.pdf.

7. “Russia-Ukraine War | Map, Casualties, Timeline, Death Toll, Causes.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, February 24, 2026. https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine.

8. Langhammer, Rolf J., et al. “Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy, Vol. 3.” EconPol Europe / ifo Institute, April 30, 2025. https://www.ifo.de/en/econpol/publications/2024/working-paper/monitoring-impact-sanctions-russian-economy-vol-3.

The photographs included here were taken by Maks Levin, a Ukrainian photojournalist who was killed in March 2022 while documenting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Maks was known for his quiet persistence and his commitment to documenting the human reality of war. His work focused not only on front lines, but on the people living through conflict — soldiers, civilians, families, landscapes altered by violence. These images are among the last he took before his death.

Investigations by Ukrainian authorities later concluded that Maks was tortured before he was killed. His death was not only the loss of a journalist, but the silencing of a witness.

I had the privilege of working with Maks in 2020 on projects at Hromadske. He approached journalism with seriousness, technical precision, and deep humanity. He believed in bearing witness — calmly, consistently, and without spectacle.

Using his photographs here is not only a documentation choice. It is an acknowledgment of his work, his courage, and the risk he took to make these realities visible.

The big picture: A war that is costing Russia its future

Public debate in the United States and Europe increasingly frames Ukraine as a country that is “losing” and must accept a peace deal with Russia soon. In this narrative, time is said to be on Russia’s side, and the main priority should be to “stop the killing on both sides.” [“Trump Pressures Ukraine to Accept a Peace Plan That…,” 2025]

However, recent data on Russia’s war spending tell a different story. Independent Russian and Western analysts now estimate that a large and growing share of Russia’s military personnel budget is being spent not on living soldiers, but on compensation for those killed or wounded in Ukraine.

One detailed breakdown suggests that of Russia’s personnel costs for the war in Ukraine, roughly 38% goes to death benefits and disability compensation, 33% goes to salaries for soldiers still alive, and about 20% is paid out as regional recruitment bonuses to keep new soldiers flowing to the front. [“Death benefits swallow 38% of military pay budget, finds analysis,” 2026]

These numbers do not describe a cheap, sustainable war effort. They describe a state paying a very high price to maintain what some commentators now call an “army of the dead”: a force whose financial footprint is dominated by the cost of casualties, not by investment in future capability.

At the same time, key figures close to United States President Donald Trump (United States, president 2017–2021 and again since 2025) are leading negotiations on a possible Ukraine–Russia settlement. Some of these envoys are businesspeople, not career diplomats, and they are reported to have links to capital that could benefit from a “gentle” deal on Russia, particularly if sanctions are eased and Western business with Russia reopens.

This article examines three main questions:

• What do the numbers on Russia’s war spending actually show?

• How do they relate to the argument that Ukraine must accept a deal now?

• Who stands to gain from a peace agreement that eases pressure on Moscow?

Russia’s war spending: Paying for the aftermath, not just the army

A budget dominated by casualties

New analysis by Russian and international researchers provides a clearer picture of how Russia pays for its war in Ukraine. One independent Russian analytical platform, Re: Russia, estimates that in the first half of 2025, payments related to manpower for the war – including enlistment bonuses, regular salaries and compensation for the killed and wounded – totaled just over 2 trillion rubles.

According to this breakdown:

• About 20% of this amount went to contract signing bonuses.

• Just over 40% went to monthly pay for soldiers.

• Just under 40% went to compensation for deaths and injuries.

A separate analysis, widely reported in early 2026 and based on similar Russian data, calculated that for total annual personnel spending on the war (about 5.1 trillion rubles), approximately:

• 38% went to death benefits for the families of killed soldiers.

• 33% went to salaries for living soldiers.

• Around 20% went to regional governments as incentives to recruit new fighters.

That means Russia is spending more on soldiers who are already dead than on salaries for those still serving.

Analysts also note that these manpower costs alone are equivalent to roughly 90% of Russia’s annual budget deficit, showing how much strain the war places on the country’s public finances.

Payouts eat into the national budget

A study by two researchers using open-source data and Russian laws estimates that if Moscow fully honored its promised one-time payouts to the wounded and to the families of those killed, the bill would be about 2.3 trillion rubles (around 26 billion US dollars), or approximately 6% of Russia’s entire 2024 federal budget.

Under Russian law and presidential decrees, families of soldiers killed in Ukraine can be entitled to combined one-off payments of roughly 14 million rubles, while wounded soldiers may receive 3 million rubles, though there is evidence that the state sometimes delays or avoids these payments.

An investigation by Euronews reports that between mid‑2023 and mid‑2024 Russia spent an estimated 2.75–3 trillion rubles on military bonuses, injury compensation and death benefits for troops, equal to roughly 1.5% of national GDP. However, there are growing signs of budget pressure, including cuts to some bonuses and delays in paying death benefits.

Together, these figures show that Russia’s war is not only costly in human lives, but also in long-term financial commitments that will shape the country’s economic future.

What this means for the “Ukraine is losing” narrative

Time pressure cuts both ways

One common argument in Western politics is that Ukraine is slowly losing the war and must accept a peace deal while it still can. This view often assumes that Russia’s war effort is sustainable and that, over time, Moscow will be able to outlast Ukraine and its Western supporters.

The budget and casualty data suggest a different interpretation. Russia is paying a rising price in both money and lives to hold its lines and make limited gains. The country is not fighting a cheap war; it is fighting an expensive, manpower-heavy conflict that forces it to devote large parts of its budget to death benefits and the care of wounded veterans.

Analysts estimate that, since the full-scale invasion began in 2022, the war has cost Russian taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars, equivalent to many years of spending on sectors such as health or education.

In this context, the idea that time is entirely on Russia’s side looks much less certain. The longer the war continues, the larger Moscow’s bill for its “army of the dead” becomes.

A settlement at peak Russian cost

Some policy analysts argue that there could be a window for a negotiated settlement when both sides are under pressure and when the costs of continuing the war are especially high.

If Russia’s manpower and budget burdens continue to grow, Moscow may have a strong interest in a deal that secures some of its territorial gains while allowing it to reduce spending.

At the same time, pressuring Ukraine to accept major concessions at exactly this moment — when Russia is carrying a very heavy war cost — arguably allows the Kremlin to turn those costs into lasting strategic benefits. Critics of this approach say that such a deal would risk sending a signal that massive use of force and high casualties are an acceptable route to territorial expansion.

Other commentators disagree, arguing that ending the war and saving lives should take priority, even if the resulting peace is imperfect and leaves Russia with some gains. [apnews]​

The debate over these choices is not settled. It reflects a wider tension between two goals: stopping immediate violence and upholding longer-term norms against aggression.

“Stop the killing on both sides”: framing and symmetry

A moral-sounding message with political weight

President Trump and his envoys often describe their goal in the Ukraine talks as “ending the killing on both sides” or similar language.

On the surface, this framing sounds balanced and humanitarian. It focuses on human life rather than borders, and it suggests equal concern for Ukrainian and Russian casualties.

However, critics point out that this language also has political effects. By talking about “both sides” in the same way, it tends to blur the difference between an aggressor state that launched an invasion and a defending state fighting to protect its territory and population. [understandingwar]​

This “two equal parties” framing can make it easier to argue for compromises that involve Ukraine giving up territory, accepting limits on its future security partnerships, or living under the threat of renewed aggression.

Draft deals and Ukrainian concerns

Reporting on draft peace proposals supported by the Trump administration suggests that several versions have included conditions such as:

• Ukraine giving up claims to territories currently occupied by Russia.

• Ukraine agreeing not to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military alliance that includes many European states and North America.

• Limits on the size or armament of the Ukrainian armed forces.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (Ukraine, president since 2019) has publicly warned that such terms would force Ukraine to make a “difficult choice” between sovereignty and an end to active fighting.

International experts are divided. Some view these proposals as a realistic attempt to stop a brutal war. Others see them as a “strategic trap” that would reward aggression and create a frozen conflict, with high risk of future escalation.

Business interests and “peace through profit”

Steve Witkoff’s role

A central figure in the current US diplomatic effort is Steve Witkoff, a real-estate developer and long-time associate of President Trump who serves as a special envoy on Ukraine and other crises.

Witkoff is not a career diplomat. Reporting by major US outlets indicates that he has business ties to investors and networks connected to Russian-linked capital, including partners close to oligarchs who have faced sanctions in the West.

Some media investigations describe a “peace through business” approach, in which ending the war would be paired with large investment projects and the gradual reopening of business with Russia. These projects reportedly involve discussions between Witkoff, Trump adviser Jared Kushner, and Kremlin-linked financiers, including Kirill Dmitriev, who previously headed the Russian Direct Investment Fund. [theconversation]​

The prize of reopening Russia

Analyses by economic media and think tanks have examined how large the potential “prize” of reopening Russia might be for global business, should major sanctions be lifted or eased in the future. These studies suggest that foreign investors could see significant opportunities in sectors like energy, infrastructure, and consumer markets, though these would be accompanied by political and legal risks. [euromaidanpress]​

Critics argue that if business interests are closely involved in shaping a peace deal, there is a risk that commercial motivations will influence political outcomes. According to this view, a settlement that is “gentle” on Russia – for example by easing sanctions or recognizing territorial gains – could create profitable opportunities for specific networks while shifting the long-term security cost onto Ukraine and its neighbors.

Supporters of this approach respond that economic engagement can help stabilize post-war relations and reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict, and that involving business leaders is a pragmatic way to secure buy-in from powerful actors. This is a long-standing debate in international relations and does not have a single clear answer.

Russia as a long-term, hybrid threat to Europe

Military damage, but continuing danger

Russia’s conventional military has suffered heavy losses in equipment and personnel during the war in Ukraine. Yet European security documents still describe Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Euro‑Atlantic security, and a long-term challenge to the regional order.

NATO assessments and independent reports note that Moscow is attempting to rebuild its armed forces towards a target of around 1.5 million personnel, while investing in missile, drone, and electronic warfare capabilities.

A recent US strategy document describes Russia as a “permanent but manageable” threat, meaning that the danger can be contained if European states continue to strengthen their defences and maintain political unity.

Grey-zone and hybrid tactics

At the same time, Europe’s main immediate concern may not be large-scale invasion, but so‑called “grey‑zone” or hybrid activities. Grey‑zone operations are actions that fall between peace and open war, such as cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, and political interference, designed to weaken an opponent without triggering a full military response.

European and NATO analyses identify several grey‑zone risks linked to Russia:

• Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure such as energy grids, transport systems, or government services.

• Sabotage or unexplained damage to pipelines, undersea cables, or other key assets.

• GPS jamming and airspace incidents in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

• Disinformation campaigns and covert support for political movements that favor Russian interests.

Eurasia Group and European Union risk reports rank a large-scale Russian hybrid operation against EU infrastructure as one of the top security risks for 2026, alongside concerns about a weakening US security guarantee.

Stopping the killing vs. ending the war

There is broad agreement that the human cost of the war in Ukraine is devastating and that reducing casualties is an urgent humanitarian goal. However, “stopping the killing” and “ending the war” are not identical concepts. A ceasefire or peace deal that leaves major issues unresolved, or that rewards aggression, may only pause the violence and could raise the risk of future conflict.

The current data on Russia’s war spending show a country devoting a large share of its military budget, and a significant portion of its national resources, to paying for death and disability. This reality complicates the idea that Russia is in a comfortable long-term position.

At the same time, the involvement of business-linked envoys and the promise of economic opportunities from reopening Russia introduce additional layers into the politics of peace.

Different analysts and policymakers draw different conclusions from these facts. Some prioritize an immediate end to hostilities, even at the cost of Ukrainian concessions. Others argue that a durable peace requires addressing the deeper imbalance created when a state can gain territory through high‑cost aggression.

What is clear is that any serious discussion about Ukraine’s future, Russia’s role in Europe, and the shape of a possible settlement must take into account both the human and economic costs of the war – not only who is killing and dying today, but also who is paying, and who stands to profit when the fighting slows.

Glossary

Ceasefire – An agreement between warring parties to stop fighting, usually temporarily and without resolving the underlying conflict.

Death benefits – Payments made by a government or employer to the family of a person who has died, often as a one-time lump sum or long-term pension.

Diplomat – A government official who represents a state in negotiations and foreign relations with other countries.

GDP (Gross Domestic Product) – The total value of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year, used as a broad measure of economic size.

Grey‑zone operations – Actions that fall between peace and open war, such as cyberattacks, sabotage or disinformation, designed to weaken an opponent without triggering a full military response.

Hybrid warfare – A strategy that combines conventional military force with non‑military tools such as cyberattacks, propaganda, and economic pressure.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) – A military alliance formed in 1949 that includes many European countries, the United States and Canada, based on collective defence.

Oligarch – A very wealthy and influential businessperson, often with close ties to political power, especially in post‑Soviet states.

Personnel costs – Spending related to people in the armed forces, including salaries, bonuses, and payments to the wounded and the families of those killed.

Sanctions – Economic or political measures, such as trade bans or asset freezes, imposed by one or more countries to pressure another state or individual to change its behaviour.

Sovereignty – A state’s full right and power to govern itself, control its territory, and make decisions without outside interference.

Sources and further reading

1. Lattanzio, Thomas, and Harry Stevens. “Russia’s Payouts to Wounded, Families Is 6% of 2024 Budget.” Business Insider, July 10, 2024. https://www.businessinsider.com/russias-payouts-war-casualties-takes-6-percent-annual-budget-researchers-2024-7.

2. “Russia’s Ukraine War Bill: Death Benefits Swallow 38% of Military Pay Budget, Finds Analysis.” Firstpost, February 17, 2026. https://www.firstpost.com/world/russias-ukraine-war-bill-death-benefits-swallow-38-percent-of-military-pay-budget-finds-analysis-13981160.html.

3. Korshak, Stefan. “One-Third of Russia’s Military Personnel Costs Are Death Benefits.” Kyiv Post, February 19, 2026. https://www.lucorg.com/one-third-of-russias-military-personnel-costs-are-death-benefits/.

4. Haberman, Maggie, and colleagues. “Trump Defends Envoy’s Tactics in Ukraine Negotiations.” New York Times, November 26, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/26/us/politics/trump-ukraine-peace-deal-witkoff.html.

5. Rogov, Kirill. “From Living Force to Dead: Total Expenditure on Providing Russia’s Army with Manpower.” Re: Russia, July 8, 2025. https://re-russia.net/en/analytics/0320/.

6. Lattanzio, Thomas, and Harry Stevens. “Russia Would Need to Spend 6% of Its Entire 2024 Budget to Pay Wounded Soldiers and Families of Dead Troops, 2 Researchers Estimate.” Business Insider Africa, July 10, 2024. https://www.businessinsider.nl/russia-would-need-to-spend-6-of-its-entire-2024-budget-to-pay-wounded-soldiers-and-families-of-dead-troops-2-researchers-estimate/.

7. Baker, Peter, and David D. Kirkpatrick. “The Three Conflicts Witkoff and Kushner Are Trying to End.” New York Times, February 19, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/19/world/europe/witkoff-kushner-iran-ukraine-israel.html.

8. “Russia Cuts Bonuses and Delays Death Benefits for Troops in Ukraine.” Euronews, December 2, 2025. https://www.euronews.com/2025/12/02/russia-cuts-troop-bonuses-and-delays-death-benefits-amid-budget-shortfalls.

9. “How Big Is the Prize of Reopening Russia?” The Economist, February 17, 2026. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2026/02/17/how-big-is-the-prize-of-reopening-russia.

10. Oliker, Olga, and colleagues. “What Price for Peace in Ukraine?” Brookings Institution, February 18, 2026. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-price-for-peace-in-ukraine/.

11. “Russian Military Personnel Costs Hit Record High – Analysis.” The Moscow Times, July 9, 2025. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/10/russian-military-personnel-costs-hit-record-high-analysis-a89769.

12. Lattanzio, Thomas, and Harry Stevens. “Wounded Veterans, Wounded Economy: The Personnel Costs of Russia’s War.” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/07/wounded-veterans-wounded-economy-the-personnel-costs-of-russias-war/.

13. “Frequently Asked Questions About the Russia–Ukraine Negotiations.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, January 31, 2026. https://quincyinst.org/research/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-russia-ukraine-negotiations/.

14. Barnes, Julian E., and colleagues. “Trump Pressures Ukraine to Accept a Peace Plan That…” New York Times, April 23, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/world/europe/ukraine-cease-fire-talks-london.html.

15. “U.S. Push for Russia-Ukraine Peace Deal Gains Momentum as Attacks on Kyiv Kill 7.” PBS NewsHour, November 25, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-push-for-russia-ukraine-peace-deal-gains-momentum-as-attacks-on-kyiv-kill-7.

16. “Assessing the Current Peace Deal for Ukraine: Opportunity or Strategic Trap.” CSIS, May 11, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-current-peace-deal-ukraine-opportunity-or-strategic-trap.

17. Jones, Seth G., and colleagues. “Peace, Ceasefire, or Stalemate? How Wars End and the Road Ahead for Ukraine.” CSIS, August 10, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/peace-ceasefire-or-stalemate-how-wars-end-and-road-ahead-ukraine.

18. NATO. “The Hague Summit Declaration.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 24, 2025. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration.

19. NATO. “Deterrence and Defence.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 9, 2025. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/deterrence-and-defence.

20. Åslund, Anders, and colleagues. “NATO-Russia Dynamics: Prospects for Reconstitution of Russian Military Power.” Atlantic Council, September 26, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-russia-dynamics-prospects-for-reconstitution-of-russian-military-power/.

21. “Pentagon 2026 Strategy Calls Russia a ‘Manageable’ NATO Threat.” Voennoe Delo, January 23, 2026. https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id12473-pentagon-2026-strategy-calls-russia-a-manageable-nato-threat.

22. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Updated IC Gray Zone Lexicon: Key Terms and Definitions.” ODNI, July 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Unclassified-Updated-IC-Gray-Zone-Lexicon-July2024.pdf.

23. Watts, Nick. “What Is Grey Zone Confrontation and Why Is It Important?” The Cove (Australian Army), July 17, 2022. https://cove.army.gov.au/article/what-grey-zone-confrontation-and-why-it-important.

24. “Hybrid War Between Russia, NATO To Intensify In 2026: Report.” NDTV, January 5, 2026. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/hybrid-war-between-russia-nato-to-intensify-in-2026-report-10400368.

25. “Russian Threats to NATO and Europe in 2025.” The Gaze, July 18, 2025. https://thegaze.media/news/russian-threats-to-nato-and-europe-in-2025.

26. European Union Institute for Security Studies. “Global Risks to the EU in 2026: What Are the Main Conflict Threats for Europe?” EUISS, January 22, 2026. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/global-risks-eu-2026-what-are-main-conflict-threats-europe.

27. Eurasia Group. “Top Risks 2026: Implications for Europe.” Eurasia Group, December 31, 2025. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/Top-Risks-2026-Implications-for-Europe.

The idea of a single, open, global internet is fading. In its place, a patchwork of national and regional “digital spheres” is emerging, shaped by state power, commercial interests, and rapidly advancing artificial intelligence.

China has built a tightly controlled online ecosystem where platforms such as WeChat and Weibo dominate and foreign services like Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and many Western news sites are blocked under the country’s long‑running “Great Firewall” system of internet controls. Russia has steadily restricted access to global platforms, introducing laws to block or slow foreign websites and requiring foreign tech companies to store data on local servers, especially after its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In Belarus, under President Aleksandr Lukashenko (Belarus, in power since 1994), authorities have designated a wide range of regime‑critical online content as “extremist,” criminalising dissent and shrinking digital space for opposition voices.

This trend is often described as “internet fragmentation”: a process in which technical controls, legal rules, economic interests, and information systems divide the online world into separate, often incompatible, spaces. Analysts argue that this fragmentation is not just about which websites people can access; it is also about which narratives, values, and political ideas are visible—or invisible—in different countries.

Digital sovereignty: how states claim control online

A key concept in this shift is digital sovereignty—the idea that a state should control the data, infrastructure, platforms, and information flows within its territory, much as it controls its borders in the physical world. In practice, digital sovereignty can mean very different things depending on the political system.

In China, the government presents its model as “cyber sovereignty,” arguing that each state has the right to regulate its own internet without foreign interference. This has justified strict content controls, expansive surveillance, and the promotion of domestic tech champions such as Baidu (search), Tencent (social media and payments), and Alibaba (e‑commerce). In Russia, President Vladimir Putin has backed laws allowing authorities to route traffic through state‑controlled infrastructure and block foreign services, especially those seen as hostile or supportive of opposition movements.

Belarus offers a more extreme example of how digital sovereignty can be used to institutionalise repression. After mass protests following the disputed 2020 presidential election, Belarusian authorities dramatically expanded the use of anti‑extremism and anti‑terrorism laws against online speech. According to legal analysis by digital rights groups, even online comments, donations to independent media, or sharing songs and memes that criticise the government can lead to criminal charges, long prison sentences, or loss of citizenship.

Supporters of digital sovereignty argue that such measures protect national security, cultural identity, and citizens from foreign influence or harmful content. Critics counter that in authoritarian contexts, digital sovereignty often becomes a tool to silence opposition, control information, and shield leaders from accountability.

For readers who want to go deeper into this debate, here is the full recording of a panel discussion held on 14.02.2026. In the conversation, I speak about how digital sovereignty, AI systems, and platform business models are reshaping the global information space—and what that means for democracy, activists, and content creators navigating an increasingly fragmented internet. I also discuss practical strategies for building digital resilience across platforms, and why questions of money, power, and transparency sit at the heart of today’s online public sphere.

Beyond platforms: AI and diverging information worlds

The fragmentation of the internet is not only about access to social media platforms or news sites. It is increasingly about artificial intelligence systems that shape what people see, how information is framed, and which narratives feel “normal” in a given society.

In North America and much of Europe, widely used AI tools are developed by companies such as OpenAI (creator of ChatGPT), Google, Anthropic, and others. These systems are trained largely on open‑web content, English‑language materials, and datasets shaped by Western media and academic sources. In China, large language models and recommendation systems are being built by firms like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, operating under Chinese laws that require alignment with government‑approved values and censorship rules. Russia and Iran are similarly working to develop domestic AI tools that can be more easily controlled and aligned with state narratives.

This means that two people asking similar questions in different parts of the world may receive very different answers—not only because of language and culture, but because their tools are trained and constrained within different political and regulatory environments. Analysts warn that this may deepen what some call a “narrative divide,” where citizens of different states inhabit distinct information realities that are hard to bridge.

Importantly, the same logic applies to recommendation algorithms on social media. An algorithm is a set of rules or instructions that tells a computer how to process information, such as which posts to show a user next. Many platforms now use machine‑learning algorithms that are optimised to maximise engagement, often measured through viewing time, clicks, or interactions. Research suggests that these systems can prioritise emotionally charged or polarising content, regardless of its accuracy, because such posts tend to keep people scrolling.

When states and companies operate their own tightly controlled platforms and AI systems, the result is not just separate markets but separate information ecologies, in which different actors decide what is visible, what is promoted, and what is suppressed.

The $270 question: who profits from the current system?

To understand why the internet is fragmenting and why it is so difficult to change, it is necessary to look at money. Most large social media platforms and many AI companies rely on advertising‑driven business models. Their profits depend on collecting user data, keeping people engaged, and selling targeted advertising.

A leaked internal presentation from Facebook (now part of Meta Platforms) in 2018 suggested that an average US teenager brought roughly 270 dollars in lifetime value to the company—essentially an estimate of total profit generated from that user’s attention and data over time. This figure, often quoted in media debates, illustrates how individual users—especially young people—are monetised in advertising models.

From this perspective, content moderation has a direct financial cost. Content moderation refers to the processes and rules platforms use to remove, limit, or label harmful or illegal content, such as hate speech, harassment, or incitement to violence.

Moderation can reduce short‑term engagement by removing sensational but harmful material, lowering the amount of attention that can be sold to advertisers. It can also create political and reputational risks when platforms are accused of bias or censorship. For a company that measures success in growth and profit, there is constant pressure to do only as much moderation as regulators and public opinion require—especially if stricter moderation means losing part of that “270 dollars per teenager” in future revenue.

There is another financial layer: content creators. Many people now earn part or all of their income from advertising revenue, sponsorships, or platform‑based payouts tied to views and engagement. When creators worry that certain topics or critical views will be penalised by algorithms or risk demonetisation, they may self‑censor—choosing not to publish content that could be less profitable or more likely to be suppressed. This economic pressure does not usually come from direct state censorship but from platform policies and opaque algorithmic systems.

Who decides what is “right”? Guardrails, safety, and democratic dilemmas

Many observers argue that major platforms now have both the computational power and the data to implement far more responsible content policies, especially with the help of AI tools that can detect patterns of abuse, hate speech, or coordinated manipulation at scale. However, there is deep disagreement about what responsible behaviour should look like.

Key questions include:

- Who defines what counts as harmful or unacceptable content?

- Where should the “guardrails” be set—at the level of law, platform policy, or personal choice?

- What is the appropriate age for children to use social media, and under what protections?

Different democracies have taken different paths. In the European Union, institutions and member states have placed growing emphasis on transparency and accountability. The Digital Services Act (DSA), a major EU law that began applying to large platforms in 2023–2024, requires companies to explain how their recommendation systems work, share certain data with independent researchers, and assess the systemic risks their services pose to society.

In the United States, debates have often centred on freedom of speech and the legal liability of platforms for user content. A key law is Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which shields online platforms from being treated as publishers or speakers of the content users post, while allowing them to moderate in “good faith.” The law was passed in an era of dial‑up modems and static websites, when most users were actively searching for information rather than passively consuming algorithmically recommended feeds.

Many legal scholars now argue that this framework no longer fits a world where recommendation systems and AI play a central role in shaping what users see. Others caution that changing Section 230 without clear rules could lead to over‑removal of content, limiting free expression, or could favour larger platforms that can absorb higher compliance and legal costs.

In short, democratic societies face a tension between different goals: protecting free speech, ensuring access to reliable information, limiting harm and manipulation, and respecting privacy and individual autonomy. There is no simple consensus on how to balance these priorities, and policy debates reflect deeper disagreements about the role of the state, the power of private companies, and the responsibilities of users.

Protest, repression, and resilience: Belarus, Iran, and beyond

The consequences of a fragmented, controlled internet are especially visible in contexts of protest and political crisis.

In Belarus, the government’s broad use of “extremism” and “terrorism” labels has created what rights groups describe as a climate of fear for online activists. Legal analyses report more than twenty thousand criminal cases linked to supposed “extremism” since the 2020–2021 protests, including cases based on online likes or membership in opposition channels. This approach effectively merges digital sovereignty with systematic repression of dissent.

In Iran, the authorities have repeatedly used internet shutdowns and platform blocks to respond to waves of protest, including demonstrations in 2019 over fuel prices and the 2022 protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody. [“Two Months Later: Internet Use in Iran During the Mahsa Amini Protests,” Cloudflare, 2022] When protests spread in 2022, the government restricted access to popular platforms such as Instagram and WhatsApp, disrupting communication and documentation.

At the same time, social media has provided new ways for Iranians to exchange information, criticise authorities, and connect with the diaspora. Platforms like Instagram and, at times, Clubhouse have served as semi‑public spaces for political debate and storytelling, even under heavy surveillance. Some activists have turned to satellite services such as SpaceX’s Starlink to bypass state controls, though these alternatives can also be disrupted or blocked.

These examples show a dual reality. On one side, authorities in authoritarian or hybrid regimes use digital tools and laws to monitor, intimidate, and punish dissent. On the other, citizens, journalists, and activists still find ways to communicate, organise, and share information, often at great personal risk and without financial incentives. Researchers argue that this persistence reflects a form of democratic resilience, where people remain committed to participation and basic rights despite repression.

The changing role of the United States in democracy support

For decades after the Cold War, successive US administrations presented support for democracy abroad as a central pillar of national security strategy, combining diplomatic pressure, aid programs, and public messaging. Under President Joe Biden, the 2022 National Security Strategy framed global politics as a long‑term competition between democracies and autocracies and pledged to strengthen democratic institutions at home and abroad.

However, more recent discussions of US strategy, including commentary on newer strategic documents adopted under President Donald Trump , suggest that democracy promotion now plays a more limited or differently framed role compared with earlier periods. Analysts note a shift in emphasis toward great‑power competition, economic security, and border issues, with democracy support often integrated into broader interests rather than standing as a separate, dominant priority.

This does not mean that US institutions have abandoned democracy support. Agencies such as the State Department and the US Agency for International Development continue to fund media, civil society, and digital rights programs in many regions. But expectations that the United States will act as the primary global protector of democracy—especially in the digital domain—are increasingly contested, both internationally and within US politics.

For activists and independent media operating in fragmented digital environments, this shift means that external support may be less predictable. It reinforces the idea that responsibility for defending democratic values and rights online cannot be outsourced to a single state, no matter how powerful.

Transparency, algorithms, and the EU–US debate

Another key fault line in debates over the digital public sphere lies between transparency‑centred approaches and speech‑centred approaches.

In the United States, many politicians, courts, and civil society organisations focus on protecting freedom of speech—the right of individuals to express opinions without undue government restriction—as a core constitutional value. This shapes debates around content moderation, platform liability, and regulation: many proposals are judged primarily by whether they might encourage censorship or chill speech.

In the European Union, discussions often stress freedom of information and access—people’s ability to receive diverse, accurate, and pluralistic information about public affairs—as well as the need for transparency from powerful platforms. Laws like the Digital Services Act require large platforms to provide users with more information about why certain content is recommended and to offer at least one option for a feed not based on profiling.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive, but they highlight different priorities. US debates emphasise limiting state interference in speech, while EU debates emphasise accountability of private platforms and protection of the broader information environment. Analysts warn that if these regulatory philosophies diverge too far, they could contribute to further fragmentation, with platforms operating under distinct, sometimes conflicting, rule sets in different regions.

Practical strategies in a divided digital space

Even in a fragmented and contested internet, individuals and groups committed to democratic values continue to find ways to communicate and organise. Many are not primarily motivated by monetisation; they may accept financial risk or personal danger to speak out. Historical examples—from underground samizdat publications in Soviet‑era Eastern Europe to independent radio in authoritarian regimes—show that information flows rarely stop completely, even under severe repression.

In the digital age, several practical strategies can help build resilience:

- Diversifying platforms: Instead of relying on a single platform or algorithm, organisations and creators can distribute content across multiple services, including email newsletters, messaging apps, podcasts, and websites. This reduces vulnerability to sudden bans, policy changes, or algorithmic downgrades.

- Prioritising authenticity over polish: In many contexts, audiences respond strongly to content that is genuine, locally grounded, and responsive to their lived realities, even if it is not professionally produced. Rough, authentic formats can be more sustainable for small teams and harder for authorities to dismiss as foreign propaganda.

- Building redundancy and archives: Mirroring important content across platforms and maintaining independent archives can help preserve information when accounts are deleted or websites blocked.

- Investing in digital safety: Basic steps such as using secure messaging apps, two‑factor authentication, and clear internal protocols reduce the risk of account hijacking, data theft, or targeted online harassment.

At a broader level, analysts stress that digital resilience also requires offline elements: strong independent institutions, local media ecosystems, education systems that foster critical thinking, and communities that can organise beyond platforms.

Glossary

Algorithm – A set of rules or instructions that tells a computer how to process information, such as deciding which posts to show a user next.

Content moderation – The processes and rules platforms use to remove, limit, or label harmful or illegal content posted by users.

Democratic resilience – The ability of democratic societies, institutions, and citizens to withstand shocks, crises, or attempts at authoritarian rollback and still uphold core democratic principles.

Digital Services Act (DSA) – A European Union law that sets new obligations for online platforms, including transparency requirements for algorithms and risk assessments for large services.

Digital sovereignty – The idea that a state should control the data, infrastructure, platforms, and information flows within its territory, similar to how it controls physical borders.

Freedom of information – The principle that people should have access to diverse, accurate, and pluralistic information, especially about public affairs and government actions.

Freedom of speech – The right of individuals to express opinions without undue government restriction, within limits such as laws against incitement to violence.

Internet fragmentation – The process by which the global internet is divided into separate technical, legal, and information spaces, often along national or regional lines.

Section 230 (of the Communications Decency Act) – A US law from 1996 that protects online platforms from being treated as publishers of user content while allowing them to moderate in “good faith.”

Self‑censorship – When individuals or creators choose not to express certain views or share certain information because they fear negative consequences, such as legal risk, social backlash, or loss of income.

Sources and further reading

Freedom House. “China: Freedom on the Net 2023.” Freedom House, October 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/china.

Freedom House. “Russia: Freedom on the Net 2023.” Freedom House, October 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/russia.

Article 19. “Belarus: Anti‑Extremism Laws Put Digital Rights at Risk.” Article 19, August 6, 2025. https://www.article19.org/resources/belarus-anti-extremism-laws-put-digital-rights-at-risk/.

Council on Foreign Relations. “The Splinternet: How Geopolitics and Commerce Are Fragmenting the World Wide Web.” Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/splinternet-how-geopolitics-and-commerce-are-fragmenting-world-wide-web.

MERICS. “China’s Cyber Sovereignty: The New Normal?” Mercator Institute for China Studies, June 15, 2021. https://merics.org/en/report/chinas-cyber-sovereignty-new-normal.

Freedom House. “China: Freedom on the Net 2023.” Freedom House, October 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2023/china

Chatham House. “Russia’s ‘Sovereign Internet’ Law: Potential and Limitations.” Chatham House, November 1, 2019. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/11/russias-sovereign-internet-law

Human Constanta and Article 19. “Belarus Anti‑Extremism Laws: Legal Analysis.” Human Constanta, August 2025. https://humanconstanta.org/belarus-anti-extremism-laws-analysis-final.pdf

Freedom House. “The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism.” Freedom House, October 2022. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2022/rise-digital-authoritarianism

Brookings Institution. “Generative AI and the Future of the Internet.” Brookings Institution, May 4, 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/generative-ai-and-the-future-of-the-internet/

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “China’s Regulations on Generative AI.” Carnegie Endowment, July 18, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/18/chinas-regulations-on-generative-ai

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Authoritarian Regimes and AI Governance.” Carnegie Endowment, February 6, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/02/06/authoritarian-regimes-and-ai-governance

Pew Research Center. “How Americans View Social Media Algorithms and Their Impact.” Pew Research Center, July 22, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2023/07/22/how-americans-view-social-media-algorithms-and-their-impact/

Hao, Karen. “How Facebook’s Algorithm Fueled the Insurrection.” MIT Technology Review, January 11, 2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/11/1015929/how-facebooks-algorithm-fueled-the-insurrection/

Zuboff, Shoshana. “Surveillance Capitalism in the Digital Age.” Harvard Business Review, January 2019. https://hbr.org/2019/01/surveillance-capitalism-in-the-digital-age.

Horwitz, Jeff, and Deepa Seetharaman. “Facebook Employees Flag Drug Cartels and Human Traffickers. The Company’s Response Is Weak, Documents Show.” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-drug-cartels-human-traffickers-response-is-weak-documents-11631812953

Keller, Daphne. “The Future of Platform Governance.” Stanford Cyber Policy Center, March 2021. https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication/future-platform-governance

Congressional Research Service. “Social Media: Misinformation and Content Moderation Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, March 17, 2021. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46662

European Parliamentary Research Service. “The Creator Economy: Digital Platforms, Policies and Fairness.” European Parliament, October 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/732190/EPRS_STU(2022)732190_EN.pdf

OECD. “Using AI in Content Moderation: Opportunities and Risks.” OECD, April 2023. https://www.oecd.org/digital/ai-content-moderation.htm

European Commission. “The Digital Services Act: Ensuring a Safe and Accountable Online Environment.” European Commission, 2023. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act-package

Congressional Research Service. “Section 230: An Overview.” Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2021. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10493

Brookings Institution. “Revisiting Section 230 in the Age of Algorithms.” Brookings Institution, May 19, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/revisiting-section-230-in-the-age-of-algorithms/.

Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Section 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech.” Electronic Frontier Foundation, March 2022. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230

Cloudflare. “Two Months Later: Internet Use in Iran During the Mahsa Amini Protests.” Cloudflare, December 11, 2022. https://blog.cloudflare.com/internet-iran-mahsa-amini-protests/

Chatham House. “Iran’s Internet Shutdown Signals a New Stage of Digital Isolation.” Chatham House, January 22, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/irans-internet-shutdown-signals-new-stage-digital-isolation

Golkar, Saeid. “Social Media in Iran’s Protests: A New Public Sphere?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 5, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/social-media-irans-protests-new-public-sphere.

National Endowment for Democracy. “Democratic Resilience in the Digital Age.” National Endowment for Democracy, June 2020. https://www.ned.org/democratic-resilience-in-the-digital-age/

“National Security Strategy (United States).” Wikipedia, last modified November 5, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Strategy_(United_States)

The White House. “National Security Strategy.” The White House, October 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

PRIF Blog. “The New US National Security Strategy: A Blog Analysis and Commentaries.” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, December 18, 2025. https://blog.prif.org/2025/12/19/the-new-us-national-security-strategy-a-blog-analysis-and-commentaries/

United States Agency for International Development. “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategy.” USAID, May 2023. https://www.usaid.gov/democracy

American Civil Liberties Union. “Free Speech on the Internet.” ACLU, April 2022. https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/internet-speech

European University Institute. “Media Pluralism and Democracy.” EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2021. https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-and-democracy/

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Transatlantic Perspectives on Platform Governance.” Carnegie Endowment, November 10, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/10/transatlantic-perspectives-on-platform-governance

Wilson Center. “Samizdat and the Idea of Freedom.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/samizdat-and-the-idea-freedom

Access Now. “Resilient Digital Activism.” Access Now, March 2021. https://www.accessnow.org/resilient-digital-activism/

Tactical Tech. “Strategic Communications for Grassroots Digital Campaigns.” Tactical Tech, 2020. https://tacticaltech.org

Amnesty International. “Preserving Digital Evidence of Human Rights Violations.” Amnesty International, September 2020. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/doc10/

Front Line Defenders and Tactical Tech. “Security in a Box: Digital Security Tools and Tactics.” Front Line Defenders, 2022. https://securityinabox.org.

Sources

[1] [PDF] National Security Strategy | Biden White House https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

[2] [PDF] The U.S. 2022 National Security Strategy: - Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung https://www.kas.de/documents/283221/283270/Balancing+Cooperation+and+Competition+in+the+Next+Decade.pdf

[3] The New US National Security Strategy: A Blog Analysis and ... https://blog.prif.org/2025/12/19/the-new-us-national-security-strategy-a-blog-analysis-and-commentaries/

[4] [PDF] National Security Strategy | The White House https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[5] National Security Strategy 2022 https://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2022/

[6] How social media is channeling popular discontent in Iran during ... https://theconversation.com/how-social-media-is-channeling-popular-discontent-in-iran-during-ongoing-period-of-domestic-unrest-273206

[7] Article 19 report finds Belarus’s ‘anti-extremism’ laws ... https://cadeproject.org/updates/article-19-report-finds-belaruss-anti-extremism-laws-threaten-digital-rights/

[8] Around the Halls: Assessing the 2022 National Security Strategy https://www.brookings.edu/articles/around-the-halls-assessing-the-2022-national-security-strategy/

[9] Social Media in Iran’s Protests: A New Public Sphere? https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/social-media-irans-protests-new-public-sphere

[10] Belarus: Anti-extremism laws put digital rights at risk https://www.article19.org/resources/belarus-anti-extremism-laws-put-digital-rights-at-risk/

[11] FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy | The White House https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-national-security-strategy/

[12] Two months later: Internet use in Iran during the Mahsa Amini Protests https://blog.cloudflare.com/two-months-later-internet-use-in-iran-during-the-mahsa-amini-protests/

[13] Legal Analysis https://humanconstanta.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/belarus-anti-extremism-laws-analysis-final.pdf

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[15] Iran’s internet shutdown signals a new stage of digital isolation https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/irans-internet-shutdown-signals-new-stage-digital-isolation

Development actors may not use military language, but they operate inside similar dynamics. For years, communication in international cooperation was treated as an add‑on: a logo on a vehicle, a plaque on a building, a roadside sign that outlived the project cycle.

That is over.

Hard power has re‑entered international politics, and domestic security concerns increasingly shape foreign‑policy choices. Crisis cycles move faster, and scrutiny of international spending has become more politicised, with election timelines often exerting more pressure on project duration than technical best practice.

In the United States, USAID projects have been cited in official communications as alleged examples of “waste and abuse,” including a 2025 White House release that singled out specific grants as supposed misuse of taxpayer funds. The agency, originally established under President Kennedy, has been effectively reduced to a legal shell with minimal staffing as the State Department assumes responsibility for most programming and its independent profile is dismantled.

In Germany, recent budget debates saw development spending branded a “waste of taxpayer funds,” with AfD politicians calling for drastic reductions to the development ministry’s budget. Digital platforms have further collapsed the distance between a local project site and the national political stage.

In this environment, communication is not a reporting afterthought; it is part of core project risk architecture.

Aid communication is layered

Projects are implemented in specific political, cultural, and institutional settings. Yet no information stays where it started. In a polarised environment, digital platforms and domestic politics quickly reframe local messages, amplifying misleading narratives within hours.

Content now travels stripped of context. An image, a budget line, a theatrical project title, or a policy objective can trigger an immediate local reaction — the first stage of the double tap, where implementation meets perception. The second stage begins when the same fragment enters a different arena, with audiences who do not share the original assumptions; interpretation becomes faster, more political, and carries greater consequences. The risk is not one misunderstanding, but how the same message keeps getting reinterpreted.

First impact: Local interpretation under pressure

Development projects operate inside complex political cultures, layered histories, and contested identities. Even technically strong programmes intersect with debates about sovereignty, reform, external influence, and distribution of resources.

In fragile or polarised contexts, reform can be read as ideology, capacity‑building as interference, gender programming as provocation, and energy transition as a threat to livelihoods. These interpretations are not irrational; they reflect domestic politics, historical sensitivities, and strategic narratives already in play. When communication is not calibrated to the local political temperature, the result can be reduced access, damaged trust, heightened scrutiny, and a shrinking operational space.

Second impact: Domestic reframing and algorithmic amplification

The second impact often lands far from the project site. Technical work designed to stabilise municipalities, regions, energy systems, or public health is reduced to a headline, a line item, or a workshop title that stands in for the whole portfolio.

Algorithmic platforms reward content that provokes anger and moral outrage. Simplified, emotionally charged framings consistently outperform layered explanations of long‑term strategic value. Those who frame development spending as wasteful, ideological, or disconnected from domestic interests are structurally advantaged in attention markets. Once reframed, aid becomes politically fragile: scrutiny intensifies, funding debates sharpen, institutional trust erodes. The narrative of “why help others when we need help here?” adds another layer, tapping into envy and perceived unfairness and making it even harder to defend long‑term, outward‑facing commitments.

From narrative capture to risk‑aware communication

The response to this dynamic is not less communication but different communication. Risk‑aware communication starts with framing: defining the purpose, boundaries, and measurable results of a portfolio clearly and repeatedly.

If institutions do not create their own narrative, others will fill that space with shorter, sharper stories aligned with platform or political incentives. Once legitimacy erodes, decisions move faster than corrections: funding freezes and political restrictions can precede any opportunity to explain. Legitimacy determines capacity to help: trust enables political support; political support protects funding; funding secures access; access allows implementation. When legitimacy weakens, that entire chain is at risk.

Aid communication is not typical marketing

It does not have the luxury of overselling, manufacturing excitement, or chasing clicks for their own sake. The goal is not to advertise institutions, but to make purpose, safeguards, and trade‑offs legible to people who live with the consequences. It is should also about making information available in a form that people can actually find, navigate, and understand — across languages, literacy levels, and attention spans.

Because of that, the success metrics should be look at differently as well. The real test is not reach or virality, but whether people understand why a project exists, who it helps, how risk is managed, and what will happen if support is withdrawn. Effective communication in this space is measured in predictable support, stable operational access, and the ability to withstand political scrutiny without abandoning core objectives. Done well, it reduces room for distortion rather than adding spin, and treats transparency as part of the protection of operational space, not as a branding exercise.

The dividend must be visible

One of the strongest counters to narrative capture is dividend framing: showing the value of the activity to the ultimate funders, the taxpayers. Development cooperation does not operate in abstraction; it produces effects that matter well beyond the immediate project site.

Simple framing: prevention abroad reduces pressure at home: fewer destabilised regions mean fewer crises, resilient institutions reduce displacement pressures, and stable energy and supply chains support domestic economic security. Earlier investment lowers the likelihood of more expensive military or humanitarian responses later. If domestic audiences cannot see the dividend — security, cost containment, stability, credibility — development remains politically exposed. Dividend framing has to be built in from the outset, not bolted on in a defensive press release.

Risk‑aware communication is structured, not improvised. One practical model uses a five‑step sequence that moves from clarity to strategic relevance and integrates the dividend explicitly:

1. Simple core message: what is being done, in human terms.

2. Expanded action: how the work is carried out.

3. Challenge: the pressure or problem the work responds to.

4. Impact: the tangible difference it makes.

5. Dividend: the broader stabilisation benefit that follows.

This progression keeps messages repeatable under scrutiny while allowing technical depth when needed. It also highlights where language can be misinterpreted or weaponised, treating core messages as risk‑management tools rather than branding collateral.

Turning the dividend into proof

Dividend framing without metrics is easy to dismiss. Risk‑aware communication pairs narrative with disciplined measurement:

1. Impact metrics (local, tangible): access to essential services, reliability of municipal services, job or income stability, continuity of basic services during crises.

2. Dividend metrics (systemic, stabilisation‑oriented): reduced out‑migration, greater economic self‑reliance, stronger crisis‑coping capacity, and lower long‑term crisis‑response costs.

A predictable proof rhythm — portfolio dashboards, aggregated outcomes, repeatable indicators — lets institutions answer viral fragments with an architecture of evidence, not isolated anecdotes.

When the double tap lands

In a double‑tap environment, the first impact is often political. The second is human. A 2025 study in The Lancet projected that deep cuts to USAID funding and the agency’s potential dismantling could lead to more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, including about 4.5 million children under five.

That is the sequence: narrative capture, political retrenchment, institutional contraction — then systemic harm. In an age where outrage travels faster than context, risk‑aware communication is not cosmetic. It is preventative infrastructure. When the second impact arrives, it is no longer a messaging problem. It is about lives.

Dr Kari Odermann focuses on international security, development cooperation, and information ecosystems. She works with think tanks and multilateral partners to translate complex policy debates into accessible narratives for domestic and international audiences.