The author in downtown Mogadishu at the monument to Somalia’s national hero Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan who resisted the British, Italian, and Ethiopian empires.

The Horn of Africa is particularly tense and conflicted at this time. Wars and severe internal and interstate tensions wrack the region. At this precarious moment, there is rising advocacy in U.S. Africa policy circles for recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. All members of the United Nations formally recognize Somalia’s borders at the time of its acceptance into that organization in 1960, which followed the voluntary unification of the former British Somaliland with the former Italian Somaliland into the state of Somalia. United States interests and the best interests of the people of the Horn of Africa region require that a United States policy review of Somaliland’s status be conducted with great care, thorough consultation, and respect for relevant facts. This review should consider maintenance of the status quo, joining other nations in establishing a diplomatic liaison office in Hargeisa, and extending formal recognition of Somaliland independence.

I first visited Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, in 2001. As political counselor at our embassy in Nairobi 2006-2008, I had responsibility for implementing our policy for all of historic Somalia and then played a role in setting up our Nairobi-based proto embassy (“Somalia Affairs Unit”). As Ambassador to Djibouti 2018-2021, I observed Somalia and supported our Ambassador in Mogadishu and our Somalia-focused military both in Djibouti and Somalia. I attended as an observer the 2020 talks in Djibouti between delegations representing the Somaliland administration and the Federal Government of Somalia. As Ambassador to Somalia 2022-2023, I visited Hargeisa and Berbera, meeting with Somaliland’s senior leadership. My team members followed up that meeting with additional trips to Somaliland, as did our military colleagues based in Djibouti. I also met prominent Somalilanders based in Mogadishu. I listened to those advocating Somaliland independence and those advocating Somaliland’s re-incorporation into the Federal Republic of Somalia as a federal member state with full autonomy.

Proceed Carefully

Americans will not suffer directly from any further destabilization of the Horn of Africa caused by unilateral and uncoordinated measures. Rather, the people of this long-suffering region will suffer even more. United States interests are best served by the Horn of Africa countries achieving stability, security, and prosperity internally and regionally. Ethnic Somalis, and their complex, often contentious, clan divisions, play key roles in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as well as Somalia itself. Traditional Somali clan territories cross international borders. For many Somalis, clan identity is much stronger than national identity. Moves that upset clan balance can trigger violent reactions by clan militias not under the control of any government. The region has experienced both positive developments and negative setbacks over the past few years. I want to see more of the former and less of the latter. In diplomacy, as in medicine, the first rule is “do no harm.”

Consult the Region and International Partners

Currently Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Burundi contribute troops to the African Union’s military mission in support of Somalia’s war against the al-Shabaab terror organization. (Burundi is scheduled to be replaced by Egypt.) These countries have experience and deep knowledge about historic Somalia. Djibouti borders Somaliland and maintains close relations with authorities in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. The Chair of the African Union Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, is a highly knowledgeable and supremely capable diplomat I respect deeply from our collaborations when he was Foreign Minister in Djibouti. His Chief of Staff, Ambassador Mohamed El-Amine Souef, until recently led the African Union Mission in Somalia. He is also a top-level diplomat well-versed in this complex region.

Turkey is a major international partner of Somalia in security, infrastructure, and development, maintaining diplomatic offices in both Mogadishu and Hargeisa. United Nations member states currently having diplomatic representation in Hargeisa are United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Kenya, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. None of these countries recognize Somaliland’s self-declared independence. The European Union staffs an active maritime security program in Somaliland. Taiwan, not a United Nations member state, has an active representation office in Hargeisa. Our policy review would benefit from consultations with these key international partners, in addition to leadership in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Prominent Somalilanders in Mogadishu should also be consulted, such as the Deputy Prime Minister, traditional clan leaders, and business executives.

Consider Relevant Facts

Much of the rhetoric concerning Somaliland status is dishonest. Those making arguments on either side of the question often purposely make false statements and edit out facts that counter their view. Here are some facts I consider relevant to our policy review.

· The Isaaq clan accounts for roughly 2/3s of Somaliland’s population. Somaliland independence is overwhelmingly supported by the Isaaq, who dominate the administration and security forces.

· The remaining 1/3 of the population are mostly divided among the non-Isaaq Dir subclans and the Darod clan, each with their traditional territories. Their views on Somaliland status are more varied with many supporting an autonomous state within Somalia where Dir and Darod communities also exist. Hargeisa has dispatched the Somaliland military to attack pro-reunion communities within Somaliland, with Las Anod the best-known instance. In the last election, Somaliland’s electoral commission declined to set up voting stations in some pro-reunion areas.

· The Federal Government of Somalia recognizes a new Northeastern state made up of pro-unionist (non-Isaaq) communities bordering Puntland. The territory of this new state is within the borders of the former colony of British Somaliland, hence are claimed by the Somaliland administration.

· It is illegal in Somaliland to express support for any status other than independence. I heard the Hargeisa delegation during the Djibouti talks defend this law. Somaliland President Bihi once told me, when I asked about Somalilanders who support reunion, “of course we arrest and imprison our traitors.” Prominent Somalilanders active in Mogadishu politics and business cannot return home to visit their families. In Mogadishu, advocates of Somaliland independence are free to express themselves.

· The Isaaq community was singled out by the dictator Siad Barre for indiscriminate mass slaughter. While all communities suffered during the brutal civil war, the Isaaq suffered the most from Barre’s murderous campaigns of annihilation.

· The 2012 Somalia provisional constitution replaced the unitary state with a federal structure. That structure is purposely defined vaguely. The intent was for Somaliland and regions under al-Shabaab control to be represented in final negotiations over central government/federal member state government roles and responsibilities. That has not happened. Somalia federal government Presidents have tended to be pro-federalism as candidates and pro-centralization once in office. Relations between the center and the states are mostly politicized, arbitrary, and dysfunctional.

· Some Somaliland detractors claim the administration made a deal with al-Shabaab to exempt Somaliland from their depredations in return for granting safe refuge for the families of al-Shabaab leadership. I never saw evidence proving that allegation.

· Somaliland leaders point out their superior level of security, administration, and economic development relative to the rest of Somalia. This is true. Somaliland benefits from the efforts of Somalia forces and their international security partners in containing al-Shabaab to the southern part of the country far from Somaliland’s borders.

· Somalia’s Puntland state, bordering Somaliland and once a center of piracy, has also achieved significant success in security, administration, and economic development relative to the rest of the country. Puntland jealously protects its autonomy while remaining a Somalia state.

· The prospects for international recognition of Somaliland’s claim to independence tend to rise and fall with the state building process and security situation in the rest of Somalia. Currently, Somalia is suffering from worsening central government/state government relations and major setbacks in the war to liberate Somalis who suffer under the murderous rule of the al-Shabaab terror organization. Hence calls for Somaliland independence are on the rise.

· East Africa has experienced secessionist movements that achieved international recognition in Ethiopia (Eritrea) and Sudan (South Sudan). In both cases, international recognition followed settlements first with the origin country and then with the African Union/Organization of African Unity. This is the precedent.

Conclusion: Somaliland Status Determination Requires a Deliberative Process

Somaliland status merits open discussion within Somaliland, within Somalia as a whole, and within the region. All are stakeholders. For the United States as a foreign friend to historic Somalia, including Somaliland, there are three options:

· Maintain the status quo with no change in status and no negotiations or discussions among the interested parties. We retain our embassy in Mogadishu with no diplomatic presence elsewhere in historic Somalia.

· Establish a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, possibly with coverage for neighboring Puntland as well. This office would function as a part of the United States Mission to Somalia under the authority of the United States Ambassador to Somalia. We could employ our diplomatic presence in Hargeisa and Mogadishu to urge both administrations to renew Somaliland status negotiations, encouraging other international partners to join us. A tentative agreement was reached in the 2020 Djibouti talks between Hargeisa and Mogadishu to initiate confidence-building, win/win cooperation in specific areas. The Somalia President at the time then reneged on that agreement. Let’s try again.

· Grant unilateral and uncoordinated recognition of Somaliland’s independence claim. This initiative would harm our relations with Somalilanders who support reunion with autonomy, with historic Somalia as a whole, with the Horn of Africa region and with the African Union. Such a move would also destabilize Somali clan relations throughout the region. Alienation of the people and government of historic Somalia is likely to increase the influence of rival powers.

I favor the middle course of action. I also favor encouraging our friends in the region to consider creative solutions modeled elsewhere in the world. The United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Tanzania (as regards Zanzibar), and Canada (as regards Quebec) all use a variable geometry version of federalism/devolution such that different regions have different roles and responsibilities in relation to the central government. In the United States, we have “one size fits all” for the 50 states and different arrangements for Puerto Rico and other territories. Historic Somalia’s national revival requires settlement of governance issues, especially Somaliland status, and liberation of the entire national territory from terror group occupation. These are difficult but achievable goals. I wish the Somali people success.

I Don’t Know

In the military, cadence call and response ditties deployed on group marches and runs often begin with “I don’t know but I’ve been told” followed by a hearsay observation of some sort. We should all consider prefacing observations with a similar statement when our knowledge of the discussion topic is limited. I have often heard the contrary: expressions of certainty about subjects the speaker has little or no knowledge of. Stated in this manner, the speaker invites affirmation or refutation, but not discussion. Even if the speaker has attained omniscience, either generally or as regards this subject, then more tentative phrasing still has the advantage of engendering dialog. Once a decision must be taken, then do so with the best available information and carry out the decision resolutely. Tentative pre-decisional statements of position do not imply a tentative decision or a half-hearted implementation of the decision. A 51%/49% decision demands a 100% commitment to implementation.

Bob Dylan’s song “My Back Pages” captures the idea that with increased knowledge can come increased receptivity and humility. Each stanza expresses formerly held moral absolutes followed by the refrain, “Ah but I was so much older then, I’m younger than that now.” Except among the omniscient, degree of knowledge is relative. In subjects I consider myself expert, I know of others who are more expert than me. Regarding omniscience, achieving that exalted state is on my “to do” list, but I appear to be slipping ever further behind. The more I know, the more I know how much more there is to know. Yet I often hear people speak as if they possess perfect knowledge. I get excited. Will I finally meet one of the omniscient? Then, as they continue to speak, it becomes obvious their views are not informed by any substance at all. How disappointing.

If your knowledge on the issue at hand is less than sufficiently comprehensive, then deploy the phrase “I don’t know” and follow that up with the query “what do you know about it?” Freely cop to having no set opinion on a topic. “That is an important issue, but I do not yet know enough to develop a view.” Core principles are important and valuable. But avoid adopting a dense thicket of subsidiary principles that obscures alternative approaches to obtaining outcomes that align with your core principles. When subsidiary principles predetermine stands on every issue, then investigation of the facts underlying a particular issue is inhibited. Why bother educating yourself on the facts and the range of perspectives on the issue if you already possess a pre-cooked answer? In my experience, that approach produces suboptimal outcomes.

I Don’t Care

I (usually) avoid making judgments unless the situation requires that I do so. Then I (usually) strive to make a judgment only within the confines of that circumstance and context. “Do not judge lest ye be judged” (Sermon on the Mount). I believe in listening to your gut instincts, as there can be value there. But I do not (usually) allow my “gut” to make decisions for me. That role is intended for my higher self, acting on core principles and rational thought. Your gut can offer advice based on subconscious observations (“don’t go down that alley”). Your gut can also offer biases deeply ingrained in the subconscious that conflict with your conscious convictions and present irrelevant decision criteria for the given circumstance and context. (Why the “(usually)”s? Because sometimes emotions and urgency short circuit the deliberative process.)

A server came to our table to introduce herself and take our order. Her face was decorated with more metal than I had ever encountered before. My gut no likey. She was friendly, updated us on the specials, accurately took our orders, and hustled to get the food and drinks to us as quickly as possible, then checked in with us during the meal to see if we needed anything else. The decision? How much to tip. The relevant criteria was the level of service (outstanding). Her many piercings were an irrelevancy in the context of our relationship (customer and server). I ignored the negative visceral reaction and replied to my gut, “I don’t care,” proceeding to tip her generously.

I became a legal adult 46 years ago when I turned 18 (you do the math). Thirty of those 46 years I spent outside the United States, mostly in Africa. My episodic periods of living in the United States limited my direct experience of the ways our culture lurched first in one direction, then another, and then back again. When I retired as a diplomat and moved back to the United States, I was informed that proper conduct in the workplace was to always “ally” with colleagues who are members of specified groups (an arbitrary list, I thought) whenever there was conflict over any issue with colleagues who were not members of those specified groups. I did not accept this. I believe in the primacy of individual identity over group identities and the application of job relevant criteria geared toward achieving organization goals when making workplace decisions. I was told that the “justice is blind” concept is no longer an ideal. Well, it still is an ideal for me. I make a conscious effort to “ally” with colleagues when I believe they are in the right without caring about extraneous matters. I once nominated a colleague for a major award because she had advanced our goals despite severe challenges. I found her demeanor consistently annoying, but that was not the point. Goal achievement was the point. For the rest, in a professional context, I don’t care.

In Summary: Humble and Honest Discourse, Fair Judgments

These two approaches work for me: 1) research the facts and consider a variety of perspectives before setting your opinions in concrete and 2) when making judgments, only care about aspects that are relevant to the specific context. If you, dear reader, believe alternative approaches yield better results in terms of productive discourse and sound judgments that promote societal wellbeing, then please share your views. I intend for this newsletter to generate mutually respectful consideration of diverse perspectives. I am eager to hear from you.

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Greetings from rural central Texas.

I am a retired American diplomat (3-time Ambassador), former Peace Corps volunteer and staff, and former USAID contractor. I have spent most of my adult life working outside the United States, mostly in Africa. Since August 2023, I have taught global policy grad students as a professor of practice at the University Of Texas at Austin’s Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs. My wife Ouroukou and I also have a consulting firm that gets me back to Africa roughly every six months.

As a Foreign Service Officer, I was a professional writer for 33 years. That is part of what we do: draft policy memoranda and diplomatic reporting cables. Since my opus was USG work product, I could not take any of it with me when I retired, not even unclassified documents. I got the writing bug. Unbidden, my mind generates articles on topics that interest me. Until today, those “articles” have stayed mostly between my ears. Hopefully, by publishing them here I will exorcise these articles and free up some head space. I hope some of my musings will be of interest to my readers.

I will keep all content relevant to my courses free and publicly available. I will inform my students of this content. At some point, I may develop paid content, but not for course relevant topics. My UT/LBJ School colleague Jeremi Suri inspired me to venture down this road. I recommend his excellent Substack newsletter Democracy of Hope and podcast This is Democracy both co-produced with Zachary Suri.

I plan to engage with readers who respond to my offerings. I am genuinely interested in the perpectives of others. I believe in remaining open to new ideas while remaining committed to core principles. Understanding the views of others does not necessarily mean adopting those views. Respectful sharing of opinions based on varying life experiences can produce useful insights. That is what I am aiming for.