Legacy media outlets are repeatedly turning to former Obama-era trade official Wendy Cutler to attack President Donald Trump’s tariff agenda.

In a July 2026 CNN interview, Cutler said Trump’s tariffs were “absolutely not” good for the American economy. Weeks later, NPR introduced her as a “global trade expert” before she declared Trump’s tariff campaign bad for both the U.S. and global economies.

Both outlets emphasized her nearly three decades inside the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and her current Asia Society position. Neither mentioned that a prominent Beijing influence group repeatedly identified Cutler as one of its international advisers—including one Chinese-language announcement labeling the role “confirmed.”

Interesting.

That previously unreported designation is documented in records published by the Center for China and Globalization, or CCG.

I found Cutler identified as a “CCG international adviser” in four separate records: CCG’s 2019 annual report, a 2019 Chinese-language announcement, a September 2020 adviser roster and an official 2021 publication.

The most explicit record placed Cutler’s photograph directly above the Chinese words: “Former U.S. Deputy Trade Representative, CCG International Adviser (confirmed).”

This was not simply her name appearing on an unexplained list. CCG says Cutler hosted a Washington breakfast for its delegation, participated in its Capitol Hill trade roundtable, joined seminars in Beijing and contributed to a CCG-edited book. A 2022 CCG article described its “long-term friendly exchange” with her.

The contact also continued long after the original adviser listings. An April 2026 CCG account says founder Wang Huiyao and Secretary-General Mabel Lu Miao met Cutler during their visit to the Asia Society Policy Institute.

The designation was also missing when Cutler advised Congress on Asian trade policy.

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Cutler testified before the Senate Finance Committee in June 2021—during the documented period in which CCG was calling her an adviser. Her Senate materials listed her government career and Asia Society role, but not CCG.

Seven months later, Cutler signed a required Truth in Testimony disclosure form for a House Foreign Affairs hearing on digital economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

The form asked whether she was a fiduciary—explicitly including an “advisor”—of any organization with an interest in the hearing’s subject.

Cutler answered: “No.”

The document warned that knowingly providing materially false information or concealing material information from Congress is a federal crime. Cutler’s April 2022 testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission also omitted CCG.

The identity of the organization is what makes the omission important. The U.S.-China Commission has called CCG a “United Front-affiliated Beijing think tank.”

The United Front is the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign-influence apparatus. It cultivates politicians, business leaders, academics and community organizations outside China to promote Beijing’s positions, weaken opposition and shape policy without the message appearing to come directly from the Chinese government.

Federal investigations show how the apparatus operates. One criminal affidavit says a covert Chinese agent was instructed to submit reports about an elected American politician to the “United Front.” He later pleaded guilty and received four years in prison. A separate 2025 indictment described the United Front Work Department as cultivating foreign elites, including by “gathering human intelligence.”

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If CCG’s repeated “confirmed” adviser designation was accurate, why did Cutler answer “No”—and why have Congress, CNN and NPR never told their audiences about it?

If it was false, why did CCG repeatedly use her name, document years of collaboration and continue meeting with her in 2026?

Either Cutler failed to disclose a significant Beijing relationship, or a CCP-linked influence group falsely claimed a former senior American official as its adviser for years. Congress and the media organizations elevating her as an authority on Trump’s China policy should determine which one is true.

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“By building a network of Muslim American professionals through ISF, we are expanding our ability as a faith community to actualize our collective potential.”

That statement from a scholarship recipient is still prominently displayed on the Islamic Scholarship Fund’s website.

It is not an isolated comment.

ISF’s 2023 annual report says its alumni enter media, film, public-interest law and public policy to “build political power and shape our narrative.” Its 2024 report calls the operation an “incubator model” providing funding, mentorship, career counseling, internships and job placement in influential sectors.

The group describes this as a “direct intervention” and says Muslim voices belong in “positions of power and influence.” Its five-year plan promises a “multiplier effect” across key decision-making spaces.

This is not simply a college-scholarship program. It is an openly advertised influence pipeline.

ISF says it has now distributed more than $5.9 million through 965 awards, supporting 692 emerging leaders. More than 100 participants have entered Capitol Hill internships or fellowships. Its 2026 banquet theme is revealing: “Pathways to Influence.”

Paying Fellows To Draft Bills

ISF’s Congressional Policy Fellowship pays a participant as much as $40,000 for nine months inside a congressional office. According to the program’s own description, fellows work as full-time staffers conducting policy research, meeting interest groups, preparing members for hearings and “drafting bills/speeches.”

ISF then provides permanent job-placement support.

The model has already produced results. Its 2023 report says a fellow placed with Rep. Ilhan Omar subsequently received a full-time position in Omar’s office. That fellow was Tahreem Alam, who became a legislative aide and correspondent.

Other documented ISF-linked placements have included:

• Muna Sultana in Rep. Pramila Jayapal’s office, where ISF says she used her Middle East and South Asia expertise to “shape domestic and international policy.”

• Mustafa Alemi in Rep. Rashida Tlaib’s office.

• Malik Hassan in Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s office.

• Ali Husaini in Rep. Ayanna Pressley’s office.

• Ali Fazal in Rep. Madeleine Dean’s office.

• Sinthia Shabnam in Rep. Ilhan Omar’s office.

• Abdullah Memon in Rep. Delia Ramirez’s office.

Memon recently credited ISF with facilitating his internship. In a post amplified by ISF, he said he authored a Cuba-policy memo, developed bill co-sponsorship strategy, organized shadow hearings and wrote speeches and video scripts.

ISF’s institutional bridge does not end with recipients. Zahraa Saheb simultaneously serves as an ISF senior policy adviser and legislative director for Rep. Veronica Escobar. Wardah Khalid, another ISF senior adviser, founded the Poligon Education Fund to strengthen Muslim engagement with Congress. Policy lead Ammar Ahmed previously advised the USDA’s Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships.

ISF recently promoted a participant’s prediction that members of its network will become “future members of Congress, future senators…maybe even future presidents.”

A Pipeline Into Judges’ Chambers

ISF also sponsors internships inside federal and state courts.

Its judicial-internship pitch says recipients can draft bench memoranda, judicial orders and opinions while working inside judges’ chambers. The organization presents this as a pipeline leading from law school to judicial internships, clerkships and eventually judgeships—placing Muslim professionals in what it calls “positions that matter.”

Named participants include Ayesha Durrani, placed with U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth, and Ali Fazal, who later interned for First Circuit Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson. ISF reported placing four Muslim judicial interns with state and federal judges in 2023 and another four in 2024.

Legal-program manager Shaheed Ansari is tasked with cultivating partnerships with judges and attorneys to secure internships and clerkships. Fellow manager Lena Ghrama previously worked for CAIR-New York

.Shaping News and Entertainment

The same architecture extends into journalism.

ISF’s 2025 report identifies Raza Naqvi, a CNN producer; Mariama Jallow, an associate producer at NBC’s Meet the Press; Alaa Elassar, a CNN writer; Erum Salam, a Guardian reporter; Reem Nasr, a CNBC news associate; and Ulaa Kuziez, a Religion News Service fellow

.In 2026, ISF placed Liyana Illyas with Mehdi Hasan’s Zeteo.

The organization’s journalism partnership with Religion News Service includes a paid newsroom internship, ISF coaching, professional mentorship and post-fellowship job-placement assistance. Its separate Journalism Bridge Programplaces participants in a directory circulated to hiring managers and recruiters seeking candidates for “values-aligned” newsrooms.

ISF’s board includes Emily Mohammed, vice president of development at the Center for Investigative Reporting and a former fundraiser for The Guardian and Mother Jones. Media adviser Firdaus Arastu describes her work as shifting narratives and building power through advocacy communications.

The film operation is equally explicit. ISF says applicants’ projects must be consistent with its mission of using art to change public policy and public opinion. Its film program has awarded $625,000 and built a pipeline of more than 100 filmmakers.

The Doris Duke Foundation supplied ISF’s largest reported institutional grant: $500,000 for a partnership with the Sundance Institute. ISF alumni now work at Netflix, Hulu and PBS.

Who Funds It?

ISF reported $1.92 million in 2024 revenue, including approximately $1.65 million in contributions.

Public grant records identify the Doris Duke Foundation, Fidelity Charitable, PayPal Giving Fund, El-Hibri Foundation and Zia and Rabia Bhatti Foundation among its funders. ISF’s own reports additionally name the Afzal Family Foundation, Amana Mutual Funds, Foundation for Intelligent Giving, Muslim bar associations and several family funds.

Some money arrives through charitable intermediaries. CauseIQ lists at least $101,250 from Fidelity Charitable and $100,311 from PayPal Giving Fund. Because Fidelity operates donor-advised funds, its name may conceal the identity of the individual who actually recommended a grant.

The 2023 sponsor list also included a “Linda Sarsour Courage and Leadership Scholarship.”

Is ISF Pro-Sharia?

In one narrow but unmistakable sense, yes.

ISF says its endowment follows Islamic Waqf principles, describes its disbursements as supporting “Shariah-compliant projects,” and confirms that it uses Sharia-compliant investment vehicles. That language appears on its own Sustainers Circle page.

A related network nevertheless deserves scrutiny. ISF made a reported $17,600 grant to Zaytuna College. Current board member Farhan Syed served on Zaytuna’s founding management committee. Former ISF board member Hatem Bazianco-founded Zaytuna, teaches Islamic law and founded American Muslims for Palestine.

In 2025, the Republican chairman of the Senate HELP Committee opened an investigation into AMP, citing alleged connections to Hamas-linked individuals and campus demonstrations.

The organization is not hiding its intentions. It is advertising them.

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In February, principals and students from three Chicago public schools—Taft High School, Lincoln Park High School and George Westinghouse College Prep—gathered inside China’s Chicago consulate for a “YES Friends” event. According to a Chinese-language report, the diplomat urged the schools to make the cooperation list “longer and longer,” especially in K–12 STEM.

This was not diplomatic small talk. It was the latest step in a program that recruits American children, sends them to China, organizes them through a consulate-run alumni club and converts the relationships into formal school partnerships.

Two months earlier, Taft principal Ryan Glowacz and a Taft teacher signed a “School Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding” with Shandong Jinan No. 9 High School—inside the Chinese consulate. More than 400 Taft students study Mandarin, and the school now hopes to send roughly 20 students to China in 2027.

Taft’s social media called it “Strengthening Global Learning.” The Chinese side disclosed far more.

Jinan No. 9’s official report says the agreement created an institutional platform for joint curriculum development, teacher training, reciprocal student and teacher visits, and cultural programming. The principal who signed it is also deputy secretary of his school’s CCP committee.

The partner school’s own annual plan says it is guided by “Xi Jinping Thought,” makes strengthening Party leadership its first priority, expands its “ideological-political classroom,” monitors public opinion and treats ideological control as an institutional responsibility.

This is the school now positioned to help shape curriculum and train teachers with a Chicago public high school.

The signing ceremony itself was even more blatant. China’s consulate says more than 100 American children, parents, teachers and school leaders attended. Before at least 16 Chinese and American schools signed agreements, Consul General Wang Baodong briefed the room on the “major achievements” of the Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP’s 20th Central Committee and recruited students for Xi Jinping’s plan to bring 50,000 young Americans to China.

Chinese-language reporting names additional pairings involving Sidney Sawyer Elementary, Jones College Prep, Evanston Township High School, Barrington Station Middle School and Intercultural Montessori. Taft’s agreement is independently confirmed; the others should release their signed documents.

At the same event, Chinese officials unveiled West Meets East: 100 American Secondary School Students’ Tales About China. Its Chicago publisher markets the K–12 book as American children “telling China’s story” to “foster support for China.” The publisher also turned it into a campus roadshow across multiple American school districts.

Chinese state media supplied the intended result. One Chicago student said Xi’s initiative allowed students to “experience China and fall in love with China.” A participating school leader called Xi’s 50,000 students “the multipliers,” predicting their influence would “triple and quadruple.”

The pipeline began earlier. At a 2024 Chinese cultural festival organized by Chicago Public Schools, more than 1,000 attendees from over 20 CPS schools heard Wang promote Xi’s Global Civilization Initiative and recruit students for the same travel program. In 2025, the consulate created the permanent “YES Friends Club” to keep returning students engaged through essays, videos and events as “messengers” for U.S.–China friendship.

Chicago public schools are allowing Beijing to turn classrooms, taxpayer-funded institutions and American children into an influence network. Parents deserve every MOU, funding record, curriculum agreement and China-trip itinerary—before the “pro-China force” grows any larger.

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The Chinese Communist Party’s infiltration of American science did not stop at universities and research laboratories. It reached inside the Environmental Protection Agency.

Yuefeng Xie, a Penn State professor, was recruited through a talent program run by the CCP Central Organization Department. He became a professor at Tsinghua University and an adviser to a Chinese government water initiative.

He then gained a seat on the EPA Science Advisory Board’s Drinking Water Committee—the panel advising the EPA administrator on the technical basis of America’s national drinking-water standards.

This was not a long-expired relationship or a stray academic affiliation. China’s own records said Xie was serving the American and Chinese water programs “simultaneously.”

That is the real scandal: a scientist recruited into the CCP’s talent apparatus penetrated a federal advisory committee in the same strategic field where he was serving Beijing.

The CCP created talent programs such as Thousand Talents to recruit scientists working abroad who possess expertise, technology and research relationships China wants. The FBI warns that participants can be incentivized to transfer American research and proprietary information to China.

Participation is not automatically illegal. But Thousand Talents was never simply an academic-exchange program—and Xie was recruited by the CCP body responsible for staffing and organizing the Party itself.

An official Hunan University biography says Xie was selected for Thousand Talents in 2010 and conducted teaching and research at Tsinghua. It also identified him as an expert for the Chinese housing ministry’s major water program and a consulting expert to EPA.

Two months after that biography appeared, Penn State announced Xie’s appointment to EPA’s Drinking Water Committee. Its announcement praised his work on water treatment and contaminants. It did not mention Thousand Talents, Tsinghua or the Chinese ministry.

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Penn State says Xie served on the EPA committee from 2017 through 2021.

Then, in 2019, China University of Geosciences–Beijing disclosed the overlap in one remarkable sentence: Xie “simultaneously” served as an adviser to the Chinese ministry’s water program and as a drinking-water expert for the U.S. federal EPA.

The records do not reveal whether Beijing had any role in securing Xie’s EPA appointment. They establish something alarming enough: the CCP had recruited him, Tsinghua had appointed him and a Chinese government water program was using his expertise before EPA placed him on its drinking-water committee.

His participation in China’s scientific system continued throughout his EPA term.

An approval notice from China’s National Natural Science Foundation named Xie as Tsinghua’s applicant for the Chinese half of a joint U.S.–China urban-water project. The Chinese award ran from January 2018 through December 2021—almost his entire EPA tenure.

The American half was a $500,000 National Science Foundation grant to Rice University. The project contemplated sharing data among laboratories and exchanging faculty and students. Three Tsinghua professors and two Tsinghua graduate students participated.

A 2020 paper funded by the American and Chinese grants listed Xie under both Penn State and Tsinghua. It modeled Houston’s real water network using city-provided information covering 43 reservoirs, 60 tanks, 127 valves, 160 pumps and 5,607 pipes. The underlying data were licensed, restricted and not publicly available.

The records do not prove Xie or Tsinghua received Houston’s raw files. The paper credits him with revising the manuscript and joining discussions, not conducting the analysis. Houston and Rice should nevertheless disclose every person authorized to access those files.

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The stakes are no longer theoretical. In 2024, the EPA and White House warned that PRC state-sponsored hackers had compromised American critical infrastructure, including drinking-water systems, while preparing to disrupt them during a future conflict. There is no evidence tying Xie to that operation, but it demonstrates why China’s penetration of America’s water-sector institutions cannot be dismissed as harmless academic cooperation.

EPA’s confidential-disclosure rules required outside university positions, consulting and research funding to be reported. The public still does not know what Xie disclosed, how EPA vetted his CCP and Chinese-government connections or whether any restrictions were imposed.

EPA did not merely appoint a scientist who happened to collaborate with China. It allowed a recruit of the CCP’s scientific influence apparatus—then simultaneously serving Beijing’s water program—to enter the committee advising America’s drinking-water standards.

That is institutional infiltration. EPA needs to explain how it happened.

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The buyer, Long Feng International, Inc., acquired 1,513.18 acres in Kings County in November 2024, USDA’s foreign-landholding database shows. The department lists the investor’s country as “CHINA” and identifies Long Feng as a U.S.-created corporation whose primary interest is held by a Chinese owner.

The location makes the purchase particularly significant.

The nearest parcel sits approximately 16.1 miles, boundary to boundary, from Naval Air Station Lemoore. The Navy calls Lemoore its “designated West-coast strike fighter hub and master jet base.” It is home to Pacific-based F-35C Lightning II squadrons—the carrier-capable version of America’s fifth-generation stealth fighter—as well as F/A-18 Super Hornets.

These are not simply aircraft parked at a regional airfield. Lemoore supplies the carrier air wings that project American power across the Indo-Pacific. The Navy has said the F-35C is designed to penetrate contested airspace and bring greater lethality, precision and survivability to carrier operations. In any conflict involving China, those aircraft and the base supporting them would be central to the American response.

The Paper Trail

USDA’s 2024 foreign-landholding data documents the core transaction: Long Feng acquired 1,513.18 Kings County acres in November 2024 for $21.2 million. USDA identifies China as the country of the investor’s primary interest and codes the deal as a cash acquisition of the full ownership interest.

Kings County records match that disclosure exactly. Fourteen parcels assessed to Long Feng total 1,513.18 acres, confirming the land behind the federal entry.

Those parcels were part of a larger 3,094-acre West Corcoran property marketed in 2020. Long Feng did not buy the entire property; it bought the 1,513-acre portion. The offering brochure described pistachio orchards, row crops, agricultural wells and Corcoran Irrigation District water. This was productive farmland with an established water supply.

County records now place three additional parcels totaling 315.38 acres under Long Feng’s name, bringing its current footprint to 17 parcels and 1,828.56 acres. The three parcels share a February 6, 2026 document reference and move the property about a mile closer to NAS Lemoore.

The underlying document is not publicly available, so it remains unclear whether the 315 acres were newly purchased or transferred through another title action. Kings County now assesses them to Long Feng.

A Company With No Publicly Identified Human Owner

A California corporate-record mirror lists Long Feng’s formation date as May 13, 2024—six months before the purchase. Yet the available records do not identify the human being who ultimately owns or controls it.

The Federal Blind Spot

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States can review certain foreign real-estate transactions near designated military installations. But the current federal list of covered sites does not include NAS Lemoore.

That omission means proximity to Lemoore alone does not appear to trigger the military-installation provision of CFIUS’s real-estate rules. CFIUS could have jurisdiction on another basis and does not normally disclose individual reviews.

The result is a striking gap: a Chinese-classified buyer acquired $21.2 million in farmland 16 miles from the base supporting America’s Pacific carrier-based fighter fleet, but that installation is absent from the federal proximity list intended to scrutinize foreign land purchases.

The unanswered questions are simple: Who owns Long Feng? What happened with the additional 315 acres in 2026? Was the original purchase reviewed? And why is the Navy’s West Coast master jet base missing from the government’s list?

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New Chinese-language records reveal that the Atlanta-based Chinese American Youth Association, or CAYA, participated in an August summer camp administered by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.

The XPCC is not an innocent cultural organization.

It is a sprawling CCP-controlled paramilitary entity that the U.S. Treasury sanctioned over serious human-rights abuses targeting Uyghurs and other minorities.

Treasury says the organization helped implement a “surveillance, detention, and indoctrination program” targeting Uyghurs. It cited reported mass arbitrary detention and severe physical abuse in imposing sanctions.

Yet the version presented to children from America was radically different.

The youths were taught “Corps spirit,” taken to an XPCC border regiment, and told to become overseas messengers who would “tell the Corps story.”

American Children Enter The XPCC

The August 3–12 program brought together 50 overseas Chinese youths from the United States, Germany, and Belgium.

An official XPCC announcement states that the camp was administered by the XPCC’s Returned Overseas Chinese Federation and co-organized by the XPCC Education Bureau and an XPCC school.

The announcement explicitly says “兵团精神”—“Corps spirit”—was incorporated into classroom instruction and field visits.

CAYA was directly involved.

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Chinese state media identified CAYA’s Ran Qimei as the American delegation leader. CAYA students performed alongside students from an XPCC school during the opening ceremony.

An XPCC official then encouraged the visiting youths to become messengers who would promote Chinese culture and “讲好兵团故事”—“tell the Corps story,” according to China News Service.

This was not simply a heritage tour.

It was an effort to teach foreign children the CCP’s preferred story about one of the most notorious organizations operating in Xinjiang—and send that message back overseas.

From America To A Chinese Border Regiment

The program eventually took the children to XPCC Regiment 185, celebrated in Chinese propaganda as the “first regiment on the northwest border.”

There, the youths toured a sentry post overlooking the Chinese-Kazakh border and listened to stories glorifying the defense of Chinese territory.

“One does only one thing in a lifetime: I stand guard for the motherland,” a guide reportedly told them.

The children were shown a monument bearing slogans about an “unbreakable border-defense line” and an “indestructible military-reclamation spirit.”

The official report published photographs of the youths—many wearing matching red shirts—posing beneath Chinese flags at the border monument.

They also toured the XPCC Military Reclamation Museum, where they heard celebratory stories about former soldiers “putting down their guns and picking up hoes” to build Xinjiang.

There was apparently no discussion of the reason Washington sanctioned the XPCC: its role in the CCP’s repression of Uyghurs.

Instead, the children were being prepared to counter that image.

An official closing account said the youths had collected “vivid material” for “spreading the real Xinjiang overseas.”

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CAYA’s American delegation leader similarly said she hoped the children would become civilian ambassadors and tell more people the “real and vivid stories” of China’s border region.

CAYA Admits Chinese Governments Fund Its Work

CAYA says it is headquartered in Atlanta and works with more than 4,500 students, Chinese clubs, and Chinese schools across the United States.

It also openly acknowledges that Chinese government offices help finance its activities.

“What we do is made possible by funding from various cultural outreach offices in several provincial and local governments in China,” its website states.

CAYA does not identify those governments, how much they provided, or which programs they funded.

No public record reviewed for this story establishes who paid for the 2026 XPCC trip.

But materials for a separate 2025 CAYA program said the “Chinese side” would cover lodging, meals, cultural activities, and sightseeing while families paid for airfare, visas, and insurance.

The CCP did not conceal what it was doing.

It published the photographs, the itinerary, and the instructions itself—apparently assuming nobody in America would bother to read them.

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But some Republican insiders are getting paid by the Chinese-controlled company sitting squarely in the middle of that fight.

Federal lobbying disclosures reviewed for this report reveal that former Republican congressional staffers have been hired by Smithfield Foods to work on the very legislation Washington is advancing to restrict foreign ownership of American agricultural land.

Smithfield is effectively Chinese-controlled: Hong Kong-based WH Group beneficially owned roughly 87 percent of the American pork giant as of 2026, while Smithfield itself reports owning approximately 87,000 acres of U.S. land. WH Group grew out of China’s Shuanghui empire, whose longtime chairman Wan Long has been identified as a Chinese Communist Party member and served in China’s National People’s Congress.

As President Donald Trump and congressional Republicans publicly move to restrict Chinese access to American farmland, Smithfield has assembled a Washington influence operation stocked with former Republican congressional aides, agriculture policy insiders, and revolving-door lobbyists.

Among them are former aides to Republican Sens. John Warner and Susan Collins, a former House Republican Conference official, and a former U.S. Department of Agriculture official.

And federal lobbying filings show they have been working directly on “foreign farmland ownership restrictions.”

THE CHINA FARMLAND LOBBY

Smithfield paid Holland & Knight $270,000 during the second quarter of 2025 for a portfolio of lobbying issues that specifically included “issues related to foreign ownership of agricultural land.”

The filing went further.

It identified S.903, the Promoting Agriculture Safeguards and Security Act, or PASS Act, as legislation Smithfield was lobbying on and described the issue as “foreign farmland ownership restrictions.”

The lobbyist assigned to that legislation was Christopher DeLacy.

Before becoming a powerful Washington lobbyist, he worked on Capitol Hill as counsel to Republican Sen. John Warner of Virginia and as counsel to the House Science Committee’s Technology Subcommittee.

By the end of 2025, Smithfield had added another Republican congressional veteran to the farmland fight.

A fourth-quarter lobbying disclosure identifies DeLacy and Molly Ross as the two lobbyists specifically working on S.903 and a separate Rounds-Cortez Masto measure involving “foreign farmland ownership restrictions.”

Ross spent eight years working on Capitol Hill for Republican Sen. Susan Collins.

Her legislative portfolio included agriculture, nutrition, appropriations, and energy, precisely the policy areas now at the center of Washington’s fight over foreign control of American agricultural assets.

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Her law firm biography boasts of the relationships she built with congressional committees overseeing agriculture policy.

Those relationships are now being deployed on behalf of Smithfield.

The same disclosure lists DeLacy, Ross, Joel Roberson, and former USDA official Peter Tabor lobbying more broadly on “issues related to foreign ownership of agricultural land.”

Smithfield paid Holland & Knight another $270,000 that quarter.

FORMER GOP INSIDERS, NOW ON SMITHFIELD’S PAYROLL

Joel Roberson offers another example of the Washington revolving door surrounding the company.

A federal lobbying registration lists Roberson’s former government jobs as committee liaison and floor debate coordinator for the House Republican Conference, followed by work for the House Judiciary Committee.

When Greenberg Traurig registered to lobby for Smithfield in May 2026, the firm listed both Roberson and DeLacy as lobbyists expected to work on “issues related to foreign ownership of agricultural land.”

REPUBLICANS SAY CHINA IS THE THREAT

The lobbying campaign comes as Republican officials are describing Chinese access to American farmland as a national-security emergency.

The Trump administration’s National Farm Security Action Plan declared that foreign adversaries should not be permitted to gain control over American agricultural land.

Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins vowed the administration would “never let foreign adversaries control our land.”

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Sen. Mike Rounds, the Republican sponsor of S.903, has warned that hostile countries including China are seeking opportunities to gain access near sensitive American facilities.

Other Republican lawmakers have described Chinese farmland ownership as a threat to military security, food security, and rural America.

Washington Republicans say they are fighting to keep China away from American farmland.

Chinese-controlled Smithfield has made sure some of their former colleagues have a seat at the table.

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The Islamization of Scouting is no longer confined to Muslim-only troops.

Across American and British Scouting, Islam is now appearing in national events, children’s activities, badges, recruitment plans, family programming and permanent infrastructure. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has placed an effective $87 million behind World Scouting’s flagship Messengers of Peace program—including a Saudi-supported operation inside America’s National Jamboree.

Scouting America—the renamed Boy Scouts of America—used its official faith account to promote an Islamic booth at its 2026 National Jamboree. Attendees were invited to get henna, pose with an inflatable mosque and minaret, “learn more about their faith” and attend Friday’s Islamic service.

At another Islamic gathering during the same national event, the account announced that Islamic Booth Staff had received “Allahu Akbar (God is Great) Jamboree” medals.

This is spreading beyond one event. A North Carolina Scouting America council invited “our Scouting families” to a 2026 Ramadan iftar at an Islamic center, circulated a halal-food presentation and asked units to distribute the invitation.

UK Scouts offers an optional Islamic ritual-washing lesson to every section—from Squirrels ages four to six through Explorers. Children may rinse their mouths, sniff water into their nostrils and perform wudu together while leaders teach that the Qur’an contains the “pure word of Allah.” Leaders can invite someone from a local mosque to demonstrate “for everyone to follow.”

Its national library contains at least 15 Islam-focused activities: mosque visits, the Five Pillars, iftar, the Black Stone story and an Islamic-call-to-prayer lesson open to “all groups.” Its optional Islamophobia Awareness Month badge recommends listening to the adhan, visiting a mosque, inviting an imam or sheikh and producing awareness videos.

UK Scouts says its Muslim-engagement toolkit resulted from a three-year project literally called “Attracting Young Muslims to Scouting”, supported by Islamic Relief UK, the Aziz Foundation and Pears Foundation. It advises leaders about changing the traditional handshake, music, meeting times, uniforms and opposite-sex interaction around Islamic practices.

Muslim membership grew from 800 in 2011 to more than 6,000 in 2021. By 2022, the Muslim Scout Fellowship had formed 76 predominantly Muslim groups.

At Gilwell Park—the historic home of British Scouting—the Fellowship operates a mosque. Its archived page describes the park’s estimated 500,000 yearly visitors as a platform for sharing Islam’s message and celebrates non-Muslims learning wudu or joining a full prayer. The Fellowship separately said it opened the mosque to more than 4,000 Explorers during one event.

World Scouting now advertises a 2026 Muslim Scout Fellowship International Jamboree at Gilwell, with “thousands of Muslim Scouts” expected. UK Scouts also reported a Palestine Awareness Day for roughly 120 children ages four to 14 featuring Arabic calligraphy, Palestinian-colored badges and “art as activism.”

In the background, Saudi Arabia has been deploying nearly $90 million to Scouting America.

Auditors recorded an original $37.25 million Saudi pledge, minus $250,000 that would not be received: an effective $37 million. Riyadh then signed another $50 million agreement in 2025. Total: $87 million.

World Scouting says the renewal targets more than 100 million Scouts in 176 countries and aligns with Saudi Vision 2030. Current Messengers of Peace grant rules require funded projects to display Saudi Arabia’s name and logo and align communications with donor requirements.

Scouting America’s publication cited that $50 million Saudi commitment under “What prompted this realignment?” before explaining why it updated its American program. At the 2026 Jamboree, its international account said Saudi-supported Scouts would assemble 5,000 disaster-relief kits through a hub whose graphic placed the Saudi emblem beside Scouting America’s branding.

The Saudi records do not prove Riyadh purchased every lesson, badge or Islamic event; most were optional. They establish the scale surrounding the transformation: Western Scouting is teaching, recruiting around and publicly celebrating Islam while Saudi Arabia bankrolls the global machinery carrying Scouting’s new model worldwide.

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Four days before Arizona’s 2026 primary, a nonprofit led by the former executive director of the Navajo County Democrats—whose résumé also includes Hillary Clinton’s campaign—invited Native voters to a “Ballot Party” with food and said attendees would be “filling out our mail-in primary ballots together.”

In Florida, an Instagram account operated by a recent Democratic state House candidate advertised free fish dinners for people who brought a new voter to register. In Georgia, a nonprofit funded for voter-registration and turnout work said it would give out $25 gift cards to people who brought an adult to register.

And nationally, a nonprofit funded by the dark-money organization behind the largest pro-Kamala Harris super PAC is running 2026 giveaways offering $400 gas cards, $500 grocery cards and a concert package worth approximately $4,900—while collecting personal information that it says is matched against voter files.

So… are Democrats literally paying people to vote?

FREE FISH FOR A NEWLY REGISTERED VOTER

An August 22, 2026 flyer for a fish fry at Movement for Change in Pensacola, Florida, gave the instruction plainly:

“Bring someone to register to vote and receive a free fish dinner along with your new register voter.”

The Instagram caption told followers to grab whoever they could, get fish and register for the general election.

The account belongs to Haley “Hale” Morrissette, whose own biography identifies her as “DJ Hale.” Florida election records identify Morrissette as a Democratic state House candidate in 2024. She filed again for the 2026 election before withdrawing.

The money trail leads to Black Voters Matter Capacity Building Institute. Its tax filings report a $14,500 “GOTV” grant in 2022 and a $9,100 “GOTV/Voter Registration” grant in 2023 to Movement for Change—a combined $23,600. A separate 2024 filing lists a $19,000 grant to Life Is Hale for emergency-relief work.

A $25 GIFT CARD FOR BRINGING A NEW REGISTRANT

On August 13, 2026, the Instagram account for Eyvone’s Porch In-Centive, Inc.—EPIC—posted another explicit offer:

“Bring someone 18 years or older to register to vote … and you will receive a $25 gift card.”

The flyer listed Publix, Home Depot, Walmart, Tropical Smoothie, LongHorn and Zaxby’s among the possible merchants.

EPIC is a Moultrie, Georgia, 501(c)(3) that describes voter registration and turnout as part of its work. The organization’s website thanks Black Voters Matter as a partner and says founder Carol Simpson received a “Georgia Democratic Lifetime Achievement Award” in 2026. The site does not identify who issued that award.

Black Voters Matter filings disclose three grants to EPIC: $10,950 for GOTV in 2022, $7,000 for GOTV/voter registration in 2023 and $15,500 for the same purpose in 2024—a combined $33,450.

The 501(c)(3) grantmaker is legally distinct from the similarly branded BVM Action PAC. But the wider network has an established partisan arm: an official FEC conciliation agreement says the PAC spent $158,018 supporting Democratic Sen. Raphael Warnock during Georgia’s 2022 runoff.

FOOD WHILE FILLING OUT MAIL BALLOTS—FOUR DAYS BEFORE THE PRIMARY

Arizona Native Vote published its Facebook invitation on July 11, 2026. It invited Hopi residents to a July 17 event in Polacca featuring “conversation, food, fun” and “filling out our mail-in primary ballots together.”

Arizona’s official calendar shows that early ballots had already been mailed. The event occurred just four days before the July 21 primary.

Arizona Native Vote calls itself nonpartisan. Its founder and board chair, Jaynie Parrish, nevertheless has an unmistakably Democratic résumé. An Aspen Institute biography says Parrish led the Navajo County Democrats and Northeast Arizona Native Democrats from 2020 through 2023. It credits that operation with helping carry Arizona in 2020 and the 2022 midterms, and lists work with EMILY’s List and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.

The organization received a $200,000 Henry Luce Foundation grant on March 5, 2026, for “Indigenous Knowledge.” Official Katz Amsterdam Foundation records disclose another $375,000 across 2023, 2024 and 2025 for voter registration and civic engagement in rural and tribal communities. A Black Voters Matter 2024 Form 990 also lists $20,000 in general operating support.

THE KAMALA MONEY PIPELINE BEHIND 2026 SWEEPSTAKES

The largest operation is All Americans Vote, a Washington-based 501(c)(3) whose website declares: “Where culture moves, voting follows.” It says its work is focused on improving Black quality of life through civic engagement.

Its 2026 sweepstakes page advertises concert experiences alongside monthly gasoline and grocery giveaways. Official rules offer a $400 gas or Visa card each month through December and a $500 grocery or Visa card each month through December. Another contest, running from July 27 through October 26, offers platinum Chris Brown and Usher tickets plus a $1,400 travel gift card—an approximate total value of $4,900.

The entry form requests a participant’s full name, street address, city, state, ZIP code, phone number, date of birth and email address.

AAV’s FAQ says it offers incentives for people to check their registration status, then matches entrants’ personal information to public voter files. The FAQ says the data is never sold or monetized. Its privacy policy, however, says information may be shared with organizations and campaigns with similar goals and, subject to restrictions, sold or exchanged with a broker or other entity.

The upstream funding is extraordinary. Future Forward USA Action’s 2024 Form 990 shows a $1.1 million grant to All Americans Vote. The same filing reports sending $251.5 million to FF PAC for “POLITICAL” activity. FF PAC was the massive outside-spending operation backing Kamala Harris in 2024.

AAV’s own revenue exploded from $113,357 in 2023 to $14.34 million in 2024. It then reported more than $10 million in grants, including $5 million to Civitech, $3.27 million to Notley Impact and $1.5 million to Woke Vote.

There is an important distinction: AAV’s official rules expressly state that checking registration, registering, voting or requesting a mail ballot is not required to enter. That language separates the prizes from a direct voting quid pro quo. The public record therefore supports describing this as an incentive-driven voter-file acquisition and mobilization operation—not as proven payment for casting a vote.

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The organization was not simply “China-linked.” Its own records say it was led by the CCP Central Secretariat and administered by the Central United Front Work Department—the sprawling Party organ the U.S. government says works to co-opt elites, neutralize opposition and manipulate foreign institutions in service of Beijing.

Buried inside a non-searchable image on the official website of the Western Returned Scholars Association, or WRSA, is Chu’s Chinese name: 朱棣文.

The page identifies the organization’s Fourth Council as serving from 1999 to 2003. In the official roster image, under the heading 海外名誉会长—“overseas honorary presidents”—WRSA lists ten additional prestige scientists.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences explicitly identifies 朱棣文 as “Steven Chu,” the Stanford physicist and 1997 Nobel laureate. WRSA itself later used the same Chinese name for the “former U.S. Energy Secretary and physicist” Steven Chu. The surrounding names—some of the most famous overseas Chinese scientists of the era—make the match effectively certain.

The title is absent from Chu’s detailed Stanford biography and the published record of his 2009 Senate confirmation hearing.

This Was Part Of The CCP’s “Magic Weapon”

The harmless-sounding English name “Western Returned Scholars Association” obscures what Beijing says the organization actually is.

The United Front is not ordinary diplomacy. Xi Jinping has called it one of the CCP’s “magic weapons.” The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission says its purpose is to “co-opt and neutralize” potential opposition and conduct influence operations against foreign actors and states—often through relationships whose true political significance is difficult to prove publicly.

The U.S. State Department has described United Front work even more bluntly: “political warfare.” It warned that Beijing weaponizes academic, commercial, diplomatic and people-to-people exchanges, frequently operating through organizations that present themselves as independent academic groups, cultural associations, friendship societies or nongovernmental organizations. The result, it said, is an opaque network of CCP officials, proxies and cutouts designed to exert “covert, coercive, and corrupting” influence inside free societies.

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WRSA was not merely adjacent to that system.

WRSA’s own official history records that a 1995 central-government staffing plan placed it under the leadership of the CCP Central Secretariat and under the administrative management of the Central United Front Work Department. That arrangement was already in force when Chu appeared on its 1999–2003 roster.

Party supervision was visible at the creation of that exact council. A contemporaneous June 1999 People’s Daily report says Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Premier Li Lanqing met WRSA’s newly elected Fourth Council in the Great Hall of the People. He instructed the organization to unite more overseas scholars and “give full play to their role” in China’s socialist modernization.

Why tighten Party control? According to a People’s Daily Overseas Edition account, Jiang Zemin said WRSA had “very broad coverage,” so leadership over it should be strengthened and its role “fully brought into play.” He separately instructed it to strengthen contact with overseas scholars and expand their channels of connection with China.

In 1998, WRSA and 17 overseas scholar organizations launched a program literally called the “Serve-the-Nation Plan.” WRSA says it used the plan to “integrate” overseas scholars’ intelligence and talent into China’s modernization. In 2000 alone, it brought in 35 projects and 14 batches of experts, while arranging for overseas scholars to become technology-development advisers, overseas-strategy representatives and guest professors.

Then, in 2000—during Chu’s listed term—the CCP formally brought overseas and returned scholars inside the scope of United Front work. United Front departments were instructed to strengthen contact with accomplished scholars living overseas and encourage them to serve China through multiple forms. The stated principle was: “broadly unite, warmly serve, actively guide, and give full play to their role.”

A five-ministry directive issued the following year identified the mechanisms. Overseas scholars were encouraged to accept advisory or honorary positions, conduct cooperative research, commercialize patents and proprietary technology in China, train Chinese personnel, introduce foreign experts, and help import technology and projects—all as recognized forms of “serving the country.”

WRSA’s modern mandate removes any ambiguity about its political character. A 2016 CCP Central Office directive described it as a CCP-led United Front organization responsible for the “political guidance and political absorption” of returned scholars and for the “discovery, cultivation, use, management and service” of representative figures. It ordered WRSA to maintain overseas contacts, build talent databases, recruit selected overseas elites, serve Beijing’s diplomatic strategy and establish a Party group with a “leadership core” role.

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WRSA’s listing was not Chu’s only formal connection to a Chinese state institution. In June 1998, one year before the WRSA term began, he became a foreign member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Academy’s official profile says Chu had “always paid attention to and supported China’s scientific research,” repeatedly visited China, and wanted to advance U.S.–China scientific cooperation.

Chu’s Chinese Academy membership is disclosed in his Stanford biography. The United Front title is not.

Then Came The Technology-Sharing Programs

Six years after the documented WRSA term ended, Chu took control of the Department of Energy. What followed was precisely the kind of elite scientific cooperation, technical exchange and joint development that Beijing’s overseas-talent policies had spent years trying to cultivate.

In November 2009, Chu personally signed a legally binding protocol establishing the U.S.–China Clean Energy Research Center, a public Obama–Hu initiative. The agreement created joint American-Chinese research teams and a technical clearinghouse covering clean vehicles, building efficiency, and advanced coal and carbon-capture technology.

The United States and China committed $150 million over five years, split evenly through public and private funding.

Chu told Caixin in a 2011 interview:

“We will jointly create intellectual property, then share the intellectual property, and undertake further development.”

Chinese government records describe outputs from one China-focused joint building-efficiency track. By March 2013 it had produced China-specific technical systems and guidance, three national or industry standards, five patent applications, energy-evaluation software, new products and the training of eleven graduate students.

Chu also personally signed a nonbinding 2011 agreement, implementing an Obama–Hu initiative, to jointly design, fund and establish a nuclear-security Center of Excellence in China. Its stated purpose was safeguards, counterterrorism and nonproliferation. The Obama White House said American agencies would provide equipment, technical exchanges and training. Chinese authorities later described America as providing professional equipment for nuclear-material analysis, security-equipment testing and response-force training.

After Government, Another China-Launched Leadership Post

Three years after leaving government, GEIDCO officially listed Chu as a first-term vice chairman and council member. Its own history says it was China’s first international energy organization and grew directly from Xi Jinping’s 2015 proposal for a “global energy interconnection.” The first council was replaced in September 2022. GEIDCO is not a United Front body and the post was publicly announced, but it is another formal China-launched leadership listing omitted from Chu’s Stanford biography.

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The federal government funded an $80 million project that paid 496 social-media influencers to promote COVID vaccines.

The project’s own report disclosed the existence of these influencers, but it never named them.

I traced Instagram paid-partnership labels, #ad captions, reposts and archived advertising records to identify 57 accounts connected to apparently sponsored campaign content.

The recovered posts reveal what the government-funded vaccine push looked like inside people’s feeds:

• A technology creator told followers: “Do your part, step up, get vaccinated and vaccinate your children!!”

• A native paid partnership promoted vaccination during pregnancy and claimed babies born to vaccinated mothers faced a lower risk of COVID hospitalization.

• Another paid partnership highlighted a vaccinated six-year-old and said the family acted partly to protect a two-year-old.

• An official campaign repost carrying #ad invoked pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding while calling vaccination the “BEST decision” for a mother and her daughter.

• A campaign-linked contest offered a $100 Amazon gift card for public vaccination stories and recruitment into El Beacon’s volunteer network.

• Another official repost carrying #ad described the vaccines as “completely safe”.

The thesis is not complicated: federal health money supported a project that paid private social-media personalities to convince people to take COVID vaccines.

But behind those posts was an operation built to monitor the vaccine debate and update its messaging in response.

THE SYSTEM BEHIND THE PAID POSTS

From September 2021 through April 2022, Public Good Projects and Hispanic Communications Network ran English- and Spanish-language searches containing hundreds of vaccine-related keywords, hashtags and phrases.

The system captured 212.7 million English-language messages and 35 million Spanish-language messages from social-media platforms, news sites, video sites and other public sources—247.7 million in total.

Staff reviewed leading results every week for claims they classified as trending or emerging misinformation. The report says the findings “directly informed” prompts telling influencers “what to include in their posts’ captions.” Those prompts were updated throughout the year.

Public Good Projects also monitored comments for misinformation and supplied influencers with counter-messaging or resources. The same monitoring findings produced weekly rebuttal guidance for Hispanic-serving community organizations.

The 496 influencers produced 1,000 posts—524 Instagram feed posts, 468 Instagram Stories and eight posts across Facebook, TikTok and Twitter. The campaign reported a potential reach of 37.2 million people.

The influencer network was only one part of the operation. The project also recruited 1,034 digital volunteers and two celebrities, produced 206 “misinformation insights” and 206 rebuttal talking points, and distributed messaging through newsletters, social-media materials, community trainings, Spanish-language radio announcements and op-eds.

WHO PAID FOR IT

The report states that the project was “100 percent funded by CDC/HHS.”

Federal records place the work under a broader $25.66 million fiscal-year 2021 award from the CDC’s immunization center to the CDC Foundation. That amount funded the wider Partnering for Vaccine Equity program—not El Beacon alone—and the records do not reveal how much was spent on the influencers.

The CDC Foundation worked with Public Good Projects, Hispanic Communications Network and World Voices Media. Public Good Projects created El Beacon and recruited the paid influencer network.

The recovered ads generally disclosed a relationship with El Beacon through #ad, paid-partnership labels or campaign branding. El Beacon separately recruited unpaid volunteers and reposted some vaccine testimonials without advertising labels, while the 57 accounts identified here were tied to posts carrying #ad, a “paid partnership” label or equivalent advertising metadata—strong evidence that the promotions involved money or another benefit.

But none of the sponsorship disclosures in the recovered 57-account sample identified CDC, HHS or the CDC Foundation as the ultimate source of the funding. Followers were shown El Beacon. They were not shown the federal government and monitoring system behind it.

THE RECEIPTS

Not an abstract strategy. These are the recovered posts. The examples below show what the federally funded campaign published or amplified. The unedited screenshots accompanying this article appear in the same order.

CHILDREN

• “Vaccinate your children!!” An official El Beacon repost preserving #ad quoted Fabio Dias: “Do your part, step up, get vaccinated and vaccinate your children!!”

• A six-year-old—and a two-year-old. In a native paid partnership, Angelica Castaneda said her six-year-old was among the first vaccinated after becoming eligible and that the family acted partly to protect their two-year-old.

  

• “Become a superhero.” An official repost preserving #ad from Ana Cruz centered on a boy with delicate lungs and his protective older brother, ending, in translation: “For the most vulnerable, for those you love most, GET VACCINATED and become a superhero too.”

PREGNANCY AND BREASTFEEDING

• The infant-hospitalization appeal. In a native paid partnership, Mariza Dávila-Madwid said babies born to vaccinated mothers faced a lower risk of COVID-19 hospitalization and that she was vaccinated while pregnant to protect her daughter.

  

• The “BEST decision.” In an official repost preserving #ad, Paola V. Desideri invoked pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeeding while calling vaccination the “BEST decision” for herself and her daughter.

GIFT CARDS FOR PUBLIC VACCINATION STORIES

• $100. A native paid-partnership post from Erica Marques promoted a $100 Amazon-card contest requiring entrants to explain why they were vaccinated or boosted, follow El Beacon and join its volunteer network.

  

• $200. El Beacon’s own account offered a $200 Amazon gift card and bonus entries for publicly explaining a vaccination decision and sharing the campaign. These were incentives for testimonial content and recruitment—not payments simply for receiving a shot.

THE ANTI-“MISINFORMATION” CAMPAIGN’S OWN CLAIMS

• “678%.” An official repost preserving #ad from Juliana Separavic said “over 678% of Americans over the age of 5 are fully vaccinated.” The impossible number appears to be a missing decimal point.

  

• “Completely safe.” An official repost preserving #ad from Thayna Beddes called vaccination “the most effective way to stop contamination and the emergence of new variants” and described the vaccines as “completely safe.”

INTO NON-HEALTH FEEDS

• “NON-BOOKISH CONTENT.” Book creator Carmen Alvarez opened her native paid partnership with that warning before introducing vaccine messaging to her literary audience.

  

• Reality television to public health. Amazing Race winner Will Jardell posted a January 2022 vaccine testimonial that El Beacon republished with #ad. A CDC-funded PHI fellowship program featured Jardell in July 2022; records do not establish when his fellowship began or coordination between the programs.

The 57 accounts identified

Fifty-five links below lead to recovered Instagram posts. Kristina Guerrero’s original post is unavailable and survives only in an indexed advertising record; AFP independently preserved and verified Lisa Marie Borjas’s campaign post.

• Akinyi Ragwar (@fitsonme) — Campaign post — Fashion blogger and personal-style creator.

• Alejandra Arce (@alearce) — Campaign post — Marketing professional and yoga, technology and lifestyle creator.

• @alinefreemann (now @usa.homemade) — Campaign post — Lifestyle and home-content creator.

• Amelia Valentin (@amelialadomiriquena) — Campaign post — Content creator, singer, editor and on-air host.

• Ana Cruz (@rollosdemujeres) — Campaign post — Bilingual journalist and founder/editor of Rollos de Mujeres.

• Ana Molina (@anaxmolina) — Campaign post — Latina lifestyle and social-media creator.

• Ana Victoria Perez (@anavictoriaperez_) — Campaign post — Fashion, shopping and lifestyle creator.

• Andreia Leifer (@andreialeifer) — Campaign post — Fashion, beauty and lifestyle creator.

• Angelica Castaneda (@angelicacastaneda_) — Campaign post — Family, travel and lifestyle blogger.

• Araceli Bindrup (@arybindrup) — Campaign post — Family and lifestyle creator covering fashion, home décor and travel.

• Awilda (@iam.awilda) — Campaign post — User-generated-content and lifestyle creator; no verified surname was recovered.

• Bianca Fortney (@biancafortney) — Campaign post — Fashion, beauty, lifestyle and user-generated-content creator.

• Carla Riojas (@carlariojasmusic) — Campaign post — Singer-songwriter and recording artist.

• Carmen Alvarez (@tomesandtextiles) — Campaign post — Book creator focused on Latino literature and a library advocate.

• Carolina Abdala (@carolinaabdala) — Campaign post — Beauty, home-décor, family and lifestyle creator.

• Cynthia Pratt (@superpratt) — Campaign post — Arizona-based lifestyle and travel creator.

• Dalia Patron (@msdaliapatron) — Campaign post — Fashion, beauty, wellness and user-generated-content creator.

• Dani Lynch (@itsmedanilynch) — Campaign post — Utah-based social-media creator; no narrower specialty was reliably verified.

• David Tutera (@davidtutera) — Campaign post — Celebrity wedding planner, designer and television host.

• Edna Freeman (@ednacfreeman) — Campaign post — Actress, author and motherhood/lifestyle creator.

• Erica Marques (@ericaamarks) — Campaign post — Lifestyle, motherhood and sustainability creator.

• Fabio Dias (@kinzaum) — Campaign post — Technology-unboxing and product-review creator.

• Fridda Fernández (@cherry.fr) — Campaign post — New York-based Latina lifestyle creator and communications professional.

• Genesis Lagos (@genesis_lagos) — Campaign post — Disney, family and travel creator.

• Guadalupe Ochoa (@fellowfashionista) — Campaign post — Fashion blogger and creator behind Fellow Fashionista.

• Gustavo Finol (@gusfinol) — Campaign post — Fashion producer, public-relations professional and actor.

• Jennifer Lee / Prickly Blonde (@pricklyblonde) — Campaign post — Secondhand, thrift and sustainable-fashion creator.

• Jessica Moore (@missmoorestyle) — Campaign post — Budget-fashion, beauty and travel blogger behind Miss Moore Style.

• Juliana Separavic (@juseparavic) — Campaign post — Lifestyle and consumer-product brand-content creator; no narrower niche was independently established.

• Julie Hauptmann / Jules Cali (@jules_cali) — Campaign post — Luxury-fashion, beauty and travel blogger.

• Karina Abdul (@karinaabdulm) — Campaign post — Fashion designer and entrepreneur behind KABDUL, with lifestyle and modeling content.

• Kelsey Kaplan (@kelseykaplanfashion) — Campaign post — San Francisco fashion blogger focused on petite styling, with motherhood content.

• Kristina Guerrero (@kristinaguerrero) — Indexed campaign-ad record; original post unavailable — Former E! News and Inside Edition correspondent and television host.

• Lesley Argotti (@lesleyargotti) — Campaign post — Bilingual fashion-and-lifestyle creator and visual artist.

• Lisa Marie Borjas — Campaign post (Facebook) (AFP verification) — Venezuelan fashion stylist and beauty creator; her Instagram handle remains unconfirmed.

• Lisette M. (@lisettem26) — Campaign post — Small lifestyle creator; her surname and a narrower niche remain unverified.

• Lucas Labrador (@lucaslabradordancer) — Campaign post — Professional ballet dancer, dance entrepreneur and founder of Ballet World Connected.

• Marcelli Rodrigues (@canalmarcellirodrigues) — Campaign post — Personal trainer and beauty, fitness and lifestyle creator.

• Mariza Dávila-Madwid (@sra.davilamadwid) — Campaign post — Connecticut high-school Spanish teacher and teacher/lifestyle creator.

• Melany Cortázar (@melanycmakeup) — Campaign post — Professional makeup artist, beauty creator and makeup-academy founder.

• Meliza Vasquez (@melizavasquezz) — Campaign post — Houston photographer and lifestyle/fitness creator.

• Miss Karenni / Karen Asencio Viera (@asencioviera) — Campaign post — Fashion-and-lifestyle creator.

• Noelia Alonso Duque (@wendynoe) — Campaign post — Model and user-generated-content creator.

• Nubia Figueroa (@nubiafiguerooa) — Campaign post — Beauty, fashion and skincare creator and photographer.

• Omar Genao (@omargenao) — Campaign post — E-commerce developer, designer and digital-marketing consultant.

• Paola V. Desideri (@paolavdesideri) — Campaign post — Fashion, beauty and family/lifestyle creator.

• Parth Patel (@_parthenaan) — Campaign post — Engineer and men’s-style, lifestyle and travel creator.

• Perla Aguilar (@iamperlita) — Campaign post — Fashion, beauty and lifestyle blogger.

• Ren (@grunge.granny) — Campaign post — Maker, small-business owner and creativity/lifestyle creator.

• Stephanie Bradford (@stephbradfordtv) — Campaign post — Four-time Emmy-winning bilingual journalist and voice-over artist.

• Stephanie Guerra (@puropinchesa) — Campaign post — Founder of Puro Pinche and a San Antonio culture, events and entertainment creator.

• Thayna Beddes (@thaynabeddes) — Campaign post — Instagram creator; no narrower professional niche was reliably corroborated.

• Thida (@vibeinstyle) — Campaign post — Boston-area travel-and-lifestyle blogger.

• V de Veronik / Camila Verônica Souza Freire (@vdeveronik) — Campaign post — Medical-research and academic-skills creator and founder of PowerPoint Academy.

• Vanessa Calderón (@nessacalder) — Campaign post — Actress, writer and filmmaker.

• Will Jardell (@williamjardell) — Campaign post — Amazing Race winner, model/dance instructor and MPH-trained public-health professional.

• Wilmarie Hernández (@wilmarielifeisnow) — Campaign post — Life/career coach and travel creator.

How I found the names

The campaign’s paper supplied the number—496 paid influencers—but not the roster. I started with El Beacon’s own Year-One Instagram footprint and worked outward from every surviving post.

I recovered 109 captions from creator originals, collaboration posts, official El Beacon reposts and archived copies. I then followed each credited handle back to the creator and matched the person to public biographies, professional profiles, interviews or contemporary coverage.

I counted an account only when the public record showed an advertising connection to El Beacon. The resulting 57 include:

• 21 creator-owned posts carrying Instagram’s native paid-partnership label;

• three creator-owned El Beacon collaborations carrying #ad;

• 31 official El Beacon reposts identifying the creator and preserving #ad;

• one campaign advertisement preserved in an influencer index; and

• one Facebook/Instagram advertisement independently preserved and verified by AFP.

This is not the complete roster. The campaign reports 1,000 influencer posts—including 524 Instagram feed posts and 468 Instagram stories—so hundreds of posts and most of the names remain unrecovered. The full list was managed through the GRIN influencer platform and has not been released publicly.

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Even worse?

L.A. County diverted $5 million originally approved for wildfire victims to pay these illegal aliens.

Los Angeles County is offering up to $15,000 in taxpayer-funded housing relief to residents regardless of immigration status—including illegal immigrant households affected by ICE raids, detentions, and deportations.

The county’s own documents make the purpose unmistakable.

Officials created a special eligibility category for households suffering a “sudden loss of income due to federal actions targeting immigrant communities.” They then earmarked millions of dollars for that category and wrote the rules so applicants would not have to prove they are lawfully present in the United States.

The county’s February 2026 Program and Application Guide states:

“Program eligibility does not require the disclosure of household members’ immigration status.”

The program can erase up to six months of housing debt, generally capped at $15,000 per rental unit. It covers unpaid rent and, for certain applicants, mortgages and other housing expenses.

In plain English: Los Angeles taxpayers are financing housing relief that illegal immigrants can receive—and the county deliberately refuses to make lawful immigration status a condition of eligibility.

L.A. County Treats ICE Enforcement As An “Emergency”

This is not a neutral housing program containing an obscure loophole. Immigration enforcement was one of the stated reasons the benefit was created.

The September 2025 Board of Supervisors motion denounced “aggressive immigration enforcement” and claimed that “thousands of families have lost their primary breadwinners due to raids.”

The Board responded by establishing “Priority Group Category 3” for households allegedly harmed by federal actions against immigrant communities.

County officials allocated $5 million in Care First and Community Investment funds specifically to Category 3. They also directed another $9.788 million in Affordable Housing Trust Fund and county money toward the category unless wildfire victims still had unmet needs.

The broader fund has since grown to at least $44.367 million, according to a February 2026 county presentation. The entire amount is not exclusively for illegal immigrants—it also covers wildfire victims—but immigration-enforcement hardship is an express component.

ICE ‘Victims’ Received Funds Meant For Fire Victims

L.A. County did not merely place wildfire victims and immigrant households inside the same newly created program. It took money already assembled specifically for wildfire rent relief—and redirected half of it to households claiming hardship from federal immigration enforcement.

Following the Eaton and Palisades fires, county officials identified $10 million to establish a fund for tenants and landlords unable to collect or pay rent because of the wildfires.

Officials divided the original wildfire allocation in half. The approved motion retained $5 million for wildfire-related categories while ordering that “$5 million in CFCI funding shall be allocated to Priority Group Category 3”—a newly created category for households suffering income loss because of federal actions targeting immigrant communities.

The county went even further, directing another $9.788 million from its Affordable Housing Trust Fund toward the ICE-related category unless wildfire victims still had unmet needs. The finished program subsequently offered as much as $15,000 per rental unit for up to six months of housing debt.

Applicants Can Decline To Provide Detention Records

The county’s verification rules are even more revealing.

If applicants say their hardship resulted from immigration enforcement, administrators may request evidence of a detention or deportation. But the guide says people who lack those records—or “choose not to disclose this information”—may still receive rent relief if they establish another eligible economic hardship.

The official program FAQ confirms both points: immigration status is not required, and households that decline to provide immigration-detention documentation may remain eligible under another hardship category.

Applicants must still document their identity, housing debt, tenancy, income, and eligible expenses. But proof of American citizenship or lawful presence is not required.

The County Designed The Program Not To Count Illegal Immigrant Recipients

Los Angeles County cannot tell the public how many illegal immigrants receive the benefit because its own rules prevent it from collecting the information necessary to produce that number.

The eligible universe includes illegal immigrants alongside lawful residents and mixed-status families. Because status is not required, the county cannot separate those populations in its published figures.

That creates a convenient political shield: officials can promote relief for families affected by ICE while later insisting they do not know how many beneficiaries are in the country illegally.

California’s largest county is not merely refusing to assist ICE. It is using taxpayer money to cushion the financial consequences when ICE detains or deports an immigrant breadwinner.

Demand has already overwhelmed the available money.

The county reported 4,587 Round One applications requesting $84,711,397—nearly twice the $44.367 million identified for the broader program.

Now you see why the county wrote the program so taxpayers may never know how many illegal immigrants received the benefit.

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The April 8 notice, quietly published by the Gansu Academy of Agricultural Sciences, disclosed that researcher Cheng Hong was scheduled to travel to the United States from May 11 to May 16, 2026 as part of an official delegation organized by the provincial government’s Foreign Affairs Office.

Buried beneath language about “agricultural exchanges and friendships” was the real destination.

The delegation would “visit the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s seed germplasm resource bank” and “carry out the utilization and cooperation of white melon germplasm resources.”

The Chinese government also named the American organization helping facilitate the trip: the U.S.-China Green Institute.

Curiously, the U.S.-China Green Institute does not appear to have publicized the USDA visit on its own website, despite extensively promoting its China trips, agricultural partnerships, and meetings with Chinese officials.

The Chinese government disclosed it instead.

THE AMERICANS OPENING THE DOOR

The U.S.-China Green Institute was founded by an extraordinary lineup of Americans with deep connections to the Chinese Communist Party and its foreign espionage and propaganda fronts.

Former Iowa Governor and former U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad serves as Founder & Chairman. Former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore David Adelman is Founder & Vice President. Jonathan Krane, founder of China-focused investment manager KraneShares, is Founder & President.

Krane’s financial ties are especially notable.

Krane Funds Advisors was majority owned by CICC USA, which SEC filings identified as indirectly owned by China Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign wealth fund. The filing stated that Krane employees had agreed to purchase CICC’s stake, but as of March 31, 2026, just weeks before the planned delegation, the Chinese ownership remained in place.

Then there’s Branstad.

Beijing has celebrated the former governor as an “old friend” of Xi Jinping, dating their relationship to Xi’s 1985 visit to Iowa. After leaving government, Branstad continued lending his name and stature to groups working to expand China’s foothold across America’s agricultural heartland.

He repeatedly appeared with the United States Heartland China Association, or USHCA, including at its 2022 agricultural dialogue alongside Chinese Ambassador Qin Gang. USHCA established secret backchannels with America politicians and agriculture officials to mainstream policies advancing Chinese ownership of U.S. farmland. Programming has included officials from CPAFFC — a top-tier political warfare branch of the Chinese Communist Party — advocating for “technology transfer.”

THE UNITED FRONT CONNECTION

The U.S.-China Green Institute’s relationship with Beijing’s influence apparatus was not indirect.

In 2024, the organization announced what it called a “historic” Memorandum of Understanding with the World Food Prize Foundation and the China Friendship Foundation for Peace and Development, or CFFPD.

The agreement promised deeper agricultural cooperation and programs to “conduct exchange programs for government officials, students, and industry leaders.”

The Green Institute itself acknowledged that CFFPD was established by the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, or CPAFFC, and remains “overseen by the CPAFFC.”

That matters because U.S. counterintelligence officials have specifically warned about CPAFFC.

The State Department has described the organization as “tasked with co-opting subnational governments” and said it has sought to “directly and malignly influence state and local leaders to promote the PRC’s global agenda.”

That is the United Front model in practice:

cultivate governors, universities, business leaders, farmers, scientists, and former officials through organizations branded around “friendship,” “dialogue,” and “exchange,” then use those relationships to expand Beijing’s access inside America.

In this case, the access apparently reached USDA.

CHINA HAS ALREADY TARGETED AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

The danger is hardly hypothetical.

Chinese national Mo Hailong pleaded guilty for participating in a conspiracy to steal proprietary corn seeds developed by DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto and transport them to China. Federal prosecutors warned that agricultural trade-secret theft posed a “grave threat to our national economic security.”

In 2025, federal prosecutors also charged Chinese nationals in cases involving biological materials smuggled into the United States for work connected to University of Michigan laboratories. One defendant pleaded guilty to smuggling Fusarium graminearum and lying to investigators.

WHY THE USDA FACILITY MATTERS

The Chinese notice did not name the USDA facility, but the itinerary routed the delegation through Des Moines and said it planned to pursue cooperation involving melon germplasm.

USDA operates the North Central Regional Plant Introduction Station in Ames, Iowa, which maintains USDA’s cucumber and melon germplasm collection as part of the National Plant Germplasm System.

These facilities are not simply warehouses full of seeds.

They preserve the genetic material scientists use to study and develop crop varieties, including traits involving disease resistance, productivity, and environmental tolerance. USDA describes the Ames site as a secure research facility maintaining genetically diverse crop material for crop improvement and product development.

And the Chinese document did not merely describe a tour.

It said the delegation planned to “carry out the utilization and cooperation of white melon germplasm resources.”

The American counterparts responsible for organizing this tour curiously made no public mention of the visit.

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“A standout attraction was the hijab photo booth,” according to the SALAM Islamic Center’s account of a February 2025 Girl Scout event at its Sacramento mosque.

Girls were invited to try on hijabs while learning about “the significance of modesty.” The event also included mosque tours and “an informative booth about Palestine.”

The Girl Scout who organized the event said she wanted to share the mosque with the “broader Girl Scout community.”SALAM has not published a clear photograph of either booth, the materials presented about Palestine, or any parent notice explaining the religious components.

“Strong Islamic Values”

SALAM openly advertises its Girl Scout program as providing “Strong Islamic Values.” Its Education page repeats the phrase while listing Girl Scouts alongside the mosque’s weekend school, Quran memorization program, and Islamic-learning center.

The mosque’s bylaws direct its Education Committee to review the activities of youth groups including Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts. They require: “Such programs shall be in accordance with the ideology of SALAM and its principles.”

Girl Scouts Heart of Central California knew about SALAM’s religious integration years earlier.

The council’s 2009 annual report said four troops with 30 girls began meeting at SALAM and incorporated Girl Scouting into the mosque’s youth programming. It highlighted a Ramadan sleepover involving fasting and girls “praying through the night.”

A Troop 972 leader explained the arrangement plainly: “we just incorporate our religion into the framework that Girl Scouts provides.

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Girl Scouts As Mosque Outreach

SALAM placed the February 2025 Girl Scout gathering inside its broader school and university outreach report.

That report described SALAM educating 45 Elk Grove Unified School District teachers about Islam, fasting, prayer accommodations, and Muslim students. It also detailed presentations to seventh graders and a mosque visit for Sacramento State students.

The same document announced World Thinking Day “in partnership with the Girl Scouts.”

A National Pattern

SALAM is not an isolated example.

The Islamic Center of Naperville says its K–12 troops follow Girl Scout principles while adhering to “our core Islamic values.” Its current materials instruct girls to bring a headscarf for salah, or Islamic prayer.

The Islamic Center of Long Island has hosted Girl Scouts since 2005 and states: “Combining Islamic education with scout activity is our prime goal.”

At Virginia’s ADAMS Center, the Girl Scout program incorporates Islamic traditions so girls can develop “without compromising their faith,” including celebrating Islamic holidays and earning an Islam patch.

A 2012 PGMA Girl Scouts event invited Girl Scouts to an overnight Ramadan program featuring taraweeh prayer, Quran and Hadith study, and religious discussion. The supply list included prayer garments, hijabs, Islamic books, and a Quran.

Girl Scouts of the USA has promoted the same model. A national GSUSA feature celebrated Orange County troops that hosted an Open Mosque Day for Girl Scout families, including a mosque tour and presentations connecting Islam to the Girl Scout Promise and Law.

That article also says organizers permitted one troop to represent Palestine at World Thinking Day after initially denying its request.

Other mosque-based troops operate through Brooklyn’s Masjid At-Taqwa, California’s Muslim Community Center East Bay, and the Islamic Center of San Diego, where historical programming included prayer, Ramadan, Muslim badges, hijab discussions, and outreach to visiting Girl Scouts.

Fudan built a million-account X “voter pool.” Researchers from Chinese government think tanks tested synthetic Pennsylvania voters with a campaign message. A state-funded project modeled “America First” attitudes to assess tariffs, alliances, and U.S. foreign policy.

China is building increasingly detailed models of the American electorate—who voters are, what they believe, why they support Donald Trump or Joe Biden, and how they might respond to political messages.

A review of Chinese-language research, university projects, datasets, and government-linked think-tank publications reveals that Chinese institutions have moved far beyond simply following American polls. Researchers are now constructing artificial versions of U.S. voters, assigning political and demographic labels to more than one million X users, simulating state-by-state presidential elections, and conducting experiments on synthetic voters in Pennsylvania.

Another Chinese study, funded by the country’s National Social Science Fund, used American polling data to infer “America First” attitudes toward tariffs, alliances, international organizations, and democracy promotion. Its author explicitly argued that the research could help China evaluate the future direction of U.S. foreign policy and formulate a response.

Chinese universities and government think tanks are developing increasingly granular, interactive models of the American electorate that can be used to forecast political behavior, test messages, interview simulated constituencies, and identify the domestic forces shaping U.S. policy toward China.

Their own documents raise a simple question: Why?

A Million-Account American “Voter Pool”

The most expansive project uncovered in this investigation began with an enormous collection of posts from X, formerly Twitter.

In a paper titled “ElectionSim: Massive Population Election Simulation Powered by Large Language Model Driven Agents,” a Fudan University-led research team said it collected 171,210,066 posts from 9,596,198 X users during the 2020 election period.

Researchers developed classifiers to infer users’ age, gender, race, ideology, and party affiliation from their public histories. They then combined those profiles with Census and American National Election Studies data to simulate presidential elections in every state.

The latest version of the paper claims the system reproduced the winner in 47 of 51 state-level contests and 12 of 15 battlegrounds. The project also allows users to select modeled voters by political or demographic traits and conduct multi-round conversations with them—effectively creating synthetic focus groups derived from real social-media behavior.

They also ran a mock 2024 election.

The researchers’ questionnaire goes far beyond candidate preference. It includes immigration, firearms and defense, race, LGBTQ issues, gender resentment, and democratic norms.

ElectionSim subsequently fed into a broader Fudan-led system called SocioVerse, described by its creators as a “world model” powered by a pool of more than ten million real-world social-media users.

Synthetic Pennsylvania Voters Get a Campaign Message

A separate research project went one step further: it used artificial voters to conduct a political-message experiment in a critical swing state.

The paper, “Intelligent Computing Social Modeling and Methodological Innovations in Political Science in the Era of Large Language Models,” was written by researchers affiliated with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, Nanjing University, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University.

Two of those affiliations are especially important. The Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences is a government academy. The Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, or SIIS, describes itself as a high-level research institution subordinate to the Shanghai municipal government whose mission is to provide intellectual support for party and government decision-making.

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The researchers proposed a framework called “Intelligent Computing Social Modeling,” or ICSM. Using 2019 American Community Survey distributions, they constructed artificial voters with combinations of ethnicity, gender, age, region, education, occupation, and industry.

The study simulated voters in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, California, Texas, Wisconsin, and Georgia. Researchers deployed 300 agents per state and prompted the models to choose between Democratic and Republican candidates.

Then they conducted a list experiment on 300 Pennsylvania agents. The treatment introduced a candidate who supported raising personal income taxes for wealth redistribution. By placing the same synthetic profiles into treatment and control conditions through separate model calls, the researchers generated 600 observations and measured the change in stated concerns.

The treatment group reported more concerns, leading the authors to argue that voters’ tax attitudes in the 2020 election may have been more conservative than commonly understood.

The researchers also conducted a longer questionnaire with 100 Pennsylvania agents. They examined why simulated Biden supporters with different education levels favored particular policies. According to the paper, college-educated agents emphasized words such as “equity” and “fair,” while non-college agents placed greater emphasis on issues including the minimum wage.

Modeling Trump’s Base—for China’s U.S. Policy

Other Chinese research documents are clearer about why modeling American voters is useful to China.

In 2024, Shanghai Jiao Tong University scholar Shu Fu published a study titled “Who Supports Trump? An Empirical Analysis of American Populism.”

Using American National Election Studies surveys from 2012, 2016, and 2020, Fu measured political, economic, and identity-based anxieties and used multiple statistical models to explain support for Trump.

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The paper said it sought to:

“勾勒出支持特朗普的右翼铁票的选民画像”

Or: “sketch a voter portrait of Trump’s dependable right-wing base.”

Fu concluded that identity anxiety—particularly views concerning immigration and the status of white Americans—was the strongest predictor of support for Trump.

But the paper explicitly placed its findings in a Chinese policy context. It said understanding the voters behind Trump could help explain the mechanisms of American domestic politics and “provide a scientific basis for our country’s policy toward the United States.”

Fu subsequently expanded the work in a 2025 paper titled “The Long-Termization of ‘America First’: The Public-Opinion Foundation of Populist Foreign Policy.”

The methodology joined two major American polling resources. Fu first used 2020 ANES data to calculate political, economic, and cultural populism. Because ANES contains limited foreign-policy questions, Fu trained predictive models using variables shared with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ 2022 survey—including vote choice, ideology, party identification, religion, education, income, race, age, sex, marital status, and homeownership.

The models were then transferred into the Chicago Council data, producing inferred political, economic, and cultural populism scores for each anonymized respondent. Those scores were used to estimate relationships between American populism and support for tariffs, isolationism, alliances, international organizations, and the promotion of democracy abroad.

The study concluded that political populism increased suspicion of alliances and international organizations; economic populism increased support for tariffs; and cultural populism increased opposition to democracy promotion and pluralist values.

The paper framed those findings as useful for evaluating the future course of U.S. foreign policy and China’s response. Its replication data and code were also deposited in Harvard Dataverse.

Thousands of American Survey Respondents Become AI Voters

The technique is spreading across Chinese universities.

A Wuhan University paper converted the demographic characteristics of 6,571 respondents in the 2020 ANES survey into large-language-model personas. The model was instructed to adopt the identity of each anonymized respondent and cast votes in the 2016 and 2020 elections.

Researchers then aggregated the artificial votes by state. Before the 2024 election, they used the same personas to forecast a contest between Trump and Kamala Harris, predicting a Trump victory and roughly 300 electoral votes.

AI As Political Warfare

Internal documents from the Chinese technology company GoLaxy, collected in a Vanderbilt University archive, describe a system intended to serve national-level “cognitive-domain confrontation and guidance.” The company claimed portions of its technology had been deployed to the Ministry of State Security, PLA Joint Staff intelligence elements, and Strategic Support Force units.

The documents include a U.S. election module featuring political-influencer rankings, follower profiles, polling, betting markets, Federal Election Commission data, swing-state history, and “supporter portraits.” Other screens show MAGA-related content and organization libraries using the National Rifle Association and National Endowment for Democracy as examples.

The question is no longer whether Chinese institutions are building models of American voters.

It is what they intend to do with them.

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That is the “Total Award Amount” the Department of Veterans Affairs lists for the Million Veteran Program, its massive research system built from the DNA and linked medical information of more than one million American veterans.

But the Million Veteran Program is only the center of a much larger story.

A paper-by-paper investigation found 61 original studies connecting VA awards, facilities, researchers, or data to the PRC and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) affiliated institutions.

One VA-backed paper included a researcher from the PLA’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences. Two years later, the U.S. Commerce Department placed the Academy and eleven of its research institutes on the Entity List—a major export restriction—after determining that they used biotechnology to support Chinese military end users and applications, including purported “brain-control weaponry.”

Three of the studies involved confirmed veteran-derived information. One enrolled 480 American veterans and included a coauthor from the PLA’s Fourth Military Medical University. Two others drew on the Million Veteran Program and included a scientist from China’s national bioinformatics system.

The first genomics study analyzed 173,996 veterans. The second analyzed 461,669 veterans and approximately 25 million genetic variants.

The public papers credit the China-based scientist with substantive research activity. They do not disclose whether she ever accessed controlled, individual-level veteran genetic and health records.

That is not a technical footnote. It is the central national-security question.

The most egregious findings

● The $676.6 million veteran DNA program: Two 2023 studies using MVP data included Minxian Wang of the Beijing Institute of Genomics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and China National Center for Bioinformation. The studies involved 173,996 and 461,669 veterans. Their contribution statements do not resolve which data Wang handled or whether she accessed individual-level MVP records.

● A clinical trial involving 480 American veterans: A Greater Los Angeles and Sepulveda VA colonoscopy trial listed H. Jia of Fourth Military Medical University, now the PLA’s Air Force Medical University. The paper reports veteran procedures and outcomes but does not disclose whether Jia could see patient-level records, deidentified data, aggregate results or only the manuscript.

● VA and Chinese military funding on the same paper: A brain and spinal-cord imaging study acknowledged VA award I01 BX002356 and the General Hospital of Jinan Military Region director’s grant 2016ZD03. Another coauthor listed the now-export-restricted Academy of Military Medical Sciences. VA’s FY2019 page lists $215,591 for the award continuation.

● An engineered fungus with PLA medical centers: VA-backed researchers modified Cryptococcus neoformans to express murine TNF-α alongside scientists from Naval Medical University’s Changzheng Hospital and the Fourth and Sixth Medical Centers of PLA General Hospital. The paper cites two VA awards; VA lists $184,461 for the relevant Merit phase.

● Long-running PLA research pipelines: Nine kidney papers connected Charlie Norwood VA researchers to Second Military Medical University—now Naval Medical University—from 2015 through 2024. Eight immune-cell papers connected the Quillen VA research environment to Fourth Military Medical University or PLA General Hospital. One identified a Fourth Military Medical University joint Ph.D. student funded by the China Scholarship Council while working on human T cells.

● A VA grant beside a Chinese talent program: A 2016 Nature Neuroscience paper acknowledged VA award I01 BX001020 and a Jiangxi provincial “Thousand Talents” Innovation Project to VA-affiliated scientist Lin Mei. VA lists $92,029 for the award.

Why this poses a national-security threat

The danger is not simply that Chinese names appeared on American research papers. It is the combination of sensitive data, reusable scientific capability, military institutions and sustained access.

Veteran genomic and health information can be exploited far beyond the original study. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center warns that PRC access to U.S. genomic and healthcare data creates serious national-security risks. Combined with other stolen or acquired records, such data can help identify vulnerabilities and target people in government or industry for surveillance, manipulation or extortion. It can also accelerate China’s artificial-intelligence and precision-medicine industries.

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The federal government now treats bulk genomic and health data as a strategic asset. The Justice Department’s Data Security Program, effective April 2025, restricts or prohibits certain transactions giving countries of concern—including China—access to bulk genomic, health and U.S. government-related data. DOJ says such information can support espionage, surveillance, counterintelligence, AI development and military capabilities.

The partners were embedded in China’s military system

The Pentagon’s FY2025 Section 1286 research-security list includes the Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Naval Medical University, Air Force Medical University and Army Medical University. The list describes covered entities as national-security concerns and says that, beginning in FY2026, Defense Department funding cannot support fundamental research involving collaboration with them.

● Academy of Military Medical Sciences: The Commerce Department placed the Academy and eleven institutes on the Entity List for using biotechnology to support Chinese military end users and applications, including purported brain-control weaponry. An Academy researcher appeared on the VA-backed imaging paper that also credited a Chinese military-hospital grant.

● Naval Medical University: Formerly Second Military Medical University, it is the PLA Navy’s medical university. Its affiliated hospitals include Changzheng and Changhai, which recur throughout the ledger. Official PLA reporting describes a university training base conducting combat-oriented joint training and a university medical center developing submarine-escape equipment.

● Air Force Medical University: Formerly Fourth Military Medical University, it appears on the 480-veteran trial and throughout the Quillen immune-cell pipeline. Its system includes the State Key Laboratory of Military Stomatology, and official PLA reporting says it developed a truck-mounted dental clinic for maxillofacial combat-wound first aid.

● Army Medical University: Formerly Third Military Medical University, it appears in muscle-wasting, liver-injury, pulmonary and metabolic research. During a 2024 inspection, Xi Jinping said military medical universities should serve “the battlefield and troops,” reviewed battlefield-treatment equipment and called for military medical innovation that improves combat capabilities.

● PLA General Hospital and Jinan Military Region General Hospital: Researchers from the PLA General Hospital’s Fourth through Eighth Medical Centers appear across the ledger. Official PLA reporting says its Fourth Medical Center developed a virtual-reality field-rescue system and its Sixth developed communications equipment for shooting training. Separately, the Jinan military hospital’s own grant appeared beside a VA award on the imaging paper.

● Beijing Institute of Genomics and China National Center for Bioinformation: These immediate institutions are PRC state bioinformatics organizations, not PLA units, and they are not individually named on the Pentagon list. Their parent system, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is named together with select affiliates. Testimony published by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission also documented a CAS strategic-cooperation framework with the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences involving joint research, talent training and a collaborative-innovation platform.

The Real Cost

The taxpayer footprint exceeds the $676.6 million headline

The $676,570,952 figure is the program-level “Total Award Amount” displayed by VA for the Million Veteran Program. It is not the cost of the two China-linked MVP papers.

Across the remaining studies, official VA pages identify millions more in separate project or project-phase amounts. The papers also cite NIH and Defense Department awards whose values were not fully totaled.

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A mechanical sum of the distinct VA figures displayed in the ledger reaches roughly $679.8 million, but that is not a clean cumulative cost. Some pages cover different fiscal years or phases of the same parent award, many awards remain unpriced, and no public record assigns each full award to the individual paper.

The Full Ledger

The list below is a documented minimum of 61 original studies.

Each entry separates the study, taxpayer connection, Chinese or PLA institution, and data or material involved. A figure from a VA fiscal-year page is the amount displayed for that project or project phase—not the cost of the paper, not necessarily lifetime spending and not an amount shown to have been transferred to China.

Where a publication lists only a VA affiliation, VA facilities or an unnumbered Merit award, the amount is marked not publicly established. Those entries identify a personnel or resource bridge and a reason to request records; they are not proof that VA financed the study.

Veteran genomics and clinical data

1. Multi-ancestry polygenic risk score for coronary artery disease (2023) — Taxpayer: MVP000; VA’s project page lists $676,570,952 for May 2019–September 2030. The paper also cites VA I01-BX003362, I01-BX004821 and VA HSR RES 13-457; paper-specific spending is not stated. PRC link: Minxian Wang, Beijing Institute of Genomics/CAS and China National Center for Bioinformation. Data: 173,996 MVP participants; individual-level access by the PRC-based author is not established.

2. Genome-wide association study of thoracic aortic aneurysm and dissection (2023) — Taxpayer: MVP000 ($676,570,952 program award) plus I01-BX003362; VA’s FY2020 page for the then-current phase of I01-BX003362 lists $215,000. PRC link: Wang at CAS/CNCB. Data: 461,669 veterans and about 25 million variants; public contribution text does not resolve raw-data access.

3. Randomized colonoscopy comparison in 480 veterans (2019) — Taxpayer: unnumbered VA Merit Review grant; exact public amount not located. PLA link: coauthor H. Jia, Fourth Military Medical University, now PLA Air Force Medical University. Data: confirmed veteran clinical-trial data; the paper does not state Jia’s access tier.

Direct or explicit VA-award collaborations with PLA institutions

4. Intact brain and spinal-cord tissue-clearing/imaging method (2019) — Taxpayer: I01 BX002356; VA’s FY2019 continuation page lists $215,591. PLA link: General Hospital of Jinan Military Region grant 2016ZD03 and Academy of Military Medical Sciences. Data/material: mouse tissue and a reusable imaging method; no veteran data.

5. TNF-α-expressing engineered Cryptococcus neoformans (2019) — Taxpayer: VA 2I01BX000656-9 and IK6BX003615; VA’s FY2017 page for the relevant I01 phase lists $184,461; the career-award amount was not located. PLA link: Naval Medical University/Changzheng Hospital and the Fourth and Sixth Medical Centers of PLA General Hospital. Data/material: engineered fungal strain and mouse experiments; no veterans.

6. Astrocytic Lrp4 and synaptic transmission (2016) — Taxpayer: I01 BX001020; VA’s FY2018 page lists $92,029. PRC military/talent link: the paper also acknowledges a Jiangxi provincial “Thousand Talents” Innovation Project to Lin Mei. Data: animal neuroscience; no veterans.

7. Type III interferon signaling in lung injury (2024) — Taxpayer: VA BX004661 and DoD W81XWH-19-1-0377; VA’s FY2024 page lists $141,746 for BX004661. PLA link: Seventh and Eighth Medical Centers of PLA General Hospital. Data: mouse lung-injury work; no veteran records.

The Quillen VA–Fourth Military Medical University T-cell pipeline

8. Tim-3 pathway controls regulatory and effector T-cell balance in hepatitis C (2012) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA work/resources are acknowledged; study-specific VA award and amount not established publicly. PLA link: Tangdu Hospital, Fourth Military Medical University. Data: human HCV immune-cell work; veteran status and foreign-author access are not resolved publicly.

9. Tim-3 regulation of inflammatory cytokines in hepatitis C (2012) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA support/resources; exact amount not public. PLA link: Tangdu Hospital/Fourth Military Medical University. Data: human immune cells; subject provenance and access tier need records.

10. HCV-induced reduction in miR-181a impairs CD4 T-cell responses (2015) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA facilities/resources; exact VA amount not stated. PLA/PRC link: Yun Zhou, Fourth Military Medical University, was described as a joint Ph.D. student and supported in part by China Scholarship Council award CSC 201306590012. Data: patient and healthy-control T cells/PBMCs; whether patients were veterans is not public.

11. MicroRNA-155 regulation of interferon-γ in natural killer cells (2015) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA work/resources; no study-specific dollar figure found. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data: human HCV-related immune-cell research; raw access is not assigned by author.

12. Protection of CD4 T cells from HCV-associated senescence (2016) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA support/resources; exact amount not public. PLA link: Tangdu Hospital/Fourth Military Medical University; the paper also acknowledges Tangdu funding. Data: human T cells; participant provenance/access needs IRB and sample records.

13. ATM insufficiency and naïve CD4 T-cell loss in chronic HCV (2018) — Taxpayer: the paper says the work used resources and facilities at James H. Quillen VAMC; attributable dollars not stated. PLA link: Tangdu Hospital/Fourth Military Medical University. Data: human T cells; no public author-by-dataset matrix.

14. TRF2 inhibition, telomere attrition and DNA damage during HCV (2018) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA facilities/resources; exact amount not public. PLA link: Tangdu Hospital/Fourth Military Medical University. Data: human T cells; subject and access questions remain.

15. Topological DNA damage, telomere attrition and T-cell senescence (2019) — Taxpayer: Quillen VA facility/resource support; amount not stated. PLA link: Center of Cadre Health Care, Fifth Medical Center of PLA General Hospital. Data: human immune cells; veteran status and the PLA author’s raw access are not public.

The Charlie Norwood VA–Naval Medical University kidney pipeline

16. MicroRNA-687 in renal ischemia-reperfusion injury (2015) — Taxpayer: I01BX000319; the paper’s exact cost is unstated. A later FY2019 continuation page for the same parent award lists $223,000. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital, Second Military Medical University. Data: animal/cell work; no veteran records.

17. MicroRNA-489 induction protects against ischemic kidney injury (2016) — Taxpayer: I01BX000319; later FY2019 project-page amount $223,000, not paper cost. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data/material: mice were housed/used at Charlie Norwood VA; no veteran data.

18. MicroRNA-17-5p in ischemic acute kidney injury (2016) — Taxpayer: I01BX000319; later listed phase amount $223,000. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: preclinical kidney research.

19. MicroRNA-375 in cisplatin nephrotoxicity (2017) — Taxpayer: I01BX000319; later listed phase amount $223,000. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data/material: mouse work conducted under a Charlie Norwood VA animal protocol.

20. Autophagy protects against endotoxic acute kidney injury (2016) — Taxpayer: VA-supported Dong laboratory/Charlie Norwood VA resources; no paper-specific public dollar amount located. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data/material: animals maintained at Charlie Norwood VA.

21. Bax/Bak double knockout and renal interstitial fibrosis (2017) — Taxpayer: VA laboratory/resources; study-specific award amount not stated. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data/material: animals maintained at Charlie Norwood VA.

22. MicroRNA-668 preserves mitochondrial dynamics in ischemic AKI (2018) — Taxpayer: I01BX000319; FY2019 phase page lists $223,000. PLA link: Second Military Medical University. Data: mice, renal tubular cells and human kidney biopsy/urine material; the paper does not identify veteran provenance or individual author access.

23. p53/microRNA-214/ULK1 axis in diabetic kidney disease (2020) — Taxpayer: VA-supported Charlie Norwood/Augusta kidney program; exact paper amount not stated. PLA link: Second Military Medical University. Data: animal models and human diabetic kidney biopsies; no public proof that samples were veterans or that data moved to China.

24. HIF-1, BNIP3 and autophagy in renal fibrosis (2024) — Taxpayer: VA BX000319; VA’s FY2025 page for the 2021–2025 phase lists $701,800. PLA link: Second Affiliated Hospital of Naval Medical University. Data: preclinical kidney research; shows the pipeline continuing under the university’s current PLA name.

Cachexia and muscle-wasting collaborations with Army Medical University

25. Inhibition of cisplatin-induced lipid catabolism and weight loss (2013) — Taxpayer: VA/Baylor support is acknowledged; exact study-specific VA amount not located. PLA link: Third Military Medical University. Data: preclinical cachexia/chemotherapy model.

26. Ghrelin prevents tumor- and cisplatin-induced muscle wasting (2015) — Taxpayer: VA Merit I01-BX000507; public project amount not located. PLA link: Third Military Medical University. Data: mouse muscle-wasting experiments; no veteran data.

27. Plant-derived ursolic acid suppresses muscle wasting in chronic kidney disease (2017) — Taxpayer: VA-affiliated Garcia research network; no study-specific VA dollar figure established from the public record. PLA link: Third Military Medical University collaborators. Data: preclinical muscle biology.

28. Ghrelin ameliorates tumor-induced adipose-tissue atrophy and inflammation (2020) — Taxpayer: VA Puget Sound affiliation/support; exact attributable award amount not stated in the public record reviewed. PLA link: Army Medical University. Data: mouse cancer-cachexia model.

James J. Peters VA kidney research with PLA General and Naval Medical University hospitals

29. Increased podocyte Sirtuin-1 attenuates diabetic kidney injury (2018) — Taxpayer: I01BX000345; VA’s FY2018 page lists $150,000. PLA link: Chinese PLA General Hospital/Institute of Nephrology. Data: animal and cell work; no veteran records shown.

30. LRG1 promotes diabetic-kidney-disease progression (2019) — Taxpayer: I01BX000345; FY2018 page lists $150,000. PLA link: PLA General Hospital Institute of Nephrology. Data: experimental kidney research, with human relevance; public paper does not establish veteran data.

31. Modulation of TGF-β-induced kidney fibrosis (online 2021; issue 2022) — Taxpayer: I01BX000345; the cited project phase’s public pages vary by fiscal year; FY2020 lists $165,000. PLA link: PLA General Hospital. Data: preclinical kidney research.

32. Loss of KLF15 in Foxd1-positive stromal cells exacerbates kidney fibrosis (2017) — Taxpayer: VA-affiliated Mount Sinai/James J. Peters research program; study-specific VA dollars not established in the public paper reviewed. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: animal kidney-fibrosis work.

33. Inhibition of Reticulon-1A stress after acute kidney injury (2017) — Taxpayer: VA/NIH-supported John He research network; exact VA amount attributable to this paper not established. PLA link: Changhai Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: experimental kidney injury and fibrosis.

Louis Stokes Cleveland VA urology and rehabilitation research with Changhai Hospital

34. Long-term effects of simulated childbirth injury on urethral function and innervation (2015) — Taxpayer: VA Advanced Platform Technology Center involvement; no study-specific award amount in the public paper. PLA link: Changhai Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: 34 female rats; no human subjects.

35. Combined histamine and serotonin treatment after simulated childbirth injury (2016) — Taxpayer: Cleveland VA-linked platform/laboratory support; exact amount not public. PLA link: Changhai Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: preclinical urinary-function research.

36. Daily bilateral pudendal-nerve electrical stimulation after injury (2019) — Taxpayer: the paper states that VA funded the work; award number and amount were not located. PLA link: Changhai Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: animal rehabilitation/electrical-stimulation work.

37. Phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor plus electrical stimulation for urinary recovery (2019) — Taxpayer: Cleveland VA research support; exact public amount not established. PLA link: Changhai Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: preclinical treatment study.

Other explicit VA-award or VA-facility collaborations

38. Triptolide-induced liver injury and Sirt1/FXR signaling (2017) — Taxpayer: I01BX001390; VA’s FY2017 page lists $43,432. PLA link: Third Military Medical University, now Army Medical University. Data: rats and cells; no veterans.

39. Calcium-sensing receptor target in temporomandibular-joint osteoarthritis (2019) — Taxpayer: 5I01BX003453; VA’s FY2020 page lists $265,000. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University’s State Key Laboratory of Military Stomatology. Data/material: rats came from and were housed at FMMU; no veteran data.

40. Native extracellular matrix preserves mesenchymal stem-cell properties (2015) — Taxpayer: I01BX002145; VA’s FY2017 page lists $237,808. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data/material: commercially purchased human marrow cells; no veteran source indicated.

41. Umbilical-cord-blood non-hematopoietic stem cells expanded on marrow matrix (2016) — Taxpayer: South Texas/Audie Murphy VA-linked stem-cell program; the same I01BX002145 project’s FY2017 page lists $237,808, though the paper-specific allocation is not stated. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data/material: umbilical-cord cells and reusable culture methods; no veteran records.

42. XBP1 in myeloma and bone-marrow stromal-cell biology (2012) — Taxpayer: VA Pittsburgh affiliation and VA Merit support; exact award number/amount not established in the public paper reviewed. PLA link: Xijing Hospital/Fourth Military Medical University. Data/material: marrow and myeloma biology; sample provenance requires source records.

43. Autophagy and neutrophil inflammatory responses after trauma (2014) — Taxpayer: VA Pittsburgh affiliation; the paper lists NIH support, and no specific VA award was verified. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: mouse/cell work. Dollar conclusion: no attributable VA award established from the paper alone.

44. VPS35-dependent dopamine-receptor trafficking (2015) — Taxpayer: Charlie Norwood VA-affiliated Mei/Xiong laboratory; no specific VA award verified for this paper. PLA link: Daping Hospital/Third Military Medical University. Data: animal/cell neuroscience; VA dollars not attributable from affiliation alone.

45. Disease-linked VPS35 mutation and neuronal trafficking (2015) — Taxpayer: VA-affiliated Augusta investigators; study-specific VA award/amount not established. PLA link: Daping Hospital/Third Military Medical University. Data: preclinical neuroscience.

46. VPS35/SLC4A11 trafficking study (2017) — Taxpayer: the paper cites NIH awards and lists Charlie Norwood VA affiliations; no VA award was verified. PLA link: Daping Hospital/Third Military Medical University. Data: mice/cells at Augusta; no veteran data.

47. Galectin-1-secreting neural stem cells for long-term stroke recovery (2015) — Taxpayer: VA Research Career Scientist and RR&D Merit support; exact award numbers/amounts not public in the paper. PLA link: PLA General Hospital. Data/material: engineered neural stem cells and animal stroke models.

48. Erythropoietin and early brain injury after subarachnoid hemorrhage (2017) — Taxpayer: Atlanta VA affiliation; study-specific VA award and attributable dollars not established from the public abstract. PLA link: Southwest Hospital/Third Military Medical University. Data: animal neurotrauma research.

49. Calpain inhibition protects against atrial fibrillation (2024) — Taxpayer: I01RX000889 and I01RX003826. VA’s FY2018 page lists $275,000 for RX000889; its FY2024 page lists $301,250 for RX003826. PLA link: PLA General Hospital. Data: preclinical atrial-fibrosis/calcium-handling work.

50. Smad3, oxidative stress and ventilator-associated diaphragm dysfunction (2017) — Taxpayer: VA Merit support; exact award and amount not identified publicly. PLA link: PLA General Hospital. Data: experimental diaphragm biology; no veteran records.

51. PARK2 variants in lung cancer and COPD (2016) — Taxpayer: NIH awards are listed; the U.S. author also listed Minneapolis VA. No VA award or VA cohort is established. PLA link: Daping Hospital/Third Military Medical University. Data: 2,484 human cases/controls plus cell/mouse work; no proof the human cohort was VA or that veterans were included.

52. MAOA-dependent Shh–IL6–RANKL signaling in prostate-cancer metastasis (2017) — Taxpayer: West Los Angeles VA affiliation; exact VA award/amount not established from the public record reviewed. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data: cancer and bone-metastasis research; no veteran-data claim.

53. Patient-specific eFace facial modeling (2015) — Taxpayer: Michael E. DeBakey VA affiliation/resources; specific VA award and amount not identified. PLA link: Third Military Medical University. Data: patient-specific facial modeling/images; subject provenance and foreign-author access should be documented before asserting a VA-data transfer.

54. EncephalApp Stroop testing in liver disease (2019) — Taxpayer: Richmond VA affiliation; study-specific VA award/amount not established. PLA link: Changzheng Hospital/Second Military Medical University. Data: human cognitive-test data; public abstract does not establish veteran participants or raw-data access.

55. Timing for selective biliary cannulation (2015) — Taxpayer: Sacramento VA-affiliated coauthor Joseph Leung; no VA award verified. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University-led ERCP network. Data: clinical endoscopy, apparently outside a VA veteran cohort; no attributable VA dollars established.

56. Rectal indomethacin for prevention of post-ERCP pancreatitis (2016) — Taxpayer: Sacramento VA-affiliated coauthor; no VA award identified. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University, Urumqi military-region and No. 451 Military Hospital sites. Data: multicenter clinical trial; public record does not show veterans or VA data.

57. Optimal balloon-dilation time during ERCP (2019) — Taxpayer: Sacramento VA-affiliated coauthor; no specific VA award/amount verified. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University-led clinical network. Data: clinical endoscopy; no veteran-data claim.

58. Rigorous plasma-microbiome analysis method (2021) — Taxpayer: Ralph H. Johnson VA affiliation/resources; exact VA award and amount not established. PLA link: Fifth Medical Center of PLA General Hospital. Data/material: human plasma and microbial-sequence analysis; sample origin and access controls require records.

59. MMP-9 deficiency accelerates periodontitis (2024) — Taxpayer: Nashville VA affiliation; no study-specific VA award/amount established. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data: preclinical periodontal research.

60. Micheliolide, PKM2–P65 signaling and post-stroke neural repair (2025) — Taxpayer: Lt. Col. Luke Weathers Jr. VA Medical Center affiliation; no VA award/amount verified. PLA link: Fourth Military Medical University. Data: stroke/neural-repair research; VA funding should not be inferred from affiliation alone.

61. Metabolic stress and MAPKAPK2-dependent signaling (2026) — Taxpayer: Kansas City VA Medical Center affiliation; no study-specific VA award/amount verified. PLA link: Army Medical University, formerly Third Military Medical University. Data: cellular/metabolic signaling; currently an affiliation lead, not a proved VA-funded project.

The United States spent years funding a Chinese scientist’s work on infrared technology with applications ranging from missile detection to military aircraft.

Then he went back to China.

Today, the Chinese university employing him openly boasts that he is using his expertise to develop domestically controlled infrared systems and help China “break foreign technological monopoly and blockade.”

The case of Jijun Qiu, now a professor and doctoral adviser at Dalian University of Technology, offers an unusually clear example of how American taxpayer-funded research can ultimately strengthen the technological capabilities of the United States’ chief strategic competitor.

According to Qiu’s official Dalian University faculty biography, he worked at the University of Oklahoma from 2011 until 2019 specializing in mid-wave infrared detectors.

During those years, Dalian says Qiu served as a “core technical backbone” on multiple projects supported by the U.S. Department of Defense, including programs funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army.

The university says those American projects involved more than $2.5 million in research funding.

Qiu subsequently returned to China and joined Dalian University of Technology.

And Dalian is remarkably explicit about what it wants him to accomplish there.

His faculty biography says infrared detectors hold an important position in China’s “national security strategy.” Qiu is now working to create low-cost, large-scale infrared focal-plane imaging technology with Chinese-owned intellectual property and move those systems into commercial production.

The stated objective?

To “break foreign technological monopoly and blockade.”

In other words, the United States helped finance years of Qiu’s work in a sensitive technology. China is now celebrating his expertise as part of its push to stop relying on foreign technology altogether.

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The American-funded technology had obvious military applications.

The underlying research was not simply an abstract physics project.

Qiu is named as an inventor on a University of Oklahoma patent covering mid-infrared detector technology developed with support from the U.S. military.

The U.S. patent application specifically identifies funding from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and Army Research Office, noting that the U.S. government retained rights in the invention because of its financial support.

The patent itself explains why these detectors matter.

It describes infrared detection technology as important for military defense involving jet aircraft, rocket-powered aircraft and missiles.

The research sought to improve the sensitivity of infrared detectors while reducing their dependence on expensive cooling equipment, making the systems easier and cheaper to deploy.

Qiu was not merely studying a technology that might someday have a military use.

American military agencies were directly funding work in a field whose own patent documents identified applications involving aircraft and missile defense.

DARPA also funded Qiu’s research.

The funding continued beyond the Air Force and Army.

A 2019 paper led by Qiu on low-cost, uncooled mid-wave infrared photodiodes acknowledged support from a DARPA Small Business Technology Transfer program as well as the Army Research Office.

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Another later publication connected Qiu’s Oklahoma research to DARPA’s Wafer Scale Infrared Detectors, or WIRED, program, through Northrop Grumman.

That matters because Dalian now highlights essentially the same field as one of Qiu’s principal contributions to China.

His Chinese biography credits him with developing technologies related to uncooled mid-wave infrared detectors, infrared focal-plane systems and scalable manufacturing.

China did not have to train this researcher from scratch.

Years of that expertise had already been cultivated while he was working inside an American university on research financed by the U.S. military.

The timeline raises another important question.

Qiu did not first establish a relationship with Dalian University after leaving the United States.

Dalian’s own archived records show that the university was bringing him onto campus while he was still working at the University of Oklahoma.

In May 2017, two years before his return to China, Qiu delivered the inaugural lecture for Dalian’s School of Microelectronics “Dean’s Forum.”

According to Dalian’s account of the event, his subject was uncooled infrared focal-plane detector technology and its applications.

That was the very field in which he was working under American defense-backed research programs.

Dalian subsequently named him a specially invited lecturer.

By 2019, Qiu had left Oklahoma and joined Dalian full-time.

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Scientific publications provide another unusually clear window into how expertise developed under American funding can migrate into China’s research ecosystem.

A 2022 paper involving Qiu states that its conceptual and experimental work was conducted at the University of Oklahoma with support from the U.S. Army Research Office.

But the manuscript itself was completed after Qiu had moved to Dalian University of Technology.

The paper says its writing was supported by Chinese funding, including Dalian’s Science and Technology Innovation Fund and China’s Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

Another 2022 paper followed a similar path.

Its experimental work at Oklahoma was funded partly through DARPA’s WIRED program through Northrop Grumman and the Army Research Office.

The manuscript was later completed at Dalian.

A 2023 paper on a high-performance uncooled mid-infrared detector again acknowledged U.S. Army funding and DARPA’s WIRED program while listing Qiu at Dalian University of Technology.

This is not simply a story about research performed a decade ago.

A 2025 technical training program described Qiu as an expert in high-sensitivity uncooled mid-wave infrared detector manufacturing and credited him with developing wafer-scale manufacturing processes.

The training covered infrared focal-plane arrays, dual-color detectors and future development of uncooled infrared systems.

It also repeated the objective of breaking foreign technological monopoly and blockade.

In April 2026, a doctoral student working under Qiu presented research on a room-temperature, high-sensitivity, dual-color mid-wave infrared detector at a Chinese Institute of Electronics conference.

The technology is still moving forward.

The only difference is where the work is now being done.

Washington has spent decades pouring taxpayer money into an open American research system while failing to adequately account for what happens when scientists trained on strategically important, government-funded technology take that expertise back to an adversarial country.

In Qiu’s case, Beijing is not hiding the objective.

American taxpayers helped build the expertise.

China intends to make sure it no longer needs America.

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The taxpayer-backed academy calls for an “Islamic world-view,” preparing students to spread Islam to fellow Americans, and currently advertises instruction in fiqh, the jurisprudence used to elaborate Sharia.

Pennsylvania awarded $5 million in taxpayer-backed funding to expand a private Islamic school whose own handbook declared “Our Culture Is Toxic To Muslims,” warned families against outside cultural influences, and explicitly instructed students to develop an Islamic worldview and spread Islam’s message to other Americans, according to state records and school materials reviewed for this investigation.

The school’s parent Islamic Society was also attended by men later convicted in the Fort Dix terror plot and hosted a guest imam who preached that, if Muslims possessed sufficient faith, they would “impose the word of Islam upon the world.”

The Commonwealth’s records identify the project without euphemism: “Al Aqsa School Expansion.”

State Senator Nikil Saval’s office⁠ confirmed the $5 million award to Al Aqsa Islamic Society, specifying that the money would expand the existing school with additional classrooms, a gymnasium, and shared community spaces.

Democratic State Representative Malcolm Kenyatta says he was instrumental in securing what his office calls⁠ the largest state grant ever awarded to a Muslim organization in Pennsylvania. His office also says Al-Aqsa’s leadership intends to expand school enrollment from roughly 300 students to “up to 3,000 students.”

Governor Josh Shapiro personally appeared at Al-Aqsa’s Ramadan iftar in March 2025 to celebrate the investment.

What received considerably less attention was what the institution Pennsylvania is subsidizing has said about American culture, the worldview it seeks to instill in students, and the kind of religious leaders it wants them to become.

“OUR CULTURE IS TOXIC TO MUSLIMS.”

The language comes from Al-Aqsa Islamic Academy’s official 2018-2019 Parent-Student Handbook.

An entire message from the school’s principal appeared beneath the headline:

“Our Culture Is Toxic To Muslims.”

The substance of the message makes the headline considerably harder to dismiss as hyperbole.

The principal warned Muslim parents that outside media could effectively enter their homes and teach their children “how to dress, talk, deal with the opposite sex”, as well as shape how they interacted with their parents.

The message characterized Western media as damaging to children’s character, warned about cell phones and inappropriate material, and urged Muslim families instead to gather together and read the Quran, according to the school’s archived Parent-Student Handbook⁠.

In its official statement of educational objectives⁠, Al-Aqsa said it sought to develop students around an “Islamic world-view.”

The school also called for strengthening students’ Islamic identity, orienting their lives toward worship of Allah, and teaching them to understand their role as representatives of God.

Then came the objective that makes the taxpayer-funded expansion particularly notable:

“carry the message of Islam to his fellow Americans.”

THE SCHOOL CURRENTLY ADVERTISES ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE.

Al-Aqsa’s current materials provide another detail absent from most coverage of the taxpayer award.

A December 2025 post from the Al-Aqsa Islamic Society describing its Academy⁠ lists its Islamic Studies offerings as including Tajweed, Quran memorization, Hadith, Arabic, and Fiqh.

Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence.

Oxford Reference⁠ describes fiqh as the work of Muslim jurists in elaborating the details of Sharia through legal investigation and debate.

That instruction sits alongside a broader curriculum that explicitly describes the purpose of Islamic Studies as developing an Islamic personality rooted in the Quran and the life of Muhammad, according to Al-Aqsa Academy’s curriculum materials⁠.

The Academy’s current mission⁠ similarly says students are to become morally and socially responsible citizens on the basis of Islam and the Sunnah. Staff are selected in part according to their Islamic values, while a qualified Islamic scholar directs religious education and other scholars teach Quran memorization and Islamic Studies.

Islamic Studies teacher Eman Mustafa says she wants to help students become “effective Muslim leaders” and establish a “community of leaders that follow the Quran and sunnah,” according to her faculty biography⁠.

Another teacher says Al-Aqsa staff share a goal of nurturing future leaders who represent Islam, while the Academy describes its principal as motivated by a desire to inspire future generations of Muslims.

THE TERRORISM CONNECTION.

In May 2007, as federal authorities broke up what became known as the Fort Dix terror plot, The Philadelphia Inquirer reported⁠ that the Duka and Shnewer families attended Al-Aqsa Islamic Society as well as another mosque in South Jersey.

The connection went beyond merely knowing the address.

Al-Aqsa spokesman Marwan Kreidie told the newspaper that the Duka brothers had been performing roofing work on the mosque free of charge immediately before their arrests.

Those arrests did not end in mere accusations.

In December 2008, a federal jury convicted Dritan Duka, Shain Duka, Eljvir Duka, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, and Serdar Tatar of conspiracy to murder members of the United States military. The Department of Justice⁠ said the group had conducted weapons training, surveilled domestic targets, and discussed killing American military personnel.

The three Duka brothers were later sentenced to life imprisonment⁠.

PENNSYLVANIA IS HELPING MAKE IT MUCH BIGGER.

The $5 million award is part of a far more ambitious expansion of Al-Aqsa’s footprint in Philadelphia.

Al-Aqsa Islamic Society’s own project website⁠ says the organization presently encompasses a K-12 school, mosque, and community grocery store and is pursuing a roughly 70,000-square-foot expansion to serve its growing educational, religious, and cultural operations.

The complete project is estimated at $43.6 million.

Phase One calls for a new Academy with 12 additional classrooms, science laboratories, a library, administrative offices, a gymnasium, and multipurpose space.

Al-Aqsa’s project website prominently lists the Commonwealth’s $5 million RACP award among the money obtained for the expansion.

The Islamic Society says its Academy currently has roughly 350 students, with another approximately 240 public-school students participating in weekend Islamic Studies.

Its stated plans would initially create space for another 300 Academy students.

But Kenyatta’s office⁠ has described a far more aggressive long-term target: up to 3,000 students.

Al-Aqsa’s master plan does not end with the Academy.

Phase Two is a new mosque.

The Islamic Society’s expansion plan⁠ says the proposed project will increase mosque capacity to 2,440 attendees.

Pennsylvania’s $5 million grant, however, is specifically designated for expansion of the school facilities and shared community spaces.

RADICAL SERMONS AT THE MOSQUE.

The school is affiliated with the same Al-Aqsa Islamic Society that operates the mosque.

That mosque has its own record of controversy.

Between November 2018 and February 2019, guest imam Abdelmohsen Abouhatab delivered three sermons at Al-Aqsa containing statements subsequently condemned as antisemitic.

Among them was his description of Jews as “the vilest” people.

The Philadelphia Inquirer⁠ reported on the remarks and said several professors fluent in Arabic independently confirmed the accuracy of the translation it reviewed.

A MEMRI translation of another passage rendered Abouhatab as telling the Al-Aqsa congregation that if faith truly took root, Muslims would impose Islam’s word upon the world. The translation was subsequently reproduced in reporting on the sermons⁠.

The question is no longer what Al-Aqsa believes. Its own documents answer that. The question is why Pennsylvania taxpayers are being forced to finance its expansion.

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Chinese state-linked researchers have published a step-by-step playbook for influencing the American electorate.

The studies, reviewed exclusively for this report, do not merely analyze U.S. elections. One uses a decade of American voter surveys, news coverage and internet-search behavior to identify the “effective leverage points” for China’s propaganda toward the United States. Another singles out a bloc comprising 40 percent of U.S. voters, names Reddit and Quora as underused channels and recommends personal accounts that can evade restrictions placed on official Chinese propaganda.

A Tsinghua University study explains how artificial intelligence can classify Americans by their “degree of susceptibility,” deliver messages point to point and potentially reverse their voting intentions. A publication sourced to the People’s Liberation Army’s National Defense University describes turning online behavior into cognitive profiles, selecting susceptible, high-value individuals and subjecting them to targeted psychological influence.

Taken together, the documents reveal what China’s acquisition of American voter information could enable: a system for moving from raw data to political profiles, from political profiles to persuadable targets and from those targets to precision influence operations.

The study that calculated how to move American opinion

The clearest document comes from Renmin University of China’s National Academy of Development and Strategy. The university describes itself as the first new formal university founded by the Chinese Communist Party.

In 2021, Renmin researcher Lü Jie published “How Can We Precisely Exert Force in International Communication Toward the United States?”

Its premise was blunt:

“美国民众正是我国对美国际传播所能发挥影响的关键领域。”
“The American public is precisely a key field where our U.S.-directed international communication can exert influence.”

Lü analyzed eight nationally representative waves of American election surveys collected from 2010 through 2020. He combined the voter responses with American news coverage and U.S. internet-search data to identify the “effective leverage points” for Chinese messaging.

The study calculated that changing an American’s assessment of Chinese culture, the Chinese government’s responsiveness or China’s international conduct from negative to positive corresponded with an average 14-point improvement in that person’s overall opinion of China.

It then converted those findings into a communication strategy: promote those subjects, reduce overt ideological language, counter negative U.S. coverage and prioritize internet distribution through ostensibly “relatively neutral” online news outlets.

“传播渠道应更多侧重于互联网媒介。”
“Communication channels should focus more heavily on internet media.”

This is the downstream use U.S. officials have warned about: American political and behavioral data transformed into a guide for where Beijing should apply influence.

Target 40 percent of U.S. voters—without looking official

A second proposal appeared on the Chinese Social Sciences Network in 2024. The platform calls itself a “national key theory website” whose foremost political task is studying and explaining Xi Jinping Thought.

The article identified Generation Z and millennials as a strategic political audience because they already represented 40 percent of U.S. voters and would soon dominate the electorate. Their current impressions of Chinese democracy and the CCP, it argued, would “directly determine” their countries’ future China policies.

The author proposed tailoring content to regional preferences and media habits, “precisely” identifying young opinion leaders, using overseas Chinese youth as intermediaries and expanding to platforms beyond Facebook and Twitter.

“Quora、Reddit等也是尚待利用的重要渠道。”
“Quora, Reddit and similar platforms are important channels still waiting to be used.”

Most strikingly, the article recommended individualized messaging from personal social-media accounts because it could “规避”—evade—platform restrictions on political content from China’s official external-propaganda organizations.

The document did not simply identify a voter group. It explained how to reach that group while concealing the official appearance of the messenger.

Classify Americans by “susceptibility”

Researchers at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy supplied the technical targeting model.

Their 2024 study of artificial intelligence in American elections described how AI can move political persuasion from broad categories—sex, race, class and geography—to the individual voter. The technology can learn a person’s political preferences, psychology and behavior, analyze voting propensity and use the response to refine the next message.

The authors described political actors using AI to:

“按照‘易受影响程度’而划分类型。”
“Classify voters by their degree of susceptibility.”

The selected voter can then receive “point-to-point precision delivery.” According to the paper, precision messaging can reinforce partisan loyalty—or shake existing beliefs, cause “partisan defection” and reverse voting intentions.

The PLA’s “brain-control weapon”

A 2023 article sourced to the PLA National Defense University supplies the military version of the same system.

It calls data-driven “intelligent communication” a “控脑武器”—“brain-control weapon”—and says browsing histories, shopping records and social activity can reveal a target’s values, political position, weaknesses and needs.

The article describes using those profiles to:

“选定易受影响、具有较大影响价值的特定个体。”
“Select susceptible individuals with high influence value.”

Customized narratives and sustained psychological pressure can then be used to change decisions. The passage attributes the tactic to foreign militaries, but the PLA publication says understanding the mechanism is important for innovating cognitive-warfare methods.

The missing ingredient: names, addresses and party affiliation

Newly declassified U.S. intelligence shows that PRC-linked actors acquired or possessed precisely the kinds of American data that could make these models more dangerous.

The documents describe voter files from at least 18 states, a separate 204.8-million-record U.S. voter dataset and consumer, state-voter and military-personnel databases. The fields included names, addresses, phone numbers, party affiliations, voting histories, polling locations, demographic information and military affiliation.

One intelligence memo said the material could be used to evaluate American identities, discover important U.S. targets and conduct “public opinion analysis” of a general election.

The influence infrastructure already exists

The operations required to execute that strategy are no longer hypothetical.

Microsoft reported that Chinese influence actors used fake accounts to impersonate American voters and poll them about divisive political issues. Meta linked the world’s largest known cross-platform covert influence operation—Spamouflage—to individuals associated with Chinese law enforcement. The Justice Department charged 40 Chinese national-police officers whose alleged troll farm created thousands of fake personas, spread PRC propaganda and sought to sow divisions inside the United States.

Those operations provide the distribution system. The newly uncovered Chinese studies provide the targeting doctrine.

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Brian Cantwell, a longtime Stanford professor of aeronautics and astronautics, spent May 9 through June 3, 2025 at Beihang University, according to an official account published by Beihang.

The nearly month-long visit was supported by what Beihang described as an “expertise introduction” program, part of a broader Chinese system designed to recruit foreign technical specialists into Chinese universities.

During the visit, Cantwell delivered six technical lectures, met directly with Chinese research teams, advised graduate students on ongoing projects, toured laboratories and an aeroacoustic wind tunnel, and discussed future scientific cooperation with Beihang faculty.

A separate Beihang notice advertising the lecture series stated that some of the material Cantwell intended to present was so recent that “the latest research has not yet been published.”

The visit is notable because Beihang has been restricted by the U.S. government for 25 years over concerns involving missile and unmanned-aircraft technology.

Washington has spent 25 years restricting the transfer of American technology to Beihang because of missile and UAV concerns. China appears to have found another route to valuable American aerospace know-how: bring the experts themselves to campus.

Cantwell Reviewed U.S. Fighter Engine Programs For 14 Years

Cantwell’s experience extends far beyond academic research.

According to his Stanford biography, Cantwell chaired Stanford’s Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics from 2001 through 2008.

From 1994 through 2008, he also served on an Executive Independent Review Team overseeing the development of the F119, F135 and F136 engine programs.

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The F119 powers the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptor. The F135 powers the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Cantwell previously served on NATO’s Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development Fluid Dynamics Panel, including a period as deputy chairman. His biography states that the panel supported NATO aerospace technology needs.

His research areas include turbulence, aerodynamics, aircraft propulsion, rocket propulsion, hybrid rocket fuels and aerodynamic drag.

Cantwell has remained active in the field. The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics selected him to receive its 2026 Fluid Dynamics Award.

Beihang Says He Presented Unpublished Research

Beihang’s records show that Cantwell’s visit involved more than ceremonial appearances.

The university organized a six-part lecture series focused on turbulence and fluid mechanics, including wall-bounded turbulent flow, boundary layers, turbulent shear flows and jet behavior.

In its advance description of the lectures, Beihang stated that much of Cantwell’s material involved research conducted after 2019.

Lecture titles include

• Primer on Symmetry Analysis (4/6)

• Similarity Rules for Incompressible Turbulent Shear Flows (5/6)

• Transition in the Jet Created by an Impulsive Point Force (6/6)

It then noted that “the latest research has not yet been published.”

He Also Advised Beihang Researchers

Beihang’s report on Cantwell’s visit describes direct interaction with researchers working under Professor Chen Xi, a Beihang turbulence specialist.

Chinese researchers presented Cantwell with their work on subjects including boundary-layer circulation, adverse-pressure-gradient turbulent boundary layers and compressible channel turbulence.

According to Beihang, Cantwell discussed the research with graduate students and provided “opinions and suggestions.”

He also toured graduate laboratories and the university’s aeroacoustic wind tunnel.

The university concluded that the visit had laid a foundation for additional cooperation with Cantwell’s team in joint scientific research, talent cultivation and academic exchanges.

Chen himself previously worked in the United States.

His Beihang biography states that he worked as research faculty at Texas Tech University from 2014 through 2019 before returning to China. He later received support through a Chinese overseas high-level talent initiative.

Cantwell’s Trip Was Part Of A Chinese Foreign-Expert Program

Beihang explicitly described Cantwell’s visit as supported by an “引智计划,” a term commonly translated as an expertise-introduction or foreign-expert recruitment initiative.

Beihang separately explains that it operates multiple programs for importing overseas expertise, including “111” foreign-intelligence bases, high-end foreign expert projects and short-term foreign-expert initiatives.

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According to the university’s own description of the system, these programs target overseas specialists in fields including aerospace and artificial intelligence, promote substantive scientific cooperation and are intended to “serve major national strategic needs.”

Beihang Has Been On The U.S. Entity List Since 2001

Beihang has faced American export restrictions since May 2001.

When the Commerce Department added the university to the Entity List, exports to Beihang became subject to restrictions connected to missile-related end-use concerns.

Those restrictions remain in effect.

The current Commerce Department Entity List imposes licensing requirements on items subject to U.S. export regulations when Beihang is the relevant end user, generally with a presumption of denial.

The university has also previously been accused of using intermediaries to obtain American goods despite those restrictions.

In 2013, the Commerce Department identified several entities it said had acted as procurement agents for Beihang and facilitated at least 75 shipments of items subject to U.S. export controls intended for use at the university.

The School Hosting Cantwell Conducts UAV Research

Cantwell’s host institution inside Beihang, the School of Aeronautic Science and Engineering, maintains significant aerospace infrastructure.

Among its facilities is an Advanced Long-Endurance Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technology Engineering Research Center.

According to Beihang’s description of the center, its work includes long-endurance UAV design, autonomous flight control, aircraft energy systems and new unmanned-aircraft configurations.

Organizations involved in its development have included major Chinese aerospace institutions.

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Beihang is also commonly identified as one of China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense,” a group of universities with deep ties to the country’s defense industrial and military research system.

There is one obvious question Stanford has yet to answer: why wasn’t any of this worth mentioning?

American universities rarely miss an opportunity to advertise their professors’ international prestige. Yet there were no glowing Stanford profiles touting its former aerospace chief’s work with Beihang, no celebration of the relationship, and seemingly no effort to tell the American public that a man with intimate experience evaluating some of the Pentagon’s most advanced fighter-engine programs was lending his expertise to one of China’s premier defense universities.

Instead, Americans had to learn about it from Chinese-language university webpages.

Beijing was apparently proud enough to publicize the relationship. Stanford was not.

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