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Hi everyone,

This is a shorter article this week but no less important.

Last week I tried out a fun new feature for Cullinan highlighting one piece of news that made me a little more bearish about the company and one piece of news that made me more bullish.

On balance I’m incrementally more bullish for than I was before I published that but I found it to be an interesting way to try and poke holes in my own thesis, as well as be honest about the risks to each program mentioned. So let’s do that again today, but this time for Geron .

I recently reviewed a poster presentation Geron did at ASCO in June related to their myelofibrosis program and came away with both a positive and negative takeaway. Like last week, I think the positive outweights the negative but I’ll let you the reader decide.

And in keeping with the format of last week’s article I’ll start with the negative first.

The “Bad” News

For everyone’s reference this is the poster I will be working off of for reference:

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I just wrote my last piece about Cullinan one month ago but multiple new material pieces of information have now come out post earnings release which makes another article a necessity. All but one of the new items is positive and even the one “bad” item isn’t really a dealbreaker. CGEM has grown to my #1 size position based on a strong run from ~$12 in June to $21.68 as of Friday’s close. I believe there is a lot more upside to come and the stock is substantially de-risked by news related to the fourth most important asset in their pipeline. Rather than explain more into the intro, let’s dive right in.

But before I start, I do want to make a quick ask. I know many newsletters covering stocks are promotional and I try to avoid promoting myself, almost to a fault. But I think I’m the only one on the CLN-049 and Zipalertinib news beat and the goal of my newsletter is to produce original content covering unexplored ideas in biotech which are not consensus ideas and that have limited downside with substantial upside. If that’s something you are interested in I would love to have you subscribe or share this post!

The “Bad” News

Okay with that out of the way let’s level set where we left off in late July:

When I was writing about CLN-049, I posted this slide from the efficacy table in the corporate slide deck.

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Okay with nearly all the companies I follow done reporting earnings it’s time to get into who raised their stock (figuratively, literally) and who lowered it.

I’m way too busy to write a long intro so let’s just get started!

TGTX - TG’s earnings call proves the markets are not wise or efficient, at least in the short-term. The company’s quarterly revenue numbers were great, as was raising their full-year revenue guide. But net profit was down for the quarter based on something they disclosed in advance back in JANUARY. And yet still, the market hyper-fixated on this one detail and the stock declined 12% the session after release.

The item in question that likely caused the decline:

On the expense side, OpEx, which we define as R&D and SG&A, excluding stock-based compensation, was approximately $150 million for the quarter, including roughly $55 million of charges associated with subcutaneous and secondary source manufacturing activities.

The company said at J.P Morgan conference this January (yes, seven months ago) that the year would have roughly $100 million in costs assigned to R&D for subcutaneous formulation inventory build and second supplier sourcing. They also said that these costs would not flow to COGS when sold, raising gross margin in the future. (This is good.) Now in the second quarter they noted that $55 million of the costs hit R&D, presumably with the other $45 million to come in the third quarter. Despite them trying to prep analysts and shareholders, the stock did what it did. The stock has recovered somewhat since then and is now only down roughly 4% from the pre-earnings price but let’s be clear: this is a buying opportunity for those not at a full position size. (And an annoyance for those that are.)

Excluding those, underlying OpEx was about $95 million, consistent with our expectations and down from Q1. As a reminder, our 2026 OpEx projections include approximately $100 million for these manufacturing activities.

Total revenue went from $205 million in Q1 to $240 million in Q2, growing 17% QoQ.

Non-stock based SG&A went from $73.1 million in Q1 to $62.3 million in Q2, contracting 14.7% QoQ.

SALES UP BIG. SG&A COSTS DOWN BIG. That’s incredible.

That’s what needs to be focused on.

R&D costs would also have been lower in Q2 if not for the one-time charges, and that’s with them starting numerous new proof of concept studies in Myasthenia Gravis and treatment-resistant Schizophrenia as well as expanding the proof-of-concept study for Azer-cel into multiple new indications!

TG Therapeutics is doing one of the most impressive jobs of cost control across the whole small to mid-cap biotech universe. The company’s CEO, Michael Weiss, is also one of the largest individual shareholders and it comes through with how they pare down costs but they are also not skimping on spending when it grows their pipeline and the BRIUMVI franchise.

Listening to the Q&A I’m more confident than ever that Briumvi across the IV and SQ formulations will grow to be a $4 billion to $6 billion annual sales franchise at peak.

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Hi everyone, there is another earnings season upon us. I’m going to get right into it and tell you which companies I’ll be following closely this quarter and what I’ll be looking for in the Q&A.

I’m sending this out very early Monday morning likely an hour or two before TG Therapeutics’ press release. My apologies I wanted to get it out earlier but had some issues preventing it. (Paid subs, you can read why below.)

TG Therapeutics, August 3rd pre-market

I think the setup for TG is pretty good into this earnings. I have written about TGTX when it was at $34.57, $33.78 and $33.39 so for the stock to be trading in the mid 50s now is a vindication of all the pounding on the table I did over the 11 months that encompassed those three standalone articles. But still, I don’t feel expectations in the stock are too high currently. This is one of the most solidly executing commercial teams, they have a major Phase 3 catalyst by the end of the year (opening up the massive self-administered section of the market), and a recent news item affirmed they are on the right track in the physician-administered section of the market as well.

Briumvi in the physician-adminstered segment has one competitor, Ocrevus, so any weakness they have in their modeling implies upside strength for Briumvi and TG Therapeutics. Ocrevus subcutaneous formulation also has to be given by physicians (which kind of destroys the point) and 44,000 patients globally is not that impressive given their hype. Furthermore we will know by the end of the year if TG’s Phase 3 trial of a once every 3 months true self-administered subcutaneous product with best-in-class efficacy will work. The odds say it is highly, highly likely to work but the market is still discounting it significantly for reasons I do not understand.

Once the risk of failure is taken off the table this will re-rate quickly I believe and it opens up the potential for acquisitions. I believe the subcutaneous every 3 months product is a true market expander which will bring new patients from inferior therapies over to the anti-CD20 space. Furthermore I can see patients switching from the IV formulation to SubQ but not the other way around. However you look at it the subcutaneous product is essential for TG Therapeutics to kick off their next wave of growth and we are getting close to data. Last patient enrolled was in April so with a six month duration primary endpoint and some time for data cleaning and analysis I don’t see how this comes later than December and possibly in November.

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Introduction

I last wrote about Cullinan Therapeutics in December 2025 with the stock trading around $10 in the aftermath of their American Society of Hematology presentation of new data for their CLN-049 program:

My thesis was CLN-049 was being wrongfully ignored by investors and was not valued in the stock despite having $1 billion to $5 billion in peak sales potential. Even if you heavily discounted the future cash flow due to the therapeutic indication being Acute Myeloid Leukemia, an indication known for a high failure rate in Phase 3, the value in the stock at the time was essentially zero giving investors lots of potential upside.

Since then the stock is up roughly 80% but I’m pleased to report the stock is still under-valued and nearly all of the current valuation reflects optimism for the lead asset, CLN-978, after a recent Immunology Day event. I am now ready to further expand my thesis to not only maintain that CLN-049 is incredibly undervalued heading into a data update at American Society of Hematology 2026 but that also their other two assets, Velinotamig and Zipalertinib, are heinously undervalued as well. Put it all together all four of these assets could literally be stand-alone companies due to the future cash flow potential. As a combined entity, the valuation is absurd and the reason why Cullinan is the only clinical-stage asset I own currently.

(Commercial-stage companies I currently own: and considering a non-biotech investment in .)

I’m going to start with a broad overview of Cullinan’s pipeline and then drill down on their second, third, and fourth pipeline assets in descending order based on my personal estimation of their estimated net present value.

Cullinan’s Pipeline

CLN-978, a CD19xCD3 T cell engager: This is their lead asset and the asset I will NOT be covering today. The company recently did an immunology day where they talked about their early data with this program. I’d encourage all Cullinan investors to check out this nearly 3 hour presentation but I will write about this program another time once they have registrational studies underway.

CLN-049, a FLT3xCD3 T cell engager: This was the subject of my last article but I think there is room to expand further on my value estimates for this program and now that ASH 2026 is only 5 months away I think it’s time to revisit this program. The data at ASH 2026, if it confirms the ASH 2025 data and reaches my expectations, will be a MAJOR derisking event for the program. I don’t blame the market for being skeptical, traditionally AML therapies have had a high failure rate in pivotal trials. But that has changed recently with targeted therapy approvals. CLN-049 would address an all-comers population but with a precedent accelerated approval based on those recent approvals. I will get into this more in the next section.

Velinotamig (GR-1803), a BCMAxCD3 T cell engager: This program is very early stage - at their immunology day, Cullinan reported data from two (2!) patients. But the results were so breathtaking to me and unexpected that it has already rocketed up to Cullinan’s third most important program. Who knows, when all is said and done it might become number one. A recent acquisition in this space makes it all the more puzzling why this asset doesn’t get more attention.

Zipalertinib (CLN-081/TAS6417), a EGFR ex20ins inhibitor: There is competition in this space and 50% of the economics of this asset have been sold off but I used to think Cullinan should sell off the remainder of the asset to fund their other high-ceiling pipeline assets. Now that I have done more research in the space I’m not so sure. I can still make the case this could be a blockbuster asset for the company and even with a 50/50 profit share split it could provide free cash flow to fund the company infinitely.

CLN-049 and AML

Let’s quickly level set where we left off in late 2025.

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Today I will lay out my thesis behind why Geron is undervalued based on their upcoming interim readout in relapsed/refractory myelofibrosis (R/R MF). I also believe the recent sales growth and changes to their launch strategy in Lower-Risk Myelodysplastic Syndromes (LR-MDS) justify a floor under the stock higher than what it currently trades it.

To be clear: Geron is one of the most infamous long-time losers in biotech stock history. Since it’s IPO on July 31, 1996 (!) it has consistently under-performed the market, diluted shareholders, and now provided disappointing sales 2 years into the launch of its first approved product. While I’m going to lay out why I think there is a “floor” under the stock due to new management and new strategy I fully know that the list of biotech stocks which have lost > 99% of their value since IPO and then gone on to more than 10x in value is slim. I often use history as a sign post and the historical precedent here is frankly not good.

To add insult to injury, Geron is probably one of the worst performing stocks I have written about since the inception of this newsletter. Not to toot my own horn (although that’s reaaaally hard in the newsletter business where marketing is king!) but other write-ups such as CELC, TGTX, and CGEM have been flying lately plus I wrote about now acquired companies such as APLS, AVDL, and SCPH within the last 12 months. But Geron has been one of the few duds on my record and I have to own it. I do want to note that me writing about Geron now isn’t an example of me trying to salvage a sunk cost - I truly believe the set-up here is as good as its ever been with the fundamental thesis still being relatively unchanged from my first write-up in January 2025. I’m also aware that Paul Tudor Jones believed “Losers Average Losers” but I believe my crime here was simply being too early to the story - before necessary management changes and too far out ahead of the Phase 3 Myelofibrosis readout - not picking a loser. But we will find out in the next 18 months.

I just wanted to be very clear with my previous two paragraphs that Geron is an investment with significant red flags which may not make it suitable for some investors. It is a highly risky investment. I already put a significant disclaimer at the top that this newsletter is for informational purposes only but the unique circumstances here I felt warranted further explanation before I launch into my thesis. I will say there is one green flag - the last time I felt out on an island…interested in a stock very few were interested in ahead of a Phase 3 readout was…

I specifically remember editing that piece and almost using the headline “I’m Still Struggling With Celcuity’s Upcoming Phase 3 Readout - But It Should Work” but I hedged at the last second because I felt so much more confident in the trial success than anyone I talked to at the time that I specifically thinking I must be overlooking something and must be overconfident. In fact, most people weren’t even interested or hadn’t researched it yet ahead of data when I thought it was a screaming opportunity. That led me to chickening out with the article headline instead of something more forceful that would given me more bragging rights. And I should have owned more shares pre-data - like 100% of my portfolio in retrospect! But that’s life! If anything I learned from that experience to just trust myself and what my eyes are seeing. I’m going into this investment with eyes wide open that there are significant warning signs but also to trust my gut that there is SIGNIFICANT value to be unlocked if a couple things break our way. Biology is unpredictable but I think there is enough evidence that the Myelofibrosis Phase 3 has a fair chance at working. Success there would trigger a significant re-rating of the stock. I also believe recent sales trends in their approved indication of LR-MDS should put a floor under the stock higher than the ~$821 million market capitalization it currently trades at. I could be wrong and sales could not grow - that would lead to the stock being functionally a zero. But I think that’s rather unlikely given recent trends and management commentary.

So let’s first tackle why the valuation should be higher pre-data based on LR-MDS and then get into my rationale for why the R/R Myelofibrosis Phase 3 trial may work leading to a much higher valuation post-data.

Margin of Safety

Here are Geron’s RYTELO sales in LR-MDS, starting with the first full quarter of launch:

2024 Q3: $28.2 million

2024 Q4: $47.5 million

2025 Q1: $39.4 million

2025 Q2: $49 million

2025 Q3: $47.2 million

2025 Q4: $48 million

2026 Q1: $51.8 million

For a drug and indication that the old CEO touted as having blockbuster potential with only 33% penetration you can see why investors have not been enthusiastic about the RYTELO launch so far. Warning signs were evident as early as March 2025 when the old CEO stepped down amid declining new patient starts quarter over quarter.

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This is my fourth time writing about Celcuity . The first time I wrote about the stock it was trading at $10.03 with relatively little buzz heading into a make or break readout for the company. My theory were that the odds were much higher than the market was giving it credit for:

Even I did not anticipate the excellent results in the Phase 3 “wild type” 2nd line HR+/HER2- Advanced Breast Cancer study which produced excellent hazard ratios of 0.24 for the “triplet” regimen of gedatolisib (Celcuity’s drug) + palbociclib (a CDK4/6 inhibitor) + fulvestrant vs. fulvestrant alone and a 0.33 hazard ratio for the “doublet” regimen of “geda” + fulvestrant vs. fulvestrant alone. (Lower numbers of course being better.) Being able to more than quadruple median progression free survival over the standard of care with the triplet, and with the doublet regimen showing the bulk of the efficacy being delivered by geda as opposed to CDK4/6 sensitization and re-treatment, was a huge step forward for the roughly 47,000 global patients with “2L HR+/HER2- ABC”. (Author calulation of 78,400 total 2L HR+/HER2- patients globally multiplied roughly 60% of patients with wild-type [vs. 40% of patients with PIK3Ca mutant]).

I wrote about the stock immediately after data when the stock traded at $36.79 on the day of the data release. My theory was that even though the stock was up over 200% on the day it was still too cheap because the company was mis-priced coming into approval and that the market had still not grasped the enormity of what had just happened:

I was forced to lead with Celcuity as my main topic again (and TRIPLE DOWN) when the stock was trading $65.50 following the release of the expanded dataset at a medical conference:

The full presentation of the data shot down concerns of tolerability issues, specifically hyperglycemia and mucositis. Levels of both looked to be very acceptable and lower in severity and time duration than previously thought. Plus greater detail on the efficacy data and further subgroup analyses provided more conviction that the drug was incredibly active compared to anything that came before it in this setting or that was currently in the clinic.

On May 1, 2026, Celcuity released a press release with information on their Phase 3 trial in “mutant” PIK3Ca cohort (the other addressable 40% of the 2L ER+/HER2- ABC population) saying the trial met its primary endpoint with no new safety signals. The stock touched $150 in the week following and settled around the 130s ahead of the full presentation of the data at ASCO.

All of that brings me to this point now.

Following the full presentation of the mutant data the stock fell rapidly and is now sitting at $87.76 as I write this.

I think I have a good history of being right on Celcuity and I believe the market is handing us an unprecedented fourth chance to buy Celcuity as a fair value discount. I was bullish at $10.03, $36.79, $65.50, and now at $87.76.

I believe the market as a whole has fundamentally misunderstood this data release for reasons I will detail. I realize one of the reasons for the stock weakness is the post-data offering of $500 million of convertible senior notes which pressure the stock by incentivizing the holder of those notes to short the stock to hedge their exposure.

What The Expectations Were And What The Data Was

Coming into this data we knew the control arm, alpelisib + fulvestrant, would likely produce mPFS between 5.6 months and 7.3 months based on footnotes 2 and 3 above. We also knew that geda + fulv + palbo had produced 12.9 months in a Phase 2 study with a mix of WT and MT patients and in the Phase 3 for WT produced mPFS of 9.2 months with the triplet and 7.4 months with the doublet. It was reasonable to assume the mutant population was driving the 12.9 months mPFS in Phase 2 and that the triplet in the Phase 3 would be around 14 months. In fact my assumptions were:

~7 months for alpelisib + fulvestrant.

~12 months for geda + fulvestrant.

~14 months for geda + fulv + palbociclib.

and a hazard ratio of ~0.5.

The company revealed at the Jefferies investment conference at the 2:25 mark of their session their estimates before unblinding were that the control arm would have mPFS of 7.5 months and the triplet would have mPFS of ~13 months for a hazard ratio ranging from 0.56 to 0.6. KOLs coming into the data voiced they would be happy with a hazard ratio of 0.65 or lower.

So what was the actual hazard ratio of the data?

(Well, let’s start destroying the six most common bear theses I hear about Celcuity, starting with Bear Thesis #1.)

Bear Thesis #1: Because mPFS For The Triplet Arm Came In “Below Expectations” In The Mutant Trial, The Data Was Disappointed

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Hi everyone,

Thank you for your patience with me getting this out. I moved to a new house on May 21 and I underestimated the time needed to get my stuff moved over plus troubleshoot a few issues in my renovated historic home. (Yay! 😬) But you don’t care about that - all of this just to say I anticipate no further delays in new articles.

Today’s article is again about TG Therapeutics but only because they have had three distinct pieces of good news happen in the last couple weeks. Frankly, I can’t believe the stock reaction isn’t larger but at least the stock has definitely found a bottom recently. When reviewing the third piece of good news it jogged my memory to one of my first research reports years ago and I believe I actually found a good comp for where TG Therapeutics stock can be five years from now in 2031. If my numbers are right they would point to a long-term stock price target of $289 in June 2031. I realize if I was an analyst this would unquestionably make me the most bullish analyst on the Street…and that I’m anticipating TG to return 48.4% CAGR over the next five years.

But I intend to support all my work with historical precedent and let you make your own mind up. If anything, I think I may be being too conservative with my assumptions and historical comp but, again, you the reader can be the judge.

First let’s get into the three pieces of good news.

Great News #1: BRIUMVI Simplified Dosing Trial “ENHANCE” Successful And “Under-Appreciated”

On May 27th, TG Therapeutics announced positive results from their trial designed to implement a simpler dosing regimen for new start patients to BRIUMVI:

We are very pleased to share these positive results from our ENHANCE Phase 3 trial. By eliminating the need for a second infusion visit two weeks after treatment initiation, this streamlined dosing regimen has the potential to accelerate time from prescription to treatment and reduce scheduling burdens at busy infusion centers. If this consolidated dosing is approved, BRIUMVI would be the first and only IV anti-CD20 for which therapy can be initiated with a single infusion.

The new trial produced nearly the exact same bioequivalence as the current on-label dosing regimen.

The trial met its primary endpoint, demonstrating bioequivalence between the new single Day 1 BRIUMVI infusion regimen and the currently approved initiation regimen administered on Days 1 and 15. Total drug exposure over 16 weeks (AUC 0-Wk16) was comparable between treatment arms, with a geometric mean ratio (GMR) of approximately 1.0 and a 90% confidence interval within the protocol-defined bioequivalence range of 0.80 to 1.25.

Surprisingly, infusion-related reactions were actually lower than in the two pivotal trials ULTIMATE I and II so the new “streamlined” dosing regimen was actually better for tolerability in addition to being much more convenient for patients.

Infusion-related reactions in both arms were lower than previously reported in the ULTIMATE I and II approval studies for BRIUMVI, with no Grade 3 or higher infusion reactions occurring in either arm. In addition, infusion-related reactions were statistically indistinguishable between treatment arms in this study with fewer infusion reactions observed in the consolidated single-infusion treatment arm.

A reminder of the current new start dosing regimen:

And how the most common RRMS medications are currently administered:

I believe this news to be noteworthy because it should mark an inflection point for BRIUMVI to increasing their dynamic share of the physician-administered anti-CD20 market. Switch patients from OCREVUS I believe are currently being started on BRIUMVI 450mg six months after their last OCREVUS infusion (or sooner, if the patients is experiencing “crap gap” symptoms and the physician can get insurance approval.) But patients starting on BRIUMVI new to the anti-CD20 class need to get those two infusions in 15 days. Patients hate it, it’s a scheduling problem for busy infusion centers, and it creates friction for physicians that doesn’t need to be there. Now it’s gone. Or at least it will be when the new streamlined regimen goes on label in 2027 but I assume some early adopter physicians will begin using it immediately if they aren’t already.

Listen to CEO Mike Weiss talk at the Jefferies Global Biotech Healthcare conference about how the company has potentially been “under-selling” the impact of this data based on recent physician feedback:

With this new dosing regimen I personally see no reason to use Ocrevus now. None. TG’s long-term extension data shows a much lower rate annualized relapse rate compared to OCREVUS, it is a shorter infusion, it is now an easier product to initiate for patients, infusion centers, and physicians, and the real world switching data is much in favor of OCREVUS to BRIUMVI switches meaning that the real world outcomes are better on BRIUMVI. To me, prescribing Ocrevus is borderline malpractice. BRIUMVI even has the lowest list price and best patient support spend in the industry as well. BRIUMVI should now dominate the physician-directed portion of the anti-CD20 market which represents over 50% of the total anti-CD20 market. My projection for BRIUMVI IV infusion sales is over $2 billion annually and the product is currently on a $819 million annual run rate in its 12th full quarter of launch. After next quarter’s earnings I anticipate a $920 million run rate and the quarter after that should be a $1 billion+ run rate. The product is growing fast, is multiple years away from peak sales, and they have all the tailwinds in their favor.

Great News #2: BRIUMVI Subcutaneous Formulation Overwhelmingly Likely To Work

Now let’s move on to even better news. Yes…news that is even better and more substantial to the stock.

On June 3, 2026, TG Therapeutics announced positive results from their “Phase 1 trial evaluating subcutaneous BRIUMVI” — this was noteworthy because we knew the doses they were taking into a Phase 3 but we didn’t know the underlying data to justify success. Well, it turns out they have a very high probability of success in Phase 3. First, the data:

• PK modeling and simulation informed by the Phase 1 bioavailability data support the conclusion that:

  • the quarterly subcutaneous dosing regimen that is being evaluated in the Phase 3 trial would achieve non-inferior total drug exposure over 24 weeks (AUC 0-Wk24) with an estimated geometric mean ratio (GMR) of 1.21 (with a lower bound of the 90% confidence interval at 1.15), as compared to IV BRIUMVI

  • the every other month subcutaneous dosing regimen that is also being evaluated in the Phase 3 trial, would achieve non-inferior total drug exposure over 24 weeks (AUC 0-Wk24) with an estimated GMR of 1.58 (with a lower bound of the 90% confidence interval at 1.50), as compared to IV BRIUMVI

  • The lower bound of the 90% confidence intervals for both dosing regimens being evaluated in Phase 3 would exceed the threshold required to establish non-inferiority (>0.80), which is the primary endpoint of the ongoing Phase 3 trial.

At Jefferies, Mike Weiss elaborated further. I’m paraphrasing but the assumption based on the early stage work was that their subcutaneous form of BRIUMVI would have about 60% bioavailability compared to the IV infusion. They dosed in the trial based on assumptions of 50% bioavailability to give themselves a cushion in case their two methods of calculation were wrong. They were not. The geometric mean ratio of area under the curve came in at 1.2x compared to IV infusion almost exactly what you would expect if you dosed 1.2x times higher than the bioavailability data suggested. For the non-inferiority trial to work the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval needs to be above 0.8 and the Phase 3 bioequivalence trial is a larger trial so tighter confidence intervals than the Phase 1.

All of this to say that subcutaneous BRIUMVI is nearly certain to work at the quarterly dosing interval. If you don’t believe me, again listen to CEO Mike Weiss at Jefferies:

How often do you hear a CEO say that failure in a Phase 3 trial would be a 1 in 100 tail risk event? A reminder that the patient-adminstered (e.g. subcutaneous injection) portion of the anti-CD20 market is nearly 50% of the market. The anti-CD20 market is over $8 billion annually in size and projected to grow to $12 billion by the first half of the next decade. BRIUMVI will finally be able to address a $4 billion+ market that is currently only being served by KESIMPTA. BRIUMVI is a more efficacious drug than KESIMPTA and will be able to be adminstered 4 times a year versus 12 times a year. Perhaps giving yourself a subcutaneous injection isn’t a huge deal to some but the option to switch to a more potent drug with 8 less injections per year will be attractive to many. For new patients who want to administer their own medication instead of go to an infusion center, BRIUMVI should quickly become the #1 subcutaneous therapy in dynamic share within years. There is no metric where KESIMPTA is better than BRIUMVI if this Phase 1 data holds to the Phase 3 trial. And their margin of error is so enormous that it’s hard to envision any scenario where the trial fails.

Success in this trial is equal to adding another $2 billion in annual sales to my peak sales estimate for BRIUMVI as a whole. Doing so radically (RADICALLY!) changes the discounted cash flow and valuation metrics, especially when the subcutaneous formulation may have longer intellectual property life.

So…what’s that worth? Well, I think I have a historical comparison that provides context for where TG Therapeutics’ stock could go long-term with a successful subcutaneous formulation.

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I am writing to you once again to discuss Harrow . I just wrote about the company a few weeks ago so it’s unusual I would revisit the stock so soon but with the stock price down from a 52 week high of $54.85 in February to below $29 last week I have to talk about it…that’s a 47% drop peak to trough so it’s clear the market is much more pessimistic about Harrow’s future than they were imagining in February.

Anton in the subscriber chat writes:

Don’t you feel like they keep overpromising and underdelivering?

I do feel the number one issue with the company is perception, not execution, and I also realize that if the company misses their own revenue guidance in Q2 2026 or for the full-year 2026 then a lot of investors will throw in the towel. Therefore it’s imperative the company hits those targets to regain investor trust. In this article I will list every catalyst in 2026 and 2027 in chronological order, give my projections for quarterly revenues in Q2 2026 and FY 2026, and also give my long-term peak sales projections per operating segment and the reasoning for how I arrived at that number.

But first…how did we get here? How did Harrow fall out of favor so quickly?

The Last Six Months

Let’s start with Harrow’s CEO Mark Baum speaking at the Leerink investment conference on March 10th of this year. This was in the aftermath of the company reporting Q4 2025 earnings and the stock decline that followed.

Later in the presentation he again made reference to the fact that Harrow’s shareholder base has a high expectation for the company’s performance and the recent weakness in the stock.

Stockholders indeed do have high hopes for the stock but partly because management has told us how well the company is executing in regards to customer demand metrics and how many catalysts the company has ahead. Thus, for the stock to be down nearly 50% from its peak is a tough pill to swallow. There is also an argument that in retrospect some of these errors were somewhat self-inflicted.

On October 6th, Harrow announced their ImprimisRx unit would be changing leadership. This was later found to be in response to regulatory issues in California and potential drug shortage issues that both leaked out to investors before being officially announced in a press release. The monetary impact of both was not too significant (less than $10 million in essentially one-time impairments) but the leadership changes caused minor reputational damage as the previous department leader had just been featured in the company’s investor day weeks prior. Thus, it was a bit puzzling to see a drastic reversal.

The one-time charge forced the company to revise full-year revenue guidance during the third quarter earnings call in November. The guidance went from > $280 million to a range of $270 million to $280 million. The company’s skeptics at this point were already saying management overpromised and underdelivered so even though the business impairments had been disclosed prior. This revision was a headwind for the stock and overshadowed many good developments in the past year, mainly some very smart business development deals.

However, despite all that, the stock somehow actually overcame that wall of worry and reclaimed a 52 week high in February! So while the previous events were not ideal, investors had mostly shrugged them off.

Then on March 2nd the stock dropped based on the company hitting the lower end of FY 2025 revenue guidance ($272.2 million on a guidance of $270 million to $280 million) but needing an enormous amount of inventory build for IHEEZO (1.5 quarters worth) to do it and with continued difficulties in the Imprimis business unit that seemed to last more than only one quarter. In addition, the Triesence revenue number was rather weak for what was once promised to be a growth driver for the stock. I believe the confluence of all the factors between October 6th and March 2nd lead to an environment where investor patience was very thin heading into the recent Q1 2026 earnings call on May 12th, 2026. Perhaps in retrospect I should have seen that but I was more focused on the great recent deals the company had done to bring in Anti-VEGF biosimilars, find new on-label uses for their specialty drug portfolio, and the acquisition of Melt pharmaceuticals.

Even with that background I gave you I was surprised to see analyst Tom Shrader with BTIG come in with a bit of a frustrated tone on the most recent call asking about the one-time charge relating to Vevye and the change in “business rules” the company uses to handle prescriptions with high out-of-pocket costs. My understanding of the business is this is relating to providing incentives to the insurer to lower the copay versus processing the prescription outside of traditional insurance using the company’s $59 OneHarrow cash pay card which caps a patient’s out of pocket costs. High out of pocket costs should become more irrelevant as the year progresses and patients chew up their Max Out-of-Pocket spend with their insurance company. It is one of many reasons for seasonality in Harrow’s business.

I’m going to include the transcript and audio because I think it speaks to vocal tone:

Kind of one more on VEVYE. Can you give us a remedial rundown of the information flow, why you learned so late, why it took 4 months for you to get a hint that this problem was going on? Because I feel like you warned on everything this quarter, but then this one hit. And is that solved?

And the response from Andrew Boll, the Chief Financial Officer of Harrow:

Yes, absolutely, Tom. I appreciate the question. So first of all, there’s -- it’s more than just one data set that we use to assess and calculate a lot of these figures. And so it’s co-pay data, it’s the claims data from the payer, it’s script data from our partners and IQVIA that we’re using. And so as we’re getting that data, we’re making assumptions.

But January, which came in -- middle of February, when you have all of the data and you can calculate and analyze it, that came in pretty much in line with what we were anticipating. And so middle of February, we thought we were in pretty good shape. When the February data came in, that’s when sort of our, I would say, our incentives went up. These numbers are coming in much higher than we thought or anticipated. But we didn’t want to make a decision based on that single data point.

That single data point being in the month of February. So we wanted to see how March came in. And unfortunately, when March came in, which the final accumulation of data came in mid- to late April, we knew we had to make changes. And so I think we had a final data set that we were able to act on, on a Friday, and we worked over the weekend and had the new business rules out to the partners Sunday night. So we make -- we try to make decisions based on trends and not data points, and that’s what we did in this case.

We worked as quickly as possible to get those changes in place. And I think going forward, we should see much better improvement on pricing for the product, especially in the case of some of these covered scripts that we’ve been talking about.

Harrow is a business that is changing fast but unfortunately that comes with sometimes unexpected consequences and it was unfortunate that this (one time) issue happened at a time when investors were already a bit fatigued by past missteps. Also I could argue this is not the best time in the market cycle for a company like Harrow from a macroeconomic perspective.

I really appreciate Harrow being a founder-led company and their tone being almost Berkshire Hathaway-esque with in-depth stockholder letters each quarter and a focus on long-term value creation. But we are currently in the late stages of a euphoria-driven bull market focused on A.I. companies, data center providers, and semi-conductor stocks. As I write this, I’m watching the Cerebras IPO double on opening. I’m not going to opine if this is a 1998-2000 redux or where we are exactly in that cycle but I do know the market environment isn’t really conducive to a small ophthalmic pharmaceuticals conglomerate missing analyst estimates. Shareholders are watching the fast money flow to other sectors in a melt-up and they are seemingly losing patience with the long-term story Harrow is selling. Or wondering where their gains are at least.

All of this to say…

Harrow provided guidance on the call of Q2 2026 revenue of $71 million to $81 million and full-year guidance of $350 million to $365 million. It feels like management must absolutely deliver on those goals and then the stock will drive much higher when the 2027 revenue guidance is disclosed which I expect to be large.

(More on that below.)

So, can they do it? Can they hit guidance? And what catalysts will fuel that growth?

Also where does this company end up long term? Is it realistic to assume in the future they can produce over a billion dollars in revenue? Harrow with a higher than $10 billion valuation in the future would certainly make all the past issues I listed above seem insignificant and well worth the headache but I know there is skepticism with management’s long-term forecasts so I attempt to give my own estimates for each line of business based on months of independent research I have done. Now I do own the stock so I am not exactly unbiased but perhaps all the legwork I have done will help you make a more informed decision about whether you want to own the stock and position sizing.

So, let’s get into it.

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No time for a long intro today - there have been so many earnings conference calls and press releases in the past week and there is a ton of new information to digest for many of the names in my biotech coverage universe. So, let’s just get into it, shall we?

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10 days ago in my article:

I put this quote explaining some companies I liked in addition to my “Four Pillars”:

Using that lens, I have found my four pillars that I will base my portfolio on for the rest of the year. That is not to say I don’t like other companies a lot. When it comes to clinical-stage companies with super high upside (but risk) I like CGEM -2.19%↓ and FULC -0.26%↓ still.

Now I have written about CGEM here:

but I have never written about ever. Let’s change that, starting now.

Before I begin, an additional disclaimer: shares make up less than 2% of my portfolio right now. Even though I said I liked it, and I truly do love the potential, I do have some unresolved questions regarding the safety and regulatory path of the drug. It’s something I would like to own huge into pivotal data (depending on price) but for now I think the company is a little bit of dead money until we can better ascertain the regulatory path and maybe get more safety data. But it doesn’t hurt to be up-to-date on a company for later data on in case of any kind of panic in equities. If FULC fell to, say, $5/share I’d probably throw some caution to the wind and take a stake even with some lingering concerns.

Why We Need New Sickle Cell Drugs

The unmet need in Sickle Cell Disease is still extremely high:

The above graphic does a good job summarizing the current landscape. Adakveo, an intravenous infusion, was on market to reduce vaso-occulsive crises but failed its confirmatory study and was withdrawn. The approvable endpoint in SCD is reduction of vaso-occulsive crises “VOCs”.

From Wikipedia:

A vaso-occlusive crisis is a common painful complication of sickle cell anemia in adolescents and adults.^[1][2] It is a form of sickle cell crisis. Sickle cell anemia – most common in those of African, Hispanic, and Mediterranean origin – leads to sickle cell crisis when the circulation of blood vessels is obstructed by sickled red blood cells, causing ischemic injuries. The most common complaint is of pain, and recurrent episodes may cause irreversible organ damage.^[2] One of the most severe forms is the acute chest syndrome which occurs as a result of infarction of the lung parenchyma. This can rapidly result in death. Other types of vaso-occlusive crisis in sickle cell anemia include dactylitis, priapism, abdominal pain, and jaundice.

Oxbryta, an oral therapy that bound to hemoglobin and increased affinity to oxygen, was initially approved but then withdrawn from the market due to safety concerns. Sales of the drug were not too strong before withdrawal due to subpar efficacy and it did not reduce vaso-occulsive crises because it was approved on an accelerated approval pathway and never made it to confirmatory trials. There is some evidence to suggest that it might have made VOCs worse.

Two gene therapies exist with strong efficacy evidence but have limited uptake due to the complex nature to administer them, initial insurance resistance to pay for the therapies, safety concerns around permanent biological modifications, and patient access barriers. Casgevy has seen a little bit of uptake recently but we are still talking about 111 patients treated in the U.S. in 2025 out of 100,000 prevalent patients.

The door is wide open for an oral therapy with even modest efficacy, no major safety concerns, and a low enough price that it can address the whole U.S. market while simultaneously saving the healthcare system money.

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As I write this, the S&P 500 just came off its best 10-day stretch of all-time on hopes that the Iran War will soon be concluded. I’m far more skeptical but that’s okay, you don’t pay me for my macro takes. If this last month has taught me anything is to try to find investments that are relatively de-coupled from the oscillations in the indices. Of course, that’s almost impossible but I have been looking at all my investments through the lens of…

“If the company executes like I think they will, will the stock be undeniably higher in 9 months, despite geopolitics/inflation/midterm elections/weakening consumer spending/etc.?”

Using that lens, I have found my four pillars that I will base my portfolio on for the rest of the year. That is not to say I don’t like other companies a lot. When it comes to clinical-stage companies with super high upside (but risk) I like and still. I think if you wanted “blue chip” mid-cap exposure, and seem far too cheap long-term but are more weighted towards 2027 catalysts so patience is required. I still own a lot of because it is so tax-advantaged I’m waiting for some tax lots to become long-term capital gains so I’ll be holding through the Q2 catalyst. Even though has some issues (which I can probably tackle in a future post soon) it’s probably too cheapish in multiple ways as sentiment is absolutely at rock bottom. has run up a good bit in the last month but long-term there is still definitely a case for long term over-performance vs. the index. (Although they just had a CFO retire which has hurt the stock in trading this morning.) I think is still a possible future long but their over-reliance on one product for growth in the next 5 years does worry me. (But of course if that product continues to grow it’s an absolute steal at this valuation.)

Here are the four stocks that I think hold the key to their own future, regardless of the world around them, and will be the pillars of my 2026 biotech portfolio:

My Four Pillars

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Perhaps Early But Not Wrong (Yet)

On May 27, 2025 I wrote my first article about TG Therapeutics:

I think everything in the article has aged very well, all things considered. The stock price has not aged that well. When I wrote that article the stock had closed at $34.57. As I write this the stock is at $33.33 in the middle of today’s trading session. So for being right on the company’s excellent execution over the last 11 months I had the privilege of not only tying up capital but also losing a slight amount of money. Exciting!

I have reason to believe the next 11 month period for TG will be much better than the last 11 months in a meaningful way that will actually attract new outside buyers into the stock. But before I go any further I wanted to share a little anecdote…

Lessons From Apellis

As I’m sure many of you saw was acquired by Biogen. I had written about Apellis numerous times so I hope this was a nice win for readers. I’m not one to take too many victory laps but I appreciate those who thought of me and sent me a nice message. Here was my most recent article:

With the acquistion priced in, the stock is up a cool 90% in less than 3 months since writing that. Not bad. Sadly, Apellis was not in my Top 5 positions because I thought the catalysts were 2027-based and that sentiment would be pretty low in 2026 and I would have time to buy shares before the major inflection point. It was a good lesson to me, and really I guess all of us, that at any time someone with deeper pockets than you can realize the value out there and snatch it up. A part of me is really mad Apellis sold for $41/share. The long-term value was far greater with execution but I guess they got scared or felt the heat from short-sighted stockholders who wanted a quick win during this scary market period. Well, what’s done is done. But I wanted to throw this in here to show that while it’s not great to be early to an idea you really can’t define what “early” even is except for in hindsight…and if you are too committed to not being early you definitely leave money on the table. I personally think finding the good ideas to be relatively easy in this market. But allocating my 100% of cash…that’s where things get really hard. It’s very hard to know when a stock will catch fire and why. And the timing and rationale for Big Pharma’s business development decisions is not forecastable. I definitely did not see Biogen as an acquirer for Apellis. I think they made a great deal (especially considering the dud deals they usually do) but it surprised me. I guess it’s all part of the fun of the game. You have to not only find the ideas but time the ideas to perfection. You aren’t going to get them all timing-wise.

There was a time where I thought maybe I should just equal-weight my ten best ideas and I’m starting to wonder if maybe that was a galaxy brain decision and maybe I should get back to it.

What’s Changed

Okay so back to - here’s why I am even more bullish than I was and why I think maybe just MAYBE the time is right now. I certainly think it can’t be much longer at least.

Here is what has changed since the first time I wrote about the stock in May 2025:

• Sales on a $1 billion+ run-rate of $250+ million in revs/q by end of 2026 (vs. $432 million run-rate at end of 2025)

• 3 clinical catalysts in the next 9 months (vs. 0 in 5/27/25)

• $300 million open stock buyback authorization (vs. $100 million 5/27/25)

• 2 active DTC campaigns (vs. 1 5/27/25)

TG Therapeutics’ new patient starts and switch patient starts are hitting new record highs on an absolute basis every month, the pipeline is about to become relevant again in a big way, the company is buying back stock more aggressively than ever before, and also investing more than ever in creating patient-driven demand in addition to physician-driven demand. Every forward-looking metric is shining a bright green light but the stock continues to trade sideways. I’m going to tackle each of these four areas to show that the market indifference is absolutely insane and will be corrected once people realize where the puck is going.

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Hi all,

In light of a very volatile period in the stock market I thought it would be a good to do a general post with quick updates on all the names I’m actively covering in the biotech market right now. I will run as quick as possible through the names and then try to give my brief thoughts on the macro environment right now for whatever you might think it’s worth.

17 names covered in total:

Let’s get started.

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A little bit of a shorter article this week as my son was on Spring Break so I took some time off to be with him.

On February 3rd, I wrote my first ever article on Esperion ahead of what I thought should be a multi-year period of 30%+ annual revenue growth:

Much to my surprise over the last six weeks the stock has declined from $3.50 to $2.60:

This makes little sense to me as the stock has had nothing but good news over the last 12 months. It should be trading at 52 week highs in my view. The -25% decline is especially puzzling considering I thought the recent earnings report was excellent, the company did an incredibly smart acquisition (which the market completely misread), and there are a ton of catalysts for growth in the next 24 months. I thought I would structure this article by recapping all the positive events of the last 12 months, charting the last 7 earnings reports since their FDA labeling, and explain why revenue will continue to grow in existing and new geographies and the reasons I really like their intellectual property strategy and latest acquisition. Let’s get into it.

Last 12 Months Newsflow

Before we look forward here is a chronological timeline of what the company has been up to over the last year. Some of this will build on my previous article as I assume the reader has a baseline understanding of Nexletol/Nexlizet and the market.

April 2025: Unveils new pipeline candidate in Primary Sclerosing Cholangitis

May 2025: Settles with 1st ANDA filer not to market a generic before April 19, 2040

June 2025: Settles with 2nd ANDA filer not to market a generic before April 19, 2040

July 2025: Settles with 3rd ANDA filer not to market a generic before April 19, 2040

August 2025: First quarter with positive operating income

August 2025: Level 1a recommendation in updated ESC/EAS (European) guidelines

September 2025: Nexletol approved in Japan

October 2025: Complete secondary offering to improve balance sheet

October 2025: Settles with Dr. Reddy’s, 4th ANDA filer and largest, for April 19, 2040

November 2025: New Chief Commercial Officer named

November 2025: Approval in Canada

December 2025: Launch in Japan

January 2026: Launch in France, with good coverage and reimbursement

February 2026: Settles with 5th ANDA filer (of 9 total) for April 19, 2040

March 2026: Acquires Corstasis for $75 million upfront, $180 million milestones

March 2026: Multiple Class 1 recommendations in updated U.S. ACC/AHA guidelines

Despite all that, the company is still trading at a relatively paltry 1.6x NTM Price/Sales multiple. This despite forecasted positive operating income in 2026, a much stronger balance sheet, potentially four marketed products in 2027, multiple new geographies just getting access to bempedoic acid, and an actual pipeline product plus the flexibility to potentially do another deal.

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Today’s article is about . I am a little stunned by the outsized negative reaction to their recent earnings release. I figured as I worked through the press release, letter to shareholders, and conference call transcript I could basically just write up my notes on why the share price drop makes no sense to me and that would be informative for readers and help me build conviction to yet again add shares.

Also, we could stress test the current equity valuation on multiple metrics like Price/Sales and EV/EBITDA as well as test the quality of the earnings going forward and the ability of the company to continue to grow > 30% YoY in 2026, 2027, and 2028 with new product launches.

So let’s just get right into it.

A Recent -33% Drop

I have written about Harrow stock in the past, notably about their biosimilar acquisition here when the stock was $36.20:

and here when the stock was $37.89 after another puzzling reaction to an earnings report:

The stock was finally on a nice run recently nearly touching the 52 week high of $54.85 in the days before the March 2, 2026 earnings call. This run was due to multiple positive pieces of news that we will revisit below. But in the wake of a conference call that had full-year 2026 guidance come in a little softer than anticipated all of this good news has been immediately forgotten by the market.

From >$54 to ~$35 the stock has lost over 1/3rd of its value in a week. Is this a generational buying opportunity? Or is the stock about to enter a period of low-growth/no-growth?

I think the former and am adding shares. Here’s why:

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I have a lot to cover this week and have been on so many conference calls I’m starting to feel a bit dizzy so no long intro this week, just jumping right into it.

I thought it would be prudent to cover nearly every company in my ecosystem of coverage in a broad update and then in the next few weeks I will go back to single company, long form articles.

Companies covered in this update:

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , .

Let’s get to it.

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This will be a very quick article as I wanted to this in subscriber’s email boxes before market open.

On July 22, 2025 I wrote this article about :

For ease of getting this out quickly, I’m not going to cover the basics of the drug or disease state as I feel the original article stands on its own.

It’s a little hard to see on the current chart but in the weeks before publishing that article the stock had pulled back from a then 52 week high of $52.36 to $42.34. A -20% pullback was not that large of a discount but this was a top-tier rapidly growing commercial launch and my idea was to buy future quality at a fairly attractive price even if it wasn’t a steal so to speak.

Little did I know the stock would explode. Tarsus briefly touched below $40 right after my publication and then rapidly rose above $80 to a 52-week high of $85.25 on December 9th.

In recent weeks, the stock again has had a -20% pullback to the low 60s. I started slowly accumulating shares (not enough) and was working on the foundation of this article but was waiting until today’s earnings call to have the most current information and quotes. Well, now I feel I have the duty to rush it out.

Today’s call was so materially bullish I feel there may never be a chance to buy this under $70 again after today — and $80+, $100+, and in a couple years 200+ are all in the cards here.

(Does anyone else really hate using a dash in their writing now because of A.I.? Anyway this is a reminder this is all from a real human with no assistance.)

Here is what struck me from the call and why my new plan is now to accumulate more for the long-term and not trade around the swings in this stock:

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This week I wanted to talk about Zai Lab which I think is a great long-term investment on its own merits. But I also think it is an intriguing way to play a trend that threatens the U.S. biotech industry: increased innovation and a lower operating cost environment in China. It’s no secret that biotech startups in China are being able to screen clinical candidates extremely fast both for novel mechanisms of action and for “fast follower” versions of drugs that have success clinically in the U.S. at the proof-of-concept stage. Pre-clinical studies move faster and cheaper in China and enrolling clinical trials is cheaper and easier as well. I do believe this poses a threat to the U.S. biotech investor that is investing in U.S. companies. It’s one of the reasons why over the last year I have been focusing on commercial-stage companies with strong launches, clean balance sheets, very little competition in the clinic, and robust and long-dated intellectual property. Those are companies that I feel are somewhat insulated near-term from the threat of a growing Chinese biotech industry. However, if you wanted to play the trend from the long side I feel Zai Lab is a pretty great candidate to do it as you have two possibilities to make money from this shifting landscape.

Zai Lab’s business has two verticals: the “regional pipeline” which are drug candidates developed primarily in the U.S. (at least up until Phase 3) and currently marketed products approved in the U.S. where Zai Lab acquires the commercial rights for China and related territories. They act as sort of a Big Pharma partner for the region to navigate patient access, reimbursement, marketing, and a sales team where it doesn’t make sense for a company to build out one for a single product given the enormous geographic size and population of China. There is also a nascent but growing “global pipeline” business of internally developed drug candidates where Zai Lab is developing products completely in-house with the intention of commercializing in China and the U.S. simultaneously and to also take advantage of reduced development costs and speed to market.

I suppose there is even a third option where Zai Lab could develop a drug up to proof-of-concept and then license the U.S. rights to a U.S. pharmaceutical company if the indication required a commercial build-out that was so large it didn’t really make sense for Zai Lab to do alone. I’m not sure how grand their aspirations are for U.S commercialization but they could probably have a pretty great business doing that as well.

You are probably wondering why, despite this glowing write-up, the stock has done horribly over the last five years. I think I have some ideas why that is and why I believe the stock has finally bottomed at $16.60 last month and will climb much, much higher than that price in the coming years.

First, let’s examine the commercial side of the business aka the “regional pipeline” which is not getting enough credit for the growth ahead.

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Two weeks I wrote about Anaptysbio, a company that is splitting into two: a “RoyaltyCo” and a “BiopharmaCo".” The first part of my article series was dedicated to the royalty company and I wanted to tackle the biopharma side this week. But there have been material updates on the royalty stream so I need to do a quick update there first.

If you haven’t read this, it’s semi-required reading to get up to speed:

JEMPERLI Royalty Stream

JEMPERLI sales continue to grow rapidly for GSK. Quick reminder of the royalty table for Anaptysbio:

GSK reported Q4 2025 earnings last Tuesday night late in the night with the time differential. Again, JEMPERLI’s QoQ growth was strong, exceeding my 10% QoQ target. I converted currency using GBP-USD of 1.37.

• Q1 2025: £174 million ($238.3 million)

• Q2 2025: £196 million ($268.5 million) (12.6% QoQ growth)

• Q3 2025: £230 million ($315.1 million) (17.3% QoQ growth)

• Q4 2025: £261 million ($357.7 million) (13.4% QoQ growth)

To give a clear picture let’s look at yearly sales since October 2023 when GSK reported overall survival data for their trial in patients with primary advanced or recurrent endometrial cancer.

• 2023 full year sales: £141 million ($192.74 million)

• 2024 full year sales: £467 million ($639.79 million) (231% YoY growth)

• 2025 full year sales: £861 million ($1,179.6 million) (84.3% YoY growth)

JEMPERLI has been growing faster than 10% QoQ but let’s model 10% QoQ growth for each quarter in 2026 with the assumption that endometrial cancer sales might slow in pace ever so slightly now that we are over two years out from the overall survival data.

With 10% QoQ growth:

• Q1 2026: $393.4 million

• Q2 2026: $432.8 million

• Q3 2026: $476.1 million

• Q4 2026: $523.7 million

Putting it all together here is what the growth curve would look like based on those 2026 assumptions:

• 2023 full year sales: £141 million ($192.74 million)

• 2024 full year sales: £467 million ($639.79 million) (231% YoY growth)

• 2025 full year sales: £861 million ($1,179.6 million) (84.3% YoY growth)

• Estimated 2026 full year sales:…..($1,826 million) (54.7% YoY growth)

Here is a Anaptysbio slide from January 2026 that is quickly becoming outdated. You can see how JEMPERLI’s S curve keeps getting revised up based on blowout quarters. The November ‘25 sell-side consensus is already far too low and GSK’S peak revenue guidance of at least $2.7 billion in USD annually probably will be revised by the end of the year to over $3 billion USD annually.

Even the January 2026 assumptions based on 10% QoQ growth (illustrative orange line above) are too low with the recent quarter showing 13.4% QoQ growth. GSK is also now doing a better job listing all future pivotal readouts instead of just AZUR-1. Success in ANY of these indications is not priced in even though I believe they all have a high probability of success especially AZUR-1 which comes on the back of earlier data showing a 100% complete response rate (not a typo) in Phase 2.

We will get another update in May from GSK on JEMPERLI sales and by late Q2 or Q3 the Anaptysbio split should be finished that the RoyaltyCo and BiopharmaCo will trade under two different tickers. I continue to want to own a greater amount of shares ahead of the split as I believe the entire company right now is undervalued just on the strength of the royalty stream and that the split will fully unlock value.

Again: I CONTINUE TO WANT TO OWN AS MANY SHARES OF THE COMPANY AS I CAN PRE-SPLIT while still maintaining the minimum diversification.

Here’s another reason why:

The BiopharmaCo Opportunity in Celiac

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