By Financial Journalist Alex Langton | 27 August 2026

Elric and I have a financial interest in Pulsar.

There is a rather obvious tension running through Pulsar Helium’s third-quarter update.

The company has unquestionably been busy.

Five further appraisal wells have been drilled at Topaz, all encountering gas under high pressure. Land has been acquired. Quotes are being obtained for up to six additional production-ready wells. A helium liquefaction plant has been reserved. Minnesota has created a clearer regulatory pathway for helium development. And, perhaps most importantly from a financial-risk perspective, Pulsar has subsequently raised another $25.5 million (£19 million).

Yet the shares remain becalmed around the level of that financing. However, it’s worth noting we first introduced Pulsar Helium to readers at 27.5p in October 2024. Even after the recent retracement to around 76.5p, the shares remain approximately 178% ahead of our original feature price. At their 142p high, the gain had exceeded 400%. That performance is worth remembering when assessing the present bout of investor impatience.

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 23 August 2026

Mike, Alex, and I all have a financial interest in SkinBioTherapeutics.

There are probably more sensible things to be doing in the small hours of a Sunday morning than arguing with Anthropic and Grok AI about postbiotic lysates, patent claims and cosmetic textiles.

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But here we are. It was fun and lasted quite a while. I opted not to cut this short because, one, I know many of you enjoy a long read, and two, there are many avenues to explore, all of which are important and therefore worth exploring. So, grab a double Espresso.

Those who have followed my research for any length of time will know that I quite enjoy developing a hypothesis. What I enjoy rather less — although it is considerably more useful — is trying to destroy it. AI is very good at playing the Devil’s Advocate, which is useful and less painful than chatting to PJ/Mike Caine.

So, having spent several months speculating that Zenakine could eventually find its way into textiles, I decided not to ask AI to prove me right.

I asked it to play Devil’s Advocate.

Find the holes. Challenge the assumptions. Tell me why the interpretation might be wrong. Look for competing explanations. Separate what the documents actually say from what an enthusiastic shareholder might like them to say.

It matters enormously for SkinBioTherapeutics.

SkinBioTherapeutics shareholders have endured enough speculation masquerading as fact over the years. We do not need to manufacture certainty where none exists.

What we can do is examine newly available evidence/patents, compare them with the existing IP estate and the Croda agreement, and assess whether our previous hypothesis has become more or less credible.

And in this case, I think it has become considerably more credible.

Not proven.

But considerably more interesting.

The patent that prompted the questions

A recently published international patent application, WO2026162532, filed by Croda’s Sederma division and published on 6 August 2026, has understandably attracted attention among SkinBioTherapeutics shareholders.

At first glance, there are two obvious questions.

Is Sederma developing something new around the SkinBiotix technology?

And, perhaps more importantly:

Does this strengthen SkinBioTherapeutics’ commercial position with Croda, or somehow weaken it?

Having worked through the specification and compared it with what we know about SkinBioTherapeutics’ existing patent estate and the November 2019 Croda relationship, my interpretation is firmly in favour of the former.

What appears to be confirmed

The patent concerns a new neurocosmetic use involving wellbeing, sleep, circadian regulation and antagonism of cortisol effects using a postbiotic lysate derived from:

Lacticaseibacillus rhamnosus GG.

That is important because the strain deposit identified is ATCC 53103.

Those who have followed the SkinBiotix story closely will recognise that immediately. It is the same bacterial strain associated with the technology underpinning Zenakine.

The apparent change from Lactobacillus rhamnosus to Lacticaseibacillus rhamnosus does not indicate a different organism. It reflects the relatively recent scientific reclassification of the genus.

Same strain.

Same deposit number.

Same underlying LGG biology.

And, importantly, the commercial Zenakine active remains described through the INCI:

Lactobacillus Ferment Lysate - The Scientific Name

That leads to what I regard as the first important conclusion.

This does not appear to be Sederma constructing some competing platform around SkinBioTherapeutics.

It looks much more like Sederma developing additional uses for the active it already licenses.

That is a very different proposition.

A Zenakine patent? Not quite

There is a little nomenclature housekeeping worth doing here because accuracy matters.

I would not describe WO2026162532 simply as a “Zenakine patent”, as some investors have suggested.

Zenakine is Croda/Sederma’s commercial brand for the active. The patent itself covers the LGG-derived postbiotic and its various applications.

A more accurate description would therefore be:

A Sederma neurocosmetic-use patent application built around the active, commercially embodied as Zenakine.

It is an inelegant sentence.

But scientifically and legally, it is considerably safer.

And that caution runs throughout this analysis.

Why I find the filing commercially constructive

Patent applications do not prove commercial success.

They do not tell us how many kilos of Zenakine Croda are being sold.

They do not tell us whether L’Oréal, Estée Lauder, Unilever or anybody else is preparing a launch, although the previously disgraced CEO has named all of them to me, and I dare say, anyone on his list of preferred suckers.

And they certainly do not provide us with a royalty forecast. I know, we can dream, right?

However, companies generally do not undertake extensive mechanistic work, human clinical studies, or international patent filings on an ingredient in which they have completely lost interest.

That does not guarantee commercial adoption.

But it does tell us something.

Sederma continues to invest intellectual and financial capital in broadening what this active can claim to do.

For SkinBioTherapeutics shareholders, that matters because the bear argument is simply crickets as far as Zenakine is concerned, and therefore a flop. Like me, they ignore the sensitive steps of adopting a new active ingredient into new or existing formulations, and shelf-life tests that secure the global brand, which is why we have seen small, nimble independents move first. They don’t have a global brand to protect.

From barrier repair to neurocosmetics

When SkinBiotix was first discussed publicly, much of the investment proposition centred on the relatively straightforward concept of improving the skin barrier.

That alone was interesting.

But Zenakine has since migrated into something significantly broader.

Croda is positioning the ingredient around concepts including:

• emotional wellbeing;

• stress ageing;

• sleep;

• skin recovery;

• neurocosmetics;

• face and neck applications;

• eye contour applications; and

• scalp treatments.

The new patent application appears to further deepen that IP envelope. And this is where the commercial logic becomes very interesting.

SkinBioTherapeutics does not necessarily need dozens of fundamentally different active ingredients.

If one active can acquire multiple commercially valuable claims, it becomes useful across a much larger number of finished products.

That potentially increases the addressable market without fundamentally changing the ingredient being sold.

The active is stable. The shop window is widening.

This is probably the simplest way I can describe what appears to be happening.

I can find no persuasive evidence that Zenakine itself has somehow been reformulated into a new active.

Its INCI remains:

Lactobacillus Ferment Lysate (and) Glycerin (and) Pentylene Glycol (and) Propanediol (and) Xanthan Gum.

What is changing is the number of ways Croda demonstrates how customers might use it. A clear signal that only the bears will ignore is the importance Zenakine has become to Croda/Sederma.

We have seen Zenakine showcased in concepts including a night cream, a reviving cream, a sleeping mask, and, particularly interestingly, a harmonising mist.

That last format caught my attention some time ago. It resulted in long, drawn-out discussions with our Croda friend, Dave.

Why?

Once you establish that an active can be delivered as a mist or spray rather than merely as a cream applied from a pot, your imagination naturally starts moving towards other delivery mechanisms.

Which brings us to textiles.

My Sunday morning vindication — with a large asterisk

I confess to taking a little satisfaction from this one.

For several months, I have been speculating that Zenakine could eventually be incorporated into textiles.

Not because I had been told it would happen.

I hadn’t.

And not because there was some secret customer launch sitting in my inbox.

There wasn’t.

It was simply a hypothesis built from the available evidence.

We knew Zenakine could be delivered through a mist.

We knew the neurocosmetic proposition lends itself to prolonged skin contact and well-being.

We knew hospitality was an obvious environment where sleep, relaxation, skin contact, and premium experiential products intersect.

And I was also aware of an interesting precedent involving a previous Company associated with an interim CEO in this ecosystem, where textile-related applications later achieved some success.

Yeah, I know… that did not prove anything. But it made the hypothesis worth keeping in the notebook.

Then along comes the Sederma patent, Mol on LSE, discovered. So, a big thanks to him for keeping me up all morning, not forgetting Anthropic and Grok.

And buried within that very broad specification is explicit consideration of cosmetotextiles. Oh, you beauty!

The active may be incorporated into woven or nonwoven material, including clothing and other materials intended to come into contact with the skin.

Well now.

That certainly got my attention.

Because we have moved from:

“I wonder whether this could work in textiles?”

to:

“Sederma itself has contemplated textile delivery within its patent strategy.”

That is not commercial confirmation.

But it is quite a meaningful progression.

Hotel sheets, pillows and sleep masks?

Oh, and OMG … thanks to Toyin. See the prices! Is this where skincare is going? Apparently!

This is where we need to resist becoming carried away. The patent does not tell us that Marriott is about to launch Zenakine bedding.

It does not identify a hotel customer. It does not tell us that Croda has signed a textile manufacturer.

And it does not mean every theoretical embodiment listed in a patent will ever see commercial daylight.

Patent specifications are deliberately broad.

You know I like caveats, right!

Nevertheless, once you combine:

sleep + wellbeing + topical delivery + textiles + prolonged skin contact

It does not require too heroic an imagination to see why hospitality could eventually be interesting.

Pillowcases.

Sleep masks.

Bedding.

Spa textiles.

Garments worn against the skin.

Potentially even premium hotel concepts built around rest and recovery.

Again, none of those should presently find their way into anybody’s revenue model.

But neither should we pretend the patent hasn’t made the earlier hypothesis more credible.

It clearly has.

And now we arrive at the more important question

What does this mean for SkinBioTherapeutics’ existing relationship with Croda?

This is where my Devil’s Advocate exercise became particularly useful.

The tempting bullish interpretation is straightforward:

Croda develops more uses → Croda sells more Zenakine → SkinBioTherapeutics receives more royalties.

And broadly, I think that is reasonable.

But there is a complication. Of course there is!

The 2019 commercial agreement granted Croda exclusivity in the relevant cosmetic field, while SkinBioTherapeutics retained other sectors, including medical, pharmaceutical, and food-supplement applications.

Further application areas were also contemplated through additional commercial agreements with tiered royalty structures.

The problem for those of us sitting outside the boardroom is that the full agreement isn’t public.

We therefore do not know every field-of-use definition.

And that means we should be very careful before declaring that any particular textile application categorically belongs to Croda or categorically belongs to SkinBioTherapeutics.

A textile does not automatically become therapeutic

This is perhaps the most important conceptual point. The physical format does not necessarily determine the commercial field.

Put Zenakine into a cream, and it can be cosmetic.

Put it into a mist, and it can still be cosmetic.

And put it into a textile, and — depending on the claims being made — it can still be cosmetic.

Imagine a pillowcase marketed to support the appearance of rested skin or to reduce the visible effects of environmental stress.

That is a very different proposition from a textile intended to treat psoriasis or eczema, assist wound healing or prevent infection.

Same broad delivery medium. Completely different commercial and potentially regulatory purpose.

Therefore, my present working hypothesis is:

Cosmetic textile applications could plausibly sit within Croda’s cosmetic field, while genuinely therapeutic, medical-device or veterinary applications could sit within areas retained by SkinBioTherapeutics.

Could. Not definitely do. It’s a hypothesis.

Is Sederma somehow disintermediating SkinBioTherapeutics?

This is another obvious bear argument raised by PJ. A reasonable query.

Sederma is the named applicant. SkinBioTherapeutics isn’t.

Therefore, the sceptic might argue that Sederma is building its own IP around the active, thereby progressively reducing SkinBioTherapeutics’ importance.

I do not find that interpretation particularly persuasive. But, PJ, being PJ, he does like to step outside the box and look at the negative possibilities, which is no bad exercise.

There is nothing unusual about a licensee developing improvement patents or new-use patents around technology it has licensed.

In fact, one could argue the opposite.

Why invest considerable R&D resources developing new applications for something you intend to abandon?

SkinBioTherapeutics retains its own patent estate around the LGG lysate technology.

Sederma’s patent seeks protection for particular downstream applications.

Those rights can coexist.

Indeed, that is quite normal.

What I would not do is make the sweeping statement that SkinBioTherapeutics “owns LGG” or that every conceivable Sederma claim must necessarily depend upon a SkinBioTherapeutics patent.

Patent rights are territorial.

Claims differ.

Families have different expiry dates.

And the precise interaction can become extremely technical.

For investment purposes, however, the broader point is simpler.

Nothing in this filing suggests that Sederma has somehow invented Zenakine away from SkinBioTherapeutics.

That said, I don’t buy into the name change from SkinBiotix to Zenakine. That, IMHO, was a pure distancing play away from a minnow to Croda for marketing.

It appears to be building a larger commercial moat around an active arising from the relationship.

Trigger Warning - More uses could mean more royalties

This is where shareholders should perhaps focus.

If the same licensed active can be sold into:

• Night skincare;

• Sleep products;

• Stress-related skincare;

• Scalp formulations;

• Facial care;

• Eye care;

• Mists;

• Masks; and potentially

• Cosmetotextiles,

Then the commercial opportunity is considerably wider than if Zenakine had remained a narrowly positioned barrier-repair ingredient.

And assuming those applications fall within the existing royalty-bearing structure, more premium, differentiated products containing Zenakine should ultimately be royalty-accretive for SkinBioTherapeutics.

The important word there is assuming.

Until we see the underlying licence, nobody outside the Company can state precisely how every novel application is treated commercially.

The intriguing SkinBioTherapeutics opportunity outside Croda

There is another side to this story, which I think could become more interesting over time.

SkinBioTherapeutics did not sell the entire platform to Croda.

It licensed a field. Other sectors remained with SkinBioTherapeutics.

Historically, conceptually interesting but commercially less useful because SkinBioTherapeutics itself had limited manufacturing infrastructure.

That changed with the acquisition of Bio-Tech Solutions Limited.

BTS manufactures health, hygiene, and personal care products for human and animal health.

It already serves channels including medical customers and veterinary distribution.

Suddenly, SkinBioTherapeutics retaining medical, therapeutic or veterinary uses of its platform becomes more than an abstract sentence buried inside an old RNS.

It potentially has an execution vehicle.

Manufacturing.

Formulation support.

Packaging.

Existing industry relationships.

Routes into medical and veterinary markets.

That does not mean SkinBioTherapeutics is secretly developing Zenakine wound dressings.

I want to make that absolutely clear.

But strategically, the pieces are more interesting today than they were in 2019.

Could BTS eventually become part of the platform strategy?

This is where the imagination starts running again.

Suppose SkinBioTherapeutics identified a retained-field application for its lysate technology.

Perhaps wound care.

Perhaps dermatology.

Perhaps veterinary skin health.

Perhaps another topical medical application.

Before owning BTS, SkinBioTherapeutics would have needed to find an external manufacturing partner and then begin constructing a commercial supply chain.

Today, it owns a business already operating within relevant markets.

That potentially shortens the distance between:

IP → product concept → manufacturing → customer.

Again, this is optionality.

Not guidance.

Not forecast revenue.

Not a disclosed development programme.

But optionality still has value when assessing what management might eventually do with the assets it now owns.

The Devil’s Advocate case

It is worth assembling the bear argument properly.

Perhaps the patent is mainly defensive.

Perhaps most of the broad embodiments never become products.

Perhaps cosmetotextiles ultimately generate negligible demand.

Perhaps Zenakine remains a relatively modest niche ingredient.

Perhaps the royalty economics are less attractive than shareholders hope.

Perhaps Croda’s customers take years to launch products.

Perhaps the NDA continues to prevent investors from understanding whether any of this is financially material.

Every one of those possibilities is legitimate.

And that is precisely why I would not attempt to place a value on the textile opportunity today.

There is nowhere near enough evidence.

But that does not mean the patent is meaningless.

The mistake investors often make is believing evidence must either prove the entire bull case or be irrelevant. Markets do not work like that.

Investment theses develop incrementally. In our case, seven long years.

One piece of evidence changes a probability.

Then another.

Then another.

Eventually, the commercial numbers settle the argument.

We are not there yet.

We thought we were until, well, let’s skip this part, it’s been done.

Patent duration requires care

There is also a particularly technical issue worth mentioning.

Different SkinBioTherapeutics patent families have different priority dates and different claim scopes.

Some protection extends far beyond what investors might assume.

Likewise, any eventual Sederma patent arising from this application could carry its own term extending well into the future.

The interaction between those rights will depend upon jurisdiction, granted claims and the underlying commercial licence.

Therefore, I would resist simplistic claims that Croda will one day somehow “own” the applications once a SkinBioTherapeutics patent expires.

Patent estates are rarely that neat.

And we are talking about something that is many years away.

There are rather more immediate things for shareholders to worry about.

Like royalties.

What would I actually like to see now?

The patent is intellectually interesting.

But SkinBioTherapeutics investors need commercial information.

We need greater visibility regarding the Zenakine royalty trajectory.

We need evidence of customer launches.

We need clarity on whether additional application areas have triggered further agreements under the original Croda structure.

And eventually, we need a way to determine whether Zenakine is becoming financially material.

The NDA has made reverse-engineering the economics extraordinarily difficult.

That may have been tolerable during development.

It becomes increasingly problematic once commercialisation begins.

Investors cannot indefinitely value something by counting formulation brochures and searching patent databases at ridiculous hours on Sunday mornings.

Entertaining, though that may be.

So what has actually changed?

For me, the significance of WO2026162532 isn’t that it suddenly transforms the SkinBioTherapeutics valuation.

It doesn’t.

It doesn’t add £20 million to my spreadsheet.

It doesn’t tell us royalties will explode.

And it certainly doesn’t justify pretending a hotel-textile business already exists.

What it does is add another piece of evidence to the direction of travel.

Croda/Sederma appears to continue investing in science. They clearly see value.

The claim envelope is widening.

The neurocosmetic positioning is deepening.

The range of potential delivery mechanisms is broadening.

And, rather pleasingly for someone who has been banging on about textiles for several months, cosmetotextiles are now explicitly sitting inside Sederma’s own patent thinking.

I will take that small victory.

But only the small one.

The larger victory comes when we see the royalties.

The bottom line FWIW

My interpretation is that this filing is constructive rather than dilutive for SkinBioTherapeutics.

It appears less like Sederma is building around SkinBioTherapeutics and more like Sederma is building on technology already within their commercial relationship.

That matters. Only a fool will argue otherwise.

The real commercial opportunity may not be one spectacular product but rather the gradual proliferation of the same active across an increasing number of premium applications.

Creams.

Masks.

Mists.

Scalp products.

Sleep-related skincare.

And perhaps, eventually, textiles.

The active remains broadly the same.

The shop window keeps getting bigger.

For shareholders, however, the discipline must remain equally consistent.

A patent is evidence of R&D commitment.

It is not evidence of material revenue.

A formulation concept demonstrates technical possibility.

It is not a customer order.

A textile claim expands potential applications.

It is not a hotel contract.

And strategic optionality through BTS is interesting.

It is not yet a commercial programme.

That is the way I prefer to look at these things.

Develop the hypothesis.

Search for evidence.

Then ask the Devil’s Advocate to try to wreck it.

If the argument is still standing afterwards, perhaps it deserves a little more attention.

This one is still standing.

If you haven’t had enough already. You can explore some of the AI chat here.

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Opinions

We offer no advice or solicit the purchase of shares in any companies we discuss. However, shares fluctuate in value, making your financial situation unpredictable.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible but stress you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.

By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 13 August 2026

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 13 August 2026

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By Financial Journalist, Alex Langton | 11 August 2026

Afentra has delivered what investors wanted from Pacassa SW: oil, substantial net pay and confirmation that the geology broadly matches the pre-drill model.

The well encountered 136 metres of net oil pay within a 217-metre hydrocarbon-bearing interval, while reservoir quality and pressure data appear supportive of management’s previous assumption that Pacassa SW could deliver around 5,000 bopd gross. That number is not yet proven. The next production test therefore matters enormously.

A Strong Run Already — But the Story Is Not Finished

We first featured Afentra at 28p, when the investment case was centered on acquiring mature Angolan production cheaply, improving operational efficiency, and using the resulting cash flows to build a larger, more valuable asset base.

With the shares now around 70p, investors who followed that original thesis have seen a gain of approximately 150%.

The shares have, admittedly, eased back from their recent high of around 87p, but that does little to diminish what has already been a strong performance for us.

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More importantly, the operational story still appears to have further to run.

Pacassa SW now offers the prospect of additional production and potentially substantial resource conversion, Impala-1 has returned to meaningful output, Impala-2 provides another near-term development catalyst, and Block 3/24 adds longer-term optionality.

So while Afentra has already rewarded patience handsomely, the investment case is no longer simply about whether management can execute its acquisition strategy. Increasingly, the question is how much additional value can now be extracted from the portfolio it has assembled.

If Pacassa can flow sustainably somewhere around management’s pre-drill expectation, this becomes considerably more than a successful exploration result. It becomes another meaningful producing asset tied into existing infrastructure and capable of contributing cash flow relatively quickly.

Afentra still believes the wider Pacassa SW structure could contain up to 70 million barrels gross recoverable resources, equivalent to approximately 23 million barrels net assuming its 33.33% interest following completion of the Etu transaction.

However, let’s be clear: those barrels are currently resource potential, not booked reserves. What today’s result does is make that resource case materially more credible. Impala-1 adds another 3,000 bopd

There was also encouraging news from Impala.

Impala-1 had been shut since 2017 but has now been returned to production following a relatively simple slickline intervention.

The well tested at rates of up to approximately 4,700 bopd gross and is currently producing at around 3,000 bopd, deliberately constrained to manage water cut and longer-term reservoir performance.

That is significant for two reasons.

First, Afentra has restored meaningful production from an existing dormant well without having to drill another expensive development well.

Second, the reservoir information collected during the intervention has reduced uncertainty around Impala-2, where drilling is expected to begin following completion of Pacassa operations.

Impala-2 is targeting approximately 4,000 bopd gross initial production.

If successful, it would provide further evidence that Afentra’s strategy of acquiring mature fields and extracting additional value through redevelopment is working.

An interesting Pacassa detail

One point investors may overlook is that Afentra currently believes a dedicated Pacassa SW injection well may not be required immediately.

If confirmed, the rig can move directly onto Impala-2 rather than spending time and capital drilling an injector.

The decision has not yet been finalised, but it potentially improves both the timetable and economics of the current campaign.

Block 3/24 — small numbers, useful evidence

Afentra has also completed its first operated offshore campaign on Block 3/24.

Using a compact remotely operated vehicle from a locally contracted vessel, the company completed the survey for approximately $60k.

Afentra estimates a conventional approach could have cost somewhere between $500k and $1 million. That saving will not transform the valuation.

What matters is the signal.

Afentra’s proposition has always been that mature African oil assets can often be operated more efficiently under commercially disciplined ownership.

This provides an early example of that philosophy being implemented.

What investors need to watch next

The investment case now turns on execution.

The most important near-term questions are straightforward:

• What sustainable production rate does Pacassa SW actually deliver?

• How much of the wider 70mmbbl resource potential eventually converts into recognised reserves?

• Will Pacassa require an injection well?

• Does Impala-2 achieve something close to its 4,000 bopd target?

• Does the Etu transaction complete during Q3?

• Can new production comfortably outrun natural decline from Afentra’s mature existing fields?

These are the numbers that matter now.

Summary Conclusion: Afentra is beginning to provide evidence that its investment case extends beyond buying cheap mature production.

• Existing assets have generated cash.

• Debt has reduced.

• Dormant wells are being revived.

• New drilling is exposing additional resources.

And Afentra is beginning to demonstrate that it can operate mature assets efficiently rather than merely own minority interests in them.

Pacassa SW therefore matters because it suggests Afentra may have acquired considerably more embedded value than was obvious from the original producing reserves alone.

But today’s update materially reduces one important area of uncertainty.

Pacassa contains commercial quantities of oil.

The geology appears to have behaved broadly as expected.

The next question is how quickly — and how efficiently — Afentra can turn that oil into cash.

Opinions

We do not offer advice or solicit the purchase of shares in any companies we discuss. However, share values fluctuate, making your financial situation risky.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible, but we stress you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.

By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 4 August 2026

I have a financial Interest in Poolbeg Pharma.

Poolbeg is approaching clinical evidence that could establish POLB 001 as the first broadly applicable preventative therapy for one of cancer immunotherapy’s most important limitations. The more revealing point, however, may be how much preparation has already taken place for what follows.

I hope you have a strong coffee to hand; if not, go and brew one, because I have done a deep dive into a two-part interview with CEO Jerremy Skillington and Chairman Cathal Friel on a podcast with the guys at The Sunday Roast. It starts at around 31 minutes and lasts around 25 minutes, but there is a deceptive amount of info to dissect and discuss. It is this one that forms the bulk of this editorial. But in the first part, “Why Management appears so confident” is based on the conversation, which you can review here.

There are moments in biotechnology when the investment case changes before the market fully recognises what has happened. I think we are witnessing this in slow-mo, but if we are not careful, some investors might be caught short of the blocks when the starting gun sounds.

Sometimes this occurs with unexpectedly strong clinical data. On other occasions, it becomes apparent that the commercial opportunity is considerably broader than originally understood.

Poolbeg Pharma may be approaching both. With a potential game-changing fiscal event early 2027, there could well be a major spike in the share price if Friel’s expectations are met. But all hinges on the clinical data, so let's keep grounded for now.

Why management appears so confident

Biotechnology executives are expected to sound enthusiastic about their principal assets. There is nevertheless a difference between customary optimism and the language now being used by Poolbeg’s leadership.

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 3 August 2026

Mike, Alex, and I all have a financial interest in SkinBioTherapeutics.

I had not intended to return to SkinBioTherapeutics quite so quickly. However, a recent article questioning whether the Company’s cash will “last long enough” appears to have caused some anxiety among some investors, while some commentators/investors appear to be asserting their own assumptions as established facts.

Some now seem convinced that SkinBioTherapeutics will require another equity raise, probably at a punishing discount.

That is a serious conclusion. It is also one that appears to fly directly in the face of the Company’s own published statements.

Let’s have some fun.

The article appears to convert a cash-management risk into an implied near-term cash crisis without sufficient evidence.

Its central analytical weaknesses are:

1. extrapolating a distorted five-month cash movement;

2. failing to adjust adequately for approximately £700k of investigation expenditure;

3. conflating operating losses with cash burn;

4. overlooking that the major disclosed loss sat within Corporate;

5. failing to engage properly with the 12-month going-concern assessment;

6. assuming that £1.5 million inevitably leads to an equity raise;

7. treating the current cost base as though all expenditure were recurring.

Given the damage caused by the governance and accounting failures associated with former CEO Stuart Ashman, the present Board knows it cannot afford careless language. Its immediate task is to restore credibility with shareholders.

BTW, my right eye now squints whenever I mention Ashman by name—are there any lawyers in the house?

Against that background, investors should distinguish between legitimate caution over a £1.5m cash balance and an assertion that a discounted fundraising is inevitable.

The going-concern statement matters

SkinBioTherapeutics reported cash of £1.5m as of May 2026 and stated plainly that careful management of resources is essential. To be expected, right.

Nobody should attempt to dress £1.5m up as a fortress balance sheet. I’m not attempting to.

However, the directors also reviewed the Group’s budget, cash resources and financial obligations and concluded that SkinBioTherapeutics had adequate resources to continue operating for at least 12 months. The Company subsequently reiterated that its FY26 accounts would be prepared on a going-concern basis.

That statement does not guarantee the Company will never raise capital. No responsible investor should interpret it that way.

The usual caveats apply.

A Company may eventually raise money for expansion, an acquisition (HOPEFULLY NOT) or an accelerated commercial opportunity. Circumstances may also change.

But that is materially different from claiming that SkinBioTherapeutics must raise cash before the year-end merely to remain solvent.

Anyone making that assertion must explain why the Board’s formal cash-flow assessment should be discounted or ignored.

That burden is particularly important now. The directors are attempting to rebuild trust after a deeply damaging period. Publishing a going-concern assessment that could unravel within months would destroy what little credibility remains.

Additionally, separate from anything said in the Business News Post, is additional scaremongering about the board's exorbitant remuneration packages, even before they are known. Obsician offers a very reasonable view on this; you can read here.

It would be an extraordinary risk for the new leadership to take.

Cash movement is not recurring cash burn

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By Financial Journalist, Alex Langton | 3 August 2026

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 29 July 2026

Mike and I have a financial interest in INSIG AI.

There comes a point in every investment when patience ceases to be a virtue and begins to resemble excuse-making.

I am increasingly concerned that Insig AI may have reached that point.

We have often made the point here at Lemming Investor that many of the Companies appearing on these pages sit at the riskier end of the market. They are frequently pre-commercial, developing new technologies or attempting to establish products in markets where adoption can take considerably longer than investors initially expect.

They therefore carry substantially more risk than the typical Companies we research for Small Company Champion. We understand that longer timelines demand greater patience, and nobody could reasonably accuse us of failing to afford Insig either.

But patience does not remove the obligation to evaluate the known evidence honestly.

We have given Insig ample coverage and have consistently tried to approach the Company with balance, allowing management the time and space needed to demonstrate commercial progress. More recently, however, we were told that elements of our analysis were wrong. No substantive counterargument was provided, nor were we shown which conclusions were supposedly incorrect or what evidence contradicted them.

Instead, the response included an alternative AI-generated assessment that appeared considerably more sympathetic to the Company’s position.

That did little to change our view. If anything, it reinforced the concern that CEO Richard Bernstein’s criticism was more defensive than analytical. Investors cannot be expected to abandon a reasoned interpretation of the available data merely because the chairman dislikes the conclusion.

We remain open to being proved wrong. But that requires evidence, not irritation.

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By Financial Journalists: Elric Langton & Alex Langton | 29 July 2026

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By Financial Journalist: Alex Langton | 23 July 2026

There comes a point in small-cap investing when a company moves beyond simply asking investors to believe the story. Execution begins to replace expectation, and operational evidence starts to do the heavy lifting.

Amcomri Group reached that point with its FY25 results.

When we first featured Amcomri at 128p, the shares were soon comfortably ahead, reaching 163p in May; the timing proved encouraging. The investment case was never especially complicated: a disciplined industrial consolidator executing a proven buy-and-build strategy across resilient engineering markets, supported by prudent capital allocation and sensible financial discipline. April's FY25 results largely vindicated that thesis, providing tangible evidence that management was delivering against the strategy it had consistently articulated.

With the shares subsequently trading comfortably above our original feature price, the market appeared to be recognising that progress.

However, yesterday’s placing leaves me somewhat irked.

Not because insiders sold stock—indeed, there are perfectly rational arguments for broadening the shareholder register and improving liquidity—but because of how the transaction was structured. As discussed below, the process once again illustrates an all-too-familiar feature of AIM: when discounted shares are allocated, institutions are invited to participate, while existing retail shareholders are left to absorb the consequences from the sidelines.

In many respects, management did exactly what they said they would do. Yet the transaction highlights a long-standing feature of the AIM market that deserves greater scrutiny—not because Amcomri is unique, but because it is so typical.

The engineering group’s “Buy, Improve, Build” strategy has been well received by investors, and the company’s operational execution has generally inspired confidence. None of that changed when it announced the sale of 7.4m existing shares—equivalent to 10.29% of the issued share capital—at 135p, compared with the previous closing price of 152p.

This was not a fundraising. The company received no proceeds. Approximately £10m flowed entirely to five existing shareholders, four of whom were directors or their investment vehicles.

On the face of it, the rationale is entirely reasonable.

Prior to the transaction, Deputy Chairman and co-founder Paul McGowan beneficially owned almost 39% of the company, while major shareholder Jeffrey Hecktman controlled a further 13%. Such concentration inevitably restricts liquidity and can deter larger institutional investors who require a meaningful free float before committing capital.

Reducing that concentration is sensible corporate housekeeping rather than a sign of diminished conviction.

Indeed, the directors have gone out of their way to demonstrate precisely that. This represents the founders’ first meaningful realisation since establishing the business in 2022. McGowan still retains 32.58% of the company, while Chief Executive Hugh Whitcomb sold only around one quarter of his holding. All participating sellers have also agreed to a 12-month lock-up, reinforcing the message that this was intended to broaden the register rather than facilitate an exit.

Viewed purely through that lens, there is very little to criticise.

Where the Questions Begin

The issue is not why the shares were sold.

It is how they were sold.

The placing price of 135p was published in the launch announcement before the bookbuild opened.

That seemingly small detail fundamentally alters the nature of the transaction.

Accelerated bookbuilds are normally defended on practical grounds. Institutions bid overnight, demand determines price, and because pricing remains fluid there is little opportunity to accommodate retail participation.

That argument carries weight—when genuine price discovery is taking place.

Here, however, the price had already been determined.

The subsequent announcement confirmed the placing was oversubscribed.

Yet an oversubscribed placing at a pre-determined price is not evidence that the market discovered fair value. It is evidence that demand comfortably exceeded supply at the chosen price. This sort of gaslighting also irks.

That naturally raises a question.

Could the shares have been sold at a higher price?

Perhaps not materially so. But if institutional demand comfortably exceeded the stock available at 135p, it is reasonable to ask whether the 11.2% discount was larger than strictly necessary.

Ultimately, that cost was borne by every existing shareholder.

The Retail Question

It also raises another issue.

If the price was fixed before the process began, why were retail investors excluded?

The usual explanation—that an overnight institutional bookbuild cannot accommodate a simultaneous retail offer—appears considerably weaker when the placing price has already been established.

Platforms such as PrimaryBid and others have repeatedly demonstrated that fixed-price retail participation is perfectly achievable.

To be fair, there is a legitimate counterargument.

The objective was clearly to broaden institutional ownership and improve liquidity. Existing retail shareholders purchasing additional shares would do little to increase free float or attract larger funds.

That rationale is entirely understandable. But it also means retail investors absorbed the dilutionary effect of the discount while being denied the opportunity to participate on identical terms.

Institutions received the discounted shares. Retail investors simply watched the market price adjust.

One further point caught my attention.

The launch announcement disclosed outstanding Long-Term Incentive Plan awards, including approximately 800,000 options held by CEO Hugh Whitcomb and around 457,000 by Finance Director Neil O’Neill.

Those option disclosures do not appear in the results announcement. If they did, I missed it.

Whitcomb sold approximately 1.16m shares, reducing his reported holding to 4.83%.

However, once those outstanding options are considered, his overall exposure remains considerably higher than the headline shareholding alone might suggest.

I’m not suggesting there’s something improper about this.

The observation is simply that many investors read only the results announcement, not both RNS releases side by side — assuming they read past the headline. As a consequence, the market’s immediate impression of management alignment may be less complete than the underlying position warrants.

I’m just irked the process happened to favour one class of shareholder over another. That has become so commonplace on AIM that many investors scarcely notice it any longer.

Yet it remains a choice.

And where a placing price is fixed in advance at an 11% discount, it is reasonable to ask whether the shareholders funding that discount should at least have been given the opportunity to participate alongside the institutions benefiting from it.

Moan concluded.

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Opinions

We offer no advice and do not solicit the purchase of shares in any company we discuss. However, shares go up and down in value, making your financial situation risky.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible, but stress that you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.

By Financial Journalist: Alex Langton | 22 July 2026

Mike, Elric, and I all have a financial interest in SkinBioTherapeutics.

I have seen some rather crass fear-porn from my good friend Mike Caine and my considerably less good friend Tom Winnifrith, suggesting that SkinBioTherapeutics’ largest shareholder, Mark Dixon, is now exceedingly close to being forced to make an offer for the Company.

The underlying arithmetic may be worth watching. The melodrama is not.

I don’t expect a bid.

I am highly confident Dixon has acquired further shares previously held by OptiBiotix Health. Winnifrith appears to believe OptiBiotix now owes the market another TR-1. He is wrong. SkinBioTherapeutics announced on 5 May 2026 that OptiBiotix’s holding had fallen to 2.2%. Once below the relevant disclosure threshold, it ceased to be listed as a significant shareholder and would not ordinarily be required to issue further TR-1 notifications simply because it sold more stock.

Too much ouzo for Tom, methinks.

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 21 July 2026

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 20 July 2026

Mike and I have a financial interest in INSIG AI.

Insig AI’s first step into digital assets is certainly interesting. Whether it proves transformational is another matter.

The headline is straightforward enough: the Company has committed €300k to Belgian start-up ATM Labs B.V., trading as 4Mica, through a zero-interest convertible loan note. If converted, Insig AI would own 2.94% of the business on a fully diluted basis.

Work backwards, and the implied post-money valuation is around €10.2m. For a pre-revenue, early-stage AI infrastructure business, that is neither especially cheap nor obviously excessive. Seed-stage AI companies are frequently valued on potential rather than financial performance.

The more important question for shareholders is not the valuation, but what this investment actually represents.

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By Financial Journalist, Alex Langton | 20 July 2026

Elric and I have a financial interest in Pulsar

A 143% increase in the company’s equity incentive reserve secured approval, but almost one in seven votes opposed it. The AGM results reveal less about remuneration than they leave unanswered.

Pulsar Helium’s AGM results looked routine at first glance. Every resolution passed. The six-member board remains unchanged, with each director re-elected on more than 98.6% support, while the auditor’s reappointment received 99.4%.

Had the announcement ended there, few investors would have looked twice and I would have nothing to post.

Instead, the final two resolutions deserve closer attention.

I’m angry; the old duffer is angry.

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The only meaningful protest

The renewal of the Stock Option Plan passed with 86.04% support, while amendments to the Equity Incentive Plan (EIP) scraped through with 86%. Around 8.4m shares were voted against both measures.

In isolation, 86% is still a comfortable majority. In context, however, it stands out.

When every other resolution attracted support comfortably above 98%, a near-14% rebellion focused solely on executive incentives cannot simply be dismissed as background noise. It suggests a meaningful group of shareholders were satisfied with the board’s stewardship but considerably less comfortable with its remuneration proposals.

A significant expansion

The approved amendments increase the EIP reserve from 7.4m shares to 18m shares.

That represents an additional 10.6m shares, or an increase of approximately 143%.

The reserve may be used for Restricted Share Units (RSUs), Performance Share Units (PSUs) and Deferred Share Units (DSUs), benefiting directors, officers, employees and consultants. Alongside this sits a separate Stock Option Plan, also renewed at the meeting.

None of this is unusual for a junior exploration company. Equity incentives are often essential where conserving cash remains a priority.

The question is not whether incentive schemes should exist.

The question is how they operate.

The information investors don’t have

The AGM announcement tells shareholders how many shares were authorised.

It does not tell them how those shares are expected to be allocated.

Nor does it disclose the performance hurdles attached to any future PSU awards.

That omission is important because not all equity awards are created equal.

Performance Share Units can be an excellent mechanism for aligning management with shareholders—provided the performance criteria are demanding, measurable and tied to genuine value creation.

Restricted Share Units and Deferred Share Units, by contrast, often vest primarily through continued employment rather than operational achievement.

Without disclosure of the intended allocation between these instruments, investors simply cannot judge how performance-oriented the enlarged pool actually is.

Timing inevitably shapes perception

The vote also follows shortly after Pulsar’s July fundraising at 75p, which diluted existing shareholders by roughly 10%.

Management argued the capital raise would strengthen the balance sheet and move the company towards becoming self-funding.

That rationale is perfectly reasonable. Equally, shareholders are entitled to ask whether substantially increasing the available incentive pool immediately afterwards represents the right sequencing.

There is nothing improper about expanding incentive capacity.

There is, however, a legitimate debate over whether investors should first see the operational milestones that justified the fundraising begin to materialise.

Questions that deserve answers

To provide greater clarity, I have asked Pulsar’s investor relations team three straightforward questions:

1. What performance conditions apply to PSUs granted under the amended Equity Incentive Plan, and over what measurement period?

2. How does the company expect the 18m-share reserve to be divided between directors, employees and consultants?

3. Assuming full utilisation of both the Equity Incentive Plan and the renewed Stock Option Plan, what would the fully diluted share count become?

If the company demonstrates robust, performance-based hurdles, that would strengthen confidence in the scheme.

If those details remain absent, investors will inevitably continue to draw their own conclusions.

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Opinions

We do not offer advice or solicit the purchase of shares in any companies we discuss. However, share values fluctuate, making your financial situation risky.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible, but we stress you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.

By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 14 July 2026

I have a financial Interest in Poolbeg Pharma.

Over three decades, I have interviewed/communicated with countless executives promising commercial breakthroughs, transformational partnerships and imminent value creation. Some delivered. Many did not. The difference was rarely found in the quality of the presentation or the bullshit embedded in an email or telephone chat.

It was found in the evidence.

That is why a recent interview with Poolbeg Chief Executive Jeremy Skillington and Executive Chair Cathal Friel caught my attention. Not because they sounded enthusiastic —that’s partly the role — but because, for perhaps the first time since Poolbeg was founded, management no longer sounded like a team trying to persuade investors that the science works.

They sounded like executives discussing how it might be commercialised. That is a subtle but important distinction.

Confidence is not evidence. Yet confidence that appears increasingly rooted in evidence can itself become a useful data point.

There is quite a lot going on in an interview that barely lasts more than 8 minutes.

Let’s start with:

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A Different Kind of Oncology Proposition

Most oncology Companies are attempting to treat cancer directly.

Poolbeg is addressing one of the most serious complications created by some of the most effective cancer treatments.

POLB 001 is being developed to prevent Cytokine Release Syndrome, or CRS, a potentially life-threatening inflammatory response associated with immunotherapies including CAR-T treatments and T-cell engagers.

CRS can cause severe hypotension, respiratory failure, kidney injury and, in extreme cases, death. I have personal experience with the first two conditions. It is also one reason patients may require prolonged hospital observation following treatment, as clinicians cannot reliably predict who will develop the condition.

Poolbeg’s approach is straightforward. Rather than waiting for CRS to occur and then treating it reactively, POLB 001 is administered orally in advance to prevent the inflammatory cascade from taking hold. Essentially, closing the barn door before the horse bolts.

Should the current clinical trial validate that approach, the implications could extend far beyond patient safety. It could change the economics and practical delivery of cancer care.

Prevention Makes for a Better Commercial Conversation

One point made by Skillington deserves more attention.

Existing CRS treatments are largely reactive. Symptoms emerge before intervention begins. Poolbeg’s ambition is to prevent the syndrome altogether.

A preventative oral therapy would likely reduce hospital admissions, shorten observation periods, ease pressure on specialist oncology centres and potentially allow more patients to receive treatment closer to home.

I wonder what the data on cash saved in the system would look like?

Importantly, Poolbeg is not asking pharmaceutical Companies to replace their existing cancer therapies. It is proposing to make them safer, easier and potentially less costly to administer.

Commercially, that is a far easier proposition.

POLB 001 would not compete with established immunotherapies. It would support and enhance their use.

Listening to What Management Emphasised

Perhaps the most revealing feature of the interview was not simply what management said, but what it chose to emphasise.

Skillington spoke relatively little about molecular biology. Instead, he discussed healthcare economics, reimbursement, hospital capacity, patient pathways, pricing, efficiency and pharmaceutical partnerships.

That suggests Poolbeg increasingly sees itself not merely as a Company attempting to prove a scientific hypothesis, but as one preparing a commercially relevant licensing opportunity.

That represents a meaningful evolution in the investment risk.

Johnson & Johnson and an Important Point of De-Risking

Skillington also explained that preclinical work undertaken alongside J&J indicated that POLB 001 does not appear to interfere with the efficacy of the underlying cancer immunotherapy.

That may sound like a routine scientific observation. It is not.

Any pharmaceutical Company considering a supportive oncology treatment will ask an obvious question: does the drug compromise the effectiveness of our therapy?

If the answer is yes, commercial discussions are unlikely to progress far.

If the answer is no, one of the most important scientific and commercial concerns has already been addressed.

This is not evidence of an imminent licensing agreement. However, it appears to remove a potentially serious obstacle from the due-diligence process.

Why the Fundraising Makes Strategic Sense

Poolbeg’s recent £3.5m placing divided opinion, with some investors understandably focused on dilution.

My attention was drawn elsewhere.

Licensing discussions rarely favour Companies approaching the end of their cash runway. A weak balance sheet gives the potential partner leverage and can force management to accept less attractive terms simply because time is running out.

By extending its funding runway into 2028, Poolbeg has bought itself negotiating time.

Time to complete the clinical work. Time to assess the data properly. Time to negotiate without an immediate funding deadline hanging over the process.

Whether that ultimately produces a superior commercial agreement remains unknown. Nevertheless, the strategic logic of raising now, rather than slowly walking towards an important clinical milestone from a weakening financial position, appears sound.

Alignment Matters

One reason Friel’s confidence carries greater weight is that it is accompanied by something tangible. His own money.

Over the years, I have encountered several executives at Companies including OptiBiotix Health, SkinBioTherapeutics and others further back whose confidence was not matched by meaningful personal investment.

That experience has left me with a simple view.

Optimism is free. Buying shares with hard cash is not.

A lack of substantial ownership does not automatically mean management lacks conviction. However, meaningful financial alignment remains one of the strongest signals executives can send to shareholders.

Friel has invested approximately £1.5m of his own money in Poolbeg, despite already being the Company’s largest shareholder.

That does not guarantee POLB 001 will succeed. Markets are littered with founders who backed businesses that ultimately failed.

What it does demonstrate is that Friel’s confidence is supported by meaningful personal financial exposure. His interests rise and fall alongside those of ordinary shareholders.

There remains one area where I would welcome stronger alignment.

Jeremy Skillington is central to the development of POLB 001 and to the commercial discussions now taking place. A more substantial personal investment from the Chief Executive would, in my view, provide an additional vote of confidence.

That is not a criticism of his commitment. It is simply an acknowledgement that meaningful executive ownership often strengthens investor confidence.

Skillington holds:

• 873,497 ordinary shares, representing approximately 0.12% of the company.

He also holds a substantial long-term incentive package:

• 15,000,000 share options, comprising:

  • 5,000,000 options at 10p

  • 5,000,000 options at 15p

  • 5,000,000 options at 15p

• These options expire in July 2031.

While Skillington's option package provides substantial long-term incentive, I would personally welcome a larger direct equity holding. Ordinary shares purchased with personal capital send a particularly strong signal of alignment, especially at this stage of the company's development.

Confidence Is Not Certainty

Friel’s statement that he was “almost certain” the clinical trial would succeed inevitably attracted attention. Some doubters will argue this statement is typical of Friel, and therefore should be ignored.

Fair enough; Investors should not mistake that confidence for clinical evidence.

Drug development has humbled many experienced and highly credible executives. Biology remains indifferent to optimism.

The more useful question is why management appears more confident today than it did 12 months ago.

The answer seems to lie in the accumulation of progress: human challenge data supporting the biological mechanism, an established safety profile, patient dosing underway, preclinical work with J&J, pharmaceutical due diligence through an open virtual data room, and a strengthened balance sheet that removes immediate financing pressure.

None of these developments proves clinical success. Collectively, however, they help explain why management increasingly sounds focused on commercial execution rather than scientific persuasion.

My Own Decision

I have already disclosed that I have a position following the placing.

Not because I regard success as guaranteed. Far from it.

Poolbeg remains a binary investment. The ongoing clinical trial will either validate the programme or it will not. Should the data disappoint, insider buying, executive confidence and commercial planning will count for very little.

Investing, however, is rarely about eliminating risk. It is about determining whether the balance between risk and potential reward has shifted sufficiently in your favour.

It has, without doubt, but risks remain.

For me, that balance appears more attractive today than at any point since I first invested.

Not because management sounded bullish, but because the foundations beneath that bullishness appear stronger.

Conclusion: The most interesting aspect of the interview was not the optimism. It was the maturity of the discussion.

This no longer sounded like management attempting to convince investors that an idea might work. It sounded like a team considering how a successful therapy could fit into real-world oncology practice and how pharmaceutical partners might assess its value.

The science must still deliver. The clinical data remain the ultimate arbiter.

Yet patient dosing has begun, commercial planning is becoming more detailed, reimbursement and healthcare economics are part of the conversation, J&J-related preclinical work has addressed an important concern, pharmaceutical due diligence is under way, and the balance sheet has been strengthened ahead of potentially significant negotiations.

Poolbeg increasingly appears to be behaving less like a Company trying to prove a concept and more like one preparing to commercialise it.

Whether that results in the licensing agreement Friel clearly anticipates will be determined by the data.

For now, I remain cautiously optimistic.

Not because management gave an enthusiastic interview, but because its conviction appears increasingly supported by tangible progress.

As always, the clinical results will have the final word.

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Opinions

We offer no advice or solicit the purchase of shares in any companies we discuss. However, shares go up and down in value, making your financial situation risky.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible but stress you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.

By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 14 July 2026

I have a financial Interest in Poolbeg Pharma.

One could argue my timing was less than ideal. Including the market spread, I am already sitting on a paper loss of around 20%. That is never comfortable. Yet my investment case was never built around the next few trading sessions. It was built around the clinical and commercial catalysts still to come. Viewed through that lens, I regard today’s fundraising as a sensible, if inevitably dilutive, decision. I’ll explain why.

Poolbeg Pharma has raised £3.5m through the placing of 58.3m new ordinary shares at 6p, representing a 16% discount to the previous closing price. Executive Chair Cathal Friel also participated, investing £250k alongside shareholders.

Friel's participation is encouraging, although it is worth noting that he has a long track record of backing fundraisings across the companies he helps build. As such, investors may view this as consistent with his established approach rather than a standalone signal of exceptional conviction. A larger personal investment from Chief Executive Jeremy Skillington would arguably have carried greater weight, given his responsibility for executing the company's clinical and commercial strategy. However, no such investment was disclosed as part of this placing.

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 13 July 2026

I have a financial Interest in Poolbeg Pharma — Again.

Poolbeg Pharma has crossed an important line.

Today’s announcement that the first patient has been dosed in the POLB 001 TOPICAL clinical trial does not, by itself, validate the investment case. It does, however, move the Company from preparation into clinical execution, and for a small-cap biotech, that matters.

Poolbeg is no longer simply telling investors what POLB 001 might become. It is now generating evidence to determine whether the asset has genuine partnering value. That makes the next few months important.

The key line is simple enough: the first patient has now been dosed in the TOPICAL trial.

The trial is evaluating POLB 001 as a potential preventative therapy for Cytokine Release Syndrome, or CRS, in patients with relapsed/refractory multiple myeloma receiving teclistamab, an approved bispecific antibody supplied by Johnson & Johnson at no cost to Poolbeg.

That Johnson & Johnson supply point remains notable. It does not mean J&J is endorsing Poolbeg commercially, and investors should avoid over-reading it. But it does indicate that the study has sufficient clinical relevance to secure access to a key approved therapy without Poolbeg bearing the drug cost itself.

More importantly, the dosing of the first patient starts the clock on the clinical evidence investors have been waiting for. Poolbeg says interim data remain on track for late summer 2026. That puts the company firmly inside the data window.

Virtual Data Room

Investors should pay particular attention to this section.

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By Financial Journalist: Elric Langton | 13 July 2026

Brave Bison’s possible offer for System1 is ambitious, strategically credible and potentially transformative. It is also the largest and most complicated step yet in Oliver Green’s acquisition-led expansion.

The logic is not difficult to understand. System1 would add a data-led, high-margin marketing effectiveness platform to Brave’s existing agency operations and MiniMBA training business.

The proposed enlarged group would generate pro-forma net revenue of £79m and adjusted EBITDA of approximately £14m, before any savings from duplicated board, plc, property and IT costs.

That would create three clear divisions:

• Marketing Effectiveness through System1;

• Marketing Excellence through MiniMBA; and

• Marketing Delivery through Brave Bison’s agency operations.

Together, the group would span marketing measurement, professional training and campaign execution. It is a more compelling proposition than simply adding another digital agency.

The 327p headline needs context

The proposed terms are 68p in cash and 2.7553 new Brave Bison shares for each System1 share.

Brave Bison says this equates to approximately 327p, using its 20-day volume-weighted average share price of 94p.

However, using Friday’s Brave Bison closing price, the offer is worth closer to 317p.

Against System1’s Friday close of 301.2p, that represents a premium of only around 5%.

The advertised 65% premium to System1’s undisturbed 198p share price is technically correct, but less relevant to shareholders deciding whether to accept today. System1 has already re-rated significantly since Brave Bison acquired its initial 28% holding.

The effective offer value will also move with Brave’s share price. At approximately 84.6p, the proposed consideration would be worth no more than System1’s Friday closing price.

That leaves System1 shareholders exposed to the bidder’s share price performance before any transaction is completed.

Dilution and debt must be justified

System1 shareholders would own approximately 19% of the enlarged Brave Bison.

That is material dilution for existing Brave Bison investors, although they would gain ownership of the remaining 72% of System1 in return.

The cash element appears manageable and would likely require borrowing of around £6m–£7m. No equity fundraising is required, but Brave Bison would move from net cash to debt via a new credit facility.

Neither dilution nor borrowing is automatically a problem. What matters is whether the transaction increases earnings and free cash flow per Brave Bison share.

The announcement does not yet provide:

• expected earnings-per-share accretion;

• quantified annual cost savings;

• integration costs;

• pro-forma net debt; or

• a timetable for delivering synergies.

Those figures will determine whether this is genuinely value-creating or merely enlarges the group.

System1 may be under-earning

The offer values System1 at £43.1m, equivalent to 20.4 times FY26 operating profit. That sounds expensive.

However, FY26 appears to have been a weak earnings year for System1, despite the strategic value of its products, customer base and proprietary advertising-response data.

If profitability recovers and Brave removes duplicated listed-company and central costs, the effective acquisition multiple could fall quickly.

The announcement also implies that System1 contributes a substantial proportion of the enlarged group’s £14m adjusted EBITDA.

A genuine strategic step forward

Brave has increasingly moved beyond its origins as a collection of digital agencies.

MiniMBA added a high-quality training platform. System1 would bring proprietary data, behavioural science tools, and scalable marketing technology.

Approximately 58% of enlarged-group net revenue would come from platform solutions, according to Brave. If delivered, that would materially improve the quality of the revenue mix and reduce reliance on labour-intensive agency work.

The enlarged group would also have more than 700 customers, broader geographic exposure, and lower customer concentration.

Potential inclusion in AIM 100 and improved liquidity would be welcome, although these are secondary attractions. The success of the transaction will depend on earnings, cash conversion, and execution rather than on index membership.

Summary View

There is much to like about the proposal.

The industrial logic is strong, the funding appears manageable, and System1 could significantly improve Brave Bison’s strategic positioning.

However, the 327p headline valuation overstates the current market value of the offer. At Friday’s prices, the implied consideration was nearer 317p, leaving System1 shareholders with only a modest premium.

For Brave Bison shareholders, the key issue is whether surrendering approximately 19% of the enlarged equity and taking on fresh debt will produce genuine per-share earnings growth.

The investor presentation on 16 July needs to provide a clear answer.

Until then, the possible offer looks strategically attractive, but the financial case remains to be fully proven.

Opinions

We offer no advice or solicit the purchase of shares in any companies we discuss. However, shares go up and down in value, making your financial situation risky.

The views and opinions contained within these editorials are for research purposes and are the opinions of the author(s). We aim to be as accurate as possible but stress you should also perform your research and never act solely on the contents of these editorials.