However, you might have noticed my name popping up less frequently in your inbox over the past month or two. There’s a good reason for that. Long story short, I have accepted an exciting job opportunity which will require my full attention going forward. As a consequence, future posts will be less frequent - but they will not go away. On a positive note (I guess), all paywalled posts will now be freely accessible, and paying subscribers will be reimbursed for the past two months.1

Against that backdrop, it feels like the right time to look at the performance of Nordic Edge. On balance, I am happy with the outcome, though a mere 12-month period isn’t a proper yardstick for measuring any investment performance, period. Below is the return generated for each company covered on Nordic Edge, benchmarked against the return for the Nordic all-share index over the same timeframe.

You can read each write-up alongside their respective quarterly updates (only for “The Pitch”) here.

Below are some movements in the portfolio:

• Reduced position in SOBI (OM:SOBI) - contemplating full exit (valuation).

• Increased position in Vend (OB:VEND) by c.50% since initiation, mainly due to unwarranted sell-off as part of SaaSpocalypse. While the timing of the Adevinta break-up catalyst may not be as imminent as first anticipated, the implied valuation of the stub (fwd EV/EBITDA at c.10x) is ridiculously cheap for an online classifieds player with clear market leadership.

• Closed position in SKAKO (CPSE:SKAKO) at DKK 63/share as the thesis had played out - closing its discount to net cash. Over Christmas I added to the name as the share price continued to slide to sub DKK 50/share. That proved to be a good call as the market finally caught wind of the discount in March. It actually traded at a premium for a brief moment. The company recently paid a DKK 49/share dividend and the stub now trades at DKK 11.95/share (i.e., implied 60.95/share). Overall, very good trade!

• Closed position in Better Collective (CPSE:BETCO) mainly due to thesis drift. I have stayed constructive on the name throughout the short-selling pressure L12M, but I am growing increasingly concerned about (i) its ability to remain a “top-of-funnel” operator as AI-overviews compress organic traffic; and (ii) competition no longer being confined to OSBs, but now also include prediction markets players who operate with an unfair regulatory advantage, effectively enabling them to front-run the white space present in the states where OSB deregulation is still pending. The latter is my primary concern given BETCO has RevShare agreements in place with OSBs - the “crown jewel” in my view - and if that goes away, things could get ugly. I’m not saying it will - in fact, I still see a decent 2026 setup (FIFA WC tailwind) and a return to sequential growth. However, the outer-year risks are just not something I am comfortable underwriting. Also, the CEO selling into the buyback has not made the decision to cut harder. Reflecting back, I should have come to this final conclusion earlier, but I took “shelter” in technicals - i.e., BETCO being a short-squeeze candidate due to trapped short-sellers in an increasingly illiquid stock with heavy buyback activity. That’s not how I aspire to invest. Good thing I still managed to make money.

• Closed position in Dataproces (CPSE:DATA) in two instalments, the first one due to share price having appreciated “too much, too soon” and the last chunk due to lack of transparency from the board on the back of the former CEO’s departure. I had requested further color on certain contradicting statements, but was met a somewhat hostile response. A core reason for firing the CEO was the desire to find a more “fitting profile” for its upcoming international expansion, M&A, etc. Turns out they recently promoted an internal candidate to CEO who, surprise-surprise, has zero experience on any of the domains listed. Bullet dodged.

• Increased position in UIE (CPSE:UIE) - no news but NAV discount still sits at c.40%, and I wanted to increase my exposure.

Rest of the names remain as-is apart from occasional rebalancing.

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Note: I was in the last innings of this write-up but didn’t manage to get it shipped before GN Store Nord announced their sale of the Hearing division to Amplifon this morning… I have decided to share the work regardless - and with some impurities. While it does feel like time was “wasted,” I am happy that I was right to call it out.

On to the next... Happy reading!

Ripe for activism is a recurring series covering Nordic-listed companies that, in my view, could benefit from shareholder activism. As a thought experiment, I outline the steps I’d take to unlock value if I had the mandate (and intellectual capacity) to act as an activist.

GN Store Nord (CPSE:GN)

The “GN” in GN Store Nord literally stands for “Great North”1, but based on the past few years it’s been anything but great and the share price has gone south. In this write-up I cover how they ended up there, and share my thoughts on how I’d crystalize value for shareholders if I had the power2.

GN is a Denmark-based conglomerate operating with three core divisions, namely, (i) Hearing (43% of FY25A sales) which provides premium, medical-grade hearing aids; (ii) Enterprise (41%) focused on professional communication headsets and video conferencing hardware; and (iii) Gaming (14%) which sells various equipment for e-sports applications.

Each segment is vastly different from one another, both in the context of end-market demand patterns and general industry dynamics. Hearing is quasi-recurring, prescription-driven, and built on clinical efficacy and audiologist channels; Enterprise is a B2B hardware business driven by enterprise IT upgrade cycles; Gaming is anchored to consumer discretionary spending, wholesale relationships, brand perception, and e-sports trends more broadly. Sure, there may be some overlap across the the up-/midstream value chain - mainly related to sourcing and support-functions3 - but I argue there is limited operating rationale for housing all three segments under the same roof.

In fact, GN itself agrees with that statement. In 2006 they struck a DKK 15.5bn4 deal with Sonova (formerly Phonak) for its Hearing division. For context, that’s ~65% of today’s enterprise value, which includes a shit ton of debt that should’ve never been there to begin with (covered later). Unfortunately, the deal was blocked by Germany’s Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellam), and while GN pursued a two-year legal appeal in an attempt to get it across the finish line, the efforts were unsuccessful.

Fair enough, not much else to do than get back to the drawing board and figure things out. That’s what management did at the time, and they executed it rather successfully though painful at first5.

Against that backdrop, you are right to ask “if the deal was blocked and you’re insinuating a break-up of GN then what’s the end-game?”. Not so fast. In April 2010, the German Federal Supreme Court decided that it was a mistake to block the deal.

“It is determined that the decision of the Federal Cartel Office of 11 April 2007 (B 3 - 33101 - Fa - 578/06) was unlawful.”

That is just to say; It’s not a lost cause to investigate such avenue today, some 20 years later. Before delving into that, helpful to understand what significant events have happened during the 20 year gap since the failed carve-out.

Fast-forward to the pandemic. The world moved to WFH overnight and GN’s Enterprise segment was firing on all cylinders, with the Jabra brand posting +22% organic growth in FY21A. That same pull-forward of demand was present in the Gaming segment as e-sports adoption widened. It doesn’t take a genius to know that both the Enterprise and Gaming was printing unsustainable numbers (i.e., over-earning), which should be baked into the valuation. Besides, GN didn’t even have a Gaming segment at the time. That’s right... They acquired it (“SteelSeries”) peak-cycle at an outrageous valuation of DKK 8bn, equivalent to +27x EV/EBITA. Better yet? It was fully debt-funded… And just when you thought it couldn’t get worse, interest rates were hiked at a pace never seen before.

In the first FY post closing, reported net leverage was 7.1x (vs. target of 2x) and the company was in the midst of a two-pronged cyclical correction of (i) Enterprise which saw demand normalize (-21% y/y) following a strong FY20/21; and (ii) Gaming headwinds from softening discretionary spending, with SteelSeries posting -33% growth just 6 months into its GN’s ownership. Pair this with cash interest expenses eating into the cash flows, and you’re in for a disaster. Management knew - the new management, that is6 - ultimately forcing the company to raise DKK 2bn via share issue at levels 60-70% from its Covid highs.

To their credit, considering the circumstances (incl. tariffs, etc.), management has done a decent job at turning the ship. That include wind-downs and divestments of a number of non-core assets, streamlining operations with shared support functions, and - in the wake of Trump’s tariffs - lowering supply-chain dependency on China.

Non-core holdings

Before looking at the potential break-up value as suggested above, turns out there may be some more straight-forward avenues to restore the balance sheet. GN holds a series of smaller non-operating assets that could plausibly be divested to bring down its debt burden. In fact, they highlighted this themselves in their Q3’25 report:

“In addition, GN’s minority interests in various non-core assets may contain significant value and could be divested to increase the speed of the deleverage.”

The most notable one - which has been making its rounds in local media - is the 19% ownership stake in NationsBenefits. Surely doesn’t look like a strategically relevant asset, and management - luckily - agrees:

“At the beginning, Nations[Benefit] were very hearing aid focused, but they've grown to be much more than that today. And as such, there is not a very strong link to our existing business. So at the right point in time to the right valuation, we would be open to consider if we're the right owner. But it's not anything we are unilaterally seeking.” - Peter Karlstrommer (CEO), Q4’25 earnings call

Question is, what is the NationsBenefit stake worth? Given it is a private company, insight into financials is fairly limited though analysts are pointing to DKK 2-4bn. The company has raised funding several times7, hence the right channel-checks could offer a glimpse of insight into the numbers.

GN also holds a 9% stake in LXE Hearing8 - an OTC hearing aid provider - which is a tad closer to GNs core, but still a rounding-error in the broader scheme of things and thus a plausible divestment candidate. LXE Hearing is mainly backed by Patient Square Capital, hence the channel-check logic also applies here. Unfortunately, I have no inroads to any of the sponsors present in NationsBenefit nor LXE Hearing - but you may!

I will work with a combined value of DKK 2bn for conservativeness9. Such transaction would cut PF FY25A net leverage (reported) by 0.85x to 2.96x - bringing the company a tad closer to its 2.0x target by FY28.

Other value levers

Apparently it is common practice among hearing aid players to provide customer loans to fund growth of specialized retailers/hearing centers - basically an alternative to vertically integrating. For FY25A GN recorded “Loan to dispensers of Hearing products” amounting to DKK 819m, which far exceeds that of peers on a relative basis:

And while part of the gap is explained by all peers having a retail footprint (i.e., less need for such vendor loans), I’d argue the value lever - to improve credit collection/tighten terms - still holds10. Importantly, it is not with immediate effect, but nonetheless a credible path to reduce complexity and incrementally strengthen liquidity.

You might wonder “why not sell the customer loans at a discount to crystalize cash?” The simple truth is that there is no incentive to do so: the customer loan (non-current) balance is netted out out debt - retarded, I know11 - hence any sale at a discount would be negative to the leverage ratio.

Break-up valuation

As noted at the outset, I don’t believe it makes sense to keep all three segments under the same roof. Each segment competes in vastly different industries, so before jumping straight to comps, I might as well frame the industry context as well.

Hearing

The global hearing aid market can broadly be split into three layers: (i) Retail; (ii) Wholesale; and (iii) Cochlear implants. For this write-up only the former two are material.

The wholesale market is estimated at EUR 7bn, growing at 3-5% p.a., and dominated by “the big four” - Sonova (~30% market share), Demant (~25%), WS Audiology (~16%), GN Store Nord (~15%). The concentrated market composition has historically instilled disciplined pricing, with incremental uplifts mainly being driven by higher-tech/more capable launches.

Given hearing aids are highly tailored, with pre-purchase diagnostics, audiologist fittings, and ongoing service, several players have vertically integrated downstream into retail to control the patient relationship. In fact, GN is the only OEM who does not directly operate with its own retail footprint. The retail market is far bigger - estimated at EUR 20bn - though the market is far more fragmented with ~70% of the market served by independents or small chains, though it is consolidating bit by bit. The largest global retailer is Amplifon (BIT:AMP), a pure-play distribution player with ~13% market share.

The sticky nature of hearing aids, coupled with the large latent-/unpenetrated patient pool and new cohorts (i.e., ageing population) entering eligibility, is the main demand-drivers. However, lack of insurance coverage or reimbursement - particularly relevant in the U.S. - may gatekeep access and thus penetration of unmet needs. To that end, hearing aids are not covered under Medicare A/B, though coverage is available through the Veteran Affairs for eligible veterans.

This affordability gap has paved the way for OTC providers, where consumer electronics companies such as Apple, Sony, and Amazon are increasingly active. As technology improves, the performance gap between OTC and medical-grade devices could narrow. If that occurs, pricing pressure could eventually build in parts of the market, though it is still too early to determine whether they will materially disrupt the wider category.

[comps table]

Unfortunately I didn’t manage to get the final parts of the post shipped before the surprising announcement of GN carving out its Hearing division to Amplifon this morning. It is what it is. On to the next!…

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

The bigger picture

FY2025 was a banner-year for UIE, driven by three tailwinds in concert: (i) record performance in United Plantations; (ii) positive FV developments in the Schörling portfolio; and (iii) favorable SEK/MYR exchange rates against the USD.

The main question-mark is the size of the proposed dividend of DKK 6.49/share1 (payable in May’26) when compared to the DKK ~400m dividend received by UIE from United Plantations - i.e., implied payout of ~50%. I would hope (and expect) the company intends to use the remainder for additional buybacks, though nothing has been communicated on this matter just yet. For context, UIE trades at a ~33% discount to NAV hence it would make sense for management to capitalize on this gap.

Zooming in on United Plantations

United Plantations - the largest (~88% of EV) and only core operating asset - delivered its best performance in its 120 years of corporate history, with MYR 2.51bn topline (+14.4% y/y) driven by record upstream CPO production (and yields), and supportive commodity prices2 for most of the year. Core EBIT3 landed at MYR 1.01bn for a record 40.8% margin mainly from improved productivity.

As noted in the full write-up, United Plantations - as with any other commodity player - is a price-taker. This means that unit economics largely depend on operating efficiency; a domain they have mastered by way of (i) its rail +600km infrastructure; (ii) proprietary high-yield planting material; and (iii) full value chain control, incl. self-powered energy usage. This is the reason for the company’s +2x industry average profitability and consequently higher valuation vs. peers.

The CPO yield and PKO yield across both Malaysia (80% of mature cultivated oil palm land) and Indonesia (20%) reached all-time highs. To that end, with the replanted cohort from Tanarata Estate - acquired in 2019 - is reaching its peak production age, hence I would expect these levels, all else equal, to remain at these levels (or even increase slightly) in the forthcoming years.

To that end, actual CPO yield will be weighed near-term by the company’s acquisition of the North Arcadia Estate (~600 hectares) for MYR 76.6m, expanding the Malaysian landbank by 1.4%. Replanting with the company’s higher-yielding material will commence this year, with yields expecting to reach group average over the next 5-6 years. Until then, it will be a slight drag to the productive area.

Unlevered FCF continued its strong development, closing the year at MYR 766m (30.5% margin), and supportive of a final dividend payout amounting to MYR 81/share, equivalent to DKK ~400m for UIE.

The management does not provide a formal guidance, but it does provide a qualitative overview of how they see markets develop, i.e., geopolitical headwinds and potential spill-over into lower export demand, Indonesia biofuels mandate, etc., which I covered in the original write-up.

Updated NAV

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NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

You can find a review for previous quarters here: Q1’25, Q2’25, and Q3’25.

The pendulum swings both ways

Better Collective reported a decent set of Q4 figures, with shares ending the day up +9% (Stockholm) and +6% (Copenhagen) yesterday and continued to rally +4% (Stockholm) and +12% (Copenhagen) today. The closing auction today looks very peculiar, and trading across the two listings is increasingly dislocated. It could very well be the long-awaited short-squeeze: remember, you heard it here first!

My investment in BETCO easily qualifies as the most contrarian, with short-sellers having circled the name since H2’24 - mainly owing to sector-wide headwinds from (i) regulation in Brazil; and more recently (ii) the rise of AI-search. I have addressed the bear case and my shared my thoughts on why BETCO is a dangerous name to short here.

Going into 2025, everyone and their grandmother knew 2025 would be a tough year, especially H1’25. With 2025 now lapped and tough comps behind us, the pendulum is set to swing back, aided by a dense sports calendar for 2026 (incl. FIFA World Cup) and stretched positioning in BETCO. To the latter point, ~20% of BETCO free-float is sold short amid (i) heavy buyback activity making up ~25% of ADTV; and (ii) reputable family offices continuing to increase exposure to the company. On those merits, I continue to believe it is a solid short-squeeze candidate.

Let’s jump into the numbers.

BETCO reported Q4-2025 revenue of EUR 94.3m (cons. EUR 94.3m), bringing FY2025 revenue to EUR 336.7m, roughly at the mid-point of its guided range of EUR 320-350m. Adj. EBITDA landed at an all-time high of EUR 36.9m (cons. EUR 35.8m) for a 39.1% margin, and FY2025 EBITDA at EUR 102.1m versus the EUR 100-120m guidance.

Revenue: It’s tough to get particularly excited about -2% y/y topline growth (FY: -9.4%), though it was widely expected. In my view, the main blemish was the lower earnings quality with RevShare contribution sliding -15.3% for the quarter (FY: -12.6%), and -9.1% when adjusting for Brazil-related headwinds. While this is partly attributable to player-friendly outcomes, it could also be an early sign of prediction markets (i.e., Polymarket and Kalshi) taking share from incumbents1.

To that end, management argue that rising sportsbook competition is a net positive for affiliates. I tend to agree, not only because it’s logical (i.e., increased competition should spill into marketing budgets), but also because RevShare structures offer operators a lower CAC (albeit at the cost of shared LTV). Mind you, many of the emerging entrants are not flushed with cash. The caveat is whether BETCO’s media assets are still perceived as a high-quality access to high-intent players in light of the ongoing shifts in the search/discovery landscape. This is a legitimate concern and supported by the step-down in NDCs (-25% y/y) - exacerbated by the Brazilian regulation, yes - though potentially also challenged by AI-search displacing its top-of-funnel position. At this point, I still believe its too early to say with certainty - after all, media consumption is known to be habitual.

Given I view RevShare as the “gem” of the business, any evidence of structural deterioration (i.e., sustained sequential declines in the coming quarters) would materially impair the value and thus it will be closely monitored.

The company has started to also report value of deposits (“VoD”) which is meant to add more nuance/context to figures - essentially suggesting that size of the underlying value-pool, for which RevShare is earned, is healthy despite the NDC slow-down.

Adj. EBITDA: The company flagged Q4 as being its highest ever quarterly adj. EBITDA figure. This is partly due to the rightsized organization with headcount reduced by 375 FTEs y/y, bringing EUR 50m in RR savings, which should boost operating leverage going into the higher-activity 2026. Cash EBITDA (i.e., incl. special items, IFRS lease payments, and capitalized R&D) landed at EUR 23.1m (FY: EUR 59.8m), also at its highest level on record2.

Cash generation: The positive EBITDA contribution was offset by NWC build-up (13.5% of FY25 sales vs. 8.3% LY), as collection of receivables (FY DSO 93 days) was pushed into 2026. Unlevered FCF landed at EUR 3.5m for the quarter (4% margin) and EUR 30.8m for FY (9.1% margin). I hope to see this pick up pace as aforementioned operating leverage kicks in. Net cash flow was EUR -13.7m (FY: EUR -54.9m), driven by aggressive buybacks of EUR 35.6m for the year (shares cancelled3).

Guidance: Management guided 7-12% organic revenue growth (EUR 360-380m) alongside an implied adj. EBITDA margin of 30-33%. The buyback streak is continuing with expected EUR 40m in buybacks, and NIBD/ad. EBITDA kept below 3x (vs. current 2.6x). I view the guidance as management being cautious.

I continue to see attractive upside in BETCO, supported by operational momentum into a busy 2026 event calendar that should drive banner-year RevShare (high-margin) contribution. This, coupled with shorts looking increasingly caged into an illiquid stock, is a cocktail that may pay off handsomely if stars align. Having said that, I am not blind to the ongoing shifts in the search landscape, and will - as outlined above - keep an eye on ongoing developments. Same logic goes for regulation.

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

It has been a difficult period for online classifieds, incl. Vend Marketplaces - driven less by fundamentals and more by industry-wide deteriorating narratives. I believe the dislocation in the narrative among online classifieds can largely be traced back to (i) Indiscriminate read-across from Rightmove management’s AI investment commentary1; and (ii) wider online-/SaaS sell-off from AI-related disintermediation. I believe there are grounds for concern among some providers - but I do not believe VEND is one of them; a point I will elaborate on in a separate post. As a result, I have more than doubled my position in VEND since my first publication, making it one of my largest (and highest conviction) holdings.

Today’s earnings report was stellar across the board, sending the shares up +5% for the day. Revenue came in at NOK 1,510m, broadly flat y-o-y and slightly ahead of consensus. The real highlight was the EBITDA at NOK 490 (34% margin) landing 13.5% ahead of consensus, driven by disciplined cost management2 (OPEX running ~6% below consensus) and continued monetization efforts.

ARPA momentum remains the central driver, with double-digit growth across the board, as pricing power is cautiously exercised. Worth noting that volumes have been subdued on weaker macro, hence once volumes eventually normalize, operating leverage should become more pronounced. On exercising pricing power, I view management’s decision to selectively postpone certain planned monetization initiatives favorably. To me, it suggests that management is well aware of the potential lash-back from hiking prices too aggressively without a perceived justifiable improvement in the value proposition.

The bottom line was distorted by a non-cash write-down of Adevinta amounting to NOK 2,824m, driven by lower peer valuation multiples rather than any deterioration in underlying operations. In fact, management explicitly pointed to improved operational performance within Adevinta.

The balance sheet is robust with net cash at NOK 210m, giving sufficient flexibility for shareholder distributions (NOK 7.9bn3 returned during FY’25) by way of a new NOK 2bn buyback program, and a proposed increase in the ordinary dividend to NOK 537m, equivalent to NOK 2.5/share (NOK 2.25/share LY).

Overall, the thesis is on track and I am happy with the quarter and my decision to increase my exposure. This is a ~20% 4Y IRR opportunity on conservative estimates, with Adevinta stake- for which exit dialogues for the largest assets are ongoing - accounting for >50% of the current share price.

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NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

Strong Q4’25 report from SOBI this morning, sending the shares up ~8% today. Headline figures were pre-announced a few weeks ago, showing SEK 7,821m topline, up +15% in CC, with adj. EBITA at SEK 3,217m for a 40% margin - with the outperformance vs. the latest guidance (in Q3’25) being driven by stronger sales for Doptelet, Gamifant and the Haemophilia portfolio.

One of today’s bright spots was the upbeat guidance of LDD topline growth (CC) alongside adj. EBITA margins in the mid-30s. Management’s historical approach to annual guidance has been to under-promise and over-deliver, hence if history is any help, that suggests we’re in for yet another banner-year in 2026.

In Haematology, the EU launch of Altuvoct remains standout and materially ahead of consensus1 - an encouraging read-across on successful market share expansion by way of (i) converting patients on short half-life factor products; and possibly also (ii) non-factor (Hemlibra) patients. Doptelet continued its steady outperformance versus expectations, while the remainder of the portfolio (Alprolix, royalties, Vonjo, Zynlonta) landed largely in line.

Immunology was a bit more mixed, with Gamifant again delivering ahead of consensus, but offset by a weakerBeyfortus royalty contribution mainly due to RSV seasonality and inventory effects. Importantly, management framed 2025 as an aberration rather than a reset for Beyfortus, with a pick-up in royalty-share expected to support 2026 - albeit still cautioning competition (i.e., Merck’s Enflonsia) and general RSV immunisation uptake2.

From a strategic perspective, pipeline progress was constructive with regulatory filings for Gamifant in new indications and geographies, early but encouraging “proof-point” data in IFNγ-driven sepsis, and the initial EU launch of Tryngolza. That said, management was explicit in labelling 2026 as a transition year, with elevated OPEX tied to launches and R&D investments temporarily weighing on margins before a return toward ~40% longer term - all of which were well-known.

Generally, I am very satisfied with SOBIs development operationally (and share price wise) and look forward to the CMD on February 18.

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Full disclosure: I have reduced my holding in SOBI both yesterday (04/02/2026) and today (05/02/2026) to (i) fund additional shares in, among other, Vend Marketplaces; and (ii) rebalance my holding as shares are closing in on my fair value assessment.

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

Quick notes for the record

This morning, Loomis reported another strong set of figures, sending the shares up ~10%. With the stock having traded down into the back half of 2025, I added to the position opportunistically; today, I have realized part of those gains (same exercise done for SOBI, covered separately) purely to rebalance risk - i.e., it is not an expression of change in views. The proceeds have been redeployed into Vend Marketplaces (also covered separately), which has been indiscriminately sold off amid the sector-wide “SaaSapocalypse” currently unfolding.

Tagging along nicely

As a reminder, the investment thesis in Loomis mainly rests on two core aspects that, in my view, the market continues to underestimate: (i) the market is too optimistic about the pace at which global cash usage will decline, particularly in the context of national security considerations amid still rising risks of cyber-attacks; (ii) the market fails to recognize the optionality for Loomis to leverage its dense logistics network and proven track-record within high-security transport in non-cash related verticals, such as pharma, defense, valuables and other end-markets where trust, reliability, and physical infrastructure (network) matter.

Loomis delivered yet another strong set of figures, with Q4’25 revenue at SEK 7.7bn, up 7.4% y/y in CC, though headline growth (-2.7%) was obscured by heavy FX-drag (-10.1% y/y) during the quarter. Profitability was again the highlight, with adj. EBITA at SEK 1.0bn for a 13.2% margin, up 30bps vs. SPLY despite ongoing restructuring and continued OPEX investments across the network.

Worth noting that consensus estimates going into the quarter reflected (i) tough comps as Q4’24 was a solid quarter overall; and (ii) management’s commentary around potential softening in the valuables segment in the event of contracting precious metals prices. The latter did not happen - continued geopolitical instability supported the demand for physical assets (i.e., precious metals) as a store of value, which Loomis helps transport.

Cash generation remained strong at ~20% unlevered FCF margin for Q4’25, and leverage still conservative at 1.55x adj. EBITDA.

In my view, a highlight of the report was the proposed SEK 15/share ordinary dividend and SEK 5/share extraordinary dividend - cumulatively SEK ~1.3bn. That’s a ~5% yield on the current share price, not bad. Add to this a total of SEK 600m in buybacks completed during FY25.

Generally, I am happy with how the company is progressing, but I do want to see some larger acquisitions outside of the cash-related business to reshape the narrative about implied terminal risks. Granted, the company has indeed conducted some smaller add-ons outside of physical cash sphere, most notably (i) Kipfer Logistics (“Loomis Pharma”) for secure temperature-controlled transport and storage; (ii) a few POS providers1 for Loomis Pay; and (iii) a Canadian precious storage facility2. I believe it’s just a matter of time before we’ll (hopefully) see a more material acquisition.

Thesis remains intact.

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The Nordic region is fertile ground for activists, and laws are among the most “pro-minority” you can find1. Yes, the shareholder base is often quite concentrated and thus perceived as less inviting for activism - but that’s not always the case. I could come up with a long list of companies that could credibly be targeted by activists. Yet, for some reason it rarely happens.

Sometimes I wonder what I would do if I had the mandate (and intellectual capacity) to act as an activist in some of these companies where, for one reason or another, the underlying quality is masqueraded by fixable (often self-inflicted) factors. Then I wake up - still a 27 year-old writing on Substack to some 1,000 readers (thank you!).

But thought experiments have their place. And so this will be the first edition of “Ripe for Activism”, where I highlight Nordic-listed companies that could benefit from an engaged owner, and share tangible levers to unlock value.

The first company in line is Bavarian Nordic (CPSE:BAVA).

Bavarian Nordic (CPSE:BAVA)

Long-time readers will recall that I highlighted Bavarian Nordic (CPSE:BAVA) as a sector favorite - alongside AstraZeneca (OM:AZN) and Swedish Orphan Biovitrum (OM:SOBI) - in the wake of Trump’s tariff scare. All of those calls have worked out well - but BAVA was an outlier given it received a takeover bid from Nordic Capital and Permira a few months later. But before we get into that, let me set the stage for you.

BAVA’s equity story has been through several iterations over the past ten years, each time leaving investor’s confidence in the dirt. It started as a classic biotech name centered around its cancer therapy candidate, ProstVac, which failed Phase 3 in 2017. Then focus shifted to its RSV-/Covid-19 vaccine candidates - both of which turned out to be failures, with the former failing Phase 3 and the latter being scrapped post Phase 3 on insufficient efficacy vis-á-vis incumbents. Granted, some of these outcomes are considered “name-of-the-game” in pharma - but management’s consistently upbeat commentary ahead of each disappointment weren’t exactly helpful to sentiment.

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As you stroll through the grocery store and fill your basket with chips, frozen pizza, ice cream, chocolate, detergent, shampoo, and cosmetics - what do you notice apart from this clearly being an American1 shopper? A closer look at the ingredients list should give it away. Palm oil.

Palm oil is everywhere, and that’s unlikely to change anytime soon, despite the heavy criticism it has attracted over the past decade. Yield-per-hectare for the crop is ~9x higher than its closest alternative, making any large-scale substitution both economically and environmentally unrealistic. That doesn’t mean investors should bury their head in the sand and ignore the criticism. Much of it is warranted and centers on the industry’s role in deforestation and the destruction of habitats for endangered species. But the debate lacks nuance, with good and bad actors often lumped together without context.

The company covered today, United International Enterprise (“UIE”) (CPSE:UIE), is a Denmark-based holding company whose core value is derived from United Plantations (“UP”) (KLSE:UTDPLT) - a vertically integrated palm oil producer in Southeast Asia, with unmatched operating efficiency and environmental leadership - two attributes that rarely coexist. Beyond its controlling stake in UP, UIE has exposure to 6 high-quality Swedish names (5/6 listed) and a smaller “venture”-like fund. The best thing is, the portfolio trades at a ~30% discount to NAV - and management is actively looking to close the gap via buybacks “so long as the shares continue to be traded at a material holding discount”.

Before anyone starts pounding the table over HoldCo discounts - citing a ~30% discount as standard compensation for risks pertaining to asset quality, incentives, governance, capital allocation, etc. - let me be the first to calm your nerves. You’re not wrong. Those risks are not applicable to UIE, who has materially improved its approach to disclosure, governance, and capital distribution2.

I believe UIE - to a large extent a historical construct - is a proxy for UP rather than a conventional investment company. As such, I see this investment as exposure to a high-quality, largely owner-operated core asset, with incremental upside from small, liquid, non-core investments.

With that, let’s dig in…

A brief look at history

Understanding UIE requires some familiarity with the history of UP - partly because the creation of UIE is indeed a byproduct of historical events, but more importantly because the foundation of UPs moat has blossomed from seeds planted more than a century ago (no pun intended). If you find the story as fascinating as I did3, I strongly recommend reading The UP Saga, which is freely available for download. Apart from that, the company has done a good job archiving past events, summarized in its 50-year and 100-year booklet.

A wealthy Dane venturing into plantation

In 1906, Aage Westenholz, a 47 year-old Danish engineer and businessman who had built his fortune in Thailand4, established a rubber estate at Jemdarata in Lower Perak, Malaysia (“The Jendarata Rubber Company”). When his brother-in-law, Willian Lennart Grut, succeeded him in 1911, the business started diversifying into other crops and new estates, consolidating operations into United Plantations in 1917. Still, the heavy exposure toward rubber production put the company near bankruptcy by 1922 on the back of collapsing rubber prices, only saved by a Straits 100,000 capital injection.

It wasn’t until the late 1920s that UP pivoted into large-scale oil palm cultivation in Malaysia - among the first of its kind. Drawing on A. Westenholz’s Thai railway experience, the company invested in narrow-gauge light railway to move fresh fruit bunches (“FFB”) efficiently from field to mill. That system still operates today, spanning +600km across estates.

The “modern” UP culture crystalized under the leadership of Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Børge Bek-Nielsen5 who took over as managing director in 1972 after 31 years at the company. He essentially institutionalized what his predecessors had begun, instilling long-term thinking, operational discipline, and strong workforce welfare as core pillars of the UP values.

“It is through discipline and productivity that UP is what it is today. We are one of the best-managed plantations. We pay the highest wages in the industry. Our workers have an excellent provident fund. We have started the first old folks’ home in one of our estates, where old employees are looked after. Our medical and housing facilities are among the best”

- Dato Seri B. Bek-Nielsen, Financial Times (May 13, 1982)

These clams still hold today. UP offers its employees modern housing, schools for their kids, medical facilities, nursing homes, etc. The community even features a Danish-inspired bakery. Perhaps more importantly - and elaborated later - the operating edge persists, supported by aforementioned railway, in-house R&D of high-yielding planting material, and deep vertical integration.

State influence and the creation of UIE

Against the backdrop of the Malaysian government’s New Economic Policy (“NEP”), foreign-controlled companies had to reduce their stakes to a maximum of 30% by 1990. As a result of this, UP’s Danish ownership structure were reduced in a transaction with the state-owned vehicle, FIMA, during the early 1980s.

This essentially left foreign (largely Danish) investors with a binary choice; accept dilution and influence of UP or monetize and exit. In that context, UIE was essentially an adaptive response, whereby shareholders could sell down part of their UP exposure to Malaysian interests while reconsolidating the remaining stake into a single holding company with board-level influence. Apart from owning UP as a core holding, the purpose of UIE was to allocate capital into the broader agriculture sector.

However, they never really got up to speed on the latter objective as the NEP was rolled back just ~5 years after the transaction, paving the way for UIE to increase exposure to today’s 48.4%. While the state-driven reset is still detectable in the UP cap table today, its impact is contained as a historical artefact (i.e., <5% holding)6.

A look into UIEs holdings

Today, UIE is formally listed as a holding company with one operating asset - UP (~89% of NAV) - for which it holds a 48.4% stake. Alongside this, UIE has indirect exposure to 6 quality Swedish companies via a 1.78% stake in Schörling (~9% of NAV), and 5 tech companies via a 9.3% investment in venture-like fund, Greenbridge (~2%), headed by Ola Rellén.

However, given UP’s dominant weight, an investment in UIE should be underwritten first and foremost as a fundamentally anchored investment in UP with the remaining holdings viewed as incremental upside.

United Plantations

With a total landbank of +60,000 hectares, of which 50,854 is cultivated, UP operates an area that is +10x the size of Manhattan. The company has a vertically integrated value chain spanning pre-seed R&D, cultivation, milling, and oil extraction and refining. Its hard-to-replicate biological asset base supports annual production of +250,000 Mt crude palm oil (CPO), ~50,000 Mt palm kernel oil (PKO), and ~90m coconuts. Here’s an overview of the estate:

Importantly, scale alone is not the key differentiator. In fact, UP is not even close to being the largest plantation operator, however, it is consistently the most productive, with yields - and consequently margins - running at ~2x the industry average. This is a crucial part of the equity story given suppliers in the agriculture industry, to a large extent, operate with limited pricing power7.

The key enabler of this efficiency comes from, inter alia, (i) its rail infrastructure spanning +600km; (ii) proprietary high-yield planting material; and (iii) full value chain control, incl. self-powered energy usage8. Below is an attempt to illustrate the value chain:

As a relatively unique characteristic, oil palms can generate two distinct types of oil; (i) crude palm oil (“CPO”); and (ii) palm kernel oil (“PKO”). Once an oil palm is planted, it takes roughly 2-4 years before reaching maturity and production of fresh fruit bunches (“FFB”). Yield then ramps and peaks between ~5 and ~23 years of age, after which yields contract9. As such, the lifecycle of a palm is ~25 years at which point it is felled and replanted - the economic life, however, is closer to ~20 years.

This long biological lifecycle is crucial as it requires plantation owners to continuously allocate land to immature plants that generate no near-term revenue - a point I will revisit shortly.

At peak productivity, a single palm produces 12-14 FFBs annually - distributed over the year as oil palms can be harvested every ~2 weeks. Each FFB weighs 20-30 kg and contains upwards of 3,000 individual fruitlets. The fruitlet consists of two economically relevant components; (i) the flesh which is processed into CPO; and (ii) the kernel which is used for palm kernel oil and related derivatives (e.g., animal feed).

Contrary to the prevailing mainstream media narrative, palm oil is second to none in terms of its yield profile - and consequently land-use efficiency and climate impact. On an industry-average basis, the yield-per-hectare of oil palms is ~9x higher than any substitutable crop (e.g., soy, rape, sunflower, etc.). With that in mind, recall that UP’s yield is 2x the palm oil industry standard.

Having said that, parts of the criticism are justified - namely deforestation and biodiversity loss linked to irresponsible expansion. As with anything, however, there are good and bad actors. UP belongs in the latter camp and is exemplary of sustainable agriculture: As documented in their collaboration with Copenhagen Zoo in this documentary and underscored by its status as the first member of the RSPO, the company has long relied on biological pest control by, inter alia, fostering a controlled ecosystem of snakes, barn owls, and other natural predators to protect crops. As a side note, the documentary also illustrates the passion of the Bek-Nielsen brothers (majority owners), who are in the trenches on a day-to-day basis as opposed to running UP on an arms-length basis.

In more recent years, the governments - Malaysian and Indonesian, that is, who account for 85% of global CPO-/PKO supply - have also taken a more proactive stance. For instance, Malaysia - which is more progressed on this front - has imposed regulations limiting the total hectares that can be used for oil palm cultivation, set at 6.5m versus the current level of 5.6m.

This effectively caps greenfield-driven supply growth and pushes operator’s volume expansion into two camps: (i) brownfield acquisitions; and/or (ii) yield uplift. To that end, UP acquired 3,656 hectares (brownfield) in Malaysia - Tanarata Estate (prev. Pinehill) - in 2019, which had an FFB yield at 14-16 Mt/Ha vis-á-vis UP Malaysia at 29.6 Mt/Ha in 2024. UP has felled and replanted the estate during 2019-2021, using its higher-yielding planting material, and that cohort - as per the oil palm lifecycle described earlier - is entering prime yield territory.

Constrained greenfield expansion is only part of the supply story. Indonesia’s biofuel mandates10 - currently at B40 as of Jan’25 but in the last innings of B50 testing - absorbs incremental CPO volumes, with some government officials guiding for 2026 as the B50 transition. Lastly, smallholders11 - collectively accounting for +30% of FFB volumes - have deferred replanting for short-term economics12. In short, I see 3 “structural” supply-side factors that are supportive for UP:

All of this happens while CPO-/PKO output from UP is expected to grow modestly13 while demand remains anchored to population growth and rising GDP per capita, particularly across EM where per-capita oils and fats consumption is still on the steep part of the income curve.

As with virtually any commodity, demand for a given crop is a shaped by the price (and supply) of substitutes. In the context of palm oil, it is helpful to understand the relative pricing and marginal substitution within the global vegetable oil complex (soybean, rapeseed, sunflower, coconut, etc.). Against that backdrop, CPO/PKO appear well positioned, trading at a discount to most competing oils today - which is supportive for UP in the short-term.

Similarly, the biofuel mandates implemented by the likes of Indonesia (palm oil) and Brazil (soy oil) has created a price-link between said oils and the wider brent crude prices. This is is despite only ~5% - but growing - of global palm oil output is used for biofuels. To that end, worth noting that UP maintains a strict (long-standing, since 2003) policy against supplying raw materials or refined products for biodiesel production.

Having said that, I am no commodity expert - and frankly, I am not aspiring to be one either - and so I will refrain from trying to call the medium-/long-term outlook. But I highly doubt that palm oil will ever get displaced as a core ingredient across food-/oleochemicals so long as humans walk this earth.

As you’d expect, UP’s financial performance tracks CPO-/PKO prices, which will always be subject to vagaries of weather and international markets. That said, the company’s efficiency-/profitability cushions any such downturns. In fact, the company has not reported a single year of negative EPS or operating cash flow since 1989 (the earliest available data point14).

Speaking of balance sheet cushion, the company runs a very conservative capital structure, with net cash at ~15% of total assets - perhaps overly conservative, in my view. While liquidity for “a rainy day” is indeed valuable, ide cash - even if part of it is placed in higher-yielding cash accounts - can get too excessive. Perhaps this is what motivated the special dividend (MYR 0.14/share) alongside the interim dividend (MYR 0.30/share) paid in Nov’25. With market pricing having remained elevated through Q4’25 and carrying into 2026, I would expect more of the same to come in 2026. For completeness, the stated payout policy is 70-90% of net income - of which UIE re-distributes at least 50% to shareholders.

Valuation-wise, I believe UP trades broadly at fair value and at a justified premium to the wider peer group. With its superior economics largely priced in at current levels, I would expect incremental upside to be driven primarily by sector beta and less company-specific.

Schörling and Greenbridge

The story of the UIE-Schörling-Greenbridge relationship can easily get messy, but here’s the short version. In 2012, UIE sold 2/3 of its stake in AAK (OM:AAK) to the then-listed investment company, Schörling (MSAB). Part of the consideration was equity rather than cash, leaving UIE with an initial 1.1% ownership in Schörling, which has since increased to 1.8% today.

Most of Schörling’s assets - at least the ones UIE have exposure to - are liquid, Swedish-listed quality companies. In fact, I own some of them myself (not that it matters). The only holding which is not listed is Anticimex, a tech-enabled pest-control business, majority owned by EQT since 2012. The company was rumored for IPO in 2021, but was ultimately sold to EQT future instead15. It was part of this sale that Schörling joined with a 22% stake. We’re now approaching 14 years of cumulative EQT ownership, hence I would not be surprised to see a listing/exit soon enough.

Greenbridge is best understood as an offspring of the UIE-Schörling partnership, but led by co-owner and prior CEO of Hexagon (OM:HEXA B), Ola Rollén who monetised half his stake in Hexagon for this project. Information on Greenbridge and its assets are relatively limited - and to be fair, it is a rounding error in UIE regardless - but my they essentially invest in founder-led advanced technology businesses16.

UIE is represented on the board of both Schörling and Greenbridge.

Look-through valuation

Given most assets are publicly listed, the look-through NAV valuation is fairly straight-forward and suggests a ~30% discount to NAV as per the below overview.

A HoldCo discount of this magnitude is not out of the ordinary. However, I don’t view UIE as your typical HoldCo. In my view, UIE is a proxy for UP - it was literally created as a legal work-around on the back of the Malaysian NEP paradigm. This is supported by the fact that (i) the Bek-Nielsen brothers’ role as “owner-operators” in UP, with day-to-day involvement; and (ii) UIE’s limited activity in new capital deployments. As such, I see UIE as exposure to (i) a fundamentally sound, “evergreen”-style asset, with (ii) a return kicker17 from the Schörling and Greenbridge investments; for which (iii) there’s a margin of safety embedded into the NAV-discount.

I know some of my readers would like to have additional margin of safety embedded into the UP share price, which is a fair take. In that case, UIE is a solid name to track going forward. Personally, I take comfort in the long historical track and the company buying back shares with a clear intent of narrowing the discount.

Risks and catalysts

• Risks

  • Commodity cycle

  • Weaponization of CPO in global trade

  • Regulations, incl. biofuel mandate changes (i.e., delay of B50 in Indonesia)

  • Deterioration of yields (weather, “animal pest control” backlash, etc.)

• Catalysts

  • Listing of Anticimex and/or Greenbridge

  • Jumbo dividend, tender offer, or similar

  • Reconsolidation to old structure-/share distribution of UP shares

  • Incremental pick-up in yields as Tanarata Estate reaches maturity

Markets often feel like a newswire in a windstorm, with headlines whipping past, up-/downgrades piling up, and your the media’s preferred guru confidently calling Bitcoin’s price three months out. Meanwhile, if you manage to shut out the noise and diligently flip through the news flow (I like mfn.se for the Nordics), you occasionally catch something interesting the market hasn’t fully digested.

This is particularly relevant when screening for special situations, which tend to reside in the quiet corners of the market. For that same reason, conviction cannot be borrowed - your work must carry the weight.

In this post, I share my thinking on a few special situations in Denmark that I am monitoring (or already own). If readers find value in this format, I’ll consider making it a reoccurring series - I have a few up the sleeve in Sweden and Finland too.

Oh… and merry Christmas!

#1 - Fast Ejendom Danmark (CPSE:FED)

TLDR: Orderly liquidation trading at ~40% discount to NAV. Watchlisted.

Fast Ejendom Danmark (“FED”) is a Copenhagen-based investor in real estate assets, including offices (41% of property value), logistics (43%) and other (16%). In late October 2025, the company announced a strategy to undergo an orderly liquidation, citing persistent detachment between reported NAV and the market capitalization.

Shares shot up +30% on announcement and have continued to climb higher in recent weeks. The discount to NAV now sits at ~40%. Question is if that is attractive from an IRR perspective. Before diving into that, a quick comment on the NAV itself.

As with any other DCF valuation, the NAV assessment is subject to management discretion. Property values are derived from (i) the expected future cash flows a given property is expected to yield, discounted by (ii) a required rate of return that reflects asset-specific risks. FED applies a weighted average discount rate of 6.3%, which I believe is fair in lieu of the property types, utilization rates (~90%), their geographical position1, and available peer info for overlapping locations.

The company’s balance sheet is decent with an equity ratio of ~44%, and 2/3 of the debt fixed for five years or longer. The residual 1/3 is floating, linked to 6m CIBOR, and introduces an element of interest rate risk but not it is concerning, in my view. Having said that, higher rates will inevitably drive down NAV so its not like you walk entirely free from duration risk.

Speaking of duration risk, real estate (especially outside Copenhagen) does not sell like hot bread. Management has, perhaps wisely, refrained from providing an exact timeline for the wind-down, aside from a more general “over the coming years”. After all, operations are cash flow positive - i.e., there is no urgency to get properties off the books per se. Still, there is an unknown - timing, both in terms of what assets get sold first and the overall timetable - which investors must get comfortable with.

I believe the below sensitivity table does a decent job summarizing the case.

Given the full value realization path is likely longer-dated (i.e., at least 2 years, in my view), I believe there are better opportunities elsewhere at these levels. However, I will monitor the situation closely in hopes of a reversal back to ~190/share area.

#2 - Schouw & Co (CPSE:SCHO)

TLDR: A HoldCo pursuing an IPO its largest holding to unlock hidden value.

Founded in 1878, Schouw & Co is an industrial conglomerate with six holdings, operated independently (limited synergies). In an effort to surface the underlying value of the Group, the company has mandated banks to explore a potential IPO of its largest holding, BioMar - the world’s third-largest producer of high-quality feed for farmed fish and shrimp with 17 facilities in 13 countries.

The IPO, scheduled for H1’26, is rumored to fetch a valuation (EV) north of DKK 15bn, corresponding to ~13x EBIT (2026E, mid-point of guide). For context, analysts are working with DKK 12-13bn EV in their SOTP models, equivalent to an equity value impact of DKK 110/share, all else equal. That’s a ~20% differential versus the current share price - i.e., nothing to get excited about just yet, but worth tracking nonetheless.

The company intends to retain a majority stake of BioMar post listing, and “proceeds from a potential listing are expected to be reinvested in the portfolio business, with the possibility of expanding through a new platform investment”. When questioned as to whether management has any platform investments in pipeline, the response is clear - they “do not have anything specific at the table”. As such, the extent to which investors will benefit from a distribution of proceeds will largely depend on (i) valuation and (ii) post-listing ownership share.

With market appetite still running hot and BioMar performing well, I would not expect any major pushback on the DKK 15bn valuation. However, worth noting that MOWI were in market with its feed division, with no deal completed - i.e., could be that appetite is in fact limited.

I will park this here and monitor for any events, reversion in share price, etc. In the meantime, I intend on digging more into the business - my familiarity with SCHO is still limited.

#3 - SKAKO (CPSE:SKAKO)

TLDR: A late-stage liquidation trading at 20% discount to net cash. Owned.

I have covered this opportunity in detail in a separate post (linked below). Recent developments, however, warrant an update. Readers who are not yet familiar with the situation are encouraged to review the original piece first.

Friday after market close, controlling shareholder Frederik2 ApS - owned by the CEO (C. Jørgensen) and Chairman (J. Willumsen) - announced a mandatory offer at DKK 49.80/share after crossing the 33% ownership-/voting threshold on the back of acquiring a 9.9% stake from Danica Pension at that same price. For context, the stock closed the session at DKK 51.60/share.

Mind you, SKAKO is a shell with DKK ~64/share in net cash, of which DKK ~47/share (mid-point of communicated range) will be returned to shareholders beginning of next year. The stub (DKK ~17/share) will remain on balance so as to backstop any warranty claims from “LegacyCo.” It doesn’t take a genius to know that the two gentlemen have struck a good deal - kudos. As for Danica Pension, the gap in financial judgment is hard to ignore…

As for the stub, I continue to believe SKAKO could transfer the residual warranty-tail exposure to a third party, enabling a full wind-down materially ahead of schedule. Nordic banks’ appetite for such risk transfers - warehousing guarantee risks, packaging it, skimming a few bps, and offloading to counterparties such as Atradius - has been notably forward-leaning in recent years.

While the mandatory offer is procedural in nature, there is a risk that minority investors get their hands tied. That risk to a large extent depends on whether Maj Invest (9.8% stake) walks in the shoes of Danica and accepts the bid. Such scenario would leave the final outcome in the hands of a fragmented shareholders base comprising the remaining ~50% stake.

What could possibly motivate Maj Invest to accept? My best guess is rooted more in practicality than valuation. In the unlikely event that no financial institution is willing to assume the warranty risks (or customers willing to change terms), the final wind-down will be dragged out, leaving them effectively pinned down with a rounding-error-position in an illiquid shell for years. Difficult to say, but definitely not out of the question. That implies rejecting a “worst case”2 IRR at ~14%, excluding any returns on the stub.

I will keep my shares (full disclosure, I added to my position prior to the bid) and intend to vote against the offer.

#4 - Asetek (CPSE:ASTK)

TLDR: A takeover trading at ~8% spread to bid. IRR potential of ~60%. Owned.

Note: I wrote this a few weeks ago. The spread has now halved, i.e., R/R not as attractive anymore. Formal bid was launched December 19.

Asetek is a Copenhagen-listed (DKK 80m MCAP) provider of Denmark-based provider of (i) Liquid Cooling solutions for computer hardware (88% of LTM sales), posting +30% EBITDA margins; and (ii) SimSports equipment (12%) which is draining cash. The company has also dipped its toes into the data center space, though it formally exited the space in 2021.

Recent industry-wide softness in gaming has put pressure on topline development and margins-/cash generation were challenged by a series of strategic missteps, mainly related to poor capital allocation - throwing good money (liquid cooling) after bad (SimSports). In late 2024, this culminated in with a covenant breach for which the company had to raise a minimum DKK 60m in new equity to cure. With a company practically on its knees, the management-/board still had the audacity to ask for DKK ~115m in new equity - with the residual (DKK 55m) earmarked for investments into… you guessed it; SimSports. Mind you, the market cap at the time was DKK ~60m, and its not like investors had great confidence in management’s capital allocation3. The company wound up raising DKK 88m with limited investor appetite.

The near term equity story became even harder to parse when the company announced two diverging messages within a three-day timespan. On April 25, Asetek lowered its 2025 guidance (mainly related to SimSports) on the back of Trump’s tariffs. On April 28, the company announced a major “milestone” when it landed an agreement with a leading Nordic electronics retailer for its SimSports products.

All throughout this tumultuous period, a tug-of-war between activists4 and the existing board-/management were building, and ultimately resulted in the entire board getting overturned at the AGM. This is likely what has brought this special situation to light.

On November 25, Asetek shareholders received a DKK 1.72/share all-cash takeover offer from China-based Chunqiu; a premium of ~110% to the prior-day close or ~156% L12M VWAP. Shares currently trade at DKK 1.59/share, implying an 8% deal spread. At least 38.5% of shareholders have accepted the offer; supported by the activist block, which held a combined ~33% at announcement and has continued to add, as evidenced by subsequent insider trade disclosures5. That alone suggests that better-informed investors (i.e., by virtue of their capacity as board members) believe there is limited execution risk.

The spread is partly explained by the lack of a formal bid - expected to land no later than December 23 🎅. Yet, the market is likely also discounting:

• Acceptance risks from retail “diamond-hand” owners who will be forced to face reality.

• ATP (13% stake) blocking the deal.

• Regulatory tail risk given the buyer is Chinese and Asetek’s (rather unsuccesful) stint in the datacenter space.

The first two are tough to handicap, though I would expect ATP to see this as a good opportunity to get rid of a headache. As for regulatory risks, there is a bigger likelihood that Asetek will pass as a toy-maker than any critical infrastructure. In that context, the tail risk pertains mainly to a potential call for review that could drag out the process - which is quite unlikely anyway, in my view.

I have a smaller position - reflective of my assessment of deal certainty/risk - in Asetek at DKK 1.58/share. For what it’s worth, I screened the company earlier this year, and rejected due to, inter alia, lumpy sales, significant supplier/customer concentration, and poor capital allocation. Hence, this is purely a merger arbitrage play; I plan on exiting before the spread is fully closed, which hopefully happens when the formal bid lands.

#5 - North Media (CPSE:NORTHM)

TLDR: Deep value on paper but governance discount in practice. Pass.

To be fair, this is not a special situation - but it is indeed an unusual situation in this neck of the woods. While it has the potential of becoming a no-brainer case, the key ingredient for such outcome is missing; shareholder alignment. Still, North Media is increasingly tossed around as a “no-brainer” opportunity in the online investing community. Below I unpack why the case is, admittedly, tempting but equally dull.

North Media is a founder-controlled conglomerate with two operating segments: (i) legacy print and last-mile distribution of magazines, supermarket leaflets, and similar formats; and (ii) a digital portfolio spanning the leading domestic apartment-rental marketplace alongside more opportunistic, venture-style assets. Perhaps paradoxically, the core operations are the least interesting part of the story. All you need to know is that the Group is not burning cash.

The more exciting part of North Media is its balance sheet. The company holds a stock portfolio worth DKK ~840m6 more than its own market capitalization (DKK ~740m), real estate at cost (DKK 242m BV), and limited debt (DKK 136m) mainly in the form of mortgages.

Any investor is right to scratch their head when looking at this. It looks like a no-brainer on the surface, but the uncomfortable truth is North Media has been this way for a long while - having tested the patience of many (mainly Danish) investors for ages. In that context, it makes sense why the enthusiasm for NORTHM in the “fintwit” community is overwhelmingly driven by Norwegian and Swedish investors.

Founder and majority shareholder (~57%), Richard Bunck is the gatekeeper of the returns said investors are underwriting. The obvious question - why doesn’t he exploit the situation and launch a takeover offer or buy back shares? After all, there is lots of headroom to give before a premium eats into his golden egg. The answer is (probably) because he doesn’t have to. I have never spoken to the guy, but the stories I’ve heard doesn’t suggest he cares one bit about your input as a “shareholder”.

Having said all that, recent events could indicate something is brewing. Only issue is, I don’t know if it is for better or worse:

• CEO stepped down in April 2025 on mutual agreement

• CFO stepped down in September 2025 due to sickness

• Chairman will step down in 2026 on mutual agreement

• Ofir, a marketplace for jobs, was sold to peer JobIndex in January 2025

• An investment property was sold in March 2025

At this stage, the only credible - and perhaps dystopian - catalyst to unlock value is biological (Mr. Bunck is 86 years old), and not something anyone should be comfortable underwriting.

What could possibly be the least glamorous business an investor can own at a time when markets are fixated on anything related to AI? A waste management company is probably a strong contender.

In this write-up, I focus on the latest demerger in a string of Finnish corporate break-ups in recent years1, Lassila & Tikanoja (HLSE:LAT1V). These sort of corporate actions often trigger indiscriminate selling pressure, with prices drifting irrespective of intrinsic value - a pattern that has historically set up attractive entry points for patient investors. With that in mind, I place L&T on The Bench and monitor for, inter alia, a repeat of the usual post-demerger unwind.

The demerger in brief

Celebrating its 120th anniversary this year, L&T has been through quite a journey to get where it is today. When the company was founded in 1905, it operated as a wholesaler of fabrics, knick-knacks, soap, bagels, confectionary, and more. Only after the acquisition of Amerplast, a provider of waste bags, in the 1980s did L&T make inroads into the wider waste management industry.

Today, L&T consists of two overarching business units: (i) Circular Economy; and (ii) Facility Services. On December 13, 2024, the company announced its intent split the two businesses into two separately listed entities - Luotea (HLSE:LUOTEA) and [new] Lassila & Tikanoja (HLSE:LASTIK). With the final formalities complete2, the demerger will be effective as of December 31, 2025 and shareholders will receive 1 share in each entity, with first day of trading on January 02, 2026.

There is a 6-month TSA in place, covering IT, HR, and other shared resources, which looks like a fairly short timeline. But then again, they have spent +/- 12 moths getting ready for this - i.e., the big steps have already been taken. Still, I am wary of this, alongside other customary carve-out risks, such as CoC clauses in contracts and potential dis-synergies among corporate clients. I would expect to get smarter on this during H1’26.

Picking the right horse

I view the split as a positive for both companies - frankly, I see either one as a credible take over candidate. After all, many of the LBO characteristics (and value levers) are present - and several peers in both Circular Economy and Facility Services are sponsor-owned. Also, the company surveyed the market for appetite during H1’243, so it’s not like sponsors are oblivious to what’s happening. The below seeks to provide a “high-level” overview of each business.

Luotea

The facility services business will be rebranded as “Luotea”, and provides (i) Cleaning and Support Services (~46% of 2024A sales); (ii) Property Maintenance (~28%); and (iii) Techincal Services (~20%). To that end, worth noting the mix is skewed toward less sticky/mission critical offerings.

Luotea is present in Finland (~66% of sales) and Sweden (~34%). Customer concentration (Group level) is low, with top-1 and top-5 representing 5% and 20% of revenue, respectively. Roughly 60% of sales are tied to long-term service contracts averaging 5 years, though I would imagine customers do have some sort of early termination rights in some offerings. The management notes a 67% hit-rate on renegotiated contracts, which, candidly, is not something to get stoked about.

Topline growth has stalled in recent years, driven by (i) management’s deliberate efforts to exit low-margin contracts, as evidenced by the portfolio shrinking from 18,000 to 14,000 contracts L3Y; (ii) persistent operational headwinds in Sweden4, which has been deadweight L4Y and prompted a EUR 23m write-down LY; and (iii) intensifying competition on the back of largely PE-led market consolidation.

Having said that, there are early indications of the Swedish operations stabilizing, though I believe it is still too early to call the trough. But if the turnaround is in fact sustainable, there could be a material re-rating pending given the business model’s 90-100% cash conversion alongside an asset-light and deleveraged balance sheet (PF net leverage at 0.2x EBITDA LTM Q3’25).

Beyond the turnaround, investors are effectively underwriting management’s ability to deliver SoW growth, essentially implying revenue diversification into property management and technical services. I am a bit skeptical as to how straight-forward this will be without M&A - which is not a path that has worked out great in the past5. Even so, Luotea could attract interest as a takeover candidate, either from sector peers6 or financial sponsors with a “playbook” in this domain (e.g., Triton through Assemblin-/Caverion, Bravida, Unica, NVS).

To gauge valuation expectations, I have compiled a peer overview, which points to an EV/EBITDA range of 8-11x for platform investments, though smaller add-ons in the industry tends to come at 4-6x. Applying these multiples (8-11x) to Luotea’s LTM Q3’25 adj. EBITDA (reported) yields an implied valuation range (EV) at EUR 160m-220m, equivalent to a per-share equity value at EUR 4.1-5.7post split.

Overall, I do not find this side of the business too compelling, given (i) the exposure toward less sticky solutions with limited pricing power; (ii) the competitive backdrop intensifying; and (iii) the poor operational execution which may prove tough to fully stabilize. Having said that, I will still monitor the name for future opportunities - particularly if the Swedish recovery holds and/or valuation gets absurd post split.

Lassila & Tikanoja (L&T)

The Circular Economy operations are being demerged but retains the Lassila & Tikanoja brand. The business offers a full value-chain offering with a dual-sided business model consisting of (i) waste collection and processing; and (ii) recycling and resale of processed outputs.

Waste is one of the most challenging global megatrends. Volumes, complexity, and variety (input) are challenging proper recycling/recovery rates. Globally, 70-80% of waste ends up at landfills with only 20-30% running back into the “ecosystem”. Finland is no exception. In fact, Finland ranks among the worst performers in EU on circular material use rate (“CMUR”), which has prompted infringement proceedings against the country for falling short of targets.

It can only get better from here7 - and the regulatory push for has never been stronger. Yet, these same pressures have prompted government-led initiatives to “centralize” responsibilities at the municipal level (“municipalization”), detailed later.

L&T operations are divided into Waste Management & Recycling (66% of 2024A sales, Industrial Services & Water Treatment (19%), and Hazardous Waste & Remediation (19%). In each vertical, L&T is the market leader or tie-/runner-up, though the distance to peers has shrunk in recent years on the back of PE-driven consolidation.

Unit economics are inherently linked to transport distance, routing efficiency, and throughput on sites. As such, strategically located sites and logistical density are critical for operators to reach the scale required for attractive ROIC generation. This “local monopoly” dynamic also creates a natural barrier to entry - on top of the scarce permits and regulatory expertise-/approvals - as it rarely makes economic sense to open a competing facility near an existing site unless the incumbent is capacity-constrained or operating with outdated infrastructure. In that sense, the asset base is quasi-infrastructure.

In that context, L&T benefits from an unmatched network density and nation-wide coverage with ~2x as many sites than the closest competitor, Remeo.

It is important to note that the above picture only applies to the “standard” WM&R segment. This part of the market is now facing headwinds from the municipalization initiative whereby responsibility of managing household waste services is transferred to municipalities, shifting EUR 70m equivalent away from the open-market8. While the initiative is still subject to interpretation9, the most restrictive scenario would have municipalities decide between: (i) consolidating services into municipality-owned operators (e.g., Stormossen, LSJH); and/or (ii) taking over the contracting role10 and tender waste volumes through public procurement. Either outcome places a ceiling on pricing power, and may even prompt a “race-to-the-bottom” if operators turn desperate enough - losing a tender can materially impair scale/density, hence it is not unthinkable to see this dynamic play out.

Municipalization is unambiguously negative, yet I believe L&T is positioned to navigate the shift better than most peers. In fact, several specialized waste operators have already begun divesting non-core “standard” WM&R assets11 and reallocate capital toward niche segments where regulatory momentum and pricing power are more favorable (i.e., hazardous waste, water treatment, etc.)

L&T is the #1-2 player in these more specialized verticals, reported under Hazardous Waste & Remediation (15%) and Industrial Solutions & Water Treatment (19%), though the bundling of segments makes a clean comparison difficult12. In these segments, pricing power is supported by specialized know-how, strict regulation, and high switching costs - the compliance risk alone pushes customers to prioritize reliability and certified operators over marginal price differences. At face value, ~44% of L&T sales are more specialized in nature, and I suspect management will aim to lean more into these areas in the coming years.

When all is said and done, L&T operates with a solid degree of financial visibility, with ~68% of sales tied to long-term inflation-protected contracts at an average duration of ~6 years. The customer base is diversified (~140,000 accounts), with top-1 and top-20 customers accounting for 3% and 25% of sales, respectively. Importantly, these relationships are durable, with an average customer tenure of ~20 years.

Margins are relatively stable across segments, though near-term pricing power - and thus margin upside - is capped in the WM&R segment. By nature of the asset-heavy industry, maintenance capex and lease payments run at ~5% and ~3.5% of sales, respectively. Growth capex is mainly directed toward (i) site expansions, where L&T already holds permits that support ~2.9x current volumes; and (ii) selective M&A, primarily in Sweden (~5% of sales) which L&T entered in 2022. Excess cash - or ≥50% of net income - is earmarked for dividends. This should be viewed in the context of the company’s medium-term financial targets:

• Revenue growth of 6% p.a.

• Adj. EBITA margin of 11%

• NIBD of 1.5-2.5x EBITDA

• Dividend payout of ≥50% of net income

As part of the demerger, the majority of the Group’s debt is transferred to the L&T balance sheet. That includes a EUR 75m bond maturing May 2028 and a EUR 50m TLB maturing also maturing in 2028 but with a two-year extension option. As such, PF net leverage for L&T stands at 1.9x (incl. IFRS 16) as of Q3’25, backed by robust assets and predictable cash flows. For context, several of the PE-owned peers operate with net leverage levels north of 4x.

The equity story essentially hinges on (i) the company’s ability to offset municipalization headwinds with up-/cross-selling, particularly across HW&R and IS&WT; (ii) successful M&A-led expansion in Sweden alongside domestic scale benefits sufficient to lift Group-level EBITA; (iii) macro conditions turn supportive following prolonged softness in the Finnish construction sector - potentially aided by datacenter buildouts13 where specialized waste-management services are in high demand.

Private equity loves trash

Private equity interest in waste management has been particularly strong in Western Europe, as evidenced by the recent Macquarie/BIC-led takeover of UK-listed Renewi at an implied EV multiple of ~6x EBITDA14, and Altor announcing its acquisition of Evac. This, alongside the handful of private transactions in recent years may provide a relevant anchor-point for what the demerged L&T could look like. Below is a list of precedent transactions, biased toward the Nordic region.

Admittedly, the valuation range is quite broad (6-11x), likely influenced in part by data quality (given it’s private data), buyer-/seller adjusted figures, and idiosyncratic aspects related to the asset.

Listed peers trade provide another useful data point. To that end, it is important to recognize the regional differences (mainly regulation-related) shaping the waste management sector. For instance, North American names tend to trade at a material premium to European names, due to, i.a., (i) a far more consolidated market structure, with the top-3 players holding a 50% share; (ii) comparatively stable and pro-landfill regulatory environment whereas Europe-based operators must navigate updated regulations (i.e., EPR expansion, landfill bans, recycling targets, plastics directives). Taken together, this enables structurally higher margins (~30% EBITDA), lower capex intensity, and consequently superior FCF conversion. Hence, the European peer group provides the more realistic valuation benchmark for L&T.

Applying a 6x EBITDA multiple, in line with the Renewi takeover and European trading average, yields an implied EV for pure-play L&T at EUR ~515m, corresponding to an equity value of ~9.75/share15.

In the current credit environment, a financial sponsor would likely be able to finance at ~4.5x net leverage (incl. undrawns) at EURIBOR +325-375bps range in a bank format16. For fun (🤥), I put together a hypothetical LBO model, suggesting ~19% IRR through 2031, assuming no margin or multiple expansion - not bad for a quasi-infra case! But, of course, sensitive to underlying assumptions.

Model output available (free) the next 15 days, though downloads are capped at 100:

LBO model output & assumptions

Final conclusion

As noted at the outset, corporate break-ups almost always trigger a window of indiscriminate selling. In this case, I intend to monitor the market response - and company performance - in hopes of history repeating itself.

While there is still some homework to do - notably a firmer view on segment-level exposure within L&T and greater clarity on the medium-term equity story (read: growth) - the broad contours of a solid case are already visible. L&T benefits from a robust and well-invested asset base, infra-like financial predictability underpinned by sticky, long-term contracts, meaningful barriers to entry, and only limited exposure to macroeconomic events, and - importantly - isolated from AI risks… For now, at least.

Disclaimer: All opinions are my own and do not constitute investment advice.

A “strategic review” is often synonymous with launching a structured auction process. Interestingly, the market reaction of announcing a strategic review tends to yield positive abnormal returns in the short-term, yet said returns often wane as impatience and skepticism of deal certainty builds. In most instances, deal certainty is correlated with seller urgency, which puts downward pressure on price. Hence, the final outcome is almost always bound to result in disappointment, either because (i) the asset got sold way too cheap; or (ii) no event occurred at all and the company has lit a couple of millions on fire… Sell-side advisors ain’t cheap.

This year alone has brought several failed strategic reviews, incl. Columbus (CPSE:COLOM) and Zalaris (OM:ZAL), which may be worth tracking as buyers often circle back to the asset as a “proprietarily sourced” deal at some point. Yet, we have also witnessed a number of companies “succeeding”, such as FLSmidth (CPSE:FLS) divesting its Cement division though the price-tag was disappointing, ABB (OM:ABB) carving out its robotics divsion, Lassila & Tikanoja (HLSE:LAT1V) upcoming demerger, Hexagon (OM:HEXA B) potential spin-off, and many more.

In this write-up, I am covering an outlier case, SKAKO (CPSE:SKAKO). What started as a strategic review in 2023 has turned into an orderly liquidation with closing of the final assets concluded on November 13. The company has a net cash position of DKK ~64/share vs. the current share price of DKK 53.4/share. Note that shares are thinly traded and thus reserved for smaller accounts.

Prior to the liquidation, SKAKO provided heavy-duty equipment used in mining, recycling, and concrete applications. Operations were split into SKAKO Concrete and SKAKO Vibration. The former division was sold to a financial buyer (Zefyr) in 2023 at an EV of DKK 123m, (equiv. to 11x EBIT FY22), and all proceeds were returned to shareholders. A few weeks ago, the company replicated the success with the sale of SKAKO Vibration to a French private equity fund (FCDE) at an EV of DKK 280 (15.7x EBIT LTM Q2), leaving behind an empty shell company with a DKK 200-205m net cash position upon closing; a discount of 20% to its current 167.1m market capitalization.

The company has earmarked DKK 140-155m as distribution to shareholders post its 2026 AGM. What remains uncertain is the fate of the DKK 45-60m net cash to be retained on balance for the purpose of backstopping any warranty claims on up to 15 SKAKO Concrete mixers through 2031.

While tough to to handicap the timing and magnitude of potential claims, a reasonable base case is to assume DKK 6-10m in total claims based on (i) DKK 1.4m of warranty costs booked in 2025 YTD Q3’25; and (ii) expiry of warranty guarantees being front-loaded. I would expect the board to explore potential avenues to transfer the risks to a third party (DKK 2-3m haircut, I would expect) so as to erase tail risk and enable a faster wind-down. I work with both outcomes, though there is also a chance they are considering repurposing the shell. Back of the envelope outcome looks like this:

The proceeds will be allocated in low-risk paper (govt. bonds, I would assume) until first payout post AGM in, say, mid-April 2026, at which point the company will revisit the investment strategy for the stub. What we know now is that the stub will be deployed in “listed shares, listed bonds, as well as investment funds,” for which it is reasonable to expect annual returns to cover the DKK ~3m annual admin expenses needed to service the shell — i.e., implied 5-6% annual return. On that basis, one would need to underwrite management-/board credibility, for which I believe prior actions offer a token of confidence.

Sure, it is not a fireworks-level return profile (liquidations rarely are), but with decent visibility of the floor and good odds of an accelerated payout vs. the “worst case”, I find it a decent place to park a bit of cash.

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up posted a months ago. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

Addressing the bear case

Better Collective has been a short favorite for a while now. When it is all said and done, I struggle to see how a company with (i) +21% of its free float sold short, (ii) ongoing buybacks representing a quarter of ADTV over the past 100 (!) trading days (with SEK ~95m still pending) and +60 days to cover, (iii) retail ownership already flushed (-50% vs. peak), (iv) and a reputable local family office holding just below the 5% flagging threshold, fits the profile of a compelling near-term short opportunity. That in itself doesn’t look like the anatomy of a compelling short.

Add to that a company that is — as suggested by the Q3’25 report and elaborated below — at its trough and heading into what’s expected to be one of the busiest betting years on record in 2026 (FIFA World Cup, hosted in U.S.), and you’re looking at a short-squeeze candidate. Having said that, I am not blind to the risks posed by AI-overviews to BETCOs top-of-funnel position — in fact, I flagged that risk well ahead of the bear thesis drifting in that direction, here. I believe its premature to draw any conclusions now.

Share

So what are the bears missing?

• First, they continue to bucket BETCO with generic affiliate businesses, missing the economic durability embedded in its RevShare agreements. Roughly half of revenue stems from these arrangements which effectively act as a lifetime royalty stream on players referred. That should cushion the downside.

• Second, they assume the company will remain passive as AI search gains traction. Yet, the company is evidently making efforts to leverage its relationships and integrations with sportsbooks to improve its position in the ecosystem. The launch of Playbook serves as a first sign, enabling users to place bets natively on platforms such as X and de-facto making BETCO serve at the distribution layer vs. user acquisition layer. While it is still early days, I don’t see why this wouldn’t work on other platforms (i.e., ChatGPT), and thus has the potential of completely shifting the power dynamics in the industry.

• Third, the bears discount optionality from new prediction markets; oddly enough something bears often cite as another “structural headwind”. If operators like Kalshi or Polymarket were to monopolize the entire betting ecosystem, the aforementioned RevShare economics would indeed compress. But that’s not the world we live in. In fact, when competition is rising, more marketing dollars will be deployed — a positive for BETCO. To that end, sportsbooks themselves are moving into prediction markets (e.g., FanDuel’s work with CME). For the record, nothing keeps BETCO away from working with “alternative” platforms; Kalshi is already a partner. There is a certain irony here: A core criticism last year was that U.S. sportsbooks lacked competitive tension and that this was structurally negative for BETCO. Now that competition is intensifying, it is somehow viewed as a problem.

Now, the Q3’25 results..

The calm before the storm?

Surface-level figures screens so-so, yet there are reasons to be optimistic. Topline landed at EUR 78.3m (in line), down -3.6% y/y, dragged by player-friendly results in Europe-/LATAM1 (RevShare drag) and continued softness in Brazil, though abating q/q. Adj. EBITDA landed at EUR 21m (cons. EUR 22m) for a 26.4% margin (-1.1pp y/y), helped by OPEX reductions but offset by mix effects (i.e., higher share of paid media).

Revenue was impacted by unusually low sports win margin2, which is part of ordinary course of business, hence difficult to blame on the company. While said headwind is in line with commentary from select European-based sportsbooks, it is difficult to validate or substantiate this figure without some form of benchmark — hence, it would have been appreciated with some tangible figures for comparison. However, when adjusting for this headwind, the company has swung back into positive organic growth; encouraging for the quarters ahead. To that end, management reiterated its FY25 guidance, implying very strong figures for Q4’25:

• Revenue: EUR 320-350m (i.e., Q4’25: EUR 78-108m)

• Adj. EBITDA: EUR 100-120m (i.e., Q4’25: EUR 35-55m)

• Free cash flow: EUR 55-75m (i.e., Q4’25: EUR 23-43m)

That’s quite a wide range of outcomes. While a strong signal, I think the market will likely remain cautious on underwriting this until we are comfortably into the back-half of this quarter.

Cash generation remained solid with adj. FCF margin at 24%, helped by a significant (EUR 14m) NWC unwind, though worth keeping an eye on elevated DSO. Capital allocation remains purely organic and excess cash returned to shareholders via buybacks (EUR 31m YTD as of November 11) with EUR 8.6m remaining in the program.

All-in, I believe the thesis is tracking well. Considering (i) tough comps are now effectively lapped, (ii) major sports events are looming in 2026, (iiii) sound valuation support (FY25E EV/adj. EBITDA at 8.6x assuming the low-end of the guided range, which is on depressed figures), and (iv) supportive positioning (see first paragraph of post), I continue to view the R/R as attractive. Let’s see.

Dear readers. Thank you for reading along. Since day one, the goal of Nordic Edge has been to share thoughtful investment ideas, gather feedback to sharpen my process, and connect with likeminded investors. To better align my time-spend with that purpose, Monday Morning Espresso as you know it (perhaps not so Espresso-y anymore) will be retired. Going forward, I will post noteworthy events, weekly performers, etc. in Notes. Thank you for your continued support and for being part of this journey!

Week 44 marked another earnings-heavy stretch, with ~225 Nordic companies reporting. Market tone remained bifurcated, with upbeat sentiment from consensus beats often fading mid-day, and vice versa. The Nordic all-share index ended the week down -0.9%.

Looking ahead, the calendar will be similarly dense in week 45 as ~300 names are set to report earnings.

Denmark

Although earnings season has yet to fully ramp in Copenhagen, the week did feature the first wave of reports alongside notable M&A activity. Sentiment tilted negative, with the all-share index down -2.5% and large-cap -1.1% on the week.

Sydbank (CPSE:SYDB), Arbejdernes Landsbank (not listed), and Vestjysk Bank (CPSE:VJBA) agreed on a landmark merger, creating one of Denmark’s largest retail and corporate banks under the new name AL Sydbank. Vestjysk Bank (+35%) will be acquired at a 34.2% premium, while Sydbank rose 5.5% to a record DKK 553.5. The merger is expected to deliver annual synergies of DKK 1.2bn from 2028, primarily from IT integration, branch overlaps, and gradual headcount reductions.

Relevant news/events:

• GreenMobility (CPSE:GREENM) lifted its FY2025 guidance for the third time in 2025, now expecting revenue growth of 15-17% (prev. 13-15%) and EBITDA growth of 42-47% (prev. 32-42%) vs 2024. The upward revision reflects strong domestic performance following last year’s exit from international markets; the company now operates 1,400 EVs across Copenhagen and Aarhus.

• ChemoMetec raised its FY2025/26 outlook following stronger-than-expected interest in its XcytoMatic platform, now guiding revenue of DKK 565-580m (prev. 545-565m) and EBITDA of DKK 320-335m (prev. 295-315m). Q1’25/26 trading update is due November 6.

• H+H (CPSE:HH) cut its 2025 guidance on a sharp UK slowdown in October; now sees ~0% organic growth (prev. ~4%) and adj. EBIT of DKK 85-115m (prev. DKK 100-150m), as housebuilders pause new projects amid falling sales rates. Prelim Q3 otherwise in line with revenue DKK 738m (+2% org) and EBIT bsi DKK 53m.

• Novo Nordisk (CPSE:NOVO B) has submitted a bid of up to USD 9 bn to acquire Metsera, which was already in agreement to be acquired by Pfizer for USD 7.3bn. The move signals an intensifying arms race in the obesity‑drug space, and can be viewed as a defensive play to block rivals and secure differentiated next‑gen assets (e.g., Metsera’s MET‑097i and MET‑233i in GLP‑1/amylin). Pfizer has resorted to sue both parties to block the deal.

• Trophy Games (CPSE:TGAMES): sales at DKK 40.2m (+62% y/y) hit an all-time high, driven by the Transport series and the launch of Farm Manager, now the top game by DAUs. EBITDA DKK 7.7m (+57% y/y, 19% margin) and EBT DKK 4.9m (vs. loss LY) on improved scale and cost control despite higher marketing spend (43% of sales). FCF timing impacted by settlement cycles; cash stood at DKK 25.5m (no debt). Mgmt. cited continued momentum ahead, supported by record user growth (+92% y/y paying users).

• AO Johansen (CPSE:AOJ): Q3 sales up +10.5% y/y (8.8% org.) to DKK 1,465m, driven by strong B2C growth (+25% y/y) and resilient B2B performance despite project margin pressure. EBITDA at DKK 98m (+15% y/y) with group margin up 150bps y/y ex one-offs, supported by mix shift and cost discipline. Net leverage at 3.0x with further deleveraging to 2.5x expected by YE. Mgmt. narrowed FY2025 guidance to revenue DKK 6,000-6,100 (prev. 5,950-6,100m) and EBITDA DKK 420-440m (420-450m), citing sustained B2C momentum but ongoing project margin pressure in Denmark and Sweden.

• Netcompany (CPSE:NETC): Q3 revenue DKK 2,172m (+34.6% y/y; +8.5% org) by strong public/private demand and NBS (formerly SDC) integration, which added DKK 421m sales. Adj. EBITDA margin 16.6% (org. 19%) rose y/y on efficiency gains, but special items (DKK 351m YTD) tied to NBS restructuring led to net loss DKK 67.9m and negative FCF. Net leverage 1.7x. Separately, the company hosted CMD, aiming for annual organic growth at 5-10% toward 2029 alongside an EBITDA reaching 20%.

• Tivoli (CPSE:TIV): Q3 revenue DKK 886.5m (-1% y/y) and EBITDA DKK 123.2m (vs. 147.0m LY) reflected fewer opening days but solid per-day attendance and record guest satisfaction. OCF DKK 110.8m (-4% y/y) remained strong, supporting elevated CapEx of DKK 165.5m for the new themed attraction opening summer 2026. Mgmt. raised FY2025 outlook to revenue DKK ~1.33bn and PBT DKK ~145m, expecting Halloween and Christmas season to offset early-year softness.

• Carlsberg (CPSE:CARL): Q3 revenue DKK 24.1bn (+17.8% y/y) driven by the Britvic acquisition (ahead of plan) and Gorkha consolidation, while organic revenue fell -1.4% (ex-San Miguel +0.3%) amid soft demand and Ukraine headwinds. Volumes +16.2% reported, -3.0% organic (ex-San Miguel -1.7%). Premium and international brands (Tuborg, 1664) grew 5%, offsetting mainstream weakness; soft drinks up 4% organically, now 28% of volume. Britvic synergy target raised to GBP 110m. Guidance maintained.

• Trifork (CPSE:TRIFOR): Q3 revenue EUR 49.3m (+4.7% y/y) with adj. EBITDA EUR 7.9m (16.0% margin vs. 12.3% LY) and EBIT EUR 3.4m (6.9% margin), driven by 49% growth in the Run segment and 14% public-sector expansion. Build (-3.9%) and Inspire (-19.8%) declined as focus shifted to higher-margin, product-led projects. Net cash EUR 37m. FY2025 guidance narrowed to revenue EUR 217.5-222.5m and adj. EBITDA EUR 32-34.5m (14.4-15.9% margin). Deconsolidation of Trifork Security will trim sales slightly but lift EBIT by EUR 3m.

Sweden

Stockholm saw a week dominated by earnings reports, though market reaction was more muted vis-á-vis last week. The all-share (-0.9%) and large-cap (-0.7%) indices both drifted lower.

Relevant news/events:

• Balco Group (OM:BALCO): Q3 sales of SEK 277m (cons. 293m), down 16% y/y, driven by delayed project starts in Sweden and Norway and weak UK activity; organic growth -13%. Renovation (SEK 206m, -17% y/y) fell on customer postponements, while New Build (SEK 70m, -17%) remains pressured by macro headwinds. EBITA SEK 3m (vs. 17m SPLY). Net leverage rose sharply to 6.8x (from 2.8x). Mgmt. flagged continued focus on cost discipline and mix improvement, and “encouraging” Nordic renovation momentum.

• Hanza (OM:HANZA): Q3 sales at SEK 1,4bn (in line, +27% y/y), with 2% organic growth and contribution from Milectria and Leden integration. Main Markets +29% y/y aided by strong Nordic demand; Other Markets +24% y/y (margin 7.1%) driven by industrial clients, partly offset by German softness. Gross margin up 390bps y/y to 44.6% on operational efficiencies and mix improvements, while EBIT margin reached 8.8% (+130bps y/y) aided by one-off earn-out release. Net leverage at 1.8x (<2.5x target. Guidance reaffirmed, mgmt. flagging accelerating organic growth Q4 onward, supported by rising defense and energy order intake.

• Storytel (OM:STORY): Q3 sales at SEK 1,013m (cons. 995m), up 6% y/y (9% CC), driven by driven by both Streaming (+4%) which recorded +10% subs (2.6 m) and record‑low churn, and Publishing (+14%) which was aided by Bokfabriken deal and new titles. Adj. EBITDA at SEK 224m for a new high margin at 22.1% on scale and prudent cost control. Net debt at 0.3x and liquidity solid with SEK 527m cash at hand. Management tone confident, citing local‑content moat and Klarna integration tailwind.

• Engcon (OM:ENGCON): Q3 sales at SEK 415m (cons. SEK 430m), up (+1% y/y, +4% organic), supported by robust order intake (+27%) but offset by softer deliveries in Europe. Nordics led with SEK 173m sales (+25% organic) on resilient demand; Europe (-10% organic) and Americas (-4%) weighed, while Asia-Oceania sales were stable. Gross margin fell to 42.6% (46.1%) on adverse mix and FX, compressing EBIT margin to 16.9% (cons. 18.9%; 22.0% LY). Cash generation held back by inventory buildup; net debt rose to SEK 144m (from net cash; SEK 239m unutilized facilities). Management flagged normalizing seasonal demand and upbeat long-term prospects supported by record order book and strategic OEM partnerships.

• Alfa Laval (OM:ALFA) Q3 sales at SEK 17,244m (cons. 16,993m), up +6% y/y (+8% organic), driven by broad strength across divisions despite a 10-13% order intake drag. Energy (+9% sales and 16.6% EBITA margin) aided by Fives Cryogenics; Food & Water (+2% sales, 16.1% margin); Marine (+9% sales, 23.5% margin). Adj. EBITA at SEK 3.2bn for a record margin of 18.4%. FCF of SEK 1.7bn (‑48% y/y) on higher WC and acquisitions; net leverage rose to 1.1x. Liquidity remains robust at SEK 18.6bn. Mgmt. reiterated stable near‑term demand, raised long‑term growth target to 7% p.a., and reaffirmed margin ambition of 17% over the cycle.

• Scandic Hotels (OM:SHOT): Q3 sa.es at SEK 6,372m (cons. 6,472m), up +3% y/y (5.3% organic). RevPAR landed at SEK 966 (cons. 941) and occupancy 74.2% underscored solid demand in Sweden (+8%) and Norway (+6%), offset by softness in Finland (-7%), and pricing initiatives. Adj. EBITDA of SEK 1,088m (cons. 1,089m) for a 17.1% margin (cons. 17.4%), weighed by commercial costs and FX. Dalata acquisition closing in Nov’25 adds 56 hotels ans +15 EPS accretion at 2024 6x EBITDA (2024). CEO flagged good growth, cash flow and stable autumn bookings.

• Sweco (OM:SWEC B): Q3 sales of SEK 7,138m (cons. 7,092m) and EBITA SEK 702m (cons. 630m) ,lifting margin to 9.8% (cons. 8.9%) on continued price hikes and efficiency gains. Order intake and backlog improved, with firm demand across energy, infrastructure, water and environment, and growing exposure to defense and security, offsetting persistent weakness in construction and real estate.

• Hansa Biopharma (OM:HANSA): Q3 revenue SEK 30.8m (-37% y/y), o/w product sales SEK 30.1m (-24% y/y) dragged by temporary European reimbursement headwinds EBIT loss SEK -147.6m on improved gross margin improved to 60% (vs. 50% LY). Pro forma cash at SEK 924m post-October raise and debt restructuring. The pivotal US Phase 3 Confides trial for imlifidase in kidney transplantation met its primary endpoint (eGFR 51.5 vs. 19.3; p<0.0001), de-risking the upcoming BLA filing and paving the way for a 2026 US launch.

• Electrolux (OM:ELUX): Q3 sales at SEK 32.3bn (cons. SEK 31.8bn) up +4.6% organic y/y, while EBIT landed at SEK 890m (SEK 889m), up from SEK 349m LY. North America returned to profit for the first time in years, driven by 10.9% organic growth and cost efficiencies; Europe and APAC saw modest gains, while LatAm remained flat. Leverage at 3.5×. FY2025 capex guidance cut to SEK 3.5-4bn (prev. 4-5bn).

Finland

For the second consecutive week, the industrial-heavy Finnish market diverged from the broader Nordics, sending the all-share (+1.1%) and large-cap (+1.6%) higher. Sentiment was buoyed by generally solid earnings and a rebound in names that sold off the week prior.

Relevant news/events:

• Nokia (HLSE:NOKIA) shares surged after announcing a USD ~1bn strategic investment from Nvidia, involving issuance of ~166m new shares at EUR 5.16/share (2.9% stake). As part of the partnership, Nokia will deploy Nvidia chips to advance its 5G/6G network development, while Nvidia explores integrating Nokia’s datacenter technology into future AI infrastructure.

• Wärtsilä (HLSE:WRT1V): Q3 sales at EUR 1,600m (cons. 1,756m), down -5% y/y on delayed Energy deliveries, while order intake held at EUR 1,800m (+6% org) and book-to-bill stayed healthy at 1.1x. Comparable EBIT rose 10% y/y to EUR 195m (11.9% margin), driven by strong Marine and Energy execution offsetting sharp order declines in Energy Storage (-80% y/y). Cash generation solid, net cash position EUR 1,415m. Mgmt. flagged continued Marine and Energy resilience but Energy Storage weakness from U.S. tariffs and regulation.

• F-secure (HLSE:FSECURE): Q3 sales at EUR 36.1m (cons. EUR 36.5m) down -0.8% y/y (+1.3% CC), with Embedded Services (+10%) offsetting softness in Security Suite (-1.9%) and direct channel (-6%). Adj. EBITA margin at 37% (flat q/q, +30bp y/y) as Opex discipline offset mix-shift and FX headwind. OCF at EUR 11.6m (78% conversion), FCF at EUR 8.2m weighed by tech and HQ investments; net leverage 2.9x.

• Nokian Reenkat (HLSE:TYRES): Q3 sales at EUR 344m (cons. EUR 335m), up +10.8% y/y in CC as strong pricing and mix offset slightly lower volumes (-3%). Passenger Car Tyres led (+13%, 16.6% margin) on premium mix and North American outperformance, while Heavy Tyres fell 4% and Vianor improved despite seasonal losses. Group EBIT at EUR 21.8m on pricing, lower costs, and mix. OCF aied by inventory release; net leverage elevated at 6.7x. FY guidance reaffirmed for higher sales and profitability.

• Posti (HLSE:POSTI) Q3 revenue EUR 343.8m (-3.9% y/y) and EBITDA reached EUR 48.3m (14.0% margin) despite impact from discontinuation of unaddressed mail and soft macro. Parcel volumes rose +8% y/y, led by consumer and recommerce demand, offsetting weaker B2B and freight activity. Outlook reiterated; revenue EUR 1.44-1.50bn, adj. EBIT EUR 65-77m. Management expects a seasonally stronger Q4 but cites continued macro softness and postal decline.

• Valmet (OM:VALMT): Q3 revenue EUR 1,295m (cons. 1,301m), flay y/y (+2% organic) and comparable EBITA at EUR 159m (12.3% margin, record), supported by EUR 15m RR opex savings under the “Lead the Way” program. Orders rose +7% to EUR 1.1bn, led by Process Performance (+11%) and a record U.S. tissue line deal, driving backlog to EUR 4.5bn. FCF at EUR 94m and balance sheet solid with net leverage at 1.5x EBITDA and and liquidity of EUR 479m.

• Kempower (HLSE:KEMPOWR): Q3 sales EUR 73.7m, up 41% y/y on strong North America (+242%) and Europe ex-Nordics (+76%) growth offsetting Nordic softness (-16%). Order intake rose 45% y/y to EUR 74.7m, backlog EUR 117.3m. Gross margin contracted to 45.8% (–550bps y/y) on scrapping, obsolescence, and mix effects, though EBIT turned positive at EUR 0.2m (vs. EUR -7.9m LY) on scale and cost-out. Mgmt. narrowed FY2025 growth to 10-15% (from 10-30%) but reiterated medium-term targets (EUR 750m sales, 10-15% EBIT margin by ‘26-’28).

• Outokumpu (HLSE:OUT1V): Q3 sales at EUR 1,298m (cons. EUR 1,346m), down -14% y/y on weak European demand and high Asian imports, with stainless deliveries -11% y/y to 432kt. Adj. EBITDA of EUR 34m, down from EUR 86m LY and EUR 75m in Q2, pressured by maintenance, ERP rollout, and lower ferrochrome prices. Mgmt. guided Q4 deliveries -5-15% q/q and lower EBITDA, as European weakness persists despite cost savings and ongoing restructuring.

• Qt Group (HLSE:QTCOM): Q3 sales EUR 40.7m (-3% y/y; -0.2% cc) and EBITA at EUR 4.3m (10.5% margin, -59% y/y) reflected smaller deal sizes, fewer large contracts, and cautious customer spend. Cash flow remained solid (YTD EUR 32.4m) with cash EUR 93.9m. The IAR acquisition (EUR 204m) completed, adding EUR 8-10m to 2025e sales but reducing EBITA by EUR 6-7m on one-offs. 2025 guidance maintained.

• Kojamo (HLSE:KOJAMO): Q3 revenue EUR 343.6m (+1.4% y/y) and net rental income EUR 231.6m (+1.4%) on improved occupancy (96.1%) and steady rental demand, offset by higher repair and financing costs driving FFO down 6.7% y/y to EUR 44.1m. Major sale of ~2,000 apartments enabled EUR 200m debt repayment and launch of a EUR 75m buyback, reducing LTV to 42.2% (-2.5pp y/y). Fair value of properties stable at EUR 7.6bn (-3.6% y/y). Guidance maintained. Moody’s affirmed Baa2 rating with a stable outlook.

• Finnair (HLSE:FIA1S): Q3 revenue EUR 834.9m (+2% y/y) supported by Asian strength (mainly Japan) and stable Europe/domestic markets, offset by North Atlantic and Middle East weakness. Comparable EBIT EUR 50.7m (6.1% margin) dragged by EUR 18m strike impact and higher crew, traffic, and maintenance costs. Mgmt. cut FY2025 guidance, with revenue now at EUR ~3.1bn, EBIT EUR 30-60m, citing industrial action, soft North Atlantic yields, and rising EU SAF costs.

• Glaston (HLSE:GLA1V): Q3 sales EUR 56.5m (+2% y/y) with EBITA EUR 4.8m (8.5% margin vs. 7.5% LY) as Services (38% of sales) offset weaker equipment demand. Order intake fell -18% y/y to EUR 43.4m. OCF at EUR -2.8m on lower advances. Cost program targeting EUR 6m annual savings (EUR 2.6m realized) to cushion margins amid soft market conditions. FY2025 guidance cut: revenue EUR 206-215m and EBITA EUR 13.1-15.1m, due to weakness in architectural glass investments.

• Kalmar (HLSE:KALMAR): Q3 sales at EUR 436m (+3% y/y) with record-high comparable EBIT margin of 13.8% driven by strong Services (+12% orders, +8% sales) and eco-portfolio growth (+17%). Equipment orders -20% y/y amid tariff and macro uncertainty, but total backlog rose 6% to EUR ~1bn, with Services order book +27%. Cash conversion 75%, leverage 0.3x. Guidance reiterated. Europe remained solid, Americas subdued, AMEA stable; electrification and low-emission solutions underpin continued structural margin strength.

• Kesko (HLSE:KESKOB) Q3 sales EUR 3.23bn (in line) up 3.5% y/y, and comparable EBIT at EUR 208.1m (-3.8% vs. cons.) on broad-based growth across grocery, building/technical, and car trades. Grocery sales (+2.2% y/y) driven by online (+9.9%); Building & Technical (+9.4%) aided by acquisitions in Denmark, Poland, Baltics; Car trade (+20.3%) on strong used and new car volumes. FCF EUR 147m, net leverage 1.8x. FY2025 EBIT guidance narrowed to EUR 640-690m (from 640-700m), citing slow building recovery

• Technotree (HLSE:TEM1V): Q3 sales at EUR 18.6m (cons. EUR 20.1m) and EBIT EUR 3.6m (cons. EUR 8.3m) for a 19% margin, dragged by lower license revenue and provisions. EBITDA EUR 5.1m and FCF positive for the sixth straight quarter (EUR 3.2m YTD). Order backlog hit a record EUR 105.5m (+40% y/y). FY2025 guidance unchanged: LSD sales growth in CC, +200 bps EBIT margin expansion, FCF EUR >4m.

• Citycon (HLSE:CTY1S): Q3 NRI EUR 52.2m (cons. EUR 52.5m), down -4.4% y/y. Operative EBIT EUT 45.8m (vs 47.0m cons., 49.1m LY). LFL NRI +6.8% y/y on rent growth (+3.9%) and 95.2% occupancy; admin expenses -22% y/y. LTV 46.9%, net leverage 9.6x, liquidity EUR 279m after EUR 750m debt repayments. EPRA NRV EUR 8.33 (-6.6% y/y). Guidance narrowed to EPRA EPS EUR 0.41-0.46 (excl. hybrid EUR 0.60-0.65) (prev. EUR 0.41-0.50 / EUR0.60–0.69.)

Norway

Shares in Oslo remain volatile amid oil-price swings and softer-than-expected large-cap earnings. Despite this, the index retains its position as the region’s top performer YTD. This week, however, the all-share (-1.6%) and large-cap (-2.5%) both ended in red territory.

Among reporting companies was the recently covered, Vend (OM:VEND). The company posted Q3 sales -1.8% y/y to NOK 1,595m (cons. 1,629m), with performance driven by ARPA uplift in Mobility (+9.4% y/y) and Real Estate (9.1%) offsetting lower volumes. Jobs (-12%) and Recommerce (-13%) came in softer vs. SPLY, but was largely expected given discontinuation of select revenue streams. EBITDA landed at NOK 640 (cons 584m) aided by faster TSA phaseout (and associated costs) and user monetization in Mobility and Real Estate. In my view, one of the more attractive opportunities in the Nordics, as elaborated in the below write-up:

Relevant news/events:

• Sats (OB:SATS): Q3 sales +8% y/y to NOK 1,293m (cons. 1.309bn), driven by a 4% rise in members to 756k and higher ARPM (+5% to NOK 576). Segments decent across markets: Norway +6-9% y/y (EBITDA margin 30%) and Sweden +7-10% (EBITDA margin 20%), while Finland and Denmark delivered modest 2-5% top-line gains and margin lift to 10% and 6%, respectively. Group EBITDA (pre-IFRS 16) rose to NOK 192m (15% margin) aided by pricing and utilization; FCF NOK 125m with 69-74% LTM conversion. Net debt 1.3x EBITDA, well below 3.5x covenant. Mgmt. reiterated NOK 1.1bn midterm EBITDA target and signaled >50% of 2025 net profit returned via dividends and buybacks.

• Elopak (OB:ELO): Q3 sales at EUR 289.7m (cons. 304m), +1.2% organic y/y as strong Americas (+18% CC) driven by robust carton/closure volumes, offset EMEA softness (-4.8%) weighed by mix and Roll Fed competition. Group EBITDA at EUR 49.1m (17.0% margin), a record high, aided by operational leverage. OCF at EUR ~55m; capex centered on U.S. expansion (EUR 30m for third line in Little Rock) and sustainability spend. Net leverage 2.1x, near midterm target; EUR 210m RCF adds flexibility. Management reaffirmed 4-6% organic growth and >15% EBITDA margin targets, flagging price increases in 2026 amid rising board costs.

• Nordic Semiconductor (OB:NOD): Q3 sales at USD 179m (cons. 178m), up +13% y/y driven by Industrial & Healthcare (+40%). Gross margin 52% (+240 bps q/q) benefited from mix and Memfault cloud integration. Adj. EBITDA at USD 18m (cons. 23.3m) for a 10.2% margin. Q4 guide: USD 155-175m revenue, >50% GM; Mgmt reiterates medium-term ambition of >20% topline CAGR and 25% EBITDA margin.

• Telenor (OB:TEL): Q3 revenue at 20,304m (cons. 20,249m) up 1.3% y/y, and adj. EBITDA of 9,472m (cons. 9,602m). CEO cited strong momentum in Nordics, yet flagged continued temporary softening in Asia. Cash generation (FCF at NOK 4,173m) and balance sheet (2.3x levered) remains healthy.

• Equinor (OB:EQNR) Q3 revenue at USD 23,388m (cons. USD 23,388m), flat y/y, with 7% production growth (2,130 mboe/d) driven by Bacalhau, Johan Sverdrup ,and Johan Castberg fields. Adj. EBIT at USD 6,210m (cons. USD 6,610m), down 35% y/y on weaker trading in MMP (-45% y/y) and USD 754m impairments from lower long-term oil assumptions. USD 5,650m capital returned via dividends and buybacks. Mg.t reaffirmed 4% 2025 production growth and USD 9bn capital distribution.

• Goodtech (OB:GOD): Q3 revenue NOK 168.0m (+16% y/y) EBITA NOK 9.9m (8.5% margin, +240 bps y/y) on cost discipline and higher utilization. Order intake up 28% y/y to 140 MNOK, backlog 317 MNOK (-9% y/y) supported by a NOK 45m offshore wind contract with Equinor (Bałtyk 2 & 3). Mgmt. sees sustained industrial investment and margin expansion potential via growing service and aftermarket offerings.

• Höegh Autoliners (OB:HAUTO): Q3 revenue at USD 370m (+1.4% vs cons.), supported by record Asian export volumes (+16.7% y/y) and full vessel utilization (43 vessels, 35 owned). EBITDA USD 155m (+0.4% vs cons.) aided by USD 20m gain from sale of Höegh Beijing. CFO at USD 173m; cash balance USD 230m; net leverage 1x. Dividend USD 30m declared, temporarily reduced due to new policy linking payout to quarter-end cash. Guidance implies slightly lower Q4 EBITDA on USD 20m U.S. port fee headwind (USD 60-70m annualized).

• Europris (OB:EPR): Q3 sales NOK 3,500m (cons. NOK 3,475m), up 9% y/y on strong growth in Norway (11.6%), where Europris outperformed the retail market (LFL +10.7%) driven by higher footfall, basket size, and campaign effectiveness; Sweden (~3%) more soft amid store remodelling, though pilot stores showing early positive signs. EBIT came in at NOK 256m (cons. NOK 264m), with margin expansion from gross margin +1ppt to 40.7% and opex/sales -0.6ppt to 25.9%. Mgmt. guides for a strong Q4 on real wage growth and signals major Sweden remodel push from 2026-2027.

• Kongsberg (OM_KOG): Q3 group sales NOK 13,300m (cons. NOK 14,483m), up 12% y/y, driven by 38% growth in Defence & Aerospace (NOK 5,890m) on strong missile and air defense demand; Maritime declined -1% but posted 46% newbuild order intake growth and record backlog, while Discovery was flat. EBIT NOK 2,000m (cons. NOK 2,215m), margin 15.2%, aided by mix and scale effects in Defence, while Maritime margin held at 15.4% despite revenue dip. Company proposes to demerge Kongsberg Maritime into a separately listed entity by April 2026, creating two sector-focused companies—Maritime and Defence & Discovery.

In case you missed it…

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up posted a few weeks ago. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

More of the same

In my view, the quarter was broadly fine operationally. However, I had hoped to see M&A pick up pace within non-cash verticals, as I continue to believe the market underappreciates Loomis’ optionality to leverage its security logistics network into higher-growth verticals (e.g., pharma, defense, valuables, etc.) With net leverage at 1.65x and SEK ~400m equiv. in treasury shares, the company has solid M&A currency to deploy. Given shares trade at ~8x unlevered FCF (LTM), any such acquisition should help reshape the narrative. Combine that with what I view as an overly optimistic societal timeline toward “cash-lessness” and the setup offers a rare double-whammy to the upside.

Now, looking into the quarter.

Reported sales landed at SEK 7,644m (cons. 7,643m), flat y/y due to FX drag (-6.9%), offsetting organic (+3.9%) and M&A (3.2%) growth. EBITA landed at 1,006m (cons. 990m) for a 13.2% margin. Cash generation remains solid with mid-90% cash conversion and ~13% FCF margin. Apart from expected continued M&A, said cash will also fund a new SEK 200m share buyback program through Q4.

On segment level, the picture looks much like the recent quarters, with Europe & LATAM trailing USA performance.

• Europe & LATAM: Sales at SEK 3,681m, down -2.1% y/y on FX effects (-4.6%) offsetting organic growth (+2.6%) and M&A (+0.2%). Margins continue to trend higher, landing at 12.9% segment EBITA-% (vs. 12.4% SPLY) on scale post FTE reductions LY and mix.

• USA: Sales at SEK 3,955 up 2.2% y/y with organic (+5.4%) and M&A (6.0%) partially offset by FX (-9.2%). Margins sustained its higher level at 16.3% segment EBITA-% (vs. 16.1% SPLY) on mix-shift. Integration of Burroughs, acquired in Q2, is on track though still early — i.e. dilutive to margins, hence positive effects yet to come. Loomis conducted two bolt-ons during Q3, namely (i) Keys Armored Express (CIT); and (ii) International Depository Services of Canada (precious metals vault and storage).

• SME-/Pay: Continues to grow from its low base. Good to see continued track toward profitability (EBITA of SEK -32m vs. -44 LY), though the size and impact is still limited in scope. To that end, the company added two POS bolt-ons during the quarter, and noted +23 y/y growth in transaction volumes. I still believe there are good synergies between its legacy business and the SME-/digital payments space, but am still cautious on placing it any value given its nascent state.

Management pointed to strong performance in Automated Solutions and International valuables transport, offset by weaker figures for ATM services on the back of contract losses in Sweden/France and ATM consolidation in UK as banks close branches. That said, the remaining figures look artificially depressed from currency effects, for which management added some color when nudged:

I was surprised on your comment around CIT because we should look at the business lines currency adjusted, and I don’t see that decrease happening in CIT. — Aritz Uribiarte, CEO

To the analyst’s credit, it is difficult to fully assess the underlying performance across segments and hence it would be great if management was less cagey about sharing information during Q&A session — although it may be for good reason.

Final thoughts: Generally not much to say about the quarter really. As noted, I hope to see the company get more active on M&A within adjacent verticals (i.e. similar to Kipfer) so as to shift narrative. If that doesn’t happen, opportunity cost will likely have me look elsewhere given many other exciting R/R opportunities in the Nordics. For now, thesis intact.

A story of simplification

Corporate history is replete with companies venturing beyond their core. In the 1960s this was usually in the spirit of diversification as conglomerates octopussed their way into unrelated industries. The modern equivalent is what one might call “moat-flexing”, extending an existing advantage into adjacent areas under the banner of synergy. Though they appear different in intent, they often converge toward the same end-point over a long enough timeframe: lower return per unit of complexity.

Over a long enough time horizon, the later derivatives of a moat-flex — the third, fourth, …, nth, adjacency — tend to reproduce the same inefficiencies that once plagued conglomerates. Eventually, share-/stakeholders come to this realization and a period of simplification follows. Valuation usually bottoms at both extremes, when (i) excessive complexity diverts management’s focus and obscures the intrinsic value; (ii) excessive simplicity surfaces terminal risk. It is in the pivot of rediscovery/refinement that the narrative of the company’s future change for the better.

Vend Marketplaces (formerly Schibsted Marketplaces) stands exactly at such inflection. After decades of moat-flexing from (i) print media, to (ii) digital media, to (iii) online classifieds, management became enamored with international expansion and embarked on 20-year run of acquiring non-Nordic online classifieds. Some proved successful (e.g., Lebloncoin), others less so (i.e., Shpock). Still, the story remained one of unrealized potential.

Finally in 2019, following several failed attempts to clear the mess, the company took decisive action and spun-off the non-Nordic classifieds (“Adevinta”), retaining a ~30% stake. Roughly five years later, Adevinta was taken private by a Permira-led consortium and the ~30% stake were reduced to ~14%.

Since then, the legacy media assets have been carved out to the Tinius Trust1, the group is rebranded as Vend Marketplaces, and remaining non-core operations have been divested or are in such process(Delivery Group, Lendo, Prisjakt, SMB, etc.). What remains is a pure-play Nordic online classifieds leader across its verticals, with strong network effects that have yet to be fully monetized. Oh, and the ~14% rolled-over equity in Adevinta? That is on track to go down in the historybooks as one of the juiciest IRRs private equity has achieved on a P2P in a long time. The sponsors have opted for a break-up with exit processes for key assets reportedly ongoing, drip-feeding proceeds back into the hands of Vend shareholders.

The anatomy of the RemainCo

The shift into a pure-play Nordic online classifieds is effectively complete, with operations now divided into four verticals, namely Mobility, Real Estate, Jobs, and Recommerce. Importantly, the tech stack has been streamlined onto a common tech stack both at the back-end (e.g., shared data lake) and front-end (shared sign-on across Vend assets). While the final tail remains to be consolidated, the progression thus far is promising.

The 14 remaining assets holds a clear #1-2 position across all verticals and markets, with majority of sales driven by Finn (Norway), Blocket (Sweden), DBA and Bilbasen (Denmark), and Tori and Oikotie (Finland). Finn is the golden nugget, driving roughly half of Group sales, and morphing its closest peers with ~100x more traffic than the runner-up in Mobility, 80x in real estate, and 12x in jobs.

Worth noting that as part of simplifying the business, Vend has removed its dual-class structure (effective 28/10/2025), resulting in a total 6.2m new shares (maximum), allocated exclusively to A-holders (i.e. 2.6% dilution) so as to compensate for the historical ~6.5% voting premium. Regardless, this alignment across the shareholder base is a net-positive.

Monetizing the moat

The online classifieds model looks deceptively simple, yet it is one of most difficult businesses to replicate. Once critical mass is secured (the difficult part), it becomes a flywheel where the value proposition improves as the active user-base grows (i.e., consumers attract more businesses, which in turn attracts more consumers, and so on). Similarly, it is at this stage when focus can shift from user acquisition to user monetization. The exciting part about Vend is that the bulk of its digital assets remain heavily under-monetized and management is committed to do something about it.

Having said that, pricing power must be exercised carefully and should ideally come by way of feature-led upgrades and clearer value-for-money rather than blanket price hikes. Too aggressive pricing is essentially an invitation to customer pushback, alternative providers, and regulatory scrutiny.

Mobility (43% of LTM Q3’25 sales)

The mobility marketplaces facilitates buying/selling of used vehicles in a C2C and B2C capacity, though the company is executing to widen the transaction modes to include C2X and B2X as well, adding a combined NOK ~15bn to the existing NOK 1.5bn TAM.

Vend assets holds the #1 spot in Norway (~45% of segment sales), Sweden (~35%), and Denmark (~20%), and addresses a total population of ~3.3m (2023) used cars sold per annum, yet remain significantly under-monetized vis-á-vis corresponding APAC-/European platforms with similar traction and user network.

Importantly — and a concept that is shared with the Real Estate segment — most sellers are insensitive to price given they list a car/property only a handful of times during a lifetime and thus have limited price anchors to benchmark against.

Real Estate (23%)

The real estate marketplaces is the second-largest vertical, and holds the #1 position in Norway (Finn) with >90% of homes sold through Finn and #1/2 position in Finland (Oikotie) competing against Alma Media assets, Etuovi and Vuokraovi. The company also has exposure to the Swedish market, though mainly via long-term rental (Qasa) and newbuild projects (HomeQ)2. Regionally, Norway accounts for the vast majority of sales (~80%) followed by Finland (~10-12%) and Sweden (~8-10%).

Finn and Oikotie, both operate with a vendor-paid advertising model, whereby seller-/agents pay for enhanced visibility and data insights in pursuit of more favorable sales price. When benchmarking against peers, it becomes clear just how under-monetized these assets are:

Even after having increased prices over the past couple of years, Finn still only accounts for 5-6% of vendors’ marketing spend, despite bringing the vast majority of leads. Granted, the housing market is cyclical in nature — as evidenced by slower volumes in recent quarters — the drag has been fully offset by capitalizing on latent power and nudging sellers toward higher-tier packages.

Jobs (20%)

As part of its simplification push, Vend has exited the Swedish (via Blocket) and Finnish (Oikotie) jobs market, zoning in on Norway (Finn) only. Finn is the clear #1 player yet still face competition from (i) state-owned site Arbeidsplassen.no which is free to use for both employers and job-seekers; (ii) global players like LinkedIn, Indeed, etc.

The presence of a free alternative to multi-home job posts caps the headroom for price-led growth, in my view. Having said that, the broader risk is relatively contained as Finn operates with far superior reach to talent while Arbeidsplassen.no mainly attracts talent when they are actively looking for a new job3. As for LinkedIn, competition is mostly present within high-skilled-/managerial jobs and less prevalent among non-corporate-/blue-collar positions. To that, worth mentioning Finn’s take-rate is only ~1.25% of the median Norwegian annual salary — roughly half of that of LinkedIn.

The cyclical nature of the end-market has meant that past years’ tight labor market has noticeably hamstrung supply, which has been offset by pricing-/upselling to higher-tier packaging (+20bps on take-rate y/y).

Recommerce (14%)

The recommerce vertical enables re-sale of various goods, and represent the newest and smallest vertical. In my view is is also the least exciting part about the equity story at this stage as it hinges on the company’s ability to drive transactional volume-/value and monetize the GMV, which sounds more straightforward than it actually is.

In the legacy platform, buyer/seller matched on-app but often times transacted off-app. This is now changed with embedded transactions; buyer pays a fee for secure payment (i.e., money released upon buyer-verification), shipping, etc. It is a logical move to “nip” at the GMV, but it comes at the risk of diluted user-experience. For what its worth, the initial customer response (reddit, trustpilot) has been mixed. This, coupled with (i) a blended take-rate already at ~15%4; and (ii) competition from both specialized (i.e. Vinted in fashion) and generalist (i.e., Facebook marketplace) marketplaces, will likely cap inner-year upside. Yet, in the longer term (i.e. 2-3 years out), I could see a scenario whereby Vend includes cross-border-/cross-platform listings, which would spin the flywheel faster as it promotes buyer discovery, seller liquidity, and unit-cost efficiencies (i.e., toward 3rd parties, such as logistics, etc.)

Upside optionality from Adevinta

The creation of Adevinta began with a simple premise to unlock hidden value of Schibsted’s non-Nordic classifieds in 2019. That narrative changed within months of birth as Adevinta executed a transformational acquisition of eBay Classifieds Group, shifting the ambition toward building a European regional champion. Hopes were revived when Antoine Jouteau became CEO (Jul-22), and a renewed focus on long-awaited path to value realization was launched. Still, markets were jittery about execution risks and the prospects of large shareholders (Schibsted and eBay) eventually looking to crystalize their stake. Permira stepped in and took Adevinta private in Nov-23 at a valuation of EUR 14bn, equivalent to 17x fwd EBITDA at the time.

Since then, investors has been debating the path ahead for Adevinta and what it means for shareholders in the now-renamed Vend Marketplace, which retains a 14% rolled-over stake. Recent divestment of Spanish assets to EQT confirms the expected direction; Permira is pursuing a break-up5, with Mobile.de likely the next asset out of the gate, exploring a dual-track exit that includes a potential IPO.

Below is my attempt to unpack the potential high/low valuation of assets based on information available (rumors, Q1’24 Adevinta reporting), layered with sober assumptions re. EBITDA development and exit multiples based on asset quality and likely exit route.

Considering peers currently trade at 17-22x, the IPO of SMG pricing at 22x, and the fact that the Permira consortium acquired Adevinta for 17x, the above table looks sensible — or perhaps even conservative. I arrive at NOK 32.6bn (NOK ~147/share), equal to ~42% of the current Vend market cap. Vend Q3-2024 balance sheet valued the stake at NOK 19.5bn6.

My understanding is that these proceeds would be exempt from taxation under the Norwegian participation exemption regime given shares are sold in a company residing within the EEA, but I could be wrong at which point you would have to account for some tax leakage as well.

Valuation and final remarks

The cyclical end-markets make it difficult to layer forecast with expected volume development, and I am not going to act like I know when/how that is going to play out. But I think it is safe to say that volumes will eventually revert from its current subdued levels, at which point the monetization initiatives will be amplified. Management have been similarly upfront about this, saying to following upon request for comment regarding volumes:

“We have confirmed that our pricing and packaging monetization measures that we are in the midst of introducing help us to deliver on revenue growth in line with our medium term targets set by each vertical. In general, given that volumes is hard to predict, we assume a quite flattish development of volumes across our verticals. And if that turns out significantly different then we will have to look at that what is possible to do.” - Per Christian Mørland (CFO), Q3’2025 earnings call

I model modest variance vs. management guidance, with topline tracking toward the lower end of the medium-term range, but profitability broadly in line, albeit still below peer benchmarks (~70 % EBITDA margin) through the period. I apply a simple clean-EBITDA exit multiple at 20x which implies an IRR of ~13% over 3 years, but with material headroom (i.e. +5pp) depending on volume development in the coming years and timing of Adevinta exit.

What could go wrong/risks:

• Delayed/lower valuation for Adevinta exit

• Persistently low volumes

• Overly aggressive monetization

• AI-disruption

• Tax case

• Data-/cyber incidents

• Regulatory scrutiny

The earnings avalanche is fully underway in the Nordics with ~350 reports hitting the tape last week and resetting expectations across sectors. The tone (for now, at least) has leaned constructively positive as beats are outnumbering misses, guidance remaining broadly intact, and management teams signaling demand resilience despite geopolitical noise. Investors have rewarded delivery and punished execution slip-ups cynically, but the center of gravity is upwards, with the Nordic all-share index ending the week up +2.5%.

Denmark

Slower week in Copenhagen compared to the neighboring countries, the week did feature the first few reports for this quarter’s earnings season. Shares traded largely range-bound with the all-share (+0.5%) and large-cap (+0.2%) ending the week flattish.

Relevant news/events:

• Permira/Nordic Capital has cut the minimum acceptance threshold from 75% to 66.6% — the minimum level needed to change the articles of association. Current acceptances stand at 36%. Large holders, incl. ATP (10 %), continue to reject the bid as too low. I sold my shares 17/10/2025 at a +50% gain over 6 months due to the skewed short-term R/R in the event the deal falls through.

• Novo Nordisk (CPSE:NOVO B) chairman, Helge Lund, steps down following disagreement over strategy, and will be replaced by Lars Rebien Sorensen (former CEO and chair of Novo’s largest shareholder). The overhaul sees over half the board departing and follows the recent CEO change.

• Demant (CPSE:DEMANT) has agreed to sell its bone-anchored hearing unit, Oticon Medical, to PE firm Impilo. The transaction includes a DKK 325m cash upfront and DKK 250m tied to milestones.

• Genmab (CPSE:GMAB) fell despite “encouraging” new Phase 1/2 data on Rina-S in advanced endometrial cancer showed positive follow-up efficacy signals in heavily pretreated patients.

• Danish building and installation group, Mendole (CPSE:MENDO) set to debut on the spotlight stock market, raising DKK 4m (gross) for M&A in roofing, energy, lighting and electrical installation services. The IPO was oversubscribed at 1.53x and values the company at DKK 39m.

• DSV (CPSE:DSV) Q3 broadly in line with Schenker synergies cushioning freight markets. Revenue at DKK 72.0bn (cons. DKK 74.2bn) and EBIT DKK 5.43bn (cons. DKK 5.41bn), aided by cost synergies. Schenker contributed DKK 1.46 bn to EBIT in its first full quarter, offsetting soft Air & Sea volumes and inflation pressure in Road. Guidance tightened to EBIT DKK 19.5-20.5bn as market remains sluggish; synergy delivery on track with DKK ~800m expected FY2025 and full DKK 9bn by 2028. Strong cash generation (FCF DKK 4.3bn, 96 % conversion) supports deleveraging, with net leverage eased to 2.7x.

• Embla (CPSE:EMBLA) reported Q3 sales of USD 237m (cons. USD 232m, +11% y/y, +7% organic) driven by Prosthetics & Neuro Orthotics (+13%) and strong regional momentum in APAC (+18%), while Patient Care and Bracing & Supports were flat due to rebranding and U.S. tariff headwinds. EBITDA margin expanded 100bps y/y to 22%, supported by operating leverage and mix. FCF landed at USD 38m, aided by normalized capex (3.6% of sales) and healthy earnings quality. Net leverage at 2.5x stays mid-range of the 2-3x target, backed by USD 191m in available liquidity. FY2025 guidance of 5-6% organic growth and 20-21% EBITDA margin reiterated.

• cBrain (CPSE:CBRAIN) lowered its 2025 revenue growth guidance to 0-5% (prev. 10-15%) following delayed government procurements and slower international ramp-up (U.S., Germany, Africa). To offset lower sales, cBrain will scale back DKK ~30m of planned one-time investments in international initiatives, prompting an EBT margin upgrade to 24-27% (prev. 18-23%), equivalent to DKK 64-77m vs DKK 53-70m previously.

Sweden

Busy week in Stockholm with ~260 companies reporting earnings. Sentiment swung noticeably positive on the back of strong reports with only a few blemishes. The all-share (+3.7%) and large-cap (+3.2%) both ended the week on strong footing.

Among the reporting companies, portfolio company, Swedish Orphan Biovitrum (OM:SOBI), reported a decent set of figures and upgraded its FY2025 guidance. I covered the earnings in more detail in a separate post, linked below:

Relevant news/events:

• Assa Abloy (OM:ASSA B) Q3 sales SEK 38.15bn (cons. 38.16bn) and with organic growth at +3.0% (cons. +3.3 %) driven by solid performance in EMEIA, Entrance Systems, and Americas, though but China was weak (APAC -4 %). Adj. EBIT SEK 6.42bn (cons. 6.35bn) and margin 16.8% (cons. 16.6%); the highest quarterly level in a decade, supported by MFP savings, tariff mitigation, and mix shift toward higher-margin units. OCF improved to SEK 6.97bn (LY 6.34bn). CEO sees 2025 tracking toward another strong year despite tariffs and currency pressure.

• Indutrade (OM:INDT) Q3 sales SEK 7.85bn (cons. 7.84bn) with organic sales down -1%, mainly due to tough comps in Life Science. EBITA at SEK 1.14bn (cons. 1.10bn) for a margin of 14.6% (cons. 14.1%); organic EBITA -5pp offset by M&A (+3pp) and divestments (+1pp). Mgmt. cited decent order intake (+3% y/y) with demand in Life Science, Tech & Systems, and process industries seeing most traction.

• Lifco (OM:LIFCO) Q3 net sales of SEK 6,842m (cons. SEK 6,750m, +8.9% y/y) driven by 4.9% organic and 8% acquisitive growth, partly offset by a 4% FX headwind. EBITA landed at to SEK 1,543m (cons. SEK 1,520m), for a 22.6% margin (+40bps y/y) on continued operational efficiency within Demolition & Tools and Dental performance. Systems Solutions improved y/y but margin dilution persists from lower-margin Contract Manufacturing and weaker European industrial demand. OCF at SEK 1,394m, aided by WC discipline, and net leverage stood at 1.9x (2-3x target) despite intensified M&A spending.

• Addtech (OM:ADDT B) reported broad-based strength with Q2’25/26 sales of SEK 5.45bn (cons. SEK 5.35bn) and EBITA SEK 844m (cons. SEK 807m) for a 15.5% margin (+60bps y/y). Organic growth landed at +4% supported by project strength in Industrial Solutions and solid demand in Energy and Electrification, offsetting softness in Automation and Sawmill. Operating cash flow up 45 % y/y to SEK 859m on improved WC mgmt. Outlook remains constructive with robust order intake, balance sheet capacity strong (1.5x leverage).

• Green Landscaping (OM:GREEN) Q3 figures soft with revenue SEK 1.61bn (cons. 1.58bn), up 4% y/y, aided by M&A (7%) yet countered by organic (-3%) on weak Nordic demand and mild weather. EBITA of SEK 114m (cons. 116m) for a 7.1% margin (8.4% LY), hit by NOK 21m write-downs and lower contribution from Sweden (2.2%) and Norway (2.4%), offset by while Germany/Finland (22.7%). Operating cash flow SEK 47m (121m LY) , weighed by project timing and WC build-up post mild winter; typical Q4 rebound expected. Net leverage at 3.0x EBITDA (2.9x in Q2) and SEK 320m undrawn credit facilities remaining.

• Instalco (OM:INSTAL) Q3 revenue SEK 3.03bn (-2.5% vs cons., -3.7% y/y) eflected continued weakness in Sweden and delayed project starts, partly offset by resilient service activity (+2% y/y). EBIT at SEK 148m (-3.1% vs cons., -3% y/y) held stready, supported by cost controls and early benefits from the new country-based operating model. Order backlog +5.8% y/y to SEK 9.0bn; OCF SEK 133m and (112% cash conversion). Net leverage elevated at 3.3x (vs. 2.5x target), tempering near-term M&A activity in the wake of despite three bolt-ons in Germany (now a 20-company platform). Focus remains on margin uplift (target 8%), working capital efficiency, and readiness for a 2026 market recovery.

• Bravida (OM:BRAV) Q3 revenue SEK 6.43bn (+1.6% vs cons., -2% y/y), driven by Denmark (+20% y//), offset by Sweden (-7%), Norway (-10%), and Finland (-18%). EBITA at SEK 342m (+7.7% vs cons., +17% y/y) on stable execution in a weak construction market. Order intake +5% y/y, with backlog stable, to which mgmt. highlights improved quality, particularly in Sweden and Finland. OCF conversion fell to 63% (134%) on project timing, but net leverage remains low at 1.5x, providing balance sheet headroom for M&A. Management reaffirmed ~5% FY margin guidance, emphasizing margin-over-volume strategy ahead of a gradual market recovery expected from 2026.

• Byggmax (OM:BMAX) Q3 sales were SEK 1,949m (cons. 2,104 m), down -0.8% y/y as soft consumer sentiment weighed on larger renovation projects, partly offset by growth in garden/outdoor. Gross margin up +150bps y/y to 37.4% on e‑commerce optimization and lower waste. EBITA rose to  SEK 272m  (14.0% vs. cons. 12.5%; +10.2% y/y), marking a sixth straight quarter of margin expansion driven by efficiency, cost-outs, and mix-shift. FCF at SEK 283m. Net leverage at 0.4x  EBITDA , leaving the group with a solid liquidity buffer (SEK 1.3bn undrawn facilities).

• Hemnet (OM:HEM) posted revenue at SEK 366.7m (cons. SEK 393m) and EBITDA SEK 195m (cons. SEK 211m), pressured by a 19% y/y drop in published listings as high supply, long sales cycles, and weak sentiment continue to dampen activity. ARPL rose 21% y/y but came in below expectations (SEK 7,477 vs 7,977 cons.) as mix shifted toward mid-tier packages. Margin contracted 200 bps y/y to 53.3% despite solid cost control. Medium term upside hinges on market normalization and monetization of new products amid intensifying competition from free platforms.

• Evolution (OM:EVO) soft Q3 with revenue EUR 507m (-5% vs cons.; -2.4% y/y), dragged by weakness in Europe (-6.5% y/y) and Asia (-6.5% y/y) partially offset resilient performance in North America (+14.5% y/y) and LatAm (+6.4% y/y). EBITDA margin held firm at 66.4% (within 66-68% target) despite higher costs sequentially. Operating cash flow EUR 342m (83% conversion) and strong balance sheet supportive for M&A and continued capital returns.

• Getinge (OM:GETI B) Q3 sales SEK 8.23bn (cons. SEK 8.02bn) and adj. EBITA SEK 1.08bn (cons. SEK 0.99bn) for a margin of 13.1%. Order intake SEK 8.48bn (cons. 8.56bn). Tariffs and FX dragged EBITA by SEK 236m, largely tied to U.S. import duties, though management reiterated FY2025 organic growth target of 2-5% and unchanged financial goals.

• Swedenscare (OM:SECARE) Q3 revenue at SEK 713m (cons. SEK 691m) and EBIT SEK 76.1m (cons. SEK 53.6 m), driven by +11% y/y growth and improved mix. Operational EBITDA at SEK 155m (cons. SEK 141m) aided by OPEX leverage. U.S. retail rollout progressing with NaturVet now in 1,400 Walmart and 1,100 CVS stores. NIBD/EBITDA improved to 2.0x. FY2025 guidance points to DD organic growth and margin stability.

• Vimian (OM:VIMIAN) Q3 figures largely in line. Revenue at EUR 104m (cons. EUR 103m) and EBITDA at EUR 29.1m (cons. EUR 28.0m); EBIT of EUR 19.2m (cons.19.5 m). Organic growth at +9% with strong Specialty Pharma and Veterinary Services, alongside MedTech returning to growth after a soft H1. Positive USD 40.2m indemnification ruling adds EUR 15m post-quarter. Leverage 2.1x; outlook calls for continued DD Specialty Pharma growth and steady M&A pipeline.

• HMS Networks (OM:HMS) Q3 revenue at SEK 894m (cons. SEK 887m), driven by 8% organic sales growth, led by IDS and New Industries divisions led growth, while Europe and Japan stayed cautious. EBIT at SEK 213m (cons. 204 m) on higher gross margins from favorable mix and tariff pass-through. Cash flow solid at SEK 258m (91% conversion). Order intake strong at SEK 855, up 25% y/y (o/w 22% organic). FX tailwind aided Q3 but seen reversing in Q4. New 2030 plan targets SEK 7.5bn sales and 25% EBITA margin with ~50 % of growth from M&A.

• Munters (OM:MTRS) delivered a robust Q3 with net sales up 17% y/y (organic 15%) to SEK 3,798m (cons. 3,694 m) driven by DCT and FoodTech, while AirTech weighed on mix. Order intake surged 57% to SEK 4.16bn (book‑to‑bill 1.1x), led by hyperscaler and AI‑driven demand. Adj. EBITA margin fell to 13.5% (-280bps y/y), mainly dragged by FX; cost savings of SEK 250-300m p.a. are targeted by 2026 (SEK ~150m restructuring cost). FCF at SEK 206m with net levarage at 2.8x (2.5c target) after green bond placement and Geoclima acquisition.

• Hexagon (OM:HEXAB) Q3 revenue EUR 1.30bn (in line, +4% organic), with Americas offsetting EMEA weakness. EBIT at EUR 349m (+1% vs cons., -7% y/y) for a 26.8% margin (-70bps y/y) weighed by currency drag and restructuring costs (EUR 299m, incl. EUR 186m impairments). Cash conversion improved to 77% (70% LY), with NWC at 5.3% of sales. The announced EUR 2.7bn sale of Design & Engineering to Cadence (closing Q1’26, EUR1.4bn gain expected) refocuses the group on core digital-reality and autonomy platforms. Octave spin-off remains on track for H1’26 and sees strong SaaS growth and record bookings.

• Lindab (OM:LIAB) Q3 revenue SEK 3.25bn (+0.6% vs cons., −3% y/y) was stable despite weak construction markets, while EBIT SEK 315m (+8% vs cons., +4% y/y) and margin 9.7% (8.2% LY) reflected full impact of SEK 120m cost-outs. Ventilation Systems (80% of sales) grew +2% y/y with record 10.6% margin, offsetting a -17% decline in Profile Systems, still weighed by Swedish and German building softness. Figures helped by SEK 176m one-off gain from Airmaster earn-out adjustment. Mgmt. points to early signs of recovery going into 2026, underpinned by energy-efficient ventilation demand.

• Sandvik (OM:SAND) Q3 order intake at SEK 30,769m (cons. SEK 29,844m), up +16% y/y in CC, driven by strong demand in mining, software, and digital solutions. Revenue landed at SEK 29,218 (cons. SEK 29,849m), with adj. EBITA at SEK 5,539m (cons. SEK 5,725m). FCF generation stable at SEK 4,493m (SEK 3,983m LY). Market reacted positively to strong order momentum despite margin compression.

• AAK (OM:AAK) showed resilience despite soft chocolate demand and FX headwinds. Q3 revenue at SEK 11.5bn (cons. 11.53bn) and EBIT SEK 1.26bn (cons. 1.25bn). Weaker chocolate and bakery volumes (-8 % y/y in Chocolate & Confectionery Fats, -2 % total excl. Hillside) were offset by higher margins from cost-out and pricing discipline. EBIT/kg rose 5% y/y (12 % at CC) to SEK 2.47, supported by mix and cost savings from the Fit to Win program. Strong cash generation FCF SEK 221m; low net leverage 0.6x. Outlook suggest sequential volume recovery expected into 2026 driven by reformulation tailwinds from high cocoa prices and local commercial initiatives.

• Essity (OM:ESSITY B) Q3 revenue at SEK 34.6bn (cons. 34.5bn) with organic growth at +0.9% (cons. +1%), held back by FX and softer tissue volumes. Adj. EBITA landed at SEK 5.06bn (cons. 4.82bn), aided by mix, and variable cost-efficiencies. New SEK 1bn SG&A savings program launched to fund growth in premium and health categories; full effect expected by 2026. Net leverage at 1.2x post share buybacks. Outlook constructive with lower pulp costs to aid Q4 margins, and focus shifting toward profitable volume recovery and innovation-led growth.

• Axfood (OM:AXFO) Q3 landed slightly lower than expected with revenue at SEK 22.3bn (cons. SEK 22.5bn) with decent LFL growth in core Willys (+4.1% y/y) and Hemköp incl. franchise and Tempo (+4.8). Adj. EBIT SEK 1.10bn (cons. SEK 1.12bn), for a margin of 4.9%, dragged by City Gross integration costs (SEK 115m vs 100m guided). City Gross still expected to break even H2 2026. Cash flow remained strong (Q3 SEK 1.35bn), supported by tight working capital. FY2025 capex guidance of SEK 1.6-1.7bn reiterated, though store openings trimmed to 9.

• Telia (OM:TELIA) Q3 revenue SEK 19.9bn (in line; +1.1% y/y LFL), mainly driven by service revenue expansion in Sweden and the Baltics, where broadband, TV, and mobile performed well. EBIT SEK 4.0bn (+3% vs cons.) on improved mix and cost efficiencies. Net debt fell SEK 7.1bn (1.9x), supported by solid FCF generation (SEK 2.9bn), divestment of TV & Media and disciplined CapEx (SEK 13bn). FY2025 guidance raised: FCF SEK ~8bn (prev. 7.5bn), EBITDA ≥5%, service revenue +2%. Capital returns intact under progressive dividend policy.

Finland

Shares in Helsinki saw their strongest weekly performance in a long while, with the all-share (+4.4%) and large-cap (+5.5%) powering through the week with strong momentum on the back of large-cap earnings.

Relevant news/events:

• Wulff (HLSE:WUF1V) Q3 revenue at EUR 31.2 m (cons. EUR 29.2m) and EBIT of EUR 2.3m (cons. EUR 3.0m), both at record highs driven by +71% growth in staffing and accounting services. Workplace products -2 % y/y but margins held firm. Outlook reiterated, with FY2025 growth seen continuing.

• Relais (HLSE:RELAIS) reported Q3 revenue at EUR 101.1m (cons. EUR 101.0m), driven by +35 % y/y growth from M&A and steady organic expansion. Comparable EBITA margin 10.8% (-1.4 pp y/y) as integration costs weighed temporarily. Multiple acquisitions, incl. Team Verksted, Matro Group, and Autodelar, made Relais the largest independent CV workshop operator in the Nordics. Leverage elevated at 3.7x EBITDA; hybrid bond EUR 50m issued to fund M&A. Also, Christian Johansson Gebauer announced as new CEO as of Jan 2026.

• Ponsse (HLSE:PON1V) Q3 revenue EUR 173m (cons. EUR 179m), pressured by Nordic demand softening, partly offset by recovery in Germany, France, and the U.S. Profitability fell short of expectations with EBIT EUR 9.6m (cons. EUR 17.7m) on lower gross margins. FY2025 EBIT expected slightly above 2024; focus remains on cost control, R&D, and network expansion amid challenging forestry markets.

• Olvi (HLSE:OLVAS) Q3 revenue EUR 186m (cons. EUR 196m) dragged by soft consumer sentiment and poor summer weather, particularly in the Baltics and Denmark, though the company still saw market share gains in non-alcoholic and premium segments. EBIT landed at EUR 26.9m (cons. EUR 33.5m); margin expansion driven by mix-shift and operational efficiencies. Guidance cut with FY2025 EBIT now EUR 80-84 m (prev. 82-86 m). Three acquisitions (Latvia, Estonia, Bosnia) expand footprint; Q4 expected stronger as cost phasing normalizes.

• Tietoevry (HLSE:TIETO) Q3 revenue EUR 454m (-1% vs cons., +4% y/y) was aided by a one-off EUR 22m court ruling in Banking. Underlying organic growth stood at -1% y/y, reflecting soft market conditions in Create and Care (-3%), partially offset by Banking (+14%), Industry (3%), and care (2%). EBIT EUR 87.8m (+10% vs cons.) and margin 19.3% (15.2% excl. court ruling) benefited from ongoing cost programs (EUR 75m run-rate savings achieved). FCF EUR 217m was inflated by the Tech Services divestment (EUR 201m proceeds), which also cut NIBD to EUR 552m (2.4x EBITDA). Order backlog rose 11% y/y, but most contribution is expected beyond 2026.

• Metso (HLSE:METSO) Q3 revenue EUR 1.33bn (+7% vs cons., +10% y/y) and EBIT EUR 222m (+10% vs cons., +9% y/y) reflected strong execution across both Minerals (sales +10% y/y, 18% margin) and Aggregates (+9% y/y, 16% margin), with aftermarket mix (53% of sales) underpinning resilience. Orders +2% y/y, driven by robust mining demand, offset softer U.S. aggregates. OCF at EUR 266m (EUR -19m LY) on improved WC. Net leverage at 1.3x. New strategy targets ≥7% annual growth and >18% EBITA margin by 2028, from copper/gold projects, aftermarket expansion, and sustainability-driven product leadership.

• Kone (HLSE:KNEBV) Q3 revenue EUR 2.76bn (+0.1% vs cons.; +3.9% y/y) and EBIT EUR 341m (+0.6% vs cons.;+6.6% y/y) reflected continued pivot toward Service and (+7% y/y) Modernization (+16%) (together >60% of sales), offsetting ongoing China new-build (-5%) weakness. EBIT margin expanded 75bps y/y to 12.3% on mix-shift and efficiency gains. OCF at EUR 444m, aided by WC release (NWC EUR -818m), lifting net cash to EUR 480m. Order intake rose +7.8% y/y and backlog +31% y/y. Management reaffirmed FY2025 guidance (3-5% organic growth, 11.9-12.3% EBIT margin), flagging FX and China as key headwinds.

• Konecranes (HLSE:KCR) Q3 revenue EUR 989m (-5% vs cons., -8% y/y), dragged by lower Port Solutions volumes, partly offset by resilient Service and Equipment demand. However, EBIT lifted to EUR 154m (+16% vs cons., +16% y/y) on mix-shift, and one-offs (EUR ~10m). Order intake surged +23% y/y to EUR 1.15bn, led by Industrial Equipment (+26%) and Port Solutions (+36%), driving backlog above EUR 3bn. FCF at EUR 214m, supported by disciplined working capital management (NWC 6.7% of sales). . Outlook stable: FY2025 sales to remain flat with margin at or above 2024 levels, implying Q4 margin to normalize.

• Hiab (HLSE:HIAB) Q3 revenue EUR 346m (-6% vs cons., -11% y/y) and EBIT EUR 39.6m (-29% vs cons., -28% y/y) reflected soft U.S. Equipment demand and lower delivery volumes, partly offset by continued Service growth (+4% y/y, 23.5% margin). Eco portfolio maintained momentum (+23% y/y, now 40% of sales), supportive amid trade-driven volume pressure. Cash conversion was strong (173%, OCF EUR 69m) aided by inventory discipline. Net cash at EUR 308m. MacGregor divestment strengthened the balance sheet, funding an extra EUR 101m dividend. Outlook steady: FY2025 EBIT margin >13.5%, with a EUR 20m cost program planned for 2026 to offset macro and U.S. tariff headwinds.

• Nokia (HLSE:NOKIA) Q3 revenue EUR 4.83bn (+4% vs cons., +9% y/y cc), supported by broad-based growth across Network Infrastructure (+11%), Cloud & Network Services (+13%), and Mobile Networks (+4%), with AI and cloud demand driving Optical and IP. EBIT EUR 435m (+27% vs cons., flat y/y excl. one-offs) as margins normalized from a strong base; comparable operating margin 9.0% (-220bps y/y) but steady ex one-time benefits. FCF EUR 429m lifted net cash to EUR 3.0bn, despite Infinera integration, which is ahead of plan and contributing positively. Order intake strong and backlog up y/y, reinforcing confidence in upgraded FY2025 EBIT guidance (EUR 1.7-2.2bn) and Q4 above-seasonal growth.

• Scanfil (HLSE:SCANFL) Q3 revenue EUR 191m (-2% vs cons., +10% y/y) marked a clear return to organic growth (+7.8%) as Medtech & Life Science (+16%) and Energy & Cleantech (+26%) offset Industrial softness (-2%). APAC (+26%) and Americas led growth and (+31%), while Central Europe lagged (-3%). EBIT EUR 14.1m (in line, +27% y/y) delivered a 7.4% margin, aided by mix, efficiency, and stable pricing. Order intake remained healthy with EUR 72m of new contracts, and three acquisitions (MB Elettronica, ADCO Circuits, SRXGlobal) broadened sector and regional reach. Balance sheet remains strong net leverage 0.1x). FY2025 guidance EUR 780-920m sales, EUR 55-68m EBITA with focus on integration, cost control, and continued organic momentum into Q4.

• Metsä Board (HLSE:METSA) Q3 revenue EUR 441m (-2% vs cons., -7% y/y) and EBIT EUR -45.6m (vs cons. 13.9m) reflected persistent U.S. tariffs, soft European demand, and production curtailments. Folding boxboard volumes (-9%) and pulp (-13%) weighed on mix, while stable pricing limited further downside. OCF at EUR 122m on EUR 120m WC release. Net cash at EUR 75. A broad cost program launched, targeting material EBITDA uplift and efficiency gains; up to 315 job cuts possible. No near-term guidance, but FY cash flow expected positive; lower wood costs and capacity optimization underpin recovery potential into 2026.

Norway

Sentiment the cyclical-heavy indices in Oslo appear to stabilize with the all-share (+1.3%) and large-cap (+1.0%) both finishing the week higher. Roughly 28 prints hit the tape, and cyclicals led the leaderboard while financials sat at the other end of the spectrum.

The week also featured earnings from watchlisted company, Medistim (OM:MEDI) which has seen its shares soar 20% since publication of my deep-dive.

Q3 showed continued strength with 2025 shaping up to be a banner-year. In Q3, the company delivered revenue of NOK 166.8m (cons. NOK 160m), up +25.7% y/y, driven by double-digit growth in Americas (+35.7%) and APAC (+194%), offset by softer EMEA (-11.8%). Imaging products rose +39.7%, fueled by the MiraQ INTUI launch, while Flow systems grew +25.3%.

The gross margin improved 260bps y/y to 81.5% mainly from pivot to direct GTM and pricing actions, which outweighed drag from mix effects. EBIT landed at NOK 40.6m (cons. NOK 38m, +27.1% y/y). FCF reached NOK 53.1m and balance sheet remains debt free with a net cash balance at NOK 129.1m (post leases and deferred income). I continue to believe the company is overcapitalized and welcome added debt to fund the equity story more aggressively and/or return money to shareholders.

Relevant news/events:

• Market chatter suggests Frontline (OB:FRO) is weighing a sale of its entire LR2 product tanker fleet (USD ~1bn). Some see scope for a sizeable special dividend, others expect redeployment into crude tonnage given firm rates and Fredriksen’s historic bias toward reinvestment.

• HydrogenPro (OB:HYPRO) is being rumored as a takeover target amid green hydrogen consolidation. The OEM, backed by Andritz (16.7 %), Mitsubishi (12.3 %) and LONGi (13.3 %), posted LTM Q2’25 revenue NOK 177m and EBITDA NOK -181m. Strategic partners’ cross-holdings and sector synergies make M&A plausible, though no formal process is underway.

• Kitron (OB:KIT) Q3 revenue EUR 168m (-4% vs cons., +16% y/y) and EBIT EUR 14.6m (-10% vs cons., +36% y/y). Defence & Aerospace (+82% y/y) drove growth, offsetting weaker Connectivity and Medical demand. Order intake at EUR 257m (+73% y/y) lifted backlog to a record EUR 599m (+31%), supporting a raised FY2025 revenue guide (EUR 700-740m) and EBIT (EUR 59-66m). Operating cash flow jumped to EUR 44m (vs EUR 2m LY) on stronger WC mgmt. Leverage at 0.8x and balance sheet supportive of continued capacity expansion in the Nordics and Malaysia. Defence-led growth cycle underpins visibility into 2026, though lumpiness should be a watchpoint.

• ATEA (OB:ATEA) Q3 gross sales rose 9% y/y to NOK 12.3bn, with broad-based demand across hardware (+6%), software/cloud (+17%), and services (+6%). IFRS revenue was NOK 8.4bn (in line) and EBIT NOK 348m (-1% vs cons.) Strong execution in Norway and Sweden, though restructuring in Denmark continues to weigh alongside softer demand in Finland (recovery expected Q4). Operating cash flow solid at NOK 220m; net debt stable at 0.2x EBITDA.

• Zalaris (OB:ZAL) Q3 revenue NOK 375m (+10% y/y) hit a new high, driven by Managed Services (+14% y/y, 77% of total) and robust growth across UK/Ireland and APAC. Adjusted EBIT NOK 47m (+27% y/y, 12.6% margin) marked the strongest Q3 to date, supported by automation, nearshore leverage, and mix shift toward recurring contracts. Operating cash flow NOK 10.9m was seasonally weaker due to timing effects. Balance sheet strengthened, with net leverage down to 0.9x, and refinanced EUR 40m RCF is set to cut annual interest by EUR ~17m. Management reaffirmed its 2028 targets (NOK 2bn revenue, 13-15% EBIT margin), highlighting high visibility and accelerating SAP S/4 HANA migration.

• Norwegian Air Shuttle (OB:NAS) Q3 revenue at NOK 12.3bn (cons. NOK 12.4bn) and EBIT NOK 3.0bn (cons. NOK 2.9bn) for a 25.1% margin (+670bps y/y) on lower unit costs and high load factors. Passenger volumes +9% y/y across Norwegian and Widerøe. FCF landed at NOK 826m. Dividend of NOK 0.90/share (NOK 950 m total) and repaid legacy bonds. Fleet expansion ongoing with 80 new 737 MAX 8s on order. Program X to deliver NOK >1bn profit uplift by 2026; booked winter yields ahead y/y.

• Vår Energi (OB:VAR) Q3 production at 370 kboepd (cons. 386 kboepd), with revenue at USD 2.14bn (cons. USD 2.15bn) and pre-tax profit of USD 1.00bn (cons. USD 0.95bn). FCF strong at USD 508m (Q2: USD 4 m) on stronger operations and prudent cost-control. Dividend at USD 300m maintained. Q4 output guided at ~430 kboepd as Balder X and Castberg reach plateau. CEO Walker flagged transition into “harvest phase” with de-risked portfolio and sustainable FCF at USD 60/bbl oil

• TGS (OB:TGS) Q3 revenue USD 424m (+12% vs cons.) and EBITDA USD 278m (+40%) sharply outperformed on surging multi-client late sales (2.1x sales/investment) and tight cost control post-PGS integration with SG&A down 33% y/y. Order inflow of USD 436m pushing backlog to USD 473m. Cash flow robust and net debt down to 0.9x EBITDA, supporting the USD 0.155 dividend. Capex trimmed to USD 110m as integration synergies accelerate; FY guidance reaffirmed with improving marine utilization and sustained multi-client demand.

In case you missed it…

NOTE: This update serves as a follow-up to the initial write-up posted a few weeks ago. To the extent you are not yet familiar with the business-/investment thesis, I recommend reviewing that piece before diving into this update.

The good offsetting the bad

This morning SOBI pre-released its Q3’25 figures in connection with its upward revision of FY2025 guidance, now expecting revenue to grow LDD at CC (prev. HSD) alongside mid-to-high 30s adj. EBITA margin (prev. mid-30s).

As for the Q3 report, SOBI delivered sales of SEK 7,776m (cons. SEK 7,776m), up 13% y/y (21% in CC), with strong figures across all three segments and across all regions, though with nuances attached.

Share

Haematology reported revenue at SEK 4,772m (cons. SEK 4,649m), up 19% y/y (26% CC), driven by strong performance in Altuvoct /Altuviiio (+4.8% vs. cons.) capturing conversions from both (i) existing SOBI patient pool (i.e., Elocta); and (ii) conversion from competing factor- and non-factor (i.e., Hemlibra) products toward UEHL products. This is aligned with the expectations outlined in my initial write-up, and in that context worth noting several large market launches are still pending. In a similar vein, Doptelet also continued its momentum (+15.4% vs. cons.) on the back of recent ITP approvals in the U.S. and Japan.

Having said that, weaker Vonjo uptake has prompted a SEK 6.6bn impairment, though management reiterated continued belief in the underlying potential of the drug. Admittedly, I struggle to parse this information — either management showed their hand and confessed to subpar allocation/execution or they are taking a cautious stance. The right answer likely lies somewhere in between, but never a good sign to push expectations further into the future. Consequently, I have lowered my inner-year estimates (below cons), while still accounting for the anticipated label expansion into a bigger patient cohort (PACIFICA, phase 3).

As for Immunology, Gamifant (+6.5% vs. cons.) was the bright spot and showing continued momentum on the on the back of U.S. launch in HLH/MAS in Still’s disease. Perhaps less encouraging, the Beyfortus royalty contribution came in short of expectations (-22.9% vs. cons.), mainly driven by a slower start to the RSV season — but not unlikely to think that Merck’s launch of Enflonsia has had an impact on volumes-/pricing. To that extent, one would have to look for commentary from Sanofi (Oct. 24) and Merck (Oct. 30).

Specialty care continued its recent growth trend with limited commentary on operations. However, management did offer notable optimism about Tryngolza potential, citing peak sales potential of SEK >5bn for EU-5 alone; quite a bit higher than the SEK ~1bn probability-weighted sales I have modeled. But it is still early, so lets see.

Profitability landed slightly below expectations on gross profit (-1.9% vs. cons.) from lower Beyfortus contribution (mix), but were fully offset by lower SG&A and R&D spend, resulting in adj. EBITA at SEK 3,671m (cons. SEK 3,233m) for a 47.2% margin (+5.5pp vs. cons.). Cash generation remained strong, with OCF at SEK 1,974m though FCF (-725m) was weighed by the SEK 2,621m upfront payment for Aspaveli royalty agreement (SOBI acquired 90% of Apellis’ ex-US Aspaveli royalties).

Thesis intact. Close monitoring of peer commentary and prescription data will follow.

Despite global indices ending higher, it appears market jitters are building as investors flag signs of revenue roundtripping among mega-cap AI names and rising credit quality concerns following the bankruptcies of First Brands Group and Tricolor Holdings, both of which have hit a handful of large U.S. banks with losses. At this stage, fears remain contained and mainly headline-driven, though the U.S. regional bank index did end the week -6% lower.

In the Nordics, the earnings season is has officially kicked off, with the first batch of companies reporting last week, mainly out of Sweden (37) and to a lesser extent Norway (6) and Finland (2). On the margin, reported figures slightly outperformed consensus yet most shares reacted negatively anyway. The Nordic all-share index ended the week down -0.6%, counter to other regional-/global indices.

Denmark

Diverging sentiment in Copenhagen, with the all-share (-2.5%) and large-cap (-0.1%) both ending down. Obesity-related names (NOVO, ZEAL, GUBRA) faced pressure on the back of President Trump’s vowing to lower prices on weight loss drugs.

Relevant news/events:

• Asetek (CPSE:ASTK) has secured a deal with a returning “tier-one” customer, prompting the company to lift its medium-term Liquid Cooling revenue goal to USD >65m (prev. >USD 50m) and targets adj. EBITDA margins above 25%. The deal comes with minimum volume commitment estimated at $35 million during the first 2-year term, from start of shipments, but revenues may be higher depending on actual order volumes. FY2025 guidance unchanged.

• Nordic Capital and Permira raise their bid DKK 250/share (prev. DKK 230/share) for Bavarian Nordic (CPSE:BAVA) and extended the acceptance deadline to Nov 5, targeting a ≥75% stake. The consortium only reached 25.7% support, though institutional owners equiv. to 5.3% of the share capital have expressed their support of the new offer (i.e. 30.7% official support). The offer implies ~10.1x 2025E EV/EBITDA at the midpoint of FY2025 guidance. I first highlighted BAVA as a sector favorite in April, and flagged likely higher bid on the back of the first offer. I find it difficult to assess the next steps from here, hence I have sold my shares (+56.9% since publication).

• Dataproces (CPSE:DATA) released its 2030 growth target of reaching DKK 200m in topline (vs. DKK 46m in LTM Q2’25), reached by: (i) doubling topline in DK (i.e. to implied DKK 100m) organically; (ii) expansion abroad (Germany and Sweden in process); and (ii) 1-2 acquisition per annum. A few days later, the company announced two new institutional shareholders entering the capital structure for which I shared my thoughts here.

• SKAKO (CPSE:SKAKO) has divested SKAKO Vibration to France’s Vibe Holding for EUR 37.5m (DKK 280m), implying EV/EBIT (Q2’25 LTM) of ~15.7x. The deal follows last year’s divestment of SKAKO Concrete, marking a full exit from industrial operations and transition to a non-operating HoldCo. The company generated DKK 253m in LTM revenue and DKK 17.8m EBIT before special items.

• Novo Nordisk (CPSE:NOVO B) announced its second major deal in a week, acquiring the rare-disease drug Zaltenibart from U.S.-based Omeros for DKK 2.2bn, with potential milestone and royalty payments bringing the total value up to DKK 13.5bn. The therapy targets rare blood and kidney disorders and has shown promising results in PNH (paroxysmal nocturnal hemoglobinuria). The acquisition comes just a week after the DKK 30bn Akero Therapeutics deal. Separately, issues at the Catelent-acquired facilities in the U.S. resurfaced, with the FDA declaring the site non-compliant with the status “official action indicated”.

Sweden

Busy week in Stockholm with a fresh slate of Q3 earnings reports. The all-share (-0.1%) and large-cap (-0.2%) traded largely flat for most of the week.

Relevant news/events:

• Hanza (OM:HANZA) surged after announcing the SEK 2.3bn all-share acquisition of Germany’s BMK Group, roughly half of Hanza’s market cap. BMK is expected to generate SEK 3.3bn in 2025 sales and an EBIT margin of 7.3%, implying an EV/EBIT of ~9.5x. The transaction, structured as a share swap (BMK owners receive 27% of the combined group), and will boost Hanza’s turnover by ~50% to SEK ~10bn, creating Europe’s largest listed contract manufacturer.

• Guldbrev (OM:GULD) debuted on Nasdaq First North Growth Market after an oversubscribed IPO (+2.8x). Existing shareholders sold ~10.5m shares; no new capital raised. Guldbrev operates a digital platform for consumer gold recycling and reported Q2’25 LTM revenue of SEK 287m and EBITDA of SEK 78m.

• Arla Plast (OM:ARLA) announced the acquisition of Finnish-based specialized plastic provider Aikolon (EV EUR ~1m). While this exact acquisition is perhaps immaterial (revenue at EUR 10m and an EBIT of EUR -2m), it follows a recent shift toward M&A fueled growth, best exemplified by the acquisition of Spainish player, Nudec. Assuming RR profitability at the level of the legacy ARLA platform, shares should trade at 90-100 SEK/share.

• Danish family office, William Demant Invest has flagged +20% ownership in Invisio (OM:IVSO).

• Ericsson (OM:ERIC B) earnings elaborated here.

• ABB (OB:ABB) delivered a strong set of Q3 figures. Order intake landed at USD 9,143m (cons. USD 8,927m) with comparable revenue up +9% y/y to USD 9,083 (cons. USD 8,893m) on continued strength in Electrification (+13% y/y) driven by data center demand. Operational EBITA rose +12% y/y to USD 1,738m, with margin improving by 20 bps to 19.2%. FCFF jumped to USD 1,552bn on strong WC management. Company maintained FY guidance for MSD organic growth and narrowed its margin outlook to the upper end of the 16-19% range. Sequential Q4 margin is expected to ease ~150bps, in line with normal seasonality.

• Avanza (OM:AZA) delivered Q3 beat across the board. Total income at SEK 1,142m (cons. SEK 1,122) and operating profit SEK 818m (cons. SEK 779), driven by strong brokerage and FX income. NBI SEK 307m (cons. SEK 295) and NII SEK 398m (in line), while costs came in at -324m (cons -342. Management reiterated 2025 cost growth guidance of +11%, implying a heavier Q4 cost load.

• Autoliv (OM:ALIV) reported reported Q3 sales USD 2.71bn (+5.9% y/y, in line with cons) and adj. EBIT of USD 271m (+14% y/y, 10.0% margin vs cons 9.2%), driven by Americas, India, and China, cost reductions, and tariff recovery. Organic growth landed at 3.9% (cons. 4.4%) and trailed global auto production (+4.6%), due to mix effects in China. Adj. EBIT of USD 271m beat expectations (cons USD 250m), for a 10.0% margin (vs cons 9.2%). Strategic highlights included a new China R&D center, JV with HSAE, and partnership with CATARC. FY2025 guidance reiterated (3% org. growth, 10-10.5% adj. EBIT margin, USD 1.2bn OCF), though FX now seen -1% and capex cut to 4.5% of sales (prev. 5%).

• Note (OM:NOTE) reported Q3 sales of SEK 830m, at 6% organic growth (-3% FX), slightly below cons (SEK 877m). Adj. EBIT was SEK 77m (cons. 82.6m) for a 9.3% margin. FCF remained strong at SEK 121m, and net debt is minimal at SEK 27m, leaving ample room for M&A. Management guides Q4 sales of SEK 1,000-1,050m and 10-11% margin, aligned with consensus.

• Volvo (OM:VOLV B) reported Q3 sales of SEK 110.7bn (-5% y/y, cons. 110.3bn) and adj. EBIT of SEK 11.7bn (cons. 11.3bn). Order intake fell -14% y/y (vs cons 44.4bn). Cash generation was weak with industrial OCF at SEK -1.7bn (vs SEK 3.1bn LY). Segment highlights: Trucks -7% y/y with 9.1% margin, CE +1% with 14.4% margin, and Penta +7% with 18.6% margin. Service and Penta growth partly offset volume and FX headwinds. 2026 truck outlook down ~5pp and CE -1%.

• EQT (OM:EQT) provided a Q3 update, pointing to EUR 19bn realized in exits LTM (EUR 267bn AUM), outpacing investments as EQT focuses on returning liquidity to LPs. Fundraising remains firm with BPEA IX and EQT XI progressing well, while new evergreen and infrastructure vehicles broaden the platform. Fee-related EBITDA margin target ≥55% reiterated; carry expected to ramp as more funds enter carry mode. Still, shares fell late in the week, tracking sector weakness amid U.S. private credit jitters, likely driven by basket-level selling.

Finland

Shares in Helsinki went against the tide with the all-share (+1.2%) and large-cap (+1.0%) ending the week in green.

Relevant news/events:

• Qt Group (HLSE:QTCOM) received 94% shareholder acceptance for its EUR ~200m acquisition of Sweden’s IAR Systems Group, clearing the final hurdle for completion. The target delivered Q2-2025 LTM revenues of SEK 478m and an adjusted EBITDA of SEK 162m, and is valued at an EV of SEK 2,203m (13.6x). Later in the week, the company downgraded its FY2025 expectations, now guiding 3-10% topline growth (prev. 10-20%) and EBIT margin of 20-30% (prev. 30-40%), citing delayed investment behavior by customers.

• Alma Media (HLSE:ALMA) issued a positive profit warning, now guiding FY2025 net sales and adj. EBIT at or above FY2024 levels (EUR 312.7m/76.9m), vs. prior guidance of “at 2024 level.” I am tracking Alma Media in hopes of a split in the media/classifieds business, similar to what has happened to Schibsted/Vend.

• Endomines (HLSE:PAMPALO) rose after new drilling results at its Hosko mine confirmed high-grade gold zones.

• Lassila & Tikanoja (HLSE:LAT1V) narrowed its FY2025 EBIT guidance to EUR 44-48m (prev. “same or better than 2024”), citing solid operational performance in Finland and Sweden. Worth noting the company will demerge into two separate listed companies by year-end, one focusing on the circular economy and the other on facility services. I have it watchlisted as I think there may be good value hidden in circular economy segment post selling-pressure.

• Talenom (HLSE:TNOM) Q3 comparable net sales grew +2.4% y/y to EUR 29.8m, led by Finland (+3.5%) and Spain (+17%), though partially offset by weaker Sweden (-13%). EBITDA landed at EUR 8.6m (28.8% margin), driving a 45% y/y cash flow improvement. The company launched a strategic review of its Easor software unit ahead of a potential spin-off/IPO, now operating with a separate management team. FY2025 guidance reiterated (sales EUR 130-140m, EBITDA EUR 36-42m).

• Nordea (HLSE:NDA FI) reported operating profit of EUR 1.60bn (cons. EUR 1.49bn) as tight cost discipline offset lower rates. Net interest income EUR 1.78bn (cons. EUR 1.76bn) modest beats. Costs EUR 1.33bn (cons. EUR 1.35 bn) on easing investment spend; credit recoveries EUR 19m (cons. EUR -26m) suggest strong portfolio. ROE 15.8% (cons. 14.9%); FY target >15% reiterated. New EUR 250m buyback starting 20 Oct.

Norway

Another red week in Oslo with the all-share (-1.9%) and large-cap (-1.5%) dragged by lower oil prices and shipping headwinds following U.S. announcing higher port fees.

Relevant news/events:

• Wallenius Wilhelmsen (OB:WAWI) withdrew its FY2025 guidance citing higher U.S. port fees and cost uncertainty. The news gave negative read-across to Hoegh Autoliners (OB:HAUTO) as well.

• Norske Skog (OB:NSKOG) announced that the company will cut up to 200 FTEs over the next two years. They have also identified other cost-cutting measures.

• ABG Sundal Collier (OB:ABG) delivered a strong Q3, with revenue up 21% y/y to NOK 476m and EPS rising 56% to NOK 0.14. The quarter was driven by record DCM activity, including a EUR 585m bond for European Entertainment Group, and improving ECM volumes. The company also reported encouraging traction in its recently launched Private Banking arm.

• Tomra (OB:TOM) missed Q3 consensus despite lowered expectations going into the print. Q3 sales EUR 306m (-4% vs cons) and adj. EBITA EUR 30m (-20% vs cons), for a 10% margin (vs cons 12%). Order intake EUR 119m, hurt by weak demand across both Collection (limited Poland contribution) and Recycling (softer mix, delayed investments). Outlook remains cautious for Recycling, though Collection is expected to improve into 2026.

• Mowi (OB:MOWI) pre-released Q3 figures show operational EBIT of EUR 112m, in line with consensus (EUR 112m) but down from EUR 173m LY. Harvest volumes reached a record 166,000t (guidance: 159,500t), while farming costs were EUR 5.42/kg, flat q/q and down y/y. Lower salmon prices weighed on earnings, though recent price recovery and solid performance in Norway, Scotland, and Ireland keep 2025-26 estimates intact.

In case you missed it…

Just as a ceasefire took hold in the Middle East, attention quickly swung back to Washington where President Trump reignited trade drama with a fresh threat of tariffs on China. The announcement, which came late on Friday, triggered a sharp risk-off move in U.S. equities, suggesting Monday will carry the true mark-to-market for European equities. Meanwhile, gold extended its late surge to fresh all-time highs; a unique sight given it happens alongside record equity indices and absent any textbook crisis.

In the Nordics, equities finished the week broadly flat (-0.4%), though the spotlight fell on Verisure (OM:VSURE), the most significant IPO in the Nordics for years. In case you missed it, I shared my take on the listing here:

Denmark

In Copenhagen, good news in some corners was largely offset by weakness elsewhere, leaving the market effectively unchanged. The all-share (+0.0%) and the large-cap index (+0.4%) both ended largely flat.

Relevant news/events:

• Virogates (CPSE:VIROG) received takeover offer from U.S. fund Remedy Ventures at a 40% premium to prior-day close. Remedy, already owning 28%, seeks to raise stake to 59% but keep listing on First North. Buyer signals potential need for new capital, implying dilution risk.

• Jyske Bank (CPSE:JYSK) upgraded its FY2025 net profit guidance to DKK 4.9-5.3bn (prev. upper end of DKK 3.8-4.6bn), citing broad-based strength from favourable financial markets, solid credit quality, and high wealth management activity. Q3 net profit landed at DKK 1.46bn (vs DKK 1.42bn LY). Loan impairments were modest at DKK 25m (vs DKK -82m reversal LY). CFO cautioned that strong Q3 market tailwinds may ease in Q4.

• Bang & Olufsen (CPSE:BO) reported Q1-25/26 revenue at DKK 517m (vs. DKK 544m LY) and EBIT of DKK -27m (vs DKK -20m LY), weighed by U.S. tariffs, weak Asian luxury demand, and 51 monobrand store closures. CEO highlighted global 15% price hikes (incl. U.S. tariff pass-through) dampening reseller appetite. Company is also managing legal disputes against former partner Canvas Hifi an ex-U.S. distributor.

• Tryg (CPSE:TRYG) delivered a solid Q3 beat on underwriting. Net profit came in at DKK 1.5bn (vs cons. 1.4bn, LY 1.6bn) with a technical result of DKK 2.2bn (cons. 2.1bn) and a combined ratio of 78.6% (vs 79.1% LY, cons. 79.2%). Premiums grew 5% YoY to DKK 10.2bn, driven primarily by retail price hikes offsetting claims inflation. Execution remains strong with stable underwriting margins and volume retention despite regulatory noise around competition.

• Netcompany (CPSE:NETC) launched Verà, an AI-driven European defense platform integrating real-time data to counter hybrid threats. It enables monitoring of critical infrastructure, arctic surveillance, and military logistics coordination. CEO cited possibility of Verá constituting 20-30% of group revenue within a few years.

• Ørsted (CPSE:ORSTED) completed Denmark’s largest-ever rights issue of DKK 60bn, with 99.3% subscription. The Danish state, Equinor, and Andel invested pro-rata to their existing stake. Proceeds aimed at strengthening balance sheet and fund six offshore wind projects after DKK >40bn U.S. impairments and comes amid regulatory uncertainty, incl. delays from the Trump administration’s temporary halt to Revolution Wind. Separately, the company announced plans to cut 2,000 jobs (~25% of global workforce) by end-2027, including ~500 before year-end (235 in Denmark).

• Novo Nordisk (CPSE:NOVO B) is acquiring U.S. biotech Akero Therapeutics for DKK 30bn to expand into liver disease (MASH). Akero’s lead candidate efruxifermin is in phase 3 trials ahead of potential FDA approval.

• Per Aarsleff (CPSE:PAAL B) has acquired Sweden’s Styrud Ingenjörsfirma, a specialist in trenchless pipeline construction. Styrud generated SEK 316m revenue and SEK 33m EBITDA in 2024.

Sweden

Shares in Stockholm ended the week slightly down, with the all-share (-0.9%) and large-cap (-0.8%) moving in locksteps. Aside from the Verisure IPO and a few M&A announcements, the week was relatively calm on the corporate news front.

Relevant news/events:

• Verisure (OM:VSURE) debuted on Nasdaq Stockholm at an EV of EUR 18.9bn, and shares jumped +12% from offer price on strong demand. The listing resulted in ~60k new shareholders, with institutional backing from i.a., Alecta, AMF, GIC, Swedbank Robur, and AP3. Proceeds (EUR 3.1m gross) earmarked for debt reduction and ADT Mexico acquisition.

• AstraZeneca (OM:AZN) rose after signing AI-driven gene therapy deal with U.S. biotech Algen Biotechnologies, worth up to USD 555m in milestones. The deal grants exclusive rights to develop and commercialize immune disease therapies using Algen’s AI/CRISPR-based platform. Separately, the company announced that its drug Baxdrostat achieved the primary endpoint in the phase 3 Bax24 study in patients with resistant hypertension (high blood pressure).

• Sweco (OM:SWEC B) announced acquisition of Finland’s Fimpec, an energy and industrial transformation consultancy, reinforcing the M&A-led upward revision trend into 2026. The news comes on the back of last week’s national infrastructure plan from the Swedish Transport Administration, and Sweden’s municipal association guiding SEK 250bn annual local investment plans o/w ~73% in water/wastewater.

• ABB (OM:ABB) cancelled IPO plans for its Robotics division, agreeing instead to sell it to SoftBank Group for USD 5.38bn EV (~17.2x 2024 EBITDA). The unit generated USD 2.3bn revenue in 2024 (~7% of group) with ~7,000 staff. ABB will reorganise into three segments post-sale, expected mid-late 2026.

Finland

Shares in Helsinki traded rangebound for most of the week with the all-share (+0.2%) and large-cap (+0.3%) both ending flat. The week featured the Posti (HLSE:POSTI) IPO, elaborated below.

Relevant news/events:

• Alisa Bank (HLSE:ALISA) is evaluating divestment of consumer finance segment (loan book EUR ~78m) to sharpen focus on SME financing and deposit growth. Exit expected to proceed gradually through 2025-26, with management guiding a positive impact on 2025 pre-tax results excl. one-offs.

• Dovre Group (HLSE:DOV1V) issued a profit warning due to deepening losses in Sweden related to crisis wind farm projects under subsidiary Suvic, with additional margin pressure in Finland. The company warned it cannot meet payment obligations without new financing or project income. Management cited lack of transparency in Suvic’s operations and has terminated plans to acquire the remaining Suvic shares.

• Admicom (HLSE:ADMCM) issued profit warning and trimmed FY25 guidance: recurring annual billings now seen +6-10% (prev. +8-14%), total revenue +5-8% (prev. +6-11%), and adj. EBITDA margin 31-33% (prev. 31-36%). Preliminary Q3 results landed in line with revenue EUR 9.3m (+7% YoY), adj. EBITDA at EUR 3.7m, and EBIT of EUR 2.5m. CEO flagged delayed construction recovery, persistent customer bankruptcies, and weaker sales execution.

• Apetit (HLSE:APETIT) is acquiring Sweden’s largest frozen pea producer Foodhills for SEK 60m, with buyer repaying SEK 20-30m in shareholder loans. The deal adds ~20% inorganic growth to Food Solutions revenue, though potentially diluting margins near term.

• Posti Group (HLSE:POSTI) debuted on Nasdaq Helsinki with shares closing at EUR 8.0 (+6.4% vs offer price EUR 7.50). The offering valued the company at EUR 303m and an EV/EBITDA of ~1.5x. The Finnish state raised EUR ~100m via secondary sales to institutions and retail, while Posti issued EUR ~3m of new shares in an employee offering. The listing attracted ~12,000 shareholders, comparable to Apetit and NoHo Partners, marking one of the broader retail IPO participations in Finland this year.

• Remedy Entertainment (HLSE:REMEDY) is cutting its FY2025 guidance after weak sales of FBC: Firebreak, and now expects revenue to grow YoY but EBIT to turn negative (prev. positive growth). The company will record a EUR 14.9m non-cash impairment covering most of the game’s capitalized development costs and related rights.

Norway

Shares in Oslo fell modestly, with the all-share (-1.0%) and large-cap (-0.8%) both affected by lower oil prices amid ceasefire in the Middle East.

Relevant news/events:

• CodeLab Capital (OB:CODE) has acquired a 50% stake in Cloudya, a fast-growing Norwegian AWS reseller founded in 2024. Cloudya has NOK 23m ARR, targeting NOK 40m by 2026.

• SalMar (OB:SALM) reported Q3 harvest at 93.2kt, up +50% YoY and a new company record (prev. 83.2kt in Q4’24). Mid-Norway accounted for 47kt and North Norway 42.5kt (vs 18kt LY). Strong execution supports LT volume ambitions, though earlier harvest timing may cap price realization.

• TGS (OB:TGS) Q3 update point to multi-client investments expected at USD ~86m, down from USD 129m LY. Resource utilisation exceeded guidance, with OBN staffing at 2.8 (vs ~2.5 guided) and streamer vessel utilisation 73% (vs 65%). CEO highlighted operational efficiency gains despite lower investment activity. Recommend reading Norwegian Hidden Gems’ timely piece on the name.

• According to Financial Times, Permira and Blackstone have hired advisers for an IPO of Mobile.de, Adevinta’s largest unit, at an implied EV of EUR 10bn. This values Adevinta at EUR ~26.7bn, implying Vend (OM:VENDA) 14% stake is worth NOK ~33bn (42% of market cap) vs. current book value NOK 20bn.

• Nel ASA (OM:NEL) received 2.5 MW PEM electrolyzer order from H2 Energy for a green hydrogen plant in Buchs, Switzerland. The facility will supply hydrogen for municipal transport, industrial use, and local networks, and marks the third collaboration between the two firms.

• Solstad Offshore (OB:SOFF) cut FY2025 adj. EBITDA guidance to USD 115m (prev. USD 120-150m) following weaker outlook from Solstad Maritime, which lowered its estimate to USD 290m (prev. USD 360-380m) amid softer North Sea conditions, lower vessel utilization, and project delays. Solstad Offshore’s share of group EBITDA now seen at ~USD 50m (vs USD 60-80m prior).

In case you missed it…