Compared to the roughly 400 analysts covering the USSR alone, this was a clear indication of Washington’s comparative lack of interest in African affairs. Indeed, apart from Egypt, most of the continent was a strategic backwater as far as US policymakers were concerned, with the exception of specific moments of Cold War-related crises and/or opportunities. The limited resources dedicated to Africa-related analysis of course meant significant gaps which themselves probably played a role in encouraging policymakers to view African politics through simplistic Cold War-oriented lenses.

HUMINT collection

A fascinating 1972 CIA “Intelligence Reporting Guide” for Africa offers an insight into this problem as it related to intelligence collection, and specifically human intelligence gathering (HUMINT in intelligence jargon). The 103-page guide outlines “longer range and continuing intelligence reporting needs believed to be obtainable from human source collectors,” over the 12-month timespan stretching from December 1972 to December 1973. The document is a useful example of a sort of intelligence wish-list, offering insights into what the CIA did not know, but wanted to find out.

The general regional issues outlined are illuminating: these included the threat of aircraft hijacking, Communist Chinese activities, Soviet space tracking facilities, and, perhaps surprisingly, health issues. The latter mainly focused on public health concerns linked to disease outbreaks and epidemic risks but also included the personal health of key African leaders and personalities – always useful information.

The country-level intelligence collection requests varied, but some patterns emerge that illustrate where the CIA believed it was already sufficiently informed. For instance, for several mainly former French colonies of marginal strategic interest to Washington-- Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon -- the report notes that the, “existing Military Intelligence Summary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs”. For all these countries, what the CIA wanted was more substantial reporting on “civil police and intelligence organizations,” notably regarding personnel changes.

For a number of countries, including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia, the CIA wanted a better understanding of the apparent growing domestic unpopularity of local governments and how this might affect political dynamics. In Ghana, the CIA wanted more information on the internal dynamics of the junta that took power at the beginning of the year and “tribal divisions” within the army and government. The agency also appeared worried about the potential for unrest from organized labor and the urban unemployed, tasking its officers to identify “leaders who might cause future trouble.”

In Kenya, the CIA was concerned over the aging President Jomo Kenyatta’s succession, and whether or not Vice President Daniel arap Moi could effectively consolidate power after the former’s death (spoiler note: he did). They also worried that internal tensions among Kikuyu political factions could lead to a contested transition, with the possibility of an eventual military coup.

The collection requirements were surprisingly few for Nigeria. One included information on the potential political ambitions of the military’s divisional commanders and concerns regarding economic nationalism.

In Senegal, there was interest in understanding the potential threat of coups or dissident mobilization against President Léopold Sédar Senghor’s rule. The potential emergence of politically powerful factions among civil servants, student movements, and the political role of influential Sufi orders also attracted interest.

For South Africa, the CIA expressed great interest in gaining a better grasp of the internal political dynamics of the Vorster regime as well as its support within the ruling National Party. It also expressed interest in the potential for improvements in the antagonistic relationship between different state security and intelligence organs. The CIA also sought any information relating to the plans of “black militant groups”. The document separately notes that “we see once-a-year signs that the African National Congress (ANC) still exists in South Africa as an underground movement” and requested information on its capabilities and ties with the ANC operating outside the country. The CIA was also curious about French arms deals with South Africa.

Intelligence capabilities

Overall, the document is a revealing illustration of the kind of questions even well-resourced intelligence agencies will struggle with. While imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, or clandestine collection can help build good understandings of issues such as military capabilities, movements, and planning, political intelligence raises different questions, and its more qualitative nature offers clear challenges. Indeed, many of the collection requests focus on what might be described as “soft” political questions; issues that are difficult to quantify and subject to many shifting variables whose evolutions are very hard to predict.

In that vein, it’s worth citing a lengthy January 1981 memorandum prepared by the intelligence community for the new Reagan administration’s incoming Director of Central Intelligence (who would eventually be William Casey). After outlining current issues that the new administration would likely face after taking office, the memo discusses US intelligence capabilities.

These are described as “strongest on military capabilities of major powers, good on many key economic questions, and least confident when trying to predict short-term decisions of political leaders, especially in closed societies.” It rates imagery intelligence (IMINT) as offering “relatively clear-cut evidence” on military and some economic issues, while viewing communications intelligence (SIGINT) as better on military and economic questions than on politics.

Perhaps surprisingly for spy thriller enthusiasts, “clandestine source data creates the most difficult problems of interpretation. Some is documentary and very solid. Much is ambiguous and contradictory, and almost all must be considered as possible disinformation. The Community is seldom willing to accept clandestinely acquired information on critical topics unless some confirmation is available from technical sources.” If only they took this approach in the lead-up to the Iraq War…

I’ve noticed from my own work on declassified intelligence documents that the observation about the relevance of advanced collection capabilities for political intelligence generally holds true. The quality of the US intelligence community’s political analysis on African issues during the periods and countries I have examined has been mixed at best, and, although it is difficult to say, seemingly disproportionately reliant on more official embassy reporting. In any case, it generally doesn’t hold a candle to the quality of analysis produced today by outlets such as International Crisis Group. Although this perhaps is not the space to reflect more broadly on the question, it likely points to deeper epistemic issues in the kinds of expertise, experience, and access that are needed for good political analysis. These sorts of things are perhaps easier to acquire as a researcher, working in the open, than as an intelligence officer.

It's unclear if this really marks the end of France’s capacity and interest for further military interventions in the region. Neocolonialism in its various guises dies hard and I won’t hazard a guess here as to whether ten years from now French troops aren’t back either propping up a shaky regime or fighting jihadists – or both.

In this context, I thought it might be interesting to look at historical US intelligence assessments of France’s role in Africa. I’ve chosen a lengthy, and well-informed CIA analysis from October 1983, entitled “Africa and France: An Enduring Relationship.” It was produced jointly by the CIA’s Office of Africa and Latin America Analysis and its Office of European Analysis. It says much about the changes and continuities in France’s presence and influence on the continent during the early years of François Mitterrand’s presidency. It also offers insights into US perceptions of France’s regional role, and Washington’s own preoccupations.

I’m often critical of US intelligence community analysis and reporting on Africa during this era, but I have to say that this report is of high quality -- perhaps because it is more about France than African countries. It is comprehensive, broadly accurate, and in some cases prescient. In other words, it’s a valuable snapshot of “Françafrique” in 1983.

Background

The analysis came at a critical moment for France’s Africa policy; Mitterrand in August 1983 had ordered the beginning of Operation Manta, France’s largest military operation since the Algerian War. Nearly 3,500 troops were eventually sent to Chad to protect Hissène Habré’s regime from being overthrown by Libyan-backed rebel forces. Mitterrand made his decision independently of Washington, but US officials had nonetheless sought to pressure Paris into intervening.

The Reagan administration saw Libyan involvement in Chad as both a destabilizing threat to the region and as an opportunity for the US to inflict politically damaging losses on Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. This logic informed US backing for Habré throughout the 1980s, as well as frequent bouts of disappointment with Paris for its uneven commitment to Habré and France’s refusal to offer support for offensive Chadian operations against Libyan forces.

Reagan Administration officials were initially wary of Mitterrand’s May 1981 election. Mitterrand won in an electoral alliance with the Communist Party, raising more questions than usual in Washington over France’s reliability as a security partner and ally. France’s African client regimes were also concerned about the future, as Mitterrand’s Socialist Party and its Communist allies had been critical of previous French backing for reactionary dictatorships in the Third World, and especially in Africa.

A “guarantor of regional stability”

However, Africa’s autocrats need not have worried too much; while the “tiers mondistes” in Mitterrand’s entourage had some influence on French foreign policy in the Third World (notably in Latin America, to Washington’s immense irritation), this did not apply to Africa where Mitterrand would pursue a more traditional neocolonial relationship. In many ways, his 1983 intervention in Chad was a confirmation of this posture, with the logic of preserving French credibility as guarantor of allied regimes in Africa asserting itself over more liberal or leftist impulses.

It is this “return to normalcy” that the CIA’s 1983 paper looks to analyze. The question was an important one for analysts, who wrote, “Whether the French retain the will and capability to act as a guarantor of regional stability in Africa and whether the Africans still want them to play this role are questions of considerable significance for the United States. If the answer to either is no, the United States will remain as the only Western power capable of deterring direct or indirect threats against the weak and unstable regimes of the region.”

As noted in an earlier post, the US had very few economic and strategic interests across most of Africa, and especially in the years after the Vietnam War few US politicians of either party had the appetite to make deep security commitments in the region. This made the French role so essential for Washington. Indeed, later in the report, analysts note that, “there is no other Western donor at present willing to step in and assume France’s role in propping up some of the world’s poorest countries.”

This US perception was often misunderstood in Paris where Mitterrand and his entourage would grow obsessed with alleged US encroachments into France’s sphere of interest. Most tragically, or one should say criminally, this obsession would later inform French decisions to back Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s regime in the early 1990s in the run-up to the Rwandan Genocide.

A return to orthodoxy

Analysts noted that in the first years of Mitterrand’s administration, he sought to improve French relations with a variety of left-wing African governments such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea in an effort to wean them away from their connections with the Soviet Union or Cuba by offering increased aid and investment. What the report fails to note is that this strategy actually succeeded in Chad, albeit only temporarily; Mitterrand in late 1981 promised aid to Goukouni Weddeye’s rickety coalition government of antagonistic armed groups, leading them to expel Libyan military forces from the country, effectively ending a year-long occupation.

Analysts saw the 1983 Chadian crisis, which now pitted a Libyan-backed Goukouni and his allies against the Chadian government of Hissène Habré (who had ousted Goukouni in 1982, who now probably regretted booting out the Libyans the year before) as accelerating a re-centralization of African policymaking under Mitterrand’s direct control. This resulted from serious disagreements within the French government, notably between the doveish Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson who opposed intervention, and defenders of France’s traditional interests, such as Defense Minister Charles Hernu and Cooperation Minister Christian Nucci. Analysts saw these disputes as delaying France’s military response in Chad.

The report then ascribes Mitterrand’s turn to a more orthodox and interventionist policy to pressure from France’s closest African clients. Although a major driver was Mitterrand’s personal neocolonial inclinations, the analysis is correct that France’s African allies placed tremendous pressure on Paris (or rather, as much pressure as poor states can) to intervene in Chad and to more actively check Libyan ambitions. The message conveyed by leaders in Gabon, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and further afield was that Paris must show resolve in Chad, otherwise they would begin to doubt French commitments to their own security (read, regime survival). The CIA noted that Cameroon in particular had begun to invest in boosting its own defense capabilities as it lost faith in Paris (despite, or perhaps because of, Mitterrand’s June 1983 visit to the country).

Economic ties

The report also provides a very useful snapshot of a wide range of French interests in Africa in the early 1980s. For instance, “French interests own all or part of over three-fourths of all commercial firms in Francophone Africa” with the largest having a turnover of over $1.5 billion. Moreover, a variety of French institutional actors worked to ensure the continuation of this commercial dominance. This included French government investment guarantees and access to concessional loans for French firms. Moreover, half of French economic assistance was channeled through French companies. Less formally, French firms benefited from close ties to African officials. These companies also took advantage of French citizens serving at high levels in African governments to ensure that public contracts were directed to those firms. Furthermore, “French import-export firms, shipping companies, and financial institutions all work together.” This was neocolonialism in its purest form.

However, CIA analysts viewed the CFA franc currency zones – often still considered a powerful vestige of French colonial rule and vehicle of neocolonial control – with more ambiguity. They saw the zones, which included most of France’s former colonies, as the fullest expression of France’s continued economic influence and “one of the few relatively successful experiments in international and monetary integration and the primary factor behind the favorable economic performance of Francophone states relative to their neighbors.”

Nonetheless, analysts felt that CFA zone benefits were beginning to dissipate, both for its African members and for Paris. The report notes that through the mid-1970s, mandated CFA-zone deposits in a French treasury operations account offered benefits for France. At the time, the account “was in continuous surplus, in effect providing a loan to the French treasury.” But more recently, “the account has been running increasingly large deficits, reflecting the persistent balance-of-payment problems of two of the zone’s more important members, Senegal and Ivory Coast.” This would become a “substantial financial drain for Paris because of heavy borrowing by African members to cover their international payment needs.”

Discontent with the currency zone was also growing on the African side. The French franc had depreciated by some 50% against the dollar since Mitterrand had taken office, thus weakening the CFA as well. This made critical imports more expensive and worsened African debt strains. African leaders increasingly resented being hostage to France’s own balance-of-payment difficulties that they had no ability to influence. Furthermore, the CFA zone enabled free capital movement between its African members and France. This meant that the high French interest rate environment of the early 1980s diverted capital flows out of Africa and into France, squeezing local investment.

This situation was “prompting a major reassessment of [franc zone] membership by all parties.” Much as they are today, African leaders had begun to examine “amalgamating their monetary and customs organizations” with the broader West African economic bloc, ECOWAS, which included Nigeria and other non-Francophone countries. France also indicated its desire to share out the economic burden of backing the franc zone to multilateral organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as other European countries. While this plans would not ultimately make much progress, they illustrate that a lot of today’s debates over the currency are not particularly new.

Military presence

Historically France’s military commitments to client states were a key pillar of its postcolonial role in Africa. Analysts well understood this aspect of the Franco-African relationship, as well as its purpose, writing that the “French security umbrella has protected ruling African elites and extensive French commercial interests from both domestic dissidents and the ambitions of neighboring governments.” The report notes that Mitterrand had also decided to largely maintain France’s extensive program of military cooperation with African clients – although Paris had reduced the number of bodyguards provided to African presidents. Funding for military aid to Africa even increased, despite France’s own economic difficulties, with military assistance constituting some 20% of all French aid to the continent.

The report goes on to note, perceptively, the importance of close personal ties between French and African military personnel in the broader bilateral security relationship – many mid-level and senior officers had earlier served in the French military, and many in the lower ranks had received training in France. Indeed, these kind of relations were crucial for Franco-African ties in general, and was arguably the glue that kept the whole edifice together.

Despite all the rhetoric emphasizing change, Mitterrand early in his term – even before his dramatic decision to intervene in Chad – had confirmed longstanding French military and security commitments to a number of key client regimes. For instance in May 1982 Defense Minister Charles Hernu reaffirmed a French commitment to protect Côte d’Ivoire (or more accurately, Houphouët-Boigny’s regime) from external or externally-backed internal threats. The French also committed to defending Niger’s government against Libyan attacks, even though there was no standing defense agreement between the two countries. Paris also committed to retaining its military presence and aid levels in Djibouti.

Although ties between the Socialists and Gabon’s dictator Omar Bongo had been tense, at least when the Socialists were in opposition, Mitterrand had actually increased security cooperation with Bongo’s regime. The French also maintained a significant advisory presence in Zaire, and French officers held command roles within elite Zairian army units. Following a logic that also applied elsewhere, French officials told their US counterparts that although they had reservations over Mobutu’s corrupt and authoritarian rule, they saw no alternatives.

The CIA viewed Mitterrand’s August 1983 decision to send troops to Chad to shore up Hissène Habré’s fragile regime against Libyan forces and their rebel allies as the clearest indication that Mitterrand’s presidency meant business-as-usual for France in Africa. Analysts expressed concern though that if French forces were to eventually withdrawal, they could face huge risks to their prestige and credibility on the continent. This reflected some French views as well, but it should be noted that France’s withdrawal the following year (which came as a surprise to Washington) had little broader impact on Franco-African relations or France’s “credibility” – they would re-intervene in 1986. Nonetheless, the limited nature of the French intervention -- which only aimed to stop Libyans and rebels from advancing into southern Chad – elicited widespread criticisms, including from Habré himself.

Cultural influence

Analysts looked with some skepticism on the extent of French cultural influence within its former colonies, with an elite largely educated in French universities and otherwise connected to France through personal relationships. This elicited concerns that the French and French-language dominance of the educational and media landscapes – in part due the role of French as an official language – meant that many in Francophone African states were exposed to negative views of the United States.

The report notes that, “As a result, we believe that a French mind-set --- with its affinity for French institutions and cultural achievements and its negative image of many aspects of US cultural, political, and commercial activities – has developed within the political and military establishments of many French-speaking African states. These perceptions are reinforced by Francophone leaders’ continuing close personal contacts with members of the French government and military.” Although I can’t say for certain, analysts fears here seem exaggerated and reflect an assumption that locals were not capable of developing opinions of their own.

Interestingly, and one might add rather presciently, analysts noted the possibility that French cultural and ideological dominance within ruling circles had begun generating a backlash among younger generations, and that this could later undercut French influence.

The report also noted that some 200,000 French expatriates (immigrants is a better word) lived in Sub-Saharan Africa. This included 40,000 in Côte d’Ivoire and 27,000 in Gabon. Both communities exerted considerable political influence in both countries. These French immigrants tended to be politically conservative and viscerally opposed to Mitterrand’s presidency. Analysts wrote that in Gabon French residents lobbied hard against close bilateral ties with Mitterrand’s France, and in Côte d’Ivoire they were working to ensure that a pro-French figure would succeed Houphouët-Boigny after the ageing leader died (he would hang on until 1993). French oil major Elf was the largest single French economic operator on the continent, and exercised tremendous amounts of political influence, especially in Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville.

Moreover, roughly 10,000 French advisors were deployed on the continent, and many ministries were staffed with them. Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire had French advisors placed in senior positions of responsibility and influence.

The conservative and even reactionary character of prominent French diaspora interests in Africa led Mitterrand to seek to weaken their influence. Analysts see this as one factor behind Mitterrand’s (ultimately very partial) overhaul of France’s foreign intelligence service, the SDECE (renamed the DGSE in 1982). My impression is that analysts overestimate the extent to which “conservative Gaullist agents” and its “Paris-based core of old Africa hands” in the DGSE were actually replaced. Analysts cite press reports of DGSE officers deliberately interfering with policymaking and, in the case of the Central African Republic, delaying the transmission of information regarding the 1981 transfer of power to prevent Paris from weighing in on the composition of the new government. My sense, reading sources from the time period, is that this was not the case, although it’s hard to be certain.

Both Mitterrand’s administration and French business interests in former colonies routinely expressed anti-US paranoia; although it goes unmentioned in the report, these concerns were largely overblown as US capital had very limited interest in Francophone African markets, especially in the poorer countries who were more likely to be French clients.

France’s future in Africa

After an excursus on French relations with non-Francophone countries – Nigeria and South Africa were (and still are) France’s largest trading partners on the continent – analysts sought to assess the future of France’s role in Africa. They foresaw France retaining overweening influence on the continent whatever the outcome of the Chadian crisis. Analysts noted that French aid played a key role in the survival of regimes in the continent’s poorest countries. Moreover, elites in wealthier states (eg Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon) saw France’s regional military posture as a major deterrent to domestic threats and a shield against Libyan subversion. They would resist any French efforts to draw down troop numbers.

Nonetheless, the report insightfully notes potential threats to the future of French influence in Africa. It lists France’s response to Libyan expansionism and the willingness of Paris to meet lasting security commitments to counter threats to African states from Libya (and elsewhere presumably). Wavering from Paris could encourage African governments to question the usefulness of their security dependence on France and look for patrons elsewhere. France’s continued economic dealings with Libya and South Africa could also serve as sources of anger and resentment. Authoritarian allies of Paris might grow suspicious of French Socialist Party ties to opposition parties, and might fear that Paris is trying to undermine their rule.

Analysts also noted the possibility, which would already emerge in the 1980s in places like Burkina Faso, that overdependence on France could generate a backlash, and an ageing generation of pro-French leaders could be replaced by more nationalist ones. The relative wealth and privileges enjoyed by French immigrant communities could also generate resentment and feed anti-French sentiment. Presciently, the report notes that French efforts to reform the CFA could become a source of tension, noting especially that a devaluation of the currency would make debts harder to service and make imports more expensive. This ultimately happened in 1994, and its traumatic consequences feed into much of the nationalist rhetoric targeting Paris to this day.

The report noted that all of this had implications for Washington: French security commitments in Africa were costly and this could lead France to increasingly look to the US for financing assistance to France’s African clients. This would happen to a degree in Chad, although Mitterrand was always careful to avoid being seen as in any way reliant on Washington’s largesse. Any softening of French engagement might also lead African countries to press the US for more assistance, including military involvement.

Analysts noted, probably rightly, that French fears of the US supplanting their position in Africa could have the (in their view positive) effect of keeping France engaged. But Paris would likely remain “an often prickly and difficult ally”.

This would bear itself out in Chad, as increasing French anger at growing ties between Habré and the US – notably over the CIA’s creation of a Libyan dissident force under the command of Khalifa Haftar—led Paris to facilitate Habré’s 1990 ouster by his former military chief, Idris Déby.

The putschists’ incompetence may have saved Biya; they wounded but failed to capture army chief, General Pierre Semengue, and they waited hours before shutting down Yaoundé’s telephone exchange. This allowed Semengue and other loyalists in the military to call for reinforcements and coordinate an early response. Although fighting in the capital would last several days, loyalist elements in the military eventually managed to suppress the coup attempt. Upon reaching Biya as the fighting wound down, Semengue reportedly told him, “I’ve done my job, now you do yours.”

The fighting itself was exceptionally bloody, with over 1,000 soldiers and civilians estimated to have been killed.

In the aftermath, at least 35 officers and others alleged to have been involved were tried by a military tribunal and summarily executed. Some estimates suggest this number may have been as high as 120 people. However the trauma of the event would haunt Biya for decades, inspiring elaborate and, to date, successful coup-proofing efforts. The regime also neither forgave nor forgot. One of the coup plot’s alleged masterminds, army captain Guérandi Mbara, was kidnapped in Bulgaria in 2013, brought to Cameroon and likely executed.

US intelligence coverage

Early US intelligence output on the coup came from US embassy reporting, and appeared on the morning of April 7 in the National Intelligence Daily (NID), the intelligence community’s most widely distributed piece of daily output. According to the NID, the situation was still confused and the embassy had been hit by shellfire, although this appeared to be accidental.

The embassy addressed what was likely the US intelligence community’s number one fear: that the coup may have been instigated by Libya or even the Soviets. Instead, the embassy emphasised that the causes were almost certainly internal and it correctly flagged Biya’s presidential guard reorganization as the likely trigger. US intelligence officials seemed to think that the insurgents likely had little support outside of Yaoundé and might be defeated if outside elements rallied to Biya. They also worried that the fighting could exacerbate north-south tensions.

By the following day, the NID could report that the coup attempt had been successfully defeated by airborne troops brought into Yaoundé. However, it expressed concern that Biya could face considerable southern pressure to mete out harsh punishments to northern soldiers, and that he’d have to balance this pressure against the need to  avoid alienating the “Muslim north.” Moreover, it judged that the coup attempt had weakened Biya’s overall political position, with his future now dependent on the southern officer corps in the army, who could step up their role in politics.

Assessments of Biya’s future

In a longer late April assessment of Biya’s challenges, the CIA highlighted Biya’s relationship with the military as key to the future of his regime. It worried that his “standing in the military has been seriously damaged” and that he could struggle to assert civilian control. It noted that he had to walk a difficult political tightrope between ceding to pressures of vindictive southerners looking to take revenge on northerners for both the coup attempt and their dominance during the Ahidjo years, and a need to ease regional and ethnic tensions.

Biya’s initial announcements following the coup avoided publicly linking the coup-plotters to any particular region or ethnic group. Nonetheless, CIA analysts thought that “the fate of Biya’s regime” could depend on how he managed the prosecution of the coup attempt’s ringleaders. This would also signal the extent of his willingness to resist southern pressure for retribution. The CIA judged that he would need to quickly assert his political leadership as a national rather than a regionalist figure in order to overcome the coup attempt’s political fallout.

However, although analysts thought that Biya understood the potential dangers of retreating to an ethno-regional political base, they worried that he might not be able to resist the temptation of doing so. While this could strengthen his political position and stabilize the country in the short-term, the animosities it would generate could pose longer-term dangers.

While the near-term likely promised something of an authoritarian crackdown on dissent, analysts were unsure if Biya had the mettle to fully assert his authority. They noted that while Biya, “has proved a more savvy politician than many expected when he gained the presidency, Biya is private person, who does not use oratory and the government controlled media to its best advantage.” Biya’s long weeks of silence following an initial public statement on the coup attempt raised concerns that he was indecisive as well as questions among Cameroonians over who was really in charge.

What this meant in practice was that, perhaps paradoxically, the defeat of the coup-plotters now meant that the military now held significant political power. The CIA worried that Biya’s apparent weaknesses could incite the officer corps to action. It outlined three possible scenarios. The most likely was a coup by southern senior officers. These would most likely remain pro-Western and could provide a degree of stability if they were willing to appease northern interests. Alternatively, northern officers and units might attempt a pre-emptive coup if they feared purges and persecution. Another potential, although unlikely possibility was a junior officers’ coup. Due to their “inexperience,” they would likely be more open to anti-Western and nationalistic messaging and potentially challenge Cameroon’s pro-Western orientation.

The biggest worry for US observers in this regard was Libya, which at the time was heavily engaged in neighboring Chad against the regime of Hissène Habré. It was also a major sponsor of opposition groups and allegedly subversive movements across the region. While CIA analysts noted that Libyan influence in Cameroon was quite limited, they worried that Libya could take advantage of any north-south tensions to boost northern opposition to Biya’s rule. This could force Biya to deploy more troops to the north, which would potentially exacerbate the problem.

Nonetheless, in terms of foreign relations, the most immediate casualty of the coup-attempt was Cameroon’s relations with France. Many Cameroonians, especially southerners, accused Paris of involvement in the coup attempt. Although the CIA suggested this related to Ahidjo’s exile in France, it also reflected long-standing popular suspicions of France’s role in the country as its former colonizer and guarantor of Ahijdo’s authoritarian rule. The CIA noted that this gave Biya an incentive to distance himself from Paris, although Cameroon’s was ultimately too dependent on France to make a full break. Similarly, although French President François Mitterrand’s administration was “not enamored with Biya”, he was far preferable to “prolonged uncertainty” that could threaten French interests.

The upside of all of this for the US, according to the CIA, was a likely increase in Cameroonian interest in building ties with Washington, including through arms purchases. But, analysts judged that Biya would have understood that Washington could not replace Paris as Cameroon’s main foreign patron, and that France would not appreciate an excessive increase of US interest in the country.

The US intelligence community’s concern for Biya’s political survival appears to have peaked the following month. A mid-May 1984 NID item was given the heading “Time Runing Out for Biya.” The US embassy in Yaoundé became worried that Biya’s continued public silence and the absence of any information over the prosecution of those involved in the coup attempt was undermining the president’s support base. It suggested that the military was stepping into the void and “assuming greater responsibility for governing the country.” This led intelligence analysts to conclude that a coup may be imminent, possibly mounted by the military’s senior leadership to pre-empt a potential putsch by junior officers.

US observers remained concerned at the end of the year, even as the coup threat appeared to recede. A December 1984 CIA assessment, reckoned that Biya still needed to “regain leadership credibility and lost momentum” following a coup attempt which “tarnished Biya’s image and raised questions about his leadership.” Biya reportedly spent the six months following the coup attempt “isolated in the presidential palace,” only rarely appearing in public. His paranoia was compounded by rumors that Ahidjo had hired mercenaries to attack Cameroon. Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding the trials and executions of coup plotters contributed to public misgivings and concern.

CIA analysts continued to worry over Biya’s ability to contain the growing political authority of the military. They, rightly it seems, based on US defense attaché reporting, identified General Pierre Semengue as both a regime loyalists and critical to continued military backing for Biya. However absent an effective assertion of civilian control, the coup risk would remain dangerously high. Nonetheless, analysts judged that Biya had “at least an even chance” of surviving in power over the next two years.

Analytic quality

Intelligence community, and especially CIA, analysis of the coup attempt was largely based on reporting from the US embassy in Yaoundé. Moreover, it appears to have reflected views prevalent among both local observers and the French media at the time. Perhaps for these reasons, along with a general tendency to view African politics through the lenses of ethnic or regional categories, the emphasis in the analysis was on a shifting north-south power dynamic which occasioned the coup.

However, as noted in the previous post, Biya’s emerging ruling coalition included many northerners. But, the weakening of Ahidjo’s former political base also coincided with a number of broadly unpopular moves not covered in intelligence reporting; a rigged January 1984 presidential election, a presidential pardon for Ahidjo, the maintenance of corrupt officials in their positions, and selective corruption crackdowns that alienated vested interests. For example, Biya’s policies not only generated resentment among powerful northern Muslim commercial interests but also disrupted many southern commercial networks as well.

These conditions not only allowed a coup attempt to proceed without popular opposition, but also may have given powerful politicians and businessmen incentives to encourage the coup-makers to move. Indeed, the coup plotters selected the head of the rural development agency and prominent businessman Issa Adoun as their choice for president. This suggests that the coup attempt was something more than simply a mutiny focused around the Republican Guard.

Another missing dimension in the analyses was  Ahidjo’s role in the plot. The CIA appeared not to know, although they were aware that he was widely blamed for it in Cameroon. Indeed, Ahidjo was again sentenced to death in absentia, with no pardon forthcoming this time. While it remains unclear (as far as I can tell) whether Ahidjo was actually behind the coup attempt, there is evidence that he was aware of it ahead of time. Jacques Foccart, who was until 1974 the central figure behind France’s African policy, later recalled that Ahidjo, a close personal acquaintance, telephoned him the day of the coup, recounting the day’s events in detail, suggesting that Ahidjo had at least foreknowledge and contact with the coup-makers (one can always question the veracity of Foccart’s memoirs, but in my experience he tended to lie by omission more than by commission).

In any event, analysts well-understood that Biya had to manage a delicate political balancing act to maintain and consolidate his authority, but their understanding of the inner-workings of this balance and its broader socio-political dimensions was limited and somewhat reductionist. This, plus a broader attachment to what one could describe as conventional thinking about Biya, also appears to have led analysts to underestimate Biya’s political acumen.

Instead of drifting indecisively into oblivion, Biya acted with far greater determination than many predicted. Within a year of the coup attempt, Biya had reorganized and renamed the ruling party, purged or co-opted former Ahidjo loyalists, created a new presidential guard composed mostly of members from his own Bulu-Beti ethnic group, and reshuffled much of the military’s leadership. These moves built the political foundations from which Biya has managed to hold onto power in Cameroon for 42 years.

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CIA analysts judged that Biya’s government  would have to “carry out a delicate balancing act” in making cuts so as not to alienate important regional and ethnic constituencies, particularly in the Anglophone portion of Cameroon. While analysts thought that his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo (president from 1960-1982) would have been capable of striking this balance, they were unsure about Biya, who, “does not have Ahidjo’s prestige” and “will be less able to resist pressure from his supporters to maintain those parts of the plan of benefit to them.”

On the plus side of the ledger, analysts applauded Biya for appointing a cabinet with an appropriate regional and ethnic (the preferred word in most analytical products from the time was “tribe”) balance.  This included ensuring that northern Muslims, mostly assumed to back Ahidjo, held key government portfolios, including the position of prime minister.

Relaying reporting from the US defense attaché in Yaoundé, analysts saw Cameroon’s security forces as well-disciplined, well-trained and “generally apolitical.” Biya would likely rely on the better paid police or gendarmerie to counter possible unrest occasioned by economic troubles. However, they did not discount a coup risk, suggesting that resentment could build within the military in case of an economic downturn and spending cuts. However, the CIA concluded that any future military regime would remain pro-Western and likely dependent on France. This view was based in part on reports that the government had long put considerable effort into excluding leftist from the military’s ranks.

The US Embassy in Yaounde saw Cameroon’s political transition as a potential opportunity to expand already growing US influence in the country, as reflected in the heightened presence of US firms and sales of US military equipment.

The CIA was less optimistic. In their view, Cameroonian authorities had overly high expectations of future US investment and aid following Ahidjo’s July 1982 visit to the United States. As these were unlikely to be met, Cameroonian disappointment could put a damper on US influence. However, due to what it considered the pro-Western and anti-communist ideological proclivities of Cameroon’s leadership and elite, CIA analysts had few worries that such disappointment would translate into outreach to Moscow or Tripoli.

The CIA’s assessment of coming economic troubles was accurate, if slightly premature – the real crisis would only kick off in 1985-1986 with major falls in oil, coffee, cocoa and cotton revenues, eventually forcing major budget cuts and a turn to the IMF. However, it would take several more months before analysts began to pick up on the importance of rising tensions between Ahidjo and Biya, and even then they appeared to downplay their importance.

Ahidjo initially retained control of the ruling Cameroon National Union (UNC) party.  However, as has happened so often in Africa and elsewhere, there was soon a major falling-out between the former president and his erstwhile protégé. If Ahidjo had thought he could use his control of the ruling party to keep real political power in his own hands, Biya couldn’t accept any kind of power-sharing arrangement, especially once he had consolidated his authority over major state institutions.

In June 1983, Ahidjo made a failed attempt to push a constitutional amendment that would expand the powers of the prime minister and UNC leader (himself) at Biya’s expense. Biya reacted as one might expect, sacking pro-Ahidjo ministers. Ahidjo on July 18, 1983 left the country for exile in France, never to return.

Biya’s prospects

The same day Ahidjo left the country, the CIA released another assessment, this time focusing on Biya’s prospects. By this point, it was clear to analysts at Langley that tensions between the two men and their backers had become a problem, although they seem to have underestimated its gravity.

Analysts noted that Ahidjo’s support had initially been key in helping Biya overcome resistance from powerful northern interests to his taking office. They also suggested that relations between the two men remained relatively good for the first few months of Biya’s rule. But now, “Biya’s growing independence and popularity have provoked a political backlash from Ahidjo.” Nonetheless, analysts judged that Biya “has gained the political upperhand,” putting him in a “good position to emerge as a powerful and independent president.”

Analysts inferred that Biya would seek to “mend fences with Ahidjo whenever possible” but only if this meant Ahidjo ultimately accepted his own reduced status. If Ahidjo refused to back down, Biya would likely look to remove him from the ruling party and political scene. Until this happened, analysts concluded that Ahidjo would remain an “irritant to Biya,” even if the former president was no longer in a position oust his successor from the presidency.

Although Ahidjo might only be an irritant, analysts did see more serious threats to Biya’s position down the road. These mainly related to rising resentments among northerners as Biya consolidated power in favor of southern interests. They also noted that Biya could face discontent in the south if expected benefits were not forthcoming. In the longer term, Biya might struggle with expected economic difficulties, which could fuel discontent over his rule.

Meanwhile, the coup threat was again assessed as limited due to the military’s professionalism, the legacy of Ahidjo’s coup-proofing measures, and Biya’s moves to increase his own control over the institution. Perceptively though, analysts did note that Biya’s changes in the composition of forces charged with presidential security - replacing northerners with southerners - risked threatening important vested interests.

The CIA’s July assessment appears to have underestimated the importance of the June showdown, although prominent independent observers also seem to have misread the intensity of growing frictions between Biya and Ahidjo.

By the time the CIA assessment appeared, relations between the two men had already reached a breaking point. Ahidjo on July 18 left Cameroon for exile in France. The following month, Biya publicly accused Ahidjo plotting against him and planning to return to power. Ahidjo responded with vigorous denunciations of his successor on French radio.

To firm up his domestic legitimacy, Biya then held an early presidential election in January 1984. He won unopposed with 99.98% of the vote. Ahidjo and several of his associates were then in February 1984 tried in absentia and sentenced to death in early 1984. Although Biya would follow this up with an official pardon, the political conflict between the two men would culminate in early April with a bloody coup attempt.

US disinterest

Regardless, none of these events were covered in the declassified analytical products available on the CIA’s FOIA database, with coverage only resuming with the April 1984 coup attempt. It’s of course entirely possible this is because none of the CIA’s analytical products from the time have been declassified and placed on the FOIA CREST database. However, this isn’t the case for reporting on other African countries, such as Chad, Libya,  Angola, or South Africa which were far more important for US interests. All of these countries were subject to intensive intelligence coverage over this time period.

The logical conclusion then is that subsequent events in Cameroon simply did not reach the level of interest to US intelligence officials, until the 1984 coup attempt. Of course, this didn’t mean that the US government remained uninformed—the US Embassy in Yaoundé would have reported on the country on daily basis. But the absence of intelligence coverage for nearly nine months is indicative of how marginal the country was to US global concerns.

Blinkered analyses

Analysts tended to think of Cameroon in terms of “tribalism,” regionalism, and/or religion and these categories structured their understanding of politics in the country and its prospects. In many ways this should not be surprising—such essentializations were characteristic of much US intelligence analysis of politics across Africa at the time. It was perhaps an easy epistemological shorthand for making politics legible and it reflected a way of thinking about Africa that remains widespread and popular to this day. However, it could lead to blinkered analyses and faulty conclusions.

This comes out most clearly in intelligence analyses of key elements of Biya’s governing strategy and, later, in the causes of the 1984 coup attempt. The CIA’s July 1983 brief on Biya’s prospects begins by describing Ahidjo’s governance of the country as “iron fisted” and characterized by “carefully balancing ethnic and regional interests while relying on loyal fellow Muslim Fulani tribesmen from northern Cameroon” to control the military, the ruling party, and government. Biya, conversely, as a southerner, is portrayed as slowly but surely shifting power away from northern interests to southern ones.

This picture, however, was at best incomplete. Neither northern nor southern Cameroon were homogenous entities. Although Ahidjo’s political base was located in the north, and especially among parts of the ethnic Fulani elite there, the north was riddled with social and political divisions which Biya took advantage of in his own balancing act to secure country-wide support for his rule. These included a variety of influential customary authorities who felt sidelined by Ahidjo’s rule, as well as marginalised ethnic communities and urban educated elites. The south meanwhile was also beset by numerous divisions -- ethnic, regional, linguistic, and economic.

The political transition from Ahidjo to Biya was in part characterized by power shifting to the south, but more fundamentally it reflected the emergence of a new cross-country political coalition – with deep roots in both the north and the south -- replacing an older one held together by Ahidjo which was also regionally balanced, but with a different set of actors and interests.

This analytical misreading had few practical consequences; Cameroon was simply not an important enough country to US policymakers. Moreover, intelligence analysts got enough right to convey that tensions between Ahidjo and Biya were about more than a mere personal rivalry, and that this posed a potential risk to Cameroon’s stability. Nonetheless, the recourse to generalizations in explaining Cameroon’s politics was not limited to Cameroon, and would generate more serious analytical failures in areas where the US was much more involved, such as in neighboring Chad.

My next post will look at US intelligence coverage of the 1984 coup attempt and assessments of Biya’s subsequent prospects.

At first, it seems, they had no idea that Biya’s predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo (president from 1960-1982), was planning to resign. Ahidjo had visited Washington in July 1982. Intelligence analysts found much to admire about the “effective, responsible leadership” of this “tough-minded Muslim President,” although they did admit that he “tolerates little domestic criticism,” which was arguably something of an understatement.

Moreover, they noted that Ahidjo, “appears to be in good health and has no plans to retire” which was arguably something of an overstatement. However, unlike Biya’s notorious long-standing refusal to groom a successor, the same intelligence note favorably comments on Ahidjo’s moves to “ensure a peaceful transition of power to preserve Cameroon’s moderate policies should he die or become incapacitated.”

Washington had few significant interests in Cameroon, largely considering it France’s responsibility as a former colony (or rather League of Nations mandate, which wasn’t any better). The main concern for US intelligence was that Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan influence remain minimal there, and they were quite satisfied that Ahidjo was doing a good job.

Washington’s lack of real interest in Cameroon is indicated by the two paragraphs Ahidjo’s subsequent November 4 1982 resignation merited in the intelligence community’s National Intelligence Daily – six days after it happened.

US analysts seemed satisfied with Ahidjo’s chosen successor, Prime Minister Paul Biya. They noted Biya’s promises to maintain Ahidjo’s policy line, which was of course approvingly described as “moderate.” Analysts described Biya’s reputation as, “an honest, intelligent, and well-educated administrator,” and noted that Ahidjo would likely continue to play an influential role “behind the scenes.”

Officially, Ahidjo resigned for health reasons. US analysts were not the only observers surprised by the decision. Jacques Foccart, who had held the reins of France’s Africa policy from 1960-1974 knew Ahidjo well and was shocked by the move. As was Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, with whom Foccart was visiting when he received the news. According to Foccart’s memoirs, both men tried to convince Ahidjo that he was making a mistake and that he should walk back his announcement, to no avail. Foccart was also surprised by Ahidjo’s choice of Biya as his successor, someone whom Foccart saw as little more than an unimpressive functionary with little aptitude for public affairs.

Whatever his faults, Biya would in the coming months quickly move to reduce Ahidjo’s lingering influence. As a result, Ahidjo left the country in July 1983. Tensions between the two men eventually led to a major showdown in a failed April 1984 coup attempt by Ahidjo’s backers. The subsequent fighting and repression left over 1,000 dead, putting an end to Ahidjo’s ambitions. The former president would die in exile in Dakar in 1989.

In my next post, I’ll look at US intelligence coverage of the early years of Biya’s rule, culminating in the 1984 coup attempt.

As part of a project I’m working on looking at US intelligence community analyses of the Chadian-Libyan conflict in the 1980s, I’ve come across a variety of interesting material covering other countries as well. I thought I’d use this space to share documents I’ve found, as well as my own commentary.

The public availability of tens of thousands of historical Cold War-era US intelligence records (albeit in problematic forms), should pique the interest of any historian or global citizen interested in relevant times and places covered by the material. As a global superpower, no region of the world escaped Washington’s interest. For those readers interested in getting a better grasp of Washington’s imperial meddling across the globe, these records furnish often fascinating insights into how US policymakers constructed knowledge about the world during the Cold War.

However, with the exception of sporadic Cold War crises and more recently, jihadist activity, most of Africa has rarely been more than of tertiary strategic interest for policymakers in Washington (I’d argue this is a good thing—the US does damage enough to places it thinks more about). At least historically, this has been reflected in the level of intelligence resources allocated to following Africa.

A look at the division of labor within the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence gives a good sense of this resource constraint. While in 1984 some 400 analysts worked in the Office of Soviet Analysis and 150 in the Office of European Analysis, only 30 analysts covered Sub-Saharan Africa. These worked alongside 100 other analysts covering Latin America within an Office of African and Latin American Analysis (a lumping together suggestive of both regions’ relative interest to Washington).

From: Draft Directorate of Intelligence Handbook, November 15, 1984

Now, these were not the only analysts working on Africa. Some of the 100 analysts working in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis covered North Africa, and their coverage of the Chad-Libyan conflict, for instance, was important. Also, a number of thematic offices or specialists covering economics, terrorism, strategic arms, imagery analysis and others also weighed in on African analysis from time to time. But overall, Africa was consistently at the margins of the global US intelligence effort.

Although my overall focus will be on historical US intelligence on Africa, I may also look at questions connected to US intelligence analysis from the time periods under discussion. These relate to sources and methods (often difficult to uncover and nearly always redacted from declassified documents) to more epistemic questions of how analysts thought about the world and their regions of focus. These of course include questions related to how power, prejudice, and policies affected analytic production and thinking. I may also branch out to discuss other issues of interest related to foreign interventions, African politics, and international history.

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