Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein appeared to expect a quick victory when his forces attacked Iran in September 1980. That assessment turned out to be mistaken, and the Iran-Iraq war dragged on until 1988. The lesson Saddam apparently learned from this was that he had attacked too big and powerful a country. So in August 1990, he attacked a much smaller one: Kuwait. Saddam’s forces did quickly succeed in overrunning that country. But convinced that the U.S. was afflicted by “Vietnam Syndrome” (the desire to avoid a similar prolonged, unsuccessful war), Saddam anticipated that America would not intervene militarily against him. That calculation, though, turned out to be a mistake, and an American-led coalition quickly expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Putin, for his part, appeared to expect a quick victory when his forces attacked Ukraine in 2022. Like Saddam’s decision to invade Iran, Putin’s assessment also turned out to be mistaken, and the Russia-Ukraine has dragged on for four and a half years since then. It could well go on for years. So could Putin, like Saddam, calculate that he is more likely to succeed by attacking a smaller country instead? And unlike Saddam, would Putin be correct in anticipating that the U.S. would not intervene militarily if he did?

There is genuine fear in Europe that President Trump’s constant disparagement of NATO as well as his drastic reduction in U.S. military support for Ukraine might encourage Putin to think he could successfully invade a small European country that would prove much easier than Ukraine to overrun. Further, if Russian forces could quickly overrun a small NATO member (such as one of the Baltic states) and other NATO members proved unwilling to fight against Russia in the way that Ukraine has, this would be a far greater victory for Putin than defeating Ukraine. It would effectively mean the end of NATO. For if the NATO allies prove unwilling to defend even one member state, their willingness to defend any others would be seriously undermined.

But would Putin, like Saddam, really decide to attack a smaller, less militarily capable country now that Russia’s war on larger, more capable Ukraine has proven to be such a quagmire? The possibility of nuclear conflict arising would be much greater if Russia attacked a NATO member—something Putin would presumably seek to avoid. Further, the U.S. did not have the same sort of security commitment to Kuwait that it has to its fellow NATO members. Despite the doubt that Trump has raised about this, Moscow cannot be, or should not be, completely certain that the U.S. would not honor its NATO commitments. Even if the U.S. did not, other NATO countries might come to the aid of an ally under attack. Finally, with Russian forces already bogged down in Ukraine where they are suffering heavy casualties, taking on an additional military adventure would be highly risky.

For all his recklessness in first attacking Iran and then attacking Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was at least prudent enough to wait almost two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 before launching his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. If Putin really did intend to invade a smaller European country in the belief that such an operation would be more successful than invading Ukraine, it would be prudent for Putin to agree to end his war with Ukraine as soon as possible either with a ceasefire in place or even withdrawal from some Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. Putin, after all, may be willing to forego subduing Ukraine if this would free up resources to overrun one or more of the Baltic countries quickly and deal a death blow to NATO’s credibility as an alliance.

There are some Western voices which have expressed fear of a scenario in which Russia ends its war with Ukraine in order to turn his attention to attacking NATO. These fears underline the uncomfortable reality that many NATO members are providing arms for Ukraine to fight against the Russians so that Europeans and Americans will not have to do so. It is not at all clear that European and American societies would be as willing or able to fight against with Russia with the same determination that Ukrainian society has. There might even be those willing to accept the loss of one country to Putin in order to avoid the possibility of a more general war involving a greater risk of turning nuclear.

Yet despite his arguably being in a better position than Saddam to successfully overwhelm a smaller country after failing to subdue a larger one, there are three reasons Putin may be unwilling to attempt this: 1) It is doubtful that Putin can bring himself to end his war against Ukraine, thus limiting his ability to divert sufficient resources from it for another military adventure; 2) Even if he does end his war on Ukraine, but especially if he doesn’t, Putin cannot be sure that Ukraine will stay out of Russia’s new conflict like Iran did when the U.S. led interventions against Iraq both in 1991 and 2003; and 3) Putin must be concerned about whether ordering his military into another conflict after suffering such massive casualties in the war against Ukraine could lead to the Russian military either turning on him or collapsing.

Putin, then, may have even less reason to be optimistic about the prospects of successfully defeating a smaller adversary after failing to defeat a larger one than Saddam was. But as Saddam previously demonstrated, the failure to vanquish one country does not mean that an ambitious leader will not attempt to vanquish another.

^{Strait of Hormuz Map—Wikimedia Commons}

President Donald Trump is reportedly frustrated because he cannot understand how the Iranian leadership thinks. With the desire to make money being so important for Trump himself, he apparently expects that this should be a primary motivation for the leaders of other countries, no matter what their purported ideology. And since it is much easier to make money by cooperating with the U.S. than by opposing it, Tehran’s unwillingness to work with the U.S. appears to be irrational. Indeed, the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and many of his close associates at the outset of the 2026 U.S./Israeli war on Iran may have been undertaken in the expectation that they would be replaced by younger, more “sensible” leaders who would understand the obvious benefits of cooperating with America. If so, this expectation has clearly been disappointed.

So if the leaders of the Islamic Republic do not view Iran’s relationship with the U.S. in a way that Trump (undoubtedly like all previous U.S. presidents since the 1979 revolution) see as sensible, then how do they view it? One obvious answer is to point out that anti-Americanism is at the very core of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology. Some even see the Islamic Republic as unwilling to let go of hostility toward the U.S. and Israel since this could undermine the regime’s basic reason for being.

However, some (though by no means all) revolutionary regimes in other countries have over time seen the benefit of improving their relations with America and its allies. For example, despite prolonged, bitter conflict between the U.S. and the Marxist regime in Hanoi during the Cold War, that same Marxist regime has had good working relations with Washington for many years now. The New York Times only recently reported that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which also fought American and allied forces for decades, is now seeking improved relations with the U.S. Adherence to a revolutionary ideology, then, does not need to be an obstacle to improved ties with the U.S. Some factor other than revolutionary ideology, then, may be at work in the case of Iran.

What could this be? I do not claim to be a specialist on Iran. My research on it has focused primarily on the Russian-Iranian relationship and secondarily on the wider topic of how relations evolve between revolutionary regimes on the one hand and with other revolutionary actors as well as status quo powers on the other. I did, though, visit Iran twice and have had numerous exchanges with scholars and journalists from there over the course of many years. What has impressed me from these conversations is that, quite independent of the Islamic Republic’s ideology, Iranians tend to hold similar distinctive views about Iran, the U.S., and the place of both in the world.

Iranians I have spoken with take great pride in Iran’s long history as a nation, which they see as one of the longest of any nation in the world, similar to China. They view America, by contrast, as a relatively young nation. And in their view, it is not military or economic strength that give a nation status relative to others, but length of history. They see Iran as an elderly nation, and America as an adolescent one. For all its economic and military strength, then, America is headstrong, emotional, and not fully in control of itself. Finally, given how young America is, many Iranians believe that it may not survive over the long run—unlike Iran which has proven that it can, and thus will continue to do. Further, the proper ordering of the world is that elders should lead and youngers should follow. For a younger not to follow the lead of an elder is extremely disrespectful and simply cannot be allowed.

In such a vision, older nations such as Iran should be the ones to set the rules of the world order while younger ones such as America should heed their elders. Clearly, neither the U.S. nor any other nation younger than Iran (which is most of them) is going to accept direction from Iran simply because its history is longer than theirs. But if indeed Iran’s leaders see the hierarchy of nations as being determined by the length of their history, then this helps explain why they simply cannot bring themselves to submit to what they consider to be a young upstart country—and perhaps even why they may foresee that such a country may ultimately have to accept Iran’s terms.

Up to now, Trump has been frustrated about why the Iranian leadership won’t make a deal with him on his terms. If Trump comes to share my understanding of why they will not, he will not be in a better position to make a deal with Tehran, but only to understand why Tehran is not going to make a deal with him on his terms.

_{Substack Image Generator}

Both in America and around the world, a once unthinkable question is being asked: Could authoritarian conservatives someday prove successful in subverting the American electoral process and turning America into an “illiberal democracy” or even an autocracy?

While America turning into an illiberal democracy or dictatorship would have the greatest impact on American domestic politics, what I will discuss here is what impact it would have both on America’s relations with other countries and on international relations more broadly. In my view, a generally acknowledged democratic decline in America would have an extremely negative impact on international relations. Counterintuitively, though, it might not have a particularly negative impact on America’s relations with other countries—or at least not initially.

America’s authoritarian adversaries—especially China and Russia—could be expected to welcome an authoritarian turn in the United States. They would loudly crow about how Washington could no longer assert that its being a democracy made America morally superior to them. An illiberal or authoritarian America, in other words, would be no better than illiberal or authoritarian regimes elsewhere. Further, such an America would presumably no longer advocate for the protection, much less propagation, of democracy abroad like it had in the past. While still competitive, relations between an illiberal or authoritarian America might well improve with a Russia or China that no longer see it as promoting their democratic transformation. They may even hope that an authoritarian America might be willing to enter into the sort of great power bargains over spheres of influence that a democratic America was not.

America’s authoritarian allies could also be expected to prefer an illiberal or authoritarian U.S. government. Such an America would end all efforts, however half-hearted and ineffectual they have often been, to encourage them to undertake democratic reforms and stop violating their citizens’ human rights. An authoritarian America and its authoritarian allies would instead have a common interest in suppressing all internal dissent in the name of protecting stability.

America’s democratic allies, of course, would be alarmed and dismayed by democratic decline in the U.S. Some of them could be expected to loudly denounce this development and warn of the negative impact it would have on their alliances with Washington. But would this really occur? The fact that so many of America’s allies already get along well with authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, and elsewhere suggests that they would accommodate themselves to an authoritarian America too. And since they will continue to fear Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea, America’s democratic allies might not quibble about remaining allied to an undemocratic America if it was still willing to protect them against their common adversaries. Further, just as most Muslim countries overlook Beijing’s and Moscow’s harsh treatment of their Muslim populations for fear of harming their relations with China and Russia, America’s democratic allies may decide that it would be prudent to avoid making too much of an issue of America’s democratic decline for fear of harming their alliances with the U.S. The deferential manner in which the leaders of so many democratic countries have treated Donald Trump suggests that this is possible.

The dismaying implication of this analysis, then, is that however harmful democratic decline would be for America’s domestic politics, it might not be all that harmful to America’s relations with other countries. Indeed, an illiberal or authoritarian America might even have better relations with America’s authoritarian allies and adversaries than it does now, while America’s democratic allies might well have to adjust to it just as they do with other authoritarian regimes.

But whatever the state of its relations with other governments, America becoming an illiberal democracy or authoritarian regime would have a profound impact on the international system as a whole. Some might hope that the European Union could take up the mantle of being the main democratic great power, serving as an example which inspires other countries—including America—to emulate. Indeed, there are many Europeans who have long wanted the EU to act as a great power itself, especially after Donald Trump cast doubt on America’s willingness to continue underwriting European security.

It is not clear, though, that the EU could replace the U.S. as the world’s preeminent democratic great power. Among other problems, Europe itself is experiencing a rise in authoritarian nationalism which could accelerate as a result of American democratic decline. As Mika Aaltola, now a Member of the European Parliament, put it in his 2021 book, Democratic Vulnerability and Autocratic Meddling, “political regression in one place is linked to its likelihood in other places.” Democratic decline in the U.S., then, could foster democratic decline in Europe and elsewhere.

Instead, international relations might come to resemble previous historical periods in which authoritarianism prevailed. Various great powers might alternate between competing with each other for alliances with smaller states on the one hand and cooperating with each other in agreeing on spheres of influence over the same smaller states on the other. Smaller states might still see themselves as needing to ally with an illiberal or authoritarian America if they remain more fearful of Russia or China. But if they also become wary of an illiberal or authoritarian America, smaller states would seek to balance between the U.S. on the one hand and China or Russia on the other in an attempt to maximize their autonomy. For while smaller countries may still ally with the U.S., others may hedge against an illiberal America which they perceive as “little different” or even “no different” from other authoritarian great powers. There are definitely reasons, then, to fear the negative impact of an illiberal or authoritarian turn inside the U.S. on what American foreign policy can achieve.

Just imagine if three months from now the following news headlines appear over the course of a single day:

• “Russian President Putin Killed in Missile Attack during Tour of Munitions Factory”

• “Ukrainians Deny Foreknowledge of Putin Visit to Munitions Factory”

• “Western Intelligence Sources Claim Putin Death Due to Backfiring Russian Air Defense Missile, not Ukrainian Attack”

• “Flash: Russian Presidential Office Announces that Putin Safe; His Body Double Was Killed Instead”

• “Russian Prime Minister Announces that Putin Really Was Killed; Fake Putin Arrested”

• “Foreign Leaders Uncertain What Is Going on in Russia”

Could this happen? There have been numerous stories over the years that Russian President Vlaidmir Putin has multiple body doubles. A Newsweek article discussed the evidence for this in 2023. Wikipedia noted a claim that there might be six Putin doubles, each specializing in a different task. But, as Wikipedia also noted, there are also those who dismiss reports of Putin having body doubles as false.

I do not know whether Putin employs body doubles. The possibility that he does, though, reminds me of the Dostoevsky novel, The Double, in which someone meets his double, the double takes over his life, and the someone whose life is taken over ends up in an asylum. Could life imitate art, and having a double lead to Putin’s undoing? While it may be a low probability event, the high impact of its occurring makes the question worth considering.

If Putin does employ a double, he obviously does so in order to protect himself. While he may see it as desirable to be seen making public appearances and travelling abroad, a paranoid Putin might see sending doubles on these missions while he stays safe in one of his bunkers as prudent. There is always a risk, though, that one of the fake Putins, with help from others, could try to take his place. Presumably, though, Putin and his guards have anticipated this possibility and taken measures to ensure that it does not arise.

Still, there is always the risk of something taking place that could make having a double render Putin more politically vulnerable than he would otherwise be. If Putin has doubles, there need to be at least a few others who know about this in order to deploy them. But it could only be a very few since the more who know for sure, the more likely that knowledge or even suspicion that a double is representing Putin will become widespread and undermine whatever benefit arises from deploying them.

This also gives the small number of people who know for sure if Putin sends out doubles the power, if they choose to exercise it, to declare who is the real Putin and who is not. And if, as the above future headlines suggest, something tragic befalls the fake Putin, the security forces in the know may may have the possibility of exploiting the occasion to declare that the real Putin is no longer with us and the one claiming to be him is a fraud. Indeed, perhaps they could even arrange for just such a scenario.

Why might those close to Putin do this? One possibility is that if the people around him recognize that the war against Ukraine needs to be halted before Russia is further weakened but know that Putin will never agree to this, replacing him with a double would be one way to solve this problem. Presumably, the double would not have the same stake that Putin does in continuing the war and would have every incentive to do and say whatever it takes to stay in the good graces of his minders. And if a double is killed while playing the part of Putin, this could give the minders the opportunity to replace the real one. Even if it was generally suspected that this was what they were doing, those within the power elite recognizing that Russia is better off without Putin would have an incentive to play along.

Many of those reading this may, I quite understand, dismiss the possibility of Putin’s downfall resulting from a situation arising from his deployment of a double. Maybe there are no Putin doubles. Even if there are, maybe Putin has complete control over them and their minders. And maybe they can continue to prevent (if that is what they have been doing) anything untoward from happening when a double is playing the part of Putin that would result in the real Putin having to assert himself by admitting that he had deployed a double.

If Putin leaves office involuntarily, though, it is probably not going to occur through either a democratic revolution (something Putin knows how to suppress) or military rebellion (which may be too difficult to plan and execute without being betrayed by one of the many needed to make it work). If Putin does leave office involuntarily, then, it is more likely to occur as a result of a bizarre set of circumstances unexpectedly arising and someone exploiting—like something in a Dostoevsky novel.

_{Anti-Putin demonstration, Moscow, 2011—Wikimedia Commons}

The prospect of a weakened Russia may seem highly unlikely or even impossible to many. Perhaps it even seems like something that it is “too good to be true,” and thus would be naive to even think about. But the fact that Putin has been unable to prevail against Ukraine after over four years of fighting and despite the drastic reduction of U.S. military assistance to Kyiv raises doubts about Moscow ever being able to do so. Ukraine’s recent success in attacking Russian military, petroleum, and other installations which Moscow relies on for its war effort only increases these doubts.

It is possible, of course, that Russia might be able to survive these setbacks in its war against Ukraine and go on and prevail (or just go on despite not prevailing) as long as Russia does not suffer from other serious setbacks. Continued poor Russian performance against Ukraine, though, could trigger other problems for Russia in general and for Putin in particular.

Muslim opposition to Russian rule in the North Caucasus did not end with the crushing of the Chechen rebellion in the 2000s, but has continued. Knowledge about how Muslims and other non-Russian minorities have suffered greater casualties in the war with Ukraine than ethnic Russians undoubtedly fuels discontent. At some point, Russia’s poor military performance against Ukraine could be seen by Russian Muslim oppositionists as providing an opportunity for rebellion. If Putin cannot prevail against Ukraine alone, they might understandably reason, he could be even less able to prevail against both Ukraine and Russian Muslim rebellion simultaneously.

There is also, in my view, the possibility that Russian army units fighting against Ukraine could break down. There are reports indicating that in some places, Russian soldiers fighting against Ukraine last only 20-35 minutes in combat before being wounded or killed. For those fighting in the Russian army who see themselves as highly likely to die in the war against Ukraine anyway, attempting to kill the loyalist officers forcing them onto the front and then surrender to Ukraine might seem like a better option despite its obvious risks.

Finally, if Russian military leaders come to see (if they haven’t already) the continuation of the war against Ukraine as only serving to weaken Russia’s armed forces, then overthrowing Putin and ending the war against Ukraine could appear to them as not just desirable, but essential for Russia’s survival as a great power.

A weakened Russia, however, could also pose serious challenges to Western and other countries. Indeed, there are many in the West and elsewhere who may fear the implications of a weak, unstable Russia. The specter of a wounded Russia lashing out, massive refugee flows into Europe, disruption in Russian petroleum production (especially at a time when Persian Gulf petroleum exports are being held hostage by Iran), uncertainty about who has control over the Russian nuclear arsenal, and the possibility of increased foreign (especially Chinese) influence are all reasons why Western governments might not want to see a weakened Russia. Just as with the collapse of both the Tsarist empire at the end of World War I or the breakup of the Soviet empire at the end of the Cold War, though, the world might be confronted with a sudden decline in Russia’s fortunes irrespective of whether Western governments want this to occur or not.

There are, of course, forces in Russia that blame the West for whatever misfortune befalls Moscow. Indeed, those who believe this may see it as reason to continue supporting Putin and the war against Ukraine despite how much these are what is actually weakening Russia. What Western governments can do to try to counter this belief is articulate a positive vision of a future Russia that they would like to see emerge. This vision should call for:

• A ceasefire in place ending all fighting as a starting point to resolving the Russia-Ukraine war;

• Withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory occupied since 2014 (as well as from the Transnistria region of Moldova) in return for sanctions relief;

• Full normalization of Western relations with Russia as it progresses toward democratization.

It may seem pointless for Western governments to express such a vision for a Russia which Putin is still very much in control over, especially given widespread Russian nationalist suspicion of the West. But if Putin’s control over Russia falters and a power struggle ensues, it could be vital to convince key Russian actors that the West does not seek Russia’s destruction but is willing to work with a Russia that withdraws from Ukraine and does not threaten its other neighbors.

To think that Russia is guaranteed to experience some sort of catastrophic setback would be foolish. But to think that Russia is guaranteed either to avoid or easily survive serious setbacks would be unrealistic. It is only prudent to plan for their possibility.

An anonymous, but apparently pro-Ukrainian, bettor has placed a $400,000 wager on the betting platform Polymarket that Putin will no longer be Russia’s president by the end of 2026.

Why would anyone place such a large bet on what seems to be such a low probability event? (As of the morning of July 3, 2026, Polymarket indicates that bettors in general see this event as having only a 12% probability.)

One possibility is that a bet that Putin will no longer be Russia’s president at the end of 2026 simply reflects wishful thinking. The bettor wants Putin to be out of power, and so is willing to bet that this is what will occur.

While I can see betting $4, or even $400, on something that I wanted to see happen even if it did not seem likely, I can’t see betting $400,000 just on a hope. Something else, then, must be at work.

One possibility is that the bettor has inside information which others do not about actual plans to oust Putin. While highly illegal and a violation of Polymarket’s rules, the bettor might not be terribly concerned about this. What should concern an apparently pro-Ukrainian bettor with inside information, though, is whether placing such a large bet on Putin’s downfall alerts Putin and his backers to the serious possibility of such an event and thus puts them in a better position to forestall it. Surely a pro-Ukrainian bettor would not risk this.

A more likely explanation for this bet, in my view, is that it was not made by someone with any inside information but by someone who hopes that placing such a bet could help precipitate the end of Putin’s presidency.

But how might this occur? Polymarket does not specify here about how Putin might lose power. It is simply taking bets on the question “Putin out as President of Russia by December 31, 2026?” So what are the possibilities for this?

One is that Putin could simply resign for one or more of several reasons: the shame of being unable to subdue Ukraine, the desire to provide for an orderly transition to a younger leadership, and/or the simple desire to live a quiet life in retirement. Well, I think we can dismiss out of hand any of these reasons or the possibility of Putin leaving office voluntarily for any reason. And the person betting on Putin’s leaving office before the end of 2026 presumably understands that placing such a bet is unlikely to precipitate Putin’s doing so.

There is always the possibility that a catastrophic health episode (perhaps resulting from the mounting strains of office) could result in his no longer being president. Yet while this may occur at some point in the future, there is little reason to believe that it will do so before the end of this year. Betting on Putin’s ouster will obviously not increase the prospects for his no longer being president due to health reasons either.

Another possibility for Putin losing his power is through his being overthrown in a democratic “color revolution” as occurred in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004 and 2013-14). But while there have been instances of widespread public demonstrations against Putin in Russia in the past, Putin and his backers have proven adept at crushing anything resembling a “color revolution.” The prospects for a Russian democratic uprising (much less a successful one) by the end of 2026 are extremely poor, and the bettor presumably is also aware of his or her inability to foment one via a Polymarket bet.

Yet another possibility still is that Putin is overthrown by elements within his own security apparatus. They would not do this out of any altruistic desire to bring democracy to Russia, but might do so to end the war against Ukraine which Putin is unable to win but refuses to call a halt to. In other words, elements within the Russian armed forces might overthrow Putin to end the catastrophic losses that they are experiencing through a war that will continue so long as Putin remains in power.

But can placing a bet that Putin will no longer be president by the end of this year serve to precipitate his overthrow by the Russian security forces? It is difficult to see how this would do so.

There is one more possibility. Perhaps the bettor has no expectation that betting on Putin’s downfall by the end of the year can do anything to precipitate it. Perhaps instead the bettor is counting on Putin and his close associates assuming that because such a sizable bet has been made (and they are bound to notice), the bettor must have some sort of knowledge about a forthcoming coup attempt. If Putin believes this, he may seek to forestall it through purging officials and officers whom he fears might be involved. If the resulting shakeup within the security services leads people within them to conclude that the only way to save themselves is to overthrow Putin, the pro-Ukrainian bettor might have achieved his or her aim. Just stoking Putin’s paranoia about his own henchmen being internal enemies might be a result that the bettor sees as worth losing $400,000 to achieve.

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_{Honoré Daumier - The Uprising (L’Emeute)—Wikimedia Commons}

Revolution has not been a static phenomenon but is something that has evolved over time both through changes in how revolution occurs and in what it attempts to accomplish. In my 1997 book, Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves, I wrote about how historically, revolutions have occurred in five different ways: 1) rural revolution; 2) urban revolution; 3) coup d’état; 4) revolution “from above;” and 5) revolution “from without” (i.e., foreign imposed revolution). Now, though, there appear to be other means still by which revolutions have been occurring, such as the mass rejection of electoral results leading to largely peaceful uprisings (“color revolutions”); and leaders coming power to democratically who then move to undermine democracy in favor of a non-democratic social and political vision.

What revolution have sought to achieve has also varied. Revolutions are always against something, such as dictatorship, foreign domination, and/or the existing socio-economic system. Revolutions, though, are also fought for something, including democracy or a non-democratic form of government which claims to be more just and more truly democratic than Western or (as the Marxists called it) “bourgeois” democracy.

In the years between World War I and World War II, fascist revolutions occurred against weak democratic governments in Italy, Germany, and Spain. When I was writing my book in the 1990s, this sort of right-wing nationalist form of revolution seemed like a thing of the past in the West. Now, though, anti-democratic movements have grown strong in several Western democracies. Their revolutions can succeed through coming to power via democratic means but then subverting democracy once they are in power.

Many Western scholars who have written about revolution have been sympathetic towards its leftist, “progressive” aims. Though they may not have been Marxist—and indeed, may have been critical of many aspects of Marxism-Leninism—these scholars tended to view Marxist revolution as something positive. Interestingly, many leftist Western scholars saw the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as progressive due to its being both anti-Western and anti-capitalist.

Western scholars of revolution, though, have tended not to regard the overthrow of governments by conservative forces as being examples of revolution. The takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban first in 1996 and then again in 2021, however, ushered in revolutionary transformation in that society—just not a progressive one. The vision laid out by Osama bin Laden and other Sunni jihadists calling for not only U.S. withdrawal from the Muslim world and the downfall of pro-Western governments there, but also the creation of a giant Sunni caliphate uniting the entire Muslim world was nothing short of revolutionary.

An obstacle to the understanding of Sunni jihadists as revolutionaries, in my view, has been the insistence on viewing them through the lens of the “War on Terror.” Yes, these Sunni jihadists have often engaged in terrorism. But to view them only as terrorists is to underestimate their appeal to many Sunni Muslims (if not to Westerners, Shi’a Muslims, and others) as revolutionary freedom fighters.

Similarly, many of the conservative Americans who invaded the halls of Congress on January 6, 2021, in a bid to stop the certification of Joe Biden’s election as president regarded themselves as the direct heirs of the American revolutionaries of the late 18^th century. An article published in The Economist on April 24, 2025 described Trump as “leading a revolutionary project that aspires to remake the economy, the bureaucracy, culture and foreign policy, even the idea of America itself.” The supporters of similar aims in other Western countries may have also grown strong partly as a result of both Trump’s example and support.

In my view, it is important to understand not just academic theories of revolution advanced by scholars, but also those advanced by revolutionaries themselves. Theories of revolution advanced by revolutionaries also tend to have a much greater following than theories of revolution advanced by scholars. While the era of leftist, progressive, or even democratic revolutions may be over at present, we are now not so much in an era of anti-revolution or counterrevolution, but conservative revolution instead. And like it or not, we are in this new era because conservative revolutionary ideas resonate with many people dissatisfied with the existing political and socio-economic systems in their countries.

But just as revolutionary ideologies can grow strong, they can also grow weak. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991 occurred not because communist regimes in these countries were defeated militarily, but because Marxism-Leninism became discredited not just among the people living under its rule but also with the personnel of the regimes upholding it. This points to a vulnerability that revolutions—whether progressive or conservative—can all have. They may not fall because they are defeated forcefully by external or even internal opponents, but because their ideas become discredited both generally and within the regimes espousing them.

Seizing power is not easy for revolutionaries, no matter what their ideology. But seizing power often proves easier than trying to fix all the problems the revolutionaries criticized the old regime for not solving and even creating. Seizing power is also easier than attempting to usher in the better world that revolutionaries all self-confidently promise when they are still in opposition. And their failures in this regard can result in some new revolutionary movement arising against them in turn.

Revolution, then, is not in retreat but is likely to continue, although possibly by different means and in pursuit of different aims than in the past. Revised theories will be needed to explain the changing phenomenon of revolution—especially the multifaceted phenomenon of conservative, anti-democratic revolution.

_{Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Wikimedia Commons}

When the Trump and Netanyahu administrations launched their joint attack on Iran at the end of February 2026, they both expected that the Islamic Republic would soon fall and be replaced by a new Iranian regime that would be friendlier to America, Israel, and the Gulf Arab states.

Clearly, this expectation was not met. Although heavily battered, the Islamic Republic not only remains firmly in place, but its leaders even see themselves as having won their military encounter with the U.S. and Israel.

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Indeed, the ability to block shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz that Tehran has demonstrated since the onset of the conflict has bolstered Iranian confidence about Tehran’s ability to demand concessions from the U.S. in exchange for allowing the strait’s reopening. And Tehran has numerous demands, including the rollback of economic sanctions, the ability to enrich its own uranium, control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and an end to Israeli military activity against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Despite the durability of the Islamic Republic (however unwanted this is in some quarters), it would be useful to consider the extent to which a new regime in Tehran would define Iran’s interests in ways similar to or different from how the IRI now does.

One interest that any Iranian government, in my view, is likely to share with the Islamic Republic is an insistence that Tehran has the right to enrich its own uranium. Indeed, I have never met an Iranian who has been willing to see Iran forego enrichment. This, in my view, is a permanent Iranian interest that will never change. Anyone hoping that a different Iranian regime would have a different policy on this issue is bound to be disappointed.

On the other hand, it is not at all clear that any other Iranian regime besides the Islamic Republic would see much value in supporting the “Axis of Resistance” forces in other countries such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, or the Houthis in Yemen. If it focused on maximizing Iran’s own economic welfare, a different Iranian regime would spare itself the expense of supporting these groups and focus on building economic ties with the West, the Arab Gulf states, and even Israel instead. This does not mean that a different Iranian regime would never support internal opposition in neighboring states. The Shah of Iran, after all, supported Iraqi Kurds against the Ba’thist regime in Iraq for a time. Further, any government of a Shi’a majority country like Iran (especially if it is democratic) is going to be concerned about the welfare of Shi’as elsewhere. A different Iranian regime, though, is less likely than the IRI to support armed movements abroad where this harms Tehran’s relations with other governments as well as Iran’s own economic interests.

Further, to the extent that it prioritized Tehran’s economic interests, a different Iranian regime would not only seek the rollback of existing economic sanctions against Tehran but conduct itself in a way that did not bring about their reimposition. Ending Iranian support to the “Axis of Resistance” would be one way to do so. But would a new regime in Tehran also definitively forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons?

This is not so clear. Other states have viewed acquiring nuclear weapons as a means of deterring attacks from others. Even Iranians who don’t support the Islamic Republic are now asking whether the U.S. and Israel would have attacked Iran if it already had nuclear weapons. In a volatile region where several states near Iran (Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel) already have nuclear weapons and several others still (such as Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or the United Arab Emirates) may have the means to do so, the Islamic Republic is not the only conceivable Iranian regime that might well be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons.

Indeed, an Iranian regime truly focused on acquiring nuclear weapons might seek to minimize U.S. and Israeli opposition to its doing so through signing an Abraham accord normalizing relations with Israel (as the UAE has done), offering assistance to neighboring governments seeking to suppress “Axis of Resistance” forces which the IRI previously backed, and making a show of being a more reliable partner to America and the West than other states in the region. That the Islamic Republic has not taken any of these steps may be an indication that it is not as willing to do whatever it takes to acquire nuclear weapons as others fear.

Whether the Islamic Republic will be replaced by a new Iranian regime is, of course, very much in doubt—especially in the short run. Those attempting to achieve anything resembling a peace agreement with Tehran now, though, would do well to keep in mind what current Iranian interests are specific to the Islamic Republic and what are likely to be pursued by any Iranian government. While the Islamic Republic is unlikely to give up what I believe to be its idiosyncratic interest in supporting the “Axis of Resistance,” it is even less likely to give up enriching its own uranium that any other Iranian regime would also insist on. The end of the Islamic Republic may not lead to an end to Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons either.

Those who hope for the downfall of the IRI need to recognize that while this might alleviate some of their concerns, it will not alleviate them all. It is unrealistic to expect otherwise.

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The bipolar Soviet-American Cold War era is long over. To the extent that it ever really existed, the unipolar American-dominated era is also over. There is now a general consensus that a multipolar era is emerging. But what shape it will ultimately take is not at all certain.

One aspect of the emerging multipolar world which does seem certain is that it not ushering in a more peaceful, fairer world order. Indeed, some of the governments lauding the onset of a multipolar world seem far less interested in creating a just, harmonious world than in seizing opportunities to extend their own influence, sometimes by force, over other countries. While opposed to American efforts to dominate others, the leaders of several governments have proven quite willing to undertake such efforts themselves.

Indeed, if anything, the emerging multipolar world is one in which more governments and other forces have greater opportunity to assert their influence over others in their own neighborhoods and often beyond. The world may not have been a particularly orderly place when the U.S. was perceived to be the unipolar power dominating it, but the Trump administration’s de-emphasis on Washington’s traditional support for its longstanding allies has resulted in their becoming increasingly fearful about how the world is becoming less orderly for them. Instead of an emerging multipolar world order, then, it is more appropriate to describe what is happening as an emerging multipolar world disorder.

In this Substack, I plan to discuss numerous dimensions of this emerging multipolar era. Much of my past writing has been on Russian foreign policy, especially toward the Middle East and what is now called the Global South. As Russian foreign policy is an important dimension of the emerging multipolar era, I will definitely write about it here. But I will also discuss many other dimensions of the emerging multipolar era—many of which I have also written about in the past. These include: the changing nature of American foreign policy, the strengths and weaknesses of the various global and regional great powers, the interplay between revolution and international relations, and how both adversary and alliance relationships can change.

I do not expect to come up with a definitive view of how the emerging multipolar era will evolve or which countries will fare better or worse in it. What I do hope I can achieve is to provide food for thought to others also seeking to understand this unfolding drama.