The second round of Lebanon-Israel talks in Rome—and the seventh round overall—is scheduled from August 4 to 6. Lebanon heads to the talks facing both tailwinds and headwinds. On the positive side, the implementation of the first pilot zones—test areas in the south where the Lebanese army is to take full security control—is proceeding apace, and the recent summit between Presidents Aoun and Trump in Washington gave Aoun’s standing and choices a boost in the country. On the negative side, Israel remains insistent that it will not discuss further military withdrawal from its self-declared buffer zone behind the “Yellow Line” and wants the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to take major steps against Hezbollah. Prime Minister Netanyahu also had his own summit with Trump after Aoun’s, and it is not clear what the two might have agreed on regarding Lebanon.

Regionally, the United States and Iran have fallen back into an escalatory cycle, and exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah threaten a return to war in the Lebanon theatre. The second Rome talks should aim to build on the forward momentum represented by the first pilot zones, expand step-by-step progress toward both Israeli withdrawals and Hezbollah disarmament, and fend off a destructive return to war in Lebanon.

Competing Agendas

The Lebanese delegation’s agenda is fairly clear: it wants to firm up the ceasefire that has been honored more in the breach than the observance; a cessation of Israel’s demolition activities of towns and villages under occupation; and agreement on the next phase of pilot zones within the Israeli-occupied Yellow Line area including an overall timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The delegation is buoyed by President Aoun’s summit in Washington. Aoun delivered Lebanon’s position to what he felt was a sympathetic Trump and emphasized the need for a full Israeli withdrawal, a sped-up timeline of pilot zone rollouts, and an efficient mechanism for verification. He also came away with renewed promises for U.S. support to the Lebanese army and a Trump announcement to restore direct flights between Beirut and the United States after a suspension of more than 40 years.

There have also been reports that the two discussed a potential U.S.-Lebanon security agreement that would build long-term strategic cooperation and enable Lebanon to return as a stable and reliable state ally amid the fast-changing Levant region. The two also reportedly discussed the need for a donor conference and opportunities for U.S. companies in Lebanon, especially in strategic sectors such as energy, electricity, telecoms, infrastructure, and digital transformation.

The summit also strengthened President Aoun’s political hand in the country after the shaky rollout of the trilateral framework agreement between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States in late June. The summit with Trump was seen by many in the country as a high-level and long-awaited win, and the respectful, friendly, and measured tone of the public component of the meeting eased some domestic tensions. Both leaders affirmed the need for deeper coordination and progress toward establishing sovereignty and stability, but they also referred respectfully to the pivotal role of parliament speaker Nabih Berri. And while discussing the need for full sovereignty and the need to disarm Hezbollah, the tone was pragmatic, with President Trump even responding to a question by saying he was willing to talk with Hezbollah if President Aoun made such a request.

The Israeli delegation is likely to arrive in Rome with an almost opposite roadmap to the Lebanese. While Lebanon wants the next phase of pilot zones to be within Israel’s occupied Yellow Line area, the Israeli delegation is likely to propose pilot zones outside its declared buffer zone. These might include areas that Israel is currently targeting but has not moved into or future areas that Israel moves into and would then propose handing over to the LAF. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is currently focused on the Ali Taher ridge, which it considers a strategic Hezbollah stronghold, but might also highlight other areas to the north and east, such as Iqlim al Tuffah and Jabal al Rihan, or other Hezbollah strongholds in the Bekaa. The Israeli proposal might be that either the LAF moves against these positions and neutralizes them or the IDF will deal with them itself.

The competing approaches of the two delegations are built into competing logics in the trilateral framework. Article 2 states that Israel will be enabled to redeploy outside of Lebanon after Hezbollah has been fully disarmed in the country, while Article 3 states that the two sides have agreed to pilot zones from which Israel will withdraw and the LAF will take over. The framework does not clarify how the two logics would play out. Much will depend, of course, on what the U.S. position will be at the talks—and whose summit, Aoun’s or Netanyahu’s, swayed Trump the most.

Pilot Zones in Context

Meanwhile, the implementation of the first pilot zone area is proceeding apace. The zone consists of one town north of the Litani river, Zawtar al Gharbiyah, that was occupied by Israel but from which it has withdrawn, and two towns south of the Litani, Froun and Srifa, which were already outside Israel’s areas of occupation. The LAF has deployed to all three towns and has begun the work of removing unexploded ordnance and other hazards, rounding up weapons and arms, removing the bodies of Hezbollah fighters, surveying first-order damages and needs, and generally securing the towns. Civilians from these towns have also been streaming back after their long displacement, and the local civilian sentiment toward the LAF has been overwhelmingly positive. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has remained critical of the entire pilot zones process and the trilateral framework.

The Lebanese state has been largely absent, in a meaningful strategic sense, from south Lebanon for over half a century. In the Cairo Agreement of 1969, the Lebanese state, under pressure from Gamal Abd al Nasser’s Egypt and other Arab states, effectively ceded sovereignty of the south to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the departure of the PLO, Iran, through the Assad regime in Syria, established Hezbollah as its strategic proxy in the south.

Until the election of President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in early 2025, the Lebanese state had gone along with this abandonment of sovereignty. The people of south Lebanon have paid the heaviest price for the exploitation of their towns and villages as areas of proxy conflict by outside powers, whether Arab or Iranian, and the Lebanese state must reverse its past practice of abandonment and reassume its strategic obligations in the south

The pilot zones represent a significant opportunity to rebuild state capacity and legitimacy, creating a credible process that could unlock more Israeli withdrawals in the future and weaken Hezbollah. But to be successful, these first pilot zones must offer a strong example, not only of Israeli withdrawal, LAF return, and an exile of Hezbollah; they must also demonstrate that as the state takes back an area, it brings with it not only real and lasting security, but also essential public services, rapid reconstruction, and the building of a safe, well-served, and thriving community.

This will require a whole-of-government approach from the Lebanese government, not just the LAF, to include the ministries of the interior, social affairs, energy, telecoms, education, and health. It also requires a whole-of-donor-community approach, such that after the LAF goes in, the state is able to come in with the requisite technical and financial support to show the formerly displaced community that opting for the state is not only an ideological and nationalist position, but also brings rapid, proven, and lasting life benefits. This will resonate widely among the displaced population of the south and will strengthen the government’s legitimacy with that community, weakening Hezbollah’s narrative and bolstering the state’s hand.

Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would and should be very worried about such a potential process. It is important to note that for them, Israel—especially as it occupies part of Lebanon—has long been their sustaining enemy; it provides them with their raison d’être. A resurgent Lebanese state in positive engagement with its own community, providing the security and public goods that the state had not provided effectively before, is Hezbollah’s existential adversary, and one that gives it—pardon the expression—its raison de disparaître.

Indeed, the flip side of Hezbollah’s presence is the state’s absence. Had the state not ceded sovereignty of the south those many decades ago, no foreign or foreign-backed group would have gained purchase there, nor dragged Lebanon and the people of the south into the decades of suffering that they have experienced. In that sense, the rebuilding of the state and its credible engagement with its people, especially those of the south, and the weakening and disarming of Hezbollah are not to be understood sequentially, but as processes that should proceed in parallel.

The more that Lebanon takes its responsibilities seriously and provides the security and public goods that are expected of a state, the more Hezbollah’s narrative is undermined and the more the state will be able to marginalize and move against it. The state cannot be “everything, everywhere, all at once”; it must rebuild capacity, step by step and region by region. The pilot zones are an excellent proving ground for that.

Israel must also make a choice: Does it want the pilot zones to be a success that leads toward the strengthening of the Lebanese state and the weakening of Hezbollah, or does it want to keep the Lebanese state weak and unable to gain legitimacy in the south, thus ensuring long-lasting fertile ground for Hezbollah and the IRGC?

Security Imperatives

This is not to say that the hard security goals in implementing these first pilot zones are to be minimized or overtaken by socio-economic and governance goals. The LAF and the Lebanese government did a great disservice to the citizens of the south by not fully eliminating the Hezbollah presence south of the Litani during the implementation of the November 2024 agreement. It is true that the Lebanese government did not give the LAF the legal ability to enter homes and remove Hezbollah weapons sites or fighting facilities if they were found. It is also true that the LAF did not have sufficient resources or time—in the few months between the September 2025 government approval of the deployment plan and the beginning of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran in late February 2026—to check every valley and mountaintop in that fairly large area.

Nevertheless, going somewhat soft on Hezbollah created a dangerous cover for Israel’s actions and has devastated the people of southern Lebanon. Therefore, the LAF and the government’s obligation as they take over the first pilot villages is to make absolutely sure that there are no IRGC or Hezbollah weapons, depots, or armed fighters in these zones, nor are they able to return to them. This is, first and foremost, not to satisfy Israel, but to provide long-term security for the citizens of those towns. This will require decisions from other branches of the Lebanese government that need to give the LAF legal permission to enter homes where depots are suspected, as well as government decisions or guidance as to who will be allowed or not allowed back to these villages—for example, whether an unarmed citizen who is a member of Hezbollah can return. The United States and Israel, for their part, must guarantee that Israel will not conduct strikes of any kind in or on those villages once the villages are proven to be fully under Lebanese government and LAF control and free of any Hezbollah presence.

Conclusion: A Test of Strategy and Political Will

The Rome talks are about far more than ceasefire implementation, pilot zones, or technical security arrangements. They represent a test of whether Lebanon can begin reversing more than half a century of state retreat and reclaim the strategic initiative in its own territory.

The first pilot zones have demonstrated that another model is possible: Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of the LAF, the return of civilians, and the gradual restoration of state authority. But these initial successes remain fragile. The Lebanese government, for its part, must show that sovereignty means more than declarations. It must provide security, reconstruction, public services, and a credible long-term vision for the people of the south, supported by allies and partners in the region and around the world. And Israel must decide whether it genuinely seeks a stronger Lebanese state or prefers to preserve the conditions that have long sustained Hezbollah.

Ultimately, the success or failure of the Rome process will depend less on what is signed at the negotiating table and more on what is built on the ground. If the pilot zones become islands of security, prosperity, and effective governance, they could become the foundation of a broader national recovery. If they fail, the region could quickly slide back into the familiar and destructive cycle of occupation, armed confrontation, and war. The choice facing Lebanon, Israel, and their international partners is therefore not simply between escalation and de-escalation. It is between perpetuating the politics of permanent conflict or investing in the slow but indispensable work of rebuilding a sovereign Lebanese state.

The wider U.S.-Israel-Iran war that Lebanon was dragged into in early March has been a disaster for the country. The diplomacy now underway to end it could deepen Lebanon’s strategic setbacks—indeed, the most likely outcome is a prolonged Israeli occupation, a strengthened Hezbollah, and a circumscribed state—alternatively, however, it could provide a historic opportunity to advance key Lebanese interests and contribute to a more stable regional order.

A Shared Interest in a Stable and Sovereign Lebanon

From Lebanon’s perspective, three strategic objectives stand out as a ceasefire is negotiated: (1) securing an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, (2) strengthening the authority and capacity of the Lebanese state, and (3) bringing Hezbollah’s military activities under the state’s monopoly of arms.

The war itself has pushed Lebanon further away from all three objectives. It has led to a major expansion of Israeli occupation, a revival of Hezbollah military activity, and the further marginalization of the Lebanese state in the face of these two combatants. This comes on top of the human and socioeconomic cost of the conflict: loss of life, massive internal displacement, the destruction of dozens of towns and villages, and yet another severe blow to an already struggling economy.

Lebanon’s neighbors—including Syria, the Arab states, Turkey, and Israel—as well as the United States and Europe all share an interest in a sovereign Lebanese state that exercises authority throughout its territory, free of foreign occupation and armed nonstate actors. Iran, by contrast, has long sought to maintain and strengthen Hezbollah as an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)–affiliated force that serves as a strategic asset against Israel and, indirectly, the United States.

Lebanon in the U.S.-Iran Talks

The U.S.-Iran MOU that secured the current 60-day diplomatic window placed Lebanon in a prominent position. The very first clause includes Lebanon within the ceasefire framework and commits both sides to respecting Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Unsurprisingly, Lebanon has emerged as a major issue in the diplomatic discussions now underway in Lucerne.

Since the outbreak of the war, Lebanon has consistently called for a ceasefire as a necessary first step to halt deterioration and create space for diplomacy. Discussions in Switzerland have explored the establishment of a “deconfliction cell” involving the United States, Iran, and Lebanon to oversee the cessation of military operations. While Hezbollah can be said to be represented in the cell through Iran, Israel is so far not a part of it.

In any case, the path toward a sustainable ceasefire remains fraught with challenges.

First, Lebanon faces not only ongoing clashes between Israel and Hezbollah but also the reality of a substantial Israeli military presence in parts of South Lebanon. Israel has indicated that it is prepared to respect a ceasefire if Hezbollah does the same, but it has also made clear that it does not intend to withdraw from occupied territory so long as it believes the Hezbollah threat persists.

Second, while Hezbollah may be willing to suspend attacks on Israeli soil, it continues to portray military action against Israeli forces inside Lebanese territory as part of its resistance mission. This creates a built-in source of instability even during periods of reduced violence.

Third, the United States has repeatedly supported ceasefire arrangements in Lebanon while simultaneously accepting Israel’s right to strike targets it considers an imminent threat. This ambiguity has weakened previous ceasefires and could undermine future ones as well.

There is no stable middle ground. Either diplomacy moves forward to a sustainable end point built on sovereignty and territorial integrity, or the Lebanon front risks sliding back to open-ended conflict and risks dragging other parts of the region with it.

The most viable path forward requires addressing both the Israeli occupation and Hezbollah’s defiance of state authority.

As direct Lebanon-Israel talks resumed in Washington on June 23, the parties—supported by sustained U.S. engagement—should seek agreement on a phased Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Armed Forces, with support from U.S. Central Command and other partner militaries, should be empowered to assume full responsibility for security in the south, ensure the absence of Hezbollah fighters and facilities, and facilitate a complete Israeli withdrawal.

At the same time, the principles highlighted in the U.S.-Iran memorandum—Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity—must be applied consistently. An Israeli withdrawal should be accompanied by the withdrawal of IRGC personnel and infrastructure from Lebanon, as well as a credible process for restoring the state’s monopoly over the use of force. The United States should insist that these elements remain integral components of any broader understanding with Iran.

Several regional powers have also become active participants in postwar diplomacy: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and Pakistan have all engaged as mediators, facilitators, or interlocutors. These countries share an interest in a more stable Levant and generally view Lebanese sovereignty as an important component of regional stability. Their long-term vision includes a Lebanese state capable of exercising authority throughout its territory, securing an Israeli withdrawal, and creating conditions under which Hezbollah’s military role is brought under state control, much as other militias were integrated after the Lebanese civil war and as some armed groups in Iraq are doing today.

Lebanon’s Urgent Agenda

The Lebanese state must ensure that it is at these diplomatic tables, not merely on them—making its case and helping drive decisions, not just standing by as other powers and parties determine its fate. Lebanon has good reason to be wary of outside powers determining its future. Yet Hezbollah’s role has never been solely a domestic Lebanese matter; it has always also been an extension of the IRGC’s regional power projection. Lebanon has an urgent interest in ensuring that its voice is heard in negotiations that will help shape both the future of the country and the wider region.

The stakes are considerable. The current diplomatic process could end up entrenching both Hezbollah’s armed status and a prolonged Israeli military occupation, possibly for decades. This would recreate the conditions that existed between 1982 and 2000. Alternatively, it could provide a pathway toward Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah’s integration and disarmament, and the restoration of state sovereignty that Lebanon has struggled to recover since the late 1960s.

External diplomacy alone will not be enough; Lebanon also faces critical domestic tasks.

First, the government must continue rebuilding state institutions and advancing long-delayed reforms. The war does not provide an excuse to postpone these priorities. Security sector reform, banking restructuring, public sector modernization, and economic recovery all remain essential. Lebanon must also move quickly—like Syria—to reconnect with emerging regional networks in energy, transportation, trade, and digital infrastructure, linking the country not only eastward through Syria to the Gulf Cooperation Council, but also toward the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Cyprus, and Europe.

Second, the state must steadily expand the areas under its exclusive authority. For decades before 2025, under the Assad regime and IRGC influence, Lebanese state institutions coexisted with—and were often penetrated by—the parallel structures of Hezbollah. The government’s decision over the past year to declare Hezbollah’s and the IRGC’s military activities illegal was a historic turning point. This must be translated into reality through a firm expansion of state control, led by the Lebanese Armed Forces and other security institutions. This process should begin in Beirut and the south but steadily extend throughout the country.

Third, the government should pursue a more robust political dialogue with Hezbollah itself. Experiences including the IRA in Northern Ireland and the FARC in Colombia demonstrate that disarmament and state consolidation rarely succeed through coercion alone. Political engagement is often an essential component. While the decision to keep or give up its strategic weapons remains a decision that will be made by Iran, many other issues that are of concern to this party, which represents one of Lebanon’s major communities, can and should be discussed domestically. Hezbollah will continue to have a long future as a regular political party if and when it decides to forego its nonstate military and security roles.

A Rare Strategic Opening

The war has been a devastating setback for Lebanon. When the U.S.-Iran framework deal was first announced, many feared it might merely freeze the conflict while preserving Lebanon as an arena for Iran’s long-term confrontation with Israel. Others worried that Washington might accept such an arrangement in exchange for broader regional de-escalation.

Those risks remain real. Yet the negotiations in Switzerland, together with the active regional diplomacy surrounding them, also offer a rare strategic opening.

The United States remains the indispensable external actor in this process and should use its leverage to pursue a durable solution rather than another temporary pause in the fighting. Fortunately, it is not acting alone. Many regional partners and allies share an interest in preventing renewed war, restoring Lebanese sovereignty, and encouraging a regional order based not on proxy conflict but on state authority, stability, and economic integration.

Whether the current diplomatic moment ultimately entrenches Lebanon’s crises or helps resolve them will depend on the choices made in the months ahead. Opportunities of this scale are rare. Lebanon and its partners should not allow this one to pass.

Even as the US and Iran have agreed a peace framework that includes the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the conflict between Tehran and Israel in Lebanon shows few signs of abating.

Recent exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel had apparently delayed the conclusion of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and contributed to the risk of renewed direct confrontation between Tehran and Israel. As the crisis in the Gulf appears to be drawing to at least a temporary close, the conflict in Lebanon has grown deeper.

First, it is important to understand where things stand today in Lebanon. On March 2, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah decided on opening a second front against Israel. It was done ostensibly in retaliation for the killing of Iran’s then-supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but in strategic terms it served Tehran’s interests to open a second front in order to ease the pressure on itself and gain further leverage over Israel.

Israel responded to the attacks by undertaking large-scale military operations in Lebanon. These included a re-occupation of a swath of territory in southern Lebanon, evacuated in 2000, and erasing dozens of towns and villages. Israel ordered the evacuation of dozens of other towns and villages north all the way up to, and beyond, the Litani River. Its latest operations include strikes on the town of Nabatiyeh, north of the Litani. It has also threatened, and occasionally hit, the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh in Beirut’s southern suburbs.

This is the largest military incursion and occupation in Lebanon since 1982. That invasion was against the Palestine Liberation Organisation and did not include the erasure of entire Lebanese towns and villages. This invasion is against Hezbollah, and Israel has purposefully targeted the Shiite population, and their towns and villages, among whom are the support base for that group.

From Israel’s perspective, the operations in Lebanon are part of its post-October 7, 2023 strategy of forward defence. This includes going after threats wherever they are in the region and occupying territory outside their borders – such as in Gaza, southern Syria and southern Lebanon – in order to prevent any future cross-border attacks such as that of October 7.

Israel’s position, made clear in negotiations with the Lebanese government in Washington, is that it has no long-term territorial ambitions in Lebanon, but that it will also not tolerate the threat from Hezbollah. In effect, this means that it is willing to discuss withdrawal from Lebanon only in the context of an effective dealing with the threat from Hezbollah, initially through a full eviction of the group from areas in southern Lebanon and finally through disarmament.

From Iran’s perspective, the activation of the Lebanese front serves its strategic interests, in pinning Israeli forces and resources and maintaining a proximate threat against Israel. While Hezbollah’s old strategic role of “deterring” Israeli or American attacks on Iran itself is no longer effective, the group is still useful to Iran.

Tehran has pressed Hezbollah to resist the Lebanese government’s demands to give up its arms and integrate into the state, much as it is urging allied militias in Iraq to do the same. There is little doubt that as Iran gets billions of dollars of revenue in the coming weeks and months following the framework agreement with the US, it will try to funnel some of these resources to Hezbollah.

For what remains of the Lebanese leadership of Hezbollah – and that leadership has been greatly annihilated in the past two years – the calculations are more complex.

On the one hand, it must continue to adhere to the directives of its IRGC commanders and to the Islamic Republic to which it owes sworn loyalty (it is also displeased that the renewed fighting and occupation in Lebanon gives its narrative of “resistance” a new lease on life). On the other hand, it is aware that the decisions of the recent months – and indeed of the past three years – have led to the historic devastation of its sustaining community. There are more and more voices rising up from that community questioning and criticising the wars that Hezbollah and the IRGC have led the community into.

From the US side, President Donald Trump is focused on opening the strait, relieving the pressure on the global and US economies and trying to salvage some sort of a deal on the nuclear issue. His administration has encouraged and hosted direct talks between Lebanon and Israel, and it is eager to help both sides reach a ceasefire and make progress against Hezbollah. It also seeks to strengthen the Lebanese army against Hezbollah and towards deployment in the south in order to bring about Israeli withdrawal.

But the administration is aware that Israel’s leadership is unhappy with how limited the US-Iran framework is. And so, it is giving it a fair amount of leeway in Lebanon to deal with Hezbollah. Both the US and Iran have only drawn the line on Israeli strikes against the suburbs of Beirut; large-scale Israeli operations have proceeded throughout the south.

Caught between the pincers of Iran and Israel, the Lebanese government has been desperate to bring the latest round of fighting in the country to an end. It has sought to strengthen its own governance and military capacities and to urgently negotiate a redeployment of the Lebanese army to the south as well as the activation of a phased Israeli withdrawal from there.

Beirut was already struggling to tackle the Hezbollah challenge and deal with a seven-year-old economic, fiscal and banking collapse. Now it also has to struggle with the displacement of a quarter of Lebanon’s population, the demolition of dozens of towns and villages and the risk of a new three-month occupation turning into one of many years.

As work continues to end the crisis in the Gulf, to open the Strait of Hormuz once again and to rebuild regional security and stability, it is important for leaders in the Middle East and internationally not to enable what is essentially a side-front of the wider war – the Lebanese front – to continue unresolved and to provide the conditions for continued armed conflict that not only devastates Lebanon and its people, but could over time send sparks that re-ignite broader conflict in the region.

The US-Iran framework is a welcome beginning, but it won’t resolve the broader conflict on its own. It is an opening towards de-escalation and will enable diplomatic efforts to forge a better future for the region. In that effort, the situation in Lebanon, let alone Israel’s recent occupation of southern Syria and its still-unresolved occupation and devastation of Gaza, must also be part of the next round of hard diplomacy.

If war is the continuation of politics by other means, then the next round of politics must be geared towards preventing the continuation of war in the coming months.

The visit of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara in Damascus earlier this month was far more than a diplomatic courtesy call. It marked the beginning of what could become a fundamentally new relationship between the two neighbors after decades of mistrust, domination and conflict. It also comes at a moment when the Middle East is undergoing profound geopolitical and geoeconomic change.

For much of the past half century, Syria and Lebanon have endured an uneasy and often deeply unequal relationship. The Baathist and Assad regimes in Damascus consistently questioned Lebanon’s sovereignty, supported armed non-state actors and sought to shape or control Lebanese political life. Syria aligned first with the Soviet Union and later with Iran, while successive Lebanese governments struggled to maintain close ties with the Gulf states, Europe and the US. During the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah crossed the border to fight alongside government forces against the Syrian opposition.

The fall of the regime of former president Bashar Al Assad and the emergence of new leaderships in Damascus and Beirut represent a historic opportunity. For the first time in decades, the two states are broadly aligned within the same geopolitical coalition and can rebuild their relationship on the basis of mutual sovereignty and respect. More broadly, this change opens the possibility of reintegrating the Levant into the wider region as a zone of connectivity, trade and stability rather than a source of chronic conflict and fragmentation.

The first and most important task is political. Lebanon and Syria are redefining their relationship around the principle that each state fully respects the independence, territorial integrity and decision-making autonomy of the other.

For Syria, this means recognizing that a stable and sovereign Lebanon is an asset rather than a threat or a sphere to be dominated. For Lebanon, it means taking the responsibilities of sovereignty seriously and managing relations with Syria on a state-to-state basis. For both countries, it requires overcoming the bitterness of the past to build trust and co-operation based on mutual respect and mutual interests.

The discussions in Damascus highlighted the breadth of the bilateral agenda. The presence of ministers responsible for energy, transport and the economy underscored the determination of both governments to focus on practical issues of immediate national importance.

Security along the lengthy Lebanon-Syria border remains a priority. Both governments have a strong interest in curbing the smuggling of weapons, narcotics, fuel and other contraband. Full delineation and demarcation of the border is also overdue, including sensitive areas such as the Shebaa Farms, whose status has implications for Lebanon’s own border negotiations with Israel. Humanitarian and political issues also demand attention, including the fate of detainees and missing persons.

Economic co-operation is also a central focus of their bilateral agenda. There is a shared interest in streamlining customs procedures, reviving commercial exchanges and coordinating on electricity, energy, water, transport and trade. Restoring these practical ties could yield substantial benefits for both countries and help lay the foundations for broader regional integration.

Lebanon and Syria were historically part of a single economic ecosystem. During the late Ottoman period and well into the Mandate and early independence periods, the two countries were integrated through shared markets, transport networks and strategic infrastructure.

Major pipelines linked the region to Gulf energy supplies. A pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq carried oil through Syria to Baniyas on the Syrian coast and Tripoli on the Lebanese coast. Another pipeline carried oil from Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia through Jordan, Syria (including the Golan Heights) to Zahrani near Sidon on the southern Lebanese coast. Beirut and Tripoli served as major ports for Syria and the deeper Arab hinterland.

Today, this historical logic is re-emerging. Gulf states are investing in new transport, digital, trade and energy corridors through Syria and Jordan, connecting the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. The strategic vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz – highlighted by recent regional tensions – has reinforced the importance of overland routes to the northwest. Lebanon can and should be part of this regional reintegration.

A fourth and highly sensitive dimension of Lebanese Syrian relations concerns Israel. Both Lebanon and Syria remain in conflict with Israel, and both currently face Israeli occupation. At the same time, each has entered into direct negotiations aimed at reaching durable security arrangements and a permanent cessation of hostilities. Peace might be beyond the current horizon but is a longer-term possibility.

These parallel diplomatic tracks create both opportunities and risks. Closer co-ordination between Beirut and Damascus would strengthen their negotiating positions with Israel and the US, help preserve Arab support and reduce the possibility that one country’s negotiations might undermine the other’s interests.

However, the challenges differ significantly. Syria must address the enduring issue of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. Lebanon faces the equally difficult challenge of reversing a new and expanding Israeli occupation and of re-establishing the state’s sovereignty over the Iran-backed armed power of Hezbollah.

There is also a broader strategic concern. Israel views Lebanon’s current government as a potentially pragmatic partner, while it is deeply suspicious of Syria’s new leadership and its ties to Turkey. Both Beirut and Damascus should avoid being drawn into rival regional alignments or external agendas that could pit them against one another.

The normalization of Lebanese-Syrian relations should be strongly supported by the Gulf states, the wider Arab world, Turkey, Europe and the US.

A stable and co-operative relationship between Beirut and Damascus would advance the security and prosperity of both countries. It would also help reintegrate the Levant into the broader Arab and Eastern Mediterranean order after more than half a century of division and geopolitical fragmentation.

Different regional actors hold varying views of Syria’s new leadership, but they should not let these views stand in the way of closer Lebanese-Syrian ties. The strategic imperative is clear: to anchor Lebanon and Syria within a constructive regional framework based on sovereignty, connectivity and co-operation rather than proxy conflict and ideological rivalry.

For decades, Lebanon and Syria were linked by geography but divided by coercion, mistrust and competing regional alignments. Today, both countries have an opportunity to turn a difficult history into a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership.

If Beirut and Damascus can rebuild their relationship on the foundations of sovereignty, resolve outstanding bilateral issues, reconnect economically and co-ordinate wisely on regional diplomacy, they can help transform the Levant from a zone of chronic instability into a corridor of trade, energy and connectivity linking the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe.

The success of this effort would not only benefit Beirut and Damascus. It would contribute to the emergence of a more stable, integrated and prosperous Middle East at a moment when the region is searching for a new strategic order.

Lebanon and Israel are in Rome this week for the sixth round of US-mediated talks. These talks come after the signing last month of a framework agreement between the two sides in Washington, in which they committed to ending the conflict, supporting the sovereignty and security of both countries and ultimately establishing peaceful relations.

But the Rome meeting moves from broad principles to the challenges of implementation in which there are still deep differences between the two sides.

The negotiations are also occurring as the Middle East, and Lebanon’s own immediate geopolitical environment, are going through profound changes. How far can Lebanon use the various tools of diplomacy at its disposable to regain its sovereignty while also rebuilding its independence from costly regional rivalries is a key challenge for its authorities as well as for its friends.

It is no small matter that the Lebanese and Israeli states agree on several fundamental matters: they commit to respecting each other’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity; Israel declares no territorial ambitions and supports the establishment of a sovereign and capable state in Lebanon; both agree that Hezbollah must be disarmed and that the Lebanese state must have a full monopoly of arms and full command of the decisions of war and peace; they also commit to ending the state of war between them, and working towards establishing peaceful relations. And the US is party to, and supportive of, this fundamental understanding.

In other words, there is agreement on the desired end state of two sovereign states, in control of their respective territories, living side by side in security and peace. But on the pathway to getting there, there are still serious challenges.

The first challenge is over sequencing.

From the Israeli perspective, the sequencing is to disarm Hezbollah first, and then Israel will halt its military operations in Lebanon and withdraw from occupied Lebanese territory. The Lebanese position is very different: Israeli withdrawals and the posting of the Lebanese armed forces should proceed together in a phased process that steadily replaces and weakens Hezbollah and puts the state in a much stronger position to ultimately weaken and disarm the group in the entirety of the country.

The “pilot zones” mentioned in the framework agreement are an attempt to bridge this divide. The Lebanese delegation in Rome will expect a rapid implementation of at least the first of these pilot zones. But the extent of these pilot zones is left vague in the framework agreement.

Israel’s position is that they might agree to a few that are largely outside of their self-declared buffer zone of occupied territory but not more; the Lebanese position is that if the first pilot zones are a success and show that its armed forces can fully implement its side of the security bargain, then these zones must be followed by others, most importantly in areas currently under Israeli occupation. Beirut must show that it has a negotiated diplomatic pathway to gradually bringing its people back to the South, or else it will be in a weak position to confront Hezbollah and its wide popular support base in other parts of the country.

The other challenge is over differing views of the wider regional context.

For Lebanon, the talks are somewhat narrowly focused on ending the recurring wars with Israel, securing a full Israeli withdrawal, getting support to rebuild full state sovereignty and disarm Hezbollah, and establishing secure and eventually peaceful relations with Israel. While Israel shares most of these goals, it is already looking further down the road in order to use its leverage to pull Lebanon into its future sphere of influence and alignment in the region.

The Israeli insistence on Rome rather than Washington as a venue for negotiations is indicative of this perspective. A key component of Israeli strategy going forward is to cement its partnerships with Cyprus, Greece and Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean in what it sees as a strategic long-term contest against Turkey. Israel is keen to bring Lebanon into this alignment.

Beyond the negotiation over sequencing withdrawals and bilateral security steps, the talks in Rome are also expected to start addressing Article 12 of the framework, which commits the two sides to begin discussing the details of a final peace agreement. Israel will probably press for the establishment of technical working committees on several issues that will be part of a final agreement in which they can use their leverage to elicit Lebanese commitments in these longer-term areas.

The Lebanese will be reluctant to move in this direction for at least two reasons.

The clear pathway here is to prioritise the ‘pilot zones’ approach, implement the first zones immediately, and if they prove a success, then expand the process to more areas of the south

First, the political context inside Lebanon is already very polarised and is just barely enabling the continuation of the current negotiation process without major incident; but it will be more difficult for Lebanon to make long-term commitments to a full peace agreement, while large-scale Israeli occupation persists. Second, while the Lebanese state is committed to secure and peaceful relations with a post-withdrawal Israel, it does not want to be dragged into a regional alignment that will effectively put it into conflict with its neighbour Syria, its main backer Turkey and other regional powers.

Beirut and Damascus have committed to rebuilding a positive and mutually beneficial relationship after decades of conflict. And it is no secret that the new authorities in Damascus have close relations with Turkey as they do with Saudi Arabia, and other key regional countries. After years of suffering from being a proxy ground for regional conflicts, Lebanon does not want to be dragged into a regional alignment one of whose primary functions is to confront Turkey.

In Rome, Lebanon is not only negotiating to restore and rebuild its sovereignty, but also struggling to rebuild its independence from regional alignments. The framework agreement achieved an important goal in stymying Tehran’s attempts to regain its influence over Lebanon through the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding; in rebuilding its independent decision-making authority, Lebanon does not want to replace one regional-power influence with another.

The administration of US President Donald Trump is a party to the framework agreement and to the ongoing talks. It is also the key player in building up Lebanese state capacity, mediating between Lebanon and Israel, and using its leverage to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. The US, and its representatives in Rome, should differentiate between the various agendas and visions brought to these talks and prioritise steps that are win-wins for both sides and that build confidence and momentum.

The clear pathway here is to prioritise the “pilot zones” approach, implement the first zones immediately, and if they prove a success, then expand the process to more areas of the south, including those under Israeli occupation.

Regional states also have an important role to play. They are very supportive of Beirut’s insistence on rebuilding sovereignty and a monopoly on the use of arms, and on its insistence not to be dragged into new regional alignments that will put it in conflict with other key neighbours in the region. These states, given their own resources as well as their close relations with the Trump administration, can help ensure that the negotiation process between Lebanon and Israel moves steadily forward, while also supporting Beirut’s needs to regain not only sovereignty but also the independence of its foreign policy decision-making.

Last Thursday, the US announced a 10-day ceasefire “to enable peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon”. The State Department statement – reportedly agreed to by both governments – marked a significant diplomatic shift. It included an affirmation that “the two countries are not at war”, and a commitment to work towards “full recognition of each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”, as well as “achieving a permanent agreement that ensures lasting security, stability, and peace”.

These are more explicit and far-reaching commitments than the two states have made at any point in their modern history. The announcement followed meetings between the two countries’ ambassadors in Washington under the auspices of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

While the intended end state is now more clearly articulated, the path towards it remains highly complex.

Hezbollah remains heavily armed and operational inside Lebanon and has already framed the ceasefire as a victory – crediting its “resistance” and Iran’s regional leverage for forcing US pressure on Israel. On the Israeli side, the military has expanded its occupation and devastation of southern Lebanese towns and villages to a depth of up to eight kilometers. The Israeli government has signaled that this new “buffer zone” could remain in place for the long term.

Compounding the fragility of the arrangement, the ceasefire statement itself contains a significant loophole: “Israel preserves the right to take all measures in self-defense at any time.”

The diplomatic opening comes amid a dramatically altered regional and domestic context. Hezbollah’s weakening during the 2024 war, combined with the collapse of Bashar Al Assad’s regime in Syria, reshaped Lebanon’s political landscape. For the first time in decades, Lebanon was able to elect a president, appoint a prime minister and form a government without decisive interference from Damascus or Tehran.

President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the new government reflect a broad domestic push to restore state sovereignty, implement long-overdue reforms and revive a country battered by years of crisis and external domination.

The immediate trigger for the current diplomatic track was the escalation on March 2, when Hezbollah – backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – launched rocket attacks on Israel, prompting a large-scale Israeli military response. In the aftermath, Mr Aoun called for direct talks with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially resisted, but sustained US pressure – especially in the context of Washington’s parallel diplomatic engagement with Iran – helped bring Israel to the table. The Lebanese government also outlawed Hezbollah’s military and security wings and declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata.

Lebanon and Israel have a long and uneven history of diplomacy, mostly indirect but occasionally direct. In 2024, they agreed to a US-brokered cessation of hostilities. In 2022, they reached a landmark maritime boundary agreement, also mediated by Washington. Earlier, mediation in the aftermath of the 2006 war helped produce UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

The last direct talks prior to this moment date back to 1993, during the bilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process. Even earlier, following Israel’s 1982 invasion, the two sides negotiated an agreement for an Israeli withdrawal, popularly known as the May 17 Agreement, which ultimately collapsed under regional pressure. Their diplomatic engagement stretches back further still, to the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

The 10-day ceasefire is, of course, far too short to resolve the underlying conflicts. Its real purpose is to create a window for launching substantive talks. If those talks show early progress, the ceasefire could be extended, potentially evolving into a more durable framework.

For Lebanon, the challenges are immense. The state requires large-scale international support to strengthen its military and security institutions in order to contain – and eventually disarm – Hezbollah. It also needs urgent financial assistance to address a deepening humanitarian and economic crisis exacerbated by the latest war. This includes rebuilding devastated areas, particularly in predominantly Shiite regions, and providing state-led services that could reduce reliance on Hezbollah’s parallel structures.

Equally important is the need for a phased security arrangement with Israel. This would involve the gradual redeployment of the Lebanese armed forces to the area south of the Litani River – potentially with support from the US or other friendly militaries – and the creation of conditions for the safe return of displaced civilians. For Israel, such a process must be accompanied by credible and verifiable actions by the Lebanese state demonstrating its ability to assert authority and constrain Hezbollah’s military activities.

Much will depend on the trajectory of US-Iran negotiations. If Washington can secure Iranian agreement to scale back or end its financial and military support to Hezbollah, the task facing Beirut would become significantly more manageable. If, however, Tehran doubles down – as current signals suggest – the Lebanese government will face a far more difficult and potentially destabilizing path.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic landscape has already shifted in meaningful ways.

The joint acknowledgment by Lebanon and Israel that they are not in a state of war, and their stated aim of achieving peaceful relations, marks a profound departure from decades of entrenched hostility. For years, Syrian and Iranian influence kept Lebanon effectively anchored within the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. Today, a growing consensus within Lebanon supports a different trajectory – one centered on sovereignty, state authority and peaceful relations with neighbors. This evolution further isolates Hezbollah politically, even as it retains military strength.

From Hezbollah’s perspective, it sees the stakes as existential. Its identity and legitimacy are rooted in its role as an armed resistance movement against Israel. Transitioning into an unarmed political party would fundamentally alter its raison d’etre. For Iran, Hezbollah remains a critical strategic asset – a forward deterrent force on Israel’s northern border. Both Hezbollah and Tehran have issued warnings against Lebanese efforts to disarm the group or engage in direct negotiations with Israel, and they have demonstrated in the past a willingness to use force to shape outcomes.

Unlike past rounds of diplomacy, the current talks appear to be oriented towards an eventual peace arrangement. This has drawn the attention of US President Donald Trump, who sees expanding the Abraham Accords framework as a central legacy objective. He has tasked senior officials, including Mr. Rubio, with prioritizing the Lebanon-Israel track and has engaged directly, encouraging both sides and reportedly inviting their leaders to meet at the White House.

Strong and sustained US leadership will be indispensable. Washington remains the only actor capable of exerting meaningful influence over Israeli decision-making, whether under Mr. Netanyahu or any successor government. At the same time, the US will need to mobilize a broader coalition – including Arab and international partners – to provide the military, economic and institutional support Lebanon requires to rebuild state capacity after decades of erosion.

Crucially, US leverage on Iran will be key in trying to find a way to disarm Hezbollah and encourage it to be a normal political party like others in the country, without risking an all-out conflict inside Lebanon.

The path ahead is therefore both promising and fraught. In the near term, the priority must be to initiate substantive negotiations and create the conditions for extending the ceasefire. Over time, these talks should lay the groundwork for a phased process in which the Lebanese state re-asserts control over its territory, Hezbollah’s military role is curtailed or transformed and Israel withdraws from occupied areas while ensuring its security concerns are addressed.

At the end of this uncertain and complex process lies a potentially transformative outcome: two sovereign states co-existing in security and stability, with the prospect of peace replacing decades of recurring war. Whether that outcome is realized will depend on political will, regional dynamics and the ability of domestic and international actors to navigate one of the most intricate conflict landscapes in the Middle East.

Unpredictability as Strategy

Trying to capture US President Donald Trump’s proudly unpredictable approach to foreign policy in fixed policy documents is inherently difficult. Surprise, leverage and improvisation are not bugs in Mr. Trump’s world view; they are features. Yet the administration has now attempted this exercise twice: with the release of the National Security Strategy last December and the National Defense Strategy this January.

Mr. Trump is unlikely to feel bound by every line in either document. He considers unpredictability a strategic asset – both against adversaries and, at times, against his own allies. Still, taken together, these texts matter. They provide the clearest available statement of the administration’s underlying world view, strategic priorities and regional intentions. They also reveal how Mr. Trump’s personal instincts intersect with longer-standing currents within the American right: skepticism towards multilateralism, emphasis on sovereignty and power, and preference for transactional alliances.

Reading Trump’s Worldview through Strategy Documents

Three top-line lessons emerge from reading the two documents together.

First, the US is formally stepping away from the post-1945 vision of an American-led rules-based international order towards a more openly competitive system of nation-states. Second, peace is pursued not through restraint or institution-building, but through leverage, pressure and credible force. Third, in the Middle East, the administration envisions a region anchored by Israel and the Gulf states, overseen by American power, economically integrated with the US and no longer defined primarily by conflict.

This article focuses primarily on what the NSS and NDS signal about US policy towards the Middle East, while briefly situating those signals within the administration’s broader global framework.

From Rules-Based Order to Sovereign Competition

Both documents mark a decisive departure from the language of liberal internationalism. The NSS explicitly de-emphasizes the idea of a US-led rules-based order in favor of a world of sovereign competitors, where American strength – military, economic, technological and energy – remains the ultimate guarantor of US interests.

Regionally, this world view produces a sharp hierarchy. The Western Hemisphere is treated as a sphere of near-exclusive US influence, echoing a revived Monroe Doctrine and illustrated most clearly by Washington’s recent actions in Venezuela. Great-power competition is reframed as manageable “jockeying”, rather than an existential struggle. Russia is portrayed as a limited and containable threat in Eastern Europe, with the administration taking pride in having forced European allies to raise defense spending from 2 to 5 per cent of gross domestic product. In the Asia-Pacific, the objective is to counterbalance China while avoiding direct confrontation – seeking co-existence and what the documents call a “decent peace”.

Why the Middle East Still Matters

Within this re-ordered global map, the Middle East remains strategically important.

Among the five “core vital national interests” identified in the NSS, three relate directly or indirectly to this region. One is explicit: “Preventing any adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas resources, and the maritime chokepoints through which they pass.” Two others – “preserving freedom of navigation and secure supply chains” and “ensuring US technological leadership in areas such as AI, biotechnology and quantum computing” – are increasingly tied to Gulf partners, whose roles in energy markets, logistics and digital infrastructure, as well as mining and minerals, are growing rapidly.

Burden-Sharing, Industry, and the Security–Economics Nexus

The NDS reinforces this importance in both global and regional terms. Globally, it emphasizes burden-sharing by allies and the need to “supercharge” the US industrial base. The Middle East figures prominently on both counts. Israel, Gulf states and Turkey are expanding their own defense capacities, while large defense purchases and direct investments – particularly from the Gulf – feed directly into Mr. Trump’s ambition to strengthen American manufacturing and strategic industries.

Even in the document’s top priority – defending the US homeland – the Middle East appears. “Countering Islamic terrorism”, which continues to justify a US military presence in the region, is explicitly identified as a core task.

The Administration’s Middle East Vision: Four Pillars

Where the documents address the Middle East directly, the administration’s vision is unambiguous. It centers on four pillars: a non-nuclear and strategically weakened Iran; a strong and secure Israel; deepened investment, energy and digital partnerships with the Gulf; and a region that has moved beyond chronic warfare towards integration, partly under an expanded Abraham Accords framework.

Peace Through Pressure

Mr Trump continues to cast himself globally as a “president of peace”. Of the eight wars he claims to have ended, three are in the Middle East North Africa region: the war in Gaza; the Israel-Iran war; and the Egypt-Ethiopia conflict (which was not a war). Central to this self-image is the promise – still unfulfilled – of ending the long-running Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict and putting an end to recurring confrontations with Iran.

The NSS explicitly de-emphasizes the idea of a US-led rules-based order in favor of a world of sovereign competitors

Yet the path to peace envisioned in both documents unmistakably mixes coercion with negotiation. Mr. Trump’s preferred method is hard bargaining: using pressure, sanctions, military strikes and the credible threat of further force to compel adversaries towards negotiation. The NDS explicitly celebrates Operation Midnight Hammer, which devastated Iran’s nuclear program, and leaves no doubt that force remains firmly on the table.

Allies That Fight

Israel is held up as a model ally – willing and able to fight its own wars, with decisive US backing when needed. Gulf partners are praised for taking greater responsibility for their own defense through the acquisition and integration of US military systems. Turkey is mentioned favorably as a key actor shaping a potential post-Assad order in Syria.

At the same time, both documents stress that regional integration among US partners – through expanded Abraham Accords and security co-operation – does not replace American primacy. The US reserves the right, and retains the capacity, to take direct and decisive action to defend its interests in the region.

Iran: Weakened and Contained

Iran remains central to this posture. Alongside China, Russia and North Korea, it is listed among the top four national defense concerns. The NSS and NDS argue that US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, sustained sanctions, Israel’s devastating blows to Hamas and Hezbollah, and US attacks on the Houthis have significantly weakened the Islamic Republic.

While the documents reiterate Mr. Trump’s bottom line – that Iran will not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon – they convey a degree of confidence that Tehran today poses a lesser threat than before. Notably absent are calls for regime change or urgency about negotiating a new nuclear deal, even as the possibility of renewed escalation in the days ahead remains a distinct possibility.

Energy Dominance and Strategic Friction

One element of the administration’s strategy may sit uneasily with regional partners: Mr. Trump’s commitment to American energy dominance. The US is already a net energy exporter, but recent moves – most notably in Venezuela – underscore how central energy is to Mr Trump’s conception of US power. Keeping global energy prices low is treated as a strategic objective, not merely an economic one.

For several regional economies, this has already translated into fiscal pressure and the scaling back of ambitious development projects. While the strategic partnership remains strong, this is one area where US and allied interests may diverge more sharply in the years ahead.

Strategy on Paper, Instinct in Practice

Taken together, the NSS and NDS underscore the administration’s strong alignment with long-standing US partners in the Middle East – especially when contrasted with Washington’s increasingly fraught relations with its European allies, which nearly tipped into conflict over Greenland two weeks ago.

At the same time, it is worth returning to the caveat at the outset. These documents offer structure and clarity, but they do not constrain the President. Mr. Trump’s foreign policy remains deeply personal, instinct-driven and improvisational. He will continue to deviate from the script, reshaping events as he goes. The strategies on paper tell us where the administration is inclined to go – but not necessarily how, or when, the next surprise will come.

In 2016, Donald Trump was brand-new to the presidency and, by many accounts, did not expect to win. It took him time to learn the ropes of domestic and foreign policy, and for much of his first term, many in his foreign policy and defence teams were long-term professionals who often opposed many of his ideas.

In his second term, Mr Trump came back with the experience of a former president and picked a domestic and foreign policy team composed of loyalists who echo and amplify his positions. In the second year of this second term, Mr Trump has been further empowered by his success last year of upending domestic and foreign policy in a revolutionary way. Mr Trump is currently coming off the high of the dramatic US operation in Venezuela.

In the Middle East, Mr Trump’s return has had – and will continue to have – significant consequences. The US President started last year with a visit to the Gulf that cemented and deepened the partnerships with America. These relationships, once based largely on energy for security, have deepened to include the future technologies of computing and artificial intelligence as well as large-scale investments and trade corridors, all without dropping the importance of traditional energy concerns.

During that visit, Mr Trump announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria – and later met President Ahmad Al Shara – a decision that reversed more than 65 years of strategic hostility between Washington and Damascus and that might help the Levant, including Syria and Lebanon, rise again.

Mr Trump started his second term seeking a deal with Iran, and oversaw several rounds of negotiations through his envoys. However, impatient with a lack of progress, he joined Israel in June in waging a 12-day war that struck Iran’s nuclear programme. Through the rest of the year, Mr Trump stepped up sanctions on Iran, all the while indicating that he was ready for a deal if Tehran would accept zero uranium enrichment and curb its missile programme as well as its regional militia network.

During much of the year, Mr Trump gave Israel wide leeway to pursue its policies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. But he changed position after Israel’s strikes inside Doha in September. After giving new security assurances to Qatar and other nervous GCC countries, he pressed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a 20-point peace plan for Gaza, announced in October.

In November, he received Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the White House, the latter’s first visit to the US since 2017, further strengthening the US-Saudi and US-Gulf relations. During that visit, Mr Trump said he had been convinced by the Crown Prince to add ending the war in Sudan to his to-do list.

Throughout the year, Mr Trump also continued to trumpet his message that he wanted to expand the list of Abraham Accords countries during his second term, even if that proved to be not achievable in the short term.

As the year ended – and before the large-scale protests in Iran would dominate the headlines – Mr Trump looked back on 2025, satisfied that he had “ended” the war in Gaza, devastated Iran’s nuclear programme, cemented lucrative relationships with the Gulf and encouraged both Syria and Lebanon to move forward.

It is impossible to predict what Mr Trump might do this year – and he considers this unpredictability a strategic asset – but the new year started with all eyes on the major demonstrations in Iran. Mr Trump came out in strong support of the protesters and threatened Tehran with military strikes if the government resorted to killing. At the time of writing, he has toned down those threats, but has also ordered a carrier battle group and other US military assets to assemble in and near the Arabian Gulf.

Ultimately, Mr Trump still wants a deal – on his terms – with Iran. As with Venezuela, he might not be interested in regime change but rather in encouraging elements within the Iranian system to make a deal with him. How the US-Iran relationship will evolve this year will depend not only on Mr Trump’s decisions, but on how events develop inside Iran and what decisions an increasingly embattled leadership in Tehran makes.

Any venture to predict what he will do in the Middle East over the next 12 months is a fool’s errand

In Gaza, the Trump administration started the year with the announcement of a credible Palestinian technocratic committee to administer the territory. This was followed by the announcement of the members of the Board of Peace that Mr Trump leads. In other words, the US President is serious about following through on his 20-point peace plan, even if Israel is reluctant.

Mr Trump and his team have maintained a generally strong pro-Israel policy throughout both his terms, although he and Mr Netanyahu often butt egos. This is despite significant elements of Mr Trump’s Maga base sharply questioning such blanket US support for Israel. The dynamics of the relationship will be much affected this year by the run-up to and results of Israeli elections that will be held some time before October.

The US President still wants Israel to grasp the opportunity of peace with Saudi Arabia – something that would require significant concessions to the Palestinians – but this remains something that Mr Netanyahu and his extreme-right government have not been willing to prioritise.

Mr Trump is a man of constant surprises and hence any venture to predict what he will do in the Middle East over the next 12 months is a fool’s errand. But one can see some elements of continuity: maintenance and strengthening of US-Gulf relations; keeping the pressure high on Iran in order to get to a deal on his terms – or short of that, greatly weakening and containing it; maintaining strong relations with Israel while pressing it to end this round of war with the Palestinians and move towards negotiation and peace making; working with Turkey and other countries to avoid an Israeli-Turkish conflict; encouraging the Syrian Democratic Forces to integrate with Damascus; and preventing ISIS and Iran from returning in Syria.

Mr Trump will continue to have a free hand in foreign policy throughout this year, with his decisions bound only by his “own morality”, as he recently put it. However, he will face midterm elections in November, and if the Republicans lose both houses, the President could have a more constrained 2027.

In the past, the countries of the Levant seemed to point the way to the future; in recent decades, they spiraled into dysfunction and civil war. After the changes over the past year, might the Levant – in particular Syria and Lebanon – be on course to re-establishing sovereignty, functioning statehood and economic revival?

The new governing order in Damascus put a necessary end to the regime of Bashar Al Assad that had become a scourge on its own people and the region. President Ahmad Al Shara is saying the right things and has found strong support from key regional powers as well as the US. But many questions and challenges remain along the path to Syria’s revival.

Will Mr Al Shara make good on his word of forging a nationalist and inclusive state, or will he revert to his past and build an exclusionary Islamist authoritarian state? Will he be able to reunite Syria, or will Syria fall back into warring ethnic and sectarian cantons?

He enjoys considerable support, internally, regionally and internationally, but is also facing strong headwinds: both Iran and Israel oppose his project, and are working to prevent Syria from uniting under his rule; Kurdish, Alawite, Druze and Christian communities in Syria are skeptical – indeed fearful – of what his group’s ascendance means for them; and Mr Al Shara’s own base – which brought him to power – is not on board with his broader nationalist project or his embrace of the US.

Unlike transitions in Libya after Muammar Qaddafi and Iraq after Saddam Hussein, Mr Al Shara’s first year in office has shown signs of progress. Despite horrific clashes on the western Alawite-dominated coast and the Druze-majority Sweida in the spring, the situation in much of the country has been fairly stable, with many internally displaced and external refugees returning to celebrate the eclipse of the Assad regime and to begin exploring means to rebuild their homes and lives.

Along the coast, the government withdrew the extreme groups that had wrought havoc in March, and sent more reliable Ministry of Interior forces. It has opened talks with local communities and generally managed to rebuild a semblance of normality. Talks with the Druze community have stalled as key leaders of the minority group have thrown their lot in with Israel, which covets control of large portions of southern Syria. Talks with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces that control the north-east have continued, although no breakthroughs have been achieved.

The coming year is likely to be one of continued consolidation for Mr Al Shara and his new order. He has at his disposal a strong grip on power, ample support in the core of the country, and strong regional and international support.

Most Syrians care most about rebuilding their homes and livelihoods, and Mr Al Shara’s top priority will be bringing back investment and economic vitality to the country. The lifting of US sanctions and strong engagement from both the Gulf Co-operation Council and Turkey, as well as the efforts and assets of the large Syrian diaspora, are likely to bring back zones of economic activity, although real recovery will be measured in years – indeed decades – not months.

In the north-east, the US is putting serious pressure on both the SDF and Damascus to find an integrated way forward – especially as the threat of ISIS remains real. Along the western coast, the government must continue to engage with the Alawite community and provide reassuring and inclusive security; activity in the western cities of Latakia and Tartous has already picked up in the past months.

Damascus still faces a major challenge from Israel in the south, although the US is encouraging both sides to build on their face-to-face talks this year. Progress in those talks is necessary to avoid major armed conflict next year, to roll back Israeli occupation of Syrian lands, and to help find a positive resolution to Druze demands.

If Mr Al Shara continues to push in the direction that he claims he is pushing, and with oversight and support from key friends of Syria, the country could see consolidation and gradual progress next year.

In Lebanon, the stakes are equally high. The devastation of Hezbollah and collapse of the Assad regime last year enabled the rise of a new nationalist and reformist executive branch in Lebanon this year, including a new president, prime minister and government.

The Lebanese army is completing phase one of its national deployment plan: it has established operational control over the south of the country (the area south of the Litani River) after an absence of more than 40 years, disarming and replacing Hezbollah there. It has also taken back control of much of the Lebanon-Syria border, the airport and the port.

Hezbollah – with support and insistence from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – is refusing to disarm, making the army’s task that much harder. Nevertheless, the army is re-establishing state sovereignty in all parts of the country – according to a phased plan – but still wants to avoid a direct armed clash with Hezbollah, which risks spilling into sectarian conflict and civil war.

Israel is also making the government’s task harder by refusing to comply with the Cessation of Hostilities agreement of November 2024, and refusing to withdraw from any Lebanese occupied territories or stop daily bombings. And this despite the widening of direct Lebanese-Israeli talks that seek to find a negotiated way forward for the two countries.

In the past, the countries of the Levant seemed to point the way to the future; in recent decades, they spiralled into dysfunction and civil war

Next year, the army needs urgent support from regional and international players to continue its reclaiming of state sovereignty across the country. Diplomatically the state needs international help to press Israel to engage with Lebanon and enable – rather than obstruct – the resurgence of state authority in the country.

Beirut also needs international help in pressing Iran to accept the Lebanese state’s revival and urge Hezbollah to end its militia status and disarm, as other Lebanese militias disarmed and integrated into the state in the recent past. At the end of the day, the decision to hand over Iranian weapons in the hands of Hezbollah is a decision that cannot be taken in Beirut, but only in Tehran.

In the meantime, the new government has also moved to tackle the crippling banking, economic and financial collapse that has devastated the population. The last of three strategic laws to address the collapse of 2019 will be sent by government to Parliament in the next few weeks.

If Parliament does its job, then 2026 could see the implementation of critical reforms that could begin to restore to the public at least part of their losses, rebuild a slimmed down and transparent new banking system, and enable the country to attract foreign and diaspora investment.

Syria and Lebanon have seen dramatic political changes over the past 12 months, which had not been seen in decades. And their fates are intertwined. Although their pathways remain strewn with challenges and risks, they both have a chance at rebuilding the promise of a more stable and prosperous future that their populations so desperately need. That would be a boon to the region as well.

The Middle East enters 2026 awaiting two strategic rethinks, neither of which might occur.

In Israel, the government has won many battles but has not developed a strategy to pivot from open-ended armed conflict to sustainable political arrangements that would consolidate its battlefield gains. “Domestically,” Israel has decimated Hamas and the Gaza Strip, but it has not rolled out a sustainable strategy — whether within a one-state or two-state context — that would ensure a secure future for Israel’s seven million Jews living alongside seven million Arabs. President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan was a welcome departure but must be followed up with continued diplomacy.

To its north, Israel’s wars have enabled the rise of new and promising state leadership in Syria and Lebanon. But Israel’s unfettered military actions in both countries and the absence of coordination is weakening the rise of those states. It is a good sign that both countries are now in talks with Israel; those talks should be moved forward.

In the wider Arab world, Saudi Arabia — and whither goes the kingdom, other Arab states will follow — remains essentially ready for a historic normalization and integration agreement with Israel, if Israel can offer a decent future for the Palestinians. Here too, the Israeli government has developed no strategy to grasp that opportunity.

A strategic rethink is desperately needed in another influential Middle Eastern capital, Tehran. The 30-year strategy pursued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of ensuring Iran’s deterrence and defense through a network of allied or proxy forces ringing Israel has collapsed. Its nuclear program is in shambles, as are its economy, water resources, and domestic political support base. Despite signs of intense strategic debate inside Tehran, the country’s regional policy remains stuck in dysfunctional autopilot, doubling down on support for militia allies and proxies, threats to Israel and the United States, and an unwillingness to seriously negotiate on a new way forward.

The wars of the last two years have wrought much destruction, devastating lives and entire communities, but they have also created opportunities for positive breakthroughs. Indeed, the region can be said to be within visible reach of historic progress toward peace and regional integration. The Trump administration wants to move in that direction — as do Saudi Arabia and most other regional powers.

Will strategic rethinks in at least one of the two key countries shift in 2026 to enable positive breakthroughs, or will it remain another wasted year in which armed conflict might not be as intense as in 2023, 2024, and much of 2025, but in which the final steps toward long-overdue peace agreements and regional integration remain as elusive as ever?

As we mark the two-year point of the region-wide conflict unleashed by the attacks of October 7, 2023, it is important to take stock of how this poly-crisis has transformed the Middle East—and how it might evolve in the months ahead.

What began as an Israel-Hamas conflict has become a region-shaping event, redrawing the balance of power and forcing every major actor—Israel, Iran, Turkey, the Gulf, and the United States—to make strategic choices that will determine whether the Middle East tips toward a new era of integration and stability, or slides into a wider and more chaotic conflict.

At stake is nothing less than the shape of a new regional order. Will Israel consolidate its unprecedented military position by pursuing normalization, regional integration, and a political settlement with its neighbors? Will Iran reconsider its policy of forward intervention and find a new basis for security and diplomacy? Can the United States and Gulf states leverage their influence to stabilize rather than merely react? And will the fragile opportunities for state revival in Lebanon and Syria become catalysts for regional revival or be lost in new rounds of regional conflict?

Winners and Losers

Israel has clearly emerged as the primary regional military power. Its operations have shaped events not only in Gaza, but also in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and even on Iranian soil. Its ability to strike Iranian facilities with impunity has shattered old deterrence assumptions and reset the regional military balance.

Iran, by contrast, has been the primary loser. Its once-potent “axis of resistance”—which for years imposed a rough balance of power with Israel—has been hollowed out. Tehran has been forced out of Syria, Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon has been greatly diminished, and Iran has shown itself unable to prevent direct attacks on its territory.

Turkey, meanwhile, has quietly gained influence. Its protégé Ahmad al-Shara’s rise to the Syrian presidency has given Ankara new leverage in Damascus and restored some of its regional prestige. The Gulf states had, until very recently, succeeded in keeping out of direct confrontation. Israel’s strike on Qatar last week, however, has put them on edge and could yet draw them deeper into the conflict.

The Old Order is Dead; A New one has Yet to Emerge

The decades-old regional order—built around a balance of power between Israel on one side, and Iran and its network of allies, on the other—has collapsed. But a new one has yet to emerge.

Israel’s Vantage point

From its position of newfound strength, Israel will have a big say in how this new order takes shape. It could consolidate its battlefield gains and use them as a springboard toward a regional security framework that permanently integrates it into the Middle East. This would mean ending the war in Gaza, advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia, offering a credible political horizon to the Palestinians, and opening the door to reconciliation with Syria, Lebanon, and other Arab and Muslim countries.

But this is not the course that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared to be pursuing so far. The war in Gaza was hurtling into a third year, and he had just tried to undermine the diplomatic attempts to end the war in Gaza by trying to assassinate the Hamas negotiating team in Doha. Indeed, it was Israel’s attack on Qatar that seems to have galvanized President Trump to return forcefully onto the scene and push through a Trump plan to end the war in Gaza—while also giving Qatar a US security guarantee and stating bluntly that “I will not allow Israel to annex the West Bank.”

The Trump plan might still fall through, as Hamas still seeks to negotiate some details of the agreement. If it does go through, however, Trump might have forced Israel’s hand to end the war in Gaza, shelf its plans to annex the West Bank, and pivot toward a deal with Saudi. If the Trump Gaza plan falls through, the war will escalate into a third year and bring us back to the dangerous situation we were in just a few weeks ago. Indeed, the attack on Qatar and rising tensions with Turkey indicated in early September that we were in for a widening regional conflict. Even the apparent “wins” in Lebanon and Syria remain militarized and unresolved. Rather than turning battlefield success into a new security architecture, Prime Minister Netanyahu—without US pressure—risks keeping Israel, and the region, in open ended conflict.

Iran’s Role

Tehran faces its own moment of reckoning. Its strategy of “forward defense” through militias and interventions in Arab states has failed. Iran now finds itself without effective deterrence, its allies weakened, and its influence diminished.

Yet no major strategic rethink has yet taken place in Tehran. The regime continues to back its surviving proxies and cling to its previous nuclear posture. This inertia is dangerous: it invites further Israeli escalation and risks leaving Iran more isolated and vulnerable.

Iran has an alternative path—one that could secure its borders and restore its place in the region. It could pivot toward diplomacy with its Arab neighbors, abandon its militia strategy, and seek negotiated solutions to longstanding disputes, including the Palestinian question. It could focus on building regional public goods—security frameworks, economic corridors, and energy interconnections—that would benefit its own regime security as well as its population, and give it a stake in regional stability.

Gulf States and Limited Leverage

The Gulf states favor a stable and integrated regional order, but they remain limited players in the current military equation.

Saudi Arabia’s offer of normalization with Israel remains the most important piece of diplomatic leverage on the table. It could unlock a transformative shift in Israeli-Arab relations, but thus far it has not moved Netanyahu’s hard-right coalition. And despite repeated overtures, they have not shifted Iran’s regional calculus.

Washington’s Role: Reactive or Strategic?

Donald Trump, now well into his second term, shares the Gulf’s interest in building a stable and integrated regional order—with the U.S. as the principal broker and beneficiary. Between his election and inauguration, Trump cast a long shadow pressuring Netanyahu to accept ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. But since then, Washington had slipped back into a reactive posture, responding to crises largely driven by Israeli decision-making.

But as mentioned above, after the attack on Qatar, Trump swung back into action. His stated regional goals are ambitious: completing the Abraham Accords with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon; finding a durable solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge; and resolving the Palestinian issue on terms that are enough to satisfy Saudi Arabia but at the same time guarantee Israel’s security. Whether his latest initiative will turn the region in the direction he has openly will determine the next phase of this regional poly-crisis—and perhaps his foreign policy legacy.

Local Arenas in Flux

While the strategic chessboard remains unsettled, developments on the ground in individual countries are shifting in ways that could either consolidate stability or spark new crises.

Lebanon: A State Reemerges

Lebanon offers one of the most promising stories of state revival. After decades of paralysis and state collapse, Beirut’s institutions are slowly reasserting themselves. Hezbollah’s grip is loosening, and Iran’s influence has been sharply curtailed.

With robust international backing, Lebanon has a unique opportunity to restore sovereignty, overhaul its broken financial and banking system, and revive a model of pluralism and prosperity that once made it a regional hub. The process is fragile—Hezbollah remains capable of disruption, and Israel has been slow to fulfill its ceasefire commitments—but momentum is on the side of state consolidation.

Syria: A Fragile Transition

Syria’s transition is equally uncertain. President Ahmad al-Shara has pledged to build an inclusive state and reintegrate Syria into the Arab world. But his government’s heavy-handed responses to dissent in the Alawi coastal region and in Suwayda have raised doubts about the seriousness of his rhetoric. The stalemate in talks with the Kurdish-led SDF underscores persistent mistrust among Syria’s communities.

But president Shara is still pushing ahead with his stated vision of rebuilding a viable and inclusive Syrian state, and one that brings Syria back into regional and global integration after more than half a century of isolation and combativeness. And in this endeavor, he enjoys strong regional and international support. Like in Lebanon, a revived and well functioning Syrian state and economy, will not only fill a desperate need of its population, but serve an important positive function within the region.

Toward a New Regional Order—or Deeper Chaos

Two years after October 7, the Middle East stands at a crossroads. The old order has collapsed, but the new one is not yet born. Israel holds unprecedented military power, Iran is on the defensive, the Gulf and the U.S. are seeking a framework for stability, and local arenas from Beirut to Damascus are in motion.

The question is whether these shifts will be harnessed to build a new architecture of security, diplomacy, and economic integration—or whether the region will slide into a new cycle of confrontation, widening the wars and deepening instability.

This is a moment of both danger and opportunity. The actors of the region—and the United States—still have time to transform the current conflicts into durable stability and to construct a regional order that benefits all. The alternative is to stumble from crisis to crisis until the next explosion redraws the map yet again.

Policymakers should seize this moment—not wait for the next shock. A bold regional strategy that links Gaza ceasefire negotiations, progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Israeli-Arab normalization, a diplomatic settlement with Iran, and a broader security and economic framework is still possible. But the window is closing fast, and the costs of inaction will be measured in more lives lost and more years wasted.

After almost two years of fighting in Gaza, and after the decimation of Hizballah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and the 12-day Israeli-American war on Iran, the Middle East is in new strategic and political territory. Two pathways lie ahead: the first is one in which the gains and changes brought about by war are turned, through intense diplomacy and negotiation, into new international and political arrangements that bring about a period of security and stability in the region; the second is one in which that corner is not turned, and the wars in Gaza, Iran, and potentially Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon, continue indefinitely. The trajectory will depend on the choices of key actors — above all Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Iran: Shaken but not turned

Strategic setback and internal dilemmas

The leadership in Tehran has a big say in the matter. Having suffered a significant downgrading of Iran’s Axis of Resistance and lost most of the country’s ability to deter — or defend against — direct Israeli or American military attacks, the Iranian government has much to consider. Tehran knows that President Donald Trump is interested in a deal, but what the regime leaders hear is a triumphalist US demanding zero enrichment as a base line; they might also expect that Trump will put curtailing their missile program and their support of proxy militias back on the table as he did in his March letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

So far, while the Iranians have signaled a willingness to talk, they have also communicated a defiance and lack of willingness to offer the major concessions that would now be required for a deal. The regime in Iran would be worried, first of all, that giving up what is left of its nuclear program will leave it more vulnerable to the next Israeli and American attack. But additionally, it fears that signaling near-surrender to the “two Satans” — against which the Islamic Republic has spent the last 45 years drumming up hostility — might leave the regime more vulnerable at home.

The prospect—and limits—of a deal

What might be possible is a deal close to what Iran was offering before the 12-day war: much-reduced enrichment, new and longer timelines, and tight international monitoring, in exchange for lifting sanctions; i.e., a spruced-up version of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement. The Trump team called the talks useful but had not agreed to walking away from zero enrichment. Of course, it would be up to the unpredictable Trump to decide if he could accept such a "limited" deal. First of all, a “yes” would allow him to tell his base he has made peace as he had promised (adding greater legitimacy to his coveted Nobel Peace Prize bid) and taken war with Iran off the table. Second, it would enhance the US’s ability to manage the Iran nuclear risk, at least for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, a JCPOA 2.0 would fall far short of the maximalist demands he has been airing. His command of the Republican Party suggests that any hardline dissent from his domestic allies could be controlled.

Israeli objections and Netanyahu’s strategic logic

The larger challenge would come from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He would be strongly opposed to such a deal. From his perspective on the developments of the last two years, Israel and the US have a great strategic military advantage over Iran. Rather than settle now, they should press that advantage either until Iran offers maximalist concessions (which would include zero enrichment, limits on its ballistic missile and maybe its drone programs, and an end to support for its regional proxy militias) or push on to degrade the regime and work toward its eventual downfall and/or replacement. Trump entertained this “Iran surrender” scenario in some social media posts during the 12-day war, but he then made different statements saying that regime change is not on his agenda. Netanyahu could be legitimately worried that Trump might be more interested in an imperfect deal that he can dress up as the “Deal of the Century” and then move on to other things.

The talks that were and the war that followed

The US and Iran were making progress toward a potential deal during their two months of talks before the war erupted in June. Iran had indicated its willingness to go back to low levels of enrichment and accept an even tighter nuclear monitoring regime. But Trump’s team was still demanding zero enrichment. Fatefully, the Iranians did not take seriously Trump’s impatience or his 60-day game clock.

It is not clear if Trump and Netanyahu had agreed on an Iran strike as early as their February summit, but Trump was still urging Iran to make a deal. In any case, Israel’s prime minister finally launched that attack one day after the 60-day negotiation deadline had expired. With Israel able to dominate Iran’s skies at will, Netanyahu has now made himself a principal player in any follow-on US-Iran talks.

The direct Israeli and American bombing campaign certainly rendered Iran much more vulnerable and hence, in theory, in need of a deal; but the attacks have also raised the nationalist hackles of the regime in Tehran. While a deal might be more necessary for Iran today, it is also now more politically difficult, as any concession would be seen as being made from a position of weakness.

Netanyahu can continue to use Israel’s military capacities to complicate or derail any talks. In addition, he will use Israel’s political sway in Washington to try to keep pressure on Trump to dissuade him from imposing anything but a maximalist deal.

All of this is to say that a US-Iran agreement appears unlikely at this point. Trump, seeing this writing on the wall, has already floated that, after the strikes on Iran, he does not need a deal. This means that the Israel-Iran confrontation will continue to simmer with a risk of escalation at any moment. For the time being, Netanyahu appears to be giving Trump a chance to deal with the political fallout with his base from having entangled the US in another war in the Middle East; and Israel is also busy assessing the effects of the strikes on Iran’s nuclear and other programs before planning its next moves.

Between lull and escalation

Without a deal, Iran could hope for an extended lull scenario, or some kind of de facto cease-fire, in which it does not make any significant moves to rebuild its nuclear program or go for a bomb and keeps its proxies away from major attacks on Israel or the US. In this scenario, Iran, having absorbed the slew of recent blows, would simply avoid any further losses and buy time to recover and figure out a way forward. While Trump might be OK with this and could move on to the many other items on his crowded and frenetic agenda, Netanyahu would not be. The latter is aware that Israel (and the US) have a decisive (and perhaps temporary) military advantage and that Iran is very much on the back foot. While Trump was eager to tie a “12-day” bow on the war that Israel started, Netanyahu sees last month’s war as only the opening, and very successful, first round of pressing a historic military advantage that had been enabled by the earlier decimation of Hizballah and the fall of the Assad regime. While Netanyahu might be patient for a few more weeks or months, his strategic logic suggests a return to direct military action against Iran in the not-too-distant future.

The weakened but persistent regional axis

When it comes to Iran’s regional influence, its Axis of Resistance is down but not out. The Tehran-led proxy network’s main function — which used to be played almost exclusively by Lebanese Hizballah — of deterring Israel or the US from direct attacks on Iran has collapsed and probably cannot be rebuilt. But the ability to harass both Israel and the US, and potentially other US friends and allies, remains. Even in its devastated condition, axis member Hamas has kept Israel at war for almost two years and is likely to engage it in a third. The Houthis in Yemen, meanwhile, have been able to harm Israeli and US interests by significantly reducing sea traffic through the critical Red Sea waterway; and they appear able to keep it up indefinitely, despite multiple American and Israeli military attempts to shut them down.

Hizballah: Down but not out

In Lebanon, Hizballah has been dealt a staggering blow. They have had to agree to withdraw their main forces from the region south of the Litani River but are so far refusing to give up their arms in other parts of the country; and they remain the dominant political party in the region south of the Litani and among their Shi’ite community. Shorn of much of its leadership, many fighters, and a significant portion of its stockpiled heavy weaponry, the group is currently in no position to pose a serious threat to Israel; but Iran takes the long view and might, if Hizballah can hold on and survive this deep crisis, find a way to rebuild the Lebanese militia in the decade or two ahead.

Strategic reversal in Syria — the long game

A key variable is Syria, where Iran suffered its starkest loss. If President Ahmad al-Sharaa can consolidate his breakthrough in Damascus and manage to reunify all of Syria under his leadership, then Iran’s setback would be permanent and Hizballah’s chances of reviving in Lebanon at all would be effectively extinguished. But the “transition” in Syria is anything but assured. Despite a strong embrace from the Gulf, Turkey, Europe, and the US, its internal situation remains deeply troubled and divided. Sectarian and ethnic tensions are at the boiling point with clashes erupting most recently in the Druze-held south, after massacres in the Alawi west, and following an explosion in an Orthodox church in Damacus; talks between Damascus and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), under American auspices, have not made measurable progress. Tehran is betting and working against Syria’s success, and it figures correctly that if the transition falls apart, Iran could reconnect to the Syrian coastline and, from there, to Hizballah in Lebanon through the Bekaa Valley.

The Iraqi cornerstone

In Iraq, the pro-Iranian militias within the Hashd (also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF) continue to cast a long political and security shadow. Iran’s influence in Iraq through them has not diminished as a result of the events of the 12-day war or the past two years. Indeed, as Iran lost Syria and has less influence in Lebanon than it had before, it is doubling down in Iraq. In addition, the rise of Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria revives the specter of a radical Sunni resurgence and recreates the worries that gave rise to the Hashd in the first place.

Decline and possible de-escalation, but not capitulation

Though Iran’s Axis of Resistance has gone down a few notches in terms of its strategic prominence and purpose, it is still likely viewed as useful to Iran and worth some — even if relatively more modest — level of continued investment.

Indeed, under current conditions, the leadership in Tehran may prefer a de-escalation of the current high intensity of conflict, with only minor adjustments to its overall policy, to any major about-face.

Israel: Military gains but political paralysis

Israel, of course, is the even bigger player in this regional dynamic. Indeed, the military actions taken by Netanyahu and his cabinet after the attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, are what have reshaped realities in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. But there too it is unclear if Netanyahu is willing or able to turn his military advantages into political wins, or whether he has locked Israel into open-ended conflict. Winning the peace is often as hard or harder than winning the war, as the US found out after its early military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq; but making that transition from winning the war to forging and winning the peace requires deep and deliberate commitment, and Netanyahu has not shown a strong interest in that direction.

Gaza: War to no viable end

In Gaza, the early goal of destroying Hamas was an understandable one, but two years into the conflict the maximalist definition of that goal has meant that as long as there is one Hamas fighter standing (or hiding), Israel’s objectives have not been met and the war must go on. This not only grants Hamas a very easy measure of claiming a “resistance victory” but has also locked Netanyahu into a seemingly perpetual war in Gaza. By any traditional military measure, Hamas was soundly defeated a long time ago. But Netanyahu is unable to “take the win” or leverage it to “win the peace” with some form of postwar arrangements for the enclave. And the main reason for this appears to be that any end to the war with Hamas even nominally surviving will trigger the exit of his right-wing extremist partners, the fall of his government, and the potential end of his political career; this would also include accountability for the failures of Oct. 7, and possible legal jeopardy.

There have been on-again off-again talks to secure at least a temporary cease-fire and exchange of hostages/captives, but the war in Gaza risks going on for a third year, to the tremendous devastation, death, and suffering of the Palestinian people and the continued anguish of the remaining Israeli hostages and their families.

The continuation of that war would also mean that the major peace dividend that the region could witness — a breakthrough US-Saudi-Israeli agreement that includes Saudi-Israeli normalization — must also be put off indefinitely. For an issue that is so essential to Israel’s long-term security and prosperity — relations with Saudi Arabia and the other agreements that would follow — Netanyahu seems unable to turn Israel’s multiple military victories into the key historic political breakthrough that is tantalizingly close.

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of ending the war in Gaza and doing so on terms that wind down the spiral of hate and violence as well as provide conditions to build peaceful and secure arrangements not only between Israelis and Palestinians but in the wider region as well.

While the newly emerging Middle East appears to be largely of Netanyahu’s making, to a large degree it is the late Hamas Political Bureau Chair Yahya Sinwar's new Middle East as well. The dynamics of peace and integration that prevailed before Oct. 7 are in abeyance, while multiple peace deals have been overshadowed by multiple wars. Walls of hate and hostility have not only been impactfully rebuilt between Israelis and Palestinians, but the events of the past two years have also turned a new generation in the Arab world into ardent supporters of the Palestinian cause and markedly hostile to Israeli actions. Gaza is where this latest crisis started, and Gaza is where regional de-escalation and peacebuilding needs to begin.

Lebanon: A hard-won agreement and rebuilding the state

Israeli ambivalence is also visible in Lebanon, where Israel dealt a major blow to its Hizballah foe. That blow, as well as the change of regime in Syria, allowed new nationalist leadership to emerge in Lebanon committed to rebuilding sovereignty and better governance. Lebanon and Israel reached a cessation of hostilities agreement last November, under US mediation. The first phase of the agreement calls for Hizballah to hand over military control of the area south of the Litani River to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from that area. The LAF and UNIFIL takeover of that region is proceeding apace, with some work still to be done, and Hizballah has largely abided by the terms of the first phase as well as a cessation of hostilities against Israel. Israel withdrew from most of southern Lebanon but has maintained an occupation of five points in contravention of the agreement and is continuing near-daily attacks across the border.

While Israel presents security reasons for these violations, the challenge is that Israeli actions directly undermine the rising Lebanese state’s case to its people, and to Hizballah’s followers, that the Lebanese state can assure their long-term security through diplomacy and the LAF presence. Israel’s contravention of the US-brokered agreement feeds Hizballah’s narrative that the Lebanese state cannot ensure the security and safety of the south — or indeed any part of Lebanon — and that, hence, Hizballah must keep its arms, at least north of the Litani.

It is not clear that Netanyahu’s goal in Lebanon is — like America’s — to leverage the change that his actions brought about to encourage the rise of a functioning sovereign and unified state that can dismantle remaining armed militias, maintain a calm and secure border, and eventually explore peaceful relations. It is conceivable that his goal is to maintain long-term Israeli armed presence and military freedom of action in Lebanon, even at the cost of preventing the rise of a sovereign state. But such an outcome will enable conditions in which non-state actors can continue to thrive.

Indeed, this question can be asked of Netanyahu’s policy in the region in general: does Israel want to only defeat or degrade adversaries around the region and notch up military victories in repeated battles, or does it want to use its power to bring about a stable, state-based, and prosperous Middle East in which it can thrive?

The US, Lebanon, and Israel all have an interest in implementing the first phase of the cessation of hostilities agreement, replacing Hizballah with the LAF and UNIFIL in the area south of the Litani, stabilizing the Lebanese-Israeli border, and enabling civilians from both sides to return to their border towns and villages. But the full implementation of the deal includes implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and other agreements, and hence the full disarmament of Hizballah

The Lebanese state needs a proactive strategy for disarming Hizballah

After hoping for an amicable resolution with Hizballah of its arms issue — a pathway that Hizballah has now cut off — the state needs a serious and proactive strategy to achieve its monopoly on the use of force. The recent 12-day Israeli-American campaign against Iran did not dramatically shift the situation in Lebanon, where Hizballah's refusal to disarm has only hardened. Despite suffering severe losses in 2024 and losing the strategic support of Syria with the fall of Assad, Hizballah remains a key node in Iran’s regional “forward defense” strategy. While Lebanese Hizballah leaders hold tactical autonomy, ultimate decisions about disarmament lie with Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran continues to see Hizballah as a useful tool — for keeping Israeli forces pinned down, obstructing US influence in Lebanon, and destabilizing the new Syrian order. Therefore, voluntary disarmament by Hizballah appears unlikely under current conditions.

From Hizballah’s domestic perspective, the situation is complex. While the movement retains symbolic capital from its past confrontations with Israel, the latest war exposed its military vulnerability, devastated its Shi’a support base, and cut off supply lines through Syria. Despite these setbacks and the need for reconstruction aid — which is contingent on Hizballah’s disarmament — the group fears that giving up arms would unravel its founding narrative of resistance and undermine its legitimacy. Moreover, Hizballah’s leaders may not even have the authority to make that decision, given Iran’s overarching control.

For the Lebanese state, the events of 2024–25 represent the first real opportunity in decades to rebuild sovereignty. A new, more independent government has made gains in asserting control over national territory and institutions. Initially, the government hoped that Hizballah’s leaders would, for pragmatic reasons, agree to disarm. But this expectation has proven unrealistic. The state must now adopt a more assertive strategy, setting a firm timetable for disarmament, stepping up actions against illegal arms and finance networks, building the LAF’s capacity, and communicating to Hizballah’s constituency that continued armament is blocking aid and reconstruction.

Realistically, the state has to avoid a rushed and full-on confrontation that could trigger civil strife or institutional collapse. Instead, it should implement a phased plan that includes proactive security measures right away, strategic messaging, and a credible roadmap toward full sovereignty within a set time limit. International diplomacy is relevant: Israel must implement the cessation of hostilities agreement to avoid undermining the state’s case for security provision. Linking Israeli withdrawal to Hizballah disarmament — as proposed by US envoy Tom Barrack — may offer a realistic path toward a sovereign and secure Lebanon. The time for waiting has passed; the state must now act with clarity and resolve.

Syria: A collapsed regime and a contested transition

Israeli policy in Syria is equally complex and often contradictory. While Netanyahu claims at least indirect credit for the fall of the Assad regime, he is very wary of the radical Islamist group that has taken over. Israel had coexisted uneasily with the Assad government for decades, but within days of the regime’s fall Netanyahu ordered the destruction of most of the Syrian armed forces and launched a ground incursion. In recent days and weeks, he has used protection of the Druze of southern Syria as a reason to bomb the Syrian Ministry of Defense and targets very close to the presidential palace in Damascus.

Despite many reservations and concerns, the US and most regional partners have thrown their weight behind the new Syrian leader, figuring he represents the best chance for the war-torn country to move forward. But Israel seems to be moving in a different direction by trying to ensure that the transition, at least under Sharaa, does not succeed and that Syria remains a failed and divided territory. Again, the question is whether Netanyahu seeks to leverage his “win” of bringing down the Assad regime and chasing Iran out of Syria by encouraging the emergence of a stable, unified state on Israel’s norther border — and Damascus has already made amply clear its desire to establish non-aggressive arrangements with its southern neighbor and eventually explore peace — or whether his primary goal is to maintain unrestrained, long-term military presence and freedom of action in the country even if that results in continued instability and conflict.

Indeed, the stakes in Syria are very high. If Sharaa sticks to the path the Arab Gulf countries, Turkey, Europe, and the US are urging him to take — and of which he publicly speaks, even if his radical followers frequently lurch in the opposite direction — then Syria could emerge as the linchpin of an increasingly integrated and stable Middle East. However, if the Syrian transition fails, the country could spiral into a fate even worse than that promised by a continued Assad regime. This could include an out-of-control sectarian and inter-ethnic war in Syria, with a more radical Islamist leader and faction in power in Damascus, and conflict engulfing minorities and other communities not only in Syria but in Lebanon as well. While Iran has an interest in the transition failing and regaining a foothold in Syria, Israel should not have the same perspective. The Shara-led government is years away from where it needs to be and should be held accountable for attacks and in some cases massacres of civilians under its watch, but Netanyahu’s investment in the breakup of Syria and the failure of a transition is the wrong policy.

Netanyahu’s military successes and political aimlessness

Netanyahu’s military victories are indisputable and have significantly shifted power balances across the Middle East. But he has not used his newfound sway to chart out a sustainable political future for Israel or for the region. For Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, what he proposes and has presided over is more open-ended conflict, occupation, and displacement with no scenario for sustainable political coexistence and governance. On Iran, there is really no “deal” that he is after, because — as the Iranians say about the Americans — he does not trust their word or their signature on a deal, so the path ahead is open-ended military conflict in pursuit of some chimera of regime change. Regarding Lebanon and Syria, Netanyahu’s actions have enabled a resurgence of hope for rebuilding sovereignty, but other policies he pursues are making it much harder for that statehood to be regained.

The deal within reach, but not grasped

Vis-à-vis the Arabs, the real “deal of the century” — a US-Saudi-Israeli agreement that would include Saudi-Israeli normalization alongside genuine concessions to the Palestinians — is more than ever a low-hanging fruit. It would not only further cement ties between Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, but with significant concessions to the Palestinians, it would allow other countries in the region and the Muslim world to follow suit. Moreover, it would remove the Palestine issue as a major leverage point for the Iranians and extremist Sunni groups. And it would dramatically increase not only regional security and prosperity, but that of Israelis — to say nothing of Palestinians — as well. Nonetheless, Netanyahu still appears unwilling or unable to take that historic win.

The US challenge

The events since Oct. 7 have significantly altered conditions in the Middle East and, in the process, created both new difficulties as well as new opportunities for US policymakers. President Trump has repeatedly made clear his preference for pursuing those fresh openings to end wars, strike lasting agreements, and bring about a more peaceful, integrated, and prosperous Middle East. Turkey and key Arab countries are also on the same page. The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the other hand, seems wedded to long-term confrontation (even if it is receptive to a measure of de-escalation) and to maintaining its militia allies in the region (even if weakened). Israel has much to gain from the peaceful, integrated, and prosperous Middle East that might be achievable; but Netanyahu is not currently working toward those conditions. The US has a chance, however fleeting, to try to mold events in a more positive direction.

When he wants to, Trump is still able to step in as the most influential player in the Middle East; and he gained additional leverage after using military power against Iran. He and his team should focus their efforts in the months ahead on using this leverage to move away from open-ended war and toward lasting solutions for Gaza and the Palestine question; come up with a deal to manage the Iran nuclear challenge; achieve Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia that includes significant concessions and a positive future for Palestinians; and stabilize the Levant by supporting — not undermining — the rise of sovereign states in Lebanon and Syria. US leadership will help determine whether 2025 is viewed as a seminal inflection point that enabled the building of a more stable, secure, and prosperous regional order, or whether it was just the third year in another ongoing, multi-front armed conflict in the Middle East.

A Ceasefire—with caveats

In the immediate term, Israel and the United States will likely move to replenish depleted air defense systems and assess the actual damage done to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. A critical concern will be determining where Iran’s enriched uranium is stored—and how to eliminate it. As of May 2025, Iran has amassed approximately 408 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%—a level just shy of weapons-grade. If further enriched, that quantity is enough to produce material for 9–10 nuclear bombs.

Iran will be using the ceasefire to assess its own damage, reorganize what’s left of its defense capacities, and decide on its path forward.

Israel may treat this ceasefire similarly to the cessation of hostilities with Lebanon: refraining from major operations but still launching selective strikes on targets it deems critical. Both Israel and the U.S. will likely maintain eyes over Iranian skies and retain the operational capacity to act if needed.

In the short term, Israel and the US will be focused on finding and eliminating Iran’s remaining nuclear capacities; in the long term, there are signs that both Washington and Tel Aviv might be recalibrating toward regime change.

Tehran’s Strategic Choice

Iran will have a major say in what comes next. It now faces a critical choice:

A. Strike a grand bargain with Trump: a total rollback of its nuclear program, deep restrictions on its missile arsenal, and a major retreat from its regional proxy network. Or

B. double down on resistance: rejecting what would amount to capitulation, and maintaining its long-standing defiant posture, even at the cost of deeper isolation, pressure, and risk.

If Tehran chooses the ‘path of the deal’, it would mark a historic pivot: effectively embracing Trump’s “Make Iran Great Again” (MIGA!) vision. This path might secure the regime’s survival, albeit at the price of strategic re-orientation and contraction.

Either way, the coming months will be decisive: for Iran, for regional stability, and for the future of US policy in the Middle East.

Barely a week into Israel’s large-scale military campaign against Iran, the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are rapidly vanishing — if they have not already. What began as an effort to halt Iran’s nuclear program has morphed into a broader Israeli campaign aimed at degrading the regime’s security, economic, and political infrastructure in order to enable or encourage regime change.

This evolving confrontation places the Islamic Republic of Iran at a critical inflection point. Tehran faces choices that range from limited negotiation and strategic restraint to escalation and eventual collapse. The following analysis explores the key scenarios that could unfold in the coming days, weeks, and years.

I. A vanishing diplomatic off-ramp

Theoretically, a negotiated de-escalation is still possible. But the political and strategic costs for Tehran would be staggering. To satisfy President Donald Trump — and the new negotiator at the table, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — Tehran would likely have to offer: complete cessation of uranium enrichment down to zero; full dismantlement of enrichment infrastructure, including Fordow and Natanz, under stringent inspections led by the United States; and sharp reductions in its ballistic missile arsenal and manufacturing capacities, and maybe in its drone arsenal and factories as well. In addition, Israel would insist on the dismantling or disbanding of regional militias in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

For the Islamic Republic, such concessions would be tantamount to capitulation — or what Trump called “unconditional surrender.” Externally, that would leave the regime stripped of both deterrent capabilities and geopolitical leverage. Internally, it would also leave the regime exposed to backlash from hardliners and vulnerable to a disgruntled population already disillusioned by decades of authoritarian mismanagement and international isolation, making its weakness all too clear.

Moreover, it is unlikely the US administration would be inclined to throw a lifeline to a regime that appears to be collapsing under pressure. A last-minute deal would risk preserving a weakened regime just as the opportunity to topple it — or severely degrade its capacity — appears within reach.

In a few days or weeks, Iran is probably going to lose what remains of its nuclear enrichment capacities — i.e., Fordow. It also no longer has the option to “rush for a bomb,” a choice it might have had months or years ago, when it still controlled its airspace and security, and maybe at a time when Israel or the US were both distracted. Today, the run would likely be detected and destroyed before it gained any real momentum.

There may have been a brief window for diplomacy early in Trump’s second term, but Tehran misread the moment and Netanyahu narrowed the time window. That window now appears all but closed.

II. The escalation option: A high-risk gamble

If Tehran concludes that diplomacy is dead, one alternative is escalation. This would likely involve attacks on US bases in the region while it still has the capacity to do so; it might also include disrupting Gulf shipping and/or attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) energy infrastructure or other targets. But this strategy is more useful in the threatening phase than in implementation. It would be a doomsday or suicidal decision for a regime that has not proven suicidal in the past but rather has always been intensely focused on its own survival. So this scenario remains unlikely. The Islamic Republic knows that such action would simply trigger large-scale US military engagement, likely with strong regional, European, and probably even Chinese support — as China cannot bear long-term high oil prices — and lead to an even more rapid destruction of the regime’s institutions and capacities.

III. Strategic endurance: Absorb, survive, adapt

The more likely option for Iran is to absorb the current military blows and shift to a strategy of weathering the storm. Iran may opt to accept the losses, preserve core regime structures, regroup over time, and pursue longer-term strategies. After all, regime change would require either a full-scale invasion, which is not in the cards, or a mass domestic uprising, which is unlikely in the immediate short term.

This trajectory echoes the cases of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria after 2012. The regime remains in power but severely weakened — unable to project major force, maintain full territorial control, or pose strategic threats beyond its borders.

In the Iranian context, this could involve loss of control over provinces with large minority populations like Kurdistan, Sistan-Baluchestan, or Khuzestan; armed uprisings in outlying regions, supported by external actors; and the eventual coalescence of these localized resistances with urban-based opposition movements in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz.

Over a period of years, this could lead to regime collapse and some form of regime change. But it would unfold slowly, not as a sudden revolutionary shift. In the meantime, what is left of the regime would have time to assess, adapt, and try to reorganize.

IV. Asymmetric retaliation and a return to the shadows

Even in a degraded state, Iran retains some asymmetric capabilities. Its global and regional covert networks — built up over decades through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, intelligence services, and proxy militias — may become its primary instruments of resistance.

This could include proxy attacks on Israeli, US, or allied interests; cyberattacks on infrastructure and financial systems; targeted assassinations or kidnappings abroad; and regional destabilization efforts in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and Iraq.

This “submerged” posture mirrors the behavior of past embattled regimes. It will not restore Iran’s regional primacy, but it could impose persistent costs on its adversaries. For the United States and its partners in the region and internationally, this would represent a long-term destabilization, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency challenge.

V. Regime mutation

While unpredictable, another possible scenario at some point is internal transformation — either through an intra-elite “coup” or a sharp managed transition.

A fracture within the IRGC or a realignment of the military and political elite could produce a new leader — or leadership — open to a transformative deal with the US and, indirectly, Israel. This would not be exactly like a “Gorbachev moment,” but something similar — a way to preserve the shell of a weakened Islamic Republic but recast in strategically new directions.

VI. Toward a muted endgame?

When Fordow is neutralized — and today it seems a matter of when and by whom, not if — and Iran’s nuclear and missile capacities are hollowed out, the pace of Israeli strikes may slow. At that point, a de facto cease-fire might be achieved — perhaps similar to the one arranged between Israel and Hezbollah last summer — that reduces the intensity of fighting and bombing (after key military sites have already been taken out). It would also precariously stabilize a new status quo in which Israel and the US retain the strategic upper hand, while Iran gets a respite from intense and open-ended bombardment. This scenario may offer all sides a tactical pause, even as long-term tensions persist.

From strategic power to contained threat

Israel has redrawn the regional map. The Islamic Republic, once a formidable and ambitious regional actor, is rapidly becoming a besieged and degraded power. It is likely to survive in the short term — but in what form, and with what purpose, remains unclear.

The pathways ahead range from slow-motion regime change to asymmetric entrenchment. What is already certain is that the Iran of late 2025 will look very different from the Iran of early 2023. The question is not only whether the Islamic Republic survives — but whether it evolves, collapses, or retreats into a long twilight of strategic irrelevance and subversive resistance.

The Middle East has entered a dangerous and uncertain moment. Much now depends on the next moves by Israel, Iran, and the United States.

On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has positioned himself as a central actor in any deal — or no deal — with Iran. He may choose to pause after this large-scale operation, absorb Iran’s initial retaliation, and allow a brief window for renewed diplomacy. The goal would be a deal that includes zero uranium enrichment and full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Alternatively, Israel could pursue sustained military operations, as it has done with Hezbollah in Lebanon, to further degrade Iran’s nuclear program and weaken its leadership and decision-making apparatus.

For Iran, the calculus is more constrained. While it must respond — and already has — its overriding interest is to avoid a full-scale conflict it cannot win. The imbalance in military power with Israel and the United States is stark. While Iran can inflict damage, Israel’s defenses and those of its partners are likely to largely neutralize most attacks. Striking US assets would trigger a forceful American response — an outcome Tehran seeks to avoid. Attacking targets in the Gulf would alienate key regional partners, undermining Iran’s long-term position.

Iran’s leadership is likely focused now on regime survival, and Israel has made it clear that the strategy of obfuscating and playing for time in fruitless negotiations has run its course. They may recognize that the only figure capable of restraining Netanyahu is Donald Trump, and that the wiser path may be to signal readiness to reengage diplomatically after a brief cooling-off period. In early April, Trump gave Iran 60 days to reach a deal. The Israeli strike comes as that deadline expired. Trump has already linked the attack to his deadline, and warned Iran to take advantage of a “second chance” or face more dire consequences. The Israeli strike gives Washington new leverage to push for a zero-enrichment deal.

Whether Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is prepared to make the kind of painful concession his predecessor made to end the Iran-Iraq war — what Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called “drinking the poisoned chalice” — remains to be seen. However, this is, after all, the first strike of such magnitude on Iranian soil since that war.

To be sure, there is a real risk of escalation that could drag in the US and destabilize the Gulf. But, to borrow US Democratic Party strategist Rahm Emanuel’s phrase, “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” This moment, perilous as it is, also offers a narrow opening to revive diplomacy toward a quick and satisfactory deal that takes the specter of an Iranian nuclear weapons program off the table. That opening should be rapidly and intensively tested.

The Middle East and North Africa are riddled with civil and proxy wars that have broken states, devastated economies, and displaced millions. The cost of reconstruction in monetary terms alone is staggering—estimated at almost three-quarters of a trillion dollars; the political challenges in terms of ending wars, standing up functioning states, and creating the regional environment that can prevent future breakdowns and sustain reconstruction are also enormous.

The last few decades have not been kind to the region. Lebanon collapsed into civil war in 1975 and recovered in 1990; it had a run at reconstruction in the 1990s but has been dragged into repeated war with Israel since then as a result of Iran’s proxy presence through Hezbollah in Lebanon. After the latest war with Israel—which is still ongoing—reconstruction needs in Lebanon stand at over $11bn.

Yemen has been in and out of civil war since the 1960s and is currently in an unstable political stalemate. If and when a resolution to the war is worked out, reconstruction cost estimates stand at over $25bn.

Syria tore itself apart after the uprising of 2011, reducing this once lower-middle-income country into one of the poorest in the region. A new order is emerging in Damascus. If it succeeds in rebuilding a unified and functioning Syrian state, its reconstruction needs could amount to $400bn.

Iraq underwent various ravages: the long war with Iran in the 1980s, a decade of biting sanctions, followed by the US-led invasion and toppling of the regime in 2003. The overall reconstruction needs in Iraq are hard to calculate, but the costs of reconstruction just from the war with the Islamic State (IS) in 2015 were estimated at the time at $88bn.

In Palestine, the wars between Hamas and Israel have taken a repeated toll. But nothing to compare to Israel's utter devastation of Gaza following the October 7 2023, Hamas attack. Reconstruction costs in Gaza are estimated at over $50bn.

Moving further west, Sudan itself has been in an on-and-off civil war for decades, which has devastated large parts of the west and south of the country. The recent eruption of conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces has brought new devastation to much of the country, displaced millions, and generated estimated reconstruction costs of over $12bn.

Libya, like Syria, collapsed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011. The long civil war is still not at an end and has ravaged various parts of the country. Reconstruction costs there could be well over $100bn.

This sketch—which highlights just the numbers associated with potential reconstruction costs—doesn't capture the multiple layers of devastation that these civil and proxy wars caused in these societies.

In addition to the calculable destruction of urban and rural housing and businesses, and once-functioning infrastructure, what is lost also and requires reconstruction is the social fabric and trust that is torn apart, the political and public management institutions that are no longer, and the personal and collective trauma that people will carry with them for decades to come.

For all of these societies, the path to overall reconstruction, if and when they start on it, will take many decades to come—indeed, perhaps much of the rest of the 21st century.

Interconnected impacts

The place to start, of course, is ending the ongoing conflict in each case, finding a war-ending and peace-sustaining political arrangement, and then putting these countries on the path to reconstruction.

To understand the overall conditions that have generated so many failed states, it is important to note the regional and international conditions that have, in many ways, generated and/or sustained these conflicts—and hence the regional and international conditions that would be favorable to ending them and maintaining an effective recovery and reconstruction.

The regional factors are perhaps the most dominant. At least two main conflict systems have generated failed states: proxy wars and civil wars. The first is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been ongoing for the past century, and that evolved into an Israeli-Arab conflict over decades, and eventually an Israeli-Iranian conflict.

The effects of this conflict were accentuated over the past year and a half with the great escalation that took effect after the attacks of October 2023. The conflict impacted Israel powerfully in October, but then led to devastation in Gaza, a Hezbollah-Israel war in Lebanon, and escalation of attacks involving Syria, Yemen and Iran itself.

It should be fairly obvious that finally finding a resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the keys to building a more stable region and giving currently broken states a chance at finding a path to recovery. While a resolution to the conflict might seem more remote than ever today, the urgency is also higher than ever.

The Trump administration is intent on achieving a US-Saudi-Israel deal that would include normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel; for that to happen, Israel would need to provide concessions to the Palestinians to satisfy Saudi demands.

Those concessions are not likely to come close to an actual sovereign state but might be enough for the Palestinian Authority to accept, and for other Arab and Islamic states to support and join in peace and normalization as well. It is a narrow pathway, but it might just provide the conditions to turn the corner to a more peaceful Israeli-Palestinian-Arab-Muslim relationship. The Saudi role in this will be pivotal.

The other major conflict system is with Iran. Much of Iran’s conflict is focused on Israel, and many of its proxies are set in a position to inflict harm or cost on Israel. Unlike many Arab countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not likely to change its policy or strategy as a result of a Saudi-Israeli breakthrough or limited concessions to Palestinians.

Iran’s case against Israel is more strategic, as it sees Israel not only as a threat in itself, but as a proxy for the United States. And in trying to counterbalance both Israel and the United States, Iran has built proxy or allied militias in various Arab countries, including Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq and Syria. It is unlikely to abandon these investments or allies easily. Indeed, Iran’s allied militia network is a primary reason that countries like Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and—even with the new order in Damascus—Syria, find it very difficult for national institutions to regain state sovereignty.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other GCC states have already de-escalated tensions with Iran and have normalized their relations, and this has contributed to reducing tensions in some countries in the region. But the conflict between Israel and Iran has only gotten more intense over the past year and a half, and the risk of all-out war between the two remains high.

The US has resumed its maximum pressure campaign on Iran, but Trump has made it clear that his goal is to achieve a transformative agreement with Iran. If such a deal with Iran can be achieved—and this might not be likely, given the leanings of the current supreme leader and the IRGC—but if it can be achieved, then the region could enter a more auspicious era. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen would have one major obstacle out of the way. Palestinians might also find it easier to rebuild national unity and have a united political front in their negotiations with Israel.

Trump has already given Saudi Arabia a central role in mediating between the US and Russia. Given the entrenched and ideological positions in both Tehran and Washington, Riyadh might play a central role in helping the US and Iran arrive at a transformative deal that, at the end of the day, is in both their countries’ interests.

Path forward

Creating a more stable and cooperative Middle East region will open the door for ending the various civil and proxy wars. Although each case is complex and different—between Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq—rebuilding stability and state sovereignty in all those cases will be much aided by a more stable regional order in which key regional players can help bring conflicts to an end, rather than fuel their escalation and continuation.

Of course, the international role in all of this is important as well. But strong cooperative leadership from within the region, especially from within the GCC, will help manage the capacities and competitions of global powers—such as the US, China, Russia and Europe—in ways that feed into a more stable region, rather than feed ongoing regional and civil wars.

In each of the country cases, the course of reconstruction cannot be embarked on until the complex political process of ending the conflict and creating a sustainable new political order has been put in place. In Yemen, part of the conflict is fueled by Iran’s proxy presence, but ending the war there will require not only regional de-escalation but also intense intra-Yemeni negotiations to agree on a new political order that can sustain a Yemeni state.

In Syria, the new president has to square competing regional and international interests, but also faces the daunting task of weaving back together the divided Syrian polity after years of war; whether President Ahmed al-Sharaa will succeed in this task well enough to be able to move on toward reconstruction is hard to say at this point.

In Gaza, the ending of the war hangs partly on the decisions of Israel and Hamas, but it will also be much influenced by American and Saudi diplomacy to get Israel to pivot toward a diplomatic track. That would enable the US-Saudi-Israeli breakthrough, and in the process create ameliorated conditions for Palestinians in Gaza and, at least, parts of the West Bank as well.

The wars in Sudan and Libya also have major regional components in addition to the domestic disputes. A more integrated and cooperative region—in which the key countries are working to end conflicts not to sustain them would give both Sudan and Libya a much better chance to rebuild national unity and functioning state institutions and hence be ready to move toward reconstruction.

In Lebanon and Iraq, a state—albeit weak and less than sovereign—exists, but faces internal challenges from Iranian-backed militias, and external threats from being dragged into the Iranian-Israeli confrontation. Defusing the latter will help both Iraq and Lebanon move forward.

If and when these various conflict countries arrive at the point of reconstruction, it should be clear that the financial sums required for direct and large-scale reconstruction are unavailable. The US-led post-World War II international world order that created the Marshall Plan for Europe and oversaw national and international institutions that stepped forward to finance reconstruction worldwide is largely a thing of the past.

The US under Trump is no longer in the business of reconstructing other countries, and it is weakening the international institutions that it established and oversaw, whose job was to help developing countries end wars and rebuild afterwards.

Europe might be a contributor, but its resources are squeezed between sluggish economies and the spending needs of supporting Ukraine, deterring Russia, and increasing defense spending. China could be a player in terms of participating in large infrastructure and development projects, but it would do so for profit and is not in the business of providing unilateral reconstruction aid. Russia has limited means, and its concerns are mainly in its near abroad.

This leaves the region's countries, primarily the resource-rich countries of the GCC, as the central players in any regional reconstruction project. And no doubt, the GCC—led by Saudi Arabia—would need to develop their regional reconstruction and aid capacities to make up for the decline of those built up by the US and the West in past decades, if they wish to see these countries emerge from crisis and the region graduate to a more stable and prosperous future.

But even in the GCC, the appetite for giving away money to construct other countries is at a low ebb; in addition to the grant and/or loan money that might be made available, the GCC states—and their companies—will be more interested in looking for opportunities to invest in these post-war economies.

In other words, if and when each country finds an end to conflict, and embarks on the road to recovery and reconstruction, it has to create conditions that render its economy ‘investable’ and not rely solely on requests for grants and loans from abroad. This is not only the case for the GCC, but also for the US, Europe, China, and other potential investors such as those in Türkiye, India, Korea, etc.

The sums needed for full reconstruction will not be available at the scale and timetable these countries would like. While some direct reconstruction money, in the form of grants and loans, could be made available, much of the postwar recovery planning must be geared toward attracting regional and international investment in core sectors. And it should be sadly clear that, given the discrepancy between the needs and availability of reconstruction aid, full reconstruction in many of these conflict cases might have to be counted in decades, not years.

Strategic challenge

The reconstruction of the Middle East and North Africa is not merely a technical or financial challenge; it is a deeply political and strategic one and will take an extended period of time to achieve. Each conflict-ridden country faces its own unique internal fractures, but they are all entangled in broader regional and international dynamics that must be addressed for meaningful recovery to begin.

Without a reimagined regional order—grounded in de-escalation, diplomacy, and cooperative leadership—these societies will remain locked in cycles of violence, instability, and underdevelopment. And the reconstruction project will not be able to rely solely on direct grants and loans, but recovering economies will have to create conditions to attract regional and international investment.

While global actors still matter, the decisive energy and resources for building a more stable and cooperative regional order and reconstruction must come from within the region, particularly from the Gulf states. The stakes could not be higher: the fate of tens of millions depends on it, and the legacy of the 21st-century Middle East may be written in how peacebuilding and reconstruction are approached—or neglected.

In addition to the many trade and business deals, and the significant political announcements made during Donald Trump’s visit to the Gulf, the trip itself marks an important shift in the geopolitical landscape.

First, for a US president to undertake a multi-day trip to the Middle East – especially as his first official overseas visit of this term – and not to include Israel, is largely unprecedented and indicates that the President sees the Gulf countries as America’s main center of interest and partnership in the region. Israel remains, of course, a close US ally and partner, but its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, must be left questioning where Israel lies in Mr. Trump’s mind-map of interests and priorities.

Second, it’s no secret that Mr. Trump does not have many warm relationships in Western Europe and has complained about US economic and security partnerships there. For Mr. Trump to make the Gulf his first official foreign visit again in his second term also indicates that he sees the Gulf countries and economies as main geopolitical and geoeconomic players in many ways surpassing the states and economies of Western Europe. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE now appear to hold more influence with the US President than do some of the leaders of America’s traditional NATO allies.

Third, Mr. Trump in his second term is confirming the shift that he is leading in the principles of US foreign policy: from a foreign policy built on Cold War-style political and power alliances built in seemingly permanent confrontation or counterbalancing against semi-permanent adversaries, to a non-ideological, business-friendly, long-war-hostile, transactional foreign policy that shuns large alliance and confrontation systems, and looks after strictly defined US interests – primarily of the economic kind.

This should be read clearly in both Tehran and Moscow – neither capital can claim that Mr. Trump has a deep seated ideological or long-term hostility to their governments. It also enables him to be close to Mr Netanyahu while also embracing President Ahmad Al Shara of Syria and hurling olive branches at the supreme leader in Iran.

At the geoeconomic level, the main shift that this visit underlines is the deep alignment of GCC states alongside the US in the latter’s bid to build out its AI capacities ahead of China over the coming years and decades. AI will define the global power landscape of the 21^stcentury, and AI processing centers require massive amounts of energy. The US does not have the capacity to ramp up its energy resources enough to meet the escalating demands of an ambitious US AI sector; the Gulf countries have both the available energy, as well as the ample cash reserves, to meet a significant portion of this need.

At the geopolitical level, the most striking outcome of the visit is the US decision to lift sanctions on Syria. This decision, followed by a warm meeting between Mr Trump and Mr. Al Shara, marks a sea change in the Levant. For the past six decades, Syria had been an adversary of both the US and most of the Gulf states, first as a long-time ally of the Soviet Union, then as an ally – and eventually a client – of Iran. If Mr Al Shara can leverage this newfound support to lift his country from civil war and economic collapse, he will be re-aligning it alongside the Gulf and the US and reversing decades of recent Middle Eastern history.

The decision on Syria also has major and positive implications for Lebanon. Lebanon has paid the price of a hostile – and problematically aligned – Syria ever since the Baath Party took over Damascus in 1963. If Mr. Al Shara succeeds in building a more inclusive and stable Syrian state and economy, and one that is not ideologically hostile to an independent Lebanon and aligned with the main Arab countries and the West, Lebanon’s path to regaining sovereignty and building a vibrant economy – already underway with a new president, prime minister and government – will have a solid and sustainable path forward.

The geopolitical move that is closest to Mr. Trump’s heart and key to his vision of the region – the expansion of the Abraham Accords – did not make visible progress during this visit. He talked about it during his address in Riyadh and mentioned it as a desired end goal of the opening to Syria, but he is also aware that the conditions for moving forward are not currently available.

Saudi Arabia is the key country in any expansion of the Abraham accords to other Arab or Muslim-majority countries, and Riyadh made clear once again that it requires an end to the war in Gaza and a solid pathway to a Palestinian state. Mr. Trump is increasingly aware that Mr. Netanyahu is neither willing nor able to move in that direction. The rift between Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu is growing; whether it will boil over into the open and lead to public clashes like Trump has had with other formerly friendly world leaders is – like everything with Mr. Trump – impossible to predict.

Although the visit was not about the US-Iran talks, it did provide positive momentum for them. The US President spent several days with Gulf leaders, all of whom now have cordial relations with Tehran and are counselling a negotiated solution over any talk of war. And Mr. Trump has made clear that he is looking for a win-win solution and is not an ideological foe. Of course, it helps that Iran’s proxy network has been devastated by both Israeli and American military action, and that its economy is on its knees – made even more desperate by the recent decline in oil prices.

Mr Trump’s two geopolitical ambitions for the region – expanding the Abraham Accords and striking a lasting deal between the US and Iran – would be truly transformative if he can achieve them. A nuclear deal between the US and Iran is looking increasingly likely; expanding the Abraham Accords is ripe for the picking but requires new leadership in Israel. In the meantime, Mr. Trump has cemented globally significant political and economic ties with the key states of the Gulf. The region’s leaders can be effective partners with the US in achieving the breakthroughs that are still needed to create a truly peaceful, integrated and prosperous Middle East.

A little over a hundred days into Donald Trump’s second term, and just ahead of his trip to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, the US president’s Middle East policy remains a work in progress.

Interestingly, Trump had clear impact on several key regional issues even before he took office. His insistence that he wanted wars to be over spurred the Israeli government to conclude cease-fire agreements with both Hamas and Hezbollah prior to Trump’s inauguration day. He might be able to again significantly influence developments in the Middle East after he devotes more time there in his coming visit and clarifies his positions and actions. So far, however, the record has been mixed.

On Gaza, Israel concluded a cease-fire agreement with Hamas just hours before Trump took office. And the US administration devoted a lot of attention in its early weeks to move the Israeli-Hamas negotiations forward. But since then, the originally agreed cease-fire period has run out and the talks have broken down. Last week, Israel announced it is preparing a large-scale military operation there, leading to at least a partial long-term occupation, even as the dire humanitarian situation grows steadily worse amid Israel’s ongoing blockade on aid. After announcing his short-lived “Riviera” plan for Gaza earlier this year, Trump has appeared to lose interest in mediation there, sent his main envoy Steve Witkoff to focus on Russia and Iran, and echoed the Israeli position that if Hamas does not hand over all hostages, he would let all “hell break loose.” Whether these positions will be affected by Trump’s meetings in the three Arab Gulf capitals is yet to be seen.

On the West Bank — where the situation has also dramatically worsened — Trump promised he would make an announcement two months ago; but no major administration position there has emerged. It is no secret that one of Trump’s main goals in the Middle East is to cement a historic tripartite agreement between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. This will not be possible — on the Saudi side — without a stop to the war in Gaza and some concessions to the Palestinians, even if minor, on the West Bank. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not in a position to deliver any of that, and it is not clear how Trump will handle or confront this challenge. But if the US leader succeeds in achieving the breakthrough normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, that would be transformative for the region.

On Iran, Trump has moved swiftly to reimpose maximum pressure and to engage in high-level negotiations. Here too, his goal is potentially transformative: to strike a lasting agreement with Tehran that will take the latter’s nuclear weapons option off the table, reduce the risk of major regional war, and encourage Iran to build on its normalized relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members by engaging with other regional countries not through proxy militias but through more normal state-to-state relations. So far, the US-Iranian talks are in very preliminary stages. How they play out could lead to a transformative deal, or a collapse of diplomacy and slide to war.

Meanwhile, the administration’s main forward-looking focus is to greatly deepen America’s ties with its Gulf partners by going beyond the old oil-for-security relationship toward a 21st century partnership encompassing technology and artificial intelligence development (AI). To compete with China in these future fields, the US would strongly benefit from the financial and energy resources of the Gulf. This new tech and AI partnership spans both the public and private sectors, got started during the previous administration of President Joe Biden, and will almost certainly see new strides forward during Trump’s visit to the Gulf.

On Yemen, Trump has scored a win: After enduring weeks of bombing, the Houthis have pledged to halt their attacks, at least on US vessels in the region. Whether this will extend to other Red Sea shipping is yet to be seen. It does not extend to Israel — the Houthis claim they intend to shut down the Israel’s airspace by targeting its airports — but Israel is organizing its own military campaign against the Yemeni group.

On Syria, Trump has yet to truly focus on that issue. He will hear a lot about it during his Gulf visit. Doubts about the new regime in Syria abound and are warranted, but a focused engagement, with potent use of both positive and negative leverage, could push the new leadership in Damascus to move in the right direction. That would be transformative, not only for Syria, but also for Lebanon and the broader Levant.

Success in Syria will also depend on Trump’s other upcoming engagement in the region, that with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The two leaders had a recent phone call, and Trump invited Erdoğan to the White House. The US president can play a major role in defusing potential Israeli-Turkish tensions, avoiding a Turkish-Kurdish conflict, as well as seeing Syria move toward a more peaceful and economically integrated future in the region.

Finally, on Lebanon, US policy has seen considerable success. The Israeli-Hezbollah cease-fire agreement negotiated last November is largely holding, and the US heads a military committee that oversees the deployment of the Lebanese army to replace Hezbollah in the south. Trump can help complete the process by persuading Israel to withdraw from the remaining five points it occupies in southern Lebanon as well as pressing the Lebanese authorities to consolidate their sovereignty by disarming both Hezbollah and the armed Palestinian factions in the country.

Sadly, the ongoing civil war and humanitarian disaster in Sudan is getting none of the administration’s attention.

Trump’s Middle East policy, now entering a more active phase with his upcoming Gulf tour, is still a work in progress. To date, it has been marked by moments of clear impact but also by lingering ambiguity and unfulfilled ambitions. The potential for transformation is real: a Saudi-Israel normalization deal, a new framework with Iran, deeper US-Gulf tech partnerships, and diplomatic breakthroughs in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel-Palestine. But these outcomes depend on whether Trump can employ his and the US’s considerable leverage to achieve key goals, all the while balancing competing priorities across a fractured region. His next steps may well determine whether his second term leaves a lasting legacy in the Middle East or merely another chapter of missed opportunities.

[This article was published by the Middle East Institute]

Thus, in its broad outlines, Trump’s Middle East policy is not too divergent from what Joe Biden’s had been. Their shared facets include a strong commitment to Israel’s security along with a desire to bring its recent conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon to an end; a prioritization of a tripartite deal between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel that features Saudi-Israeli normalization but would require some concessions from Israel to the Palestinians; a high valuation of US economic and technological relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an end in itself as well as a way to contain China; and a strong desire to reach a negotiated deal with Iran.

What emerges from this demonstrated list of objectives and his administration’s policy steps to date is that Trump is focused on realizing two transformative and valuable breakthroughs that his predecessors failed to accomplish: an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, centered on a tripartite US-Saudi-Israeli deal that would include Saudi-Israeli normalization, and an agreement between the US and Iran. Both would be historical achievements. So far, however, progress in each case has proven difficult and plodding.

The first months

Donald Trump had a marked effect on Middle Eastern dynamics even before he took office. Weeks after he was elected in early November, Israel and Lebanon signed a US-brokered cease-fire deal to halt 15 months of fighting between Israeli and Hizballah forces. And just days before he took office on Jan. 20, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire and hostage/prisoner exchange in Gaza. In both cases, Trump’s rhetoric and surrogates were reportedly instrumental in clinching these diplomatic successes.

Trump had made ending wars — and not starting new ones — a cornerstone of his campaign, and it seemed that this promise was bearing fruit. Yet now, more than two months into his second term, the cease-fire in Gaza has largely broken down, and Israel has returned to fairly large-scale military activity; the cease-fire in Lebanon has not been fully implemented, and a flare up of fighting last week — including rockets into Israel and an Israeli attack on Beirut — threatened to bring that cessation of hostilities crashing down as well. As of last week, the US is itself engaged in a stepped-up military conflict with the Houthis, having expanded its airstrike campaign against the group in Yemen. And on Sunday, Trump threatened war on Iran if it did not agree to a deal with the US (although he did not make clear if the war would be an Israeli one, American, or both). In other words, the clouds of war are once again overshadowing hopes for peace.

Israel-Palestine

Indeed, as of April 1, the Trump administration has not been able to get far off the starting block on just about any key issue in the Middle East. In Gaza, the US is again mired in negotiations with Hamas — via Qatari and Egyptian mediators — to release remaining hostages, establish a lasting cease-fire, and figure out a postwar arrangement for the devastated coastal territory. In the West Bank, the situation continues to deteriorate dangerously.

With an eye toward the grand prize of Saudi-Israeli normalization, the Trump administration has not yet made clear what it may offer the Palestinians that Israel would agree with and the Saudis could sign on to. Troublingly, in a recent interview, US special envoy Steve Witkoff talked repeatedly about the potential for Saudi-Israeli normalization but only mentioned arrangements in Gaza as relevant to that discussion; he conspicuously said nothing about any arrangements regarding the West Bank. Was that just a random omission or an indication of White House policy? It is doubtful that Riyadh would move forward on normalization if the only Israeli concessions pertain to Gaza; some concession on the West Bank would also have to be part of the deal.

The way forward in Lebanon

In Lebanon, the US-brokered cease-fire agreement is holding a bit better than in Gaza, but it appears shaky there as well. Israel has maintained a military presence in five points inside Lebanon — which has only fed into Hizballah’s narrative — and it continues to attack Hizballah targets in the country at will. Last week’s flare up, including the first Israeli air attack on Beirut since the cease-fire, warned of the possibility of a wider breakdown; Israel carried out another such strike on the capital yesterday. On the other hand, Hizballah has largely gone along with its evacuation of positions south of the Litani River, the breadth and intensity of Israeli attacks has declined dramatically compared to before the cease-fire, and over a million Lebanese displaced have come back to their towns and neighborhoods in the south, Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley. The return of Israelis to their towns in northern Israel has been markedly more limited.

The coming challenge vis-à-vis Lebanon is to ensure the cease-fire agreement links to broader United Nations resolutions that demand the full disarmament of Hizballah and any other non-state armed groups. While agreeing to withdraw from south of the Litani, Hizballah has so far refused to consider giving up its weapons north of the river to the Lebanese state. This standoff could degenerate into serious internal political and security troubles in Lebanon or potentially escalate into a resumption of full-scale Israeli war on Hizballah — or both.

Back to the future in Yemen

In Yemen, the Trump administration is also employing more or less the same playbook as the Biden administration — ordering direct US military strikes in an attempt to force the Houthis to stop their attacks in the Red Sea and on Israel. Like before, the strikes may degrade Houthi capacities; but so far at least, they have neither deterred the group’s additional Red Sea attacks nor missile volleys against Israel.

Dealing with Iran

As both the Biden and Trump administrations have accurately surmised, Iran is a linchpin in many of the conflicts the US is dealing with in the region. And indeed, President Trump has made bold moves toward Iran, resuming the “maximum pressure” campaign and threatening “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” while also sending a letter to the supreme leader urging negotiations and a peaceful resolution of differences. Trump is clearly ready for a transformative deal; it is not clear that the supreme leader is. Indeed, Iran announced over the weekend that it rejects direct talks but is open to indirect ones.

On the one hand, Iran can be said to be under intense pressure: it has lost access to Syria; its crown jewel, Hizballah, has been greatly weakened; its Houthi allies are under attack; and Hamas is largely decimated. In addition, Iran’s economy is weak and under mounting strain and Iran itself is vulnerable to direct attack.

On the other hand, Iranian hardliners might see things in a different light. After 18 months of war with Israel — and, in their assessment, with the US as well — the Iran-led Axis of Resistance has been battered but survives. Even Hamas has persevered despite months of direct Israeli attacks; as have Hizballah, the Houthis, and the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMF). So far, Iran has suffered a full loss in Syria, but even there it is looking for ways to reverse its fortunes. Tehran is banking on — and investing in — the failure of the new leadership in Damascus to bring unity and stability to Syria, figuring that continued or increased fragmentation of the country will allow Iran a pathway back in. The events on the Syrian coast in mid-March indicate that the Iranians might not be far off the mark. It is particularly troubling that both Iran and Israel seem to be committed— and contributing — to a failure of the Syrian state.

And looking at the security ledger for the Middle East’s two main rivals, Israel and Iran, over the last 18 months, the conclusion is not so obvious. Yes, Iran is now vulnerable to Israeli and American attack. But on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel suffered the largest single-day loss of life in its modern history and, since then, has been engaged in effectively a non-stop, full-mobilization war. Meanwhile, Iran itself has been comparably safer and less overstretched. It endured a couple of targeted strikes on its air defenses and the destruction of a missile-fuel plant and a nuclear research facility in April and October of last year — which were definitely significant attacks and pointedly exposed the country’s vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, Iran and Iranians have suffered nothing near the traumatic and extended distress that Israel and Israelis have been experiencing for the past 18 months.

The inverse effect of attacking Iran’s proxy allies

Although the defanging of Iran’s missile force and the degrading of its militia allies, especially Hizballah, have virtually eliminated Iranian deterrence against Israeli attack, Israel’s — and in some cases, America’s — ongoing wars with Iranian proxies actually reinforce Tehran’s commitment to the Axis of Resistance. Every attack on a militia ally is resources and energy spent by Iran’s foes on targets other than Iran itself; and this validates the Iranian strategy of arming proxy forces as buffers and “crumple zones” to absorb Israeli and American attacks. The more Iran can keep its foes busy and distracted fighting its Arab militia allies, the more it can hope to keep itself above the fray.

Meaningful talks or just going through the motions?

Of course, Trump is trying to call Tehran on this strategy by threatening direct military action if the Iranians do not come to the negotiating table with major concessions. But Tehran also knows that while it does not have effective military defenses against direct Israeli or American attacks, it could hit and disrupt oil and natural gas production and transport in the Gulf, which Trump surely would want to avoid lest such strikes trigger a global energy and economic crisis. Both sides have each other over a barrel, so to speak.

It is likely that the hardliners in Iran would rather hunker down in their familiar bunker — one that now includes Russia and China as allies — and play the long game, hoping to elude an actual war and outlast the terms of both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As things stand now — facing “only” economic sanctions and attacks on Iran’s Arab militia allies — Tehran is not under such intense pressure that the supreme leader and the hardliners feel they have to offer major or transformative concessions. They might be incentivized to engage in talks but only entertain limited concessions on the nuclear file, not too far from what they ostensibly renounced in 2015. In addition, their confidence in negotiating with President Trump — who abrogated the last agreement they had with the US — is low. Of course, that calculus might change if the situation shifts quickly toward major direct attacks on Iran itself.

The economic centrality of the GCC

Conflicts aside, what is central to the Trump’s administration view of the region is the importance of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries as major economic — and increasingly technological — partners. In describing the tremendous progress being made in the Saudi kingdom and the rest of the GCC, US envoy Steve Witkoff argued that these developments, in the context of Arab-Israeli normalization and a more integrated Middle East, could make the region “much bigger than Europe” in terms of its importance for the United States.

Conclusion

Since coming to power a little over two months ago, the Trump administration’s policies have not yet had a transformative effect on the intractable conflicts and suspended crises of the Middle East — but these are still early days. Two key questions await an answer from the administration.

First, what is the US plan for the “day after” in Gaza and the West Bank, and will there be enough in it for the Saudis to assent to normalization with Israel? If the answer to that question ends up being positive, then the region will be truly on the brink of a major positive transformation, with other Arab and Muslim countries normalizing with Israel in the context of acceptable arrangements for the Palestinian people and pressure from Saudi Arabia to follow suit.

The second question is how the Trump administration will get to a transformative deal with Iran. Such a deal would also have profound positive consequences for the Middle East. But as things stand now, what is more likely is more of the same — no major war but no major diplomatic breakthrough either.

Trump prides himself on being the ultimate dealmaker. He is correct in prioritizing a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and an agreement that would end decades of US-Iranian hostility. Both deals are long overdue. So far, it’s been hard going, but there is plenty of time in the months ahead for Trump to move these two goals forward.

[This article was published by the Middle East Institute]

I was in Baghdad in late February for a conference on Iraq’s regional role, where we had the opportunity to meet with top leadership and policymakers. Iraq has come a long way since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the battle against ISIS. The state has reasserted itself, the political power-sharing system has proven durable, and the economy is inching forward. Yet deep challenges remain — sectarian divisions persist, corruption is rampant, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), an umbrella of largely Iran-backed militia groups formed to combat ISIS, now pose a dilemma for Iraq’s national sovereignty.

Economic aspirations vs. harsh realities

Iraq’s government is touting ambitious economic projects, including the Development Road, a massive overland trade corridor linking the Gulf to Turkey and Europe beyond. In cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey, Iraq hopes to position itself as a critical hub for international commerce. But the project is still in the planning stages and will take many years to build. Meanwhile, overdependence on oil revenues, severe electricity shortages, high unemployment, and environmental degradation weigh heavily on progress. Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani has made strides, but Iraq’s political system — riddled with competing interests — slows meaningful reform. Elections in October will likely reshape the political landscape once again.

Iraq: Regional mediator or battleground?

The prime minister has championed Iraq as a diplomatic bridge in a volatile region. Baghdad has hosted multiple rounds of Saudi-Iranian talks and repeatedly offered to mediate between the US and Iran. In May, Baghdad will host the Arab League Summit, further cementing its role as a regional convener. So far, Iraq has built working relations with Turkey, Iran, and its Arab neighbors while carefully balancing between US and Iranian interests. But tensions are rising.

In particular, the recent power shift in Syria following the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in December is sending ripples through the country. While there was little love lost in Iraq for Assad’s regime, it was at least predictable and aligned with Iran. The new Syrian leadership under interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa — who once fought alongside al-Qaeda in Iraq — raises alarms in Baghdad. Iraq is also worried that instability next door in Syria could give ISIS a chance to resurge and once again project power into Iraq. Baghdad is cautiously engaging with Damascus, dispatching intelligence officials to the Syrian capital and inviting its foreign minister to Baghdad. But whether Syria’s new president will attend the Arab League Summit in May remains uncertain.

In the Kurdish Regional Government’s capital of Erbil, concern was particularly high for the fate of Syria’s Kurds — between the rising power of Turkey after its allies Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took over Damascus and the reelection of Donald Trump, who touts his good relations with the Turkish president and is likely to seek a withdrawal of US forces from northeastern Syria. The former president of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, met with the leader of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, in Erbil in January to help find a soft landing for the embattled Syrian Kurdish forces. The framework agreement between the SDF and the new authorities in Damascus, announced a few days ago, lays out a promising pathway for Syrian Kurdish and SDF integration into emerging state institutions in Syria and is welcome news in Erbil.

For its part, Iraq has to manage the risks of a long and unpredictable transition in Syria not only by engaging politically and diplomatically, but also by strengthening its monitoring and controls along the 600-kilometer shared border between the two countries.

Managing the US relationship

The resumption of the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is another headache for Baghdad. The Trump administration is taking a hard stance, deciding not to renew Iraq’s waiver to import Iranian electricity. While Iranian power only accounts for 4% of Iraq’s consumption, any dip in supply during the brutally hot summer months could lead to widespread blackouts and ignite public unrest. More concerning is Iraq’s reliance on Iranian natural gas, which fuels nearly a third of its power plants. While Baghdad is ramping up domestic production and seeking alternatives, solutions are years away, leaving the country vulnerable as the sweltering summer approaches and elections are due in October.

On another note, Baghdad is rethinking the push for American forces to leave the country by this fall. The risk of instability and ISIS resurgence emanating from the new Syria is causing even Iran-leaning factions to reconsider the September 2025 deadline, established as part of an agreement reached last year between Baghdad and Washington.

The US is also pressuring Iraq to rein in the Iran-aligned PMFs, whose influence extends far beyond security matters. Some Iraqi politicians support bringing them under tighter state control, fearing a Hezbollah-like scenario where Iraq becomes entangled in Israeli-Iranian conflicts; but the PMFs have many political allies in government and parliament as well. In January, Prime Minister Sudani visited Tehran to discuss developments in Syria and gauge Iran’s stance on both the PMFs and the US military presence. While Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian appeared receptive, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took a hardline position, declaring the presence of US forces “illegal and contrary to the interests of the people and the government,” and that the PMFs represent “a crucial component of power in Iraq, and more efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen them.”

Iraq’s fragile balancing act

In my brief visit to the Iraqi capital, it was heartening to see Iraqis of all stripes enjoying the return of normal life to their storied city. But it was also clear that Iraq is in a very difficult position. It seeks stability and economic revival but faces mounting regional and international pressures. From an unpredictable Syria to the intensifying US-Iran confrontation, Iraq must carefully navigate its alliances to avoid being pulled into another cycle of conflict. With an energy crisis looming this summer and elections on the horizon in the fall, the months ahead will be challenging. The US has an interest in remaining closely engaged with leaders in both Baghdad and Erbil to help support the tentative stability and progress that is being made in the country, while managing the risks for Iraq from a volatile regional environment and an escalating US-Iranian confrontation.