The Israeli operation in which Moein al-Arabid, head of Hamas's General Security Service, was captured and brought to Israel provides a fascinating glimpse into the state of the campaign in the Gaza Strip, nearly three years after the October 7 massacre. On one hand, Israel's ability to insert a special force deep into Hamas-controlled territory, locate a senior official, and extraction him from the Strip is a significant operational achievement. On the other hand, the very necessity to execute such a dangerous operation inside an area where Hamas still maintains control, along with the exchange of fire and the reliance on airpower to enable the force's extraction, underscores just how far Israel remains from its stated goal: ending Hamas rule in the Strip and ensuring long-term security for the residents of the Gaza border region in particular and the State of Israel as a whole.

The operation, reportedly led by the Shin Bet and executed within a Hamas-controlled area, sent a message of capability to both Hamas and the mediators. Beyond the intelligence value of the capture, Israel sought to demonstrate that even as Hamas continues to maintain security apparatuses, institutions, and areas under its control, it is not immune to Israeli penetration or the targeting of its senior leadership ranks. According to Arab reports, the force encountered resistance and was forced to rely on air cover to complete its withdrawal. Simultaneously, it was claimed that local elements from clans opposed to Hamas assisted Israel, a strategy Israel has attempted to leverage in the past, though it subsequently learned how complex it is to operate in a space where Hamas constantly hunts for traitors and perceived traitors. While the full operational details remain unclear, the overall narrative indicates a complex operation rather than a simple raid.

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The gap between how Israel presented the event and how it was covered in the Arab media was stark. Major Arab media outlets focused heavily on the deaths of four Palestinians, including three children and a woman, who were reportedly members of the senior official's household, while casting doubt on the claim that Israel had abducted a senior Hamas figure. Through this lens, the Israeli operational achievement was pushed to the sidelines. Al Jazeera went so far as to publish videos purporting to document the moment the official was taken, illustrating once again the Qatar-backed platform's influence in shaping the media narrative surrounding the war. Hamas initially denied the abduction altogether, claiming that an Israeli force had tried to operate in the area and that the strikes and gunfire were merely intended to enable its retreat. Eventually, however, Hamas admitted that it was a senior officer in its internal security forces who was taken by Israel, rather than a top executive official.

This operation did not occur in a vacuum. In recent weeks, tensions with Hamas have escalated over kites and balloons sent toward Israeli communities near the Gaza border, prompting Israel to warn that continued launches could lead to escalation. Following the Israeli threat, mediators including Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey reportedly pledged to press Hamas to stop the launches. At the same time, ongoing contacts persist between Hamas, representatives of the Trump administration, and the Peace Council. Jared Kushner's direct meeting with Hamas leadership was similarly intended to advance the American plan centered on disarming the organization and transitioning the Strip to a new governing structure, even as the parties remain divided over what those terms actually mean.

The political context is broader still. Hamas is simultaneously attempting to chart a path for its own political and military survival by integrating into the broader Palestinian system, particularly ahead of planned elections for PLO institutions. Therefore, the struggle surrounding the captured official is not merely an intelligence or security matter. It is taking place at a moment when Hamas is striving to prove that despite the blows it has absorbed, it remains an indispensable political, security, and social force. For Israel, by contrast, an operation of this nature is designed to clarify that the ground control Hamas continues to hold does not grant it immunity.

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Yet this is precisely where the central paradox lies. If the goal of the war was to end Hamas rule, then nearly three years after the massacre, the fact that Israeli forces must still risk their lives to reach senior operatives inside territory controlled by the group serves as proof that the objective has not yet been achieved. Israel has indeed succeeded in severely degrading Hamas's infrastructure, command chain, and military capabilities. Despite this, Hamas has survived both as a governing entity and as an armed force, continuing to operate internal security apparatuses and remaining capable of confronting Israeli forces operating on the ground.

For this reason, while the operational achievement and its implications should not be underestimated, its strategic significance must not be misconstrued. Eliminating or capturing a senior Hamas figure may improve intelligence, damage the organization, and deter its operatives, but it is no substitute for achieving the political objective that the government set for the citizens of Israel. Furthermore, the very fact that Hamas still holds territory and enjoys operational latitude with mediators and the international community obligates Israel to clearly define its end-state for the campaign and articulate how it intends to reach it.

Ultimately, the operation in Gaza serves as both a symbol of Israeli capability and a reminder of an incomplete campaign. Israel can and should continue to act against senior Hamas figures wherever they operate, but the responsibility rests with the government to ensure that tactical successes do not become a substitute for strategy, and that the goals set after October 7, chief among them ending Hamas rule and securing the safety of Israel's citizens, are truly realized.

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(Originally published in Besheva)

For over a decade, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were a central player shaping the Levant. Established in 2015 around the core of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) with American backing, the Kurdish-Arab force became the tip of the spear in the campaign against ISIS in Syria. Under the umbrella of the international coalition, it dismantled the terror group's territorial hold, captured vast swathes of northern and eastern Syria, and established an autonomous governance region known as "Rojava."

At its peak, the Kurdish autonomy covered 25% to 30% of Syrian territory, encompassing strategic northeastern regions, critical oil and gas fields, vital agricultural land, and the border with Iraq. For Syria's Kurdish population, Rojava was not merely a security arrangement, but a historic effort to establish self-rule, civil institutions, independent education, and police systems - ensuring that after decades of oppression under the Assad regime, they would never again be rendered a powerless minority.

However, the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa fundamentally altered the equation. The new government in Damascus sought to re-establish full sovereignty over national territory and was unwilling to tolerate armed forces outside its chain of command. For months, the parties attempted to reach an agreement regulating the SDF's future, but talks repeatedly hit a dead end. The Kurds demanded significant autonomy and a separate command structure, while Damascus insisted on full integration into state institutions.

This unfolded against the backdrop of a shifting American stance. Trump administration officials - including the pro-Turkish US envoy Tom Barrack - had signaled that the Kurdish role in the fight against ISIS had reached its end, and that they must integrate into the new Syrian state. For the SDF, the message was unmistakable: their primary ally was no longer interested in preserving the model that had sustained their autonomy for years.

Against this backdrop, the announcement by SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi agreeing to integrate his forces into state institutions marks a major triumph for al-Sharaa. For nearly two years, Damascus worked toward a primary goal: bringing one of the country's most significant independent power centers back under a single governing authority. Under the emerging framework, Kurdish forces will be absorbed into the Syrian army within existing units rather than functioning as an independent army, while local security apparatuses will be integrated into national systems. A measure of local control over civil administration and municipal services is expected to remain, but without security or military independence.

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For Abdi, this was a painful decision - a clear indication that his operational maneuverability had dramatically shrunk. Pressure from Damascus, dwindling US support, the withdrawal of American forces from Syrian territory, and insufficient regional backing left him with very few alternatives. It is also possible that external Kurdish actors pushed for a settlement, particularly following recent meetings between al-Sharaa and the Iraqi Kurdistan leadership under the Barzani family, where the Syrian Kurdish issue was likely raised.

For Erdoğan, this marks another positive development. For years, Ankara viewed the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) - which it designates a terrorist organization - and staunchly opposed any expression of Kurdish autonomy along its border. The dismantling of Syria's independent Kurdish structure removes a major obstacle for Erdoğan and represents a clear victory for his regional policy.

For Israel, the picture - as usual - is complex. For years, Syrian Kurds were viewed as a potential partner against hostile actors due to their fight against ISIS, their relative independence, their secular character, and their strong ties with the US. Their integration into the Syrian state effectively cements al-Sharaa's standing and brings Damascus closer to establishing a permanent new reality. Conversely, the emergence of a more functional Syrian state could serve Israeli interests if it facilitates coordination mechanisms capable of reining in hostile forces.

Consequently, Israel must continue to approach Damascus with caution. Suspicion toward the new regime remains fully justified, particularly given the ideological background of some of its elements and its close ties to Turkey. Yet alongside maintaining operational freedom, there is room to leverage overlapping interests: pushing Iran out of the Syrian arena, curbing excessive foreign influence, and establishing security arrangements that prevent new threats from taking root.

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It is worth noting that the dissolution of the SDF does not mark the end of the Kurdish question; it merely alters its form. The doors to dialogue with the Kurds are far from closed, and Israel can continue to maintain indirect channels with them while observing how they fit into the emerging Syrian architecture.

The next arena testing al-Sharaa's success will be in the country's south - with the Druze in Suwayda. The Druze are watching developments in the north closely, well aware that once the Kurdish issue is resolved, government focus will turn inward toward other domestic challenges. Just last week, Hikmat al-Hijri, one of the community's prominent leaders known for his hardline stance against the new regime, declared that the Druze in Suwayda are an integral part of the State of Israel - statements that underscore the explosive potential of this front.

To be sure, Syrian Druze society is not a monolith, and various currents hold differing views toward the new regime. Regardless, Israel will need to act deliberately: safeguarding the security and interests of the Druze community while avoiding moves that would allow its enemies to frame it as attempting to build its own "proxy armies."

Ultimately, the integration of the SDF represents a major turning point in the battle over the identity of the new Syria. It strengthens al-Sharaa, weakens a key independent power center, and delivers a strategic win to Erdoğan. But it also opens a new arena for Israel - not just regarding the Kurds, but across the entire Syrian landscape. There, the primary challenge will be striking the right balance between neutralizing threats and shaping a regional order that serves its interests while pushing back hostile forces, Sunni and Shia alike.

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(Originally published in B'Sheva)

The signing of the defense pact in Mecca between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan last week is far more than just another security agreement. By pledging that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against all, the three nations have laid the groundwork for a new security framework spanning from Anatolia through the Gulf to South Asia.

The choice of location is equally deliberate. Holding the signing in Mecca bestows upon the alliance an unmistakable aura of Islamic - and largely Sunni - solidarity, while simultaneously placing Saudi Arabia firmly at the center. The fact that leaders gathered in Mecca, rather than Ankara or Islamabad, underscores Riyadh’s desire to act as the host, facilitator, and diplomatic engine shaping the new regional architecture—and shows that the other two parties are more than comfortable with that dynamic. Indeed, the joint declaration itself explicitly highlights "Islamic brotherhood and solidarity" as a core pillar of the accord.

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Parallel Interests

Each of the three nations has its own set of motivations for joining the pact, and each is eyeing its traditional rival to flex its muscles: Pakistan against India, Saudi Arabia against Iran, and Turkey against Israel and the Hellenic bloc.

For Saudi Arabia, beyond its ambition to serve as the gravity center of this newly aligned pan-Sunni camp, the goal is to reduce reliance on a single security umbrella - the United States. Riyadh has learned time and again that a U.S. presence does not guarantee immunity from Iranian missiles, drones, and proxies. Joining forces allows the Saudis to leverage their financial clout and diplomatic weight alongside Turkey's standing army and Pakistan's military power - including its nuclear prestige.

Pakistan, for its part, gains financial backing, prestige, and renewed influence across the Islamic world, projecting power beyond South Asia and into the Middle East - all while winking at Washington as a key security partner of America’s close allies. Saudi funding and Turkish defense industries offer valuable launching pads for Islamabad’s broader ambitions.

For Turkey, this is a direct continuation of the security network Ankara has already established around Qatar, Syria, Libya, and Somalia. It provides an opportunity to expand its defense exports and cement its role as a power broker bridging the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. Furthermore, according to various reports, Turkey struggled to maintain adequate air defense during Operation Roaring Lion (despite Erdogan's assertions regarding Turkish self-reliance in air defense) and ultimately relied on NATO and German systems. Turkey therefore seeks to diversify its strategic dependencies and draw defense R&D knowledge from its new partners, in keeping with its longstanding playbook. Alongside these goals, Ankara aims to benefit from Saudi funding, leverage Pakistan's nuclear umbrella, and continue building a ring of isolation around Israel.

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The Implications for Israel

Indeed, the agreement carries significant implications for Israel. For years, discussions surrounding potential regional architecture centered on integrating Israel with the Arab world through normalization, economic cooperation, and joint security initiatives aimed at countering Iran. The "Mecca Pact" presents an alternative vision: three major Muslim powers constructing a substantial security framework without Israel - and conspicuously pushing it to the margins - with Egypt potentially next in line.

This does not mean Saudi-Israeli normalization is off the table permanently. U.S. President Trump continues to express optimism that a deal will materialize down the road, and recent reports point to sales of Israeli systems to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the regional center of gravity has shifted - at least for now - from a model where Israel is integrated to one where regional powers join hands to balance both Israel and Iran. The common denominator is not a single shared enemy, but a mutual desire to enhance deterrence against multiple simultaneous threats.

Tehran is equally attuned to this duality. Some Iranian analysts view the pact as a encirclement effort: Turkey to the northwest, Saudi Arabia to the southwest, and Pakistan to the southeast. Others echo Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan’s framing, arguing that this is not an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition, but rather the inception of a flexible regional architecture.

What Happens in Practice?

The major question mark hovering over the alliance is its practical implementation. The Houthis were quick to test this new strategic deterrence by attacking facilities in Saudi Arabia, yet no significant joint response materialized from the three signatories. Historically, even when Saudi Arabia faced mounting pressure and attacks from Iran or its proxies, its prior defense agreement with Pakistan yielded only a highly measured response - troop deployments, system placements, and mediation attempts, but little else. Iranian analysts similarly assess that in the event of a direct Iranian strike, Turkey and Pakistan would likely offer intelligence, logistics, weaponry, and diplomatic backing rather than entering a full-scale war.

The alliance is also far more complex than it appears on the surface. Saudi Arabia, for instance, exports roughly 15% of its oil to India and will not easily sacrifice that vital economic interest for complete alignment with Pakistan.

The same applies to Riyadh’s relationship with Turkey: reports recently revealed that Greek systems intercepted several ballistic missile launches directed at Saudi Arabia; Riyadh will not readily abandon Athens' support in favor of total integration with Ankara. Furthermore, there is the Chinese dimension: Beijing enjoys strong relations with Islamabad, but any deeper alignment involving Saudi Arabia and Turkey risks creating friction with Washington.

All of this suggests that despite the initial hype, an "Islamic NATO" has not been forged overnight. What we are witnessing instead is a gradual process of security alignment among key Sunni powers, each pursuing its own strategic interests.

Paradoxically, credit for the emergence of this bloc can be shared between Jerusalem and Tehran: Israel fueled growing anxieties over its military and diplomatic dominance in the region, while Iran and its proxies reminded the Gulf states just how vulnerable they remain. The Mecca Pact is a direct response to both forces - aiming to push Israel to the fringes of the emerging regional architecture while establishing a more formidable counterweight to the Iranian axis.

Here, too, the ultimate key lies in Washington, which views all three signatories to the Mecca Pact as vital allies and strategic assets. Israel will need to keep a close watch on this rapprochement, cautioning the Trump administration against potential leaks of strategic military intelligence and the erosion of normalization prospects. Concurrently, Israel must strengthen ties with Egypt to prevent Cairo from drifting too far into this camp, while deepening cooperation with its key regional allies - India, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and Somaliland - who, not coincidentally, happen to be the traditional rivals of the new alliance's members.

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In recent weeks, two seemingly unrelated events took place involving Qatar and the Jewish world. However, the connection between them is deep and crucial to understand.

The first was the release of a viral video in English, initially attributed to an independent American channel, which was later revealed to be operating out of Qatar. The second was the publication of a photo showing Rabbi Mendy Chitrik alongside the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, accompanied by an announcement regarding the expansion of Jewish life in the country and plans to appoint Chitrik's son as a Chabad emissary to Qatar.

At first glance, these appear to be two separate stories. Upon closer inspection, they complement each other.

The video in question does not stop at criticizing the Israeli government or its policies. It seeks to attribute an essential set of negative traits inherent to every Israeli, regardless of who they are: arrogance, a sense of superiority, exploitation of others, and an inability to integrate into host societies. To achieve this, it mobilizes Israeli stereotypes, such as the "try your luck" mentality ("shitat matzliach") and the deeply rooted fear of being a "sucker" (freier), and combines them with descriptions of Israeli backpackers, as well as liberal Israelis who relocated to Europe. Even when discussing individuals who left Israel out of opposition to their government or to build a life elsewhere, the video depicts them as establishing new colonial outposts, disenfranchising the "natives," and acting with moral superiority.

Even education on Holocaust remembrance is not portrayed as a means of coping with one of the greatest atrocities in human history, but rather as a tool designed to foster "eternal victimhood" aimed at justifying those very same negative traits.

The message is clear: it does not matter what an Israeli's political views are, where they live, or how they act. The mere fact of being Israeli makes one a colonialist, arrogant, and irredeemable figure. This is not political criticism, it is essentialism, attributing innate, unredeemable traits to Israelis. This is precisely the mechanism that historically underpinned campaigns of demonization against Jews.

Indeed, when an entire population is branded as inherently evil, humiliating, violent, and inhumane treatment toward them becomes normalized. History teaches us that dehumanization does not necessarily end with words, and the question of "what to do with this evil Israeli" is left unanswered in the video, left to the viewer's imagination.

In this context, it is hard to ignore the fact that Qatar is not a liberal democracy with a free media landscape or a thriving civil society. In a country where freedom of expression is severely restricted and the "media" functions as a propaganda arm of the regime, it is unlikely that a production of this nature is merely a meaningless private initiative. It is highly probable that it received a green light from the top.

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Just days later, a photo suddenly emerged from Doha: Rabbi Mendy Chitrik, Chairman of the Alliance of Rabbis in Islamic States (despite being an Ashkenazi Chabad Chassid himself), was received with warmth and affection by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The official announcement hinted that his son is expected to serve as a Chabad emissary in the country, alongside wishes for the prosperity of Jewish life in Qatar, the very same state that provides moral, financial, and diplomatic support to Hamas, and whose propaganda arms sow antisemitic hatred, Holocaust denial, and blood libels wherever they reach.

It is difficult not to notice the picture Qatar is trying to paint.

On one hand, propaganda is disseminated portraying the Israeli as a violent, colonialist, and irredeemable creature. On the other hand, photos are showcased featuring a warm reception for a Jewish rabbi. Through this, Qatar seeks to establish a narrative distinction tailored to appeal to the West: We are not against Jews; we are only against Israelis, or against Zionism.

This is not a new distinction. Iran has utilized it for years, as have various anti-Zionist figures in the West such as current mayor of New York, Zohran Mamdani. Its objective is twofold: externally, it offers a defense against accusations of antisemitism; internally, it drives a wedge within the Jewish world and fuels internal Jewish conflict.

Under this narrative, the "good Jew" is a Jew devoid of sovereignty, power, and a state. Conversely, the Israeli who possesses a state, an army, and the right to self-determination and self-defense is portrayed as inherently evil. As noted, this is not a critique of a specific policy, it is a denial of the very legitimacy of Jewish sovereignty.

The recent public dispute between former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Qatar also fits into this broader picture. The more Israel conducts its struggle against Qatar through public declarations that can easily be weaponized as propaganda tools, the more Doha can position itself as a host to Jews, a promoter of "coexistence," and a mediator "releasing hostages" (rather than the entity that funded their abduction), all while claiming to be falsely accused. This is a narrative game in which the Qatari regime is highly skilled.

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Israel must not allow itself to be dragged into this game. As Israel's leadership internalizes that Qatar is not a complex actor, but one that consistently works to promote delegitimization, incitement, violence and support for extremist elements, it will need to respond not with slogans, but with policy: through diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and strategic communications tools, in cooperation with its allies in the West and the region.

Ultimately, the danger lies not merely in another viral video or another festive photo from a palace in Doha. The danger resides in the ongoing attempt to redefine the boundaries of acceptable hatred: rendering an entire population inherently flawed, while simultaneously presenting the distinction between the "good Jew" and the "bad Israeli" as a moderate and moral stance. This is a move far more sophisticated than simple propaganda, and therefore, far more dangerous.

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(Originally published in "B'Sheva")

In September 2023, the Middle East seemed to be on the verge of a historic turning point. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman gave an interview declaring that Israel and Saudi Arabia were moving closer to a normalization agreement, emphasizing that "every day we’re getting closer." Simultaneously, at the G20 summit in New Delhi, the IMEC initiative was launched - an ambitious economic corridor designed to connect India to Europe through the Gulf states, Jordan, and Israel. It was a strategic vision of regional connectivity, linking ports, railways, energy grids, and supply chains across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

And then came the October 7 massacre and the ensuing war. Less than three years after those major headlines, the picture looks entirely different. Key regional players are now working to delay, derail, or bypass critical initiatives where Israel was meant to play a central role. At the heart of this shift are Saudi Arabia and Turkey - each driven by its own distinct motivations.

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The Saudi U-Turn

The Saudi reversal is particularly striking. Before the war, Riyadh was viewed as a potential partner for a historic normalization deal, and even as the actor that gave its neighbors the green light to join the Abraham Accords. Today, according to numerous reports, Saudi Arabia is exerting quiet, behind-the-scenes influence to stall regional arrangements that could strengthen Israel’s standing. For instance, reports indicate that Riyadh is applying pressure in both Syria and Lebanon to block settlements that would allow Israel to deepen its regional integration and reap significant political and security benefits.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has been conducting aggressive media campaigns against the United Arab Emirates. In a twisted turn of events, one of the primary criticisms leveled against Abu Dhabi is its normalization with Israel. Saudi propaganda outlets are weaponizing the Abraham Accords to undermine their rival's regional legitimacy. This campaign has even crossed into antisemitism, as flagged by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in an unusual public tweet a few months ago.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s refusal - alongside Qatar - to meet President Trump’s recent demand to join the Abraham Accords as part of a regional framework against Iran demonstrates that Riyadh is currently unwilling to reduce regional tensions or contribute to stability via normalization with Israel.

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Turkey’s ‘Blue Homeland’ and Alternate Routes

While Saudi Arabia attempts to stall Israeli integration from within, Turkey is working to bypass it from without. In recent years, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been promoting an alternative, imperialistic regional vision based on creating transit routes that intentionally circumvent Israel. Among other initiatives, Ankara is pushing plans for a new Hejaz railway connecting Turkey, Syria, and the Arab world, while presenting various alternatives to IMEC designed to diminish the importance of - or completely omit - the Israeli corridor.

Turkey is taking a similar approach at sea. Its "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) doctrine expands Ankara's maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, putting it in direct conflict with Greece, Cyprus, and joint energy projects involving Israel. The 2019 maritime agreement Turkey signed with Libya, claiming a shared maritime border, was effectively designed to cut off maritime continuity between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. By doing so, Ankara aims to disrupt regional energy projects - including initiatives to transport Middle Eastern gas to Europe - and strip Israel of its geo-economic advantage in the regional trade race.

This friction isn't limited to infrastructure and energy. According to various reports, Erdogan even moved to block an Israeli-American initiative aimed at expanding aid to Kurdish groups operating against Iran. His motivation? Fear that while such a move might destabilize the Iranian regime, it would inevitably strengthen Kurdish movements - Erdogan's ultimate nemesis - in the region.

How Israel Should Respond

Israel cannot alter Saudi or Turkish ambitions, but it can - and must - formulate an effective counterstrategy.

• Deepen Like-Minded Alliances: Israel must strengthen cooperation with nations that still value regional integration—chief among them India, the UAE, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus. Jerusalem must ensure these partners see the tangible fruits of peace, rather than being pushed back into the arms of rejectionist states due to loose rhetoric or policy proposals driven by domestic election campaigns.

• Maintain Momentum on IMEC: Jerusalem needs to show consistent, stubborn determination in advancing IMEC and other connectivity projects, even if it happens at a slower pace or takes routes that bypass Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This means appointing dedicated project managers, passing relevant legislation, and allocating budgets for necessary infrastructure—such as upgrading the railways between the Jordan River Crossing and Haifa, and modernizing border terminals.

• Leverage the Rejectionism: Israel can utilize the Saudi and Qatari refusal to normalize relations to position itself before the Trump administration—which is eager for deals—as the party genuinely interested in regional cooperation, while highlighting that others are the true obstacles to peace.

The Broader Battlefield

The struggle for the future of the Middle East is not being fought solely on the battlefield. It is taking place in ports, on railway tracks, on energy maps, and along trade routes. In this conflict, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are attempting to shape a regional order where Israel is marginalized and excluded from critical regional initiatives.

We must remember that one of Hamas's explicit goals on October 7 was to halt the momentum of normalization, integration, and prosperity that Israel was experiencing in the region. The response to this must be a sophisticated Israeli policy that mobilizes partnerships and advances initiatives, ensuring that reality evolves in the right direction.

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(Originally published in B'Sheva)

Reports suggest that the talks between the United States and Iran are not converging toward a grand, comprehensive bargain, but rather a temporary interim agreement. This short-term framework is designed to halt the ongoing escalation, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and grant Iran limited relief on its oil exports, all while pushing deep, foundational questions, particularly the nuclear issue, further down the road. This is all unfolding just weeks before the World Cup is set to kick off, and with the US midterm elections looming on the horizon. In other words, Washington and Tehran are not necessarily close to resolving the crisis, they are simply trying to manage it.

According to some of the published details, the emerging understandings begin with Iran's immediate demands: a broad ceasefire that includes secondary fronts like Lebanon, a gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, temporary sanctions relief on oil, and future discussions regarding the release of frozen assets and broader sanctions removal. In this context, it remains unclear what the US, and by extension Israel, receives in return. Discussions on Iranian concessions regarding its nuclear program, most notably the fate of its enriched uranium, have essentially been deferred to the next stage. Even when American officials speak of a tentative Iranian commitment on the matter, Tehran makes sure to publicly deny any actual concessions.

If these reports are accurate, this represents a significant achievement for the Islamic Republic. The regime entered these talks under intense military, economic, and infrastructural pressure. Yet, it managed to leverage the Strait of Hormuz, the global energy market, and both regional and American public opinion to pressure Washington, while it remains unclear what the US gains in return. Instead of negotiations beginning with how to dismantle or export Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, they are starting with how to prevent another spike in energy prices. This is precisely the playground where Iran excels at bargaining: it manufactures a systemic risk, and then sells the reduction of that risk as a diplomatic achievement.

The Hormuz issue is far from purely technical. Iran is not interested merely in opening the strait, it wants to secure a special status there, ensuring the situation does not simply return to the pre-crisis status quo. Tehran recently went so far as to announce the establishment of a "Strait of Hormuz Protection Authority," effectively marking its territory and extending its control all the way to the Port of Fujairah on the eastern coast of the United Arab Emirates. If the agreement leaves Iran with the capability to block, threaten, or exact a political price on maritime traffic, it will not solve the problem but rather institutionalize it. From Tehran's perspective, the mere fact that the West is forced to negotiate the rules of the game in Hormuz is a strategic victory.

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Regional and Domestic Pressures

The role of the Gulf states in these events raises several question marks. Former President Trump noted last week that a date had already been set for an American military strike, but regional leaders asked him to cancel the plans and give diplomacy a chance. This claim, which has since been denied by various countries, is particularly interesting given the lack of cohesion the Gulf states have shown so far regarding Iran. There is a stark contrast between the hawkish stance of the UAE, which took significant fire and demanded a reality free of Iranian ballistic or naval threats (and reportedly even carried out strikes inside Iran), and Saudi Arabia, which has favored dialogue initiatives. It is highly possible that a shared weariness of war brought these leaders closer together, leading to collective regional pressure on Trump to hold back on a strike.

Simultaneously, a carefully engineered narrative is taking root in both the American and regional media. This narrative suggests that Israel dragged the US into a purposeless, unwinnable war. Reports have also claimed that the US "wasted" many of its interceptors defending Israel, leading to delays in American defense industry deliveries to other nations. This anti-Israel, and at times antisemitic, pressure is weighing heavily on Trump, and it may well influence his calculations moving forward.

In this regard, Trump's intriguing recent tweets are worth noting. He claimed to have demanded that a surprised Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan, and perhaps even Iran itself, join the Abraham Accords with Israel. However, this may simply be his way of pushing back against their leverage and creating domestic political pressure within those countries.

Regardless, Washington’s sense of urgency stems from more than just regional dynamics. The Trump administration is operating under mounting domestic pressure: high energy prices, fears of renewed inflation, the upcoming World Cup, eroding public trust, and rising political criticism ahead of the midterms, including from within the Republican base itself. It is also possible that the resignation, or firing, of Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard a few days ago stemmed from a lack of confidence in Trump’s decision-making regarding Iran.

Consequently, for the White House, a "reasonable" deal that lowers the flames may be preferable to continuing an expensive, unpredictable, and politically dangerous campaign. Reports of falling oil prices driven by optimism surrounding the talks illustrate just how heavily the economic arena weighs on American decision-making. At the same time, it is worth noting that Trump continues to post threatening tweets aimed at Iran, keeping the military option visibly on the table.

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What Lies Ahead for Israel?

For Israel, the implications of this shift are twofold.

First, it must guard against an interim agreement that provides Iran and its proxies with economic oxygen, diplomatic legitimacy, and time, without establishing a real mechanism to halt the nuclear program, the missile project, and the proxy network. Second, Israel must ensure that the American desire for quiet does not translate into restrictions on Israeli freedom of action against Iranian violations or its proxies, especially in Lebanon. A ceasefire that fails to restrain Hezbollah could easily become a rehabilitation mechanism for the Axis rather than a secure, lasting arrangement.

On the nuclear front, while there is immense focus on the 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium in Iran's possession, which was apparently buried during the American bombings last June, another critical point must be emphasized. Iran also holds hundreds of additional kilograms of uranium enriched to lower levels of 20%. This level is already vastly higher than what is required for civilian nuclear energy, which is roughly 5%.

This means that any hollow Iranian declaration about having no desire to develop a nuclear weapon cannot be taken at face value. Israel must continuously emphasize the existence of these specific stockpiles to the United States.

Ultimately, this strategic event is not in Israeli hands; it will be finalized between the Trump administration and Iranian representatives. Nonetheless, Israel must engage with Washington immediately, working both with the administration and with allies in the House and Senate before this interim framework solidifies into a permanent reality.

The red lines must be clear:

• The removal of all enriched uranium from Iran or its irreversible neutralization.

• Strict oversight of all nuclear facilities.

• A total ban on rehabilitating sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure.

• An automatic "snapback" response mechanism for any violations.

• The preservation of Israel’s freedom of action against both Iran and Hezbollah.

If the agreement begins with Hormuz and ends with a mere promise to discuss the nuclear issue in the future, it will be a temporary pause that allows for rearmament rather than a real solution. Israel may not be able to stop the diplomatic momentum, but it must ensure that diplomacy does not become a bypass route around a decisive outcome, at the direct expense of its national security.

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The seismic decision by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel didn’t happen in a vacuum. For those tracking the rhetoric coming out of Abu Dhabi in recent weeks - from senior officials to state-aligned commentators - the tone was unmistakable: a profound disillusionment with the regional order, both political and energetic, and a growing desire to break free from frameworks deemed "irrelevant."

The Security-Energy Nexus

The UAE has borne the brunt of Iranian aggression over the past two months, facing a barrage of thousands of drones and missiles launched directly from Iranian territory across the Gulf.

Abu Dhabi’s sharp criticism stems from a sense that traditional multilateral frameworks failed to deliver security or energy stability when it mattered most. While regional bodies remained silent, only specialized bilateral cooperation (most notably with Israel, which reportedly provided vital air defense systems and intelligence) proved effective.

In this light, leaving OPEC is more than just a technical move. It is a symptom of a broader UAE critique of organizations like the Arab League. Abu Dhabi has signaled that it will no longer invest political or financial capital into "partners" who do not stand by its side during a crisis.

The Collapse of "Arab Solidarity"

The Emirati critique, largely voiced through influential commentators rather than official government channels - a hallmark of UAE diplomacy - has been aimed squarely at the Arab world itself.

During the conflict with Iran, key regional powers like Egypt and Turkey failed to provide sufficient political or security backing. Even worse, from Abu Dhabi's perspective, they refrained from issuing clear condemnations of Iranian violations of UAE sovereignty.

Increasingly, the Arab League is being viewed in Abu Dhabi as a tool for Egyptian interests rather than a platform for genuine regional cooperation. This disillusionment is pushing the UAE to redefine its role: not as a member of a stagnant regional bloc, but as an independent power setting its own rules of the game - a shift led decisively by President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

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Tensions with Riyadh

The decision also highlights the deep friction within OPEC itself. The fact that Iran, the aggressor, remains a member is a bitter pill for Abu Dhabi. Furthermore, the withdrawal sends a pointed message to Saudi Arabia.

Despite their historical ties, relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are fraught with tension. The UAE has not forgotten Saudi "heavy-handedness" in Southern Yemen earlier this year - where Riyadh moved to suppress UAE-aligned forces and even targeted Emirati supply ships. Coupled with sharp disagreements over Sudan and Somaliland, and aggressive Saudi media campaigns labeling the UAE a "Zionist Trojan Horse," the exit from OPEC serves as a clear declaration of independence from Saudi leadership.

The timing is particularly surgical: the announcement came just as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) was hosting a Gulf summit aimed at coordinating a unified stance toward Tehran and Washington.

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A Coordinated Move with Washington?

The global context cannot be ignored. The UAE’s move coincides with a series of Trump administration initiatives aimed at securing strategic maritime chokepoints and global supply chains.

In recent weeks, Washington has bolstered defense ties with Indonesia, Morocco, and the Philippines - guardians of the Malacca, Gibraltar, and Luzon straits, respectively. By challenging OPEC’s dominance, the UAE’s move aligns with American interests in the energy market, particularly as Trump prepares for a high-stakes summit with Xi Jinping.

However, the UAE is no passive pawn. From the Abraham Accords to its strategic investments in Somaliland, Abu Dhabi has proven its willingness to break conventions and challenge traditional partners to serve its own strategic interests.

What it Means for Israel

For Jerusalem, this shift presents both an opportunity and a challenge. On one hand, a UAE seeking reliable partners is likely to deepen its clandestine and overt cooperation with Israel. On the other, if Abu Dhabi becomes increasingly isolated from the broader Arab world, its ability to serve as a bridge for Israel to the rest of the region may diminish.

One thing is certain: the exit from OPEC is not the end of the story. It is the first chapter in a new Middle Eastern playbook where flexibility and ad-hoc alliances replace the rigid, outdated institutions of the past.

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(Originally published in B'Sheva)

The persistent Iranian threat to Gulf energy infrastructure and to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz has created a broad common denominator among regional states. Many of these nations are unaccustomed to the level of systemic aggression currently emanating from Tehran. Yet, instead of forging a united front against Iranian defiance, the strategy for confronting this threat has become a fundamental bone of contention that is cracking the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

At first glance, grassroots discourse on social media suggests a wave of regional solidarity, fueled by a shared sense of fate among populations targeted by thousands of missiles and drones. Official communiqués also feature expressions of mutual guarantee. Common trends have emerged across the Gulf: a surge in patriotic rhetoric celebrating national resilience, a sobering realization that "flexible" foreign policies offer no protection from a rogue neighbor, and a palpable frustration with the broader Arab League for failing to come to a "sister’s" aid. Underlying it all is the grim acknowledgement that Iran is a permanent fixture of the landscape and that one cannot burn every bridge with a neighbor that is not going anywhere.

However, beneath the surface, the reality is far more fractured. The Gulf of 2026 appears incapable of acting as a strategic collective. Instead, it operates as a collection of individual actors moving along a volatile spectrum of fear, rage, and betrayal.

Along the Spectrum: From Appeasement to "Root Canal" Diplomacy

On the spectrum of responses to the Iranian aggression, Oman remains anchored at the pacifist pole. Muscat continues to cling to its traditional role as the "Switzerland of the Middle East." For the Omanis, most of whom adhere to the Ibadi school which is neither Shi’a nor Sunni, the war is not a catalyst for muscle-flexing but rather a confirmation that keeping a low profile is the safest bet. Even under fire, Oman eschews aggressive rhetoric and maintains a direct line to Tehran. It refuses to point a finger of blame toward Iran, viewing a rigid anti-Iranian bloc as a gamble too high to take. Interestingly, Oman has become a "conspicuous absentee" in joint regional statements, drawing increasingly pointed criticism from commentators across the Arabian Peninsula. Notably, Oman remains the only Arab state to host a Houthi representation office, which is a clear signal of its permissive tilt toward the Iranian axis.

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Moving slightly to the right is Kuwait. While it initially summoned the Iranian ambassador for a reprimand, its primary focus remains internal. The announcement of three separate arrests of Hezbollah and Iranian-linked cells in a single week displays domestic proactivity, even if its foreign policy stops short of overt confrontation.

Toward the center of the spectrum lies Qatar. The wealthy emirate finds itself in an existential dilemma. It shares the world’s largest strategic gas field with Iran, yet it has been significantly impacted by Iranian fire. Doha has utilized its media apparatus to broadcast deep resentment over Tehran's violent tantrums. It has reported the arrest of Iranian cells on its soil and claimed the downing of Iranian fighter jets violating its airspace. Simultaneously, uncharacteristic signs of "media confusion" have surfaced within Qatar. Reports suggest the dismissal of Al Jazeera journalists perceived as overly empathetic to Iran, alongside calls to prioritize the official Qatar News Agency over the less "statist" lines of Al Jazeera, all in addition to reports on anger directed even at members of the pro-Iranian camp within Hamas. While this does not signal a break from Qatar’s core commitments to the extremist teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood, these internal fractures reflect an unprecedented level of wartime dissatisfaction.

The Hawks: Diplomatic Warfare and Hard Power

On the more hawkish side is Bahrain. Usually, Manama lacks significant leverage over Tehran. However, a significant stroke of timing saw Bahrain take a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in January. This platform has allowed Manama to lead major diplomatic initiatives, including a recently passed resolution condemning Tehran’s attacks. Reports also indicate Bahrain is spearheading a new proposal to secure the Strait of Hormuz, which serves as a strategic move to corner the Islamic Republic diplomatically.

Standing at the most defiant pole, unsurprisingly, is the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi shuttered its embassy in Tehran at the war's outset. Today, its rhetoric is the most uncompromising in the region. Anwar Gargash, advisor to the UAE President, recently stated that the Emirates would not settle for mere "ceasefire" talk. He argued that there must be a "root canal" treatment for the Iranian threat, addressing its ballistics, nuclear ambitions, and energy blackmail. This hawkishness is a direct byproduct of the UAE's consistent stance against extremism and the fact that it has endured more Iranian-led fire than all other Gulf states combined.

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And what of Saudi Arabia? Despite its oil infrastructure being repeatedly targeted, Riyadh’s position is tinged with irony. While leading bellicose statements and expelling diplomats, the "Big Sister" of the Gulf remains out of sync with its neighbors. Historical tensions and economic competition with the UAE prevent deep coordination. Western reports suggest Riyadh would prefer to see a Trump administration "finish the job," yet its refusal to voice this publicly reveals a reluctance to take the ultimate risk of leadership.

Conclusion

Contrary to expectations, the current war has not birthed a romantic era of "Gulf Brotherhood." Instead, it has laid bare the rigid boundaries of national interest.

The regional response is not a united front but a series of parallel national strategies. While bound by a thin veil of shared culture and history, the GCC states have failed to produce the cohesive strategic doctrine required to face a regional hegemon like Iran. The Gulf may be wealthier than ever, but in the ultimate test of cohesion, it remains profoundly divided.

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Originally published in B'Sheva

For over two weeks, the Middle East has been burning more fiercely than ever. The "Axis of Resistance" established by the Islamic Republic appears stretched almost to its breaking point. Yet, one question continues to echo through the void: Where are the Houthis?

So far, "Ansar Allah" has refrained from joining the escalation, even following the earth-shattering reports regarding the elimination of Ali Khamenei, a figure who served as both their spiritual and strategic compass. While the movement's senior officials maintain a militant tone and constantly swear allegiance to their total war against Israel, these words have yet to translate into significant practical action.

The destructive potential of this Yemeni Shiite militia is beyond doubt; recent history is proof enough. They possess the capability to paralyze essential sectors of the global economy by physically blockading the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Such a move, if coordinated with an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, would create an unprecedented maritime stranglehold on the region.

The Houthis have also proven their ability to strike the Gulf States at their most sensitive points. The 2019 combined attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, which temporarily knocked out half of Saudi oil production, is credited to them (or at least to their capabilities). They have targeted the United Arab Emirates as well.

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The ability to once again turn their cannons eastward and strike strategic refineries in the Gulf, synchronized with their primary patrons in Tehran, serves as a massive lever of pressure. Furthermore, they hold the option to throw their full weight into a direct campaign against Israel through drone swarms and ballistic missile fire as part of a coordinated multi-arena assault. Security officials are also keeping a watchful eye on as-yet-unrealized scenarios, from cutting undersea cables to aerial threats against Mediterranean shipping, and even collaborations with North African terror groups to export attacks or create blockades at the Strait of Gibraltar.

And yet, since the direct conflict between Israel and Iran commenced, Houthi statements have focused primarily on legitimizing Iran. At least twice, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the current leader of Ansar Allah, has spoken publicly about the war. Despite his bellicose rhetoric and expressions of support and condolence to the Iranian people, he stopped short of announcing a move to join the fray. Similarly, the militia's military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, made a unique appearance on Iranian television a few days ago. Contrasting his usual fiery delivery, Saree was seen sitting comfortably in an armchair, speaking calmly. In an interesting role reversal, he offered messages of solidarity and "words of encouragement" to the Iranian people in their struggle against "aggression."

Why the sudden quiet?

Some interpret this as Iran not yet giving the Houthis the "green light," suggesting the regime does not currently perceive an existential threat. This view reduces the Houthis to mere Iranian puppets. The reality, however, is more nuanced: while Ansar Allah receives extensive Iranian support, they are ultimately an independent quasi-state entity with a broad domestic support base and their own strategic calculations.

Another factor is the intelligence dimension. The series of targeted assassinations carried out by Israel and the U.S. against senior Hezbollah and Iranian officials made it clear to the leadership in Sana'a that launching missiles is effectively an "invitation to be hit." Any overt military activity immediately exposes launcher locations, movement routes, and the electronic signatures of commanders. The Houthis understand that the moment they up the ante, they become hunted targets within their own territory, and geographical distance is no longer a shield against the Israeli Air Force.

These factors are compounded by reports of significant attrition. The ongoing campaign in the Red Sea against the international coalition has depleted stocks of high-quality weaponry and damaged critical launch sites. Difficulties in replenishing supplies from an Iran currently under siege and attack have turned their missile inventory into a precious resource. They may still be reeling from the realization that Israel is willing to strike not just the military leadership of the organization, but its "political" infrastructure as well. Consequently, they may prefer to preserve their strength until it becomes clear if and how the Axis can recover from these blows.

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Regional image is another consideration. If the Houthi brand was previously built on "aiding Gaza," a narrative that won them immense popularity in the Arab street, aggressive action on behalf of Iran is viewed quite differently, especially when that same Iran is attacking neighboring Arab Gulf states. The Houthis likely fear that acting to "save" Tehran would paint them as mercenaries of a Persian empire, damaging their legitimacy in Yemen and the wider Arab world.

Furthermore, the Houthis face complex governance challenges. They are no longer just a guerrilla militia hiding in the mountains; they are a governing body managing institutions, a failing economy, and a starving population. Entering a total war could lead to the collapse of Yemeni infrastructure and ignite internal unrest that threatens their rule.

Moreover, from the Houthi perspective, restraint coupled with threats is a strategic tool: the threat remains potent and deterrent only as long as it isn't used.

On the other hand, one cannot rule out the Houthis joining the campaign sooner or later. Reports indicate that Sana'a has recently shifted its focus inward, including mass recruitment and extensive military training aimed at long-term ground force building. This could be preparation for the day they must defend their assets within Yemen, or perhaps preparation for a different event, such as a ground, sea, or air incursion against neighboring countries or Israeli interests in the region.

Indeed, this past Saturday, a senior Houthi official and member of the political bureau, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, stated explicitly that "the decision has already been made." According to him, their "finger is on the trigger," and Ansar Allah joining the war is "a question of when, not if."

For all these reasons, Israel must keep a close watch on the Yemeni arena, even during intense warfare with Iran and Hezbollah. The Houthis may prefer, for now, to safeguard their governance and avoid a new adventure, but the threat remains significant to Israel, the region, and global freedom of navigation.

Jerusalem would be wise to continue leading the dialogue with allies regarding the potential threats posed by Ansar Allah and to promote a broad campaign against the Houthis, diplomatic, legal, and economic, even before the necessity for military action becomes unavoidable

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The year 2026 was supposed to be a milestone for Saudi Arabia on its path toward "Vision 2030." Yet, instead of inaugurating glittering mega-projects, Riyadh finds itself hitting an economic and political "wall" that calls into question the stability of the House of Saud’s historic social contract with the kingdom’s citizens.

The numbers behind the scenes reveal a troubling reality. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia set an ambitious goal: attracting $100 billion in foreign direct investment annually to fund its revolution. In practice, it has managed to secure only a fifth to a third of that amount. Consequently, the kingdom is forced to use its own capital, through the Public Investment Fund, to keep projects on life support instead of spreading the risk among global investors.

Budgetary pressure is evident everywhere. Reports this week indicated that Saudi Arabia’s deficit rose in the fourth quarter of last year to its highest level in five years, amid falling oil prices that add further strain on the kingdom's financial resources. Meanwhile, the futuristic "Neom" city project has been scaled back, and other construction ventures like the Mukaab building, intended to be the world's largest structure by volume, have been canceled entirely. Additionally, various companies report difficulties receiving payments from the government.

This situation has trickled down to the streets: unusual videos recently circulated on social media showing Saudi citizens storming stores offering massive discounts, a sight that points to eroding purchasing power and cracks in the economic prosperity promised to the people in exchange for their loyalty to the regime.

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These signs of consumer distress serve as a strategic warning light for the Crown Prince and de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who has centralized all security and economic powers in his hands and will find it difficult to shift the blame for failure elsewhere.

In a recent move, bin Salman ordered the dismissal of the former Investment Minister, Khalid al-Falih, likely due to the kingdom's economic difficulties. Interestingly, his replacement is Fahad bin Abduljalil Al-Saif, who is reportedly the first minister in the kingdom’s history from the Shiite minority. This minority, comprising about 15% of the population and residing mainly in the Eastern Province, has long been perceived as intentionally excluded from national decision-making. Some observers view this appointment as a diplomatic nod toward Iran.

In an attempt to stimulate further investment, Saudi Arabia also executed a significant regulatory U-turn. After years of conditioning participation in government tenders on establishing a physical headquarters in Saudi Arabia - an effort to compete with Dubai’s status - the kingdom announced the cancellation of this requirement. Foreign companies can now bid for tenders without a physical presence, an easing of rules designed to bring in quick capital without entangling investors in local bureaucracy.

From Economic Distress to Diplomatic Activity

This economic hardship is likely one of the primary drivers behind Saudi Arabia’s intensified foreign policy. There have been extensive reports on Saudi efforts to "expand the Sunni tent," closing ranks with old rivals Turkey and Qatar, signing major agreements with Pakistan and Egypt, and investing in infrastructure in Somalia and Syria. Beyond the diplomatic and security aspects aimed at "confining" Israel, MBS hopes to expand economic cooperation with regional states and solidify Riyadh’s position as an indispensable regional leader.

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On the other hand, this activism allows Saudi Arabia to push back against its prominent regional competitor, its "little sister" the United Arab Emirates, which has outperformed Saudi Arabia economically. While Riyadh leads with the Arab world's largest GDP (approximately $1.25 trillion), driven mainly by oil, the UAE, whose total GDP is about half that size, enjoys a higher GDP per capita (around $50,000 compared to $35,000) and a more diversified economy based on trade, logistics, tourism, and technology, with a much larger non-oil sector. In other words, bin Salman may be using security and diplomatic pretexts to marginalize Abu Dhabi economically as well, particularly given the small ecosystem the UAE has built for itself in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Aden.

Ironically, despite Saudi Arabia's anti-Israel rhetoric, normalization with Israel could actually benefit Riyadh’s shaky economy. A prime example is the IMEC mega-project: the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which is currently stalled, partly due to Saudi Arabia’s insistence on turning its back on normalization. By maintaining its current hostility toward Jerusalem, Saudi Arabia is blocking one of the very projects that could boost its revenues and aid its economy.

Nevertheless, reports suggest that "soft normalization" is indeed occurring. A notable example is the launch of the project to link the power grids of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The project, signed years ago, recently began construction under the auspices of Israeli gas: without the flow of gas from Israel to Egypt, Cairo would not have been able to stabilize its energy sector to allow the connection to the Saudis.

This is a case of de facto normalization. Saudi Arabia, which requires regional stability to attract investment, is cooperating within an energy framework where Israel is a central node. This is compounded by the fact that international flights from India and the UAE to Israel (and back) regularly pass through Saudi airspace, a dramatic shift from the past that is often overlooked. For these reasons, and in light of the aforementioned IMEC project, some argue that the pivot away from Israel is temporary - a period of confusion or a certain "tantrum" that will pass with time.

Regardless, bin Salman is in a race against time. The struggle against the UAE for regional "hub" status, nuclear ambitions (civilian or military), and the attempt to leverage investments across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa all depend on one thing: money. If MBS fails to restore investor confidence and find growth engines independent of oil, the grandiose vision of 2030 could become a memory of a historic missed opportunity that undermines both his throne and his country's standing.

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As security tensions in the Persian Gulf reach a boiling point, international press reports are revealing what is happening inside the closed chambers of Tehran. According to a report by The New York Times, based on conversations with officials within the regime and the Revolutionary Guards - the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, realizing that his regime faces an unprecedented existential threat, has ordered the establishment of an emergency succession mechanism.

At the center of the plan: transferring the reins of de facto management to Ali Larijani, while systematically eroding the powers of the elected echelon. This also includes an unprecedented directive requiring every key official, whether military or governmental, to appoint a "chain" of four potential successors for every rank.

First and foremost, it must be emphasized that this is not a successor in the full sense of the word. The foundational value of "Velayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), upon which the Islamic Republic is built, does not allow a person who is not a religious scholar to serve as "Supreme Leader." Had it been suggested that Larijani would replace him in title as well, it would be an admission that the model of the Islamic Jurist's rule has failed. Therefore, the "replacement" in question will likely focus on a de facto administrative role regarding security and foreign policy, a move that highlights the inherently low status of the presidency in the Islamic Republic's decision-making process. If Khamenei is eliminated, a new governance model may emerge: a religious leader as a ceremonial "puppet," while real power is held by a small security council.

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Either way, this is a sober acknowledgment by the Supreme Leader that an American or Israeli attack is a plausible, even imminent, scenario, and that he himself is in the crosshairs this time. By building this succession array, perhaps as a lesson learned from Operation "Rising Lion" / the 12 Day War which began with a significant strike on the top command of the Revolutionary Guards, the regime seeks to achieve functional continuity. The goal is to nullify the effect of surprise and chaos that could result from a "decapitation" strike, and perhaps to signal to Washington that the elimination of the leader will not lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic, and perhaps quite the opposite.

Western media tends to label Larijani as a "moderate," "moderate-conservative," or as belonging to the "pragmatic camp." While Larijani was among the opponents of the extremist Ahmadinejad in the past, this does not mean he is an ardent liberal. Larijani is first and foremost a man of the establishment, part of the inner circle that enjoys Khamenei’s trust. There is no doubt he sees eye to eye with him ideologically; he is a man of political realism whom Khamenei views as a sober individual who desires the stabilization of the regime and sees it as a supreme value.

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Parallel to reports on the succession system, the French newspaper Le Figaro published a startling report about an "internal coup" attempt last January. According to the report, former President Hassan Rouhani and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif were among those who tried to push Khamenei away from decision-making centers at the height of the protests, and were consequently sent to a brief house arrest.

It is important to underscore that the ability of these two to carry out such a move against the Revolutionary Guards is very limited. However, the very existence of the report indicates deep rifts within the Iranian leadership. The struggle between the conservative-security camp and the pragmatic camp is not just over ideology, but over the question of Iran's survival on the day after.

Trump’s Win-Win

Khamenei’s continuity mechanism reduces the strategic utility of a targeted killing as a tool for toppling the regime. Nevertheless, on the surface, Trump is in a win-win situation. If the concentration of power around figures like Larijani and Ghalibaf creates a more "rational" leadership in his view, one that prefers temporary de-escalation to save the system, similar to what occurred with the Maduro regime, then he has achieved a second party he can "work with" to reach an agreement to his satisfaction.

Alternatively, if an operation to eliminate the leader leads instead to the rise of an even more extreme leadership that chooses to respond with unprecedented force against American targets to prove it is still in control, the unprecedented deployment of the US military in the region would allow him to execute a large-scale and sustained military operation against the entire regime until its surrender. It remains unclear whether Trump perceives "surrender" as the total disappearance of the regime and its replacement by another, or as a capitulation that brings the regime to sign an agreement to his satisfaction.

What are the Possible Scenarios?

For Israel, the situation is complex. The ideal Israeli scenario is, naturally, the collapse of the current regime and its replacement by a friendly one, and this should be pursued as much as possible, even if the chances of success for such a move from the air are unclear.

Another scenario discussed is that the collapse of the current regime would trigger the rise of a military dictatorship of the Revolutionary Guards, as they are the most organized and armed body on the ground in Iran. In such a case, Israel would prefer to work toward a significant weakening of the regime while keeping it occupied with internal issues in a way that allows Jerusalem to continue acting against the nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

A further scenario is an Iranian surrender, either before or after an attack, and a turn toward an agreement. This would preserve the regime and keep it on its feet temporarily until the rise of a different, less hostile American administration. It is possible that this is what Iran will ultimately aim for, and it is not unlikely that regional countries, fearing regional escalation and the toppling of the regime, are also trying to pull in that direction. In such a case, Israel would find itself facing an existing Iranian regime, even if weakened, and would have to coordinate with the American administration to ensure the agreement includes essential elements for Israel: zero enrichment, cessation of funding for the proxy network, dismantling the missile program, and more.

Ultimately, the big question remains open: will the system Khamenei built succeed in standing the test of the approaching American fire, or will it be the "succession arrangement" itself that ignites the bloody succession battle that Tehran fears so much?

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In recent months, we have witnessed a disturbing phenomenon: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has been promoting an aggressive media campaign against the United Arab Emirates. Notably, a significant portion of this campaign is built upon blatant antisemitic rhetoric. What began as a regional conflict over influence in southern Yemen has rapidly devolved into a troubling example of using antisemitism as a political weapon between two foreign nations.

To provide some context: until very recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were perceived as steadfast allies. They were closely coordinated on a range of regional and global issues, including opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and the Houthis. Together, they led a pragmatic front toward the West while maintaining a clear balance of power between the "Big Sister" in Riyadh and the "Little Sister" in Abu Dhabi.

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However, in recent years, and especially in recent months, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified due to clashing interests in arenas such as Sudan, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen. The common thread is that the UAE has tended to support local groups that help it combat Islamists and build a "mini-empire" in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has generally supported central governments - even when it disagreed with them - in the name of political stability.

Matters came to a head about two months ago when Saudi Arabia decided to end the UAE's presence in southern Yemen and dismantle the forces it supported, which sought to establish an independent state in the south. The Saudis did not stop at targeted diplomatic or military steps; they launched a massive online campaign. Pro-Saudi mouthpieces and "bot farms" began systematically and venomously attacking Abu Dhabi across social media.

Beyond regional disputes, the Saudi campaign chose to focus on a particularly despicable angle: using the Abraham Accords and the peace between Israel and the UAE as a tool to tarnish Abu Dhabi's reputation. Repeatedly, the UAE was portrayed as a "traitor" because of its peace and relations with Israel and Jewish communities, utilizing language that quickly crossed the line into overt antisemitism.

For example, the Saudi establishment newspaper Al-Jazirah (not to be confused with the Qatari-owned channel) published an article, accusing Abu Dhabi of being a "Zionist Trojan Horse" implementing Israel’s agenda in the region. The article did not stop at political criticism; it veered into familiar antisemitic territory, invoking conspiracy theories about "global Jewish plots" and attempts to dominate the region.

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This antisemitic discourse was not limited to the written press. Anti-Jewish sermons were heard in mosques, and Saudi commentators and journalists used "antisemitic code words" and published caricatures to propagate these messages.

The backlash was swift. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) issued an unusual statement expressing deep concern over the increasing frequency and intensity of Saudi voices promoting antisemitic rhetoric. The ADL warned that this trend harms regional coexistence and undermines initiatives for tolerance. Further criticism of this trend was voiced by Israeli journalists from across the political spectrum - from Amit Segal to Barak Ravid.

International pressure, alongside media exposure by Israeli and American journalists, led to the rapid deletion of some antisemitic content, such as the aforementioned article in the Saudi newspaper. In light of the criticism, Saudi Arabia attempted to polish its image through a high-profile meeting held this week on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan met with Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, an envoy to the Trump administration for the fight against antisemitism. The meeting was proudly publicized on the official Arabic social media pages of the Saudi Foreign Ministry. This was met with cynical responses from the Emirates, pointing out the hypocrisy of such a meeting following months of Saudi de-legitimization of Abu Dhabi precisely because of its ties to Israel and the Jewish people.

In the past, it seemed the Saudis were intending to move closer to the "People of Zion," with political hints from MBS and even a historic visit by a prominent Saudi cleric, Mohammed Al-Issa, to the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp.

Now, unfortunately, the direction seems to have shifted. The Jewish people are well-acquainted with totalitarian rulers who use antisemitism as a diplomatic tool to advance political interests. It is a well-known fact that antisemitism is a symptom of a sick society. A single meeting will not erase months of a deliberate antisemitic campaign, especially when the Saudis refuse to take responsibility for promoting this discourse. American Jewish organizations were right to demand that this trend come to an end.

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(First published on Besheva)

In recent weeks, a trend that has been quietly forming has come into sharp focus: the United States is scaling back its military presence in Syria and Iraq. This strategic retreat is poised to reshape the face of the Middle East.

At the end of October, Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Sudani proudly declared that ISIS no longer poses a significant threat in Iraq. He announced an intent to transition to a "partnership model" with the United States - a softened phrasing for a veiled demand to reduce the American footprint in the country.

ISIS, of course, hasn’t vanished. Only a few weeks ago, loyalists of the group carried out a severe attack on American soldiers in Syria - a brutal reminder that the declared victory is far from absolute. The attack exposed the painful gap between political declarations and the reality on the ground; a gap that regional governments find convenient to blur, and the Trump administration finds convenient to ignore.

Despite this, this past week saw the announced evacuation of the Al-Tanf base in Syria. For years, this base served as a geographical bulwark between Iran and the Mediterranean. Located at the "tri-border" junction of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, it effectively disrupted Tehran’s attempts to establish a land corridor toward Lebanon and Hezbollah. With this barrier removed, the path is once again clear for exploitation by the Iranian axis, including the transfer of the high-quality weaponry that a depleted Hezbollah desperately needs to rebuild its military might.

Messages of Abandonment

The American military presence in Iraq is not a new phenomenon; it has continued, in various incarnations, since the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion to topple Saddam Hussein. After a formal withdrawal in 2011, U.S. forces returned in 2014 following the meteoric rise of ISIS and its conquests across both countries. Since then, U.S. and Coalition forces have operated in Iraq as part of an ongoing effort to eradicate ISIS, transitioning after the fall of the Caliphate to an advisory, training, and assistance role.

It is important to note: as with the Gulf Wars and the fight against ISIS, the rise of totalitarian forces is not the only driver for mobilizing thousands of troops. One must mention the region's strategic importance regarding oil and gas fields - which generate global economic stability - as a significant factor in a superpower's choice to station soldiers on foreign soil.

According to various reports, approximately 2,500 Coalition troops currently operate in Iraq, spread across several key bases from Kurdistan to Baghdad and Ain al-Asad (the evacuation of which was also announced last month). In Syria, roughly 900 soldiers are reportedly stationed, primarily in small bases alongside oil fields in the northeast, in addition to the small Al-Tanf outpost. This drawdown is part of a broader American move to reduce its regional presence, a trend that began with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which, while executed hastily under the Biden administration, was signed by Trump during his previous term.

As noted, the American presence in Iraq also provided regional air and ground access, facilitating military operations in both arenas simultaneously. Reports indicate this presence was also used to intercept Iranian missile attacks against Israel; consequently, from Jerusalem's perspective, there is significant cause for concern.

Who Does the Exit Serve?

The importance of the Al-Tanf base was derived not only from its geography but from the message it sent: America is here, watching and responding. With the departure, the message is reversed.

Beyond the Iranian threat, the American withdrawal may indirectly serve ISIS and other terrorist organizations seeking to strengthen their foothold. This trend is particularly striking given the American "cold shoulder" toward the Kurdish forces, who were their primary allies in the war against ISIS for years. With the rise of the Al-Sharaa regime, Washington has seemingly preferred to push for the stabilization and unification of a fractured Syria, even at the cost of trampling Kurdish aspirations. The American departure leaves the Kurds exposed and abandoned to their fate - threatened both by ISIS and by Al-Sharaa’s forces, some of whom remain loyal to former jihadist elements. This transmits a troubling message regarding American reliability toward its allies.

While the Syrian arena faces issues with the regime's Salafi-Jihadist leanings, the problem in Iraq centers on the deep infiltration of pro-Iranian militias. These groups work tirelessly to empower Tehran’s proxies from Lebanon to Yemen. The vacuum left by the Americans could be filled by either of these threats, or both, as the ability to manage effective, independent combat against ISIS or Iran without American intelligence and logistical backing is doubtful, to say the least.

Interestingly, even Washington seems to quietly admit that monitoring ISIS under the Al-Sharaa regime will be difficult. Just weeks ago, the U.S. announced the transfer of thousands of ISIS prisoners from Syrian jails to Iraq. While no official reason was given, it is undoubtedly linked to prison breaks and the release of ISIS-affiliated inmates by forces loyal to the regime during the push into Kurdish areas. It is a silent acknowledgement: Al-Sharaa’s loyalists cannot be trusted to keep ISIS prisoners behind bars.

Ultimately, despite the festive announcements, the defeat of ISIS is incomplete. This serves as a reminder of a recurring Trumpian tactic, seen also in declarations regarding the end of wars, the return of hostages, or the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program: declaring a reality even when it has not fully materialized on the ground, hoping the facts will eventually align with the rhetoric - or simply ignoring the discrepancy.

However, one cannot rule out that the new regime in Damascus, which is itself hostile to Iran and seeking international legitimacy, might strive to prove its ability to curb border smuggling to assert its sovereignty. Furthermore, American forces remain in Jordan, which has recently been reported as a more stable and preferred location for a U.S. military presence. These forces could maintain regional deterrence and provide Israel with increased operational flexibility in the north.

In conclusion, there is a certain irony in analyzing an American exit from the Middle East while dozens of aircraft and destroyers are currently heading toward the region, perhaps as part of a planned operation against Iran. Nevertheless, one must distinguish between a permanent presence and a mission-specific deployment. In this context, Israel must strive for understandings with Washington that compel Damascus to prevent the restoration of smuggling corridors and the entrenchment of hostile actors, while ensuring a significant American presence in Jordan to maintain the Kingdom's stability.

The American withdrawal is, for now, an established fact. The question is no longer whether it will happen, but whether Israel can shape the circumstances of that exit—turning parts of the threat into an opportunity.

The Middle East is changing before our very eyes. The Iranian axis has been decimated (though not defeated), Assad is gone, the living hostages returned, a multinational force, not necessarily an Arab one, is planning to set up camp in the Gaza Strip, and Kiryat Gat City has become a sought-after pilgrimage destination for senior US officials.

As the saying goes, there is no real vacuum in our world, and one force that withdraws immediately makes way for another one. Here too, the Iranian withdrawal brought with it a trickle that turned into a flood of another force, more sophisticated, more cunning, more confusing - and much more accepted in the West, despite its many dangers.

I am talking about the Muslim Brotherhood axis, led by Turkey and Qatar - the former a NATO member, the latter defined as a special NATO ally, and both major patrons of their little sister Hamas.

And so Israel is slowly becoming surrounded by a ring again. This time it’s not a violent ring of missiles and rockets - but a strangling ring of delegitimization, anti-Semitism and demonization of the Jewish state. This time it’s not a military or kinetic ring of fire, which the West has identified and recognized as its enemy, and which can be explained, defined and presented - but rather a ring that is more vague, even more loved for a strange reason, despite the fact it slowly drips toxic poison that degenerates everything it touches.

—

What do the Muslim Brotherhood actually want? The answer in general is: an Islamic state. And the path? "Da'wah" - an invitation to Islam, a slow and patient preaching, complimented by community services and a social envelope that draws the masses to its gospel.

Unlike their brothers from the Salafi movement, who want a caliphate here and now and slaughter whatever and whoever is needed along the way, this sect, known as "Wasati" (central) is characterized by long-term strategic patience, slow progress that creeps until the goal is achieved. At the same time, Islamist movements are primarily responsible for translating, Islamizing, and spreading classic anti-Semitic conspiracy theories throughout the Arab world.

—

So what’s going on with Qatar and Turkey?

Qatar joined the gang about five decades ago, when immediately upon gaining independence, the royal family invited Muslim Brotherhood refugees from Nasser’s Egypt to join the bureaucracy and shape the religious and political ideology of the new state (although the family’s Wahhabi past surely provided fertile ground for absorbing the Brotherhood’s toxic teachings).

Erdogan’s Turkey is relatively new to the Islamist world politically. Until about two decades ago, it was forbidden to establish parties on religious grounds in the country, which is extremely secular, but over time they managed to find detours and settle in the hearts of the people, and political Islam in its neo-Ottoman version, which grew organically in the country back in the 1960s, took root and became increasingly popular.

For Erdogan, the road to Jerusalem runs through Gaza and Damascus. And for Sheikh Tamim, any international influence is a prize, and any humiliation of Israel is a bonus.

—

Turkey now enters Gaza through the front door: Just this week it was announced that the Turkish IHH association, which Israel declared a terrorist organization back in 2008 for being part of the Hamas "charity" foundation network led by Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, has resumed operations in Gaza. At the same time, there is talk of other Turkish associations that operate and manage the Strip as if it were a real civilian government, and in Gaza, Turkish flags are flying just like in East Jerusalem.

In the northern front, Turkey signed an agreement with Syrian President Al-Sharaa according to which it will build, shape, arm, and train the new Syrian army, and at the same time it is also taking part in infrastructure reconstruction projects in the country (it is said that the Turkish lira has become a tradable currency in Damascus).

Ankara is deeply involved in other countries in the region. In the Horn of Africa, it is friendly with Somalia, and with Libya it has signed a maritime agreement that defines the two countries as bordering the sea (take a look at the map to grasp just how exaggerated this is). In Iraq, it is a partner of the Americans by pumping gas from Kurdistan and selling it to the West, and only in September did Erdogan sign an agreement with Trump on nuclear energy (!)

This week it was also announced that Turkey had convinced Germany to agree to Erdogan's purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets that would strengthen its air force, at least until the launch of their own domestically produced fighter jet, known as KAAN, which is supposed to be ready in 2030.

Turkey has also reached out to the East, when it signed an air defense agreement with the Muslim majority country of Bangladesh, and over the past year, additional agreements in the field of technology with nuclear-armed Pakistan.

For its part, Qatar is creating a pincer movement, also participating in reconstruction and mediation projects in Gaza, Syria, and the region in general. Just last week, it managed to mediate between Afghanistan and the war-torn Pakistan (with Turkish assistance), and in Africa, with American support, it achieved a peace agreement between Congo and the M23 rebel organization supported by Rwanda. This event may be mistakenly seen as unimportant - but then one realizes that there are huge deposits of rare materials there that are critical to the new tech race between Trump and China, and that Doha has thus scored another small victory in the eyes of Trump - who pursues both peacemaking and technology.

At the same time, Qatar continues to spread anti-Semitism, leaking a document containing names of 30,000 Israeli soldiers through Al Jazeera, collaborating with an organization that pursues IDF soldiers abroad, and in Israel, diplomatic commentators like Filber and Segal try to sell to the public that the recent agreement actually restrained Al Jazeera and that it reduced hostility on television (nope, didn’t happen).

—

So a situation has arisen in which from a ring of crushing fire, we have moved to a ring of slow and elusive venom, which knows how to flatter the West and is difficult to point at and identify.

And what about us?

Does anyone in the Israeli or American leadership understand the deep danger of the Muslim Brotherhood axis and the Ring of Venom?

Is anyone in our leadership capable of overcoming Israel's shattered image, and promote a vision, lead a policy, take a political and diplomatic initiative?

Is there anyone here who, between embarrassing the US Vice President with his delusion of frayed sovereignty, and childish provincialism and haughtiness over camels in the desert, is capable of rising above and seeing beyond their electoral base or prejudices?

The Middle East is at a critical juncture that will shape the future of the region for decades to come. If Israel wishes to flourish, it needs a leadership that understands the region and its dangers, that has a public mandate and international credit and a positive image and the political courage to take action within our boiling geopolitical chulent pot, while adhering to red lines and guiding principles, from a perception of partnership, from a desire to create for Israel a status of a regional and international asset, and not of a burden which needs babysitting or restraint.

Israel’s attempted strike against Hamas leaders hosted in Doha this week is a watershed moment with extraordinary political, diplomatic and security related implications. Here are a few angles that are worth stressing:

The Sovereignty Gamble and Regional Shock

The decision to strike at Doha's heart is extraordinarily dramatic, reverberating throughout the Gulf. Qatar has never experienced warfare; most citizens have never heard explosions or interceptions and haven’t had the chance to develop resilience mechanisms found in war torn areas. When this happens, genuine shock follows, potentially affecting the economy too.

Gulf states now look at destroyed buildings in Tehran, Gaza, and Bat Yam, immediately thinking of their own fragile skyscrapers. Once they sense this glass might crack, real concern follows; and for this reason, the condemnations emerging aren't merely "for protocol."

For better or worse, Israel's current image, particularly in the Gulf, is that of an unpredictable, aggressive destabilizer with territorial ambitions, who opts to resolve everything through violence, while continuously violating other states’ sovereignty - and this further entrenches the “rally-around-Qatar” effect.

One may argue that these costs were worth paying had the operation succeeded; however, for whatever reason, it appears that most of Hamas’s leadership was not present at the targeted spot, and were thus temporarily saved from meeting their well deserved doom.

Qatar: The Real Enemy

Here's a kind reminder: Qatar is Israel's most strategic and dangerous enemy, surpassing Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood axis that Qatar fosters works quietly, investing in consciousness, future generations, academia and media that demonize Israel and Judaism, essentially laying the groundwork for the next mass massacre. It's difficult to pinpoint, but it is absolutely a real and critical threat.

Since October 7, many have insisted that Qatar was the only party capable of saving hostages, when reality was opposite. Qatar prolonged this war and extended negotiations, with clear interest in keeping Hamas in power. For Hamas to remain in power they needed leverage over Israel, and there’s no greater bargaining chip than a Jewish hostage.

Prior to the attack in Doha, Israel may have finally reached the conclusion that Qatar wasn't really bringing hostages home, but rather preventing the return of all of them at once. Qatar's unwillingness to generate real pressure on their protégé Hamas, their insistence on partial hostage-for-many-murderers deals, plus Doha’s ideological (not merely pragmatic) fostering of the Muslim Brotherhood (of which Hamas is the local branch) - are all proof of exactly that.

A Chance to Learn from Our Mistakes

Still, it appears that the operation didn’t go as smoothly as planned. In hindsight, here are some things that Israel could have done better:

• Controlled Escalation: Instead of sudden action against Doha, Israel could’ve gradually introduce to its public discourse explicit threats against Hamas leaders in Qatar. Not just "Israel will strike terrorists wherever they are," but specifically "they're not safe anywhere, including Doha." Israel could have created explicit calls through diplomatic channels for Qatar to extradite terrorist leaders, for instance, threatening to strike otherwise.

• Branding. Israel could have anticipated the global outrage focused on the issue of sovereignty violation, and chosen smarter name for the operation, dubbed, for a weird reason, "Summit of Fire." Playing off "Operation Neptune Spear", the bin Laden elimination in Pakistan, would have forced critics into different headspace, acknowledging precedent for violating sovereignty to eliminate fleeing terrorists.

• Messaging: Israel could have - and still can - convey a message that reminds Qatar of the two attacks it suffered on its territory in the same year: one by the Islamic Republic, and one by Israel, against their respective enemies. The message should be: stop hosting controversial actors because you're dragging yourself into their wars.

Current Reality and Future Paths

As mentioned earlier, the world is now witnessing Gulf and global solidarity around Qatar, with leaders making virtual and physical pilgrimages to the capital of terror Doha. Qatar is a champion of narrative building, now presenting itself as yet another victim of Israeli aggression, while calling on nations to sever relations with Israel.

Though one may recall how Gulf nations attempted themselves to change Qatar’s constant undermining and subversive behavior, including boycotts, severing of relations and closing their airspace to Qatari flights (but not force as Israel just attempted), one must always remember the old Arabic proverb: "My brother and I against my cousin, and my cousin and I against the stranger."

Now two paths emerge in front of Israel: either escalation, doubling down and persistence until achieving the current objective; or de-escalation and attempts at reconciliation. However, both options are seemingly futile as the US won't likely grant a green light to another similar operation, while it is highly probable that no nation has any patience left to hear Israel out.

This is a difficult conundrum to crack. One may argue that, since Israel’s image is already as worse as it can get, maybe it might as well just go ahead and finish the job, exploiting even further the Qataris’ inner fear for their fragile national security, and forcing the antisemitic emirate to exert more pressure to bring our hostages back and end this war?

The Train has Left

Israel may have concluded that Qatar wasn't the solution to bringing hostages home, but the obstacle. Combined with Qatar's ideological ties to Hamas and unwillingness to pressure them meaningfully, this strike represents a strategic pivot - messy in execution, but potentially necessary.

The sovereignty violation creates short-term diplomatic costs but sends a clear message: harboring terrorists has consequences, regardless of your wealth or diplomatic immunity. Whether this gamble pays off depends on what follows; but sometimes the train engine (‘Qatar’ in Hebrew) needs to leave the station, even if the track ahead looks uncertain.

1. The Historical Context

The Druze are an indigenous ethno-religious group with major communities in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, numbering around 2 million across the region and the world. Known for being mountain dwellers and tough warriors who adhere to a secret religion, the Druze have traditionally abstained from making claims for self-determination, opting to preserve their identities in their respective countries - often at the expense of any chance of partaking in international politics, making their voice basically unheard.

In Syria, the Druze were fittingly loyal to the Assad regime, even during the first stages of the Arab Spring - which won them resentment from many of the Sunni rebels.

But as time passed and the civil war deepened, things began to shift. The Sunni cities joined the rebellion, and the Druze of Sweida also experienced a terrible massacre by Islamist forces in July of 2018 with hundreds murdered, perhaps facilitated by the regime, which led most of them to desert the regime's ranks and support a more independent stance. This, in turn, led Assad's regime to tighten the noose around them even more, occasionally executing Druze leaders in mysterious circumstances.

2. The Post-Assad Era

After the regime's fall, the Druze in Sweida gained more breathing room. A few months ago, they established the Military Council of Sweida, which transformed from a collection of armed groups into something slightly more organized. This allowed them not only to defend themselves but also to attack proactively.

The Druze and Sunni Bedouins in southern Syria have been locked in armed confrontations for many years, fitting for a peripheral region in a country that has not functioned as a unified state for at least 15 years. In this situation of no functioning state around, armed groups in peripheral region thrive and participate in the all-out war that revolves not only around identity issues but also around control of resources and economy. Thus, between the Druze and the Bedouins, more "gangster-like" elements developed that fought over control of trade routes, including smuggling routes (weapons, drugs, all the usual things).

These smuggling routes were a serious headache for Jordan, which acted to thwart them and even attacked Sweida itself several times in the past, killing civilians (but who cared, since Jews weren't involved in this and no Jews - no news).

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3. The Current Escalation

Some of the confrontations we saw this week came precisely against this backdrop of smuggling routes. Apparently, a Bedouin gang kidnapped and tortured a Druze young man, the Druze retaliated against the Bedouins, and thus the current cycle of revenge and counter-revenge began to gain momentum – including Druze ambushes against security forces and several murder acts against the Druze population.

When the regime understood that this was a destabilization hazrd, it decided to send its forces to "maintain stability." However, the regime's "forces" are actually a loose collection of armed Islamist groups that have been engaged in continuous warfare for many years, so it should come as a surprise to nobody that the wars also included acts of humiliation and lawless murder without any moral codes.

There were attempts to reach agreements and stop the cycle of blood, but the gaps within the Druze leadership between the hawkish camp of Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri and the dovish one of Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou, as well as the jihadist fervor of the Sunni militants, led these initiatives to collapse, and the killings continued.

4. The Regime's Intentions

Did the regime want humiliating atrocities to be carried out against the Druze?

Some are tempted to believe so – that Al-Sharaa (known as Al-Julani), as a jihadist, hates the Druze, and perhaps he thought he could silence the Druze militants with an iron fist and didn't expect Israel to intervene in this way.

I hold the view that even on a practical level, these images are not good for Al-Sharaa and that he knows they damage his legitimacy vis-à-vis the Druze. Therefore, in my opinion, he himself wasn't particularly pleased that such atrocities occurred, even if among his fighters there was a jihadist fervor and bloodthirst of the kind we saw on October 7th.

This obviously doesn't change the acts of murder and humiliation carried out by the Bedouins and some of the forces loyal to Al-Sharaa against the Druze – nor the fact that there were and will be terrible acts of revenge from the other side. Now they're talking about dozens of dead Druze civilians – and also about dozens of Al-Sharaa's men and Bedouins that the Druze killed, and the hand is still extended.

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5. Israeli Intervention

And what about Israeli intervention?

First, the numbers: There are 150,000 Druze in Israel and 750,000 in Syria.

The tiny Druze community in Israel, led by Sheikh Muwafaq Tarif, has managed in an admirable way to harness Israel's commitment to it and effectively shake the entire Middle East, and potentially the entire world (much to the dismay of the American administration, which basically roots for peace and quiet). A minority without a state and without a voice that shakes the region and potentially the entire world to protect its brothers – I can think of maybe one other example in our region that resembles this somewhat.

Indeed, the core of the decision to intervene lies, in my opinion, in the power of the Druze minority in Israel. After all, in 2018 there was also a terrible massacre of Druze and Israel did nothing openly (behind the scenes it was claimed that there was some kind of assistance). But this week was a power display by the Druze of Israel in the country who have essentially become the strongest and most influential Druze community in the world, and this says something both about the sector's power and about the State of Israel.

6. Evaluating the Intervention

Should Israel have intervened in the specific way it did?

This is, in my opinion, the million dollar question. On one hand, it appears that Al-Sharaa, who according to experts I spoke with is very deterred from entering Sweida only because of Israel, found himself publishing a statement that there will be a reckoning with the criminals against the Druze, and also seems to have begun withdrawing his forces following the American demand (which came following Israel's demand which came following the demand of the Druze in Israel). Perhaps this also sent a message that harming the Druze is, for the first time in history, not going to go unchecked. It may also allow them more prosperity in the future, and perhaps it will also bend Al-Sharaa to dialogue only on condition that he calms his jihadists.

On the other hand, of course, these events were a significant disruption from Trump's perspective and his vision of peace, set back the Israeli-Syrian track he wanted to build, were a significant nuisance from Turkey's perspective, earned Israel criticism from relatively friendly countries like the UAE – and served as "proof" for those who wanted to portray Israel as an unpredictable player that solves things by force and might be influential "from within" if only enough citizens are motivated. Perhaps Israel also branded the Druze there as supposed ‘Israeli collaborators,’ and perhaps the precedent of Israeli intervention in sectarian struggles in foreign countries is not exactly positive, as we learned from the Lebanese case. Also the issue of bombarding governmental institutions might have not been the best idea.

So there are advantages and disadvantages. Personally, I very much hope that once the decisions were made, Israel will know how to leverage the developments to its advantage within the Syrian event that Trump is so interested in.

7. Israel's Strategic Interests

What Israel needs to ask itself now is: What is our interest in Syria?

And in my opinion, the interest boils down to neutralizing the threat poised by Syria on the state and organizational level for the very long term, as it was with Egypt after 1973 (hopefully forever, of course, but we remember where we live). For this to happen, what is needed is a Syria that is not threatening, not aggressive, not chaotic, not arming itself against Israel – and this can only be done through the political act that follows the military act, through agreements with international guarantees. Just as it was with Egypt and Jordan and just as it happening in front of our eyes with Lebanon – slowly but surely.

8. The Regional Competition

Al-Sharaa is currently leading Syria in a state of a major auction. The entire Middle East and beyond are offering him their wares to gain influence and pull him in their direction, and he's actually showing openness to this and not limiting himself to Qatar and Turkey as one might have been expected.

If Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US enter more strongly than Hamas-harboring Qatar and Turkey into Syria – then that's where Syria will go. Not because of the question of whether Al-Sharaa is an insane jihadist or a pacifist hippie, but because of the international system that won't be interested in jihadist collapse and armament (to the dismay of the jihadists). Just as under the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt didn't cancel the peace agreement, and just as Pakistan is an Islamic Republic but exists as a state with international relations and everything.

9. The Path Forward

So the American administration very much wants a peace track between Israel and Syria, and Israel has something to gain from such peace. On the other hand, the current situation is that the government is not stable and very hostile, so perhaps instead of jumping straight into the water with Abraham Accords and peace and love that will collapse quickly and have no chance, it's worth taking it in stages: security arrangements, non-belligerence agreement, establishing a three-way hotline with Jordan for coordinating activity to thwart Iranian smuggling. Perhaps later also examining local ad-hoc cooperation on issues like agriculture and construction, especially with the Druze population (similar to the Jordanian workers model in Eilat) and establishing working teams to prepare the ground for a future agreement that may come.

And any meaningful future peace agreement that may come must include the following clauses:

• Protecting the security of Druze and Kurds

• Full recognition of the State of Israel and the Jewish people as an integral part of the Middle East

• Creating a demilitarized buffer zone between the states to prevent Islamist armament on the border

• Al-Sharaa's open renunciation of HTS's jihadist past

• Syrian de facto renunciation of any demand regarding the Golan (on my part, let it be an undeclared renunciation)

10. Syrian Public Opinion

And what about the Syrian public? Do they want peace?

The answer is that the Sunni public mostly probably doesn't (minorities like Druze, Kurds, and Alawites might think a bit differently), but this is also true for Jordan and Egypt and also true for other countries we have peace or trade agreements with from Ireland to Bahrain (and recently also the US). But what's important here is arrangements with the government that will allow Israel to focus its gaze on the big threats (Iran in second place, Qatar in first place by a large margin) and move forward, while keeping a watchful eye at all times.

That's it for today! I'd love to hear your thoughts.

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Something odd is happening in Lebanon.

Unprecedented viral images spiraled online showing Lebanese forces taking down Hezbollah flags and paraphernalia from the streets of Beirut; while the newly elected President, Joseph Aoun, delivered a speech in which he pledged to disarm Hezbollah and potentially merge its militants into the Lebanese army.

After years of bullying and silencing any shred of criticism, Hezbollah’s weakening is showing even within the Lebanese arena, proving yet again that the Iranian loyalist militia, which competed in a distorted manner with the Lebanese Armed Forces over the state’s monopoly on violence, is far from being representative of the wills and aspirations of the Lebanese people.

This summer, Israel methodically remarkably decimated Hezbollah, a group previously considered among the most heavily equipped, extensively trained, and fiercely menacing extremist faction loyal to Iran in the entire world. From the ‘beeper uprising’ to the precise eradication of the terrorist group’s leadership – the Jewish demonstrated once again the well-known Israeli ingenuity and unconventional strategic thinking.

Then came the fall of the Assad regime in December, which represented yet another blow to the Islamic Republic’s array of proxy actors across the Middle East. The current Iranian regime made a strategic decision to embed itself within local populations - in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and even Gaza. This proxy apparatus keeps Iran at a safe distance from a direct confrontation with Israel as the regime races to a nuclear bomb. It also makes it more complicated for Israel to fight, explain and justify its military operations, which are taking place not against countries that declared “official war” - but rather against ‘armed groups’ that are well-rooted in their respective societies, and which operate in a civilian environment, as terror groups usually do.

Hezbollah’s former leader Hassan Nasrallah decided on October 8th, 2023, to opt against participating directly in the massacres, choosing instead a prolonged harassment campaign against the Israeli north, killing dozens of Israeli civilians and soldiers alike, including the 12 children at Majdal Shams, and forcing tens of thousands to evacuate from their homes, all in his failed attempts to force Israel into halting retributive operations in Gaza. Had he and his role models in the Islamic Republic known that the spectacular demise of so many important Iranian loyalists would be decided by Sinwar's bloody ‘adventure,’ the deadliest one for the Jewish people since 1945, might they have chosen a different path?

This question will apparently never be answered.

Nevertheless, other questions must be asked for the sake Israel’s future: how might Israel guarantee that the fall of Hezbollah and Assad and the pouncing of Hamas and the Houthis becomes a comprehensive solution vis-a-vis Iran, rather than a temporary patch until the next round of fighting?

The ‘Indigenous Alliance’

Now more than ever, Israel must look forward and become pro-active in its diplomatic activity. Now is the time to establish stable and prosperous Middle Eastern pacts and alliances, both open and discreet, to make sure that the Iranian threat is eradicated for good.

I’ve interviewed activists, politicians and fighters from across the Middle East, all of which identified the Islamic Republic as an entity thriving upon regional destabilization practices. These conversations included Sunnis, Druze, Christians, Kurds, Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and more; and they all highlighted Tehran's damaging disruptive influence affecting every territory where Iranian involvement became established.

Israel’s challenge would be, then to turn Iran’s proxy war strategy on its head, and collaborate with the countless ethnic and religious groups which have suffered from the regime’s tyranny do bring it down, just as the regime attempted to operate against Israel.

The regime generated fierce opposition throughout the area, where its expansionist and interventionist policies created devastation. In Yemen there is a southern separatist movement battling fiercely against Houthi oppressors. Throughout Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, there area substantial communities including Druze, Maronite Christians, and Sunni Muslims who have experienced severe persecution by Iranian militias.

Even within Iran proper, numerous minority populations experience systematic oppression – Arabic communities southern regions, the Azeri and Kurds in the northern territories, the Baha'is, who are essentially legally discriminated against. Plus, everyday Iranian citizens nationwide who reject brutal authoritarian administration which hijacked Iran's extensive cultural and historical heritage.

Therefore, Israel's forthcoming challenge involves creating mirrored responses countering bloody proxy conflicts. Wherever Iran extends influence, Israel should establish connections and contribute toward severing Tehran's control mechanisms. Building upon Ben-Gurion's "Peripheral Alliance" and Begin's "Minority Alliance" policies, Israel must establish "Indigenous Alliance" between the Jewish state and indigenous populations and religious groups throughout Middle Eastern regions suffering under Khamenei.

These partnerships will require strategic sophistication, incorporating lessons from historical missteps, such as the First Lebanon War. They could take place publicly or in secret, featuring economic, humanitarian or military measures. They could happen on religious backgrounds or ethnic connections, with spiritual and ethnic leaders taking a more salient role in the forging of these relations. Likewise, each of these alliances should be tailored to the respective group in question, only once the Israeli side has fully learned the differences, conflicts, disagreements and potential points for collaboration.

One must not forget that the simple goal is a thriving, stable and Middle East, and the path there entails a strong Israel, radiating both its might and its message of inclusiveness and pluralism; as well as a reformed Iran.

Finally, there is another actor undermining Israel, destabilizing the Middle East and posing a threat to the West; an actor which espouses the extremist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas and provides material, moral and media support to its antisemitic rot - the State of Qatar.

As opposed to Tehran, Doha enjoys an internationally respected status of a legitimate actor, despite its open endorsement of massacres and terror attacks. The Qatari threat must be dealt with, and Israel allies across the world must be made aware of it, divest from its terror supporting activity and boycott its goods.

But we’ll leave Qatar for the next time.

Picture found online, adapted from YouTube

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I’ll start with the bottom line: this interview means positive news, regardless of its contents, and in the end of this short analysis I intend to explain why.

But first, I’ll review some interesting points from the interview - as well as where I think Arad Nir miss and hit in the questions he posed.

Let's start with seven headlines from the interview that I thought were most interesting:

‏1. "We managed to rescue 109 hostages in the first deal."

‏Right at the beginning of the interview, Al Thani attempts to position himself as a savior of the hostages - not someone who had anything to do with their kidnapping. This is gaslighting at its finest.

‏2. Towards the end of the interview, the Qatari PM called on the families of the hostages to pressure the government to bring about a final deal that would end the war and bring the hostages home.

‏This happened when he was asked about his message to the people of Israel, and he tried to present himself as a noble soul who had met with families of hostages in the past.

In fact, Al Thani seems to have blurted a Freudian slip, implying he implores the hostages families to pressure their government (which might ultimately keep Hamas in power? – my addition). This blatant exploitation of the families’ pains is vile, regardless of one's opinion regarding the deal.

‏3. "How long will we continue to invest in a place that will continue to be destroyed over and over again?"

A surprising statement, which I think he also realized at some point was exaggerated because he immediately corrected himself and said that they were ‘optimistic’ and they would ‘never give up’ on Gaza. But maybe, just maybe, this statement signals some disdain at the destructive "adventurism" of the messianic trend within Hamas. Or maybe it's just a rich person who realized that his money was wasted for nothing.

‏4. "The Hamas office in Doha was opened in coordination with the US as a direct communication channel for Hamas to achieve security for Israelis."

Well, as October 7th proved, security has not been achieved, has it?

5. "We never transferred billions to Hamas, this is propaganda... we only sent to families in need, and in coordination with Israel."

Indeed, the transfer of funds into Gaza was made in coordination with Israel, and this is the root cause October 7th. And yet Qatar has not taken responsibility for anything that happened on that terrible day.

6. "We will not determine what will happen to Hamas, but the Palestinians."

To me, this sounds like a hope that Doha’s protege, Hamas, will still remain in power.

7. "I did not mention either side above the other, I respected my role as a mediator."

Seemingly, Al Thani is being careful here the dignity of Hamas and also of Israel, in contrast to what he has done so far when he has accused only the Israeli leadership of delaying the agreement for political reasons (and not to mention the Hamas leadership that kidnapped the hostages in the first place).

—

2.

Now to a short review of six points Arad Nir could have brought up in the interview, but unfortunately didn’t:

1. The tedious attempts to extort a headline about Netanyahu and his advisors from the Qatari PM. "The funding for Gaza came from the Netanyahu government???", he asked, scheming. "Did Qatar’s PR campaign succeed thanks to the campaign led by Yonatan Urich (Netanyahu’s aide)?".

This was Arad Nir’s opportunity to expose *Qatar*, not to reckon with political rivals at home.

2. Al Thani said that "we need to address the root causes of the conflict" in order to reach peace. Nir failed to ask him what those "root causes" were and missed an opportunity to look into the question of the legitimacy of Israel's existence in Qatari eyes.

3. Other questions that were not asked: the incitement and anti-Semitism on Al-Jazeera and in the Qatari parliament, Doha’s fueling of the university protests, Qatar’s backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the issue of normalization, the cancellation of the ‘democratic’ elections in Qatar, and more.

4. Even when he mentioned the World Cup, Nir chose to focus again on Netanyahu's advisors instead of mentioning the almost urged anti-Israeli atmosphere, the encouragement to wave Palestinian flags, the constant attacks on his colleagues from the Israeli press, and the story of modern slavery in the country.

‏5. Nir also didn't wear a the yellow hostages pin, which is also a missed opportunity to bring up the issue.

6. In general, I don't like the practice of sending foreign affairs analysts to such interviews - instead of Middle East correspondents who could have conducted the interview in Al Thani’s own language.

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3.

Three good points that were brought up in the interview:

‏1. The short mention of Al Jazeera and Qatar’s hosting senior Hamas officials.

‏2. The claim in Israel that Qatar represents Hamas and not just mediates between the parties.

‏3. The question: ‘Did Qatar really use all its pressure levers on Hamas?’

‏These are all important questions. Unfortunately, they didn't feature any follow-ups and they were asked in a somewhat shallow way, but at least that's something.

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4.

So, after all this, why do I insist that the interview is relatively good news anyway?

‏The fact that Al Thani appeared in front of the cameras to speak to the Israeli public is unequivocal proof that public awareness in Israel about Qatar, which hosts Hamas leaders and fuels the terror organization and the Muslim Brotherhood axis financially, ideologically, and in the media – is at its peak. This is what, in my opinion, led the Prime Minister to embark on a "hasbara campaign" aimed at the Israeli public, and even to express his regret that Qatar is being criticized for "simply wanting to do good for the region."

‏It should also be noted here that Al Thani arrived wearing a suit and not in his traditional white dishdasha (white robes), which could signal an attempt to appeal Westwards – a bit like his protégé Ahmed al-Shara' is trying to do in Syria.

Still, there are two things that Al Thani fails to understand:

In an interview, Al Thani claimed that "politicians" in Israel are the ones who incite against Qatar in order to gain political gain. He apparently does not understand that the popular campaign in Israel is much stronger than the one within the Israeli leadership, which is turning a blind eye, willingly or unwillingly, to the Qatari role on and after October 7th (and of course before it).

Al Thani will not find a friendlier Israeli government than the current one. The entire nation has opened its eyes to the Qatari threat - on the battlefield, in the political arena, in the media and on campuses in the US. Future generations will no longer fall for the trap, and now all that is missing is for the pro-Zionist community in the US to wake up and show the decision-makers in Washington the way forward on this issue.

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In my capacity in the media, and as someone who feels connected to his Jewish roots and has the privilege of speaking and understanding Arabic, I feel almost obliged to bring forth some of the untold stories of our brothers and sisters from the Middle Eastern diaspora.

One of these stories is the story of the holocaust in the Middle East, as well as its direct and indirect implications. I am in no way a scholar or expert on the topic, but I have conducted interviews and researched some of these issues as part of my academic tracks, and the scarcity of material just begs to be put out there.

So in this short review I will try to tell the story of the Holocaust in the Middle East and the suffering of Middle Eastern Jews, the ripple effects caused by the pro-Nazi wave across nations in the region, and the way the holocaust is perceived today.

1. The Holocaust in the Middle East

The map of Europe in the eve of WWII is probably one of the most studied ones there is. Yet Europe’s powers extended well outside the continent itself, including in the Middle East, a fact which would bring strong ripple effects with the war that was about to erupt.

Several areas of influence existed in the Middle East: the British one in Iraq, the Levant and Egypt; the Italian one in Libya; and the French one in the Maghreb area of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

Some nations were already semi-independent, including Egypt and Iraq, and to a lesser extent Jordan and Lebanon. Other areas were still under a League of Nations sanctioned mandate, such as the case of Israel, while most of North Africa was subject to direct colonial rule from France and Italy.

In the eve of the war an estimated 400-450 thousand Jews lived in French North Africa, while about 30-40 thousand Jews lived in Italian controlled Libya.

Hitler made some attempts at broadcasting Nazi propaganda in Arabic to the Arab sphere. This was done mainly to sow discord and create within the colonies or the European areas of influence, and try to force the European powers to turn their attention to these regions at the expense of the war itself.

As was the case in Europe itself, it all began with antisemitic legislation. In 1938 race laws were enacted in Italy in accordance with the Fascist Manifesto, which made it to Libya as well; while in 1940 Germany defeated and occupied France, installing the pro-Nazi Vichy regime in the southern part of the country, and subjecting France’s colonies to their indirect rule.

Antisemitic legislation began in both areas of influence, which varied from place to place but included in most instances the stripping of citizenship and the rights that it entailed, denial of access to the public education system, bans from jobs in the public service and even confiscation of property, mainly in Algeria.

Concentration camps and forced labor camps began operating in French North Africa, with Jews being forced to build railways and carry out other logistic operations under the scorching North African sun.

In Libya, Jews were sent to different camps according to their citizenships. Jews who held British citizenship were treated as enemies and sent to camps in Europe, mainly Bergen Belsen. Those with French citizenship were expelled to camps in French North Africa, and those with only Libyan citizenship were sent to local concentration camps. The most infamous of them was named Giado, located hundreds of kilometers inland into the desert, in which over 560 Jews died from malnutrition, disease and poor sanitary conditions. The following is a rare picture from the Giado concentration camp:

Tunisia was the only place in Africa which was subject to direct Nazi rule for a short period in 1942. The ruler placed there was none other than Walter Rauf, who invented the idea of gas trucks as a means to exterminate Jews back in Europe. The Nazi ideology was the same antisemitic one, but luckily, the ‘Final Solution’ was much harder to implement in North Africa due to logistical issues of the forces present.

Interestingly, Jews also took part in local Resistance against the Vichy regime, which is an entirely different topic worthy of delving into. Main names include Jose Albuker from Algeria, and the Monier resistance in Tunisia. In both cases, Jews helped in the struggle against the pro-Nazi government, transferring information and engaging in activities of espionage and detective missions.

At the end of the day, the antisemitic propaganda, the humiliating and limiting antisemitic legislation, and the forced displacement to concentration and labor camps, are all reminiscent of the path that European Jews suffered on the way to their terrible fate of extermination. Hundreds of North African Jews died and hundreds of thousands suffered from terrible conditions and discrimination, yet most of the Jews of North Africa were spared their European counterparts’ horrible destiny, mainly due to external reasons which include the tides of war and the issues of logistics.

2. Ripple Effects of the Holocaust in the Middle East

The holocaust also created ripple effects outside countries directly under German or Italian rule. Nazi propaganda was being broadcast in Arabic inciting against Jews, books of Nazi ideology were translated to Arabic, including Mein Kampf, and organizations emulating the Hitler-Jugend and the “brown shirts” began to appear across Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

Mufti Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, one of the most prominent Arab leaders from Jerusalem who incited pogroms against Jews in Eretz Israel during the 1920s, met with Hitler and Himmler to express his admiration and tried to convince them to pledge to exterminate the Jews in the Land of Israel, too. He took part in their propaganda efforts and encouraged Muslims who enlisted in the Third Reich’s army. The following is a famous picture of the Mufti and Hitler:

In 1941, a terrible Nazi-inspired massacre took place in Iraq, where some 180 Jews were murdered during the holiday of Shavuot, in the event known as the Farhoud. This happened following a short lived pro-Nazi coup d’etat, where Jews were accused of collaborating with the Brits in the plundering of Iraqi oil. These terrible events hastened the process of the end of the oldest Jewish diaspora in the world, which was believed to be about 2,600 years old. Here’s an iconic photograph from the Farhoud massacre:

Other Nazi and Fascist inspired pogroms took place in the late 1940s in Tripoli, Alexandria and Cairo, resulting in dozens of Jews murdered. In Egypt specifically, these pogroms were led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Green Shirts mentioned earlier.

Islamism and Jihadism were also important factors in the trickling of classical European antisemitism into the Arab world. Sayyed Qutb, a disciple of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood Hassan Al-Banna, wrote an essay named “Our Struggle with the Jews”, where Jews are described in classical antisemitic ways - redressed in Islamist attire.

Nowadays, consensus academy is that, despite some anti-Jewish scriptures, Islam cannot be considered antisemitic in and of itself; however, Islamist movements are seen as the main ones who “imported” classical European antisemitism either under religious or pro-Nazi influence, further entrenched as the Israeli-Arab conflict became stronger.

In other words, the pro-Nazi trends of the last century led by Islamist movements are a main part of the reason for the widespread antisemitism found today throughout the Arab world.

3. The Holocaust in the Arab World Nowadays

Today the holocaust is treated in the Arab world in several ways, most of them not very constructive.

Some deny it altogether or at least try to downplay it, like this screenshot from a now deleted video posted by Qatar’s state-owned and state-sanctioned TV, Al-Jazeera:

Others, like Hamas, try to appropriate it. In this scene from this week, the released Israeli female soldiers stand before a sign denouncing “Nazi Zionism” (see top left):

while Hamas official Osama Hamdan has likened the situation in Gaza to a ‘holocaust’ several times:

The goal is clear - to provoke the readers, but also to downplay the holocaust, appropriate it, and completely ignore the decades long process of the holocaust itself, from demonization in schools to discrimination in offices to ghettos and finally to death camps.

Finally, on social media some even admire Hitler and Nazi Germany, making up quotes such as this one here, which Hitler probably never said, reading: “I could’ve killed all the Jews of the world but I left some so that the world would know why I killed them:”

Something about the Holocaust just seems to be too much for many in the Arab world. The victimhood and thus humanization of Jews is something that is apparently just too hard to fathom.

Despite this, there are some positive changes, including the visit by Saudi clergymen to Auschwitz several years ago, and the beginning of holocaust education programs in places like Morocco and others.

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I hope that this short review arouses the readers’ curiosity. There are some great materials on the Yad Vashem website, but there is still much more to research and cover.

Speak out. Never again is now.

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1.

The current deal is the starting price that Israel has to pay for turning a blind eye to Hamas's arming, strengthening, and tunneling for over three decades, thinking that if we just ‘feed the beast’ it will suddenly become pragmatic and want to live by our side; and that if we just strengthen it, the internal rift among the Palestinians will continue to deepen, ending up with a ‘weak PA’ and ‘weak Hamas.’

The current deal is the starting price that Israel has to pay for turning a deaf ear to the warnings of so many heroic soldiers, women and men, who saw it all coming and rang all the bells - but no one listened to them.

The current deal is the starting price that Israel has to pay for the arrogance and ignorance that political and military leaders have demonstrated towards the Middle East and the ideologies of our enemies, who, turns out, when they promise to rise up against us to destroy us - they are not just talking.

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2.

Truth be told, tectonic changes have taken place in the Middle East since the outbreak of the war, most of which are positive for Israel. From the collapse of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and status in Lebanon, to the fall of the Assad regime, to the world waking up to the Houthi threat in Yemen, to the demonstration of Israel's spectacular capabilities against Iran (and the Iranian vulnerability and fragility on the other hand).

And now there is also talk of returning to the path of peace with Saudi Arabia, despite Hamas's admission that they started the terrible massacre in order to stop normalization.

All of this allows such a deal to go down a little (a little) more smoothly. And all of this only adds to the knowledge that there are lives being saved here, and that we will be able finally see the return of those kidnapped on that Shabbat morning - back to their homes and their loved ones.

And here it is important to say - the return of the hostages is a noble goal that the State of Israel owes them, their loved ones and the entire public with whom it signed the social contract. There is a moral obligation that is so clear that it does not even need to be mentioned.

And there is also a strategic dimension to it, because the hostages are Hamas's strongest bargaining chip on Israeli society, and neutralizing this ability is very important for continuing the campaign for our existence and continuing our strength here as a state.

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3.

There are people who have been misled into thinking, with many slogans and speeches and publicly funded conferences, that we will ‘resettle in Gaza.’

There are people who been have misled into thinking, with many declarations and maps, that holding the Philadelphi Corridor or the Netzarim Corridor is a goal in and of itself and that we will remain there forever.

Judging by the details of this deal, it seems that these were just bargaining chips in favor of making such a deal in the end.

"We will go in there so that we can get out and return the hostages," was, perhaps, said in one of the closed rooms, with many nodding their heads.

In this context, the worst thing would be to say "hundreds of soldiers died in vain." I reject this accusation, which carries an inherent insult to the honor of the dead.

A soldier’s most noble cause is to protect and defend those civilians who stand behind them. These soldiers have dismantled a great deal of infrastructure and got rid of many Hezbollah and Hamas terrorists. They made the region safer and we have all paid a terrible price for it.

One can be disappointed with the deal, but I utterly reject throwing mud on our soldiers, their memory, and their sacrifice for our sake.

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4.

And a word about the other side and us.

They other side are celebrating, rejoicing, ecstatic, even revitalized.

The murderers that will be released will become icons and rock stars, even more than they already are (though their large number will probably leave less airtime for everyone).

We will see gut wrenching images of our murderers hugging their families back instead of languishing in prison (or in their grave) for eternity.

These will be difficult moments - and we must remember that these images are only because of us. In this context, we did not deliver - as a society, a country, an army, a political system.

We failed to protect civilians, who were taken from their beds, from their parties, from their homes. We failed to protect our soldiers, who take crazy risks for us, and who now will find themselves in a crazy legal battle wherever they go.

It is all true: a group of backward rap*sts with a shovel and homemade rockets (and a lot of tailwind from Iran and Qatar, yes) managed to outwit Israel this time, just as their kin have outwitted many democracies around the globe. This is the price of failure.

But, in this context, I do not share the sentiments of "Israel is doomed."

This is a loss in battle (and the loss began on October 7), but not in the war. In the war, we really have no other choice but winning.

And in this context - we also have something that the other side does not have.

We do not thrive on ‘honor’, or empty slogans, or suffocating peer pressure that denies us our ability to say what is on our hearts.

We, as opposed to them, are not afraid to say "we failed." Our own Bible is filled with stories and reprimands about our failures.

But we are not just “a nation of all its failures.”

We are a people of deep and shared historical consciousness, of connection to the land, of hard and strenuous work, of reinventing ourselves from scratch, of national revival in the land of our ancestors, of salvation and success against all odds and from the deepest of wells.

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So let's face our mistakes,

look them in the eye,

take responsibility for them,

apologize,

draw lessons,

and make sure it's time to repair.

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And to our sisters and brothers who are, God willingly, on their way home: welcome back.

We apologize that it took so long,

We apologize that for all you went through,

We apologize that you got there in the first place because it was our fault.

We hope that you manage to get back on track with your lives in the best way possible.

And a speedy return to everyone (everyone, everyone).

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