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The Russian escalation challenge

In a recent post, I presented a partial list of likely Russian hybrid attacks in Europe just in the first two weeks of August. Since then, there have been many more. There have now been arson attacks or foiled strikes at ammunition depots or weapons production facilities in Italy, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia. While not every item on the list has been officially attributed to Russia (unsurprisingly, since official deniability is part of hybrid warfare), the pattern is undeniable: Russia is escalating. It is conducting what amounts to a summer offensive in its asymmetric or hybrid war against Europe. And the changing nature of its activities is its own signal of escalation: spectacular kinetic attacks are no longer off the table, and European individuals are now potential targets of Russian assassinations.

We are now in an escalation cycle. One could provide a more fine-grained description, but the basic logic is this: Russia starts a full-scale conventional war on Ukraine —> Europe gives Ukraine weapons with which to defend itself —> Russia conducts hybrid attacks against Europe. Russia has multiple objectives with its hybrid war on Europe that I have written about before, but this escalation is quite clearly aimed at frightening European voters and thereby politicians to end support for Ukraine. Putin is giving us an ultimatum: “Stop it, or else…”

We can discuss whether the term “hybrid war” is right for Russia’s recent spate of drone and sabotage attacks against drone production and transportation facilities in Europe, but I will put a pin on that for now. My view is that it is a good enough term for my purposes and that there is more than enough overlap between the attacks against European weapons depots that some prefer to call a horizontal escalation of the war in Ukraine, and the ongoing hybrid attacks aimed at disrupting stability and democracy in Europe.

Europe’s choices

Regardless of what we call the recent Russian escalation of attacks, Europe must now decide how to respond to it. Allow me to be a bit polemical in naming our options to drive home my point. Put starkly, the choice is between muddling through, capitulation, and striking back. Only two of those have a chance of breaking the escalation cycle. None is risk-free.

Muddle through

I think that the most likely option is that European leaders reject Putin’s ultimatum and continue providing enough support for Ukraine that it can fend off Russian territorial advances and conduct limited strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. By calling it “muddle through,” I don’t mean to undervalue the level of support that Europe is providing now. We have stepped up to fill the gaping void created by America’s—let’s be frank and call it what it is—shameful withdrawal of all material support for Ukraine. Doing much more than what Europe currently does would be politically difficult.

But it is muddling through if we do not radically amp up our support to allow Ukraine to make serious gains on the battlefield, and if we do not forcefully respond to Russia’s attacks in Europe.

And what strange world do some Europeans think that we live in? A world in which some countries can afford to simply accept or ignore that they are being repeatedly attacked without retaliating? In the normal world of international relations, states retaliate when attacked because if they don’t, they risk becoming “suckers” whom others attack at will. Would we react in the same blasé manner if Russia were launching air strikes against Berlin? I am certain that we would not, but for some reason, many in Europe seem to think that retaliation and deterrence by punishment is irresponsible or unrealistic in the hybrid realm. I find it honestly hard to comprehend, and almost certainly deeply misguided.

The steel-man version of this option is that it is holding steady even in the face of Russian provocations. The problem is that this strategy has clearly not stopped Russia from now attacking Europe directly. Quite the contrary. Russia is now increasingly taking the fight to Europe. Putin has escalated his attacks on us to get us to stop supporting Ukraine. If we do not back down in the face of the current level of pressure, he is unlikely to give up. More likely, he will continue escalating until we do. Thus, this option is not likely to end Putin’s asymmetric attacks on Europe. Ironically, not retaliating will likely incentivise Putin to escalate.

Capitulation

We could also give in. End our support for Ukraine and thus sacrifice a free and democratic European country, hoping that appeasement gets better results against Putin now than it did in Chechnya, Transnistria, Georgia, Crimea, or Donbas. This is what Putin wants. “Just stop helping Ukraine, and you’ll be fine. Trust me...”

While I do not think that current European leaders are likely to capitulate to Putin’s threats right now, the political strength of anti-establishment parties running on platforms of “peace” (i.e. submission to Putin) and against “the war party” in many European countries means that we cannot exclude this at some future date. This is probably Putin’s bet. That he can wait us out. So far, he has been wrong, but Russia is patient.

Unlike muddling through, capitulation might break the current cycle of escalation of attacks on our support infrastructure for Ukraine, but it would only be a partial and temporary breathing pause at the cost of significantly worsening Europe’s strategic position in the long run. If I am allowed to use a vivid image: if we roll over on our back and expose our throat to get Russia to stop as some in Europe want, we will have to remain in that pose, subjugated and vulnerable.

It will likely only offer temporary relief. Backing down in the face of threats is appeasement, and it is based on the dubious assumption that Putin will stop if we show him that his attacks on us work. In fact, it has never worked before with him and will not work now. If we allow him to win in Ukraine, the Baltics could be next, or Poland, or Armenia, or ... Whether Putin uses raw military force as in Ukraine or limited force plus subterfuge as in Donbas 2014 or Georgia 2008, we would just have to wait and see. The only certainty is that in time, we would find out.

It will likely only offer partial relief. Putin’s broader hybrid war is not merely aimed at compelling us to end our support for Ukraine, so bending to that specific demand is unlikely to end the broader campaign. Maybe we can stop the attacks on ammunition depots, but the broader hybrid campaign of cyber attacks, sabotage, and foreign intelligence manipulation and interference (FIMI) has been aiming to undermine or destroy Europe as a model of democracy, stability, and prosperity, so it will continue. There is little we can surrender that would satisfy Putin on this score, except perhaps electing leaders who accept his vision of Europe as a weak collection of vassal states.

That’s an actual option on many ballots in Europe, but it is not an option for me.

Fight back

This leads to the third and final option: to impose costs on Putin. Believe it or not, I am not an instinctual hawk. I would much prefer that we still lived in a world in which we could rely on multilateral institutions to exact costs on Russia and hold it accountable for its transgressions. Unfortunately, we no longer do. We can not simply hope that Putin stops or expect anyone else to stop him for us. Unless we want to capitulate, if we want him to stop attacking Europe, we must make him stop. And we—Europe—have to do this alone, more or less without the United States.

The third choice is difficult and comes with risks. But unless we want to capitulate, striking back is the only way to break the cycle of escalation. We should not do so out of anger or because it feels good, but—accepting that we are already in a hybrid or asymmetric war in which Russia has already escalated—to compel Putin to step down the escalation ladder and to deter future Russian aggression.

What costs has Putin incurred as a result of his recent escalation? To my knowledge, few, if any. So why should he stop?

As I have argued before, we have to close the hybrid/assymetric warfare capability gap and start using our existing capabilities to exact high costs on Putin. We should flexibly employ a full range and mix of hard and soft tools such as

• communications through formal diplomatic channels and/or backchannels,

• more liberal use of attribution,

• significant increase of military and financial support for Ukraine,

• increased support for—and gradual removal of restrictions on—Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia,

• PNG designations and sanctions on Russian individuals,

• other forms of economic coercion,

• disruptive information operations,

• cyber attacks,

• and deniable kinetic attacks in Russia.

The full list is longer. These kinds of retaliatory measures would be intended to demonstrate to Putin that his escalation comes with a high price, and they should be coupled with diplomatic communications and offers of off-ramps for Putin, showing him that there is a way to reduce the cost: for him to step off the escalation staircase. The proponents of appeasement often set up a false choice between diplomacy and deterrence. States have a full range of tools at their disposal—from diplomacy to weapons, and everything in between—and mere talks with Putin will always be futile or worse unless we are simultaneously able to impose high costs on him on the “battlefield.”

Escalation management

I have benefited from discussions with people who have more experience than I do in this field (special shoutout to ), and I may develop my thinking around European hybrid warfare strategy in a co-authored future post about flexible escalation management. Let me just here prefigure this by responding to a likely objection: the risk of uncontrolled escalation and nuclear conflict.

As soon as one proposes retaliatory strikes against Russia, some raise fears of escalation to direct conventional war that could end in a nuclear conflict. These concerns should be taken seriously and not dismissed, but neither must we grant Russia a Pascal’s wager-like nuclear trump card that completely paralyzes us. First of all, even if the US extended deterrence is in doubt, we need to remember that several European states have a nuclear deterrent. Russia may bluster, but starting a nuclear conflict with Europe would come with an unacceptably high price for Moscow.

Second, we can learn from Ukraine, which is fighting a conventional war against a nuclear superpower, even striking deep into its territory without exaggerated fears. Third, we can learn from Russia’s own skillful use of the tools of the grayzone/hybrid domain. One of the reasons that Europe is struggling with how to respond to the recent spate of attacks is that none of them is easily attributable to Russia, and none is big or spectacular enough to provoke an automatic conventional military response. Deniability and salami tactics are key attributes of this type of Russian asymmetric warfare. But two can play that game. Europe, too, can make use of deniability and salami tactics to reduce the risk of escalation.

Escalation is a real risk, but one to be managed, not one to fear so much that one freezes and does nothing.

“We announce today the end of the mission of the Syrian Democratic Forces and announce with full responsibility its dissolution as an independent military force,” SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said in a televised speech. (Quoted in Al Monitor.)

This is in line with an agreement struck on March 10, 2025. Integration stalled after the March agreement, but after government forces initiated a successful military push earlier this year, the SDF relented, and another agreement was negotiated in January of this year. Asharq Al-Awsat reports some of the results of that compromise:

In February, Noureddine Ahmed Eissa, a Kurd from the city of Qamishli, was appointed governor of Hasakeh. In March, senior Kurdish military official Sipan Hamo was appointed regional assistant defense minister.

As part of the deal’s implementation, government forces entered the cities of Hasakeh and Qamishli, and Damascus took over the management of Qamishli airport and key oil fields.

US troops also transferred more than 5,700 ISIS detainees in previously Kurdish-controlled camps to neighboring Iraq.

The concurrent process of disarmament and reintegration of the PKK in Turkey is technically separate from developments in Syria, but the two processes are not unrelated in practice. The Syrian Democratic Forces are led by the PYD and its armed branch, the YPG. They are in turn under the umbrella of the PKK’s regional organization, the KCK. The fact that both the PKK and the SDF militia led by its Syrian sister party, the PYD, are simultaneously dissolving as fighting units is of course not coincidental.

The armed Kurdish struggle in Syria and Turkey is in the process of being transformed into a peaceful political struggle. How that goes depends on many things, but it will certainly be incumbent on Damascus and Ankara to now show Kurds that laying down their arms was the right call, and that they can get some real gains from ordinary politics.

A partial list of hybrid attacks

• Italy, Aug 13: Explosion at KNDS Ammo plant in Colleferro.

• Germany, Aug 7-13: Drone sightings by Mechernich Patriot logistics site.

• Sweden Aug 11: Two Russian nationals with coms radios on SAAB CEO Micael Johansson’s land detained.

• Bulgaria Aug 10: Explosion at Bulgaria’s Emco ammunition depot.

• Sweden Aug 10: Foiled Russian intelligence plot to use a foreign diplomat for influence operation.

• Poland Aug 7: Foiled assassination plot against an American-Ukrainian man.

• Latvia and Romania Aug 7: Drone incidents:
  1. Drone shot down over Latvia.
  2. Drone crashes in Romania.

• Germany Aug 5: Uncovered assassination plot against Stefan Thumann, CEO of German drone company.

• Germany Aug 4-5: Leipzig-Halle Airport drone attacks:
  1. Drone with explosives hit a parked Ukrainian Anatov cargo plane but failed to detonate.
  *2. DHL Boeing 757 cargo freighter hit by drone as it came in for landing & was forced to reroute.
  DNA found on the armed drone has been linked to a 2024 DHL attack.

• Continuous Russian attacks include:
  * Baltics: GPS jamming.
  * Online disinformation operations.
  * Full-scale conventional war on a democratic European country (Ukraine).
  * Cyber attacks.

Add to this list the Ceuta migrant crisis on July 30-31. This was likely a hybrid attack by Morocco, possibly with foreign help, but not necessarily Russia.

We’re in a war, whether we accept it or not

Russia is waging a war against Europe. You think I'm exaggerating? The Russian leadership doesn't care. It verifiably sees Europe as being at war with Russia.

Outside Ukraine, Russia’s war in Europe is asymmetric, not conventional. However, experts on Russian doctrine say that it does not distinguish clearly between the hybrid and conventional domains but rather sees a continuum. And the list above from just two weeks in August suggests that we have entered into a new, hotter phase of this war.

Is Europe ready for this? I have my doubts. I’ll have thoughts on our options in an upcoming post.

För min del säger jag varken bu eller bä om väljarnas val av regering, men jag har ett oortodoxt och åtminstone delvis seriöst förslag: Behåll Pål Jonson som försvarsminister oavsett valresultatet! Kanske drömmer jag här bara, men låt mig förklara (och håll i åtanke när ni läser att jag aldrig har röstat på Påls parti och inte kommer att göra det heller i detta val).

Inspiration från USA

Dagens USA är så djupt polariserat att det kanske förvånar några läsare om jag säger att det där finns en tradition av att utse opartiska försvarsministrar, eller t.o.m. utse medlemmar av det motsatta partiet till just den posten. (I USA heter de förstås “Secretary of Defense”, men rollen är densamma, så jag använder det svenska “minister”.)

Bakgrunden till traditionen är dels att det länge funnits en “bipartisan” överenskommelse mellan huvudfårorna av de två partierna i det amerikanska systemet kring de breda linjerna i utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken: vikten av att upprätthålla allianserna och att underbygga det internationella systemet med amerikansk militärmakt. Genom denna tradition kunde allierade och motståndare ha tilltro till att grundlinjerna i politiken skulle kvarstå trots regeringsskiften.

Dessutom fanns det en allmän uppfattning om att republikaner hade mer trovärdighet när det kom till de “hårda” aspekterna av säkerhetspolitiken. Därför kände särskilt demokratiska presidenter att de behövde övertyga det säkerhetspolitiska etablissemanget och utländska aktörer om att de inte skulle avvika från avskräckning eller allianser. JFK valde därför Republikanen Robert McNamara till sin försvarsminister, Clinton utsåg Senatorn William Cohen, och Obama valde inte bara att behålla Republikanen Robert Gates som utsetts av George W. Bush, utan också att lite senare utse Republikanska senatorn Chuck Hagel efter Gates.

Från Republikanernas sida har man inte riktigt svarat på Demokraternas tradition då man inte har känt samma behov, men under Trumps första mandatperiod utsåg han faktiskt en mycket erfaren och opolitisk general—Jim Mattis—till posten som försvarsminister. Denne—och även i viss mån hans republikanska efterträdare—Mark Esper—hjälpte till att bromsa Trumps värsta instinkter, till presidentens stora förtret. Trump feltolkar dessa framgångsexempel som misstag och har denna gång utsett en politiskt lojal försvarsminister som saknar tillräcklig kompetens: Pete Hegseth. Vi kan alla se hur det går genom att snegla mot kaoset i den Persiska Gulfen.

Sveriges utmaningar är historiska

Sverige är givetvis inte USA och vi har en helt annan politisk tradition. Men traditioner kan brytas, och vi befinner oss i det mest osäkra säkerhetspolitiska läget sedan andra världskriget, med en nästan obegripligt komplex och viktig uppgift framför nästa försvarsminister. Hotbilden är osäker men också potentiellt extremt allvarlig, som en ny rapport från amerikanska Atlantic Council visar:

Kanske vore det med tanke på detta allvarliga ryska hot till och med läge för en samlingsregering. Men en sådan kommer med andra problem, som att den antingen skulle behöva inkludera ytterlighetspartier eller göra dem till den enda reella oppositionen, vilket sannolikt skulle gagna dem politiskt.

Mitt okonventionella förslag är därför att nästa statsminister—oavsett färg!—gör en kompromiss mellan att bilda en samlingsregering och business as usual: behåller Pål Jonson, som kanske får sägas vara den mest kompetenta minister Sverige sett på många årtionden. Detta skulle i praktiken innebära att Magdalena Andersson, som av allt att döma ser ut att bli nästa statsminister, gör något som få svenska politiker före henne gjort. Men politik är, som Bismarck sa och Palme brukade påpeka, det möjligas konst.

Det finns, mig veterligen, åtminstone ett par historiska exempel på opolitiska statsråd utanför samlingsregeringar. Reidunn Laurén var statsråd och biträdande justitieminister i Carl Bildts regering och Dag Hammarskjöld var utrikeshandelsminister i Erlander II. Denna korta lista kan läsas som att det är extremt ovanligt, men också som att det är möjligt.

Det orealistiska är att inte ta uppgiften på allvar

Jag är medveten om att detta är ett okonventionellt och politiskt orealistiskt förslag. Men vi lever i tider där gamla konventioner omkullkastas på löpande band och det som var orealistiskt plötsligt blir en realitet. Hade ni inte också tolkat det som orealistiskt om någon för ett par år sedan varnat för att USA snart skulle hota Danmarks territoriella integritet?

Försvarsministern har en extremt svår och viktig uppgift: att fullfölja en historisk upprustning och omdaning av det svenska försvaret när det varnas för att Ryssland när som helst kan vilja testa NATO:s artikel 5. Detta skall genomföras samtidigt som det pågår vad experter kallar a revolution in military affairs där drönare och automatiserade vapensystem samt AI och radikalt förkortade utvecklingscykler dramatiskt ändrar förutsättningarna för såväl upphandlingar och krigsplanering som taktik och militärens själva uppbyggnad. Detta är en närmast ofattbart svår kombination av utmaningar.

I detta arbete kan inte snäva partipolitiska hänsyn vara vägledande och Pål Jonson är tveklöst den bästa personen att leda det. Låt honom fullfölja uppdraget.

OBS: Nej, jag har inte frågat Pål Jonson själv om han ens vill stanna kvar. Jag tänker att vi i värsta fall får tvinga honom.

What has happened?

On October 22, 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, the aging leader of the ultranationalist Turkish MHP (National Action Party) and President Erdoğan’s ally, made a surprising overture to the jailed PKK leader—Abdullah Öcalan. At the opening of parliament on October 1, he had extended his hands to members of the pro-Kurdish opposition DEM party. Now, he invited his erstwhile mortal enemy to give a speech in parliament in person and call for the PKK to be disbanded. The Öcalan visit never materialized, but the speech marked the beginning of a new round of peace talks with the PKK—the first since talks collapsed into violent fighting in 2015—and the most serious talks to-date.

Öcalan responded by declaring an end to the four-decade-long insurgency against the Turkish state in February of 2025, and called on his party to disarm and formally disband. To the surprise of some observers, the party heeded his call at a general congress in May 2025, and arranged a symbolic burning of some arms in July that same year.

In the meantime, a parliamentary commission worked on developing a legal framework that would guide the remainder of the process. They presented their work in February of this year, but since then, the government has largely been silent on the topic. This led to some dissatisfaction among many Kurdish activists in Turkey and the large Kurdish diaspora, who increasingly feared that the PKK had made concessions but that the government did not seem intent on giving anything in return.

And then this framework law was announced. While the Turkish government does not want to call it an amnesty, it is precisely that, albeit a limited one. One way to think about this is as a standard step in the resolution of conflicts like this. Mediation/conflict resolution experts and the United Nations talk about the components of conflict resolution with the acronym “DDR”: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. The PKK has announced that it is disarming and that it has disbanded (demobilized), so the next step in the process is arranging for the reintegration of former fighters.

The PKK may have announced the first steps (the DD), but the Turkish state will need to ensure that they are actually implemented before fighters are actually allowed to reintegrate (R). The Turkish intelligence agency MIT will oversee the process and the National Security Council (MGK) will certify that they are satisfied. Only when that happens will this framework law allow for PKK members to apply for amnesty. They will then have six months from that date to do so.

The exact nature of the limited amnesty is a little complex, but in broad terms, it applies to anyone accused or convicted of a PKK-related terrorist crime after 2005, murderers excluded. If their application is approved, their sentences would be postponed for five or ten years depending on the severity of the crime. If no new crimes are committed during that period, charges will be dropped, and sentences will be considered as having been served. They will also be allowed to engage in politics and stand for office after a waiting period that varies depending on the crime.

The law could apply to nearly 4,000 prisoners in Turkey, to a large number of PKK fighters in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and elsewhere accused or convicted of terrorist crimes. It could mean that the jailed leaders of the pro-Kurdish party—Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ—could be freed, but it would not cover Öcalan, the PKK leader who has been jailed since 1999, often in solitary confinement, in his island prison on Imralı.

Technically, the PKK has already ended its violent struggle, but it ain’t over until the fat lady sings. If the process unfolds as it could—with the PKK actually disarming and demobilizing its fighters, and with the MGK confirming this—then this will have been a major step towards ending a 42-year conflict that has claimed over 40,000 lives and complicated Turkey’s relations with international bodies and European allies.

Why is it happening now?

The AKP government has tried to end the conflict several times before, so this is not something entirely new. Erdoğan’s party comes out of a tradition of political Islam that has a nationalist streak, but it is not as pronounced as in many of the other parties in parliament. That may help explain why he might be more open to talking to the PKK, but not why the ultranationalist MHP would be. I see three broad explanations for this determined push by the two allied parties as the most likely ones:

First, the MHP leader Bahçeli’s invitation came in 2024, after Israel was not only fighting a war with Hamas in Gaza but had also attacked Iran, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Qatar. Israel’s shift post-October 7 towards a much more aggressive and offensive security posture seems to have prompted serious thinkers in Ankara (in which I include then intelligence chief, now foreign minister Hakan Fidan, EDIT: I am told that it is rather Ibrahim Kalin who is the thinker behind the push, alongside Bahçeli) to determine that Turkey was too vulnerable as long as the conflict with the PKK remained unresolved. Ankara is of course aware of Israel’s longstanding “periphery doctrine”—that is, of supporting oppositional or separatist minority groups in neighboring countries as a way of disrupting them—and was apparently concerned about the prospect of the PKK being used as a proxy by Israel.

I think that it is safe to say that the new rivalry between Turkey and Israel was a key driver, but other geopolitical developments in the neighborhood may also have shaped Ankara’s thinking. Iran, having seen its proxies weakened after the fighting with Israel, might also be expected to look around the region for new proxies. While it is engaged in an armed conflict of its own against PJAK, the Iranian branch of the PKK, Ankara appears to have felt that it was better not to leave any adversarial powers openings. Developments in Syria, where the YPG—the group’s Syrian branch—was in negotiations with the new Ankara-friendly government in Damascus to resolve that conflict, almost certainly also played into the Turkish government's estimation that too many moving parts in the region left Turkey vulnerable.

Second, the PKK may not have been completely defeated, but it is at least seriously weakened. The brutal fighting in 2015 and 2016 left hundreds or perhaps even thousands dead and displaced perhaps as many as half a million displaced. The PKK has retreated to the Kandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan, where they are assaulted by Turkish ground troops, drones, and aircraft. From Ankara’s point of view, the current process is thus almost tantamount to an orderly capitulation by the PKK. They don’t speak of a peace process but of a “terror-free Turkey.”

From the point of view of the broader Kurdish movement, many feel that the PKK has outplayed its usefulness. The armed struggle now means that anyone who is engaged in Kurdish politics risks getting slapped with terrorism charges. A resolution to the violent conflict could mean that the “Kurdish issue” writ large can become de-securitized. That may make it easier for Kurds to argue their case in public.

Third, Erdoğan’s alliance with the MHP has failed to produce reliable majorities in recent elections. That means that he needs to find additional electoral support, and by making concessions to the Kurds, he may be able to get their votes. That would divide the opposition at a time when judicial attacks on the largest opposition party—the Republican People’s Party (CHP)—have created a deep fracture in the party that even led to the creation of an offshoot party—the New Party (YENİ Parti). That might be enough for Erdoğan to secure an absolute majority in the next presidential elections, should he choose to run again.

The 2015 negotiations collapsed for many reasons, but among them was the fact that the pro-Kurdish party then refused to support Erdoğan’s ambitions to create a presidential system. The current leadership of the DEM party will surely have learned the harsh lesson: They can choose to stand against the autocrat in charge OR support the PKK’s peace talks with him, but not both. The assumption is also that he is dangling the prospect of cultural/language rights enshrined in a new constitution if they support it. Incidentally, a new constitution would also mean that he could run for another five-year term, which he is currently barred from doing. It all comes together neatly in the end.

What is this not?

This suggests rather transparently that while this may signal a lasting end to the violent conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, it does not contribute to democratization in Turkey. Some of the literature on conflict resolution and much commentary on the PKK conflict rely on a somewhat normative assumption that ending conflict and democratization go hand in hand. I fear that that may be too facile an assumption and have written about autocratic conflict resolution with a colleague, Imren Borsuk Eroğlu. The current process is an illustration of the complexities of these issues.

Morover, while this may be an important step towards the end of violent conflict, it is not necessarily a resolution to the “Kurdish issue” if we by this mean the tension between a unitary state in which Turkishness is nearly a holy idea, and a desire on the part of some Kurds for recognition of their separateness as a people and perhaps for some degree of autonomy for predominantly Kurdish parts that they—but definitely not the Turkish state—call Northern Kurdistan.

Not all Kurds complain about discrimination, but those who, e.g., want to be able to speak one of the Kurdish dialects freely and openly without fear of retribution do. This conflict is about collective identities, about uneven development, infrastructure investments, education, culture, media, centralization versus devolution, and many other things. The PKK took up arms influenced by militant ideals about radical armed struggle, but it was also a response to real grievances. The DEM party will have to pursue the Kurdish cause solely by political means from now on, and this may not be easy when they gather only 10-16 percent nationally.

Moreover, while the relationship between conflict resolution and democratization is not as straightforward as critical scholarship has sometimes made it out to be, the fact that Turkey has become a deeply autocratic state means that the political struggle for recognition of Kurdish rights won’t be easy for the DEM party.

Risks going forward

There are lessons from attempts to resolve similar conflicts around the world. Where the process of resolving the “troubles” in Northern Ireland succeeded, but the Colombian peace process between the state and the FARC guerrilla partially failed, was in the sequencing between the DDR components and the commitment by the state to live up to its side of the bargain. Sinn Féin’s political inclusion came with the 1998 Good Friday agreement, years before the full disarmament of the IRA (2005). In Colombia, the FARC disarmed and demobilized first, but the government’s implementation of the 2016 JEP accords lagged. This and the fact that the FARC’s political party has performed dismally at the polls have led some former FARC members to pick up arms again in the “Segunda Marquetalia” and the EMC factions.

The Turkish process differs from both of these in the almost complete absence of international monitoring and verification instruments. From what I can tell at the moment, it is almost entirely up to the security structures in the Turkish state to monitor and verify that the PKK has lived up to its commitments. And once it has done so, it will be up to Turkish judges and institutions to live up to theirs. Ankara sees this as basically a capitulation by the PKK, and the process is thus largely in Ankara’s hands.

Kurds may not be left entirely to Erdoğan’s goodwill, however. The fact that he will be relying on the continued political cooperation of the DEM party to implement his agenda may mean that he will have an incentive not to defect from the process even after the PKK has demobilized and disarmed. The AKP and DEM parties will remain mutual political hostages to each other, so to speak. Still, the risks to the peace process going forward are significant.

One such risk factor comes from external actors like Iran, or more likely, Israel. Fears that Kurdish fighters may receive support from foreign adversaries that wanted to destabilize Turkey were a driving force behind the peace initiative. The Turkish-Israeli rivalry does not show any signs of softening, so Mossad may well want to spoil the process. I have written before about the Israeli plans to encourage Iranian Kurdish parties to make a move against Tehran. Tensions are high at the moment, with Iranian Kurdish militias conducting an assassination campaign targeting Kurds who are collaborating with the Iranian regime, and the IRGC and Iraqi militias aligned with Iran striking against Kurdish targets in both Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan. That fighting could well interact with the Turkish process in unpredictable ways if it escalates.

Another potential hurdle is that while most parties in parliament voted in favor of the framework law, my hunch is that public skepticism against even a limited amnesty is much more widespread than those votes suggest. The hatred against the PKK, which has conducted spectacular terrorism attacks in Turkey since 1984, runs deep in Turkey. It is significant that the amnesty law was formulated so as to exclude not only those PKK fighters who have been convicted of murder, but especially to exclude Abdullah Öcalan, whom the Turkish press long called “the baby killer.” Kurds have their grievances, but so do many Turks, and feelings can run very hot on this topic. Even if the government is committed to live up to its promises, it will be running a delicate balance between doing so and not angering too many ordinary Turks, not to mention hardcore nationalists.

This attempt to end the conflict has gone further than any previous attempt. It would be an exaggeration to say that we are just at the beginning of the end. But there is still some way to go, and plenty of hurdles on the road ahead.

While it may be a while before we learn with certainty exactly what prompted 70,000 migrants to suddenly rush into the small Spanish territory in North Africa from neighboring Morocco, I think that it is safe to assume that Tocci is broadly correct. The crisis was probably manufactured and certainly amplified. There are multiple media accounts of Moroccan police encouraging Moroccans to get to Ceuta and videos supposedly showing Moroccan police standing by as trucks unload hundreds of migrants. Ukraine’s foreign minister noted that Russian accounts pushed 1,500 stories about the crisis, and Musk and his army of right-wing followers on X were not far behind.

Using migrants as “weapons” to pressure neighbors is an established practice, and Morocco has been accused of doing it before. While rumors on social media can emerge and gain a life on their own, I think that it would be naive to deny that this was almost certainly orchestrated and that Moroccan authorities played a key role in it. Given that some 70 people died in the incident, this would be a very serious crime; perhaps a violation of the Rome Statute’s prohibition against forcible transfer of populations.

Unfortunately, we also know that other actors have used refugee weaponization as an instrument of hybrid warfare before: Hungary, Turkey, the UAE, and most prominently, Russia. Did Morocco do this alone or did it have help and encouragement from other actors? Tocci notes correctly that Russia, Israel, and the Trump administration might have interests in attacking Europe and Spain.

I will remain agnostic on the matter until there is more evidence. However, assuming Ceuta was a deliberate covert operation by Moroccan actors—alone or in cooperation with other external foes of Spain and Europe—how would the team behind the op evaluate it and Europe’s response? I think that it could be worthwhile to imagine their reasoning to see our own response from an adversary’s perspective. To do a red team analysis of sorts, if you will.

Hence: let’s say I were an intelligence operative tasked with covert actions and influence operations aimed at hurting the sitting government in Spain and undermining Europe. I work either for Morocco or for another foreign government that has beef with Spain and Europe (I’ll be vague and let your imagination run wild here since there really are several possible candidates) to manufacture a temporary migrant crisis in the Spanish territory of Ceuta on the Mediterranean coast of Africa. What would my report after the conclusion of the active measure look like?

Spoiler alert: The main conclusion would not be kind to European states and the way that they handled it:

Fears of migration remain one of the most fruitful topics for further active measures. European politicians are easily manipulated and reflexive control is firmly in our hands. Divisions can easily be exacerbated and Europe weakened by playing on political divisions on this topic and others like it.

Europe really needs to be better prepared and avoid the main trap of internal division. As the saying goes: United we stand, divided we fall.

Rapport d’Action Opération “Ceuta2026” (fictive)

• Location: Morocco and Ceuta, Spain

• Date: July 30-31, 2026

• Note: Conducted simultaneously with a separate media influence operation called “#August1”

Concept: Large numbers of migrants were encouraged to swarm the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, bordering Morocco. Repeat of 2021 action on a larger scale (see Rapport d’Action Opération “Ceuta2021”).

Execution:

• A team of six people carried out the operation in cooperation with police.

• On the morning of July 30, operatives knocked on doors in Castillejos/Fnideq and encouraged residents to leave for Ceuta.

• Police were instructed to encourage and aid movement to Ceuta.

• Social media posts claiming that the border was open were posted on several platforms.

• 60-80,000 people swarmed Ceuta in a span of two days.

• Ca 70 deaths due to drowning or stampede.

Objectives:

1. Destabilize the Pedro Sanchez government.

2. Impose costs on Sanchez for refusing to align with our foreign policy objectives.

3. Exacerbate disruptive conditions between EU member states.

4. Improve position of oppositional far-right, anti-establishment parties within the EU.

Evaluation of results:

1. Destabilize govt objective met. Polling is not yet available in Spain, but Sanchez has been much weakened by attacks from multiple EU member state governments. He has been forced on the defensive.

2. Impose cost objective met. Madrid government has indicated that they understand that this was a controlled measure, in response to Madrid’s unwillingness to meet requirements.

3. EU division objective met. Italian government closed border to Spain and 22 EU member states sent a letter to the European Commission accusing him and Spain of creating “a pull factor” for migration with his migration policy. Sanchez has hit back. Internal European divisions exceeded our expectations. This confirms our established analysis that migration is the number one weakness in Europe and remains highly ripe for targeting.

4. Enhance far right objective met. Polling is not yet available, but social & tabloid media images and coverage that evoke memories of the 2015-15 refugee crisis (see Rapport d’Action Opération “Syria2015”), coupled with our own media and social media Operation “#August1” that immediately amplified those fears, were readily taken up by anti-establishment parties on the right. Mainstream parties on the right/center right played into the narrative, with public statements blaming the Spanish government and raising the spectre of another migrant crisis. Our analysis is that this will contribute to our objective of bringing down establishment governments in Europe and replacing them with far-right parties more amenable to our points of view.

   Coverage in European media was extensive and included pictures and videos of thousands of migrants climbing border fences and emerging en masse out of the sea. Headlines in right-wing tabloids prominently included “Invasion”. Media links included in the appendix.

Conclusions and recommendations:

Fears of migration remain one of the most fruitful topics for further active measures. European politicians are easily manipulated and reflexive control is firmly in our hands. Divisions can easily be exacerbated and Europe weakened by playing on political divisions on this topic and others like it.

The op yet again revealed that the European Union’s ability to quickly act in a cohesive fashion is weak, and External Action Service measures are non-existent or toothless. Member states focus on populist media commentary as opposed to centralised, productive efforts.

Combining active measures like “Ceuta” with pre-planned Info Ops like “#August1” that use media and social media to stoke division, fear, and hatred remains highly effective against a Europe in which politics is still national.

Appendix: Media Coverage

Breitbart’s headline was explicit: "Ceuta 'Invasion': 49,000+ Illegals Swim to Spanish Territory in 24 Hours." Link: https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2026/07/31/ceuta-invasion-49000-illegals-swim-to-spanish-territory-in-24-hours/

The Daily Signal ran a piece titled “Ceuta Invasion Is the Predictable Result of Spanish Amnesty,” which explicitly framed the crossings as a modern echo of the 8th-century Umayyad conquest of Iberia. Link: https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/07/30/ceuta-invasion-is-the-predictable-result-of-spanish-amnesty/

German outlet Tichys Einblick (opinion/movement site, not a tabloid but influential in that space) ran the headline “Invasion: Knapp 50.000 Menschen überrollen binnen 24 Stunden Ceuta” (”Invasion: Nearly 50,000 people overrun Ceuta within 24 hours”), describing arrivals as “Invasoren” (invaders) throughout. Link: https://www.tichyseinblick.de/kolumnen/aus-aller-welt/marokko-ceuta-europa/

Journalistenwatch (German far-right outlet) ran “Invasion auf Ceuta,” quoting AfD parliamentary spokesman Gottfried Curio. Link: https://journalistenwatch.com/2026/08/01/invasion-auf-ceuta-der-kanzler-schwafelt-die-afd-will-handeln/

Notes:

My after-action “report” is of course entirely fictional, but I based it loosely on the format of a real after-action report by a group of Serbian nationals working for Russian intelligence. The group reported back to their handlers an information op where “Ten severed pig heads were delivered to mosques and Muslim cultural centers in Paris, each marked on the forehead with "MACRON" in blue marker or another permanent ink.” The full report in Russian can be found here: https://dossier.center/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/980988765576e78-Otchet-ob-Aktsii-Svinaya-golova.pdf

Thanks to for feedback on an earlier draft of this post.

Entropy is one of those concepts in physics that often gets misunderstood and co-opted by writers like myself, who have no training in the natural sciences. It’s a classic case of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. Once one begins to learn about the concept and the Law and realizes its implications, it is easy to be filled with an existential dread, if one is so predisposed.

But the video had an uplifting ending, and I watched to the end and am here to tell you that we should feel good about entropy, not bad. Let me explain.

Thermodynamics is, put simply, the branch of physics that deals with heat and energy. (I Googled it.) Entropy is a measure of the disorder and randomness of any given system. (Yeah, I Googled that, too). In the unlikely case you don’t have the laws of thermodynamics memorized, here is a reminder of the first two, much simplified:

The First Law of Thermodynamics states that energy cannot disappear, only be rearranged.

The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that in a closed system, you cannot transfer heat (energy) from a colder body to a hotter one, only the other way around. Basically, the colder body will become warmer until both are evenly warm. Put another way, energy tends to spread out and become less useful, in an irreversible process.

(Caveat: If the reference to Google and “a YouTube video” did not already give it away, let me be very clear: I am not a natural scientist, much less an expert on thermodynamics. Pedants can point out the errors in the comments section. But I think that I am getting this right enough for my purposes, anyway.)

So why might the sensitive soul be bothered by the second law? Well, it basically says that everything is decaying. We see it all around us, but also in ourselves, if we are being honest. We grow older and die, and the physical energy in our bodies dissipates into the world as heat and fertilizer for the soil, which is less useful than we are now. (At least less useful than most of us.) For anyone prone to anxiety over their mortality, the realization that there is a LAW of nature that states that decay is an inevitable, constant, and ever-present condition of all matter in the universe can open up a whole can of existential worms.

One way to describe entropy is that it is what happens when you drop an egg on the floor. Before the fall, the egg is ordered, and its parts are distinct from each other. Once it hits the floor, it disassembles, with the yolk and the white of the egg getting smeared out and the shell fractured into lots of pieces. What’s more, it is impossible to reverse the process and put the egg back together.

Our lives are a more stretched-out version of the egg getting smashed on the floor. A gradual diffusion of energy and order, impossible to reverse.

And if you want a dose of real existential angst, chew on this: The Second Law tells us that the universe tends towards greater entropy, i.e., the dispersion of energy and heat. If we follow the logic, that means that we are all careening towards the inevitable “heat death” of the universe, in which energy and heat are so diffused and low that everything ultimately just stops. It is the “thermodynamic equilibrium” in which no further reordering or change is possible. At that point, physicists tell us, even time itself stops existing.

OK now, take a deep breath. I am here to tell you that there is no reason to panic. Here’s what else the science apparently tells us.

The beginning of the universe wasn’t that great either. It had extremely low entropy, which means that energy and heat were highly organized and concentrated. The time around the Big Bang wouldn’t have been a great time for humans to hang around. In fact, it is only thanks to the rise in entropy, to the increasing disorder and diffusion of the extreme energies of the universe at the time of the Big Bang, that the conditions for life emerged. The perfectly organized energy spread out and started lumping together to form galaxies, stars, and planets. These were all more diffuse forms of energy, so higher entropy. But without them, we would not exist. We live on a planet and are completely dependent on our star for life. Hence, the diffusion and decay described by entropy is not so bad after all.

The video I mentioned at the beginning describes life on Earth as made possible by the energy our sun provides. That is hardly a revolutionary insight, but if you think of everything that happens on Earth as merely an instantiation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, it changes the way you think about life (and decay). The energy from the sun fuels plant life via photosynthesis (the process by which plants make oxygen out of sunlight). Herbivores eat plants, carnivores eat herbivores, and omnivores like us consume both plants and animals. Basically, this means we consume the sun’s energy in a more diffuse, diluted form.

In turn, we continue the dispersion of the sun’s energy in a more diffuse form. It fuels our movements and thoughts, and our bodies give off heat and vapor. We excrete what our bodies can’t use, and when we eventually pass away, we disperse the energy in our bodies to the soil or as heat in the atmosphere. This goes for us and all life on Earth. Collectively, we disperse all the energy that the sun provides us back into the universe, only in more diffuse and disorganized forms.

We could, then, see ourselves as the vehicles for the diffusion of the sun’s energy. I find that beautiful. There’s the saying that we are all made out of stardust, and given the laws of thermodynamics, we truly are built on the energy from the stars.

And entropy is not just about disorganization. It also allows for complexity. Physicists tell us that another, perhaps better, way of thinking about entropy is that higher entropy means more options and possibilities. In a low-entropy state, particles have fewer possible configurations. When entropy increases, possibilities increase. Think of the molecules in the egg. They are more or less stable. But when you drop it on the floor, the number of possible arrangements increases greatly. Our bodies and life on Earth constitute more diffuse forms of energy than what comes from the sun, but they are also much more complex.

And the complexity of life on Earth is truly astounding. Evolution has given rise to creatures able to sing and write poetry and reflect upon their own existence. If that is the result of the decay of the energy from our sun, I’ll take it any day over the unpleasantries of the universe at the time of the Big Bang.

If we zoom back out again, towards the vast time horizons of the universe, I prefer to think of our existence as just perfectly timed. Instead of worrying about a heat death that will occur eons from now, why not think about the inconceivably extraordinary luck that we exist at a time where the degree of entropy is just right for that to even be possible? Our cosmic lottery ticket of attempted existence was much more likely to have been drawn when the degree of entropy was too low or too high for a winning ticket to mean much. Instead, we happened to occur in the Goldilocks moment of entropy, of decay, where life is possible and can flourish.

Or perhaps that is the wrong way to think about it. Maybe the lottery of existence only occurs at a time and place where life is possible. Fine. That still means that we have entropy to thank for our existence. It has created the perfect time and place for us to appear.

So, entropy may be an unavoidable law that governs everything. But think of it not as decay but as what makes us live and create, and as the process by which we help spread the energy of our star to the rest of the universe.

That’s not so bad.

What is the meaning of life? Maybe I’m just experiencing a midlife crisis, but for whatever reason, I have been giving a lot of thought to this question recently. If I were a Christian or Muslim or believer in some other religion, this would arguably be an easier question to answer. I was created by a God who had a plan for me. Things that happened in my life, even sad things like the sudden death of a loved one, could be given meaning as part of that plan.

Unfortunately for me, I’m an atheist, which means that I do not have access to those kinds of explanations. So, what is the meaning of my life if there is no God and no greater cosmic plan?

This is a profound question, and here is my, perhaps shocking, answer: Our lives have no intrinsic meaning.

Before you go kill yourself, hear me out, because it’s not as bad as it sounds. It’s not bad at all, in fact.

First of all, I think that the very question is premised on a misunderstanding of sorts. We look for meaning mainly because our brains have evolved to make us look for it even where it makes no sense.

Apparently, much of our brain—our computing capacity, if you will—is geared toward the extremely complex task of reading intentions behind other human beings’ facial expressions, actions, and words. There is a reason for this. Those past humans who failed to see that a scowl meant that someone was angry or that a raised spear meant that someone was poised to attack them did not survive to reproduce as often as our ancestors did. Our forefathers (and foremothers) survived in no small part because they were good at reading such intentions. They were also eventually able to communicate with words and could outcompete other groups that were less good at collaborating in the complex ways that language made possible. In other words, we have evolved to be extremely good at seeing meaning.

We are therefore genetically and physiologically predisposed to interpret intentions and meanings behind people’s actions. We are pretty good at distinguishing between an involuntary twitch and a meaningful wink. We can usually distinguish between the sounds of a cough or sneeze and the meaningful, intentional words in an uttered sentence. That apparently takes A LOT of our brain capacity. It is an amazing ability.

But like all traits that have evolved, it isn’t perfect, and it has some unintended side effects. Our predisposition to read intention behind actions and words means that we sometimes overdo it. Sometimes what we interpret as a wink was actually just an involuntary twitch. Psychologists claim that we are prone to making what they call the “fundamental attribution error.” This is the error of attributing ill intentions behind harmful behavior by others, whereas we tend to blame the environment or other external factors when we engage in similar behaviors ourselves. (Just think about how you view other drivers compared to your own driving, when behind the wheel and stuck in traffic.)

I believe we are also prone to making similar mistakes when interpreting natural events or occurrences in our lives. Think of our brains as overactive machines designed mainly to infer intentions behind the things that other machines do. Pascal Boyer and Justin L. Barrett named this “machine” our Hyperactive Agency Detection Device. Such overactive machines may tend to “anthropomorphize,” to see inanimate objects as if they were meaning-machines, i.e., humans, and to see natural events as if they were the result of actions by humans or human-like beings. Following David Hume, the anthropologist Stewart Guthrie made anthropomorphism the central dynamic in his explanation of religion.

In the early Christian chronicles that describe natural disasters like earthquakes or plagues, the calamities are almost ubiquitously described as punishments for the sins of the people affected by them. In other words, the events did not just happen but had a meaning; they were messages from God that just needed to be decoded.

It is not a coincidence that such chronicles focused on natural disasters. I think that our instinct to attribute meaning and purpose to events is especially powerful when it comes to things that affect us in profound ways. When terrible things happen to us, we have a strong urge to try to “make sense” of them, to see a meaning behind them. And we are not satisfied with factual answers such as “my family member died in a car crash because there was a thick fog that made it difficult for a truck driver to see far enough ahead to be able to stop in time.” We want to know the “meaning” behind their death in a deeper sense. “Why was Johnny taken from us at such a young age? What purpose did his death serve?”

The religions all provide such answers. “He died because God loved him and wanted him near.” Or, less benign if we are talking about a suicide bomber, but no less meaningful to those who believe it: “He died/I will die as a martyr for Allah.” In the worst-case scenario, religions only give us vague answers like “God’s ways are mysterious,” but even then, it gives faithful mourners comfort to believe that God has a plan, even if it is incomprehensible to us.

Such faith can indeed give comfort and aid, and I don’t want to deny it to anyone. I just cannot believe it myself, much as I cannot make myself believe in fairytales, even if it would be nice to do so. Instead, I am left with a realization that our search for “meaning” in life may be what philosophers call a category mistake. Meaning requires agency and intention. If there were a Creator who made us, he (because it usually is a “he” for some reason) could have an intention in doing so. He could well have created us for a purpose. In that sense, our lives would have meaning in the same way that a person’s spoken words have meaning, a meal was created to be eaten, or a chair is meant to be sat on.

However, if (as I am convinced) there is no Creator, then we were not made with any intention in mind. Our species evolved, and we were born. The closest thing we could come to a Creator would perhaps be our parents, who may well have created us with an intention. If they are alive, we could of course ask them what they intended our purpose to be, but I suspect that many adults would find that as unsatisfying as I do. Some of us were accidental creations, and even if our parents did have a plan for us, it doesn’t follow that we need to accept their view on the meaning of our lives.

When I say that life has no meaning, I mean only this: There is no intention behind it. Meaning is something given by an agent. Imputing meaning to non-intentional things or happenings is a mistake. Hence, looking for “meaning” in life is, in this sense, a category mistake. It is confusing different categories of things. Things created by agents with a purpose versus things that have evolved.

If this is so, why do I say that this is ok? Should this not be a reason for a terrible existential angst? I don’t think so. For one thing, meaning and value are two distinct things. Just because there was no supernatural Creator who made us with a given purpose doesn’t mean that our lives lack value. We do, in fact, value our own lives and those of the people we care about. If we did not value our own lives, we would have died long ago. Sometimes, we may be so sad or depressed that we can’t see the value, and some people do such evil things as to not be of value to others, but there are as many secular ethical systems as there are religions that affirm that human life has intrinsic value.

Moreover, we do not care about things, seek purpose and meaning because some God has laid out a plan for us, but because this is how we are endowed, how we have evolved. We have feelings and seek pleasure, but also challenges, and want to grow and learn. We thrive in social interactions, feel good when we do good things for others, and feel bad if we hurt others. We do not stop having all of those drivers and sentiments just because we realize that there is no God who created us with a purpose.

This leads me to the final point about the category mistake. There are still lots of things in our lives that can be meaningful to us and give us a sense of purpose. There may not be any supernatural agent, but we have agency. I did not create myself with a purpose, but I am perfectly free to decide that helping others or reaching my full potential is the purpose of my life.

In this sense, giving up on the religious view of the world is not anxiety-inducing but exciting. It gives you agency. Granted, it is more challenging. You will have to decide between worldviews and philosophies, or perhaps create one yourself, rather than simply accepting one. But then again, why should you accept a mythical narrative that is based on what some people wrote thousands of years ago and was imposed upon you as a child by virtue of where you happen to be born?

So, accept that you were not created with a preordained purpose, and then go out and give your life meaning!

As a (recovering?) transatlanticist myself, it saddens me to say that I fear that America won’t be back as a reliable partner for quite some time. Such predictions are never certain, but there are reasons European leaders should be concerned. Let me explain.

Is Trump the symptom or the disease?

There is a bit of a debate in the US and around the world about whether Trump is the source of the problem or whether he is, in fact, just a symptom of a much deeper “disease.” I dislike the latter word since it evokes notions of a “cancer” that needs to be “cut out” of the body politique. That’s unironically awful stuff. I use the metaphor in the sense of “problem.”

I think the answer is clearly “yes.” He is both.

Trump is the problem

You cannot have a sociopath and pathological liar who suffers from malignant narcissistic personality disorder and surrounds himself with ideological extremists and corrupt oligarchs holding the most powerful office in the world and not expect a bad outcome. In other words, Trump is the “disease,” so to speak, or rather the cause of many problems.

One has to be blinded by ideology to dismiss the damage that the person Donald Trump, with all his pathologies—his constant lies, his cognitive inabilities, his crude selfishness, and his stunning, outlandish corruption—is doing. This used to be a problem on the American far left, where it was common to argue that all mainstream politicians were equally corrupt and that it wouldn’t matter if George W. Bush or Al Gore won, or if Hillary or Trump won. My own view is that they can tell that to the Iraqis that Bush invaded, to the climate, or to women in red states seeking an abortion. But to the people making this argument, the “establishment” and the “Uniparty” would rule anyway, backed or directed by the military-industrial complex or some such nefarious actor. (In the far right version of this narrative, “globalists” or Jews played the role of the bad guys steering things behind the scenes.)

I honestly don’t really feel a need to argue this point. The scale of corruption is a quick and easy way to illustrate why it is frankly nothing short of absurd to suggest that Trump and his MAGA movement are not in and of themselves a qualitatively different and massive problem, as opposed to a mere symptom. Was there corruption in US politics before Trump? Undoubtedly. But let’s put things in perspective.

The “greatest and most sensational scandal in the history of American politics” before Watergate was arguably the so-called Teapot Dome Scandal. That scandal involved oil-industry bribes in the Warren G. Hardin administration to the tune of around $9 million (in today’s currency). The House Oversight Committee has identified $9,7 BILLION in realized profits for Trump “from foreign payments, corrupt oligarchs, and others” when digital assets are factored in. Rounding down to 9 billion, that means that Trump’s corruption is roughly a THOUSAND times worse than the worst corruption scandal in US history before Trump. Moreover, the Teapot Dome Scandal was investigated, a cabinet official (Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior) was sentenced to jail, and laws were changed to prevent it from happening again. The Trump family’s corruption is out in the open, and he regularly pardons those who bribe him.

The scale of the corruption problem illustrates the undeniable fact that Trump is more than just a symptom of a deeper problem. A thousand times more. If you are a committed Transatlanticist, this could actually seem like good news. If Trump is the problem, that should mean that as soon as he is gone, the problem is gone as well, right? Not so fast.

Trump is also just a symptom

So yes, Trump is more than just the symptom of an underlying malaise. However, he is also that: the symptom of an underlying problem. First of all, the American electorate chose him despite all the information about who he was and about his character. And they did so not once, but twice. But surely they must have learned their lesson now?

Well, a quick search for the most popular US politics podcasts suggests that disaster lies ahead, not salvation. Four of the top five podcasts are by far-right pundits of varying degrees of lunacy. I deem it likely that Tucker Carlson—who interviews Holocaust deniers and Vladimir Putin—will run for President in 2032, perhaps even in 2028. (After I started drafting this post, Carlson declared that he is indeed “going to help build a third party.”) I do not deem it impossible that Candace Owens—who believes that French assassins are out to get her because she claims that the wife of French President Emanuel Macron is secretly a man—will run as well.

Megyn Kelly has jumped up in the podcast rankings thanks to maddeningly racist rants, and Matt Walsh is a proponent of the Great Replacement Theory, a conspiracy that you would once mainly find in neo-nazi circles, who describes himself (jokingly, surely) as a “theocratic fascist.” The experience of Trump has not made Americans lose their taste for crazy. Far from it.

Media and party

This points to an underlying problem that I think is rooted in culture, education, and the media ecosystem in the United States that has been developed by the right flank of the Republican Party since the 1970s. The religious right has deliberately fostered an anti-science, anti-intellectual, and anti-government culture that now is lending itself very well to right-wing populist demagogues like Donald Trump or Candace Owens. Beginning with the expansion of right-wing talk shows on local radio stations across the country, with figures like Rush Limbaugh turning news into perpetual political campaigns, and national news as polemical entertainment on the Fox News channel, the right-wing information sphere has today ballooned to include multiple vast media empires on legacy as well as new/social media.

Claims and theories that sound crazy to normal people’s ears—untrained by years of consumption of conspiracy theories and disinformation in the right-wing media universe—sound perfectly believable to regular viewers of OAN/OANN or the now-defunct InfoWars1. This entire media ecosystem will remain even after Trump is gone, and it has its own logic: One that produces consumers/voters who will vote in ways that won’t produce thoughtful leaders of the Western alliance.

The origins of the decline of the Republican Party as a serious and pro-democracy party can be found in the middle of the 20th century, with Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, Nixon’s Southern Strategy of “positive polarization” (appealing to racist voters in the South), and Lee Atwater’s hardball campaigning as key early landmarks. Newt Gingrich was arguably a pivotal figure in transforming the culture of the party, with his GOPAC memos outlining the words with which to smear Democrats (words like “sick,” “traitors,” and “corruption”). At some point, politics became anything-goes warfare to Republican operatives like Roger Ailes, Karl Rove, and Roger Stone. All that mattered was winning, at any cost.

Now, Trump has consolidated control of the GOP, with his daughter-in-law, Lara Trump, even briefly serving as co-head of the Republican National Convention (now chaired by Trump’s longtime political ally from Florida, Joe Gruters). Any GOP candidates for office or party officials and staff hired in recent years will have been MAGA adherents and Trump loyalists. Wresting back control over the party from the MAGA populists, Christian nationalists, and even White Power accelerationists that now dominate it would take time and could get very rowdy.

State capture

In addition to the media and the party, right-wing Republicans have successfully played the long game on several other fronts and have now achieved major victories: a partial capture of the judicial branch and an ongoing packing of government agencies.

The current 6-3 conservative majority on the Supreme Court (SCOTUS) is not an accident. It is the result of nearly half a century of planning and action by groups like the Federalist Society. The fruits of their efforts to promote increasingly extreme right-wing candidates for judicial appointments are visible not just in SCOTUS but throughout the American judiciary. These groups will remain even after Trump is gone, and the appointments they have been able to push through will remain. Supreme Court justices sit for life.

One of the most underappreciated developments right now may be the ongoing packing of US agencies, including the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, with thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of MAGA loyalists. Ads for, e.g., ICE agents clearly target candidates who share the administration’s narrative of an “invasion of criminals and predators.” While experienced counterterrorism or cyber experts are reassigned to work on immigration-related cases or other similarly ideological topics, an entire generation of MAGA-aligned civil servants is being added to the US government.

There are additional underlying factors that contribute to the strength of the populist far right in America, of which I would merely mention two:

First, the now practically unregulated and unhindered presence of money in politics, in large part thanks to the calamitous 2010 SCOTUS Citizens United decision. Obama’s revolutionary crowd-funding campaign shows that the impact of money in politics is not linear or always easy to predict, but it would be foolish to dismiss the dangers of the practically unlimited abilities of billionaires (and trillionaires) and corporations to fund candidates, parties, and causes in American politics today.

Second, the now quite extraordinary economic inequalities in the US, along with such oddities for advanced economies as the complete lack of universal healthcare.

In sum, I am the first to argue that Trump’s rather unique personal qualities make him a hugely consequential President. However, there are also deeply rooted structural, cultural, legal, and institutional dynamics that enabled his rise and which will outlast him, as well as changes that his administration is currently making that will last. That has consequences for European policymakers.

The Next Administration’s Options

Given that Trump likes to joke about a third term and that he clearly has serious difficulties accepting election defeats, it is a bit bold to assume that he will graciously accept the term limits set out by the Constitution. Other strongmen, like Putin and Erdogan, have found ways around such limits, so I would not be surprised if his advisors aren’t at least looking for ways for him to stay on. One possibility is therefore that he somehow attempts to cling to power even after 2028. That could turn very turbulent. Both a fully autocratic America and an America embroiled in societal conflict would quite obviously be bad for Europe.

But if we assume that the quest for ideas for how to stay in power turns up empty, or that even this SCOTUS majority has certain limits when it comes to the degrees of its politicization, current polling and past precedents suggest that we are likely to see a Democratic president in 2028. What would such an administration do about the judicial capture and packing of agencies with loyalists outlined above? What would they do about the mind-boggling levels of corruption on all levels of this administration? There are, as I see it, three options: The Merrick Garland way, revenge, and fair accountability. Unfortunately, none of these is likely to enable the US to return as a trustworthy ally to Europe in short order.

1. The Merrick Garland Way

After the first Trump term in office, there were numerous credible allegations of wrongdoing by the former President, but President Biden’s Attorney General, Merrick Garland, with his deputy Lisa Monaco, chose not to vigorously pursue prosecutions. There were investigations, but they were slow and deliberate. The guiding belief was arguably that too energetically pursuing prosecutions of the former President would be seen as political vindictiveness and might trigger an endless cycle of retaliation after each election. Moreover, Trump was seen as having disgraced himself with his failure to accept the election loss anyway, and any thought of him running again seemed fanciful to many in the Democratic establishment.

Eventually, investigations did produce such credible evidence of wrongdoing that prosecutions became inevitable. A grand jury indicted Trump for election obstruction, but it came in August of 2023, merely a year before the next election. By that time, it was too late. The former President was found guilty of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records in a New York trial, but he ran out the clock in four criminal cases, one of which was Garland’s Justice Department’s prosecution of Trump’s effort to overturn the 2020 election.

Some very reasonable people defend Garland’s handling of the many allegations against the former president. It is not my place to evaluate the arguments for or against it, but the net effect of his choices was that Trump was able to run for office again instead of facing potential jail time.

If the same careful and hesitant approach is allowed to prevail even after a Democratic election victory in 2028—if the democratic backsliding is not aggressively reversed and the audacious corruption not rooted out—there is little to stop another corrupt and anti-democratic candidate from winning again, whether in 2032 or 2036. For Europe, this scenario thus means a temporary (four or eight) year reprieve, followed by a possible return to chaos with more naked American nationalism and anti-Europeanism.

2. Retribution

The polarization in American society runs deep today, and the anger on the Democratic side should not be underestimated. Republicans talk derisively about “Trump derangement syndrome,” and they are not too far off from reality. Trump is a polarizing figure in ways that even other charismatic but controversial autocratic leaders like Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan only come close to. Recent primary elections have seen some anti-establishment candidates win in the Democratic Party, and many call for left-populist candidates to counter the populism of the far right.

I actually doubt that a Democratic President in 2028 would appoint an Attorney General of the same cautious ilk as Garland. Trump kicked in the door by breaking the norm that the AG be a respected jurist from whom one could expect at least a modicum of independence by appointing his former defense lawyers, first Pam Bondi and now Todd Blanche, for the job. Democrats would be politically foolish not to walk through the open door and appoint a more aggressive Attorney General than Garland was. To appoint someone with the spirit of a fighter rather than a lawyer. A populist Democratic president would almost certainly do so.

There will be a strong demand for the next administration to charge every single one of the Trump administration’s corrupt officials and family members and to go after ICE and CBP agents who abused their powers and inflicted violence on peaceful residents. And one of the things that the election of Trump has shown is that the American electorate can be foolish and emotional. Two could play that game.

But satisfying the Democratic base’s desires for revenge against every single member of the ultra-corrupt and autocratic-minded Trump administration could very well lead to societal turbulence of a scope and kind not seen since the American Civil War. The MAGA base is angry, too, and given how well-armed “red” (conservative) states and communities are, the societal strife of the late 60s could well pale in comparison in the retribution scenario. For Europe, this would mean an American ally that is fully engulfed in domestic turmoil, unable to function as a dependable ally and leader of the Western alliance.

3. Fair Accountability

The third option, which I personally hope for, is for a hypothetical Democratic administration to forgo both vengeful and politicized retribution and the ill-advised Garland approach of pretending that everything is normal and the old ways of doing things will also work in an emergency. It is not just the Democratic base that demands accountability. If American democracy (or the Republic, if you prefer) is to survive, there needs to be a massive reckoning and accountability for the lawlessness of this administration, and a rollback of its autocratization efforts. Trump has been granted nearly unlimited immunity and will almost certainly pardon all his corrupt accomplices, but if the judicial system allows criminals to walk free simply because they are powerful, the American people will lose all faith in the judicial and political system.

It will be tempting for Democrats to make use of the radically extended powers of the President that Trump, under the guise of the “unitary executive theory,” has pushed through. It looks like Hungary’s new Prime Minister Peter Magyar is taking this approach. He is taking dramatic steps such as ousting an Orbán-ally from the presidency and radically revamping the public service media that Orbán turned into state propaganda. In the US, there are controversial calls to remedy the politicized majority on the Supreme Court by expanding the court.

Even less radical calls for change want to see very thorough-going reforms. Democrats could (and probably should) use the newfound powers of the executive not merely to roll back the Trump administration’s autocratic “reforms” but to address some of the underlying problems: the media ecosystem, money in politics, healthcare, or economic inequalities. However, that would surely encounter fierce resistance.

The problem for both Democrats (and by extension, for America’s European allies) is that the reasonable third option—fair judicial accountability instead of revenge—is also quite likely to lead to significant domestic strife in the USA. The American far right (which now controls the GOP) will almost certainly refuse to acknowledge any difference between 3) judicial accountability for actual crimes and 2) politicized revenge by the left. They will scream “bloody murder” almost no matter what the Democrats do.

Consider an example: To reverse the packing of agencies with (tens of?) thousands of MAGA loyalists—a dramatic departure from the practice of hiring based on merit under both Republican and Democratic administrations since the end of the spoils system—the next Democratic administration would have to resort to spectacular measures like mass firings of all recent recruits. Or at least suspensions while applications were reviewed by independent panels. But that would almost certainly be fiercely denounced by Republicans on OANN, Fox News, and other partisan channels as tantamount to a declaration of war.

That means that the risk of turmoil—in which I do not exclude more or less large-scale societal violence—is nearly as high if Democrats choose fair accountability as in the partisan revenge scenario.

What does this mean for Europe?

Each of these three possible scenarios (four, if you include Trump staying in power) spells trouble for America’s European allies. If Trump voluntarily steps down after his second term, that could be a temporary relief for Europe. But the underlying American malaise is so deep that whether the next Democratic administration chooses to gloss over the problem or address it, and whether they choose to do so judiciously or vengefully, will not much change the long-term European equation: America is quite likely to be preoccupied with domestic affairs for decades.

To be sure, these are possible scenarios, not predictions. And America can surprise. There were obviously very serious domestic problems and tensions in its past (slavery, genocide and conquest of native American peoples and lands, Jim Crow, etc), but the basic system established by its founders allowed for remedies to emerge. So I can be wrong. Perhaps there can be a reckoning with the Trump era that allows the country to move forward while remaining focused on its international leadership role.

However, my hunch is that such a reckoning and remedy will be difficult. Slavery was only ended with the Civil War. Either Democrats fail to address the underlying “disease,” in which case the mad wing of the Republican Party will eventually return to power. Or they do address the problem. That may result in a stronger Republic once they get through it, but it is quite likely to result in a turbulent period of reckoning, no matter how they do it.

There is a major war raging on the European continent and a conflict in the Persian Gulf that is currently sputtering in a state of limbo between war and negotiations. The difficulties in ending the latter raise questions about the current plans for stopping the former.

If I were to try to identify a European plan for ending the war in Ukraine right now from open sources, it seems to go something like this: Europe funds and arms Ukraine while sanctioning Russia in the hopes that this will get Putin to negotiate. The US leads the negotiations and then helps monitor a ceasefire it backs with security guarantees (“backstop”), while the European Plan for the Ukraine Facility provides reconstruction aid and a path toward EU accession (perhaps with some lucrative deals for the Trump family or its network of oligarchs to keep Trump on board).

I am afraid that at least one element of this plan is flawed, and part of the reason is to be found in the Persian Gulf right now.

I have written before about Trump’s disastrous decision to join Israel in a war against Iran, arguing that it was clear early on that America was the loser in more ways than one, and that Trump was stuck in a “stupidity trap” of his own making, wanting to end the war but being unable to secure a good enough deal to allow him to do so. Now the fighting is erupting again, and it is really too much of a mess to even try to go through the chronology of the on-again, off-again talks.

So let me instead just pose a simple question to European (including Ukrainian) policymakers based on how the US-Iran talks are going:

Are these really the people that you trust to lead negotiations to end the war in Ukraine?

Play out the scenario: Let’s say that a time comes for real talks between Zelenskyy and Putin. How do you think such talks would go if they were held under the stewardship of Steve Witkoff and Donald Trump? Is there any reason to believe that this bumbling American team would do any less of a terrifyingly bad job on Ukraine than they are doing with the Iran talks?

Don’t get me wrong. I understand the desire to keep the US engaged and on the right side. US intelligence support is still crucial for Ukraine, as is the continued use of Starlink. We don’t want Trump actively opposing an effort to resolve the war. I have no quarrels with that. Invent another fake peace prize and award him that to keep him happy, for all I care.

I am much less convinced of the European and Ukrainian belief that the US needs to be present as a guarantor of a ceasefire or deal with Putin. The US was a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, but the US bilateral security assurances to Ukraine that were part of the deal proved to be of little use in 2014 and 2022. Europe can hardly even trust US commitments to NATO’s Article 5 today. Why would a commitment by Donald Trump to defend Ukraine be any better?

What about US tripwire troops in Ukraine? Well, even if you could get Putin and Trump to agree to that, look at how Trump is responding to American troops killed and US bases in the Gulf having been shot to pieces by Iran: by imposing a blackout of satellite imagery of the destruction and quietly removing the troops. So much for the tripwire. The Gulf States are beginning to look elsewhere for protection.

No, a deal with Putin needs to stand even without an American backstop. If someone needs to give credible security guarantees to Ukraine, Europeans will have to do the heavy lifting. Anyway, a more credible long-term guarantee of security would be to arm Ukraine to the teeth by creating a Ukrainian “steel porcupine” (or perhaps even by sneaking some nuclear weapons back into Ukraine for an iron-clad deterrent). Even if I am wrong and a ceasefire deal does need to include US security guarantees, European leaders should not leave it up to Trump’s inept team to negotiate it.

Learning all the lessons

Europe now seems to have learned one important lesson: that it alone can help Ukraine bring Putin to the negotiating table by increasing the pressure on him on the battlefield. It took Trump abruptly ending all US aid for the lesson to sink in, but it is at least now clear to most European leaders that Trump cannot be trusted to help with this.

That’s good, but I wonder if it isn’t time for Ukraine and Europe to realize a second lesson: that the US may not be trusted to lead any negotiations to end the war. First of all, I seriously doubt that the Trump administration can be trusted to defend European interests for ideological and personal reasons. Trump holds a deep-seated disdain for Europe that he shares with Vance (who backs it up with ideology), while Witkoff appears fully compromised by Russia (among others). The risk that Trump will strike a deal with Putin involving lucrative resource extraction for Trump’s oligarchs while selling out European security is very real.

Second, as I have argued, even if we were to pretend that they were not corrupt and ideologically hostile to Europe, the US-Iran talks debacle shows that the American real estate moguls cosplaying as diplomats may simply lack the seriousness, competence, and experience for such a difficult job. Taken together, both of the lessons are clear: If Europe’s plan is anything close to what I outlined at the beginning, then it needs to be revised by dramatically reducing the role of the Americans. No US-led talks. Perhaps not even a US backstop.

Now, I doubt that Putin would accept Merz or von der Leyen as actual mediators or facilitators, but European leaders need to be involved on Ukraine’s side and help prepare the talks. When it comes to venue and facilitation, perhaps only a neutral country like Switzerland, which has not provided any military aid to Ukraine, will be acceptable to Russia. If not Switzerland, Turkey has already facilitated negotiations over prisoner exchanges and grain, and would be a natural place for further talks. Qatar has also developed impressive mediation capabilities in recent years. In short, there are many options besides Trump.

Whatever venue is chosen for any eventual talks, European leaders need to shake off the learned helplessness that comes from 80 years of American leadership. Pretend America did not exist: what would you do then? The Trump administration wants Europe to take over the burden of defending the continent. Ending the Ukraine war without the aid of American crutches is a good first test of our abilities to do so.

Erdoğan the Putin-whisperer

While many in Europe (and the US under Biden) complained about Turkey’s hedging vis-à-vis Russia despite the full-scale invasion of 2022, there is now a grudging realization that Turkey can fill an important role by remaining on speaking terms with Russia. When I ask Turkish diplomats, officials, or government-friendly experts about Russia, they are adamant that they are not hedging or striking a balancing act. They condemned the Russian 2022 invasion, have sold a range of military equipment to Ukraine and even launched co-production of arms in Ukraine, and have eventually clamped down on sanctions-evading trade with Russia. I think that the truth is a little bit more complicated, but I see their point.

My point is that Erdoğan’s cordial relations with Putin have turned Erdoğan into one of the few European leaders who can still speak with the Russian dictator. This has enabled Turkey to fill an important function as mediator, having hosted multiple talks between Ukraine and Russia (over grain exports, prisoner exchanges, and ceasefires). Let’s call Erdoğan Europe’s Putin-whisperer. Europe needs one because relations with Putin are dismal (in part because of the war in Ukraine, but also, as I have argued ad nauseum, because Russia is waging an unconventional war against Europe as well).

Erdoğan the Trump-whisperer

The comical and tragic thing is that European leaders also need a Trump-whisperer these days. It’s funny because the thought that European leaders can’t speak to the President of the United States is absurd, and it is tragic because it reveals the deep animosity that exists between the Trump administration and Europe today. To be sure, there are already some Trump-whisperer candidates: The fawning NATO SG Mark Rutte, Finnish President Stubb (who once played golf with Trump), Trump’s ideological far-right soul mate in Rome, Georgia Meloni, and French President Emanuel Macron. But Meloni and Trump have just had a nasty spat, and none of these leaders can offer what Erdoğan can anyway: the imagery of a strongman who receives foreign dignitaries in a vast, gold-laced palace with over a thousand rooms.

I suspect that the fact that the palace was built despite massive public protests and a court decision that it violates environmental restrictions only heightens the appeal to Trump. Add to that the manner in which Erdoğan responded to the opposition to the construction:

With any other leader, it would be absurd to suggest that these things truly matter. With the real-estate-magnate/reality-star-turned-President Donald Trump, who cannot stop talking about his plans for a golden ballroom, glorious, golden monuments, and other matters of interior design and ostentatious symbols of personal power, it matters more than perhaps anything else. Indeed, the fact that the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, July 7-8, will take place in the Beştepe Sarayı (Beştepe Palace) may well do more to keep Trump in a good mood than almost anything else the Europeans can do.

There will be gold and shining marble and a strongman leader with an iron grip on his country who couldn’t give a shit about critics or annoying courts welcoming Trump when he arrives at the White Palace. What more could he dream of? Sure, Rutte fawns over Trump, but Trump fawns over Erdoğan.

Europe’s high-level visit

In an indication of how important Turkey has become to the EU, three high-level EU officials are today visiting Turkey: The EU’s “Foreign Minister” and deputy President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas; the Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos; and the Internal Affairs and Refugee Commissioner Magnus Brunner are all in Turkey. They will be meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, the Minister of Treasury and Finance, Mehmet Şimşek, and the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, Abdulkadır Uraloğlu.

According to Turkish reporting, the Turkish side will bring up a host of topics, including but not limited to:

• Turkey’s seriousness when it comes to full EU accession (color me skeptical), but also the importance that the membership process is fair and merit-based (a not entirely unreasonable note from a country that applied for EU (EC) accession in 1987 given the currently fashionable ideas of fast-tracking Ukrainian membership).

• Other EU-Turkey matters, such as Turkey’s desire to participate in the EU’s SAFE mechanism for joint funding of arms production and in the single European payments union (SEPA), visa liberalization, modernization of the Turkey-EU Customs Union, and the need to reshape cooperation on migration “in light of new realities on the ground.” Without further detail, I will go out on a limb and suggest that Turkey wants more money for hosting refugees that the EU doesn’t want.

• Geopolitical hotspots that affect both the EU and Turkey, like the Ukraine war, the situation in Gaza and Palestine, Syria, and Iran. They will also talk about the situation in the South Caucasus, where I suspect that Turkey and the EU can find some common ground. There is a window of opportunity where the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process can be made to work, but it will require joint efforts and EU investments.

Do not expect EU officials to make a big fuss over the continued crackdown on—or rather, hostile takeover—of the main opposition party (the Republican People’s Party, CHP), the continued imprisonment of the philanthropist Osman Kavala and the former leaders of the pro-Kurdish HDP (now DEM) party, Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, at least not in public settings. I suspect that they will bring it up, especially behind closed doors, because stemming Turkey’s continuing autocratic slide would make it much easier for the EU to improve relations with Ankara. But the relationship is not as lopsided as it once was. Turkey no longer stands hat in hand, knocking on the EU’s door. Relations remain strained on many topics, but both parties now need each other.

There are many reasons why Europe can no longer afford to alienate Turkey, not the least of which is that Erdoğan can offer to serve as Europe’s Trump-whisperer AND as its Putin-whisperer.

Här kommer några reflektioner om skapande och hur man kan utvecklas som “kreatör” utifrån mina erfarenheter från detta verk.

Målningen ingick i en serie tavlor med besläktade motiv, färgskala och stil som jag ställde ut på Galleri Elfva för ett par år sedan. Det var en väldigt kort utställning—endast en helg—och jag sålde bara några verk. Denna målning var inte en av dem. Rent objektivt är den således ett misslyckande: jag lade ner mycket tid och möda på den och fick ingenting monetärt för det, och jag vill heller inte påstå att den utgör något slags mästerverk i kvalitativ bemärkelse.

Trots det ser jag den som en stor personlig/professionell framgång och jag är väldigt stolt över den. Jag bryr mig visserligen om vad andra tycker om mitt måleri och det glädjer mig när någon tycker om eller köper en tavla. Konst är för mig ett sätt att kommunicera och då vore det märkligt om jag struntade i hur mina verk mottas. Men jag har också en inre kompass (eller bedömare) som nog är ännu viktigare för mig.

Att “level up”

Varför är då detta verk så betydelsefullt för mig? Det bästa sättet jag kan beskriva det på är med en term från videospel: Det känns som om jag “leveled up” med denna målning. Att jag nådde en ny nivå i mitt måleri.

För det första är motivet annorlunda än i mina tidigare verk. Betongsuggor är alltså de tunga avgränsare som man ofta ser på parkeringsplatser eller längs vägrenar. Ingen naturligt “vackert” motiv för ett konstverk. Men kontrasten mellan den “brutala” betongen och de vackra skuggorna på snön och de repetitiva, svepande mönstren som skapades av hur suggorna radats upp skapade en spänning som jag föll för. Jag tog fotografiet som målningen är baserad på under en kvällspromenad med hunden nere vid vattnet. Motivet var också inspirerat av en målning av Anne-Lie Larsson Ljung som hänger hos min mamma på Gotland och som även den föreställer betongsuggor.

Vidare är målningen råare och ledigare än mina tidigare verk. Den har en ofärdig känsla som väcker frågor. Vad är det för något vi ser? Jag har dessutom under många år försökt hitta min “röst” som konstnär. Med detta verk har jag tagit ett större steg mot en egen distinkt röst eller stil än något jag tidigare gjort, även om jag kanske inte kan (eller vill) beskriva den mer än att säga att målningen är figurativ men expressiv, ödesmättad och melankolisk. I mitt tycke är det med konst lite som med skämt: om man försöker förklara dem finns risken att effekten försvinner.

“Concrete dividers” är alltså en vattendelare i den bemärkelsen att mitt måleri ser annorlunda ut efter detta. I serien jag skapade till utställningen ingick även ett par andra verk i liknande färgskala och med liknande motiv. Mitt personliga favoritverk av dessa—och kanske av alla mina verk hittills—är en målning av långa skuggor på isen en vinterdag, med en något märklig kajkant i den gamla industrihamnen i Gåshaga i förgrunden. Den är kanske inte riktigt lika ledig och fri som “dividers”, men jag lyckades med att förenkla motivet i stora färgfält, att inte överarbeta ytan, utan lade ner breda penseldrag och lät dem ligga. Denna tavla tycker jag om så mycket att den hänger hemma.

Sedan finns det en dimension som är lite svårare att motivera i ord. “Concrete dividers” är helt enkelt i mitt tycke skickligare gjord än mina tidigare verk, även om den har fel och skavanker. Måleri är i viss utsträckning ett hantverk, och jag ser på detta verk ungefär som till exempel en korgmakare kan se på en skickligt flätad korg och vara nöjd över hantverket. Det sker en underlig alienering när ett konstverk är färdigt. Oftast är jag missnöjd, men ibland kan jag se på en målning och inte förstå hur jag lyckades skapa den.

Hur man växer som kreatör

Jag har funderat en del över varför just detta verk blev en personlig framgång, och kanske gömmer sig ett par generaliserbara lärdomar vad gäller skapandeprocesser och hur man kan bli bättre som konstnär/skribent/kreatör i min erfarenhet med målningen.

En av de vanligaste reaktionerna jag får från icke-konstnärer som ser mina verk är någon variant av ”Vilken talang du har!” Jag har alltid tyckt att det är en lite märklig kommentar. Jag skulle gissa att en gymnast som gör volter med skruv eller står stabilt i “korset” i de romerska ringarna inte lika ofta får uppmuntrande komplimanger om sin “talang”. Jag skall inte förneka att talang spelar en viss roll inom måleri, men de flesta som ägnat sig åt en sport eller kreativ verksamhet vet att det som är ojämförligt viktigast är övning.

Jag skulle helt enkelt inte ha kunnat skapa denna målning om jag inte först hade målat väldigt mycket. Verket tillkom efter en period då jag hade tillbringat särskilt mycket tid i ateljén och efter många år av att ha målat i naturen. Någon sa att när man lär sig att måla har man hundra dåliga målningar i sig och det enda sättet att bli av med dem är tyvärr att fästa dem på duk. Jag har kanske inte målat hundra dåliga målningar ännu, men många. Kanske Malcolm Gladwells regel om att det krävs 10 000 timmar för att bli en “mästare” på något inte stämmer helt, men inget ger färdighet som tid framför staffliet.

Det gäller förstås inte bara måleri utan allt skapande. Ja, det mesta här i livet för den delen. Ju mer vi gör av något, desto bättre blir vi på just det, så det gäller att fundera på vad vi lägger tid på. Själv lägger jag som många för mycket energi på mobilen. Jag har successivt försökt skära bort mina största tidstjuvar: sociala medier (Twitter/X, Instagram och Facebook), men ännu inte “lyckats” helt (jag är fortfarande på BlueSky). Nyhetsflödet pockar på den som är intresserad av internationell politik. Men att då gå ifrån allt det till ateljén och ställa mig framför en duk i flera timmar i sträck, en hel dag om jag har möjlighet, är ett sätt att komma ifrån tempot. Att lämna det digitala och göra något väldigt “analogt”. Och ju mer jag gör det, desto bättre blir jag på det.

Den andra reflektionen handlar om att använda begränsningar för att utmana sig. Innan jag ställde mig framför staffliet och den tomma pannån (den är målad på trä, inte på duk), bestämde jag mig för att jag skulle frångå min ibland lite för noggranna stil och i stället måla med stora, grova penseldrag. Att låta den vara “slarvig” och ofärdig. Jag försökte visualisera verk av Edvard Munch—min personliga favoritkonstnär—när jag började. Inte för att efterapa honom, utan för att ge mig själv tillåtelse att vara lika lös och ledig som han var.

Jag tycker att det är svårt att inte hålla på och peta, så jag var handgriplig och konkret i hur jag försökte styra min teknik. Jag använde stora penslar. Större än vad jag egentligen ansåg lämpligt. Jag höll penslarna längst ut på skaftet och försökte stå så långt från staffliet som möjligt, med högerarmen nästan helt utsträckt. På så sätt “tvingades” jag måla med stora drag istället för att peta i detaljer.

En ständig kamp

Jag skriver ner dessa rader till dig som läser och funderar över ditt eget skapande, vilken form det än må ta sig, men också för att påminna mig själv. Skapande är en ständig kamp. Efter att jag målat denna och en hel serie målningar som jag var odrägligt nöjd med, trodde jag att jag kanske hade nått en nivå i mitt skapande där det inte längre var “hit and miss” med var och varannan målning. Men sedan kom en misslyckad målning som var så dålig att jag var tvungen att måla över den. Och så en till efter det.

Inte heller är det lätt att följa egna råd. Jag försökte göra om “Concrete Dividers” med ambitionen att vara ännu lösare och ledigare än originalet. Jag använde breda penslar för att måla plank. Jag lade till och med fotografiet helt åt sidan och använde bara målningen som referens. Och för att ännu mer bryta upp traditionella konventioner målade jag den inte på duk eller ens pannå utan använde istället locket på en stor packlåda i trä. Men jag misslyckades med att hålla mig lös och fri. Den blev mer noggrann och “traditionell” i sin stil än originalet och än vad jag hade önskat.

Därmed inte sagt att denna andra version är dålig. Den är bara annorlunda. Rent tekniskt kanske den till och med är bättre än förlagan. Jag tycker mycket om skuggorna och högdagrarna i den övre vänstra delen av målningen, vilka lades dit med några enkla och beslutsamma drag med en stor målarpensel. Och den har en mystisk och melankolisk stämning som jag gillar. Dessutom har jag lärt mig att mina samlare inte alls alltid delar min bedömning av mina verk.

Vad är slutpunkten?

Kanske slutsatsen är att det går att använda några enkla knep för att växa som skapare, men inte att bestämma slutpunkten. Ge dig mer tid framför staffliet/datorn/på banan och utmana dig själv på olika sätt. Sätt begränsningar som tvingar dig att jobba på andra sätt. Men var beredd på att du aldrig blir färdig. I mitt fall kan jag bara bestämma mig för att jag vill röra på mig. Jag vet aldrig var jag hamnar. Det gör resan spännande.

Trump started a war of choice against Iran based on false claims about an “imminent threat” from Iran and goaded on by Benjamin Netanyahu, who apparently has been wanting to draw the US into a war with Tehran since he was a wee child. Despite undeniable tactical achievements, the war is a strategic, economic, and political disaster for the United States, and Trump knows that he needs to get out of it ASAP.

However, the only way that he can do that—given that an Iranian defeat looks very unlikely at the moment—is by making a deal with the rulers in Tehran. Such a deal will almost certainly be something like the one Barack Obama made in 2015 (the so-called JCPOA1), and will likely be a bit worse. The problem is that Trump withdrew America from the JCPOA and spent years blasting it as “disastrous” (and all kinds of other things). In reality, while the JCPOA was imperfect, it was better than no deal, and the main reason Trump so hated the deal was clearly that Obama had struck it, but that is another matter.

Why would Trump’s deal with Iran probably not be any better than Obama’s deal? Because, as Trump likes to put it, the war has allowed Iran to show that it has “the cards.” US and Israeli strikes have not eliminated its ballistic missile or drone capabilities, killing much of the leadership with air strikes turned out to be insufficient for regime change, and an ill-conceived plan to arm Kurdish insurgents did not help topple the regime either. Iran has shown that it has credible deterrence by striking at US allies in the Gulf and by disrupting world trade through the closing of the Strait of Hormuz.

These were predicted and avoidable outcomes, made possible only because of the stunning incompetence of the Trump administration, which ignored war games, plans, warnings, and logic when they bumbled into this war without first thinking it through: Expecting allies to support you after more than a year of shocking threats, insults, and failing to consult them before launching the war. Not expecting the regime to resort to the “nuclear” option of closing the Strait after you make the war existential by trying to decapitate the regime. Apparently, not preparing for the (obvious) eventuality that Iran could do so using its vast ballistic missile and drone arsenal against ships in the Strait, in addition to mining the Strait. Etc. Incompetence is actually too kind. Stupidity is more apt.

Trump is likely to have to make substantial concessions just to get things almost back to the way that they were before the war, with the Strait of Hormuz yet again open for shipping, sort of. On top of that, are we supposed to believe that Trump is going to get Iran to make difficult concessions about its nuclear program that go beyond what they agreed to in Obama’s deal? That they will agree to caps on their ballistic missile program and end their support for regional proxies? And to do so without getting meaningful stuff in return?

I mean, anything can happen in theory, but color me deeply skeptical. Trump may be able to get some kind of preliminary pre-agreement, like the “memorandum of understanding” Axios has enthusiastically reported is just about to be signed every other day for weeks. But whatever the Iranians are likely to agree to in the near future will be a pretty crappy deal from Trump’s perspective. He knows this, and that is why he is hesitant to strike such a deal.

Trump is stuck in a trap of his own making. A stupidity trap.

When asked about how the Democrats would do things differently on Ukraine, he also presented several good recommendations: Continue intelligence sharing, cooperate on drones and artillery, provide more munitions for air defense, put sanctions pressure on Russia, and seize the frozen Russian assets. All of that is good. There’s a reason I listen regularly to both Pod Save the World and Pod Save America. Tommy and his gang are smart, and their hearts are in the right place.

Why I yelled in anger

However, his take on what the Biden administration did wrong on Ukraine made me yell out loud in anger. Any listener to Pod Save America knows that he and his co-hosts are angry, too, but not about Biden’s Ukraine policy. They are angry with members of the Biden team who have never acknowledged the errors they made by sticking with Biden for so long in the 2024 Presidential campaign. They are angry because the flawed analyses of past strategy will infuse future campaign strategies with similarly flawed assumptions. I couldn’t agree more, but the next democratic administration also needs to base its Ukraine policies on the correct analysis of past mistakes, or they are doomed to repeat them, too. And Ukraine is too important for Democrats to get wrong.

When Spy Talk co-host said that he didn’t see how Tommy’s proposals would lead to a resolution of the war, Tommy agreed and said you needed more economic pressure. Then he added (and this is where I yelled in my car):

I think the challenge with the Biden policy was [that] it felt like endless feeding of weapons without any diplomatic track [that] could lead to a resolution. I think Trump has put forward a diplomatic track. The problem is that it’s a complete and total joke led by clowns like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, who have been to Russia, what, like eight times, and they’ve never even been to Ukraine. It’s not an actual negotiation. It’s those guys greasing future economic deals with the Russian oligarch in charge of their sovereign wealth fund, in my opinion.

But I think where Biden failed was not having talks with Russia, not having that diplomatic track going. So people felt like at least there was some process toward resolving [the conflict].

I have no beef with his assessment of the clownery and self-enrichment of Trump’s compromised interlocutors, Jared and Witkoff (AKA Dim Philby). But what in the world makes him argue that where Biden failed was in not talking to Putin??? What evidence is there that Biden could have stopped the war if he had just talked to Putin some more? Obviously, there is none.

The charitable interpretation of what Tommy was saying is that not engaging in negotiations with Putin was a domestic political problem for Biden and the Democrats in the US. A problem of perception, not policy. Notice that he says that the problem with the policy was that it “felt” like endless feeding of weapons without any diplomatic track. I’m guessing that the charitable interpretation is probably the right one, but it is still a problem that when asked about Democratic policy toward Ukraine, he frames it in terms of domestic politics. I’ll get back to the question of politics, but let’s look at the policy.

The real problem: not too little talk but too little action

The actual policy problem (as opposed to the political perception problem) with the Biden administration’s policy towards Ukraine was almost the inversion of what Tommy said. It was consistently providing too little military support to Ukraine and making those decisions too late. It was giving Zelenskyy just enough not to lose, but not enough to win.

To be fair, the US under Biden did provide substantial military support to Ukraine, and it started even before the 2022 full-scale invasion. During the Obama administration, the US response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Donbas and annexation of Crimea only came in the form of non-lethal assistance. The adults in the first Trump administration began providing lethal aid in 2017, and Biden continued the practice. Before February 24, 2022, US military support consisted of:

sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures.

It looks like a long list, and many of the items on it were surely important and likely helped AFU prepare to stave off the Russian invaders. At the same time, sniper rifles and night vision goggles do not an army make. Biden’s team repeatedly held back more extensive support and only gradually dialled it up, prompting critics to deride the administration’s approach as drip-drip-drip. They held back for different reasons at different points in time; all of them seemingly sensible but ultimately profoundly misguided.

Before the full-scale invasion, there was a fear that providing Ukraine with weapons could provoke Putin to invade, so they held back deliveries of any weaponry that could be seen as provocative or offensive. Putin would falsify that hypothesis on February 24, 2022: US support had been minimal, and yet he invaded. If anything could have prevented an invasion, it would have been credible deterrence, certainly not appeasement.

(On deterrence, consider the different fates of some of Russia’s Western/Southern neighbors. Chechnya, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine all share three things: Russia as a neighbor, no NATO membership, and Russian military aggression. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland all share three things: Russia as a neighbor, NATO membership, and no Russian conventional military aggression. Putin’s Russia needs to be deterred. Belarus is the exception that proves the rule. If Russia has hostile intentions towards you, it cannot be appeased except at the cost of turning your country into a de facto Russian dominion, like Belarus.)

As the threat of war drew closer, the US intelligence community landed on the correct assessment that Putin had already decided on a full-scale invasion. In a laudable departure from standard policy, they publicly shared this assessment in an effort to let Putin know that they were on to his plans. But while speaking boldly, the administration was still far too timid in its actions. Even if they had realised that appeasement had failed, a massive transfer of military equipment was still not attempted because they thought that Ukraine would be overrun and any US arms would end up in the hands of the Russian occupiers. Understandable, perhaps, but Zelenskyy and his fellow Ukrainians would falsify that assumption with their brave resistance. “I need ammunition, not a ride,” Zelenskyy famously said when turning down a US offer to escape on the eve of the invasion.

As the war began and Ukraine disproved those arguments against helping them, there instead emerged fears that providing Ukraine with too powerful weapons would anger the Russians so much that they would escalate to nuclear war, ending life on earth. This was also a common argument against supporting Ukraine among European policymakers, most consequentially German ones, who infamously initially sent only helmets to Ukraine. There is, of course, a real escalation risk. I have been cautioning against the direct participation of NATO member states in the war for this reason. The question, however, is where you draw the lines and how much credence you give to Putin’s and Medvedev’s sabre-rattling and repeated threats of unlimited escalation up to and including nuclear.

The fact that tanks, fighter jets, and long-range weapons have now all been provided to Ukraine without all of us perishing in a nuclear holocaust despite Putin’s threats that that would be the consequence, falsifies some of the more hysterical concerns about escalation, and I would place the Biden administration’s overbearing fears and stubborn handwringing among those. This is not Monday morning quarterbacking, as it was clear to me and others at the time that many of those fears were dramatically overblown. They basically assumed that Putin and the Russian leadership were members of a suicidal death cult. Nothing in Putin’s past or present behavior suggested that. Indeed, he seems extremely preoccupied with his own survival and that of his regime.

Were Russia to face defeat in Ukraine, it would surely be traumatic and might even spell the beginning of the end of Putin’s rule, but it wouldn’t be Armageddon. Nuclear powers have been embarrassed on the battlefield before. The Soviet Union and the USA were forced out of Afghanistan, the US was forced out of Vietnam, and Trump will soon likely be forced to accept a bad deal (or even no deal) to end his foolish war against Iran. When great powers gamble on risky foreign military adventures and those gambles don’t pay off, they retreat. Actions have consequences. It’s (literally) not the end of the world. Putin made the bed; he will have to lie in it.

Once Putin had launched his war, no “diplomatic track” could have convinced him to end it. The main problem with Jared and Witkoff’s “mediation” is not that they are corrupt and incompetent (they are; beyond belief), but that Putin does not want to end the war, and they are unwilling to put any serious pressure on him to do so. All analysis of this war needs to be premised on a few very simple observations: Putin chose to start this war. Ukraine did not want it. Putin could end the war today, but he does not want to. For this war to end, Putin must (be made to) want to end it. We need to change Putin’s calculus so that he comes to prefer talking over fighting.

The paradox is thus that arming Ukraine in a radically more decisive fashion is likely to increase the chances of meaningful talks and thus an end to the war. For example, if Ukraine had managed to hold on to parts of the Russian territories (Kursk) that it took in 2024, that could have given Putin an incentive to talk and agree to a swap of territories. They were not able to do so, in part because the Trump administration halted its intelligence sharing in March of 2025. Less support for Ukraine means less incentive for Putin to negotiate.

The only things that are moving the parties closer to real talks right now are, first, Ukraine’s newfound ability to strike deep inside Russia. At the moment, it is making Putin lash out in anger, but it may, in the longer run, change his calculus by imposing real economic and political costs, especially if the US were to stop offering him economic outs. Second, the rising Russian casualty numbers may also change his calculus, as he might have to do another general mobilization to be able to replace lost troops.

The end of the war will almost certainly involve negotiations, and in those talks, both sides will likely have to make concessions. Those observations are trivial. But to get to such talks, we need to enable Ukraine to threaten Putin with defeat. Only then will he be willing to talk for real, and to make concessions.

The politics of supporting Ukraine

I actually suspect Tommy Vietor would agree with most of this, which is why he wants a return to supporting Ukraine militarily and to enforcing sanctions against Russia. I don’t want to suggest anything else. And I am not naive. I understand the politics here. The Democratic base is as tired of “forever wars” as the MAGA base. There are pacifistic and isolationist factions and tendencies in the Democratic party that Tommy and any future Democratic presidential candidate have to bring on board. But signalling that the problem is the “endless feeding of weapons” and the absence of a “diplomatic track” is what concerns me.

No one knows how things will look in 2028, but Democrats can already now criticize Trump for failing to end the war in 48 hours, as he promised. They don’t have to adopt the MAGA critics’ isolationist rhetoric in doing so. They can (rightly) accuse Trump of empowering Putin to continue the war by ending sanctions and abandoning Ukraine.

And I think the Democratic strategists’ fears about the politics of this are overblown, perhaps even misdirected. First of all, there are no US troops in Ukraine. Ukraine is Russia’s “Vietnam War,” not America’s. Second, there is a powerful narrative to be made—along the lines of precisely the values-based foreign policy that Tommy himself advertised toward the end of the podcast—that democracy and peace are on the line in Ukraine. It is powerful because it is true. Both the real-world and the political risks are higher if we allow wars of aggression like Putin’s invasion of Ukraine to pay off. If we do, there will be many more of them in the future, perhaps starting with Taiwan. That is a world in which the US will inevitably get dragged into multiple wars. If the autocratic leader of Russia defeats democratic Ukraine, he can turn his full attention to the (remaining) democracies of Europe, against which he is already waging an unconventional war. That would be bad for democracy, but also for Democrats, who would face a growing global coalition of right-wing populists working together to weaken a Democratic president.

Moreover, the Vietnam War analogy and current Russian struggles on the battlefield suggest that there is actually now a window of opportunity to end the war with some bold policies. Ukraine has stopped Russian territorial advances using sophisticated drone warfare and has developed the capability to strike oil refineries deep inside Russia, crippling crude oil processing.

A concerted European and American effort to tighten economic containment of Russia and massively increase support to the Ukrainian war effort could thus tip the balance. Europe has dramatically stepped up its support since the election of Donald Trump, so an American return to supporting Ukraine at earlier levels would more or less double the overall support. That could cause a cascade of failures that could force Putin to either retreat or strike a deal to end the war. That could even provide a Democratic president with a Reagan-esque moment of victory on the world stage.

Wars are evil and should be avoided at almost all costs. But not at any cost. States have the right and even duty to defend their citizens. If Ukrainians have made the determination that fighting the invasion is preferable to Russian occupation, that is their right by any moral standard, as well as by international law (per Chapter 7, Article 51 of the UN Charter). All states that value sovereignty and democracy—including the USA under a future Democratic president—should do everything in their power to help Ukraine defend itself. When Putin is ready for real talks, there should be talks. Returning to drip-drip-drip is not the way to get there.

Deterrence by punishment today

I got support from people in the know on my last post, but also a little bit of private pushback from some who argued either that we do have weapons, we just don’t appear willing to use them, or that we are, in fact, striking Russia, but whatever we do is classified. As for the latter, I am a civilian and an amateur in this field, so I obviously have no direct insight into what our intelligence agencies are doing in secret. But I would be extremely (if happily) surprised to learn that, e.g., Swedish intelligence actors are conducting physical sabotage inside Russia in retaliation against Russian sabotage. All I can say is that we have not seen any headlines or other open source information so far suggesting that European actors (apart from Ukraine) are conducting offensive (retaliatory) covert operations in Russia. And people with better insight than I have aren’t thrilled about our capabilities.

However, I am happy to adjust my claim. We do have some weapons in our arsenal and do use some of them. But not enough. We do have economic weapons. We could retaliate against Russian hybrid attacks by sanctioning Russia. The US did impose sanctions against Russian individuals involved in the 2016 election interference. In practice, however, there are few sanctions today that we have not already imposed in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine or that we could find European political support for, as I argued in my last post.

One thing that my native Sweden is doing today that we were not doing only recently is that we have started disturbing the Russian shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea. The Swedish Coast Guard has started boarding and seizing tankers/ships, interrogating the crew, and sometimes charging them with various crimes. Finland was the first to take this dramatic step, and other European countries, like Germany, Italy, and France, have followed suit. These are welcome developments, even if prosecutions do not generate convictions, because disturbing the fleet inflicts economic costs on Russia, telling Putin that Baltic Sea sabotage comes with a price.

Expulsion is another weapon. The Swedish security services estimated already in 2015 that one-third of accredited diplomats were Russian spies. After February 24, 2022, there was a mass expulsion of Russian diplomats from European countries. But this is arguably more deterrence by denial than by punishment. Moreover, as the return of Russian participation in European athletic or cultural events like the Venice Biennale indicates, not all European states remain eager or willing to use this weapon.

Taken together, we do have some weapons and use some of them, but our ability and response are hardly commensurate with the threat. On the line is not just European unity and political support for Ukraine, but arguably democracy in Europe.

When we are talking about weapons, we could of course also, in theory, retaliate with conventional or even nuclear weapons against Russian disinformation or cyber-attacks. In practice, the threshold for such escalation is obviously too high. As I argued in my last post, this means that our punitive deterrence against hybrid attacks is not credible. Today, Putin can therefore attack us more or less freely without fearing much in terms of retribution. To raise the cost for Russian hybrid attacks so much that it becomes less attractive for Putin to use them than to stand down, we need to develop credible deterrent capabilities in the hybrid domain.

In plain English: We need to be able to fight back.

Developing our offensive hybrid capabilities

That is, Europe needs to be able to respond more or less in kind to Russia’s attacks. The Royal Swedish War Science Academy’s task force on hybrid war has made similar arguments for a while, and Johan Wiktorin’s chapter in the final report of their SV-A-R task force does so in depth. (I will include several of his ideas below.) We need to be able to go on the offensive in retaliation for Iranian hybrid attacks, for example. What has been said on this so far has often been limited to the cyber realm, however. In their recent introduction to hybrid war, for example, the SV-A-R task force argued in favor of setting up “ethical hacking” training camps for Swedish youths. This is a low-cost and (relatively) low-risk proposal, even if there are dangers with blowback. It is now clear that Russia has devoted branches of its higher education system to training hackers and spies. We may need to take note.

But it is important to face the fact that the cyber realm is only one battlefield on which Russia is attacking us. We need to be bold, creative, and willing to take significant risks to defend democracy. If Russia is using Telegram to recruit individuals in Europe to conduct physical sabotage attacks, what is stopping our intelligence agencies from turning that tactic against Russia? And I mean the question literally. Are there laws that would stop such tactics? Then those may need to be changed. Is it technical or operational capabilities? Then those need to be improved. I suspect that it is both.

As far as I am aware, it is basically only France and the UK in Europe that have retained any serious covert action capabilities. France’s DGSE (in particular SA, its clandestine Action Service) not only retains covert action capabilities but has shown a willingness to conduct disruptive actions. DGSE is now investing in new equipment and collaborations in Eastern frontline states, which suggests an awareness of the task ahead. Likewise, the new head of Britain’s MI6 has publicly declared the need to be more daring and not just gather information, but actively shape the battlefield in ways inspired by the SOE, the UK’s clandestine WW2 service, which conducted sabotage and other covert actions against the Nazis. Even the ever-so-cautious Germans have realized the need to be able to fight back in the hybrid war that is going on.

My (offensive) recommendations

I am not an intelligence specialist, so take this for what it is. My intention is primarily to push the envelope and get people to think and talk about this. Others will have to correct me and fill in the details. But my firm conviction is that we—individual European countries and ideally, to the extent possible, groups of countries in different constellations—are going to have to develop capabilities that include the following:

• Punching at the bruises. There is a fundamental misunderstanding that informs skeptics who argue that our political polarization is a problem of our own making and that the threat from Russia is overblown. Russian intelligence actors do not create non-existent vulnerabilities. They exploit existing ones. We should do the same: Carefully identify Russian weaknesses (Putin’s vulnerabilities) and strike at those. These probably have to do with corruption and the economy. Russia experts can tell you more.

• Retaliate. This is perhaps obvious, but it is important to stress that even when I write “go on the offensive,” I am writing about retaliation. That is, our attacks should be chosen so as to be obvious even to an increasingly paranoid and isolated Putin hiding in his bunker that we are responding to Russian attacks. We should try to avoid the classic security dilemma, whereby defensive actions can be seen by the adversary as offensive. Target selection should therefore be deliberate. If Russia conducts sabotage against six telecommunications masts in Skåne, Sweden, then we and our allies should do the same to six (or perhaps twelve) strategically significant telecommunications masts somewhere in Russia. Tit for tat. Raise the cost. (Edit: There is a potential tension and tradeoff between these first two recommendations. Whether to strike where it hurts Russia the most OR respond in kind is a tactical choice that may need to be thought through when developing a strategy and associated tactics for hybrid warfare. I assume that you can strike in ways that make it clear that we are retaliating, without it being an exact copy of the Russian hybrid attacks that you are responding to.)

• Cyber attacks. This is a no-brainer. See the discussion about “ethical hacking” summer camps above. (Edit: My uninformed guess is also that this is the domain where European intelligence agencies are already developing or even employing punitive deterrence capabilities.)

• Information warfare. Information operations aimed at weakening and undermining Putin’s rule, telling truths about his corruption, and countering false narratives regarding the West and Putin’s war in Ukraine, but also sowing discord and supporting a range of dissidents and anti-Putin groups. When it comes to the latter, we will have to be careful to try to avoid blowback. Our ambition should be nothing less than to be able to threaten regime change, since that is what Putin is doing with his hybrid war against democratic governments in the West. Tit for tat. Raise the cost.

• Physical sabotage. Ukraine is now able to strike deep inside Russia with drones, and this ability is arguably altering Putin’s strategic and political calculus. Ukraine is suddenly taking the fight to Russia. Ukraine’s strikes are in retaliation for Russian strikes against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Similarly, Europe needs to be able to show Putin that sabotage against European targets will come with direct and concrete costs in the form of retaliation against targets inside Russia. Where Ukraine hits ammunition depots, we could, for example, target the intelligence agencies involved in active measures and other targets of value to Putin. Tit for tat. Raise the cost.

• Let’s talk about assassinations. Ok, I do not think that European intelligence agencies should start assassinating Russian officials today. For one thing, Russia’s assassination plots, to my knowledge, have mainly been targeting Russian dissidents abroad, at least so far. That’s bad enough. However, the foiled plot against the CEO of Rheinmetall shows that Russia is contemplating assassinations against European nationals as well. I therefore think that we should at least discuss developing this capability and creating the legal room for it in case we need to retaliate, were Russia to take the quite dramatic step of starting to assassinate Europeans, whether CEOs, political leaders, scientists, or others. The reckless and ill-advised American and Israeli assassination campaigns against Iranian leaders and their proxies have arguably undermined a taboo, and while Europe should not take the first steps, we have to be ready to respond were Putin to follow their unwelcome and illegal lead. That means developing, but then sitting on the capability. Perhaps the counterarguments are stronger here, but we should at least have the discussion.

Reflexive control and taking the fight to Putin

A key element in Russian hybrid warfare is cognitive warfare: the strategic use of narratives and what is called reflexive control. When multiple drones violated Polish airspace last year, Polish social media was instantly inundated by posts criticizing the government’s and NATO’s response, questioning the facts surrounding the incursions, and shifting the blame onto Ukraine. A Polish expert on disinformation told me at the time that this stream of instant posts was, in all likelihood, part of a pre-planned narrative warfare strategy whereby Russia controlled the domestic political discourse surrounding the event. Indeed, according to one analysis, over 60% of online comments echoed Kremlin narratives. The objective, according to another Polish expert, was to divide, confuse, and demoralize Poles and undermine their support for Ukraine.

By taking the initiative and forcing a response, Russia attempts to gain what Russian intelligence operatives call “reflexive control.” That is, put pressure on the enemy to act in ways that are disadvantageous to their interests. One of my son’s football coaches used to tell his players to “pose questions” to a defender. That is, when you approach with the ball, make a move and force the defender to respond, then you can use that against him. Fake to the right that gets the defender off balance, allowing you to go to his left. In much the same way, when we allow Russia to constantly go on the offensive, we are forced to respond. By going on the offensive, we can force Putin to respond, and if we do so cleverly, we can use that to drive him in the direction we want. We can exercise reflexive control over Russia as well. Two can play this game.

The risks

I see four main risks with covert European actions against Russia. First of all, developing covert action capabilities like training youth in cyber warfare comes with a risk of blowback. We don’t want to train the next generation of cyber criminals. Second, when developing capabilities of surveillance and information warfare, we need to be mindful of what I have called the democrat’s dilemma. That is, the point is to defend democracy, not to undermine it ourselves. These are real risks, and policymakers and civil servants need to mitigate them when developing new tools. However, they are not reasons to do nothing.

Third, Russia is a superpower when it comes to hybrid warfare. We are not. Russia is a closed autocracy with a strategic culture that embraces perpetual grayzone warfare, and plenty of experience with it that Europe lacks. For a small European country to attack Russia is risky, just like it would be to do so with conventional weapons. For that reason, we meet and buzz Russian jets when they violate European airspace, but we don’t shoot them down. But the comparison is actually revealing. The difference is that Russian jets are not currently firing their missiles at European cities. Russian spies are doing the equivalent. Our responses should match the severity of the attacks. Wiktorin’s above-mentioned chapter recommends careful evaluation of risks and cost-benefit analysis before any action. I agree. I also think that cooperation and coordination between countries in Europe is the best answer to this problem. Russia cannot as easily pick us off one by one if we act in unison.

This brings us to the final risk: the danger of escalation. There is always a danger of escalation when you retaliate during conflict, but pretending that we are not in a conflict and refusing to fight back won’t stop Russia from attacking us. We have not attacked Russia until now, and Putin has seen that appeasement strategy as an invitation to escalate his attacks on us, not a reason to refrain. We should expect that Russian politicians and mouthpieces will scream bloody murder and threaten nuclear war if Europe builds the courage and capability to conduct sabotage actions in Russia, but we should ignore that for the bluster that it will be.

Moreover, inaction risks generating even worse escalation. Due to Europe’s hybrid capability gap, Europe is missing several rungs on the escalation ladder, and European leaders are forced to choose between inaction and dramatic escalation. The danger is that they do nothing until Russia’s salami tactics become unbearable, at which point they have no other weapons with which to respond than conventional or nuclear. It would be better to develop the ability to retaliate in kind and deter further Russian escalation.

To avoid uncontrolled escalation, our retaliatory attacks should send a very clear message: “We didn’t start this. Our attacks are responses. Tit for tat. If you hit us, we will hit you, perhaps a little harder than you hit us. We now have the capacity to inflict damage on you, perhaps even foment regime change, and if you continue to support those who wish to dismantle European democracy, we will use that capacity against you. If you stop, we stop. If you don’t, we can and will hurt you.”

How to do it

The Russians have invested systematically into these capabilities. We need to do the same.

I assume that the relevant European actors that are now working on this do so in a deliberate manner, but here are my thoughts on process:

• Develop a hybrid deterrence strategy. For deterrence by punishment in the hybrid realm to be effective, it needs to be part of a careful and coherent strategy that sets up clear objectives and matches them with capabilities and means, balanced against risks like the ones described above. A hybrid deterrence strategy should be integrated with existing defense, foreign, and security policies, and if any of those need to be amended to support the hybrid warfare strategy, they should be so amended.

• Create the legal room to conduct covert operations. Wiktorin discusses this at length concerning Swedish laws, but this needs to be examined elsewhere as well. The liberal democrats’ dilemma needs to be taken seriously here. We need to land on a compromise between naïve openness that allows democracy to be killed, and killing democracy ourselves when trying to defend it. But the dilemma is not a reason to do nothing.

• Institutional change. Are our current intelligence agencies (civil and military) fully equipped and designed to take on these new tasks? If not, they need to be re-designed with this in mind.

• European cooperation. Individual European countries and agencies should enhance cooperation with like-minded countries, whether in the UK-led coalition of the willing that is supporting Ukraine, or in the Nordic-Baltic (NB8) plus Poland framework. I can only assume that there already is cooperation, but also that intelligence agencies are wary of sharing details about their most secretive programs, plans, and actions. However, for smaller countries like the Nordics, conducting covert actions against Russia on their own is a tall and risky order, so cooperation and coordination are probably needed.

Let’s be realistic

We should be realistic about what Europe can achieve. Many who study Russian strategy and warfare argue that the political, intelligence, and military leadership is steeped in ideas about a perpetual war. If they are right, we may have to reset our expectations. While I would much prefer to raise the cost of bad behavior so that we can return to a peaceful and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia in a future after Putin, that may be wishful thinking. The Swedish Russia expert Gudrun Persson made waves when she warned, a few months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that war was coming and that it would take several generations before Europeans could expect better relations with Russia, if ever.

Whether you are an optimist or a pessimist about Russia in the long run, you cannot ignore the fact of Russian hybrid aggression today. That aggression needs to be deterred, and to do so, Europe needs to learn to fight back.

Accepting that we are in a hybrid war means that we have to be ready and willing to fight that war. The problem is that Russia is a lot better at hybrid warfare than we are. Russia has been perfecting “active measures” for decades, and never dismantled its capabilities following the end of the Cold War, but what about us? Could we fight back even if we chose to? The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences has been working on this topic for a few years. Their work contains some interesting insights concerning hybrid war and deterrence that I will use as my stepping-off point for this post. (I found the recently published final report in their SV-A-R (Sweden, Deterrence, and Resilience) program after this post was already drafted, but the excellent chapter by Johan Wiktorin also makes a strong case for going on the offense and is well worth a read. It is unfortunately in Swedish.)

Two kinds of Deterrence: Denial and Punishment

As Lars Wedin argues in a recent paper, the literature distinguishes between two kinds of deterrence: First, there is deterrence by denial, which means that you make it less attractive for an adversary to attack because you are so resilient that attacks fail to achieve their objectives. This forces the adversary to spend more to achieve the same objectives, raising their cost-benefit calculation. When it comes to the sphere of hybrid warfare, this means making our societies more resilient by increasing redundancy in energy grids, by repairing damage from sabotage quickly, teaching citizens and employees how to avoid cyber-attacks, and countering disinformation with truth. As a former martial artist and combat sports practitioner, I like to think of deterrence by denial using the analogy of a fighter who is good at blocking, bobs and weaves skillfully, and has a good chin.

This leads us to the second kind of deterrence. To continue with the metaphor, as anyone who has ever watched a boxing match knows, no fighter, not Canelo or even Muhammad Ali at his prime, can simply duck and slip an entire fight. Canelo has a masterful defense, but is also a brilliant counterpuncher. European institutions are spending a lot of energy and time on making us get better at taking punches. This is undoubtedly important, but it is not sufficient. We cannot hope to prevail in this hybrid war against Russia unless we also make it hurt for Russia to conduct aggression against us, and for this, we need punitive deterrence. We need to punch back.

However, it is unclear to me if Europe still has any serious capacity for punitive deterrence in the hybrid domain. Recent developments should have made it very clear that we can no longer trust the United States to defend us in this realm. So what about Europe’s capacity to deter Russian grayzone attacks?

Thresholds and Credible Deterrence

Before I turn to the hybrid domain, let me just mention a few additional concepts, two of which are often used in the study of nuclear deterrence: thresholds and credibility. Nuclear weapons like Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which target enemy cities, can be used to deter a similarly equipped adversary from launching a nuclear attack. Any use of these missiles—often called “strategic” nuclear weapons—against such an adversary would result in Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), so both parties are deterred from starting a nuclear war.

Since any use of strategic nukes would result in MAD, there is a high threshold for using them, even for defensive purposes. If a hypothetical state (let’s call it the United Queendom) has a defense that only consisted of strategic nuclear weapons, a hypothetical foreign adversary (let’s call it Rozzia) could then conduct limited aggression up to that threshold without the UQ being able to retaliate without bringing about its own destruction. The United Queendom could theoretically threaten to retaliate against each of Rozzia’s minor aggressions, but such threats of retaliation would lack credibility due to the high threshold for using them. In this way, having too big a gap between conventional defense and nuclear defense undermines the credibility of a state’s deterrence.

This is why defense experts talk about the need to have a full range of deterrent capabilities. As in our hypothetical nuclear example, any gap can be exploited by a foreign adversary using salami tactics:

The concept applies to any domain of conflict, including hybrid warfare. If the defender has tools calibrated to defend against conventional military or even nuclear attacks, but not against hybrid or grayzone attacks, then it lacks a credible deterrence against them.

This is not theoretical. I think that we are in a situation similar to that of the hypothetical state United Queendom when it comes to hybrid war. While many European states may have downgraded their conventional defenses after the end of the Cold War, they are now being rapidly reconstituted. We still have a problem with credible deterrence in this domain, but it is nowhere near as bad as when it comes to the hybrid domain.

European hybrid deterrence capabilities

Deterrence by denial

Russia has almost certainly devoted large parts of its state apparatus to waging a hybrid war against us. The Guardian just revealed that it has university programs devoted to training covert military operatives, and it conducts multipronged attacks on a regular, weekly, or perhaps even daily basis. Those attacks range from influence operations and support for extremist political parties and organized crime to cyber-attacks and physical sabotage.

My amateur assessment is that we may be somewhat resilient when it comes to attacks on our physical infrastructure, even though I suspect that Russian sabotage hitherto has often just been probing attacks in order to identify weaknesses, leading many to overestimate our resilience because the damage wasn’t worse. Damage may not have been the point.

When it comes to European defenses against influence operations, cyber, and election interference, there are some positive signs. Romania and Moldova have protected their elections against Russian attacks, and the European Union is actively pushing back against Russian influence operations. That is good, but to my knowledge, Europe has so far focused almost all efforts in the hybrid domain on deterrence by denial.

The four pillars of the EU’s Action Plan Against Disinformation concern improving capabilities to “detect, analyse and expose disinformation,” strengthening “joint responses to disinformation,” mobilizing the private sector to tackle disinformation,” and “raising awareness and improving societal resilience.” These tasks all fall under the rubric of deterrence by denial. The EU’s East Stratcom Taskforce, with its EU vs Disinfo project, is focused on identifying and publicizing Russian disinformation, and explicitly states that it does NOT conduct counterpropaganda or its own disinformation. The European Democracy Shield, which was launched in November of 2025, “strives to make democracies more resilient against information attacks and interference coming from its adversaries.” Again, this is deterrence by denial. It is bobbing and weaving only. It is needed, but even if it is fully successful, it will not stop the attacks.

And as I have argued elsewhere, despite the occasional successes, it is clear that we are actually not resilient, but rather extremely vulnerable when it comes to influence operations and attacks that exploit our societal divisions. With a few exceptions, Putin’s assault on our politics is proceeding almost unhindered and has already achieved extraordinary returns on his investment. We cannot afford to rely exclusively on deterrence by denial.

Europe’s deterrence by punishment capability gap

The situation is, unfortunately, even worse when it comes to punitive deterrence. One powerful punitive tool that we do have in our arsenal is economic. We could impose sanctions as a form of retaliation, but we have already deployed them in response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Europe could use the frozen Russian assets to help fund Ukraine’s defensive war and reconstruction, but Russian threats and European timidity and division have so far hampered those efforts. I believe that Europe should tighten its sanctions and seize the frozen assets and let it be known that we are doing so in response to Russian hybrid attacks, not just its war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, there are still too many actors who have an interest in helping Russia evade or weaken the sanctions for them to be as powerful a tool as they could be.

Moreover, economic sanctions in retaliation for devastating attacks on the democratic foundations of our societies are too asymmetric. The message we are sending is tantamount to “if you burn down my house and kill my family, you may have to pay a fine.” It is not just an unsatisfying and disproportionate response; it is unlikely to be successful. The best game-theoretical strategy for a player in the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which two players are incentivized to fail to cooperate, is to use the Tit For Tat strategy. That is, you respond in kind.

Our problem is that in the hybrid domain, we lack the capability to respond in kind. My understanding is that few European intelligence agencies had extensive covert capabilities even during the Cold War, as this was largely outsourced to the United States and the CIA. What capabilities there were were largely dismantled following the end of the Cold War. Today, my (admittedly limited) understanding is that it is mainly the UK and France that maintain any serious such capabilities (but wait for my next post for some positive signs on this front). Europe is essentially fighting a hybrid war without weapons.

Europe needs to close the capability gap

This lack of capacity creates a gap similar to that of our hypothetical nuclear-armed state, the United Queendom. If we do not have the capability for punitive deterrence in the realm of hybrid war, then we are left with having to threaten with conventional military retaliation for hybrid attacks like sabotage or influence operations. That threshold is obviously too high, which means that such a threat would not be credible. European politicians are rightly fearful of escalating the hybrid war into a conventional war and thus avoid issuing such threats. This leaves us essentially defenseless against the ongoing, massive Russian hybrid attacks that we have been experiencing. Hybrid attacks against which we are not fully resilient, and which constitute serious threats to our democracies.

We need to start punching back to raise the cost for Russia of attacking us in the first place. That is, we need to get better at hybrid deterrence by punishment. In my next post, I will present ideas for how we need to start thinking and acting to close this capability gap. The good news is that some key players appear to have realized this and are beginning to do so.

Perhaps it is a slight exaggeration to say I learned to drive. But I did drive. And with all that is happening in certain straits these troubled days, I feel like my experience might hold some broader lessons. Especially for my friends across the pond.

As the story has been relayed to me, we were on a trip to Helsinki, and my parents stopped the car outside the Fazer store with the engine running so that they could slip in quickly and buy some Finnish chocolate before our return home on the ferry. Seeing an opportunity, I crawled into the driver’s seat and simply put the car in gear. Fortunately for the Helsinkians on the sidewalks of the city, my father was paying attention. He saw the car move, ran out quickly, and stopped the car before any damage was done. I can only presume that my parents (who were otherwise good parents!) were less than pleased with themselves for leaving me in the car.

For my part, however, I had gotten the bug. It was not long thereafter that I repeated my accomplishment, only this time I seemed to have lost all my earlier inhibitions. I aimed the vehicle not just at unsuspecting Finnish pedestrians but straight toward Storsjön, the lake by my grandparents’ summer cottage in the Swedish North. Had it not been for my grandfather’s quick (and by all witness accounts, surprisingly athletic) intervention this time around, it could have been an epic adventure. Not only did the steep slope that I started the car down lead straight into the very deep lake, but it also included a cool jump from a small embankment above the beach. Alas, it was not to be.

Anyway, as fun as these test drives were for me at the time, the adult me is willing to concede that a toddler behind the wheel is not a great arrangement. Moreover, perhaps my father—bless his memory—should have learned his lesson from the first adventure and done more to prevent me from attempting it again. So let my story be a lesson to you all: Don’t put a child in the driver’s seat!

And let’s say you do let it happen once despite my sage advice and you manage to avert disaster, it is still a very bad idea to let it happen again. The child may have gotten a taste for speed. And the second time, there might not be any adults around to stop the vehicle as it careens toward the deep, dark waters below.

***

(Note: My mother told me that I got one detail wrong in the original version of the post. It was a family trip, and not a business trip. Since loyal readers know that I am all about the truth, I have edited the relevant passage.)

Hungary is not fully democratic

First of all, no, the fact that Viktor Orban, the Hungarian strongman Prime Minister, lost the election does not mean that Hungary was or is a fully functioning democracy. The Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project at Gothenburg University classified Hungary 2025 as an Electoral Autocracy (EA). This is one of the four types of governments or regimes that V-DEM has identified. Ordered from most to least democratic, these are: Liberal Democracy, Electoral Democracy, Electoral Autocracy, and Closed Autocracy.

The shorthand description of the concept of Electoral Autocracy is that it describes a country that has competitive elections, but these are not fully free or fair. You could say that the system is “gamed” in favor of the incumbent through his control over the media, the electoral system, and the judiciary. This gives him an unfair advantage, but it does not predetermine the outcome. The strongman still garners legitimacy from his ability to win elections. That makes EAs different from Closed Autocracies, which may have elections, but you always know who is going to win them.

The political system in EAs may be “gamed,” but their elections are not “rigged.” Orbán gamed the system by gerrymandering election districts and changing the rules. He created a few large election districts where the opposition was strong, and many smaller districts where his Fidesz had strong support, while the number of representatives each district produced did not properly reflect its size. He then eliminated second-round runoffs in case no party got a majority in a district, a change that benefited the largest party (often Fidesz), and erected hurdles for coalition candidates when the opposition tried to join forces.

He did all of this with the gavel, not the gun. He could do so because he had obtained a two-thirds majority in parliament in the 2010 elections, which allowed Fidesz to push through constitutional changes alone. He used them to remove checks and balances on the executive, packed the judiciary, and kicked out the troublesome (and excellent) Central European University from the country. And he made good use of control of the media to make sure that the opposition had trouble reaching out with its messages. So, despite the election loss, Orbán’s Hungary was not a fully functioning democracy. (I have great hopes that Hungary’s new leader will now reform the country and return it to its democratic path, but that is a topic for another day.)

Hungary is not a closed autocracy either

Having said this, it is important for my American readers and friends not to gloss over the fact that Orban’s Fidesz, despite gaming the system, did just lose an election. Hungary is not a Closed Autocracy. That creates a challenge for the autocratic ruler: He always runs the risk of losing an election, no matter how much he tries to tilt the playing field in his favor. The ruler of an Electoral (or Competitive) Autocracy like Hungary can make it very hard for the opposition to win, but he cannot prevent it unless he is willing to take the dramatic step towards a Closed Autocracy.

Turkey’s Erdogan seems to have decided that he needs to take that step, and he has simply jailed the much more popular opposition candidate for President. That is an option. But even then, he has not abandoned elections altogether, and he is probably not able to fully rig them, so he still runs the risk of being defeated by the next opposition candidate in line. Perhaps because he feared harsh EU penalties if he jailed Peter Magyar, Orbán did not jail the popular opposition candidate even though he constituted a real political threat. Neither did he cancel elections or order the military on the streets on election day.

The lesson for Americans fearful of the Trump administration's strident efforts to turn the US into an autocracy is this: Don’t exaggerate Trump’s powers. Leaving aside the question of whether MAGA is a fascist movement or simply an authoritarian one, there has undoubtedly been a spectacularly “rapid and aggressive concentration of powers in the presidency” during Trump’s whirlwind second administration. V-DEM has now demoted the USA from Liberal Democracy to Electoral Democracy for the first time in over 50 years.

When V-DEM visualizes the changes, as in this graph of their measures of liberal democracy, their dramatic nature is clear.

Importantly, however, the report also concludes that, at least for now, the integrity of elections is not significantly affected. Despite the decline, the USA in 2025 remained a democracy, only an Electoral Democracy, no longer a Liberal Democracy. Even if we were to assume that the downward fall continues and that the US in 2026 is now actually an Electoral Autocracy instead, Republicans can still be unseated in elections. Even if Trump games the system by threatening media outlets with lawsuits and gets loyal oligarchs to purchase various media like CBS, Twitter, and TikTok, and then change their editorial line/algorithms, that is different from rigging elections. Trump attempted the kind of aggressive gerrymandering that Orbán implemented, but some Republicans balked, and Democrats pushed back. The net result right now is a loss for the Republicans, and even if they continue with existing plans for Florida and other states, they would likely only net a few more seats.

Moreover, the Hungarian elections revealed the risk of too aggressive gerrymandering. The most common way to get more districts for your party is to dilute your majorities in existing districts. To illustrate: You can divide one district where you historically have had a safe (say) 70% majority into two districts with (say) 60% majorities. That gets you two seats instead of one, but in a wave-election where the opposition outperforms their historical results, you could suddenly lose both districts. That is arguably why Indiana Republicans decided to resist Trump’s demands to gerrymander last year. Actually rigging elections (using outright fraud) is the only way to guarantee autocrats a win, but it is very hard in countries with any tradition of voting, like Hungary or Turkey, not to mention the United States. Modern autocracies instead try to game the system and tilt the playing field in their favor. That is unfair and undemocratic, but far from foolproof.

Resistance works

And this is what I really want American readers to retain from this post: Hungary—a more deeply authoritarian country than America has yet become under Trump 2.0—was able to dispose of its autocratic strongman in an election. So can you. America is not a fascist dictatorship, even though it feels like it to many on the Left right now. Trump is undoubtedly trying to push through an authoritarian agenda at a record pace, but whether you look carefully at institutions and elections in the US or look at the country in an international comparison, you are not a dictatorship. If we place the USA on a scale from Liberal Democracy to Closed Autocracy, it has moved rapidly rightward but is thankfully nowhere near the latter end of the scale. This means that elections still matter and the ruling party can still lose them.

Importantly, this means that both massive protests against democratic backsliding and “normal” election work and voting are useful tools. Political violence, coups, and assassinations are not. What we did see work in Hungary was also resistance from within the state, as whistleblowers within the police and the security services started leaking regime plans to conduct red flag attacks like fake assassination attempts shortly before the election. Those leaks may have preempted attempts to undermine the integrity of, or at least further game, the elections. So please do not misunderstand me. My advice is not to stand down and do nothing while waiting for the next election. Any American concerned about democracy in the US should resist and fight for their rights, but they should do so peacefully because that is both right and the most effective strategy.

The Hungarian lesson for Americans worried about their democracy is thus simultaneously that their concern is real, but also that wannabe (or real) autocrats in Electoral Democracies as well as Electoral Autocracies can be defeated at the ballot box. So protest, volunteer for a political candidate, and vote. Don’t do stupid shit.