Over the past several weeks, the Houthis have sharply escalated their attacks. They have targeted shipping in the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure, and launched some of their most intense attacks against Yemeni government forces since the 2022 truce. The escalation comes amid the widening confrontation between Iran and the United States. But it also marks a potentially important turning point in Saudi policy toward Yemen. After years of seeking to reduce the threat from both Iran and the Houthis through de-escalation, Riyadh seems to be adopting a more proactive approach to its own security — both to guard against renewed confrontation with the Houthis and to reduce its vulnerability as the Iran-US conflict expands. This shift also reflects Saudi Arabia’s own strategic interests: securing its Red Sea energy corridor, reasserting regional leadership, and shaping a more favorable political order on its southern border.

The current Houthi escalation against Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government has two main dimensions: one regional and the other domestic. Regionally, the Houthi escalation against the Kingdom can be understood within the broader context of the confrontation between the U.S. and Iran. Their naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and their attacks on Saudi shipping and energy infrastructure create another pressure point against a key US ally at a time when Iran itself is under significant pressure. This is particularly important because the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has made Saudi Arabia more dependent on the Red Sea for its oil exports. By threatening Saudi shipping there, the Houthis can increase pressure on both Riyadh and Washington while supporting Iran in its wider confrontation with the United States.

But there is also a domestic dimension. The Houthis are increasingly concerned about the possibility of a ground offensive and are trying to disrupt government preparations, degrade these forces before they are ready to launch offensive operations, and force them onto the defensive. There are reasons for that concern. Since January, there has been significant progress toward bringing Yemen’s different government forces under a more unified command. The Presidential Leadership Council established the Supreme Military Committee to prepare, equip, and organize these forces under the leadership of the Saudi-led coalition. The declared goal is to unite ranks, strengthen cohesion, and mobilize all capacities to restore state institutions and end the Houthis’ coup. Saudi Arabia has since provided additional military support and reinforcements, particularly in Marib and other key frontlines. Over the past weeks, government forces have demonstrated growing air power capabilities that had largely been absent since 2014, carrying out both airstrikes and drone attacks against Houthi missile and drone launchers and other military sites in Marib, al-Jawf, Taiz, and elsewhere.

The Houthis’ objective in this recent escalation is to disrupt these preparations before government forces are ready, degrade their capabilities, and force them onto the defensive. This helps explain the scale and intensity of their recent attacks. The Houthis reportedly used hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones in attacks against Yemeni government forces in key frontlines including Marib, Hadhramaut, and Mokha city on the Red Sea. Underlying these attacks, however, is a broader aim: the Houthis are trying to shape the rules of engagement so that, if escalation takes place, it happens on their own terms.

For several years, Saudi Arabia’s approach to both Iran and the Houthis was built around de-escalation. In Yemen, the 2022 truce was the result of direct Saudi-Houthi negotiations, which Riyadh had hoped would pave the way for a political settlement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government — one that would allow the Kingdom to end its military involvement and focus on more urgent domestic priorities. In March 2023, Riyadh restored diplomatic relations with Tehran under a China-brokered agreement that was also intended to reduce regional tensions, revive security cooperation between the two countries, and prompt Tehran to rein in the Houthis.

Neither track fundamentally changed the underlying dynamics: Iran and Iran-allied Iraqi militias have targeted Saudi territory with hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones during the current confrontation between Iran and the United States, some of which struck critical energy and other infrastructure.

On the Yemen track, the pattern was similar. The Houthis rejected the implementation of the phased UN-brokered 2022 roadmap, demanding instead that Saudi Arabia finance civilian and military salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, pay reconstruction and reparations directly to the group, withdraw from Yemen, and end its support for the internationally recognized government. Later that year, they attacked government oil export ports, cutting at least 70 percent of government revenues. By late 2023, they had expanded the conflict into the Red Sea, attacking international shipping. Now, they have brought the confrontation back to Saudi Arabia itself, declaring a naval blockade, targeting Saudi shipping and once again attacking Saudi energy infrastructure.

These developments seem to be pushing Riyadh toward a more proactive approach to its security, both regionally and inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia is pursuing two parallel goals: reducing its exposure to renewed confrontation and building new military and diplomatic capacity to expand its options if de-escalation fails. This shift is playing out across four main fronts, most of which have taken place over the past few weeks.

First, Saudi Arabia is strengthening its position in the Red Sea by building the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance, a broader coalition that already brings together fourteen countries from the Gulf and the Horn of Africa, in addition to powerful allies such as Pakistan and Turkey, with other countries expected to join. Beyond the immediate maritime threat, the initiative reinforces Saudi leadership in Red Sea security and brings littoral states into a Saudi-led security framework at a time when the waterway has become increasingly important to the Kingdom’s energy exports.

Second, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan, signed earlier this month, potentially gives Riyadh greater strategic depth and additional deterrence against a wider regional conflict. It also reflects a broader Saudi effort to diversify its security partnerships and reduce its dependence on the United States as its primary security guarantor, particularly after years of uncertainty over Washington’s willingness to come to the Kingdom’s defense.

Third, Riyadh appears to be strengthening its coordination with Washington. The Saudi defense minister and ambassador to Yemen recently met with Vice President JD Vance, amid reports that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had secured US support for potential military action against the Houthis. US pressure in the past constrained Saudi-backed military operations against the Houthis and pushed Riyadh to curtail its support for Yemeni government offensives, ultimately giving the Houthis greater space to consolidate. Securing US political backing in advance would therefore be important if Riyadh is considering a more assertive approach this time.

Finally, inside Yemen, the shift in Saudi policy was already visible earlier this year, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily against the UAE-backed STC, helping government forces regain territory, and with it Saudi influence, over much of the south. Riyadh’s efforts to increase its support to unify, equip and strengthen government forces against the Houthis suggest that Saudi Arabia increasingly sees a stronger Yemeni state as an important part of its own security.

None of this necessarily means that Riyadh has decided to return to war in Yemen. A more assertive approach would also carry significant risks. If Riyadh decides to support a government ground offensive, it would expose Saudi Arabia once again to Houthi retaliation. Between 2015 and 2022, the group carried out nearly 1,000 rocket and missile attacks and more than 350 distinct drone attacks against Saudi territory, at times striking critical oil and other infrastructure. It could also draw Saudi Arabia more directly into the wider confrontation with Iran, particularly if Tehran responds by increasing its support to the Houthis or targeting the Kingdom directly.

This creates a dangerous dynamic: Saudi Arabia is strengthening its options because de-escalation has failed to provide the security it sought, while the Houthis are escalating in part to prevent those options from becoming a credible military threat. Each development gives the other side greater reason to prepare for confrontation. Riyadh may still prefer de-escalation. But after years of pursuing it to reduce the threats from Iran and the Houthis to no avail, Saudi Arabia increasingly appears determined not to rely on de-escalation alone.

The current escalation can be traced to July 3, when an Iranian Mahan Air flight landed in Sana’a for the first time since 2015 to transport a Houthi delegation to Tehran for Khamenei’s funeral. Following the flight, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of attempting to prevent its arrival and warned that any future interference with direct flights between Tehran and Sana’a would trigger retaliation against airports and other vital interests.

The situation escalated further on July 13, when the Yemeni government prevented another Mahan Air flight from landing in Sana’a. The aircraft, carrying a Houthi delegation returning from Tehran, ignored repeated warnings before diverting to Hodeidah. The Yemeni government offered to return the delegation aboard either a Yemenia flight or a chartered civilian aircraft, but the Houthis rejected both options. They also rejected efforts to resume civilian flights between Sana’a and Amman on Royal Jordanian, insisting that Sana’a should be reopened to all destinations and without interference.

These developments should not be viewed in isolation. They are part of a broader Iranian regional strategy that serves two purposes. In the short term, Tehran is responding to growing U.S. military pressure through calibrated escalation. By using the Houthis to raise the costs for a key U.S. partner—Saudi Arabia—Iran is creating additional leverage over Washington.

In the long term, however, the current escalation accelerates—not creates—Iran’s long-standing effort to consolidate Yemen as a strategic platform. As Tehran comes under increasing military pressure across its regional network, it is seeking to deepen its strategic foothold in the country. Yemen’s location gives Iran direct access to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, making it an ideal platform for projecting power across both theaters.

Iran’s insistence on using the IRGC-affiliated airline despite alternative arrangements offered by the Yemeni government suggests that preserving a direct logistical corridor into Yemen is strategically important. Mahan Air has been under U.S. Treasury sanctions since 2011 for providing logistical support to the IRGC.

Tehran increasingly views Yemen as more than a proxy battlefield or launchpad for Houthi operations. As Iran comes under growing military pressure elsewhere in the region, including at home, Yemen may also serve as a relatively secure sanctuary where the IRGC can preserve personnel, sustain logistical networks, and maintain operational flexibility. According to reports, the July 3 Mahan Air flight transported IRGC personnel, weapons components, and other equipment into Sana’a.

This long-term approach is reflected in Iran’s sustained investment in the Houthis. Since at least 2021, Iran has invested in the Houthis’ naval capabilities while the group has expanded sophisticated smuggling networks and cultivated relationships across the Horn of Africa. The pattern points to a broader Iranian objective: transforming Yemen from a proxy battlefield into a regional hub linking the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf.

If Iran succeeds in consolidating its position in Yemen, it will gain more than a stronger foothold in the Red Sea. It will strengthen its long-term leverage against the United States and its regional partners while expanding its ability to operate across one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Yemen is not the destination. It is the platform.

The message was unmistakable: Iran was testing a red line, challenging Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government while attempting to establish a new reality on the ground. Tehran understands that its neighbours have little appetite for escalation. Between February and June 2026, Iran and its proxies launched over 7,000 missiles and drones against Gulf countries, targeting military facilities, airports, ports, energy infrastructure, and civilian areas. Yet Gulf responses largely emphasized condemnation, diplomacy, and de-escalation, including relying on Omani mediation and diplomatic channels to contain the crisis and prevent further escalation.

Saudi Arabia’s preference for de-escalation did not emerge in a vacuum. It followed years of costly Houthi missile and drone attackson Saudi cities, airports, oil infrastructure, and military facilities that ultimately helped pave the way for the 2022 truce between Riyadh and the Houthis. Tehran is betting that, once confronted with an established reality, its neighbours will ultimately adjust.

On July 2, a Mahan Air aircraft landed in Sana’a, marking the first direct flight between Iran and Houthi-controlled Yemen since the outbreak of the war in 2015. The aircraft carried a Houthi delegation to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. At the time, Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council condemned the flight as “a blatant violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen and a flagrant challenge to international law and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.” Over the following days, Iran and the Houthis insisted that the delegation return aboard the same Mahan Air aircraft, despite objections from the Yemeni government.

The dispute was never really about civilian aviation or simply returning a Houthi delegation from Tehran. The Yemeni government had agreed to facilitate the delegation’s return to Sana’a aboard a Yemenia Airways aircraft. The issue lay in what Mahan Air represented. The airline was designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2011 for acting as a logistical arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), transporting personnel, weapons, and equipment to Iran’s regional partners and proxies. For Tehran, the issue was not merely the return of a delegation, but the normalization of direct Iranian access to Houthi-controlled Yemen. Accepting a Yemenia aircraft would have acknowledged the Yemeni government’s sovereignty over the route. Insisting on a Mahan Air flight sent a different message entirely: Iran intended to establish its own channel to the Houthis for political, logistical, and potentially military support — and expected the region to adapt to it.

The Houthis quickly reinforced that message. In an official statement, they accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the strikes on Sana’a airport, described them as a violation of the 2022 truce, and warned that the attack “will not go unanswered. “The message was equally clear: efforts to challenge this new reality would carry risks of escalation of their own.

The incident came amid renewed escalation between the United States and Iran. A day earlier, Iran had launched attacks across several Gulf states and Jordan in retaliation for a new wave of U.S. strikes on Iranian targets.

The Mahan Air episode should therefore not be viewed in isolation but as part of a broader Iranian strategy that combines calibrated escalation with political messaging to reshape the regional security environment in its favor. Washington’s assumption has long been that military pressure would force Tehran to back down or change course. Iran, however, has repeatedly shown an ability to turn confrontation into leverage while improving its own strategic position.

Similar dynamics have played out in the Strait of Hormuz, where Tehran has used coercive pressure not simply to retaliate, but to alter the calculations of its adversaries, demonstrate its ability to impose costs, and strengthen its bargaining position. This tactic paid off. The U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding went beyond de-escalation by recognising a leading role for Tehran in defining the future administration and maritime services of the Strait of Hormuz alongside Oman and in consultation with other Gulf states, effectively playing into Iran’s hands.

The normalization of direct Iranian access to Houthi-controlled Yemen extends far beyond political symbolism. Reports surrounding the July 2 Mahan Air flight suggested that the aircraft may also have transported specialists and sensitive equipment into Sana’a, including missile parts, alongside the Houthi delegation. Sources also indicate that dozens of IRGC officers and experts arrived in Yemen on the flight, some accompanied by their families.

As Iran comes under growing military pressure and scrutiny from the United States and Israel, the Houthis and Yemen offer Tehran something increasingly valuable: strategic depth beyond Iran’s borders and a platform from which to project influence into the Red Sea, the Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. This is particularly important as the Houthis are increasingly spearheading Iranian efforts to expand smuggling, recruitment, and operational networks across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. More importantly, embedding personnel, expertise, and infrastructure inside Yemen creates capabilities that are far more difficult for the United States and its partners to monitor, disrupt, or roll back than those located inside Iran itself.

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