Wells Fargo trimmed its target range to $4,900–$5,100, while Citigroup lifted its 6–12-month target to $5,000. Although not base cases, JP Morgan and a few others have bull case scenarios of $5,500-$6,000.

Au hit an all-time-high just shy of $5,600 in late January, then pulled back to the upper $3,900s in July. There appears to be meaningful support around $4,000, a price few dreamed possible 2-3 years ago (Au averaged $2,166/oz from 1/1/23 to 12/31/24)…

Producers are meaningfully stepping up the pace of strategic investments into juniors. Combined, Agnico, Barrick, and Newmont have made nearly two dozen investments into attractive projects in the past few years.

Others staking claims in promising projects and/or companies include; Freeport McMoRan, BHP, Rio Tinto, AngloGold Ashanti, Centerra Gold, Gold Fields, Teck Resources, Kinross Gold, Lundin Mining, B2Gold, South32, Pan American Silver, First Quantum, Fortescue Ltd., OceanaGold, and Evolution Mining.

The following table shows examples of M&A in the past year. While these deals are mostly in the C$ billions, a tsunami of small-to-midsize transactions is increasingly likely going forward. Juniors with market caps in the C$100s of millions will attract a lot of attention.

Strikepoint Gold (TSX-v: SKP) / (OTC: STKXF) is graduating from micro-cap to small cap with a truly ambitious acquisition of a meaningful Au project in Nevada, USA. Last month StrikePoint agreed to buy Newmont’s Northumberland for upfront consideration of US$70M (~C$97M), plus two contingent US$25M (~C$35M) payments.

Kinross, AngloGold Ashanti & Centerra surround Strikepoint…

One payment would be after delivery of a Feasibility Study, (probably not before 2029-30) the other after commercial production has begun. Some investors no doubt fear management is biting off more than it can chew.

One of the biggest risk factors is raising the C$97M due to Newmont, a huge sum compared to Strikepoint’s current market cap. However, a Canaccord-led bought deal financing was announced, and soon after upsized due to strong investor demand. Gross proceeds raised could be up to C$190m.

Northumberland hosts a meaningful 2.86M Au Eq. ounces in the Indicated category + 1.57M Inferred. Using the full US$120M (~C$167M) potential acquisition cost, the Company’s paying ~C$38/oz, quite attractive for Nevada assets. Compare that figure to peer Nevada-focused juniors at pre-PEA and PEA stages.

Look at peers, Northumberland stands out as a brownfield, past-producing site on substantial private/fee land, which could potentially shorten surface-access and permitting friction versus claim-heavy green field projects.

It already has pits, pads, ponds, roads, and a decline, among other infrastructure assets. The scale is larger than the peer average, (+111%). And, there’s dual oxide-plus-sulfide optionality here.

In addition to double the resource size, upon the deal closing, Strikepoint’s Northumberland would have an +81% higher Au Eq. grade, yet the Company is valued at a 62% discount on an EV/Au Eq. ounce basis. The Project’s resource is 65% Indicated vs. ~29% Indicated for peers (three have 0% Indicated).

I tracked down CEO Mike Allen to ask him some questions about the Northumberland transaction. It’s certainly a game-changer, can his team pull it off?

Please describe the proposed Northumberland Gold Project transaction. In what ways is this seemingly large price tag (relative to initial company size) structured in such a way as to be financially manageable and operationally flexible?

It’s a relatively simple transaction, an acquisition with an associated financing. Granted, it’s a very large acquisition & financing relative to our size. The initial payment to Newmont is ~C$97M, which will be paid out of a bought deal financing.

There are two milestone payments of ~C$35M each, one due 120 days after delivery of a full Feasibility Study, the other 120 days post commercial production. So, several years away, and a few years between the two.

One of the biggest risk factors is raising the cash to close the deal and fund exploration & development expenses + working capital for the next year or two. Our bought deal financing, assuming it closes reasonably as planned, addresses that significant risk.

After a 10-for-1 rollback and C$2.00/share financing, what will StrikePoint’s fully diluted share count, pro forma cash (incl. assumed exercise of all pro forma options/warrants), and pro forma enterprise value be?

Post roll back, there will be 6.24M shares of SKP outstanding. With the sidecar and assuming a full upsize of the bought deal to C$190M, there would be ~102.24M shares with a modest number of options & warrants. Estimated EV (market cap – cash) would be ~C$112M (after C$97M payment to Newmont).

Is Strikepoint buying Northumberland for its current multi-million ounce resource or for its exploration potential to get even bigger?

Both. The Northumberland transaction puts a multi-million ounce resource, 65% of which are Indicated into StrikePoint. It’s a significant change in the company going from a junior explorer, to a company thinking about potential development scenarios.

However, Northumberland has substantial exploration upside potential. For reference, a resource was done on the project in ~2010 that used $895/oz Au. The 2026 pit constrained resource estimate used $3,500/oz.

This allows lower-grade mineralization to be included, giving larger more continuous resource. In addition, the edges of the deposit, where grades were marginal in 2010, are now wide open using current prices.

Importantly, there are exploration opportunities that could significantly impact total ounces across the property. Two potential game-changing targets are the Eastern Limb and White Canyon targets, both outside the existing resource estimate.

If your team successfully raises C$160M, or up to C$190M, how long will that cash fund the Company?

The original thought was that the C$140M raise would give us 1 year of working capital. The extra capital from the announced upsizing (C$160-$190M) should give us up to two years of funding, maybe more, depending on how aggressive we are. We expect to have enough to get us through a PEA in 1H 2028.

What can be said, if anything, about the prospects for obtaining permits for Northumberland given surrounding communities, private vs. public land, etc.

One of the interesting things about Northumberland is it’s well positioned for success. Historically, there was a land swap done that creates a significant parcel of private land that’s right over the resource.

Generally speaking, on private land in the USA, the lead permitting agency becomes the State. Nevada regulators are well educated in all things mining, so there’s a potential advantage here. Northumberland is ~25 miles from Kinross Gold’s Round Mountain, so the neighboring communities also know mining.

Surrounding the private parcel is Federal land under claim. For exploration and mining on these claims it’s a well documented pathway to obtain permits.

Thank you Mike, exciting times. I look forward to hearing more from you and your team after the private placement closes and the deal is completed, both coming up fairly soon!

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Strikepoint Gold, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Strikepoint Gold are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Strikepoint Gold was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned no shares in the company.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Companies with strong teams, in world class jurisdictions, with high-grade drill results, near key regional infrastructure, surrounded by meaningful mines & projects.

To be clear, high-quality prospects in places like Quebec, Canada, near Agnico Eagle’s La Ronde and Eldorado Gold’s Lamaque don’t need an Au price north of $5,000/oz to stand out, today’s $4,450 is perfectly fine.

A name that looks quite promising is Bullion Gold Discoveries (TSX-v: BGD). It recently announced the completion of an important “validation drilling” program of 32 diamond holes for 3,909 meters —> more than the planned 3,000 meters outlined in June.

Management reports that every hole intersected their targeted geological & mineralized zones, supporting the historical model.

However, there were no drill assays in the press release. The only new numbers were a few modest grade channel & grab samples. All eyes are on core results slated to be released from September on. The results could be impactful.

According to CEO/Pres. Simon Britt, "The primary objective was to validate historical data and known gold intersections within the Terragold mineralized system, confirm continuity of mineralization, and evaluate its complete geochemical signature. Since program launch in June, we advanced several stages of the discovery process simultaneously, from surface prospecting & channel sampling, to validation drilling at depth. Shallow drilling intersected the targeted geological & mineralized zones in every drill hole. Our focus now turns to assay results and their integration into the geological model.”

In the next month, management will focus on receiving & interpreting assay results. The latest drill data will be combined with historical information and added to Terragold’s new 3-D model to identify areas with the strongest potential.

Management believes there’s clearly a shallow Au deposit of interest, it’s a question of how much more extensive it is, how deep it might run, and how much medium-to-higher-grade mineralization there might be.

Speaking of management, this is a strong team, led by CEO Simon Britt who’s been actively buying shares in the open market (he now owns nearly 1.8M shares). Please note the following three technical committee members…

Claude Britt, géologue (OGQ), graduate of the Univ. of Western Ontario (B.Sc., 1974), is an exploration Geo with 50+ years’ experience. He has contributed to the discovery and advancement of gold, copper and iron deposits in Québec, Peru & Africa. His career spans senior roles at Pangea Goldfields, Geomega Resources, Century Global Commodities, and Hana Mining.

Guy Morissette has 45+ years’ in exploration. He founded Vanstar Mining Resources, and was Chair., Pres/CEO until 2020. Vanstar was acquired by IAMGOLD in 2024; Guy is credited with the Moriss discovery in 2010 and helped advance the Hendrick, GP, RB, Hurd and Moriss showings (~1.8M Inferred ounces) and the Lake Expanse showing. He has advised on the development of Galloway, now owned by Fokus Mining Resources.

Chairman Gilles Laverdière, P.Geo., has 40+ years’ experience. He’s a NI 43-101 QP. He worked in NW Québec (1978–1984), then in senior management and on boards in Canada, the Philippines, Brazil & Nevada. He was Pres./CEO of HMZ Metals, taking it public. Gilles planned/supervised drilling & authored NI reports in NW Québec, then led a Mali gold project for Merrex Gold in a JV with IAMGOLD. He was CEO of Vantex Resources, and a Dir. of Vanstar Mining and Fokus Mining.

The Terragold deposit is open in all directions and at depth. Historical drilling in the 1960s and 1980s only assayed for gold. Detailed compilation work has identified a 2.2 km gold-mineralized strike length to ~250 m of vertical depth, and ~450 m width.

A 3D Leapfrog model of 107 holes (100 with assays; 98 mineralized) uses cutoffs: green 0.3–1 g/t, yellow 1–2, orange 2–5, red 5–10, purple > 10 g/t.

Of course, there’s a lot of lower grade green and yellow, but if one zooms in and looks closely there’s a meaningful amount of orange, red & purple, especially in the middle of the image.

Importantly, this year’s drilling will be assayed for more than just gold. We already know their are silver & copper showings, could there be others? Very little core survived from the 1960s/80s, but assays reportedly included 21 intervals of 10+ g/t Au over a minimum of 0.6 meters.

Significant results from the mid-1960s include the following intervals at down hole depths of 2 to 447 meters. Note, these are from five different holes.

• ~14.7 g/t Au over 6.7 m (from 2 m)

• ~11.5 g/t Au over 8.1 m (from 76 m)

• ~11.7 g/t Au / 10.0 m (from 104 m)

• ~3.45 g/t Au / 27.1 m (from 302 m) Incl. 18.2 g/t / 3.9 m (from 302 m)

• ~6.4 g/t Au / 15.4 m (from 447 m)

  Regional mines/projects routinely plunge 1,000+ meters

Notice the owners/operators of these assets. Companies like Agnico Eagle, Eldorado, IAMGOLD, groups that could invest into TerraGold and run hard with it.

Readers should note that producers are meaningfully stepping up the pace of strategic investments into juniors. Combined, Agnico, Barrick, and Newmont have made nearly 20 investments into attractive projects in the past few years.

Others staking claims in promising projects and/or companies include; Freeport McMoRan, BHP, Rio Tinto, AngloGold Ashanti, Centerra Gold, Gold Fields, Teck Resources, Kinross Gold, Lundin Mining, B2Gold, South32, Pan American Silver, First Quantum, Fortescue Ltd., OceanaGold, and Evolution Mining.

Terragold is a robust project, Bullion Gold’s flagship, but the Company has a few other projects as well. The Bousquet project covers 2,393 hectares, also in the Abitibi Greenstone Belt, is ~30 km west of Rouyn-Noranda, Québec. In March 2025, Bullion farmed Bousquet out to Australian-listed Olympio Metals to earn up to 80%.

Bousquet has multiple high-grade hits, highlighted by 19.4 meters of 17.3 g/t Au, incl. 7.5 m of 41. 8 g/t, incl. 2.0 m at 109.5 g/t drilled this year. Bousquet is very near Agnico’s giant La Ronde Complex (~15 km away) and IAMGOLD’s Westwood (less than 8 km).

Another project, Langlade, is a VMS exploration project in Québec targeting copper, zinc, Au & Ag. Historical drilling returned wide mineralized intervals, and the company is following up with till sampling and new holes to test extensions and nearby geophysical targets.

Even if Bousquet and Langlade are only worth C$1-2M each, that’s not insignificant as Bullion Gold’s enterprise value is under C$8M (C$0.08/shr). For now, all eyes are on drill results at Terragold.

Will September/October be big months for Bullion Gold Discoveries? High risk, but high return potential in a bull market for gold.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Bullion Gold Discoveries, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Bullion Gold Discoveries are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Bullion Gold Discoveries was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned no shares in the company.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic

On August 21st, Silver Storm announced a top up investment by legendary Ag enthusiast Eric Sprott for 15M units at C$0.50/share. Each unit includes a half warrant at C$0.70. This is notable as Sprott already owned 11.6% of the Company.

In addition, another significant high net worth investor (unnamed) is investing, bringing the total raise to C$15M. Some might complain about equity dilution, but a half warrant isn’t terrible and it’s Eric Sprott, not a bunch of retail flippers.

I take this as a vote of confidence in Silver Storm’s two 100%-owned crown jewel assets — La Parrilla & San Diego — both in Durango, Mexico. And, a stamp of approval in the mining jurisdiction and management team, led by CEO Greg McKenzie.

Sprott is presumably optimistic about the ramp up of La Parrilla being on schedule, and about next year’s prospects for renewed exploration/development to resume at San Diego. The following image shows a summary of a very recent webinar.

For the past three years the story has been entirely focused on the restart of its La Parrilla mining complex. While it’s too soon to declare mission accomplished, first pour was two months ago, ramping up to an annual run-rate of 3.0M Ag Eq. ounces in 1Q/27.

As can be seen in the following table, if Silver Storm only had La Parrilla, it would be undervalued. However, the Company has a second flagship asset named San Diego.

Both are in Durango State Mexico. In this article I focus on San Diego. Comparing it to peer projects suggests it’s worth C$100s of millions. That may seem hard to believe, but the comps speak for themselves.

I haircut the average peer EV/oz ratio by 33% due to a lack of recent development activity and modestly lower grade. Even with a 33% haircut, San Diego is arguably worth $327M.

Again, this may seem odd given that the entire enterprise value of Silver Storm is only about $412M. San Diego has been off the radar for so long that Investors have largely forgotten about it. Yet, at the end of 2020 it had a valuation as a standalone asset in a predecessor company of ~C$100M.

Given inflation in the past six years, and that Ag has tripled, perhaps a prospective value of C$327M is not as crazy as it sounds. Once La Parrilla is up and running, a lot more attention will be paid to San Diego.

Support for an estimate of C$327M can also be found in M&A for Ag-heavy names, most notably takeouts of producers Gatos, MAG Silver, SilverCrest, and early-stage pre-production developers Prime Mining & Australian-listed Adriatic Metals.

A key takeaway in the above table is the far right column showing the Ag price when each transaction was announced. The average of $33.6/oz half today’s level. In my view, M&A over the next few years will be at even more robust valuations.

To be clear, I’m not suggesting Silver Storm will be acquired anytime soon, I’m building a case for how much San Diego could be worth to a strategic investor. Having said that, if La Parrilla ramps up as planned, there’s no rush to secure a partner for San Diego.

San Diego could be self-funded for the next 12-24 months, through delivery of a PEA or perhaps a PFS. At that point, a strategic partner (if desired) would have to pay A LOT more to get a piece of the action.

If one agrees that C$327M is a reasonable estimate, what form of investment could Silver Storm potentially see?

In my view, not necessarily that of management, the 100% interest in San Diego could be farmed out for an upfront cash payment, plus the partner free-carrying all or most of Silver Storm’s remaining interest for several years —> through BFS, or all the way to production.

Given the potential size of a San Diego operation, reportedly 10-15M Ag Eq. ounces per year, the net present value (NPV) of being free-carried for 4-6 years through commercial production could be quite significant.

In the following table, please note how serious a 10-15M Ag Eq. oz operation would be. Fresnillo, Pan American Silver, and Coeur Mining will do 30-52M Ag Eq. in 2026, but notice that the bottom three multi-billion dollar producers are in the same ballpark as San Diego.

Obviously, San Diego at pre-PEA stage is a not apples-to-apples to these producers, but producers urgently need large projects, including early-stage ones. Especially in prolific mining-friendly & Western-friendly jurisdictions.

In the latest (2025) study, Durango ranked as Mexico’s 3rd safest state (out of 31) in the Mexican Peace Index. This annual ranking is conducted by an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia.

According to CAMIMEX, Mexico’s main private mining industry association, there are currently 59 mines and/or active projects in Durango State.

As a frame of reference, a few years ago Vale announced a 60% earn-in for Ero Copper. I mention this deal b/c Ero Copper’s project was pre-PEA at the time.

The key takeaway here is the very considerable value of being free-carried. GROK estimates the NPV(5%) to be ~C$150M. Note that in Ero Copper’s case they received 71% free carry on the first $1B, and 65.5% on the subsequent $1B.

Imagine CEO Greg McKenzie using this template as a starting point, but saying his board wants a 80%-100% free carried interest. Or, consider the Freeport McMoRan investment into Amarc Resources for a 60% stake.

In September of last year, Freeport agreed to invest an additional C$75M to increase its interest by 10% to 70%. Amarc’s project in B.C. Canada is a very good one, but it’s very early stage, (pre-maiden resource).

Bottom line: Securing a strategic investor for San Diego would be a massive de-risking event that would arguably worth C$100s of millions, (my opinion only) to the enterprise value. That’s C$100s of millions of incremental value as the asset is currently valued near zero.

To reiterate, I don’t know if a strategic investor is in the cards for later this year, next year, or ever, only that numerous companies should be interested in a world-class Ag-heavy (~75% Ag!) project like San Diego.

While all eyes remain on the ongoing ramp up of La Parrilla, which again is reportedly going well, San Diego is an increasingly valuable hidden asset. Hidden assets are, by definition, undervalued or even valued closed to zero.

Next year, if not sooner, I believe San Diego will be rediscovered by investors. Even if not ascribed a C$327M asset value, a third or half of that figure included in Silver Storm’s enterprise value would be meaningful.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Silver Storm Mining, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Silver Storm Mining are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Silver Storm Mining was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Investors can look at today’s Ag price as the glass half empty or half full… For the 24-month period ended 12/31/24, Ag averaged $25.5/oz., 60% below the current level.

Yet, during that time projects were being advanced, PEA/PFS/BFS reports were delivered, drilling was ongoing. The market was fine with Ag in the mid-$20s, thinking it was headed for $40+/oz.

Surprisingly, some investors are upset with the mid-$60s, a level few dreamed of two years ago. I believe the glass is half full. Funding for good projects has improved, fundamentals for Ag remain strong, and there’s growing urgency to secure long-term sustainable supply from Western-friendly countries.

Two of the top four largest producing countries are China & Russia, what could probably go wrong? The world clearly needs more silver from S. & N. America. In my view, if one’s bullish on the medium-to-long-term outlook for Ag, several companies offer compelling buying opportunities.

Silver’s inflation-adjusted high dates back to January, 1980! In today’s dollars it’s ~$210/oz. Is $210 a crazy outlier? Note that the entire year of 1980, averaged ~$86.

What’s changed since 1980? Solar power was a novelty, now it’s globally ubiquitous. There were no EVs, AI/Data Centers, cell phones, laptops, the Internet, or high-tech (wireless) consumer electronics.

We’re in year six of a mined Ag deficit, new mines take well over a decade from discovery to commercial production, while truly massive solar farms are deployed in 1-2 years. Yes, I think Ag is headed back above $75/oz. If true, select companies could see meaningful rebounds.

Which juniors? Fully-funded ones with high-grade Ag-heavy projects in safe, prolific jurisdictions, near regional infrastructure, not highly remote areas like in parts of Australia, Canada, Russia, Mongolia, Brazil, Chile, or Alaska.

A company that checks a lot of investment boxes is Pacifica Silver (CSE: PSIL) / (OTCQB: PAGFF). It has an excellent team, and is fully-funded for 60,000+ meters of drilling over the net two seasons on a very promising project in mining-friendly, prolific, Durango, Mexico.

The focus is on its flagship 11,876 hectare Claudia property (a past-producer, with at least nine artisanal/small -scale mines), acquired in July, 2025. Importantly, the transaction was negotiated in 2nd qtr. 2025, when Ag was ~$33/oz., roughly half today’s level.

In 2025, Durango was ranked as Mexico’s 3rd safest state (out of 31) in the Mexican Peace Index. The annual ranking is conducted by an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia.

According to CAMIMEX, Mexico’s main private mining industry association, there are 59 mines and/or active projects in Durango State.

Claudia hosts previously identified mineralized zones, including the Aguilareña, Guadalupana, Tres Reyes, La Concepción, Santiaguera, Mina de Oro, Mina Vieja, El Grullo, Noche Buena, Don José, El Cristo, and Lizeth vein exposures.

As mentioned, Pacifica Silver has a strong team, especially for a fully-diluted enterprise value of just ~C$78M. The Company had a robust C$27M in cash on 3/31/26. Please see bios above/below… In addition to Founder/CEO Todd Anthony, please review the impressive credentials of Chairman Kunz, VP Exploration Redak, Advisors Dr. Valedor & Weiss.

Note, CEO Anthony has been actively buying shares in the open market for the past two years. He owns 3.0 million. Historical work on the Aguilareña vein included a 90-meter-deep shaft and three development levels, with the most extensive extending ~770 m along strike.

Prior to Pacifica’s involvement from mid-2025, drilling had tested < 10% of the mapped 30 km of strike length. Surface mapping/trenching by previous operators, and numerous small-scale historical mine workings, indicate strong potential for new high-grade discoveries.

The Claudia project is located in the Sierra Madre Occidental –> one of the world’s most prolific epithermal precious metal belts, with major mines/projects and robust infrastructure nearby.

Mined for over 500 years, the belt has produced billions of ounces Ag, plus millions of ounces Au. Major companies currently active across the belt include Newmont, Fresnillo, Agnico Eagle, Pan American Silver, and First Majestic Silver.

Following meaningful success in Phase I drilling last year, a 20,000 meter Phase II program well underway. The Project benefits from low-cost and year-round drilling. More on drill results later.

I believe Pacifica is undervalued largely due to it only having an historical resource, not a current NI 43-101 compliant one. Below is the historical resource, including “potential mineralization” as identified by a third party.

As a frame of reference, not to be relied upon as it’s non NI 43-101 compliant, at $64/$4,400 Ag/Au, the potential mineralization estimate would be the main driver of a mineral resource of 183M Ag Eq. ounces, with an Ag Eq. grade of ~450 g/t.

Note, potential mineralization is derived from “40% of vein material over a projected 300-350 meters of vertical depth.” Even if this third-party estimate proves overly aggressive, upwards of 90,000 meters of drilling will have been done by 2H/27, which should support a sizable Ag Eq. resource.

In my view, an upcoming compliant resource estimate could show tens of millions of Ag Eq. ounces, perhaps ~60M, given the number of meters that will be drilled, with more ounces to follow in subsequent estimates. However, herein lies a primary risk… How many ounces can be booked, how quickly, and at what cost?

Even if there’s north of 100M Ag Eq. ozs, which I believe is a reasonable goal, if it takes 3+ years to get there, then today’s valuation might not be especially compelling. I’m hoping to see 100M+ Ag Eq. troy ounces after next year’s fully-funded drilling. Note, we might not see that until late-2027 or early-2028.

Peer high-grade Ag-heavy juniors, albeit mostly at more advanced stages (PEA, PFS, BFS), are valued in the C$4 to C$10/Ag Eq. oz. range. And, pre-PEA junior, newly listed, Sinda ltd., is valued at ~C$8.8/oz. in the ground. Sinda is notable as it also is a Mexican Ag junior.

In support of an attractive, growing resource, drill results have been robust since 2025, including the following; 754 g/t Ag Eq. over 4.4 meters, (incl. 2.0 m of 1,613 g/t Ag Eq.), and 987 Ag Eq. over 2.5 m. That’s very high grade over decent widths (not merely sub-1 meter hits).

I really like that some of the best drill results ever at Claudia are the most recent. And, note how shallow those two intervals from July are, from 66 & 100 meters, respectively.

Make no mistake, given the early stage, Pacifica Silver is riskier than many peers, but high-grade helps a lot, and a strong, experienced, well-connected team is comforting.

Therefore, I argue that investors are being well rewarded for the incremental risk of being pre-maiden resource, (but hosting past production, an historical resource + a potential mineralization estimate).

Assuming the Claudia project can book 60M Ag eq. high-grade ounces, (fully-funded for that report, but no guarantees on the 60M figure), the Company would be valued at ~C$1.30 per pro forma *prospective* Ag Eq. oz. vs. the more advanced high-grade peers at C$4-$12/oz.

Yes, to reiterate, pre-maiden resource is a risk here, but fully-funded drilling, hitting great mineralization, in a known high-grade district is a mitigating factor. In a bull market for precious metals (if we’re in one), taking on extra risk can be prudent.

Look, if Pacifica were valued at C$4+ per pro forma prospective ounce, that would be different. It’s not. If one’s bullish on Ag/Au prices over the next few years, investing in early-stage plays like Pacifica Silver might make sense.

Table is for illustrative purposes only, Pacifica Silver is pre-maiden resource...

To be clear, not any early-stage junior, only well-funded ones with strong teams, in safe places, with high-grade deposits, projects that are not remote, or at 4,000+ meters elevation (water scarcity), or facing local opposition. Pacifica Silver checks a lot of investment boxes.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Pacifica Silver, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Pacifica Silver are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Pacifica Silver was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Explosive demand from EVs, renewables, grid expansion, and AI data centers is outpacing supply. New mines take 15–20+ years from discovery to commercial production, yet data centers are built in under 5. Meanwhile, mined Cu supply has been, and will continue to be, under pressure.

Chile, by far the world’s largest producer, just announced that 2026 production will be -2.6% below that of 2025. The result of booming demand and stagnant supply is multi-year deficits that only higher prices can close.

Cu forecasts are being revised higher. Jefferies has a new $8/lb. target for 2030, while CFRA expects $8-$10/lb. by 2028-29. Mining legend Robert Friedland is calling for $9+/lb. As a frame of reference, $8/lb. is +20% above current levels. It’s like an Au target of $5,300/oz, or an Ag target of $80/oz –> hardly a stretch!

Importantly, this bullish commentary understates the growing need for long-term sustainable supply from Western-friendly countries. Three of the top six largest Cu producing countries are China, the DRC in Africa, and Indonesia. North American supply will be increasingly sought after.

A company I like a lot is Domestic Metals Corp., (TSX-v: DMCU) / (OTCQB: DMCUF) which holds an option to earn a 60% interest from Rio Tinto in the Smart Creek Cu-Au-Ag project in Montana, USA. The ~8,000-hectare property lies 50 km from the Butte district, boasting historical production of over 20 billion pounds of Cu. Montana, you ask?

Montana is a moderately mining-friendly state, hosting assets held by Rio, Hecla Mining, Australia’s Sandfire Resources (A$10B market cap), Sibanye-Stillwater, and Robert Friedland’s Ivanhoe Energy. All five have mines or projects within 115-185 miles of Smart Creek.

Note: Sandfire Resources owns 87% of Sandfire Resources America (~C$300M enterprise value, and ~2 billion pounds Cu Eq.). Sandfire Resources America holds the high-grade Black Butte project. This PFS-stage project is valued at a very robust ~C$0.15/lb.

If one gives early-stage Domestic Metals a prospective C$0.03/lb. valuation, the Company’s C$15M market cap gives it credit for a potential 833M pound Cu Eq. resource, (net for its pro forma 60% interest). I assure you that Rio is not helping Domestic’s team advance the Project expecting a sub-billion pound outcome...

Rio presumably sees potential for 3B+ pounds (1.8B+ net to Domestic Metals). That’s why Rio is holding on to 40% of the project, even though CEO Gordon Neal wanted 80%, not just 60%. Rio insisted on a 20% clawback provision, a clear demonstration of its conviction in both the district and project.

Domestic Metals is earning into a 60% controlling interest by investing US$5M over 5 years. It has already deployed ~$2M and has three years remaining on the earn-in. Smart Creek benefits from generations of drilling, modern geophysics, surface geochemistry, and a significant, ongoing, vote of confidence from a Major.

Rio’s continued involvement — including tech support and the 20% clawback option — de-risks the exploration thesis. Porphyry exploration is expensive and can be fatal for juniors, but Domestic Metals is the fifth group to explore Smart Creek.

Prior exploration was fairly extensive. Rio drilled 26 of the 40 holes, including a strong 109.7 m of 0.75% Cu, (that’s Cu, not Cu Eq.) incl. 89 m of 0.97% Cu, and incl. 16.8 m of 2.25% Cu. There were also showings of Ag in the 10s of grams/tonne, not huge, but not tiny, (especially if Ag bounces back above $80/oz).

A grade of 0.75% Cu at US$6.70/lb. is ~US$112/t rock, (ignoring the Ag component)near-surface, in the USA. In addition to drilling, surface sampling produced grades as high as 102 g/t Au, 23.1% Cu, and 3,810 g/t Ag.

How good is 0.75% Cu? In B.C., Teck Resources, Taseko Mines, Hudbay Minerals, and Imperial Metals are mining 0.2% to 0.3% Cu (mid-point $37/t rock). Importantly, 36 drill sites are permitted by the U.S. Forest Service through 2031, a serious de-risking factor for any junior. A fully-funded 9,000 m drill program begins this month.

Management believes that post-drilling geophysics has shown that Rio was likely drilling on the edge of the porphyry. For example, the team has found that Cu grades improve consistently toward the main target. This drill program is compelling because it leverages a strategic re-interpretation of legacy data.

While Rio’s 26 holes established the system’s framework, recent geophysics suggests these efforts were confined to peripheral lower-grade halos. By utilizing modern Magnetotellurics (“MT”) + IP, the team is vectoring toward the high-grade heat source previous operators might have missed.

In my view, 9,000 meters is a meaningful campaign. I’m excited for the drill results, and so is management. All it would take is a single interval of > 100 meters, at > 1.00% Cu Eq., to send shares soaring. Yes, that’s a tall order, but I think it’s reasonably possible.

Of course, a meaningful risk is that great results are possibly coming, but not in this program or the next one… That’s why the idea of Rio having narrowly missing the good stuff is so encouraging. Remember, Rio is still involved helping plan exploration activities. Why does Rio care?!?

The technical team includes seasoned advisors Peter Megaw, Dan MacNeil, and Alan Wainwright. Most junior miners have 0, 1 or 2 impressive (non-financial/capital markets) execs attached, this company has five.

Note: Unlike billionaire investors like Eric Sprott, who’s invested in over 100 juniors, Dr. Megaw is involved in fewer than 10, and advisors MacNeil & Wainwright are only active in a handful. I encourage readers to compare Domestic Metals’s technical board to those of similar-sized peers.

Gordon Neal is CEO/Director. He helped build MAG Silver (a major success story) from junior explorer to multi-billion-dollar company, and later led New Pacific Metals through critical growth phases. His career has focused on advancing high-potential mineral projects in the Americas. Will Domestic Metals be his next big win?

Chairman J. Patrico Vara, P.Geo. has 38 years’ experience, incl. expertise in developing precious & base metal projects. He played integral roles in advancing Santo Domingo Sur Cu-Fe – Chile, Diavik Diamonds – NWT, and Milestone Potash – Sask. He led delivery of key feasibility studies and has been involved in significant asset sales & corp. transactions.

Senior Tech. Advisor Peter Megaw holds a PhD in geology focused on carbonate replacement deposits (“CRD”s). With > 34 years’ experience in Mexican geology, he’s a leading authority and a frequent speaker at international conferences. Peter and his team are credited with major discoveries at Juanicipio-Fresnillo, Platosa, and Cinco de Mayo. He co-founded MAG Silver & Minaurum Gold.

Advisor Dan MacNeil, MSc, P.Geo., is an economic geologist specializing in precious/base metals with > 20 years’ experience spanning project generation to in-mine resource expansion across the Americas, Europe, and the Near East. He founded Vector Geological Solutions and advises numerous Cu/Au exploration companies on target delineation & project evaluation.

Advisor Alan Wainwright completed his PhD researching Ivanhoe Mines’ Oyu Tolgoi Cu/Au deposit in Mongolia, and was a co-recipient of the H.H. Spud Huestis award for his role in the Coffee Gold discovery (5M oz Au) in Yukon. He’s a Fellow of the Society of Economic Geologists.

Bottom line, clearly a strong technical team, management/board. Clearly a project with elevated Cu grades from both drilling and sampling. Clearly a favorably jurisdiction in the USA.

What do readers think this company could be worth if it hits a very good or excellent hole or holes? I don’t know the answer, but with Cu at a very robust $6.70/lb., and drilling soon to be underway, I can’t wait to see what unfolds in the coming months.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Domestic Metals Corp., including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Domestic Metals Corp. are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Domestic Metals Corp. was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

I agree with the management team/board that we’re in the midst of a commodities super cycle, Canada is one of the best places to develop assets, and the West is serious about sourcing critical materials outside of China.

MetalQuest owns 100% of the massive Lac Otelnuk iron ore project in northern Quebec, plus significant properties in Ontario’s Ring of Fire (“RoF”). High-purity iron ore, the kind Lac Otelnuk has, is highly-prized globally.

The Company has just 49M shares outstanding, and is cashed up with ~C$2M. It holds shares + deep-in-the-money warrants in Canadian Copper Inc., (“CCI”) worth roughly a combined C$2.1M (at C$0.70/shr.).

CCI just closed a C$48M financing with OR Royalties. Another C$48M is available from Ocean Partners. Also in July, CCI filed its Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”). These major milestones increase the value of MetalQuest’s two NSRs (totaling 1.0%) on CCI’s flagship Canadian project.

I provided a description of the NSRs and asked seven Chat boxes what the 1.0% NSR could be worth today. The average result? C$8.8M. Note, this figure has not been vetted by MetalQuest management.

Even half, C$4.4M, would be great vs. the Company’s current valuation of ~C$6.5M (at C$0.17/shr.).

To reiterate, cash + CCI shares + CCI warrants + the approximate value of the 1.0% NSR is greater than the Company’s entire enterprise value. Investors are getting BOTH Lac Otelnuk AND the RoF properties for FREE.

Lac Otelnuk, is N. America’s largest iron ore project. It’s in the northern Labrador Trough (most iron ore in the region comes from the southern, infrastructure-rich part).

CEO Barr believes ~C$170M has been spent on the Project to date. There’s an historic (2015) Bankable Feasibility Study (“BFS“) showing a 30-year of mine life (vs. a 100+ year total resource).

The Project was considered feasible using 2015 iron ore prices. Post-tax NPV(8%) was C$7.2B, and the IRR 13%. The iron ore price assumption was US$110/tonne. Today, in my view, that same quality ore might be closer to US$135/t.

Does that mean the NPV & IRR in a new BFS would be meaningfully better? It depends on how much op-ex & cap-ex have increased, and to what extent the mine plan can be optimized.

Examples of iron ore prices in recent economic studies…

Since 2015, high-purity iron from western-friendly countries is increasingly desired for “green-steel,” (steel made with hydrogen or renewables to reduce steel’s substantial carbon footprint). Only high-purity iron is amenable, 67.0%+ with low impurities. Lac Otelnuk’s project was 68.0-68.5% Fe in 2015. Management and third party experts are studying ways to improve the Fe content to 69.0%-70.0%.

In my view, there are levers to be pulled to improve project economics, while at the same time, demand for green-steel feedstock, namely high-purity iron ore, is far greater than it was 11 years ago. Also, the desire to source in Western-friendly countries has grown.

Among the largest iron ore countries are China, Russia & Ukraine. Ukraine is of course Western-friendly, but meaningfully impacted by war. Note, the US$/C$ exchange rate is ~15% weaker since 2015, a tailwind for project economics.

A post-tax IRR in the mid-teens percent is not unusual for giant projects. See the following table. Notice the jurisdictions, I prefer remote in #Quebec to Papua New Guinea, Guinea, (in western Africa), Panama & Mongolia.

The same firm that completed the 2015 BFS, (AtkinsRéalis), conducted a gap analysis to show what’s needed for an updated BFS. The results are being shared with prospective strategic partners, many of which are Japanese.

Over the years, including this year, there have been multiple management trips to Japan. Japanese firms including giant trading houses like Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsui & Co., Marubeni Corp., Itochu Corp., and Sojitz Corp remain very interested in iron ore.

Japan is 100% import reliant, and the third largest steel making country on earth. Its steelmakers, including; Nippon Steel, JFE Steel, and Kobe Steel need millions of tonnes per year.

Mitsubishi, Itochu, ArcelorMittal, Franco-Nevada, and Tata Steel have direct stakes in Canadian iron ore assets. Glencore, Rio Tinto, Vale S.A., BHP, Fortescue ltd., POSCO and privately-held Gerald Group are also active.

A knock on Lac Otelnuk is a nearly C$20B cap-ex hurdle, (due in large part to it being remote), and a long timeline to first production, probably the mid-2030s. However, this is only a problem if management cannot secure a strategic partner.

I believe a surprising number of partners could step forward for four reasons. First, Japanese commodity traders have grown substantially since 2015 (enterprise values 3x-6x larger), second, cap-ex would be deployed over 5-7 years, not all at once. Third, major groups have huge debt capacity (if needed), and fourth, green steel is the future.

It need not be just one partner. Two or more groups could form a consortium. Imagine the Company selling a majority stake in the Project for a considerable amount, and getting free-carried through commercial production?

CEO Barr has made 43 deals with much larger companies in his career. In my view, the net present value of the free-carry alone could be north of C$100M, and the residual interest might eventually be worth C$100s of millions. Yet, MetalQuest has an enterprise value {market cap + debt – cash} of just ~C$6.5M.

Much of Project risk could be mitigated by a strong partner (or partners) with deep pockets, long-term horizons, and vast iron ore experience. One should not downplay the remoteness of Lac Otelnuk, but numerous major projects are remote, many of are in; Africa, Russia, Mongolia or China. I prefer Quebec, Canada.

Moving on to the world-class, mineral-rich, Ring of Fire district, (“RoF“). Development has been very slow for decades due to a lack of an all-season road, slow permitting and hesitation from certain First Nations.

Having said that, there’s a land rush underway in the RoF, with MetalQuest in the center of it. A recently-started all-season road in the RoF will make projects more viable, to the benefit of local communities, companies, and the Province.

Lately, prospects for the RoF have improved. Ontario’s Premier Doug Ford has finally committed to a major road/bridge project. Look at the two RoF slides above showing MetalQuest’s recent activities. The Company has become a notable player.

Admittedly, there have been false starts on pledged infrastructure builds dating back over a decade. Why is this time different? Canada can no longer rely on the U.S. for its economic wellbeing.

The transition from economic & security ties with the U.S., to closer alliances elsewhere, is not gradual. There’s a sense of urgency.

A busy image, considerable progress being made…

That means faster permitting times for metals/mining, oil/gas & infrastructure projects. Few areas stand to benefit as much as NW Ontario. MetalQuest Mining is meaningfully undervalued due to its very large cap-ex requirements.

While the cap-ex concern is understandable, readers are reminded that Harry Barr has done 43 significant transactions with much larger companies. The Company could reasonably be expected, (timing unknown), to sell a majority stake in the Project and get free-carried to commercial production.

Owning even a small minority stake in a Project possibly worth over C$10 billion would be a highly attractive outcome. There’s simply too much at stake for the Japanese, and others, in urgent need of long-term, safe, supply of high-purity iron ore, to ignore MetalQuest Mining’s incredible endowment.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about MetalQuest Mining, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of MetalQuest Mining are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, MetalQuest Mining was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

If one believes Ag will remain under pressure for an extended period, there’s no investment catalyst to buy Ag juniors (at this time). However, the near-month future price is up +13% from last month’s low of $55/oz. Readers should keep an eye on companies in good jurisdictions, with strong teams, high-grade projects, near-term production potential, and cheap valuations.

A company that checks those boxes and more is Honey Badger Silver (TSX-v: TUF) / (OTC: HBEIF). It will deliver an updated PEA & resource estimate later this year. Importantly, this isn’t some 2030s timeline in Africa or Bolivia, CEO and largest shareholder Chad Williams proof of concept could in hand within a year.

There’s already a very valuable, permitted milling complex. Management believes the revised PEA could be a real eye-opener. The Company has several other promising assets, one or more of which could possibly be farmed out. I ascribe 90% of Honey Badger’s valuation to the PC Mine project.

Before digging deeper into the PC Mine asset, consider that the 100%-owned Nanisivik project hosts a massive pyrite system of 50–100 million tonnes. Pyrite is a sulphur source, and sulphur prices up 500%. There’s also germanium at Nanisivik. In my view, although early stage, this is billions of dollars of in-situ sulphur value, and 100’s of millions in NPV potential.

Honey Badger has a FULLY-DILUTED enterprise value (market cap + debt – cash) of ~C$255M. Yet it has a 1,000 tpd Mill (permitted for up to 2,400 tpd) that was 95% built (by the Hunt brothers), in the 1980s. In my view, the replacement value of the Mill complex alone is greater than the current enterprise value.

I like that CEO Chad Williams doesn’t oversell the germanium narrative. Yes, there’s true potential for germanium and perhaps a few other metals as byproducts, but it’s not a sure thing. Notably, they won’t be included in the upcoming, revised PEA, but have tangible option value. For instance, a few months ago germanium (outside of China) was trading at ~US$8,000/kg, equal to ~US$230/troy ounce, (~4x the price of silver).

In addition to the financial benefits germanium *could* deliver, it might attract commercial and/or gov’t interest as a key strategic material. There is, and will be, A LOT of money thrown at critical material projects in Canada and the U.S., (from both U.S. & Canadian entities). In my estimation, > C$500M (in today’s dollars) has been spent over several decades at the PC Mine project alone, twice Honey Badger’s fully-diluted enterprise value.

Remoteness matters A LOT with Ag under $30/oz, but far less with Ag around $62–> down from January’s ~$122/oz (near-month futures price)! If the main pushback from investors is flagship project PC Mine’s remoteness, I get it. Yet, I would rather be remote in northern Canada than in many parts of Africa, Russia, Mongolia or Bolivia.

Other factors offsetting the moderate remoteness? Substantially all project permitting is already in place, strong agreements are in force with three First Nation groups, and there’s reportedly Federal gov’t support for an all-season road.

Although at PEA-stage, (with an updated PEA coming later this year), CEO Williams reminds us that a Mill was ~95% built and nearly ready to go in the early-1980s. What happened? Ag collapsed after hitting $50/oz in 1980 (~$210/oz in today’s dollars). Another important theme from the early 1980s? High inflation. Sound familiar?

It seems clear that management is focused on achieving one or more of the following to fund the PC Mine project. 1] partially pre-paid off-take agreements (interest is reportedly high from smelters & trading companies), 2] low cost gov’t loans for road building and other cap-ex items, 3] U.S. and/or Canadian gov’t grants, 4] royalty/streaming (a last resort, not necessarily needed, but ample room to bridge a funding gap).

If some of these non-equity sources can be tapped, the amount of new equity issuance in the coming years should be manageable. If one’s bullish on Ag (and zinc), and a fan of world-class Ag-heavy juniors like those shown in the above table, one should take a closer look at Honey Badger Silver. Speaking of zinc, the PC Mine has a lot of it.

I won’t go too deep into the bullish fundamentals for Zn, but note that the price is +34% in the past year. Demand is set to rise structurally over the coming decade as galvanizing remains essential for protecting steel in the massive buildout of renewable energy (solar/wind), grid infrastructure, and EVs.

The management team, board, advisors, is clearly top notch. I’ve spoken with CEO Williams, Justin Cochrane, and Andrew Jedemann. All three are highly credible and experienced. And, there are several other impressive execs shown on the corporate website.

This is a poly-metallic mine, not a pure silver play, which could/should matter a lot for operating costs. The PC Mine carries meaningful zinc + lead credits alongside silver, which can materially lower all-in sustaining costs versus a single-metal operation.

It’s also worth noting the asset was significantly de-risked by its prior owner (Canadian Zinc/NorZinc) over roughly four decades — federal/territorial permits, Indigenous agreements, and a fully built mill weren’t assembled by Honey Badger from scratch; the company bought decades of valuable regulatory and construction work at a steep discount.

The project already benefits from roughly 5 km of existing underground development, a fully permitted 1,000 tpd mill (expandable to 2,400 tpd), an airstrip, surface infrastructure, signed First Nations benefit agreements, and a $25M federal grant under the National Trade Corridor Fund toward an all-season access road.

Management has laid out a clear, three-pronged near-term operating plan for PC Mine — advancing all-season road infrastructure, phased refurbishment of the existing mill, and underground/surface drilling for resource expansion — all explicitly framed around maximizing per-share NPV.

Drilling will also sample existing core and outcrops for germanium, building on a germanium showing at a project that already carries a historic resource of 9.8 Mt of Measured & Indicated material grading 139 g/t silver, 9.7% zinc and 8.8% lead.

While the Company’s share price might remain closely tied to the underlying Ag price in the near-term, if/when Ag retakes $$70, $80, $90/oz, vs. its ATH of nearly $122/oz in January, few companies have as much upside potential.

Of course, most juniors have substantial upside from today’s oversold levels. The big difference here is the downside protection that comes from hard tangible assets, most notably the milling complex, and the potential for near-term production to provide possibly meaningful, early cash flows.

Bottom line? Honey Badger Silver controls a diversified portfolio of eight 100%-owned Ag-heavy projects spanning the Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut. At the flagship PC Silver Mine, an updated mineral resource estimate and PEA led by JDS Energy & Mining is targeted for completion in Q3/26.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER] ) about Honey Badger Silver, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of ICG Silver & Gold are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, ICG Silver & Gold was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

Noble’s business model de-risks exploration/development by optioning or joint venturing on attractive properties and retaining royalties + equity stakes, thereby building shareholder value without bearing the full costs of exploration. As a quick example of the model, note this news from August 4th.

Noble is acquiring the North Bradshaw property, at very low upfront cost. North Bradshaw is a set of mining claims in Northern Ontario contiguous to GoWest Gold’s Bradshaw Gold project (a known gold deposit with indicated & inferred resources) within the Abitibi Greenstone Belt. Its geology offers potential for similar gold mineralization and new discoveries.

Another example is the mid-July announcement of the planned acquisition of the Lucas Gold project, a drill-ready gold target ~30 km north of Timmins. Lucas hosts a 1.7 km mineralized trend with confirmed gold zones from 2018 drilling and five additional untested parallel IP anomalies.

It enjoys paved highway access, power, water, local services, an existing First Nations MoU, and upside to expand known structurally controlled gold mineralization through follow-up drilling.

The following image shows the minerals Noble is leveraged to.

Of those, nickel, REEs, gold & copper are the largest exposures. The structural bull case for Ni is supply-constrained. Indonesia (~60% of global output) is tightening ore supply via 2026 quota cuts, mining caps, rising electricity costs, and potential export taxes. New to supply challenges is sulfur/sulfuric acid shortages due to the Middle East conflict.

In February, 2025, Canada Nickel closed an agreement with Noble whereby Canada Nickel and Noble contributed mining properties, including the existing Mann joint venture, into East Timmins Nickel (“ETN”) to consolidate their respective interests in the portfolio of nickel projects NE of Timmins.

Noble has meaningful equity stakes in Canada Nickel & Homeland Nickel (combined worth ~C$7M) and a 20% interest in privately-held ETH (80% owned by Canada Nickel) which contains significant, emerging nickel discoveries & resources. I believe the ETN stake alone could be worth tens of millions, vs. Noble’s entire market cap of ~C$17M ETN —>

ETN ~12 billion Ni Eq. lbs. @ 0.31% Ni Eq.(71% Ni, ~8.7B lbs.)

ETN hosts several meaningful exploration properties (including Stimson, Mortimer, McCool, Moody, Reaume, Newmarket, Galna, and Calder) that do not yet have published NI 43-101 resources. Although at a much earlier stage, ETN is thought to be at least 4x the size of Canada Nickel’s Crawford project, which past BFS-stage, has a C$1.9B post-tax NPV.

As Crawford advances toward production as soon as 2029-2030, a lot of attention will turn to ETN. Canada Nickel is valued at roughly a quarter of Crawford’s post-tax NPV(8%). Note that using an 8% discount factor at BFS-stage is conservative as many junior mining projects use 5%.

A PEA or (possibly skipping right to) a PFS, on ETN, could be delivered in 2H/27, which could show a similar NPV/IRR to Crawford. If ETN were to be valued at just 5%-10% of NPV, Noble’s 20% stake would be worth ~C$19-$38M. To reiterate, Noble’s market cap is currently ~$17M.

So, ETN, an asset that gets virtually no credit at all, possibly covers Noble’s entire market cap. It’s easy to ignore this 20% stake, not much is typically said about it, but the asset should be worth a lot to strategic investors. For example, groups like; Agnico Eagle, Anglo American plc & Samsung SDI are already invested in Canada Nickel.

Or, Sumitomo Metal Mining Canada (invested in FPX Nickel), Finnish stainless steel manufacturer Outokumpu Oyj (also invested in FPX), Mitsubishi Corp. (invested in Giga Metals). Japanese trading houses are actively involved in base, battery & platinum group metals; Sumitomo Corp., Mitsui & Co., Marubeni Corp., Itochu Corp., and Toyota Tsusho Corp.

Others large groups include; Glencore, Trafigura, Vitol, Mercuria Energy Group, Anglo American/TECK, BHP, Rio Tinto, Vale, South32, Korea Zinc, POSCO Holdings, Eramet, Wyloo Metals. Note, I don’t include Russian or Chinese names. Don’t forget major Li-ion battery makers and EV OEMs like; LG Energy Solution, SK On, Ford, GM, Volkswagen & Stellantis.

That’s three dozen prospective partners on ETN. Importantly, perhaps the strongest evidence of real tangible value for ETN comes from last week’s news that Canada Nickel’s world-class Crawford nickel project received a positive decision statement from the Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Nature, marking the first mining approval issued under Canada’s amended Impact Assessment Act since 2019.

Nickel is essential for stainless steel, accounting for most Ni demand. It’s also a critical component in high-energy-density lithium-ion batteries, and critical in aerospace, clean energy, defense, and chemical processing. Virtually every major economy now lists Ni as a critical mineral.

With EV/battery demand growing ~15-20% annually, (plus stainless steel, growing at robust ~5-6%/yr. vs. Cu at ~3%), the market is shifting toward deficits, supporting higher prices. Ni has rallied from ~$14 to ~$17k/tonne.

Notably, the price hit a high of ~$50k/t in 2022, (not including a brief, but intense, short squeeze sending it to ~$100k/t). This shows how critical Ni is to the world, when push comes to shove, end users will pay up.

Management, led by CEO Vance White, has demonstrated a repeatable playbook –> acquire, explore, partner, distribute equity interests. Recently, a 9M share distribution of Homeland Security shares was made to Noble shareholders.

There’s a lot going on at Noble, but I believe multiple opportunities (many partner-funded ) are excellent to have in a commodities bull market. While silver/gold prices have declined (significantly), since ATHs in January, look at the copper price, within 1.5% of an ATH! And, given China/USA geopolitical factors, select REE/critical material prices are strong.

Above and below are two lists of projects/properties in Ontario & Quebec. Not all of these assets will be winners, but all it takes is 1 or 2 or 3. Even a moderately successful outcome on a single asset can fund company-wide operations for a long time.

There are multiple ways to win with Noble Mineral Exploration. Canada Nickel’s recent (very) good, de-risking news is helping investors become more comfortable with low-grade Ni projects in Canada. Mind you, not low-grade projects that are highly remote, but ones quite near power, roads, rail, workers, services, equipment.

Investors used to think that sub 1 g/t Au projects would never be economic… Look at Agnico’s Detour Lake, one of N. America’s valuable gold mines. Many thought that sub 0.40% Cu Eq. outside of S. American would never be viable. Look at western Canada production with mines operating at 0.20% Cu.

The Western world needs long-term, safe, secure, sustainable production of battery, base, precious and platinum group metals, and REE/critical materials. Canada has them all, and Ontario/Quebec are excellent places to get them.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Noble Mineral Exploration, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Noble Mineral Exploration are highly speculative, not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Noble Mineral Exploration was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned no shares in the company, but might acquire shares in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or sector.

I could point out numerous bullish metrics for the gold (“Au”) price to bounce back, like central bank buying (led by China). Several countries, most notably Russia & Turkey have been sellers, but others are collectively buying more than what’s being liquidated.

This is one of the best charts I’ve seen. Au follows global money supply higher. That’s the definition of what Au does (inflationary hedge, real, tangible hard asset, a store of value, the answer to fears of fiat currency debasement, etc.). Crypto currencies, not even bitcoin, are no longer considered reliable reserve assets.

The above chart points to a reasonably good chance that Au will rebound. This could be a great set up for high-quality juniors. Mind you, I’m not talking about a trade, but a longer-term investment.

Dryden Gold (TSX-V: DRY, OTCQX: DRYGF) controls 100% of a 90,000 hectare land​ package along a 50 km gold-bearing trend in NW Ontario’s Manitou-Dinorwic​ deformation zone. The footprint has district-scale potential in the Kenora Gold District.

Note: Readers are encouraged to review the new corporate presentation, packed full of important and compelling information. Key takeaways? Well funded, backed by Centerra Gold & Alamos Gold, high-grade, district-scale, large land holdings, surrounded by ample infrastructure (roads, power, labor/services, etc.).

Dryden’s consolidated holdings host high-grade structurally-controlled orogenic​ Au along a 20 km trend including the Gold Rock target area, which includes the Elora​ gold system (containing the Pearl & Jubilee zones), and the nearby Big Master gold​ system (containing Treasure & Barrelman).

These targets focus on expansion on-strike, and down-plunge. Hyndman is a 12 km x 2.5 km anomaly corridor with a distinct mineralization style. It is contiguous to the Kenorland/Centerra JV, and has high-grade historic samples. Hyndman & Sherridon are separate regional targets receiving dedicated follow-up drilling this season.

Dryden’s sizable portfolio sits in an under-explored greenstone belt with historic high-grade production. The team and footprint are validated by significant equity stakes from Alamos Gold (10.5% owner) + Centerra Gold (9.99% stake). Importantly, the Company has ~C$16M in working capital. Both Alamos & Centerra topped up in the last private placement.

Management is fully-funded for the ongoing 45,000-meter drill campaign at a low all-in drilling cost of ~C$330/meter. Dryden enjoys year-round site access, ensuring a steady cadence of news flow & investment catalysts.

Recent drilling is building the case for a broader high-grade system. Three new high-grade zones, and a hole that intersected 15 mineralized structures, have strengthened the view that Gold Rock could host multiple parallel trends.

On July 29th, more good news. Please review the following image summarizing the latest press release. The consistency of structural setting and mineralization along strike and at depth supports an interpretation of a significant mineralized corridor rather than just more hanging-wall structures. Maura Kolb, Dryden’s P.Geo. & President commented,

“Gold Rock continues to generate exciting new high-grade targets across a growing footprint. With only five holes completed at Elora 2, we have already identified a high-grade zone and demonstrated roughly a kilometer of strike length. With the second drill rig deployed, our objective is to define additional high-grade zones within this growing system.”

These kinds of Archean Au systems tend to host​ numerous stacked parallel structures. On April 2nd, considerable smoke was identified via three high-grade discoveries:

Sparrow (BM1) — 4.3 m @ 32.9 g/t Au, incl. 0.5 m @ 252 g/t, from 160 m depth on a 300 m NE step-out from the Treasure/Barrelman zones.

Ruby (BM2) — 4.0 m @ 6.5 g/t Au, incl. 1.5 m @ 16.1 g/t, from 80 m depth on another 300 m NE step-out targeting the BM2 structure.

Buccaneer (BM1) — 3.8m @ 13.1 g/t Au, incl. 1.2 m @ 41.5 g/t, from 190 m depth, 80 m below the historic Big Master Mine workings, 300 m SW of Barrelman.

Big Master shows the same structural patterns identified at the Elora shear, where drilling revealed vertically oriented high-grade, stacked mineralization. The improved and growing understanding allows the team to better predict mineralization across the broader Gold Rock system.

On June 4th, the Company delivered a strong batch of drill intervals, highlighted by 14.8 m of 3.2 g/t Au, incl. 1.4 m of 25.6 g/t.

Management is prudently & methodically advancing and de-risking Gold Rock. The April discovery proved the geological model. May drilling at the Jubilee/Elora system added high-grade results.

The June PR showed wider, more consistent intercepts. July 29’s update showed more of the same, which is good news as in this case “the same” represents continued fully-funded advancement of Gold Rock.

Results are supportive of strike continuity, stacked structures, and depth extensions, substantially expanding the potential of the mineralized footprint. Over the years intercepts have included spectacular grades.

The best hits to date are; 301.7 g/t Au over 3.9 m, incl. 1,930 g/t over 0.6 m in May 2025, and an historical interval of 3,497 g/t over 8.45 m in 2011. In February, management reported 6.4 g/t Au over 3.3 m, incl. 152 g/t over 1.0 m in a new high-grade footwall zone. February’s intercept of 152 g/t was at 17-18 meter depth.

In mid-May the Company announced 2.9 g/t Au over 14.5 m which further defined mineralization at Jubilee. The team added a second drill rig to further expand Gold Rock. One rig will continue to test across the stacked structures and infill between the high-grade zones. The other will drill deeper holes to expand the high-grade zones down plunge.

Management, led by CEO Trey Wasser, continues to prioritize and rank targets to guide the 45,000-meter drill program, with Gold Rock remaining the central focus. The Company is fully-funded for this robust drill program across multiple targets.

Property-wide gold-in-till anomalies further support exploration potential. Dryden reported results from 3,816 gold-in-till samples outlining multiple anomalies along a 65 km corridor, with especially strong findings at the Hyndman target.

This work led to the staking of 5,200+ additional hectares at Hyndman. In my view, results continue to point to district-scale potential. The technical team has identified structurally controlled zones, and highlighted new areas (especially at Hyndman) as exciting drill targets.

Dryden Gold (TSX-V: DRY, OTCQX: DRYGF) is funded for a substantial amount of exploration across multiple targets this year. High-grade juniors with sizable land packages in Tier-1 locations like NW Ontario are well positioned.

The Company doesn’t need higher Au prices to keep key shareholders Centerra & Alamos interested in learning more about its district-scale portfolio. Readers are once again encouraged to review the new corporate presentation.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Dryden Gold Corp, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Dryden Gold are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Dryden Gold was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Yet, up to two-thirds of silver juniors are down > 50% from 52-week highs. Of course, today’s silver price is lower than $75, it’s $58. That’s more than double 2023-24. The only way silver juniors are fairly valued is if one believes silver will remain below $60 for an extended period.

While it is obviously possible it will remain below $60, I believe it will recover. Recall it topped $121/oz in January. Was $121 a crazy outlier, not to be revisited for years to come? Perhaps…

Or, perhaps not. Silver’s inflation-adjusted high dates back to January, 1980. In today’s dollars it’s about $210/oz. Is $210 a crazy outlier? Note that the entire year of 1980, averaged ~$85. Although $58 is much higher than a few years ago, it’s nothing compared to 1980.

What’s changed since 1980? Solar power was a novelty, now it’s globally ubiquitous. There were no EVs, AI/Data Centers, cell phones, LED lighting, high-tech consumer electronics, or modern medical devices.

We’re in year six of a mined silver deficit, new mines take well over a decade from discovery to commercial production, while truly massive solar farms are deployed in 1-2 years. Yes, I think silver is headed back above $75/oz. If true, select juniors could see meaningful rebounds.

A name I continue to be bullish on is ICG Silver & Gold. In today’s dollars, the value of the Company’s technical database, (5,000 samples, 130 line-kilometers of geophysics + 40,000 meters of drilling) is estimated at C$25-$30M, triple the Company’s enterprise value of ~C$10M (C$0.305/shr.).

The district-scale 100%-owned Tuscarora District land package in NE Nevada sits at the intersection of the world-class Carlin and Independence Trends — two of Nevada’s most significant gold corridors.

A Phase 1 3,000 meter RC drill program kicked off in July. It consists of ~15 holes. The cost is ~C$1.5M vs. the Company’s recent cash balance of ~C$4M. Drill results should start in August, leading to a maiden resource estimate in 1H/27. Management has identified six high priority targets. Five have never seen modern drilling.

For an update on ICG Silver & Gold I spoke with CEO Steven Sirbovan, asking him the following six questions.

Drilling at the Company’s Tuscarora district project began in early July. Please walk us through the Phase 1 3,000-meter RC drill program.

Phase 1 consists of approximately 15 RC holes averaging 200-300 meters,totaling 3,000 meters. The six priority targets are Silica, Battle Mountain, Modoc, Kings Vein, East Pediment and Grand Prize. They were selected by integrating historical drilling, surface geochemistry, mapping and CSAMT geophysics.

Drilling began at Silica and will focus primarily on the Central Zone, while East Pediment and Grand Prize test additional district-scale opportunities. The program is flexible, allowing later holes to be adjusted based on geological observations.

Can you provide an update on the drill program’s progress?

As of July 27, 2026, the Company has completed 4 holes totaling approximately 965 meters.Because this is RC drilling, the team inspects and logs rock chips rather than core.

Logging evaluates lithology, alteration, horizons of oxidation and veining and mineralization, but assays are required to determine gold and silver grades. Initial results are expected in August. Initial inspection exhibits continuity of lithologies and model projected targets with silica, sulphides and alteration being present.

Regarding the Central Zone (the project’s backbone, ~80% of the drilling), how do you see the Silica, Battle Mountain, Modoc, Kings, and South Navajo targets connecting?

Our working model is that Silica, Battle Mountain, Modoc, Kings and South Navajo may be parts of a broader structurally controlled mineralized system rather than isolated targets.

Approximately 80% of Phase 1 drilling is focused here to test continuity, expand known mineralization and identify the strongest areas for follow-up drilling. Those results will guide additional drilling intended to support a potential mineral resource estimate in the first half of 2027. The timing will ultimately depend on assay results and demonstrated geological continuity.

Your team just staked an additional six un-patented mineral claims totaling ~120 acres, increasing the land package to over 10,100 acres. Please describe the importance of this move.

The six new claims add approximately 120 acres, increasing the land package to more than 10,100 acres and securing the newly identified TJ Zone. The area contains an Eocene volcanic dike cutting Paleozoic sedimentary rocks and thrust structures, along with observed brecciation, silicification and hydrothermal infill.

Thirty-nine surface samples have been collected and are awaiting assays. The staking protects the full prospective feature and provides another target for future exploration.

With ample cash, and a Phase 1 budget of ~C$1.5M, how does the current capital structure and liquidity runway position ICG Silver and Gold to expand drilling if early assays (expected in August) are encouraging?

ICG reported approximately C$5.5 million in cash as of March 31, 2026, compared with the Phase 1 budget of approximately C$1.5 million.

This provides sufficient funding for the current program and the flexibility to add meters or begin follow-up drilling if results are encouraging. Any expansion will be technically driven, with capital directed toward targets showing the strongest grade, continuity and resource potential.

You’ve appointed Eric Saderholm as Senior Technical Advisor and formed a Technical Advisory Committee that includes Borden Putnam and Charles Sulfrian—professionals with deep experience in Carlin Trend discoveries, Goldstrike/Post-Betze systems, Newmont operations, and project evaluation. How is this group influencing the exploration model, drill design, risk mitigation at Tuscarora?

The Technical Advisory Committee reviews the geological model, target priorities, drill design and new results as they become available.

Its members bring extensive Nevada discovery, mine geology and project-evaluation experience. Their input is particularly valuable in assessing Tuscarora’s epithermal silver-gold systems alongside the potential for Carlin-style mineralization on the western flank. This independent review helps challenge assumptions, refine targets and reduce exploration risk.

Thank you Steven for your insightful responses to my questions. I look forward to continued progress and de-risking and hope for a rebound in silver prices in the coming months.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER] ) about ICG Silver & Gold, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of ICG Silver & Gold are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, ICG Silver & Gold was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

The underlying silver price is down more than 50% from nearly $122/oz in January to today’s $59/oz. I say the devastation is unwarranted simply because I continue to believe the medium-to-longer term outlook for silver is bright.

We’re in year six of mined silver deficits, as stagnant mine supply lags robust industrial demand. Growth is driven by usage in solar panels, EVs, 5G, AI/data centers, power-grid expansion, electrification, high-tech electronics, and defense applications, where silver has little-to-no viable substitutes.

Silver’s byproduct nature, and China’s reclassification of it to a strategic material, further constrain supply and restrict exports. Analyst targets have come down in the past several months, but there are numerous bullish outlooks (from reputable financial firms, not online coin dealers). Targets ranging from $75 to $100/oz over the next 6-12 months are easy to find.

A company I continue to love for its very rare 100% Ag leverage is Silver Crown Royalties. Silver Crown’s latest transaction is one of the primary reasons its share price has held up far better than Ag-heavy companies and royalty/streaming peers.

In early June, management, led by CEO Peter Bures, announced the acquisition of two existing 1% net smelter return royalties (“NSRs”) on Titiminas Silver Inc.’s Madre Sierra project in central Peru for US$6M in cash, plus US$1M to the holder of each royalty upon first royalty payment. The US$6M was satisfied by cash on hand.

Madre Sierra is a past-producing mine with numerous surface access points and working faces targeting small scale (70 to 100 tonnes per day [“tpd”]) production starting as soon as next quarter. Titiminas Silver’s target production rates are 1,000 to 1,100 tpd in 18 to 24 months.

This is a fairly high-grade mine (~140 g/t Ag), with solid reported recoveries in the mid-to-high 80’s percent. Silver Crown anticipates run-rate annual revenue equal to ~60,000 ounces/yr within two years.

Readers should note that Titiminas Silver controls a significant land package in a past-producing camp, so the NSRs could potentially produce cash flow for decades. Silver Crown Royalties had ~C$15M in cash before paying out the US$6M.

A prior royalty, on PPX Mining, really moved the need, but this latest deal will generate a similar amount of cash flow, for a longer duration. At an assumed US$70/oz Ag over the next several years, the IRR on PPX would approach 100%. Notably, when the PPX royalty was signed, the Ag price was < $31/oz, about half the current level and a quarter of January’s ATH Ag price.

Minimum deliveries (the cash equivalent of) 14,062.5 ounces of Ag/quarter, commenced last quarter. At the front-month Ag price of ~$59/oz, this single royalty equates to ~C$4.6M/yr. in cash flow.

PPX runs through early-2030. As a reminder, SCRI holds a 15% royalty on PPX’s Igor 4 project in Peru. CEO Bures has over 10 deals like this one under careful review at any given time.

Important shareholder Michael Gentile participated in a long interview with Crux Investor about multiple investments, but he was most excited about two companies, including Silver Crown.

Mr. Gentile is the largest shareholder in over 25 juniors, sits on several company boards, and is a valued strategic advisor. In 2021 he co-founded Bastion Asset Management, Montreal-based hedge fund managing over C$700M.

While he appreciates the royalty model and would buy royalties at attractive prices, he has major issues with the micro-cap junior royalty space. He says many junior royalty companies claim they will be “the next Franco Nevada.” Yet Franco Nevada succeeded largely because it was essentially the only company creating royalties.

It had first pick of deals, wrote high-IRR (20–30%) perpetual royalties, and the market rewarded it with a 2× P/NAV multiple and very low cost of capital (~4–5%). By contrast, most junior royalty companies face the opposite problem. They have high costs of capital (over 20%). Gentile believes that Silver Crown’s model is superior.

Roughly 70-75% of the world’s silver comes as a byproduct. In a gold or copper mine, silver might be only a few percent of revenue — just a credit to production cost, with no formal resource/reserve estimate. Therefore, many projects don’t even bother valuing contained silver.

Gentile explains that Silver Crown approaches such producers, and creates a royalty specifically on that small silver “stub.” What Gentile likes most is that this creates an essentially unlimited acquisition runway in a niche where management does not compete head-on with much larger royalty companies.

He sees a 10–20 year runway of M&A where CEO Bures can possibly build a 10–20 million troy ounce/yr, pure-silver royalty company, via many smallish (but growing) deals, and some larger ones later.

Unlike most so-called “silver” companies that might be only 30–40% silver, Silver Crown has 100% pure-play silver exposure. Generalist investors like pure-play silver exposure, low operational risk, and open-ended growth. But, it’s hard to find.

In prior articles on Silver Crown Royalties, I’ve pointed out that the past year has not been smooth sailing. The Company has had a few setbacks, but new transactions coming in, like the latest one for Titiminas Silver’s existing royalties, are far larger than the troubled deals.

Of course, if new (larger) deals run into trouble, management will find itself playing defense (growing more slowly) instead of offense. To be clear, there’s room for problems, just not too many! Simply put, the IRRs management gets are strong enough to allow for a few disappointments.

Michael Gentile is a highly experienced, incredibly savvy, and hard-working junior mining investor. Readers are encouraged to listen to this webinar from the 36-minute mark to hear his thoughts on Silver Crown.

If one believes Mr. Gentile is overly bullish, rest assured that the Company could be less successful than he describes, and the investment would still be a very good one. He said in the webinar his long-term goal (over years, not months) is 20x+ returns on his investments.

In my view, that goes to show the serious potential here, albeit with commensurate high risk.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER] ) about Silver Crown Royalties, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Silver Crown Royalties are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Silver Crown Royalties was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

The Company now expects to pour Ag-Au doré continually. Subsequently, management secured 4-yr. permits for the construction of 62 drill pads & 27 access roads. An initial exploration plan has been developed for the C340 and 14 Marcos targets.

At C340, Silver Storm has two objectives, upgrading the Inferred resources at the past-producing Rosarios mine to Indicated; and growing the resource by extending known mineralization to the west. Approximately 3,600 meters of surface drilling is planned.

At 14 Marcos, historical mining was carried out on two levels to a depth of ~100 meters. The expected down-dip projection of the vein, mined by artisanal miners, lies ~140 m south of mine development within the Rosarios mine. Silver Storm will conduct an initial 3,000 m of surface drilling to test mineralization to a depth of ~300 m.

Circling back to first pour, why is it so important? It demonstrates that the mill & circuit can run, the management can recover and pour saleable doré. This means operating systems are operable, and the plant works end-to-end.

Last week, Silver Storm announced the start of hot commissioning of the sulphide circuit at La Parrilla using stockpiled high-grade sulphide material to produce silver-lead and zinc concentrates — a key restart milestone.

Management also amended its Samsung C&T concentrate prepayment agreement, deferring payments to September 2026, and extending the supply period by six months. First Majestic also advanced a US$5M unsecured loan (15% interest, 36-months, prepayable any time without penalty).

Ramping up to an annual run-rate of 3.0M Ag Eq. ounces by 1Q/27 remains a challenge, but a routine restart challenge. Could there be delays? Yes. Cost overruns? Yes. That’s why CEO Greg McKenzie has a prepaid off-take facility with Samsung C&T, and obtained that US$5M loan from First Majestic.

Silver Storm is valued cheaply vs. peers on next year’s anticipated cash flow, AND, it has a second crown jewel asset, also in Durango, the large 100%-owned, early-stage San Diego project.

In late 2020, when Ag was around $24.5/oz, -60% below today’s $59/oz, San Diego was valued at up to C$100M in a single project predecessor company. I see no reason why it could not be worth ~C$318M based on comparable large scale, undeveloped, primary Ag projects. See table below.

Note, C$318M assumes a 50% discount to higher grade peers. New to the table is the U.S. IPO in June of Sinda ltd., a pre-PEA company with 100% of its primary Ag assets in Mexico. Sinda has good things going for it; the backing of highly successful Electrm Group, Fresnillo owns 5%, ~385M high-grade Ag Eq. ounces, and a strong team.

Sinda boasts an “exploration target” of 468M (additional) ounces. If one adds those prospective ounces, the total would be 853M Ag Eq., and the valuation ~C$3.10/oz. Readers are reminded that San Diego has booked 211M Ag Eq. ounces.

If one includes SGS Canada’s exploration target of 20-50M tonnes @ 100-150 g/t Ag Eq., (not a sure thing, timing unknown) the implied valuation would jump to C$489M (net of an estimated C$40M in exploration/drilling costs to find an incremental ~141M Ag Eq. ounces).

When SGS reported the 20-50M tonnes target in 2013, Ag was in the low $20s, so the prospective tonnage was largely ignored. At $59/oz, it’s a different story… San Diego is early-stage, but has booked 211M Ag Eq. ounces (so far). At spot prices, over 75% of its economic value would come from Ag, making it a true primary Ag project.

I recognize I’m throwing around big valuation numbers for San Diego, but it’s one of the largest undeveloped primary Ag projects in Mexico not owned by a much, much larger player.

Given the big market splash of Sinda’s IPO, it’s difficult for me to imagine a scenario in which San Diego isn’t worth C$100s of millions. Yet, the market is attributing close to zero value for it. In my view, as La Parrilla gets ramped up, a lot more attention will be paid to San Diego by management and investors.

Silver Storm’s enterprise value {market cap + debt – cash} on 7/17/26 was ~C$307M. That means investors get the restarted La Parrilla complex at a very large discount.

How often have readers heard a narrative about near-term operations funding other company initiatives? Even with Ag at $59, down from an all-time-high of $121 in January, La Parrilla could provide meaningful investment capital to advance San Diego.

Note: This undervaluation is substantial… Please take a moment to read the assumptions at bottom of table.

La Parrilla was a significant past producer (34M Ag Eq. ounces from 2006 to 2019) with a mill that delivered (mostly) Ag, + zinc & lead, from 2006 until 2019. When placed on care & maintenance, Ag was under $19/oz.

In its prime, production averaged ~3.5M Ag Eq. oz/yr, with a high above 4.5M. Although profitable, the operating margin was never more than US$10/oz, at least not for extended periods. CEO McKenzie stands by 3.0M Ag Eq. oz in 2027, but he’s cautiously optimistic about opportunities to increase production.

In the above table, producers are valued at an average 6.0x 2027e EBITDA multiple. By comparison, Silver Storm is at just 2.2x, with zero credit for the San Diego asset. My upside case (not vetted by management) is hardly a stretch. I use an Ag price of $65.6/oz on 3.5M Ag Eq. ounces vs. guidance of 3.0M. Note, Ag was $70/oz five weeks ago…

With blockbuster drill results incl.; 14.6 m of 1,810 Ag Eq., and 13.1 m of 911 Ag Eq., La Parrilla’s resource was upgraded & expanded to ~27M Indicated (40%) & Inferred (60%) ounces.

Latest Ag-heavy transactions done with Ag at half today’s level…

La Parrilla’s mine life is ~7 years, which is decent, and it could be extended with further internally-funded drilling. CEO McKenzie’s drill campaigns at La Parrilla have been successes –> low-cost, highly efficient, blockbuster grades.

Imagine if a much larger company were to sign a JV on San Diego, perhaps paying Silver Storm C$100M for a 35-40% interest, and free-carrying them to commercial production?

Who might do that? How about one of the following… Over a dozen producers should care. Note, this list is just Mexican-heavy names, U.S., Canadian & Australian focused producers would double or triple the number of prospective suitors.

To be clear, management does not necessarily need a partner for San Diego if it can meaningfully self-fund development from 2027 on, a very nice position to be in.

Although probably not this year’s business, these things take time, I imagine Silver Storm will one day be listed in the U.S. on the NYSE American or NASDAQ, which could drive index/ETF buying and attract generalist U.S. investors and institutions.

Metals/mining companies, including numerous Ag names like; First Majestic, Pan American Silver, Avino Silver & Gold, Americas Gold & Silver, Vizsla, Fortuna Mining, Endeavour Silver, and Contango Silver & Gold are dual-listed in Canada + the U.S.

Silver Storm Mining (TSX-v: SVRS) / (OTCQX: SVRSF) should have positive drill results and La Parrilla ramp up/commissioning news this Summer/Fall. Any update on San Diego would be icing on the cake.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER] ) about Silver Storm Mining, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Silver Storm Mining are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Silver Storm Mining was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

It’s my understanding that Graycliff’s largest shareholder owns multiple drill rigs and provided one to the Company at very low cost. That suggests to me that the current cash balance could support a decent amount of drilling.

This marks the first drill program at Shakespeare since 1Q/23, building directly on metallurgical assay results (three holes) announced in June/July. Drilling is currently underway on a large-diameter (HQ) core hole positioned directly behind Hole A. Readers are reminded that Hole A was the Monster interval of 454 g/t gold over 7.0 meters.

Without going on and on and on about how good that intercept is, suffice it so say it’s a Top 1% result anywhere in the world. The few holes that are better on the [gram x meter] scale are almost entirely from multi-billion dollar juniors or at producing mines.

I estimate less than 10% of juniors enjoy a single 200+ gram-meter hit in their lifetimes, vs. Graycliff’s spectacular 3,180 reading (most deposits are not particularly high-grade).

We may never see another 3,180 [ g x m] outcome, but future results in the 100s of [g x m] (if meant to be) should be well received, not panned as a disappointment compared to Hole A. Of course, the market decides what’s liked, not me.

If Graycliff was valued in the C$10s of millions, then the risk/reward would be more balanced headed into this drill program. Instead, the Company is valued at ~C$6M.

The new (fourth) metallurgical hole is designed to sample material directly below Hole A, collecting additional representative core for initial “mineralogical, extraction, and concentration testing.”

According to the PR, the new drilling incorporates results from the recently announced metallurgical test core assays, plus extensive historical work. Recall, there’s been significant drilling over four prior phases (61 holes, over 12,900 m).

Management states that 62% of holes intersected Au mineralization, with 40% of those displaying visible Au. Once the 4th metallurgical hole is complete, Graycliff will immediately transition to other high-priority targets to further define and expand the main zone. Chairman James Macintosh commented,

Graycliff has an excellent team, especially for a company valued so cheaply. Director Bruce Durham was a key member of various exploration teams credited with the discovery of significant mineral deposits including the David Bell and Golden Giant gold mines in Hemlo, Ontario and the Redstone Nickel and Bell Creek gold mines in Timmins.

Mr. Durham also worked with two of Canadian mining’s most iconic figures, promoter Murray Pezim and Hemlo prospector Don McKinnon. Working with Chairman Macintosh, also a geologist, Durham is focused on finding high-grade Au, near surface, and across an identified, promising, 6 km horizon at the former Shakespeare Au mine.

The past-producing Shakespeare mine is 88 km west of Sudbury on the Canadian Shield. It operated from 1903 to 1907, producing ~3,000 troy ounces from six underground stopes. The current project has been expanded to 1,366 hectares.

I’ve spoken several times at length with Mr. Macintosh. He’s both knowledgeable and quite experienced (40+ years), but given Mr. Durham’s impressive track record, I thought it would be useful to interview him on the Shakespeare opportunity.

Notice strong historical results, like 16 m of 16.4 g/t Au, [shallow], 89 meters

Thank you for your time Bruce, much appreciated. Everyone wants to know what makes Shakespeare special?

My pleasure. Look, no one can say that Shakespeare will be special in terms of becoming a viable deposit, a lot more drilling is needed. My friends and colleagues consider me to be conservative in my views on the prospects of early-stage properties. Your readers should remember this is still a very high risk opportunity.

I’ve been closely involved with dozens of prospects over the years. One would be hard pressed to find a project anywhere in the world, in a C$6M company no less, that has the drill result we announced. Is it a one-hit wonder I’m asked? Sure, it could be, but I see no reason to assume it is.

It might be a one-hit wonder in the sense that a better one won’t be found, but Graycliff doesn’t need to keep drilling blockbusters. A string of good-to-very good holes would be sufficient to methodically, prudently, advance the project towards a potentially viable resource.

Not every hole will be good, but each delivers important info. I’m excited that drilling is underway, we could start to see assays in August.

You say there’s no reason to assume this is a one-hit wonder. Can you add a bit more context?

Sure. Isn’t every deposit essentially a one-hit wonder until additional strong results emerge? If the results were great, but not so extraordinary, would investors have been as concerned about this being a one-hit wonder? I understand the concern if one fears Hole A’s assays are a mistake, an error, but I see no evidence of that.

I was speaking with a very well known geologist (I won’t name drop), but we agreed that as a rule of thumb, when one sees coarse visible gold it’s often a good sign. We have that here.

For those possibly underwhelmed by holes B & C vs. hole A, what are a few takeaways that help advance the project?

What’s important is overall grade, not grades reported in a single hole. Hole A certainly had a lot of gold, two orders magnitude higher than the highest grade mines. Hole B was high grade, well above the average grade for gold mines in Canada.

For Hole C we targeted an area where the grade was expected to be lower. In carrying out metallurgical test work we need a representative mix of low. medium, and high grade material to see variations in mineralogy and specifics.

Extremely high-grade intervals are critically important, they suggest a likelihood of finding areas of high-to-very-high-grade mineralization once we eventually see it up close. High grades like in holes A & B indicate that high grades are going to be more prevalent than originally thought.

Besides HUGE drill Hole A, what else regarding the Shakespeare prospect has your attention?

Although not in a major camp like Timmins or Hemlo, I’m intrigued with the past production from 120 years ago. Back then, only very high-to-ultra-high grade ore (by today’s standards) would have been mined. The historic mine was not large, but not tiny either. It was developed on six levels.

I like the idea of possibly doing a bulk sample, something the board is carefully considering. If one could pull out good grades, say 8+ g/t, a bulk sample could actually deliver meaningful cash flow with gold at $4,100/oz. It wouldn’t take that many ounces to move the needle on a C$6M company.

The reason a bulk sample is worth considering is that the high grade would enable ore to be profitably shipped 100s of km to a third party for toll-milling. Note, executing on a bulk sample program takes a lot of work above and beyond just funding it.

Presumably, multiple companies would be interested in funding a bulk sample initiative. However, to be clear, this would be next year’s business at the earliest. Drilling is the main focus for 2026.

Thank you Bruce, very insightful commentary. I look forward to drill results as soon as next month!

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Graycliff Exploration, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Graycliff Exploration are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Graycliff Exploration was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Calling a bottom is of course very difficult, Ag topped $121/oz and is now at ~$60. I thought there would be stronger support at $60, but last week the near-month futures contract hit $55. I’m not saying the bottom is in, but I believe we’re close. For readers bullish on Ag/Au over the next quarters/years vs. days/weeks, please continue reading.

A lot of speculative excess has been flushed out while structural demand remains intact. Central bank gold buying, most notably China continues, persistent/growing fiscal deficits, geopolitical uncertainty, constrained mine supply, and ever-rising industrial silver demand are powerful tailwinds.

On-shoring of critical materials/metals in the U.S. has been a major theme for a year and a half. For instance, the creation of Project Vault in February, a critical mineral reserve funded by a $10B Export-Import Bank loan plus another $2B in private investment.

In the following table are more U.S. initiatives tied to funding, fast-track permitting, and/or tax incentives. In total, $10s of billions are available for U.S. projects of merit, ones that can reach initial production this decade.

In my view, a clear *potential* winner from government support is Blackrock Silver (TSX-v: BRC) (OTCQX: BKRRF) with its flagship Tonopah West project is in Nevada, USA, the world’s top mining jurisdiction (ranked #1 in the most recent Fraser Institute Mining Survey).

Tonopah West sits in the historic Tonopah Silver District, part of the larger Walker Lane Trend. In late March, the Company announced an updated PEA that meaningfully de-risks the Project. Consider the above enhanced preliminary economics.

Post-tax NPV(5%) came in at C$603M, but that’s using a conservative US$31/oz Ag + US$2,700/oz Au. Studies around the same time by Pan American Silver, SilverCo Mining & Denarius Metals used $44 to $50/oz Ag. Last week New Pacific Metals used $45/oz in a PEA.

Blackrock’s PEA press release showed that, all else equal, at US$66.9/oz Ag & $4,554/oz Au, post-tax NPV is roughly ~C$2.1B with an IRR of 79% and a 1.4-year payback. This means at $66.9/oz, (currently ~$60/oz), the ratio of post-tax NPV to upfront cap-ex is an amazing 8.2 to 1.

Readers please note, upfront cap-ex for the Project is only US$190M. I mentioned above that $10s of billions in financial support is available. Yet, $10s of millions (just 0.1% of that total!) would be very meaningful to Blackrock, especially if it were to come via free-money grant(s).

Add to government assistance the potential for pre-paid off-take agreements to help fund the Project, and the need for onerous equity raises diminishes. Yes, private placements will continue, but hopefully not large ones, and not all at once.

Having said that, if a prominent strategic investor (a mining company, Eric Sprott is already invested) wanted to acquire a 9.9% equity stake, I imagine management would consider it if the terms were attractive (perhaps no warrants, possibly at a premium to market).

On July 21st, Barrick Mining announced a 9.9% stake in a junior at a 30% premium to market with a half warrant. Many more investments like this one are coming in N. America…

The enhanced PEA showed very good recoveries (91.0-91.5% Ag, 96-97% Au), with clean metallurgy (silver + gold only, no base metals). Importantly, the updated resource accompanying the PEA shows nearly a third of total ounces in the Indicated category.

Readers should note, mine life was extended from 8 to 11 years. In my view, an acquirer or strategic partner could extend it to 15+ years, and possibly increase annual production, (subject to further drilling success).

Given ample and growing government resources, management, led by CEO Andrew Pollard, announced the engagement of Global Frontier Advisors LP (“GFA”), a Washington, D.C. based strategic advisory firm of former military officers, diplomats, and intl. executives, in the proactive pursuit of federal/state financial support, and tax incentives.

GFA will help identify & facilitate “non-dilutive” government funding, procurement, and financing pathways” that Tonopah West may be eligible for, potentially including programs administered under the Defense Production Act, the Dept. of Energy, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Development Finance Corp., among others.

In addition, state-level incentives, tax credits, and fast-track permitting may be available in Nevada. The Company anticipates breaking ground on underground development in 2027, with an aim to commence test mining and a large-scale bulk sample in 2028.

President & CEO Andrew Pollard commented: “Silver is a critical input to solar energy, defense systems and the technologies driving America’s industrial future, and yet the U.S. still imports the majority of what it consumes. Tonopah West is exactly the kind of high-grade, domestic project that can help close that gap. We’re leaving no stone unturned in pursuing the federal and state support available to us, giving us the potential to move faster and more efficiently to bring Tonopah West online.“

This article is mainly about government support initiatives, which I believe are promising, albeit likely to be a time consuming effort. It’s important to circle back to the strategic investor track. In my view, the most likely acquirers or strategic investors are;

Nevada Gold Mines (a Newmont/Barrick JV), Agnico, AngloGold Ashanti, Pan American Silver, Fresnilo, Alamos, Coeur, Hecla, Kinross, Equinox Gold, First Majestic, Hochschild, I-80 Gold, B2Gold, and SSR Mining — and one should not ignore royalty/streaming giants like Franco-Nevada & Wheaton Precious Metals.

If one considers Cu-heavy names that dabble on the precious metals side, one cannot rule out Freeport McMoRan, BHP, RIO, Glencore, and the Gruop Mexico/Southern Copper/ASARCO conglomerate (considerable assets in neighboring Arizona).

I just name-dropped nearly two dozen groups, some of which CEO Pollard is talking with, but I don’t know which ones.

Bottom line —> the real possibility of government support, bolstered by clear and strong on-shoring initiatives, plus the real potential for a strategic investor, the outlook for Blackrock appears bright. In my opinion, the low upfront cap-ex hurdle + ultra-high grade profile places Tonopah West in the top decile of global projects.

I think Ag-heavy juniors will bounce back from being down 50-60%+. If so, the shares of Blackrock Silver (TSX-v: BRC) / (OTCQX: BKRRF) could offer a compelling, albeit high-risk, buying opportunity.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Blackrock Silver, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Blackrock Silver are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Blackrock Silver was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

Like “superfoods” or “essential” health supplements, some are more important than others… A key differentiating metric is how replaceable a scarce material truly is. Some juniors contend their featured metals are irreplaceable when in fact they really aren’t.

A metal I have high conviction in is tungsten. Tungsten’s extreme hardness & highest melting point of any metal make substitution nearly impossible for key industrial uses. And, in my view, recycling can’t scale fast enough to close the gap. The following image depicts recent commentary on tungsten fundamentals.

From Linked-in post by Mike Henshaw of PURE Asset Management

Project Blue estimates that defense demand, which accounts for ~12% of the tungsten market, is expected to grow to ~15% between 2027 and 2028… Global defense sector demand grows by ~8% per year. That’s twice the demand CAGR of copper.

Some pundits & analysts expect defense applications to overtake automotive as the top end-use by the mid-2030s. Tellingly, Western governments are already paying a premium for non-Chinese tungsten supply.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, 83% of tungsten comes from China, and adding Russia, Vietnam & North Korea bumps the total to 90-91%%. Since Feb. 2025, Beijing capped authorized exporters at ~15 companies for 2026-2027.

The U.S. added tungsten to its critical minerals list, launched DPA stockpiling, and is barring Chinese, Russian, Iranian & North Korean tungsten from key defense applications starting Jan 1, 2027. And, the EU is building its own stockpile.

Juniors that can deliver new supply this decade are very well positioned. Almonty Industries’ Sangdong restart in South Korea is getting significant attention, but it’s only expected to reach ~2,300 tonnes of concentrate per year, a small fraction of the world’s growing needs.

Tungsten is essential in carbide tooling for machining, mining, and manufacturing. Supply is highly concentrated and, outside of China, is slow to expand. New mines can take a decade or more, keeping deficits tight. Inside China increasing production will be difficult.

The country faces declining ore grades, stricter environmental rules, production quotas, and reserve depletion concerns. New long-term sustainable supply from the U.S.. Canada, Europe & Australia is incredibly important.

A company that has caught my attention is Allied Critical Metals (CSE: ACM) / (OTCQB: ACMIF) a junior advancing two 100%-owned, past-producing tungsten projects in northern Portugal — Borralha (one of the EU’s largest undeveloped resources with excellent metallurgy) and Vila Verde (tungsten-tin with significant exploration upside).

This is a company that’s cashed up and reporting continuous de-risking news flow, such as this morning’s drill result press release.

Positioned as a near-term, potentially low-cost, Western producer, it benefits from Portugal’s mining-friendly jurisdiction and EU critical minerals push. I have been speaking with CEO Roy Bonnell, and conducted the following interview in the week ended July 10th.

Roy, when did the tungsten price start moving meaningfully higher? What was the reason?

Near the time we went public in 1H/25, tungsten prices, especially outside of China, started to soar. The main driver was U.S. / China tariffs. We believe that military uses of tungsten is different then almost all other end uses. If a government needs tungsten, it often needs it ASAP and nations are typically NOT price sensitive.

Trump has made critical metals a key policy issue and has stuck with it. That’s why the non-Chinese tungsten price is up as much as +900% since early last year. I get asked why the tungsten price won’t fall back like the lithium (“Li”) price did (Li fell 80% from its 4Q/22 high). That’s a good question.

The difference between tungsten an Li is there was no real shortage of Li, but of Li processing capacity… And, there are substitutes for Li in batteries, like sodium-ion. Not to mention, new battery chemistries keep coming… That’s simply not the case tungsten.

NOTE, mtu stands for metric tonne unit in tungsten pricing (mainly for APT or concentrates). It’s an industry convention for quoting prices per 10 kg of WO₃ content (WO3 = tungsten trioxide). Tungsten is traded based on contained WO3, so MTU makes pricing concentrates easier. Conversion: 1 metric tonne = 100 MTU (since 1 MTU = 10 kg).

Importantly, even if the tungsten price were to fall 50%, we still have a very robust post-tax NPV, IRR & payback period. At $1,500/mtu, post-tax NPV would be C$963M, IRR +78% and payback period just 1.2 years. Perhaps more important, upfront cap-ex is only C$124M.

Some readers don’t know Portugal and will default to worrying about social license to operate and slow permitting. What are mitigating factors to those concerns?

Yes a key concern of investors in the past was slow permitting. However, so far permitting in our region of Portugal has been easier than places like B.C. Canada, or many U.S. states. In January, we received our Environmental Impact Declaration (DIA), clearing a major permitting hurdle and enabling progression into detailed engineering & development.

Our flagship Borralha project is methodically advancing through Portugal’s mine licensing pathway under the Directorate-General for Energy and Geology (DGEG) and the Portuguese Environment Agency (APA). While there’s always risk of delays, we’re in a known, past-producing mining district, not a major tourist area. As you mentioned, there’s an urgency to develop long-term non-Chinese sources of tungsten.

Europe urgently wants more military metals, (NATO countries are upping defense spending to 5% of GDP, a very large increase) especially tungsten, and the U.S clearly wants tungsten as well. If Portugal could contribute valuable tungsten, that would contribute towards its 5% of GDP pledge.

Regarding social license to operate, again we’re in a past-producing mining district. Mining is in the cultural heritage of the entire region, everyone knows family & friends employed in the past, or currently, by mining companies. We are proactively sharing economic benefits (jobs, training, taxes, infrastructure buildouts, etc.)

Without naming names, what challenges do peer tungsten juniors face compared to Allied Critical’s prospects?

Good question. Look, outside of China there are a handful (but not dozens) of strong projects. Simply put, the problem is many are in highly remote parts of good countries like Canada & Australia, or in places that Western countries cannot reasonably rely upon like Kazakhstan. Also, many peers are 6-10 years from production.

Some of the projects around the world are not nearly as large as ours, and some do not offer pure-play tungsten leverage. Finally, not every project has local community support. That’s why we believe Allied Critical Metals has world-class, near-term, tungsten potential.

Please tell readers about your projects, what makes them stand out?

Borralha was historically the largest tungsten mine in Portugal. It’s just about an hour drive on a three-lane paved highway from the deep water port of Porto, is near an international airport, ~30 minutes from Portugal’s third largest city, and ~2.5 km from the largest electrical dam system in Portugal, (no oil/gas/diesel price concerns once up and running).

Not only is Borralha a large and growing resource, it’s high grade, and has wide intercepts, some in the 100s of meters. In January we received environmental permits, a huge de-risking event, and in March we delivered a robust PEA. Drilling this year could double the size of our already large resource.

Several generations in surrounding communities grew up mining tungsten at Borralha. We get calls daily from heavy equipment operators, electricians, skilled trades people who want to work in the mine when reopens. We have social license to operate, which is not always the case around the world.

We’re moving forward rapidly, but prudently. We hope to have small-scale pilot mining underway next year at our second project, Vila Verde, host of the historic Vale das Gatas mine (3rd largest tungsten producer in Portugal). It has 4–5 million tonnes of high-grade surface tailings/waste.

With a small plant costing under $10 million, we could be in production within 6-9 months after financing is arranged, possibly generating ~$40 million/yr. in revenue at current prices.Vila Verde is just 30–40 minutes from Borralha, so it shares the same world-class infrastructure.

Thank you Roy for your insightful comments. It seems the tungsten price outside of China is likely to remain very strong, even if it pulls back moderately (it has pulled back quite modestly). I look forward to more news on small-scale production starting in the next 6-9 months and the prospects for a much larger resource at Borralha.

Disclaimers

Allied Critical Metals is not a current or former client of Epstein Research [ER], and the Company did not pay for this CEO interview. Mr. Epstein of [ER] owns shares in the Company, acquired in the open market. Allied Critical Metals is a highly speculative junior mining company. Readers should do careful due diligence, in conjunction with trusted financial advisors, above and beyond reading the above commentary.

Troilus Mining (TSX: TLG) / (OTC: CHXMF) has a world class, growing, 13.0M oz gold (“Au”) / copper (“Cu”) project in Quebec with a May-2024 Feasibility Study on it. Funding news, a new resource estimate, and final permitting could be important investment catalysts.

The flagship Troilus project is on a past-producing site with reportedly over US$500Mof legacy infrastructure in place. Low-cost, clean, hydroelectric power has been secured. In addition to ample Au production, Troilus will be a meaningful source of future Cu supply for Canada. For more details on the project, see images, tables, maps, below.

I’m asked why it’s taking so long for Troilus to nail down the final details of a fully-funded project package (incl. coverage of possible cost overruns & working capital needs).

I don’t agree that it’s taking too long simply because the Company, led by CEO Justin Reid, is engaged in a methodical, prudent approach. This expanding, highly-talented team is weighing all options with the help of third-party financial professionals as needed.

Options on the table are debt, streaming and equity, with the possibility of partially pre-paid forward sales via off-take agreements, and the potential for government grants (neither pre-paid off-takes nor grants are a sure thing).

In my view, Troilus likely needs to raise ~US$1.5B (including a cash cushion). For those who think that’s a lot, it really is not that bad. Consider that management announced that up to US$1.2B could come from debt funding.

Yes, more equity is required, but it need not be issued all at once. Having said that, if strong investment groups (institutions, prominent investors, pension funds, natural resource groups, PE, etc.) want in, (on good terms for the Company), I imagine management would consider it. Lately, the Company has raised equity without warrants — a trend it hopes to continue.

Bottom line, Troilus is evaluating a range of financing alternatives, including debt, equity, streaming and off-take-linked structures, with the objective of securing an efficient and executable financing package, with targeted decisions expected this quarter.

Turning back to the debt component, management upsized its debt capacity estimate to US$1.2B due mostly to global inflationary pressures across all industrial sectors & jurisdictions. Presumably higher oil/gas/diesel prices for example.

As an aside, the weaker C$ vs. the US$ (from C$1.35 in the May 2024 Feasibility Study to C$1.415), is a modest tailwind.

In May 2024, Au/Cu prices were well below current levels, AND the Company’s market cap was far smaller. Investors understandably worried about debt funding. And, if enough debt capacity, at what price? I distinctly remember commentary from investors fearing 12%-15% debt with a large slug of equity warrants, when the share price was under C$0.35 vs. today’s C$1.67. Now, I believe sub-10% debt is likely.

In prior articles, I mentioned Skeena Gold & Silver refinancing its debt before producing a commercial ounce. Skeena’s bonds were priced at par ($100) with an 8.5% coupon. They now trade at $105, yielding 7.0%. Skeena’s valued at ~C$5 billion.

If Troilus were to follow Skeena’s timeline, it could possibly be in a position to issue corporate bonds (if it wanted to) in 18-24 months. I’m not suggesting this is the plan, but it speaks to the range of financing alternatives.

Finally, on streaming, I get asked if management is looking at streaming Au, silver or Cu. The answer is all of the above, or none. CEO Reid has financial experts continually assessing all streaming options.

Troilus would rather stream Au and/or silver if it can get a better deal than streaming Cu. It’s just math. If the proposed cost of capital for streaming comes in at an attractive level, management would likely monetize a small portion of metal(s) this way.

Investment pundits believe competition for metal streams from safe jurisdictions is high. It’s been widely reported for the past year that smelters are very interested in securing Cu concentrate. Notice that the Cu price has held up far better than Au, down just -5% from its ATH vs. Au -27%.

Spreading total cap-ex needs (+ cost overruns & working capital) across debt, streaming & equity (with possible off-takes and/or grants) is a wise move to maximize financial flexibility and lower risk.

Management has several initiatives underway to move the project forward in tandem with ongoing funding steps. Things like robust mine optimization studies, ordering long-lead time equipment, hiring new executives.

It has completed basic engineering, and mobilized detailed engineering/procurement teams with BBA (incl. 3D modeling, vendor selection, and infrastructure planning).

Management is advancing geotechnical work, site characterization, and early earthworks such as road relocations, deforestation, mobile crushers for aggregate, and pit de-watering. The company is expanding on-site infrastructure (increasing camp from 100 to 250 people, plus a septic system/kitchen for a 1,000-person peak workforce).

Now a word on drilling. Readers are typically not overly excited by infill drilling, but checks with industry players and comments from large shareholders suggest that drilling has been successful. And, management is doing more than just infill work, in my view there could be new discoveries down the road (but no guarantees).

Wide widths at under 1.0 g/t Au Eq. might not be SEXY, but the 13.0M oz existing resource is at 0.69 g/t Au Eq. So, the 150+ meters in two recent holes @ 0.95 g/t Au Eq. should (subject to more drilling) lead to a meaningful increase in the number of ounces.

How much might a fully-funded, fully-permitted Troilus Mining be worth? In my view, a lot more than today’s roughly C$860M. Compare Troilus to new producer Artemis Gold. Artemis is expected to produce ~280,000 very low-cost ounces this year. It’s valued at nearly C$8 billion.

If a producer is looking to acquire Troilus, it could presumably increase production above 300,000 oz/yr. As it stands, maximum production in year 7 is 536K Au Eq.

Importantly, I believe a C$10B+ producer (of which there are a few dozen, not incl. Chinese/Russian names) were to acquire Troilus, it could self-fund cap-ex (deployed over 2-3 years), allowing for a strong takeout price to be paid.

G2 Goldfields & Rupert Resources were recently acquired for over C$550/oz. I do not include them in the following table as they’re not low-grade, bulk tonnage plays. Note, they were earlier-stage then Troilus Mining (PEA/PFS, respectively) and were not fully-funded.

At the bottom of the table are three fully-funded juniors with an average EV/Au Eq. oz ratio of C$686/oz. By contrast, I estimate a pro forma, fully-funded Troilus might be valued at ~C$219/oz.

Although I remain bullish on Troilus Mining, there are plenty of risk factors to consider; permitting delays, lower metal prices, social license to operate, funding, construction delays, etc.

I believe the Company has made good progress since its May 2024 Feasibility Study, and that many risk factors appear to be under control. However, things can change. Metals/mining juniors, even in safe jurisdictions, are high-risk investment propositions.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Troilus Mining, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Troilus Mining are highly speculative and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. Readers assume and agree that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Troilus Mining was an advertiser on [ER], and Peter Epstein owned shares in the Company bought in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors, including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

Importantly, the factors that launched Au/Ag to all-time highs in January remain in place. Central bank buying — especially by China as it slowly but surely exits U.S. treasuries — paused briefly in some countries, but is picking up again.

Other key points include the related factors of extremely high debt levels (globally), currency debasement and rising inflation rates. We are in year six of a mined Ag supply deficit, with demand exceeding mined supply by ~160–200 million ounces.

If one is bullish on the medium-to-longer-term outlook for Au/Ag, junior miners with strong teams and solid projects in safe locations offer very significant upside potential, albeit with substantial investment risk. Undervalued, cashed-up juniors provide a degree of downside protection.

Surrounded by meaningful mines/projects, see Tuscarora in red…

Newly listed (March 2026) ICG Silver & Gold Ltd. (CSE:ICG) / (OTC: ICGSF) offers a compelling risk/reward proposition as typical junior miner risk is offset (somewhat) by a strong team, one of the world’s best jurisdictions (Nevada), a sizable land package, robust cash position, cheap valuation, and valuable historical database.

In today’s dollars, the value of the Company’s technical database, (5,000 samples, 130 line-kilometers of geophysics + other work) is estimated at C$15-$20M, exceeding the Company’s enterprise value. And, the replacement cost of 40,000+ meters of historical drilling in Nevada would be another C$20M+.

American Pacific Mining Corp., who ICG purchased the Tuscarora District Project (now 10,000 acres) from, invested over C$6M on soil/rock chip sampling, RC & core drilling, and CSAMT geophysics since 2018.

The district-scale Tuscarora District land package in NE Nevada sits at the intersection of the world-class Carlin and Independence Trends — two of Nevada’s most significant Au corridors.

Notably, the district is near substantial past-producing mines including; Jerritt Canyon (10 miles) and Midas (25 miles), and current producer Goldstrike (55 miles). Combined, Jerritt Canyon and Midas produced ~12M ounces Au + 27M ounces Ag.

Jerritt Canyon is an important factor as First Majestic Silver is bringing it back online next year. This is great news. It will attract regional infrastructure, workers, services and even more investor interest to NE Nevada.

ICG’s thesis proposes two overlapping epithermal systems — one Au-dominant, the other Ag-dominant — converging in a layered configuration that previous operators left mostly untested.

A Phase 1 3,000 meter RC drill program kicked off in July. It will consist of ~15 holes. The cost is ~C$1.5M vs. the Company’s cash balance of ~C$4M. Drill results should start by August, leading to a maiden resource estimate in 1Q/27. Management has identified six high priority targets. Five have never seen modern drilling.

Pres./CEO/Dir. Steven Sirbovan commented,

“Commencing our first drill program at the Tuscarora District is a major milestone for ICG, marking the transition from district-scale compilation/target generation –> to active exploration.”

Korbon McCall, VP Exploration added, “Phase 1 drilling will allow us to test multiple shallow silver-gold targets and collect geological data to refine our district-scale model. Our objective is to assess geological controls and prioritize the strongest targets for subsequent drilling.”

The Central Zone is the backbone of the project. It will see ~80% of Phase 1 drilling, mainly on the Silica, Battle Mountain, Modoc, and King’s Vein targets. Management wants to see how those targets interact with South Navajo, where there’s a good understanding of the mineralization as it’s on trend with the historical Dexter Pit.

South Navajo hosts high-to-very-grade gold. As a reminder, Novo Resources drilled it in 2016, returning a remarkable 4.6 m of 127 g/t gold.

Battle Mountain is a new target acquired as part of a new claims block a few months ago, which also came with a historical database. Acquiring land with data has been a focus for ICG, adding to mineralized inventory before the drill bit has even turned.

The other 20% will be spent on the East Zone, (East Pediment & Grand Prize) where there has been meaningful historical drilling, sampling, and geophysics, but no modern drilling.

The East Zone is considered more prominent for silver. In 1997 Newcrest Resources drilled a hole at East Pediment that delivered 1.5 m of 367 g/t silver + 52 g/t gold. If drilling goes well, the team will consider expanding the campaign.

The West Zone is a newer acquisition with significant blue-sky potential. It appears to be a different system, potentially Carlin-style with bulk-tonnage characteristics. It includes the Beard Hill & Dacite targets. The Company recently completed geophysics there that shows promising features feeding known targets.

Integration of the expanded database into VRIFY visualization software has been completed. CEO Steven Sirbovan makes a big deal about the new VRIFY model. I agree with his enthusiasm. It’s important as it allows management to visualize every drill hole on the Project, bringing the opportunity to life for investors & potential strategic investors.

For example, at South Navajo, one can see a strike length of ~1.2 km by 325 m, with high-grade intercepts including; 4.6 m of 12.7 g/t gold, 18 m of > 1 g/t, and ~14 m of ~2.5 g/t). I encourage readers to watch this very recent investor webinar that nicely describes BOTH the imminent drill program, and the VRIFY model.

Mineralization remains open along strike and at depth. At Modoc and Silica, surface geochemistry aligns well with drilling. King’s Vein is an un-drilled target that looks structurally fed from depth. The East Zone targets are shallow and ready for follow-up. The West Zone remains largely untested but shows strong potential.

ICG has 43.2M shares outstanding, zero debt and ~10M warrants/options struck at C$0.50, so 54M fully-diluted shares. At C$0.42, the fully-diluted enterprise value ~C$13M, quite low for an open pit + underground prospect in Nevada.

To reiterate, there are multiple promising, untested new & existing Ag/Au targets, and considerable cash in the bank. In my view, ICG Silver & Gold has a tremendous team for a sub-C$15M junior.

CEO Sirbovan is a capital markets professional with 13+ years’ experience in Investment Banking, Private Equity & Investor Relations, focused on sub-$100M companies. He has led public & private financings, M&A, and corp. advisory work on 100+ transactions.

Earlier, he worked as an analyst at Waterton Global Resource Management, evaluating metals and mining projects across Nevada & Arizona. Steven is surrounded by a strong team including Exec. Chair Jeff Swinoga.

Mr. Swinoga is a CPA & MBA with 25+ years’ experience in capital markets, project development and mine construction. He held senior roles at Barrick (7 years), First Mining, Torex Gold, and Hudbay Minerals. He was recently Pres./CEO/Dir. of Exploits Discovery Corp.

VP Exploration Korbon McCall, Founder of McCall Geosciences, LLC, is an experienced geologist, with a project development background, focused on the western U.S.

Gary Baschuk is Dir. & Senior Technical Advisor. He brings 40+ years’ experience as a geologist, mining analyst, & investment banker, including 13 years with Barrick at the Goldstrike complex in Nevada. His focus is on small to midsized precious metal juniors.

The Ag angle is an important opportunity for ICG. Despite weakness of late, Ag has nearly tripled since 3Q/2024. Historical sampling and drill results showed pockets of strong Ag, but the focus was always on Au. Note the rock chip sample grades above, up to 37,820 g/t Ag, and 11 samples > 1,000 g/t Ag.

I believe ICG Silver & Gold Ltd. (CSE:ICG) is undervalued vs. the following Nevada-focused juniors. Assuming the Company can deliver 500,000 Au Eq. ounces in an MRE, (with a longer-term goal of 1M+ ounces), ICG trades at a prospective C$27/oz. vs. peers at C$103/oz.

Comparing a pre-MRE company to these more advanced, (but still early-stage), peers would be aggressive if not for ICG’s roughly C$4M in cash, enough to take it through delivery of a MRE in 1q/27.

Large players in Nevada include; Newmont, Barrick, AngloGold Ashanti, and Kinross, as well as royalty/streaming giants like Franco-Nevada, Wheaton Precious Metals and Royal Gold.

Mid-tiers include; Coeur Mining, Equinox Gold, Hecla Mining, SSR Mining, I-80 Gold, McEwen Inc., Orla Mining, and Torex Gold. Integra Resources. Hycroft Mining and First Majestic have meaningful precious metal assets in Nevada.

I believe a tsunami of global M&A — especially of U.S. projects — will lift valuations across the board. Recent acquisitions of G2 Goldfields (PEA-stage) by G Mining Ventures, and Rupert Resources (PFS) by Newmont, were done at eye-popping levels above C$500/oz.

Therefore, the timing is ideal for ICG Silver & Gold Ltd (CSE: ICG) / (OTC: ICGSF) to deliver a MRE in 1Q/27, when precious metal prices and junior miner valuations *could be* stronger. Today’s C$13M, fully-diluted enterprise value could be a distant memory if drilling goes well.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER] ) about ICG Silver & Gold, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of ICG Silver & Gold are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, ICG Silver & Gold was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company, acquired in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector, or investment topic.

How high grade? The best drill interval last year was 16.6 m @ > 15.1% Cu Eq. (March 2025). Importantly, that was far from a one-hit wonder. Last month a slightly better (width x grade) interval was announced, 22.0 m of 11.5% Cu Eq. Please note, Cu Eq. grades differ over time depending on relative metal prices when holes are assayed.

The simple average width of these top eight intercepts is 23.7 meters, at an average 10.1% Cu Eq. The weighted average Cu Eq. grade is 9.3%. Understandably, management is excited that three of the top eight results since 2024 were from May 2026.

See latest corporate presentation here.

Analysts suggest the current resource estimate at Lion alone could be 7–14 million tonnes @ 4.5–7.0% Cu Eq., with ~40% Cu, ~45% platinum/palladium, ~10% gold, and ~5% silver.

Earlier this year, management reported a metallurgical breakthrough that the market largely ignored. Locked-cycle tests from SGS delivered ~95% preliminary recoveries vs. the Company’s 80% assumption.

On an objective, industry-benchmark basis, preliminary recoveries in January were world-class for poly-metallic sulphide systems. Near 99% Cu, and 94–97% palladium/platinum sits at, or above, the high end of ranges.

Management believes production is possible within five years. Initial, preliminary, metrics suggest a smaller, faster, high-return scenario. While five years could be deemed aggressive, NISK/Lion is in Quebec, not at 4,500+ meter elevation in S. America or in Russia, Mongolia, or Africa.

CEO Terry Lynch a thought leader in junior mining space

NISK/Lon has good community and First Nation support (James Bay Cree), is very near low-cost hydroelectric power, and has ample access to water, workers, services, and equipment. CEO Terry Lynch envisions roughly two years of permitting and two of construction.

Having strong metallurgy and very high grades in Quebec as opposed to places like Siberia, Russia (Norilsk), South Africa (Platreef) or the DRC (Kamoa-Kakula) is an added bonus. When pundits talk about the next few decades of Cu/PGM/Ni discoveries, they point to Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, and Zambia. I prefer Quebec.

Many lower-grade, much larger, Cu-heavy projects have upfront cap-ex burdens well over a billion dollars, post-tax IRRs under 20%, and ratios of post-tax NPV to cap-ex near 1.0x. With Lion’s monster grades, I believe (not necessarily the views of management) Power Metallic’s NPV/cap-ex ratio will be at least 2x, and its IRR at least 35-40%.

Readers can run scenarios (using estimated grades, throughput, recoveries, metal prices, capital intensity, etc.) through ChatGPT, GROK, and Claude, but the December PEA will deliver definitive results.

Backers of Power Metallic include legendary mine finders/builders Robert Friedland, Rob McEwen, Gina Rinehart & Eric Sprott. Billionaires like these, (reportedly 16 in total), have expert teams that conduct extensive due diligence. NISK/Lion has been, and continues to be, carefully vetted.

Near-term investment catalysts include; drill results from an ongoing 100,000 meter program, a maiden resource estimate (“MRE“) in July/August, a PEA in December, and a possible NASDAQ listing in Sept./Oct. The NASDAQ listing could trigger index & ETF buying of Power Metallic shares.

The fully-funded, 100,000 meter drill program has been a major success. Shallow drilling is going well, especially in the Lion zone where most of the work has been done. In addition to blockbuster intervals, infill drilling is showing robust continuity. As mentioned, the best result to date is 22.0 m @ 11.5% Cu Eq.

Four targets (Tiger Deep, Elephant, NISK West and Hinge/Hydro) point to the likelihood of a district-scale project. And, new discoveries are quite possible, some might say expected (eventually). Even without new discoveries, management believes NISK/Lion is large enough, and growing, to be a standalone mine. Bring on the PEA!

On May 26th, positive metallurgy on low-grade disseminated zones (98.3% Cu recovery) was announced. This is important as it enables lower cut-offs and more tonnage in the upcoming MRE & PEA.

New to the Power Metallic story is a partnership with Adion Technologies for borehole muon tomography imaging. What is that? Cosmic rays pass through the earth, but metals have different densities that impact the speed rays travel through them. Copper & PGMs are denser than surrounding materials. That contrast is detectable.

After a MRE this Summer and a PEA at year end, I believe Power Metallic could land a strategic partner. To be clear, unlike most juniors, it might not need one. The Company is cashed up, it just raised C$28M, and has a 16-member billionaires club backing it. What types of investors might care?

Sovereign Wealth Funds, trading companies (Glencore, Trafigura, etc.). Private Equity (Blackstone, KKR, etc.), Japanese/Korean conglomerates (Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui & Co, POSCO, etc.), and traditional miners (Teck Resources, HudBay Minerals, First Quantum, etc.).

Given Power Metallic’s enterprise value of just ~C$240M, dozens of groups could/should care about a world-class, low cap-ex, high IRR, poly-metallic project in Quebec, Canada. Several of the billionaire shareholders could fund help NISK/Lion themselves, or make key introductions to numerous interested parties.

A quick mention of Saudi Arabia, where the Company has potentially valuable assets. Smart money is invested there, some making large bets. Names like Friedland, McEwen, Rinehart & Anil Agarwal, among the world’s best mine finders/builders/financiers.

They look everywhere on earth for juicy projects, yet are excited about wildly under-explored Saudi Arabia. Power Metallic holds 100% of the ~200 km² Jabal Baudan exploration license in the prospective Jabal Sayid VMS belt (~150 km south of Jeddah).

The land package is prospective for Cu-Au-Zn, near the world-class Jabal Sayid mine. A May 2026 JV with Amaar United Mining Co. provides a highly scalable 50/50 platform for future license auctions. Power Metallic will act as technical lead/operator; Amaar will deliver local coordination, connections & investment.

The JV is highlighted by an initial US$10M work program (Power Metallic $2.5M, Amaar $7.5M), going to 50/50 thereafter. Jabal Baudan is prudently advancing via modern geophysics & reconnaissance toward drilling.

NISK/Lion is by far the main focus, but could Saudi Arabia become a meaningful (valuable) asset later this decade? I think it could, and investors get that option for FREE.

Most Cu-heavy juniors like Power Metallic Mines (TSX-v: PNPN) / (OTCQX: PNPNF) have been sold off along with Au/Ag juniors, yet Cu is just 7% from its ATH, while Au/Ag are down 39%/52%.

This makes no sense. Especially for Power Metallic, that has delivered game-changing metallurgical news & drill intervals, and has impactful news coming (more drill results, MRE, Nasdaq listing, PEA).

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Power Metallic Mines, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Power Metallic Mines are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Power Metallic Mines was an advertiser on [ER] and Peter Epstein owned shares in the company.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

It would be hard to overstate the insatiable demand for copper (“Cu“) in the coming decades. It’s critically important for EVs, clean power, new/refurbished electrical grids, AI/data centers, military/defense, robotics (humanoids), etc. Even though demand isn’t growing by more than 4%/yr., supply simply can’t keep up.

Mining legend Robert Friedland, and others, point out that we need something like five new Escondidas (world’s largest Cu mine) each year, yet we’re discovering virtually none. And, even if new giants were found tomorrow, it would take 15-20 years to commercialize them.

Over a decade of serious underinvestment in exploration/development means there’s no way around a very tight Cu market well into the 2030s. There simply are not enough Major (advanced-stage) development projects in the pipeline.

Readers may be hearing about very strong growth in Battery Energy Storage Systems (“BESS“). All of that growth requires cabling, inverters, motors, transformers, harnesses, and other Cu-intensive infrastructure. Solar farms also require a lot of Cu, and I think solar deployment could surprise to the upside as panel costs have plummeted.

Well positioned Cu juniors, even early stage ones, are going to be scooped up by producers, who themselves will be acquired by Majors like Glencore, Freeport McMoRan, and Codelco. Interestingly, the Cu price is down just 7% from its ATH, while Au/Ag are down 38%/52%. Many well-positioned Cu-heavy juniors are oversold, some meaningfully oversold.

Algo Grande Copper Corp. (TSX-V: ALGR) (OTCQB: ALGRF) is advancing a high-grade​ copper-silver-gold skarn discovery in the heart of Sonora, Mexico – one of the world’s premier​ copper & silver jurisdictions.​

Backed by strong historic drilling, shallow high-grade mineralization, and district-scale upside,​ the project is emerging as a compelling skarn system with significant blue-sky porphyry​ potential at depth. Cu hits incl. 16.15 m @ 1.97%, 69.25 m / 1.29%, and 47.6 m / 1.05%.

Importantly, those intercepts are not deep, they’re from 36 to 224 meters down hole. And, these results are not at 4,500+ meter elevations in S. America, but in prolific mining jurisdiction Sonora, Mexico.

As global demand for Cu accelerates, Algo Grande is positioned at the intersection of near-surface discovery potential, with the opportunity to find a much larger porphyry Cu system below.

In addition to high-grade Cu, Algo enjoys historical intervals of 0.7 to 6.3 meters of 1.1 to 3.1 g/t Au and 94 to 398 g/t Ag. These Au/Ag grades were largely ignored a few years ago when precious metal prices were much lower. Now, they are a notable and possibly under appreciated attribute.

Recent drilling (Feb. 2026) returned promising intervals incl. 1.8 m of 151 g/t Ag, and 3.5 m of 61 g/t Ag. As a by-product, 61 to 151 g/t Ag is meaningful. If/when Ag rebounds, (it topped US$121/oz in January vs. $60 today), each troy ounce becomes more increasingly important. The same is true for prospective Au credits upon a rebound in Au.

Algo Grande has a very tight capital structure, ~49M fully-diluted shares (~40% held by insiders & strategic investors, ~10% by institutions). It has secured 100% ownership of the Adelita Project, a district-scale Cu-Ag-Au play in one of the world’s premier Cu belts.

The December 2025 acquisition was sourced by the legendary, Mexico-focused, CRD/skarn expert, geo Peter Megaw (best known for co-founding MAG Silver and its world-class Juanicipio project, one of the highest-grade projects globally).

Projects like Adelita stand out as the type of asset that should attract strategic interest from Major and mid-tier mining groups. Sonora is home to some of the world’s largest Cu operations, yet deposits grading north of 1% Cu are relatively rare.

Sonora hosts some of the largest mining companies in Latin America, including Grupo México (through Southern Copper), Industrias Peñoles, and Fresnillo plc — all of which maintain significant regional operations plus infrastructure.

Mexico is also a key jurisdiction for major producers such as Agnico Eagle, Alamos Gold, Pan American Silver, First Majestic, Coeur Mining, Capstone Copper., Orla Mining, Torex Gold Resources, Fortuna Mining, and Endeavour Silver.

Most of these names are not Cu producers. However, as Barrick Mining & Newmont continue to expand into Cu, others will follow. Zijin Mining, Harmony Gold, Coeur, and Eldorado Gold are now pursuing Cu.

Yes, Adelita is early-stage, but modestly de-risked via ~7,000 m of historical drilling, a small campaign in February, multiple high-grade Cu intercepts, and a substantial geological, geochemical and geophysical dataset. DON’T FORGET, SUBSTANTIAL AU/AG GRADES, and the newly started 8,000 m campaign.

The Project is near regional infrastructure; roads, smelters, power, a deep-sea port, water, workers, mining services. Combining that with Sonora Mexico’s efficient permitting, creates a lower risk operating environment.

While nearby producers have lower grade Cu, Adelita routinely delivers 1%+ Cu, (plus meaningful Au/Ag), making it highly strategic for those seeking higher-grade feed to blend in their mills.

Two porphyry targets add district-scale depth potential. Management’s strategy prioritizes expansion of the known high-grade skarn, while methodically testing the broader corridor.

Subject to more work, a maiden resource estimate next year, supported by strong historical metallurgy, (greater than 80% recovery of Cu, Ag, Ag) could underpin a fairly high-margin underground operation with relatively low upfront cap-ex.

This near-surface, high-grade material makes Adelita an attractive acquisition or JV target. Yet, management is cashed up with no need to sell or partner anywhere near the current valuation.

Geological vectors including a strong resistivity anomaly beneath the skarn, increasing molybdenum concentrations, and improving grades in deeper historical intervals point to a classic porphyry feeder system.

If we could get confirmation of a significant porphyry, that could trigger a re-rating in the valuation as investors would see substantial blue-sky potential.

Successful drilling in June/July could transform Adelita from a high-grade skarn target, to a district-scale Cu-Ag-Au asset. Phase II exploration is advancing that story. Results should start to come back by August.

Development flexibility enhances the investment case. Option A: advance toward an underground mine leveraging high grades & strong metallurgy. Option B: position the asset for sale or JV.

A direct-shipping ore (“DSO”) scenario is also plausible, trucking high-grade material to nearby processing facilities for earlier cash flow, and far less upfront cap-ex, while drilling continues.

Algo Grande Copper (TSX-V: ALGR) / (OTCQB: KNDYF) presents a compelling new story in a Top-tier jurisdiction during a global commodities boom driven by mined Cu shortages with no end in sight.

A combination of high-grade skarn (near-surface, expandable), district-scale potential, a strong technical team, pristine capital structure, elevated Ag/Au grades, talks with possible strategic partners, and drilling, positions the Company for an impactful 2H 2026.

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Algo Grande Copper, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Algo Grande Copper are highly speculative, and not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Algo Copper was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned no shares in the company, but may acquire shares in the open market.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.

The IEA projects Co demand will rise from 213,000 tonnes in 2023 to 344,00 by 2030. The Co sulphate market specifically is forecast to grow ~5%/yr. through the mid- 2030s. That’s half or a third the rate of Li demand, but better than copper.

Electra’s Battery Materials Complex (“BMC“) has a third-party (Hatch) estimated replacement cost of US$250M, (in my view, it might be closer to US$300M, as the assessment is approaching three years old, and inflationary pressures have been significant).

Importantly, it would take over five years to find a site, plan, fund, PERMIT, build, and commission a new facility like Electra’s. Compare Hatch’s US$250M valuation to Electra’s market cap of ~US$74M (US$0.57/shr.).

All eyes have been on the Middle East, but a critically important second-order effect is deteriorating relations between China & the West. As the bifurcation between East & West grows, having strategic assets in safe, prolific jurisdictions like Canada & the U.S. is increasingly important.

Electra’s BMC is on a sizable industrial site that could (subject to more studies & investment capital) host other operations, most notably black mass recycling and nickel sulfate production. That’s likely 2028 or 2029 business, for now the main focus is Co sulfate.

In my opinion, the optionality of being able to expand into new cash flowing segments has tangible value. These segments, if deemed attractive and viable, are not 6-8 years away, more like 2-4 years. In the following interview of CEO Trent Mell, I ask about the latest happenings at Electra, and the significant interest in the Company’s refinery.

Trent, you travel regularly to Washington D.C. and elsewhere in the U.S. What are the primary goals of these visits?

Our focus is on building relationships with policymakers, government agencies, strategic partners and other key stakeholders in the critical minerals space.

Electra is developing infrastructure that directly supports North American supply chain resilience. It’s essential that we stay engaged with decision-makers in both Canada and the U.S. Our visits help us communicate the strategic importance of domestic refining, understand policy priorities, and explore potential partnerships.

On June 8th a PR announced a study looking into a nickel refinery in the southeastern U.S. Please explain this initiative.

The nickel refinery study is part of Electra’s longer-term growth pipeline. The work will evaluate the technical requirements, capital intensity, and potential development pathways for a domestic nickel refining operation in the southeastern U.S.

The proposed facility is an opportunity to leverage expertise gained through the development of our cobalt refinery. Importantly, this is a study-stage initiative, not a final investment decision. Our cobalt refinery remains the Company’s top priority.

For the past few years, your team has said Electra’s cobalt sulfate refinery will be the first in North America. Is that still the case? Has the outlook for cobalt sulfate changed?

Yes. Electra continues to describe the Ontario refinery as N. America’s first, and currently only, cobalt sulfate refinery. The strategic rationale remains intact; North America still has limited domestic refining capacity for battery-grade cobalt sulfate.

Yet, demand for secure, responsibly-sourced critical minerals remains crucial for batteries, energy storage, defense and advanced manufacturing.

Can you comment on funding status? Is Electra fully funded through initial production, but will need to raise US$15M for commissioning? Could some of the US$15M come from non-equity sources?

Electra has a defined construction plan and has secured significant funding support, including government backing, to advance the cobalt refinery. The Company has also disclosed that additional capital may be required for commissioning plus working capital.

Future funding could potentially include government or other financial support. We will continue to evaluate the most attractive funding sources, including non-equity sources where appropriate, while remaining focused on minimizing dilution and advancing the refinery toward commissioning.

At a 30,000-foot level, what is your impression of relations between the U.S. and China? How serious is the U.S. about sourcing critical materials outside of China?

Good question. Critical minerals have become a strategic priority for the U.S. The issue is no longer only about EVs, it’s about energy security, defense readiness, advanced manufacturing and economic security. The U.S. is taking supply chain diversification seriously because processing capacity for many critical minerals remains highly concentrated offshore.

From Electra’s perspective, that creates a clear need for North American refining infrastructure that can provide secure, transparent and allied sources of battery materials.

LG Energy Solution has secured 60% of the refinery’s output for the initial five years. What type of end users might care on the remaining 40%? Auto OEMs? Battery makers? Defense companies? The U.S. government?

The remaining capacity could be relevant to several categories of customers and stakeholders. Battery manufacturers and automotive OEMs are obvious candidates because cobalt sulfate remains an important input for certain lithium-ion battery chemistries.

We also see potential interest from energy storage, defense and advanced manufacturing supply chains where secure, traceable, North American-refined material will be in high demand. The 40% uncommitted capacity gives Electra commercial flexibility and potential exposure to market upside.

What’s the latest thinking on black mass recycling, a business segment that’s been carefully studied by your team?

Black mass recycling remains part of Electra’s longer-term strategy, but the cobalt refinery is the priority. Electra completed a Feasibility-level Class 3 engineering study for a modular battery recycling facility adjacent to the Ontario refinery, designed to recover lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite from manufacturing scrap and end-of-life batteries.

The next phase involves further technical work to simulate commercial-scale throughput, supported in part by Natural Resources Canada. The strategic value is clear: recovered cobalt could feed directly into the adjacent cobalt refinery, creating a more integrated domestic battery materials loop.

Why should readers consider buying shares of Electra Battery Materials, why not wait for further de-risking?

Electra has a permitted refinery under construction, a strategic customer in LG Energy Solution, backed by the Canadian and U.S. governments, and a defined role in North America’s critical minerals supply chain. Investors who wait for further de-risking may get more certainty, but may miss part of the value creation opportunity.

Value derived by construction progress, commissioning, commercial execution and future growth opportunities in recycling and nickel refining. Electra is building strategic refining infrastructure at a time when North America is actively trying to reduce reliance on offshore processing.

Thank you Trent, as always very insightful commentary on battery materials. The strong demand and urgent need for long-term, secure N. American supply of cobalt sulfate and other key materials is becoming more clear by the day. Canada will be a leader.

Owing hard assets, highly strategic ones that are very difficult (time + cost) to replicate, should serve Electra Battery Materials well. I look forward to reporting on further de-risking of the Company!

Disclosures/disclaimers: The content of this article is for information only. Readers fully understand and agree that nothing contained herein, written by Peter Epstein of Epstein Research [ER], (together, [ER]) about Electra Battery Materials, including but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts, calculations, etc. is not to be considered implicit or explicit investment advice. Nothing contained herein is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security. [ER] is not responsible under any circumstances for investment actions taken by the reader. [ER] has never been, and is not currently, a registered or licensed financial advisor or broker/dealer, investment advisor, stockbroker, trader, money manager, compliance or legal officer, and does not perform market-making activities. [ER] is not directly employed by any company, group, organization, party, or person. The shares of Electra Battery Materials are highly speculative, not suitable for all investors. Readers understand and agree that investments in small-cap stocks can result in a 100% loss of invested funds. It is assumed and agreed upon by readers that they will consult with their own licensed or registered financial advisors before making investment decisions.

At the time this article was posted, Electra Battery Materials was an advertiser on [ER]. Peter Epstein owned shares in the company.

Readers understand and agree that they must conduct due diligence above and beyond reading this article. While the author believes he’s diligent in screening out companies that, for any reason whatsoever, are unattractive investment opportunities, he cannot guarantee that his efforts will (or have been) successful. [ER] is not responsible for any perceived, or actual, errors including, but not limited to, commentary, opinions, views, assumptions, reported facts & financial calculations, or for the completeness of this article or future content. [ER] is not expected or required to subsequently follow or cover events & news, or write about any particular company or topic. [ER] is not an expert in any company, industry sector or investment topic.