Many friends have told me that they are very concerned about their children’s anti-Western beliefs and their failure to understand the risks created by these beliefs. Gays for Gaza is just a simple example. We need to help them understand the truth, but social media makes this very hard.

This is the first installment in a new series examining how social media manufactures false consensus — and what the actual data says about the stories you thought you knew.

What UNICEF’s own data now says about child malnutrition in Gaza — and why it almost certainly never appeared in social media feeds

Before you scroll past this, answer one question honestly: If I told you that children under five in Gaza currently have one of the lowest acute malnutrition rates ever recorded anywhere on Earth — lower than Finland, lower than Egypt, tied with Germany — would you believe me?

Most people wouldn’t. And that reaction — that instinctive, confident “no, that can’t be right” — is precisely what this series is about.

Because it is right. The data comes from UNICEF itself.

The Data

In June 2026, a UNICEF-led team conducted the most rigorous, population-based nutrition assessment of Gaza since the war began: the Gaza SMART Survey 2026. SMART — Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions — is the gold-standard methodology humanitarian agencies use worldwide. Trained teams measured 1,335 children aged 0–59 months across 147 randomly selected clusters.

The finding, in the survey team’s own words: “Wasting is low across all domains, suggesting no widespread acute malnutrition at population level.”

The number: 0.5 percent.

To put that figure in context, here is how it compares with acute child malnutrition (wasting) rates elsewhere, drawing on the UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates:

Read that table again, slowly. Gaza’s children, at 0.5 percent, sit second only to the United Kingdom — statistically tied with Germany, one of the wealthiest nations in human history. Egypt, the country next door, at peace and unbombed, has a rate more than six times higher. The world average is thirteen times higher.

As Olivia Reingold reported in The Free Press, this new, more rigorous data “paints a dramatically different picture” from the famine declarations of a year earlier — and it “has triggered a debate over whether the original declaration was correct.” The same survey found stunting in Gaza at roughly 12 percent — less than half the regional average of 26 percent reported by UNICEF, the WHO, and the World Bank.

How Did We Get the Story So Wrong?

Here is where the story becomes a case study in how information failure works at scale.

The earlier, catastrophic malnutrition claims — the ones that generated the headlines, the viral photographs, and hundreds of millions of impressions across Instagram, TikTok, and X — did not come from population-representative surveys like this one. They were built on fundamentally different, and far weaker, evidentiary foundations: screening data drawn disproportionately from children who were already presenting at hospitals and clinics, many with pre-existing medical conditions, measured using non-standard proxies rather than the full weight-for-height protocols that anchor SMART methodology.

Any first-year graduate student in research methods can identify the problem. Measuring malnutrition among children who show up at hospitals is like estimating a city’s crime rate by surveying its prison. The sample selects for the very condition you are measuring. It is called selection bias, and it is one of the oldest and most well-understood errors in empirical research. When the measurement instrument is also non-standard, the error compounds.

When rigorous, randomized, population-based methodology was finally applied — by UNICEF’s own led team — the result was 0.5 percent.

The Illusion of Truth

Now ask yourself the more uncomfortable question: Why didn’t you know this?

The SMART survey results were uploaded in July 2026 and formally released in August. The Free Press covered them. UNICEF issued a press release. And yet, for most people under forty — the demographic that, per Pew and Reuters Institute research, now gets the majority of its news from social platforms — this correction simply never arrived. The famine narrative reached billions. The data that undercut it reached almost no one.

This asymmetry is not accidental; it is structural. Social media platforms are not journalistic institutions. They employ no fact-checkers of consequence, enforce no sourcing standards, issue no corrections, and retract nothing. Their algorithms are optimized for a single variable — engagement — and nothing engages like outrage. A false claim that provokes fury will always outcompete a true correction that provokes reflection.

Psychologists call the mechanism the illusory truth effect, and it has been replicated continuously since Hasher, Goldstein, and Toppino first documented it in 1977: mere repetition increases perceived truth. It does not matter whether the claim is plausible. It does not matter, remarkably, whether you already know it to be false. Each additional exposure makes a statement feel more true, because the brain mistakes fluency — the ease of processing something familiar — for accuracy. Social media is, in effect, the most powerful illusory-truth machine ever constructed: a system that shows billions of people the same claims, thousands of times, sorted by emotional intensity rather than veracity.

The result is a generation that is more connected to information than any in history, and arguably less connected to truth.

Why This Matters Beyond Gaza

I choose this example to open the series not because of what it says about the Middle East, but because of what it says about us — about the information ecosystem we now inhabit.

If a claim of this magnitude — famine, the gravest humanitarian designation that exists — can saturate global consciousness while resting on selection-biased hospital samples and non-standard measurements, and if the subsequent gold-standard data from the same UN agency can vanish into a void of algorithmic indifference, then no topic is safe. Not elections. Not public health. Not economics. Not Islamism. Not socialism. Not antisemitism. Not science. The machinery that misinformed you about this will misinform you about everything else, because the machinery does not care what the topic is. It cares only that you keep scrolling.

The scholarly literature on this is sobering. False news, as Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral demonstrated in Science (2018), diffuses “significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly” than the truth — and not because of bots, but because of us. Humans share falsehood more readily than fact, because falsehood is engineered — evolutionarily or algorithmically — to be more novel and more emotionally arousing.

There is currently no regulatory fix coming. There is no platform redesign coming. The only correction mechanism available is the deliberately skeptical, source-checking reader — and there are not nearly enough of them.

What You Can Do — Today

This is where you come in, and I am asking directly.

If you are a parent or grandparent, send this article to every member of your family — especially the ones under forty — and ask them to send it to their friends. Not because I wrote it, but because the correction cannot travel the way the falsehood did. The falsehood had an algorithm. The correction only has you.

The sources are all here. Verify them yourself — in fact, I insist that you do, because taking my word for it would repeat the very error this series exists to correct:

• The Free Press: “New UNICEF-Led Data Undermines Claims of Gaza Famine” (Olivia Reingold, August 24, 2026)

• UNICEF, Gaza SMART Survey 2026 — official report page: unicef.org/sop/reports/gaza-smart-survey-2026

• Full survey report (PDF): Gaza SMART Survey 2026 Report

• UNICEF press release, August 24, 2026: “New SMART survey provides updated assessment of child and maternal nutrition in accessible areas of Gaza”

• UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates (comparison data): data.unicef.org/resources/jme

Coming Next in This Series

This article is the first of many. In the coming installments, we will apply the same approach to other claims your feed has taught people to believe. Some of what we find will comfort you. Much of it will not. All of it will be sourced.

Subscribe so you don’t miss Part II. And remember the rule that will govern every article in this series:

The question is never “Did I see it everywhere?” The question is always “Where did the statements and images come from?”

If this article changed your understanding of a story you thought you knew, that is the point of the series — and the strongest possible argument for sharing it. Forward it to your family. Ask them to forward it to their friends.

To understand Iran’s behavior—its defiance, its appetite for suffering, its willingness to endure isolation and economic ruin—you must first comprehend the worldview that animates the Islamic Republic. Western democracies often misread Iran because they assume its leaders think like conventional political actors. They don’t. Their motivations are rooted in a revolutionary theology more than 1,200 years old, one that treats sacrifice as virtue, suffering as proof of righteousness, and death as a pathway to divine victory.

This interview—one of the best I’ve heard all year—lays out that worldview with remarkable clarity. On The Iran Breakdown, one of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ regular podcasts, host Mark Dubowitz speaks with Haviv Rettig Gur, Middle East analyst at The Free Press. Haviv details how the regime reframes military defeats, economic collapse, and mass hardship into narratives of resistance and victory. In this ideological universe, martyrdom is not tragedy; it is strategy. And that makes the regime profoundly risk‑tolerant.

If you want to grasp why Iran escalates when rational actors would de‑escalate, why it chooses self‑sacrifice over retreat, and why external pressure is interpreted as a divine test rather than a warning, this conversation is indispensable. Every democratic government should study it closely.

Watch the interview here:

I learned this the hard way.

For years, I’ve spent two full days every month extracting data from a stack of PDF account statements and entering it into a large Excel workbook that tracks dozens of accounts across monthly and yearly periods. It’s tedious, repetitive work — exactly the kind of thing AI is supposed to automate.

So, I built a project in Claude Chat (and later MyNinja.ai) to scan each PDF, locate the correct account block, and paste the numbers into the following rows:

• Beginning Balance

• Deposits or Additions

• Withdrawals or Redemptions

• Net Income

• Ending Balance

The first test was magical. The AI found the correct account number, verified the opening balance, placed deposits and withdrawals in the right month and year, and confirmed that the calculated ending balance matched the statement. I sat back thinking: This is it. Two days of monthly drudgery gone forever.

Then I fed it the next statement.

This time, the AI took the statement’s deposits and withdrawals, added them together, and confidently placed the sum in the Net Income row — leaving the actual deposits and withdrawals rows blank. It was as if a student had turned in a math test with all the right numbers in all the wrong places, smiling proudly.

That’s when the optimism evaporated.

I asked Claude why the results were inconsistent. The answer was revealing:

“Small ambiguities get resolved differently depending on the statement layout, phrasing, or context window.”

In other words: chatbots don’t follow instructions — they interpret them. And interpretation is the enemy of repeatability.

Claude continued:

“Free‑form chat instructions get reinterpreted slightly differently on each run. The fix is to convert your prose instructions into a structured, deterministic specification.”

This was the moment I realized something most people still don’t understand: AI doesn’t eliminate work — it changes the kind of work you have to do.

The Hidden Layer: SPECs

To make the extraction consistent, you must build a SPEC — a custom instruction set that every conversation inherits. There are three alternative instruction set methods, each with different levels of accuracy:

Option 1. Reusable but still model‑interpreted instructions

Option 2. Markdown or JSON‑based SPECs (deterministic enough for most people)

Option 3. The fully deterministic method: Claude API + code

Option 3 is the “gold standard.” You wrap everything in a Python script, enforce a JSON schema for the extracted data, and let code — not the AI — handle the Excel writing. The AI extracts; the script guarantees correctness.

It took me several days to build this deterministic pipeline. Not because the task was conceptually hard, but because AI’s cheerful confidence often hides its unpredictability. You don’t debug the AI — you debug your instructions, your schema, your assumptions, and your guardrails so AI can’t get creative anymore. The final SPEC project was built in MyNinja.ai which I recommend. (Several additional files are required, a How_TO_USE.md operating manual with changelog and a START_HERE.md with instructions and the exact kickoff message to paste into a new project.)

The Real Lesson: AI Isn’t Replacing Jobs — It’s Rewriting Them

This experience taught me something that contradicts the breathless headlines about AI replacing millions of jobs overnight.

AI today requires a level of sophistication most people don’t yet possess. It’s not plug‑and‑play. It’s not magic. It’s a tool that demands structure, precision, and a willingness to think like both a programmer and a project manager.

Companies already know this. First‑time job seekers with strong AI skills are being valued above recent MBA graduates — not because AI replaces the MBA, but because an MBA who can’t use AI will be replaced by an MBA or candidate who can.

The jobs aren’t disappearing. The skill requirements are evolving. Workers who thrive will be the ones who understand a new kind of literacy.

AI won’t take your job. But someone who understands how to build a very deterministic SPEC might.

Iran’s coastline along the Strait of Hormuz measures roughly 170 km (102 miles). Yet this figure understates the operational reality. When the coastline is measured in its fractal form—including coves, inlets, and the irregular littoral terrain where Iran can conceal fast boats, mobile rocket launchers, and drone platforms—the effective length expands to approximately 700 km (420 miles).

This matters because Iran’s short‑range rockets and one‑way attack drones typically have ranges of 40–50 miles. When that range is projected outward from a 700‑km irregular coastline, the defensible surface area becomes enormous—on the order of 5,100 square miles, roughly the size of Connecticut.

Defending such a space is extraordinarily difficult. A drone is the size of a small car; a mobile rocket launcher can be hidden in a garage, a warehouse, or a fishing village. Even if the United States were to destroy 90–95% of Iran’s missile and drone inventory, the remaining systems would still be sufficient to threaten commercial shipping. Insurance carriers would withdraw coverage after even one successful strike every week or two, effectively shutting down maritime traffic.

The consequences of shutting the navigation in this international waterway are immediate and global. The Strait of Hormuz is the transit point for oil, natural gas, fertilizers, and industrial gases. Iran understands that its ability to disrupt this flow gives it leverage far beyond its conventional military power. Over the past two weeks, the United States has focused its operations on reopening the Strait and suppressing Iran’s coastal strike capacity.

But this approach has a strategic flaw. Iran’s leadership and the IRGC command structure are not located along the Strait. They are hundreds of miles away (Tehran is 700 miles away), insulated from the fear, pressure, and psychological impact of U.S. strikes. They do not hear explosions. Their daily lives continue uninterrupted.

A small number of U.S. strikes have targeted facilities deeper inside Iran, but these represent a minor fraction of the overall campaign. As a result, Iran’s governing elite has little incentive to alter its behavior.

If the United States seeks to achieve its core objectives—preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, halting its ballistic‑missile expansion, cutting off funding to proxy militias, and ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait—then the geographic scope of U.S. operations must change.

The focus should shift from the coastline to the centers of regime power:

• military bases and headquarters

• IRGC command nodes

• intelligence and internal‑security facilities

• prisons and police complexes used for political repression

The goal is not indiscriminate punishment, but strategic pressure: Iran’s leadership must feel the consequences of its decisions. When senior officials, IRGC commanders, and internal‑security forces experience sustained disruption, casualties, and operational degradation, the incentives change.

This urgency is underscored by recent events. Several U.S. soldiers were killed in Jordan last week by Iranian ballistic missiles and Iranian‑made attack drones, despite sheltering in hardened facilities. Iran’s strike capabilities are becoming more accurate, more powerful, and more difficult to intercept.

The United States no longer has the luxury of a slow‑paced campaign. To compel Iran to negotiate and to secure the Strait of Hormuz, the scale and focus of U.S. operations must expand. The current approach—centered narrowly on the coastline—cannot achieve the strategic outcomes the United States requires.

Most people assume they can easily distinguish fact from fiction. Yet many widely repeated “facts” are simply wrong. Consider the following statements:

• The Great Wall of China is visible from space.

• Sugar causes hyperactivity in children.

• Cracking your knuckles causes arthritis.

• Napoleon was unusually short.

• Vikings wore horned helmets into battle.

• Jews used the blood of Christian children to make matzah.

Every one of these claims is false. Some are harmless misconceptions; others, like the medieval blood libel, fueled centuries of persecution and violence. But all share a common psychological mechanism: the more often we hear something, the more likely we are to believe it.

Psychologists call this phenomenon the Illusion of Truth. When a statement becomes familiar through repetition, the brain processes it more easily—a cognitive shortcut known as processing fluency. Because the information feels easy to retrieve, the brain mistakenly interprets that fluency as evidence of accuracy. As one friend of mine likes to say, “It takes nine repetitions to learn something.” In reality, repetition doesn’t make a claim truer—it simply makes it stickier.

This bias is one of the most powerful and unsettling features of human cognition. It explains why propaganda—information crafted to manipulate emotions or beliefs—can be effective even when its content is demonstrably false. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, understood this well. He argued that messages should be simple, repeated endlessly, and stripped of nuance. Familiarity, not logic, was the goal.

The Digital Amplifier

The modern information ecosystem supercharges the Illusion of Truth. Older adults tend to rely on cable news, local television, and print newspapers—institutions that, despite their flaws, operate within recognizable journalistic norms. Younger adults, however, increasingly encounter news through algorithmic feeds on platforms such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube.

These platforms do not prioritize accuracy. They prioritize engagement.

Social media systems learn what to show you by tracking:

• what you watch

• what you scroll past

• what you pause on

• what you like, share, or comment on

Over time, the algorithm constructs a behavioral profile and feeds you more of what keeps you engaged. Crucially, it does not show you a balanced range of viewpoints unless your behavior indicates interest in them. This creates information silos where repeated messages—true or false—become familiar, and therefore believable.

Political Consequences of Algorithmic Familiarity

This probably explains the recent wave of Democratic Socialist Candidates sympathetic to Islamist political ideologies, who have won primaries in many major cities. These election results have been traced to strong turnouts by young white girls voting for candidates who are often supportive of radical Muslim views and falsely accuse Israel of genocide. These young girls consume most of their information from social media. They do not understand what can happen if the pro-Islamist candidates they are voting for get into office. They may be forced to cover their hair, faces, and bodies, lose the right to a higher education in many fields, be banned from certain professions, and suffer heavily restricted divorce and travel rights.

A Historical Case Study: Iran’s 1979 Revolution

This type of change came to Iran when the Shah fled in 1979 due to a revolutionary coalition of:

· Islamists

· Marxists and socialists

· Students

· Secular progressives

· Clerics, and

· Intellectuals.

Within weeks and months, women’s rights drastically changed. Polygamy was legalized, the minimum marriage age for girls dropped from 18 to 13, women’s testimony in court was valued at half that of a man, genders were segregated in workplaces and schools, and mandatory dress codes were enacted. How many of the young female voters in todays’ primaries know anything about how Islam is capable of treating women?

These changes were not accidental. They were the product of a political ideology that sought to reorder society according to a strict interpretation of religious law.

The question for contemporary voters is not whether history will repeat itself exactly, it never does, but whether they understand the full implications of the ideologies they support. Social media rarely provides that context. Algorithmic feeds reward emotional content rather than historical analysis or diverse views.

The Broader Danger

We are living in an era where the ability to distinguish truth from propaganda is eroding. This is not accidental. Foreign adversaries, extremist movements, and disinformation networks exploit the Illusion of Truth to shape public opinion. Anti-Israel and antisemitic narratives spread rapidly online because they are repeated frequently, framed emotionally, and delivered through channels where familiarity is mistaken for fact.

This does not mean these voters are all naïve or incapable of critical thought. It means that too many are operating within an information environment shaped by repetition, emotional framing, and algorithmic reinforcement. We should evaluate how to reduce bias in social media by requiring that a percentage of every discussion includes alternative positions. This will weaken today’s information silos, increase the understanding of historical precedents, and reduce the seduction of repeated falsehoods.

Below is a distilled and expanded examination of the major themes raised in the interview.

1. Can There Be a “Deal” With a Regime Built on Apocalyptic Ideology?

The much‑discussed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran is reportedly “electronically signed,” yet conspicuously absent from public release. The most plausible explanation is that the terms remain unsettled. Iran continues to escalate its demands, and Washington — eager to keep Tehran at the negotiating table — has conceded additional points.

This dynamic raises a fundamental question: Is a negotiated settlement possible with a regime whose ideological foundation is the destruction of the United States and Israel?

Iran’s leadership does not behave like a defeated power because it does not believe it has been defeated. Its negotiating posture reflects confidence, not capitulation.

2. Why the World’s Strongest Military Could Not Force an Iranian Surrender

Gur’s analysis underscores a critical asymmetry: Iran’s regime does not value the survival or well‑being of its own population.

Unlike states grounded in Western political norms, the Islamic Republic is driven by a revolutionary, fierce religious devotion with political ideology worldview. Its leaders have:

• Massacred more than forty thousand Iranian citizens for protesting.

• Systematically destroyed Iran’s economy for nearly half a century.

• Embraced mass martyrdom as a political and religious virtue.

A regime that sees self‑destruction as a form of victory cannot be coerced through conventional military pressure alone.

Moreover, Iran has discovered that nuclear weapons are not its most effective strategic tool. Its ability to threaten or close the Strait of Hormuz — the chokepoint for roughly one‑fifth of global oil — has proven far more disruptive. Cheap drones and rockets have driven insurance companies to halt coverage for shipping, effectively shutting down the waterway without firing a shot.

3. Why Iran Cannot Outlast the United States — Yet Still Holds the Advantage

Iran’s regime does not answer to its citizens. The United States government does.

This asymmetry shapes the battlefield:

• American voters care more about gas prices than foreign policy.

• Media coverage amplifies domestic discomfort rather than long‑term strategic stakes.

• Midterm elections exert more pressure on Washington than a collapsed economy does on Tehran.

Thus, the United States is the party suing for peace, not because it is losing militarily, but because it is losing politically. Iran, insulated from public accountability, faces no comparable pressure.

The Gulf states, meanwhile, hold a weak hand. Their proximity to Iran — and the vulnerability of their defenses to swarms of cheap drones and rockets — forces them to tread carefully. Interceptors are expensive, scarce, and easily overwhelmed.

4. Will Iran Honor Any Agreement? History Says No

Iran’s track record is unambiguous. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is only one example among many:

• Inspectors were blocked.

• Iran insisted on taking its own soil samples.

• Violations were met with diplomatic indulgence rather than consequences.

The regime’s strategic doctrine is rooted in religiously justified warfare. Conflict is not a failure of diplomacy; it is a fulfillment of divine mandate. Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrate the regime’s willingness to destroy territories it claims to “support” in pursuit of its ideological goals.

There is no historical basis to believe Iran will abide by a new agreement once sanctions relief and financial assets are restored.

5. Did the United States Lose the War?

Under the emerging terms, the United States is preparing to release $300 billion in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and signing a final agreement. According to some reports $12 billion of frozen assets is to be released before the 60-days of negotiations begin.

Once released, these funds will be nearly impossible to control. Based on forty‑seven years of precedent, Iran will:

• Rebuild its proxy networks

• Replenish its missile and drone stockpiles

• Strengthen its internal repression apparatus

In international politics, the loser is rarely paid to settle. Yet that is precisely the dynamic emerging here.

Even if Iran agrees to nuclear restrictions, will they sunset — as they did under the Obama‑era JCPOA? Who will monitor compliance? And what leverage will remain once Iran has regained access to global oil markets?

6. Will a Final Agreement Ever Be Signed?

The current, but not yet fully disclosed, MOU functions as a 60‑day extension of the ceasefire, not a comprehensive settlement. Most major issues remain unresolved:

• Will Iran cease funding its proxy armies?

• Will it accept ballistic missile and rocket limitations?

• Who will verify compliance?

• Will Israel be pressured to withdraw from Lebanon while Hezbollah continues firing rockets?

Iran is also demanding supervisory control over the Strait of Hormuz — including the authority to charge transit fees. Such a concession would effectively end the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) program, a pillar of global maritime stability since the Cold War.

At the same time, the MOU allows Iran to resume oil sales and ends the blockade, removing economic pressures that once forced Tehran to negotiate from a position of weakness. With both military and economic leverage diminished, the likelihood of a “fair” agreement shrinks dramatically.

7. What Hindsight Reveals

Several strategic missteps now appear clear:

• The U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz should have begun a month earlier.

• The strait should have been reopened by force, preventing the global oil shock that fueled domestic political, and international pressure.

• Presidential threats should have been carried out, not withdrawn.

Given the regime’s ideological rigidity, its collapse was never going to occur in weeks. It would likely have taken six months or more — but the pressure was working. A premature easing of military and economic leverage has now prolonged the conflict and strengthened Iran’s negotiating position.

Final Reflection

Gur’s analysis highlights a painful truth: The United States is attempting to negotiate with a regime that does not share the basic assumptions of statecraft, deterrence, or self‑preservation that underpin Western diplomacy.

Until Washington internalizes this reality, it will continue to mistake temporary pauses for progress and concessions for stability.

It is generally known that AI makes mistakes. I recently used AI to create an Excel workbook to generate prepaid asset and accrued liability accounting entries. During the process, the AI made so many critical errors that it maxed out my available tasks, which it didn't reset for days. You do not need to know accounting to see the magnitude or frequency of its mistakes. Will the AI learn from these mistakes or continue to make the same mistakes with other users of AI platforms?

Working with AI to Create a Project

I have just finished an AI-assisted project for a condominium association, and the experience was far more complicated and far more revealing than I anticipated. What follows may challenge your assumptions about the current state of AI.

My prompts to the AI appear in italics. The AI’s responses are in quotes.

The project itself was straightforward: build an Excel workbook that automatically generates accounting journal entries (“JEs”) for transactions spanning more than one month. For example, when you pay twelve months of property insurance up front, the correct accounting entry is a debit to Pre-paid Asset and a credit to Accounts Payable. Each month, you then expense one-twelfth of the prepaid balance. This is precisely the kind of deterministic, rules-based task that AI is supposedly well-suited to handle.

Sometimes expenses, such as water and sewer, are billed in arrears, often quarterly, once usage is known. In those cases, you estimate each month’s usage and record a monthly entry debiting Water/sewer Expense and crediting Accrued Liabilities.

To create this Excel workbook, I gave the AI the following prompt.

Create a complete Excel workbook that generates journal entries for invoices paid in advance or in arrears, where the recognition period is not fixed but calculated dynamically from the invoice’s coverage start and end dates. Build logic that determines whether an invoice is prepaid or accrued based on those dates, calculates the exact number of months in the coverage period, allocates revenue or expense evenly across that period, and produces the correct deferral or accrual entries. Include tabs for inputs, calculations, monthly recognition schedules, automated reversing entries, department and class fields, and a JE export tab formatted for an accounting system.

The AI took about forty minutes to run and then announced it was finished. It included 5 pre-loaded sample invoices demonstrating both PREPAID and ACCRUAL scenarios across insurance, SaaS, legal, rent, and consulting categories.

When I reviewed the entries it generated from the sample data, they seemed incorrect. I therefore sent it the following prompt:

Explain why the Initial Booking Entry is debit: Expense GL / credit: Prepaid Asset GL (full amount). I thought the opening entry should be debit: Prepaid Asset GL for the full amount and credit: Accounts Payable GL for the full amount. For each month covered by the payment, I thought the entry should be debit the Expense GL and credit the Prepaid Asset GL account? What am I getting wrong?

The AI responded:

“You’re not getting anything wrong — you are 100% correct. The initial booking entry in the workbook was documented backwards, and that’s an error in the workbook I built. Let me explain the correct treatment clearly, then fix the workbook.

What the Workbook Had Wrong

The workbook documented the booking entry as Dr: Expense / Cr: Prepaid — which is actually the monthly recognition entry run backwards. That would incorrectly hit the full expense on day one and create a credit balance in the prepaid account (a liability), which makes no accounting sense for a prepaid asset. Fixing it now:”

Encouraged, I opened the “fixed” workbook but could not find a way to initiate the journal entry generating process. The AI shockingly gave me the following explanation:

“However — a critical limitation to know before you proof:

The workbook is not uniformly formula-driven. It has two very different kinds of content:

Tab

What’s actually there

Invoice Inputs

Raw data entry cells

Calculations Engine

✅ Real Excel formulas — linked to Invoice Inputs, will recalculate

Monthly Recognition

✅ Mostly formula-driven

JE Detail

❌ Hardcoded static values — NOT formulas

Reversing Entries

❌ Hardcoded static values

JE Export

❌ Hardcoded static values

It then explained that the journal entries “were stamped in as fixed values for the 5 sample invoices at build time. There is nothing to recalculate.”

“The JE Detail, Reversing Entries, and JE Export tabs do not dynamically generate entries from Invoice Inputs. If you add invoice #6 to the Inputs tab, nothing on those three tabs updates — they only contain the 5 hardcoded sample invoices built at generation time.”

And then:

“My recommendation: Let me know if you want me to rebuild the JE generation logic as a proper VBA macro. That would turn this into a truly functional system where entering a new invoice on the Inputs tab actually produces real JE rows — which is clearly what the original design intent was.”

It then “offered to rebuild the JE generation tabs using a VBA macro if you want a working system.” I accepted its offer. Moments later, the AI produced a 35-page VBA macro for me to paste into the Excel workbook.

My next prompt was:

I have followed the first 5 steps that you set forth above to make the Workbook VBA enabled. When I right-click on the Green “Generate JEs cell area I do not see the choice of “Assign Macro” and therefore I do not see in a dropdown “GenerateJEs”. Also, when I read the Copied Module I do not see a macro “Generate JEs”. What am I missing? Is there a later Workbook version or Module I should be starting with?

The AI replied:

“You’ve hit two completely separate but equally fixable problems. Let me explain exactly what went wrong and how to resolve both right now — then I’ll fix the workbook instructions so they’re correct going forward.

Both issues are completely understandable — and both are caused by errors in the instructions I gave you, not anything you did wrong. Let me fix this now.”

This pattern repeated. I encountered multiple VBA compile errors, each caused by mistakes in the AI-generated code. The AI acknowledged typically:

“Good news — the cause is identified. There are two separate problems in the code as it was pasted from the chat.”

Other issues included missing formulas where they were required, a chart placed over data, and a chart that made no conceptual sense.

Then, abruptly, I received this message:

“You’ve reached your weekly Tasks limit. Check back Friday for more tasks.”

And that was it. I was locked out of my own project for three days.

This raised a natural question: Did I use up the tasks or did the AI? After all, it was the AI that created the errors requiring the corrections, which used up the tasks!

Do AIs Learn From Their Mistakes?

Another surprising discovery: AIs do not “learn” from individual user interactions. The AI explained:

“I don’t “learn” globally from our conversation in real time.

If you catch me making an error and I agree with you, that correction helps you in this thread, but it doesn’t instantly update some master brain that fixes it for everyone else.

I can remember some things about you (when allowed and appropriate), like preferences or context, so I’m less likely to repeat the same mistake with you in future chats—but that’s not the same as updating my core knowledge.

Model-wide improvements happen offline, when developers retrain or fine‑tune newer versions using large, curated datasets and feedback patterns—not from a single interaction.

So: if you correct me, it absolutely matters for this conversation and sometimes for future ones.”

This is a crucial point. AI does not “learn” the way humans do. It does not update its global understanding based on your corrections. It does not improve itself mid‑conversation. It does not remember its own mistakes.

Where This Leaves US

As this experience demonstrates, AI is not poised to take over the world yet. It will improve – dramatically, but today it still makes frequent, consequential mistakes and can easily mislead you as to what it has actually produced.

In the end, I did finish the project, and it accomplished everything I wanted. Once corrected, it generated 108 journal entries in less than ten seconds. Going forward, the workbook will produce all of the entries instantly and accurately from the Invoice Input tab.

But it took far more time than expected to get there. The VBA code the AI produced – after multiple attempts - would have taken me weeks to write manually, and debugging it without AI assistance would have been nearly impossible.

My hope is that this article gives you something close to a hands‑on AI experience—especially if you’ve been avoiding one. AI can be powerful, but it is not magic. It is a tool, and like any tool, it requires oversight, skepticism, and patience.

At the core of the Islamic Republic’s political theology is the doctrine of Velayat‑e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist). This doctrine asserts that, until the return of the hidden Twelfth Imam (the Mahdi), absolute political and religious authority rests with a supreme Islamic jurist. For loyalists—particularly within the IRGC and Basij—the Supreme Leader’s commands are not merely political directives. They are divinely sanctioned obligations.

Thus, loyalty to the Supreme Leader is not a matter of policy preference or national identity. It is an act of religious obedience. Dying in defense of the Regime is framed as martyrdom, and martyrs are believed to ascend immediately into the presence of Allah and the Imams. This belief system transforms the state from a political institution into a religious order defending the gateway to salvation.

Funeral of a Martyr

Western societies often struggle to comprehend this worldview. Modern Western states mobilize citizens around concepts such as liberty, human rights, and national sovereignty—not around metaphysical promises of eternal reward. The Islamic Republic, by contrast, motivates its followers through a fusion of political authority and sacred destiny.

Martyrdom as a Political Technology

The Regime’s ideology draws heavily on the Shi’a tradition of martyrdom: the moral imperative to stand against overwhelming odds in defense of the faith. Within this framework, dying for the revolutionary cause is not a defeat but a spiritual triumph and a guaranteed path to paradise. This belief was institutionalized during the Iran–Iraq War, when the state sent waves of young volunteers—including children—into minefields and celebrated their deaths as “wedding ceremonies” (aroosi‑ye shahadat), symbolizing their union with the divine.

Whereas normal authoritarian regimes fight to avoid losing power—and the imprisonment, exile, or execution that may follow—the Islamic Republic’s hardline core fears something far greater. Losing power would mean:

• the collapse of what they believe is God’s chosen government

• the triumph of “infidels”

• the end of their religious mission

• the invalidation of their entire worldview

These fears produce a fight‑to‑the‑death mentality. A cornered ideological regime is more dangerous than a cornered political regime. A political actor fights to avoid death; an ideological actor fights because it believes death is victory. The former can be deterred. The latter is far harder to restrain.

Anti‑Imperialism and the Sacred Enemy

The Regime’s identity is explicitly anti‑imperialist. Western political, cultural, and secular influence is portrayed as an existential threat to Islamic purity. Israel is not viewed as a geopolitical rival but as an illegitimate, Western‑backed entity occupying Islamic land. Opposition to Israel is therefore framed not only as a strategic necessity but as a religious duty.

Why the Regime Is Uniquely Risk‑Tolerant

The IRGC and Basij have spent decades teaching that:

• “Martyrdom is the highest form of life.”

• “Death in battle is not loss—it is ascension.”

• “The blood of martyrs sustains the revolution.”

• Every conflict is a cosmic struggle between good and evil.

This doctrine produces a leadership class that is unusually willing to take risks. As a result, the Regime may:

• escalate when a rational actor would de‑escalate

• choose symbolic self‑sacrifice over strategic retreat

• lash out regionally to create chaos and regain leverage

• accept massive casualties among its own forces

• interpret external pressure as a divine test rather than a warning

The Regime is not suicidal, but it is highly risk‑tolerant. It is willing to endure enormous economic, military, and human costs because it believes suffering has spiritual value. Dying in the fight is not merely acceptable; it is holy.

This does not mean there is no solution to this war. As the war proceeds and creates a credible threat of total destruction targeting the Regime’s core leadership, command infrastructure, or vital economic assets (such as energy infrastructure), the Regime will change its calculus. When the choice is narrowed to tactical capitulation or the total annihilation of the state, historical precedents indicate that the Regime will choose tactical retreat to preserve itself. Ayatollah Khomeini established the precedent that protecting the Islamic Republic is a supreme obligation. Hence, the Regime will eventually agree to a negotiated settlement if it is not overthrown before then.

Conclusion

To outside observers, the Regime’s behavior often appears extreme, disproportionate, or self‑destructive. But from its own perspective, these actions are not reckless. They are expressions of faith, rooted in a worldview that fuses political survival with divine purpose. Any strategy for confronting the Islamic Republic must begin with an understanding of its ideological foundation. Without it, we misread the Regime’s motivations and underestimate its willingness to endure—and inflict—pain in pursuit of what it sees as a sacred mission.

For five weeks, Iran has been unable to load outbound oil tankers. Crude from active wells has instead been diverted into onshore storage, which is now nearing capacity. To delay the moment when it must shut in production—a step that risks long‑term damage to its oil fields—Iran has attempted to pull aging, out‑of‑service, and mothballed super tankers back into operation to act as floating offshore storage facilities. The United States has targeted these vessels to prevent Tehran from expanding its storage capacity.

The more consequential problem lies ahead. If Iran is forced to shut down its wells, many may not be able to be restarted. Iran’s fields are mature and geologically fragile; shutting them in can permanently reduce reservoir pressure and cause irreversible declines in production. The regime knows this.

But it would be a mistake to assume that Iran will respond rationally, or in a way that prioritizes the welfare of its population or the stability of the region. Remember that this regime killed 40,000+ of its own citizens in two days just for protesting.

Oil Slicks in the Strait: A Dangerous Signal

In recent days, maritime intelligence firm Windward AI and European Space Agency’s Sentinel satellites have captured massive dark patches on the sea surface near Kharg Island. One slick measured over 120 square kilometers (roughly 46 square miles). Additional slicks have been observed drifting out of the Strait of Hormuz.

These developments strongly suggest that Iran may have exhausted its storage capacity and is now diverting crude directly into the seas rather than shutting down its wells. Another possibility is that rising pipeline pressure—due to the inability to offload crude—has led to structural failures and leaks.

Either scenario carries serious environmental and economic consequences. Oil contamination in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz threatens marine ecosystems, reduces fishery yields, and harms the livelihoods of coastal communities across the region. These impacts will not be confined to Iran; they will affect every nation bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Escalation Beyond Oil: Threats to Global Infrastructure

Iran has also threatened to sabotage the undersea high‑speed communications cables that run through the Gulf—critical infrastructure that supports global financial markets, telecommunications, and data flows. This threat follows Tehran’s demand for “compensation” from ships transiting the Strait, and now, apparently, for the mere presence of international data cables. If Iran succeeds in asserting control over the Persian Gulf and Strait, it could set a precedent with global implications. China, for example, may see this as an opportunity to control the Gulf of Taiwan. The principle of free and open seas, central to international maritime law, that the seas are free to all countries, would erode, and the foundations of globalization would weaken. The global order would shift dramatically.

The logic is unmistakable: Iran is attempting to hold the world hostage by targeting shared global systems.

This raises a sobering question: What would this crisis look like if Iran possessed nuclear weapons? If Tehran were armed with deliverable nuclear warheads, its coercive leverage would be exponentially greater. The international community would have far fewer options for resisting Iranian demands. Iran has already demonstrated a willingness to attack even former friends such as Qatar and Turkey; nuclear capability would only embolden such behavior.

A Global Recognition: Iran Must Be Constrained

The world is beginning to understand the scale of the threat. Britain and France are deploying naval forces to help secure the Strait—though only after the United States reopens it. Forty nations are now coordinating on a joint plan to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait once it is restored.

Countries that have declared neutrality are discovering that neutrality offers no protection. If Iran disables the data cables, their economies will be among the first to suffer.

Iran’s leverage extends beyond the Strait. Through its network of proxy militias and sleeper cells, the regime retains the ability to conduct asymmetric attacks across multiple continents. While these cells have not yet been activated, it would be naïve to assume they will remain dormant. The regime’s ideological worldview—rooted in a belief that it is divinely mandated to reshape the region and, ultimately, the world—makes escalation a persistent and growing risk.

Iran now finds itself in an economic version of that submission hold. The military phase of the conflict has given way to a far more consequential contest: the systematic constriction of Iran’s economic lifelines. If the current pressure continues or accelerates Iran will eventually have to “tap out” to avoid total economic collapse. Their leaders may not care about their citizens, but their citizens and solders will have no choice but to revolt.

The Financial Backbone of Iran’s Security Forces

A significant portion of Iran’s oil revenue flows through channels controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Analysts estimate that roughly half of Iran’s oil production is allocated to the IRGC, which then sells it on the grey market. These proceeds fund the salaries and operations of approximately 150,000 IRGC personnel, 40,000, or more, active-duty Basij members, and several hundred thousand Basij reservists.

If that revenue stream collapses, the question becomes straightforward: how many members of this security apparatus will continue to report for duty without pay, and how will they support their families in the absence of income?

A Government Running Out of Cash

Without oil revenue, the Iranian government faces severe liquidity constraints. Observers note that the state could exhaust its available funds within weeks. While the government can print money, inflation is already estimated to exceed 50 percent per annum. Additional money creation would accelerate inflation dramatically, further eroding purchasing power and making basic necessities increasingly unaffordable.

In such an environment, the ability of ordinary Iranians to buy food becomes a central point of concern.

The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Economic Artery

Approximately 90 percent of Iran’s foreign trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. With the strait effectively closed to Iranian commerce, imports of essential goods have slowed to a trickle. For many Iranian businesses — especially those dependent on foreign components, raw materials, or consumer goods — this disruption is existential. Without imports, production halts, inventories vanish, and companies fail.

Oil Storage at Capacity

Iran’s oil storage facilities are reportedly nearing capacity. If oil exports remain blocked, storage tanks could be full within days. Once that happens, Iran will be forced to “shut in” production wells. Shutting in wells is not just pressing a simple pause button: when wells are closed, reservoir pressures redistribute, pressures equalize, and some wells may never return to previous production levels. Others may fail entirely.

This represents not just a temporary setback but a potentially irreversible loss of national revenue.

The Domestic Economy Under Strain

Iran’s government has restricted internet access for about 50 days, a move that has crippled the country’s entrepreneurial sector. Roughly 30 percent of Iranian small businesses rely on online platforms for sales and operations. With the internet largely shut down, many of these businesses have already collapsed. Without revenue, they cannot pay employees, further deepening the economic crisis.

External Lifelines Are Limited

Some analysts speculate that Russia or China could attempt to provide financial support, possibly through gold transfers or other mechanisms. But even if such support materializes, it cannot solve the core problem: without access to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran cannot import and export the goods its economy depends on.

The Choke Hold and the Political Question

By imposing a blockade on Iran’s use of the Strait, the United States now has Iran in a decisive economic choke hold. It can and will even tighten that economic hold. The argument is that if this pressure is maintained, Iran will eventually have no choice but to negotiate terms that address longstanding concerns: nuclear enrichment and development, ballistic and other missile development, support for proxy forces, existing enriched uranium stockpiles, and human rights abuses.

The central risk, to this choke hold strategy succeeding is not Iran’s resilience but domestic political pressure within the United States. Critics of the administration may push for a relaxation of sanctions or a shift in strategy. Easing pressure prematurely will forfeit a rare opportunity to secure a comprehensive agreement and reduce regional and global instability.

Conclusion: The Tap-Out Moment

In combat sports, a fighter taps out to avoid irreversible harm. Iran’s economy is under extreme strain and it is approaching a tap out moment. Maintaining pressure for a few more months — even at the cost of higher gasoline prices — should force a strategic shift that has eluded policymakers for decades.

Whether that pressure continues, or whether domestic political dynamics lead to an early release of the choke hold, will determine the outcome of this confrontation.

Today, Russia produces an estimated 7.5 million drones per year, including roughly 360,000 long‑range Shahed‑type systems with operational ranges between 1,100 and 1,550 miles. The remainder are short‑range platforms—typically with 6‑ to 12‑mile ranges—designed to deliver rocket‑propelled grenades. This industrial capacity allows Russia to launch mass saturation attacks, often 5,000 drones in a single night, overwhelming Ukrainian air defenses. To support this scale, Russia has converted at least 15 shopping malls into drone‑manufacturing facilities. By the end of the year, new variants are expected to incorporate fiber‑optic guidance, rendering them largely immune to electronic‑warfare jamming.

Shahed-136 gas engine at the exhibition of the destroyed Russian military equipment in Kyiv

The Shahed‑136 itself is a relatively simple but effective weapon. With a top speed of approximately 115 miles per hour and a maximum range of 1,550 miles, it weighs about 440 pounds and carries an 88‑ to 110‑pound explosive payload—roughly one‑tenth the destructive power of a Tomahawk cruise missile, which costs roughly $1.8 million per unit. By contrast, a Shahed‑136 is estimated to cost $25,000 to $50,000, depending on configuration, to produce and arm. This cost asymmetry is precisely what makes drones so strategically disruptive: it enables sustained, high‑volume attacks against critical infrastructure at a fraction of the cost of traditional precision‑guided munitions.

Prior to the current conflict, Iran is believed to have possessed as many as 5,000 long‑range drones. Heavy operational use has likely reduced that stockpile by about 50%. Moreover, recent precision strikes on Iranian drone‑manufacturing facilities have severely degraded Iran’s domestic production capacity to replenish its inventory.

Yet the most consequential—and least discussed—dimension of this issue lies in the supply chain. Despite sanctions, approximately 77 percent of the guidance, navigation, and control components inside Iranian drones originate from commercial off‑the‑shelf electronics manufactured by American companies. These include:

• Texas Instruments: DSPs and microcontrollers

• Xilinx / AMD: memory modules and FPGAs

• Maxim Integrated / Analog Devices: rail‑to‑rail buffers and transceivers

Although export controls formally restrict the sale of these components to Iran, Russia, North Korea, and China, the parts continue to flow through gray‑market distributors, shell companies, and transshipment hubs.

This reality exposes a critical vulnerability in U.S. national‑security policy. Drones are inexpensive, scalable, and increasingly central to modern conflict. Preventing their proliferation requires more than traditional sanctions; it requires systemic control over the commercial electronics supply chain.

A useful precedent exists. Sanctions on Iranian oil exports were largely ineffective until the United States imposed secondary sanctions on banks, making financial institutions legally liable for facilitating oil‑related transactions. Once banks faced real penalties, compliance surged, and Iranian and Russian oil revenues dropped sharply.

A similar model is needed today. If banks, distributors, and freight forwarders faced direct liability for facilitating the sale or shipment of critical dual‑use electronics to adversarial states, the flow of components would slow dramatically. Without access to these high‑precision chips, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian drones would become far less accurate and far less strategically valuable.

The United States cannot prevent every drone from being built. But it can make it significantly harder—and far more expensive—for hostile states to produce the advanced systems that now shape the battlefield. Strengthening supply‑chain controls is not merely a regulatory matter; it is a national‑security imperative.

Public anxiety over rising gasoline prices has become one of the most politically salient features in the early weeks of the Iran war. Although the conflict was initially projected to last six weeks, it is only halfway through that timeline, and yet domestic pressure on the administration to “do something” about higher fuel costs due to the Iranian conflict has already reshaped U.S. policy in ways that run counter to core national‑security objectives.

The United States now faces a classic dilemma in international relations: short‑term domestic political incentives are colliding with long‑term strategic imperatives. In response to public frustration over fuel prices, the administration has adopted a series of measures intended to increase global oil supply and reduce consumer costs. These steps may offer temporary economic relief, but they simultaneously weaken the coercive tools the United States and its allies rely on to constrain hostile regimes.

Policy Measures Taken to Reduce Oil Prices

To blunt the domestic political impact of rising gasoline prices, the administration has implemented, or caused, four major actions:

1. Suspension of sanctions on Russian oil exports for 30 days

2. Suspension of sanctions on Iranian oil exports for 30 days

3. Release of 172 million barrels from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)

4. Coordinated release of 228 million barrels from the strategic reserves of 32 allied countries

These steps are designed to flood the market with supply and ease price pressures. Yet each carry significant strategic costs.

Strategic Consequences of These Measures

1. Strengthening Russia’s War Economy

By suspending sanctions, Russia can now sell oil on the open market at prices far above the discounted rates it previously accepted from China. This windfall directly strengthens Moscow’s capacity to sustain its war against Ukraine.

Russia’s drone‑production surge illustrates the scale of the problem: since 2024, it has manufactured over 1.5 million drones annually and has demonstrated the ability to launch up to 1,000 drones in a single night. Sanctions had meaningfully constrained their military munitions capacity. Even with sanctions, Russia was able to produce this shockingly large volume of deadly drones. The sanctions suspension provides Russia with a financial lifeline at a critical moment and the ability to produce even more weapons.

2. Enabling Iran’s Regional Power Projection

The suspension of sanctions on Iranian oil similarly empowers Tehran. With access to global markets, Iran can now sell oil to the highest bidder, including countries that were not buyers due to sanctions, generating revenue to support its network of proxy militias and procure ballistic‑missile components, fuel, and other military inputs.

In effect, the United States is temporarily relaxing the very pressure mechanisms designed to limit Iran’s capacity to wage war.

3. Higher Global Prices Increase Enemy Revenues

Ironically, the very price spike that triggered these policy changes now magnifies the financial benefit to Russia and Iran. With global prices elevated, every barrel sold yields significantly higher revenue, effectively doubling the income streams of both adversaries compared to the below‑market prices China had been paying.

4. Prolonging Both Wars — and Increasing U.S. Costs

By increasing the financial resilience of Russia and Iran, these measures risk prolonging both conflicts. A longer war directly increases U.S. expenditures. Current estimates indicate that the United States is spending approximately $1 billion per day on the Iran war.

If the conflict extends even through the 30‑day sanctions-suspension period, the additional military cost could reach $30 billion — a figure that does not include the broader economic impacts.

5. Heightened Human and Economic Risks

A protracted conflict increases:

• Military and civilian casualties

• The economic impact on our allies

• Inflationary pressures on energy and food

• Fertilizer shortages during the planting season, with downstream effects on global food security

These are not abstract concerns; they are predictable consequences of extending the war’s duration.

The Domestic Political Drivers

Most Americans are unaware of the strategic costs associated with suspending sanctions on Russia and Iran. Instead, public discourse has focused narrowly on gasoline prices — a politically potent issue in an election year.

The administration’s short‑term political incentives, particularly concerns about the midterm elections, have shaped decisions that carry profound long‑term consequences. This dynamic reflects a recurring tension in democratic governance: the electorate’s immediate economic concerns can undermine the coherence of national‑security strategy.

A Call for Strategic Patience and National Unity

The United States is engaged in a conflict with a state that has openly declared itself an adversary for 47 years. In such moments, national unity and strategic discipline are essential. Allowing short‑term consumer discomfort to dictate wartime policy reverses the logic of deterrence and weakens the very tools designed to protect American interests.

The public must understand that prioritizing temporary relief at the pump over long‑term national security ultimately increases both the cost and the danger of the conflict. The stakes extend far beyond fuel prices; they concern the stability of the international system and the security of future generations.

At a moment when adversaries are watching closely for signs of American resolve, the question becomes unavoidable: Where is our sense of national purpose?

A broader, historically informed understanding of imminence reveals three critical flaws in the argument that Iran posed no immediate threat.

AI generated image

1. Imminence Cannot Be Defined by Waiting for an Adversary to Complete Its Weapons Programs

History offers sobering lessons about the consequences of ignoring declared intentions and observable military buildups. In the 1930s, Nazi Germany openly violated the Treaty of Versailles, rearming at a pace unmatched in Europe. British and French leaders, convinced that Hitler’s ambitions were limited or that deterrence could be achieved through accommodation, declined to act decisively during the early stages of German rearmament.

The result was catastrophic. By the time Germany completed its military expansion, it possessed the capability to overrun much of Europe, contributing to a global conflict that claimed between 70 and 85 million lives. The failure to confront a rising threat early—when it was still manageable—stands as one of the most consequential strategic miscalculations in modern history.

To argue that Iran is not an imminent threat simply because its longest‑range missiles cannot yet reach the continental United States is to repeat the same analytical error: assuming that a threat becomes “real” only once an adversary has fully matured its capabilities. No responsible state waits for a hostile power to finish building the very weapons it has repeatedly promised to use.

2. An Imminent Threat to the United States Is Not Limited to the U.S. Homeland

The United States maintains a global presence—military bases, diplomatic missions, and personnel stationed across regions where American interests are deeply intertwined with international stability. In the Middle East, these installations have been repeatedly targeted by Iranian forces or Iranian‑backed militias over the past several years.

Under U.S. law and long‑standing strategic doctrine, an attack—or a clearly impending attack—on American forces abroad constitutes an imminent threat to the United States itself. The geographic location of the target does not diminish the legitimacy of the threat. When American service members, diplomats, and facilities are under sustained risk, the nation is under imminent threat.

Iran’s pattern of threats, attacks, and attempted attacks on U.S. positions in the region meets this threshold.

3. Iran’s Global Proxy Network Extends the Threat Far Beyond Its Borders

Iran’s strategic doctrine relies heavily on proxy organizations—most prominently Hezbollah, but also a constellation of militias and covert networks operating across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These groups receive Iranian funding, training, intelligence support, and operational guidance.

In Latin America, Hezbollah’s presence is well‑documented, including involvement in illicit finance, narcotics trafficking, and past terrorist operations. These networks have targeted Americans and U.S. partners, and they provide Iran with a means of projecting power far beyond its missile range.

A threat delivered through proxies is no less real than one delivered directly. When a state arms, trains, and directs non‑state actors to attack American interests, it is engaging in hostile action. The mechanism of delivery does not diminish the immediacy of the danger or remove Iran from full responsibility.

Conclusion: Avoiding the Comfort of Simplistic Definitions

The assertion that Iran did not pose an imminent threat rests on a dangerously narrow interpretation of the term—one that ignores historical precedent, strategic reality, and the global nature of American interests. Imminence is not defined solely by the range of an adversary’s missiles. It is defined by intent, capability, pattern of behavior, published threats, and the vulnerability of American personnel and allies.

To insist otherwise is to embrace a comforting and dangerous fiction rather than a sober assessment of risk.

Beyond the Ideological

Under Beijing’s Wing: Iran’s Arsenal

Addressing the Fatal Flaw

Zineb Riboua

Mar 02, 2026

In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was sold to the American public and to the world as the definitive answer to Iran’s nuclear threat. The agreement placed extensive restrictions on uranium enrichment, centrifuge capacity, and stockpile levels, but said almost nothing about the one thing that would actually deliver a nuclear warhead to its target: ballistic missiles. Nothing about cruise missiles either. No limits on the development, testing, production, or deployment of the very weapons systems that transform a nuclear device from a dangerous secret in a bunker into a weapon that can destroy a city. A bomb is only as threatening as your ability to deliver it, and the JCPOA left Iran’s ability to deliver it completely unconstrained.

For Iran, this distinction matters more than it does for almost any other country on earth.

Decades of international sanctions have left Tehran with one of the weakest air forces in the region, an aging fleet incapable of penetrating the air defenses of Israel or any major Gulf state. Iran cannot deliver a nuclear weapon by aircraft. It cannot do so by sea with any reliability. The ballistic missile is the only component that gives the rest of the nuclear program strategic value.

What makes this failure even more consequential is who stepped in to exploit it.

Over the past two years, China has emerged as the principal external supplier of Iran’s ballistic missile program, providing everything from chemical precursors for solid rocket fuel to satellite guidance through its BeiDou-3 navigation network, which replaced American GPS across Iran’s entire military architecture. The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several Chinese entities for supplying the IRGC with chemicals used in missile fuel production.

Intelligence revealed Iranian cargo ships unloading shipments of sodium perchlorate at Bandar Abbas, a substance that bypasses existing monitoring mechanisms, in quantities sufficient to produce propellant for approximately 800 new missiles in a single delivery.

Beijing had also been negotiating the sale of CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles to Tehran, a system designed to sink aircraft carriers. In December 2025, American special forces raided a merchant vessel in the Indian Ocean carrying Chinese military cargo bound for the Revolutionary Guards.

By the time Operation Epic Fury launched, Iran possessed the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, an estimated 2,000 missiles of varying ranges dispersed across hardened underground facilities, rebuilt and resupplied in large part by Chinese industrial networks.

The Deferral

But let’s take a step back and look at what happened:

The Obama administration’s decision to exclude missiles from the 2015 JCPOA agreement represented a calculated concession, and more fundamentally, an act of deliberate deferral. In fact, both China and Russia categorically refused to include missile restrictions in the multilateral negotiations, and Tehran declared its indigenous missile development a non-negotiable sovereign right.

Naturally, the Obama team, determined to secure a landmark diplomatic achievement before leaving office, separated the nuclear file from the missile file entirely, treating them as two distinct problems when they formed two halves of the same threat.

Obama especially framed the deal in aspirational terms, saying it provided “an opportunity to move in a new direction,” but the direction left the missile program entirely unaddressed. In the language of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the provisions on missiles merely “called upon” Iran not to conduct certain activities, far weaker than the binding prohibition in the prior Resolution 1929, which had explicitly prohibited Iran from pursuing ballistic missile technology capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

The administration even watered down the enforcement language of that earlier resolution to get the deal through, reasoning that missiles could be addressed later. That word, “later,” defined the entire approach. Iran tested ballistic missiles within weeks of the JCPOA entering into force, and no mechanism existed to stop it.

Free from constraint, Iran used the decade that followed to transform its missile program from a crude deterrent into a sophisticated, mass-produced strategic arsenal. It perfected guidance systems, extended ranges to cover all of the Middle East and parts of Europe, transitioned from liquid to solid-fuel propulsion, and constructed hardened underground launch facilities designed to withstand aerial bombardment. The interesting part? None of this violated a single provision of the deal.

And the missiles served a purpose beyond delivery: Iran aimed to amass such an overwhelming conventional arsenal that military action against its nuclear program would become prohibitively costly. Secretary of State Marco Rubio put today the math in stark terms: “They can build 100 ballistic missiles a month. We build 6 or 7 interceptors a month.” Each interceptor costs between $1 million and $15 million, while each Iranian missile costs between $200,000 and $500,000.

But the missiles did not stop at Israel’s borders. In the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury, Iranian retaliatory strikes slammed into civilian areas across Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Manama; debris from intercepted projectiles rained near Kuwait International Airport. In the UAE alone, three people were killed and at least 58 wounded. Iran, in this sense, was (and still is) holding Arab capitals hostage, using its missile arsenal as a coercive instrument to punish the Gulf states for daring to deepen their alignment with Washington and/or Jerusalem.

The cruelest irony is that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi saw this coming. Neither was consulted as a stakeholder during the JCPOA negotiations, and both warned — publicly and repeatedly — that any deal leaving Iran’s missile program untouched would one day endanger their populations. They were dismissed as alarmist. Iranian warheads landing on Gulf Arab soil have now settled the argument.

The Reversal

Rubio’s articulation of the objectives behind Epic Fury collapsed a distinction that three decades of American diplomacy had fought to preserve. “The objectives of this operation are to destroy their ballistic missile capability and make sure they can’t rebuild, and make sure that they can’t hide behind that to have a nuclear program,” he said. One sentence fused what the JCPOA had deliberately kept apart, the nuclear file and the missile file, and redefined what an acceptable Iran looks like.

The urgency is real. Israeli defense planners had tracked how Chinese components, machine tools, and technical guidance were accelerating Iranian production lines, and their projections pointed toward catastrophe: 5,000 missiles by 2027, potentially 10,000 by the end of the decade. Every warhead carried a Chinese fingerprint, from solid-fuel propellant chemistry to the precision guidance systems that turned inaccurate rockets into weapons capable of striking downtown Abu Dhabi. Beijing was not merely trading with Tehran.

The Chinese government was industrializing Iran’s capacity to hold the Middle East at gunpoint. Whatever Beijing’s full calculus, the military consequences of that investment are legible on at least three levels.

• First, every interceptor the United States fires over the Middle East represents one fewer available for the Western Pacific. THAAD batteries, Patriot systems, and SM-3 carrying naval vessels all draw from the same overstretched production lines. By accelerating Iran’s missile output, China imposed a war of attrition on American munitions without deploying a single soldier.

• Second, Every Iranian salvo also forces the United States to reveal electronic warfare capabilities, radar signatures, and interceptor performance data in real combat conditions, giving Chinese military intelligence a live laboratory to study American defense systems without ever confronting them directly.

• Third, if the United States proved unable to shield its Arab partners from sustained bombardment, every ally watching from Tokyo to Manila to Taipei would draw the same conclusion: Washington’s promises have material limits.

The drain on American readiness had already begun.

During the twelve-day war in 2025, the United States burned through roughly 150 THAAD interceptors, munitions that take years to produce and that feed the same queue supporting Pacific deterrence.

Only a few dozen replacements followed. Iran was rebuilding faster than America could reload. Left unchecked, the math led to a devastating fork: accept Iranian nuclear breakout behind a missile shield too thick to penetrate, or fight a war in the Middle East with stockpiles earmarked for the Taiwan Strait. Beijing had engineered precisely this dilemma. Operation Epic Fury represented the decision to prevent that choice from ever arriving. By destroying the missiles, the United States turned years of Chinese strategic investment and billions in transferred technology to ash.

The ruling elite in Tehran does not view political authority as contingent, transactional, or derived from the consent of the governed. It views authority as sacred. In this worldview, the state is not an instrument of national interest but a vessel of divine mandate. Concessions are not policy choices; they are theological betrayals. Compromise is not a diplomatic tool; it is an admission that God’s will is negotiable.

This is the dimension most observers miss. When leaders believe their legitimacy flows from heaven rather than from outcomes, public welfare, or international standing, the entire logic of negotiation collapses. Pressure does not moderate. Isolation does not compel. Suffering does not signal danger. Instead, each becomes a test of faith, a confirmation that endurance—not adaptation—is the highest political virtue.

The open letter that follows, written by Inside_Israel_Intel, articulates this reality with clarity and moral precision. It explains why the Islamic Republic cannot reform, why it cannot comply with meaningful agreements, and why every round of negotiations inadvertently strengthens a system that survives through repression. It is a sober reminder that diplomacy is only as effective as the assumptions that underlie it—and that in this case, those assumptions have been disastrously wrong.

An Open Letter to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner

By Inside_Israel_Intel @inside_IL_intel 2/4/2026

Mr. Witkoff, Mr. Kushner,

This is written with respect for the offices you hold and the influence you wield, but also with urgency and moral clarity. There is a fundamental mistake shaping Washington’s approach to Iran, and it has nothing to do with leverage, sequencing, or diplomatic creativity. It is a failure to understand belief.

You are attempting to negotiate with a leadership that does not believe its authority comes from outcomes, consent, or performance. It believes its authority is divinely granted. Once power is understood that way, negotiation ceases to function in any meaningful sense.

Western diplomacy assumes rational actors. It assumes pain alters behavior, pressure produces compromise, and survival overrides ideology. Those assumptions collapse when leaders view themselves as instruments of divine will. In that worldview, suffering is not a warning sign. It is validation.

The Islamic Republic is not a state that uses religion to justify politics. It is a political system built to preserve a religious claim. Ali Khamenei does not see concessions as tradeoffs. He sees them as confessions that his authority is conditional, negotiable, and therefore illegitimate. Once that admission is made, the system does not reform. It unravels.

Economic collapse does not frighten leaders insulated from their population. Military humiliation does not compel moderation when defeat is interpreted as a test of faith. Internal unrest does not produce reform when repression is framed as a sacred duty. This is not irrationality. It is consistency.

Khamenei has studied what happens to ideologically rigid systems that attempt reform under pressure. He knows conceding legitimacy is more dangerous than enduring isolation. He also remembers his own history. When his predecessor agreed to end a catastrophic war decades ago, he described the decision as drinking poison. It was survivable then because the regime was young and still commanded loyalty.

Today, the Islamic Republic is old, brittle, and widely despised. To drink from that same cup now would collapse the system, not save it. Refusal to compromise is not obstinacy. It is self-preservation.

Even if theology were removed from the equation, the system would still be incapable of compliance. The regime is economically and coercively dependent on an institution that cannot survive transparency or normalization. The Revolutionary Guard is not a stakeholder to be accommodated. It is a parallel power center whose wealth and control depend on repression and opacity.

Any agreement serious enough to matter would threaten that structure.. So the system delays, deceives, and prepares to use force. This is where diplomacy crosses from ineffective into morally indefensible.

While negotiations proceed, the regime is actively preparing its next internal crackdown. There are defined thresholds at which command transfers, the internet goes dark, and live fire is authorized. Families search hospitals and morgues once communications are cut. This is not excess. It is policy.

And at some point, we need to say the quiet part plainly: negotiations with Tehran function as a form of violence. Not metaphorically, but materially. They extend the lifespan of a system that survives by shooting protesters, cutting communication, and calling it a divine duty. Every month bought at the table is paid for in blood on the street. That is not restraint. It is outsourcing repression.

Every round of talks buys time. Not for reform, but for repression.

Negotiations signal that killing protesters does not disqualify legitimacy. That violence carries no diplomatic cost. That time favors the regime, not the people.

You cannot claim to stand with Iranians while repeatedly validating the structure that brutalizes them. If the administration’s demands are truly non-negotiable, then the conclusion should be equally clear. This regime cannot meet them. Not because it lacks capacity, but because meeting them would require surrendering the premise of its existence. The Islamic Republic is not designed to evolve. It is designed to endure until it fractures.

The choice before Western policy makers is not diplomacy versus war. It is denial versus preparation. History will not judge these negotiations by their intentions. History will not count the meetings. It will count the graves.

The Crisis Inside Iran

Since 1979, the Islamic Regime (“the Regime”) has ruled Iran through authoritarian and often brutal means. Today, it faces the most widespread and determined uprising in its history. Estimates suggest that as many as 90% of Iranians support regime change, a dramatic rise from earlier figures near 80%. This surge is directly tied to the Regime’s increasingly violent suppression of mass demonstrations.

Reports from inside Iran describe security forces deliberately targeting protesters’ eyes, deploying poisonous gas, and even storming hospitals to attack the wounded. News sources estimate 16,500 to 30,000 deaths and over 330,000 injured—numbers that, if accurate, represent a national trauma touching nearly every family.

To conceal the scale of the crackdown, and likely additional casualties, the Regime has imposed a nationwide internet blackout and is conducting door‑to‑door raids to confiscate Starlink mobile phone and internet connectivity equipment. Families attempting to retrieve the bodies of loved ones are reportedly forced to pay for the bullets that killed them and charged additional fees to reclaim the remains. These practices have deepened public outrage and further eroded the Regime’s legitimacy.

The U.S. Position and Trump’s Commitments

A significant portion of these casualties occurred after President Trump publicly warned that if Iran “shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters,” the United States would “come to their rescue.” He also stated that the U.S. was “ready to help” Iranians seeking freedom and promised “serious consequences” for continued repression.

Having issued such warnings, Trump now faces a credibility test. If the violence continues unchecked, the administration risks appearing unwilling to enforce its own red lines established to protect 90 million Iranian citizens.

The Aborted Strike and Regional Diplomacy

Last Wednesday, U.S. jets reportedly penetrated deep into Iranian airspace and were 17 minutes from reaching their first target before being recalled. The reasons remain unclear. Some analysts speculate that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Israel may have requested a delay to coordinate broader regional planning. Iran has threatened to retaliate against all these countries—as well as U.S. bases—if attacked.

Last week, the U.S. was ready for unilateral military action, and no subsequent developments appear sufficient to warrant a reassessment of that posture.

Iran’s Missile Arsenal and the Escalation Risk

Any confrontation with Iran carries a significant military risk. Iran possesses one of the largest ballistic‑missile inventories in the world, with estimates ranging from 3,000 to as many as 7,000 missiles. These weapons:

• Travel at extremely high speeds

• Descend nearly vertically from high altitude, greatly complicating interception

• Carry large explosive payloads

• Increasingly include multi‑warhead (MIRV‑like) designs, enabling a single missile to divide and strike multiple targets

No Middle Eastern country is fully prepared to defend against a saturation attack of this scale. Israel has the most advanced missile‑defense systems, but even it could be overwhelmed if Iran launched a large volley. This would limit Israel’s ability to assist the United States in any broader conflict.

U.S. Military Movements

In the last two days, more than a dozen heavy military transport aircraft, reportedly carrying logistics and munitions, have flown into the Gulf region. Additional aerial refueling tankers have also arrived, expanding the range and endurance of U.S. strike aircraft. Last week, 12 additional F-15E fighter aircraft arrived. Strategic bombers have also landed at the joint U.S.-U.K. base on Diego Garcia, a staging point for missions across the Middle East.

The United States is repositioning the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group from the South China Sea to waters near Iran. The group includes:

• The aircraft carrier itself

• Three guided‑missile destroyers

• At least one attack submarine

This strike group is expected to arrive by Friday, tomorrow. Its presence, combined with U.S. forces already stationed across the Middle East and Israel, signals preparation for a potential large‑scale operation—one that would require both offensive capability and regional defense against Iranian retaliation.

The Strategic Imperative

Trump knows delaying action will only strengthen the Regime. The Iranian people are demanding freedom, democratic governance, and an end to Islamist rule. Protesters have even begun destroying mosques, a symbolic rejection of the theocratic system itself.

If the Regime were to fall, the geopolitical implications would be profound. Iran is widely viewed as the largest state sponsor of terrorism; its collapse could dramatically reduce regional instability, reshape Middle Eastern politics, and give Trump a hero’s reputation in Iran.

Many around the world are ready for an end to the Regime’s internal repression and external aggression. In this view, only the United States has the military capacity and global influence to lead such an effort.

Words alone can inflame hostility. But now, as mayor, Mamdani has moved from rhetoric to governance — dismantling legal protections designed to safeguard Jewish New Yorkers. This shift marks what can reasonably be described as Phase Two: the transition from hostile speech to hostile policy.

The Revoked Executive Orders

Within days of taking office, Mamdani revoked 51 executive orders issued by the previous administration. Among them were four orders explicitly crafted to protect Jewish New Yorkers from discrimination, harassment, and targeted intimidation:

Executive Order 51 — Office to Combat Antisemitism

Created a dedicated city office tasked with coordinating antisemitism‑prevention efforts and producing annual reports. Revoking the order weakens the office’s authority and permanence.

Executive Order 52 — Adoption of the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism

Formally adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition, which recognizes denial of Jewish self‑determination as a form of antisemitism. This provided a consistent framework for city agencies to identify antisemitic discrimination. Its removal creates ambiguity and weakens enforcement.

Executive Order 60 — Prohibition on Boycotting or Divesting from Israel

Barred city agencies from participating in boycotts or divestment actions targeting Israel or Israeli‑affiliated entities. Revoking it opens the door for BDS‑aligned discrimination within city departments.

Executive Order 61 — NYPD Evaluation of Protest‑Free Zones Around Houses of Worship

Directed the NYPD to evaluate protective measures after protesters physically blocked Jews from entering a Manhattan synagogue. Revoking it removes a tool designed to safeguard religious access.

Taken together, these reversals dismantle the city’s most explicit legal mechanisms for protecting Jewish New Yorkers from discrimination and targeted harassment.

A Troubling Pattern in City Leadership

A recent Anti‑Defamation League (ADL) report found that roughly 20 percent of Mamdani’s transition and administrative appointees have either a documented history of anti‑Israel extremism or affiliations with organizations that “openly promote terror and harass Jewish people.” With the executive orders gone, these officials now operate with fewer constraints and less oversight.

Normalizing Antisemitism as a Political Position

Mamdani’s rhetoric and policy choices work in tandem to make antisemitism appear socially and politically acceptable. This normalization is historically significant: before discrimination becomes widespread, it must first become socially permissible.

His economic messaging has also followed a familiar pattern. He has repeatedly framed “wealthy New Yorkers” — often implicitly coded as Jews — as obstacles to social progress, arguing they do not pay enough taxes and should be targeted with punitive measures. His proposals for sharply higher taxes on specific neighborhoods and citywide rent freezes echo historical precedents in which governments used economic policy as a tool of political punishment.

Historical Parallels and the Danger of Rights Erosion

While today’s circumstances are not identical to 1930s Germany, history offers clear warnings about how quickly rights can erode once a government begins targeting a minority group. Under Hitler, Jews were first isolated through rhetoric, then stripped of legal protections, then subjected to property confiscation and forced relocation. Jewish businesses could be sold only to non‑Jewish Germans; Jewish families were compelled to abandon their homes and move into ghettos.

The pattern was incremental — and it accelerated once the legal framework protecting Jews was dismantled.

A Caution for New York and America

New Yorkers should not be surprised if anti‑democratic and anti‑Western ideas continue to expand under Mamdani’s administration. The revocation of these executive orders is not an isolated bureaucratic decision; it is a structural shift that removes safeguards, empowers hostile actors, and signals that antisemitism is an acceptable part of the city’s political culture.

History shows that when governments normalize hostility toward Jews, the consequences escalate quickly. New York and America must decide whether it will learn from that history — or repeat it.

Today, Saudi Arabia’s actions make that question even more urgent. The kingdom is taking a series of foreign‑policy steps that move it away from its previous claims of moderation and toward alignment with Islamist‑leaning states such as Qatar and Turkey. As reported by the Jewish Insider on December 31, 2025:

“Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its regional posture in ways that are challenging long-held assumptions about Riyadh’s role as a moderating force in the Middle East, as recent moves across Yemen, Sudan and the Horn of Africa expose the country’s widening rift with the United Arab Emirates and a growing alignment with Qatar and Turkey — two countries with openly hostile positions toward Israel.

The realignment has been most stark on the issue of Yemen, where Saudi Arabia led an airstrike on an Emirati shipment of vehicles on Tuesday which Riyadh claimed was intended for the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which has consolidated power in the country’s south as Saudi-backed efforts to stabilize the war-torn nation have stalled. Hours after the strike, the Emirati government announced it would withdraw its remaining troops from the country.

The Saudis’ decision to embrace Islamist-aligned factions in Sudan, where the UAE is aligned with rival forces, has caused additional fissures with the Emiratis, putting the two U.S. allies and Gulf power players at odds.”

This pattern extends beyond Yemen and Sudan. Saudi Arabia has also taken positions that diverge sharply from those of the more moderate Gulf states on issues such as Somaliland. Somaliland is a functioning democracy with elections, police, and relative stability, while Somalia remains plagued by the al‑Shabaab insurgency and a weak federal government. Yet Riyadh condemned Israel for its December 26th, 2025 recognition of Somaliland’s independence—a move supported economically and militarily by the UAE. These choices collectively undermine Saudi Arabia’s former claims to be a moderating force in the region or a credible potential partner for Israel.

My 2022 trip was led by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), which at the time believed Saudi Arabia’s moderation was genuine and was working to encourage the kingdom to join the Abraham Accords. But FDD’s experts have since revised their assessment. Hussain Abdul‑Hussain, a research fellow at FDD, recently stated that Saudi Arabia is:

“abandoning its past policy and distancing itself from the UAE and the moderate capitals and getting closer to Islamist Qatar and Turkey. … How far on the scale of Islamism the Saudis decide to go remains to be seen.
There have been two alliances competing in the region: A radical Islamist one led by Turkey and Qatar and allied with Iran and Pakistan, and a moderate one led by Israel and UAE and allied with India, Greece and Cyprus,”

Nevana Mahmoud, a political commentator based in the U.K., has offered a similar warning about Riyadh’s strategic thinking:

“I see the Saudis saying “We cannot defeat the Islamists, but we can influence them, using them for strategic influence. They think they can influence the Islamists rather than be fooled by them. Before Islamists were infiltrating Saudi, now Saudi thinks they are powerful enough to influence and tame them to serve strategic interests. I see that as wishful thinking.
I see Riyadh of “playing the game” on the normalization with Israel issue while “always having an excuse not to. “The excuses will never end.””

If Mahmoud is right, Saudi Arabia is not merely hedging—it is making a calculated bet that it can harness Islamist movements for its own purposes. History offers many examples of regimes that believed they could “manage” or “tame” radical actors, only to find themselves constrained or destabilized by the very forces they empowered. Riyadh appears confident that it can avoid that fate. That confidence may prove misplaced.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to secure major strategic gains from the United States. Their recent approval to purchase F‑35 fighter jets—despite the implications for Israel’s legally mandated “qualitative edge”—is only the latest example. Another is the U.S. approval for Saudi Arabia to acquire the most advanced Nvidia graphics‑processing chips for its new $5 billion global AI hub. These are extraordinary concessions for a country that is simultaneously drawing closer to Islamist, anti‑Israel, and anti‑Western governments.

United States F-35 fighter jet on a runway

Saudi Arabia’s earlier efforts to counter the Muslim Brotherhood and broader Islamist movements are fading into history. As Abdul‑Hussain of FDD put it last week, “Saudi is getting closer to all Islamist, anti-Israel, anti-West governments, whether it’s Iran and Pakistan or Qatar and Turkey.” Western governments—and especially those who continue to view Riyadh as a reliable moderate ally or a near‑term candidate for normalization with Israel—need to recognize this shift.

Saudi Arabia’s words have long been reassuring. Its actions now tell a different story. The West must stop treating Riyadh as a trusted partner based on promises and begin evaluating it based on its increasingly clear alignment with Islamist and anti‑Western blocs.

The Panama Canal is one of the most audacious engineering feats in human history, a 48‑mile passage carved through the isthmus after centuries of failed dreams and geopolitical maneuvering. The modern canal—built by the United States after the French collapse—took roughly 10 years to complete, opening in 1914. Its construction came at a staggering human cost: the official U.S. death toll stands at 5,609 workers, though historians believe the actual number was likely far higher, especially when including the earlier French effort, which lost an estimated 20,000 lives due to mosquito-borne diseases.

Today, the canal remains the backbone of Panama’s economy, generating about $3 billion in revenue for the Panamanian government each year. It is one of the most strategically important trade corridors on Earth.

In addition, only Palestinians consider people born in the country where they reside as refugees of Israel if they are descendants of refugees of Israel. Refugee status is not inheritable under international law, and this teaching of permanent refugee status also makes peace impossible.

This persistent refusal to accept citizenship in the countries where most Palestinian refugees currently reside has rendered every serious peace initiative unworkable. Generations of Palestinians have been raised on narratives that valorize martyrdom and frame violence against Israelis as a religious and national duty. Many are taught that coexistence with Israel is not merely undesirable but sinful, jeopardizing their standing in the afterlife. Transforming these deeply embedded beliefs would require a fundamental overhaul of the educational and ideological systems that shape Palestinian society—systems currently dominated by Islamist movements that promote hostility toward Israel and the West. Under such conditions, a negotiated peace becomes structurally impossible.

Given this reality, some argue that only a total and unconditional military defeat of the governing Palestinian factions could create the conditions necessary to reform the educational infrastructure and reshape societal beliefs. The following article by Andres Fox, a frequent Substack commentator, explores in detail why such a decisive victory is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in the contemporary Middle East. His analysis offers valuable insights into the strategic challenges Israel faces, and it is well worth reading in full.

The Gaza ceasefire is an illusion

It does not exist and has never existed, and “Phase 2” is a sham

This week’s deep dive: why the Trump “ceasefire” is no such thing, and why we need a dose of strategic realism when analysing the problem.

I believe we all tend to fall into a simple analytical habit when it comes to Gaza: viewing the Trump-brokered “ceasefire” as a meaningful way to measure progress. Where are we in Phase 1? When does Phase 2 begin? What will it look like? This line of thinking is tidy, reassuring, and entirely mistaken. To truly understand where this conflict currently stands and its possible future directions, we must completely abandon that perspective.

This is because there has never been a ceasefire in Gaza. Not in any meaningful sense of the word.

What we have observed is a hostage release deal, and nothing more. Hamas never ceased firing shots at the IDF; the IDF never stopped responding, though in a much more restrained manner than in earlier stages of the conflict. Violence was managed, not stopped. Friction was reduced, not eradicated. Calling this a ceasefire flatters our desire for closure rather than reflecting reality.

This pattern is not unique to Gaza. We observe it clearly on the northern front in Lebanon. Major Israeli ground manoeuvre operations have mostly ceased, but airstrikes continue whenever suitable targets are identified. Hezbollah remains a force with malicious intent. Israel has not “won” in the traditional sense of achieving a decisive end to fighting, where one side is victorious over a vanquished and surrendered enemy. Instead, there has been a shift from high-intensity warfare to sustained, low-level military management.

If we take the idea of an interconnected Seven Front War seriously (and we should), then this makes perfect sense. Across none of those fronts can it credibly be said that peace has broken out, or that Israel’s enemies have been neutralised to the point of irrelevance. Each enemy is chastened and humbled, yet still in the fight, harbouring future malign intent. A risk comprises opportunity, capability and intent. Israel’s challenge in the future is to prevent opportunities and capabilities.

Beyond Gaza and Lebanon, Israeli intelligence-led strikes persist in Syria. Iran’s malicious intent has not shifted in the slightest. Its nuclear ambitions remain unchanged; its regional strategy stays aggressive; and it continues to project power indirectly, including missile attacks against Kurdish targets in Iraq and continuing its ballistic missile development programme. Iran has gone nowhere.

The Houthis, meanwhile, have been weakened by US airstrikes but not eliminated. They still possess both the intent and enough capability to remain a persistent problem in the Red Sea and, occasionally, against Israel. Of all the regions involved, only Iraq has stayed relatively quiet, mainly due to the size of the US military presence there rather than any fundamental change in militia attitude. Judea and Samaria remain as they have long been: places with ongoing terrorist threats that require constant counterterrorism efforts by the IDF. This situation can be described in many ways. “Ceasefire” is not one of them—anywhere.

Viewed from this perspective, much of the current commentary about “Phase Two of the Gaza ceasefire” becomes almost meaningless. It is an analysis based on a false premise. There is no Phase Two because there was no Phase One to begin with. There was simply a transaction: hostages exchanged for restraint.

Allow me, briefly, to blow my own horn. Over the last two years, I made several predictions, some of which were not especially popular at the time:

• Hamas would not be removed by force.

• Hamas would be defeated as a strategic threat to Israel.

• The hostages would only be brought home through diplomacy, not military action.

• Large-scale operations such as Gideon’s Chariots and the Gaza City offensive would prove to be expensive mistakes—failing to bring the hostages home, failing to eliminate Hamas, and feeding the international propaganda campaign that was steadily isolating Israel.

From where we sit now, those predictions have all aged uncomfortably well. Those four points accurately describe where the situation is today.

Hamas remains entirely in control of its part of Gaza and shows no signs of disarmament. At the same time, it is clearly no longer capable of posing a serious threat to Israel’s borders. This distinction is essential. Hamas has survived politically and organisationally, but it has been militarily weakened as a cross-border actor.

I did not expect the hostages to return. I assumed that the United States was too compromised, too entangled with Qatar, to do the only thing that would bring them home: exert the necessary diplomatic and economic pressure to secure a deal. What I failed to foresee was Donald Trump’s preferred method of diplomacy: not leverage, but bribery. Paying off the Qataris and Turks to influence Hamas was crude, transactional, and effective.

And so here we are.

High-intensity operations in Gaza ended approximately a year later than they probably should have. Instead of ending up on a defensive line along the Gaza–Israel border, the IDF now controls territory halfway inside the Strip. This territorial buffer is the only genuine strategic benefit of Gideon’s Chariots: increased depth between Hamas and Israeli communities, and a strip of land where, in theory, reconstruction can begin without immediate Hamas interference. Beyond that, the strategic picture is uncertain.

Israel remains diplomatically isolated. Washington-mandated gas deals with Egypt will not alter that; such things are just another expression of the Trump administration’s transactional approach to foreign affairs. The Arab street remains deeply hostile, putting the brake on any overt rapprochement with Arab leaders. Israel’s neighbours still harbour resentment. Among Western nations that truly matter, overt support is notably absent. This is the reality from which any serious discussion of “next steps” must commence.

If we accept the reality outlined above, that there is no ceasefire, only managed violence, the question must be not how Israel “wins”, but how Israel manages the situation going forward: strategically, diplomatically, and morally. Some suggestions:

1. Keep Gaza out of the headlines

High-tempo manoeuvre warfare should be avoided. Not because it is illegitimate, but because it is strategically counterproductive. Gaza dominates Western media cycles in a way no other front does, yet the West forgets quickly once attention shifts elsewhere. Most Western publics are exhausted by pro-Palestinian agitation, increasingly sceptical of its performative excesses, and quietly more receptive to discussions about antisemitism than they were a year ago. The scale has shifted, marginally but significantly. Renewed large-scale ground operations would reverse that shift overnight.

2. Sustain low-grade pressure across all seven fronts

Israel’s enemies must never again be given the time, space, or freedom of action to amass strength. That is the key lesson of 7 October, and it applies universally.

Low-intensity, intelligence-led strikes by air, cyber, and special forces should persist wherever threats arise: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Judea and Samaria, and beyond. The aim is not escalation but continuous disruption. Israel does not require decisive victories in these areas; it must prevent its enemies from gaining momentum. They will try to reconstitute. They always do. The IDF understands this. Just this week, Israel has raised concerns over Iran’s ballistic missile production. Chief of Staff Zamir said the IDF will strike, “…wherever required, on near and distant fronts alike.” This is the correct answer.

3. Begin reconstruction in southern and eastern Gaza

Reconstruction should be attempted cautiously, selectively, and without illusions within the enlarged buffer zone now held by Israel. This is probably the only strategic dividend of Gideon’s Chariots: space.

The obvious question remains: who will live there? Hamas is unlikely to allow large-scale civilian flight from its territories, nor will it permit meaningful reconstruction under its control. That reality must be accepted rather than wished away.

4. Let Gazans have Hamas

This will sound brutal, but it is the least bad option available. Gaza is a Gazan problem. Hamas is a Gazan regime. If Gazans wish to rise up, leave, or overthrow Hamas, that must come from within. Israel cannot and should not attempt to engineer social transformation through force, as it will not succeed.

Nevertheless, Israel can change its approach. It should discreetly support armed opposition to Hamas. Continue to recognise sympathetic clans, networks, and groups in western Gaza. Supply them with arms quietly. Stir tension. Promote defection. Let them witness what exists beyond the line: functioning infrastructure, housing, electricity, and normal life. If Hamas collapses, it will not be because Israel destroyed it. It will be because Gazans have decided they have had enough.

5. Do not cede the ascendant ground

Under no circumstances should Israel resume full-scale warfare in Gaza. It will neither eliminate Hamas nor provide strategic clarity. Instead, it will deepen Israel’s international isolation at a moment when a narrow, fragile but genuine exit route still exists. The war has achieved its realistic military aims. Continuing operations will only diminish what has been accomplished.

6. Take the way back

That path back will not be quick or fair, but it exists. Israel now needs a sustained global diplomatic, economic, and cultural charm offensive to reconnect with the silent majority in Western societies who do not chant, do not march, and do not post. These people still matter, and so do their governments through them. This is about rebuilding legitimacy.

These six points summarise that Israel must settle into strategic realism. Defend the borders. Strike threats wherever they emerge. Maintain freedom of action, but abandon the fantasy that Israel can solve Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, or Gaza through force. It cannot.

What it can do is respond relentlessly to the threats those places generate, while refusing to be drawn into wars of choice that serve only its enemies’ narratives. If the international community truly wants peace rather than process, posture, or moral exhibitionism, then responsibility must finally shift outward. Israel has done what it can do militarily and knows what it must do militarily, moving forward. What remains is political, economic, and diplomatic, and that burden does not and should not belong to Israel alone.

There is one further factor in this strategic picture: the USA. Trump administration’s post-“ceasefire” machinations in the Gulf should be regarded as a flashing red warning light. Examine carefully who envoy Steve Witkoff is addressing and on whose behalf. We are observing American strategic alignment with Qatar and Turkey, which claim to be neutral negotiators. It suggests that Washington is internalising the assumptions of actors whose interests are fundamentally misaligned with Israel’s. This is how strategic traps are built.

Qatar and Turkey are not honest brokers caught between Israel and Hamas. They are active participants in the conflict, possessing agendas, networks, and ideological commitments that directly oppose Israel’s long-term security interests. Portraying them as “indispensable mediators” has been one of the major self-inflicted strategic mistakes of the past decade.

Any Israeli policy that recognises Qatari or Turkish influence in post-war arrangements in Gaza effectively outsources leverage to hostile states. It fosters dependency. It restricts freedom of action and guarantees that any future “stabilisation” effort will depend on the goodwill of regimes that profit from instability.

Therefore, a core strand of Israel’s near abroad policy must now be the systematic minimisation of Turkish and Qatari political, economic, and security-related involvement in neighbouring theatres wherever possible. This applies not only to Gaza, but to Lebanon, Syria, and even the West Bank. Every inch of ground conceded to Ankara or Doha diplomatically is ground Israel will later have to fight to regain, either politically, militarily, or both.

A US betrayal is imminent, not necessarily in a stark way, but through the slow loss of Israel’s strategic independence under the guise of mediation. The lesson is straightforward and long overdue: states that support your enemies do not become your allies by hosting peace talks. All of this leads to one clear conclusion: Israel must relearn how to exercise strategic autonomy.

The assumption that the United States will remain a permanently reliable guarantor of Israeli security is no longer sound or wise. Polling trends within the United States already show a clear shift: anti-Israel sentiment is increasing, especially among Democrat voters as well as “America First” supporters, Turning Point–style activists, and groups associated with figures like J.D. Vance. This antisemitic, muscular “Christian” nationalism is a rising political trend.

At the same time, Qatar’s long-term influence campaign in Washington is yielding results. Doha has embedded itself deeply within US media, think tanks, universities, and policy networks. This is not soft power in the benign sense; it is deliberate subversion, aimed at reshaping elite opinion, restricting Israel’s freedom of action, and normalising the political presence of actors aligned with Hamas and political Islam. Turkey, meanwhile, operates on the ideological front—less subtle, more confrontational, but equally corrosive.

Taken together, these trends suggest a future in which Israel could find itself increasingly constrained by an American political environment that is less sympathetic, less reliable, and more transactional than at any point in recent history. Losing the US would not happen overnight, but it could happen far faster than Jerusalem is comfortable admitting. I have written about this extensively elsewhere.

That makes the task of repairing Israel’s international reputation an existential one through disciplined statecraft. Israel must diversify its alliances, rebuild credibility with the silent majorities in Western societies, and reduce its reliance on single-patron dependency. Strategic autonomy does not mean abandoning the US; it means ensuring Israel is not paralysed if Washington wobbles. As Europe has recently learned the hard way, the most dangerous moment in any alliance is not when it ends, but when one side still believes it is guaranteed, and the other no longer does.

If there is a single thread running through this analysis, it is that Israel has reached the end of comforting illusions. There is no ceasefire, only managed violence. There is no decisive victory on offer, only sustained pressure and denial of enemy momentum. Furthermore, there is no benevolent international system waiting to intervene once Israel shows sufficient restraint. What exists instead is a fragmented, self-interested global environment in which Israel’s enemies are persistent, adaptive, and patient; their major ally is wobbly; and in which some of those claiming to mediate are, in fact, actively working against Israeli interests.

That reality calls for a colder, more disciplined approach to statecraft. Israel must maintain its military achievements and ruthlessly safeguard freedom of action. Simultaneously, it must reduce strategic reliance, diminish the influence of nearby hostile actors, and begin the gradual process of rebuilding legitimacy with key audiences in the West. Rather than sentiment or apologies, this is about survival in a system that is becoming less forgiving each year.

What lies ahead will be more difficult, slower, and less emotionally gratifying, but ultimately more significant. Strategic autonomy is no longer an abstract idea; it has become essential. Recognising this sooner rather than later could mean the difference between managing this conflict indefinitely or becoming gradually constrained by allies, adversaries, and “mediators” alike.