This sounds like an April fools’ day wind up. Or something that AI has not got quite right, some good old fashioned #fakehistory. But no! it’s true, there is an Argentinian football team called ‘Club Atletico Douglas Haig’, and ‘Douglas Mania’ is their club website. Gary Sheffield mentions it in his biography of Douglas Haig, so it must definitely be true. The mention of it on a recent episode of ‘Oh What a Lovely Podcast’ a podcast (where ‘The First World War meets popular culture and the media’) made me regret not including this little gem of information in a recent article that I have written about Haig. I am not sure how many other army commanders have football teams named after them. Not many, I’m guessing.

Only last month we were watching the antics of Messi & Co (didn’t that seem to go on forever?) and the inevitable mention of a certain Boca Juniors player’s hand of God, but it’s fair to say ‘Club Atletico Douglas Haig’ are a lot less well known than that Buenos Aires based home club of Maradona. Wikipedia informs me that they play in ‘Torneo Argentino B which is one of two leagues that form the fourth level of the Argentine football league system made up of 100+ teams playing within eight regional zones across Argentina’. Knowing next to nothing about football, I am going to take Wikipedia’s word for this and conclude that ‘Club Atletico Douglas Haig’ are not a top tier football team. They did, however, win the Pergamino football league 26 times in their history.

So how did a football team in the city of Pergamino, Argentina, come to be home to a football team that is named after the CinC of the British expeditionary force in the first world war? The story goes back to 18^th November 1918, a week after the armistice was signed, ending the hostilities on the Western Front. Argentina had been neutral throughout the conflict. It was home to many European immigrants and a number of these were employed on the railways. The club history section of the ‘Douglas Mania’ website describes how a group of railway workers decided to form a football club as they wanted to take part in local competitions. Their inaugural meeting was held in a room next to the water tank by the railway engine shed. However, to be able to be allowed to do this they had to obtain the consent of the chief of the central Argentine Railway (Mitre Railway) Ronald Leslie. Leslie allowed the club to be formed on the condition that it be named after Douglas Haig. The team adopted the name of the British CinC along with a red and black vertical striped jersey and, within 2 years, had won the association championships. All the meetings held during the formation of the club and the creation of its board of directors were held at the water tank – El Tanque.

It was not all plain sailing for the ‘Douglistas’. In the 1950s the national governing body decreed that the name of the club was not suitable and did not meet regulations, but it was too difficult to change the history of the club, not least when supporters chanted it from the terraces. Club members held their ground, and the name of Douglas Haig was retained.

It is unclear what Ronald Leslie’s connection with Haig was. Maybe he was a fellow Scot, or maybe it was simply out of respect for the hero of the hour who had led the British army. Afterall, as Gary Sheffield notes, ‘Haig emerged from the war a celebrity’. If anyone has any more info on this I would definitely be interested!

I believe a football jersey from ‘Club Atletico Douglas Haig’ is currently on display at the National WW1 Museum and Memorial in World Cup host venue Kansas City, as part of the celebrations surrounding the tournament. It is part of a special exhibition called ‘The Beautiful Game’ exploring the impact of football on people’s lives during the war. I did a search through the ‘Douglas Mania’ website (in Spanish with no translate button) to see if it was possible to acquire such a jersey but without success, I am not sure of the Spanish translation of ‘Club Merch’…

In their match last weekend, the ‘Douglistas’ drew 0-0 with ‘Club Atletico 9 de Julio’

‘mon, the Douglistas!

Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, Arum Press Ltd 2011.P344

https://ohwhatalovelypodcast.co.uk - Episode 71

David Tattersfield https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-1-articles/2021/july/Argentina-in-the-great-war

www.douglasmania.com.ar (All photos from ‘Douglas Mania’ except where noted otherwise.

National WWI Museum and Memorial. https://theworldwar.org/exhibitions/beautiful-game.

www.copaargentina.org/es/news/9901

On a bright spring day in April 1945, one thousand people from the city of Weimar were rounded up by American troops and forcibly marched up a nearby hill to view the horrors held within the Buchenwald Concentration camp, sights which reduced US General Patton to tears when he first entered the gates. Corpses lay in piles, inmates who were little more than living skeletons sat pitifully awaiting their fate, the doors to the gas ovens were open, revealing remains that had not be fully consumed by the flames. Covering their noses and mouths to evade the sickening stench, these townsfolk were forced by American soldiers to look at the terrible scenes presented to them. “Wir Haben es nicht gewusst” they chorused to a man, “we didn’t know”. One of those Weimar residents forced to take part in this march of horrors was Carl Weirich, and it is through his words, along with those of a handful of other residents of the city, that Katja Hoyer skillfully ties together the story of Weimar, through two tumultuous and violent decades in the aftermath of the First World War.

Weimar, the name is synonymous with German High Culture, home of Schiller, Goethe and Nietzsche, and the birthplace of the Bauhaus. While Germany was still suffering from its collective trauma of defeat in the First World War and the loss of hundreds of thousands of its young men, Weimar gave its name to the new post war republic where German democracy was born, its first constitution signed in the theatre in Weimar. It was a time of liberalism and hope and, at its extreme, a by-word for the decadence of the Weimar republic, mainly attributed to the night clubs and cabarets of Berlin. Famous names listed as being residents of Weimar include Marlene Dietrich, architect Walter Gropius (founder of the Bauhaus movement), and the artist Kandinsky. Many of these forward-looking progressives had to leave Weimar, and in some cases Germany, as Hitler clamped down on “degenerate art”.

Yet Weimar was also a place where the Nazi ideology found a spiritual home. Hitler visited many times, along with important Nazis such as Goebbels and Goring, returning time and time again to their favourite hotels and theatres. Ultimately though, it is a city where thousands of ordinary Germans lived and worked. Hoyer uses the first-hand accounts, diaries, letters and memoirs of these residents to tell their stories which are inexorably intertwined with the story of the rise and fall of Nazi Germany. Initially, the thuggish behaviour of the Nazis, and their cruelty towards Jews, meant that they were not popular in Weimar. Their popularity grew through the confusion of the many elections held through the 1920s and early 1930s, and as the population suffered badly in the financial crisis of the post war years through hyperinflation followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Having opened with such a distinctly disturbing scene, the foreboding of what is to come runs through Hoyer’s narrative. The reader is looking at the failure of democracy in post war Germany with the benefit of hindsight, for Carl and his fellow townsfolk there is no such luxury. The tension is strengthened with the stories of individuals who were to become the victims of the Nazis. The impending sense of dread is built up over the course of the narrative through the story of Rosa Schmidt, a Jew, who owns a hotel with her husband. The Schmidt’s hotel happens to be a favourite with members of the Nazi party, for whom Rosa cooks and caters for while simultaneously having to avoid any situation where her Jewish background could be discovered. There is Kurt Nehrling, a member of the SDP party, whose political activity is driven underground and becomes increasingly risky as the Gestapo start to infiltrate the town. For both of these perceived enemies of the Nazi regime, the end is predictable and tragic. The narrative is gripping despite the foreshadowing, which will never be subtle given the topic.

From a very different perspective, there is Emmy Sonnerman, a wannabe actress, who becomes the second Mrs Goering. Driven by the desire for fame and fortune, it is unlikely a political thought ever entered her head. Such was her ambition, she was happy living in a house that was a shrine to the first Mrs Goering, complete with a pet lion cub for company. There is Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, sister of the great philosopher Fredrich Nietzsche and who, despite holding a dislike for Hitler and being ideologically a conservative, sees the Nazis as a way of obtaining funding for the Nietzsche archive, even at the risk of manipulating the essence of Nietzsche’s writings to fit Nazi ideology. There is Harry Graf Kessler who believes that the fall of democracy leaves a choice between a Nazi government and a military dictatorship, and that the Nazi’s were the lesser of two evils. There are the school children of the city, who see their Jewish classmates gradually banned from the education system and their parents, who witness Jewish business shut down and Jews driven out of their jobs, and public life.

And in the middle is Carl Weirich, owner of a stationary shop, whose personal life is touched by tragedy all too often.

Buchenwald Concentration camp was established in 1937. Prisoners arrived by rail into the city before transportation to the camp. Townspeople from Weimar worked in industries that supplied the camps, and prisoners carried out hard labour in full sight. Nothing was hidden. Somewhere in the region of 56,000 people died at Buchenwald, and many of those were cremated, not just in the camp’s crematorium, but also in the municipal crematorium. The question is were these seemingly ordinary townsfolk entirely innocent? Surely, they must have known what was going on? Was it the case that they knew about the existence of Buchenwald concentration camp, they knew it was bad, just not how BAD? Hoyer notes that there was the crematorium manager, the registrar responsible for recording the huge numbers of deaths, and the city medical officer who complained that the municipal crematorium couldn’t keep up with the number of cremations, and complained that the black smoke emitted by the camp was a public health hazard. Yet “Wir Haben es nicht gewusst”.

In the final chapter Hoyer notes how a study of this type, which looks at the behaviour of individuals and society as a whole, can help us reach an understanding of how an ideology as inhumane and extreme as Nazism was able to take hold throughout an entire country, not just amongst fanatical group of individuals. The characters whose lives she writes about are all “complicit or complacent” in some way or for some reason. Surprisingly few of them are easily identifiable as dyed-in-the-wool ideological Nazis. Most importantly though, by posing the question of what should these ordinary residents of an ordinary German town have done, Hoyer is asking you what you would have done in their place. What level of cognitive dissonance would make you behave in the same way as Hoyer’s protagonists if you were not ideologically a Nazi? Would you be like Rosa, hiding away and pretending not to be a Jew whilst serving the very people that you are hiding from, or would you be like the opportunistic Emmy Sonnerman and Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche? Alternatively, would you be like Carl, who observes the threat to the Jews in his diary but, like every one else, does nothing, perhaps too wrapped up in his own personal troubles? Can you regard any of these people of Weimar as “complicit” in what happened or was mere “complacency” to blame, much in the same way as the “boiling a frog” analogy works. In the final paragraph Hoyer poses a question for our time. In a similar situation would we realise what is happening, and be able to stop it in order to safeguard our freedom and democracy?

After being part of the group selected to observe first-hand the conditions inside the camp, things were only to get worse for Carl. He was then detailed to be part of a clearing party tasked with hideous job of clearing the camp and burying the dead. Did he deserve that? Should he have been held to blame for what happened along with other ordinary Germans? The American liberators of the camps certainly thought that so.

Lying just north of the Devil’s Elbow and south of the large car park at Glenshee ski centre, barely visible from the A93 road which passes on the hill above them, are a group of large concrete blocks or “cubes” measuring approximately 5ft x 3ft each. I have driven past this area many times having skied in Glenshee, and have climbed all of the Munros (hills over 3000ft) there, but have never noticed these concrete blocks before, their covering of moss and their grey colouring blending them into the backdrop of rock and heather. They are set in soft mossy ground leading down to the little stream of Alt a Choire Sheiridh. Further up the slope broken up bits of the cubes are strewn around.

These concrete blocks comprise part of the western end of the Cowie Line, a Second World War anti-tank stop line running between Glenshee in the Cairngorm mountains, and ending on the coast at Stonehaven, 16 miles south of Aberdeen. It was in Glenshee that a intrepid band of the We Have Ways Highland IC started their adventure, following the Cowie line eastwards with stops to inspect the various remaining elements of this system of defences. The first stop of the day was to look at these substantial concrete anti tank defences, after all that concrete has been left unbothered for years!

On the other side of the road, high up above the road, there is also a pillbox, standing like a silent sentry overlooking both the north and south approaches to the Glen. A little path from the car park at the ski centre leads up the hill to it. The pillbox itself is in very good condition despite the obviously harsh weather conditions that it has endured over the years, and obviously it is not subject to the coastal erosion that many of these concrete structures are. The lack of graffiti, and empty Tennents lager cans and cider bottles in it are testament to the few visitors that it receives, again unlike many of its contemporaries. Originally there was a second pill box on the west side of the road just opposite from where the concrete blocks are located, but that has long since been demolished. The concrete blocks on the west side of the road and immediately alongside the old road on its east side have also vanished, all as a result of road improvement works over the years. Standing here on a chilly, grey blustery day (Scotland in June!) it seems hard to believe that anyone really thought that German Panzers could make their way southwards through the mountains but in 1940 the threat of invasion seemed very real.

Construction work on the Cowie Line began on the 11^th of May 1940, mere days after the formation of the Home Defence Force. Although it was always thought the main invasion would come through the south of England, an attack from the north on Scotland’s vulnerable wide east coast beaches could not be ruled out since Norway had fallen to the Nazis the previous month.

The forces tasked with home defence in Scotland included Royal Engineer and Pioneer units attached to the 9^th and 51^st Highland Divisions. They were ill equipped for the task, and lacking the necessary mobility to be able to man the positions easily so an alternative solution was fixed upon. This involved the construction of a large number of static defenses, particularly in coastal areas seen as being vulnerable to an invading German force. Set inland from these coastal defences were a system of “stop lines” should the coastal defences have failed to do their job, and a secondary means of defence was required to stop the invading German forces. The Cowie Line is one of these stop lines.

The route south from the beaches in the Aberdeen area would not have been an easy road to take for any invader. The pass of Glenshee would have been the only viable option through the centre of the Cairngorm mountains should an invading force had been forced to head west from Aberdeen via Deeside before routing to the south. Although the route south from Ballatar to loch Muick is accessible via good tracks and drovers roads, as is Glen Tanar through to Glen Esk, presumably the it was felt that the German war machines wouldn’t manage the climb over the Mounth so defences were concentrated on the next three most viable options.

To the east of Glenshee, the Cairn o’ Mount road (B974) which is an old military road running between Banchory in the north to Fettercairn in the south, and whose first use can be traced to the Roman invasion of Scotland, would be the next option as a route to the south. The Slug road (A957) which is an old drovers road would have been a further possible route from the A93 to the coast at Stonehaven and defences are located at river crossings along this route. The final, and most obvious route from the beaches in the north would be through Aberdeen and would follow the flatter land along the coast directly south. Defences were installed along these routes south and, should it have been necessary, bridges would have been destroyed as a further obstacle for the invading German army.

Our next stop took us north east to the little town of Aboyne alongside the river Dee. Such dedicated historian-ing (is that a verb?) is hungry work and so lunch was had at the lovely Black Faced Sheep café, an old favourite haunt of mine from when I used to run on the hills in the area. After lunch we took a look at a pillbox sitting just up above the road, and close to what would have been the Deeside railway line (now a long-distance walking track – Thanks Mr Beeching) covering the approach road from the east. This would have been a line of defence that the invading force would have needed to get past if they were to attempt to head out to Braemar and then south by the pass of Glenshee. This pillbox was constructed out of local stone rather than from the usual concrete, although its central blast wall was brick as is more normal.

The next route to the south runs from Crathes to Fettercairn via the Cairn O’Mount. Before reaching the high point on the road there is an old stone bridge dating from 1680 which crosses the River Dye in a dip in the road, with a newer bridge constructed alongside it which now carries the traffic. On both sides of the road stand pillboxes guarding the approach from the north. One of them is now incorporated into the garden of a farmhouse. The second is designed so as to beautifully blend in with an existing dry stone wall, concealed beneath the trees.

Despite the Cowie Line taking its name from this river, the river itself does not originate in Glenshee or the Cairngorm mountains, instead rising above Hobseat about 15 miles to the west of the coast. Our next stop was a car park just off the Slug road above the river. Before checking out the concrete it was time for a wee snack and a discussion on the merits of various bakeries in Scotland. The iced rings kindly supplied by Andy L were from the legendary bakers Harry Gow in Elgin.

Concrete anti tank blocks stand each side of the river concealed in the undergrowth. These ones have, for some reason, large stones set in the concrete on the top giving them the look of a lego brick, or even an Empire biscuit (#joobjoob - IYKYK). Nobody was really quite sure what purpose these large stones served though, it’s not as though you can give a tank a puncture is it? Both of our next pillboxes were in fields surrounded by sturdy fences, clearly to deter access. As there was a group of us and it was broad daylight we contented ourselves with taking photos from a safe distance and not annoying any landowners. One of the pill boxes was on the side of the hill overlooking the river and the other appeared to be nestled into the valley right next to the river.

Finally, we reached Stonehaven. Definitely time for another snack and, as we were at the seaside, what else is there to do but go for ice cream. Aunty Betty’s ice cream shop is a bit of an institution in the North East and large ice creams fueled the final part of our adventure.

Down by the river Cowie there are yet more concrete anti tank cubes. Again I must have passed these many times without noticing when I worked in Stonehaven. A pillbox nestles on the steep north bank of the river and a large covering of concrete, now concealed under moss and broken up in places, formed a revetted embankment artificially steepening the south bank of the river to ensure that tanks and other motorised vehicles wouldn’t be able to climb out of the river bed heading southwards. We walked along the river underneath the impressive arches Glenury viaduct, which carries the rail line between Dundee and Aberdeen, and which no doubt would have been blown up should the Germans ever have got to it.

Of course, by now it was beer and dinner time so we headed to the Marine hotel located on the harbour for the final bit of post concrete bothering war waffle.

Thanks to Nick for all his planning and for coming up with such a great route.

References - Barclay, Gordon, The Cowie Line: A Second World War Stop Line West of Stonehaven, Aberdeenshire, Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland 135 (2005) P119-161 (This is the source for the above map showing the Stop Lines of Scotland)

My thanks must go to Andy Moody and Phil Watson whose advice and ideas have proved invaluable in the development of this piece of work

~

The most important revisionist work on the topic of Haig’s command has been carried out by Professor Gary Sheffield. His book Forgotten Victory, described on the Goodreads website as “challenging and controversial”, was published in 2001. In this book Sheffield attempted to debunk some of the myths surrounding the First World War, and Haig’s command. Forgotten Victory challenges long held beliefs, those being it was a mistake for Britain to enter the war, that it was a futile war, and he carefully dissects these long held popular beliefs. Building on the work of Terraine, Bond, and Falls, Gary Sheffield looks at the background to Haig’s operations on the Western Front including social, political and logistical factors, all of which give a context to the debate. The most significant of these was that Haig, and the UK, were the junior partners in the alliance with France, and therefore subject to all of the difficulties that fighting in a coalition could bring. Haig had another battle on his hands dealing with a less than supportive Prime Minister, it was noted that he “had more enemies than the central powers.” [i] Similarly to the 1996 Timewatch programme, there were some angry reviews because a historian was trying to seemingly defend the indefensible. In the later revision of the book from where the above reference is taken, Gary Sheffield notes how he felt that the success of the original[ii] book showed that the public were interested in the debate. Forgotten Victory received the seal of approval of other eminent historians such as Richard Holmes.[iii]

Seven years previously J.P Harris, at the time senior lecturer in war studies at Sandhurst, had published his volume Douglas Haig and the First World War coming to a different conclusion to that of Gary Sheffield. Harris clearly states his opinions on Haig in the introduction of the book, and lays the blame for the loss of so many men firmly at Haig’s feet.

“His capacity to “read” battles and broader strategic situations often proved poor and he bears much responsibility for British losses in1915–1917 that were excessive in relation to the results achieved”

Harris accuses Haig of failing to adapt to the conditions of warfare on the Western Front,[iv] diverging from the ideas of Gary Sheffield who writes that Haig did learn and adapt. Sheffield emphasises that Haig, and the British army, went through a “learning curve”. Unfortunately, it was a slow learning curve resulting in battles with catastrophic numbers of men lost and did not achieve Haig’s desired breakthrough. It interesting to see how two eminent historians with access to the same first-hand accounts, papers and documentary evidence have come to differing conclusions from their archival research, and goes to show that the debate over Haig’s leadership is far from being resolved.

“The result is that there are now two distinct perceptions of the First World War. The majority of people view it as an unique cultural event essentially “outside” history. In contrast, a small group of historians see the war in the context of political and military history”[v]

This point is picked up by Andrew Weist in his chapter Douglas Haig and the Somme, contained within the volume At All Costs: The British Army on the Western Front in 1916. Weist’s work represents the latest available study of Haig at the Battle of the Somme, and in it he looks at the comparison between the work of Gary Sheffield with that of JP Harris. Harris concludes that the disastrous loss of life on the Somme was down to Haig’s command and errors that Haig made in planning the offensive. Gary Sheffield on the other hand argues that Haig was a realist and understood that success on the Western Front would always be through a battle of attrition, of wearing down the enemy’s resources and morale.[vi] Weist takes this a step further and describes how Haig’s planning showed this tension between his need for attrition in which to “wear down” the enemy, against his desire to achieve the decisive breakthrough that he craved. Unfortunately, the first day of the Somme tended toward the breakthrough, with Haig rejecting Rawlinson’s preferred “bite and hold” offensive with limited objectives[vii] The result was huge numbers of casualties and the ongoing damage to Haig’s reputation.

Like Gary Sheffield, Andrew Weist highlights how Haig faced an unprecedented situation with the rapid expansion of the BEF, a vast inexperienced army of volunteers who for the most part would learn on the job, and the necessary rapid promotion of officers and commanders to lead these new divisions of men. This resulted in a difference in command abilities which manifested themselves during battle. Weist also notes the restrictions that Haig faced from being tied down in coalition warfare.[viii]

Haig has been criticised for not calling a halt to the battle of the Somme earlier. This may have preserved soldier’s lives, but Haig understood that he had to maintain the pressure on the Western Front. This was made clear to him during a heated meeting with Joffre on 3^rd July 1916 where Joffre was adamant that the offensive must continue. The French were fully engaged at Verdun and an offensive on the Somme by the British would take some of the pressure off them. Thanks to his own Prime Minister, as well as the Secretary of State for War from whom these directions originated, Haig was the junior partner in the relationship and, for the most part, had to acquiesce to the supreme commander’s demands.[ix] Intelligence reports throughout July indicated that German morale was failing. This also offered Haig an incentive to continue[x] and, as previously mentioned, Haig’s character did tend towards being overly optimistic, based on the evidence with which he was presented.

Weist points out that although Haig should hold the blame for not taking Rawlinson’s advice in attacking the German defences in depth, a factor that diluted the effectiveness of the artillery on the opening day of the battle, Haig did learn and adapt. In the case of the battle of the Somme, Haig was able to adapt quickly. This was demonstrated on the 14^th July when the BEF attacked again, but this time succeeded in most of their more limited objectives. Haig had learned the lessons from the first day of the Battle of the Somme and applied them. Thanks to these lessons learned in previous battles, two years later the BEF had become a formidable fighting force, but for many the loss of life at the Somme is what Haig will be most remembered for.

As can be seen, over the years revisionist historians have attempted to introduce nuance and context, as well as indisputable facts, into the debate surrounding Haig with mixed success. The historians named above are just some of those of the many who have written about Haig and the Great War, but this should in no way be seen as an exhaustive list. There are many other historians whose work would also benefit from examination when looking at Haig and his command of the British army, not least Peter Simkins, Tim Travers, Richard Holmes, Spencer Jones, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson. Most historians, if not the British public, now seem to have reached a consensus which is best described by Andrew Weist

“the Douglas Haig of the Somme was not a dull witted butcher leading the brave men of the BEF to needless slaughter. Nor was he a great captain in the mold of Napoleon or Robert E Lee. Instead, he was a man of his time wrestling with some of the most difficult challenges ever faced by a commander at any level”[xi]

Although clearly not a “butcher” or a “bungler”, this does not place Haig in the ranks of the greatest generals of the British Empire, and no historian has ever restored Haig back to his 1918 reputation as the man who led the allies to victory in the greatest conflict the world had ever seen. This is possibly because it is hard to ignore that costly mistakes were made, and almost certainly because it is impossible to ignore the enormous casualty figures.

Despite the efforts of revisionist historians and their application of rigorous historical analysis of first hand archival documents, The Great War has always been seen as a uniquely awful event and something beyond the realms of historical study. It is often viewed emotionally and personally rather than as a historical event like any other.[xii] This being the case, Haig remains one of the most controversial figures in British history. The constant repetition and reinforcement since the 1930s of the well-known caricature of the British General as a “Donkey” has meant it has become firmly embedded in British culture, and fundamental to how Douglas Haig is perceived by the British public. The overwhelming collective memory of Haig and the First World War is that of the vast losses of men, rather than the commander who led Britain to victory. It would appear modern academic study has not made the leap from academia to popular understanding. A recent (2022) award-winning Netflix adaptation of “All Quiet on the Western Front” has demonstrated that we are still some way from that happening, with the viewing audience still being presented with what is expected of a First World War film. In this case the German generals are portrayed as the “donkeys” rather than the British high command. Again, part of the film’s success is down to giving the audience the film that they both want and expect.

The situation for Haig’s reputation is not entirely hopeless though; there may be a glimmer of hope on the horizon. The Nat 5 and higher history curriculum in Scotland, and the GCSE and A Level syllabus in England, now tackle Haig’s leadership in the war. The marking instructions for the 2025 higher history paper note that students should receive marks for the following key point “As Commander in Chief, Haig was known for employing new tactics and technology such as tanks and the creeping barrage” and explanation “Haig is credited with having a pivotal role in defeating the German armed forces but was criticised for the scale of losses.”[xiii]

The incredibly popular podcast “The Rest is History” records 20 million monthly downloads of its podcast episodes and has an international following, covering a whole array of historical topics. The latest series tackles the First World War in 1915 with host historian Dominic Sandbrook acknowledging that the Western Front proved to be “A military challenge, the like of which has never been seen in history.” In discussing the casualties sustained in attempting to break the stalemate, Sandbrook’s podcasting partner, Tom Holland, says of the commanders on the Western Front:

“To be fair to them it is a massive problem without an answer. They are not killing hundreds of thousands just for the fun of it, none of them knew what to do”.[xiv]

Although addressing the topic in a very simplified manner for a mass non-academic audience, it is possible that the reach of this podcast by two famous, and extensively published historians, may be another step along the way towards the establishment of a more nuanced view of Haig and his command.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has a bad reputation when it comes to historical research and accuracy, with poor examples available on many Facebook pages pertaining to contain historical information. These are often illustrated with images of dubious quality generated by AI. The term “AI slop” has entered the modern lexicon to describe this poor quality computer generated output. As with any historical source, whether it is archival material, books, letters or journals, AI needs to be approached with caution. Probably more so. If a question is typed into the most popular search engine, Google, the first response returned is an “AI overview” so there seems to be little hope of avoiding this type of technology if you wished to do so. It should be noted though that AI is a term which covers a wide range of technologies such as Siri, customer chatbots, predictive analytics for the finance industry, and generative AI which can be used to create images such as those mentioned above. In this case the AI referred to is specifically a Large Language Model (LLM) which processes vast amounts of text data relating to a topic and, according to the Google AI overview, “it processes human language to generate, summarize, translate, and analyze content”.[xv]

It is interesting to see what happens when ChatGPT, an AI application powered by an LLM, is asked the question “Was Haig a Donkey?” Once ChatGPT has confirmed that Haig was not literally a donkey, it goes on to say the following:

“Douglas Haig is often portrayed as incompetent or uncaring because of the huge casualties suffered by British forces during World War I, especially at battles like the Battle of the Somme. Critics nicknamed him “Butcher Haig.”

But most historians today think that picture is too simplistic.

Arguments against Haig:

• He approved offensives with enormous loss of life.

• He sometimes underestimated how difficult trench warfare and machine guns made attacking.

• His diaries and public statements could seem detached from soldiers’ suffering.

Arguments in his defense:

• Every major army in WWI suffered catastrophic casualties; the technology favored defense.

• The British Army under Haig became far more effective between 1916 and 1918.

• In 1918, British-led forces played a major role in defeating Germany during the Hundred Days Offensive.

• Many historians argue he adapted over time, using artillery, tanks, aircraft, and coordinated tactics more effectively.

So, was he “a donkey”?
That phrase comes from the popular idea of “lions led by donkeys,” but historians debate whether it’s fair. Haig was probably neither a military genius nor a complete fool. He was a flawed commander operating in an extraordinarily brutal kind of war.”[xvi]

Microsoft Co-Pilot comes to a similar conclusion:

“No — calling Douglas Haig a “donkey” is a mythologised insult, not a fair historical assessment. Modern historians argue the label oversimplifies a far more complex reality”[xvii]

Currently the answer generated is dependent on the quality and clarity of the input question. The question “Was Haig a Donkey?” is obviously very simplistic, but in this experiment ChatGPT seemed to cope with more complex concepts when asked “Had technology replaced doctrine in the First World War? How did this affect Haig’s leadership?”

This prompts quite a lengthy piece which concludes with the following paragraph:

“Technology therefore did not completely replace doctrine, but it forced doctrine into crisis. Military leaders had to invent new methods while fighting an unprecedented industrial war. Haig’s leadership was shaped by this transition. Early in the war, he appeared tied to outdated offensive doctrines, contributing to enormous losses. Yet over time he adapted, helping oversee the transformation of the British Army into a more modern fighting force by 1918. His reputation remains controversial because he embodied both the failures and the learning process of warfare in the industrial age.”[xviii]

The conclusion reached by AI is broadly the same as the consensus amongst historians today. The advantage of AI is that it, unlike the general public, can process vast amounts of data at incredible speeds. This includes the wealth of information now available about Haig which is often ignored as it doesn’t fit the popular narrative, or is simply unavailable to the public due to the cost and inaccessibility of academic books and journals. Unlike the general public, AI also does not hold preconceived ideas and does not bring human emotions into the equation. With the increase in popularity and overwhelming presence of applications such as ChatGPT and Microsoft Co-Pilot maybe it is AI, along with the modern school history curriculum and “popular history” in the form of podcasts, that will help to finally change the understanding of Haig and his generalship during the First World War, where even the most eminent of historians have failed to do so. I can’t, however, emphasise enough that AI needs to be approached with a large amount of caution as my next little experiment using an AI checker application demonstrated. It told me that the paragraph commencing with “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times” was generated by AI. I’m sure Charles Dickens would have been fascinated by this.

The enormous casualty figures will always be the stumbling block in any attempt to rehabilitate Haig, but these recent developments in the debate about Haig’s command all point to a trend towards an enhanced understanding of the actions of the commander of the British army, as he faced a conflict of unprecedented scale and complexity.

The final word though should go to a human being, Professor John Bourne, Honorary Vice President of the Western Front Association, who sums up exactly the reality of the situation faced by Haig and the criteria that Haig had to meet during the First World War, and did so, a point that is often conveniently forgotten.

“Generalship is the most arduous and exacting of all human activities. It is a zero-sum game: win or lose. There is no in-between. What is not a victory is a defeat. And military defeat in this century has been followed by not only national humiliation but also by occupation, oppression and genocide. Douglas Haig fulfilled the most important criteria of generalship. He won. The scale of his victories was the greatest in British military history. His countrymen have never forgiven him.”[xix]

~

Bibliography

Archival Sources

The Haig Papers held at The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Acc3155 348 e

Published Sources

Bourne, John. Britain and the Great War (Edward Arnold, 1995)

Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge University Press 2008 Intro.

Scottish Qualification Authority. 2025 History: Scottish History Higher Question Paper Finalised Marking Instructions. 2025.

Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. (Great Britain, Headline, 2018)

Weist, Andrew. Douglas Haig and The Somme in At All Costs: The British Army on the Western Front 1916. Ed. Spencer Jones (Warwick: Helion, 2018)

Podcasts

Holland, Tom and Sandbrook, Dominic. The First World War: Death in the Trenches (Part1) The Rest is History podcast. Episode 671. 18^th May 2026.

AI Applications

Google AI Overview. May 2026.

Microsoft Co-Pilot. May 2026.

ChatGPT. May 2026.

[i] Haig Papers. Acc3155 348 e

[ii] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P336

[iii] Ibid. P12

[iv] Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. P2

[v] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P6

[vi] Weist, Andrew. Douglas Haig and The Somme in At All Costs: The British Army on the Western Front 1916. Ed. Spencer Jones. P72

[vii] Ibid. P75

[viii] Ibid. P74

[ix] Ibid. P80

[x] Ibid. P82

[xi] Ibid. P91

[xii] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P5

[xiii] Scottish Qualification Authority. 2025 History: Scottish History Higher Question Paper Finalised Marking Instructions. 2025. P35

[xiv] Holland, Tom and Sandbrook, Dominic. The First World War: Blood in the Trenches (Part 1) The Rest is History podcast. Episode 671. 18^th May 2026. https://therestishistory.com/episodes/death-in-the-trenches-part-1 Accessed 21^st May 2026.

[xv] Google AI Overview. May 2026

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] Microsoft Co-Pilot. May 2026.

[xviii] ChatGPT. May 2026.

[xix] Bourn, J. Britain and the Great War. P174

~

The approach of the 50^th anniversary of the First World War inspired a renewed interest, and one of the first people to make the most of this was Conservative MP Alan Clark with the publication of his book The Donkeys in 1961. An immensely readable book which is still in print, it slotted in well with the antiwar sentiments of the 1960’s. This was an era of CND, peace marches and left-wing protests, and at a time when the world seemed to be on the brink of a third worldwide conflict. It is notable too, that in his introduction to the book Clark thanks Basil Liddell Hart and notes an “immense debt” to him in the development of the book.[i]

The title of the book is taken from a supposed exchange between two German generals

Ludendorff: The English Fight like Lions

Hoffman: True. But don’t we know that they are lions led by Donkeys[ii]

Years later Clark reportedly confessed to making up the exchange in order to create the book’s catchy title. This exchange may have dated from an earlier war such as the Franco Prussian war half a century earlier, or the Napoleonic wars – historical opinion on this is split - but it almost certainly did not occur during the First World War. Clark’s book intensely focused on horrific battlefield losses at the Battle of Loos in 1915 and supposed failures of the British high command. Like Lloyd George, Clark accuses the British generals of gambling with men’s lives, with a quote Clark that attributes to Robertson, but is taken from the files of Liddell Hart.

“Prevailing military thought was summed up by Robertson “We are like a gambler who must always call his opponents bluff. Whatever chips he puts down, we must put down more.”[iii]

Haig was not Commander in Chief of the BEF during the Battle of Loos in 1915 but, as a result of the failure of the attack, Field Marshal Sir John French was replaced by Haig in December of that year. Clark notes how Haig manoeuvred himself into position and records, maybe not completely unjustifiably, Haig’s lack of loyalty to those above him, something also pointed out by Lloyd George.[iv] Clark also notes how Haig’s marriage to Dorothy, one of the queen’s ladies in waiting, elevated him to a seemingly unassailable position for someone who Clark describes as being of ordinary talents. Haig after all had failed college exams, and was out manoeuvred on army exercises in 1912.[v]

Clark had no links to the war, he had not served, nor had lost a close relative in the conflict, but it is likely he knew that in focusing on the losses and the futility of the war, already popular topics, he would have a bestseller and a potential new post politics writing career. There was nothing in Clark’s book that was new, it built upon the works of Liddell Hart and David Lloyd George and reproduced a popular stereotype to a receptive British public. It fitted neatly into the backdrop of current political issues. This now mainstream popular view of the war, and of Haig, was to gain further momentum throughout the 1960s.

Professor Sir Michael Howard CBE, Professor of military history at Oxford and Yale Universities and described in the Financial Times Newspaper in 2013 as “Britain’s greatest living Historian” was deeply scathing of the lack of academic rigour shown in Clark’s work. In a review for The Listener in 1961 he says of Clark’s book “as history it is worthless” describing it as “entertainment” and he criticised its “slovenly scholarship” accusing Clark of “personal bitterness” which comes through in his writing. Howard notes that the flaws in the book as history do not detract from its readability, and with that, he makes a very pertinent point. It is without doubt a very readable and entertaining book, and of an easily digestible size, when compared to far more rigorously academic works which are challenging to read and expensive to buy, putting them out of reach of all but the most dedicated historian.[vi] The Donkeys reinforced a viewpoint already held by the general public and so proved very popular. This resulted in “The Lions led by Donkeys” view of the First World War becoming firmly engrained in British culture, with Haig portrayed as the ultimate Donkey.

In 1963 Joan Littlewood produced, and directed, the satirical musical stage show, Oh! What a Lovely War set during the First World War. Its title song was written as a music hall song during the conflict in 1917. Littlewood’s immensely entertaining production used songs from the First World War, along with powerful and memorable imagery, to put the blame for the catastrophic losses of the conflict firmly at the feet of the upper-class generals, those of the ruling classes. It should be noted that Littlewood had previously been banned by the BBC at one point due to her links with the communist party, and remained under MI5 surveillance even after her ban had been served.

The musical was a West End hit and was a view of the war from a working-class perspective. It embraced the British tradition of the music hall, fully utilising the stereotypes of generals of the First World War, who appear as caricatures of the typical callous, incompetent, bumbling “Donkeys” sending their hapless men to their deaths in their thousands. Throughout the show, the ever-increasing number of casualties appear on a background screen as a constant reminder of these losses. The main scene is a funfair on Brighton beach as though to emphasis the frivolous nature in which soldier’s lives were frittered away. Littlewood’s show was as much an attack on the political establishment of the early 1960s as the generals of the Great War. 1960s Britain was becoming more liberal, left wing and less deferential to class than ever before. In 1969, Littlewood’s stage show moved to the big screen. Directed by Richard Attenborough, and featuring an all-star cast including Laurence Olivier, it reached a huge audience.

Littlewood borrowed heavily, without acknowledging her sources, from Alan Clark’s publication The Donkeys, resulting in a court case, and like Clark’s book, quotes were taken wholly out of context.

Haig: We must break through

British general: regardless of loss sir?

Haig: The loss of another 300000 men may lead to really great results[vii]

(Haig’s actual diary entry reads “Whether a loss of say 300,000 men will lead to really great results, because if not, we ought to be content with something less than what we are now doing.”) [viii]

Littlewood gives no context as to what the war was about, not least the fact that the allies had won and had defeated Germany. This is ignored in favour of presenting a satire of the upper classes, military leadership and a clear antiwar message for the 1960s viewer. What the older generation who had participated in the conflict made of the underlying message is less easy to see, with this perpetuation of the narrative that their sacrifice had been for nothing. According to George Sewell, the actor who played Haig in the original stage production, many found nostalgia in the war time songs, possibly an unintended by product of Littlewood’s show. Some found a sense of relief that their war hadn’t been entirely overshadowed and forgotten by the more recent conflict.[ix]

Published at a time when a book defending Haig was very unlikely to gain much traction, the memoirs of Haig’s former army chaplain George S Duncan were released in 1966. This less well known book was published with the title Douglas Haig as I knew him just after Duncan’s death. Duncan had been Haig’s Presbyterian chaplain during the conflict, and this book very much focuses on Haig as a person and describes his character. The volume doesn’t pretend to be a biography or an analysis of Haig’s military capabilities with Duncan readily admitting that he knew little of military affairs, instead it covers Duncan’s everyday experience of being Haig’s chaplain and his personal relationship with the Commander in Chief. The book offers a somewhat biased review of Haig’s character, bordering on adulation, with Duncan stating of Haig “he showed the mind of a brilliant staff officer always”[x]

Contrary to most other written accounts where Haig is portrayed as emotionless, cold and taciturn Duncan describes incidents where Haig shows what Duncan describes as a “sensitive spirit,” concerned with the welfare of his men. Duncan cites an example of this when Haig, who ordinarily didn’t become involved with day-to-day matters, intervened. On this occasion he reprimanded subordinate officers after he found they had kept men in waterlogged trenches.[xi]

The realisation that someone so high up in the ranks was so dedicated to worship would be of immense personal value to Duncan, particularly at a time when attendance at religious worship was mandatory for all ranks, not voluntary, and was resented by many.[xii] Failure to attend was classed as failure to obey an order which would result in some form of punishment. As failure to attend church parade would be classed as failure to obey an order the punishment could vary and include being confined to barracks or latrine cleaning duties right up to a harsher penalty of imprisonment.[xiii] Haig’s religious beliefs sustained him during the long years of conflict, when the result was not at all certain. It was of vital importance to him, and he rarely missed a Sunday service. Haig’s never wavering self-confidence comes through, with Duncan noting Haig’s “invincible faith,”[xiv] perhaps sustained by the belief that God was guiding him and he was on the side of the righteous. Duncan perceptively notes that Haig’s position as Commander in Chief was a lonely one[xv]and that his religion was as much a comfort to him as anything else.

Duncan, however, does comment that Haig at times may have been “unduly optimistic”[xvi] a fault which others, including David Lloyd George, accused him of. This optimism, perhaps, drove Haig to continue with battles such as Passchendaele when he would have spared men’s lives by halting the battle once it was clear that the situation had become desperate, and there was no clear sign of a breakthrough.[xvii] This decision to continue with the battle, when the conditions were so bad, formed the basis of the accusation that high command were out of touch with the experience of their men on the battlefield.[xviii]

In 1960, Cyril Falls finally published his book on the Great War under the title The First World War, but unfortunately his objectivity was not what the reading public was looking for. Its viewpoint was, as described by Professor Hew Strachan, unfashionable and the length of time he had taken to write the book had allowed him to yet further develop his arguments. Falls’s views were not as controversial as those of John Terraine who was to publish his revisionist work Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier two years later. In his book, and in a subsequent article in The Times newspaper, Falls argued that Haig’s 1918 victories should be taken into account when analysing Haig’s performance as a commander, and implied that people were being “coached” into following the orthodoxy. This brought him into to direct conflict with Liddell Hart, the man responsible for establishing that orthodoxy.[xix]

At the same time as Alan Clark’s The Donkeys and Oh What a Lovely War were being absorbed by the general public, the publication in 1963 of Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier by John Terraine marked a move away from the beliefs of Liddell Hart and Lloyd George at least in the field of academic history, if not in popular history. Terraine’s father had served in the war, and Terraine developed fascination with the subject. Terraine’s book focuses on the achievements of the British army without skirting away from the enormous casualties, but from the perspective that the war was a great allied victory and the terrible battles such as the Somme were all necessary stepping stones towards defeating the German army. Terraine took Haig’s standpoint that the war was only ever going to be won on the Western Front with the defeat of the German army. He argues for Haig’s ability as the Commander in Chief, who over saw these great battles.[xx]

If Liddell Hart’s wartime experiences coloured his view of Haig, then it is possible that the war time experiences of Terraine’s father did likewise towards David Lloyd George. In his book the Great War Myth and Memory Dan Todman draws attention to a footnote in The Educated Soldier[xxi] about previously wounded men having to return to the front as Lloyd George was starving Haig, and his army, of the necessary manpower. Terraine’s father was one of those wounded who returned to the front. Terraine does acknowledge that Lloyd George had to manage the political fallout from huge battlefield losses and the societal impact of a shortage of able bodied men in the workforce, at a time when there were many industrial disputes, and the spectre of revolution was raising its head in Russia[xxii]

Terraine was very much a lone voice working against the popular view of Haig. His book received cutting reviews with Liddell Hart orchestrating a campaign of hostile reviews and going so far as to send potential reviewers notes prompting them in what to write. In his book The Smoke and the Fire: Myths & Anti Myths of War 1861-1945 published in 1980 Terraine says

“When my book “Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier came out in 1963, Sir Basil Liddell Hart took a deep dislike to it (for obvious reasons). As was his custom, he industriously circularized a number of people, prompting them to attack it (though he never did this publicly himself); I know of at least eight whom he approached in this way, or supplied with critical material, including the actor who played the part of Haig in “Oh! What a Lovely War!” and who was invited to review my book for “Tribune”.[xxiii]

In 1963, coinciding with the approaching 50^th anniversary of the conflict, the BBC commissioned its landmark series The Great War. It attracted 8 million viewers which at the time was approximately one fifth of the British viewing public. The format was 26 episodes, with a combination of black and white archive film footage and interviews with war veterans, and the voice of Sir Michael Redgrave as the narrator. This was an entirely new way of sharing history. John Terraine and Correlli Barnett were the main scriptwriters, and Liddell Hart was brought on board as an advisor. The core idea which Terraine wanted to get across to the audience was that “there is no cheap, easy or quick way to win any war” and that it was necessary to “wear down” the German army through these battles. Terraine and Barnett were attempting to present a view that was at odds with the prevailing understanding of Haig and the Great War.[xxiv]

One key episode featured the Battle of the Somme. Terraine didn’t gloss over the death toll and acknowledged the enormity of the losses. He also highlighted the damage that the battle of the Somme had done to the German army and how the British army was now beginning to learn how to fight this war. This, however, was the episode that Liddell Hart took exception to. It was about the one battle that he had been involved in, and he objected to Terraine’s revisionist interpretation of it. With it being so far removed from his own standpoint, Liddell Hart very publicly resigned from the show in disgust, noting the reasons why in a letter to the Times Newspaper. A key point that came across in that particular episode was that “The British Army learned how to fight….” A line that could be taken to mean that it was the soldiers that were wrong and had to learn, not their commanders[xxv] or, as noted in Emma Hanna’s book The Great War on the Small Screen Liddell Hart felt that Terraine’s script had placed “undue emphasis on the rawness and lack of training of troops while ignoring the faults of high command”[xxvi] The show seemed to be stuck between its intended educational purpose of showing the audience that there was no easy way to win the war, and the director’s need for emotion and drama. In the end the scenes of mud and dead soldiers were far more memorable to the audience than the intended educational purpose.

During the making of The Great War, the BBC advertised for veterans to appear in the interviews, and they were inundated with applications.[xxvii] However, as is always the issue with first-hand accounts given many years after the actual event, the question was how accurately these veterans would remember everything some 50 years on. Another point to consider is whether those veterans who were selected were those who remembered significant standout events, rather than those whose war time experience was altogether less dramatic. One person’s individual memory would come to speak for all of those men involved and, in the public mind, one person’s individual memory became conflated as the whole wartime experience of everyone who served. Individual memories of the war homogenised into a collective memory of trenches, mud and mindless slaughter. The views of these soldiers were formed within the narrow confines of their own individual experiences, and they certainly would not have understood the wider strategic reasons for decisions made by their commanders such as the need to support their French allies.

How questions to veterans are framed are also key to what answers are given. Veterans are as much subject to cultural influences and memories as anyone else[xxviii] and their memories too, have become fused with the current popular perception of the war. Historian Richard Holmes noted that the issue with using these firsthand testimonies of veterans was that they often repeated things they had been told, or had heard, rather than their own experiences. They were also happy to repeat the stories that they knew people wanted to hear, resulting in an uncomfortable tension between memory and myth, and these stories became part of the established narrative of the Great War.[xxix]

The 1960s was also an era of World War Two films such as Where Eagles Dare (1968) Kelly’s Heroes (1961) and The Eagle has landed (1969) which on screen stood in stark contrast to the scenes presented to the viewer in BBC TV series The Great War. Heroic, brave leaders were seen defeating evil Nazis, and commanders were portrayed as being active, intelligent, resourceful and as putting themselves into the line of fire along with their men. A far cry away from the “Chateau Generals” of the previous conflict, hiding many miles behind the front line as their men walked across no man’s land into machine gun fire. It was easy for the public to draw comparisons, particularly when accusations were levelled at Haig by significant and well known figures such as Field Marshal Montgomery that Haig never visited the front line, or that he was completely unaware of the conditions that men were facing in battle.[xxx] These criticisms ignored many of the complexities of fighting on the western front that were faced by Haig.

It is likely that most British children’s introduction to the first world war at this time was through English lessons, rather than history lessons, as poets of the First World War became one of the key cultural influences of the 1960s, They had, in fact, been part of the history of remembrance of the Great War since before the war was even over but now were given renewed prominence. A generation of children became familiar with the words of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon. Anthologies of First World War poetry were produced for the 50^th anniversary of the war, with those chosen no doubt carefully selected for appropriate content. Some, not originally intended to be written as anti-war poems by their authors, were now interpreted as such in the minds of the reading public, notably John McCrae’s poem In Flanders fields. McCrae’s poem was written in a dugout near Ypres in 1917 and is where the symbol of the poppy is first introduced. One of the poem’s lines from the third verse, “take up our quarrel with the foe”, clearly isn’t calling for a halt to the fighting. This third verse is often missed out when the poem is recited at remembrance services. This was a time in which history lessons in schools took of a form of an outline of key historical events, the type of history described as “talk and chalk,” where facts were written on a blackboard and learned by the students. What has been referred to as “the great tradition” of history teaching had remained little altered since the last century.[xxxi] Children therefore gained more of an understanding of the First World War from English lessons, rather than history lessons with the obvious result being that this understanding was through poets rather than historians.

Some 2,225 poets were identified as having published works between 1914-18. Many have now been forgotten such as the one printed in Punch magazine in 1917 in honour of Haig.[xxxii] Similarly to war veterans, war poets are taken as being the voice of authority and as encapsulating everyone’s wartime experience, despite that fact that only a fifth of those 2,225 poets had actually served at the front. Wilfred Owen was relatively unknown until the 1960s, and at the time of his death he had only published 5 poems whereas Rupert Brooke’s collection of poems sold more than 300,000 in the early 1920’s. Commercial success for literature now came when the author gave the reader what the reader expected to read, those poems and works which dwelt on mud, blood, and futile sacrifice. A small unrepresentative group of middle-and upper-class junior officers[xxxiii] became the default spokesmen for an army of hundreds of thousands of working-class men.

It was not only John Terraine who bought academic rigour to the study of Haig’s command and took a view of Haig which diverted from the mainstream. Other historians such as Peter Simpkins and Brian Bond followed suit, but their views remained challenging for the general public, and any deviation away from the now established view of Haig was to bring forth a flurry of complaints and angry letters. If anyone had thought that the revisionist work by John Terraine on Haig had taken effect then they were to be quickly relieved of this notion. There were still enough writers happy to produce works that were regurgitating the Lions led by Donkeys theme.

Other volumes of questionable historical value became popular such as British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One by Australian journalist and teacher John Laffin, and The Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman Dixon. Dixon was a psychologist, not a military historian, and makes claims that cannot be substantiated such as the losses at the battle of the Somme were down to Haig refusing to using tanks (the tanks were not available for use at that point) and, the most glaringly obvious error, that the German army was not beaten in 1918, a claim that has been disproved by military historians.[xxxiv]

On the surface this appears to be a strong argument. The German Army did not surrender and were still on French and German soil. However, by summer 1918 the German army was exhausted and back home the naval mutiny had spread to the barrack rooms and factory floors. To compound matters Germany’s erstwhile allies, Turkey and Austria Hungary, were negotiating their own separate peace agreements with the allies leaving Germany isolated and unable to fight on. This civil unrest led Ludendorf to declare that the German army had been “stabbed in the back”, a phrase later adopted by the Nazi party as part of the conspiracy theory adopted by the Nazis blaming Jews and Bolsheviks, amongst others, for betraying Germany.

There are also the obvious pitfalls of trying to psychoanalyse somebody from a distance, not least a historical figure who died nearly a century ago and was born in a different era. Although Laffin makes reference to first hand primary documentary sources it is unclear which have actually been consulted in the course of his work.

Another publication where the author doesn’t restrict himself to the world of rigorous academic examination is Haig’s Command: A Reassessment by Denis Winter. Winter does use Haig’s papers as a source for his research but unfortunately he resorts to salacious hints as to Haig’s sexuality, hinting that it was the reason for his promotion “the frisson of homosexuality attaching to each of his patrons gave ammunition to jealous rivals, all the more because of a strong dislike of women which he made little effort to conceal”[xxxv] and that Haig’s regular church attendance was as a “result of a particular preacher’s good looks, youthful energy, and simple sermons”[xxxvi]

Winter makes the accusation that papers were planted in archives or removed from the public record office, the implication being that this was to protect Haig’s reputation. In this he may have been correct as anomalies in Haig’s papers and diaries had been noted earlier by James Edmonds, who had access to the typed copy of Haig’s diary as well as the original hand written drafts. Passages had been inserted later and entries to the diary made at differing times to when they are noted as being made. Evidence for this was provided by Lady Haig herself, and the reason given was for the future publication of the diaries as a book rather than any attempt to hide anything.[xxxvii] An equally likely explanation is that the differing accounts simply reflect that they were written for different people and for different purposes.

Through careful cross checking of sources Edmonds did, however, uncover evidence that some sections of 4^th Army’s war diary had been removed and replaced with a different narrative. Sir Archibald Mongomery Massingberd, Chief of Staff to Sir Henry Rawlinson, seems to have been complicit in this altogether more serious falsification of the record. The reason for this was to conceal Rawlinson’s reluctance to follow Haig’s orders on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, orders that he disagreed with.[xxxviii] It is unclear as to what level Haig was, if at all, involved in this but by now any hint of wrong doing that could be linked to Haig would be jumped upon by his detractors.

The 1980s were a time of social turmoil, with the Brixton riots and the miner’s strikes, and so 1985 Channel 4 documentary Lions led by Donkeys is as much a critique of its own time as that of 1914. TV footage which was current at the time was used to make clear its anti-establishment and anti-war stance.[xxxix] The introduction to the show describes how the state of the country in 1914 was the same as in 1985 with high unemployment, poor wages and working conditions. This documentary also featured the testament of war veterans and, whereas the veterans interviewed for Terraine’s The Great War series were not particularly critical of Haig, those featured in Lions led by Donkey’s painted Haig as the villain of the story. One veteran even states that in 1917 the soldiers referred to Haig as “The Butcher”, perfectly illustrating the point that the veterans were selected based on what type of testimony the programme wished to present. If the title of the show was not indicative enough of the viewpoint of the show, then featuring a short interview of one of Haig’s leading detractors, Norman Dixon, would seal any doubt.[xl]

Comedy may seem at first glance an unlikely and inappropriate vehicle for a programme about the Great War and, for the makers of the BBC comedy Blackadder Goes Forth Richard Curtis and Ben Elton, setting it in a First World War trench in 1917 must have seemed very high risk. They must have then been surprised at the enormous success of the programme, with both the show and Rowan Atkinson winning BAFTAs, Atkinson for his appearance as the title character, the sardonic and reluctant captain Blackadder. Many of the stereotypes exist within the script from General Sir Antony Hogmanay Melchett who resides in a chateau far away from the front line, the upper class brave idiot George, and the poor simple working class Tommy, personified in Baldrick. Much of Blackadder’s huge success was down to these easily recognisable characters that the audience could identify with, coupled with a poignant and tragic ending to the final episode broadcast shortly before Remembrance Day in 1989. Blackadder has seen many repeats on TV and is one of the most well-known BBC shows featuring oft repeated lines such as “I have a cunning plan”.

Blackadder would not work as comedy if it had not reflected the audience’s preconceived and strongly held views about the war, and the generals such as Haig. This is perfectly illustrated with Blackadder’s memorable line describing Haig’s order to advance as “another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin”[xli]

The idea of the futility of the fighting, and men not understanding what they were actually fighting for, is perfectly illustrated in the following exchange between Private Blackadder and Private Baldrick

Baldrick: I heard it started when some bloke called Archie Duke shot an ostrich

Blackadder: I think you mean it started when the Archduke of Austria got shot

Baldrick: No, there was definitely an Ostrich involved

Blackadder: Well possibly. But the real reason for the whole thing was that it was just too much effort not to have a war[xlii]

An attempt to re-dress the balance was made in 1996 with a Timewatch documentary released on BBC1 for the 80^th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier attempted to offer a balanced view of Haig and explore some of the myths surrounding his leadership, and the role he played in this battle which resulted in such shocking casualty figures. The format of the programme was to illustrate both sides of the debate, with clips of Blackadder shown to illustrate the popular public perception of Haig as the butcher general uncaring about his men. This point of view was expressed fully in the programme by John Laffin, author of British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One with Laffin going so far as to state that Haig’s actions in sending men into battle were criminal and tantamount to murder.

Presenting the alternative argument were revisionist historians Gary Sheffield and Trevor Wilson, who in their research and publications look at Haig’s performance within the context of the conflict and the political background in which Haig was working. Despite interviews with these leading historians, these factors were only lightly touched upon in the programme and little time was given to exploring the conditions and restraints under which Haig was operating. The overwhelming impression was that despite the best attempts by the historians to place Haig in the context of the development of the British army during the war, it ended up focusing on Haig very much as a person rather than his performance as a Commander in Chief.[xliii] Perhaps the programme makers recognised that this might appeal to a broader audience than would analysing Haig’s military performance from a technical or strategic viewpoint.

With viewers so accustomed to the now easily recognisable idea of Haig as a villain, many were unhappy at what they saw as an attempt to rehabilitate Haig. Gary Sheffield received “hate mail” after the programme.[xliv] He was seen as trying to defend what many felt was the indefensible by challenging the stereotype of Haig. Sheffield was uncomfortable with how he had been portrayed in the programme as an out and out defender of Haig when this was not the case, but there was no room in the programme for nuance. Sheffield’s interview for the programme took place in a Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery only adding weight to the argument that so many had died as a result of Haig’s actions. Two years after this Timewatch programme The Daily Express launched a campaign to have Haig’s statue in Whitehall taken down,[xlv]with Haig again uniting people across the political spectrum in agreeing at his criminal incompetence.

“It appeared that four television critics took the Blackadder clips as historical truth against which to evaluate the programme. This demonstrates the sheer popularity of the series and the depth of anti-Haig sentiment. Blackadder was seen to encapsulate the essential truths about Haig and the Western Front, and the British, Australian and American historians who appeared to state otherwise were not to be taken seriously”[xlvi]

In 2003, two series made for television, The Great War in Colour and The First World War, attracted a fraction of the viewing public compared with earlier documentaries about the war. The First World War was based on the research of Professor Hew Strachan and tried to present a balanced view of the conflict with less of an Anglo-centric slant. It looked at the war as a truly global event and examined the problems that British commanders faced, as well as how British army techniques developed. The Battle of Cambrai was used as an example, with clear evidence presented that demonstrated that Haig wasn’t the unimaginative general who avoided new technology, but was more than happy to embrace it.[xlvii] In comparison the BBC’s The Last Tommy, airing in November 2005 attracted 3.9m viewers, which was more than double the number of viewers who watched The First World War. The Last Tommy features an interview of veteran Harry Patch by poet laurate Andrew Motion, who then writes a poem about Harry. The emotionally charged format of veteran interviews and accounts clearly remained extremely popular.[xlviii] These numbers were small compared with the 8 million viewers who watched The Great War back in 1963. Over time there had been a change in viewer priorities and interests, with more channels and choices for viewers, and possibly less interest in The First World War.

~

The third and final part of this article covers the period between 2000 and today and looks at the most recent developments in the historiography.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

The Haig Papers held at The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Acc3155 347 64

Basil Liddell Hart Papers held at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London.

LH /1/384.

Published Sources

Clark, Alan. The Donkeys. (London: Pimlico, 1961)

Connolly, Mark. Oh! What a Lovely War: A red rag for a certain kind of bull. (Gateways to the First World War https://www.gatewaysfww.org.uk/blog/oh-what-lovely-war)

Crang, Jeremy A. The Abolition of Compulsory Church Parades in the Army. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, (Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Duncan, George S. Douglas Haig as I knew him. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd) (First published by George Allan & Unwin Ltd 1966)

Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009)

Holmes, Richard. Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918. London: Harper Collins 2004)

Laffin, John. British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One. (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1988)

Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs Vols 1-6. (Hants: Chapel River Press, 1933)

Reynolds, David. The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century. (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2013)

Sheldon, N. From New History to the GCSE 1960s-1988. The Institute of Historical Research. P2. 2011

Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. (Great Britain, Headline, 2018)

Sheffield, G. Bunglers and Butchers of World War One: Book review. (https:www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-book-reviews/British-bunglers-and-butchers-of-world-war-one/)

Edited Sheffield, G & Bourne, J. Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2005)

Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War and British Military History. Ed Brian Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)

Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Leo Cooper, 1990)

Terraine, John. The Smoke and The Fire: Myths and Anti Myths of War 1861-1945. (London: Cooper, 1992)

Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005)

Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd 1987)

Winter, Denis. Haig’s Command: A Reassessment. (London: Penguin,1991)

Television

BBC1. The Great War. Episode 13 The Devil is coming. 1963

Channel 4. Lions Led By Donkeys. 1985

BBC1. Timewatch. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier. 1996.

BBC1: Blackadder Goes Forth. 1989.

[i] Clark, Alan. The Donkeys.P12

[ii] Ibid. Introduction

[iii] Ibid. P127

[iv] Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs Vol 6 P3385

[v] Clark, Alan. The Donkeys.P23

[vi] Liddell Hart Papers LH/1/384

[vii] Reynolds, David. The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century.P332

[viii] Edited Sheffield, G & Bourne. J. Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. P213

[ix] Connolly, Mark. Oh! What a Lovely War: A red rag for a certain kind of bull. https://www.gatewaysfww.org.uk/blog/oh-what-lovely-war

[x] Duncan, George S. Douglas Haig as I knew him. P103

[xi] Ibid. P107

[xii] Crang, Jeremy A. The Abolition of Compulsory Church Parades in the British Army. P92

[xiii] Holmes, R. Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918. P556

[xiv] Ibid. P148

[xv] Ibid. P125

[xvi] Ibid. P103

[xvii] Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs. Vol 4.P2269

[xviii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P81

[xix] Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War. P67

[xx] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P112

[xxi] Ibid. P251

[xxii] Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. P325

[xxiii] Terraine, John. The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War. P134

[xxiv] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P41

[xxv] BBC1 The Great War 1963 Episode 13 The Devil is coming.

[xxvi] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P35

[xxvii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P196

[xxviii] Ibid. P200

[xxix] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P73

[xxx] Haig Papers Acc3155 347 64

[xxxi] Sheldon, N. From New History to the GCSE 1960s-1988. The Institute of Historical Research. P2. 2011

[xxxii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P154

[xxxiii] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P36

[xxxiv] Sheffield, G. British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One. Book Review (https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-book-reviews/british-bunglers-and-butchers-of-world-war-one/)

[xxxv] Winter, Denis. Haig’s Command: A Reassessment. P33

[xxxvi] Ibid. P2

[xxxvii] Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. P26

[xxxviii] Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948. P59

[xxxix] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P78

[xl] Channel 4. Lions led by Donkeys. 1985

[xli] BBC1 Blackadder Goes Forth 1989

[xlii] Ibid.

[xliii] BBC1 Timewatch. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier. 1996

[xliv] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P2

[xlv] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P24

[xlvi] Ibid. P95

[xlvii] Ibid. P27

[xlviii] Ibid. P28

Professor Sir Michael Howard CBE, Professor of military history at Oxford and Yale Universities and described in the Financial Times Newspaper in 2013 as “Britain’s greatest living Historian” was deeply scathing of the lack of academic rigour shown in Clark’s work. In a review for The Listener in 1961 he says of Clark’s book “as history it is worthless” describing it as “entertainment” and he criticised its “slovenly scholarship” accusing Clark of “personal bitterness” which comes through in his writing. Howard notes that the flaws in the book as history do not detract from its readability, and with that, he makes a very pertinent point. It is without doubt a very readable and entertaining book, and of an easily digestible size, when compared to far more rigorously academic works which are challenging to read and expensive to buy, putting them out of reach of all but the most dedicated historian.[vi] The Donkeys reinforced a viewpoint already held by the general public and so proved very popular. This resulted in “The Lions led by Donkeys” view of the First World War becoming firmly engrained in British culture, with Haig portrayed as the ultimate Donkey.

In 1963 Joan Littlewood produced, and directed, the satirical musical stage show, Oh! What a Lovely War set during the First World War. Its title song was written as a music hall song during the conflict in 1917. Littlewood’s immensely entertaining production used songs from the First World War, along with powerful and memorable imagery, to put the blame for the catastrophic losses of the conflict firmly at the feet of the upper-class generals, those of the ruling classes. It should be noted that Littlewood had previously been banned by the BBC at one point due to her links with the communist party, and remained under MI5 surveillance even after her ban had been served.

The musical was a West End hit and was a view of the war from a working-class perspective. It embraced the British tradition of the music hall, fully utilising the stereotypes of generals of the First World War, who appear as caricatures of the typical callous, incompetent, bumbling “Donkeys” sending their hapless men to their deaths in their thousands. Throughout the show, the ever-increasing number of casualties appear on a background screen as a constant reminder of these losses. The main scene is a funfair on Brighton beach as though to emphasis the frivolous nature in which soldier’s lives were frittered away. Littlewood’s show was as much an attack on the political establishment of the early 1960s as the generals of the Great War. 1960s Britain was becoming more liberal, left wing and less deferential to class than ever before. In 1969, Littlewood’s stage show moved to the big screen. Directed by Richard Attenborough, and featuring an all-star cast including Laurence Olivier, it reached a huge audience.

Littlewood borrowed heavily, without acknowledging her sources, from Alan Clark’s publication The Donkeys, resulting in a court case, and like Clark’s book, quotes were taken wholly out of context.

Haig: We must break through

British general: regardless of loss sir?

Haig: The loss of another 300000 men may lead to really great results[vii]

(Haig’s actual diary entry reads “Whether a loss of say 300,000 men will lead to really great results, because if not, we ought to be content with something less than what we are now doing.”) [viii]

Littlewood gives no context as to what the war was about, not least the fact that the allies had won and had defeated Germany. This is ignored in favour of presenting a satire of the upper classes, military leadership and a clear antiwar message for the 1960s viewer. What the older generation who had participated in the conflict made of the underlying message is less easy to see, with this perpetuation of the narrative that their sacrifice had been for nothing. According to George Sewell, the actor who played Haig in the original stage production, many found nostalgia in the war time songs, possibly an unintended by product of Littlewood’s show. Some found a sense of relief that their war hadn’t been entirely overshadowed and forgotten by the more recent conflict.[ix]

Published at a time when a book defending Haig was very unlikely to gain much traction, the memoirs of Haig’s former army chaplain George S Duncan were released in 1966. This less well known book was published with the title Douglas Haig as I knew him just after Duncan’s death. Duncan had been Haig’s Presbyterian chaplain during the conflict, and this book very much focuses on Haig as a person and describes his character. The volume doesn’t pretend to be a biography or an analysis of Haig’s military capabilities with Duncan readily admitting that he knew little of military affairs, instead it covers Duncan’s everyday experience of being Haig’s chaplain and his personal relationship with the Commander in Chief. The book offers a somewhat biased review of Haig’s character, bordering on adulation, with Duncan stating of Haig “he showed the mind of a brilliant staff officer always”[x]

Contrary to most other written accounts where Haig is portrayed as emotionless, cold and taciturn Duncan describes incidents where Haig shows what Duncan describes as a “sensitive spirit,” concerned with the welfare of his men. Duncan cites an example of this when Haig, who ordinarily didn’t become involved with day-to-day matters, intervened. On this occasion he reprimanded subordinate officers after he found they had kept men in waterlogged trenches.[xi]

The realisation that someone so high up in the ranks was so dedicated to worship would be of immense personal value to Duncan, particularly at a time when attendance at religious worship was mandatory for all ranks, not voluntary, and was resented by many.[xii] Failure to attend was classed as failure to obey an order which would result in some form of punishment. As failure to attend church parade would be classed as failure to obey an order the punishment could vary and include being confined to barracks or latrine cleaning duties right up to a harsher penalty of imprisonment.[xiii] Haig’s religious beliefs sustained him during the long years of conflict, when the result was not at all certain. It was of vital importance to him, and he rarely missed a Sunday service. Haig’s never wavering self-confidence comes through, with Duncan noting Haig’s “invincible faith,”[xiv] perhaps sustained by the belief that God was guiding him and he was on the side of the righteous. Duncan perceptively notes that Haig’s position as Commander in Chief was a lonely one[xv]and that his religion was as much a comfort to him as anything else.

Duncan, however, does comment that Haig at times may have been “unduly optimistic”[xvi] a fault which others, including David Lloyd George, accused him of. This optimism, perhaps, drove Haig to continue with battles such as Passchendaele when he would have spared men’s lives by halting the battle once it was clear that the situation had become desperate, and there was no clear sign of a breakthrough.[xvii] This decision to continue with the battle, when the conditions were so bad, formed the basis of the accusation that high command were out of touch with the experience of their men on the battlefield.[xviii]

In 1960, Cyril Falls finally published his book on the Great War under the title The First World War, but unfortunately his objectivity was not what the reading public was looking for. Its viewpoint was, as described by Professor Hew Strachan, unfashionable and the length of time he had taken to write the book had allowed him to yet further develop his arguments. Falls’s views were not as controversial as those of John Terraine who was to publish his revisionist work Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier two years later. In his book, and in a subsequent article in The Times newspaper, Falls argued that Haig’s 1918 victories should be taken into account when analysing Haig’s performance as a commander, and implied that people were being “coached” into following the orthodoxy. This brought him into to direct conflict with Liddell Hart, the man responsible for establishing that orthodoxy.[xix]

At the same time as Alan Clark’s The Donkeys and Oh What a Lovely War were being absorbed by the general public, the publication in 1963 of Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier by John Terraine marked a move away from the beliefs of Liddell Hart and Lloyd George at least in the field of academic history, if not in popular history. Terraine’s father had served in the war, and Terraine developed fascination with the subject. Terraine’s book focuses on the achievements of the British army without skirting away from the enormous casualties, but from the perspective that the war was a great allied victory and the terrible battles such as the Somme were all necessary stepping stones towards defeating the German army. Terraine took Haig’s standpoint that the war was only ever going to be won on the Western Front with the defeat of the German army. He argues for Haig’s ability as the Commander in Chief, who over saw these great battles.[xx]

If Liddell Hart’s wartime experiences coloured his view of Haig, then it is possible that the war time experiences of Terraine’s father did likewise towards David Lloyd George. In his book the Great War Myth and Memory Dan Todman draws attention to a footnote in The Educated Soldier[xxi] about previously wounded men having to return to the front as Lloyd George was starving Haig, and his army, of the necessary manpower. Terraine’s father was one of those wounded who returned to the front. Terraine does acknowledge that Lloyd George had to manage the political fallout from huge battlefield losses and the societal impact of a shortage of able bodied men in the workforce, at a time when there were many industrial disputes, and the spectre of revolution was raising its head in Russia[xxii]

Terraine was very much a lone voice working against the popular view of Haig. His book received cutting reviews with Liddell Hart orchestrating a campaign of hostile reviews and going so far as to send potential reviewers notes prompting them in what to write. In his book The Smoke and the Fire: Myths & Anti Myths of War 1861-1945 published in 1980 Terraine says

“When my book “Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier came out in 1963, Sir Basil Liddell Hart took a deep dislike to it (for obvious reasons). As was his custom, he industriously circularized a number of people, prompting them to attack it (though he never did this publicly himself); I know of at least eight whom he approached in this way, or supplied with critical material, including the actor who played the part of Haig in “Oh! What a Lovely War!” and who was invited to review my book for “Tribune”.[xxiii]

In 1963, coinciding with the approaching 50^th anniversary of the conflict, the BBC commissioned its landmark series The Great War. It attracted 8 million viewers which at the time was approximately one fifth of the British viewing public. The format was 26 episodes, with a combination of black and white archive film footage and interviews with war veterans, and the voice of Sir Michael Redgrave as the narrator. This was an entirely new way of sharing history. John Terraine and Correlli Barnett were the main scriptwriters, and Liddell Hart was brought on board as an advisor. The core idea which Terraine wanted to get across to the audience was that “there is no cheap, easy or quick way to win any war” and that it was necessary to “wear down” the German army through these battles. Terraine and Barnett were attempting to present a view that was at odds with the prevailing understanding of Haig and the Great War.[xxiv]

One key episode featured the Battle of the Somme. Terraine didn’t gloss over the death toll and acknowledged the enormity of the losses. He also highlighted the damage that the battle of the Somme had done to the German army and how the British army was now beginning to learn how to fight this war. This, however, was the episode that Liddell Hart took exception to. It was about the one battle that he had been involved in, and he objected to Terraine’s revisionist interpretation of it. With it being so far removed from his own standpoint, Liddell Hart very publicly resigned from the show in disgust, noting the reasons why in a letter to the Times Newspaper. A key point that came across in that particular episode was that “The British Army learned how to fight….” A line that could be taken to mean that it was the soldiers that were wrong and had to learn, not their commanders[xxv] or, as noted in Emma Hanna’s book The Great War on the Small Screen Liddell Hart felt that Terraine’s script had placed “undue emphasis on the rawness and lack of training of troops while ignoring the faults of high command”[xxvi] The show seemed to be stuck between its intended educational purpose of showing the audience that there was no easy way to win the war, and the director’s need for emotion and drama. In the end the scenes of mud and dead soldiers were far more memorable to the audience than the intended educational purpose.

During the making of The Great War, the BBC advertised for veterans to appear in the interviews, and they were inundated with applications.[xxvii] However, as is always the issue with first-hand accounts given many years after the actual event, the question was how accurately these veterans would remember everything some 50 years on. Another point to consider is whether those veterans who were selected were those who remembered significant standout events, rather than those whose war time experience was altogether less dramatic. One person’s individual memory would come to speak for all of those men involved and, in the public mind, one person’s individual memory became conflated as the whole wartime experience of everyone who served. Individual memories of the war homogenised into a collective memory of trenches, mud and mindless slaughter. The views of these soldiers were formed within the narrow confines of their own individual experiences, and they certainly would not have understood the wider strategic reasons for decisions made by their commanders such as the need to support their French allies.

How questions to veterans are framed are also key to what answers are given. Veterans are as much subject to cultural influences and memories as anyone else[xxviii] and their memories too, have become fused with the current popular perception of the war. Historian Richard Holmes noted that the issue with using these firsthand testimonies of veterans was that they often repeated things they had been told, or had heard, rather than their own experiences. They were also happy to repeat the stories that they knew people wanted to hear, resulting in an uncomfortable tension between memory and myth, and these stories became part of the established narrative of the Great War.[xxix]

The 1960s was also an era of World War Two films such as Where Eagles Dare (1968) Kelly’s Heroes (1961) and The Eagle has landed (1969) which on screen stood in stark contrast to the scenes presented to the viewer in BBC TV series The Great War. Heroic, brave leaders were seen defeating evil Nazis, and commanders were portrayed as being active, intelligent, resourceful and as putting themselves into the line of fire along with their men. A far cry away from the “Chateau Generals” of the previous conflict, hiding many miles behind the front line as their men walked across no man’s land into machine gun fire. It was easy for the public to draw comparisons, particularly when accusations were levelled at Haig by significant and well known figures such as Field Marshal Montgomery that Haig never visited the front line, or that he was completely unaware of the conditions that men were facing in battle.[xxx] These criticisms ignored many of the complexities of fighting on the western front that were faced by Haig.

It is likely that most British children’s introduction to the first world war at this time was through English lessons, rather than history lessons, as poets of the First World War became one of the key cultural influences of the 1960s, They had, in fact, been part of the history of remembrance of the Great War since before the war was even over but now were given renewed prominence. A generation of children became familiar with the words of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon. Anthologies of First World War poetry were produced for the 50^th anniversary of the war, with those chosen no doubt carefully selected for appropriate content. Some, not originally intended to be written as anti-war poems by their authors, were now interpreted as such in the minds of the reading public, notably John McCrae’s poem In Flanders fields. McCrae’s poem was written in a dugout near Ypres in 1917 and is where the symbol of the poppy is first introduced. One of the poem’s lines from the third verse, “take up our quarrel with the foe”, clearly isn’t calling for a halt to the fighting. This third verse is often missed out when the poem is recited at remembrance services. This was a time in which history lessons in schools took of a form of an outline of key historical events, the type of history described as “talk and chalk,” where facts were written on a blackboard and learned by the students. What has been referred to as “the great tradition” of history teaching had remained little altered since the last century.[xxxi] Children therefore gained more of an understanding of the First World War from English lessons, rather than history lessons with the obvious result being that this understanding was through poets rather than historians.

Some 2,225 poets were identified as having published works between 1914-18. Many have now been forgotten such as the one printed in Punch magazine in 1917 in honour of Haig.[xxxii] Similarly to war veterans, war poets are taken as being the voice of authority and as encapsulating everyone’s wartime experience, despite that fact that only a fifth of those 2,225 poets had actually served at the front. Wilfred Owen was relatively unknown until the 1960s, and at the time of his death he had only published 5 poems whereas Rupert Brooke’s collection of poems sold more than 300,000 in the early 1920’s. Commercial success for literature now came when the author gave the reader what the reader expected to read, those poems and works which dwelt on mud, blood, and futile sacrifice. A small unrepresentative group of middle-and upper-class junior officers[xxxiii] became the default spokesmen for an army of hundreds of thousands of working-class men.

It was not only John Terraine who bought academic rigour to the study of Haig’s command and took a view of Haig which diverted from the mainstream. Other historians such as Peter Simpkins and Brian Bond followed suit, but their views remained challenging for the general public, and any deviation away from the now established view of Haig was to bring forth a flurry of complaints and angry letters. If anyone had thought that the revisionist work by John Terraine on Haig had taken effect then they were to be quickly relieved of this notion. There were still enough writers happy to produce works that were regurgitating the Lions led by Donkeys theme.

Other volumes of questionable historical value became popular such as British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One by Australian journalist and teacher John Laffin, and The Psychology of Military Incompetence by Norman Dixon. Dixon was a psychologist, not a military historian, and makes claims that cannot be substantiated such as the losses at the battle of the Somme were down to Haig refusing to using tanks (the tanks were not available for use at that point) and, the most glaringly obvious error, that the German army was not beaten in 1918, a claim that has been disproved by military historians.[xxxiv]

On the surface this appears to be a strong argument. The German Army did not surrender and were still on French and German soil. However, by summer 1918 the German army was exhausted and back home the naval mutiny had spread to the barrack rooms and factory floors. To compound matters Germany’s erstwhile allies, Turkey and Austria Hungary, were negotiating their own separate peace agreements with the allies leaving Germany isolated and unable to fight on. This civil unrest led Ludendorf to declare that the German army had been “stabbed in the back”, a phrase later adopted by the Nazi party as part of the conspiracy theory adopted by the Nazis blaming Jews and Bolsheviks, amongst others, for betraying Germany.

There are also the obvious pitfalls of trying to psychoanalyse somebody from a distance, not least a historical figure who died nearly a century ago and was born in a different era. Although Laffin makes reference to first hand primary documentary sources it is unclear which have actually been consulted in the course of his work.

Another publication where the author doesn’t restrict himself to the world of rigorous academic examination is Haig’s Command: A Reassessment by Denis Winter. Winter does use Haig’s papers as a source for his research but unfortunately he resorts to salacious hints as to Haig’s sexuality, hinting that it was the reason for his promotion “the frisson of homosexuality attaching to each of his patrons gave ammunition to jealous rivals, all the more because of a strong dislike of women which he made little effort to conceal”[xxxv] and that Haig’s regular church attendance was as a “result of a particular preacher’s good looks, youthful energy, and simple sermons”[xxxvi]

Winter makes the accusation that papers were planted in archives or removed from the public record office, the implication being that this was to protect Haig’s reputation. In this he may have been correct as anomalies in Haig’s papers and diaries had been noted earlier by James Edmonds, who had access to the typed copy of Haig’s diary as well as the original hand written drafts. Passages had been inserted later and entries to the diary made at differing times to when they are noted as being made. Evidence for this was provided by Lady Haig herself, and the reason given was for the future publication of the diaries as a book rather than any attempt to hide anything.[xxxvii] An equally likely explanation is that the differing accounts simply reflect that they were written for different people and for different purposes.

Through careful cross checking of sources Edmonds did, however, uncover evidence that some sections of 4^th Army’s war diary had been removed and replaced with a different narrative. Sir Archibald Mongomery Massingberd, Chief of Staff to Sir Henry Rawlinson, seems to have been complicit in this altogether more serious falsification of the record. The reason for this was to conceal Rawlinson’s reluctance to follow Haig’s orders on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, orders that he disagreed with.[xxxviii] It is unclear as to what level Haig was, if at all, involved in this but by now any hint of wrong doing that could be linked to Haig would be jumped upon by his detractors.

The 1980s were a time of social turmoil, with the Brixton riots and the miner’s strikes, and so 1985 Channel 4 documentary Lions led by Donkeys is as much a critique of its own time as that of 1914. TV footage which was current at the time was used to make clear its anti-establishment and anti-war stance.[xxxix] The introduction to the show describes how the state of the country in 1914 was the same as in 1985 with high unemployment, poor wages and working conditions. This documentary also featured the testament of war veterans and, whereas the veterans interviewed for Terraine’s The Great War series were not particularly critical of Haig, those featured in Lions led by Donkey’s painted Haig as the villain of the story. One veteran even states that in 1917 the soldiers referred to Haig as “The Butcher”, perfectly illustrating the point that the veterans were selected based on what type of testimony the programme wished to present. If the title of the show was not indicative enough of the viewpoint of the show, then featuring a short interview of one of Haig’s leading detractors, Norman Dixon, would seal any doubt.[xl]

Comedy may seem at first glance an unlikely and inappropriate vehicle for a programme about the Great War and, for the makers of the BBC comedy Blackadder Goes Forth Richard Curtis and Ben Elton, setting it in a First World War trench in 1917 must have seemed very high risk. They must have then been surprised at the enormous success of the programme, with both the show and Rowan Atkinson winning BAFTAs, Atkinson for his appearance as the title character, the sardonic and reluctant captain Blackadder. Many of the stereotypes exist within the script from General Sir Antony Hogmanay Melchett who resides in a chateau far away from the front line, the upper class brave idiot George, and the poor simple working class Tommy, personified in Baldrick. Much of Blackadder’s huge success was down to these easily recognisable characters that the audience could identify with, coupled with a poignant and tragic ending to the final episode broadcast shortly before Remembrance Day in 1989. Blackadder has seen many repeats on TV and is one of the most well-known BBC shows featuring oft repeated lines such as “I have a cunning plan.”

Blackadder would not work as comedy if it had not reflected the audience’s preconceived and strongly held views about the war, and the generals such as Haig. This is perfectly illustrated with Blackadder’s memorable line describing Haig’s order to advance as “another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin”[xli]

The idea of the futility of the fighting, and men not understanding what they were actually fighting for, is perfectly illustrated in the following exchange between Private Blackadder and Private Baldrick

Baldrick: I heard it started when some bloke called Archie Duke shot an ostrich

Blackadder: I think you mean it started when the Archduke of Austria got shot

Baldrick: No, there was definitely an Ostrich involved

Blackadder: Well possibly. But the real reason for the whole thing was that it was just too much effort not to have a war[xlii]

An attempt to re-dress the balance was made in 1996 with a Timewatch documentary released on BBC1 for the 80^th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier attempted to offer a balanced view of Haig and explore some of the myths surrounding his leadership, and the role he played in this battle which resulted in such shocking casualty figures. The format of the programme was to illustrate both sides of the debate, with clips of Blackadder shown to illustrate the popular public perception of Haig as the butcher general uncaring about his men. This point of view was expressed fully in the programme by John Laffin, author of British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One with Laffin going so far as to state that Haig’s actions in sending men into battle were criminal and tantamount to murder.

Presenting the alternative argument were revisionist historians Gary Sheffield and Trevor Wilson, who in their research and publications look at Haig’s performance within the context of the conflict and the political background in which Haig was working. Despite interviews with these leading historians, these factors were only lightly touched upon in the programme and little time was given to exploring the conditions and restraints under which Haig was operating. The overwhelming impression was that despite the best attempts by the historians to place Haig in the context of the development of the British army during the war, it ended up focusing on Haig very much as a person rather than his performance as a Commander in Chief.[xliii] Perhaps the programme makers recognised that this might appeal to a broader audience than would analysing Haig’s military performance from a technical or strategic viewpoint.

With viewers so accustomed to the now easily recognisable idea of Haig as a villain, many were unhappy at what they saw as an attempt to rehabilitate Haig. Gary Sheffield received “hate mail” after the programme.[xliv] He was seen as trying to defend what many felt was the indefensible by challenging the stereotype of Haig. Sheffield was uncomfortable with how he had been portrayed in the programme as an out and out defender of Haig when this was not the case, but there was no room in the programme for nuance. Sheffield’s interview for the programme took place in a Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery only adding weight to the argument that so many had died as a result of Haig’s actions. Two years after this Timewatch programme The Daily Express launched a campaign to have Haig’s statue in Whitehall taken down,[xlv]with Haig again uniting people across the political spectrum in agreeing at his criminal incompetence.

“It appeared that four television critics took the Blackadder clips as historical truth against which to evaluate the programme. This demonstrates the sheer popularity of the series and the depth of anti-Haig sentiment. Blackadder was seen to encapsulate the essential truths about Haig and the Western Front, and the British, Australian and American historians who appeared to state otherwise were not to be taken seriously”[xlvi]

In 2003, two series made for television, The Great War in Colour and The First World War, attracted a fraction of the viewing public compared with earlier documentaries about the war. The First World War was based on the research of Professor Hew Strachan and tried to present a balanced view of the conflict with less of an Anglo-centric slant. It looked at the war as a truly global event and examined the problems that British commanders faced, as well as how British army techniques developed. The Battle of Cambrai was used as an example, with clear evidence presented that demonstrated that Haig wasn’t the unimaginative general who avoided new technology, but was more than happy to embrace it.[xlvii] In comparison the BBC’s The Last Tommy, airing in November 2005 attracted 3.9m viewers, which was more than double the number of viewers who watched The First World War. The Last Tommy features an interview of veteran Harry Patch by poet laurate Andrew Motion, who then writes a poem about Harry. The emotionally charged format of veteran interviews and accounts clearly remained extremely popular.[xlviii] These numbers were small compared with the 8 million viewers who watched The Great War back in 1963. Over time there had been a change in viewer priorities and interests, with more channels and choices for viewers, and possibly less interest in The First World War.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

The Haig Papers held at The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Acc3155 347 64

Basil Liddell Hart Papers held at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London.

LH /1/384.

Published Sources

Clark, Alan. The Donkeys. (London: Pimlico, 1961)

Connolly, Mark. Oh! What a Lovely War: A red rag for a certain kind of bull. (Gateways to the First World War https://www.gatewaysfww.org.uk/blog/oh-what-lovely-war)

Crang, Jeremy A. The Abolition of Compulsory Church Parades in the Army. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History, (Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Duncan, George S. Douglas Haig as I knew him. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Ltd) (First published by George Allan & Unwin Ltd 1966)

Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009)

Holmes, Richard. Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918. London: Harper Collins 2004)

Laffin, John. British Bunglers and Butchers of World War One. (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1988)

Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs Vols 1-6. (Hants: Chapel River Press, 1933)

Reynolds, David. The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century. (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2013)

Sheldon, N. From New History to the GCSE 1960s-1988. The Institute of Historical Research. P2. 2011

Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. (Great Britain, Headline, 2018)

Sheffield, G. Bunglers and Butchers of World War One: Book review. (https:www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-book-reviews/British-bunglers-and-butchers-of-world-war-one/)

Edited Sheffield, G & Bourne, J. Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2005)

Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War and British Military History. Ed Brian Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)

Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Leo Cooper, 1990)

Terraine, John. The Smoke and The Fire: Myths and Anti Myths of War 1861-1945. (London: Cooper, 1992)

Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005)

Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd 1987)

Winter, Denis. Haig’s Command: A Reassessment. (London: Penguin,1991)

Television

BBC1. The Great War. Episode 13 The Devil is coming. 1963

Channel 4. Lions Led By Donkeys. 1985

BBC1. Timewatch. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier. 1996.

BBC1: Blackadder Goes Forth. 1989.

[i] Clark, Alan. The Donkeys.P12

[ii] Ibid. Introduction

[iii] Ibid. P127

[iv] Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs Vol 6 P3385

[v] Clark, Alan. The Donkeys.P23

[vi] Liddell Hart Papers LH/1/384

[vii] Reynolds, David. The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century.P332

[viii] Edited Sheffield, G & Bourne. J. Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918. P213

[ix] Connolly, Mark. Oh! What a Lovely War: A red rag for a certain kind of bull. https://www.gatewaysfww.org.uk/blog/oh-what-lovely-war

[x] Duncan, George S. Douglas Haig as I knew him. P103

[xi] Ibid. P107

[xii] Crang, Jeremy A. The Abolition of Compulsory Church Parades in the British Army. P92

[xiii] Holmes, R. Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918. P556

[xiv] Ibid. P148

[xv] Ibid. P125

[xvi] Ibid. P103

[xvii] Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs. Vol 4.P2269

[xviii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P81

[xix] Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War. P67

[xx] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P112

[xxi] Ibid. P251

[xxii] Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. P325

[xxiii] Terraine, John. The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War. P134

[xxiv] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P41

[xxv] BBC1 The Great War 1963 Episode 13 The Devil is coming.

[xxvi] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P35

[xxvii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P196

[xxviii] Ibid. P200

[xxix] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P73

[xxx] Haig Papers Acc3155 347 64

[xxxi] Sheldon, N. From New History to the GCSE 1960s-1988. The Institute of Historical Research. P2. 2011

[xxxii] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P154

[xxxiii] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P36

[xxxiv] Sheffield, G. British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One. Book Review (https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/world-war-i-book-reviews/british-bunglers-and-butchers-of-world-war-one/)

[xxxv] Winter, Denis. Haig’s Command: A Reassessment. P33

[xxxvi] Ibid. P2

[xxxvii] Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. P26

[xxxviii] Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948. P59

[xxxix] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P78

[xl] Channel 4. Lions led by Donkeys. 1985

[xli] BBC1 Blackadder Goes Forth 1989

[xlii] Ibid.

[xliii] BBC1 Timewatch. Douglas Haig: The Unknown Soldier. 1996

[xliv] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P2

[xlv] Hanna, Emma. The Great War on the Small Screen: Representing the First World War in Contemporary Britain. P24

[xlvi] Ibid. P95

[xlvii] Ibid. P27

[xlviii] Ibid. P28

Melchett: Now Field Marshal Haig has formulated a brilliant tactical plan to ensure final victory in the field.

Blackadder: Would this brilliant plan involve us climbing over the top of our trenches and walking slowly towards the enemy

Melchett: How did you know that Blackadder? Its classified information

Blackadder: It’s the same plan we used last time sir, And the seventeen times before that

Melchett: Exactly! And that’s what’s so brilliant about it. It will catch the watchful Hun totally off guard. Doing exactly what we’ve done eighteen times before will be the last thing they expect us to do this time. There is, however, one problem

Blackadder: That everyone gets slaughtered in the first ten seconds?

In the 100 years since the death of Field Marshal Douglas Haig much has been written about him and his command on the Western Front, but rarely does the mere mention of a military commander’s name provoke such hostility as that of Haig. Public perception of Haig is that of the bungling general as featured in the hugely popular BBC TV series Blackadder. In the public mind Haig is far removed from his troops, ensconced in a chateau safely behind the front lines, devoid of imagination and profligate with men’s lives. In one memorable Blackadder scene Haig, played by Geoffrey Palmer, is seen sweeping his toy soldiers from a map and into a bucket.

In contrast to this TV persona, when Field Marshal Earl Sir Douglas Haig died on the 21^st January 1928, at the relatively early age of 66, he was hailed as a hero and described by The Times Newspaper as “The greatest soldier that the empire possessed.” The article then went on to list Haig’s military achievements, from service in Africa and India to holding the most senior command possible as Commander in Chief of the British army. The article presents him as a man who, from the earliest point in his military career, was destined for greatness.

“During the second year Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, the historian, then one of the instructors, said one evening to a group of students, “There is a fellow in your batch who will be Commander-in-Chief one of these days,” and then, without hesitation, said “Haig” Two who were present were able to remind Sir Douglas Haig of the prophecy when he assumed command of the B.E.F. at St. Omner in December 1915. And, as one of them remarked, “by the way Henderson said it, he meant you would be a successful one.”[1]

There was a public outpouring of grief on Haig’s death, many thousands of people, including ex-servicemen, lined the streets to pay their respects as his coffin was taken through the streets on London on a horse drawn gun carriage to his funeral at Westminster Abbey. He was then taken to Edinburgh and his final resting place at Dryburgh Abbey, near his home on his estate at Bemersyde in the Scottish borders. He was hailed a national hero, and his work for the British Legion in supporting the welfare of ex-servicemen bought him further acclaim. Haig’s death acted as a focal point for grief for so many who were unable to give loved ones lost in the fighting a funeral. Their remains had to remain abroad through government policy at that time, or in many cases, their remains were simply never recovered from the battlefield. Even Haig’s greatest detractor of the time, former Prime Minister David Lloyd George, adhered to social conventions of not speaking ill of the dead, instead writing a suitably reverential tribute to Haig which was published by The Times newspaper.

Two years later the first attacks on Haig’s reputation began. Swiftly he progressed from national hero to bungling upper class general, a character recognisable today as portrayed in books, on film, and the small screen. Much of what has been written about Haig, and the First World War, focuses on the battles of Passchendaele and the Somme, two immense battles, the mention of which will always invoke an emotional reaction about the terrible casualty lists and losses of men. As time went on, and the distance increased from the end of the war, the need to find some way of explaining these losses grew. From the 1930s onwards, writers such as Basil Liddell Hart, Alan Clark and John Laffin, along with the wartime Prime Minister, helped to cultivate the familiar persona of Haig as the unimaginative general who didn’t think twice about sending men over the top to their deaths, in a series of futile attempts to break the deadlock along the Western Front. Haig gradually progressed from national hero to national villain in the mind of the British public.

Brigadier General James Edmonds had been a staff officer and had been involved in the retreat from Mons and Le Cateau in the summer of 1914. He was invalided out of the army shortly afterwards, having suffered some form of breakdown. Edmonds never returned to the front line, serving in GHQ instead. He retired from the army after the war becoming director of the Military Branch of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence and was appointed as editor of the Official History of the Great War. The full title of this work was The History of the Great War based on Official Documents by direction of the Committee of Imperial Defence and it stretched to 26 volumes, with 14 of those dedicated to the conflict on the Western Front. The first volume was published in 1922 and the final volume in the mid-1940s. Edmonds was given a broad scope but a very small budget, and an equally small number of staff, but he attempted to write a book that would be useful, bearing in mind he had access to files that were not generally open to others. His approach, although not uncritical of British command during the First World War, did not tend towards the out and out attacks on Haig that later writers such as Basil Liddell Hart employed. Edmonds, of course, was constrained by the official nature of his work and the natural reluctance to publicly criticise Generals and high command, those with whom he had served and knew personally.[2] Edmonds’s response to Liddell Hart’s criticism of his work was “many of your points passes through my mind but I always had space and the views of my comrades to consider.” Edmonds reluctance to criticise lessened over time with the volume of the official history covering the Battle of the Somme being published after Haig’s death. Revisions of earlier editions of the volumes contained additions that Edmonds had withheld earlier, for instance when referring to the retreat from Mons he notes “Haig momentarily lost his head”.[3]

Historian Andrew Green, who has carried out extensive study of James Edmonds’s work, concludes that “the facts were there for the informed reader to draw the correct conclusion”. For example, tucked away in the appendix is Haig’s “inherently damning” letter of October 1917 written at the time of the costly battle of Passchendaele. In this letter Haig states that “Germany may collapse at any moment” and discredits the ability of Germany transferring troops from Russia to the Western Front in the wake of the Russian withdrawal from the conflict. In this case the reader had to dig deep within Edmonds’s work to find the facts.[4]

“His (Edmonds) methods were to either tone down offending passages, or to place awkward evidence in footnotes or appendices, or more usually simply to confine the text to facts, without drawing critical conclusions.” [5]

There was also a deeper reason for Edmonds not to criticise the actions of high command too closely. Britain faced social upheaval in the wake of the conflict, and the rise of bolshevism was a concern amongst the ruling classes. Drawing attention to the incompetencies of those in charge of traditional institutions, such as the army, at a time when the war had drained the country’s finances and where the potential for European conflict and need to call up men remained, would have been extremely counterproductive for the government. [6]

In The First World War and British Military History Edited by Brian Bond, David French writes that “Edmonds basic explanation of the heavy losses suffered by the British army on the Western Front echoed many of the points raised by the General staff during the war.” These included difficulties in training and equipping men, operations hampered by bad weather and that the French were directing overall strategy on the Western Front leaving British commanders little freedom to make decisions.[7]

Haig’s death in 1928 cleared the way for a nation that tended to be deferential towards its superiors and, during the post war era of soldiers returning home to economic hardship, the atmosphere started to change. In Germany, Erich Maria Remarque’s anti-war novel All Quiet on the Western Front was published to huge acclaim both in Germany and in the UK, with the film of the same naming taking two Academy Awards the following year. The popularity of war poets also grew. Initially war poetry had been patriotic, it would not have been possible to publish something viewed as unpatriotic or defeatist during the war. That too began to change. People began to question what the Great War had all been for and to question the immense losses. Surely someone must be to blame? Anti-war literature was selling well, which would be an incentive for any writer.

Edmonds’s attempt to write a balanced book was soon to be overshadowed by more popular writers. The “battle of the memoirs” had started with Haig’s predecessor, Sir John French the first to release his account with others following swiftly in his wake. French was a man who Haig had disliked on both a personal and a professional level, blaming him for the debacle surrounding the use of the reserves at the Battle of Loos.[8] Haig replaced French as Commander in Chief of the British forces following Haig’s letter to Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for war, criticising French’s actions over the use of the reserves.[9]

The first writer to achieve notable public attention for his views on the conduct of the war was Captain Basil Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart had fought at the Battle of the Somme during the First World War where he was injured and subsequently left the army. Initially he was an admirer of Haig, producing a short written piece of work published in 1928 that praised Haig;

“There as hardly been a finer defensive general… As a great gentleman, also in the widest sense, and as a pattern of noble character, Haig will stand out in the Roll of History, chevalier sans peur et sans reproche, more spotless by far than most of Britain ’s national heroes.”[10]

By the 1930s, Liddell Hart’s view of Haig had changed considerably[11] and he became one of Haig’s greatest detractors. Liddell Hart’s 1930 book The Real War was highly influential and widely read. It contained many of his criticisms of the way in which the war on the Western Front was conducted, particularly the lack of imagination of the leadership and what he saw as their unwillingness to embrace technology or manoeuvre warfare in order to defeat Germany.

Liddell Hart kept close correspondence with Edmonds, with whom he did not agree and whom he accused of drawing the wrong conclusions from the facts presented to him.[12] In this correspondence between Edmonds and Liddell Hart, Edmonds attributes some of Haig’s issues as Commander in Chief as being down to the lack of armaments with which he was supplied, and the Prime Minister holding back troops that could have been sent to the front line, accusations that Liddell Hart refuted.[13] Liddell Hart concentrated his criticisms on Haig based on the two battles where the British army suffered significant casualties, those of the Somme and Passchendaele. His writing does not cover the social, economic and political background to the war, all of which impacted on Haig. Nor does he turn any focus on Haig’s victory in the 100 days in 1918, by which time Liddell Hart had left the army and was not there to bear witness to.

By the 1930s, Liddell Hart had become a significant figure in the Haig controversy via his prolific output of writing, particularly for newspapers that were widely read at the middle class breakfast table. The view of Haig held by the public as the conquering hero had begun to perceptibly shift towards that with which we are familiar with today. Liddell Hart was hugely influential in how the British general public viewed Haig and has cast a long shadow over how Haig, and The Great War in general is perceived, even now.

After Liddell Hart, Haig’s next greatest detractor was wartime Prime Minister David Lloyd George, whose six volumes written between 1933-1936 under the title War Memoirs were a best seller. The initial six volumes were condensed into a more reader friendly and cheaper two volumes, and there was no need even to read these as they were condensed still further and serialised by the Daily Telegraph.[14] These volumes contain what is possibly the most systematic character assassination in history. Lloyd George does not hold back in his criticisms of Haig with even the index entry for “Haig” running to more than four pages and littered with terms such as “failure”, “unimaginative” and “prefers to gamble with men’s lives than to admit an error”.[15] Lloyd George held a well publicised book launch, and a speaking tour, to promote sales of his books. The reach of his publications was enormous and, as Liddell Hart was advisor to Lloyd George on his memoirs,[16] Liddell Hart’s criticisms of Haig were reinforced and perpetuated.

One of the roots of the animosity between the Prime Minster and the Commander in Chief of the army was that Haig firmly believed that the war would be won on the Western Front, whereas Lloyd George did not. In his memoirs Lloyd George both praises, and at the same time criticises, Haig for his single-minded focus. The focus and tenacity to get the job done being admirable trait but, at the same time, a trait that made Haig unimaginative and incapable of planning battles on a vast scale, in his Prime Minister’s eyes. Lloyd George accuses Haig of ignoring other theatres of war and losing sight of the bigger picture beyond the Western Front. This was unfair criticism as this was not Haig’s role, he was only the operational commander on the Western Front. Concern over the “bigger picture” would fall to the Secretary of State for War and the Chief of the General staff, amongst others.

Frustrated that he could not impose his own view on the army’s strategy, as he did not have a majority support in government, Lloyd George resorted to trying to weaken Haig by proposing at the Calais conference that the British forces fall under the command of the French General Robert Nivelle as the senior commander on the Western Front.[17] Lloyd George did his best to have Haig removed from his post, and sent South African Defence minister Jan Christian Smuts on a fact-finding mission to interview other generals on the Western Front to see if a suitable replacement for Haig could be found. Smuts came back to Lloyd George saying that in his opinion there was no one better. To compound matters for the Prime Minister yet further, Haig also had the support of the king. In his book Forgotten Victory Professor Gary Sheffield quotes historian David Woodward who suggested that;

“Lloyd George viewed the Generals much as he had seen the upper classes and industrialists before the war, as oppressors of the common people, in this case the ordinary soldier.”[18]

Thus, bringing a class element into the debate. Historian Dan Todman suggests that Lloyd George was perhaps jealous that his own role in 1918 was overshadowed by that of the war hero Haig[19]and that his critique of Haig was intended to ensure that Lloyd George was not to be held to blame for the enormous wartime casualties. As wartime Prime Minister Lloyd George was answerable to the British electorate in a way that Haig was not and was having to justify the enormous losses at the Somme and Passchendaele at a time where there was increasing industrial unrest. Lloyd George was not critical of the war itself, the need to defeat Germany was clear, but he was critical of how the war was conducted laying the blame for the many perceived failures on the battlefield firmly at the feet of Haig.[20]

Dissenting voices in the popular discourse about Haig at this time included Alfred Duff Cooper, 1^st Viscount of Norwich. Cooper was a Conservative MP serving between 1935 and 1937 as Secretary of State for War, before resigning in protest at Neville Chamberlain’s Policy of appeasement. Cooper had been wounded on the Western Front in 1918 and was awarded the DSO for his actions, and he was an acquaintance of the Haig family. The executor of the Haig Estate approached Cooper with the proposal that he write a biography of Haig, although Cooper was not their first choice of author with others turning down the proposal prior to this. This was to be an authorised biography, as confirmed in a letter from Lady Haig’s lawyer.[21] Cooper was at an advantage as he had complete unparalleled access to Haig’s papers and diaries, something which was not available to the general public, nor other historians and writers at that time. He was also at a disadvantage in that he was at the mercy of the goodwill of Lady Haig and the trustees of the Haig estate. Cooper’s book, published in 1935, was based on Haig’s unpublished diaries and was serialised in the Sunday Pictorial. None other than Basil Liddell Hart contacted Cooper with comments noting that “There are a number of statements in the extracts from Haig’s diary which are contrary to the facts on record” and warning Cooper that his book was in danger of losing credibility due to Cooper making “the best case” arguments for Passchendaele.[22]

Despite Cooper’s favourable review of Haig and his relationship with the Haig family, both Cooper and the Haig estate ended up in court, with Lady Haig attempting to gain an injunction against him to prevent publication. It is unclear on what grounds, maybe for fear of further attacks on Haig’s reputation. More likely, as is hinted at the legal correspondence between Lady Haig and her solicitor, the concern was that Cooper’s book would be published in direct competition to her own, with a resulting potential loss of revenue.[23]Eventually both books were published, albeit with an agreed period of time between the release of the publications after Lady Haig’s solicitor advised her that she was not acting “in good faith.” [24]Both Duff Cooper and Lady Haig’s volumes were, perhaps understandably, uncritical of Douglas Haig and his command during the war.[25]

The other challenge to the now accepted view of Haig was by Cyril Falls, who paved the way for later revisionist historians such as John Terraine, with the publication of The History of the 36^th Ulster Division in 1922 and War Books: A Critical Guide in 1930. An Ulsterman, Falls had served with the 36th (Ulster) Division. Like Liddell Hart, Falls became a captain but, unlike Liddell Hart, he was decorated for gallantry, receiving the Croix de Guerre for his bravery. His service extended from 1915 through to the end of the war, and so he was there to bear witness to the defeat of Germany. He was a divisional staff officer, therefore his service experience was wider than that of Liddell Hart. He had served in a liaison capacity which gave him less of an Anglo centric view, and he reacted against the picture painted by Liddell Hart of the hapless soldiers sent in their thousands to the death. Falls accepted that conditions on the Western Front were awful in a way that only those who served there could appreciate, but also found and noted in his 1930 publication “War Books” that “the constant belittlement of motives, of intelligence, and of zeal….nauseous”[26] James Edmonds was sufficiently impressed with Falls and invited him to join the team in writing The Official History. Falls was able to avoid the controversy at the time by concentrating on volumes relating to the Middle East and Macedonia, rather than the Western Front. Although publishing a number of other volumes, Falls did not release his book, The First World War, until 1961.

Professor Hew Strachan writes

“Liddell Hart’s interpretation of Great War command had become orthodoxy, Falls balance constituted revisionism.”[27]

Within the collection of the Haig papers held in the National Library of Scotland there are many incidents where it is evident that both Lady Haig and her son, Earl Haig, have made a concerted attempt to gain evidence in which to clear Haig’s name of any wrongdoing. Perhaps the most interesting views on Haig are those held by veterans of the conflict reflected in a collection of letters to The Times Newspaper dating from 1934. These men, who had served under Haig, were writing in response to the publication of Lloyd George’s memoirs and were defending Haig. Most mention the respect that he commanded in his men. “Never was a leader in the field more harried by knowledge of the intrigues against him at home than was the field marshal during the Passchendaele offensive.” [28] It should be noted though that these letters were retained by the Haig family, and so impartiality cannot be guaranteed. There seems to be little likelihood of the family retaining letters criticising Haig, with the odd exception. Liddell Hart noted that there were as many veterans who were publicly supportive of Haig but privately critical.[29] In reality, most veterans would have had no contact with Haig, or high command, during the course of their wartime service, their day-to-day experience would be shaped by their immediate commanders[30] who were the source of their dissatisfaction. It was only later this dissatisfaction was to become targeted towards Haig, as the influence of Lloyd George and Liddell Hart gained traction in people’s perception of the war.

During 1940s and 1950s, the country’s focus was understandably on the Second World War, and it was inevitable that comparisons would be made with the earlier conflict. The Second World War has always been much easier to explain, it was clearly a more easily defined fight between good versus evil, this particularly apparent once the full horrors of the holocaust were revealed. The reasons for Britain being drawn into the First World War were complex and harder to understand, as were the reasons that men fought and died in it. Men had come home from war to economic hardship in the 1920s and 1930s, and so it was unclear to many what exactly they had been fighting for. For many, it was as much a dissatisfaction with the peace and the post-war world as it was dissatisfaction with the war itself, but steadily the feeling of futility grew and coloured people’s view of the First World War. The First World War had proved not to be the “war to end all wars” and the children of those who had fought in the First World War were now fighting the same enemy as their fathers had 25 years previously. What had it all been for?.

In 1953 Haig’s diaries were published by Robert Blake and Haig’s intrigues against his commanding officers and reservations over his French allies were laid bare for all to see. The publication of the diaries was considered newsworthy with at least one newspaper reviewing the book and describing Haig in disparaging terms “that here there was no great brain” and “he was born with a diamond studded silver spoon in his mouth”[31] Haig’s diaries were now available to any researcher with an interest. This particular newspaper was an Australian one, giving an insight into the way Haig was viewed internationally, and not just at home.

~

The next article will cover the period of time between the 1960s-2000s where Haig’s reputation sustained further damage through not just books, newspapers and other publications, but through other media such as television and the stage. It also covers the emergence of revisionist historians who began to tackle the subject with academic rigour and nuance.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

The Haig Papers held at The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.

Acc3155 348 e

Acc3155 325 a

Basil Liddell Hart Papers held at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College London.

LH/1/295/95

LH/1/259/201

LH/1/247/11

Published Sources

Beckett, Ian. The Great War. (Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd, 2001)

French, David. Sir James Edmonds and the Official History: France and Belgium in The First World War and British Military History. Ed Brian Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)

Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003)

Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs Vols 1-6. (Hants: Chapel River Press, 1933)

Mead, Gary. The Good Soldier: The Biography of Douglas Haig. (London: Atlantic Books, 2007)

Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. (Great Britain, Headline, 2018)

Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War and British Military History. Ed Brian Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)

The Times Newspaper, Tuesday 31^st January 1928. Lord Haig Obituary, (https:www.thetimes.com/article)

The Argus Newspaper, Saturday 24^th January 1953. Soldier’s Diary Reveals Intrigue, (https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/23223930)

Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Leo Cooper, 1990)

Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005)

Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd 1987)

[1] Lord Haig Obituary, The Times Newspaper. Tuesday 31^st January 1928.

[2] Green, Andrew. Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948.P47

[3] Ibid. P49

[4] Ibid. P56

[5] Travers, Tim. The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918. P24

[6] French, David. Sir James Edmonds and the Official History: France and Belgium in The First World War and British Military History. Ed Brian Bond. P73

[7] Ibid. P86

[8] Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. P162

[9] Ibid.P164

[10] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P91

[11] Liddell Hart Papers LH/1/295/95

[12] Ibid.

[13] Liddell Hart Papers LH/1/295/201

[14] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P92

[15] Lloyd George, David. War Memoirs, Vol 6. P3473-3478

[16] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P91

[17] Beckett, Ian. The Great War. P155

[18] Sheffield, G. Forgotten Victory: The First World War Myths and Realities. P132

[19] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P91

[20] Ibid. P134

[21] Haig Papers Acc.3155 325 a

[22] Liddell Hart Papers LH 1/247/11

[23] Haig Papers Acc3155 325 a

[24] Ibid.

[25] Mead, Gary. The Good Soldier: The Biography of Douglas Haig. P11

[26] Strachan, Hew. The Real War: Liddell Hart, Cruttwell, and Falls in The First World War. P63

[27] Ibid. P65

[28] Haig Papers Acc3155 348 e

[29] Liddell Hart Papers LH 1/247/11

[30] Todman, Dan. The Great War: Myth & Memory. P92

[31] https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/23223930

There are approximately 36 large magazine storage warehouses, with double pitched roofs, surviving from the First World War, although these are now fairly dilapidated. Arranged neatly in 6 rows, they are positioned at notable intervals (approx. 100m) from each other in order to prevent a blast from one triggering a blast in the others. Earthwork embankments were built in a couple of areas to deflect blast, but these have disappeared over time. There are no remains of the other buildings visible, such as a detonator store and blast shelters, which would have been present then. Labour for the construction of the facility came from a nearby prisoner of war camp called Polmaise, surprising perhaps, but the use of PoWs in providing labour in the UK was not unique to the Second World War

The individual buildings were linked by an internal railway system, which in turn was linked to the main railway system, to supply the complex with material and workers. The internal railway was also linked to a crane on the pier enabling the shells and mines to be loaded on to a “puffer” (steamboat) and transported to the Admiralty bases such as at Rosyth, about 16 miles downstream. Rosyth was the base of the Battlecruiser Fleet in the first few years of the conflict, before expansion work allowed the rest of the Grand Fleet to relocate there. Some of the naval shells produced for use in the Queen Elizabeth class battleships weighed more than 800kg apiece.

After the First World War the complex at RNAD Bandeath grew. To the south of the site 7 larger magazine buildings were constructed, along with the laboratory buildings. This was leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War where Bandeath again became an important manufacturing facility for armaments. Similarly to the First World War, some of the labour harnessed to construct the additional facilities came from PoWs housed at a nearby camp.

To the south of the site there are four large sheds dating from after 1946. These were an assembly workshop and the “married mine” stores, where mines which had been fitted with their detonators were stored. Material supply stores, fuel supply stores and worker’s canteens were also provided. There would also have been watch posts and air raid shelters, but these are long gone.

After the Second World War, many polish servicemen stationed in the UK chose not to return to Poland as it had now fallen behind the Iron Curtain and under Soviet leadership. For a few years RNAD Bandeath functioned as a resettlement camp, housing these Polish soldiers and airmen and their families, while preparing them for a future life in their new chosen homeland. In the 1950s and 1960s, the site remained under the ownership of the military until it was decommissioned in 1978 and sold to the local authority. It was renamed Bandeath Industrial Estate, and some of the buildings on the site have been repurposed by local businesses. One unit has become a gym and another a dog shelter for the local authority. Felled timber is also stored on the industrial estate grounds, but mostly the old warehouses sit empty, surrounded by agricultural land. Many are in a state of disrepair, and only small sections of the internal railway remain. The crane and the pier are very dilapidated and look as though they could fall into the water at any time. The advice is not to investigate too closely should you manage to arrange a visit to the site. Bandeath is now a very quiet and remote setting, its also a bit eerie. It’s very hard now to image just how significant this facility was, and how many hundreds of workers would have been employed here in order to maintain a vital supply line of munitions to Britain’s battleships through two huge worldwide conflicts.

The YouTube video below covers the site in great detail and is well worth a watch.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bcbJfLvHaA

Further Reading

https://www.trove.scot/place/332958#details

Cook, Murray & Roche, Jim. Conflicts of the Forth, Extremis Publishing, Stirling, 2024.

Barclay, Gordon J & Morris, Ron. The Fortification of the Firth of Forth 1880-1977, Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, 2019

https://maps.nls.uk/view/75221403 1950 aerial map

https://maps.nls.uk/view/75826770 1920 OS map (published 1924)

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1947/jan/21/naval-establishments-scotland

The plan for Operation Hush can be traced back to 1914, and my last visit to the National Library of Scotland Haig Collection unexpectedly uncovered a couple of documents about Operation Hush which were mixed up in Sir Douglas Haig’s papers outlining preparations for the Battle of the Somme in July 1916. The discussions and deliberations around this proposed landing by British forces contained within these documents are very interesting.

The first document is a handwritten paper with the title “SECRET NOTE on projected landing at Ostend by Lt General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston” which is dated 24.2.16, well in advance of the final planned date for Operation Hush, which was summer 1917 to coincide with the 3^rd Battle of Ypres.

By way of introduction, Hunter-Weston starts by saying that “Nothing is impossible in war” and predicts that the success of what was to become known as “Operation Hush” would have a very important effect on the war should it succeed. It is initially written with the sort of “can do” attitude that no doubt Hunter-Weston wanted to present to his superiors and they, no doubt, expected of him, stating that “nothing would give me greater pleasure than to organise and lead this enterprise” He then goes on to say that big risks are important in war, but there has to be a reasonable chance of success. The document then outlines all of the issues that would have to be overcome, before finally concluding that the chances of this operation succeeding are too slim to justify the attempt. Hunter-Weston, of course, had commanded 29^th division during a similar venture the previous year with the unsuccessful Gallipoli landings and I suspect was not willing to get his fingers burned twice with a very similar risky operation, not to mention the further reputational damage that would come with it.

Hunter-Weston notes that that to be successful the landing would have to be made over a broad front, and this couldn’t happen at Ostend. The coast around Ostend consisted of flat wide open beaches, barbed wire and was too well defended. The landing therefore, could only in the harbour, and that would only be successful if British forces were able to get in behind the harbour which was only possible if the enemy could be taken by surprise and hadn’t established sufficient defences around the harbour. He then outlines the difficulty of troops departing harbour once landed where narrow exits through the town would be be blocked by the enemy. Ostend harbour is overlooked by houses and other buildings which were more than likely occupied and defended by Germans, who would be firing on the troops as they disembarked, and the monitor ships in the harbour would also be vulnerable. Enemy occupation of buildings in the town would prevent British troops advancing from Ypres and meeting the landing force.

Possibly also trying to present solutions rather than just problems, he does suggest that armoured cars could be used for street-to-street fighting, but acknowledges that it was only really the infantry that could be fully effective in house to house fighting to flush the enemy out. He also suggests that the Germans would use the local Belgian population as a screen during the fighting (dastardly Hun!), but makes the point that British artillery would also be damaging the town and killing local people, hinting that this would cause hostility by the local population against the British forces. This, of course, was assuming the monitor ships could get past the German mines and torpedoes guarding the entrance to Ostend harbour in the first place. All very good points.

Within Haig’s papers there is also a copy of the minutes of a meeting on 12^th June 1916 between Haig, Rear Admiral Reginald Bacon, Lt General L. E. Kiggell, Brig General J. Charteris, Cpt Bowring and Lt Col C.F. Aspinall to discuss the “Ostend Project”

These minutes outline many of the issues that Hunter-Weston had observed 5 months earlier, with Bacon recorded as saying that conditions were no longer favourable for “the Ostend Project” as the number of German destroyers on the coast had recently increased from 4 to 21, electric mines and torpedo tubes were reported to be in use and the German coastal batteries had increased in number and had been strengthened. All 4 of the naval guns at the Tirpitz Battery could fire round 360 degrees. Bacon spoke about the intention to mount a 12” naval gun within a range in which he which he hoped would be able knock out the Tirpitz battery. This would allow his monitors closer to the shore to knock out the other batteries, and create conditions favourable for a amphibious landing.

Haig agreed with Bacon, but the minutes record his thoughts that “it will probably become most desirable to open a new base at Ostend later on and he is therefore anxious to retain the power of sending troops there by sea” Optimistic as ever, Haig considered that the likelihood of the enemy being able to hold on to Ostend was slim if the British army were to break out of the Ypres salient and advance. Haig did acknowledge the complexities of timing this assault, correctly taking into account weather, sea conditions and tide, and presence of the enemy. Haig also wanted the troops involved in the landing to embark from French ports such as Dunkirk, rather than send them back to Dover as it would be difficult to explain why troops are being shipped home at what was a critical time for the army. Keeping those troops in France would accommodate for any last minute changes of plan.

The final conclusion of the meeting was that all present agreed that the opening of Ostend as a base was important for the success of land operations in enemy occupied Belgium, and that Operation Hush, with its the amphibious landings, would not go ahead until British forces had broken out of the Ypres Salient and reached a line between Roulers and Thourout, and the enemy coastal batteries had been knocked out. These conditions were not to be in place until the final weeks of the war in 1918, and so Operation Hush was never put to the test.

Reference: The Haig Collection NLS Acc3155 106 (May and June)

Slowly move the ships in darkness piercing through the inky night -
Monitors lashed close together, pontoons reaching out of sight
Eighteen thousand men assembled, chafing at the progress slow,
Wait the aim of their ambition, wait the time to strike the blow.

Breezes soft blow warm, for summer with its heat has scarcely gone;
These will bear our sheltering smoke-cloud, and blot out the fleet at morn.
Light-buoys gleam and mark the turnings for our passage to the beach -
Ships now swing and head the pontoons for the points they hope to reach.

Roar of guns at shattered Nieuport, Westende batteries reply.
See the shore attack in progress lights with glare the neighbouring sky.
Star-shells burst and light our vessels with the brilliance of their rays,
But our smoke spreads sweeping shorewards an impenetrable haze.

Dawn now tints the former darkness; blackness changed to ashy grey,
Marks the near approaching advent of that long-awaited day.
Bursts of firing from the smaller monitors on either beam,
Shells from batteries soon answer, heralded by vicious scream;

Then our twelve-inch join the clamour, hurling death at point-blank range.
Each man grips his rifle firmly, final whispers interchange.,
Tanks are throbbing, engines warming, ready for that classic climb -
Minutes never passed so slowly; seconds seem long hours of time.

Then at last faint shock and grating, one great rush, and one great cheer,
As the tanks and living columns in the smoke-cloud disappear.
But that shout our dream has ended; broken is our reverie -
Wake to find that we’ve been dreaming of what never now can be.

Cruel fortune rudely shattered that matured and cherished scheme
All that might have been has faded. Nothing left us but a dream!”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

Before talking about Operation Strandfest (Operation Beach Party) you need to start with Operation Hush. You probably haven’t heard of Operation Hush because, spoiler, it didn’t happen. It was, however, an ambitious plan by the British military in 1917 involving amphibious landings on the beaches around the coastal towns of Nieuwpoort, Middelkerke and Ostend in order to dislodge the Germans from the Belgian coast which they had occupied, along with most of Belgium, after the Race to the Sea in 1914.

“We, on the other hand, have to protect our trade-route to the Thames and our transport routes to Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne - all within easy striking distance of their harbours. To do this we must constantly keep our forces patrolling at sea. To keep a force constantly on patrol, it is necessary to have in harbour, resting and repairing, a force larger than that keeping the sea. If, therefore, we are always to maintain at sea a force equal in number to that which the enemy can bring to attack us, we must allocate and keep in the vicinity a force nearly three times as great as that which the enemy can bring to bear.

“Such a force is not usefully holding an equivalent number of the enemy, as he need not keep his force continually in southern waters. He can move them from the Elbe secretly and at will, and it must be a pure matter of chance if their advent is discovered, since aerial observation is the only form of reconnaissance available, and this is a rotten reed to trust to in the misty and cloudy area of the Belgian coast.

“The enemy can, therefore, bring down and raid us with vessels which need not remain here, but which can operate in the north at will; he requires no vessels resting, as they merely raid and return to their base.

“We should, for safety, keep at sea a force sufficient to deal with his vessels when they arrive, since it is useless in practice to treat vessels as “supporting vessels” when those vessels are in harbour, as they have to get out of harbour, gather speed, and arrive at the spot attacked. In practice, before this can be done, the raid is over, the damage done, and the enemy well away to his harbours.

“This is the penalty we should have paid more than once during this war for letting the enemy establish strong naval bases close to our main arteries of traffic. The Germans are learning daily; they have improved vastly in sea initiative; and we may expect trouble of this sort before long.”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

The origins of Operation Hush extended back to these earliest days of the conflict where the British government and the Admiralty considered the prompt removal of the Germans from the Belgian coast as being of the utmost importance. Having the Germans in such close proximity to the channel was a clear threat to British naval interests in the channel threatening the sea transport routes to Dunkirk and Calais. First Lord of The Admiralty Sir Winston Churchill saw removing the Germans from the coast as a priority in 1914 which he impressed upon Commander in Chief of the British forces, Sir John French, but at the time Sir John had other competing priorities. In December 1915 Sir Douglas Haig had replaced John French as Commander in Chief of the British forces and he took up the idea of an amphibious landing on this stretch of German held Belgian coastline. Action was originally planned for 1915 but other events such as Gallipoli overtook him and so the plan was temporarily shelved.

In 1916 the plan had been temporarily resurrected, with Rear Admiral Reginald Bacon, commander of the Dover patrol, and Lt General Hunter Weston tasked with its development. Hunter Weston of course having had experience of amphibious landings at Gallipoli, albeit pretty disastrous ones. Bacon’s original plan involved landing a force at Ostend harbour, with decoy landings in other areas, but this was rejected by Hunter Weston on the basis that Ostend was too well protected by the Germans and the harbour, being very narrow, would be easy to block. The plan was delayed for yet another year when the BEF’s involvement in the battle of the Somme meant that another offensive in Flanders would have to be delayed. The quotes featured in this post are taken directly from Bacon’s own memoirs of commanding the Dover Patrol between 1915-1917.

“The postponement of the Ostend landing in no way altered my views as to the necessity of wresting the coast from the enemy, and I devoted all the time I was able to devising methods by which the naval forces could assist the army in an advance in Belgium.”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

By 1917 the danger to British shipping in the channel had greatly increased as the Germans were now well established in the area with the U-boat fleet based in Bruges and Zeebrugge considerably increasing its activities. The plan was developed further and this time Operation Hush formed part of the master planning for the 3^rd Battle of Ypres. The BEF, already located in Nieuwpoort, would attack eastwards along the coast whilst simultaneously the landing parties would attack west of Ostend around Middelkerke. These attacks would be triggered by a long awaited British breakthrough at Ypres, with the commencement of the battle planned for July. Haig wanted to use tanks in these landings which was something that would not have been possible to do at the harbour at Ostend, plenty of room would be required to move these machines around and Ostend would have provided a very narrow front. To allow the tanks to be landed on the beach, 550ft long specially designed landing pontoons would be pushed up the beach by Monitor ships which would allow an array of vehicles such as armoured cars as well as the tanks, to be landed.

“The following is roughly how the scheme developed in my mind.

The first and obvious idea was to have landing-piers constructed, which would be towed into position by vessels alongside them; the piers, after touching the beach, would have their sea-ends held up against the tide by anchors. But even supposing these in place, the troops would still have to be got on them. The idea then expanded into one of monitors going alongside the pier; but, to obtain the necessary draught of water to float a monitor, the piers would have had to be 300 yards long. If the monitors poked their bows against the ends of the piers instead of going alongside, 100 yards would be saved, and the men could tumble over the bows on to the pier.

But how were the monitors to be got into position with the pier? How would it be possible even to ensure getting the bows of the monitor up to the pier with a strong tide on her beam? Why not let the monitor come in and push the pier ahead? In this idea lay the crude solution of the problem. It seems now a simple and direct line of argument, but it took me days and days of thought to evolve it. Gradually the problem cleared until the arrangement shown in Plates XLI (below) and XLIII (following) was devised, whereby a pier 200 yards long was to be pushed ahead of two monitors lashed together.”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

On landing, the Mark IV tanks would be faced with a smooth concrete sea wall at an angle of 30 degrees so these tanks would have to be specially adapted to enable them to climb this sea wall and get clear of the beach. Large inclined timber ramps with timber battens called spuds would be hauled into position to enable the tanks, with corresponding timber spuds fitted to their tracks, to climb up although much discussion seems to have gone on regarding the construction of these ramps and the material that the ramp and the spuds would be made of, without it ever appearing to be fully agreed. The tanks were also to be fitted with winches in order so that the tank could haul up any heavy kit and artillery behind it.

“The 30-foot sea-wall sloping at an angle of 30°, with an overhanging buttress three feet high, of semicircular coping stone overlooking the landing, formed a natural fortress. (Plate L - repeated below.) This, armed by machine-guns and rifle-fire, would appear to the enemy to be almost impregnable, unless he mentally visualised the paralysing effect of smoke on the defence. Our smoke experiments had advanced so rapidly and satisfactorily that every hope existed of landing in an artificial fog”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

All of this was practised with varying degrees of success, and in great secrecy, in the Thames estuary and on the French coast.

“One pontoon was built and tried in the Swin Channel at the entrance to the Thames in March, 1917, which rapid building was due to the energy of Mr. E. J. Maginnis, Chief Constructor of Chatham Dockyard. Everything at first went wrong. Provisionally, a small vessel was placed on each side of the pontoon to assist in steering, and the hawsers to the monitors were kept slack. This method was not a success. The gays were therefore hove as taut as possible, and the ships manoeuvred with the pontoon rigidly attached to them. In this case the wires parted, but fortunately the high steering position of the monitors enabled a good view to be obtained, and I saw that the wires parted on steadying the ship owing to the jerk on them caused by the unavoidable slack, and the sideway velocity of the pontoon, and not to the steady strain during actual turning. The remedy was obvious - namely, the use of chains. Chains were got out to replace the wires, and after this there was no more trouble. The ships turned quite reasonably well, and a speed of approximately six knots was obtained. The pontoon-cum-monitor scheme was now an assured success. The other two pontoons were immediately commenced and hurried forward with all despatch”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

On the day of the attacks it was planned that smoke screens would protect the landing force from the German batteries. Buoys were positioned off the coast to guide the monitors to the correct positions. The monitors would be armed with 12” guns to cover the landing of some 10,000 men who had been transported there by sea. This landing force would fall under the command of General Sir Henry Rawlinson and so XV Corps were moved to another part of the French coast in order to practice embarkation and landing from sea, again in great secrecy. XV Corps took over the front line at Nieuwpoort on the 15^th June.

On the 18^th June Haig approved the final plan which involved three separate landing parties of about 4500 men of 1^st Division, each targeting three different landing sites on the beaches near Middelkerke. These landing parties would be covered by a smoke screen and by a naval bombardment which it was hoped would prevent them being too obvious a target for the Germans. After all disembarking so many men and slow moving vehicles, which were not going to be able to climb the sea wall quickly despite all their practice, were going to prove quite an easy target for the Germans. The tanks would disembark from the pontoons and move forward to cover the advance of the infantry. Each landing party had bicycles and motor bikes to increase their moveability, as well as a motor machine gun battery. Once they had landed on the Belgian beaches Rawlinson’s forces were to head inland to seize various strategic points such as bridges and road junctions. Simultaneously two Corps divisions would advance from Nieuwpoort. For this purpose 32^nd Division had been moved to Nieuwpoort in order to replace the French force which had been stationed there and were joined shortly afterwards by 1^st and 66^th Division and by 49^th and 33^rd Divisions towards the end of July. The infantry was also joined by the Royal Flying Corps.

A 12” naval gun was also transported to the area. It was intended that this would be installed at the Tirpitz battery once that had fallen to the British but eventually this was installed about 16 miles away having been landed at Dunkirk. Plans to land other large guns were abandoned, or the guns were to be installed in the monitors instead which would have given the British a greater range from which to fire on the German batteries, and cause a significant distraction, had the operation commenced.

Planning the date of the attack to coincide with the correct tides left a very narrow window of opportunity if the water was to be the correct depth for both the monitors draught and for men to be able to wade through it as they landed and so August the 8^th was elected as the date of the attack when tide conditions and visibility were going to be optimal. The offensive at Ypres which was to be later known as the “Third Ypres” or “Passchendaele” was then postponed to the 31^st July which meant a postponement of Operation Hush to either the 24^th August or 6^th September for the sea conditions to be favourable once again. Haig delayed Operation Hush once again until after 6^th September but soon events were to overtake him once again and the offensive at Ypres became bogged down in the mud of Flanders without the much anticipated breakthrough.

“It was necessary to obtain the slope of the coast with considerable accuracy, especially as the photographs taken at low-water showed ridges in the sand. This meant that the slope was not even, and therefore a wedge-shaped pontoon, such as that designed, might have difficulty in grounding owing to the uneven nature of the beach.
If the ridges were too high, the pontoon might ground on a ridge and have too deep water under its bow, for the men to land in. The landing, of course, would be timed to take place at high water. The fall of the tide on this coast dries the shore for about 275 yards from high-water mark, so that all the sand which at high water would be under the pontoon and the forepart of the monitors could be seen at low water. An obvious method of survey was available. Briefly this may be described as follows.

When the tide began to fall, with each foot of fall in height, the edge of the receding water formed a visible line along the beach. It was only necessary to photograph the shore at each foot of fall of the tide for the edge of the water in each photograph to fix a contour line which gave successive positions on the beach corresponding to every foot below high-water mark. Of coarse it was impossible to hit off such times exactly, but this was immaterial if the height of the tide when the photographs were taken was known, as a general section of the coast could he plotted, and the intermediate results obtained.

Now, to know the height of the tide at definite places on the coast, was a matter of some difficulty. The times and heights of tide at Ostend were known: at Nieuport all that was known was that high water occurred about twenty minutes earlier than at Ostend; but its maximum height and the rate of fall during each hour were unknown. At Donkirk, again, where the times and heights were also known, the times were an hour different from those of Ostend, and the heights again varied. To interpolate, from these scanty data, the times of high water and the heights of tide at intermediate spots on the coast, was impossible.

It was necessary that our survey should be accurate to within six inches. A submarine was, therefore, sent to submerge off Nienport, to lie on the bottom, and to register the height of water above her hull continuously for twenty-four hours by reading the depth-gauge. The rise and fall and the tide-curve at this spot was thus obtained at springs, neaps, and intermediate tides”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

Bacon’s account of the preparation for the landings goes into great detail regarding the complexity of working out the tides and the depth of water required for the landings.

It was always going to be very difficult to prepare for this invasion in secret and of course the increased activity by the British in the coastal area didn’t go unnoticed by the Germans, who suspected something was afoot. On the 19^th June eleven soldiers of the 32^nd division were captured by the Germans. It is unknown if these captives gave away any information, but German suspicions were backed up by the considerable increase in British forces in the Ypres area, and by aerial observation. German defences present on the coast included the Tirpitz battery which covered Zeebrugge with its 11” guns having a range of about 18 miles, the formidable Kaiser Wilhelm battery with its 4 x 12” guns which were newer than those equipping the Tirpitz battery. By 1917 there were 42 Batteries with some 80 German guns of a calibre greater than 6” defending the coastline. In June of that year the Pommern battery was completed which was inland of the coast and which included the 15” Lange Max gun, then the largest gun in the world, with its range of well over 20 miles meaning that the towns of Nieuwpoort, Ostend and Zeebrugge were well within its range. The MarinesKorps Flandern had been created especially for the purpose of protecting the area of coast held by the Germans and consisted of the 1^st and 2^nd Marine divisions. These divisions were defending the front line at Nieuwpoort facing the British front line.

The evidence of the build up of British troops in the area was enough for Admiral von Schroder to launch his own pre-emptive attack, named “Unternehmen Strandfest” or “Operation Beach Party” which commenced on 6^th July with a 3 day bombardment of the Nieuwpoort area. The low cloud and foggy conditions hindered the British in detecting the build up of German forces in the area. Early in the morning on the 10^th July the massed German artillery including 24cm naval guns from shore batteries opened up a huge barrage and attacked the British position on the bridgehead at Nieuwpoort, an attack which continued throughout the day. Gas called Diphenyl Chloroarsine or “Blue Cross gas” was used alongside mustard gas. “Blue Cross gas” was a fine particulate rather than a true gas and could infiltrate everywhere including through respirators and caused considerable disruption. Most of the bridges over the river Yser were demolished during the offensive which isolated the two battalions of the 1^st Northamptonshires and 2^nd Kings Rifles where they were. Telephone communications were cut making co-ordination of infantry and artillery almost impossible. That evening the MarinesKorps launched an infantry attack which badly mauled these two trapped battalions. German stormtroopers attacked, followed by German marines and then a third wave of flamethrower teams followed on to clear the British dugouts. Of the two British battalions only 4 officers and 64 men managed to escape to the west bank of the Yser river, some of the survivors were reported as having to swim across the river to reach safety. 50 officers and 1,253 other ranks were either killed, missing or wounded, a casualty rate of between 70-80%.

32^nd Division situated further to the east fared better, and a counterattack in the evening by 11^th Border regiment and 17^th Highland Light infantry restored most of the front line back into British possession. Although a further counterattack was ordered to take place on the 11^th July this did not go ahead. In all the total British casualties from Operation Strandfest amounted to approximately 3,126 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. This very end section of the Western Front was to remain in German hands until nearly the end of the conflict in autumn 1918 and, after autumn 1917, all plans for Operation Hush were completely abandoned.

“The plans unfortunately were never put into operation.

July and August (1917) passed, and our troops were still held up on the Passchendaele Ridge. The advance of the troops never reached Roulers. All July and August we eagerly waited an increased rate of advance, but the weather was against the expected progress. The tides in September suited, but the mornings were closing in, and, as the time of landing had to be about high water, it became evident that, if it was to come off in October, it would have to be before dawn; but hitherto the army had desired daylight for the attack.

A conference was therefore held at G.H.Q., at which I urged that, in default of the Army reaching Roulers, we should carry out a modified operation - seize the coast merely from Middelkerke to Nieuport, destroy the one hundred odd guns installed in that corner, and give the Navy a chance of landing heavy guns at the Palace Hotel to reach the Zeebrugge lock and Bruges dock. Of this, however, the Commander-in-Chief did not approve.

But, as General Sir H. Rawlinson was quite prepared to carry out the main operation before dawn if there was good moonlight, the Commander-in-Chief approved of this being done. Everything was, therefore, kept ready for the project all through September and half of October. The only difference it made to us was that the glare of the phosphorus-burners would be apparent; but this, extending over a length of three miles, did not worry me. After the enemy had appreciated that the glare was approaching, it would have been impossible for him, in the twenty minutes only that would elapse up to the time of landing, to take any active measures to forestall the attack.

One kindly act on the part of General Strickland and his officers was to invite the interned monitors’ crews to visit the camp of the 1st Division interned at Le Clipon. This proved a very welcome change from life shut up in the Swin. The monitors went over in pairs and anchored off Le Clipon, and the men had three days ashore. Visits under good surveillance were arranged to the Front, and the officers and men thoroughly enjoyed their visit.

On October 15th (1917) the 1st Division was ordered to move from the coast, and the operations were abandoned for that year. Disappointment and gloom settled for the time on us all!”

(Source: The Dover Patrol by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon)

Sources:

The Long, Long Trail website: https://www.longlongtrail.co.uk

Bacon, R. (1919). The Dover Patrol 1915-1917, Vol. I, mainly Belgian Coast Operations. Doran, NY, USA available at naval-history.net

All spellings of place names which appear in Bacon’s account are as published, inconsistencies included.

Starring: Noel Coward, John Mills, Celia Johnson, Bernard Miles, Joyce Carey, Kay Walsh, Richard Attenborough.

Director: Noel Coward and David Lean, Photography Ronald Neame

In 1938 Noel Coward was drafted into the British Secret Service, initially dispatched to Paris to serve in the Propaganda Bureau before being sent to the USA in 1940. Coward was a writer, director, actor, composer and singer and one of the original bright young things of Britain’s artistic society in the 1920s and 1930s with plays like Private Lives and a myriad of songs and revues. By the late 1930’s he was at the peak of his fame and his international profile was the perfect cover for intelligence gathering, first of all on the Nazi’s, and then to test the temperature of American support for Britain’s war effort against Germany prior to Pearl Harbour. He was to use his fame and popularity as one of the world’s most prolific and successful entertainers, and the epitome of Englishness, to influence the Americans to take up the allied cause against the Nazi’s. Coward had decided to put his stage career on the back burner when he volunteered to serve his country but was persuaded to carry out various propaganda and morale boosting work such as visiting various ships of the Royal Navy to find out what films the serving sailors would like to see on board as entertainment during the long days at sea.

In Which We Serve is based on the experiences of Lord Louis Mountbatten whose ship, HMS Kelly, was sunk by German bombers off Crete in 1941 with the loss of 130 men. Kelly becomes the destroyer HMS Torrin in the film and Coward’s Captain Kinross is clearly based on Mountbatten, who had an advisory role on the film. One of the film sets included a 200m long replica section of a destroyer and a pool full of tepid dirty water as the setting for the scenes, including the life raft on to which the survivors of HMS Torrin cling for their lives. Filming didn’t proceed without incident as the production ran out of money before filming was completed and there was a fatality on set when an electrician opened a container of gun powder. Two others ended up in hospital seriously injured. Mountbatten apparently said that the conditions on set were worse than those he had experienced in the Mediterranean!

Coward’s name appears numerous times in the credits as writer, director, lead actor and composer of the musical score for the film which also saw David Lean’s directorial debut beginning a career as one of Britain’s greatest ever filmmakers. Ronald Neame, another regular collaborator with Coward, was the director of photography. The film is shot entirely in black and white, colour film stock was rare in wartime Britain, and this allowed for seamless transition from drama to real-life footage of attacking Ju 88 bombers. On the whole, the blending of studio drama, stock footage and accurate and believable model work is executed very well and, given the absence of any of the digital technology we take for granted today, it is a technically complex feat to pull off and very impressive for that. Coward’s rather theatrical and clipped delivery of lines, he was primarily a stage rather than film actor, and ever so slightly condescending view of the lower classes does not detract from the film’s message. This was a time when people were encouraged to know their place in society and would have been entirely credible to British audiences, if a little amusing to ones in the United States. In contrast to Coward’s stagey performance, John Mills is superb as the ordinary seaman and his superiority as a film actor gives notice on a long and successful career. He would team up again with Lean just after the war for Great Expectations and notably with Robert Neame in Tunes of Glory.

The drama is heightened using short dramatic action scenes which are then interspersed with slower paced, and in places lengthy segments which fill in the back stories of the main characters. Coward’s Captain Kinross has a paternalistic view of his men, but also one which is deeply imbued with a sense of duty and responsibility. This is movingly illustrated in a scene where he admonishes an act of cowardice by one of the crew (a young Richard Attenborough making his film debut) but also himself for failing to instill sufficient discipline and duty into the man. Again, at the end of the film, as Kinross is posted to command another ship, he shakes the hand of every surviving crewman as the camera, over Coward’s right shoulder, registers the emotion on the men’s faces. Respect given and received and a message of ‘Britain can take it because we’re all in this together!’ that cannot have been lost on audiences worldwide.

The non-linear narrative alternates episodes of the home front and the domestic situation of the servicemen and their thoughts of home as they cling to the life raft after the Torrin is sunk. The mundane domestic struggles of their wives and families and the lives they have left behind created a genuine sense of empathy with the characters and accentuates the sense of peril as they face danger on the seas. In another memorable scene, Kinross’s wife, Alix (played by regular Coward collaborator, Celia Johnson) informs a soon to be naval bride that her husband’s affections will above all belong to his ship and not her, such was the devotion to duty. Being at home brought no certainty of safety during the war as Petty Officer Hardy’s (Bernard Miles) wife and mother-in-law are killed in an air raid and the task of breaking the news falls to Ordinary Seaman Shorty Blake (John Mills). This sad task is carried out in a typically British understated manner with all emotion contained and not on display. Hardy even congratulates Blake on the birth of his child before leaving the room for a walk on deck to be alone with his thoughts.

In Which We Serve was a huge international success and a key propaganda film of the British war effort. Initially viewed with suspicion by the navy, a sinking ship was not the obvious subject for a film whose intended purpose was to raise morale, complaints were made to the Admiralty, but Mountbatten pulled strings and showed the script to the king who liked it. It became the second highest grossing film of the year at the box office with its message of patriotism, stoicism in the face of the enemy and unshakeable determination to defeat the Germans. This artistic, propaganda and commercial success was recognised by the United States National Board of Review of Motion Pictures who voted it the outstanding film of 1942. The following year, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences awarded Coward a special Oscar solely for In Which We Serve, recognising the enormity of his achievement.

So on to Saturday -

Saturday morning saw us emerge from the tent less tired although in no less need of a good wash so I braved the showers (bit grotty) and the toilets (next level grotty) before making my way to the first talk of the day which was Rob Lyman and Phil Craig talking about the war in the east in 1945 and the nuances of empire. We Have Ways Fest is such a great opportunity to listen to some of the world’s best historians talk and this year was no different, where else would you get the opportunity to see so many brilliant talks and meet such interesting people all with a passion for history all in the one place. It is what makes this a truly unmissable event.

Rob was on stage later that afternoon along with Gordon Corera and Claire Mulley talking about intelligence and espionage work in three very different theatres of the second world war. Claire talked about female SOE agents whose wartime contribution has until very recently been very much overlooked and I had seen Gordon talk at Chalke Valley history festival and stumbled on his fascinating podcast, The Rest is Classified, also out of the Goalhanger “stable” I am looking forward to reading Rob’s book “Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918-1940” I am hoping that he too is going to take Peter Caddick Adam’s lead and dabble a little more in the First World War history in the future. Speaking of which, as always the Great War Group stall was always a bit of a central gathering point for us and it was good to catch up with the Great War Group members who frequent this event – even if it is “the wrong war” for us 😊. We seem to be luring WW2 enthusiasts into our ranks now too and if I am not mistaken that is now three Great War Group members who have infiltrated the organisation and have spoken at We Have Ways Fest, including GWG director Alex Churchill.

During the morning, I also went along to Merryn Walters superb talk on mapping the Blitz in London which was both amusing and very informative, particularly regarding the wide uses of the maps created to show the damage from the blitz which is which is something that I had no idea about. I also didn’t know that the Italians had also bombed Britain in 1940. This talk was in the new venue “The Arsenal” which was a lovely little tent in the woods rather than the old Arsenal venue which basically cooked speakers and audience alike under a glass roof.

At lunchtime we finally got around to trying one of my favourite venues of the whole weekend – the vintage tearoom, with its old-style china teacups and slices of traditional cakes and later on there was also another spitfire flight – you can never have too many of those. It was nice to have the opportunity to have a quick look at the Vickers exhibits as the Vickers collection in Shrivenham is one of my favourite museums, and to have a quick chat with the historians at the North Staffordshire regimental museum stand as this regiment had a key role in Dunsterforce and the Battle of Baku 1918. It was also lovely to catch up with Marcus and Brianne from Osprey books who have been so helpful in getting “Baku 1918” at least to a first draft stage.

We Have Ways Fest has grown massively over the last two years and so by the evening it was time to carefully work out logistics and tactics to be able to get decent seats in the tent for the ENSA show. Should we go for a direct frontal assault, or should we move in teams in a pincer movement? We went for the pincer movement with Andy and Adam holding the places in the queue as myself and Doug got the hotdogs in for dinner. Once we got into the tent and got our seats it was a case of not moving for fear of losing them. Next year they are going to need a bigger tent! The final talk of the day for day for me was John McManus, Saul David and James M Scott 1945 with “End game in Japan” and the use of the atomic bomb. This brilliant talk was given to a capacity audience, it was standing room only.

The educational and informative part of the day over it was now time for the fun. The entries for Hawaiian shirt competition were as horrific as ever – where do people find these polyester and viscose horrors? Certainly not to be worn near any open fires. Fiona won a prize with her flamingo style headgear meaning we are really all going to have to aim higher next year. Or maybe that should be aim lower? Yes, the bar really is quite low…

Then it was time for the ENSA show with a superb mix of comedy including Al and James as the two Ronnies, The 3 Yalta men based on the 3 Yorkshire men sketch, a hilarious George Formby sketch by Al Murray for which everyone now wants a note of the lyrics, and then a sight from which my eyes will never recover no matter how much bleach I pour into them, Al Murray in a sparkly mini skirt as Cilla Black in a We Have Ways version of Blind Date. I’m not sure those sitting in the front few rows will ever get over the view that they had – maybe they will but it’s going to take years of therapy. Alex Churchill starred as Essex girl Eileen, the munitions factory worker, who had to take her pick from three gorgeous eligible chaps, Bomber Harris (Charlie Higson) Jim Gavin (Ben Willbond) and James Holland with a dubious German accent. Eventually Bomber Harris/ Swiss Toni’s deliciously risqué and hilarious responses stole Eileen’s heart. This ENSA show is something that will be hard for them to top next year, it was top level comedy entertainment and as well as the ENSA show there was musical entertainment from Willow and Ned and We Have Ways favourites, The Bluebirds.

We didn’t hang around for too long on the Sunday, which is unusual as I like to watch the vehicle displays in the arena. This time I just felt chilled and weary and was facing a long drive home. I guess we have been spoiled with the fantastic hot sunny weather over the last few years and, well quite frankly, we both just wanted a good nights sleep and a hot (clean) shower and bathroom. After a sociable Saturday evening we did however amazingly make it to our “9am” on the Sunday morning despite being a bit bleary eyed where Alex Churchill delivered a brilliant talk about the Philippines in 1945. She also spoke a few words about Coral, friend and IC member from Hawaii who tragically died a couple of weeks before WHWF and will be greatly missed.

I don’t know about you but I always leave We Have Ways Fest feeling as though I have missed something that I really should have seen and feeling guilty about it but happily the talks are all recorded so that will have to do for now – of course until the dates of We Have Ways Fest 6 are announced and it all starts over again. The many Independent Company WhatsApp groups were certainly subdued in the week following We Have Ways Fest, everyone seemed to be coming down from a high and back down to earth and reality with a massive bump. Hopefully this announcement will come soon so plans can be made for next year - fingers crossed - as I fear we are all suffering from We Have Ways Fest withdrawal at the moment.

After a lovely evening on the campsite chatting to Henry and Doug over drinks it descended into a less than lovely night on the We Have Ways Fest campsite. The boorish behaviour at 2am, an inflatable mattress which has inflated its last after only eight uses and grim festival style facilities (kitty litter anyone? IYKYK) saw me emerge out of my tent the next morning somewhat regretting life choices and in need of a good wash. However, a bucket of coffee later and I was feeling human again and ready for the day. The build up to the grand opening to We Have Ways Fest is always brilliant, and this time was no different with Al and Jim making their appearance to the background sounds of AC/DC, much to the delight of the audience. I was not going to miss this for all the coffee in the world!

And then the real struggle begins. Actually, the struggle begins the moment the event programme is released. How to get to see all the talks and displays that you want to see and decide which ones you will have to reluctantly miss? After three previous WHWF’s I can tell you that it is impossible to see everything that you want to see, and the struggle is indeed real. Happily, though the first choice of talk for the day was easy – Great War Group trustee Henry Spilberg was presenting a talk about Wartime Convoys along with Chris Gatenby. Chris bought his obvious knowledge of the sea from his maritime career to the talk which was perfectly complemented by Henry’s historical expertise. Of particular interest were the coastal convoys and the way in which they kept war time Britain functioning despite the huge risks they faced from German sea borne threats. Both Chris and Henry are knowledgeable presenters and are new to the WHWF stage so hopefully they will be invited back. They got a shout out on Monday night’s WHW livestream so here’s hoping.

As this was a very much 1945 focused event the next talk was The Final Frontier: Crossing the Rhine. Predictably enough this very popular talk headlined by Al Murray and festival favourites John McManus and Peter Caddick Adams was standing room only which for us meant standing outside – and was perfectly timed with a deluge of rain! Sadly, PCA had car issues and couldn’t make it but Andy Aitchison was a superb and knowledgeable last minute stand in. It turns out that PCA was rescued by an RAC man who was a fan of his work and who was rewarded with a copy of a PCA book!

Next stop was a late breakfast/early lunch, whichever way you want to look at it, and a wander around the various stalls and exhibits. Our entries for the #kitoff were dropped off and arranged on the stall and my tiny little Bren carrier certainly looked tragically unimpressive compared to Simon Errington’s (Red 5 models) fantastic jeep and some of Al Murray and Tony Rowntree’s offerings. The kits were on display in what was formerly the Arsenal (or Greenhouse) along with the model shops, the war gaming display and, one of the best things I’ve ever seen, Tank Scalextric! Andy won our impromptu race but I was awarded the gold medal, I suspect due to my enthusiasm rather than due to my ability. It’s hard not to spend a fortune in here on model related kits and my discovery of the weekend was that you can get 1/35 scale bakery products – universal bread carrier anyone? It was equally hard to resist buying a jacket at the clothes vendor stalls too but while a WW2 replica jacket seems like a good idea at this festival I have a sneaking suspicion I’d look a bit daft wandering into the local pub back home wearing one. Lunchtime also featured a spitfire flypast (everyone loves a spitfire don’t they) and a look at the many vehicles also on display.

That afternoon I went for a Roger Moorhouse double bill (I’m not stalking you Roger, honest) with The Betrayal of Poland followed by The War Below, all about submarine warfare which Roger presented along with James M Scott. I knew that life in submarines for sailors on board was bad but I had just no idea HOW bad. “U boat stink” was a thing as was gingivitis, scabies and other nasty health conditions. The chances of coming back alive from a u boat patrol in WW2 decreased dramatically as the war went on – it almost made tail gunner seem like a good career option – and fewer and fewer merchant ships were lost to U-boats as time went on. It’s got to be said though, firing Juliet the mouse out of a torpedo tube was overly harsh if you ask me.

The evening’s entertainment started with “Family Stories” always an emotional occasion where people have the chance to tell some incredible stories of their family’s war time service (it suddenly got dusty in the tent, honest!) before the mood was lightened by We Have Ways Fest’s take on Mastermind. Which, if anyone asks, was nothing like Mastermind. Honest. Jane Guilliford Lowes excelled to win by answering what I thought were very tricky questions. The evening was finished off by a hilarious performance by WHWF’s very own house band The Achtung Babies and their take on some very familiar songs with less familiar lyrics, all altered to fit a WW2 theme.

We wandered off back to the tent hoping for if not a peaceful night, then a little bit warmer night. Got to be said though, the red wine helped on both counts.

What do you do when you make a pitch to speak at a history festival and you don’t make the shortlist? Give up? Grumble about it on social media? Nope. You do it anyway!

And lo and behold the We Have Ways Fest Fringe event was born. A group of like-minded history nerds (David Alexander, Jasper Verolme, John Concagh, and myself) all keen to give presentations about our areas of research, ably supported by the Cambridge Independent Company “Big Wing”. The organisational brains behind the event were Drew Campbell and Nigel Leaney and technical sound and recording whizz, and lead singer of the We Have Ways house band “The Achtung Babies”, Karl Reid. Full credit to these guys for a brilliant idea, well executed in not the easiest of conditions.

All plans to use a large screen to show the power point presentations were quickly shelved as it was too windy and so graphics were projected on to the back of the white gazebo – making pointing out anything on a map an interesting task as the gazebo flapped about in the wind.

David kicked off the evening with his detailed talk about “The challenges of breaking into the 4 rotor enigma, in a non mathematical way”, followed by John who was a very last minute replacement and stepped up to the task brilliantly with his talk on “Fighting for Empire: African Soldiers in World War Two”. I was third to speak, the title of my talk “The Kuban: The Wehrmacht’s retreat from the Caucasus Region” which was most amusingly referred to as the Couscous region by Karl. (The battle of the small grain based foodstuff?) By this time it was getting really quite dark. Last up was Jasper with an entertaining talk about “The last operation of the Dutch BomVa (bomber command) in 1940”

It was a bit of a strange experience presenting to an audience that I couldn’t see in the darkness and certainly a first for me. Usually people’s facial expressions give you some feedback but with the darkness and the silence they could all have been asleep as far as I could tell, although maybe it was probably just a bit too cold and windy for that. All my attempts to point out the city of Stalingrad on the map projected on to a wildly flapping gazebo wall fell flat but other than that it seemed to go ok, and I don’t think anyone spotted me shivering.

Everyone professed to have enjoyed the evening and the talks, although admittedly it was a somewhat captive audience on the campsite! On top of that it was a great way to kick off the main event. There is always a bit of a build up to We Have Ways Fest, and if messages on the numerous Independent Company chat groups are anything to go by then the excitement build up is something akin to that of primary school children on Christmas eve.

So next year join in the fun, pull up a straw bale, pull on a coat and woolly hat, pour yourself a drink and enjoy the We Have Ways Festival fringe!

Thanks must also go to Al Murray, James Holland and the festival organisers at Goalhanger for allowing us to do this

Today there is a small museum perched on the canal bank in this very peaceful location in the Belgian countryside. Located 1.5km north of Diksmuide and 14km south of Nieuwpoort and the Belgian coast, this is nearly at the very end of the western front. The museum overlooks the restored trenches and contains an exhibition about the trenches, the First World War in the area, and the harsh reality of the fighting that took place here, and of life for soldiers posted here. A rooftop balcony gives a view over the system of restored trenches and bunkers and, decorating the floor of the top storey of the building, is an aerial photo taken in 1916, which gives a good idea of the huge extent of the trench development and the opposing Belgian and German lines.

After the “Inundations” of October 1914 where the Belgians opened the sluice gates on the river Yser and flooded the land to halt the German advance, the Belgian and German front lines met at a spot facing each other on either side of the bank of the river Yser near Diksmuide. For several months the war had been fought across these flooded areas of farmland with any high point captured a valuable asset from where to observe the enemy. This was the defensive position that the Belgian troops had fallen back to and were holding off the German advance.

Although the Belgian position here was primarily defensive some attacks were made. In early May 1915 4th Division were sent to forward to the enemy lines but their advance was halted by German artillery and machine gun fire. Eventually the German firing along with the barbed wire, and the waterlogged ground, proved too much of an obstacle and the Belgians were forced to withdraw. One of the key high points held by the Germans were two very tall fuel tanks on the west bank of the Yser. On 9^th May the Belgians staged an attack against the Germans to try to dislodge them from their high point on these fuel cylinders but again the flooded land caused a problem for the attackers and again they had to withdraw. Although the inundations had saved Belgium from German invasion 7 months earlier it was to create on going problems for both sides. The waterlogged land was difficult to advance through and it was impossible to tell the different between ditch and trench or a shell hole.

After these two failed attacks by the Belgians it was decided that a trench would be dug on the west side of the river bank which would link up all of the other smaller trenches and fragments of trenches already formed there, in some cases these were little more than shallow ditches. Work began in late May 1915 and this new trench was to be called “Boyau de communication de la borne 16 de l’Yser” shortened to “Boyau de l’yser” and soon after, “Boyau de la Mort” – The Dodengang – the Trench of Death.

It was aptly named and, within its context, not at all over dramatised. It is not a place you would have wanted to be posted to.

The trench formed a key role in defending this section of the front line and preventing further German advances. The Germans and Belgians faced each other across the river, the Belgians on the west bank, the Germans on the east. To add to the immense threat facing the Belgians the Germans also had a toehold on the west bank, to the north of the Trench of Death which meant that the Belgians holding these trenches were under attack from two different directions. In some areas the frontlines were less than 50m apart.

The restored sections of the Trench of Death here are approximately 400m long and concrete bags now take the place of the original sandbags. The front trench nearest the river is laid out in a zig zag pattern to disrupt the sightlines and direction of fire of any potential German trench raiding parties and for the prevention of the spread of blast should an enemy artillery shell hit its mark and land in the trench. Observation bunkers looking out over the canal towards the German front line are interspersed along the length of the trench. Behind the first trench lies a second long straight trench, from where a system of light railways bought supplies into the complex.

At the very north end of the trench complex there is a concrete bunker and there the Belgian trench line stops. A couple of hundred meters away across what would have been no mans land lies another concrete bunker, this time a German one, which marks the start of the German trench line on the west side of the Yser river. This area was the scene of heavy fighting for much of the war and a key part of the front line There was continuous fighting here throughout the duration of the war, if not large offensives then trench raids, artillery fire, patrols etc. There was constant risk and a significant number of casualties were sustained at this location and no wonder with the frontlines being so close together and landscape reduced to little more than a boggy muddy swamp. The Trench of Death earned its name.

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The remains of approximately 130,000 German soldiers remained buried in Belgium after the end of the First World War, in 128 different cemeteries throughout the country. In 1925 an agreement was reached between the German and Belgian governments whereby Germany would have an Official German burial service in Belgium the “Amtliche Deutscher Gräberdienst in Belgien” who cared for the plots and arranged for exhumation and reburial of remains in co-operation with the Belgian, French and UK government organisations. The privately funded Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (VDK) established in 1919, the German equivalent to the Imperial War Graves Commission, worked in conjunction with the Amtliche Deutscher Gräberdienst in Belgien in raising money for the maintenance of cemeteries and for taking photos of graves for families of the dead. Langemarck-Nord cemetery and Roeselaere-de Ruyter cemetery, with 10,143 and 2,806 war dead respectively, were redeveloped with some of this funding.

The construction team responsible for the creation of the German military cemeteries was led by Architect Robert Tischler and do not follow the uniform style of military cemeteries of Britain and her allies. They are designed to blend in with their setting, in the case of Vladslo cemetery, making use of the trees and woodland. Tischler’s aesthetic was one of heavy masses and unpolished masonry which gives the cemeteries a sombre feel. This can be seen in the roughly hewn basalt crosses present.

In 1940 Belgium was invaded by Germany once again and the Official German burial service in Belgium was disbanded. The Belgians then took over care of the German cemeteries with the Belgian red cross and an organisation called '‘Nos Tombes - Onze Graven'’ working alongside the Belgian government to look after the care and maintenance of these war graves. Post war a further agreement was reached between the Belgian and German government over the care of the 128 German cemeteries on Belgian soil and the VDK again took over this work. It was agreed that all of the war dead from the First World War would be removed from the various small cemeteries around the Belgium into three much larger “concentration” cemeteries. This made the access and maintenance of the cemeteries much easier as they were all on Belgian soil. Between 1954 and 1956 the grim task of moving the remains of thousands of men was carried out as they were relocated to Langemarck-Nord cemetery, Vladslo cemetery and Menen cemetery, which is the largest German military cemetery in Belgium. These cemeteries were extended with Tischler again leading on the design. All of the unidentified German war dead were placed in Langemarck-nord as there was room available to create a mass grave there. The number of burials at Langemark-nord, Vladslo and Menen cemeteries now number 44,234, 25,647 and 47,864 respectively. It was decided that German war graves would be left in a further two cemeteries in Belgium, at Zeebrugge which has the remains of 173 German soldiers and Hooglede which has 8,247 graves. German remains buried in British and allied cemeteries in Belgium were also to remain where they lay.

Vladslo cemetery is located near to Diksmuide in Belgium. It is in a peaceful secluded location in mature woodlands. The cemetery entrance is via a low red brick gatehouse leading to row upon row of grey granite plaques lying flat on the ground, each with as many as 20 names engraved on it. It is hard to believe so many individuals are lying in such a small area.

Two sculptured figures stand at the far end of the cemetery. These are “The grieving parents” by German sculptor Kathe Kollwitz. These originally stood in Roggeveld military cemetery near to where Kollwitz’s eighteen-year-old son Peter died on 22 October 1914, early in the conflict. Kathe’s sculpture was finished in 1932 and erected at Roggeveld cemetery where it could look down on Peter’s grave. Käthe and her husband had two sons. When war broke out and the older son, Hans, joined up, his younger brother Peter asked his father for his permission. This was needed as Peter was below the age for being allowed to sign up. Peter’s father Karl was reluctant to grant his son permission but he was persuaded to by Kathe, a decision she would bitterly regret. The sculpture was relocated to Vladslo in 1956 as part of the works to create the concentration cemetery and now overlooks the graves of the soldiers buried there. If you follow the direction of the gaze of the father figure it lands directly on his son’s grave.

With the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany in the 1930s Kollwitz’s work was removed from art galleries. She had displayed work in an anti-fascist exhibition in 1942 and due to her pacifist ideals she was interrogated by the Gestapo and threatened with being sent to a concentration camp. She enjoyed the distinction of being included in the Degenerate Art exhibition in Munich. She escaped deportation to a concentration camp, possibly by now because she was very well known across the world and she died Moritzburg in 1945 just days before the end of the second World War in western Europe. As a tragic footnote Kollwitz’s eldest son Hans had survived the First World War and went on to have a son, also named Peter. Peter was killed on the eastern front in 1942.

Veronique and Ann had arranged for us to stay in a wonderfully quirky guest house above a florist, with large ceramic vases adorning the shelves and a lovely ornate wooden staircase with carved banister and handrail leading to the bedrooms past huge wooden doors giving the place real Louis XIV vibes! The guest house was run by the man who also owned the fabulous Leonidas chocolate shop and café over the road which doubled as the location for our delicious breakfast. Luxury handmade chocolates for breakfast should really be introduced in this county and we couldn’t resist bringing home a selection of out-of-this-world chocolates as a memento!

Theux is situated on a large, fast flowing river and the town has suffered from severe flooding in the past but the supply of water was necessary for its traditional textile industry and it was nice falling asleep to the sound of the water outside.

On arriving in Theux we parked up and were astonished by the number of WW2 vehicles driving up and down the street and parked up all around the town. A steady stream of olive-green vehicles and people in authentic looking uniforms were milling around up and down the road. These were mostly American vehicles, left over after the war, but restoring, maintaining and driving them is apparently a very popular past time in Belgium and Holland and on speaking to some of the people we discovered that Belgium has it’s very own Second World War vehicle club, of which, most seemed to belong. We made our way into the town and took in the atmosphere, reading the various information boards at the side of the river as best we could (they were not in English) and checked out the vehicles and the Bailey Bridge constructed across the river for the weekend by a company of US Army engineer re-enactors. The reason for the exclusive GI presence was the town’s 80^th anniversary of the liberation by the US army in late 1944, just prior to the Battle of the Bulge.

We met up with Veronique and Ann, along with our guide Phillippe and were introduced to the mayor who welcomed us to his town and to the planned festivities. The first activity of the day was a trip in a Jeep to Fort Tancremont, just on the outskirts of the town. Our Jeep joined similar cavalcade of vehicles taking visitors to the fort and we made our way up the surprisingly steep and narrow roads out of the valley – and I thought Belgium was flat! At that point I was very grateful that we were being conveyed in a Jeep with a punchy 2.2 litre engine and not in our under powered Fiat 500 hire car!

Arriving at Fort Tancrement we joined the large group taking the tour of the fort and followed our guides underground. I was half expecting it to be very like Fort Loncin, The WW1 fort just outside Leige, which I had been to earlier in the year but this was different in many ways. The immense concrete structure is almost entirely buried beneath a huge amount of protective earth, and this fort felt newer and more sophisticated with its lighting and ventilation systems. Technology had much improved by the time of its construction in the 1930s and it had not suffered from the catastrophic damage that Fort Loncin had experienced during its capture in 1914. Picking our way through Tancrement’s sub-terranean world was a similarly disorientating experience to Fort Loncin with the endless labyrinth of tunnels but it did not have the oppressively sombre atmosphere as Fort Loncin after the terrible events of August 1914 which left over 350 men buried beneath the rubble, with the fort remaining as a war grave to this day.

Fort Tancrement was completed in 1938 and, along with Forts Eben-Emael, Aubin Neuf-Chateaux and Battice formed the outer ring of defences protecting Liège. The Belgians had learned lessons from the destruction and surrender of their forts in WW1 and reinforced concrete was laid to remedy weak spots in the joins between pours during construction, far better ventilation and sanitation was provided for and gun turrets were less closely grouped. Ammunition stores and powder magazines were also far better protected.

However, this availed them little and in May 1940 after only a few days of fighting, the forts surrendered one by one to the Germans beginning with Eben-Emael on the 11^th May, captured by an audacious assault by paratroopers and glider born infantry, with Fort Tancrement falling on 29^th May

After the extensive tour of the fort (I think we saw everything!) we were then taken to the fascinating little museum nearby crammed full of interesting artifacts salvaged from the fort in time of war, and in peace, and had a look at the various tanks parked outside the museum before our Jeep arrived to take us back into the town. We then had a more time to look round the impressive collection of vehicles and displays on offer including a WW2 field hospital set up in the village church and displays of propaganda newspapers of the day and various other WW2 artifacts set up all over the village.

Phillippe told us about the town’s history including that of the fate of jews in the town during Nazi occupation, some of whom were hidden in basements. The town hall was also hosting a display of graphic novels, many of them historical and military history based. These are incredibly popular in Europe and the authors were there putting on demonstrations of their drawing skills and signing their work.

Reluctantly we left and by then the weather had improved so we were able to watch the vehicle parade including a demonstration of blank firing from a quad 50 calibre anti-aircraft gun mounted on a half-track, which was very impressive. We had lunch with our hosts sitting in the town square and I opted for a traditional black pudding dish which was lovely and very filling while Andy had Boulets à la Liégeoise, a traditional Ardennes meatball dish served with a tangy onion gravy. Frittes and beer accompanied this, of course!

The evening entertainment also happened in the town square in a marquee with a stage and a bar with a band playing 1940s songs to a lively and joyous crowd. At times it felt as though the entire town had tried to squeeze in to join the party! Afterwards, we walked back to the guest house and fell asleep listening to the rush of the water in the river.

The next morning dawned cold, grey and wet as we gathered outside the church and joined the procession to the village cemetery for the remembrance service. The scouts laid crosses at the CWCG graves and Andy took his place to do the same at the grave of his uncle Wilfred in a very moving ceremony where the mayor gave a short message of gratitude and the trumpeter played the last post.

Once back in the town we gathered with everyone in the square next to the church and the mayor and Jeanne-Pierre, who had organised the event gave speeches and the national anthems of Belgium, Great Britain and the USA were played. Andy was also asked to give a speech and he spoke of his gratitude to the town for caring for the graves of the fallen and for cherishing the memory of his uncle and his fellow soldiers. An American officer, whose grandfather had been killed in January 1945 while serving with the 82^nd Airborne Division also made a powerful speech reminding us all of the importance of alliances and the ties that bind our nations together

The school children of the village all sang very enthusiastically along to their national anthem and were incredibly well behaved given just how cold and damp the morning was and they presented us with a small gift each to say thank you for visiting, which was really touching. Finally, we joined the service of remembrance at the Catholic church, an atmospheric experience with its rituals and music and in some ways not speaking the language and not fully understanding what was going on actually added to the magic as I could just sit and take in the experience.

We then headed back to the town square where the band was ready to strike up a tune again and the party was about to start for the afternoon. This weekend was as much about celebration as it was commemoration and, unlike the sometimes somber affair that is Remembrance Day in the UK, this was also about the liberation of Belgium from German occupation, not once but twice in the last century. Perhaps for this reason, it did not have a sense of ‘gatekeeping’ of remembrance that you sometimes get in the UK, that there was somehow a right way or a wrong way to do things. The scouts and guides wore shorts and trainers, a 1940s band was playing in the town square and food and drink was being consumed merrily everywhere, scenes had to imagine in Britain on November 11^th. Perhaps being somewhere that has suffered occupation and liberation brings a more tangible feeling of celebration as well as the more solemn commemoration usually associated with remembrance at this time of year?

We said our goodbyes to our new friends and thanked them for their warm hospitality then headed into a small café for a huge pizza before leaving the village and driving back to Waterloo for the night.

One tweet and one email led us to have the most incredible weekend. We were made to feel so welcome by the people of Theux and were honoured to join them in their weekend of both commemoration and celebration

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Sir Walter Bullivant, Head of British intelligence to Richard Hanny in the novel “Greenmantle” by John Buchan

The struggle for India had its roots in a century old contest known, thanks to Rudyard Kipling’s novel “Kim”, as The Great Game. This was the on-going struggle between Britain and Russia for mastery in India and Central Asia. This incarnation of the Great Game drew to a close shortly before the outbreak of the First World War with the signing of Anglo Russian treaties which established “spheres of influence” in Afghanistan and Persia. In 1914 Britain and Russia found themselves unexpected allies in the First World War and, with Russia riven with internal strife and revolution, all thoughts of the Great Game and mastery of India were put aside, at least for a while

A German Jihad

In 1914 Germany realised that destabilising India and Central Asia could be a way of destabilising Britain as Britain would have to draw troops away from the western front to restore order in India, troops that Britian could ill afford to lose, even more so once Britain’s ally, Russia, withdrew from the conflict. The Kaiser believed this could be done by the Ottoman Caliph declaring Jihad against the enemies of Islam in the west. This did leave the Ottomans with a conundrum as they would be declaring Jihad against Britain, France, Russia but not against Germany and Austria Hungary which would be an unusual form of religious Jihad to say the least. Islamic theorists and the Ottoman Fatwa Bureau did some mental gymnastics over this and concluded that a targeted Jihad could indeed be declared but many Muslims, including the Aga Khan, disagreed and felt that the Caliph should not be working to a Western Master.

With Jihad settled, the Kaiser’s eyes could turn eastward and he employed agents to carry out his work in trying to raise Muslims against the British and to trigger revolt in India. The Kaiser’s weakness was that Britain was well versed in this sort of intrigue having played the Great Game for the best part of a century and the often clumsy strategies used by the Germans were foiled at every turn.

The new Great Game

In 1918 Russia was racked by revolutionary turmoil and her agreement with Germany in the form of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, allowed Lenin to return to Russia and signaled Russia’s withdrawal from the war. It also signaled the rise of the Bolshevik party led by Lenin. Lenin regarded Britain as Bolshevism’s number one enemy and the feeling was mutual, with the British soon to be sending small military interventions into Russia to fight the Bolsheviks, much to Lenin’s annoyance and leading to a growth in friction between Britain and Russia. The rise of Bolshevism signaled a new phase in Anglo- Russian, now Anglo-Soviet, antagonism and a new phase in the Great Game.

By now the Bolsheviks had been in power for less than a year and Russia was being torn apart by civil war. The outcome of the First World War was far from certain and Britain was fighting without her ally Russia, and was extremely alarmed by the loss of her ally and the anticipated large number of German troops who now could leave the eastern front for the western front. There also loomed the spectre of a joint German and Turkish attack on India. Such was the confusion neither Delhi, London nor Lenin were sure of exactly what was happening and where.

In a secret telegram in 1919 British Prime Minister David Lloyd George warned of the danger of Germany falling to bolshevism and that the whole of Europe was filled with the spirit of revolution “There is a deep sense not only of discontent but of anger and revolt” British Chief of Staff Henry Wilson noted unrest in the British army and warned of the danger of Indian troops following suit in mutiny and insurrection. Ever since the threat of what Churchill termed “the bacillus of bolshevism” to India had become apparent, intelligence agents were being sent to central Asia, to Tashkent and to Bokhara. The Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford warned the government about rising anger amongst Indian Muslims over what was happening to their Muslim brothers in the Ottoman empire in the wake of its defeat, and the threat to Britain that this posed.

First though, Lenin was determined to spread the Bolshevik Revolution throughout Europe which he assured his followers would be swiftly followed by a worldwide revolution, a fire that would spread through Asia and Africa and release those people from their capitalist oppressors. However, the Bolshevik revolution did not materialise in Germany despite her collapse at the end of 1918, nor elsewhere in Europe for that matter, so Lenin had to change tack and turned his head towards India. Lenin had always believed that the Bolshevik revolution in Europe would be followed by the “liberation of the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa” but now the east would have to become his starting point by which he would undermine the West. “The East will help us conquer the west” India, the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, the place where maximum damage could be caused. Raising insurrection in India would cause economic collapse for Britain and a resulting revolution back there, so Lenin believed. From India and Britain his Bolshevik revolution would then proceed to spread across the world. Lenin planned to set the east ablaze.

In order to reach India Lenin’s Bolsheviks had to conquer Central Asia, a vast tract of land in some very inhospitable landscapes including the Karakum Desert. For the Bolsheviks this meant defeating the “White Russians” in the area, still fanatically devoted to the Empire as well as anti-Bolshevik tribespeople looking for independence. There were also the so-called “Interventions”, small scale British missions sent to the region in order to combat this rising threat of Bolshevism. Control of this area of central Asia would allow Lenin to turn his sights back to India and the prospect of causing Indians to rise up in revolution against their British masters. Others were also keen to use the power vacuum caused by the fall of the Russian Empire to advance their own causes such as the former Ottoman minister of war Enver Pasha.

Revolution in India

To carry out his plan Lenin needed a man on the ground, someone who understood India, to work for him in stirring up insurrection and set India on the path to liberation from the British. The man chosen to take the lead in this new phase of the Great Game and spread revolution to India was Manabendra Nath Roy. Like many Bolsheviks Manabendra Nath Roy was not his real name any more than Stalin, Lenin and Trotsky were the real names of those revolutionary leaders. His real name was Bhattacharya and Lenin saw him as the potential leader of his planned revolution in India.

In March 1919 the communist international was formed, soon to become the Comintern, with the aim of spreading the Bolshevik revolution worldwide and Roy was a delegate at the first conference of the Comintern held in Baku. Roy was only in his 20s and was wanted by the British for various revolutionary activities including treason and arms smuggling. He had fled India, ending up in Mexico where he met senior members of the Comintern and they recommended him to Lenin. Roy first of all made his mark by daring to question Lenin’s doctrine and disagreeing with Lenin over whether the Comintern should co-operate with non-Marxists (Roy thought they should not) overall though Lenin seemed impressed by Roy’s arguments.

“Of all the strange things which have happened in the last few years none have been stranger than the spectacle of two Jews, one of them a convicted pickpocket, summoning the wrath of Islam to a Jihad”

The Times 23^rd September1920

One of the Jews to which this antisemitic headline applied was Grigori Zinoviev who, at this week-long rally of the Comintern and delegates in Baku had called on Muslims everywhere to rise against their western oppressors. However, many delegates had come from central Asia, the trans-Caucasus and trans-Caspian areas which were former territories of the Russian empire under the Tsar. They had seen how independence and self-determination under the Bolsheviks did not apply to them and their disillusionment in aspects of the Bolshevik rule began to be communicated in the speeches and discussions held at the rally but these accounts have been removed from the official records. Always watchful, British agents had been among the delegates and reported back on proceedings

The Army of God

The dismemberment of the Ottoman empire in the wake of her defeat in the war had caused upset amongst Muslims with rumours abound that the abolition of the caliphate would also mean the denial of access to Mecca for devout Muslims. It was estimated that some 30,000 Indian Muslims were volunteering to support the Turks but had found themselves stuck in Afghanistan, some of these Indians were deserters from the Indian army already well trained and drilled and, to heighten the fears of the British, lawyer and nationalist Mahatma Gandhi also appeared to be supporting the Muslims. The British had not helped to endear themselves with Indian Muslims when 380 unarmed Indian protestors were shot by British troops in Amritsar.

With the backing of the revolutionary council Roy decided to recruit and train a revolutionary army of Indian Muslims in central Asia which would invade India through Afghanistan as an “Army of God”. Roy hoped that this would trigger off a series of uprisings within India against the British, however the Soviets were short of arms after three years of civil war. Roy headed to Tashkent as the training location for his army, which was already a seat of anti-British resistance. The next task was to obtain the King of Afghanistan, King Amanullah’s, consent to invade India through his country which would involve creating bases in Afghanistan from which the attack could be launched with the 30,000 Indian Muslims currently languishing in Afghanistan forming the main body of this army.

Roy’s biggest problem was stopping the ever present British agents infiltrating his training school and reporting back to London and Delhi. The struggle for India again was being played out by those agents who so expertly played “The Great Game” and the Viceroy had authorized increased expenditure on espionage. Documents acquired by British agents confirmed that the Bolsheviks intended to target not just India but other countries such as Egypt and Arabia where the British were in occupation or had significant influence.

Capture and execution of any British agents who were Indian had to be carried out in extreme secrecy by the Bolsheviks to avoid upsetting other would be revolutionary Indians. By February 1921 several British agents had been reported as missing in this area. Overall though British agents were very effective in infiltrating Bolshevik organisations and intercepting communications. One tool in the fight against Bolshevism the British were to use was propaganda in an attempt to deter new converts to this ideology, but a balance had to be struck between deterring new converts and rousing their interest. On both sides rumours were spread as the war of information and disinformation gained speed, Moscow in particular wanted to raise alarm amongst the British in India via Roy’s activities but at the same time Lenin and Roy also desperately needed supplies from the west so Lenin upped the pressure hoping to force a trade agreement and various concessions from Britain. Lenin also tried to deny all links between the Soviet leadership and the Comintern in an effort to distance himself from Roy’s planned revolution in India. According to Lenin the Comintern was an independent International organization and nothing to do with him. The British were not fooled.

Enver Pasha’s ambitions in India

Lenin and Roy were not the only ones with hopes of stirring up revolution in India. With the defeat of Turkey, Enver Pasha, Turkey’s former minister of war was forced to flee so he made his way to Moscow on the invitation of Lenin and here he met Roy. Enver too had plans for India and proposed to Lenin that he could lead to revolutionary army into India in exchange for Lenin’s help in giving him control of Turkey which was now held by Ataturk, a former colonel in the Turkish army. Ataturk (Mustafa Kemel) and Enver Pasha had never been on friendly terms. The British got wind of the plan but didn’t for a minute believe Enver had any Bolshevik principles whatsoever but, as the old saying goes, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” So far Ataturk wasn’t hostile to the Bolsheviks but should the situation change it might prove useful for Lenin to have Enver Pasha to play as a trump card. When Lenin signed a treaty with Ataturk in 1921 Enver was not happy but Lenin didn’t suspect this and sent him to do his bidding in central Asia. Here Enver met with the men who he believed he could lead against the Bolsheviks. It wasn’t long before it dawned on Lenin that Enver had double crossed him and was now about to launch a holy war against Bolshevism.

Enver captured Dushambe in February 1922 and carried out an attack on Bokhara inflicting heavy casualties on the Bolsheviks while also attracting new recruits. King Amanullah of Afghanistan now started secret communications with Enver which were discovered by Lenin’s agents. Amanullah ignored their threats and protests. Enver’s operations were built on professional lines and his army contained many experienced Turkish officers. Lenin tried to negotiate but Enver refused saying that peace was only possible when the Bolsheviks withdrew from Turkistan and Bokhara, where his pan-turkik empire was to spread to. The Bolsheviks then prepared for an all out attack on Enver’s forces.

Soon Enver was forced on to the defensive and Enver’s pan-Turkik empire was a dream that was crumbling and many, including king Amanullah, sensing the danger, started to desert him. One by one towns fell back to the Bolsheviks. On August 4^th 1922 Enver had realized that his position was hopeless and as three hundred soviet troops approached the village where he and his troops had been celebrating Eid al-Adha he jumped on to a horse and rode straight at them. Twenty five of his men followed him, all were mown down by machine gun fire. It was some weeks before Enver’s death was reported by the Moscow correspondent of the Manchester Guardian (better known as author of children’s book) Arthur Ransome. On the 2^nd December 1922 the Manchester guardian ran the headline “The last adventure of Enver Pasha”

Roy’s Failed Revolution

On his return to Moscow from Tashkent Roy met with Stalin to discuss how to go about training revolutionaries to work on the Bolshevik’s behalf in India. Stalin had realised that there was little point in sending weapons and money to India if the recipients had little idea how to use them, they must first be trained.

Roy spoke of his time in Tashkent saying “A year and a half ago I had left Moscow with great expectations. The experience in central Asia was very valuable. The contact with a cross section of the Indian masses dispelled some of my earlier illusions and gave me a realistic view of the latter. I was convinced that Indian revolution was still a long way off and an uphill path lay ahead”

Additionally nobody was sure what the implication or results of Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaign in India would be, Roy thought that it was very unrevolutionary and was proved right after Gandhi called off his campaign when a riot resulted in blood letting. This gave the British some relief with Lloyd George quoted as saying “you cannot go on arresting people forever, especially when there are 319,000,000 of them” but Lenin was furious with Gandhi, just when it seemed Gandhi was on the cusp of achieving unrest against the British he had stopped. Lenin saw this as a betrayal. Although not entirely surprised by Gandhi’s actions, Roy was disappointed noting that the opportunity for a national uprising was lost because there was not a revolutionary party in the country to guide the masses. Other issues faced by Roy included disputes and schisms within and between various nationalist movements within India, the sheer size of the country and its population and petty jealousies about Roy who some resented for being the chosen representative for Indian Bolshevism and for being close to Lenin.

Roy started on his next project to install revolutionary cells in India which would infiltrate existing organisations. This did not go as planned. The first four of Roy’s agents were either arrested by the British or disappeared and the rest following them were too immediately picked up and arrested. The ever-capable British agents were reading virtually all of Roy’s correspondence without him realising. Roy’s agents whom had been arrested by the British in India on arrival were tried and jailed or turned Kings evidence and were set free.

On the 21^st December 1922 The Times newspaper headlines exclaimed “Bolshevik plan for India” and “a revolutionary programme…..grievances to be exploited” and printed the details of a pamphlet outlining the Bolsheviks plan for India calling Roy “the notorious Indian communist” In the pamphlet Roy asked for independence of India, no more occupation by the British through the Indian army and the confiscation of all large properties and estates. He called for a campaign of national disobedience to cause the authority of the government to break down in the “final stage of our struggle” The general public had little awareness of what had been going on during those previous four years other than through works of fiction such as those by John Buchan.

Roy’s call had achieved little other than causing the Indian national congress to distance themselves somewhat from Roy, alarmed at being accused of being Bolsheviks. Roy had always needed arms and money to develop his revolutionary cells but these, although sent from Moscow, often did not arrive. One sum of money that had made it over the border into India was secretly used by one of Roy’s less than idealist agents to build himself a house.

Stalin, who was now in charge of operations in India, saw few results by Roy even though Roy was still being lauded in Moscow for his achievements. Stalin sent a memo to the Politburo in Moscow, “It has now been realized that communism is completely unacceptable to the Hindus in their present state of development, and independence is a condition which must precede it. Our propaganda agents did not realise this and did not report it, and continued to work on completely the wrong lines”

Ghandi could have told him as much, writing “India does not want Bolshevism. The people are too peaceful to stand anarchy. They will bow the knee to anyone who restores order. Let us recognize the Indian psychology”

The main problem for the British though was that the only way they could counteract Lenin’s denial of being involved in Roy’s revolutionary plans was by providing actual physical evidence of the Soviet’s involvement and that would be revealing the intelligence that the British agents had supplied to London and Delhi thus putting at risk all agents still working in the field. Some evidence was carefully selected and presented including money in notes issued by a British bank to a Soviet trade official finding its way into the hands of revolutionaries who were arrested by the British in India. Selected details of Roy’s training camp in Tashkent were also released.

Lenin was forced to climb down in the face of overwhelming evidence of Moscow’s complicity in Roy’s plot now completely exposed, the ceasing of these activities by the Soviets was promised “The Soviet Government undertakes not to support with funds or in any other form persons or bodies or agencies or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent or to foment rebellion in any other part of the British Empire” Despite this both London and Moscow believed that they had gained the upper hand with the Soviets believing that there was no way the British would be able to police the Bolshevik’s activities fully and that they had secured their trade deal with Britian and the British believing that the trade deal would secure Soviet compliance.

By 1923 Lloyd George’s coalition government had been replaced by a Tory government under Andrew Bonar Law and Lord Curzon returned as foreign secretary. India was still bubbling with unrest and Roy was still determined to stir up his Bolshevik revolution so Curzon sent an ultimatum to Moscow threatening to cut all trade links with Moscow unless Moscow halted its intrigues against the British in India and withdrew its agents and stopped any planned invasions. Although it was generally felt that the Soviets would be badly affected by a trade boycott others pointed out that British exports to the Soviets had increased greatly over the last year or so and it might not be the case that a severance in trade links would be entirely to Britain’s benefit. Her trade rivals would rapidly fill that void and the Soviets would be free to pursue their ambitions in the east.

Moscow’s reply included an outright denial of the charges but despite their trouble making in the east the Soviets were still keen to maintain these trade links with Britain which were crucial for Moscow at this time. A number of concessions were offered by the Soviets along with a general toning down of their subversive activities. The agreement also included the transfer of Soviet agents and officials from Kabul and Tehran but this may have occurred anyway as both the governments of Persia and Afghanistan by now had tired of the activities of the Bolsheviks in their countries and had complained to Moscow. Again, both the British and the Soviets saw themselves as the winners, publicly at least.

The only one who couldn’t declare himself a winner was Roy. There was no hope now for his planned revolution in India, the Army of God was disbanded without so much as a shot fired. The Soviets and the Comintern abandoned him and he was left to carry on with his revolutionary activities alone, making one final attempt in 1930 when he slipped back across the border into India but the ever vigilant British intelligence agents were on his tail and he was arrested and imprisoned the following year.

For now, the chances of a Bolshevik revolution in India seemed as distant as ever - but Moscow had no intention of abandoning her ambition of setting the east ablaze

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Indians in Defence of the Suez Canal in 1915

Dr Adam Prime

Dr Adam Prime opened the conference with his talk about the war time service of the Indian troops in defence of the Suez canal. The geographical importance of the Suez canal was considerable as it significantly reduced the time and distance of any journey to the Middle East or India from Europe and Britain, but it’s construction had left Egypt virtually bankrupt and so Britain bought controlling shares in the canal. On the 5^th November 1914 the Ottomans declared war against Britain and that month the opening shots were fired in the conflict over control of this vitally important waterway.

Indian troops had formed a significant part of the defence of India along the infamous North Western frontier but this was an entirely different from of warfare than they were to experience in both Egypt and the trenches of France and Flanders where Indian troops were also sent into action. One division of Indian troops were used to dig the defences along the bank of the Suez canal which became critical when reports of the build up of Ottoman troops in the area were received from the middle of January 1915 onwards, and the 11^th Indian division was sent into action successfully defending the Suez canal from the attacking Ottomans in February 1915.

The Second Battle of Ramadi: The most perfectly fought battle of the war?

Paul Knight

Major Paul Knight kicked off his talk about the Battle of Ramadi with a list of well known names who had fought in the Middle East or who had in some way been involved in shaping policy in the Middle East such as Clement Atlee, TE Lawrence, Gertrude Bell and Ibn Saud, founder of modern day Saudi Arabia.

The Mesopotamia campaign is always overshadowed by the disastrous siege of Kut resulting in the largest surrender of the British army until the surrender of Singapore twenty five years later but the Battle of Ramadi was a notable, if not well known, success. The Mesopotamia campaign was a campaign where logistics were of major importance, given the distances and the severe terrain to be covered, supply lines were stretched to the limit and the importance of “new” vehicles such as aviation and armoured cars and tractors became significant. Planes could cover distances that people couldn’t and tracked vehicles and flat bottomed boats could navigate the swampy muddy conditions in the found in the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

The battle of Ramadi was actually a series of two battles taking place between July and September 1917. In the initial battle the British were defeated by the harsh conditions, the enemy and their over stretched communication and supply lines. In the second battle these issues were overcome successfully, with the Turks falling for the deception plan launched by the British which made the Turks believe the attack would be to their right flank. Logistics were the key to this success too, such as supplying fresh drinking water for the troops, with the result that the Turkish garrison surrendered and 3000 Turks were taken prisoner leaving the area between Ramadi and the Syrian border clear of the Turkish enemy.

Dunsterforce

Louise Provan

I had the after lunch slot where I supplied the audience with Singapore Stingahs to keep them from their post lunch nap. The Stingahs were a favourite drink of Aussie troops on this expedition to Baku, then in the Russian empire but now the capital of modern day Azerbaijan. The purpose of Dunsterforce, led by Major General Lional Dunsterville, was to prevent the Turks and the Germans getting hold of the oil of Baku. Over the four years of the Great War oil had become an increasingly important resource and one that the British were determined that would not fall into the hands of the enemy in the critical last months of the war. Dunsterville’s route took him through famine ravaged war time Persia and into conflict with not only the Turks but also local tribes and the new Bolshevik regime.

Badly outnumbered and with local forces unwilling to pull their weight and fight alongside the British to save the town, Dunsterforce was only able to hold Baku against the Turks for a matter of weeks but it was long enough to prevent the oilfields of Baku from falling into enemy hands

Rupert Brooke and the Glitterati in Gallipoli

Peter Hart

Final speaker of the day was the ever entertaining Peter Hart talking about Rupert Brooke and the Glitterati, that fashionable, famous and wealthy set of young men who went off to serve their country in 1914 and 1915. Brooke served as an officer in the Royal Naval Division, a newly formed and so a comparatively untrained division, which was always going to be difficult for any officer to command. The RND saw service in 1914 during the siege of Antwerp and then in the ill-fated Gallipoli expedition of 1915.

Brooke joined the Hood Battalion along with others of similar background, the musician Denis Browne, Patrick Shaw Stuart, Olympic athlete Frederick Kelly, Arthur Asquith, son of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, Charles Lister and VC winner New Zealander Bernard Freyberg, better known for his WW2 exploits. They formed part of a glamorous set who moved in more elite circles than your average officer, however they overcame their initial difficulties as officers where they could barely understand the working class men that they commanded and likewise, the men couldn’t understand their officers, to achieve highly in their wartime service.

Freyberg won the VC at the Battle of Ancre, Shaw Stuart was killed by German artillery in December 1917, Asquith was twice awarded the DSO, Lister was wounded 3 times, his third, terminal, wound coming as he protected his men in the trenches. Slightly less auspiciously Brooke succumbed to septicemia from a mosquito bite, like many others who died of illness rather than wounds in Gallipoli, and he died on board a hospital ship. Brooke was buried on the Greek Island of Skyros.

Despite the initial unpromising appearance of these men widely regarded as dilettantes, the wartime days of rapid promotion saw them become brave highly thought of officers who served their country and empire well.

               If I should die, think only this of me:

                 That there’s some corner of a foreign field

              That is for ever England. There shall be

                In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;

             A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware,

               Gave, once, her flowers to love, her ways to roam;

            A body of England’s, breathing English air,

               Washed by the rivers, blest by suns of home

                                                       The Soldier, by Rupert Brooke

This was a very successful first edition of the “Not the Western Front” conference with a wide range of very interesting and, for a lot of attendees, new topics explored. A second conference is planned for October 2025. Keep an eye on the Gosling Press website for further details.

Conference – Gosling Press

This weekend it is the Not the Western Front conference in Wakefield.

Organised by John Wilson of Gosling Press, this conference gives prominence to less well known theatres of conflict and to other aspects of the great war not linked to the trenches of Northern France and Belgium.

Speakers include Peter Hart who will be talking about the war poet Rupert Brooke who was assigned to the Royal Naval Division in  early 1915, sadly dying of blood poisoning a few months later.

Dr Adam Prime will be talking about the Indian troops in charge of the defence of the Suez Canal and Paul Knight will be talking about the Battle of Ramadi fought between the British and the Ottomans in 1917 during the Mesopotamian campaign.

Last up is myself talking about Dunsterforce, a small military expedition to Baku in the closing months of the war to prevent the Germans and their Turkish allies from taking the important oilfields of Baku.

Tickets for these talks, including lunch, are £29 via Gosling Press’s website. Gosling Press is a small publisher specializing in books about the First World War, with a special interest in campaigns away from the Western Front and about the Indian Army. Books can be purchased directly from Gosling Press or from Amazon.

Gosling Press – Military History Books